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+{"text":" \nNeuro\nNeuro\n\nThe New Brain Sciences and the Management of the Mind\n\nNikolas Rose and Joelle M. Abi-Rached\n\nPRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS\n\nPrinceton and Oxford\nCopyright \u00a9 2013 by Princeton University Press\n\nPublished by Princeton University Press, 41 William Street, Princeton, New Jersey 08540\n\nIn the United Kingdom: Princeton University Press, 6 Oxford Street, Woodstock, Oxfordshire OX20 1TW\n\npress.princeton.edu\n\nCover image: Joan Mir\u00f3 (1893\u20131983), _Head of a Catalan Peasant_ , 1925. Oil on canvas.\n\nMus\u00e9e National d'Art Moderne, Centre Pompidou, Paris. Peter Willi \/ The Bridgeman Art Library.\n\n\u00a9 2012 Successi\u00f3 Mir\u00f3 \/ Artists Rights Society (ARS), New York \/ ADAGP, Paris.\n\nReproduction, including downloading of Joan Mir\u00f3 works is prohibited by copyright laws and international conventions without the express written permission of Artists Rights Society (ARS), New York.\n\nAll Rights Reserved\n\nLibrary of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data\n\nRose, Nikolas S.\n\nNeuro : the new brain sciences and the management of the mind \/ Nikolas Rose and Joelle M. Abi-Rached.\n\np. cm.\n\nIncludes bibliographical references and index.\n\nISBN 978-0-691-14960-8 (hardcover : alk. paper) \u2014 ISBN 978-0-691-14961-5\n\n(pbk. : alk. paper) 1. Neuropsychology. I. Abi-Rached, Joelle M., 1979\u2013 II. Title.\n\nQP360.R655 2013\n\n612.8\u2014dc23 2012023222\n\nBritish Library Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available\n\nThis book has been composed in Minion Pro and Ideal Sans\n\nPrinted on acid-free paper. \u221e\n\nPrinted in the United States of America\n\n10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1\nFor Diana, as always.  \nNR\n\nFor my parents, May and Maroun.  \nJAR\nContents | Acknowledgments _ix_\n\n---|---  \n|\n\nAbbreviations _xi_\n\n|\n\n**Introduction _1_**  \nBeyond Cartesianism? _3_  \nGoverning through the Brain _6_  \nOur Argument _9_  \nHuman Science? _23_\n\nOne | **The Neuromolecular Brain _25_**  \nHow Should One Do the History of the Neurosciences? _28_  \nInfrastructure _38_  \nA Neuromolecular Style of Thought _41_  \nEnter Plasticity _47_  \nA Neuromolecular and Plastic Brain _51_\n\nTwo | **The Visible Invisible _53_**  \nThe Clinical Gaze _55_  \nInscribed on the Body Itself _56_  \nOpen Up a Few Brains _61_  \nSeeing the Living Brain _65_  \nThe Epidemiology of Visualization _74_  \nThe New Engines of Brain Visualization _80_\n\nThree | **What's Wrong with Their Mice? _82_**  \nArtificiality? _85_  \nModels1, _Models 2, Models3, Models4_ (and _Possibly Models 5_) _92_  \nThe Specificity of the Human _102_  \nTranslation _104_  \nLife as Creation _108_\n\nFour | **All in the Brain? _110_**  \nTo Define True Madness _113_  \nThe Burden of Mental Disorder _125_  \nAll in the Brain? _130_  \nNeuropsychiatry and the Dilemmas of Diagnosis _137_\n\nFive | **The Social Brain _141_**  \nThe \"Social Brain Hypothesis\" _143_  \nPathologies of the Social Brain _148_  \nSocial Neuroscience _151_  \nSocial Neuroscience beyond Neuroscience _156_  \nGoverning Social Brains _160_\n\nSix | **The Antisocial Brain _164_**  \nEmbodied Criminals _167_  \nInside the Living Brain _173_  \nNeurolaw? _177_  \nThe Genetics of Control _180_  \nNipping Budding Psychopaths in the Bud _190_  \nSculpting the Brain in Those Incredible Years _192_  \nGoverning Antisocial Brains _196_\n\nSeven | **Personhood in a Neurobiological Age _199_**  \nThe Challenged Self _202_  \nFrom the Pathological to the Normal _204_  \nThe Self: From Soul to Brain _213_  \nA Mutation in Ethics and Self-Technologies? _219_  \nCaring for the Neurobiological Self _223_\n\nConclusion | **Managing Brains, Minds, and Selves _225_**  \nA Neurobiological Complex _225_  \nBrains In Situ? _227_  \nCoda: The Human Sciences in a Neurobiological Age _232_\n\nAppendix | How We Wrote This Book _235_\n\n|\n\nNotes _237_\n\n|\n\nReferences _277_\n\n|\n\nIndex _325_\nAcknowledgments\n\nThis book arises from research funded by the United Kingdom's Economic and Social Research Council in the form of a three-year professorial research fellowship to Nikolas Rose (grant number RES-051-27-0194), and we are happy to acknowledge this support and the opportunities that it provided. We have also benefited greatly from the work with our colleagues in the European Neuroscience and Society Network (ENSN), funded by the European Science Foundation (ESF), and the numerous events organized by this network that bring researchers from the human sciences together with leading neuroscience researchers in the spirit of critical friendship within which we have written this book: thanks to Trudy Dehue, Giovanni Frazzetto, Cornelius Gross, Ilpo Hel\u00e9n, Kenneth Hugdahl, Ilse Kryspin-Exner, Klaus-Peter Lesch, Linsey McGoey, Cordula Nitsch, Jo\u00e3o Arriscado Nunes, Andreas Roepstorff, Ilina Singh, and Scott Vrecko. We would also like to acknowledge our lively conversations with Francisco Ortega and Fernando Vidal, and to thank as well the many members of the international network of social scientists working in the field of neuroscience for so many productive discussions on its social dimensions. The research for this book was carried out within the wonderfully supportive community of the BIOS Research Centre at the London School of Economics, who also helped with organization of the final \"Brain, Self, and Society\" conference and follow-up workshop, \"Personhood in a Neurobiological Age,\" held in London on September 13\u201314, 2010: special thanks go to Btihaj Ajana, Valentina Amorese, Rachel Bell, Astrid Christoffersen-Deb, Megan Clinch, Caitlin Connors, Des Fitzgerald, Amy Hinterberger, John MacArtney, Sara Tocchetti, and our excellent administrator Victoria Dyas and outstanding manager, Sabrina Fernandez. We also wish to thank our editorial team at Princeton University Press for their support for this book and their careful work on our text.\nAbbreviations\n\nAD: | Alzheimer's disease\n\n---|---\n\nADHD: | attention deficit hyperactivity disorder\n\nAPA: | American Psychiatric Association\n\nAPIRE: | American Psychiatric Institute for Research and Education\n\nBNA: | British Neuroscience Association\n\nBOLD: | blood-oxygen-level-dependent (contrast imaging)\n\nBPD: | bipolar disorder (sometimes termed \"manic depression\")\n\nBRA: | Brain Research Association\n\nCaltech: | California Intitute of Technology\n\nCNRS: | Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (France)\n\nCNVs: | copy number variations\n\nCT scan: | Computerized tomography (formerly computerized axial tomography or CAT scan)\n\nDALYs: | disability adjusted life years\n\n_DSM_ : | _Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders_\n\nDSPD: | dangerous and severe personality disorder\n\nEBC: | European Brain Council\n\nECNP: | European College of Neuropsychopharmacology\n\nEEG: | electroencephalography\n\nENSN: | European Neuroscience and Society Network\n\nESF: | European Science Foundation\n\nESRC: | Economic and Social Research Council (U.K.)\n\nFDA: | Food and Drug Administration (U.S.)\n\nfMRI: | functional magnetic resonance imaging\n\nGWAS: | genome-wide association studies\n\nIBRO: | International Brain Research Organization\n\nICD: | International Classification of Diseases\n\nLSD: | lysergic acid diethylamide\n\nMAOA: | monoamine oxidase A\n\nMCI: | mild cognitive impairment\n\nMIT: | Massachusetts Institute of Technology\n\nMRC: | Medical Research Council (U.K.)\n\nMRI: | magnetic resonance imaging\n\nNESARC: | National Epidemiologic Survey on Alcohol and Related Conditions (U.S.)\n\nNGBRI: | not guilty by reason of insanity\n\nNHS: | National Health Service (U.K.)\n\nNIDA: | National Institute on Drug Abuse (U.S.)\n\nNIH: | National Institutes of Health (U.S.)\n\nNIMH: | National Institute of Mental Health (U.S.)\n\nNMR: | nuclear magnetic resonance\n\nNRP: | Neurosciences Research Program (U.S.)\n\n_OED_ : | _Oxford English Dictionary_\n\nPET: | positron emission tomography\n\nRSA: | Royal Society for the Encouragement of Arts, Manufactures and Commerce (U.K.)\n\nSfN: | Society for Neuroscience\n\nSNPs: | single nucleotide polymorphisms (pronounced \"snips\")\n\nSPECT: | single photon emission computed tomography\n\nSSRI: | selective serotonin receptor inhibitor\n\nUC Berkeley: | University of California, Berkeley\n\nUCLA: | University of California, Los Angeles\n\nWHO: | World Health Organization\n\nYLDs: | years lived with disability\nNeuro\n**Introduction**\n\nWhat kind of beings do we think we are? This may seem a philosophical question. In part it is, but it is far from abstract. It is at the core of the philosophies we live by. It goes to the heart of how we bring up our children, run our schools, organize our social policies, manage economic affairs, treat those who commit crimes or whom we deem mentally ill, and perhaps even how we value beauty in art and life. It bears on the ways we understand our own feelings and desires, narrate our biographies, think about our futures, and formulate our ethics. Are we spiritual creatures, inhabited by an immaterial soul? Are we driven by instincts and passions that must be trained and civilized by discipline and the inculcation of habits? Are we unique among the animals, blessed or cursed with minds, language, consciousness, and conscience? Are we psychological persons, inhabited by a deep, interior psyche that is shaped by experience, symbols and signs, meaning and culture? Is our very nature as human beings shaped by the structure and functions of our brains?\n\nOver the past half century, some have come to believe that the last of these answers is the truest\u2014that our brains hold the key to whom we are. They suggest that developments in the sciences of the brain are, at last, beginning to map the processes that make our humanity possible\u2014as individuals, as societies, and as a species. These references to the brain do not efface all the other answers that contemporary culture gives to the question of who we are. But it seems that these other ways of thinking of ourselves\u2014of our psychological lives, our habitual activities, our social relations, our ethical values and commitments, our perceptions of others\u2014are being reshaped. They must now be grounded in one organ of our bodies\u2014that spongy mass of the human brain, encapsulated by the skull, which weighs about three pounds in an adult and makes up about 2% of his or her body weight. This 'materialist' belief has taken a very material form. There has been a rapid growth in investment of money and human effort in neurobiological research, a remarkable increase in the numbers of papers published in neuroscience journals, a spate of books about the brain for lay readers, and many well-publicized claims that key aspects of human affairs can and should be governed in the light of neuroscientific knowledge. A host of neurotechnologies have been invented\u2014drugs, devices, techniques\u2014that seem to open ourselves up to new strategies of intervention through the brain. In the societies of what we used to call the West, our brains are becoming central to understanding who we are as human beings.\n\nFor many in the social and human sciences, these developments are profoundly threatening. Their unspoken premise, for at least the past century, has been that human beings are _freed_ from their biology _by virtue of that biology_ \u2014that we come into the world unfinished and that our individual capacities, mores, values, thoughts, desires, emotions (in short, our mental lives), as well as our group identities, family structures, loyalties to others, and so forth are shaped by upbringing, culture, society, and history. Practitioners of these disciplines can point, with good reason, to the disastrous sociopolitical consequences of the biologization of human beings: from eighteenth-century racial science to twentieth-century eugenics, and more recently to the reductionist simplifications of sociobiology and evolutionary psychology. To give priority to the biological in human affairs, it seems, is not only to ignore what we have learned from more than two centuries of social, historical, and cultural research, but also to cede many of the hard-won disciplinary and institutional achievements of the social and human sciences to others, and to risk their sociopolitical credibility.\n\nWe are sympathetic to these anxieties, and there is much truth in them. One only has to glance at the wild overstatements made by many of the popular writers in this field, the recurring overinterpretation of the findings from animal research in neurobiology, the sometimes willful misrepresentation of the significance of the images generated by brain scanning, not to mention the marketing on the Internet of many dubious products for improving brain power, to realize that there is much scope for critical sociological analysis and for cultural investigation of the contemporary lure of the brain sciences. But in this book, while we certainly seek to develop tools for a critical relation to many of the claims made in both serious and popular presentations of neuroscience, we also seek to trace out some directions for a more affirmative relation to the new sciences of brain and mind.\n\nWe do this for two reasons. On the one hand, there is no reason for those from the social and human sciences to fear reference to the role of the human brain in human affairs, or to regard these new images of the human being, these new ontologies, as fundamentally threatening. These disciplines have managed to live happily with the claims of psychoanalysis and dynamic psychologies, even though these disciplines also see much of human individual mental life and conduct as grounded in processes unavailable to our consciousness. Perhaps, then, we should not be so wary of the reminder that we humans are, after all, animals\u2014very remarkable ones, indeed, but nonetheless not the beneficiaries of some special creation that sets us in principle apart from our forebears. And, on the other hand, the new brain sciences share much with more general shifts within contemporary biological and biomedical sciences: at their most sophisticated, they are struggling toward a way of thinking in which our corporeality is in constant transaction with its milieu, and the biological and the social are not distinct but intertwined. Many of the assumptions and extrapolations that are built into the heterogeneous endeavor of neurobiology are ripe for critique. But at a time when neurobiology, however hesitantly, is opening its explanatory systems to arguments and evidence from the social sciences, perhaps there is a relation beyond commentary and critique that might be more productive. We will return to these issues in our conclusion. For now, though, it is sufficient to say that it is in the spirit of critical friendship between the human sciences and the neurosciences that we have written this book.\n\nBeyond Cartesianism?\n\nMind is what brain does. This little phrase seems to encapsulate the premise of contemporary neurobiology. For many, it now merely states the obvious. But it was not always so. In 1950, the BBC broadcast a series of talks titled _The Physical Basis of Mind_ , introduced by the eminent neurophysiologist Sir Charles Sherrington, with contributions from leading philosophers, psychiatrists, and neurologists (Laslett 1950). In his opening remarks, Sherrington pointed out that half a century earlier he had written, \"We have to regard the relation of mind to brain as still not merely unsolved, but still devoid of a basis for its very beginning\"; in 1950, at the age of ninety-two, he saw no reason to change his view: \"Aristotle, two thousand years ago, was asking how the mind is attached to the body. We are asking that question still.\" Whatever their differences, all the distinguished contributors to this series agreed that this debate over the relation between mind and body, between mind and brain, had lasted many centuries, and that it was unlikely that a consensus would soon be reached as to whether there _was_ a physical basis for the mind in the brain, let alone what that basis was, or where it was, or how such a basis should be conceptualized.\n\nA half century later, Vernon Mountcastle, celebrated for his fundamental discoveries about the structure of the cerebral cortex, contributed the introductory essay on \"Brain Science at the Century's Ebb\" to a special issue of _Daedalus_ (the journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences) devoted to the state of brain research. \"The half-century's accumulation of knowledge of brain function,\" he wrote, \"has brought us face to face with the question of what it means to be human. We make no pretention that solutions are at hand, but assert that what makes man human is his brain.... Things mental, indeed minds, are emergent properties of brains\" (Mountcastle 1998, 1). Minds are properties of that organ of the body that we term the brain. And brains makes humans human, because the minds that constitute their humanity emerge from their brains. Mountcastle spoke here for most of those working in the field that had come to call itself neuroscience. In a way that they did not quite understand and yet that they could not doubt, the human mind did indeed have a physical basis in the human brain. And that brain, however remarkable and complex, was an organ like any other organ, in principle open to neuroscientific knowledge: the 'explanatory gap' between the processes of brain and the processes of mind they somehow produce was beginning to narrow and would, in time, be closed.\n\nOf course, many would say, there is nothing much new here. Have we not known that the brain is the seat of consciousness, will, emotion, and cognition since the Greeks? Closer to our present, from the nineteenth century onward, especially in Europe and North America, there was an intense focus on the significance of the brain to human character, to human mental pathologies, and to the management of the moral order of society: while many may now scoff at the attempts of the phrenologists to read intellectual and moral dispositions in the shape and contours of the skull, few would dispute the pioneering work on brain anatomy and function memorialized in the brain areas designated by the names of Wernicke, Broca, Flechsig, and their colleagues (Hagner 1997, 2001; Hagner and Borck 2001). If we wanted further evidence that there was nothing new about the salience long accorded to brain research, we could point to the fact that in the first six decades of the twentieth century more than twenty scientists were honored by the award of a Nobel prize for discoveries concerning the nervous system\u2014from Santiago Ramon y Cajal in 1906 to John Eccles, Alan Hodgkin, and Andrew Huxley in 1963.\n\nNor is there anything particularly novel in the challenge that contemporary neuroscientists mount to dualism. For example, in the early decades of the twentieth century, Charles Sherrington sought to develop an integrated theory of brain and mind, and this was the prelude to a host of neurological, psychological, and philosophical attempts to clarify the mind-body relation; it also led to a host of worries about the implications for the higher human values of morality, autonomy, wholeness, and individuality (R. Smith 2002). Like their contemporaries today, neurologists and brain researchers in the first half of the twentieth century certainly believed\u2014and claimed\u2014that their research had uncovered mechanisms of the brain that would have major social implications. The gradual acceptance of the usefulness of the electroencephalograph in the 1930s, and the image of the electrical brain that it seemed to embody, appeared to some (notably William Grey Walter) to offer the possibility of objective diagnoses of psychiatric conditions, and indeed of normal characteristics; it was thought of \"as a kind of truth machine or electrical confessional\" that would reveal the workings of the human mind and enable public access to private mental life, and also have implications for the management of everything from child rearing to the choice of marriage partners (R. Hayward 2002, 620\u201321ff.). Perhaps, then, when neuroscientist Michael Gazzaniga titled his recent book _Human: The Science behind What Makes Us Unique_ (Gazzaniga 2008a), claiming that advances in research on the brain will reshape our understandings of who we are, he was only the latest in a long tradition.\n\nYet, as the twenty-first century began, there was a pervasive sense, among the neuroscientific researchers themselves, among clinicians, commentators, writers of popular science books, and policymakers that advances in our understanding of the human brain had implications that were nothing short of revolutionary. Much had indeed changed in the fifty years between Sherrington's pessimism and Mountcastle's optimism. By the end of the twentieth century, the term _neuroscience_ slipped easily off the tongue, yet it dates only to 1962. The Society for Neuroscience (SfN) was formed in 1969 and held its first major conference in 1979, which was attended by about 1,300 people; by 1980 it attracted about 5,800 people; by 1990 this number had grown to more than 13,000; and by 2000 it reached more than 24,000. Alongside this annual event there were now dozens of other conferences and workshops organized by more specialist associations of brain researchers, each with its own membership, websites, and newsletters, along with undergraduate and graduate programs in neuroscience, 'boot camps' for those who sought a rapid immersion in the field, and much more. These activities were not confined to the United States but spanned Europe, Japan, China, and many other countries. This was not a unified field: there were many different formulations of the problems, concepts, experimental practices, professional allegiances, and so forth. But nonetheless, by the start of the twenty-first century, a truly global infrastructure for neuroscience research had taken shape.\n\nThese organizational changes were accompanied by a remarkable burgeoning of research and publishing. While in 1958 there were only some 650 papers published in the brain sciences, by 1978 there were more than 6,500. By 1998 this figure had risen to more than 17,000, and in 2008 alone more than 26,500 refereed papers were published on the neurosciences in more than four hundred journals. In the wake of the decade of the 1990s, which U.S. President George Bush designated \"the decade of the brain,\" things seemed to shift into a new phase, with discussions of the crucial role of the brain for individuals and society in the light of advances in neuroscience moving from the specialized literature into a wider domain. In the subsequent ten years, dozens of books were published suggesting that we have witnessed the birth of new sciences of brain and\/or mind, and drawing on research findings to illustrate these claims (Andreasen 2001; Kandel 2006; Restak 2006; Iacoboni 2008; Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia 2008; Begley 2009; Lynch and Laursen 2009). These books, and the regular newspaper articles and television programs about these discoveries and their importance, are now almost always accompanied by vibrant visual illustrations derived from brain imaging of the living brain in action as it thinks, feels, decides, and desires (Beaulieu 2002): the brain has entered popular culture, and mind seems visible in the brain itself.\n\nGoverning through the Brain\n\nBy the turn of the century, it seemed difficult to deny that the neurosciences had, or should have, something to say about the ways we should understand, manage, and treat human beings\u2014for practices of cure, reform, and individual and social improvement. Across the first half of the twentieth century, the prefix _psy_ \\- was attached to a great many fields of investigation of human behavior, seeming to link expertise and authority to a body of objective knowledge about human beings (Rose 1989); now the prefix _neuro_ \\- was being invoked in the same way. Psychiatry was an obvious niche, not least because of the belief, since the 1950s, that new pharmacological treatments had been discovered that were effective because they acted directly on the neurobiology underpinning mental disorder. While the term _neuropsychiatry_ had been used as early as the 1920s (for example, Schaller 1922) and gained popularity in the European literature in the 1950s (for example, Davini 1950; Garrard 1950; Hecaen 1950), by the start of the twenty-first century the term was being used in a very specific sense\u2014to argue that the future of psychiatry lay in the integration of insights from genetics and neurobiology into clinical practice (Healy 1997; J. Martin 2002; Sachdev 2002, 2005; Yudofsky and Hales 2002; Lee, Ng, and Lee 2008).\n\nBut while psychiatry might seem an obvious niche for neuroscience, it was not alone in using the _neuro_ -prefix to designate a novel explanatory framework for investigating phenomena previously understood in social, psychological, philosophical, or even spiritual terms. Thus we now find _neurolaw_ , which, especially in its U.S. version, claims that neuroscientific discoveries will have profound consequences for the legal system, from witness interrogation to ideas about free will and programs of reform and prevention; the first papers proposing this term appeared in the mid-1990s (Taylor, Harp, and Elliott 1991; Taylor 1995, 1996). We encounter _neuroeconomics_ , which argues for the importance of studying the neurobiological underpinnings of economic behavior such as decision making. We read of _neuromarketing_ ( _Lancet_ 2004; Lee, Broderick, and Chamberlain 2007; Renvois\u00e9 and Morin 2007; Senior, Smythe, Cooke, et al. 2007); _neuroaesthetics_ (Zeki 1993, 1999), which concerns the neuronal basis of creativity and of perceptions of beauty; _neuroergonomics_ , which studies brain and behavior at work; _neurophilosophy_ (Churchland 1986, 1995); and _neurotheology_ , or the neuroscience of belief and spirituality (Trimble 2007).\n\nFor some, even the capacity to think ethically, to make moral judgments, is a brain kind of thing (see for example, Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, et al. 2001; Tancredi 2005; Koenigs, Young, Adolphs, et al. 2007). And, reuniting apparent rivals for a knowledge of the human mind, we find _neuropsychoanalysis_ ; proponents always remind their readers that Freud was a neurologist and hoped for just such an integration in his early _Project for a Scientific Psychology_ (Bilder and LeFever 1998). We see _neuroeducation_ \u2014thus Johns Hopkins University established an initiative bringing together educators and brain science researchers to \"magnify the potential for current findings to enrich educational practice,\" and the University of London launched its own platform on \"educational neuroscience.\" We see _social neuroscience_ , which, in the words of the journal of that name, \"examine[s] how the brain mediates social cognition, interpersonal exchanges, affective\/cognitive group interactions [and] the role of the central nervous system in the development and maintenance of social behaviors.\" Centers, institutes, and laboratories in social neuroscience were established at the Max Planck Institute, New York University, the University of Chicago, UCLA, Columbia University, and elsewhere.\n\nFor others, the new brain sciences had important implications for the reform of social policy and welfare (cf. Blank 1999). In 2009, the United Kingdom's Institute for Government was commissioned by the Cabinet Office to produce a report on the implication of neuroscience for public policy. The following year the nation's Royal Society\u2014the oldest scientific academy in the world\u2014launched a project called Brain Waves to investigate developments in neuroscience and their implications for policy and for society. In 2009, the French government's _Centre d'Analyse Strat\u00e9gique_ launched a new program dedicated to inform public policy based on neuroscientific research. And there is much more of the same. Hence, perhaps inevitably given the contemporary ethicalization of biomedical matters, we have seen the rise of a new professional enterprise for worrying about all this: _neuroethics_ (Marcus 2002; Moreno 2003; Kennedy 2004; Illes 2006; Farah 2007; Levy 2007). It appears that to understand what is going on when people engage in social interactions with one another, when they feel empathy or hostility, when they desire products and buy goods, when they obey rules or violate laws, when they are affected by poverty or child abuse, when they do violence to others or themselves, and indeed when they fall in love or are moved by works of art, we should turn to the brain.\n\nWhat are we to make of all this? How has it come about that in the space of half a century, the neurosciences have become such a repository of hope and anticipation? How have they emerged from the laboratory and the clinic, and have not only entered popular culture, but have become practicable, amenable to being utilized in practices of government? And with what consequences? We know that there are close linkages between the ways in which human beings are understood by authorities, and the ways in which they are governed. The various psychological conceptions of the human being in the twentieth century had a major impact on many practices: on understanding and treatment of distress; on conceptions of normality and abnormality; on techniques of regulation, normalization, reformation, and correction; on child rearing and education; on advertising, marketing, and consumption technologies; and on the management of human behavior in practices from the factory to the military. Psychological languages entered common usage across Europe and North America, in Australasia, in Latin America, and in many other countries. Psychological training affected professionals from child guidance counselors and social workers to human resource managers. In the process, our very ideas of our selves, identity, autonomy, freedom, and self-fulfillment were reshaped in psychological terms (Rose 1979, 1985, 1988, 1989, 1996, 1999; Miller and Rose 1988, 1990, 1994, 1995a, 1995b, 1997; K. Danziger 1990; Hacking 1995).\n\nWill these developments in the neurosciences have as significant a social, political, and personal impact? If we now consign the Cartesian split of mind and body to history and accept that mind is nothing more than what the brain does, does that mean that neuroscientists, after years of toiling in relative obscurity, are poised to become nothing less than \"engineers of the human soul\"? It is undoubtedly too early for a considered judgment; it is far from clear what we would see if we were to look back on these events from the twenty-second century. Despite all the grand promises and expectations generated by neuroentrepreneurs, we cannot know for certain whether any lasting new bodies of expertise will emerge, nor can we foretell the role of neurobiology in the government of conduct across the next decades.\n\nIn this book, we abstain from speculation wherever possible. We also seek to distance ourselves from the overgeneralized critiques of 'neuromania' and other fundamentally defensive reactions from the social and human sciences. For while we raise many technical and conceptual problems with these new ways of thinking and acting, and point to many premature claims and failed promises of translation from laboratory findings to treatments and policies for managing human miseries and ailments, we also find much to appreciate in many of these attempts to render human mental life amenable to explanation and even to intervention.\n\nAnd, unlike many of our disciplinary colleagues, we do not think that the social and human sciences have anything to fear, provided that they maintain an appropriate critical awareness, from our new knowledge of the brain. The _Oxford English Dictionary_ ( _OED_ ) provides a definition of criticism that matches our aims. Rather than fault finding or passing censorious judgment, we are critical here in the sense of \"exercising careful judgement or observation; nice, exact, accurate, precise, punctual.\" It is in that critical spirit that we aim to describe the new ways of thinking about the nature of the human brain and its role in human affairs that are taking shape, to consider the problems around which these have formed and the conceptual and technical conditions that have made it possible to think in these new ways, and to analyze the ways in which these developments have been bound up with the invention of novel technologies for intervening upon human beings\u2014governing conduct though the brain, and in the name of the brain.\n\nOur Argument\n\nIn the course of the intertwined investigations that make up this book, we argue that a number of key mutations\u2014conceptual, technological, economic, and biopolitical\u2014have enabled the neurosciences to leave the enclosed space of the laboratory and gain traction in the world outside. It may be helpful to summarize these here, to help guide readers through the rather detailed analyses contained in the following chapters.\n\nConcepts and Technologies\n\nOver the course of the half century that we focus on in this book, the human brain has come to be anatomized at a molecular level, understood as plastic and mutable across the life-course, exquisitely adapted to human interaction and sociality, and open to investigation at both the molecular and systemic levels in a range of experimental setups, notably those involving animal models and those utilizing visualization technologies. This has generated a sense of human neurobiology as setting the conditions for the mental lives of humans in societies and shaping their conduct in all manner of ways, many of which are not amenable to consciousness. Each of the major conceptual shifts that led to the idea of the neuromolecular, plastic, and visible brain was intrinsically linked to the invention of new ways of intervening on the brain, making possible new ways of governing through, and in the name of, the brain. Yet despite the ontological changes entailed, and the emerging belief that so much of what structures human thoughts, feelings, desires, and actions is shaped by nonconscious neurobiological processes, few of those who work in this area believe that humans are mere puppets of their brains, and the emerging neurobiologically informed strategies for managing human conduct are rarely if ever grounded in such a belief. Neurobiological conceptions of personhood are _not_ effacing other conceptions of who we are as human beings, notably those derived from psychology. On the contrary, they have latched on to them in the many sites and practices that were colonized by psychology across the twentieth century\u2014from child rearing to marketing, and transformed them in significant ways. In this way, and through these processes, our contemporary 'neurobiological complex' has taken shape. Let us say a little more about some of these developments.\n\nThe central conceptual shift that we chart in the chapters that follow is the emergence of a neuromolecular vision of the brain. By this we mean a new scale at which the brain and nervous system was conceptualized, and a new way in which their activities were understood. At this molecular level, the structure and processes of the brain and central nervous system were made understandable as material processes of interaction among molecules in neurons and the synapses between them. These were conceived in terms of the biophysical, chemical, and electrical properties of their constituent parts. At this scale, in a profoundly reductionist approach, despite the recognition that there was much that could not yet be explained, there seemed nothing mysterious about the operations of the nervous system. Mental processes\u2014cognition, emotion, volition\u2014could be explained in entirely material ways, as the outcome of biological processes in the brain, understood as an organ that was, in principle, like any other, even if, in the case of humans and many other animals, it was far more complex than any other organ. While the explanatory gap still remained, and the move from the molecular level to that of mental processes was highly challenging, the dualism that had haunted philosophy and the sciences of mental life increasingly seemed anachronistic.\n\nThe project of neuroscience\u2014for it was indeed an explicit project to create interactions between researchers from the whole range of disciplines that focused on the brain, from mathematics to psychology\u2014had as its aim to revolutionize our knowledge of the brain, and in so doing, radically to transform our capacities to intervene in it. One key transactional point was psychiatric pharmacology\u2014that is to say, the development of pharmaceuticals to treat mental disorder. The emergence of this neuromolecular gaze was intrinsically intertwined with the development of psychopharmacology and the increasing resort to drugs for treating people diagnosed with mental illness, first within, and then outside the asylum walls. Many key findings about molecular mechanisms were made in the course of trying to identify the mode of action of those drugs, almost always using animal models. Indeed, we argue that animal models were epistemologically, ontologically, and technologically crucial to the rise of neuroscience. Research using such models focused on the molecular properties of drugs that appeared to act on mental states and behavior, and hence almost inescapably led to the belief that the anomalies in those mental states could and should be understood in terms of specific disturbances, disruptions, or malfunctions in neuromolecular processes. Since the drugs seemed to affect the components of neurotransmission, this led both to the triumph of the chemical view of neurotransmission over the electrical view that had previously been dominant, and to the belief that malfunctions in neurotransmission underpinned most if not all mental disorders.\n\nThe two founding myths of psychopharmacology\u2014the monoamine hypothesis of depression and the dopamine hypothesis of schizophrenia provided ways of organizing these linkages conceptually and technologically. Both have proved mistaken, perhaps fundamentally wrong. However, this 'psychopharmacological imaginary' enabled the growth of novel transactions between laboratory, clinic, commerce, and everyday life. In particular, it was linked to the growing associations between the pharmaceutical companies, the neurobiological research community, and the profession of psychiatry. It was associated with many inflated statements about the therapeutic potency of the compounds being produced and marketed, with the growing routinization of the use of psychoactive drugs that claimed to be able to manage the travails of everyday life by acting on the brain, and with the reshaping of distress in ways that might best accord with the vicissitudes of an increasingly competitive and profitable market for pharmaceuticals.\n\nThere were, of course, many who were critical of these new relationships. Critics denounced the medicalization of social problems, linked this to an analysis of psychiatry\u2014and in particular of biological psychiatry\u2014as an apparatus of social control, and argued that the profession, its explanatory claims, its diagnostic categories, and its preference for drugs as a first line of intervention, resulted from its capture by the pharmaceutical industry. For many of these critics, aware of the doleful history of eugenics, genetic explanations of mental disorders were particularly distasteful. Despite the certainty of psychiatric geneticists that mental disorders had a genetic basis, critics correctly pointed out that the repeated claims to have discovered 'the gene for' schizophrenia, manic depression, and many other conditions were always followed by failures of replication. However as the twentieth century came to a close, a radical transformation in the styles of thought that characterized genetics made a different approach possible. This focused on variations at a different level\u2014at the level of changes in single bases in the DNA sequences themselves, and the ways in which such small variations in the sequence might affect the nature of the protein synthesized or the activity of the enzyme in question, with consequences for susceptibility to certain diseases or response to particular drugs.\n\nThis molecular vision of genomic complexity thus mapped onto the vision of the neuromolecular brain. It thus became possible to move beyond studies of heritability in lineages and families to seek the specific genomic variants and anomalies that had consequences for susceptibility to certain diseases or pathological conditions such as impulsive behavior. One now looks for the variations that increase or decrease the activity of an enzyme, the operation of an ion channel, or the sensitivity of a receptor site, and which, in all their multiple combinations, underpin all differences in human mental functioning, whether these be deemed normal variations or pathologies. Further, one tries to locate these within the environmental or other conditions that provoke or inhibit the onset of such conditions. As we have moved to such a neurogenomics of susceptibilities and resiliencies, new translational possibilities appear to emerge for neuroscience to engage with strategies of preventive intervention in the real world, whether via early identification and treatment of mental disorder or of neurodegenerative diseases, or in enabling preventive intervention to steer children from a pathway that will lead to antisocial behavior and crime.\n\nAlongside psychopharmacology and psychiatric genomics, there was a third pathway, equally significant in our view, for the transactions between the knowledge of the brain and interventions in human lives\u2014the growing belief that, at least when it comes to the human brain, neither structure nor function is inscribed in the genes or fixed at birth. One term has come to designate this new way of thinking\u2014 _plasticity_. The neural architecture of the brain was now located in the dimension of time\u2014not just the time of development from fertilization to birth and into the early years of life, but also throughout the life-course, through adolescence, into adulthood, and indeed across the decades. While it had long been recognized that plasticity existed at the level of the synapse\u2014that synaptic connections constantly formed or were pruned in response to experience\u2014new ideas of plasticity were taken to mean that a wider 'rewiring' was also possible. Notable, here, were the results of work on rehabilitation after stroke in humans, and related work with animal models, which showed that the primate brain could remap itself after injury and that this process could be accelerated by neurobiologically informed practices of rehabilitation\u2014an argument that was commercialized in the development of a number of therapeutic methods, often patented by the neuroscientific researchers themselves.\n\nAt the other end of life, researchers argued that experience in the very early days and months following birth, perhaps even in utero, shaped the brain in fundamental ways through modifying gene methylation. Epigenetic arguments sought to establish the ways in which experience 'gets under the skin' at the level of the genome itself. In particular, it seemed, early maternal behavior toward offspring might so shape their neural development to affect not only the behavior of offspring over their whole life span, but also their own maternal behavior. There now seemed to be a mechanism to pass these environmentally acquired characteristics of the brain down the generations. And finally, the long-held dogma that no new neurons were produced after the first years of life was itself overturned with the finding that in humans, neurogenesis or the growth of new nerve cells in the brain, was possible throughout adult life and might be stimulated or inhibited by environmental factors from nutrition to cognitive activity. No matter that many doubts remained about the translation of these findings from animals to humans, and the interpretation of these results. The brain now appeared as an organ that was _open_ to environmental inputs at the level of the molecular processes of the genome, shaping its neural architecture and its functional organization, with consequences that might flow down the generations. The implications were clear: those who were concerned about the future of our children, and the conduct and welfare of the adults they would become, needed to recognize, and to govern, these processes of shaping and reshaping our plastic brains.\n\nIf these three imaginaries\u2014of pharmacology, neurogenomics, and neuroplasticity\u2014provided pathways linking the work of brain labs to interventions in the everyday world, so too did a fourth: the visual imaginary, associated in particular with the development of powerful technologies of brain imaging. While the skull initially proved an impenetrable barrier to techniques of medical imaging such as X-rays, there were early attempts\u2014notably by Edgar Adrian\u2014to explore the electrical activity of the living brain using electroencephalography (Adrian and Matthews 1934). However, the fundamental shift in the visibility of the living brain was linked to the development of computerized tomography (CT) scanning in the 1970s and magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) in the 1980s. These produced images of the structure and tissues of the brain that were, to all intents and purposes, equivalent to the images produced of any other bodily tissues. They were simulations, of course, not simple photographs, but they were open to confirmation by physical interventions into the imaged tissues.\n\nTwo further developments, positron emission tomography (PET) and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), seemed to produce identical images of something with a very different ontological status\u2014not the _structure_ of the brain but its _functioning_ , its activity as its human host engaged in certain tasks or experienced certain emotions. We seemed to be able to see the neural correlates of the activities of mind itself in real time. And once we did, it seemed impossible to doubt that mind is what brain does. As these technologies became more widely available to researchers, thousands of papers were published claiming to identify the neural correlates of every human mental state from love to hate, from responses to literature to political allegiances; by 2011, such publications were appearing at a rate of about six hundred a month. Despite the well-known technical problems, assumptions, and limitations of these technologies, and the fact that they do not speak for themselves and must be interpreted by experts, the images have undoubted powers of persuasion, and their apparent ability to track mental processes objectively, often processes outside the awareness of the individual themselves, have proved persuasive in areas from neuromarketing to policies on child development. The belief that we can see the mind in the living brain, can observe the passions and its desires that seemingly underlie normal and pathological beliefs, emotions, and behaviors, has been a key element in the claim that neuroscience can provide useful information about the government of human beings, the conduct of their conduct in the everyday world.\n\nGoverning the Future\u2014through the Brain\n\nWe should beware of scientific or technological determinism. Truths and technologies make some things possible, but they do not make them inevitable or determine the sites in which they find a niche. Different societies, cultures, and sociopolitical configurations offer different opportunities for the new brain sciences. Nonetheless, there is one feature of contemporary biopolitics that has proved particularly welcoming to the image of the molecular, visible, and plastic brain\u2014that which concerns the future. Contemporary biopolitics is infused with futurity, saturated with anticipations of imaged futures, with hope, expectation, desire, anxiety, even dread. The future seems to place a demand not just on those who govern us but also on all those who would live a responsible life in the present (O'Malley 1996).\n\nNo doubt this widespread sense of obligation to take responsibility for the future is not unique to advanced liberal democracies in the early twenty-first century. Biopolitics, since at least the eighteenth century, has been future-oriented. From earliest politics of the population, governing vitality operates on axis of time and orients to the future, and images of the future are intrinsic to biopolitical thought and strategies from the politics of health in the eighteenth century, to concerns with the degeneracy of the population in the nineteenth century, through the rise of eugenics and the birth of strategies of social insurance in the first half of the twentieth century. Today we are surrounded by multiple experts of the future, utilizing a range of technologies of anticipation\u2014horizon scanning, foresight, scenario planning, cost-benefit analyses, and many more\u2014that imagine those possible futures in different ways, seeking to bring some aspects about and to avoid others. It would not be too much of an exaggeration to say that we have moved from the risk management of almost everything to a general regime of futurity. The future now presents us neither with ignorance nor with fate, but with probabilities, possibilities, a spectrum of uncertainties, and the potential for the unseen and the unexpected and the untoward. In the face of such futures, authorities have now the obligation, not merely to 'govern the present' but to 'govern the future.' Such futurity is central to contemporary problematizations of the brain.\n\nOne feature of these imagined futures is the growing burden of brain disorder. Public funding for research in the new brain sciences, not just in the so-called Decade of the Brain but from at least the 1960s, when initiatives such as the Neurosciences Research Program (NRP) were established, has almost always been linked the belief that conquering this new frontier of the brain will, in an unspecified time line, lead to major advances in tackling that burden. The idea of _burden_ , here, has disturbing resonances for those who know their history (Proctor 1988; Burleigh 1994). Nonetheless, in a very different sociopolitical context than that of eugenics, psychiatrists, lobby groups, and international organizations make dire predictions about the rising numbers of those in the general population who suffer from depression and other mental disorders, not to mention the \"dementia time bomb\": a recent estimate was that, in any one year, more than one-third of the population of the European Union could be diagnosed with such a brain disorder (Wittchen, Jacobi, et al. 2011). In the emerging style of thought that we trace in this book, brain disorders encompass everything from anxiety to Alzheimer's disease, and often include both addictions and obesity\u2014all, it seems, have their origin in the brain. These disorders, the majority of which are undiagnosed, lead to many days lost from work and many demands on medical and other services, costing European economies hundreds of billions of euros. The corollary seems obvious: to reduce the economic burden of mental disorder, one should focus not on cure but on prevention. And prevention means early intervention, for the sake of the brain and of the state.\n\nChildren are the key\u2014children who are at risk of mental health problems as they grow up. Many pathologies\u2014ADHD, autism, schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, dementias\u2014are now reframed as _developmental_ and hence amenable to early detection and ideally to preventive intervention. This logic can then be extended from mental disorders to antisocial conduct, resulting in the attempt to discover biomarkers in the brain or in the genes of young children that might predict future antisocial personality or psychopathy. In this logic, one first identifies susceptibility, and one then intervenes to minimize the chances of that unwanted eventuality coming about, in order to maximize both individual and collective well-being and to reduce the future costs of mental health problems. Earlier is almost always better\u2014as the mantra has it. Earlier usually means during childhood, because the brain of the developing child is more 'plastic,' believed to be at its most open to influences for the good (and for the bad)\u2014and hence leads to intensive interventions in the parenting of those thought to be potentially at risk. This is the rationale of \"screen and intervene\" (Singh and Rose 2009; Rose 2010b). Neuroscientifically based social policy thus aims to identify those at risk\u2014both those liable to show antisocial, delinquent, pathological, or criminal behavior and those at risk of developing a mental health problem\u2014as early as possible and intervene presymptomatially in order to divert them from that undesirable path.\n\nAt the other end of life, many argue for early intervention to forestall the development of Alzheimer's disease and other dementias, which has led to regular announcements of tests claiming to identify those at risk, the rise of the prodromal category of \"mild cognitive impairment,\" the growing number of \"memory clinics\" to diagnose such brain states and prescribe interventions to ameliorate them, and much research, so far largely unsuccessful, to find effective forms of intervention into the dementing brain (discussed in Whitehouse and George 2008).\n\nIn the era of the neuromolecular and plastic brain, those who advocate such strategies think of neurobiology not as destiny but _opportunity_. Many believe that to discover the seeds of problematic conduct in the brain will reduce stigma rather than increase it, despite research showing the reverse (Phelan 2002, 2006). Those seeking biomarkers for psychopathy, even when they believe that there is a clear, genetically based, neurobiological basis for antisocial conduct, argue that neurobiology informs us about susceptibility but not inevitability. Their wish to identify the gene-environment interactions, which provoke vulnerability into frank psychopathy, is linked to a hope for protective strategies, for \"the goal of early identification is successful intervention\" (Caspi, McClay, Moffitt, et al. 2002; Kim-Cohen, Moffitt, Taylor, et al. 2005; Odgers, Moffitt, Poulton, et al. 2008).\n\nInterventions sometimes involve behavior therapy, cognitive therapy, and psychopharmaceuticals. But the preferred route to the problematic child\u2014as so often in the past\u2014is through the parents. In the age of the plastic brain, many undesirable neurobiological traits appear to be malleable by changing the ways parents deal with their vulnerable children (Dadds, Fraser, Frost, et al. 2005; Hawes and Dadds 2005, 2007). Such arguments for early intervention have been strengthened over recent years by the proliferation of brain images seeming to show the consequences of early adverse environments on the developing brain of the child (Perry 2008). On the one hand, these images provide powerful rhetorical support for early intervention into the lives of the most disadvantaged families, in the name of the individual, familial, and social costs of the developing brain, and hence future lives, of their children. On the other hand, in situating the origins of all manner of social problems and undesirable forms of conduct so firmly in neurobiology, even in a neurobiology that is itself shaped by environment, we see a repetition of a strategy that we have seen innumerable times since the nineteenth century\u2014to prevent social ills by acting on the child through the medium of the family: a neurobiological explanation for the persistence of social exclusion in terms of a 'cycle of deprivation' grounded in the inadequate parenting provided by the socially deprived.\n\nEconomies of the Brain\n\nThese arguments about the burden\u2014in this case the economic costs\u2014of brain disorders and the increasing faith in the economic benefits to be gained through strategies of prediction and preventive medicine, have been one important factor for the growth of public investment in neuroscientific research. The National Institutes for Health (NIH) in the United States, their equivalent in the U.K. research councils, the European Commission's Framework Programmes, the European Research Council, and the European Science Foundation have all invested in this work, as have private foundations and charitable bodies, such as the MacArthur Institute in the United States and the Wellcome Trust in the United Kingdom. Given the diversity of these funding sources, the total sums involved are hard to estimate. However, in the United States as of 2006, it was estimated that the combined commitment to neuroscience research of the NIH, the pharmaceutical industry, large biotech firms, and large medical device firms increased from $4.8 billion in 1995 to $14.1 billion in 2005\u2014adjusted for inflation, this meant a doubling of investment, which was more or less in line with that for biomedical research as a whole.\n\nIn the case of neuroscience, over half of this investment came from industry, a proportion that remained around that level over that decade, despite the fact that investment in this area was not matched by an increase in new pharmaceuticals coming on to the market: the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved only \"40 new molecular entities for indications within the neurosciences from 1995 to 2005, with the annual number of approvals remaining relatively stagnant during this period\" (Dorsey, Vitticore, De Roulet, et al. 2006). However, commenting on developments over the decade from 2000 to 2010, and into the near future, leading neuroscientists have expressed their fears that public funding for research in neuroscience in many major industrialized countries\u2014notably the United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan\u2014has not kept up with inflation and has been affected by the recession; they argue that this is producing something of a crisis and does not match the scale of the social costs of what they variously refer to as brain diseases, mental disorders, or brain disorders (Amara, Grillner, Insel, et al. 2011). In the United Kingdom, in early 2011, the British Neuroscience Association (BNA) estimated overall U.K. neuroscience research funding from public sources to be in the region of \u00a3200 million per year. In the United States, despite a one-time supplement to the NIH of $10 billion as a result of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, funding in the second decade of the century was expected to be flat.\n\nCommercial investment in neuroscience is, of course, linked to the belief that there is a growing global market for the drugs, diagnostics, and devices that are being produced. Zack Lynch of NeuroInsights, perhaps the leading organization appraising the neurotechnology market, has estimated that the global value generated by the neurotechnology industry in 2009 was around $140 billion, slightly down from that in previous years (a fall attributed to the drop in cost of neuroimaging devices), but that over the previous decade the average annual growth had been on the order of 9%. As we have already remarked, many critics have viewed the business strategies of pharmaceutical companies as a key factor in reshaping psychiatry toward neuropsychiatry, influencing its diagnostic systems and the use of psychiatric drugs as the main form of therapy. In fact, global neuropharmaceutical revenue actually slowed over 2009, largely as a result of the failure of new drugs to come onto the market and the replacement of patented products by generics, although there is now some evidence that the pharmaceutical companies are withdrawing investment for the development of novel psychiatric compounds that are based on the hypotheses of specificity of etiology and treatment that had informed their strategies since the 1960s. But other key neurotechnology areas showed growth, including neurodiagnostic technologies ranging from brain scanners to biomarkers, and neurodevices ranging from cochlear implants, through brain stimulation technologies, to neuroprosthetics purporting to arrest memory decline and optimize attention.\n\nWe can see immediately that it would be misleading to separate the academic and the industrial components of this neuroeconomy: what Stephen Shapin has termed \"the new scientific life\" entails an entrepreneurial spirit on the part of both researchers and universities, and the search for intellectual property and the rhetoric of knowledge transfer are endemic (Shapin 2008). Thus, for example, David Nutt, president-elect of the BNA, commenting on the effects of the decisions by GlaxoSmithKline and Merck in 2011 to close their U.K. neuroscience research sites, with a loss of about one thousand jobs in neuroscience, remarked that it not only \"removes the only major site of job opportunities for neuroscience graduates and postdoctoral researchers outside academia\" but \"the company pull-out directly impacts research spend[ing] in neuroscience as many PhD students and postdoctoral researchers were funded by, or in partnership with, this industry.\"\n\nIndeed, such partnership funding has been a major element in the strategy of the U.K. Medical Research Council. Many of the start-up companies in the neuroindustry are initiated by research scientists with the assistance of venture capitalists, and in turn, their investments are fueled by expectations about future market growth and market opportunities generated by organizations such as IMS Health and NeuroInsights (\"the neurotech market authority\") whose own business models depend on their effective servicing of these expectations. Running across all actors in this new configuration is a 'translational imperative': an ethos that demands and invests in research that is predicted to generate returns of investment\u2014in therapies and in products. This translational imperative now inflects every serious research proposal or grant application in the United States, the United Kingdom, continental Europe, and many other regions. It has arisen, at least in part, because of failure: the failure of many hopes that an increased knowledge of basic biological processes of body and brain would lead inevitably to better therapies for individuals and valuable products for national bioeconomies. If that return in health and wealth, rather than advances in knowledge for its own sake, was the quid pro quo for public investment in basic research, it seemed that the researchers had not kept their side of the bargain. The response of the funding organizations\u2014the NIH in the United States (Zerhouni 2003, 2005) and the MRC in the United Kingdom (Cooksey 2006; National Institute for Health Research 2008)\u2014was to argue for a radical reshaping of the pathways from research to application, and a specific focus, organizationally and financially, on 'translational medicine.'\n\nOf course, there is no simple path from 'bench to bedside' or vice versa. It is rare for a single piece of research, or even the research program of a single group or lab, to translate on its own. The time frames over which research findings are integrated into novel therapies or products are often of the order of decades; the acceptance and utilization of research findings often depends more on social, political, and institutional factors than on the inherent productiveness of the research itself. Nonetheless, we have seen the formation of a number of 'translational platforms'\u2014sites of diverse material exchanges, from knowledge production to decision making and commercial transactions, from innovation to technical assemblages of material entities, where diverse agents and agencies, practices and styles of thought, discourses and apparatuses, converge in the name of the promissory benefits of translational neuroscientific research. This is, of course, an agonistic space, especially when it comes to the role of pressure groups. Some such groups are strongly opposed to the neuro-biomedicalization of conditions such as autism or depression, while others seek to shape biomedical funding toward their own translational demands as a sign of the new democratization of biomedical research (Heath, Rapp, and Taussig 2004). Many activist pressure groups of patients or their families are funded in part by donations from those very commercial corporations and pharmaceutical companies that stand to benefit from increased public awareness and concern about the disorders in question (Moynihan 2002, 2008; Moynihan and Cassels 2005). These new vital economies are tangled webs and permit of no easy ethical judgments.\n\nIn the analyses that follow, we do not argue that there is something essentially malign in the intertwining of researchers' hopes for academic success, hopes for a cure for one's loved ones, hopes for private financial advantage for individual scientists and for companies, and hopes for public economic benefits in terms of health. Indeed, these intertwinings characterize contemporary biomedicine in what Carlos Novas has termed our contemporary \"political economy of hope\" (Novas 2006). But we do point to zones where such entanglements may be highly contentious, for example, where there are powerful but hidden financial links between researchers and those who stand to benefit from the claims made in their research.\n\nEven where frank corruption is not entailed, we have seen significant changes in the economics of research in the life sciences generally, which certainly extend to neuroscience. Steven Shapin quotes a writer in _Science_ magazine in 1953: \"The American scientist is not properly concerned with hours of work, wages, fame or fortune. For him an adequate salary is one that provides decent living without frills or furbelows.... To boil it down, he is primarily interested in what he can do for science, not in what science can do for him.\" This description certainly seems to fit some of the key figures in the early years of neuroscience, and it undoubtedly fits some of those working in the field today. But it is doubtful if it characterizes those many others who would be scientific entrepreneurs; even for those for whom the research itself is the prize\u2014the much-cited article, recognition by peers, career advancement\u2014the economy of neuroscience as a whole, and hence the comportment of most of those who work in this field, has had to change.\n\nIn the United States, the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act in 1980 gave up federal rights to intellectual property that arose from research supported from government funds, allowing those property rights and the value that might flow from them to be claimed by universities or by individual scientists (Kennedy 2001). The ostensible aim was to avoid important scientific discoveries lying idle, and thus not contributing to national wealth and well-being. But this act, coupled with other legal changes, opened biomedical research to a flood of private investment and venture capital. Trends in the United States were followed across much of the rest of the world, and the new opportunities were embraced enthusiastically by research universities, which set up technology transfer offices, participated in start-up companies, and entered into the murky realm of patenting, licensing, distribution of royalties, and complex commercial relations with the corporate world.\n\nBut many argued that the principles that should govern scientific knowledge were being compromised by the drive for intellectual property and the growing entanglements between universities, researchers, industry, and knowledge claims. For example, in 2002, the Royal Society of London set up a study to ask \"whether the use of laws which encourage the commercial exploitation of scientific research is helping or hindering progress in fields such as genetics.\" The conclusion of its study was that \"[i]ntellectual property rights (IPRs) can stimulate innovation by protecting creative work and investment, and by encouraging the ordered exploitation of scientific discoveries for the good of society.... [But] the fact that they are monopolies can cause a tension between private profit and public good. Not least, they can hinder the free exchange of ideas and information on which science thrives.\"\n\nWhile questions of patenting and intellectual property have been crucial in reshaping the neuroeconomy, we would argue that this intense capitalization of scientific knowledge, coupled with the other pressures on researchers to focus on, and to maximize, the impact of their research, has additional consequences. It exacerbates tendencies to make inflated claims as to the translational potential of research findings, and, where those potentials are to be realized in commercial products, to a rush to the market to ensure that maximum financial returns are achieved during the period of a patent. It produces many perverse incentives (Triggle 2004). These include the possibilities of 'corporate capture,' where universities, departments, or research centers are significantly funded by commercial companies that gain priority rights to patent and commercialize discoveries that are made. They increase the already existing incentives on researchers selectively to report positive findings of research\u2014an issue that is particularly relevant where the studies are funded by commercial companies. And, as we show in the chapters that follow, they can lead researchers (or the press releases issued by their university communications departments) to overclaim the generalizability of studies carried out with small samples and to imply that studies with animals will, very soon, lead to therapeutic developments for humans.\n\nBut from our point of view, above and beyond these specific problems generated by the new forms of scientific life, there is a more general question about truth. For if one has a path-dependent theory of truth\u2014if you believe as we do that it is difficult to make things become true in science, and among the necessities for making things become true today are the funds to enable the research to proceed\u2014then the decisions by public, private, and commercial bodies as to which areas of research to fund, and the often un-acknowledged intertwining of promises, hopes, anticipations, expectations, and speculations that are involved, play a key role in shaping our contemporary regimes of truth about persons and their mental lives.\n\nBrains and Persons\n\nMany critics have suggested that the rise of neurobiology is leading to a kind of reductionism in which mental states are reduced to brain states, human actions are generated by brains rather than conscious individuals, and the key dimensions of our humanness\u2014language, culture, history, society\u2014are ignored (Ehrenberg 2004; Vidal 2005; Vidal 2009; Tallis 2011). For some, this rests on a philosophical error: attributing to brains capacities that can only properly be attributed to people (Bennett and Hacker 2003). For others, it is the apotheosis of contemporary individualism\u2014a turn away from social context to a vision of society as an aggregate of isolated individuals (Martin 2000, 2004). There is an analogy here with the concerns that social scientists expressed about 'geneticization' before and after the Human Genome Project. Dire warnings of genetic reductionism, genetic discrimination, and hereditary fatalism proved wide of the mark. And as with genomics, so with neuroscience. This is partly because of the findings of the research itself. But it is also because of the way such arguments are aligned with existing conceptions of personhood and regimes of self-fashioning in advanced liberal societies (Novas and Rose 2000; Rose and Novas 2004; Rose 2007c).\n\nWe argue that despite their apparent contradictions, neurobiological research emphasizing the role of nonconscious neural processes and habits in our decisions and actions can\u2014and does\u2014happily coexist with long-standing ideas about choice, responsibility, and consciousness that are so crucial to contemporary advanced liberal societies (Rose 1999). Such societies are premised on the belief that adult human beings, whatever the role of biology and biography, are creatures with minds, who have the capacity to choose and to intend on the basis of their mental states. Humans can be held accountable for the outcomes of those decisions and intentions, even when they are shaped by those nonconscious forces, except in specific circumstances (compulsion, mental disorder, brain injury, dementia, automatism, etc.). Indeed, it is hardly radical to suggest that human beings are swayed by forces that come from beyond their consciousness. In most cultures and most human practices, individuals have believed in the importance of fates, passions, instincts and drives, unconscious dynamics, and the like. And, as a result, they have been urged, and taught, to govern these forces in the name of self-control, whether by spiritual exercises, by prayer and mortification, by the inculcation of habits, by learning how to govern one's will through inhibition, by understanding the dynamics of projection and denial, by consciousness raising, or a multitude of other techniques.\n\nSimilarly, the recognition of nonconscious neurobiological factors in our mental lives does not lead policymakers to propose that we should resign ourselves before these neural forces. On the one hand, it leads them to believe that those who govern us should base their strategies on knowledge of these nonconscious neurobiological mechanisms, for example, by creating settings that make it easier for human beings to make the right decisions, with nonconscious cues that steer them in the desired directions (Thaler and Sunstein 2008). Likewise, they urge our authorities to nurture the nonconscious bonds of fraternity and good citizenship and to minimize those that weaken culture and character (Brooks 2011). They suggest that our governors need to recognize the nonconscious roots of valued moral understandings such as empathy and the sense of fairness, and to reinforce them\u2014to build social policies on the neurobiological evidence that our beliefs, actions, and aspirations are shaped more by our evolved emotional judgments and the habits that have become ingrained in our nonconscious neural pathways, than by conscious, rational deliberations. On the other hand, they argue that we as individuals should seek to manage these underlying processes, to become conscious of them, to develop mindfulness, to work responsibly to improve ourselves as persons, to reform our habits through acting on our brains: we have entered, they claim, the age of neurological reflexivity (Rowson 2011).\n\nIn this emerging neuro-ontology, it is not that human beings _are brains_ , but that we _have brains_. And it is in this form\u2014that our selves are shaped by our brains but can also shape those brains\u2014that neuroscientific arguments are affecting conceptions of personhood and practices of self-fashioning. In the final decades of the twentieth century in the West, we saw the rise of a \"somatic ethic\" in which many human beings came to identify and interpret much of their unease in terms of the health, vitality, or morbidity of their bodies, and to judge and act upon their soma in their attempts to make themselves not just physically better but also to make themselves better persons (Rose 2007c). The contemporary cultural salience of the brain does not mark the emergence of a new conception of personhood as \"brainhood\" (as suggested by Vidal 2009), in which persons become somehow conceived of as identical to, or nothing more than, their brains. Rather, we are seeing this somatic ethic gradually extending from the body to the embodied mind\u2014the brain.\n\nThe pedagogies of 'brain awareness' and the rise of practices and devices for working on the brain in the service of self-improvement thus find their locus within a more general array of techniques for working on the somatic self in the name of maximizing our well-being. While it is true that much neuroscience presents a picture of brains as isolated and individualized, an alternative image is also taking shape. In this image, the human brain is evolved for sociality, for the capacity and necessity of living in groups, for the ability to grasp and respond to the mental states of others: human brains are both shaped by, and shape, their sociality. As various aspects of sociality are attributed to human brains, neurobiological self-fashioning can no longer so simply be criticized as individualistic and asocial. It is now for the _social_ good that parents need to understand the ways in which their earliest interactions with their children shape their brains at the time when they are most plastic, to recognize the ways in which they learn to understand other minds, to enhance their capacities for empathy and the inherent emotional ability of their brains to respond positively to fairness and commitment to others, to maximize the mental capital and moral order of society as a whole. And it is in the name of improving the well-being of our societies that each of us is now urged to develop a reflexive understanding of the powers of these nonconscious determinants of our choices, our affections, our commitments: in doing so, we will no longer be passive subjects of those determinants, but learn the techniques to act on them in order to live a responsible life. Once more, now in neural form, we are obliged to take responsibility for our biology, to manage our brains in order to bear the responsibilities of freedom.\n\nHuman Science?\n\nWhat, then, of the relations between neuroscience and the human and social sciences? There is much to be critical of in the rise of these technologies of the neurobiological self. Experimental practices in laboratory settings still fail adequately to address the fact that neither animal nor human brains exist in isolation or can be understood outside their milieu and form of life. Conceptions of sociality in social neuroscience are frequently impoverished, reducing social relations to those of interactions between individuals, and ignore decades of research from the social sciences on the social shaping and distributed character of human cognitive, affective, and volitional capacities. Strategies of intervention, of governing through the brain, are based on many dubious assumptions and often blithely ignorant of the likely social consequences of their endeavors.\n\nArguments claiming that neuroscience offers a radical and challenging reconceptualization of human personhood and selfhood are often confused and are based on the very culturally and historically specific premises that that they claim to explain. Many, if not all, of the claims made for _neuro_ products claiming to improve mental capacities by brain stimulation of various types have no basis in research, although they appeal to long-standing cultural beliefs that mental capacities are like physical capacities and can be improved by exercise, training, and rigorous ascetic control of the body. Practices such as 'mindfulness' have swiftly migrated from being self-managed radical alternatives to other forms of 'governing the soul' to become yet another element in the armory of the psychological, psychiatric, and lifestyle experts trying to persuade their clients to improve themselves by becoming mindful. And we can see how the practices of self-improvement, focusing on enhancing each person's capacity to manage themselves flexibly and adaptably in a world of constantly changing demands, do aim to produce the forms of subjectivity that might be able to survive in the new patterns of work and consumption that have taken shape over the past twenty years.\n\nYet, as we argue throughout this book, new styles of thought are beginning to emerge in neuroscience that recognize the need to move beyond reductionism as an explanatory tool, to address questions of complexity and emergence, and to locate neural processes firmly in the dimensions of time, development, and transactions within a milieu. These offer the possibilities of a more positive role for the social and human sciences, an opportunity to seize on the new openness provided by conceptions of the neuromolecular, plastic, and social brain, and to move beyond critique to find some rapprochement. The human sciences have nothing to fear from the argument that much of what makes us human occurs beneath the level of consciousness; indeed, many have long embraced such a view of our ontology (Ellenberger 1970). If we take seriously the renewed assault on human narcissism from contemporary neurobiology, we may find the basis of a radical way of moving beyond notions of human beings as individualized, discrete, autonomous, coherent subjects, free to choose. Neuroscience may seem an unlikely ally of progressive social thought, but its truth effects could surprise us.\nChapter One\n\nThe Neuromolecular Brain\n\nThose of us who have lived through the period in which molecular biology grew up... realized that here was an enormous opportunity for a new synthesis... [an] approach to understanding the mechanisms and phenomena of the human mind that applies and adapts the revolutionary advances in molecular biology achieved during the postwar period. The breakthrough to precise knowledge in molecular genetics and immunology\u2014\"breaking the molecular code\" resulted from the productive interaction of physical and chemical sciences with the life sciences. It now seems possible to achieve similar revolutionary advances in understanding the human mind.\n\n\u2014Francis O. Schmitt, \"Progress Report on the Neurosciences Research Program,\" 1963\n\nIn the summer of 1961, at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Francis O. Schmitt and a small group of collaborators began to lay the plans for a project that was as simple to state as it was ambitious to imagine: to do for the brain what Watson and Crick had so recently done for the gene when they discovered the structure of DNA and \"cracked the genetic code.\" In the process they were to invent what they would come to term _neuroscience_ (Swazey 1975, 531). \"To this end, new devices are being forged,\" wrote Schmitt in 1967, \"with one of which I am closely identified. This is the Neurosciences Research Program (familiarly known as NRP), being a group of 34 gifted scientists\u2014mathematicians, physicists, chemists, neurobiologists, neurologists, psychologists, and psychiatrists\u2014who meet regularly to study the problem and who sponsor a center and a center staff which arranges work sessions on relevant topics of conceptual importance and which communicates the harvest of the work sessions in the program's Bulletin\" (Schmitt 1967, 562).\n\nThe NRP had grown out of the first Intensive Study Program (ISP) that took place in 1966 at the University of Colorado at Boulder, where more than a hundred participants from diverse professional backgrounds gathered to \"unify the disparate neurosciences\" and shed the light on the emerging trends, issues, hypotheses, and findings that could further advance our knowledge of the human brain (Quarton, Melnechuk, Schmitt et al. 1967). The community brought together by this first study program defined itself by its set of objects of study: the brain, the nervous system, and their relation to their arising \"products\" (for example, learning, memory, sleep, arousal, reflex, etc.). The challenge, as they saw it, was to bring together the disparate fields of neurologists, behavioral scientists, physicists, chemists, and mathematicians into meaningful communication with one another under the rubric of what Schmitt (1970)\u2014in one of the first journal articles to mention _neuroscience_ in its title\u2014was to call \"brain and behavior.\" In other words, the intention was to integrate not just the _neuro_ disciplines\u2014neurophysiology, neuroanatomy, neurochemistry, and neurology\u2014but also the _psy_ disciplines of psychology, psychoanalysis, and psychiatry, as well as some other less obvious fields such as immunology (Schmitt 1990). Their approach was characterized by the attempt to combine analysis at many levels: cellular, molecular, anatomical, physiological, and behavioral (Quarton, Melnechuk, Schmitt, et al. 1967). Twenty years later it seemed easy to state the program's aim: it was to answer the question \"What is neuroscience?\" (Schmitt 1985, 1990).\n\nThe terms _neuroscience_ and _neuroscientist_ now seem the obvious ones for this kind of research on the brain. But neither the name nor its implications were immediately evident to those visionaries at the time. Judith Swazey tells us that Schmitt first used the terms \"mental biophysics\" and \"biophysics of the mind\" to encapsulate his attempt to bring together the \"wet, the moist and the dry\" disciplines that addressed central nervous system functioning (Swazey 1975). He and his colleagues later worked under the title \"the Mens Project\" (adopting the Latin term for mind) and initially applied to the NIH for a grant for a \"Neurophysical Sciences Study Program\"\u2014which was approved in just two weeks. The project only became the \"Neurosciences Research Program\" in a subsequent grant application to NASA and the term _neuroscience_ made its first public appearance (in the plural) in 1963 in the title of the _Neurosciences Research Program Bulletin_ of that year.\n\nSchmitt was a biophysicist who was recruited to MIT in 1941 at the request of MIT's president, Karl Compton, and its then vice-president, Vannevar Bush, author of the classic text on the endless frontier of science published in 1945 (Bush 1945). Compton and Bush were keen on establishing a \"new kind of biology\" or \"biological engineering\" that would combine physics, mathematics, and chemistry (Bloom 1997). This vision, as we have suggested, was explicitly informed by the rapid developments in molecular biology during the 1950s (Schmitt 1990). The new kind of biology that Schmitt was called upon to establish at MIT was a molecular biology heavily rooted in biophysics, biochemistry, and biophysical chemistry (Schmitt 1990). Swazey tells us that when Schmitt was sketching out his plans in 1961, \"he listed nine 'basic disciplines' for mental biophysics: solid state physics, quantum chemistry, chemical physics, biochemistry, ultrastructure (electron microscopy and x-ray diffraction), molecular electronics, computer science, biomathematics, and literature research\" (Swazey 1975, 531). Physical chemistry, bioelectric studies and computer science seemed to be essential to study the \"physical basis\" of memory, learning, consciousness, and cognitive behavior.\n\nIn a later paper the list was expanded to twenty-five areas of study, and in its progress report to the NIH in 1963, the NRP enumerated fourteen disciplines represented in their program: chemistry, biochemistry, neurochemistry, physical chemistry, mathematics, physics, biophysics, molecular biology, electrophysiology, neurobiology, neuroanatomy, psychology, psychiatry, and clinical medicine. This was in danger of becoming an enterprise without limits! By 1967, however, Schmitt created a simpler diagram that divided the neurosciences into \"three intellectual areas\": _molecular neurobiology_ , working at the molecular, subcellular, and cellular level; _neural science_ , dealing with \"net characteristics,\" including neuroanatomy, neurophysiology, and neuropathology; and _behavioral or psychological science_ , or what he called \"molecular psychology\" and which he\u2014like so many of his successors\u2014found the most challenging to integrate (Schmitt 1967, 562).\n\nSwazey argued that the NRP had a \"catalytic role in creating and promoting the growth of a _neuroscience_ community.... [T]he term and concepts of 'neuroscience,' of a new type of integrated multidisciplinary and multilevel approach to the study of the brain and behavior, came into being with the NRP\" (Swazey 1975). While those working in this area would retain their specific disciplinary allegiances\u2014molecular biologists, neuroanatomists, biophysicists, psychologists, and so on\u2014they would also locate themselves within this emerging scientific project with a common goal: they would think of themselves as _neuroscientists_. By 1964, this aspect of the project had achieved some success. The term _neuroscientist_ was first used publicly in an article in the journal _Technological Review_ titled \"A neuroscientist sees 'invisible colleges' as a means of meeting the information problem,\" with specific reference to the \"invisible college\" of the recently created Neuroscience Program \"activated and made 'visible' in Boston.\" To create the neuroscientist, then, required, first and foremost, the creation of a matrix\u2014the invisible college\u2014that could bind those who identified with this term into some kind of community.\n\nFor Schmitt, as for other prominent scientists of the time, it would be through the unification or \"synthesis\" of these diverse and separate disciplines and through the reductionist molecular approach (i.e., a bottom-up approach) that substantial breakthroughs could be delivered (cf. Kay 1993). He based this belief on his perception that the success of molecular biology, genetics, immunology, and biophysics arose from the multidisciplinary dialogue between three traditionally separate disciplines: physics, chemistry, and biology. \"It now seems possible,\" Schmitt wrote in a 1963 progress report, \"to achieve similar revolutionary advances in understanding the human mind.... By making full use of [the approaches of physiology and the behavioral sciences] and by coupling them with the conceptual and technical strengths of physics, chemistry, and molecular biology, great advances are foreseeable\" (quoted in Swazey 1975, 530). This was not to be simply a natural evolution of scientific knowledge; it was an explicit project to anatomize the workings of mind in terms of brain, to be undertaken at a novel, neuromolecular level: \"[M]olecular neuropsychology is becoming ripe for study by the methods and concepts that proved significant in molecular genetics and molecular immunology. It seems inevitable that the problem of the mechanisms of brain function will soon become the primary intellectual salient, offering the greatest promise for the life sciences\u2014indeed, as Schroedinger has suggested, of all science\" (Schmitt 1967, 561\u201362). This, then, was to be the promise, and the mission, of the new molecular vision of the brain that was born in 1962.\n\nHow Should One Do the History of the Neurosciences?\n\nBut surely this claim, that the neurosciences were born in 1962 is absurd, or at the least, purely semantic. As we have already mentioned, human beings have been concerned with the brain, the nerves, let alone the mind, since time immemorial, and rigorous reflections, often based on empirical examples, go back at least to the Greeks. So why focus on 1962? To explain this, it is necessary to reflect for a moment on different ways of writing the history of the neurosciences.\n\nConsider, for example, one of the first articles published in French to use the term _neuroscience_ , written by Andr\u00e9 Holley in 1984: its title was \"Les neurosciences: Unit\u00e9 et diversit\u00e9\" (Holley 1984). Holley argued that there is one object of study, and one objective of these new sciences of the brain, namely, \"the knowledge of the nervous system, its function and the function of the diverse phenomena that emerge from it\" (Holley 1984, 12; our translation). Yet, says Holley, on the other hand there are a plurality of methods and concepts. Thus, for him, the neurosciences were born with the convergence of all these sciences around one object of study and concern: the brain. This account of unity in the face of conceptual and methodological diversity seems to fit the account given in most 'authorized' versions of the history, which usually take the form of chronologies of the great thinkers, establishing a lineage of precursors for the present (Garrison and McHenry 1969; DeJong 1982; Brazier 1984, 1988; Finger 1994). These are often supplemented, for the modern period, by compilations of autobiographical accounts of key figures in the manner of oral history (Healy 1996, 1998, 2000; Squire 1996; Tansey 2006).\n\nThere are also a number of institutional versions of this history: many university departments of neuroscience have created their own accounts or time lines of the milestones\u2014key discoveries, key texts, key persons. Some versions are presented from the perspective of the various disciplinary trajectories\u2014from the perspective of neurology, neurochemistry, or neuroimaging. For example, the Society for Neuroscience (SfN), has its own history and has produced eleven DVDs of interviews with prominent neuroscientists. Along the same lines, accounts of other societies and organizations have been published as well, for example, the International Neuropsychological Symposium, founded in 1951 (Boller 1999); the International Brain Research Organization (IBRO), founded in 1961 (Marshall, Rosenblith, Gloor, et al. 1996); the International Society for Neurochemistry, founded in 1965 (McIlwain 1985); and the European Brain and Behavior Society, founded in 1968 (Marzi and Sagvolden 1997).\n\nIn addition, numerous memoirs have been written by famous neuroscientists of the twentieth century (Ram\u00f3n y Cajal 1937; Schmitt 1990; Hodgkin 1992; Kandel 2006), as well as abundant biographies and articles on the contributions and achievements of particular individuals, either in the form of \"neuro-anniversaries\" (Eling 2001) or as part of the development of a particular concept or a discovery, for example, the discovery of acetylcholine by Henry Dale (Tansey 2006) or the discovery of dopamine by Arvid Carlsson (Benes 2001). Other published papers name this or that historical figure as the true founder of neuroscience (Changeux 1985, 1997; Wills 1999). Alongside these accounts of founding fathers\u2014and they were mostly men\u2014we find accounts of the major discoveries, such as the synapse (Rapport 2005), and of major controversies, such as the famous \"war of the soups and the sparks\" between the proponents of electrical transmission and neurotransmission in the central nervous system (Valenstein 2005). And, starting in the 1990s, the history of neuroscience becomes a kind of subdiscipline in its own right, with the founding of the _Journal of the History of the Neurosciences_ , and then of the International Society for the History of the Neurosciences (Rosner 1999).\n\nWhat are they for, all these histories? What role do they play for the neurosciences themselves? As in other truth-claiming disciplines, a historical sensibility is internal to the science itself. It is performative: it establishes a respectable past for neuroscientific knowledge, thus securing a basis for its future. Knowingly or not, such histories solidify the scientificity of the present state of the science whose tale they tell by presenting it as the culmination of a long trajectory of the progress of knowledge. Georges Canguilhem terms such accounts \"recurrent history\"\u2014the history written and rewritten by almost every science, viewing the past from the perspective of its own regime of truth. These histories establish a division between the sanctioned and the lapsed. The sanctioned: a more or less continuous sequence that has led to the present\u2014a past of genius, of precursors, of influences, of obstacles overcome, crucial experiments, discoveries, and the like. The lapsed: a history of false paths, of errors and illusions, of prejudice and mystification, and all those books, theories, arguments, and explanations associated with the past of a system of thought but incongruous with its present. To point to this use of history within science is not to denounce it but to characterize its constitutive role: using the past to help demarcate a contemporary regime of truth, to police the present, and to try to shape the future.\n\nCentral to such a history is a succession of predecessors. This quest for precursors fabricates \"an artifact, a counterfeit historical object\" and ignores the fact that the precursor is the creature of a certain history of science, and not an agent of scientific progress; Canguilhem quotes Koyr\u00e9: \"It is quite obvious (or should be) that no-one has ever regarded himself as the 'forerunner' of someone else.... [T]o regard anyone in this light is the best way of preventing oneself from understanding him\" (Koyr\u00e9 1973, 77; quoted in Canguilhem 1994, 51). Indeed, as Canguilhem points out (1968, 21): \"The precursor is a thinker who the historian believes he can extract from one cultural frame in order to insert him into another, which amounts to considering concepts, discourses and speculative experimental acts as capable of displacement or replacement in an intellectual space in which reversibility of relations has been obtained by forgetting the historical aspect of the object dealt with.\"\n\nFor such histories, we can reinterpret the arguments of those precursors in terms of our own concepts and problems. The objects of study\u2014the brain, the nerves\u2014remain static, intact, brute entities in a world external to thought, which are merely grasped more or less adequately by a succession of thinkers. But the kind of historical epistemology practiced by Canguilhem recognizes the historicity of the very object of explanation, the set of problems, issues, phenomena that an explanation is attempting to account for. In a way, Andr\u00e9 Holley is right when he says that the neurosciences (in the plural form) are centered on one object of study: \"la connaissance du syst\u00e8me nerveux, de son fonctionnement et des ph\u00e9nom\u00e8nes qui emergent de ce fonctionnement\" (Holley 1984, 12). He insists on this 'unity': \"pluralit\u00e9 des methods, diversit\u00e9 des concepts mais unit\u00e9 de l'objet\" (ibid.).\n\nYet the contemporary brain is not the object that formed the focus of nineteenth-century neurologists, nor that explored by Sherrington and Adrian in the first half of the twentieth century. In this chapter we will suggest that the new style of thought that has taken shape in the form of neuroscience has so modified the object of thought, the brain, that that it appears in a new way, with new properties and new relations and distinctions with other objects. And yet, as pointed out by Hans-J\u00f6rg Rheinberger in another context, the research object\u2014what he terms the \"epistemic thing\"\u2014has a \"characteristic, irreducible vagueness\" (Rheinberger 1997, 28). That is because this object embodies what is not yet known. The object, in our case, the neuromolecular brain, is both there and not there. Rheinberger quotes Latour: \"[T]he new object, at the time of its inception, is still undefined. [At] the time of its emergence, you cannot do better than explain what the new object is by repeating the list of its constitutive actions. [The] proof is that if you add an item to the list you _redefine the object_ , that is, you give it a new shape\" (Latour 1987, 87\u201388, quoted in Rheinberger 1997, 29). That is no doubt true, yet we will suggest in this chapter that while the object of the new brain sciences is elusive, vague, shifting, and while it constantly refers back, and gains some of its power, from that brain that we think we have always known, that mass inside the skull, a new style of thought has taken shape, which has provided the possibility for the neurosciences to achieve their current status, to move out of the laboratory and the clinic, to become a kind of expertise in understanding and intervening in human conduct in many different practices.\n\nIt is, of course, a mistake to think of historical time as continuous: the time of history is not that of a calendar, it is intercalated by discontinuous events (Canguilhem, 1968; Foucault 1972) or \"turbulences\" (Serres 1977). The birth of neuroscience marks something like an event. Yet even a discontinuous genealogy cannot do without dates, symbolic landmarks to alert us to something like an 'event.' It is in that sense that we mark this event with a date\u20141962. This is the point at which a number of distinct lines of thought and practice seem to come together to create a difference. It is beyond our capacity to undertake a genealogy of this event here. So, at the risk of simplification, let us try to orient ourselves by distinguishing, purely for heuristic purposes, three intertwining pathways that seem to intersect in that event\u2014the path through the nerves, the path through the brain, and the path through madness.\n\nThe Path through the Nerves\n\nNeuroscience, neurology, neuroanatomy, neuroembryology, neurophysiology, neurochemistry, and the burgeoning _neuro_ fields, from neuroeducation and neuroeconomics, to neurophilosophy and neuromarketing all have in common the prefix _neuro_ -, which is taken from the ancient Greek _ne\u00fbron_ or the Latin _nervus_ , meaning \"of or relating to nerves or the nervous system.\" The _OED_ dates the first use of _neuro_ -in words of Greek origin to the seventeenth century with the introduction of the term _neurology_ and in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries in loanwords from post-classical Latin, as with the terms _neurotomy_ (the anatomical dissection of nerves), _neurography_ (the anatomical description of nerves), and _neuralgia_ (pain in the area served by a nerve). In French, the prefixes _n\u00e9vro_ -and _neuro_ -both occur from the late seventeenth century onward (1690, in _n\u00e9vrologie_ ; 1691, in _neurologie_ ). In German, the prefix makes its first appearance probably in 1856 with the term _Neuroglia._ In Italian, the _OED_ dates the first use of _neurologia_ in 1764 and _nevralgia_ in 1828.\n\nThomas Willis is thought to have coined the term _neurology_ to refer to the \"Doctrine of Nerves\": the first entry in the _OED_ for the term _neurology_ is 1681, the date of publication of Samuel Pordage's translation of Willis's 1664 influential _Cerebri anatome_. The use of that term to describe a treatise on the nervous system dates back to 1704, and the word gradually came to refer to the branch of science or medicine dealing with the nervous system and its diseases and disorders. Wilhelm Griesinger, in Berlin, founded the _Archiv f\u00fcr Psychiatrie und Nervenkrankheiten_ in 1867, and the American Neurological Association was formed in 1875. The _OED_ tells us that term _neuropath_ \u2014for both the doctor who attributes diseases to disorders of the nerves, and to those suffering from or susceptible to nervous diseases\u2014dates from the 1880s.\n\nAll histories of these matters credit Golgi with inventing the silver salt staining method that enabled the visualization of the elements of the nervous system, although he believed that they formed a single continuous network, and Cajal with establishing the doctrine that neurons were discrete cells that were the elementary units of the brain. The _OED_ finds the first English use of the term _neuron_ in a paper by Alex Hill, published in _Brain_ in 1891, summarizing the research of Camillo Golgi, Santiago Ram\u00f3n y Cajal, Albert von K\u00f6lliker and Wilhelm His Sr. But Jean-Pierre Changeux tells us: \"As to the term 'neuron,' we owe it neither to Ram\u00f3n y Cajal nor to His, but to Wilhelm Waldeyer (1891) about whom Ram\u00f3n y Cajal wrote that all he had done was to 'publish in a daily paper a r\u00e9sum\u00e9 of his research and invent the term neuron' \" (Changeux 1997, 28). In 1906, despite their bitter disagreements, and Cajal's attacks on Golgi's reticular or neural net theory, Golgi and Cajal jointly received the Nobel Prize for Physiology or Medicine for their discoveries of the structure of the nervous system.\n\nThe French Soci\u00e9t\u00e9 de Neurologie was formed in 1899, and its German equivalent in 1907. We find _neuroanatomy_ used in 1900, the first reference to _neurobiology_ in 1906, and _neuroembryology_ emerged in the 1930s. The first chair in _neurochemistry_ was established in 1945, the _Journal of Neurochemistry_ started publishing in 1956, the International Society for Neurochemistry was founded in 1965, and the American Society for Neurochemistry was inaugurated in 1969. The mode of action of the neuron was gradually unraveled over this period: in 1926, Edgar Adrian published his recordings of impulses for individual sensory nerve fibers; in 1939, Hodgkin and Huxley published their classic paper reporting the recording of action potentials from inside a nerve fiber; and in 1944, Joseph Erlanger and Herbert Gasser were awarded the Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine \"for their discoveries relating to the highly differentiated function of single nerve fibres.\" _Neuropharmacology_ appears in the late 1940s, used in relation to the introduction and discovery of more effective antiepileptics (Toman 1949). In 1951, the International Neuropsychological Symposium was formed under the leadership of cofounder Henry H\u00e9caen, and it met almost every year from 1951 until 1998 for the purpose of promoting knowledge and understanding of brain functions and cognate issues on the borderland of neurology, psychology, and psychiatry. The 1950s saw the famous \"war of soups and sparks\"\u2014the disputes between the believers in electrical neurotransmission and those who believed that neurotransmission in the central nervous system was chemical\u2014and the gradual victory of the chemical view of neurotransmission (cf. Valenstein 2005). And thus we arrive, more or less, at 1962.\n\nThe Path via the Brain\n\nMost historians agree that contemporary research in neuroscience builds on studies of the brain that flourished in Europe in the nineteenth century. It was at this point, it seems, that the brain began to be truly understood as an organ analagous to others, and that specific areas and structures in the brain came to be seen as responsible for certain functions\u2014such as those that are still known by the names of their discoverers\u2014Broca, Wernicke, Flechsig, for example. The journal _Brain_ was first published in England in 1878, calling itself \"A Journal of Neurology\"\u2014thus making it clear that our separation of nerves and brain is purely heuristic! It had four editors. J. C. Bucknill and James Crichton-Browne both had backgrounds as medical superintendents of insane asylums; both were prolific authors and advocates for what was then often termed psychological medicine. David Ferrier and John Hughlings Jackson were neurologists working on the localization of brain functions, work that we discuss in more detail in chapter 2.\n\nIn the half-century that followed, work on brain structure and function continued, notably by Charles Sherrington and his group in the United Kingdom, using technologies of stimulation or ablation of specific of brain areas. Others, notably Sherrington's colleague Edgar Adrian, used technologies of visualization, such as the electroencephalogram. A meeting of electroen-cephalographers in London in 1947 led to the establishment of an International Federation of Electroencephalography and Clinical Neurophysiology, and the proposal for an International Brain Research Organization arose from a meeting of this group in Moscow in 1958 initiated by the French clinical neurophysiologist Henri Gastaut. IBRO was established as a component of the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), which was founded in 1951. Initial proposals for UNESCO had included an \"Institut du Cerveau\" (Institute for the Brain), which was not accepted (McIlwain 1985). IBRO was constituted with seven panels\u2014in neuroanatomy, neurochemistry, neuroendocrinology, neuropharmacology, neurophysiology, behavioral sciences and neurocommunications, and biophysics. This multidisciplinary structure of collaboration between approaches and across national borders was retained when it became an independent body: again note the year of its foundation\u20141961.\n\nThe Path via Insanity\n\nWe arrive at roughly the same point in the 1960s if we follow the path of those dealing with those deemed insane or otherwise mentally afflicted. In fact, the journal _Brain_ , not surprisingly, given the interests of two of its founding editors, was much concerned with the ways in which brain damage or disorder could produce symptoms like those of hysteria or mania, as well as loss of speech, hearing, memory, or other functions. Broca, Wernicke, Flechsig, and others studied the brains of those who died in lunatic asylums in their attempts to discover the basis of mental afflictions in the brain. Many also studied those who had suffered brain injuries, for example, those who drew conclusions from emblematic figures like Phineas Gage, who had suffered changes in character after an injury to specific regions of his brain caused by that famous tamping iron (Macmillan 2000). There were those like the French psychiatrist B\u00e9n\u00e9dict Morel, whose understanding of madness as a physical condition was closely linked to their ideas of inheritance and the problem of degeneration (Morel 1852\u201353, 1860). The birth of psychiatric genetics was intrinsically bound up with the eugenic style of thought that was prevalent in Europe and North America in the first half of the twentieth century, although the pathways for the action of the supposed inherited diathesis were unknown.\n\nIt is true that this period was also that of the early development of dynamic psychotherapies, but most of those who worked in this tradition were\u2014like Freud himself\u2014quite open to the belief that the propensities to the disorders they addressed were organic and inherited, although once more the locus of these disorders in the nerves or the brain was a matter of conjecture. The first half of the twentieth century saw the birth of movements to address the 'maladaption' and 'maladjustment' of the instincts that underpinned the troubles of everyday existence at work or in the family, such as the mental hygiene movement. But in the asylums, physical treatments were flourishing: shock therapies using electroshock-or insulin-induced coma, malaria therapies (for neurosyphilis), and psychosurgery (Sargant and Slater 1944; Sargant, Hill, and Slater, 1948). Somehow, it seemed, the brain was the locus of mental pathology, and potentially therefore the target for therapy, but just how and where remained elusive.\n\nIn 1936, Egas Moniz reported the first results of his technique of frontal lobotomy. These were apparently inspired by a report of the calming effects of destruction of the prefrontal brain area of monkeys and chimpanzees; Moniz's version of this procedure involved the destruction of a portion of the frontal lobes, first by injection of alcohol, and later by cutting nerve fibers with a surgical leucotome (Moniz 1948, 1954; Valenstein 1986; Pressman 1998). These methods were taken up by Walter Freeman and James Watts in the United States, who invented a technique to enter the brain through the eye socket using an instrument modeled on the ice pick (Freeman and Watts 1942, 1950). By 1948, lobotomies had been performed on about twenty thousand patients worldwide. In 1949, Moniz was awarded the Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine for this work.\n\nJoseph Zubin, in his article on \"Abnormalities of Behavior\" for _Annual Reviews of Psychology_ in 1952, notes: \"The tremendous impact that psychosurgery has made on current investigations is evidenced by the following books and monographs which were published between 1949 [ _sic_ ] and 1951\" (Halstead 1947; Mettler 1949; Freeman and Watts 1950; Partridge 1950; Fulton 1951; Greenblatt, Arnot, and Solomon 1951) and the number of symposia that focused on this topic (Association for Research in Nervous and Mental Disease 1948; Rees, Hill, and Sargeant 1949; Congr\u00e8s International de Psychiatrie 1950; Halstead 1950; U.S. National Institute of Mental Health 1951), as well as the studies of the brain that showed the impact of this research (Hebb 1949; Golla and Richter 1950; Penfield and Rasmussen 1950; Porteus 1950). Psychosurgery, he remarks, acted as a \"shot in the arm\" for psychiatry in the 1940s, and while \"the mechanisms whereby the operation brings about improvement remain unknown.... By the end of the third month, most of the psychological functions have returned to their preoperative level, or have even exceeded it\" (Zubin 1952, 262\u201363). Subsequent experience was to prove him wrong.\n\nThe enthusiasm for physical treatments in the 1940s and 1950s, along with the conviction that they had a scientific basis and major therapeutic implications for psychiatry, led to the formation in 1945 of the Society for Biological Psychiatry, whose mission was to encourage \"the study of the biological causes of and treatments for psychiatric disorders.\" Edward Shorter credits Stanley Cobb, one of the originators of this society, with being the founder of biological psychiatry in the United States, not only building the Department of Psychiatry at Massachusetts General Hospital beginning in 1934 (Shorter 1997, 263) but also promoting psychoanalysis. The opposition between the biological and the psychoanalytic does not emerge until the 1960s. When the first International Congress on Psychiatry was held in Paris in 1950, sessions on Psychotherapy and Psychoanalysis (chaired by Franz Alexander) were presented alongside those on Genetic and Eugenic Psychiatry (chaired by Torsten Sj\u00f6gren), on Shock Therapy (chaired by Josef Handesman), and on Cerebral Anatomy and Physiology in the Light of Lobotomy and Topectomies (chaired by Frederick Golla) (Congr\u00e8s International de Psychiatrie, 1950). Present at the meeting were Denis Hill, who talked on the use of the EEG in psychiatry, and Max Reiss and Derek Richter, both of whom were then working on the psychiatric implications of hormones and endocrinol-ogy. The overall chairman of the Congress was Jean Delay, who was the emblem of the new bridge between psychiatry and neurochemistry via psychiatric drugs that would rapidly come to replace most, if not all, of the more direct physical interventions into the brain (whose promises were only to be enthusiastically explored again half a century later).\n\nThis is not the place to recount the history of psychopharmacology in any detail; a rapid sketch will serve our purposes. The effects of chlorpromazine were first reported by Henri Laborit working at Val-de-Gr\u00e2ce military hospital in Paris in 1951, and in 1952, Jean Delay and Pierre Deniker published the apparently dramatic results of administering this drug to psychotic patients at the Saint Anne Hospital in Paris (Delay 1953). In a series of transactions between France and North America, the drug was widely taken up by those working in psychiatric hospitals in North America during the 1950s (Horwitz 2002). The first results of another drug, reserpine, on psychotic patients were reported in 1954, and by 1955, when Jean Delay organized an international colloquium on psychopharmacology in Paris, it seemed as if at last drugs had been developed that acted on the symptoms of mental disorder by virtue of their specific effects in the brain. Once more, however, this was not framed as an opposition between physical and psychological treatments, for it was argued that one of the main advantages of the drugs was that it made the patients who had been treated more amenable to psychotherapy.\n\nThroughout the 1950s, a number of key papers begin to discuss the effects of other drugs, notably isoniazid, iproniazid, reserpine, and imipramine on disturbed or depressed patients. Gradually the theory took shape that all these novel psychotherapeutic agents produced their effects on mood and conduct by acting on the levels of monamines in the brain (Salzer and Lurie 1953; Kline 1954; Delay and Buissoj 1958; Kuhn 1958). Bernard (\"Steve\") Brodie, who decided to enter psychopharmacology \"after hearing about the sensational clinical actions of the new antipsychotic drugs and the ability of the hallucinogenic LSD to block the effects of serotonin on various peripheral organs\" (Carlsson 1990, 486), developed new analytical methods that enabled him and his colleagues to demonstrate that the effects of reserpine were linked to its ability to deplete serotonin in the brain (Brodie, Pletscher, and Shore 1955; Pletscher, Shore, and Brodie 1955; Shore, Silver, and Brodie 1955). Arvid Carlsson, who had worked with Brodie, generalized this to other catecholamines, notably to dopamine (Carlsson, Lindqvist, Magnusson, et al. 1958; Carlsson 1959; Carlsson and Lindqvist 1963; Dahlstrom and Carlsson 1986), and began to formulate the link between the depletion of dopamine by reserpine and the symptoms of Parkinson's disease.\n\nAlthough by the 1950s it was accepted that neurotransmission in the _peripheral_ nervous system was chemical, as late as 1960, according to Arvid Carlsson, there was still considerable resistance to the argument that chemical neurotransmission happened in the brain and was probably the dominant form of neurotransmission. However, the work of Carlsson and his collaborators over the next few years, involving many technical developments, established the neuronal localization of dopamine, noradrenaline, and serotonin in the central and peripheral nervous system, and mapped the major monoaminergic pathways and the sites of action of the major psychotropic drugs. According to Carlsson, by 1965 a \"paradigm shift\" had taken place, and it was now almost universally accepted that the monoamines played the key role in neurotransmission in both peripheral and central nervous systems and that their presence and actions were clearly linked to psychiatric symptoms (Dahlstrom and Carlsson 1986; Carlsson 1990, 2001).\n\nA kind of informal consensus began to develop in which each of the major classes of neurotransmitters then known was allocated to a specific disorder\u2014catecholamines to mood disorders, serotonin to anxiety, dopamine to psychosis, and acetylcholine to dementia (Healy 1997). In 1963, Carlsson and Lindqvist published what is usually taken as the first formulation of the dopamine hypothesis of schizophrenia, describing the interaction between the antipsychotic drugs chlorpromazine and haloperidol, and the level of the dopamine metabolite, 3-methoxytyramine, in the mouse brain\u2014thus suggesting that high levels of dopamine might be linked to the symptoms and that reduction in dopamine might be the mode of effect of the drug (Carlsson and Lindqvist 1963).\n\nIn 1965 Joseph Schildkraut published his paper on the catecholamine hypothesis of depression: \"what has been designated 'the catecholamine hypothesis of affective disorders,' proposes that some, if not all, depressions are associated with an absolute or relative deficiency of catecholamines, particularly norepinephrine, at functionally important adrenergic receptor sites in the brain. Elation, conversely, may be associated with an excess of such amines\" (Schildkraut 1965, 509). This paper, which hedged its conclusions with many reservations, marked the moment when a new language was assembled together, one that would come to shape the style of thinking and research in psychopharmacology and the forms of clinical practice in psychiatry. Indeed, Schildkraut claimed that he decided to publish first in the _American Journal of Psychiatry_ , a clinical journal, because he saw his work as more than about catecholamines\u2014it was about the \"notion that pharmacology can become a bridge, linking neuroscience and clinical psychiatry\"\u2014though he later published a version in a journal that would be read by the psychopharmacologists, when he discovered that they didn't read the clinical journals (Schildkraut 2000, 124).\n\nThe significance of the hypothesis was not limited either to the catecholamines or to depression. What one had to do, from this point onward, was to understand mental disorders in terms of their characteristic patterns of biogenic amines in the brain and to understand the action of actual or potential psychiatric drugs in terms of their actions on the secretion, breakdown, depletion, and reuptake of these amines in the synapses or the receptors. A whole continent of potential experiments, clinical trials, and drug development was opened for exploration. One might examine the amines in the brain directly, if one could. One might examine them in experimental animals. One might examine the behavior of synapses or receptors by using in vitro cultures. One might examine them or their breakdown products in the blood or urine of psychiatric patients. One might, in a reverse move, seek to refine psychiatric diagnoses in terms of amine malfunctions. This, then, was the path to a future neuropsychiatry (Healy 1997).\n\nThe dopamine hypothesis of schizophrenia and the monoamine hypothesis of depression were the two founding myths of the psychopharmacological imaginary. Both have proved to be wrong, perhaps fundamentally so. However, for the biological psychiatrists, who would gradually come to dominate the field, the biogenic amine system in the brain would increasingly become the obligatory passage point of all accounts of mental disorder. If there were environmental or biographical factors in the etiology of disorder, they would have their effects by acting through this mechanism. If there were genetic factors, they would work through their impact on this mechanism. If there were psychodynamic factors, well, they too would work via this mechanism. Even evidence that seemed to conflict with the argument would have to be explained in analogous neurochemical terms. Once more, note the date when this neuromolecular vision of the mode of action of psychiatric drugs was formulated\u2014the early 1960s.\n\nInfrastructure\n\nDespite so many histories of neuroscience, most social historians working in this area agree that we do not have anything approaching a sociological account of the development of the neurosciences\u2014that is, at a minimum, something that would link these developments to their social, cultural, perhaps even political conditions of emergence. We have not attempted such an account here. Our claim is a limited one: that the event here was a new way of seeing the brain\u2014a 'neuromolecular gaze.' And in the chapters that follow, we will argue that it is this new way of envisaging the brain and nervous system, and the style of thought and intervention to which it is linked, that has established the conditions that allow for the burgeoning of the neurosciences over the past five decades, and hence for the birth of our contemporary neurobiological complex. This is not to say that Schmitt was the founder of the neurosciences or of the new complex of sciences of mind and behavior that takes shape after 1962. Rather, his NRP is emblematic; it exemplifies a moment, dispersed across different sites, cultures, and countries, in which something new was coming into existence\u2014a neuromolecular vision of the brain as an intelligible organ that was open to knowledge.\n\nBut a vision itself is seldom enough. A vision needs some kind of infra-structure. Many different infrastructural forms can be found in scientific research. We have already encountered a number in our rapid overview of pathways to neuroscience. Many involve a kind of discipleship, where a charismatic scientist infuses certain beliefs and commitments into those who are trained at his or her feet. Others involve the founding of learned journals developed to promulgate a particular kind of identity for those who publish, contribute to, and read them. In some, a university has played a key role, for example where a university department employs those who share and transmit the vision of the professor. Another ancient form of infrastructure is the scientific society or the academy. And one more form, that of an 'invisible college,' refers us back to the phrase used by Robert Boyle in the 1640s to designate a network of intellectuals without an institutional form, exchanging ideas, information, and speculation on specific topics (Crane 1972). And a framework has also been provided by scientific institutes\u2014usually located within or attached to universities, with a physical form, an organizational structure, a group of faculty, students, visitors, and so forth.\n\nSchmitt was certainly aware of the significance of infrastructure. While he did sometimes speak of the NRP as an invisible college, he spent much time and energy pondering and organizing the rather material conditions under which his project might best flourish. Beginning with the idea of a bricks-and-mortar research center or institute, Schmitt concluded that this was not the best form to foster the novel mode of scientific communication and interaction that he sought\u2014he wanted to establish a different kind of center \"oriented towards probing and evaluating the state of the art, seeking to map new research and conceptual directions, and providing new modes of education for the communication among a worldwide network of scientists\" (Swazey 1975, 533). He took the idea of a study program from those he already knew from biophysics, and chose a structure in which a core group of individuals from the different disciplines would sponsor a series of such programs\u2014conferences and workshops\u2014with a relatively small central physical base independent of any university for the co-location of staff and for meetings of the associates.\n\nThis was indeed the form the NRP took, with premises located within the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in Brookline, Massachusetts, undertaking a set of activities\u2014study programs, focused conferences, teaching activities to introduce those with no knowledge of neuroscience to the fundamentals of brain structure and function\u2014plus the _NRP Bulletin_ which would disseminate the results of all these endeavors. The NRP thus involved many of the key elements of infrastructure: a charismatic leader, a network of loyal students, a shared language and nomenclature, a shared moral economy among its members, and, perhaps more than anything, a certain way of seeing the object of investigation, rendering it thinkable and actionable via a neuromolecular gaze. But the NRP was no 'origin'; rather, it was exemplary of something happening at several other sites, around other key individuals. For Schmitt was not alone in his endeavor to forge a community among those who were addressing this organ of the brain from diverse disciplinary perspectives.\n\nIn their own 'recurrent history' of neuroscience, Eric Kandel and his colleagues choose David Rioch at the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research as the key early figure, and they single out Stephen Kuffler, who created the first Department of Neurobiology at Harvard Medical School in 1966, as the person who drove the project of a unified neuroscience together, \"surmount[ing] the conventional divisions that had separated the subdisciplines of the neurosciences, and succeed[ing] in establishing a unified discipline that represented the various subfields\" (Cowan, Harter, and Kandel, 2000, 347). They argued that it was Kuffler's work that inspired the formation of similar departments in other universities and led to the formation of the Society for Neuroscience in 1969 \"under the leadership of the psychologist Neil Miller, the biochemist Ralph Gerard, and the neurophysiologist Vernon Mountcastle,\" which in turn brought together researchers who had previously been associated with their own disciplinary societies\u2014as physiologists, anatomists, biochemists, or psychologists (ibid.). What was taking shape here was a rather different form of infrastructure from that developed in the NRP, linked to a different project of neuro-interdisciplinarity. Rioch certainly facilitated interdisciplinarity, as David Hubel later reflected: \"In the neuropsychiatry division [of Walter Reed] David Rioch had assembled a broad and lively group of young neuroscientists, notably M.G.F. Fuortes and Robert Galambos in neurophysiology, Walle Nauta in neuroanatomy, Joseph Brady and Murray Sidman in experimental psychology and John Mason in chemistry.... As in Montreal, the focus was on the entire nervous system, not on a subdivision of biological subject matter based on methods.\"\n\nSo indeed did Kuffler and his group at Johns Hopkins\u2014a group particularly focused on the electrical physiology of the nervous system, and that included Vernon Mountcastle, David Hubel, and Torsten Wiesel. The scope of these collaborations widened when Kuffler moved to Harvard to set up a new Department of Neurobiology in 1966 (Katz 1982). As Timothy Harrison puts it:\n\nIn the 1960's, many scientists in and outside Kuffler's orbit realized that their grasp of biology was too limited. A prime example of this limitation was that electrical recording techniques could give only electrical answers and information, whereas new questions constantly suggested themselves. What are optimal nerve membrane ionic and biochemical requirements for nerve impulse propagation? What are the brain's energy sources? Do they differ from those of peripheral nerves? To answer such questions, an army of scientists developed new areas of neurobiologic research. Molecular and sub-cellular physiologists were interested in regulation of protein synthesis. Other scientists, specifically neurochemists, immunologists, molecular geneticists and several varieties of biophysicists all focused on the biology of the nervous system. Many of these neurobiologists gathered in Kuffler's new department at Harvard.... Kuffler's department inspired many other scientists trying to organize their departments and research in neurobiology. In its way Harvard served as a microcosm of a greater and broader scientific world now available to the handful of interested scientists who started the Society of Neuroscience in 1969. (Harrison 2000, 177)\n\nThe achievement here was both conceptual\u2014the need for some kind of integration of these distinct approached to the nervous system\u2014and topographical\u2014for, as the autobiographies by those associated with these developments show, it was the co-location in a single physical building, often along a single corridor, of researchers working on different questions, using different methods and approaches\u2014that enabled ideas and techniques to travel and to hybridize (Purves 2010).\n\nAs the researchers and postdocs moved from mentor to mentor, from the United States to London, to Australia, to Germany and back again, encountering enthusiasms and resistances to these new integrative approaches in equal measure, the linkages became stronger. By the end of the 1960s, then, neuroscience, as an interdisciplinary project with a neuromolecular gaze, was acquiring a spreading network of trained disciples of such charismatic people as Schmitt and Kuffler, although it took longer for other departments to form under the title of neurobiology. By 1970, Schmitt was able to point to the \"recent appearance of several journals and series of books with the words _brain_ and _neuroscience_ in their titles, and the formation of new multidisciplinary societies concerned with neuroscience. These include the Brain Research Association of the United Kingdom, the Society for Neuroscience of the United States, the European Brain and Behavior Organization and new specialty groups such as the International Neurochemical Society and the American Society for Neurochemistry\" (Schmitt 1970, 1006). And Schmitt would have agreed with Kandel and his colleagues when they write that the existence of the new discipline of neuroscience was institutionalized in a new way when, a \"decade later, in 1978, the first volume of the _Annual Review of Neuroscience_ appeared... a clear recognition that this new synthesis of disciplines had matured and could stand on an equal footing with other fully mature basic science disciplines\" (Cowan, Harter, and Kandel 2000, 348).\n\nA Neuromolecular Style of Thought\n\nIn 1962, the International Brain Research Organization began its world survey of research facilities and manpower in the brain sciences, focusing on three broad areas: first, the basic sciences modified by the prefix _neuro-_ : neuroanatomy, neurochemistry, neuroendocrinology, neuropathology, neuropharmacology, and neurophysiology; second, a group of disciplines consisting of neurocommunications and biophysics, including cybernetics and information theory, mathematical modeling, nerve cell and membrane biophysics, and neuromolecular biology; and third, the behavioral sciences, encompassing animal behavior, behavioral genetics, psycholinguistics, sensation and perception, and certain aspects of anthropology, psychology, psychiatry, and sociology. By 1968, using rather generous criteria, it could identify 880 different research groups and 4,245 investigators identified with the neurosciences in the United States alone (International Brain Research Organization 1968). And in the forty years that followed, it seemed self-evident that neuroscience was indeed a discipline, with all the implications of the term\u2014institutional organization; authorities of truth; incorporation into the academy; textbooks and training; norms of experimentation, evidence, and argument; and much more.\n\nBut nonetheless, it is a discipline whose boundaries seem blurred and whose internal configuration is complex and shifting. Papers are published in hundreds of different specialist journals as well as those, such as _Nature_ , intended for a more general scientific audience. The Neuroscience Citation Index (NSCI), which covers more than 350 journals, divides the neurosciences into eleven fields: Behavioral Neurology, Cardiovascular Disease and Metabolism, Developmental Neuroscience, Electroencephalography, Epilepsy Research, Molecular Brain Research, Neural Networks, Neurogenetics, Neuroimaging, Neurosurgery, and Psychopharmacology. Even in areas that might seem closely related to the outsider, interdisciplinary divisions into distinct organizations are evident, each with its own international conferences, recurrent themes, key reference points, and forms of argument and experimentation.\n\nThus, despite the claims that neuroscience is now a discipline with a unified object of study and concern, what we have here is something different. But this heterogeneity and contestation is not surprising. For, as we have seen, the creation of a neuroscience community was not intended to eradicate the specific disciplinary allegiances of those who formed it, but rather to create a common space within which they could interact. In any event, we agree with those historians and philosophers of science who have pointed out that disunity, rather than unity, characterizes the sciences (Dupr\u00e9 1993; Rosenberg 1994; Galison and Stump 1996; Hacking 1996; Galison 1997). There are a number of research fronts, with different sources of public and private research funding directed to different aspects and research strategies, and the multiplication of specialist institutes on everything from basic research on brain and behavior, to clinical and translational research. Efforts at unification, even when merely in the form of a consolidated textbook or introduction to neuroscience, can thus be seen as strategic, with political, cultural, epistemological, and ethical implications (Galison and Stump 1996).\n\nYet there is another way in which this appearance of diversity is misleading, because the event that we have traced to the 1960s is not really one of disciplinary formation. It is more an event in epistemology and ontology, in the nature of the object of the neurosciences and the forms of knowledge that can render it into thought. Is there any unity in the thought styles that characterize the diverse neuroscientific communities built around specific disciplines and research fronts? Is there something like an overarching \"style of thought\" (Fleck [1935] 1979)? Ian Hacking, drawing on A. C. Crombie more than Fleck, has identified six \"styles of reasoning\" in the sciences: (1) deducing from postulates, (2) experimental exploration and measurement of observational relations, (3) hypothetical construction of analogical models, (4) use of comparison and taxonomy to establish order, (5) statistical analysis of regularities in populations and the calculation of probabilities, and (6) analysis in terms of genesis or historical development (Hacking 1992b). John Forrester added another: (7) \"thinking in cases\" (Forrester 1996). Approached from this perspective, we would not find just single style of reasoning in neuroscience: in the same paper or the work of a single research group, we can often see thinking in terms of models, use of the laws of large numbers, analyses of the genesis and development of neuronal structures, concerns with traits or disorders, questions of taxonomy and classification, and even reasoning in cases.\n\nYet, approached in a different way, closer to the spirit of Ludwik Fleck, it is indeed possible, by 1970, to discern something like a style of thought what we term a \"neuromolecular style of thought.\" At the risk of oversimplification, let us enumerate some of its key structuring principles:\n\n1. The brain is an organ like any other (even if much more complex).\n\n2. Like other organs, many basic neural processes and structures have been conserved by evolution, so that one can posit, and indeed identify, similarities not merely in other primates, but also in other vertebrate animals, and indeed, in some cases, even in other phyla. Thus one can use animal models to understand these features that humans share with other creatures.\n\n3. Neural processes in the brain, and their common features across species, can and should be anatomized at a molecular level\u2014that is to say, each event in the brain can and should in principle be traced to identifiable molecular events\u2014thus investigations should proceed in a reductionist form, that is to say, by exploring these in the simplest possible systems.\n\n4. At that level, the key processes are those of neurotransmission, that is to say, communication along and between neurons. Communication is a combination of chemical transmission (across the synaptic cleft) and electrical transmission (down the neuron itself), and neurons are of different types, in part depending on the neurotransmitters that they use\u2014dopamine, serotonin, and so forth.\n\n5. Neurotransmission also entails the function of multiple other entities: ion channels, transporters, receptors, enzymes that catalyze or metabolize neurotransmitters at different rates, and so forth. Variations in each of these elements have functional significance and can in principle account for processes at higher levels.\n\n6. Different parts of the brain\u2014both different structural areas and different types of neurons using different neurotransmitters\u2014have different evolutionary histories, and have been evolved for different mental functions, and these networks of interconnected neurons can be identified anatomically and visualized by observing levels of activation in different brain regions when the organism is undertaking different tasks or is in different cognitive, emotional, or volitional states.\n\n7. All mental processes reside _in the brain_ (where else could they reside!), and each mental process will reflect, or be mediated by, or have something variously described as a correlate, an underpinning, or a basis, in brain events.\n\n8. Thus any mental state or process (normal or abnormal), and the behavior associated with that state or process (normal or abnormal), will have a relation\u2014exactly what relation is in dispute\u2014with a potentially observable material process in the organic functioning of the neuromolecular processes in the brain.\n\nExplicitly or implicitly, those who belonged to the invisible college of neuroscience shared this neuromolecular vision of the brain. However intellectually challenging it was in practice, in principle the brain was to be understood as an organ like any other organ (Schmitt 1967). The mental functions of perception, cognition, emotion, volition, and so forth could all be accounted for, in principle, by processes operating at the molecular level that was their substrate, and that underpinned or subserved them.\n\nInitially, the focus of this reductionist style of thought was on features that were common to all members of a species and especially those that were conserved across species by evolution. But what of variation? It was, of course, well understood that there were variations in all of the above, from individual to individual and across the life span, as well as across species. The belief that these variations were evolutionarily intelligible, meant, of course, that they were shaped by genetics, as did the fact that they could be affected by mutations, both naturally occurring and artificially induced though mutagenesis. This is not the place to trace the history of neurogenetics or the role played by such key figures as Seymour Benzer in identifying the genetic bases of behavioral characteristics in his favored model animal, the fruit fly _Drosophila melanogaster_. In this style of thought, genes were conceived of as more or less individualized, distinct units of inherited information that determined the synthesis of proteins. They could occur in a small number of distinct forms, or alleles, which could affect the phenotype of the animal concerned\u2014either its physical properties or in its behavior. These could be investigated in the laboratory by artificially inducing mutations in the genes of individual animals\u2014that is to say by mutagenesis\u2014and then by breeding from those animals and observing the effects in their offspring, and if necessary, in further generations. A whole range of technologies were used to study these changes and the way in which they were carried in pedigrees or lineages, and to explore the relations between genes, brains, and behavior, not just in laboratory studies of animals, but also in field studies of the genetics of mental disorders in humans. While few questioned the advances made in behavioral genetics of animals, the use of these explanatory regimes in humans was highly socially and politically controversial, not least because of the historical association with eugenics: genetic accounts of mental illness appeared to naturalize mental distress, to make it a matter of pathological brains not of pathogenic social experiences, and to legitimate physical methods of intervention, notably through the use of drugs.\n\nIn the aftermath of the sequencing of the human genome, however, a new style of thought took shape that may still speak of genes, but that focuses on variations at a different level\u2014at the molecular level of the base pairs themselves that code for proteins or that act to regulate gene expression. Variations between individuals were now thought to be related to variations at this molecular level, where one base might be substituted for another, thus affecting the nature of the protein or the activity of the enzyme that was synthesized. Conceived in this way, molecular genomics came into alignment with molecular neurobiology. Research could now explore the genomic basis of variations in the molecular components of neural activity\u2014of the neurotransmitters or the enzymes that metabolize them, the structures of receptor sites, ion channels, and so forth, and, indeed, of the factors that influence methylation and gene expression, or neurogenesis.\n\nThis molecular vision of genomic complexity thus mapped onto the vision of the neuromolecular brain. In this way of thinking, the properties and variations in the former underpinned all differences in human mental functioning, whether these be deemed normal variations or pathologies. Other molecular-level variations in DNA sequences were discovered, notably copy number variations (CNVs), where a relatively large region of sequence on a chromosome, sometimes within a coding sequence, sometimes involving several coding sequences, may be repeated several times. Taken together with research that was beginning to grasp the mysterious operations of the stretches of DNA previously thought of as 'junk' as well as the complex operations of RNA in gene transcription, by the first decade of the twenty-first century, genomics was a world away from notions of simple genetic determinisms of the 'gene for schizophrenia' variety. As we shall see in later chapters, this shift in thought was linked to a very significant shift in strategies of intervention and prevention.\n\nDespite constant references to the social importance of the project of neuroscience by those who sought funding and recognition for this new discipline, and, indeed, the initial concerns of many of its key figures with problems of mental illness and practices of psychotherapy, until the closing decades of the twentieth century, most of the actual research undertaken in the institutions and laboratories of the new discipline was primarily focused on investigations of what were thought to be basic neural processes at the neuromolecular level. The reductionist approach that started to gain more prominence in neurobiology in the 1950s and 1960s aimed at studying primarily known and simple behaviors, usually in their normal, or physiological, state: \" _normal_ mentation: of perception, motor coordination, feeling, thought, and memory\" (Kandel 1982, 299). It seemed that, in order to account for abnormal mental states, one first needed something like a map of the so-called normal nervous system: one had to proceed \"one cell at a time\" (Kandel 2006, 55). One needed to reduce the complex phenomenon to a simple or basic process. One needed to chart the normal neuronal circuitry involved in simple and normal behaviors; inducing abnormalities was indeed important experimentally, but only in order to assess their implications for the understanding of normal patterns and functions.\n\nNonetheless, the burgeoning neurosciences were full of hopes and also claims about their social relevance. Thus Schmitt, writing on the \"promising trends in neuroscience\" in 1970 suggested that it has \"relevance to social needs\" (Schmitt 1970, 1008): research in animals on hormonal reaction to psychosocial stress may have relevance to ghetto disturbances; basic and clinical research in neuroscience may help address the drug menace to society evidenced by \"extensive use of various psychotomimetic substances by adolescents and young adults and the widespread addiction in suburbia to 'energizing' and tranquillizing drugs\"; work with brain stimulation may help investigate \"the neural, hormonal, biochemical and genetic mechanisms of aggressive and other aberrant behavior,\" and so forth. Such speculations, however, remained gestural; Schmitt concluded, \"Perhaps still more important to man's progress is the possibility of a better understanding of _basic_ mental processes which, in the end, is responsible for the advancement of science and society\" (Schmitt 1970, 1008; emphasis added).\n\nNonetheless, the neuromolecular vision of the brain that was taking shape blurred two historically significant boundaries, and in so doing, paved the way for neuroscience to leave the lab for the world outside. _First_ , what one might term the Cartesian boundary, so crucial to psychiatry since its beginnings in the mid-nineteenth century, between organic and functional disorders\u2014the former being regarded as originating in identifiable lesions in the brain, the latter being considered to be a disturbance of mental functioning in which the symptoms have no known or detectable organic basis, and whose origin is thought to be in life history, biography, stress, or some other experience. In the neuromolecular style of thought, all mental disorders and disturbances must, in principle, and in some potentially identifiable way be related to anomalies within the brain. _Second_ , the distinction between 'states' and 'traits,' which had grounded the division between psychiatry and psychology. States were in-termittent periods of illness\u2014a person had been well, became depressed, and then, as a result of treatment or merely of time, returned to more or less his or her normal state of mind. Traits were pervasive features of mind or character, attributes one was born with, perhaps that one inherited, aspects of one's personality, such as, for example, that one was introverted or of a melancholy disposition. On this distinction between states and traits, a disciplinary stand-off between psychiatry and psychology was erected in the mid-twentieth century. Psychiatry would deal with abnormal states, for after all, these were illnesses, which could be treated and perhaps even cured, and psychiatry was a medical discipline. Psychology, on the other hand, would deal with traits, for these were aspects of character and personality, even if they were problematic or pathological: they could not be treated or cured, although they could be assessed and perhaps even managed better via forms of psychological therapy. But if both states and traits essentially were variations of the same molecular mechanisms, that distinction blurred, and along with it the distinction between personality disorders and psychiatric illnesses\u2014perhaps, even, the disciplinary divide between psychology and psychiatry when it comes to intervention.\n\nAnd indeed, it was in and through practices of intervention, and research aimed at generating interventions, that the conceptual architecture of the neuromolecular brain was established. We have already remarked on the crucial role of psychopharmacological research in identifying processes of neurotransmission and in explicating its elements\u2014as receptor sites, reuptake mechanisms, and the like\u2014all of which were first invoked as hypothetical entities to explain differences in action of various drugs on the brain, and then, through sophisticated experiments in vitro and in vivo, accorded an anatomical reality. The researchers, and the pharmaceutical companies who were funding much of the research, became convinced, not only that this was the pathway for the development of powerful, specific, and effective psychiatric drugs, but also that one could divide up the psychiatric nosology according to the pharmaceuticals that would act on each condition, and then develop and market the drug for each.\n\nIt became increasingly common, and acceptable, to seek to modulate troublesome mental states\u2014from the minor anxieties of family and work to the major disturbances of thoughts and feelings of schizophrenia and depression\u2014by drugs that, according to their manufacturers and marketers, acted precisely on specific sites in the brain (Rose 2003b, 2004). Beyond the walls of any asylum, when troubles arose in the family, the school, the workplace, the prison, the military, and in the management of daily life, a plausible response\u2014often the first response\u2014was to seek a drug that would mitigate the problems by acting on the brain. The management of everyday life through neurobiology was no longer associated with science fiction. This neuromolecular vision of the brain was fundamental to the rise of 'psychopharmacological societies' over the closing decades of the twentieth century.\n\nAs the rising rates of consumption of minor and major tranquilizers, antidepressants, and antipsychotic medications showed, many were happy to accept these designations, or were persuaded or coerced to consume the products of these styles of thought. But at the same time, a vocal movement began to take shape to contest them. The antipsychiatric movements of the 1960s and 1970s disputed the expansion of the categories of mental disorder to ways of thinking or acting that were at the least only unconventional, and at the most, were challenges to the existing social order. And they disputed the conviction that the use of psychiatric drugs should be understood as treatment of a disorder of the brain, rather than normalization of those who were socially challenging or disruptive. We return to these issues in chapter 4. However, whatever the fate of this sociopolitical challenge to the explanatory system and social practice of psychopharmacology, along with its founding mythologies of the neurobiological specificity of psychiatric classifications and the neurobiological specificities of the mode of action of drugs, the neuromolecular vision of the brain to which these were linked was to underpin research in the neurosciences for the next half century.\n\nEnter Plasticity\n\nIt is no surprise to find that the research problems addressed by developmental neurobiologists were increasingly shaped by evidence and arguments from this growing neuromolecular vision of the brain. Those developments are illustrated by the pathway of research from the 1950s onward, which eventually led to the discovery of Nerve Growth Factor by Rita Levi-Montalcini and the identification of its molecular mechanisms in the 1970s (Levi-Montalcini 1982). Toward the end of the account of this journey that she published in 1982, Levi-Montalcini asked a key question: \"Is the formation of neuronal circuits in the central nervous system and the establishment of specific connections between nerve fibers and peripheral end organs rigidly programmed and unmodifiable, or are nerve fibers endowed with sufficient plasticity to allow for deviation from predetermined routes, in response to chemical signals issued during neurogenesis and regeneration from neuronal and non-neuronal cells?\" (ibid., 356). The growing attention to these questions of development, neurogenesis, and plasticity was to establish another key condition for the movement of neuroscience from the laboratory to the world. For it was linked to the growing belief that, when it comes to the _human_ brain at least, neither structure nor function were fixed at birth, or inscribed in the genes. The neural architecture of the brain, it seemed, had to be located in the element of temporality\u2014not just the time of development from fertilization to birth and into the early years of life, but also the time of the life-course, through adolescence, into young adulthood, and indeed across the decades.\n\nBy the close of the twentieth century, the brain had come to be envisaged as mutable across the whole of life, open to environmental influences, damaged by insults, and nourished and even reshaped by stimulation\u2014in a word _plastic_. An ISI Web of Knowledge search reveals a steadily increasing rate of journal articles on this theme throughout the 1990s and 2000s. And in the first decade of the present century, more than a dozen semipopular books on this theme were published, mostly stories of hope invested in the power of the brain to change across a lifetime (for example, Doidge 2008; Begley 2009; Arden 2010). While the details of the history of the idea of neuroplasticity are disputed by specialists, a certain version is now entering common sense. The Wikipedia entry in December 2010 embodies this common sense when it asserts that neuroplasticity is \"the ability of the human brain to change as a result of one's experience,\" that the brain is \"plastic\" and \"malleable,\" and that the \"discovery of this feature of the brain is rather modern; the previous belief amongst scientists was that the brain does not change after the critical period of infancy.\"\n\nThe belief that up until about 1970, the human brain was viewed as immutable after the period of its development in utero and in early childhood has become something of a modern myth, though no less important for that. It is true that most researchers followed Ram\u00f3n y Cajal's dogma from 1928 that: \"[o]nce development has ended, the fonts of growth and regeneration of the axons and dendrites dried up irrevocably. In adult centers, the nerve paths are something fixed and immutable: everything may die, nothing may be regenerated\" (Ram\u00f3n y Cajal 1928, quoted from Rubin 2009). Other researchers demonstrated the importance of 'critical periods' in development of various sensory abilities such as vision, hearing, language, and certain other capacities in humans. However, there was general acceptance that synaptic connections among neurons were constantly being created and pruned across the life of the organism, as a result of neural activity arising from experience\u2014even Cajal, it seems, used the word _plasticity_ in this context (Berlucchi and Buchtel 2009). This premise was most clearly stated in Hebb's famous postulate from 1949 that \"any two cells or systems of cells that are repeatedly active at the same time will tend to become 'associated,' so that activity in one facilitates activity in the other\" (Hebb 1949, 70)\u2014usually glossed as 'what fires together, wires together.'\n\nA series of developments from the 1960s onward established neuroplasticity as a premise for those interested in the implications of neuroscience for therapy and policy\u2014and a premise entirely congruent with the hopeful ethos that would imbue the life sciences over the closing decades of the twentieth century. It had long been known from neurological studies of patients with brain damage that the brain could somehow recover some of the functionality lost as a result of stroke or injury that had caused a lesion in a key area, suggesting that other areas of the adult brain were capable of taking over those lost functions. But Paul Bach-y-Rita's famous work on the rehabilitation of patients with brain injury would firmly establish this as the underpinning of therapy in such cases (Bach-y-Rita 1967). Other research carried out on animals, notably monkeys, strengthened this belief in plasticity.\n\nIn their popular account in _The Mind and the Brain: Neuroplasticity and the Power of Mental Force_ , Jeffrey Schwartz and Sharon Begley suggest that one can trace the discovery of neuroplasticity to the Silver Spring monkey experiments in the 1970s (Schwartz and Begley 2002). In these experiments, carried out by at the Institute of Behavioral Research in Silver Spring, Maryland, Edward Taub cut the afferent nerves that carried sensations from the limbs of the monkeys to their brains and then explored the ways in which they might be trained to use those limbs despite the supposed absence of sensations. An undercover animal rights activist reported Taub's work to police, the monkeys were seized by federal agents, and a series of trials ensued in which the primary investigator, Edward Taub, was accused of animal cruelty and initially convicted, although that verdict was overturned on appeal. Following these trials, the monkeys were eventually killed, and on dissection it appeared that significant cortical remapping had occurred; publications in the 1990s took this as evidence of the plasticity of the somato-sensory cortex in adult primates despite long-term deprivation of sensation (Jones and Pons 1998).\n\nTaub eventually took a position at the University of Alabama and developed his findings into a program called constraint-induced movement therapy, or more simply Taub therapy, that \"empowers people to improve the use of their limbs, no matter how long ago their stroke or traumatic brain injury.\" By the time of the publication of the research into the brains of these monkeys, there was other evidence that showed that the mapping of sensory functions such as vision onto the cortex could be redrawn even into adulthood (Wall, Kaas, Sur, et al. 1986; Merzenich, Recanzone, Jenkins, et al. 1988; Jenkins, Merzenich, Ochs, et al. 1990). Like Taub, Merzenich was also to go on to found a number of companies seeking to apply such findings therapeutically to humans\u2014to turn them into a technology. These include Scientific Learning, which uses his Fast for Word software, and Posit Science which seeks to develop behavioral therapies, including brain training software called Cortex and Insight. Plasticity was to become one of the key dimensions of the matrix that linked the laboratory, the corporation, and the everyday world.\n\nA further dimension was added by the work of Elizabeth Gould and her group, which seemed directly to contradict Cajal's 'dogma.' Early claims to have discovered the formation of new neurons in the brains of birds and some other species had been discounted: leading authorities, notably Pasko Rakic, expressed the view that neurogenesis in the adult brain of primates could not occur, as the generation of new neurons would interfere with the neuronal storage of learning (Rakic 1985). But in the 1990s, using newly developed DNA labeling techniques, Gould and her colleagues were able to identify neurogenesis in adult mammals, first in adult rodents, where it was enhanced by training on learning tasks (Gould, Tanapat, Hastings, et al. 1999), and later in primates, where it was modulated by hormones and by stress (Gould and McEwen 1993; Cameron and Gould 1994; Cameron, McEwen, and Gould 1995; Gould, Reeves, Graziano, et al. 1999).\n\nThere remained many doubts about the functional implications of such newly generated neurons, let alone the extent to which such properties might be harnessed therapeutically. But by 2004, Gould herself was drawing social and policy implications, arguing that early adverse experience inhibits structural plasticity in responses to stress in adulthood, as did other factors such as social isolation (Mirescu, Peters, and Gould 2004; Stranahan, Khalil, and Gould 2006). By the end of the decade, she and her colleagues drew on evidence from neurogenesis to emphasize the need to understand the impacts of parenthood on the developing brain of the child to avoid potentially serious consequences for cognition and mental health (Leuner, Glasper, and Gould 2010). The idea of neurogenesis, and that external inputs might stimulate or inhibit it, was rapidly seized upon in sociopolitical debates. For some progressive thinkers, it supported what they had believed all along\u2014that the environment\u2014by which they seemed to mean that ill-defined social domain generated by political action\u2014was a, perhaps _the_ , crucial determinant of human abilities. For others, for whom the environment was thought of, principally, as the family, it seemed to confirm that pathological consequences flowed from poor family environments, and hence that intensive family intervention was the key to addressing social problems (Allen and Duncan-Smith 2008).\n\nThese arguments for early intervention in the name of the brain drew support from another body of work that framed plasticity in terms of epigenetics. Michael Meaney and his group had been carrying out research in rodents from the 1980s on the effects of early experiences of maternal care on the developing brains of offspring. In the first decade of the twenty-first century, in a number of very widely cited papers, they came to understand these effects in terms of epigenetic programming, arguing that the mother's behavior toward her pup shapes the expression of genes in its brain through altering methylation, and that this shapes neuronal development, which in turn has consequences for that pup's later behavior toward its own offspring\u2014hence providing a mechanism whereby these changes could be passed down the generations (Meaney and Stewart 1979; Meaney, Aitken, Bodnoff, et al. 1985; Champagne, Chretien, Stevenson, et al. 2004; Champagne and Meaney 2006; Szyf, McGowan, and Meaney 2008).\n\nBy 2009, Meaney and his colleagues were suggesting that these findings could be extended to humans, for example, suicide victims with a history of child abuse (McGowan, Sasaki, D'Alessio, et al. 2009; Meaney and Ferguson-Smith 2010). The brain now seemed open to environmental inputs, not just at the level of the synapse, at the level of cortical mapping, or at the level of the neuron and neurogenesis, but at the level of the molecular processes of the genome with consequences that might pass from parents to children and even on to _their_ children. The developing brain of the child now seemed to be a key site through which a range of social problems could be understood; once mapped onto the brain, paradoxically, they became more, not less amenable to intervention\u2014governing through, and in the name of the plastic brain.\n\nA Neuromolecular and Plastic Brain\n\nThe processes and structures of the brain and central nervous system were now understandable as material processes of interaction among molecules in nerve fibers and the synapses between them, in terms of the chemical and electrical properties of their constituent parts. While the explanatory gap still remained, and the move from the molecular level to mental processes of volition, emotion, and cognition was recognized to be highly challenging, the dualism that had haunted philosophy and the sciences of mental life seemed increasingly anachronistic. In this profoundly reductionist approach, despite the recognition that there was much that could not yet be explained, there seemed nothing about the operations of the nervous system that could not potentially be explained in terms of the biophysical properties of its component parts.\n\nBut the growing acceptance of plasticity acted as something of a coun-terweight to such reductionism. Ideas about plasticity and the openness of brains to environmental influences, from initial evidence about nerve development, through the recognition that synaptic plasticity was the very basis of learning and memory, to evidence about the influence of environment on gene expression and the persistence throughout life of the capacity to make new neurons\u2014all this made this neuromolecular brain seem exquisitely open to its milieu, with changes at this molecular level occurring throughout the course of a human life and thus shaping the growth, organization, and regeneration of neurons and neuronal circuits at time scales from the millisecond to the decade. This was an opportunity to explore the myriad ways in which the milieu got 'under the skin,' implying an openness of these molecular processes of the brain to biography, sociality, and culture, and hence perhaps even to history and politics. It could act as an antidote to suggestions of unidirectional causality. For if that openness was a condition of normal development, perhaps abnormal development might be understood in terms of such influences as well, and perhaps, by modulating those influences, one could indeed open the brain\u2014and the person\u2014up to calculated intervention at the neural level.\n\nHence the plastic brain itself became thinkable as open to government by experts. It simultaneously became open to action by each individual themselves. Dozens of Internet sites were developed to instruct us how to harness brain plasticity for our personal growth\u2014informed by books such as that by Norman Doidge\u2014for \"your brain constantly alters its structure according to your thoughts and actions has enormous implications for your personal growth, particularly in the areas of behavior change.\" Correctly informed about plasticity, we could rewire our brains for love, rewire corporate brains, and so much more (Zohar 1997; Begley 2007; Lucas 2012). The plastic brain becomes a site of choice, prudence, and responsibility for each individual.\nChapter Two\n\nThe Visible Invisible\n\nThe biological basis of mental illness is now demonstrable: no one can reasonably watch the frenzied, localized activity in the brain of a person driven by some obsession, or see the dull glow of a depressed brain, and still doubt that these are physical conditions rather than some ineffable sickness of the soul. Similarly, it is now possible to locate and observe the mechanics of rage, violence and misperception, and even to detect the physical signs of complex qualities of mind like kindness, humour, heartlessness, gregariousness, altruism, mother-love and self-awareness.\n\n\u2014Rita Carter, _Mapping the Mind_ , 1998\n\nNeuroscience, and the study of the activity of the brain, is beginning to bring its own illumination to our understanding of how art works, and what it is. I have come to see the delight in making connections\u2014of which metaphor-making is one of the most intense\u2014as perhaps the fundamental reason for art and its pleasures. Philip Davis, at Liverpool University, has been working with scientists on responses to Shakespeare's syntax, and has found that the connecting links between neurons stay \"live\"\u2014lit up for longer\u2014after responding to Shakespeare's words, especially his novel formations of verbs from nouns, than they do in the case of \"ordinary\" sentences.\n\n\u2014A. S. Byatt, \"Novel Thoughts,\" 2007\n\nIn mid-February 2007, a press release generated considerable interest in the popular media. Titled \"The Brain Scan That Can Read People's Intentions,\" it reported the work of an international team led by John-Dylan Haynes at the Max Planck Institute for Human Cognitive and Brain Sciences in Germany. The team had conducted some laboratory experiments imaging the brains of subjects who were confronted with a simple task in which they had to decide between a small number of possible choices. The scans showed activity in particular brain regions _before_ the action was undertaken; it seemed that one could predict the later choice from the earlier pattern of activation. On this basis, Haynes sketched out a mind-reading scenario in which such scans could reveal a person's intentions in advance of actions, and he called for an ethical debate about the implications. Neuroethicists pitched in, expressing their worries to the journalists, happy to take this prospect seriously. Of course, this scenario was a fantasy; the highly artificial and simplistic laboratory experiment told us nothing about the formation of actual complex human intentions to undertake meaningful actions in the messy real world. But it was premised on a belief that is coming to acquire the status of truth: that experiments scanning the brains of individuals in laboratory settings to identify patterns of activation while they undertake simple tasks or games can reveal the workings of the human mind in real time\u2014and, moreover, that they can show exactly which regions of the brain are involved in exactly what specific mental states, not just emotion and cognition but also intentionality, volition, and more. It seems that these new technologies of visualization have finally and objectively revealed the physical basis of human mental life in patterns of activity in the living brain.\n\nIt would be misleading to claim that, by the end of the twentieth century, brain imagers believed that the age-old dilemmas concerning the relations of mind and brain had been resolved. Most neuroscientists are careful to speak of 'the neural correlates of mental processes,' avoiding the language of causes, which suggests that the neural is prior to and determinative of such states, and the language of identity, which suggests that mental states are simply neural states. Their press releases and media accounts are less cautious. And the images produced by brain scans are certainly central to the new ways in which this issue of mind and brain is being posed, not just in the laboratory, or in psychiatry, but in the popular media, in the arts, and in many other areas of human life. It is not simply that many now believe it to be possible to locate each faculty of the human mind\u2014emotion, fear, self-control\u2014in a specific region of the brain; it is also the belief that one might, in principle, use this new knowledge of the brain to target interventions into the mind on these faculties in practices from the therapeutic to the artistic and the commercial.\n\nWe have many good studies of the intertwined social, technological, and conceptual history of medical imaging in general (Kevles 1997; Burri and Dumit 2007; Saunders 2008), and of brain imaging in particular (Dumit 1997, 2003; Beaulieu 2000a, 2000b, 2002, 2004; Roepstorff 2001, 2002, 2007). While we draw upon these studies in this chapter, our focus is quite specific\u2014it is on the diverse attempts to render 'mind' thinkable by means of images. Without pretense to a genealogy of our contemporary forms of visualization, we explore some of the technologies that have been invented and the kinds of information that they seem to provide. We examine the modes of interpretation and arguments that have been developed around those technologies and their products. And we sketch out the new ways of thinking about and articulating the relations of the corporeal, the mental, and the psychopathological that these entail and support. This visual imaginary has been one pathway along which neuroscience has been able to move out of the laboratory and into the territory of everyday life, and to play a role in the management of normal and problematic conduct.\n\nThe Clinical Gaze\n\nWhen we speak of rendering the mind visible, we do not just mean the act of seeing. We mean the whole configuration by means of which a certain way of seeing becomes possible and can be articulated. The ways of seeing that characterize a scientific practice, or a mode of intervention, do not arise from an isolated act of looking, but from a conjunction of different elements and practices. One dimension is _spatial and temporal_. This distribution occurs along a number of planes: across the individual body (localization), across the collective body (social factors in causation and recovery), across time (the life-course and the course of illness), across generations (family pathology, heredity). A second dimension of this conjunction is _technical_ or perhaps _technological_. It consists in the means, the apparatus and devices, that render that which is observed into marks, lines, colors, spaces and edges, patterns and patterning. As many recent studies from the social and cultural sciences have demonstrated, the images produced by the electroencephalographs, the CT scanners, the magnetic resonance imaging machines, and all the other technical devices of contemporary brain mapping are no more 'true to nature' than those produced by the other \"engines of visualization,\" such as photographs, so tellingly analyzed by Patrick Maynard (Maynard 1997). But it is only through such artifacts that we have become able to see that which is not present to our un-augmented eyes.\n\nA third dimension of this rendering visible, perhaps the most significant, consists in the practices within which acts of seeing are enmeshed. They are always bound up with specific ways of _practicing_ , occurring within specific sites and by means of particular techniques of intervention upon those who are the subjects of that act of seeing. When it comes to seeing the brain, seeking to discover within its fleshy volume the traces of the pathological or normal mental processes that the brain might embody, it involves the designation of those who have the authority to see: doctors, neurologists, researchers, psychopharmacologists, geneticists, and now, of course, the imagers. It also involves the subjectification of those who are spoken about\u2014subjectification in the sense that living creatures become subjects of these visualizing technologies only as a consequence of certain technical interventions, and subjectification in another sense, in the case of humans, whose sense of themselves may well be transformed as a result of the images of their brains with which they are presented. The act of seeing, or the practice of seeing, also involves a particular locale for the act of visualization\u2014the designation of a case in the asylum, the 'demonstration' of the patient in the clinic, the dissection of the brain in the laboratory, the scanning of the subject in the imaging suite. A real space is required that is all too often absent when the image produced in the scanner is being interpreted. To render visible, that is to say, requires conditions of possibility within a larger networked, distributed, assembled field of intensities and powers\u2014connecting up such diverse sites as the clinic, the lab, the pharmaceutical company, popular literature, and the mass media. Seeing, rendering visible, is thus part epistemology, part topography, part technology, part objectification and subjectification, part network of forces, even part ethics.\n\nOur argument in this chapter is intended, in part, as a homage to Michel Foucault and to his 1963 book, _Naissance de la clinique_ , translated into English under the title _The Birth of the Clinic: An Archaeology of Medical Perception_ (Foucault 1973). Alan Sheridan, the translator, remarks that the word _gaze_ would have been a better choice in the subtitle than _perception_ \u2014the book is about the formation of a particular clinical gaze\u2014a way of seeing, saying, and doing in relation to illness, the body, life itself. It charts a fundamental shift in the medical gaze, which occurred in Europe in the early nineteenth century. Previously medicine had focused on a two-dimensional space of tissues and symptoms, but from that time forth, the gaze of the doctor would plunge into the interior of the body. To diagnose an illness would be to interpret symptoms in terms of the internal organic malfunctions that were their cause. In life, the gaze of the doctor would now need to be augmented, initially by such devices as the stethoscope. In death, that which had been rendered into thought while life persisted would be confirmed\u2014or disconfirmed\u2014by the dissection of the corpse. This new way of seeing was inscribed into the anatomical textbooks and embodied in a multitude of anatomical models, educating the eye of the doctor by progressively revealing the layers of skin, muscles, blood vessels, nerves, and organs that made up the interiority of the living being. It was the body itself that had become ill. Through a knowledge of how that illness appeared in the sick body, it became possible to understand what the absence of illness might look like\u2014to envisage the functioning of those interior processes of the body to produce the state we took to be health. To know normality, it was necessary to see pathology. But if this was the case for the body, what then for the afflictions of the mind?\n\nInscribed on the Body Itself\n\nSander Gilman is the preeminent historian of ways of \"seeing the insane\" (Gilman 1982). Gilman tells us that, from the sixteenth century onward, to speak of madness was also to visualize it. Images of madness were central to the ways in which the mad person was turned into a proper object for rational knowledge and for the practice of a cure. Madness was represented iconically through the association of the mad person with images such as that of the divided stick or the pinwheel. It was represented in the complexion of the mad person, where the black bile that was at the root of the condition was manifested in the dark hue of complexion, and this also linked madness to the blackness of skin that was consequent upon the soul falling from grace. It embraced the posture, gesture, and movements of the figure. The melancholic was seated, eyes cast down, clothing disheveled, hands clenched or hidden to manifest a turning away from useful labor. The maniac raved in semi-nakedness, arms akimbo, and mouth agape. The epileptic and the ecstatic shared a posture: arms and legs flailing, body in the fixed curve known as the _arc de cercle_ that would become, for Jean-Martin Charcot at the Salp\u00eatri\u00e8re, the emblem of the hysterical crisis.\n\nFrom the mid-eighteenth century onward, from the essay on the passions in Diderot and d'Alembert's _Encyclop\u00e9die_ through Johann Lavater's _Physiognomische Fragmente_ (1774\u201378), madness became associated with a specific physiognomy, initially an emphasis on the fixed aspects of skull shape and facial appearance, which could be derived from particular techniques of inscription of the head on a homogeneous and regular plane of two dimensions. Some disputed the claim that there was a direct relation between psychopathological states and these fixed physical characteristics. They argued that other visible features\u2014expression, gesture, posture\u2014were the real external signs of the inner pathology. But in either case, few doubted that madness was inscribed on the surface of the individual, that, as Arthur Schopenhauer was to put it in his work on physiognomy published in the mid-nineteenth century, \"the outer man is a graphic reproduction of the inner and the face the expression and revelation of his whole nature\" (quoted in Gilman 1982, 164).\n\nEvery student of psychiatry is told the story of Philippe Pinel, acclaimed as the radical physician of the French Revolution who publicly struck the chains from the inmates at Bic\u00eatre in Paris in October 1793, restoring the mad person to the status of an individual citizen with rights, and inaugurating 'moral treatment.' The enlightened asylums of the early nineteenth century also flooded the inmates with a new light, a light that that made them individually visible in new ways. Pinel himself introduced illustrations of the insane in his _Trait\u00e9 m\u00e9dico-philosphique sur l'ali\u00e9nation mentale, ou la manie_ (Pinel 1801). These compared the physiognomy and skulls of \"an idiot\" and \"a maniac\" in a style familiar to Lavater and the craniologists, with a special emphasis on the proportionality of the parts and the relation of head size to body size: these drawings of particular individuals seemed to show that for each case, appearance was the key to diagnosis. In the ensuing years, Pinel's pupil Jean Esquirol documented the newly visible varieties of insanity in his _Dictionnaire des sciences m\u00e9dicales_ (1812\u201322). He commissioned some two hundred drawings of the insane at the Salp\u00eatri\u00e8re, focusing both on facial expression and on bodily comportment, each of which was used to illustrate the varieties of insanity that he described. When he published his collected papers in 1830, he selected twenty-seven of these illustrations and appended them in the form of an _Atlas_ (Esquirol 1838).\n\nThe use of the word _atlas_ in such contexts is conventionally traced to Gerard Mercator, who adopted it \"to honour the Titan, Atlas, King of Mauritania, a learned philosopher, mathematician, and astronomer.\" It appears first to have been used posthumously on the title page of a collection of his maps published by his son in 1595: the illustration of Atlas with the globe of the earth in his hands as the frontispiece was added to later editions (Hall and Brevoort 1878). The atlas format was taken up by William Playfair, \"who, in 1786 published a collection of forty-four diagrams and charts, the content of which was in the nature of political economy, with the title _The Commercial and Political Atlas_ : he \"founded a tradition... in which collections of charts and figures appertaining to disciplines like biology, medicine, physics as well as statistical overviews were also put into the category 'atlas' \" (Krausse 1998, 11\u201312). The lines, curves, and shapes in the diagrams that Playfair produced, Krausse suggests, enable the eye to reckon without calculating\u2014to commit information to memory in seconds that would take days to assimilate if it were in the form of words or numbers.\n\nThis was equally true of the lines and curves of Esquirol's drawings. They certainly recycled some of the old themes in the positioning of hands and body. They also followed the physiognomies in their ways of rendering the shape and proportions of the skull. But these plates did something more. They were part of a fundamental individualization that rendered madness into a possible object for a clinical medicine. The laborious procedures of observation and documentation that accompanied moral treatment visualized each insane person as an individual case, but one whose uniqueness was intelligible because it could be charted and measured in terms of the general norms of types of madness, their characteristics, etiology, and prognosis. Esquirol gave a detailed description of the visual appearance characteristic of each type of madness, accompanied by an account of a specific case\u2014an individual diagnosed with mania, dementia, or lypemania\u2014focusing not just on the course of that person's condition and its symptoms in speech, behavior, posture, and comportment, but also his or her visual appearance\u2014the color of the hair, the shape of the eyebrows, the complexion of the skin, the look of the face, and much more. In this way, the image was fused to the biography in the form of the case, and inscribed at the heart of psychiatric epistemology and diagnostic practice. As Sander Gilman argues, such combinations of description, case study, and picture bridge the theoretical and the observable (Gilman 1982). The patient is rendered into thought in terms of the theory; the means of diagnosis have merged with the object of diagnosis itself. In these images of the mad person, the norms of psychiatric thought seem to have merged with the individual subject of psychiatric practice in the portrayal of each specific case.\n\nEsquirol was not the first to use portrayals of the inmates of asylums to document the varieties of madness through appearance. As Gilman shows us, Charles Bell had done so at the very start of the nineteenth century in his vividly illustrated _Essays on the Anatomy of Expression in Painting_ (Bell 1806) focusing in particular on the fear and terror of the mad, and Alexander Morrison, having visited Esquirol in Paris, published his own series of plates in his _Outline of Lectures on Mental Diseases_ of 1825 (Albin 2002), which rapidly went into two further editions and led to his later _Physiognomy of Mental Diseases_ (Sani, Jobe, Smith, et al. 2007). And the idea that madness could be captured in the image of the mad person was pervasive well beyond the asylum. From the drawings of William Blake and Thomas Rowlinson to those of Goya and Delacroix, whatever their stylistic differences, to see madness in the face, in the posture, in the comportment of the body, was to know it for what it was.\n\nClinical medicine in the nineteenth century mutated fundamentally when the gaze of the doctor focused beneath the skin, into the interior of the patient's body. But across the second half of the nineteenth century, the gaze of the mad doctors remained stubbornly on the surface; the images played the same epistemological role when they moved from drawings to still photographs and then to moving images. Whether in the photographs that Hugh Diamond presented to the Royal Society in 1856, in William Hood's collection of Henry Hering's photographs of the inmates of the Bethlem Hospital of which he was the first superintendent (Gale and Howard 2003; Logan 2008), in Dietrich George Kieser's _Elemente der Psychiatrik_ of 1855 (Kieser 1855), in Max Leidsdorf's _Lehrbuch der Psychischen Krankheiten_ of 1865 (Leidesdorf 1865), in the nosological archives created in the San Clemente Hospital in Venice in 1873, in the photographs taken at the Devon County Lunatic Asylum used by Bucknill and Tuke to illustrate their _Manual of Psychological Medicine_ (Bucknill and Tuke 1874), or in Henri Dagonet's _Nouveau trait\u00e9 \u00e9l\u00e9mentaire et practique des maladies mentales_ (Esman 1999), the photographs seemed to show, apparently without requiring the artifice of the portrait painter, that the invisible states of the human soul were visible in the proportions of the mouth, the hue of the complexion, the expression on the face, the posture of the body and the arrangement of the limbs (most of these examples are discussed in detail in Gilman [1982]). Even Darwin was initially tempted to use similar photographs\u2014supplied by James Crichton Browne, the medical director of the West Riding Asylum at Wakefield\u2014to support his theory of the innate bases for the expression of the emotions. But Darwin recognized the circularity of the procedures by which the images were produced: the unfortunate individuals who appeared in these photographs were clothed and posed in terms of prevailing beliefs as to how emotions were manifested in visual expression\u2014they could hardly serve as evidence for the inherited or universal basis of those expressions (Gilman 1982, 185).\n\nIn this continuous work of visual documentation of asylum inmates, we can learn a lot, not merely about the form of the gaze that the mad doctors directed to their patients, but also of the power of the visual in seeming to render the interior world of the human mind into thought\u2014its passions, affections, thoughts\u2014in the form of images. Such images were simultaneously to satisfy the requirements of knowledge (the image as both evidence and proof), of the clinic (the image as diagnostic), of pedagogy (for these pictures were teaching tools), of museumology (for the picture would enter the archive and the plethora of scientific collections gathered across the nineteenth century), of aesthetics (for there was a certain style of representing the interior world here that would go beyond the world of science), and of the popular imagination. Understanding, here, is played out, almost without the need for language, through the apparently empirical form of the image. Despite its objectivity effect, a whole scientific and cultural imaginary underpins these images of mental states\u2014this remains true today, despite the technological gulf between these images and those generated in the brain scanners of our own times.\n\n\"Behold the truth.... I am nothing more than a photographer; I inscribe what I see.\" With this quote from Jean-Martin Charcot, Georges Didi-Huberman opens the chapter on \"Legends of Photography\" in his provocative psychoanalytic study of _The Invention of Hysteria_ (Didi-Huberman 2003, 29). Charcot, who worked in the Salp\u00eatri\u00e8re from the 1850s to 1893, represented the apotheosis of this tradition of visualization of the troubled or deranged mind through the appearance and comportment of the body and the expressions of the face. In 1877, he founded the _Iconographie photographique de la Salp\u00eatri\u00e8re_. It was published until 1880 and resumed publication under his editorship in 1888, as the _Nouvelle iconographie_. In this form it was to publish twenty-eight volumes until its demise in 1918. It illustrated not only the faces and postures of the varieties of madness, but introduces time into these pictorial representations, for example, providing a series of pictures demonstrating the sequences of epileptic attacks, hysteria, and the like. Vision was the key to grasping the nature and progress of the condition: the troubles of the mind were now intelligible to the extent that, before all else, they were visible. Charcot is, of course, now infamous for the way these demonstrations were carefully staged, and for how they relied on extensive coaching, suggestion, and simulation: yet the photographs became their inscribed and durable counterparts. Charcot's most famous pupil, Freud, referred to him in his obituary as a \"visuel,\" one who sees (Freud [1893] 1962, 12). But Freud, and the psychoanalysis and dynamic psychiatries that followed, turned away from the image and paid scant attention to the visual appearance of the patient\u2014 _the voice_ was the royal road to the unconscious in all of the 'talking cures' that were to follow.\n\nThe chapters on cretinism, dementia praecox, general paresis, manic depression, and idiocy in Kraepelin's _Textbook on Psychiatry_ ([1899] 1902) all contained the carefully posed photographs familiar from earlier works, but these images were no longer accorded a particular diagnostic significance. In his _Lectures on Clinical Psychiatry_ (translated into English in 1904) Kraepelin describes the patient to his audience: the clothes, the demeanor, the facial expression of emotion. But these are important only for what they reveal of the everyday life of the individual, they are not clues to the nature of his or her condition. The significance of the image of the mad person as the outward and visible sign of an internal constitutional defect or malady was beginning to fade (Kraepelin 1904). Kraepelinian diagnosis was based on the course of the condition and on etiology and prognosis as manifested in conduct, speech, emotion, thought. Illustrations still play a role, but this is, precisely, to illustrate\u2014the pictures in Kraepelin's texts are presented neither as pedagogic nor as diagnostic. But nonetheless, in the closing decades of the nineteenth century, different kinds of image were beginning to become important\u2014images of the brain itself.\n\nOpen Up a Few Brains\n\nOf course, even nineteenth-century proponents of moral medicine like Esquirol thought madness was a disease of the brain. But it was in the work of Franz Joseph Gall that we can find the first modern articulation of the idea that the brain is a differentiated organ whose different regions are responsible for different aspects of human mental life. While the physiognomists sought to correlate the form of the face and the proportions of the skull with mental characteristics, Gall's view was that it was the cerebral cortex that was the key (English and Annand 2010; Gall [1822] 1835). The cortex was composed of distinct \"brain organs\"\u2014regions associated with different faculties\u2014whose distribution could be represented visually to show exactly where under the external skull each organ was located. The size of each brain organ was linked both to its power in the individual and to the configuration of the part of the skull above it. Thus it could be detected externally by examining the form of the skull and the shape and size of the various regions, not just in death, but also in life. Condemned for his materialism in Austria, Gall traveled around Europe, giving demonstrations of his skill at brain dissection, and collecting material\u2014brains and skulls\u2014especially from prisons and asylums.\n\nGall's craniological work had many disciples; under the name of phrenology, it was promoted in Europe by his former assistant, Johann Spurzheim, and by George Combe. It was institutionalized in phrenological societies and journals and was enthusiastically taken up by many in America. However, by the end of the 1830s, it had lost most of its credibility as a scientific analysis of mental functions, notably at the hands of Pierre Flourens, whose experimental work creating localized brain lesions in animals and documenting their consequences seemed to disprove the claim that there was a close relation between cerebral locales and specific behavioral capacities (Flourens 1824). Nonetheless, phrenology retained considerable popular appeal, especially through the visual technologies developed by Spurzheim and Combe\u2014the familiar charts, diagrams, and model phrenological heads that showed the different mental faculties distributed across the brain and mapped to specific locations on the external surface of the skull.\n\nGall's fate was to be derided by association with the role of phrenology in fortune telling and showmanship. But the concept of cerebral localization was to entrance European neurologists in the second half of the twentieth century. In 1861, Paul Broca seemed to have reestablished the truth of localization theory, when he described eight patients with loss of speech, each of whom had lesions in the third left frontal convolution (Broca 1861). He developed this thesis further, with arguments based on specific case studies, such as that of Leborgne (the famous \"Tan\"), claiming to have demonstrated the centrality of the frontal lobes in many higher functions, and he also developed the thesis of cerebral dominance, arguing for the distinct functions of the left and right cortex. Neurology seemed to have shown without doubt that the brain was an organ composed of regions with specific structural properties that were the basis of the various human mental functions.\n\nIn 1867, Wilhelm Griesinger, professor of psychiatry in Berlin from 1865 to 1868, founded the _Archive for Psychiatry and Nervous Diseases_ , and this journal provided a focus and a forum for a succession of German psychiatrists and students of brain structure. It also stimulated the development of psychiatric clinics in Germany attached to universities, which helped provide the necessary infrastructure for this organic gaze. In the 1870s and 1880s, Theodore Meynert in Vienna pored over his microscope scrutinizing stained sections of the brains from psychiatric patients in a search for pathological lesions in the cerebral cortex, the frontal lobes, and the nerve fibers themselves. More work on cerebral localization was carried out by Carl Wernicke, also in Vienna, who in 1874 identified the specific part of the brain that, if damaged, led to an incapacity to understand the spoken word or to speak comprehensibly. Wernicke spent the rest of his days trying\u2014and failing\u2014to discover similar links between psychiatric symptoms and brain abnormalities.\n\nPaul Flechsig worked in Leipzig from 1877 to 1922, seeking to localize the basis of many neurological disorders, and mapping the human brain into multiple areas according to the sequences in which they became myelinated. He used this as the basis for his speculations that particular areas in the cortex were most important for the exercise of intellectual functions, for the formation of mental images, the naming of objects, and so forth, and sought to confirm these by postmortem studies of the brains of patients with general paresis and other brain diseases. Flechsig had trained himself in psychiatry, visiting asylums in Germany and spending time with Charcot in Paris (Flechsig's work is usefully discussed in Finger 1994, 308\u201310). Daniel Paul Schreber, whose case was to be made famous by Sigmund Freud, spent time in his clinic, and Flechsig was the target of Schreber's allegations of \"soul murder\" (Schatzman 1973, 30\u201331). However limited his therapeutic achievements, Flechsig's cortical maps were highly influential visualizations of cerebral functions. He believed that what he termed \"the posterior association center\"\u2014rather than the frontal lobes\u2014was the part of the brain most important for intellectual functions, thus, like so many other neuroanatomists, linking the size of regions to intellectual capacity.\n\nWe should not underestimate the risky radicalism of many of the early researchers on cerebral localization: most held explicitly materialist philosophical positions, asserting that human mental capacities could be explained without reference to any metaphysics or religion, and without invoking an immaterial soul. We can see this clearly in the work of the Society for Mutual Autopsy studied by Jennifer Hecht (2003). This organization was established by a group of French anthropologists, psychologists, artists, and intellectuals in the 1870s, and was directly inspired by Paul Broca, who was one of the founding members, along with other neurologists and intellectuals. It was organized around specifically atheist values\u2014notably the belief that there was no soul, only brain. Those who established the society were troubled by the fact that the only brains available for dissection were those of the abnormal, the damaged, the insane\u2014not of the normal or the intellectuals. Membership was based on an agreement to examine each other's brains after death to see to what extent their eminence was inscribed within the brain itself, and what difference their lives may have made to the configuration of the cerebral fissures\u2014a relationship that proved to be problematic when some of the more eminent intellects proved to have small brain volumes, and in some cases, the convolutions of their brains were not fine, as had been hoped, but somewhat coarse.\n\nIf the brain was the seat of mental life, it seemed self-evident that there must be a relation between the intellect and the size and configuration of the brain, if the calculations were done correctly. Given the ways in which racial science had long linked the hierarchy of races to the configuration of face and skull, it is not surprising that race was one focus of these investigations of the brain. Samuel Morton was one of the first systematically to measure brain size by calculating the volume of cranial capacity (initially filling the skull with mustard seed, then with lead shot) and comparing average skull volume by race (Morton 1844). But Broca was probably the most rigorous of all craniometrists (this work is discussed in detail by Stephen Jay Gould [1981, esp. chap. 3]). Gould points to Broca's careful refinement of the methods of craniometry and his undoubted respect for empirical and statistical methods. Nonetheless, Gould argues, Broca systematically distorted his data, perhaps unwittingly, and applied all manner of dubious corrections in order to make his results conform with his preconceptions concerning the differences in relative size of brain regions\u2014for example frontal versus posterior cranial regions\u2014in \"inferior\" versus \"superior\" races, and between men and women. A few neurologists disputed the basic premise of a relation between brain size and intelligence, but similar endeavors occupied many members of the anthropometric societies that flourished in many European countries and in the United States (Chimonas, Frosch, and Rothman 2011).\n\nWhatever the rationale for many of these early explorations of the shape, size, and anatomy of the brain, and despite the repeated failure of attempts to link intellect to brain size, a vision of the brain as an internally differentiated organ was taking shape, in which specific regions were associated with speech, language and comprehension, and other mental faculties. For obvious reasons, experiments to explore these relations between region and function were mostly undertaken on animals and involved creating lesions in specific brain areas and studying the consequences. The names of the researchers are known to all modern students of neuroanatomy. Fritsch and Hitzig's experiments on dogs in the 1870s seemed to identify a localized motor area in the cortex (republished as Fritsch and Hitzig 2009). David Ferrier's subsequent experiments on a range of animals, notably his work with monkeys, seemed to support the existence of distinct cortical areas for sensory and motor functions: the results were presented in the late 1870s and in the 1880s culminated in successive editions of _The Functions of the Brain_ , replete with maps of brain areas associated with different function (Ferrier 1876, 1886). Others followed a similar route.\n\nThe architecture of the brain was also being opened to visualization in another way, thanks to a different technique\u2014that of staining. The nerve cell was first described in the form we know it today by Otto Deiters in 1865, leading to much dispute as to whether such cells formed a continuous network or whether the cells were distinct and contiguous. Camillo Golgi, who invented his method of silver staining in the 1870s, was an ardent supporter of the first hypothesis; Santiago Ram\u00f3n y Cajal used Golgi's method of staining to support the second. Jean-Pierre Changeux quotes the account Cajal gave in 1909 of what he saw when he looked at a section of nervous tissue that had been left around for a few days in M\u00fcller's fluid and then immersed in silver nitrate: \"Sections were made, dehydrated, illuminated, and observed. An unexpected spectacle!... Everything looked simple, clear, unconfused. Nothing remained but to interpret. One merely had to look and note\" (Changeux 1997, 26).\n\nLook and note: vision, once more, seems to reveal the truth without interpretation. Done correctly, everything looked clear. From 1903 to 1908, Korbinian Brodmann, working with Oscar Vogt in the Neurobiological Laboratory of Berlin, used another staining technique, that developed by Franz Nissl, for his work on neuroanatomy. He published a series of papers in the _Journal f\u00fcr Psychologie und Neurologie_ , setting out the results of his comparative studies of the mammalian cortex; these became the basis of the maps of the cerebral cortex of humans, monkeys, and other mammals contained in _Vergleichende Lokalisationslehre der Grosshirnrinde in ihren Prinzipien dargestellt auf Grund_ (Rheinberger 2000). These maps delineated the so-called Brodmann areas of the cortex, which, in the words of Laurence Garey, \"must be among the most commonly reproduced figures in neurobiological publishing\" (in his introduction to J. Smith and Berlin 1999). The brain now appeared as a differentiated organ, with an anatomy that was consistent within species and comparable between species, and which could be localized and classified according to a standardized nomenclature agreed upon across laboratories and researchers.\n\nFerrier's experiments had been carried out at the West Riding Lunatic Asylum, with the support of the asylum director, James Crichton-Browne; in 1878, Ferrier and Crichton-Browne together with John C. Bucknill\u2014who had founded and edited the _Journal of Mental Science_ in 1853\u2014founded _Brain: A Journal of Neurology_. However, despite this close association of neuroanatomy with the asylum, and despite dissecting innumerable brains of deceased asylum inmates, nineteenth-century neurologists were unable to identify any visible abnormalities in the brain that correlated with abnormalities of thought, conduct, mood, or will. Charcot had carried out autopsies of his patients at the Salp\u00eatri\u00e8re, but was unable to find lesions that correlated with mental disturbances, except those that involved physical disabilities such as the scleroses. Freud had himself carried out neurological studies of the brain in the 1880s and was apparently a supporter of the theory of a continuous network of nerves. But while he remained committed in principle to the ultimate neurological basis of the processes that he hypothesized, these attempts to visualize psychiatric disorders in terms of lesions in the brains of dead patients, extracted, sliced, stained, and magnified, were derided by psychoanalysts in the early twentieth century. And it is true that they had little to offer psychiatrists. As Nissl concluded in 1908: \"It was a bad mistake not to realize that the findings of brain anatomy bore no relationship to psychiatric findings, unless the relationships between brain anatomy and brain function were first clarified, and they certainly have not been up to the present\" (quoted in Shorter 1997, 109).\n\nThe mapping of the functional architecture of the brain became ever more developed throughout the twentieth century (Frackowiak 2004). Yet even if anatomical variations between brains did have the functions attributed to them, they seemed to have no therapeutic implications. The study of the potential links between mental disorder and the anomalous brain did not seem able to generate any clinical interventions, and was only possible after the patient had died. How could one make this neuronal anatomy of the organ of the mind amenable to clinical thought and practice, let alone to those other practices concerned with the mental states and conduct of the living human being?\n\nSeeing the Living Brain\n\nCould one see the activity of the living human brain? Could the gaze of the neurologist actually plunge into the interior of that organ in life, rather than observing it dead, extracted, sliced, stained, and preserved, and thus inferring functions from accidentally produced lesions or experiments with animals? Central to the conquest of the living brain for knowledge in the twentieth century was the invention, assembly, refinement, and commercialization of a whole variety of devices that could \"prosthetically augment... the range of the scientific observer's vision, allowing the perception of deep, minute, mobile and generally imperceptible structures\" (L. Cartwright 1995, 83) within the skull of a living person. In the process, our very understanding of what it is to be human being\u2014that is to say, an individual with a brain that makes mental life possible, has been irreversibly transformed.\n\nThe first conquest of the living brain by vision was to reveal its structure. At the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, X-rays transformed the way in which the interior of the body could be seen, and indeed transformed the very idea of what it was to have such a body. Bettyann Holzmann Kevles quotes an early enthusiast describing the experience as \"the mind walk[ing] in among the tissues themselves\" and from that time on, as she points out, much intellectual effort was spent visualizing what was once invisible: that which was once hidden was now amenable to a new kind of knowledge (Kevles 1997, 2). But when it came to the brain, while a great deal was known from brain dissections postmortem, the opacity of the skull made it impossible to produce X-ray pictures of the living brain. This was a challenge for surgeons seeking to understand symptoms that appeared to originate in damage to the brain from accidents, blood clots, or tumors.\n\nWhat was needed, it seemed, was some kind of contrast agent that would show up the configuration of brain tissue in relation to the surrounding fluid. Some surgeons had already achieved results in a few cases where air had somehow entered the space occupied by the cerebrospinal fluid. These findings were drawn upon in 1918 by an American neurosurgeon, Walter Dandy, who developed a method that involved draining some of the cerebrospinal fluid via a lumbar puncture while simultaneously injecting an equivalent volume of air: the air found its way into the skull, filling the ventriculi, and subsequent X-rays revealed the position and size of tumors or blood clots. This rather painful technique, known as pneumoencephalography, enabled at least the gross features of the cerebral anatomy of living patients to be visualized, and hence surgeons were able to confirm the origins in the brain of symptoms such as extreme headaches or strange bodily sensations (Kevles 1997, 97\u2013103).\n\nEgas Moniz, who had returned to his original career in neurology after a successful spell in Portuguese politics, notably as ambassador to Madrid and minister of foreign affairs, is now famous or infamous for his development of the frontal lobotomy in the 1930s, for which he received the Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine in 1949. However, prior to that, he was already well known for inventing the technique of cerebral angiography, in which a contrast agent\u2014initially sodium iodide and later thorium dioxide\u2014enabled the distribution of blood and other fluids in the brain to be captured on film when the head was X-rayed. This technique, developed in 1927, enabled both normal and abnormal blood vessels in and around the brain to be visualized: X-rays of the skull now made visualization of intracranial tumors, vascular abnormalities, and aneurysms possible.\n\nOf course, in some cases it proved necessary to actually expose the brain of an individual to the direct vision of the surgeon during an operation. No one made more of this opportunity than Wilder Penfield. While neurosurgeons had previously operated on the brain to remove tumors and scar tissue thought to be the focus of epileptic attacks, such operations often caused further scarring, with very undesirable consequences. Penfield, working in Montreal from the mid-1920s, developed a novel procedure involving the removal of considerably more tissue; initially controversial, this actually proved more effective (Penfield 1927). The procedure involved shaving the head of the patient, opening a \"trapdoor\" in the skull, and removing the protective layers of tissue to expose the surface of the cortex. The patient remained conscious at all times. The surgeon then stimulated different points on the cortex with a wire carrying a small electrical current, and the patient reported what he or she felt\u2014a tingling in the left hand, or a flashing light, each understood, by Penfield, as indicating the part of the cortex where that organ or function was represented. The aim, in part, was to identify the region where the sensations that precede a fit were elicited. This is the so-called aura, which is different for each patient and sometimes involves a strong smell or flashing lights. Stimulation of different areas of the cortex would help identify the scar tissue or other lesion that was the focus of the seizure\u2014a process aided initially by X-rays or ventriculograms, and later by the use of an EEG method developed by Hebert Jasper. Further, the mapping of vital functions enabled the surgeon to identify which regions should not be damaged in the operation if one was to preserve those functions. In the course of undertaking hundreds of these operations, Penfield was also able to produce his famous visual maps of the sensory and motor cortex, indicating the locations of different functions and sensory zones on its surface (Penfield and Erickson 1941; Penfield and Rasmussen 1950; Penfield, Jasper, and Macnaughton 1954).\n\nIn addition to mapping sensory and motor functions, this method of cortical stimulation produced some unexpected results. When some regions of the temporal lobes were stimulated in some patients, they recalled what seemed to be precise memories of long-forgotten events, sometimes mundane, sometimes frightening. In other cases, stimulation produced intense perceptual illusions or hallucinations, also usually seeming to recreate specific past experiences, such as an orchestra playing\u2014the patient would hum along to the tune. The sensations, memories, and hallucinations would disappear when the probe was removed. For the first time, it seemed, Penfield had achieved the cerebral localization of conscious experiences and memories, although he doubted whether these were actually integrated in the cortex.\n\nBut, starting in the 1950s, other methods would be found to enable the vision of the investigator to penetrate the skull without the need for surgery. The first major development in imaging brain structure was computerized axial tomography\u2014the CAT scan or CT scan. Kevles recounts the long and winding road that finally led to the development of a scanner that would use computer algorithms to assemble the results of repeated X-ray 'slices' across the brain to produce an image of an anatomical slice, showing the internal structure to the extent that it was made up of tissues of different densities. Many relatively independent steps were involved\u2014Bracewell's work in the 1950s developing mathematical techniques for constructing imagelike maps of astronomical bodies from multiple 'strips' of data; Olendorf's work in Los Angeles rigging up a device that sent collimated beams of high-energy particles through a plane in a model head; Cormack's work to develop a computer that could reconstruct images from X-ray scans.\n\nBut it was Godfrey Newbold Hounsfield who integrated all the elements into a functioning scanner that could image the internal structure of the brain in sufficient detail to be used for diagnostic and research purposes. Hounsfield developed and built the device for Electrical and Music Industries Limited (EMI), which financed this work with funds generated from the sale of records by bands such as the Beatles, together with support from the Department of Health and Social Security, which was interested in the possibility of early detection of brain tumors, and from the United Kingdom's Medical Research Council. CAT scanning\u2014now simply CT scanning or CT\u2014enabled three-dimensional images to be produced of any section of the body, including the brain. Indeed, the first CT scanner was designed for the head, and Hounsfield demonstrated it in 1971 at Atkinson Morley's Hospital in London. Cormack and Hounsfield won the 1979 Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine for this work, and such scanners\u2014rapidly improving in speed and acuity\u2014and scans\u2014in pictorial rather than numerical form\u2014rapidly became part of the everyday world of physicians treating brain injuries and neurological diseases in the clinic and hospital.\n\nThe development of the CT scanning technology was closely paralleled by another method for visualizing body structure, including brain structure\u2014magnetic resonance imaging, or MRI (Kevles 1997). The principle of what was initially termed nuclear magnetic resonance (NMR) was that the protons in atoms would become magnetized and align themselves when exposed to a strong magnetic field; when that field was altered, the protons would also realign themselves. In 1946, Felix Bloch (Harvard) and Edward Purcell (Stanford) independently published papers that showed that the protons in a spinning nucleus would resonate when placed in an alternating magnetic field at a particular frequency: when the magnetic field was turned on, the protons would align themselves, and when it was turned off, they would 'relax.' The times taken between their original state and their relaxed state varied between substances, and could be detected by a receiver and turned into images.\n\nInitially, the technique was used in chemistry to explore the structure of molecules, but in the 1950s, as the machines became more widespread, researchers began experimenting with slices of tissue\u2014the images picked up variations in the water in tissues by focusing on spin in hydrogen atoms. In 1959, the first NMR scans were conducted to measure rates of blood flow in living mice by Jay Singer at Berkeley, and at the start of the 1970s, in an episode of apparently independent discovery plagued by controversy and competition, Raymond Damadian and Paul Lauterbur worked out the techniques for deriving images by reconstructing them from multiple scans across a body: Damadian was looking for a device that would map malignancies, and Lauterbur hoped to image fluids. In 1973, Lauterbur used NMR to create cross-sectional images in much the same manner as CT and published the results in a paper in _Nature_ (Lauterbur 1973). There was immediate interest not only because the technique was free of ionizing radiation but because it produced better body images than CT because of its sensitivity to soft issues.\n\nMeanwhile, in the United Kingdom, Peter Mansfield was developing a related way to use NMR to image first solids, then liquids, in the human body; working with others, he developed a machine that would produce three-dimensional images, not by reconstructing them from successive slices, but by using complex algorithms to manipulate data. By the early 1980s, facilitated by the success of CT scanning and by the advantage that NMR did not use ionizing radiation, the machines that undertook what became known as MRI scanning entered clinical use. During the 1980s, many technical refinements of MR were made, and a number diagnostic MR applications were undertaken: MRI received FDA approval for clinical use in 1985. Of course problems remained, not least the great expense of the machines, the need to take special precautions around the very high magnetic fields that they produced (in supercooled magnets, cooled with liquid helium), and the disorienting effects on humans of the strong magnetic field itself, when the organ imaged is the brain. Nonetheless, given its capacity to reveal variations in soft tissue, the brain was one of the key targets of MRI scanning, which was used to detect injuries caused to babies by violent shaking, to reveal the demyelination of nerve fibers that was at the root of the previously mysterious symptoms of multiple sclerosis, and to identify the anomalies, lesions, and tumors that underlay many neurological disorders. Mansfield and Lauterbur were awarded the Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine in 2003 for their work in developing the technology.\n\nBut how to go from imaging _structure_ to imaging _function_? CT and MRI scanning, however useful for detecting structural abnormalities, did not image what the living brain was _doing_. Of course, conclusions could be drawn from structure, however tentatively, where structural anomalies were thought to be linked to functional anomalies. For example, in the trial of John Hinckley for attempting to assassinate Ronald Reagan, CT scans were introduced by the defense, who argued that they showed abnormalities in the appearance of the brain\u2014in its gyri and sulci\u2014and that autopsies had shown these to be characteristic of people diagnosed with schizophrenia. However, this route was indirect\u2014was there a more direct route to render visible the invisible operations of the mind?\n\nFrom the 1930s onward, some investigators had explored normal and abnormal brain activity using electroencephalography (EEG). Edgar Adrian had demonstrated that the Berger rhythm, discovered by Hans Berger in the 1920s, was genuine and not artifactual, reporting his findings in a famous paper of 1934 that argued that the rhythm was linked to attention (Adrian and Matthews 1934). But it was positron emission tomography, or PET, that first seemed to enable the gaze of the investigator to visualize mind in brain. PET appeared to permit direct imaging of very specific processes in the brain as it undertook certain tasks, by showing how certain radiolabeled molecules, such as glucose or drugs, were taken up into brain tissue over time. As Joseph Dumit puts it in his ethnographic study: \"PET was the first noninvasive technology to permit direct quantitative assessment of regional physiological processes in the brain.... PET allowed scientists to make exacting measurements of blood flow, glucose uptake and dopamine receptor uptake\" (Dumit 2003, 22).\n\nThere is a long and generally accepted history of the precursors of PET\u2014those whose basic work established the various elements that would be brought together in the technology. But there is a short and rather disputed history of rivalry and competition when it comes to the last stages in developing PET itself, in particular between the groups around Michael Phelps, Michael Ter-Pogossian, and Henry Wagner (Dumit [2003] provides an excellent account of these rival versions of the history). PET assembled together three basic elements: the idea that a molecule could be labeled with a small amount of radioactivity and traced as it circulated through the body and was metabolized in particular cells; the idea of a device that could attach radioactive tracers attached to a range of molecules of interest; and idea of a scanner that could identify the location of the radioactively labeled molecules at multiple time points, and compile these data into an image.\n\nAll accounts credit Georg Van Hervsey with discovering the tracer principle in the early decades of the twentieth century, for which he received the Nobel Prize in Chemistry in 1943: he showed that \"radioisotopes of elements participate in biochemical and physiological processes in the same way as the chemicals they have replaced\"; that organisms absorb, circulate, metabolize, and excrete these labeled molecules; that their radioactivity decays in a predictable way; and that this process can be traced over time through the various organs and can be traced externally by a detector such as a Geiger counter (Kevles 1997, 202). Hervsey initially used naturally occurring radioisotopes. However, after the Curies had shown, in 1934, that artificial radioisotopes could be produced by bombarding elements with atomic particles, it became possible to create radioisotopes of a whole range of elements that were taken up in particular organs and tissues and in specific metabolic processes. At around the same time, Ernest Lawrence invented a machine, later termed a cyclotron, that used this process of bombarding elements with high-speed neutrons to produce a whole host of radioisotopes, and these began to be used in medical research, even though, at first, there was some concern that they might produce biological damage from radiation effects. In 1965, the first medical cyclotron was installed at the Hammersmith Hospital in London, followed by installations at Massachusetts General Hospital and Washington University's Mallinckrodt Institute of Radiology, also in 1965.\n\nThe next step was the development of the scanning technology. In the 1950s, David Kuhl worked out methods to create images by detecting and localizing the emissions of the radiolabeled ligands, and in particular of a radiolabeled form of deoxyglucose, termed FDG, which, like blood, would be taken up specifically in areas of cerebral activity. This work led to the development of the first scanner that used the method of imaging multiple slices through the brain and using algorithms to compile them together into a three-dimensional image\u2014the process known as single photon emission computerized tomography, or SPECT. SPECT was first used to map brain function by tracking blood flow by Niels Lassen in 1972 (see Lassen 1978). It is the question of priorities in the research that led from SPECT to PET that is most disputed by the participants: the short version of this period is that Phelps, working in Ter-Pogossian's lab, used versions of the algorithms developed for CT scanning to generate similar images from the positron emissions\u2014first dubbed PETT (Ter-Pogossian, Phelps, Hoffman, et al. 1975).\n\nIn the subsequent years, techniques were improved, leading to the commercialization of PET devices, although these remained costly and complex. This was partly because, in order to use them, a lab or clinic had to have a cyclotron close at hand: the radioisotopes that were required had to be produced in cyclotrons, but they decayed rapidly and had to be used in a short time; a considerable crew of technicians and others were required to deploy the procedures. Nonetheless, PET was a powerful research tool, one which, for example, enabled Henry Wagner, who became a powerful promoter of the virtues of nuclear medicine, to image the dopamine receptor (Wagner, Burns, Dannals, et al. 1983). PET was also used in clinical studies of cancer, heart disease, and many other areas, as well as in imaging studies of motor activity, attention, cognition, and various psychiatric disorders, even though its diagnostic capacities proved limited.\n\nWhat scale was appropriate, and possible, for imaging neuronal activity? Some argued that such imaging should ideally be at the molecular level, and that nuclear medicine should become molecular imaging. The earliest studies to quantify neurotransmission and neurochemistry in humans were published in the 1980s (Wagner, Burns, Dannals, et al. 1983; Holman, Gibson, Hill, et al. 1985). Twenty years later, advocates of this approach argued for \"the visual representation, characterization, and quantification of biological processes at the cellular and subcellular levels within intact living organisms\"; they believed that \"the change in emphasis from a non-specific to a specific approach represents a significant paradigm shift, the impact of which is that imaging can now provide the potential for understanding of integrative biology, earlier detection and characterization of disease, and evaluation of treatment\" (Massoud and Gambhir 2003, 545). Shankar Vallabhajosula, the author of one of a flurry of textbooks on molecular imaging published in the first decade of the twenty-first century, claimed that it would be the future of clinical practice: \"although molecular imaging is not necessarily new, what is new is 'molecular and anatomic correlation' \" (Vallabhajosula 2009). The aim would be \"to integrate patient-specific and disease-specific molecular information with traditional anatomical imaging readouts\" with the eventual hope of achieving \"non-invasive or minimally invasive molecular diagnostic capabilities, better clinical risk stratification, more optimal selection of disease therapy, and improved assessment of treatment efficacy\" (ibid., 4).\n\nFrom this perspective, the goal was to create a molecular and neuromolecular therapeutics. The Society for Molecular Imaging (SMI) was founded in 2000 (Provenzale and Mukundan 2005); the European Society for Molecular Imaging (ESMI) was created in 2006; and the journal _Molecular Imaging and Biology_ was launched in 2005 as the official journal of the Academy of Molecular Imaging (AMI), the SMI, and the ESMI. According to Henry Wagner, molecular imaging can help create a more \"cost-benefit knowledge-based health care system\" by shifting the focus and the gaze to specific molecules that become the \"nexus for understanding disease, developing both preventive measures and effective therapies and monitoring treatment efforts\" (Wagner 2006). By 2009, when Wagner published a book titled _Brain Imaging: The Chemistry of Mental Activity_ , it seemed that the technologies for rendering the mental visible in the material, in the chemistry of tissues, fluids, and membranes, had fused with the neuromolecular conception of the brain (Wagner 2009).\n\nIt was another development, however, that was to underpin the proliferating belief that one could see the functional activity of the living brain\u2014to see the mind in the brain. This was functional MRI or fMRI. MRI, as we have seen, focused on structure. How could one get from structure to function? Speed was one part of the answer to this question. As the MRI technology became faster, and the algorithms became more sophisticated, it became possible to take successive MRI images and link them together to capture up to 110 frames per second. The second requirement was to find a tissue that, on the one hand could be imaged, and on the other could be linked to functional activity in the brain. What could be more closely linked to levels of activity in a body than blood? And blood was one of the tissues that could be imaged by MRI techniques. It was via the medium of blood, and the long-standing observations that correlated increased brain activity with increased blood flow, that the functional activity of the living brain\u2014mental states themselves\u2014would seem to be captured in a scanner.\n\nThe link between brain activity and blood flow goes back to the 1870s, when Angelo Mosso, a prominent Italian physiologist, made the observation in humans that local blood flow to the brain is related to brain function: he published his results in 1880 (Mosso 1880). The actual physiological relation between brain function and blood flow was further explored in 1890 by Charles Roy and Charles Sherrington (Roy and Sherrington 1890). In 1948, Seymour Kety and Carl Schmidt developed the method of measuring cerebral blood flow by using the nitrous oxide method (Kety and Schmidt 1948), and in 1955, Kety and colleagues at the University of Pennsylvania and the NIH used radioisotopes to track brain blood flow in cats (Landau, Freygang, Roland, et al. 1955; Freygang and Sokoloff 1958; Kety 1960). This 1955 paper from Kety's group is often claimed to be the first quantification of blood flow in the brain related to brain function. Blood had another great advantage: its magnetic properties. Faraday had carried out studies of the magnetic properties of hemoglobin in 1845, and almost a century later, Linus Pauling and Charles Coryell found that oxygenated and deoxygenated hemoglobin have different magnetic susceptibilities (Pauling and Coryell 1936).\n\nSeiji Ogawa, working at the AT&T Bell Laboratory in New Jersey, recognized that these findings, taken together, made functional imaging possible. He based his approach on the observation that brain cells, when activated, increase their uptake of energy from oxygenated blood, which then becomes deoxygenated (Kevles 1997, 198). Ogawa realized that the deoxygenation of the blood in the regions of the brain where activity was taking place could be imaged. As Kevles explains: \"[V]enous blood, lacking a bound oxygen molecule, is paramagnetic, and when placed in a magnetic field changes the magnetism all around it. This distortion of the magnetic field, in turn, affects the magnetic resonance of nearby water protons. It amplifies their signal as much as 100,000 times. Ogawa called this effect BOLD (blood-oxygen-level-dependent) contrast imaging, and he published his first paper using this method in 1989 (Kevles 1997, 198). Other research groups were experimenting with the use of contrast agents with MRI to demonstrate changes in brain blood volume produced by physiological manipulations of brain blood flow; after some animal studies in the late 1980s, the first study using this approach with human volunteers to explore task activation brain mapping was published in 1991 (Belliveau, Kennedy, McKinstry, et al. 1991). However, the BOLD response, which required no administration of an external contrast agent, was to become the key to the widespread use of functional MRI (Ogawa, Lee, Kay, et al. 1990).\n\nAs functional brain imaging, whether by PET or by fMRI, came to supplement images of anatomical structures, we now seemed able to observe metabolic activity in living, functioning brains in four dimensions\u2014three of space and one of time. The very interior processes of the living and dynamic brain, its anatomical normalities and pathologies, its activity in delusions and normal perception, its secretion or blockade of neurotransmitters, could be rendered visible and correlated with a phenomenology of mental life. At last, it now seems that we can see the physical basis of mind in the activities of the living brain. To see is to know, and to know is to see. But what is it that is being seen, what is happening when, to quote Andreas Roepstorff, \"knowing becomes seeing\"? (Roepstorff 2007)\n\nThe Epidemiology of Visualization\n\nIn 2008, Nikos Logothetis reported that\n\na recent database (ISI\/Web of Science) query using the keywords \"fMRI,\" or \"functional MRI\" or \"functional magnetic resonance imaging\" returned over 19,000 peer reviewed articles.... About 43% of papers explore functional localization and\/or cognitive anatomy associated with some cognitive task or stimulus\u2014constructing statistical parametric maps from changes in haemodynamic responses from every point in the brain. Another 22% are region of interest studies examining the physiological properties of different brain structures, analogous to single-unit recordings; 8% are on neuropsychology; 5% on the properties of the fMRI signal; and the rest is on a variety of other topics including plasticity, drug action, experimental designs and analysis methods. (Logothetis 2008, 869)\n\nWhen we repeated this exercise in October 2010, the result was even more staggering\u201453,662 papers were identified, starting with one published in 1980 (Holland, Moore, and Hawkes in the _Journal of Computer Assisted Tomography_ ), 146 papers in 1990, 2,139 in 2000, 4,725 in 2005, and almost 7,000 in the one year of 2009 alone. Alongside the categories that Logothetis reports, we find papers relating changes in brain activity to responses to art in general and to the work of specific painters; to responses to music and to specific composers or performers; papers discussing the neurocognitive processes of religious leaders; studies of brain activation related to the use of language, metaphor, or responses to various novelists; papers that monitor brain activity in response to television commercials or to grief after the loss of a child; as well as hundreds of studies purporting to image love, hate, fear, and other emotions, all manner of cognitive processes, and volition and acts of will when individuals in scanners are given simple tasks to undertake. What is one to make of this industry of visualization?\n\nOne cannot fail to be tempted by the results of all this research\u2014has not the activities of the living mind within living brain now come into view? Yet many of the researchers in this area, including many of those actually responsible for generating the statistical maps that make the images possible, feel profoundly uneasy about this translation of their quantitative data into pictorial form and the conclusions, both professional and popular, that are drawn from these studies. As indeed do the social scientists who have explored these developments. For the sake of simplicity, we can group their concerns under four headings: localization, the lab, pixels to pictures, and evidence to interpretation.\n\nAre Brain Functions Localized?\n\nAre brain functions localized, and in what sense? And why should this be important? One of the most vociferous critics of the emphasis on localization in the practices of imaging has been Jerry Fodor who is a philosopher and cognitive scientist. Writing in the popular magazine the _London Review of Books_ , he argued:\n\nI want, to begin with, to distinguish between the question whether mental functions are neurally localized in the brain, and the question where they are neurally localized in the brain. Though I find it hard to care about the second, the first clearly connects with deep issues about how the mind works;... [but] just what is the question about the mind-brain relation in general, or about language in particular, that turns on where the brain's linguistic capacities are? And if, as I suspect, none does, why are we spending so much time and money trying to find them? It isn't, after all, seriously in doubt that talking (or riding a bicycle, or building a bridge) depends on things that go on in the brain somewhere or other. If the mind happens in space at all, it happens somewhere north of the neck. What exactly turns on knowing how far north? (Fodor 1999)\n\nThis argument actually comes rather strangely from someone who is one of the strongest proponents of the mental ontology that seems quite consistent with localization, that is to say, a 'modular' theory of mind (Fodor 1983, 2001). Nonetheless, many others, including many neuroscientists, have also questioned a strict conception of localization, one that is based on the idea of hard-wired connections of neurons, clustered together, along with the belief that there can be a one-to-one mapping of specific mental processes to specific brain regions common to all 'normal' human beings' brains.\n\nConsider this analysis from Russell Poldrack:\n\nOne cannot infer that the activated regions are necessary or sufficient for the engagement of the mental process. Indeed, there are well-known examples of cases in which regions that are activated during a task are not necessary for the task. For example, the hippocampus is activated during delay classical conditioning, but lesions to the hippocampus do not impair this function.... Inferences from lesion studies are limited by the fact that the brain may often have multiple ways to perform a cognitive process.... Cognitive neuroscientists have generally adopted a strongly modular approach to structure\u2013function relationships, perhaps driven by the facile leap to localizationist conclusions from lesion and neuroimaging results. Despite the longstanding appreciation for the importance of functional integration within the neuroimaging literature, the widespread use of functional and effective connectivity analyses has not yet come about. Given that many cognitive processes may be distinguished not by activity in specific regions but by patterns of activity across regions, there is reason for caution regarding many of the inferences that have been driven by highly modular approaches. (Poldrack 2008)\n\nNeuroscientists critical of many of the conclusions drawn from brain imaging further point out the problem of scale. For despite all its increases in acuity, fMRI can only measure mass action. Nikos Logothetis has examined the three hundred top-cited fMRI studies and estimated that a typical voxel size (before filtering of data that is likely to increase this by a factor of two or three) contains 5.5 million neurons, between 2.2 \u00d7 1010 and 5.5 \u00d7 1010 synapses, 22 km of dendrites, and 220 km of axons. Leaving aside all the other complications that will shape the blood-oxygen-level variations within this cube of brain tissue that is somewhere between 9 and 16 mm square and around 7 mm in thickness\u2014notably, the balance in every single neuron between excitation and inhibition\u2014this is, to say the least, a large and heterogeneous population of cells.\n\nIn any event, how are we to know what scale is appropriate for examining mental processes? What proportion, in what configuration of the 1010 neurons and 1014 connections in the human cortex alone should be analyzed in relation to any task? Logothetis quotes neuroanatomist Valentino Braitenberg: \"It makes no sense to read a newspaper with a microscope\" (Logothetis 2008); one might add, as pointed out by Hauke Heekeren, of the Max Planck Institute for Human Development, that it makes no sense to read a book from a photograph of the bookshelf. No wonder that Logothetis concludes that the \"limitations of fMRI are not related to physics or poor engineering, and are unlikely to be resolved by increasing the sophistication and power of the scanners; they are instead due to the circuitry and functional organization of the brain, as well as to inappropriate experimental protocols that ignore this organization\" (Logothetis 2008: 876\u201377).\n\nThe Lab: Place or Non-Place?\n\nTypically, reports of brain imaging experiments pay little attention to the material properties of the laboratory setting. This is unfortunate, for, as ethnographers such as Simon Cohn have pointed out, the scanning facility is not a 'non-place' for those who are being scanned, it is a particular and rather unusual arrangement of space, persons, machinery, sounds, and sights, not to mention the experience of being in the scanner itself. What are the subjects thinking and doing when they are in the scanner? The scanned brain is in a human body, the body of a human being who is being paid to lie in a machine to perform a task that the brain will never be confronted with in the world outside. These features, that cannot enter the modeling of the relation between the stimulus and response contained within the space of the scanner, cannot enter into the analysis that the scanning software uses to generate the images (Cohn 2008).\n\nYet as Cohn also points out, those social relations of the scanning facility, the \"brief but intimate personal relations\" between the researchers and their subjects, are central to the possibility of the scanning experiment. What impact do the social relations of the scanning facility have on the mental life of the scanned subject? How can the researchers set aside, for the purposes of the experiment, the arguments about the nature of 'the social brain' that neuroscientists themselves are generating\u2014that the human brain is particularly evolved for interactions, including adapting itself in all sorts of ways to its attributions of wishes and intentions to others? How might this experience and response to sociality differ between subjects, for example, in the scanning of healthy volunteers and hospitalized patients diagnosed with depression? To what extent can there be generalization across subjects who are experiencing and understanding the scanning situation in different ways, let alone beyond the lab setting?\n\nThese are, indeed, key questions. What is involved here, as we will discuss in the next chapter in relation to animal models, is the creation of a certain kind of \"setup\" (Latour 1987) that brings together, within a particular institutional form and practice, experimenters, assorted technicians from various backgrounds, devices, concepts, theories, and subjects. Only through this setup is it possible to generate the data that are required to generate the images that can then be subject to interpretation at leisure and then deployed in presentations, articles, and books to make arguments. The brain of the individual is thus given the opportunity to produce something that it would not otherwise be able to produce. But that setup, with all its sociality, contingency, specificity, and embedded meaning, disappears in the interpretation of the measurements produced. This is not necessarily a problem in itself: it is an inescapable part of the incredibly difficult process by which data of this sort can be generated. But it does raise some rather important questions about what can be concluded from such data, or rather, from the images that the data are used to generate. What is the salience of the image, when it emerges from the secluded and simplified world of the laboratory, and makes claims for its relevance to the understanding of conduct in the wild and messy world of everyday life?\n\nPixels to Pictures\n\nThe artifactual character of the images produced in the various technologies of brain scanning has attracted much critical attention (Dumit 1997, 1999; Beaulieu 2000b, 2002; Roepstorff 2004). In the analysis and presentation of the scan data, computerized methods are used, involving choosing among a whole range of available algorithms to transform quantitative information into images of domains that can be explored spatially. This is a technically highly complex rendition, generated by mapping quantitative data on the emission of each positron in a scan of a particular subject (carefully chosen, screened, prepared) in four dimensions onto a morphological space usually drawn from a standardized MR atlas of slices of the typical or average brain. The process involves transforming, smoothing, warping, and stretching the data on each individual to fit the standard anatomical space; this is necessary to make the images comparable and cumulable. And the colors, so impressive in the proliferation of such images in the domains of nonspecialists, are similarly artifactual\u2014there are no reasons apart from convention why areas seemingly highly active should be represented in reds and those less active in blues. Yet of course, those colors carry cultural resonances that have great significance for the meanings that are attributed to the images, at least when they are represented beyond the laboratory or the journal article.\n\nJoseph Dumit identifies four key stages in the amalgam of social and technical processes that generates the image (Dumit 2003). First, _devising the experimental design_ : choosing participants, defining them (normal, schizophrenic, drug naive, etc.), controlling prior states, specifying the task unambiguously. Second, _managing the technical process_ of measuring brain activity: conducting the scan, compiling the data, algorithmically reconstructing a three-dimensional map of activity. Third, _making the data comparable_ : normalizing the brainsets, warping them onto a standard anatomical atlas of brain space, then combining brainsets by manipulating the datasets. Fourth, _making the data presentable_ : coloring, contrasting, and production of the images. Much of this is handled by standard software packages, notably statistical parametric mapping (SPM). While such packages are regularly updated and incorporate input from the researchers in the field, like other such programs, many assumptions, some dating back many years, are 'black-boxed' within them\u2014in this case literally, as the software is designed to work 'straight out of the box.'\n\nThe sociologists of scientific knowledge have given us many ways to think of the process of black-boxing in scientific research. But here, in the image itself, as the process disappears into the product, the illusion of transparency is crucial to the effects of truth. To quote another ethnographer of brain imaging, this process does not so much \"image\" mind in brain, but constitutes a new object: \"the mind-in-the-brain\" (Beaulieu 2000b). Like the diagnostic space opened by Bucknill and Tuke's carefully posed pictorial representations of the varieties of madness, then, this new molecular vision opens onto an irreal space of thought and interventions. It represents not by the _simulacrum_ but by the _simulation_ \u2014by generating a model of processes at the level of the living brain, a model that is, precisely, capable of modeling in apparently precise images and flows, the functioning and malfunctioning of those process under particular conditions.\n\nIt is undoubtedly true that such images provide powerful support for particular theories of brain functioning, by purporting to allow researchers to actually observe the mind\/brain seeing, hearing, smelling, thinking, desiring, emoting, willing, or hallucinating. Yet the power of these images is located at their weakest point\u2014the point where simulation claims not merely to be a way of isolating certain elements of a more complex system for analysis (as, for example, in a computer simulation of an earthquake), but to be the thought image of that system itself. Despite their apparent realism, claims to account for the phenomenology of mental states in terms of these simulated functions localized in the living brain require an act of faith in all those elements on which the image is premised. The visual imaginary that is the result is, in this sense, no different from that of the phrenologists of the nineteenth century.\n\nEvidence and Interpretation\n\nOf course, the experiments, and the images they produce, do not demonstrate _nothing_. But _what_ they demonstrate is a matter of dispute. The 'objectivity effect' of the image seems to be clear: studies have shown that the presentation of a brain image can positively influence the reader's judgment about the quality of the reasoning of the article in which that image appears (McCabe and Castel 2008) and that of verbal descriptions of neuroimaging results can make weak arguments more persuasive\u2014even when they are irrelevant to the argument (Weisberg, Keil, Goodstein, et al. 2008). We shall see in a later chapter, however, that this objectivity effect seems to be limited by the characteristics of the practice in which the image is deployed. For the image, despite suggestions to the contrary, and despite all the arguments black-boxed within it, does not speak for itself\u2014it has to be spoken for. And in areas where those who speak in the name of the image are challenged, for example, in the criminal justice system, the image itself may get caught up in the dynamics of controversy.\n\nIn other domains too, the interpretations necessary to give images their salience have come under significant criticism from imagers themselves. Let us take a single example here, a paper titled \"Does Rejection Hurt? An fMRI Study of Social Exclusion\" published in _Science_ in 2003 (Eisenberger, Lieberman, and Williams 2003). Here is how the abstract describes the study:\n\nA neuroimaging study examined the neural correlates of social exclusion and tested the hypothesis that the brain bases of social pain are similar to those of physical pain. Participants were scanned while playing a virtual balltossing game in which they were ultimately excluded. Paralleling results from physical pain studies, the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) was more active during exclusion than during inclusion and correlated positively with self-reported distress. Right ventral prefrontal cortex (RVPFC) was active during exclusion and correlated negatively with self-reported distress. ACC changes mediated the RVPFC-distress correlation, suggesting that RVPFC regulates the distress of social exclusion by disrupting ACC activity.\n\nThis illustrates the problems of this style of reasoning rather clearly. First, one creates a game that an individual can play in a scanner, that is taken to simulate a 'social' interaction (although the relation between virtual ball tossing and any salient social situation is somewhat tenuous). Second, one adjusts one's scanning parameters until one is able to observe increased brain activity\u2014or rather an increased BOLD response\u2014in a particular region of the brain\u2014or rather, a region of the standard brain space onto which your data has been warped, in this case the anterior cingulate cortex, or ACC. Next, one refers to previous experiments claiming that this brain region shows an increase in activation in another condition: in this case, the ACC has been shown to be activated when the subject experiences physical pain. Then one concludes that, because the same region is activated in both conditions\u2014here in both social exclusion and in physical pain processing\u2014the two are causally linked: hence social exclusion hurts.\n\nAmong the many rather obvious flaws in this chain of reasoning is the fact that activation in the same brain region has been claimed in multiple tasks. For example, changes in amygdala activity have been found to occur in experiments seeking to generate or simulate a whole range of mental states: fear, reward, fairness, moral status, subjective reports of beauty, trustworthiness, and more. So to make such arguments work, either more and more baroque alignments must be made, or the experimenters must, as in this case, be exceptionally selective. The authors of the study cited above conclude: \"This study suggests that social pain is analogous in its neurocognitive function to physical pain, alerting us when we have sustained injury to our social connections, allowing restorative measures to be taken. Understanding the underlying commonalities between physical and social pain unearths new perspectives on issues such as why physical and social pain are affected similarly by both social support and neurochemical interventions... and why it 'hurts' to lose someone we love\" (Eisenberger, Lieberman, and Williams 2003, 292). On the basis of such extrapolations in hundreds of papers using fMRI to measure changes in brain activity when subjects undergo tasks said to simulate features of our form of life in the scanner, an empire of brain imaging research has been built.\n\nThe New Engines of Brain Visualization\n\nWhat, then, are the consequences of this artful construction of the mind? Should we object to artfulness itself? This would be unwise, not least because it would tie us, even if tacitly, to the aspiration for an untenable realism. Knowledge, as a whole tradition of thinkers about science have reminded us, always entails a break away from the immediate and the concrete to the visualization and manipulation of artificial objects moved by hypothetical forces in abstract space. It is not the irreality of this image of the mind that should concern us, but the attribution of false concreteness to that image by researchers, policymakers, and popular interpreters. The implications of these attributions of false concreteness are best discussed in relation to specific practices, and will be examined in our later chapters. But, more generally, can we say that we have traveled up a gradient of objectivity as we have moved from Esquirol's drawings through Diamond's posed photographs, Charcot's movies, Brodmann's maps, and Penfield's homunculi to the luminous images of fMRI investigations that stud the pages of our contemporary scientific journals?\n\nIt is hard to free ourselves from the photographic illusion that might support such a belief in progress toward the real. But it is nonetheless misleading. In saying this, we are not suggesting a fundamental rejection of the truth effects of brain imaging. To attend to the artifice of the image is not to critique it but to recognize the nature of the objectivity, the facticity that it produces. The image should be understood not as a picture to be judged via a criterion of realism, but as a tool, a move in an argument, an instrument in an intervention, to be judged by criteria of rationality, validity, or efficacy. Advances in clinical medicine from the nineteenth century onward went hand in hand with the penetration of the gaze of the doctor into depths of the body itself. There are now many examples of analogous advances linked to the structural imaging of the brain\u2014in the detection of tumors, the identification of lesions, the mapping of the damage caused by injury or stroke. Thanks to such images, the mind of the neuroscientist, the neurologist, and the psychiatrist does now seem able to \"walk among the tissues themselves.\" But however similar the images of brain _function_ are to those of brain _structure_ , they mislead if they seem to allow the mind of the neuroscientist to walk among thoughts, feelings, or desires. Technology alone, even where it appears to measure neural activity, cannot enable the gaze to bridge the gap between molecules and mental states. We should not fall victim to the illusion that visualization itself has\u2014or could\u2014resolve the question of the relations between minds and brains. To recognize this is not to undermine the work of brain scanning, far from it. On the contrary, by enabling us critically to evaluate the different kinds of claims made in behalf of the diverse components of this avalanche of images, an analysis of these new engines of visualization can and should help improve the robustness of the truths they create.\nChapter Three\n\nWhat's Wrong with Their Mice?\n\nWhat a pitiful, what a sorry thing to have said that animals are machines bereft of understanding and feeling, which perform their operations always in the same way, which learn nothing, perfect nothing, etc.!\n\n\u2014Voltaire, _Dictionnaire philosophique portatif_ , 1764\n\nTread softly when approaching a mouse model of a human psychiatric disease.\n\n\u2014Jacqueline Crawley, _What's Wrong with My Mouse? Behavioral Phenotyping of Transgenic and Knockout Mice_ , 2007\n\nWe take the title of this chapter from Jacqueline Crawley's _What's Wrong with My Mouse?_ from which we have learned a great deal about the world of animal modeling of behavioral disorders (Crawley 2007). Given the limitations that have long surrounded experimental intervention into the brains of living humans, animal research has been crucial to the project of neuroscience, from the molecular dissection of neurobiological processes such as neurotransmission, to research on plasticity and neurogenesis, and of course, to the development and testing of psychiatric drugs. But why frame the chapter in such terms\u2014why might there be 'something wrong' with the mice\u2014or for that matter the flies, rats, macaques, and the other creatures\u2014that populate the labs, and the papers, of those who use animal models, and model animals, in the experimental investigation of the neurobiological underpinnings of human behavior? The question of _translation_ poses this issue most clearly, for if there are persistent failures in using the findings in the laboratory to develop effective therapeutic interventions in practices that seek to treat, cure, or reform humans, then it might be sensible to ask whether there is 'something wrong' with the practices of animal modeling and experimentation themselves.\n\nSociologists, anthropologists, historians and philosophers have written extensively on models in science. There have been analyses of scientific modeling as a practice and as a \"style of reasoning\"\u2014sometimes referred to as \"the third dimension of science\" (Morgan and Morrison 1999; Thagard, Magnani, and Nersessian 1999; de Chadarevian and Hopwood 2004). There has been a range of ethnographic and historical studies that have focused on the social relations within which models are shaped and used among communities of modelers (e.g., Star and Griesemer [1989] 1999; L\u00f6wy 1992; Kohler 1994; Gaudilli\u00e8re and L\u00f6wy 1998; Lemov 2005; Franklin 2007; Shostak 2007; Friese 2009). But surprisingly, little has been written from the social and human sciences on animal models of _behavior_. And even less has been written on animal models _in psychiatry_ \u2014where the models are neither conceptual representations (although they embody these) nor three dimensional artifacts (although they are in three dimensions), but living, breathing, developing organisms (adding the dimension of vitality and temporality) that are of interest because of their _behavior_ (adding a further dimension to the model), and of behavior deemed pathological or abnormal, which complicates things even further.\n\nWhen we have discussed with colleagues from the social and human sciences the use of animals to explore issues relating to human cognition, emotion, volition, and their pathologies, the initial response has usually been skeptical. When we have described the methods of assessment used in such laboratory studies, for example, the use of the elevated plus maze in the study of anxiety, or the forced swim test in the study of depression, the reaction is often one of laughter. How, our naive colleagues ask, can anyone believe that there can be any similarity between mouse _behavior_ in this strange apparatus in an artificial laboratory setting and the rich meaningful, culturally embedded, historically shaped, linguistically organized, situationally framed, _experience_ of depression, anxiety, and whatever else in our everyday human world\u2014especially, when we find it difficult enough to describe these human feelings in rigorous ways, to compare them between persons and societies, or to distinguish what is normal from what is not?\n\nThe immediate response of researchers who use such animal models in their work is to point to similarities in the genomes of the two species, in the structure of mouse and human brain, in patterns of brain activation, in neural mechanisms at the cellular and molecular level, in responses to drugs and so forth, perhaps with reference to evolution and the principle of conservation across species when it comes to the most basic aspects of living organisms, including their brains. To which our colleagues in the human sciences might well respond\u2014if they had read Wittgenstein\u2014that this is all very well, but \"[o]nly of a living human being and what resembles (behaves like) a living human being, can one say it has sensations; it sees, is blind; hears, is deaf; is conscious or unconscious\" (Wittgenstein 1958, \u00a7 281)\u2014or, to extend the argument, it is only of a person that one can say that he or she experiences anxiety or feels depressed.\n\nThey might also suggest that the animal modelers were guilty of what Bennett and Hacker call the \"mereological fallacy\" (Bennett and Hacker 2003): that talk of similarities in genes or brains between animals and humans as-signs properties to genes or brains that properly belong only to persons. And so, they might continue, showing similarities in genes or brains between animals and humans does not resolve the problem. For while the genes or the brain may be involved\u2014certainly are involved\u2014in anxiety and depression in humans, while there may be brain activity associated with these complex affects, they are distributed across whole embodied persons in specific social situations whose meaning is given by the whole complex of resources that we can briefly sum up as 'culture.' In short, the way in which humans are in the world, their emotions, actions, and desires, depends on the way in which they give meaning to themselves and to their world, their models of that world, their beliefs about themselves and that world, and the affects associated with those beliefs. While those may have conditions of possibility in brain states and gene states, they do not reflect them. Indeed such an idea is meaningless because, _as a result of their biology_ , humans are the _only_ creatures that live, act, feel, and will in a world of language, meanings, beliefs\u2014sedimented and stabilized in artifacts, buildings, forms of life, human social practices, and much more.\n\nResearchers who use animal models are familiar with such reactions and have several responses. They claim that they are well aware of the problems of anthropomorphism and are taught from the outset not to speak of anxiety or depression in mice but of 'anxiety-like' or 'depression-related' states, because \"[t]here is no way for a human investigator to know whether a mouse is feeling afraid, anxious, or depressed. These are subjective emotional experiences, existing in the mind and body of the individual\" (Crawley 2007, 227). Thoughtful modelers such as Crawley insist that, at most, it is possible to develop a behavioral test for mice that has some validity for a symptom of the human condition, or an assay that is sensitive to therapeutic drug responses in humans (261). Nonetheless, those within the community of animal modelers in psychiatric research and behavioral neuroscience have pointed to at least six sets of problems that afflict such work: (1) the problematic homologies and analogies between human and animal behaviors, especially in relation to psychiatry; (2) the precarious assumption of common mechanisms; (3) the difficulty of the phenotype\u2014of the behavioral classification of mouse models of disorders generated by knockouts or other techniques, as these are seldom open to validation other than by means of pointing to apparent similarities in the observable behavior of the animal and the human; (4) the difficulties of modeling human stressors in animals; (5) the weakness of current tests, such as forced swim test, the elevated plus maze, and so forth for simulating variations in _human_ behavior; and (6) the fact that many trials are not properly blinded or randomized. This is not to mention the further difficulties arising from the great variety between strains, between labs, between particular practices for managing the animals, and so forth, all of which bedevil comparisons between results obtained by different research groups.\n\nThese technical difficulties are of great importance. However, we want to locate them in the context of some more fundamental issues. We can system-atize these into four interconnected themes that will structure this chapter. The first three are rather general and conceptual, the fourth more specific and practical.\n\n\u2022 First, the question of the _artificiality_ of the laboratory situation within which animal experiments are conducted.\n\n\u2022 Second, the idea of a _model_ in behavioral and psychiatric research.\n\n\u2022 Third, the fundamental objection from the social and human sciences\u2014the _specificity_ of the human and the elision of history and human (as opposed to animal) sociality.\n\n\u2022 Finally, the problem of _translation_. For if the criticisms from the social and human sciences are correct\u2014of the artificiality of the laboratory experiment; of the idea of an animal model of human behavior; of the blindness of animal modeling to the realities of the social and cultural lives that shape human mental life and human actions, then the translational problems of behavioral and neuroscientific work on animals would be inevitable. And the question would then be, to what extent are any of these problems remediable.\n\nArtificiality?\n\nFirst Stabilization: The Experimenter\n\nFor those of us who have undergone training in biology, the cry \"what's wrong with my mouse?\"\u2014or fruit fly or pigeon\u2014is usually one of desperation from novitiates whose dratted creatures will not manifest the attributes or behavior that our textbooks, professors, and demonstrators assure us is there if only we knew how to look: how to mix the reagents, to manage the apparatus, to observe the experiment, to note the results, and so forth. This common experience, banal as it is, may serve to highlight one set of considerations when we are thinking about laboratory studies using animals as models of human behavior. The activity of modeling must be seen as a practice, a craft work, and one that involves training and inculcation of routines and habits. This is a process that involves a triple stabilization\u2014of the experimenter, of the setup, and, of course, of the subject (the fly, mouse, rat, pigeon, etc.). No stabilization along these three dimensions\u2014no laboratory, no result, no paper; and, for those who fail the test of stabilization, no more experimenter. So the stabilization of the researcher\u2014or in most cases the research team\u2014is the first task. We will not dwell on this process of creating the experimenter here, though there is much to be said about it, for we all know that this is what scientific apprenticeship is intended to achieve\u2014to embed these ways of seeing and doing (and many other controls over conduct)\u2014into the bodily and mental habits of the experimenter so that all the strange activities invoved in animal work become a kind of second nature.\n\nSecond Stabilization: The Setup\n\nLet us say more, however, about the idea of a setup, of which the experimenter is one element. We have taken the term _setup_ from Bruno Latour (Latour 1987), who uses it to refer to the _dispositif_ that brings together experimenters, colleagues from a range of disciplines, institutions, apparatuses, data, concepts, theories, subjects (in this case the animals themselves) and much more in order to produce what he terms \"inscriptions.\" Inscriptions are the visual records of the experiment, turned into data that can be taken away from the lab, and worked upon long after the experiment itself is concluded and combined with many other inscriptions, in order to produce an argument. In that process, Latour suggests, the complex, heterogeneous, fragile, crafted assemblage of the setup retreats into the background, as its outcomes, in highly processed forms, appear in graphs, diagrams, formulas, and the like.\n\nWhile some regard this account as a criticism, from our own point of view, to characterize the process through which data are produced is not to seek to undermine it. It is just to point out that this is one way of enabling the animal and its behavior to 'appear' in a form that enables one to do scientific work on it. One consequence, of course, is that the animals appear in a particular way. They do not appear as individual creatures, with their own peculiarities, as they are seen in the actual practice of the experiment, and as they are known by those who work in the animal labs\u2014who often have a finely tuned knowledge of the specific 'character' of each animal, and an awareness of its 'emotional state' at the time of its entry to the experiment. These individual differences among individual living organisms, which persist despite all the work of stabilization of the animals that we discuss later, disappear as the animal is transformed into a series of measurements that are aggregated with others and turned into the group data that can work in experimental analysis.\n\nThis is not the only way to work with animals, of course\u2014one could observe them in their natural habitat\u2014but this would require a different setup. Latour, who has done some interesting work in primatology with Shirley Strum, therefore suggests that it is not helpful to analyze this in terms of an opposition between naturalness and artificiality. We devise different setups to make visible, to elicit, features of the lives and potentialities of the animals that were previously invisible or hard to discern. We can make use of something that Latour points out in a debate with primatologists, drawing on the way in which Thelma Rowell speaks of her work on sheep\u2014we \"give the mouse the opportunity to show what it can do,\" we give it a chance to show us something, perhaps even give it a chance to enter into behavior in which it would not otherwise engage (Latour 2002). There are, of course, other ways to give the mouse, or the monkey, the chance to show what it can do\u2014maybe better ways, maybe ways that have different consequences. But without some setup, producing some kinds of inscriptions that can be worked upon, the animal would not have a chance to show what it can do in a way that can enter scientific debate. So it is no criticism of animal models to say they produce their phenomena only in a certain setup. But this does exemplify one of the two translation problems that we are addressing\u2014the translation from those features that are given permission to appear within the setup of the lab to the features that appear in the clinic and the world beyond.\n\nA comment by Georges Canguilhem in his 1965 essay \"The Living and Its Milieu\" is relevant here. Discussing the work of Kurt Goldstein, he writes, \"The situation of a living being commanded from the outside by the milieu is what Goldstein considers the archetype of a catastrophic situation. And that is the situation of the living in a laboratory. The relations between the living and the milieu as they are studied experimentally, objectively, are among all possible relations, those that make the least sense biologically; they are _pathological_ relations\" (Canguilhem [1965] 2008, 113; emphasis added). To live, to be an individual living being, Canguilhem argues, is to _organize_ one's milieu\u2014and to deprive the experimental animal of precisely that opportunity is to vitiate a crucial aspect of that mode of living that one wishes to analyze. And yet, as we shall see, this seems to be precisely the situation of the animal in behavioral neuroscience. Is this, then a catastrophic situation, and if so, with what consequences?\n\nWe need to situate this question in the more general context of the laboratory disciplines, which use a very particular sort of setup to produce truth. They make use of apparatus, instruments, and procedures in order to create phenomena in the laboratory that did not exist before: the truthfulness of their statements is then mapped onto the phenomena produced by that experimental apparatus (Shapin and Schaffer 1985; Hacking 2009, 43). Historians of science tell us that this laboratory form of life emerged across Europe in the seventeenth century (Salomon-Bayet 1978). The _OED_ defines a laboratory as \"a building set apart for conducting practical investigations in natural science, orig. and esp. in chemistry, and for the elaboration or manufacture of chemical, medicinal, and like products\" and finds its first use in the early seventeenth century. Laboratory researchers may bridle at the way in which some of these early usages think of the laboratory as place for alchemy, but undoubtedly, the emergence of laboratories led to a new way of making truths.\n\nThis way of truth-making was controversial at the outset, but is now so ordinary that its artifactual nature has become almost imperceptible. In the laboratory sciences, we no longer derive truth from speculation, nor from the observation of natural phenomena in the wild. From this time forward, scientific truths will have to answer to the phenomena that are produced in a novel, enclosed and most unnatural setting which is neither public nor is it exactly private: the phenomena and procedures are observed and recorded by reliable witnesses and only then communicated to others by means of words spoken or written. So the apparatus, the setting, the witnesses (which include, of course, the apparatus and the inscriptions it produces), the form of writing, the kind of fact, the means of making things true\u2014all of these are specific to, constitutive of, the laboratory as a style of thought, and one that is embedded in the emerging form of scientific life. And while, in the early days of the laboratory, the emphasis was on the trustworthiness and reliability of the human witnesses to the experiment, today the crucial role of trust is retained, but displaced to other mechanisms such as peer review and the rhetoric of replication (Shapin 1994, 2008). So, this is the second stabilization\u2014of the apparatuses and the instruments.\n\nIf we are to understand the role of model animals and animal models in experimental investigations in neuroscience, then, it will not suffice to denounce them for their artificiality. This would require us to denounce most of what has come to be accepted as truth within the laboratory sciences, for those truths too have been created, manufactured, or at least exposed, intensified, given a chance, made visible, stabilized, within the peculiar world of the laboratory. But perhaps another line of criticism is more salient\u2014that of self-vindication. Ian Hacking has argued that, in the case of those kinds of science that \"study phenomena that seldom or never occur in a pure state before people have brought them under surveillance\" (1992a, 34), the setups of the laboratory science are \"self-vindicating\":\n\nAs a laboratory science matures, it develops a body of theory and types of apparatus and types of analysis that are mutually adjusted to each other.... They become... \"a closed system\" that is essentially unrefutable.... The theories of the laboratory sciences... persist because they are true to phenomena produced or even created by apparatus in the laboratory and are measured by instruments that we have engineered.... Our theories are at best true to the phenomena that were elicited by instrumentation in order to get a good mesh with theory. The process of modifying the workings of instruments\u2014both materially (we fix them up) and intellectually (we redescribe what they do)\u2014furnishes the glue that keeps our intellectual and material world together. It is what stabilizes science. (1992a, 30, 58)\n\nAnimal research in behavioral neuroscience certainly studies phenomena that do not occur in nature but are produced in the laboratory setup. So is such research also self-vindicating? If so, the translation problem would inescapably follow.\n\nThis is a question raised within the community of animal modelers themselves. Thus Helene Richter, together with Joseph Garner and Hanno W\u00fcrbel, argues that \"mounting evidence indicates that even subtle differences in laboratory or test conditions can lead to conflicting test outcomes. Because experimental treatments may interact with environmental conditions, experiments conducted under highly standardized conditions may reveal local 'truths' with little external validity\" (Richter, Garner, and W\u00fcrbel 2009). Could one move from such local truths\u2014the truths of a particular laboratory\u2014to the truths of the lifeworld of persons, or even the lifeworld of mice? From our perspective, the key test should not merely be a one-off demonstration of a capacity to translate, as, for example, in the claim that some pharmaceuticals tested on animals seem effective when used to treat analogous conditions in humans. We need an integrated way of escaping self-vindication by establishing a continual relation of transaction between the world of the laboratory and that lifeworld world of humans that it seeks to elucidate. If the laboratory neuroscience of animal models cannot establish those relations, then their problem, perhaps, is not a technical matter, to be rectified by tinkering in various ways, but a conceptual matter about the very nature of the animal models themselves as they function in behavioral neuroscience. We will return to this point later. First, however, let us turn to the third stabilization, that of the subjects, the animals themselves.\n\nThird Stabilization: The Animals\n\nThe stabilization of animals used in modeling has involved two aspects\u2014the selection of species to use in modeling, and the stabilization of the creatures within that species to render them into 'model animals' appropriate for experimentation. How does one choose one's model animal? No doubt some animals are exceptionally convenient for laboratory research on behavior. Curt Richter, in his charmingly titled piece \"Experiences of a Reluctant Rat Catcher,\" extols the Norway rat, which he studied for more than half a century, beginning in the 1920s: \"If someone were to give me the power to create an animal most useful for all types of studies on problems concerned directly or indirectly with human welfare, I could not possibly improve on the Norway rat\" (Richter 1968, 403). He lists the following advantages of his favored creature (377\u201378):\n\n_Norway Rat's Qualification for Behavior Studies_\n\nAt this point I should like to call attention to the advantages that the rat offers for behavior studies as well as for scientific studies in general.\n\n1. Its dietary needs are very nearly the same as man's. This explains how observations made on it can readily be extrapolated to man. It is a very stable and reliable animal.\n\n2. It reproduces readily.\n\n3. It is just the right size for all kinds of anatomical and physiological studies.\n\n4. Its short lifespan of about three years makes it possible to study factors involved in growth, development and aging.\n\n5. It is a very clean animal. Given the opportunity, it will keep itself perfectly clean.\n\n6. It is well equipped with tools for manipulation of its environment: with very sharp and strong teeth, very dexterous paws and feet, and strong hind legs.\n\n7. It is well equipped with sensory organs: for tasting, smelling, seeing, hearing, and tactile orienting (whiskers and tail).\n\n8. It is available in large numbers in both the domesticated and wild forms.\n\nWhen the _Scientist_ produced its supplement on \"Biology's Models\" in 2003, its account of the criteria for the choice of model organism was articulated in pragmatic terms very similar to Richter's. Introducing their collection of articles on the \"motley collection of creatures\" that \"fly, swim, wiggle, scurry, or just blow in the wind\" that \"for the scientific community... has been elevated above all other species,\" the editors argue that \"[r]esearchers selected this weird and wonderful assortment from tens of millions of possibilities because they have common attributes as well as unique characteristics. They're practical: A model must be cheap and plentiful; be inexpensive to house; be straightforward to propagate; have short gestation periods that produce large numbers of offspring; be easy to manipulate in the lab; and boast a fairly small and (relatively) uncomplicated genome. This type of tractability is a feature of all well-used models\" (Bahls, Weitzman, and Gallagher 2003, 5).\n\nBut how should one choose one's model organism? Is there one standard species that one should use to study everything, or are there some species that are particularly suitable for studying specific questions? For Hans Krebs, the answer was the latter: he articulated what he terms \"the August Krogh principle,\" which was that \"[f]or many problems there is an animal on which it can be most conveniently studied\" (Krebs 1975). From this perspective, close attention to diversity is an important feature of biological research on animals, because that enables one to select the particular animal most appropriate for the purpose at hand. Nonetheless, while a range of animals have been used as model organisms\u2014the fly, the worm, the zebra fish, the mouse, the rat, the guinea pig, the macaque\u2014the assumption has almost always been that what one is able to study most clearly in _each_ is an exemplar of principles and processes that have generality across _all_ \u2014or many\u2014species. One studies the fly or the mouse, not because one has a particular interest in the fly or the mouse, but because, one hopes that this will enable one to explore issues, processes, and functions that go beyond those specific animals. The particular species is thus not so much a model as an _example_ of general principles, no doubt based on the idea that such general principles are preserved, or conserved, across species because of the conservatism of evolution: \"Two premises underlie the use of simple organisms in medical research. First, most of the important biologic processes have remained essentially unchanged throughout evolution\u2014Rose. that is, they are conserved in humans and simpler organisms. Second, these processes are easier to unravel in simple organisms than in humans\" (Hariharan and Haber 2003, 2457). But are these assumptions so unproblematic?\n\nCheryl Logan, who has examined the history of test animals in physiology, argues that this presupposition of uniformity across species diversity arises, at least in part, from the pragmatics of the modern research process. The use of a small number of 'standardized' animal species and strains for experimental research began around the start of the twentieth century. Until then, Logan points out, experimenters tended to stress the importance of exploring their hypotheses in a number of different species: \"Experimental physiologists gave many reasons for the choice of test animals, some practical and others truly comparative. But, despite strong philosophical differences in the approaches they represented, the view that it was best to incorporate as many species as possible into research... was widespread.... Authors aimed for generality, but they treated it as a conclusion that would or would not follow from the examination of many species\" (Logan 2002, 329). However, there were numerous criticisms of the variations in results found between different laboratories, and Logan argues that this was partly responsible for an increasing emphasis on standardization, which was also linked to the growth and industrialization of scientific research, and the commercialization of animal breeding for research. This, she suggests, led to a restriction on the number of species used. \"As animals were increasingly viewed as things that were assumed to be fundamentally similar, scientific generality became an _a priori_ assumption rather than an empirical conclusion\" (Logan 2002, 329). The standardized animals were thus regarded as laboratory materials, along with other materials that had to be combined in an experimental setup, and\u2014like those other materials, measures, scales, and instruments\u2014their uniformity was both required and, after a while, assumed. If they were obtained from reputable sources, they were, indeed, stable and stabilized.\n\nThe animals conventionally used as experimental materials have been raised through many generations of interbreeding of closely related individuals in order to create organisms that can be treated as interchangeable in repeated experimental situations. This has required much labor\u2014often a labor of love\u2014over many years and many generations\u2014as the historical studies by Robert Kohler of the fly (Kohler 1993, 1994) and Karen Rader of the mouse (Rader, 1998, 2004) have shown. Thus Evelyn Fox Keller is uncharacteristically misleading when she suggests that \"unlike mechanical and mathematical models (and this may be the crucial point), model organisms are exemplars or natural models\u2014not artefactually constructed but selected from nature's very own workshop\" (Keller 2002, 51). For while those species that are to become models may be selected from nature, the model animals are indeed artifactually constructed, and it takes a lot to sustain them as such\u2014not only to breed, feed, and manage them, but crucially to standardize them and the experiments undertaken with them\u2014it takes animal houses, trained persons, specially adapted feed cages, constant tending and familiarity, and much more. We thus agree with Canguilhem when he writes that \"the study of such biological materials, whose elements are a given, is literally the study of an _artefact_ \" (Canguilhem [1965] 2008, 13). We have here another problem of translation, for even the translation between the stabilized model animal and its wild type contemporaries is assumed rather than demonstrated. This brings us directly to the issue of models themselves.\n\n_Models 1, Models2, Models3, Models4_ (and Possibly _Models 5_)\n\nThere are, of course, many types of models. For our current purposes, we would like to distinguish four: conceptual models ( _models_ _1_ ); mechanical or material models ( _models_ _2_ ); animal models of structures, functions, and diseases ( _models_ _3_ ); and animal models of behavior ( _models_ _4_ ). And perhaps there is even a fifth: animal models of human psychopathology ( _models_ _5_ ). Most epistemological work has been done on the first two of these\u2014conceptual models and mechanical models. A conceptual model\u2014 _models_ _1_ in our little classification\u2014such as those in theoretical physics, is a kind of diagram of theoretical entities and the dynamic relations between them, which can be manipulated in thought\u2014nowadays often in silica on-screen or in virtual reality\u2014by varying values and the like in order to explore their consequences. Nancy Cartwright suggests that, in such cases, \"the model is the theory of the phenomenon\" (Cartwright 1983, 159). Or, in a slightly different vein, that we should view such models as instruments that mediate between experiments and theory, not to be evaluated by their truth but by their ability to perform in particular experimental and practical contexts, \"go-betweens\" between the world of things and the world of theories (Cartwright, 1997; Morgan and Morrison 1999). Others have suggested their value is more practical\u2014as Evelyn Fox Keller puts it, a model \"suggests experiments, it enables one to predict the consequences of particular interventions, and it prompts the posing of new questions\" (Keller 2000, S78).\n\nThe brain sciences have not been without their conceptual models that perform such functions. For example, the catecholamine hypothesis of affective disorders discussed in chapter 1, formulated by Schildkraut in 1965 explicitly as a heuristic device, brought together a range of empirical evidence and conceptualization into a diagram of the mode of action of the monoamines, and this functioned as a model to organize much research and explanation in this area for some four decades (Schildkraut 1965). But, as this example illustrates, a model of this sort, which abstracts and generalizes from the experimental moment and which then structures the path of future experiments and the interpretation of results, runs the risk of becoming self-vindicating. Indeed, the life span of the monoamine hypothesis of depression is a very good case in point. Simplified and abstracted, and represented in icons and simulations (Stahl 1996), this theory structured clinical and experimental thought and practice and underpinned drug development and the interpretation of the effects of the drugs so developed (Kramer 1992).\n\nMost recent work in the history of science and technology has focused on mechanical or material models\u2014which we think of as _models_ _2_. Soraya de Chadarevian and Nick Hopwood have referred to these kinds of models as \"the third dimension of science.\" Their focus is on such things as wooden ships and plastic molecules, displays of stuffed animals, artfully constructed model bridges and other artifacts that \"purported to bring the tiny, the huge, the past, or the future within reach, to make fruitful analogies, to demonstrate theories.... [A]ll are three-dimensional (3-D), and as such, their advocates claimed, displayed relations that could not easily be represented on paper\" (de Chadarevian and Hopwood 2004, 1). Such models combine a certain sense of realism with the advantage of docility and manipulability. One can hold them in one's hands, examine them from different perspectives, and subject them to various stresses and other insults to see how they respond.\n\nBut the history of biology\u2014more or less since the invention of the term at the start of the nineteenth century\u2014has been coextensive with the use of a different kind of model\u2014one that we term _models_ _3_. These use certain animals, or parts of animals, to elucidate what are thought to be the basic features of the structure and function of organs, tissues, systems, cells, and other corporeal elements, which are believed to be generalizable to other living creatures, notably to humans. This has certainly been the case in research on the nervous system. The frog was the animal of choice for the eighteenth-and nineteenth-century practice of neurophysiology. Frogs were used for the study of the concept of reflex and the discovery by Galvani of \"animal electricity,\" thus displacing the long-standing belief in \"animal spirits\" (Meulders 2006; Harr\u00e9 2009), and paving the way for the birth of a new avenue of inquiry: electrophysiology. In the 1950s, after his work with Eccles and Kuffler in Australia in the 1930s, Bernard Katz used the neuromuscular junction of the frog as a model system to explore synaptic transmission.\n\nThe squid was also a model of this sort\u2014or at least its giant axon was. Initially discovered by J. Z. Young in 1936 (Keynes 2005), the giant squid axon was subsequently used by several prominent scientists in the twentieth century, notably Alan Hodgkin and Andrew Huxley, who shared the Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine in 1963 for uncovering the ionic mechanisms in nervous cells. One chose the animal on the basis of its suitability for the purpose at hand\u2014for instance, Kuffler, and a number of those who worked with him in the 1960s, chose the medicinal leech because of its relatively small number of neurons, whose size enabled them to be observed using an ordinary microscope and to be recorded by using intracellular microelectrodes. Not that the researcher was interested in the leech\u2014or the crayfish, the lobster, the mudpuppy, or the sea slug, to enumerate some of the creatures popular with neurobiologists\u2014but because each in some way provided a simple system for studying basic neurobiological mechanisms believed to be universal and hence generalizable. And, it was hoped, one would eventually be able to build up from such basic knowledge of isolated specific mechanisms to a knowledge of the whole\u2014this was the promise, and the premise, of neuroreductionism.\n\nThese brief examples serve to demonstrate that model organisms are rather different from the classes of models that we have termed _models_ _1_ and _models_ _2_. This is, in part, because they do not exist in just three dimensions\u2014as in the model of a bridge, for example\u2014but in four. The fourth dimension is time. They have\u2014indeed they exploit\u2014the added feature of vitality\u2014birth, development, change, and death. Model animals are certainly 'simplifications' in one sense: because they are thought to have eliminated much of the genetic variation that is found in the wild type and because of the apparent standardization of their rearing and their living environment. But like other models, they are complex and heterogeneous products of persons, artifacts, theories, concepts, apparatus, and much craft work\u2014to use the term coined by Carrie Friese, they are \"model assemblages\" wherein heterogeneous things with varying historical legacies are brought together in order to pursue certain goals (Friese 2009).\n\nYet despite that labor of standardization, the animals used as _models_ _3_ remain individual living creatures. It may be hard to think this of the fly, the worm, or the zebra fish, but when one reaches rodents, it is hard to ignore the fact that each mouse is a unique life form struggling to survive in its own way. Animals, unlike most other model entities, are also dynamic, homeostatic, self-regenerating, and self-compensating, continually adapting in various ways to internal and external signals. As Canguilhem put it in his essay titled \"Machine and Organism,\" animals are polyvalent: \"An organism has greater latitude of function than a machine.... Life... is experience, that is to say, improvisation, the utilization of occurrences\" (Canguilhem [1965] 2008, 90). Indeed, it is often this internal systemic vitality that is precisely the issue for investigation. Perhaps this is why, to paraphrase Canguilhem again, it is only of living creatures\u2014and not of machines\u2014that one can distinguish the normal and the pathological (ibid., 88\u201390).\n\nThis vitality, this purposiveness, this 'holism,' this teleology of each individual organism has implications for the particular problems of animal models: the practice of treating one organism as a model for another. Every biology student has heard of Fran\u00e7ois Jacob's confident assertion that what is true for _Escherichia coli_ is also true for the elephant (Jacob 1988). Canguilhem takes a different view. In his classic paper \"Experimentation in Animal Biology,\" he emphasizes the specificity of the animal that is used in each experimental demonstration:\n\nIt must be said that, in biology, the specificity of an object of observation or experiment limits unpredictably any logical generalization.... [I]t would often be both prudent and honest to add to the title of a chapter of physiology that it concerns the physiology of a certain animal, so that the laws of phenomena, which almost always bear the name of the person who formulated them, would also bear the name of the animal used for the experiment: the dog for conditioned reflexes, the pigeon for equilibration, the hydra for regeneration, the rat for vitamins and maternal comportment, the frog (that \"Job of biology\") for reflexes, the sea urchin for the fertilization and segmentation of the egg, the drosophila for heredity, the horse for the circulation of blood. (Canguilhem [1965] 2008, 11)\n\nIn the experimental approach of biology, he argues, we need to accept \"that no experimentally acquired fact (whether it deals with structures, functions, or comportments) can be generalized either from one variety to another within a single species, or from one species to another, or from animal to man without express reservations\" (Canguilhem [1965] 2008, 12). When it comes to the action of caffeine on striated muscles, for example, what is true for the green frog is not for the red frog; when it comes to the reflex, the cat differs from the rabbit but resembles the newt, and when it comes to the repair of bone fractures, the normal development of the callus in humans differs from that in dogs. That is to say, there can be no _assumption_ of common mechanisms between different species or strains of animals: even rather basic mechanisms are _not_ conserved by evolution but differ, even between closely related varieties, let alone between animals and humans.\n\nIf Canguilhem may be regarded as a rather obsolete source, more recent studies have similar findings. Thus Andrea Gawrylewski, in her article \"The Trouble with Animal Models,\" says: \"A recent study at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology shows distinct differences between gene regulation in humans and mouse liver, particularly how the master regulatory proteins function. In a comparison of 4,000 genes in humans and mice, the researchers expected to see identical behavior, that is, the binding of transcription factors to the same sites in most pairs of homologous genes. However, they found that transcription factor binding sites differed between the species in 41% to 89% of the cases\" (Gawrylewski 2007, 44).\n\nThis issue becomes more important when one begins directly to approach issues of disease. _Models_ _3_ have long been used to study human disease, either by making use of an apparently analogous pathology that occurs spontaneously in the animal, by breeding the animal to manifest the disease, or otherwise inducing it experimentally. Mice, for example, have served as models for the study of cancer since the elucidation of the nature of leukaemias in the bone marrow of rats in 1933 by the French oncologist and hematologist Jean Bernard (Degos 2006; Irino 2006). However, translation is not as straightforward as this might imply. As Francesco Marincola put it in the opening editorial of his new _Journal of Translational Medicine_ , animal models \"do not represent the basic essence of human diseases.... Prestigious journals, however, appear more fascinated with the modern mythology of transgenic and knock-out mice than the humble reality of human disease\" (Marincola 2003, 1, 3). Or, in the words of Thomas Insel, director of the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH), in a paper titled \"From Model Animals to Animal Models\":\n\n[M]any biological psychiatrists seem to assume that a mouse is a small rat, a rat is a small monkey, a monkey is a small human, and that all of these are \"models\" for studying abnormal behavior or abnormal brain function in humans. The failure to attend to species differences not only ignores the opportunity for understanding mechanisms of diversity, it will doom anyone who wants to make facile comparisons. The broad use of laboratory mice and rats for clinical drug development has demonstrated repeatedly that not only are these species inconsistent predictors of clinical response, they are poor predictors of toxicity in humans. (Insel 2007, 1337)\n\nInsel provides a convenient link to what we have termed _models_ _4_ : animal models of _behavior_. The use of such models dates at least back to the nineteenth century. David Ferrier's studies in the 1870s, carried out while he was the director of the laboratory of experimental neurology at the West Riding Lunatic Asylum, involved ablating cortical regions in dogs and monkeys in the 1870s to cast light on the issue of the localization of functions in the human brain. Better known are the experiments in Pavlov's laboratory in 1912, notably the work of Yerofeeva on behavioral disturbances in dogs caused by conditioning techniques, which were followed by Pavlov's own experiments from the early 1920s on \"experimental neurosis\" (Broadhurst 1960; Abramson and Seligman 1977). That type of neurosis was very different from the human neuroses as they were conceived by Freud or the other dynamic psychologies of the time\u2014the Pavlovian neurosis was either \"excitatory\" or \"inhibitory\" as opposed to the \"ideal normal type in which both opposing nervous processes exist in equilibrium\" (Pavlov 1941, 73).\n\nRelated work was carried out in the United States in the early 1940s, where a number of research groups created experimental neuroses and other conditioned reflexes primarily in sheep. Models, here, were experimental me-diums through which a behavior, like salivation or other physiological phenomena like respiration and heart rate could be measured and tested. From this point onward, we begin to see the use of animal models for therapeutic investigation. For example, in the 1930s, phenobarbital, a sedative drug, was investigated by Liddell and his group, who tested its effect on the \"excitatory neurosis\" in sheep (Liddell, Anderson, Kotyuka, et al. 1935). Pavlov also used bromides, another sedative drug, in the treatment of the experimental neurosis of his dogs (Pavlov 1941). Indeed, experimental neurosis was investigated in all kinds of species\u2014sheep, pigs, rats, cats, and monkeys\u2014with a view to the psychiatric relevance of the findings: this was an \"experimental approach to psychiatry\" (Gantt 1936, 1942, 1953; Liddell 1938, 1947). This brings us to Harry Harlow, whose early work was on the effects of brain lesions and radiation on learning in monkeys, but who is now best known for his studies of infant macaque monkeys and their wire and cloth mother surrogates, as models for the importance of mother love for normal human development\u2014or, in the words of the title of his presidential address to the sixty-sixth annual convention of the American Psychological Association\u2014on \"the nature of love\" (Harlow 1958).\n\nNeurosis, anxiety, depression, love\u2014how is one to characterize the _human states_ that the animal models model? Let us take one example\u2014aggression. Jacqueline Crawley opens her chapter \"Emotional Behaviors: Animal Models of Psychiatric Diseases\" with the firm injunction \"Step one: _Don't anthropomorphize!_ \" (Crawley 2007, 227). In her discussion of animal models of emotional behavior, for example, in anxiety research, she expresses great caution about the dangers of anthropomorphization; we must always talk not of anxiety in a mouse but of \"anxiety-like behavior.\" But surprisingly, in her discussion of \"social behaviors\" she does not write of \"aggression-like behavior\" but of \"aggressive behavior.\" Perhaps we can learn something from this apparent contradiction.\n\nIt seems that, for Crawley and many others working in this field, aggressive behavior can be identified without reference to internal states. The behavior shown by mice in the lab is self-evidently aggressive and reflects that which is present in aspects of the \"natural mouse repertoire\": namely, attacks that \"serve the functions of defending progeny, mates, and self from attack by a predator, defending the resources of the home territory, gaining access to a sexual partner, and achieving dominant status within the social group\" (Crawley 2007, 209). It is on this basis that strains of mice can be developed that are more or less aggressive, and knockouts can be created, entailing null mutants in many of the genes affecting aspects of the neurotransmitter system\u2014subtypes of serotonin receptors, monoamine oxidase, the serotonin transporter, nitric oxide, adrenergic receptors, adenosine receptors, Substance P, vasopressin, and many more. On the basis of the behavioral definition of aggression in mice, these variations certainly increase aggressive behavior\u2014in mice. But what relevance does this have for the kinds of actions in humans that we think of as aggression? In what sense are these artificially produced, engineered mice, developed in close association with the setups, apparatus, and testing procedures that measure their behavior, a mouse model of human aggression?\n\nAnd, while \"don't anthropomorphize\" might be a maxim ritually invoked, how about the following breathless translation between species when it comes to aggression:\n\nPsychopathological violence in criminals and intense aggression in fruit flies and rodents are studied with novel behavioral, neurobiological, and genetic approaches that characterize the escalation from adaptive aggression to violence.... One goal is to delineate the type of aggressive behavior and its escalation with greater precision; second, the prefrontal cortex (PFC) and brainstem structures emerge as pivotal nodes in the limbic circuitry mediating escalated aggressive behavior.... By manipulating either the fruitless or transformer genes in the brains of male or female flies, patterns of aggression can be switched with males using female patterns and vice versa.... New data from feral rats point to the regulatory influences on mesocortical serotonin circuits in highly aggressive animals via feedback to autoreceptors and via GABAergic and glutamatergic inputs. Imaging data lead to the hypothesis that antisocial, violent, and psychopathic behavior may in part be attributable to impairments in some of the brain structures (dorsal and ventral PFC, amygdala, and angular gyrus) subserving moral cognition and emotion. (Miczek, de Almeida, Kravitz, et al. 2007, 11,803)\n\nWhile few make the leap from flies to humans in quite such a startling manner, there is a long history of ethological studies of aggression, with many arguing for its universality across species and drawing analogies between humans and animals. We see this, for example, in the work of John Paul Scott (Scott 1958), but the most emblematic of authors here is Konrad Lorenz (Lorenz 1964; see also Ardrey 1966; Tinbergen 1968). J. Z. Young notes, in his classic _Introduction to the Study of Man_ , that the approach of these authors was undoubtedly shaped by the doleful history of human conflict across the twentieth century and indeed by the threat of nuclear war in the 1960s (Young 1974). Even among ethologists, arguments that human conflict manifests internal states of aggression, even in animals, were highly contentious and were criticized by eminent ethologists such as Robert Hinde (1967, 1970).\n\nOf course, most of those from the social sciences were skeptical to say the least. And with good reason. Many circumstances commonly thought of as human aggression\u2014fighting in wars, violence between gangs of youth, knife crime, for example\u2014are not necessarily accompanied by an internal mental state of aggression. Soldiers fight for their comrades, rarely because they feel aggressive toward their enemies; indeed, an aggressive soldier is often a liability. Gang members fight for social recognition or esteem, and for many other reasons related more to personal anxieties and social values than to aggression. Knife crime is as much a matter of fear as it is of aggression, and it of course depends on fashion, availability, town planning, alcohol, and much more. Suicide bombers kill as an act of faith or resistance and rarely out of misanthropy. Genocide, especially where groups mobilized by nationalist or other rhetoric brutally murder others with whom they have lived side by side for years, is another example that indicates that even apparently highly aggressive actions by human beings are shaped and often instigated by language and the mobilization of meanings, ideologies, and memories.\n\nAre these actions based on the same evolutionary mechanisms that generated aggressive behavior in mice? Doubtful. Do drugs that reduce aggressive behavior in mice do the same in humans? Alcohol (when one can get a mouse to ingest it) does not seem to increase aggression in mice, while it certainly facilitates aggressive actions in some humans\u2014but only in some circumstances (in other circumstances it facilitates singing, sex, or sleep). Is aggression part of \"the natural human repertoire\"? Given the enormous historical, geographical, cultural, and religious variations in what we consider human aggression, and the varieties of types of behavior that are often grouped under that one name, it seems problematic to place all this under one common heading and to imagine common neural underpinnings, let along to seek correlates of superficially analogous behavior in other species and then to grant those correlates a causal status. And even if such behavior did have neural correlates, at what point and in what contexts would it become pathological? And, more relevant to the present discussion, what are the analogies between the 'natural' repertoires placed under this description in animals and those called aggression in humans? For example, according to Crawley, observations of aggression in mice entail such behaviors as general body sniffs, anogenital sniffs, tail rattling, rump biting, and allogrooming (Crawley 2007, 213\u201317): behaviors hardly thought of as components of aggression in humans, although some would undoubtedly elicit a punch on the (human) nose if displayed on the streets of London or New York on a Friday night.\n\nThis brief overview of some of the more obvious problems in using animal models to explore the genetic or neural correlates of human aggression brings us to _models_ _5_ \u2014animal models of human psychiatric disorders. It is commonly thought that chlorpromazine, the first of the modern generation of psychiatric drugs, was developed by serendipity while the French pharmaceutical company Rh\u00f4ne-Poulenc was seeking potential molecules that might be marketed as antihistamines. However, even at this early point, the properties of novel molecules were first explored through experiments on animals. The first experimental setups that used the elevated plus maze to explore anxiety in animals began in the 1950s, but it was not until the 1980s that this apparatus was validated as a _measure_ of anxiety and then used to assess the efficacy of anxiolytic drugs (Pellow, Chopin, File, et al. 1985; Pellow and File 1986). The role of the third edition of the _Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders_ ( _DSM-III_ ) published in 1980 by the American Psychiatric Association was crucial here (American Psychiatric Association 1980). As we discuss in detail in chapter 4, _DSM-III_ and its successors provided checklists of apparently objectively observable phenotypic features that could then be reproduced in animals. That is to say, one could try to produce a breeding line of mice or other animals that would exhibit these overt and visible behavioral characteristics, initially by conventional breeding techniques or by the use of drugs to modify animal behavior and later via transgenic and knockout technologies.\n\nThis procedure produces a paradoxical looping effect, in which the testing regime plays a key role. Suppose one is trying to develop a psychiatric drug for a given condition included in the _DSM_. One first uses selective breeding or genetic modification to produce a strain of mice that show analogous behaviors to those listed in the _DSM_ as criteria for diagnosis of the disorder in humans. Whether or not they do have those analogous characteristics is assessed, in large part, by their performance on certain tests. For instance, the elevated plus maze is used to assess anxiety by measuring how much time a mouse or other rodent spends in the exposed arms of the maze, as opposed to the enclosed parts\u2014presumably on the basis of an simple analogy that an 'anxious' mouse will 'prefer' to be in an enclosed space, while a less 'anxious' mouse will be more ready to explore. The forced swim test and the tail suspension test are thought to assess depression, based on the idea that depression in humans is characterized by 'learned helplessness'\u2014that is to say, the tendency for the depressed person to give up rapidly in the face of obstacles. Hence, it is suggested, one can assess the level of 'depression' in a mouse by measuring the length of time that it will continue to swim and make attempts to escape when immersed in a bath of cold water before switching to mere floating, or the length of time that it will struggle when suspended by its tail before merely hanging passively: each is taken as a measure of learned helplessness and hence of depression.\n\nOne then takes individuals from the strain of mice that seem to exhibit high levels of anxiety or depression, administers the drug to them, and sees whether the anxious or depressed behavior is mitigated. Once more, one uses the same tests\u2014elevated plus maze, forced swim test, tail suspension test, and so forth\u2014to assess the behavioral change. If the results are positive, then (subject to all the necessary protocols and phases of drug regulation) one trials the drugs on humans who are selected for the trial on the basis of the _DSM_ criteria. One then interprets the results of these trials as evidence that the drug is indeed treating the condition that one has modeled in the animal. One then explores the gene expression pattern, the patterns of brain activation, or the structural features of the brains of the animals, in an attempt to learn about the molecular mechanisms of the condition in humans. The _DSM_ diagnosis is thus the fulcrum of such a setup. The self-vindicating loop is designed to find the neural correlates of the _DSM_ category that shaped the research design in the first place. And, given that such experiments seek to reduce, eliminate, or ignore all factors other than those modeled in the individual animal\u2014that is to say, those that can be thought of as internal to its genome and brain\u2014the translation to the humans entails an almost inescapable reduction of human action and human affect to expressions of such somatic determinants.\n\nCrawley titles her excellent book on animal models in behavioral neuroscience _What's Wrong with My Mouse?_ because this is the question repeatedly addressed to her by researchers who are trying to work out what they have actually modeled when they have genetically modified an animal (Crawley 2007). Have they produced a mouse (and hence a potential mouse line) that is depressed, anxious, aggressive, schizophrenic, or what? The process of characterizing an animal phenotype of a human disorder created by genetic manipulation is no easy matter, even in the hands of an expert such as Crawley:\n\nEvaluating the behavioral phenotype of a new line of transgenic or knockout mice involves a multi-tiered approach that begins with the systematic assessment of general health, home cage behaviors, neurological reflexes, sensory abilities, and motor functions. Intact performance on these initial measures of procedural abilities allows investigators to proceed with specific complex tests in the behavioral domain of interest (e.g. anxiety-like tests, feeding, learning and memory tasks). If preliminary analyzes indicate deficits in procedural abilities, then investigators may be able to select or modify complex behavioral tests to avoid false-positive results and artifactual interpretations of genotype differences.... In addition, careful attention to the baseline behaviors of the background strain(s), and to the possibility that flanking genes and environmental factors may affect phenotypic effects, will maximise the correct attribution of interesting phenotypic anomalies to the targeted gene mutation. (Bailey, Rustay, and Crawley 2006, 129)\n\nBut this technical sophistication does not remove the fundamental problem. Even if one goes through all these onerous steps, what is one to say of the relation between the phenotype that accompanies the knockout and the human actions and emotions that it is supposed to model? How is that translation accomplished?\n\nThomas Insel has some cautionary words on such an approach. Taking Fragile X syndrome as an example, he argues that the animal model approach\n\nmight have created a cognitive deficit in a mouse or rat to resemble Fragile X... and then hunted for altered molecular and cellular function that could be targets for drug development. This approach to model Fragile X might work if cognitive deficits were simple lesions with a few predictable causes, as, for instance, in a model of ischemic stroke. This approach might work if we knew that the deficit created in the mouse was identical to the cognitive deficit in the human syndrome, as, for instance, in a lesion model of Parkinson's syndrome. This approach might work if we knew much more about the pathophysiology of the human syndrome, as, for instance, in diabetes. The problem for autism, anorexia nervosa, schizophrenia, and mood and anxiety disorders is that we know so little about the biology of these disorders; there is no credible way to validate (or to falsify) an \"animal model\" to learn more about the pathophysiology of the human syndrome. (Insel 2007, 1338)\n\nThe problem, in Insel's view, is that these animal models are analogies rather than homologies\u2014they produce a phenotype that superficially resembles the condition in humans, but the condition in humans is complex, with multiple causes; in the absence of a clear understanding of the pathophysiology, the model animal is merely a simulacrum. Insel himself has some suggestions as to how to overcome such simulation-based experimental practices, and hence, he believes, to have more success in translation from the laboratory to the clinic and from animals to humans. But before turning to these, let us consider the primary objection from the human sciences: the specificity of the human.\n\nThe Specificity of the Human\n\nA belief in the specificity of human beings has been foundational for the social and human sciences. Humans are unique among living beings, it is argued, in having language, culture, and history. Human action differs from animal behavior as a wink differs from a blink: the one has meaning, the other, though it involves the same set of physiological pathways, does not. Even behavior in humans that resembles that in animals bears only a superficial similarity, as human action embodies intention, and intentions are linguistically and culturally shaped. Human affects may seem similar to those of animals, but that is misleading. Although, as Darwin argued in the late nineteenth century, there are similarities in \"the expression of the emotions in animals and man\" (Darwin [1872] 2009), there are also very significant historical and cross-cultural variations in the recognition, experience, naming, and consequences of human emotions (Lutz and White 1986; Reddy 2001; Oatley 2004). Even the expression of pain in humans, is a communicative act, as Erving Goffman points out in his wonderful little essay on response cries. The utterance \"ouch\" on hitting one's thumb with a hammer is a call for attention, a request for sympathy, a complaint about having been required to undertake a task unwillingly (\"now see what you've made me do!\"); it is not an immediate physiological and instinctive response to the sensation of the blow (Goffman 1978).\n\nThe role of historical, social, and cultural processes is even more evident in human psychopathologies, which are shaped, organized, differentiated, and framed in terms of language and meaning. The categories of the diagnostic manuals certainly do not 'cut nature at its joints,' and psychiatric phenotypes from schizophrenia to anxiety are notoriously heterogeneous. The thresholds of disorder\u2014where one might mark the divisions of normality and pathology\u2014are difficult to define and vary across history and culture, as is shown in the difficulties in delimiting attention deficit hyperactivity disorder or antisocial personality disorder, or in differentiating clinical depression from normal sadness. Features often considered to be unique symptoms of psychiatric disorder, for example hearing voices, often turn out to be quite widespread in the population, and only contingent factors lead to them being treated as diagnostic indicators (Romme and Escher 1993). Cognitive psychiatrists, whatever one may think of their general claims, are surely correct in the argument that beliefs are of crucial importance in the development and experience of psychiatric symptoms, and there is some plausibility to their argument that \"disruption or dysfunction in psychological processes is a final common pathway in the development of mental disorder [and that] biological and social factors, together with a person's individual experiences, lead to mental disorder through their conjoint effects on those psychological processes\" (Kinderman 2005, 206).\n\nThus, until about a decade ago, the standard social science position would be to deny, and decry, all endeavors that sought to account for human thoughts, beliefs, actions, and psychopathologies by relating them to supposedly analogous matters in nonhuman animals. Anthropomorphism was a cardinal error, as was its reciprocal, the biologization of the human. Such biologization, or animalization, was the province of those deemed reactionary, part of a lineage linked historically with racism and eugenics, and more recently with the reductionist simplicities of evolutionary psychology and sociobiology, with their beliefs in fixed human capacities and predilections, laid down over millennia, and merely played out in human social life and relations.\n\nBut perhaps things are changing. This is not merely because animal rights activists have repeatedly challenged the privilege that humans accord to themselves over other animals and ecologists have located humans squarely within a natural ecosphere. It is also because a theoretical avant-garde is beginning to question the dichotomy between animals and humans, which they now see as perhaps the final unchallenged legacy of the Enlightenment. Donna Haraway has pointed to the ways in which humans have evolved along with their companion species and has explored the anthropomorphism that seems endemic to the human condition itself\u2014which may have provided some benefits for humans, though probably not for animals (Haraway 2003, 2007). But further, today, the most radical theoretical move of all is to question the ontological divide between humans and animals. For is it not the final rebuff to the narcissism of the human, to recognize that we are, after all, just animals\u2014that the divide between humans and all other beings needs to be overcome, along with all the other humanist dichotomies of self and other, reason and passion, mind and body, society and nature, organism and machine (Wolfe 2009)?\n\nFor present purposes, we do not need to follow that line of argument to its conclusion. We merely need to refuse the simplifications that see human animals as the only living creatures who exhibit the features of vitality that we have pointed to earlier\u2014polyvalence, individuality, improvisation, and constant dynamic transactions with their milieu. What would it mean, then, for those who conduct this work with animals in psychiatry to 'think with the animal' in this sense\u2014to locate their experimental results, and, even more important, their experimental procedures, in the mental life of the animal, and indeed in the form of life of the animal? Perhaps this is impossible. We might recall Wittgenstein once more, and ask whether, if a lion could talk, we would understand him (Wittgenstein 1958, 223). But we should not satisfy ourselves by repeating the nostrum that only humans have language or that animals' communication is radically different, a matter of signals eliciting 'fixed action patterns' rather than of signs embedded in systems of meaning. A host of evidence argues to the contrary, from Gregory Bateson's studies of play among mammals in his essay \"A Theory of Play and Fantasy\" (Bateson 1972) through discussions of linguistic competence in great apes (Maturana and Varela 1987) to studies of the domestication and training of animals, such as Paul Patton's intriguing use of his knowledge of French philosophy to explore his communication with his horse in the practice of dressage (Patton 2003).\n\nAnthropomorphism is almost inescapable among those who work with animals, whether in or outside the lab. But perhaps we can learn a better way of attributing mental life to animals, a better way of thinking with the animal. If we were to couple this kind of attitude in our animal experimentation with a genuine zoomorphism, then, this would challenge the standard social science critique of modeling humans, in whole or in part, in animal experimentation. Not that humans and animals would be rendered equivalent, but that the capacities, pathologies, and behaviors of animals, like those of humans, would have to be located in their form of life and their constant dynamic interchanges with the specificities of their milieu. The price of breaching of this imagined boundary is, of course, to trouble the ethical sensibilities of those who undertake such experiments\u2014though such concern with the welfare of laboratory animals is somewhat hypocritical in a culture where so many living creatures are bred for slaughter to serve human desires. But even if one can get beyond the old oppositions between anthropomorphism and anthropodenial, the assumptions underlying animal models and model animals remain problematic and need to be opened to empirical examination. And that brings us back to the place where that examination of the distinctions between humans and other animals has consequences for medical and psychiatric practice\u2014the question of translation.\n\nTranslation\n\nMany leading biological, biomedical, and neuroscientific researchers have criticized the conception of translational medicine as a pathway \"from bench to bedside\" and suggested that their criticism might in turn challenge the usage of animal models. Thus Sydney Brenner has argued, \"I think that the focus should be the other way around. We should have \"from bedside to bench\" research by bringing more basic science directly into the clinic. We should also stop working exclusively on model organisms like mice and shift the emphasis to humans, viewing each individual patient as an experimental model\" (Brenner 2008, 9).\n\nLeading neuropsychiatric researchers such as Steven Hyman, former director of the NIMH, and Thomas Insel, its current director, share Brenner's critical assessment of much work with animal models, and his view that the failures of results from animal research to translate to effective understanding of the molecular underpinnings of human disorders, let alone to result in the radical improvement of pharmaceutical or other treatments that was promised, should lead us to question some of the fundamental premises on which this work has been based. Thomas Insel, in the paper discussed earlier, suggests that a more effective approach would be what he terms \"reverse translation,\" starting not from the creation of model organisms whose behavior bears a phenotypical resemblance to a human psychopathology, but from the identification of the molecular pathways in humans with mental disorders, and then modeling those pathways in animals: \"The good news is that studies of mental disorders might finally be able to exploit reverse translation, moving from studies in humans with a mental disorder to understand how risk genes or abnormal proteins alter brain development and function.... The next decade should see a shift from creating abnormal animal behaviors that phenotypically resemble aspects of mental disorders (i.e., animal models) to increasingly understanding the mechanisms of disease by developing animals with the molecular and cellular abnormalities found in mental disorders (i.e., model organisms)\" (Insel 2007, 1339).\n\nAt first sight this seems a very significant conceptual shift, embodied in a distinct idea of the model, and a distinct setup. One identifies molecular anomalies in humans diagnosed with a condition such as schizophrenia; one seeks to find their genomic basis, perhaps using genome-wide association studies (GWAS); and one then tries to produce animals with a similar genomic anomaly and investigates to see if they show the same disrupted molecular pathways and also display the same behavioral anomaly\u2014if so, one has grounds for arguing that one has modeled one element of the pathway for the disorder. Once more, however, this runs into the problem of replicating\u2014perhaps self-vindicating\u2014a particular _DSM_ -derived model of a psychiatric disorder as an amalgam of discrete elements, each of which has a specific neurobiological basis. Insel himself seems to hint at that problem:\n\nConditioned fear in a rat is not an anxiety disorder, and social defeat in a mouse is not major depressive disorder. Yes, we have made great progress in \"models\" of individual features of psychiatric syndromes. For example, in common laboratory animals, conditioned fear has been highly informative of human fear. But how well does this paradigm serve as a model of any human syndrome? At best, we can focus on singular features of disorders, such as vulnerability to conditioned fear, assuming that human syndromes are composites of isolated abnormal behavior, cognition, or emotion. This assumption remains unproven. (Insel 2007, 1337)\n\nBut even so, this argument retains the idea of identifying singular features and of isolating, characterizing, and modeling what are taken to be the distinct components of a mental disorder. Perhaps we should remind ourselves of a caution expressed by Claude Bernard over 150 years ago in his _Introduction to the Study of Experimental Medicine_ : \"Physiologists and physicians must never forget that a living being is an organism with its own individuality. We really must learn, then, that if we break up a living organism by isolating its different parts, it is only for the sake of ease in experimental analysis and by no means in order to conceive them separately. Indeed when we wish to ascribe to a physiological quality its value and true significance, we must always refer it to this whole and draw our final conclusion only in relation to its effects in the whole\" (Bernard [1865] 1957, 88\u201389). For Bernard, then, when it comes to a living creature, the whole is not merely the sum of its parts. Even if we had an effective animal homology, based on a specific neurobiological pathway, for one aspect of the particular behavior in question, can we isolate one feature from the individuality of the organism as a whole? How can we avoid the self-vindication of _DSM_ -type neuropsychiatry?\n\nPerhaps this problem is best illustrated by an example. In July 2007, a team from Johns Hopkins University published a paper that was referred to as \"the first mouse model of schizophrenia\" in the press release that accompanied it: \"Johns Hopkins researchers have genetically engineered the first mouse that models both the anatomical and behavioral defects of schizophrenia, a complex and debilitating brain disorder that affects over 2 million Americans. In contrast to current animal studies that rely on drugs that can only mimic the manifestations of schizophrenia, such as delusions, mood changes and paranoia, this new mouse is based on a genetic change relevant to the disease. Thus, this mouse should greatly help with understanding disease progression and developing new therapies.\"\n\nThe work, by Akira Sawa's lab, was published in a paper titled \"Dominant-Negative DISC1 Transgenic Mice Display Schizophrenia-Associated Phenotypes Detected by Measures Translatable to Humans\" (Hikida, Jaaro-Peled, Seshadri, et al. 2007). The researchers generated mice that make an incomplete, shortened form of a protein thought to play an important role in neural development\u2014called DISC1 (short for \"Disrupted-in-Schizophrenia-1\")\u2014in addition to the regular type. The short form of the protein attaches to the full-length one, disrupting its normal duties. As these mice matured, they became more agitated when placed in an open field, had trouble finding hidden food, and did not swim as long as regular mice; such behaviors allegedly parallel the hyperactivity, smell defects, and apathy observed in schizophrenia patients. The mice were also subjected to MRI and showed certain brain defects, notably enlarged lateral ventricles. The press release reports Sawa as noting that the defects in these mice were not as severe as those typically seen in people with schizophrenia, because more than one gene is required to trigger the clinical disease. \"However, this mouse model will help us fill many gaps in schizophrenia research,\" he said. \"We can use them to explore how external factors like stress or viruses may worsen symptoms. The animals can also be bred with other strains of genetically engineered mice to try to pinpoint additional schizophrenia genes.\"\n\nHere we see the idea of reverse translation\u2014and its inescapable link to _DSM_ diagnoses. The belief that there is a relation between DISC1 and schizophrenia is based on a number of family studies, starting in 2000, that show statistical associations between mutations in this coding sequence and a psychiatric diagnosis. However, the original study was in a Scottish family with a very wide range of psychiatric symptoms\u2014including bipolar affective disorder, unipolar affective disorder, and conduct disorder: the authors themselves remark that this may be somewhat \"atypical\" (Millar, Wilson-Annan, Anderson, et al. 2000). The significance of this gene in the original Scottish family is still controversial, as is the specificity of the link to a particular psychiatric diagnosis of schizophrenia, and the mechanisms of action in the brain are also disputed (Ishizuka, Paek, Kamiya, et al. 2006). The functional properties of the protein expressed by the DISC1 gene seem to relate to some very basic pathways and processes in the brain at key points in development, and it appears to interact with a wide variety of proteins linked to neural growth, signal transduction pathways, and proteins linked to neocortical development (Morris, Kandpal, Ma, et al. 2003). Thus one might expect disruption of this gene, and hence of these various pathways, to be nonspecific to this particular diagnosis, and this is indeed the case: \"genetic analysis has implicated DISC1 in schizophrenia, schizoaffective disorder, bipolar affective disorder, and major depression\" (Hennah, Thomson, Peltonen, et al. 2006, 409).\n\nNonetheless, the mouse knockout made on the basis of the debatable claim concerning DISC1 is deemed a mouse model of basic pathways in schizophrenia, and then attempts are made to see if behaviors in the mouse parallel those associated with the diagnosis in humans. This relation is established by a rather simplistic set of analogies of just the sort that troubled Insel in his criticism of earlier animal model research: agitation of the mouse when placed in an open field reminds us of hyperactivity, trouble finding hidden food reminds us of smell defects apparently shown by persons diagnosed with schizophrenia, and poor performance in the forced swim test reminds us of apathy\u2014or even \"anhedonia\" (Hikida, Jaaro-Peled, Seshadri, et al. 2007, 14,503)\u2014observed in those diagnosed with schizophrenia. For those apprenticed in animal models in psychiatry (though not perhaps to others) the effect is, to quote John Medina \"evocative of some of the information processing anomalies observed in patients with mood disorders and psychoses\" (Medina 2008, 26). But would we be surprised\u2014given the basic pathways being disrupted here\u2014that mouse behavior was somewhat abnormal in a whole variety of ways? No. Do we know how widely distributed are disruptions in DISC1 in the general population of those without a psychiatric diagnosis, and in different countries or regions? No. Do we know whether DISC1 has the same developmental pathways and functions in mouse and human? No. In what sense, then, do we have \"a mouse model of schizophrenia\"?\n\nWhat indeed, about schizophrenia itself\u2014a diagnosis given its name a century ago, whose symptomatology and prognosis have varied greatly across that period (changing dramatically, for example, when those living under that diagnosis were no longer subject to long-term confinement in psychiatric institutions) and where recent failures in GWAS confirm what has long been argued by critics\u2014that this is a problematic label for an array of heterogeneous anomalies in human mental life and social skills. If we are not very careful with our thinking, reverse translation from humans into animal models will indeed get caught in the spirals of self-vindication of the diagnosis through these multiple translations between the level of _DSM_ , the level of the genome, and the level of the rodent performance in those setups we have discussed earlier.\n\nLife as Creation\n\nAnimal models have been crucial in the experimental practices of the brain sciences and central to the development of neuroscience over the past fifty years. Yet we have argued in this chapter that they have some quite fundamental flaws when used as the basis of claims concerning human mental life and psychopathology. Many of our criticisms, though perhaps not our conclusions, are shared by the most careful researchers who work in this field and, as we have seen, some are trying to rethink the practice and conceptualization of animal models and model animals.\n\nHowever, it seems we are left with more questions than answers. How can we avoid self-vindication in behavioral neuroscience? Can one resolve some of these problems by a move toward 'ecological validity' in animal experimentation? Can one develop forms of assessment of animal behavior that do not rely on crude analogies with human stressors, such as the elevated plus maze or the forced swim test? Can we avoid self-vindication by moving beyond the checklist approach to mental health problems, with all the presumptions embodied in the _DSM_? Can we overcome the epistemological and ontological divide between animal work on human mental states and all we know of humans\u2014and of animals? Or are model organisms in psychiatry doomed to disappear, as some suggest (Debru 2006)? Will they be displaced by the power of novel biotechnologies to create stem cell lines from tissue derived from those diagnosed with disorders and to use these for the conduct of experiments and the trialing of therapies, or by simulation in computer models in silica, or by virtual experimental situations, or by a return to the human as its own model (Rheinberger 2006; Brenner 2008)?\n\nPerhaps there is something to be learned from our earlier insistence on the animal experiment as craft work\u2014for given that modeling is craft work, is there a way in which we can setup the animals differently? Can we reimag-ine the epistemological status of animal models? And perhaps, just perhaps, a genuine interdisciplinary, transdisciplinary dialogue between animal modelers in neuroscience and those from the social and human sciences can contribute to this. So let us conclude by returning once more to the reflections of Georges Canguilhem in his essay on \"Experimentation in Animal Biology,\" written almost half a century ago: \"The use of concepts and intellectual tools [of biology] is thus at once both inevitable and artificial. We will not conclude from this that experimentation in biology is useless or impossible. Instead, keeping in mind Bernard's formulation that 'life is creation,' we will say that the knowledge of life must take place through unpredictable conversions, as it strives to grasp a becoming whose meaning is never so clearly revealed to our understanding as when it disconcerts it\" (Canguilhem [1965] 2008, 22).\nChapter Four\n\nAll in the Brain?\n\nNothing can be more slightly defined that the line of demarcation between sanity and insanity. Physicians and lawyers have vexed themselves with attempts at definition in a case where definition is impossible. There has never yet been given to the world anything in the shape of a formula upon this subject which may not be torn to shreds in five minutes by any ordinary logician. Make the definition too narrow, it becomes meaningless; make it too wide, the whole human race are involved in the drag-net. In strictness, we are all mad as often we give way to passion, to prejudice, to vice, to vanity; but if all the passionate, prejudiced, vicious, and vain people in this world are to be locked up as lunatics, who is to keep the key of the asylum?\n\n\u2014 _The Times_ (London), July 22, 1854\n\nPsychiatry is a biomedical science. This is not a trivial statement. Nor could psychiatry have been called a science twenty years ago.... [T]oday a remarkable body of new knowledge relates neurobiology to psychiatric disorders.\n\n\u2014Philip Berger and Harlow Brodie, preface to _Biological Psychiatry_ , 1986\n\nHere's how doctors decide which mental or neurological disorder their troubled patients suffer from: they ask questions like, \"Are you hearing voices?\" and \"Do you feel like people are out to get you?\"... Not all that different from how they used to do it about 100 years ago. New techniques are set to radically change that approach... relying more on changes in physiology than in behavior.... Scientists are increasingly turning to biomarkers\u2014such as genes or proteins in tissues, blood and body fluids\u2014to distinguish between symptomatically indistinct illnesses.... Using techniques that have only become available in the past few years, scientists are looking at the brain, serum and spinal fluid and asking which combinations of genes or proteins might be expressed differently in these disorders. The field is still far from ready for the clinic, but holds great promise: markers could allow for earlier treatment and a better prognosis, ultimately enabling scientists to intervene even before the full-blown disease strikes.... The most challenging aspect might yet turn out to be redefining a 100-year-old classification system.\n\n\u2014Amanda Haag, \"Biomarkers Trump Behavior in Mental Illness Diagnosis,\" 2007\n\nIn 1953, Dr. Henry Yellowlees, chief medical officer at the United Kingdom's Department of Health, published a small volume described as \"commonsense psychiatry for lay people\"; its title was _To Define True Madness_. This phrase is, of course, a quote from Shakespeare's _Hamlet_ , published in 1602. Polonius, in act 2, scene 2, having told the King that his noble son is mad, then pauses for a second: \"Mad call I it; for to define true madness, What is't but to be nothing else but mad? But let that go.\" Psychiatry, since its invention in the nineteenth century, has found it less easy to let that question go\u2014the question of what it actually is to be 'mad,' of the boundaries of madness and sanity, and of the differentiation between the various forms that madness\u2014whether termed lunacy, mental illness, or mental disorder\u2014can take. Indeed, it has been haunted by this problem, framing it as the problem of diagnosis, with theorists, practitioners, and critics returning to it again and again (cf. Porter 2002, 1). Some feel that we are, at last, on the verge of putting these troubles behind us, that neurobiology has enabled psychiatry to become a science, and as psychiatry becomes neuropsychiatry it will be able to answer, finally, the question of who is 'a suitable case for treatment.' Will an appeal to the brain, or to specific genetic sequences associated with particular neurobiological anomalies, or to the new visibility apparently conferred by neuroimaging, finally enable clinicians to delineate the boundaries of normality, and to differentiate between disorders? Will neuroscience at last provide psychiatry with the objectivity that it seeks?\n\nWhile the term _neuropsychiatry_ had been in use both in English and French since the early twentieth century and probably since the late nineteenth century, it was not until after the Second World War that it gained popularity in the European and American literature. While it was used in a variety of senses, by the start of the twenty-first century the term was being used to argue that the future of psychiatry lay in the integration of insights from genetics and neurobiology into clinical practice (Healy 1997; J. Martin 2002; Sachdev 2002, 2005; Yudofsky and Hales 2002; Lee, Ng, and Lee 2008). There is a weak version and a strong version of this argument. Some advocate the formation of neuropsychiatry as a particular professional specialty, appropriate for those disorders whose understanding and treatment requires both neurology and psychiatry. This, for example, is the argument of Yudofsky and Hales in an article titled \"Neuropsychiatry and the Future of Psychiatry and Neurology\":\n\n[There are] many problems inherent in separating psychiatry and neurology into discrete medical specialties. First, the separation perpetuates mind-body dualism that is a perennial source of the public's confusion about whether or not mental illnesses have biological bases and whether psychiatry is a credible medical specialty. This confusion is also a source of the stigmatization of the mentally ill and leads to a lack of parity in the reimbursement for psychiatric treatments with those for other medical conditions. Second, this separation of the specialties promotes the condensation of complex brain disorders into simplistic categorizations that are based on single symptoms.... [N]europsychiatry... bridges conventional boundaries imposed between mind and matter as well as between intention and function [and] vaults the guild-based theoretical and clinical schisms between psychiatry and neurology. (2002, 1262)\n\nOthers argue more expansively and either propose, or assume, that all psychiatric disorders are ultimately grounded in anomalies in the brain and nervous system\u2014that is to say, the disorders that psychiatry deals with are neurological disorders. This, for instance, is the U.S. Surgeon General writing in 1999: \"Mental disorders are characterized by abnormalities in cognition, emotion or mood, or the highest integrative aspects of behavior, such as social interactions or planning of future activities. These mental functions are all _mediated_ by the brain. It is, in fact, a core tenet of modern science that behavior and our subjective mental lives _reflect_ the overall workings of the brain. Thus, symptoms related to behavior or our mental lives _clearly reflect_ variations or abnormalities in brain function\" (United States, Center for Mental Health Services 1999, 39; emphases added).\n\nWe will not dwell on the slippery terms used here\u2014 _mediated_ , _reflect_ , _clearly reflect_ \u2014we should not expect the Surgeon General to resolve the age-old problem of mind and brain. However, he is just one of the many who invest their hopes in a fusion of psychiatry and neuroscience. It will, some hope, overcome the legacies of the Cartesian division between mind and body that are still enshrined in the distinction of organic and functional disorders in psychiatry, proving conclusively that neurobiological anomalies underpin mental disorders. It could help challenge stigma, they believe, by demonstrating that psychiatric disorders are genuine conditions, not just 'all in the mind' and hence not problems for which the sufferers themselves should be held responsible. And, as we have said, some expressed the hope that such developments could overcome the multiple problems that have surrounded psychiatric diagnosis, generating new methods that rely on measurable and objective markers (Hyman 2003; Haag 2007; G. Miller 2010). Many made the linked argument that this would also enable early, presymptomatic identification of incipient disorders, allowing early intervention and preventive treatment. In this chapter we focus upon this question of diagnosis and explore some of the hopes for the relations between neuroscience and psychiatry from this perspective. For, as we have already suggested, this question of diagnosis goes to the heart of the key question, not just for neuropsychiatry, but for psychiatry in general\u2014the question of what is it to be mad, what kind of a thing is a 'mental disorder'?\n\nTo Define True Madness\n\nSome of us are old enough to have lived through\u2014indeed participated in\u2014the contentious disputes of the decades of the 1960s and 1970s that troubled psychiatry to its core. At that time madness, as mental illness, came to be regarded as an 'essentially contested category.' These contests were not restricted to academic debate. They entered popular imagination, in films like _One Flew over the Cuckoo's Nest_ (1975) or _Morgan: A Suitable Case for Treatment_ (1966), and penetrated general cultural awareness in the array of critiques that became known as antipsychiatry. David Rosenhan, in a classic and widely known experiment published in 1973, used this instability of diagnosis to ask a key question: \"if sanity and insanity exist, how shall we know them?\" Pseudopatients (students with no existing psychiatric problems) presented themselves at several psychiatric hospitals, claiming to hear voices that corresponded with prevailing existential philosophies\u2014\"thud,\" \"empty,\" \"hollow\"\u2014and each was admitted to a psychiatric ward. Their histories in their case records were reworked by their psychiatrists to fit prevailing conceptions of the etiology of schizophrenia. None were unmasked by psychiatric professionals, and all were eventually discharged with the diagnosis of \"schizophrenia in remission.\" For Rosenhan, the message was stark: normality is hard to diagnose.\n\nThese criticisms were linked with others, familiar from the sociology of deviance then in its heyday\u2014that a psychiatric diagnosis was actually the outcome of a social process of labeling; that mental illness was a residual category, applied to those whose violation of cultural norms could not be explained in any other way; that diagnosis is the outcome of a social process and retrospectively gathers together all manner of previous episodes in a life history and reframes them as evidence of developing mental breakdown; and that the label, once applied, is sticky and hard to dislodge, leading to stigma, exclusion, and isolation. In labeling deviance as mental illness, psychiatry, it was claimed, was actually creating the forms of damaged and disordered selfhood that it claimed to explain. If these concerns had been restricted to critical social scientists, they would have been of minor significance. But, as we shall see, others were also troubled by psychiatric diagnosis, including psychiatrists themselves.\n\nWhat is diagnosis? A layperson might say that a medical diagnosis is intended to identify the nature of the disease or condition that ails an individual, in order to clarify its causes and suggest an appropriate treatment. Its Greek root \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03b3\u03bd\u03c9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03cc\u03c2 ( _diagnostikos_ ) means \"capable of discerning.\" The _OED_ gives a similar definition, dating it to Willis in 1681: \"Determination of the nature of a diseased condition; identification of a disease by careful investigation of its symptoms and history; also, the opinion (formally stated) resulting from such investigation.\"\n\nRobert Kendell, who in 1975 was a professor of psychiatry at the University of Edinburgh, published _The Role of Diagnosis in Psychiatry_ in the throes of these debates over the objective status of psychiatric diagnoses. He opens the book with a quote from Daniel Hack Tuke, the great-grandson of William Tuke, founder of the York Retreat: \"Eighty years ago Hack Tuke observed that 'The wit of man has rarely been more exercised than in the attempt to classify the morbid mental phenomena covered by the term insanity,' and went on to add that the result had been disappointing. The remark remains as apposite now as it was then\" (Kendell 1975, vii). Kendell argues that \"the failure of both psychiatrists and psychologists to develop a satisfactory classification of their subject matter, or even to agree on the principles on which that classification should be based, is a most serious barrier to fruitful research into the aetiology of mental illness and even into the efficacy of treatment regimes\" (ibid.).\n\nOthers took the fact that psychiatrists could not agree on the application of their own categories to indicate that those categories themselves were unstable subjective judgments. The decision by the American Psychiatric Association (APA) in 1973 to remove homosexuality as a category of disorder, the regular ridiculing of psychiatric evidence in legal cases, and the association of psychiatry with confinement for political reasons in the Soviet Union also led many to wonder about the capacity of psychiatrists to legitimately categorize an individual as suffering from a particular mental disorder, or even a mental disorder at all. We shall return to these debates presently. But if psychiatry ran into so much trouble over its diagnoses, one might be forgiven for thinking that this occurred for clinical reasons\u2014that diagnoses were failing to identify an underlying disease from a set of symptoms or to clarify etiology and enable treatment and prognosis. However, a brief glance at the history of psychiatric classification is enough to show us that such categorization has not been a purely clinical matter.\n\nMany have written histories of attempts to classify diseases, have described the work of pioneers in medical nosology, and have examined the debates over the status of such classifications\u2014whether they were, for example, 'natural' or 'artificial' (see, e.g., Roy Porter's chapter in L. Conrad et al. 1995). Critical sociologists, especially in the United States, have focused on the development of the _Diagnostic and Statistical Manuals_ produced by the APA and have tended to regard the whole enterprise as suspect, as part of an entrepreneurial strategy to expand the empire of psychiatry and enhance its power and legitimacy by pathologizing everyday life, hand in glove with a pharmaceutical industry looking to increase the market for its wares (Kutchins and Kirk 1997). Such overly general critiques usually fail to consider the work of classification in psychiatry in other national contexts, and greatly underestimate the level of awareness of those undertaking the exercises about the problematic epistemological and ontological issues involved in classification. It is not only sociologists who understand the performative character of categorization, as the debates among those responsible for creating and using the manuals themselves testify. It is, therefore, worth sketching the development of psychiatric classification and examining some of the debates within psychiatry itself.\n\nAlthough we can find many earlier attempts at classifying forms of madness, notably Robert Burton's _The Anatomy of Melancholy_ , published in 1621, or Thomas Sydenham's _Epistolary Dissertation on the Hysterical Affections_ of 1682, the project of classification in modern psychiatry can be traced to the visibility cast on inmates by the reformed asylum of the nineteenth century. Indeed, the asylum provided key conditions for the birth of psychiatry, because it first assembled together the diverse characters who were to form its object. It was only the asylum that seemed to confer some homogeneity upon those disparate individuals\u2014displaced, desolate, despairing, deranged\u2014who were collected within its walls. What first linked these troubled and troublesome people was not a medical gaze, but a civilizing project: the asylum was the place for all those who offended the norms of self-conduct and self-control that were beginning to grid the emerging urban, liberal social orders in the mid-nineteenth century (Foucault [1961] 2005; Rothman 1971; Castel 1976; Scull 1979; Goldstein 2002).\n\nAs doctors conquered the space of asylum over the second half of the nineteenth century, guarding its points of entry and of exit, and managing its interior world, the assorted figures who were confined within became psychiatry's subjects. The doctors of the mad began to search for a single classificatory schema that would embrace them all, that would grasp them all as sufferers from varieties of a common condition\u2014madness, mental illness, or mental disorder. These schemes of classification drew upon older themes, it is true, but attempted to give them clinical utility, linking each category to a description intended to educate the gaze of the doctor, and often adding some case histories and recommendations as to appropriate treatment (Esquirol 1838, 1845, [1845] 1965; Bucknill and Tuke 1874).\n\nIn the United States, this clinical desire to classify was supplemented by another, a _statistical_ project driven by the national census, and its demand that every person within the national territory should be enumerated (on the history of the U.S. Census, see Alonso and Starr 1987; Anderson 1988). The 1830 U.S. census had counted the deaf, dumb, and blind, and the 1840 U.S. census added a count of the insane and idiots, distinguished by race and by mode of institutional or other support. When the results of this census were published in 1841, the total number of those reported as insane or feebleminded was more than seventeen thousand, of whom nearly three thousand were black. The rate of insanity among free blacks was eleven times higher than that of slaves and six times higher than that of the white population.\n\nFor those who opposed abolition, like U.S. Vice President John C. Calhoun, these census figures proved that blacks were congenitally unfit for freedom: \"Here is proof of the necessity of slavery. The African is incapable of self-care and sinks into lunacy under the burden of freedom. It is a mercy to him to give him the guardianship and protection from mental death\" (Calhoun, 1843; quoted in Deutsch 1944, 473). Abolition, he believed, far from improving the condition of \"the African,\" worsened it: where \"the ancient relations\" between the races had been retained, the condition of the slaves had improved \"in every respect\u2014in number, comfort, intelligence and morals\" (quoted in Gilman 1985, 137). A political dispute about madness and slavery followed, waged in the language of numbers (Deutsch 1944).\n\nBy the time of the 1880 U.S. census, seven categories were used to count the institutionalized population of the mad\u2014mania, melancholia, monomania, paresis, dementia, dipsomania, and epilepsy. It was in order to provide the U.S. census with a better basis for its classification of those confined that the first official U.S. nosology of mental illnesses, the _Statistical Manual for the Use of Institutions for the Insane_ , was prepared in 1918 by the American-Medico Psychological Association (the successor of the Association of Medical Superintendents of American Institutions for the Insane, which was to become the American Psychiatric Association in 1921) and the National Committee for Mental Hygiene (Grob 1991). That manual was the forerunner of the _Diagnostic and Statistical Manuals_ that would follow from the 1950s onward.\n\nThe history of these manuals has often been told (Spitzer, Williams, and Skodol 1980; Bayer and Spitzer 1985; Grob 1991; M. Wilson 1993; Spitzer and Williams 1994; A. Young 1995, 89\u2013117; Spitzer 2001; Cooper 2004; Mayes and Horwitz 2005). The first editions, as we have said, focused on classification of those who were confined in the asylums, with their growing populations of inmates. This remained their main concern until the 1940s. However, by then a different kind of psychiatry was beginning to flourish outside the asylum and was difficult to ignore. From the spas and water treatments of the nineteenth century, through Mesmerism and the work of the nerve doctors like Breuer and Freud, and through the pathologies of children; the problems of the maladjusted worker or soldier; the work of psychiatric social workers in courts, schools, and elsewhere; and in the growth of individual and group psychotherapeutics, a much wider territory for psychiatry had taken shape, not defined by the walls of the asylum. This was the territory of anxieties and minor mental troubles, of problems of the adjustment of the individual to the demands of family and workplace, of delinquency and criminality\u2014in short, the territory of the neuroses and of problems of conduct (Rose 1989).\n\nHence it is not surprising that the tenth edition of the _Statistical Manual_ included classifications for the psychoneuroses (hysteria, compulsive states, neurasthenia, hypochondriasis, reactive depression, anxiety state, anorexia nervosa, and mixed psychoneuroses) and primary behavior disorders (adult maladjustment and primary behavior disorders in children), although it nonetheless conceived of these states, like the other conditions it named, primarily as somatic conditions. It is also not surprising that the term _neuropsychiatry_ was used at the time to refer to the study and management of those _neuroses_ precipitated by industrialization and transformations at the workplace. Thus, for example, in an article published in 1921 under the title \"The Service of Neuropsychiatry to Industrial Medicine,\" Dr. Harold Wright defines neuropsychiatry as a \"synthetic\" specialty and the neuropsychiatrist as \"a synthesist\" who \"considers the personality as a whole with all its physical and psychological faults of adjustment. And if the psychiatrist or general medical man is to do effective work in an industrial plant, he must consider things outside of the plant as well as those influences which are present within it and within the patient's body\" (Wright 1921, 465).\n\nIn the Second World War, in the United States, as in the United Kingdom, psychiatrists were widely deployed in the military apparatus, in branches ranging from psychological warfare and propaganda, through personnel selection and allocation, to the diagnosis and rehabilitation of those invalided out of the forces with mental troubles apparently brought on by the conflict (Rose 1989; Shephard 2003). A whole array of minor neuropathologies were now being diagnosed and treated by psychiatrists, and at the same time, psychiatry began to argue that these mild mental pathologies were at the root of problems in many social institutions and practices; they thus argued that there was a positive role for their expertise in the promotion of mental health. As Grob puts it (1991, 427): \"In the postwar era, the traditional preoccupation with the severely mentally ill in public mental hospitals slowly gave way to a concern with the psychological problems of a far larger and more diverse population as well as social problems generally. Persuaded that there was a continuum from mental health to mental illness, psychiatrists increasingly shifted their activities away from the psychoses toward the other end of the spectrum in the hope that early treatment of functional but troubled individuals would ultimately diminish the incidence of the more serious mental illnesses.\"\n\nThe American psychiatrist William C. Menninger, head of the newly created Neuropsychiatric Division of the U.S. Army in 1943, perhaps captured this approach best. In treating war neurosis, he wrote, one should take into account the \"whole environment,\" that is, \"everything outside ourselves, the thing to which we have to adjust\u2014our mates and our in-laws, the boss and the work, friends and enemies, bacteria and bullets, ease and hardship\" (W. Menninger [1947] 1994, 352); in the postwar years, he was to play an important role in the revision of psychiatric nomenclature (Houts 2000), However, it was his brother, Karl Menninger, who made the most uncompromising statements of this idea that there was an essential unity of all mental troubles: they were failures to adapt to pressures of the environment, and hence conditions should be explained and symptoms interpreted in psychosocial terms (K. Menninger 1965; cf. M. Wilson 1993). For Karl Menninger, \"most people have some degree of mental illness at some time, and many of them have a degree of mental illness most of the time\" (K. Menninger 1965, 33). Hence, as William Menninger put it in 1947: \"Psychiatry should place high priority on its efforts to provide the 'average' person with psychiatric information he can apply to his own problems.... The public wants this education.... Very possibly it may increase the number of patients who seek help from a psychiatrist, just as a campaign about cancer or tuberculosis increases the number of patients who go to doctors about these problems\" (W. Menninger [1947] 1994, 79).\n\nIt was in the context of this radically expanded field that the _Diagnostic and Statistical Manual_ , published in 1952, was prepared by the APA's Committee on Nomenclature and Statistics (American Psychiatric Association 1952). This manual construed mental disorders as reactions of the personality to psychological, social, and biological factors. Following the lesson of wartime, both minor and major mental troubles were included in the classificatory framework\u2014although distinguished as neuroses and psychoses. Psychiatry, it was argued, now had a key role outside the hospital, in addressing all those minor troubles, and in prevention. Accurate diagnosis was the key to competent prognosis and appropriate treatment, especially in the name of preventive intervention. And diagnosis required interpretation: symptoms needed to be understood as meaningful responses to events in the life of the patient.\n\nIt was not until sixteen years later, in 1968, that the first revision of the _DSM_ was published. The revision arose, according to its foreword, from the need for American psychiatrists to collaborate with those who were preparing and using the new revision of the International Classification of Diseases (ICD-8), which had been approved by the WHO and was to come into use in 1968 (American Psychiatric Association 1968, vii). _DSM-II_ , as it was known, was developed by a Committee on Nomenclature and Statistics of the APA, with advice from a team of three consultants\u2014Bernard Glueck, Morton Kramer (who had worked on _DSM-I_ ), and Robert Spitzer (then director of the Evaluation Unit of Biometrics Research of the New York Psychiatric Institute). For Kramer, the earlier versions of ICD were unsuitable \"for use in the United States for compiling statistics on the diagnostic characteristics of patients with mental disorders or for indexing medical records in psychiatric treatment facilities\" (ibid., xi). The APA committee worked in consultation with the WHO team that was revising the ICD, though \"the Committee had to make adjustments\" to conform to U.S. usage. _DSM-II_ was 134 pages long and had 180 disease classifications organized into ten categories. The aim was \"to avoid terms which carry with them _implications_ regarding either the nature of a disorder or its causes\" (ibid., vii). The foreword, by Ernest Gruenberg, who was chairman of the APA's Committee on Nomenclature and Statistics, drew particular attention to the renaming of \"schizophrenic reaction\" to \"schizophrenia\" to eliminate such causal assumptions, adding, somewhat poignantly, \"Even if it had tried, the Committee could not establish agreement about what this disorder is; it could only agree on what to name it\" (ibid., ix).\n\nOn the occasion of the publication of _DSM-II_ , Robert Spitzer, together with Paul Wilson, who had done much of the editing work on the _Manual_ , published an account of the new diagnostic nomenclature and the ways in which it differed both from _DSM-I_ and from ICD-8. They claimed that the new classification system was not a \"return to a Kraeplinian way of thinking, which views mental disorders as fixed disease entities\" but an attempt to avoid terms that carry implications about the causes of a disorder, especially where there is controversy over its nature or cause (Spitzer and Wilson 1968, 1621). While _DSM-II_ reduced the previous emphasis on disorders as reactions to precipitating life experiences, it did not eliminate this suggestion entirely, and it also retained, and indeed extended, the categories of neurosis. It also retained the categorical distinctions between mental retardation, organic brain syndromes, neuroses, and personality disorders (American Psychiatric Association 1968). Spitzer and Wilson concluded their presentation thus: \"With the adoption of _DSM-II_ , American psychiatrists for the first time in history will be using diagnostic categories that are part of an international classification of diseases. While this is an important first step, it is only an agreement to use the same sets of categories for classifying disorders\" (Spitzer and Wilson 1968, 1629).\n\nDespite these high hopes, by the time of its publication in 1968, the expansive project of psychosocial psychiatry that _DSM-II_ sought to underpin was already under attack (cf. M. Wilson 1993). As we have seen, over the 1960s, antipsychiatry, in its various manifestations, cast doubt on the conceptual underpinning and sociopolitical consequences of this broadening of the remit of psychiatry. The debate in the early 1970s over the inclusion or exclusion of homosexuality as a disease category seemed to some to mark a turning point (Bayer 1981). The text of _DSM_ was altered for every printing of _DSM-II_ , and in the seventh printing homosexuality was removed as a disease category, seemingly confirming the view of critics that its categories were just sociopolitical labeling of behavior considered to be socially undesirable by the authorities at any given time.\n\nWithin psychiatry itself, concern began to mount about the lack of standardized criteria for diagnosis and the poor reliability of diagnosis in practice\u2014studies such as that by Rosenhan exacerbated this anxiety. Further, as funding for psychiatry was restricted in the United States in the 1970s, government and private health insurers became concerned about the lack of specificity of classification, the confusions of terminology, and the difficulty of establishing clear boundaries between those who were eligible for treatment\u2014and hence for insurance reimbursement\u2014because they were suffering from an illness and those who were not, even if they were receiving some kind of psychological therapy. The response by many within the profession was to emphasize the classical medical model of disease and to argue that this should form the basis and the limits of psychiatry's vocation, which should not seek an extension of its ministrations to the ills of society as a whole (Klerman 1978).\n\n_DSM-III_ , published in 1980, is often seen as a response to this crisis in legitimacy of psychiatry (American Psychiatric Association 1980; Mayes and Horwitz 2005). It had begun with the perceived imperative to narrow the definition of mental disorder, to raise the threshold for diagnosis of illness, and to set out a classificatory scheme based on observable symptoms. This was no simple \"return to Kraepelin\" (Decker 2007), but it owed a great deal to the so-called Feighner criteria, associated with the Department of Psychiatry at Washington University School of Medicine in St. Louis (Kendler, Munoz, and Murphy 2010). These were most influentially set out in a 1972 article by John Feighner and his colleagues as diagnostic criteria to be used in psychiatric research (Feighner, Robins, Guze, et al. 1972). In contrast to _DSM-II_ , say the authors, \"in which the diagnostic classification is based upon the 'best clinical judgment and experience' of a committee and its consultants, this communication will present a diagnostic classification validated primarily by follow up and family studies\" (ibid., 57). The diagnostic criteria that they presented for fourteen psychiatric illnesses each contained a general clinical description together with a checklist of observable symptoms, with the stipulation that a certain number of these must be present to warrant a diagnosis, and a criterion concerning the time scale of the condition and the implications of preexisting psychiatric conditions. The authors referred to the desirability of \"laboratory studies\"\u2014chemical, physiological, radiological, and anatomical, which they considered to be \"generally more reliable, precise and reproducible than are clinical descriptions\" but remarked that \"[u]nfortunately, consistent and reliable laboratory findings have not yet been demonstrated in the more common psychiatric disorders\" (ibid.). Nonetheless, they concluded that what they presented was \"a synthesis [of existing information] based on data rather than opinion or tradition\" (ibid., 62).\n\nThis paper was receiving some two hundred citations a year by the mid-1970s (Garfield 1989; Kendler, Munoz, and Murphy 2010), and by 1974, two of the authors consolidated this way of thinking into a textbook on psychiatric diagnosis (Woodruff, Goodwin, and Guze 1974). But the view that this was in some way a return to Kraepelin was hard to shake off, despite the protestations of the authors. Thus, writing in 1978, while head of the Alcohol, Drug Abuse and Mental Health Administration, Gerald Klerman referred to them as \"neo-Kraeplinian,\" and portrayed them as engaged in a long struggle against what they felt to be an entrenched Meyerian domination of the field in the NIMH in the United States and the MRC in the United Kingdom (Klerman 1978).\n\nKlerman, like Spitzer, had been working since the early 1970s with psychiatric research groups developing \"research diagnostic criteria\" based on the Feighner approach. He argued that this classificatory ethos does not necessarily imply a commitment to a biological etiology for psychiatric problems, let alone a biological approach to treatment\u2014indeed Klerman himself was a key contributor to the development of interpersonal psychotherapy. However, Spitzer and his team _were_ committed to biological approaches from the outset; they were working on the basis of a commission from the NIMH as part of their Collaborative Program on the Psychobiology of the Depressive Disorders: \"biological and clinical collaborative programs... initiated in the early 1970s [spanned] research on nosology, genetics, neurochemistry, neuroendocrinology, and psychosocial factors... [arising from the] excitement created by the introduction of the new antidepressant drugs and the controversy surrounding some inspired hypotheses about the potential genetic and biochemical causes of the major depressive psychoses\" (Katz, Secunda, Hirschfeld, et al. 1979, 765).\n\nBy 1975, writing with Eli Robins, a biological psychiatrist who was one of the authors of the Feighner paper, Spitzer was commending the Feighner approach to diagnostic classification for the forthcoming _DSM-III_ , in contrast to that taken in _DSM-II_ (Spitzer, Endicott, and Robins 1975, 1187\u201388). Urging the use of what they now termed \"specified diagnostic criteria\" in _DSM-III_ , Spitzer and his colleagues argued that these would not eliminate clinical judgment or displace validity in the quest for reliability, but would improve training of psychiatrists and improve communication; in conclusion they contended that \"[t]he use of such criteria also forces clinicians to share their definitions of clinical terms and concepts, overcoming the tendency to be idiosyncratic.... We believe that the major potential beneficial effect of including specified diagnostic criteria in _DSM-III_ would be to improve the reliability and validity of routine psychiatric diagnosis. This in turn should improve the value of the standard nomenclature for all of its many uses, clinical, research and administrative\" (ibid., 1191).\n\n_DSM-III_ was, indeed, reshaped along these lines. In particular, much to the irritation of psychodynamic psychiatrists (Frances and Cooper 1981), it eliminated the use of the term _neurosis_ , which was thought inescapably tainted by psychodynamic theory, although in a moment of appeasement to pressures from psychoanalytic practitioners, the team preparing the revision agreed to put some reference to this term in parentheses, next to the disorders that had been termed neuroses in _DSM-II_. Thus 300.40 \"Dysthymia\" was followed by \"(or Depressive Neurosis),\" and the section headed \"Anxiety Disorders\" followed this title with \"(or Anxiety and Phobic Neuroses)\": \"the term 'neurotic disorder' is used in DSM-III without any implication of a special [and invisible] etiological process\" (American Psychiatric Association 1980, 9\u201310; quoted from A. Young 1995, 100).\n\nAlthough much criticized over the years of its development, its publication marked a crucial moment in the development of American psychiatry. _DSM-III_ and its subsequent versions were sanctioned by the NIMH, and diagnoses using its classification became required elements in research protocols, in articles submitted for publication in psychiatric journals, in the management of clinical trials and recruitment of subjects, in reimbursement criteria of health management organizations (HMOs), and in training programs for psychiatrists. _DSM-III_ stressed that diagnosis must be based on a pattern of symptoms that was not merely an expectable response to an event, but a manifestation of a dysfunction in the person: \"Neither deviant behavior... nor conflicts that are primarily between the individual and society are mental disorders unless... a symptom of a dysfunction in the person\" (American Psychiatric Association 1980). Its 494 pages classified 265 distinct diagnoses; the revised version of 1987 was 567 pages and classified 292 diagnoses (American Psychiatric Association 1987). Each was to be diagnosed in terms of a set of \"observable\" criteria, and each of these categories was construed as a distinct disorder, with a unique etiology and prognosis, amenable to a specific kind of treatment.\n\nBut despite the fact that the demand for revision of _DSM-II_ grew, in part, out of disquiet with the expanding scope of psychiatry, _DSM-III_ did not restrict the field of action of the experts of mental disorder. Its rejection of the fundamental division of neuroses and psychoses, together with its claims to provide neutral and theory-free empirical descriptions of symptom patterns did quite the reverse. It actually reinforced the claim that psychiatrists could diagnose as mental disorders conditions ranging from troublesome conduct in children to men's problems in getting an erection. All the travails of everyday life now seemed to come within its purview. And, indeed, by the 1980s this expanded territory of psychiatry had become a reality. At the risk of overgeneralization, we could say that up until the 1960s, there was a reasonably clear distinction\u2014professional, clinical, conceptual\u2014between what one might term 'asylum psychiatry,' based in the mental hospitals and often associated with the use of compulsory powers of confinement, and the psychiatry of everyday life, of the neuroses, of minor mental troubles of childhood, of psychotherapy and psychoanalysis. The former were the focus of the disquiet of the critics and were associated with the use of harsh physical treatments, drugs, and electroshock; the latter were associated with talking cures and increasingly with the use of minor tranquilizers such as Valium and the other benzodiazepines. But by the 1980s, in almost all developed countries a re-configuration and reunification of the territory of psychiatry was under way (Castel, Castel, and Lovell 1982). The antipsychiatric critiques of the custodial and segregative project of the asylum were welcomed by many psychiatrists, who were frustrated by the fact that they were confined to the mental hospitals along with their patients, shut off from the world of therapeutic optimism outside the asylum, and from the general hospitals and general medicine where the real progress appeared to be being made.\n\nThe movement for deinstitutionalizing the mental hospitals was much more than a shift of the incarcerated population from one locale to another. A new configuration of sites for the practice of psychiatry was taking shape, together with their populations\u2014halfway houses; residential homes; specialized units for children, alcoholics, anorexics, or drug users; and clinics of many different sorts. Children, delinquents, criminals, alcoholics, vagrants, the work shy, unhappy sexual partners, troubled husbands and wives all became possible objects for this extended practice of psychiatry. The unrivaled dominance of the doctor gave way to teams of multiple professionals with diverse claims to expertise. That monologue of reason about madness, of which Foucault wrote so eloquently, was supplemented by an array of sites where the incitement of the patient or client to speech had become obligatory.\n\nThe voice of the patient, expressed in therapies, group sessions, confessional literature, and the like was initially encouraged by professionals for reasons of therapy: few regarded it as the pathway to a transformation of the relations of power and authority within the psychiatric system. However, it presaged the emergence of psychiatric users into the mainstream of debates about psychiatry and mental health, with narratives of illness and recovery, pressure groups, and support networks playing an increasing role in psychiatric politics. By the 1980s, psychiatry had become much more than a specialty for the management of a small minority of persons unable to live in the world of work, family, and civility\u2014it had become a widespread \"discipline of mental health\" whose rationale was not so much cure as \"coping\"\u2014helping troubled individuals manage themselves in their everyday lives (Rose 1986). And, by the closing decade of the twentieth century, this focus had widened to a positive vocation for the maximization of individual potential, the minimization of sadness and anxiety, the promotion of well-being, even happiness (Rose 1989, 1999).\n\nThe diagnostic manuals of our own age are, in a certain respect, analogous to those that arose from within the nineteenth century asylums. Like those 'atlases' that we discussed in chapter 2, they suggest that there are fundamental connections between all those who come under the gaze of the psychiatrist, a gaze now not confined to the asylum, or the closed world of the hospital, but directed across the open space of the community. Now, however, these connections among the inhabitants of this territory are established through making connections between the 'molar' and the 'molecular.' That is to say, the diversity of problems in managing a life in the everyday world is nonetheless unified\u2014at least in aspiration\u2014at the level of the brain. For it is in the brain, in its patterns of activity, in the structures of its regions and networks, in the functioning of its systems of neurotransmission, in its capacities to adapt to stimuli, and in its molecular and cellular processes that these heterogeneous problems find their substrate. But we are anticipating our argument. Let us return to the _DSM_.\n\nFrom the 1980s onward, the expanded yet differentiated idea of mental disorder that we have described became indelibly inscribed in the style of thought of modern psychiatry. _DSM-IV_ , published in 1994, runs to 886 pages and continues the trend of identifying even more distinct conditions. It classifies some 350 distinct disorders, from acute stress disorder to voyeurism (American Psychiatric Association 1994). It cautions that individuals within any diagnostic group are heterogeneous: its categories are only intended as aids to clinical judgment. But it promotes an idea of specificity in diagnosis that is linked to a conception of specificity in underlying pathology. The broad categories of the start of the twentieth century\u2014depression, schizophrenia, neurosis\u2014no longer appeared adequate: it seems that pathologies of mood, cognition, will, or affect must be dissected at a finer level of discrimination.\n\nIn the course of these developments, key distinctions began to wither away. The distinction between inside and outside the asylum began to blur in the 1950s. The distinction between the neuroses and the psychoses began to blur in the 1960s. By the 1980s, the distinction between mental and physical disorders itself began to blur. As _DSM-IV_ put it: \"although this volume is titled the _Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders_ , the term _mental disorder_ unfortunately implies a distinction between 'mental' disorders and 'physical' disorders that is a reductionist anachronism of mind\/body dualism\" (1994, xxi). Over the 1980s, another key distinction, which had been the basis of a division of professional labor between psychiatrists and psychologists, also began to blur\u2014the distinction between states and traits. As discussed in chapter 1, this distinction between a relatively enduring feature of personality (a trait) and a particular episode of illness (a state) were the province of distinct disciplines\u2014psychology and psychiatry\u2014distinct explanatory regimes, and distinct modes of intervention, as well as grounding legal distinctions between those who were, or were not 'treatable' for their condition. But by the 1980s, it was being argued that there was no such ontological distinction between states of illness and traits of personality: for example, episodes both of illness, such as depression, and variations in traits, such as shyness or hostility, could be altered by psychiatric drugs (Knutson, Wolkowitz, Cole, et al. 1998). In the new neuromolecular gaze, variations in both states and traits could be analyzed in terms of the same molecular mechanisms, differing in many things, of course, but not in their underlying nature.\n\n_DSM-IV_ included, for the first time, a \"clinical significance\" criterion, which requires that, to be classified as a mental disorder, symptoms must cause \"clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning\" (1994, 7). In the words of Robert Spitzer and Jerome Wakefield, \"In response to concerns that the DSM criteria are overly inclusive, the clinical significance criterion attempts to minimize false positive diagnoses in situations in which the symptom criteria do not necessarily indicate pathology\" (Spitzer and Wakefield 1999, 1856). But Spitzer and Wakefield suggest that this delimitation, though helpful, is not in itself sufficient to eliminate the problem of false positives, because it still does not sufficiently consider questions of social context, and discriminate between normal and abnormal reactions to \"psychosocial stress\u2014it does not restrict the diagnosis of a disorder to situations where there is what they term 'a dysfunction' \" (ibid., 1863). Their cautions do not seem to have influenced the ways in which _DSM\u2013IV_ has been used to estimate the prevalence of psychiatric disorder. It seemed that, according to its criteria, the diagnosable psychiatric population was no longer a small minority; quite the reverse. Psychiatric morbidity was now common, widespread, almost ubiquitous. And, for many, this 'burden of mental disorder' had to be placed firmly on the agenda of policymakers.\n\nThe Burden of Mental Disorder\n\nHow many people suffer from psychiatric illness? This deceptively simple question turns out to be rather difficult to answer. One indicator is the high and increasing rate of use of psychiatric drugs (Rose 2006a, 2006b). But this is not the only one. In 2001, the WHO published a report titled _Mental Health: New Understanding, New Hope_. In the report, based on its own epidemiological work and that of others, it estimated that: \"mental and neurological conditions account for 30.8% of all years lived with disability (YLDs).... Six neuropsychiatric conditions figured in the top twenty causes of disability (YLDs) in the world, these being unipolar depressive disorders, alcohol use disorders, schizophrenia, bipolar affective disorder, Alzheimer's and other dementias, and migraine\" (World Health Organization 2001, 26). And it concluded: \"By the year 2020, if current trends for demographic and epidemiological transition continue, the burden of depression will increase to 5.7% of the total burden of disease, becoming the second leading cause of DALYs (disability adjusted life years) lost. Worldwide it will be second only to ischemic heart disease for DALYs lost for both sexes. In the developed regions, depression will then be the highest ranking cause of burden of disease\" (ibid., 30).\n\nEpidemiological studies of the prevalence of psychiatric disorders in the general population seem to give empirical support to this picture. Both in Europe and in the United States, such research claimed very high rates of prevalence of untreated psychiatric illness, as diagnosed by checklist interviews based on the descriptions of disorders in _DSM-IV_. The classic studies were undertaken by a team led by Ronald Kessler, originally trained as a sociologist and later a professor of health policy at Harvard Medical School. By 2003, the first of these surveys, published in 1994, had received more citations than any other paper published in the field of psychiatry and psychology (Kessler, McGonagle, Zhao, et al. 1994). In an interview at that time, Kessler noted that his survey, carried out by a household interview survey, was fundamentally dependent on the \"operational precision\" of the _DSM_ diagnostic criteria and the structured diagnostic interview developed by Lee Robins.\n\nKessler believed that the first of its findings\u2014that as many as half of all Americans have met criteria for some mental disorder at some time in their lives\u2014was so significant because \"it addressed the issue of stigma that has for so long interfered with rational thinking about mental illness. The mentally ill are not some distinct set of 'them' out there who are distinct from 'us' sane people. Instead, the vast majority of us have been touched by some form of mental illness at some time in our lives either through personal experience or through the illness of a close loved one. In many cases these illnesses are either mild or transient or both, but they certainly should not be considered in any way foreign.\" Kessler and his colleagues repeated the survey in 2005 with rather similar results: in any one year, 26.2% of adult Americans reported having symptoms that would qualify them for a _DSM-IV_ diagnosis of mental disorder, with the anxiety disorders leading at 18.1%, followed by mood disorders, notably depression, at 9.5% and impulse control disorders at 8.9%\u2014\"a total of over 57 million Americans diagnosable with mental disorder in any one year\" (Kessler, Chiu, Demler, et al. 2005). The authors concluded: \"About half of Americans will meet the criteria for a _DSM-IV_ disorder sometime in their life, with first onset usually in childhood or adolescence\" (Kessler, Berglund, Demler, et al. 2005).\n\nWe are not speaking here of the kinds of conditions that might previously been thought of as mild neuroses. Take, for example, personality disorder. While we often think of personality disorder as a relatively rare condition, the 2001\u20132 National Epidemiologic Survey on Alcohol and Related Conditions (NESARC), which administered a standardized diagnostic instrument to 43,093 adults over eighteen years old in the United States, reported that almost 15% of Americans, or 30.8 million adults, met _DSM-IV_ diagnostic criteria for at least one personality disorder (Grant, Hasin, Stinson, et al. 2004). The most common types of this disorder diagnosed were obsessive-compulsive personality disorder (16.4 million people), followed by paranoid personality disorder (9.2 million), and antisocial personality disorder (7.6 million). Other personality disorders affecting substantial numbers of Americans were schizoid (6.5 million), avoidant (4.9 million), histrionic (3.8 million), and dependent (1 million) (Bender 2004). This survey excluded borderline, schizotypal, and narcissistic disorders; however, NIMH estimates that borderline personality disorder alone affects a further 5.5 million Americans (National Institute for Mental Health 2001). All in all, then, these figures suggest that some 20% of Americans have diagnosable personality disorders. Which, of course, does make one wonder about the very idea of a normal personality.\n\nThese estimates have been much criticized, with many suggesting that they are the consequence of the _DSM_ itself (Kutchins and Kirk 1997). But they are not confined to the United States, nor to the use of the _DSM_. In 2005, a task force of the European College of Neuropsychopharmacology published the results of a Europe-wide survey of the size and burden of mental disorders in Europe, which claimed that some 27%, or 82.7 million of the adult EU population (eighteen to sixty-five years of age) \"is or has been affected by at least one mental disorder in the past 12 months.... [T]he most frequent disorders are anxiety disorders, depressive, somatoform and substance dependency disorders.... Only 26% of cases had any consultation with professional health care services, a finding suggesting a considerable degree of unmet need\" (Wittchen and Jacobi 2005, 357). It further estimated that over their lifetimes 50% of the EU population would be affected by at least one diagnosable psychiatric disorder, if lifetime risk was considered, and that mental disorders were associated with costs of more than \u20ac290 billion, the majority of which were not health-care costs (ibid., 355\u201356).\n\nThe matter was put plainly by the European Brain Council (EBC): \"There are an estimated 127 million Europeans currently living with a brain disorder out of a population of 466 million. The total annual cost of brain disorders in Europe was estimated to \u20ac386 billion in 2004\" (European Brain Council 2005, x). The diagnostic and epidemiological data used in these estimates were not solely based on the _DSM_ , but included the diagnostic criteria more often used in Europe, such as the ICD-9 or -10, or other diagnostic assessment scales. For the EBC, not just neurodegenerative disorders and major mental illnesses are considered brain disorders, but so are addiction, depression, anxiety and panic disorder\u2014what else could they be? How can we understand this simultaneous extension and cerebralization of the idea of mental abnormality?\n\nLet us return to the United States and the _DSM_. It is, of course, something of a paradox that while a key objective of those developing _DSM_ had been the _delimitation_ of the territory of psychiatry, the argument now is reversed. Kessler, speaking in 2003, said that the initial skepticism about his findings had been based on the error that \"the term 'mentally ill' is being taken too seriously.... [W]e invest the term 'mentally ill' with excess meaning. A number of common mental illnesses, like adjustment disorders and brief episodes of depression, are usually mild and self-limiting.\"  In his view, not everything classified in the _DSM_ \u2014and hence included in his estimates\u2014required treatment. However, this was a little disingenuous as, in the same year of this interview, he and his colleagues argued that it was important to include mild disorders in the forthcoming _DSM-5_ because mild disorders may progress to major ones, and diagnosis at an early stage provides an opportunity for preventive intervention (Kessler, Merikangas, Berglund, et al. 2003). Indeed, most of those who use these data to urge policymakers to focus funding and energy on mental health argue along the same lines: the burden of untreated mental disorder shown by such studies, they argue, shows that we need a step change in our capacity to understand and to treat these disorders, and in our capacity to screen our populations for them, to pick up presymptomatic susceptibilities and prevent the development of disorder.\n\nThus, Steven Hyman opens his paper \"A Glimmer of Light for Neuropsychiatric Disorders\" by referring explicitly to estimates of the prevalence of psychiatric disorders\u2014or what he terms \"neuropsychiatric disorders\"\u2014and suggesting that neuropsychiatry may soon be able to meet the challenge they pose:\n\nNeuropsychiatric disorders severely compromise the well-being of those affected, with their negative effects on general health and on the ability of children to learn and of adults to work. These disorders have a relatively high prevalence[,]... can have an early onset (for example, autism in childhood and schizophrenia in young adulthood) or a relapsing\u2013remitting course (as in mood and anxiety disorders and obsessive\u2013compulsive disorder), and often have disabling symptoms. For these reasons, they exert, in aggregate, a devastating impact on the families involved and on the human capital of a society.... Despite the disease burden attributable to neuropsychiatric disorders, and despite significant research, their mechanisms of pathogenesis and precise genetic and non-genetic risk factors have remained stubbornly out of reach. Although sustained and clever exploitation of clinical observations has produced a useful pharmacopoeia, almost all recently introduced psychotherapeutic drugs are based on reverse engineering the mechanisms of existing drugs. Arguably, no new drug targets or therapeutic mechanisms of real significance have been identified for more than four decades.... This parlous state of affairs is finally beginning to improve, in part through the application of new genomic technologies coupled to advances in neuroscience. (Hyman 2008, 890)\n\nTwo questions thus seem relevant. First, how much credibility can we give to these estimates? And second, why should we look to neuropsychiatry for the answer?\n\nLet us begin with the first question. The debate about the utility of these epidemiological studies has not abated. Some have suggested that the high prevalence rates reported arose because researchers failed to address such issues as symptom threshold, severity and level of impairment, and duration of symptoms (Regier, Kaelber, Rae, et al. 1998; Regier 2000). Insel and Fenton believe that this was indeed a problem for earlier epidemiological research: \"Many critical issues were not addressed by earlier studies. While the overall 12-month prevalence of any mental illness was reported to be in the range of 30%, significant questions about the disability associated with these syndromes remain. How severe are the disorders reported to be present in 30% of the population? What is the economic and public health impact of these conditions? How long is the delay between onset and diagnosis?\" (Insel and Fenton 2005, 590).\n\nBut their comment is in a commentary on more recent studies by Kessler and his colleagues that replicated the earlier research and sought to refine it; they claimed that the majority of those diagnosed by such methods are rated as having a serious or moderate disorder, with substantial disruption to their ability to carry out their normal activities and, further, that retrospective studies such as theirs actually _underestimate_ prevalence because respondents underreport the symptoms that they have had in the past, perhaps because of poor recall (Kessler, Berglund, Demler, et al. 2005a; Kessler, Chiu, Demler, et al. 2005; Wang, Berglund, Olfson, et al. 2005; Wang, Lane, Olfson, et al. 2005). Thus, in their commentary, Insel and Fenton concur with those who believe that such surveys do clearly demonstrate the high level of unmet need for mental health care. If this was not enough, researchers using a different, 'prospective' approach, based on their work with the Dunedin cohort study in New Zealand, argue that this method confirms the underestimation of prevalence in existing research and suggest that the actual lifetime prevalence rate of _DSM_ -diagnosed mental disorders is about twice that shown in the retrospective studies such as those by Kessler and his team (Moffitt, Caspi, Taylor, et al. 2009).\n\nOthers, however, continue to question the high prevalence rates and the methods used to generate them. Those from the team developing _DSM-5_ suggested technical changes, for example, requiring more evidence of severity (Narrow, Rae, Robins, et al. 2002; Narrow, Kuhl, and Regier 2009). Others warned those developing _DSM-5_ of the pitfalls they might face. Thus Allen Frances, who was chair of the _DSM-IV_ task force, argued that the problems in delimiting the diagnostic criteria in _DSM-IV_ had produced the consequences of contributing to \"the false epidemic of autism and attention-deficit disorder and a forensic disaster that has led to the inappropriate psychiatric commitment of sexually violent offenders\": he warned those responsible for producing _DSM-5_ of the danger of exacerbating these problems if they produce a set of criteria that \"capture\" prodromal and subthreshold conditions (Frances 2010, 2).\n\nPerhaps the most through interrogation of the methods used to create the prevalence data on the burden of brain disorders has been undertaken by Allan Horwitz and Jerome Wakefield (Horwitz and Wakefield 2007). Their principal argument is that psychiatric diagnoses using _DSM_ criteria generate many false positives because they fail adequately to discriminate between 'normal' responses to experiential factors\u2014that is to say, normal anxiety, normal sadness, or normal grief in the face of the difficulties that life presents us with\u2014and pathological conditions requiring specialized medical intervention. The presenting features of these normal responses overlap with those designated as symptoms of disorder in _DSM_ , and because _DSM_ fails to recognize the importance and take adequate account of context, it thus fails to differentiate between normal reactions that have a clear cause (for example, loss of job, ending of a relationship, reaction to a life-threatening medical condition, etc.) and those that, because of their severity, duration, or other features, that is, those without a cause, reveal that something has gone wrong that requires specialized psychiatric intervention.\n\nWhen framed as 'symptoms,' these normal reactions may well appear to psychiatrists, or those conducting community epidemiological surveys, as indicating a high level of undiagnosed psychiatric disorder in the general population. While clinicians may be able to make good and appropriate use of _DSM_ -type diagnostic procedures in clinical settings, they are not appropriate for use in the community. Even the clinical significance criterion introduced into _DSM-IV_ is not very helpful here, they argue, because normal reactions can indeed reach the threshold of significant distress or impairment in functioning in one's allocated social roles without indicating some underlying harmful dysfunction. The apparent epidemic that such community studies seem to reveal, and that mental health policy is urged to address, is, in their view, merely a consequence of the inappropriate decontextualized conceptual framework used in the research\u2014it is an epidemic of false positives.\n\nIt is not surprising, then, that in the light of these continued questions over the validity of diagnostic methods, some argue that there is really only one way to settle this matter\u2014to identify some biological abnormality, lesion, malfunction, or marker that will demonstrate objectively, once and for all, who is, and who is not, suffering from a mental disorder. Will neuroscience enable us, at last, 'to define true madness'?\n\nAll in the Brain?\n\nOur chapter opened with a quote from Amanda Haag, but we do not have to look to science journalists for the hope that neuroscience will resolve the diagnostic problems of psychiatry by demarcating disorders in terms of their underlying neurobiological bases. Let us quote Steven Hyman again. In 2003, writing while director of the NIMH for a popular audience in _Scientific American_ , he put it thus: \"By combining neuroimaging with genetic studies, physicians may eventually be able to move psychiatric diagnoses out of the realm of symptom checklists and into the domain of objective medical tests. Genetic testing of patients could reveal who is at high risk for developing a disorder such as schizophrenia or depression. Doctors could then use neuroimaging on the high-risk patients to determine whether the disorder has actually set in. I do not want to sound too optimistic\u2014the task is daunting. But the current pace of technological development augurs well for progress.\"\n\nThe hope at that time was threefold. First, in pinning psychiatric classification and categorization to a neurobiological basis, using identifiable markers in genetics and in patterns of brain activation, it would be possible not just to make accurate distinctions between normality and pathology, but also to distinguish subtypes of pathology according to their organic and functional pathways. Psychiatric classification would move from the surface to the interior, from symptom checklists to the brain itself. Second, in doing so, one would gain understandings of etiology, which would not only enable accurate diagnosis and prognosis, but also would make it possible to screen presymptomatic individuals thought to be at risk and intervene preventively before the disease developed. Third, on this basis, one might be able to develop effective treatments that target the neurobiological basis of mental disorders.\n\nOne organizing focus for these hopes of reform was, once again, the revision process for the _DSM_. The process of revision of the fourth edition of that manual began in 1999, with the _DSM-5_ scheduled for publication in 2013. In 2002, David Kupfer, Michael First, and Darrel Regier published _A Research Agenda for DSM-V_ , which among other things, argued for greater neurobiological research on nosological issues\u2014that is to say, questions of classification of disorders (Kupfer, First, and Regier 2002). The volume collected five \"white papers\" from different work groups, the first substantive one of which was titled \"Neuroscience Research Agenda to Guide Development of a Pathophysiologically Based Classification System.\" The authors\u2014Dennis Charney, David Barlow, Kelly Botteron, Jonathan Cohen, David Goldman, Raquel Gur, Keh-Ming Lin, Juan L\u00f3pez, James Meador-Woodruff, Steven Moldin, Eric Nestler, Stanley Watson, and Steven Zalcman stated the problem boldly, if pessimistically, early in their discussion: \"At the risk of making an overly broad statement of the status of neurobiological investigations of the major psychiatric disorders noted above, it can be concluded that the field of psychiatry has thus far failed to identify a single neurobiological phenotypic marker or gene that is useful in making a diagnosis of a major psychiatric disorder or for predicting response to psychopharmacologic treatment\" (Charney, Barlow, Botteron, et al. 2002, 33).\n\nThey argued that it would be years\u2014and possibly decades\u2014before a fully explicated etiologically and pathophysiologically based classification system for psychiatry would exist. Nonetheless, at the close of their review of a whole variety of methods\u2014genetic research, brain imaging, postmortem studies, and work with animal models\u2014relevant to elucidating the pathophysiology of mental disorders, they allowed themselves to imagine:\n\nWe speculate that single genes will be discovered that map onto specific cognitive, emotional, and behavioral disturbances but will not correspond neatly to currently defined diagnostic entities. Rather, it will be discovered that specific combinations of genes will relate to constellations of abnormalities in many brain-based functions\u2014including but not limited to the regulation of mood, anxiety, perception, learning, memory, aggression, eating, sleeping, and sexual function\u2014that will coalesce to form disease states heretofore unrecognized. On the other hand, genes that confer resilience and protection will also be identified, and their interaction with disease-related genes will be clarified. The impact of environmental factors on gene expression and phenotype expression will be defined. The ability to discover intermediate phenotypes will be improved with advances in techniques such as neuroimaging. This will all lead to novel therapeutic targets of greater efficacy and specificity to disease states. Prediction of therapeutic response will be possible through genetic analysis and phenotype analysis. Disease prevention will become a realistic goal. (Charney, Barlow, Botteron et al., 2002: 70)\n\nAnd they even suggested a hypothetical radical revision of the _DSM_ axes. Instead of the current multiaxial system (introduced in _DSM-III_ ), which provides information for clinical disorders (Axis I), personality disorders and mental retardation (Axis II), any general medical condition (Axis III), psychosocial and environmental problems (Axis IV), and global functioning (Axis V), they proposed the following: Axis I for _genotype_ , identifying symptom-or disease-related genes, resiliency genes, and genes related to therapeutic responses and side effects to specific psychotropic drugs; Axis II for _neurobiological phenotype_ , such as identifying intermediate phenotypes discovered by neuroimaging, cognitive evaluation, and neurophysiological testing that could aid in selecting targeted pharmacotherapies and psychotherapies and monitoring the neurobiological response; Axis III for _behavioral phenotype_ , severity and frequency of specific cognitive, emotional, and behavioral disturbances; Axis IV for _environmental modifiers or precipitants_ to be evaluated in the context of genotype; and Axis V for _therapeutics._\n\nSeven years later, the prospects for a radical revision of diagnostic criteria along neurobiological lines looked, if anything, even more remote than they did in 2002. When Regier and his colleagues from the team overseeing the revision discussed the conceptual basis of _DSM-5_ , their diagnosis of the problems of _DSM-IV_ was damning, and it seemed that the prospects for a neurobiological solution were remote (Regier, Narrow, Kuhl, et al. 2009). They were particularly concerned by the lack of clear separation between _DSM_ -defined syndromes, as there seemed to be high levels of \"comorbidity\" between mood, somatic, and anxiety syndromes. The question, for them, was how to \"update our classification to recognize the most prominent syndromes that are actually present in nature, rather than in the heuristic and anachronistic pure types of previous scientific eras\" (ibid., 646).\n\nThe hope that psychopharmaceuticals would 'cut nature at its joints'\u2014that one might differentiate disorders by identifying which conditions responded to which drugs\u2014now seemed forlorn. The SSRIs had proved not to be specific for depression but were now prescribed for a range of anxiety, mood, and eating disorders; the 'atypical antipsychotics' were now licensed not only for schizophrenia but also bipolar disorder and for treatment-resistant major depression. More troubling, given so much investment in genomic research, the _DSM-5_ revision team was skeptical about the prospects for large-scale genetic studies using GWAS: they thought it would be \"unlikely to find single gene underpinnings for most mental disorders, which are more likely to have polygenetic vulnerabilities interacting with epigenetic factors (that switch genes on and off) and environmental exposures to produce disorders\" (Regier, Narrow, Kuhl, et al. 2009, 646). But hope does not die easily, and they remained optimistic that, in some way mental disorder syndromes could be redefined so that they were useful diagnostically and related to objective neurobiological features\u2014that one could recognize the \"dimensional\" nature of disorders, yet still set clear thresholds between pathology and normality.\n\nIndeed by the end of the decade, the prevailing attitude among neuropsychiatric researchers seemed to be a combination of disappointment in the present with hope for the future. Take, for example, Chou and Chouard, in their introduction to a _Nature_ \"Insights\" supplement published in October 2008:\n\nDespite decades of... research, the prevalence of neuropsychiatric diseases has not decreased. Our understanding of the biological mechanisms of diseases such as mood disorders, schizophrenia and autism is frustratingly limited. And, although it has long been clear that most such diseases have a strong genetic component, the identities of the genes involved have proved elusive. There is also a lack of reliable biological markers for characterizing these diseases and, perhaps unsurprisingly, treatment options are far from optimal in terms of efficacy and specificity. There is, however, some cause for optimism. Recent advances in genomic technology and large-scale studies are helping to identify genetic variants associated with diseases. In addition, new animal models of disorders such as depression and autism are providing ways to test hypotheses about the underlying neuropathology\u2014at the molecular, neural-circuit and behavioral levels.... The hope is that developments such as these will lead to integrative approaches for designing better therapeutic strategies. (Chou and Chouard 2008, 889)\n\nOthers writing in the same issue were less optimistic and doubted the very premises on which neuropsychiatric hope was based. Take, for example, Steven Hyman, who, as we have seen, was an optimist in 2003 and even quite up-beat when writing for a popular audience five years later. Yet in the same year, writing for his peers, he expressed a rather different opinion: that we have made little progress even in those disorders where conventional measures of heritability based on family studies indicate a strong genetic component, such as autism, schizophrenia, and bipolar disorder:\n\nEfforts to identify risk-conferring alleles... have been largely unrewarding.... The underlying genetics of common neuropsychiatric disorders has proved highly complex.... [T]here is much evidence that similar neuropsychiatric symptoms can result from different combinations of genetic risk factors [and] that the same genetic variant may be associated with multiple DSM-IV diagnoses.... The identification of common risk-conferring variants has... proved extremely challenging in most cases, because of their relatively small contribution to the disease phenotype... because of the diverse genetic, environmental and random factors that lead to these common disease. (Hyman 2008, 891)\n\nHyman, concurring with several generations of sociological critics, now concluded that \"what we think of as a single 'disease' is not in a strict sense a homogeneous entity for which there is a 'Platonic' ideal phenotype. Common diseases are more likely to represent families of diseases that share major pathophysiological and symptomatic features, but can differ in important characteristics such as age of onset, severity of symptoms, rate of progression, and response to treatment\" (2008, 891). He argued that this problem of the phenotype is one of the reasons why GWAS fail in psychiatry, but that they also fail because they do not take account of the fact that genes for psychiatric disorders are pleiotropic in effects (i.e., a single gene can produce many effects), and crucially that the pathways from genomics to phenotype are complex and not understood. And, perhaps most damaging for the hopes that were vested in neurobiology to resolve the diagnostic problems of psychiatry, he questioned the view that it might ever be possible to draw clear boundaries between ill and well\u2014it is, he thinks, better to think of \"dimensions\" without sharp boundaries.\n\nThis pessimistic conclusion on the current state of neuropsychiatry was echoed in the same issue of _Nature_ by Krishnan and Nestler, who discussed the molecular neurobiology of depression (Krishnan and Nestler 2008). Nestler, who is Nash Family Professor of Neuroscience, chairman of the Department of Neuroscience, and director of the Brain Institute at the Mount Sinai Medical Center in New York, was one of the authors of the chapter on neurobiology in the 2002 _Research Agenda for DSM-V._ He and his coauthor were also skeptical of the prospects for GWAS in depression, not least because of the problems of comorbidities. They argued, further, that brain imaging studies were flawed because of simplistic ideas about localization (for instance, that the amygdala is the locus for fear and anxiety; the nucleus accumbens the locus for reward; and so forth). \"Such artificial distinctions are of limited heuristic value,\" they believe, as \"depressive symptoms are probably mediated by dysfunction in a diffuse series of neural networks.\" (ibid., 895). Earlier theories of depression, like the monoamine hypothesis, are false: \"[A]lterations in central monoamine function might contribute marginally to genetic vulnerability.... [T]he cause of depression [is not] a simple deficiency of central monoamines.\" (ibid.). And the effects of drugs that act on serotonin levels, they suggested, are actually due to secondary changes in molecular and cellular plasticity. They concluded: \"Collectively, these studies highlight the weaknesses of attempts to generate a 'unified theory' of depression. Mechanisms that promote depressive symptoms in response to stress differ markedly between different neural circuits and can also be distinct from changes that underlie depression in the absence of external stress ('endogenous depression'). In addition, neuroplastic events that are required for antidepressant efficacy need not function through the reversal of stress-induced plasticity... and might function through separate and parallel circuits\" (Krishnan and Nestler 2008, 898). In short, at the neurobiological level, \"enormous gaps in the knowledge of depression and its treatment persist... [and researchers] must follow a systems approach that acknowledges the powerful bidirectional interactions between peripheral organs and the brain\" (ibid., 901).\n\nIn February 2010, the APA released the proposed draft diagnostic criteria for the fifth edition of the _DSM_. Among the changes proposed were several relevant to our discussion here: the current diagnoses of autistic disorder, Asperger's disorder, childhood disintegrative disorder, and pervasive developmental disorder (not otherwise specified) were to be incorporated into a single diagnostic category of \"autism spectrum disorders\"; there were various changes to the categories relating to substance abuse and dependence, which were to be incorporated into a new category of \"addiction and related disorders\"; a new category of \"behavioral addictions\" was proposed, with gambling as the sole disorder; there was to be consideration of a new \"risk syndromes\" category, with information to help clinicians identify earlier stages of some serious mental disorders, such as neurocognitive disorder (dementia) and psychosis; and there were other changes designed to assist clinicians in better differentiating the disorders of children. Dimensional assessments would be added to diagnostic categories to permit clinicians to evaluate the severity of symptoms. And arabic numerals were to replace the previously used roman numerals\u2014thus the new edition would be, not _DSM-V_ but _DSM-5.0_ , to enable future revisions to be identified as _DSM-5.2_ , etc.\u2014to make _DSM_ \"a living document.\"\n\nMany of those who had high hopes for neuropsychiatry expressed disappointment at the way things were shaping up. One prolific commentator, Dr. Charles Parker, writing in his CorePsychBlog three days after the draft criteria were published, expostulated:\n\n_The Earth Is Flat! DSM 5 Points at the Tips of Icebergs\u2014Only What You See_\n\nThe tip-toe progress with these new superficial labels for office appearances misses altogether the complexity of new brain and body science. Neuroscience evidence is easily available, often paid for by insurance, and remains almost completely ignored by psychiatry. Real facts, not labels, will foretell the changes necessary for psychiatric practice, for treatment strategies to evolve with the rapidly evolving new science.... [T]he new DSM5 conclusions are based almost completely upon 19th century vertical thinking, insufficient feedback with patients in the office, and questions that ignore modern neurophysiology and metabolism. Psychiatrists will remain speculative with dreams and fantasies, while hard evidence from molecular and cellular physiology remains in the closet\u2014frequently derided as quackery. Interestingly, psychiatry is held to a different standard on evidence than the rest of medicine, as SPECT brain imaging and the measurement of neurotransmitter biomarkers is still derided as non-specific, while patently non-specific biomarkers, such as cholesterol screening, are accepted uniformly in general medicine. It's time for diagnostic change\u2014but DSM5 is already old news.\n\nOthers, however, did identify something new emerging in the proposals for the new version of _DSM_ \u2014the inclusion of some subthreshold or prodromal conditions. These were conditions where clear symptoms of disorder were not yet visible, but where there was believed to be high risk of progressing to a frank disorder\u2014a perception intrinsically linked with the belief in the value of screening to identify those at risk at the presymptomatic stage and to intervene early to avert or mitigate the development of the disorder. Two areas were notable here: psychosis risk syndrome and minor neurocognitive disorder. Let us focus on the first.\n\nEarly intervention for those at risk of psychosis had advocates dating back at least to the 1990s, with some arguing that best results would be obtained by intervention at as early a point as possible, even before any outright symptoms had emerged (McGorry et al. 2009). During the first decade of this century, a group of international collaborators, with key investigators at the Institute of Psychiatry in London, developed a program for early diagnosis of psychosis, to be followed by intervention with atypical antipsychotics, perhaps combined with the prescription of some essential fatty acids and cognitive behavioral therapy. It appeared that general practitioners could be educated to make early diagnosis (Power et al. 2007) and that it might be possible to use imaging technologies to assist accurate diagnoses at the prodromal stage (Pantelis et al. 2003; Howes et al. 2007; Meisenzahl et al. 2008; Smieskova et al. 2010), although the efficacy of these early interventions with drugs and other measures in preventing further development of the disorder was not yet clear (Gafoor, Nitsch, and McCrone 2010). Some suggested that cost savings would be generated by such interventions with those deemed to be at high risk (Valmaggia et al. 2009). Others, however, were more skeptical, arguing that prodromal interventions were not clinically justified, generated high levels of false positives, that no significant differences arising from early intervention were found on follow-up, and that there were significant problems from the side effects of antipsychotic medication (De Koning et al. 2009; Bosanac, Patton, and Castle 2010).\n\nMore radically, Nil Kaymaz and Jim van Os, writing in the journal _Psychosis_ , took particular issue with the proposed diagnosis itself, arguing that the category of Psychosis Risk Syndrome \"is based on the notion that labeling people with invalid diagnostic terms has more clinical relevance than simply addressing care needs, is contingent on elusive sampling strategies posing as precise diagnostic criteria, and is associated with a false-positive rate of at least 90% in the year after diagnosis. In the twenty-first century, opinion-based diagnostics continues to pose a threat to the process of diagnostic revision\" (Kaymaz and van Os 2010). Not, however, that these authors were opposed to early intervention in itself; indeed, although they recognized that all current examples of such intervention generate large numbers of false positives, they remained of the view that early intervention \"improves subsequent course and outcome given that psychotic disorders, arising during adolescence and early adulthood, disrupt important maturational tasks and increase the risk of long term exclusion from meaningful societal participation\" (ibid., 100). Despite their assertion that \"the hypothesis of valid nosological entities is very weak,\" they look to resolve this issue not by an appeal to biomarkers, but to the generic diagnosis already in _DSM-IV_ : \"Psychotic Disorder, Not Otherwise Specified\" (Kaymaz and van Os 2010)\n\nSome leading psychiatrists, however, warned of the dangers of these proposals for early intervention. In the month before the publication of the draft criteria for _DSM-5.0_ , Allen Frances, who had been the chair of the _DSM-IV_ task force, had expressed his concern that the subthreshold diagnoses would \"medicalize normality\":\n\nThe most appealing subthreshold conditions (minor depression, mixed anxiety depression, minor cognitive disorder, and prepsychotic disorder) are all characterized by nonspecific symptoms that are present at extremely high frequencies in the general population. These proposed \"disorders\" might well become among the most common diagnoses in the general population\u2014particularly once they are helped along by drug company marketing\u2014resulting in excessive use of medications that often have serious long-term complications associated with weight gain. Early case finding is a wonderful goal, but it requires a happy combination of a specific diagnostic test and a safe intervention. Instead, we would now have the peculiarly unhappy combination of a wildly false-positive set of criteria coupled with potentially dangerous interventions.... Altogether, in my view, the costs and risks of the subthreshold diagnoses far outweigh any possible current gains. (Frances 2010)\n\nHowever, as we shall see in many of the areas discussed in this book, the logic of 'screen and intervene,' the identification of prodromal or subthreshold disorders coupled with interventions in the name or preventing or mitigating the condition, has proved hard to resist.\n\nNeuropsychiatry and the Dilemmas of Diagnosis\n\nCould _DSM 5.0_ avoid those dangers of neurobiology's medicalization of normality by utilizing biomarkers, by grounding diagnostic classification on objective anomalies identified in the brain? The situation did not look very encouraging. In the draft criteria, positive references to the current utility of biomarkers are rare. One does find reference to \"a positive genetic test for dominantly inherited AD, or as the field develops, evidence that certain imaging markers, atrophy of medial temporal lobe structures on MRI, temporoparietal hypometabolism on FDG-PET, amyloid deposition on PET scanning or markers for tau and abeta in the CSF\" as a requirement if one is to make a prediction of Alzheimer's disease in cases of minor neurocognitive disorder, but the working group does not consider that this would be appropriate in cases where the diagnosis is Mild Cognitive Impairment (MCI). But this reference to a biomarker is an exception. Each of the pathways that neuropsychiatry has attempted to trace through the brain seems to run, not into the bright uplands of clarity, but into the murky, damp, misty, and mysterious forests of uncertainty. Where, then, do matters stand in the question of the role of neuroscience in the diagnosis and delimitation of mental disorders?\n\nDespite the penetrating gaze of neuroscience, which has opened up the brain to vision in so many ways, as we have seen in chapter 2, psychiatric classification remains superficial. This neuromolecular vision seems incapable of grounding the clinical work of psychiatry in the way that has become routine in other areas of medicine. Despite the conviction of most practitioners that they deal with conditions that have a corporeal seat in the brain of the afflicted individual, psychiatry has failed to establish the bridge that, from the nineteenth century on, underpinned the epistemology of modern clinical medicine\u2014the capacity to link the troubles of the troubled and troubling individuals who are its subjects with the vital anomalies that underpin them.\n\nWhy, then, has neuropsychiatry not been able to \"self-vindicate\"\u2014to use Ian Hacking's term (Hacking 1992a)? Of course, in part this is because it is not a laboratory science, for while its research may, in part, follow the protocols of an experimental laboratory discipline, the phenomena that it addresses\u2014persons deemed to be ailing in particular ways\u2014are not laboratory subjects. One might have thought that _DSM_ criteria would enable such self-vindication\u2014after all, they are used to select subjects for entry into neuropsychiatric research studies, which then become the basis for hypotheses, trials, developments of drugs, labeling and treatment by relevant personnel, changes in self-perception, and so forth. And as we have seen in chapter 3, the behaviors of animals in animal models of psychopathologies\u2014what we called _models_ _5_ \u2014are indeed assessed according to those very _DSM_ criteria. But although the criteria have summoned up an image of a mental disorder in thought\u2014a specific genetic sequence or set of sequences linked to anomalies in the neurotransmitter system or other aspects of neurobiology causally related to a particular array of cognitive, affective, volitional, or behavioral dysfunctions\u2014this assemblage has proved impossible to summon up in reality, despite the expenditure of millions of dollars and thousands of person-hours. The phenomenon itself, that is to say, has proved resistant. Why should this be?\n\nNo doubt a certain quantum of realism is essential here. Genomics, once welcomed as a potential savior, has not lived up to its early promises. The style of thought that underpins GWAS has proved to be radically oversimple when applied to the field of mental disorder. The response of neuropsychiatrists committed to this way of thinking has been to appeal to _complexity_. They suggest that many genes are likely to be involved in any psychiatric disorder. They argue that any gene sequence that might be involved is likely to be pleiotropic. They contemplate the likelihood that there may be many routes to the final common pathways that generate the phenotypical symptoms. And they try to incorporate in their explanatory systems something that, elsewhere within psychiatry, has always been well known: that the manifestation of a disorder is an outcome of complex and individual variable interactions between genomics, developmental processes, epigenetics, neuroplasticity, life experiences, and hormonal and nutritional states.\n\nMore fundamentally fatal to self-vindication has been the recognition that psychiatric diagnoses, however much they may appear to be stabilized by the circular transactions between the diagnostic manuals and the training of the clinical gaze of the psychiatrist, seem to have a kind of irreducible fuzziness, so that selection of cases and controls on the basis of phenotypes is unable to frame studies in a way that is capable of generating clear results. Of course, social scientists have argued for decades that sociocultural belief systems play a crucial role in shaping not only the recognition of unease by others, but also its shaping into phenotypical symptoms. Hence it is no surprise to them to find that there are no good routes from psychiatric phenotypes to SNPs; that in almost every case, GWAS signals have been weak in psychiatry; and that functional pathways that have been implicated are those that are basic to neurodevelopment, and not specific to psychiatric disorders.\n\nFor the same reason, the drive to discover biomarkers, though stimulated by a whole constellation of forces\u2014commercial interests, public health concerns, employer and health service concerns, and pressure from individuals and families\u2014has yielded no validated results. Even if some markers are found in the future, all available evidence suggests that they will, at best, indicate marginal increases in susceptibility in particular environmental circumstances, and that these will be modulated by other genetic and neurobiological factors that are related to _resilience_ \u2014a term that is itself now becoming the basis of an expanding program of research. Further, despite the fervent beliefs in the virtues of early diagnosis and intervention, there is little evidence that presymptomatic intervention is more effective than intervention at the time when problematic conduct is shown. Premature use of such biomarkers within a strategy of screen and intervene would produce large numbers of false negatives and false positives, generate stigma rather than reduce it, expand interventions and their costs and downsides, and start many unnecessarily on a psychiatric career (Rose 2008; Singh and Rose 2009). Perhaps there is a lesson here about the dangerous lure of the 'translational imperative'\u2014neurobiological work in these areas may have been valuable in exploring brain mechanisms, but it may also be wise for those working in this area to avoid premature claims about the implications of their results for humans and clinical practice.\n\nIt is clear that neuropsychiatry has a long way to go in developing a style of thought adequate to the complexity of its object, when that object is an ailment suffered by an individual human being living in a social world. Few would doubt the enormous advances in our understanding of neural processes that have been made since the 1960s. But neurobiology will not solve psychiatry's current diagnostic dilemmas. Neurobiology cannot bear the weight placed on diagnosis in psychiatry for many reasons. First, allocation to a diagnostic category does not tell one much about the severity of symptoms, their duration, the level of impairment involved, the amount of distress caused to the individual or the family, and the extent of need for care. Further, diagnosis has low predictive validity and tells us little about the course of development of the problem, or the specific social, environmental, or other factors that may shape this course. More fundamentally, neuropsychiatry won't solve the dilemmas of diagnosis, because diagnosis is not solely about the nature or causes of a disorder. As we have seen, diagnoses in psychiatry answer to many different and competing demands: statistical record keeping for institutions and clinicians, entry into research trials and studies, eligibility for treatment, choice of intervention, prognosis, predictions of need for care, eligibility for work, eligibility for compensation via insurance, and epidemiology and public health policies, including predictions of need and distribution of resources. Perhaps no single system could ever bear this weight, but it is certain that one based on the brain alone cannot.\n\nAt root, the neurobiological project in psychiatry finds its limit in the simple and often repeated fact: mental disorders are problems of persons, not of brains. Mental disorders are not problems of brains in labs, but of human beings in time, space, culture, and history. And, indeed, so is diagnosis; however well-trained and stabilized the gaze of the doctor, however regulated by criteria and augmented by neuromolecular indicators, diagnosis is a practice governed by its own rules\u2014rules that are different in epidemiology, in cohort studies, in research, in the clinic, and in life. Has neuropsychiatry brought us any closer to resolving that centuries-old problem of how to define 'true madness'\u2014to find what one recent author referred to as \"a brain based classification of mental illness\" (Miller 2010)? At present, one must answer in the negative.\nChapter Five\n\nThe Social Brain\n\nA primate specialization which has now been amply documented by behavioral scientists, but ignored for the most part by neuroscientists, is the specialization for social cognition. What I mean by the term \"social cognition\" is the following: _Social cognition is the processing of any information which culminates in the accurate perception of the dispositions and intentions of other individuals_. While many non-primates (for example, ants) can interact in highly specific ways with others of their kind, it appears that primates, especially those most closely related to ourselves, have developed a unique capacity to perceive psychological facts (dispositions and intentions) about other individuals. This capacity appears to distinguish primate social behavior from that of other orders.\n\n\u2014Leslie Brothers, \"The Social Brain,\" 1990\n\nAn... hypothesis offered during the late 1980s was that primates' large brains reflect the computational demands of the complex social systems that characterize the order.... There is ample evidence that primate social systems are more complex than those of other species. These systems can be shown to involve processes such as tactical deception and coalition-formation... which are rare or occur only in simpler forms in other taxonomic groups. Because of this, the suggestion was rapidly dubbed the Machiavellian intelligence hypothesis, although there is a growing preference to call it the social brain hypothesis.\n\n\u2014Robin Dunbar, \"The Social Brain Hypothesis,\" 1998\n\nPhilosophers and psychologists have long wondered about \"this thing called empathy.\" Only recently social neuroscience has begun to provide some support in this endeavor. Initial findings are encouraging that we will some day have a better understanding of why, when, and how we experience empathy and whether we can use that knowledge to increase prosocial behavior and an intersubjectivity that is grounded in a better understanding of ourselves and of others.\n\n\u2014Tania Singer and Claus Lamm, \"The Social Neuroscience of Empathy,\" 2009\n\nHuman beings, to state the obvious, are social creatures. We have platitudes by the dozen to assure us that 'no man is an island.' We live in groups\u2014families, communities, societies. We work collaboratively in organizations, fight in bands and armies, take pleasure in events where we gather together to dance, party, watch or play sports. We interact in pairs, and small and large groups, whether in love or in hate, in teams and gangs, and in everyday activities. We care for one another and experience sympathy, empathy, or a sense of obligation to some, though not to others. And so forth. But why? What accounts for this apparently intrinsic and ubiquitous sociality of our species? Is it, as one might say, in our nature, as we primates have evolved to become human? And, if so, does that nature, that biology, that neurobiology, account not only for the fact that we humans are social, but also for the ways that sociality has varied across history, between cultures, among different practices?\n\nFor the human sciences, the constitutive role of human sociality is undoubtedly a premise, but it is one that tends to be framed in a particular way. What _is_ in our nature is the fact that we humans are born incomplete, requiring interaction with others, and enmeshing in language, meaning, and culture, to be completed\u2014to paraphrase Simone de Beauvoir, we are not born, but become social. Absent that, humans remain mere animals; and for some, the repetitive stories of wild children, abandoned, isolated, living without human contact, seem to testify to that truth (Hirst and Woolley 1982). But what if it was the case that our sociality, like that of our primate ancestors, was a consequence of the evolved capacities of our brains, if our group formation was shaped by our neurobiology, if our empathy was not merely social but neural? And what if our neurobiology does not just establish the _conditions_ for sociality but also the _forms_ that it takes? What if our friendships and our loves, our communal ties and hates, our social and cultural lives take the shape that they do as only a consequence of our neuronal architecture? What then for the social and human sciences? Would such a neurobiologically grounded conception of human sociality represent a fundamental threat to the social and human sciences, as suggested by some of the critics discussed in earlier chapters? Or does it represent a new opportunity for collaboration across the 'two cultures,' one area where the 'critical friendship' we have proposed might be possible and valuable? And whether or not the claims made about the neural basis of human sociality are true, what might be the wider implications of such arguments being _considered truthful_ \u2014what might follow for how we are governed or govern ourselves\u2014how we manage our brains?\n\nThe \"Social Brain Hypothesis\"\n\nIn 1985, neuroscientist Michael Gazzaniga published a book called _The Social Brain_ (Gazzaniga 1985b). It was based on the work that he had done, initially with Roger Sperry, on so-called split-brain animals\u2014where the corpus callosum bridging left and right hemispheres had been lesioned\u2014and other evidence from clinical studies of individuals with brain lesions. This work seemed to show that damaging or destroying specific areas of the brain affected very specific aspects of cognition, language, and memory. On this basis he argued that the brain was not an indivisible whole but a confederation of relatively independent modules, each of which was relatively discrete and had specific functions. This modular way of thinking about the brain has been accepted by many.\n\nBut it is not in this sense of a kind of confederation of modules that the phrase _social brain_ has become so popular. Rather, the term has come to stand for the argument that the human brain, and indeed that of some other animals, is specialized for a collective form of life. One part of this argument is evolutionary: that the size and complexity of the brains of primates, including humans, are related to the size and complexity of their characteristic social groups. To put it simply, it is argued that the computational demands of living in large, complex groups selected for brains that had the capacities for interaction required to live in such social groups. _Social group_ is used here in the sense attributed to it by ethologists\u2014the characteristic number of animals such as primates who interact with one another in a relatively stable pattern and who differentiate themselves from other groups of the same species (see, for example, Bateson and Hinde 1976).\n\nAs far as humans are concerned, the evolutionary psychologist and anthropologist Robin Dunbar suggested that the number 150\u2014subsequently known as the Dunbar number\u2014specifies the optimal size of self-managing collectivities of human beings bonded together with ties of reciprocity, trust, and obligation, such as the clan or the village (Dunbar 1993). He and those who followed him suggested that this group size was intrinsically related to the size and structure of the brain as it had evolved to manage the complex tasks required to collaborate with others, to solve problems, maintain cohesion, and deal with others as enemies or collaborators; even today, it is claimed, it remains significant in shaping the optimal size of the functional groupings in the military and other human organizations, and for contemporary self-assembled networks (Dunbar 1996, 1998, 2003a, 2003b; C. Allen 2004; Dunbar and Shultz 2007; Shultz and Dunbar 2007).\n\nBut the social brain hypothesis is more than a general account of the role of brain size: for in this thesis, the capacities for sociality are neurally located in a specific set of brain regions shaped by evolution, notably the amygdala, orbital frontal cortex, and temporal cortex\u2014regions that have the function of facilitating an understanding of what one might call the 'mental life' of others. This faculty became termed _social cognition_. A key paper by Leslie Brothers in 1990 drew on evidence from work with macaques, and from humans with various neurological syndromes, to develop the hypothesis that humans, together with some primates, had a \"specialization for social cognition\": \" _the processing of any information which culminates in the accurate perception of the dispositions and intentions of other individuals_ \" (Brothers 1990, quoted from Brothers 2002, 367; emphasis in original). Brothers suggested that face recognition, with a specific neural basis, was crucial for this capacity and that social cognition formed a separate module subserved by a discrete neural system. Brothers, who herself was trained in psychiatry and later in psychoanalysis, developed this insight into a popular book, _Friday's Footprint_ , which argued that human brains are \"designed to be social\"\u2014that is to say, to attribute mental lives to human bodies (Brothers 1997).\n\nBut she could not have anticipated the ways in which, over the next twenty years, a body of work grew up that turned increasingly toward a neurobiological account of human behavior. Indeed, she later criticized this movement on Wittgensteinian grounds, and attributed it, in part at least, to the dominance of hidden interests, such as those of the pharmaceutical industry (Brothers 2001). But despite such concerns, this way of thinking has underpinned a growing body of work that focused on the identification of these neural bases and emphasized their determining role in social behavior: a body of research that called itself variously the social brain sciences, social cognition, or social cognitive neuroscience (Cacioppo 1994; Adolphs 2003; Heatherton, Macrae, and Kelley 2004). Ralph Adolphs has described this as \"an uneasy marriage of two different approaches to social behavior: sociobiology and evolutionary psychology on the one hand, and social psychology on the other.\" Nonetheless, he argues that \"neuroscience might offer a reconciliation between biological and psychological approaches to social behavior in the realization that its neural regulation reflects both innate, automatic and cognitively impenetrable mechanisms, as well as acquired, contextual and volitional aspects that include self-regulation\" (Adolphs 2003, 165; capitalization as in original), because there seems to be a relation between some biological factors that we share with other species and other psychological factors that are unique to humans.\n\nDoes neurobiology now claim to have resolved the question of how I know what is going on in your mind? This has long been the concern of philosophers, playwrights\u2014and, of course, of psychologists\u2014for my relations to you are shaped by my beliefs about your beliefs, what I think that you are thinking, what I take to be your motives\u2014the phenomenon of ascription. In the late 1970s, Premack and Woodruff coined the phrase that social neuroscience would adopt to describe such ascription\u2014the way humans and some other primates think about others and take account of what others are thinking in their own conduct\u2014such creatures had what they termed a \"theory of mind\" (Premack and Woodruff 1978). It was by means of a theory of mind that we are able \"to attribute mental states to other people,\" in particular to attribute beliefs, and false beliefs, to them (Adolphs 2003, 171).\n\nOf course there was no reason, in principle, to seek to localize such a capacity in specific brain regions, but in the developing style of thought within the experimental neurosciences that we discuss in chapter 2, this was exactly what followed: it appeared that theory of mind entails the activity of particular brain regions, including the amygdala, the medial and orbital prefrontal cortex, and the superior temporal gyrus. Now, of course, the reciprocal of such a claim was the argument that lesions or anomalies in the sites that underpin theory of mind might produce different kinds of deficits in social abilities\u2014such as the inability to detect social faux pas. Many are cautious about such localization, not least because while a specific area might be activated when a particular task is carried out, often a lesion in that area does not result in an impairment in carrying out that task, or else it produces only subtle and very specific changes. Indeed, because of the plastic nature of the brain, discussed in chapter 1, such deficits may take unpredictable turns. Thus Adolphs concludes: \"Although the data that I have reviewed... converge on several key brain structures that mediate social cognition, it cannot be over-emphasized that the causal role of these structures remains unclear.... This probably reflects the considerable redundancy and plasticity of the brain.... Caution should be taken in attempts to predict people's behavior from knowledge about their brains\" (Adolphs 2003, 174).\n\nNonetheless, despite the difficulties entailed by localization, theory of mind has come to be a central concern for social brain theorists and a key element in their explanatory repertoire. One dimension has come to be termed _mentalization_ \u2014a kind of built-in intersubjectivity in human experience, perhaps shared with some other primates. Mentalization refers to the \"largely automatic process by which we 'read' the mental states of others\" and which helps us make predictions about their future actions (Frith 2007b, 671). Much emphasis has been placed on the apparent phenomenon termed _mirroring_ that was reported in macaque monkeys in the early 1990s and in humans soon after: the existence of a so-called mirror system in the brain that was mapped in 1999 (Di Pellegrino, Fadiga, Fogassi, et al. 1992; Gallese, Fadiga, Fogassi, et al. 1996; Rizzolatti, Fadiga, Gallese, et al. 1996; Iacoboni, Woods, Brass, et al. 1999; Hari 2004; Rizzolatti and Craighero 2004).\n\nWhen an individual observes a movement being carried out by another\u2014usually a 'conspecific' but sometimes an individual of another species\u2014a small number of neurons are activated in those areas of the brain that are also activated when the individual carries out that same movement him-or herself. If I watch you reaching for a banana, there is some activation in the same areas that would be activated more intensively if I was reaching for that banana myself\u2014the original observations were made by chance in monkeys and initially termed \"monkey see, monkey do\"\u2014a phrase that did not travel so well (Iacoboni 2003). The mirror system thus seems to embody a neural basis for imitation learning, \"the capacity to learn an action from seeing it done\" (the definition from Thorndyke in 1889 is quoted in Rizzolatti and Craighero 2004, 172).\n\nNow this capacity is apparently present only in humans and some apes, leading some to believe that it has been crucial for human development, not only for the learning of complex motor skills, but for interpersonal communication and learning social skills. V. S. Ramachandran extrapolated further than most, arguing that this mirror system, and the capacity for imitation that it enables, facilitated the propagation of culture and was \"the driving force behind 'the great leap forward' in human evolution\" and \"set the stage for the emergence, in human hominids, of a number of uniquely human abilities, such as proto-language... empathy, 'theory of other minds,' and the ability to 'adopt another's point of view.' \"\n\nBut mirror theorists developed their argument beyond their original claims about simple imitation or simulation (Gallese and Goldman 1998). It was not merely some kind of mechanical imitation of action that was at stake, but the capacity to grasp the intention behind an action\u2014for example, to understand someone's intention to drink when reaching for a glass, but not when reaching in an identical manner for some other object. This means that I don't just understand your intentions through the mirroring mechanism: I also feel your feelings. For mirroring is not restricted to the observation of another _carrying out a movement_ , but is extended to the observation of another _experiencing an emotion_ such as joy or pain, at least when this other is a conspecific.\n\nThus Chris Frith explains that the notion of a \"mirror system in the brain arises from the observation that the same brain areas are activated when we observe another person experiencing an emotion as when we experience the same emotion ourselves\" (Frith 2007b, 673). It appeared that this challenged the conventional, rationalist accounts of ascription\u2014that we understand the intentions of others by creating theories about what lies behind their appearance or their acts, on the basis of our own commonsense psychology about their desires and their beliefs about how to achieve them. It was not through _theorizing_ about others, but through _feeling what they feel_ , that we understand the mental states of others. I really do 'feel your pain.'\n\nBy around 2005, driven largely by the work of the research groups that had formed around the original mirror neuron researchers, mirror neurons had moved on from imitation and language to account for everything from a feeling of disgust when observing others showing disgust (Wicker, Keysers, Plailly, et al. 2003; Rizzolatti 2005) to providing a unified general theory of the neural basis for interpersonal relations (Metzinger and Gallese 2003; Gallese, Keysers, and Rizzolatti 2004; Iacoboni, Molnar-Szakacs, Gallese, et al. 2005). Ramachandran, with characteristic hubris, predicted that \"mirror neurons will do for psychology what DNA did for biology: they will provide a unifying framework and help explain a host of mental abilities that have hitherto remained mysterious and inaccessible to experiments.\"\n\nIt was not long, however, before these claims for mirror neurons were being contested. Critics argued that the claims made were philosophically, conceptually, and empirically problematic and that there was little or no evidence that these mirror neurons actually could achieve the effects claimed for them\u2014of understanding the intentions from observing actions or appearances of others, especially when it came to complex interpretations of social behavior or of the communicative acts of others\u2014and indeed that there was actually rather little evidence for the existence of mirror neurons in humans (Jacob and Jeannerod 2005; Borg 2007; Dinstein 2008; Dinstein, Thomas, Behrmann, et al. 2008; Lingnau, Gesierich, and Caramazza 2009). Skeptical voices suggested that the enthusiasm for these claims derived, not from their scientific bases or importance, but because the neuroscientists concerned were carried away by their desires to make their research seem socially important and relevant outside their own narrow disciplinary domain.\n\nThe controversy continues. But perhaps because of such doubts, many of those working in social neuroscience chose not to base their arguments on mirror neurons, but on the more limited claim that the social brain consists of brain areas specifically attuned to the recognition of different aspects of conspecifics\u2014individuals of the same species\u2014such as faces, motion, and attribution of mental states, some of which seem present at birth, and others of which develop over time. As Sarah-Jayne Blakemore puts it: \"The social brain is defined as the complex network of areas that enable us to recognize others and evaluate their mental states (intentions, desires and beliefs), feelings, enduring dispositions and actions\" (Blakemore 2008, 267). Even without reference to mirroring, this is the basis of the argument that there is a neural basis for many human social phenomena, such as empathy (Decety and Meyer 2008; Singer and Lamm 2009). Such arguments rapidly became central to a way of thinking about the human brain as specialized for sociality through the built-in capacity to understand the beliefs and intentions of others (Kilner and Frith 2008; Rizzolatti and Fabbri-Destro 2008).\n\nFor social brain theorists, then, the human brain, as it has evolved from our primate forebears, actually embodies the capacity for intersubjectivity: when I observe your actions, or the visible signs of your inner states, areas of my own brain activate that enable me to understand the intentions or feelings that lie behind those observable features, and hence to feel a tiny trace of what it would take, what it would mean, for me to act or feel that way myself. Of course, on the one hand this proposal, whether it is neurobiologically accurate or not, is sociologically anodyne. Few would doubt that there are neurobiological conditions for our capacities to impute feelings, thoughts, and intentions to others, or for our capacities to engage in social interaction. For the human sciences, the possibility of such imputations and attributions has long been taken as a premise; what has been crucial has been the analysis of the varying forms of such attribution, and the ways in which they have been shaped by culture, history, language, and by highly variable regimes of meaning and value.\n\nHence, from this perspective, it is not clear what would be gained by attempts to localize such feelings in particular brain regions such as the anterior insula or anterior cingulate cortex, or in suggesting that particular brain regions provided the causal basis for such capacities. The interesting question from the human sciences would concern the ways in which, given that apparently universal basis, we might account for that historical and cultural variability in the ways in which individuals do, in fact, attribute beliefs and intentions to other entities, and the variability in the forms and limits of the empathy or fellow feeling that they exhibit to others. But the human sciences would not be alone in such concerns. When Tania Singer and Claus Lamm reviewed the neuroscience of empathy in 2009, they agreed that this research is beginning \"to reveal the mechanisms that enable a person to feel what another is feeling\" (Singer and Lamm 2009, 81). But they were exceptionally cautious about claims for universality, not only arguing for very careful distinctions to be made between different forms of \"affect sharing\"\u2014empathy, sympathy, compassion, and so forth\u2014but also showing that \"a clearcut empirical demonstration of the link between empathy and prosocial behavior is still missing\" (ibid., 84). Further, they concluded, we know little of variations across a life span, almost nothing about individual differences, have not sufficiently recognized the fact that affect sharing is highly contextually specific and far from universal, and know almost nothing about the malleability of these features and the ways in which such sharing of affects may be influenced by training and experience\u2014the latter, they claim, having potentially \"enormous implications for education and society as a whole\" (ibid., 93).\n\nAs we have seen in previous chapters, such expressions of caution about what we know today coupled with optimism about future possibilities are characteristic of leading researchers in the new brain sciences. But the lure of translation is hard to resist. Whatever their consequences in other areas, a number of researchers saw, in these arguments, a way in which some important problems of mental health in humans could be reframed. Were not many human mental disorders characterized by problems in precisely those capacities explored by social brain theorists? Crucially, if these disorders were recoded as pathologies of the social brain, they appeared to offer the prospect of various forms of neurobiologically based interventions.\n\nPathologies of the Social Brain\n\nCould conditions such as schizophrenia and autism be disorders of the social brain, arising from disruptions in the evolved neural circuits that implement social behavior? As early as the mid-1990s, Chris Frith and his colleagues were suggesting that those diagnosed with schizophrenia had deficits in their theory of mind and problems in \"mentalizing\" (Corcoran, Mercer, and Frith 1995; Frith and Corcoran 1996). Over the next ten years, this idea was developed into a full-scale social brain theory of schizophrenia (Russell, Rubia, Bullmore, et al. 2000; Sharma, Kumari, and Russell 2002), largely based on neuroimaging studies that seemed to show that patients with such a diagnosis had abnormal activation patterns in regions thought to be involved in social cognition. In a characteristic reverse move, it could then be suggested that the social brain networks in the medial prefrontal cortex, the prefrontal cortex, the amygdala, and the inferior parietal lobe were the neural systems underlying disorders in theory of mind, emotion perception, and self-agency in such patients (Brunet-Gouet and Decety 2006).\n\nFor some, mirror neurons, once more, were involved. Mirror neuron theorists suggested that pathologies such as autism or schizophrenia arise because of deficits in that capacity for mind reading found in all presumably normal human beings (Iacoboni 2008). For example, mirror neuron deficits might lie behind the false attribution of auditory hallucinations to external sources found in some patients diagnosed with schizophrenia (Arbib and Mundhenk 2005). Mirror neuron deficits might provide the neural substrate for deficits in mentalization in autism\u2014a view proposed in a popular piece in _Scientific American_ by Ramachandran and Oberman under the title of \"Broken Mirrors\" (Ramachandran and Oberman 2006).\n\nOthers, however, managed without mirror neurons. Well before the advent of the mirroring arguments, Uta Frith and Simon Baron-Cohen had argued that autism and autism spectrum disorders were linked to deficits in the capacity of an individual to mentalize, that is to say, to construct a theory of the minds of others in order to attribute beliefs and intentions to their actions (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, and Frith 1985); it was only later that they looked to neurobiology for reinforcement, although in combination with psychological arguments (Baron-Cohen, Tager-Flusberg, and Cohen 2000; Frith and Hill 2003; Hill and Frith 2003; Baron-Cohen and Belmonte 2005). Baron-Cohen and Belmonte concluded their 2005 review by hoping that it will eventually be possible to identify the way in which \"large numbers of genetic biases and environmental factors converge to affect neural structure and dynamics, and the ways in which such abnormalities at the neural level diverge through activity-dependent development to produce an end state in which empathizing abilities are impaired and systemizing abilities are augmented. Such a unified understanding of the psychobiology of autism will offer targets for intervention on many levels\" (Baron-Cohen and Belmonte 2005, 119): not a single mention of mirror neurons here.\n\nThere were other routes to explanations of mental disorders in terms of the social brain. Thomas Insel, who was appointed director of the NIMH in 2002, had previously adopted a different research strategy to explore the neurobiology of sociality. In his famous studies of prairie voles, he had argued that the neuropeptides oxytocin and vasopressin played crucial roles in the establishment of enduring social bonds among these creatures, and suggested that differences between the reproductive, parenting, and affiliative behaviors of the microtine voles and the asocial behavior of the closely related montane voles were related to differences in the patterns of oxytocin and vasopressin receptors in their brains (Insel and Shapiro 1992; Winslow, Hastings, Carter, et al. 1993; Insel and Young 2000).\n\nIn 2004, he linked these arguments into more general neurobiological accounts of the way in which the brain \"processes social information\"\u2014as he and Russell Fernald phrased it when they were \"searching for the social brain\" (Insel and Fernald 2004). They singled out four dimensions of such processing of social information\u2014epigenesis; sensory specializations for social perception, such as smell; imprinting or early social learning based on the exceptional plasticity of the infant brain; and the presence of specialized neural circuits for social recognition, also often involving the effect of olfaction on specific brain regions. Insel argued that these evolved mechanisms for processing social information or social signals might provide a way of understanding human psychopathology that offered possibilities for translation into the clinic. \"Results from these studies and some recent functional imaging studies in human subjects begin to define the circuitry of a 'social brain,' \" they concluded (Insel and Fernald 2004, 697). Not only does this conception of a brain evolved for sociality help us understand why isolation and social separation are linked to many types of disease, but it also suggests that conditions such as autism and schizophrenia could be viewed as neurodevelopmental disorders characterized by abnormal social cognition and corresponding deficits in social behavior. Thus \"social neuroscience offers an important opportunity for translational research with an impact on public health\" (ibid.).\n\nBy the time that Insel was appointed to the NIMH, others were also suggesting that the idea of the social brain could become an integrating zone for a new kind of social psychiatry. Thus Bakker and colleagues argued that the social brain provided the physiological focus that could be a unifying foundation for psychiatry \"The social brain is defined by its function\u2014namely, the brain is a body organ that mediates social interactions while also serving as the repository of those interactions. The concept focuses on the interface between brain physiology and the individual's environment. The brain is the organ most influenced on the cellular level by social factors across development; in turn, the expression of brain function determines and structures an individual's personal and social experience\" (Bakker, Gardner, Koliatsos, et al. 2002, 219). While not expecting social psychiatrists to resolve the mind-brain problem, we may note, once again, the phrasing\u2014\"the expression of brain function determines and structures... experience\"\u2014that is called into service to bridge the explanatory gap between the neurobiological and the experiential.\n\nThe link between psychopathology and this complex notion of the social brain, in which arguments from evolution and comparative studies of animals, explanations based on mirror neurons, and findings from genomics and neurochemistry are brought together, is perhaps best exemplified in the work of Klaus-Peter Lesch. Lesch's classic paper of 1996 identified a polymorphism in the promoter region of the 5-HTT (serotonin) transporter gene\u2014basically a region of the gene sequence that came in two version, short or long\u2014where possession of one or two copies of the short variants led to a lower expression of serotonin in the brain and was associated with greater levels of anxiety and personality traits often linked to depression and suicidal behavior (Lesch, Bengel, Heils, et al. 1996). In subsequent work, Lesch argued that the 5-HTT transporter was a kind of controller that was responsible for fine-tuning the serotonin system and hence for the regulation of emotion and disorders of emotion regulation, within which he included such conditions as depression, substance abuse, eating disorder, and autism. Further studies in rhesus monkeys, where there was a different but analogous polymorphism, seemed to show that stress in early life reinforced the effect of the low-acting form, suggesting that 5-HTT was a susceptibility gene for depression.\n\nFor Lesch, these studies reveal a set of complex interactions between single nucleotide polymorphism (SNP)-level genetic variations, \"embryonic brain development[,] and synaptic plasticity, particularly in brain areas related to cognitive and emotional processes,\" which \"transcends the boundaries of behavioral genetics to embrace biosocial science\" (Lesch 2007, 524). Life stress interacts with variations in the 5-HTT genotype to influence patterns of brain activation, provoking different cognitive and emotional states. And Lesch turns to Iacoboni's mirror neuron theory (Iacoboni 2005) to argue that the regions affected by allelic variations in 5-HTT genotype are none other than those \"that integrate imitation-related behavior, from which social cognition and behavior have evolved\" (Lesch 2007) and that epigenetic programming of emotionality by maternal behavior demonstrates the ways in which environmental influences can remodel neuronal organization in the course of development. \"We are clearly a long way from fully understanding the evolutionary and neural mechanisms of social cognitive phenomena and social functioning,\" he concludes. \"But the potential impact of 5-HTT variation on social cognition transcends the boundaries of behavioral genetics to embrace biosocial science and create a new social neuroscience of behavior\" (Lesch 2007, 528). Here, in perhaps its most complex formulation to date, seeking to incorporate evidence from molecular genomics, evolutionary theory, brain imaging, and cognitive neuroscience, we have the new image of the social brain.\n\nSocial Neuroscience\n\nThis emergent, though far from homogeneous, discourse on the social brain seems to escape some of the ritual criticisms leveled by social scientists at biological explanations of human conduct\u2014reductionism, essentialism, individualism, and the like. There is certainly a genealogical link back from today's social brain to the ethological studies of human behavior that were popular in the 1960s and early 1970s, but there is little of sociobiology here, either in its scholarly or popular forms. The teleological tropes of evolutionary psychology are, if not absent, then mitigated. There is no appeal to a fixed human nature to account for either virtuous or vicious conduct, and humans are not portrayed as naked apes. If evolution has provided humans with their behavioral attributes through selection for certain neural capacities, these are not those of unmitigated self-interest, but rather of empathy, sociality, and reciprocity, enabled by imitation learning, the ability to form a theory of other minds, and the plasticity of the human brain. All these are in turn shaped by gene expression that is modulated by biographical, social, and environmental inputs in utero, infancy, and across the life-course. The human brain is now portrayed as evolved for sociality and culture\u2014open, mutable, and in constant transactions with its milieu, whether these be at the level of the epigenetic modification of gene expression; the interactions of gene and environment in development; the interaction of evolved visual, olfactory, or other sensory capacities and relations between individuals in a milieu; or the role of mirror neurons in the attribution of beliefs, intentions, and mental states to others (Cacioppo and Berntson 2004). A discipline of _social neuroscience_ has become possible.\n\nMost of those who write the history of social neuroscience agree that the beginnings of the discipline emerge in the 1990s, if by that one means the invention of a name and the framing of a project (Cacioppo, Berntson, and Decety 2011). Certainly some of the psychological ethologists working in the 1960s and 1970s discussed the social functions of human intellect and the evolutionary pressures for intellectual development (e.g., Humphrey 1976). However, the first to use the term _social neuroscience_ in print seem to have been two psychologists, John Cacioppo and Gary Berntson, who published an article in _American Psychologist_ in 1992 titled \"Social Psychological Contributions to the Decade of the Brain\":\n\n[T]he brain does not exist in isolation but rather is a fundamental but interacting component of a developing or aging individual who is a mere actor in the larger theater of life. This theater is undeniably social, beginning with prenatal care, mother-infant attachment, and early childhood experiences and ending with loneliness or social support and with familial or societal decisions about care for the elderly. In addition, mental disorders such as depression, schizophrenia, and phobia are both determined by and are determinants of social processes; and disorders such as substance abuse, juvenile delinquency, child and spousal abuse, prejudice and stigmatization, family discord, worker-dissatisfaction and productivity, and the spread of acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS) are quintessentially social as well as neurophysiological phenomena. (Cacioppo and Berntson 1992, 1020)\n\nThe term _social_ was used here to index the fact that (a) neurochemical events influence social processes and (b) social processes influence neurochemical events. However, despite references in the paper to economic factors and to social systems, the social processes that the authors sought to integrate into their \"multilevel analysis\" were not placed under the sign of sociology but rather of social psychology. Cacioppo and Berntson used the term _social neuroscience_ only in the concluding section of their paper, and it was followed by a question mark. The question mark expressed a concern about potential for reductionism and the need to recognize different levels of explanation: \"[T]he brain is a single, pivotal component of an undeniably social species,\" but we must recognize that \"the nature of the brain, behavior, and society is... or-derly in its complexity rather than lawful in its simplicity\" (Cacioppo and Berntson 1992, 1027). Two years later, Cacioppo used the term more affirmatively in the title of an article in 1994 discussing the effect of social and psychological factors on the immune system (Cacioppo 1994), and by the time that he and others published their entry under that title in the _International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences_ in 2001 (Cacioppo, Bernston, Neil, et al. 2001), the question mark had been firmly left behind.\n\nA discipline needs an infrastructure (Star and Ruhleder 1996; Star 1999)\u2014a fact of which the practitioners are usually very well aware. Cacioppo identifies the first infrastructural element in a grant to him from the Behavior and Neuroscience Division of the National Science Foundation in the 1980s to establish a five-year interdisciplinary research program, although it appears from the resulting edited volume that this research was actually focused on the neurophysiological, psychoneuroendocrinological, and psychoneuroimmunological foundations of psychophysiology (Cacioppo and Tassinary 1990). Following that, he identifies other infrastructural elements, ranging from the establishment of the Summer Institute in Cognitive Neuroscience, to the use of EEG technology and the study of \"event-related potentials\" (ERPs) and other measures of brain activation within experimental social psychology, and eventually to fMRI scanning, which made it possible to study neural activity by noninvasive means as humans engaged in various tasks in laboratory settings. Over the 1990s, the number of papers published that used the term _social neuroscience_ gradually increased, from one or two a year at the start of the decade to around twenty per year at the end, but this number rapidly increased after the turn of the century\u2014there were 36 in 2001, 128 in 2006, and 279 in 2009. By the start of the twenty-first century, MIT Press was publishing, largely under Cacioppo's influence, a book series on social neuroscience, about which it quoted a review in _Science_ : \"In a very short time, social neuroscience has come from almost nothing to become one of the most flourishing research topics in neurobiology.\"\n\nThe Center for Cognitive and Social Neuroscience at Chicago, founded in 2004 and headed by Cacioppo, provided a crucial institutional basis for social neuroscience. As it describes itself, the center focuses on the study of the biological systems that \"implement\"\u2014an intriguing term\u2014social processes and behavior. In many different publications since, Cacioppo has asserted his own definition of social neuroscience as \"an interdisciplinary approach devoted to understanding how biological systems implement social processes and behavior and to using biological concepts and methods to inform and refine theories of social processes and behavior...,\" and his work explores the effects of social environment\u2014notably social isolation\u2014on everything from gene expression to hormonal regulation. This is the direction that his own work has taken, both in his general accounts of the discipline (Norman, Cacioppo, and Berntson 2010) and in his specific studies of the physical and mental consequences of a preeminently culturally shaped human experience\u2014loneliness (Hawkley and Cacioppo 2010). Further, Cacioppo and his coworkers made a move that opens a space for the entry of more conventional arguments from the human sciences, stressing that the effects of loneliness were not merely those of actual isolation but also those where people perceive that they live in isolation (Cacioppo and Patrick 2008). For along with the entry of human perception, rather than raw external sensory input, comes culture, language, meaning, history, and all the other dimensions known to the cultural sciences. An interdisciplinary effort, it seemed, might be on the cards. Or was it?\n\nWhen the _Journal of Personality and Social Psychology_ published a special section on \"Social Neuroscience\" in its October 2003 issue, the editors defined the field in terms that owed a lot to Cacioppo: \"Social neuroscience is an integrative field that examines how nervous, endocrine, and immune systems are involved in sociocultural processes. Being nondualist in its view of humans, it recognizes the importance of understanding the neural, hormonal, and immunological processes giving rise to and resulting from social psychological processes and behaviors\" (Harmon-Jones and Devine 2003, 590). However, the bulk of the papers were rather different: they used various imaging and localization technologies to identify the patterns of brain activity associated with tasks performed in the traditional experimental setups of social psychology (e.g., Cunningham, Johnson, Gatenby, et al. 2003) and considered the potential of brain imaging for the discipline (Willingham and Dunn 2003). Indeed, in the same collection, Cacioppo himself expressed some reservations about that direction of travel and the way it framed its research questions (Cacioppo, Berntson, Lorig, et al. 2003). But when, in 2004, a range of journals in psychology, such as _Current Directions in Psychological Science_ , and neurobiology, such as _Current Opinion in Neurobiology_ , published expository and review papers on social neuroscience, they mainly followed the brain localization route (Heatherton 2004; Jackson and Decety 2004; Ochsner 2004).\n\nIt is no surprise, given its focus, that when _NeuroImage_ published its special section on \"Social Cognitive Neuroscience\" in the December 2005 issue under the editorship of Mathew Lieberman, whose own work focused on the use of functional neuroimaging to investigate social cognition, it was indeed the power of imaging that was central, notably its role in revealing the nonconscious impact of situational factors on motives, attitudes, behaviors, perceptions, beliefs, and reflective thought (Lieberman 2005). And the bulk of what came to call itself social and cognitive neuroscience follows this direction, adding various versions of brain imaging to the methodological armory of experimental social psychology. Indeed, the journal _Social Neuroscience_ , which commenced publication in 2006, defines its focus as \"how the brain mediates social cognition, interpersonal exchanges, affective\/cognitive group interactions, and related topics that deal with social\/personality psychology\"; the editors define social neuroscience as \"the exploration of the neurological underpinnings of the processes traditionally examined by, but not limited to, social psychology\" (Decety and Keenan 2006).\n\nIn the same year, the journal _Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience_ published its first issue. It asserted that it was devoted to \"publishing research on the social and emotional aspects of the human mind by applying the techniques from the neurosciences and providing a home for the best human and animal research that uses neuroscience techniques to understand the social and emotional aspects of the human mind and human behavior.\" However, the opening editorial, once more written by Mathew Lieberman, was quite clear about the type of work it wished to publish: \"[S]ubmitted research should report new empirical investigations using neuroscience techniques (including, but not limited to, fMRI, MRI, PET, EEG, TMS, single-cell recording, genetic imaging, psychopharmacological perturbations, and neuropsychological lesion techniques) to examine social and affective processes\" (Lieberman 2006, 2). Location and visualization, it seemed, were the paths to understanding the social brain.\n\nTo know is to see; and, as we have seen, many believed that to see the brain meant to localize. By 2010, localization by means of brain imaging had become the method of choice for much social neuroscience, especially within psychology departments. Although scanning was usually an intensely individual experience for any experimental subject, researchers instructed their subjects to carry out tasks in the scanner that they believed simulated social interactions, and then tried to find the regions of the brain that were activated. This style of investigation was not merely an American or European preoccupation. By 2010, the Culture and Cognitive Neuroscience Laboratory based at Peking University was receiving research funding for \"Neuroimaging studies of human aggressive and affiliative behaviors\" (funded by the Ministry of Science and Technology of the People's Republic of China), \"Modulation of empathy by culture and social relationship\u2014A transcultural cognitive neuroscience study\" (funded by the National Natural Science Foundation of China), and a study of the \"Cognitive and neural mechanisms underlying emotional influences on risk behaviors\" (funded by the National Natural Science Foundation of China).\n\nNonetheless, tensions remained within the field itself. When the Society for Social Neuroscience was established in 2010, under the leadership Cacioppo and Decety, and headquartered with Cacioppo in Chicago, it framed its mission in terms that owed much to Cacioppo: the impact that social structures\u2014from dyads, through families, neighborhoods, and groups to cities and civilizations\u2014have on the brain and nervous system of the individual \"through a continuous interplay of neural, neuroendocrine, metabolic and immune factors on brain and body, in which the brain is the central regulatory organ and also a malleable target of these factors.... Social neuroscience is the interdisciplinary academic field devoted to understanding how biological systems implement social processes and behavior, and how these social structures and processes impact the brain and biology. A fundamental assumption underlying social neuroscience is that all social behavior is implemented biologically.\"\n\nEach of the two sessions in its first conference in November 2010 focused on one dimension. The first session examined such matters as the social regulation of brain gene expression and aggression in honey bees; measuring social behavior in the rat and mouse; neuropeptides, bonding, and social cognition in voles to man; and perspectives on stress, brain, and body health. The other featured evidence from neuroimaging in areas ranging from fronto-temporal dementia to reasoning processes in game theory. Cacioppo and Decety commented that despite the agenda for integration set out in the early project for social neuroscience, \"contemporary social neuroscience investigations to elucidate the genetic, hormonal, cellular, and neural mechanisms of social behavior have grown from two largely separate root systems: one based on data from humans grounded in the discipline of psychology and the other based on data from animal models grounded in biology and biomedicine.... With a few notable exceptions in each group, there has been little communication between these two groups of scientists. In our view, this is a gap that must be filled for social neuroscience to reach its full potential\" (Cacioppo and Decety 2011). In many ways, the relation of social neuroscience to the human sciences more generally depends on which of these two paths is followed, for they point to two very different conceptions of sociality.\n\nSocial Neuroscience beyond Neuroscience\n\nBy 2005, social neuroscience was attracting the interest of those funding research on types of human social behavior considered problematic. The NIH, the U.S. National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA), the U.S. National Institute of Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism (NIAAA), the U.S. National Institute on Aging (NIA), and the U.S. Institute of Neurosciences, Mental Health and Addiction (INMHA), and the Canadian Institutes of Health Research (CIHR) were calling for proposals under the heading of social neuroscience to \"act as a catalyst for the emerging area of social neuroscience in order to elucidate fundamental neurobiological mechanisms of social behavior.... Clinical and preclinical research supported by this initiative must take a multidisciplinary, multilevel approach to a social behavioral research question (or set of questions) that is framed at the behavioral level (e.g., social cognition, social development, social interaction, and social aspects of emotion).\"\n\nIn the same year in the United Kingdom, the Economic and Social Research Council carried out a 'scoping' workshop on social neuroscience and issued an enthusiastic media briefing titled \"Social Neuroscience Will Shed New Light on Human Behavior\" that asserted this \"new domain of study is set to spearhead an assault on what has been described as science's final frontier: understanding, even decoding the complex interconnected web that mediates between the brain, and the mind and human behavior. Already it is making us think again about humanity's understanding of itself and what this means for the norms and dynamics of how we behave in society.... The Economic and Social Research Council fully intends that the UK should not be left behind in this exciting and potentially extremely valuable field.\" Together with the Medical Research Council, in 2007 it was calling for cross-disciplinary grants in this area, arguing that \"[e]normous advances are being made in our understanding of the links between the mind, brain, innate traits, society, culture and behavior, whether normal or abnormal.\"\n\nSome of those within the social and human sciences were open to the opportunities presented by these new ways of thinking. At the 2008 meeting of the American Anthropological Association, a group convened a panel on \"the encultured brain: neuroanthropology and interdisciplinary engagement.\" They argued in their proposal that neuroanthropology\n\ncan help to revitalize psychological anthropology, promote links between biological and cultural anthropology, and strengthen work in medical and linguistic anthropology.... Neuroscience has increasingly produced basic research and theoretical models that are surprisingly amenable to anthropology. Rather than \"neuro-reductionist\" or determinist approaches, research has increasingly emphasized the role of environment, body, experience, evolution, and behavior in shaping, even driving organic brain development and function. At the same time, the complexity of the brain makes a mockery of attempts to pry apart \"nature\" from \"nurture,\" or to apportion credit for specific traits. Research on gene expression, endocrine variability, mirror neurons, and neural plasticity all beg for comparative data from across the range of human variation\u2014biological and cultural.... Anthropology has much to offer to and much to learn from engagement with neuroscience.\n\nAt almost the same moment, in November 2008, the first Social Brain Conference convened in Barcelona, focused on \"a neurocognitive approach to fairness.\" It included sessions titled \"From Animosity to Empathy: Neuroimaging Studies on the Building Block of Fairness\" and \"Genetic Markers for Good and Bad Cooperators: A Biological Approach to Fairness in Economic Exchanges\" alongside those on \"Sacred Values: Anthropological Perspectives on Fairness in Social Conflicts.\" Political figures were among the speakers, for instance, Lord John Alderdice, who played an important role in brokering the peace deal in Northern Ireland. The representatives from social neuroscience included psychologists using brain imaging, researchers on economic game theory and social groups, as well as Tania Singer, whose work on moral feelings we have already encountered, and who published the first imaging studies of pain empathy and the relation of neural signatures of empathy with cooperation and competition (Singer, Seymour, O'Doherty, et al. 2004). The organizers were modest about whether this new approach to issues from nationalism, terrorism, and suicide bombers to cooperation, fairness, and empathy would form the basis for \"ruling human communities according to high standards of values and morality,\" as some had hoped (Atran 2009, 2), but undoubtedly the social brain hypothesis was enabling some anthropologists to reframe their research such that it seemed to address pressing social issues and perhaps even inform public policy.\n\nAnthropology has always had a biological branch, so perhaps its openness to the social brain hypothesis is not so surprising. Similarly, we should not be surprised that social neuroscience also seemed attractive to many social psychologists. One of the most articulate spokespersons was Chris Frith, for whom social neuroscience seemed to promise this fragile discipline some objectivity at last (Frith 2007a). Frith placed the social brain firmly within the forms of sociality studied within experimental social psychology\u2014sociality as a kind of interactional nexus: \"what the social brain is for\" is that it \"allows us to interact with other people,\" and specifically, \"the function of the social brain is to enable us to make predictions [which need not be conscious and deliberated] during social interactions\" (Frith 2007b, 671). The themes that have most engaged such researchers\u2014empathy, trust, love, social bonding, maternal-infant relations, deception, ascriptions of beliefs and feelings to others, decision making\u2014all fit easily within a premise that social life is, in essence, a life of interactions. The preconditions for such interactions may lie in some form of socialization or development, but the capacity for enactment of those interactions in particular ways\u2014or the failure to enact them\u2014is, at any one instant, located within the capacities and attributes of the interacting entities. The social brain is construed as the fleshy and embodied material substrate that enables (subserves, implements, underpins) the transactions between self and other\u2014in pairs, families, friendships, and social networks. This interactive conception of sociality is embodied in the experimental setups of those whose preferred technology is that of brain imaging.\n\nImaging technologies, with their focus on the localization of function and the experimental manipulations they require and utilize, impose their own constraints and logics as to what can be thought. As with a long tradition of experimental psychology, they make it seem unproblematic to draw upon evidence that occurs in the laboratory setting where such interactions can be simulated, because the other features of the laboratory\u2014its specific properties as a location full of meaning, expectations, dense with a different kind of sociality for all the participants\u2014may somehow be deleted from the analysis (Cohn 2008). Such premises lead, usually almost imperceptibly, to a theory of sociality that renders it in terms of the capacities required to maintain interactions between individuals in small groups, because that is all the sociality that can enter the experimenters' purview. That explicit or implicit theory is then operationalized in experiments in laboratory situations that appear to simulate such interactions, and, through the use of recording machines of one sort or another, the outcomes are turned into data that will then stand in for the experiment itself. The data produced by this technology are then used to support the theory that has enabled its production. In the process, the tool or technology has, as it were, merged with the theory itself. We can see here a reciprocal relation between concepts and technologies\u2014a slightly more recursive example of what Gerd Gigerenzer once termed \"tools to theories,\" in which physical tools, such as computers and scientific instruments, and intellectual tools, such as statistics or intelligence tests, start off as the means to produce data and end up providing the theories of the data that they themselves have produced. Where human mental life is concerned, scientific tools are not neutral: \"the mind has been recreated in their image\" (Gigerenzer 1991, 19).\n\nCacioppo and those who think like him seek a conception of sociality that goes far beyond interpersonal interactions: \"As a social species, humans create emergent organizations beyond the individual\u2014structures that range from dyads, families, and groups to cities, civilizations, and international alliances. These emergent structures evolved hand in hand with neural, hormonal, cellular, and genetic mechanisms to support them because the consequent social behaviors helped humans survive, reproduce, and care for offspring sufficiently long that they too survived to reproduce.\" The work he and his colleagues have done on social isolation, for example, is placed in the context of a range of other sociological and epidemiological evidence and acknowledges the fact that humans \"are an irrepressibly meaning-making species, as well, and a large literature has developed showing that perceived social isolation (i.e., loneliness) in normal samples is a more important predictor of a variety of adverse health outcomes than is objective social isolation.... [The] social environment, therefore, is fundamentally involved in the sculpting and activation\/inhibition of basic structures and processes in the human brain and biology.\"\n\nBut while many social psychologists have been eager to ally themselves with these new styles of thought and research, the same cannot be said for sociologists. Warren TenHouton ascribes the first use of the term _neurosociology_ to a 1972 paper on the impact of different cultures on the development of the left and right hemispheres of the brain (Bogen, DeZure, TenHouten, et al. 1972). Five years later, in a paper in the _Journal of Social and Evolutionary Systems_ , TenHouton argued: \"The case for neurosociology begins with the observation that no social relationship or social interaction can possibly be carried out in the absence of human mental activity. It follows immediately that, as scientists, sociologists must find ways to describe and measure such mental functions and cognitive structure.... Just as neuropsychology has far reaching implications for general psychology, so also, then, does neurosociology for general sociology\" (TenHouten 1997, 8). The case was carried forward by David Franks, who described neurosociology as \"the nexus between neuroscience and social psychology\" (Franks 2010; cf. Franks and Smith 2001), taking up themes of emergence and neuroplasticity to argue that neuroscience can be brought into alignment with the sociology of embodiment as well as with insights from interactionist sociology and the pragmatism of George Herbert Mead and the Chicago pragmatists. But he is a rather lonely voice: few sociologists seem to believe that the explanatory models of social neuroscience have implications for their often unarticulated conception of human beings as sense making creatures, shaped by webs of signification that are culturally and historically variable and embedded in social institutions that owe nothing substantial to biology.\n\nGoverning Social Brains\n\nGordon Allport opened his historical review of social psychology in 1954 by quoting from Giambattista Vico's phrase of 1725: \"government must conform to the nature of the men governed\" (Vico, quoted in Allport 1954, 1). Despite the commonly held view that governing is an essentially pragmatic affair, attempts to conduct human conduct are always based on certain premises about people, even if these are often tacit and frequently incoherent. That is to say, there are intrinsic links between 'ontological' assumptions (about what human beings are really like), 'epistemological' questions (about the kinds of knowledge practices according to which they are best understood), and 'governmental' questions (about how the conduct of human beings might best be conducted according to their nature). No doubt for much of our history, these assumptions have been derived from a mixture of folk wisdom, theological doctrines, philosophies, and the accumulated experience of those who have exercised authority in different domains. Across the twentieth century, the _psy_ -disciplines came to infuse these assumptions, not just in relation to identifying and managing aberrant individuals, but also in understanding and governing groups and collectivities. Psychology, that is to say, became a 'social' science (Rose 1996). It is thus not surprising that social neuroscience too is becoming an expertise with a social vocation, claiming the capacity to provide an objective knowledge about key features of human social conduct and of human pathology that can and should underpin interventions.\n\nIn his book _Mirroring People: The New Science of How We Connect with Others_ , Iacoboni remarks: \"Unfortunately, Western culture is dominated by an individualistic, solipsistic framework that has taken for granted the assumption of a complete separation between self and other.... Against this dominant view, mirror neurons put the self and the other back together again\" (Iacoboni 2008, 155). And he concludes by asking how, despite the fact that we are \"geared toward empathy and sharing of meaning\" our world is so filled with violence and atrocities. We are at a point, he asserts, \"at which findings from neuroscience can significantly influence and change our society and our understanding of ourselves. It is high time we consider this option seriously\" (ibid., 271). Others share this view that significant implications follow from the recognition that the human brain is profoundly social. Sarah-Jayne Blakemore argues that understanding the social brain should help us adjust educational practices in the light of knowledge about the impact of specific types of environmental input on social cognition (Blakemore 2010). The United Kingdom's Royal Society for the Encouragement of Arts, Manufactures and Commerce (RSA) launched its Social Brain project in 2009, based on the belief stated by its director, Mathew Taylor, that we are entering an age of \"neurological reflexivity.\"\n\nBecoming aware of the social and biological conditions that underpin our actions can, it seems, help each of us develop our competencies and understand and manage our cognitive frailties. But more important, our authorities have much to learn from the lessons of social neuroscience, notably that much of our behavior results from automatic, nonconscious, and habitual reactions to social situations, and that although our brains are inherently disposed to value cooperation and altruism, they are sadly myopic and focus on things close to us temporally, spatially, and emotionally (Grist 2009, 2010). For the Social Brain project, neuroscience has shown us that \"the brain is fundamentally social and largely automatic\" and thus that policies based on \"the notion of a rational, profit maximizing individual who makes decisions consciously, consistently and independently\" was at best a very partial understanding of who we are; hence it was not surprising that social policies based on this idea were hardly successful (Rowson 2011). While recognizing that individual behavior was largely habitual and shaped by nonconscious dynamics did not lead to clear \"policy levers,\" individuals can be aided to become more \"reflexively aware\" of the way their brains shape their lives, and hence move from passivity in the face of such constraints to proactively shaping their lives with an awareness of them. We can anticipate many similar initiatives over the next decade.\n\nElliot Aronson's social psychology textbook _The Social Animal_ was first published in 1972. Much praised and much translated, and now in its tenth edition, the book deals with topics from conformity to interpersonal attrac-tion, and manages its task without any reference to the role of the human brain. But when David Brooks published his book with the same title, _The Social Animal_ , in 2011, he looked first to the brain to understand human sociality, drawing wide implications from neuroscientific arguments about the myriad nonconscious processes occurring each millisecond that make humans exquisitely finely attuned to other human beings throughout their lives. Seeking to dethrone consciousness from its role in shaping human relationships, the book claimed to show \"the relative importance of emotion over reasons, character over IQ, emergent, organic systems over mechanistic ones, and the idea that we have multiple selves over the idea that we have a single self\" (Brooks 2011). The subtitle of the book, _How Success Happens_ , points to its pedagogic ambition\u2014if we understand these profoundly unconscious forces shaping decisions and our affects, whether as individuals, as those in authority, or as politicians, we will not only learn so much more about ourselves, we will learn why so many attempts to improve our societies have failed in the past to combat educational underachievement, achieve social mobility, and tackle welfare dependency and crime. Through social neuroscience and the recognition of the nonrational processes of our social brains, it appears that human beings\u2014at least those in the kinds of societies envisaged by such authors\u2014will know better how to achieve social and political goals.\n\nDespite the radical claims of many of those who write about the implications of understanding the role of nonconscious processes of the social brain in shaping human lives, the policy implications they extrapolate are usually entirely familiar: for example, that the social environment has a role in promoting the individual; stressful and deprived environments are harmful; good parenting and family support is desirable; educational input should take account of critical periods in children's development; and social institutions need to override short-term impulses (now arising in the brain rather than the instincts or the psyche) and foster commitment and social control. Perhaps arguments from neuroscience are merely being invoked to give such proposals a sheen of objectivity\u2014for they are often criticized as arising from hopes rather than facts. Yet the very fact that invoking the brain increases the power of a truth claim shows us something about the way we are coming to understand ourselves today.\n\nOne is reminded of an earlier movement in which a theory of the human mind with the status of truth, this time derived from dynamic psychology, grounded a program for transforming policy. This was of course the movement for 'mental hygiene,' whose many adherents and advocates argued that authorities from politicians to industrialists, and from teachers to parents, needed to reform their practices in the light of the new understanding forged by dynamic psychology of what shaped us as human beings, in order to maintain and maximize the adjustment of the individual to his or her social milieu (Rose 1985). Today, it is no longer a matter of the social shaping of the dynamic forces of instincts inscribed in our biology by evolution producing adjustment or maladjustment with personal, social, and industrial costs. Now, the inescapable nexus where these forces meet is the brain. All agree that social factors are very important. But everything that is considered social now must pass through the brain and have effects via the brain. Parenting, biography, experience, diet, alcohol, drugs, stress, and lifestyle all pass through the brain, shaping and reshaping that brain at the very same time as those capacities and attributes\u2014cognition, emotion, conduct, disorder, resilience, and the like\u2014are shaped by the brain. Hence we have a social brain, in the sense that it now seems that capacities that are crucial to society are a matter of brains. We have a social brain in that the brain has evolved to favor a certain type of sociality manifested in all the interactions between persons and groups that come naturally to humans in our social lives. And we have a social brain in that this organ is now construed as malleable, open to, and shaped by, social interactions\u2014shaping sociality as it is itself reshaped by it.\n\nWe should not diagnose neuroreductionism here. It is not that human beings have become conceived of as mere puppets of their brains, far from it. Human beings are not thought of as identical with their brains, or reduced to their brains or determined by their brains. Mental states have not disappeared; an interior psychological realm of thoughts, intentions, beliefs, and will is still accorded a role. Indeed, as we have seen, in the social neuroscience project, elements drawn from social psychology are frequently invoked. Not only are human beings understood as persons with mental states that are in constant transactions with their neurobiology; they also have the responsibility\u2014presumably via an exercise of will\u2014to nurture their mental capacities in the light of a knowledge of their brains. We, as persons, must adopt the mental states, the habits, the relationships and forms of life appropriate for this work on our brains\u2014we must shape them as they shape us. And we must look after our brains, so that they may continue to look after us. As responsible subjects obliged to manage ourselves in the name of our own health, it seems now we have the added obligation of fulfilling our responsibilities to others by caring for our mutable, flexible, and valuable social brains.\nChapter Six\n\nThe Antisocial Brain\n\nA difference between the brains of psychopaths and ordinary people has been identified.... Research by British scientists using advanced brain-scanning techniques has revealed that a critical connection between two regions of the brain appears to be abnormal in psychopaths. The findings are preliminary and do not show that brain abnormality causes psychopathy but they suggest a plausible biological explanation for the antisocial and amoral behavior that characterizes the condition. If the link to brain wiring could be proved it would raise the prospect of using brain scans to help in diagnosing psychopaths.... Professor Murphy said the findings offered the most compelling evidence yet that altered brain anatomy might be involved in psychopathy.\n\n\u2014\" **Brains of Psychopaths Are Different** , British Researchers Find,\" _The Times_ (London), August 3, 2009\n\nThe exceptionally strong influence of early experience on brain architecture makes the early years of life a period of both great opportunity and great vulnerability for brain development. An early, growth-promoting environment, with adequate nutrients, free of toxins, and filled with social interactions with an attentive caregiver, prepares the architecture of the developing brain to function optimally in a healthy environment. Conversely, an adverse early environment, one that is inadequately supplied with nutrients, contains toxins, or is deprived of appropriate sensory, social, or emotional stimulation, results in faulty brain circuitry. Once established, a weak foundation can have detrimental effects on further brain development, even if a healthy environment is restored at a later age.\n\n\u2014 **J. Cameron** , G. J. Duncan, N. A. Fox, et al., \"The Timing and Quality of Early Experiences Combine to Shape Brain Architecture,\" 2007\n\nThe headline on _Sky News_ on April 26, 2010, read: \"Murdered Gangster's Brain Donated to Science: Scientists Have Been Given the Chance to Get Inside the Mind of One of Australia's Most Notorious Gangsters.\" It was reporting the fact that Roberta Williams had given \"experts\" permission to examine the brain of her husband, Carl Williams, who had been murdered in Melbourne's maximum security Barwon Prison less than three years into a thirty-five year sentence. \"I believe it's to help with research,\" Mrs. Williams is quoted as saying, \"and might explain why guys like Carl do the violent things they do.\"\n\nA month earlier, in March 2010, _Nature_ carried a news feature titled \"Science in Court: Head Case\" (Hughes 2010). Virginia Hughes reported on the brain imaging\u2014using fMRI\u2014of Brian Dugan, who was serving two life sentences in DuPage County Jail for two murders committed in the 1980s, and was facing the prospect of the death penalty for having confessed to an earlier killing. Dugan had been taken to Chicago's Northwestern Memorial Hospital \"to meet one of the few people who might help him to avoid that fate: Kent Kiehl, a neuroscientist at the University of New Mexico,\" Hughes wrote. \"Kiehl has been amassing data on men such as Dugan for 16 years. Their crimes are often impulsive, violent, committed in cold blood and recalled without the slightest twinge of remorse. They are psychopaths, and they are estimated to make up as much as 1% of the adult male population, and 25% of male prisoners.\" And Hughes went on to tell her readers that Kiehl had, by that time, used fMRI to scan more than one thousand inmates, often using a mobile scanner that he took to the prisons. Kiehl's studies, she reported, show that \"the brains of psychopaths tend to show distinct defects in the paralimbic system, a network of brain regions important for memory and regulating emotion\"\u2014work that he believes will \"eliminate the stigma against psychopaths and find them treatments so they can stop committing crimes\" (Hughes 2010, 340).\n\nKiehl is among a number of neuroscientists who believe that advances in genomics and brain imaging are, at last, enabling researchers to detect anomalies in the specific brain regions that are responsible for the pattern of behavior shown by violent and impulsive individuals. For most social scientists, these claims are just the latest episodes in a history of biological criminology dating from at least the early nineteenth century, and indeed are coextensive with the history of modern psychiatry\u2014a history of attempts to find the roots of criminality in the criminal body itself, replete with bold claims, misplaced fears, false hopes, and sometimes tragic failures. It is, however, not just sociologists and historians who are doubtful about claims made by brain researchers for the significance of their work for the criminal justice system. ABC in Australia reported on the Carl Williams case under the headline \"Carl Williams' Brain Unlikely to Reveal Secrets\" and quoted Professor Brian Dean from the Mental Health Research Institute in Melbourne on the \"contentious history\" of examining brains and the lack of good evidence linking violence in men to a change within a particular brain structure, while commenting more optimistically about the role of brain research in depression and schizophrenia.\n\nVirginia Hughes in _Nature_ (Hughes 2010) notes that some researchers, such as Ruben Gur of the Brain Behavior Laboratory at the University of Pennsylvania, who has testified in court on the basis of structural brain scans, believe that, unlike psychiatric \"soft data,\" \"the brain scan doesn't lie\" where structural brain anomalies are concerned. They remain skeptical, however, about functional imaging, which they feel is not reliable enough for legal settings. Similarly, Helen Mayberg, a neurologist from Emory School of Medicine who uses brain imaging in studies of depression, has testified in several court cases _against_ the use of brain scans: \"It is a dangerous distortion of science that sets dangerous precedents for the field.\" Among the reasons for criticisms are the fact that, as discussed in chapter 2, fMRI measures BOLD responses that are difficult to interpret, is based on small samples, usually compares differences between groups and is difficult to extrapolate to single cases, and tells us nothing about the mental state of an individual at the time when the crimes were committed, which may have been many years before the scan was performed.\n\nIn the Dugan case, as in the other cases to which we will refer in this chapter, the court was not convinced by the evidence from neurobiology. But Kiehl is not alone in believing that neuroscientific evidence can and should play an increasingly important role in the criminal justice system. In this chapter we will examine these arguments that claim that human antisocial behavior\u2014notably impulsivity, aggression, and related forms of criminal conduct\u2014have neurobiological roots. We argue that while neurobiological evidence from genomics or functional brain imaging is likely to have limited traction in the criminal courtroom itself, a new diagram is nonetheless emerging in the criminal justice system as it encounters developments in the neurosciences. This does not entail a challenge to doctrines of free will or an exculpatory argument that \"my brain made me do it,\" as some have suggested. Rather it is developing around the themes of susceptibility, prediction, and precaution that have come to infuse many aspects of criminal justice systems as they have come to focus on questions of risk\u2014risk assessment, risk management, and risk reduction (Feeley and Simon 1992, 1994; O'Malley 1996, 1998, 2000; Ericson and Haggerty 1997; Pratt 2000; Baker and Simon 2002).\n\nThis is an element in a wider shift in strategies and policies in many societies toward preemption of unwanted incidents, including criminal offences. In criminal justice systems, especially in the English-speaking world, this has focused particularly on certain types of offending behavior involving violence, impulsivity, repeat offences, danger, sexual predation, and the like. We term the new diagram of control taking shape 'screen and intervene,' and in this chapter we trace out this new configuration and consider some of the consequences. Whatever the virtue of arguments for preventive intervention in relation to health, in the case of neurobiologically based strategies for preventive crime control, we argue that policies of screen and intervene\u2014which have a family resemblance to other strategies for 'governing the future' in the name of security\u2014are likely to contribute to a further widening of the net of the apparatus of control to the 'precriminal' or 'predelinquent,' and to play a part in the new ways in which subjects and subjectivities are governed in the name of freedom in an age of insecurity.\n\nEmbodied Criminals\n\nIn 1890, the same year that he published his classic study _The Criminal_ (Ellis 1890a), extolling the European tradition of scientific analysis of the bodies and brains of criminals to an English audience, Havelock Ellis summarized his analysis in an article published in the _Journal of Mental Science_ (Ellis 1890b). He traced the pathway from the physiognomic epigrams of Homer and Aristotle to Galen and Lavater, via a brief mention of Johann Christian August Grohmann, whose 1820 work he quoted: \" 'I have often been impressed in criminals, and especially in those of defective development, by the prominent ears, the shape of the cranium, the projecting cheek-bones, the large lower jaws, the deeply-placed eyes, the shifty, animal-like gaze' \" (Ellis 1890b, 3). He then arrived at Franz Joseph Gall, that \"unquestionable scientific genius\" who was the founder of criminal anthropology and for whom \"the varying development of the brain was the cause of the divergent mental and moral qualities of the individual.\" For Ellis, it was Gall's \"unceasing study of all the varieties of the brain and of the living head that he could find... throughout Europe, in lunatic asylums and in prisons, as well as among the ordinary population\" that led Gall to foresee \"the extent of the applications of the science that he was opening up to medicine and to law, to morality and to education\" (ibid).\n\nGall had indeed studied the criminal brain, and he provided a full account of the \"carnivorous instinct\" or the \"disposition to murder\"\u2014which was one of the twenty-seven faculties that he hypothesized were linked to different regions of the human brain (Gall [1822] 1835, 4:50\u2013119).  This was based on assessments of the differences in skull shape between carnivorous and non-carnivorous animals, and on observations of the skulls of a parricide and a murderer: \"[T]here was, in each, a prominence strongly swelling out immediately over the external opening of the ear\" (Gall [1822] 1835, 4:50, quoted from R. Young 1970, 39). This was supported by further inspections of the heads of animals, as well as by an examination of the skulls of many famous criminals and the busts and portraits of others. These observations, together with much doleful evidence of cruel, sadistic, murderous, and tyrannical behavior of humans led Gall to the conclusion that this propensity to violence against members of his own species was innate in man and particularly prominent in certain individuals\u2014and that the outward mark of their cruel and bloody character could be seen in this particular prominence on their skulls. \"There can be no question,\" he said, \"of culpability or of justice in the severe sense; the question is of the necessity of society preventing crime. The measure of culpability, and the measure of punishment cannot be determined by a study of the illegal act, but only by a study of the individual committing it\" (Gall [1822] 1835, quoted from Ellis 1901, 31).\n\nOne of Gall's earliest followers in the exploration of the criminal brain was Moriz Benedikt, whose text of 1879, _Anatomische Studien an Verbrecher-gehirnen f\u00fcr Anthropologen, Mediciner, Juristen und Psychologen bearbeitet_ , was translated into English in 1881 as _Anatomical Studies upon Brains of Criminals_. The moral sense, he believed, was located in parts of the occipital lobes that were absent in apes and criminals (Verplaetse 2004). Benedikt, according to Verplaetse, was a freethinker and committed materialist\u2014it was in the brain, not in the soul, that one should look for human moral sensibility. So it was with Paul Broca: the Society for Mutual Autopsy, whose foundation in Paris in 1876 he inspired, was organized around specifically atheist values\u2014notably the belief that there was no soul, only brain (Hecht 2003). As we saw in chapter 2, while Broca may now be remembered for his identification of the brain area that still bears his name, he was also a keen measurer of brain size, in particular seeking the differences between races and between men and women. He was also rather interested in the brains of lunatics and criminals. It might have been assumed that criminals, on the whole considered of low intellect, would have smaller than average brains. The reverse turned out to be the case\u2014the criminal brain was large\u2014something that Broca attributed to the manner of death itself in those whose brains were available to him\u2014sudden death by execution, he reasoned, diminished the original deficit in brain size.\n\nEllis, in the paper we have just discussed (1890b), selects Broca as the founder of the modern science of anthropology and credits him with initiating the special science of criminal anthropology. The next significant advance, in his view, was the conception introduced by the French psychiatrist B\u00e9n\u00e9dict Morel: that the criminal was one of the \"types,\" or forms, taken by degeneration (Morel 1857). This idea was developed by Prosper Despine in his _Psychologie naturelle_ of 1868 and led to Henry Maudsley's comment in _Responsibility in Mental Disease_ (1872) that \"[i]t is a matter of observation that this criminal class [instinctive criminals] constitutes a degenerate or morbid variety of mankind, marked by peculiarly low physical and mental characteristics\" (Maudsley 1872, 30). He considered such criminals morally insane individuals who should be treated in the same way as the intellectually insane. \"Circumstances combined,\" Ellis writes, \"to render possible, for the first time, the complete scientific treatment of the criminal man as a human variety\" (1890b, 9).\n\nIn 1872, inspired by Gall, Benedikt, and Broca, and after early attempts to understand the insane by the use of various instruments of measurement, Cesare Lombroso published the results of some investigations he had made on prisoners at Padua in _Revista delle Discipline Carcerarie_. And by 1876, he published the first volume of _L'uomo delinquente_ , in which he \"perceived the criminal as, anatomically and physiologically, an organic anomaly\" (Ellis 1890b, 9). Ellis acknowledged the many criticisms of this work, notably Lombroso's somewhat indiscriminate collection of facts, but then opined that Lombroso \"was, as he has himself expressed it, the pollen-conveying insect, and the new science which he fecundated has grown with extraordinary rapidity. A continuous stream of studies from books of the most comprehensive character down to investigations into minute points of criminal anatomy or physiology is constantly pouring forth\" (Ellis 1890b, 10). Ellis points to work in criminal anthropology not only in Italy, but in France, Germany, Portugal, Spain, Poland, and Russia, and to the various international congresses on criminal anthropology. \"In Great Britain alone,\" he laments, \"during the last fifteen years there is no scientific work in criminal anthropology to be recorded.... Fifty years ago English men sought to distinguish themselves by the invention of patent improved tread mills and similar now antiquated devices to benefit the criminal. We began zealously with the therapeutics of crime; it is now time to study the criminal's symptomatology, his diagnosis, his pathology, and it is scarcely possible to imagine that in these studies England will long continue to lag so far behind the rest of the civilized world\" (Ellis 1890b, 14\u201315).\n\nFor in Great Britain, as Ellis noted with regret, despite Maudsley's initial commitment to criminal anthropology, the uptake of these ideas was slow. It is true that at the Exeter meeting of the British Association in 1869, Dr. G. Wilson had read a paper on \"The Moral Imbecility of Habitual Criminals as Exemplified by Cranial Measurements\": he measured 464 heads of criminals and found that habitual thieves presented well-marked signs of insufficient cranial development, especially anteriorly. And soon after came the study of more than five thousand prisoners that was published in the _Journal of Mental Science_ in 1870 by J. Bruce Thomson, resident surgeon to the General Prison for Scotland at Perth, pointing to the large numbers who showed morbid appearance at postmortem. This was followed by a series of papers on \"The Morbid Psychology of Criminals\" in the _Journal of Mental Science_ by David Nicholson (Nicolson 1873a, 1873b, 1874, 1875a, 1875b). But it was Italy that had become the home of criminal anthropology and of all the sciences connected with crime and the criminal. We are all too familiar with the charts of degenerate ears, jaws, and noses, along with the measurements of skulls and other physical characteristics that were created by Lombroso and his followers, initially understood in terms of atavism and later recast in the language of degeneracy. It was partly as a result of the proselytizing by Havelock Ellis that the work of the criminal anthropologists\u2014notably of the Italians Lombroso, Ferri, and Garafalo\u2014became much better known in the English-speaking world in the 1890s.\n\nIn the United States, criminal anthropology seemed, at first, to have a hopeful future. At least a dozen books on this topic were published by American authors between 1890 and 1910, repeating Lombroso's catalogue of physical deformities and anomalies of behavior\u2014laziness, frivolity, use of argot, tendency to adorn body and surroundings with hieroglyphics, moral insensibility, and emotional instability (Rafter 1992). Although some expressed misgivings, in America, Britain, and continental Europe, the search for a science of man and a knowledge of the criminal, the delinquent, and the degenerate based on the objectivity of numbers\u2014height, weight, relative proportions of various body parts, and the like\u2014generated an extraordinary flurry of activity. Heights of criminals were compared with those of other sections of society to determine whether, as some thought criminals were inferior in stature: for example, \"Mr. Jacobs, in a paper communicated to the _Journal of the Anthropological Institute_ ,\" determined that the average stature of the London criminal, at 64.3 inches, was some five inches less than that of the well-to-do classes, and very nearly the same as that of the \"East End Jew\" (Morrison 1891, 179). Many focused on the question of impaired intelligence, which encompassed not only intellectual feebleness but moral weakness, and argued that criminals suffered from a defective moral sense\u2014arguments that would feed into a growing concern with the problems of the feebleminded and the need for eugenic strategies to counter their threat to the race and the nation.\n\nBut while many in the English-speaking world were initially impressed with the claims of criminal anthropology, in Great Britain, most medical professionals interested in the specific links between insanity and crime expressed their doubts, as for example, did the influential Scottish psychiatrist Thomas Clouston (Clouston 1894). This is not to say that research into 'pathological' brains was nonexistent. We have already encountered James Crichton-Browne, one of the founding editors of _Brain_ , and medical superintendent of the West Riding County Asylum in Yorkshire, where David Ferrier carried out his experiments on cerebral localization. As Cathy Gere has pointed out (Gere 2003), Crichton-Browne sought to turn his institution into a center for neurological research, appointing W. Lloyd Andriezen as his pathologist in 1872: Andriezen's study of more than one hundred human brains was published in _Brain_ in 1894 (Andriezen 1894). Yet, as David Garland has argued, the psychiatric and medico-legal framework within which early criminological science developed in Great Britain differed from the Lombrosian tradition: it \"was a therapeutically oriented discipline based upon a classification system of psychiatric disorders [within which] there were a variety of conditions which criminals were typically said to exhibit\u2014insanity, moral insanity, degeneracy, feeble-mindedness, etc. But generally speaking, _the_ criminal was not conceived as _a_ psychological type\" (Garland 1988, 3).\n\nFurther, the medico-legal approach to the criminal was institutionally based within the prison establishment and wary of challenging the basic doctrines of legal responsibility as they were elaborated in the courts. Indeed, by the 1890s when Havelock Ellis was proselytizing, most of the leading figures\u2014Needham, Hack Tuke, Nicolson, Maudsley\u2014were explicitly criticizing the excesses of criminal anthropology. Maudsley, having initially been attracted by criminal anthropology, now became one of its most influential critics, arguing \"first, there is no general criminal constitution, predisposing to and, as it were, excusing crime; second,... there are no theories of criminal anthropology so well-grounded and exact as to justify their introduction into a revised criminal law\" (in his \"Remarks on Crime and Criminals,\" quoted in Garland 1988, 4). Or, as David Nicolson put it in his presidential address to the Medico-Psychological Association in 1895:\n\nWriters give us a copious and precise history of the anatomical configuration, the physiological eccentricities, the complexion, the shapes of the ear and nose, the tattoo marks, etc., in certain criminals. We get a striking and elaborated account of their numerous fearful crimes, of their atrocious mental peculiarities and hideous moral obliquities. This analytical and biological process is applied by those who call themselves criminalists to a comparatively small group of criminals; and by implication, and even more directly, it is made applicable to criminals generally. The whole picture is by some writers exaggerated to distortion as regards even the few, and it is in its main features so spurious and unfair as regards the many that it becomes impossible to regard the conclusions or assumptions to be either authentic or authoritative. (Nicolson 1895, 579)\n\nNicolson proposed a complex classification of types of crime and criminals, linked to an assessment of the most appropriate methods of dealing with each, arguing that if the criminal brain was significant, this was only where education and training had prevented the normal development of the brain. In this, his approach was typical of British criminology as it was to develop across the first three decades of the twentieth century: it was to be largely an exercise in individual classification and administrative management of the criminal around the different sites of punishment and reform, using forms of psychiatric and psychological knowledge that undoubtedly made reference to heredity, but moved away from a focus on the exterior of the body and the organic structures of the brain toward an internal mental realm\u2014it was the criminal mind, as formed by domestic circumstances, education, training, and its moral milieu, not the degenerate criminal brain, that was at issue.\n\nIn any event, in the decades at the turn of the century, many of those with skills in neurosurgery and access to brains of criminals cast doubt on the evidence suggesting that there were specific anomalies in the brains of criminals. In Canada, as early as 1882, William Osler rejected Benedikt's argument: he examined the brains of two executed murderers, compared them with thirty-four controls, and found no differences (Osler 1882a, 1882b). In words that may have some resonance today, he wrote that \"as society is at present constituted it cannot afford to have a class of criminal automata and to have every rascal pleading faulty grey matter in extenuation of some crime\" (quoted from Couldwell, Feindel, and Rovit 2004, 711). And in the United States, the anatomist Franklin Paine Mall, writing in 1909, considered that racial comparison of brains spoke volumes about the misleading nature of such claims: \"It certainly would be important if it could be shown that the complexity of the gyri and sulci of the brain varied with the intelligence of the individual, that of genius being the most complex, but the facts do not bear this out, and such statements are only misleading. I may be permitted to add that brains rich in gyri and sulci, of the Gauss type, are by no means rare in the American negro\" (quoted from Finger 1994, 308).\n\nBy the end of the first decade of the twentieth century, these attempts to ground differences in intellect and morality in variations in the gross features of the brain\u2014weight, complexity of gyri and sulci and the like\u2014had more or less run their course, at least in the English-speaking world, as evidence failed to confirm earlier reports, and pointed to some problematic implications. Nonetheless, criminal anthropology continued to flourish into the twentieth century in a number of countries in continental Europe\u2014one of which was Germany. As Michael Hagner has shown, the work of neurologists and psychiatrists on the criminal brain was to become a significant element within what he terms \"the cultivation of the cortex\" in German neuroanatomy (Hagner 2001). From our point of view, two essential elements are consolidated in the work of Meynert, Flechsig, Forel, and Oscar and C\u00e9cile Vogt, so well analyzed by Hagner, and to which arguments about the antisocial brain will return almost a century later. The first is the conception of the brain as a complex organ that can be anatomized into multiple functional areas, and where anomalies in one or more areas have specific and determinate consequences for normal and pathological conduct. The second is the belief that important sociopolitical issues are at stake in an understanding of the structures and functions of the human brain, together with all that contributes to their healthy or unhealthy development. As August Forel put it in 1907: \"As a science of the human in man, neurobiology forms the basis of the object of the highest human knowledge which can be reached in the future.... It will... also have to provide the correct scientific basis for sociology (and for mental hygiene, on which a true sociology must be based)\" (quoted from Hagner 2001, 553).\n\nA true sociology based on the brain\u2014these words have a renewed resonance a century later. Whatever their many differences, Meynert, Flechsig, Forel, and the Vogts mapped out a picture of the brain as an organ differentiated into distinct regions, sometimes thought of along a temporal axis running from the oldest, primitive parts wherein were located the basic drives for survival and reproduction, to the newest, higher regions of the cortex, where impulses from the sense organs were associated with one another. It was in the cortex, it seemed, where complexes developed over time as a result of experience and the progressive myelination of the nerve fibers. It was the cortex that coordinated these into images of the world and into ideas, and in the cortex where the civilizing and rational controls over those lower impulses were located. The anatomists and pathologists waged an interdisciplinary battle with the developing experimental psychologists, namely, Wilhelm Wundt and his followers. Oscar Vogt termed their position one of \"neurobiology\" and linked their arguments with those from what he termed \"neuropsychology.\" At the same time, the Vogts, working with Korbinian Brodmann, undertook \"the most complete structural and functional mapping of the cortex possible, and integrated neurophysiological studies and brain surgery into their research in order to find a physiological correlate for every element of consciousness\" (Hagner 2001, 554).\n\nThe Vogts examined many brains of eminent men in the 1920s and 1930s, including those of Lenin, Forel, and Ferdinand Tonnies, but they also collected the brains of criminals and thought they had observed \"a weak development of the third cortical layer\" in some feebleminded criminals. They linked this analysis to programmatic proposals for both positive eugenics (\"the deliberate marriage of men and women with similar talents\") and the prevention of the \"pre-destined development\" of some individuals into criminals (Hagner 2001, 556\u201357). The Vogts proposed and established the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Brain Research in 1914, which increasingly focused on the genetic underpinnings of brain pathology. But in 1933, Oscar Vogt was dismissed from his position as director, and according to Hagner, the Vogts themselves turned away from their ideas of cultivation through breeding and did not advocate forced sterilization or euthanasia. However, those themes were enthusiastically pursued by Oscar Vogt's successor as director of the institute, Hugo Spatz, and his colleague Julius Hallervorden. Spatz and Hallervorden received many brains from the Aktion T4 extermination campaign. However, despite the many measures enacted by the Nazis to target, sterilize, incarcerate, and murder habitual criminals and others thought to be psychopaths or asocial, the focus of these Nazi brain explorers was not directly on the criminal brain, but on the brains of those deemed feebleminded or mentally ill.\n\nInside the Living Brain\n\nIn June 1989, the Max Planck Society announced plans to give a respectful burial to some ten thousand glass slides with sections of brain tissue that had been collected by Hallervorden; the slides were cremated and buried in Munich a year later (Dickman 1989). There was little interest in research on the criminal brain in the period following the end of the Second World War, no doubt, in part as a reaction to such research on those murdered in the Nazi period. Yet four decades later, at the same time as the fate of the Hallervorden collection was being debated in Germany, the relation between the brain and criminality was to be reopened within another style of thought, in a very different sociopolitical climate, with other technical means, and in living subjects. In 1987, the _British Journal of Psychiatry_ published a study by Nora Volkow and Lawrence Tancredi from the University of Texas of four individuals \"with a history of repetitive purposeless violent behavior,\" using three neuroimaging techniques: EEG, CT scan, and PET. They reported the following results: \"Three patients showed spiking activity in left temporal regions, and two showed CT scan abnormalities characterized by generalized cortical atrophy. The PET scans for the four cases showed evidence of blood flow and metabolic abnormalities in the left temporal lobe. Two patients also had derangement in the frontal cortex. The patients showing the largest defects with the PET scans were those whose CT scans were reported as normal\" (Volkow and Tancredi 1987, 668).\n\nA year earlier, when Thomas Grisso, a leading forensic psychiatrist at the University of Massachusetts Medical School, had reviewed the tools available to those conducting assessments for forensic purposes, the repertoire seemed limited to traditional symptom description and diagnosis, together with history-taking about head injuries, brain insults, and epilepsy, and psychological tests of intelligence and personality, including some specifically developed for forensic use (Grisso 1986). In this context, and given the many criticisms of the validity and forensic utility of the psychological tests, it was perhaps not surprising that Volkow and Tancredi's study, probably the first to use such neuroimaging techniques in relation to violent individuals, was hailed by Daniel Martell, an American forensic neuropsychologist, as foreshadowing a larger role for the neurobehavioral sciences in criminal law: \"[T]he particular appeal of neuropsychological evidence in the criminal context [is] the expert's ability to bring quantified, normative data on brain-behavior relationships to bear in support of what have traditionally been professional opinions based on mental status examinations and clinical interview techniques.\" (Martell 1992b, 315).\n\nMartell noted that such imaging studies nonetheless raised the thorny issue of how to relate specific brain abnormalities to individual behavior in particular cases: \"while neuroimaging technologies can provide powerful evidence of the presence, type, location, size, and angle of brain lesions, they provide the trier of fact with little information about the behavioral sequelae of a given lesion\" (Martell 1992b, 324). Hence, he suggested, it is precisely in this area that the neuropsychologist, using a battery of other tests, is best prepared to provide evidence to inform the decision-making process in the court: the \"very best neuropsychological assessments represent the highest level of contemporary objective psychological evaluation [and, with] the highest standards of thoroughness, accuracy, and care in the administration, scoring, interpretation, and reporting of findings... speak adequately to the presence or absence of mental disease or defect, and its relationship to specific criminal-legal referral issues\" (ibid., 318).\n\nThe early 1990s saw a series of papers from Martell and others, arguing for a new neurobiology of violent crime and pointing in particular to the results of research using EEGs and brain scanning of violent offenders (Kahn 1992; Martell 1992a; Volavka, Martell, and Convit 1992; Pincus 1993; Rojas-Burke 1993; Dolan 1994). The direction of the brain scanning research itself, here as elsewhere, was toward localization. Within the style of thought that had taken shape in brain imaging, if there was something anomalous in the brains of violent offenders, it had to be locatable in a specific brain region. But where?\n\nIn 1990, Antonio Damasio and colleagues at the University of Iowa Hospitals and Clinics published a paper drawing on the clinical observation that adults with previously normal personalities who sustain damage to the ventromedial frontal cortex develop defects in decision making and planning revealed in abnormal social conduct (Damasio, Tranel, and Damasio 1990). They suggested that this might be a result of inability to activate the somatic states related to previous experiences of punishment and reward, hence depriving the individual of the automatic devices regulating conduct; they claimed to find confirmation in the abnormal autonomic responses of patients with frontal lobe damage. The belief in a link between regional (frontal) brain abnormalities and problems of impulse control seemed to be firming up.\n\nIn 1991, Joseph Tonkonogy published the results of head CT and MRI scanning studies that had been undertaken since 1987 at the Worcester State Hospital. Reporting on five patients with violent behavior and local lesions in the anterior-inferior temporal lobe, he argued that \"violent behavior in psychiatric patients may manifest as a primary symptom of tissue loss in the areas adjacent to the amygdaloid nuclei or in the amygdala itself, especially when combined with a history of seizure disorders.... To the best of our knowledge, this is the first report of local tissue loss in the anterior temporal lobe in the group of psychiatric patients with violent behavior\"\u2014although the author noted that such patients formed only a relatively small percentage of all violent psychiatric patients in the Worcester State Hospital (Tonkonogy 1991, 189\u201390, 193).\n\nAs this work gathered pace, one of the first to reflect on its more general implications was Adrian Raine, a former airline accountant turned experimental psychologist, who had worked for a spell in high security prisons prior to his academic career, first at Nottingham University and then at the University of Southern California. In 1993, Raine published _The Psychopathology of Crime: Criminal Behavior as a Clinical Disorder_. He reviewed the evolutionary, genetic, and neurobiological evidence and sought to rehabilitate biological investigations of criminal behavior. His aim was to free them from their associations with racism, suggesting that many of the critics were attacking a straw man: he argued that there were good grounds for considering at least some types of offending behavior as a clinical disorder. What was still lacking, he contended, was a concerted effort to integrate biological and social theories with empirical evidence, in particular to resolve currently tangled issues concerning the relations of causality between the biological, psychological, and social factors involved (Raine 1993, 288).\n\nAcross the 1990s, the apparent insights to be gained from using the technology of brain imaging, which had now become relatively easy for researchers to access, encouraged many other investigators to use PET and fMRI to study the brains of individuals with a history of violence or aggression, and indeed to extend the groups studied to those diagnosed with personality disorder (Goyer, Cohen, Andreason, et al. 1994). Raine himself continued his studies of the brains of murderers. He argued that \"seriously violent offenders pleading not guilty by reason of insanity or incompetent to stand trial are characterized by prefrontal dysfunction\" and suggested that \"deficits localized to the prefrontal cortex may be related to violence in a selected group of offenders,\" although he accepted that the group that he studied\u2014those accused of murder or manslaughter undergoing examination in relation to a potential plea of not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI) or incompetence to stand trial\u2014might not be typical of violent offenders in the community (Raine, Buchsbaum, Stanley, et al. 1994). By 1997, he and his colleagues were arguing that \"[t]he advent of brain imaging research has recently made it possible for the first time to directly assess brain functioning in violent individuals,\" and their research followed up the suggestion that frontal brain regions were implicated in addition to the temporal cortex (Raine, Buchsbaum, and LaCasse 1997, 496). Using a larger sample group of forty-one people (thirty-nine men and two women) accused of murder or manslaughter who were undergoing examination in relation to a potential plea of NGRI or incompetence to stand trial\u2014a group the researchers designated somewhat misleadingly as \"murderers\"\u2014Raine and his colleagues concluded that significant brain abnormalities were present. In their discussion, the researchers conceded that this was both a relatively specific subgroup of offenders, and also one that was itself clinically heterogeneous. They emphasized that the findings did not demonstrate that violence was caused by biology alone, nor that murderers pleading NGRI were not responsible for their actions, nor that PET could be used diagnostically, nor that their findings \"could speak to the issue of the cause (genetic or environmental) of the brain dysfunction,\" nor could they be taken as specific to violence in particular, since a nonviolent criminal control group was not used (Raine, Buchsbaum, and LaCasse 1997, 505). But their abstract stated their findings in less cautious terms: \"Murderers were characterized by reduced glucose metabolism in the prefrontal cortex, superior parietal gyrus, left angular gyrus, and the corpus callosum, while abnormal asymmetries of activity (left hemisphere lower than right) were also found in the amygdala, thalamus, and medialtem-poral lobe. These preliminary findings provide initial indications of a network of abnormal cortical and subcortical brain processes that may predispose to violence in murderers pleading NGRI\" (ibid., 495).\n\nIn 2000, Raine and his team published their much-cited study claiming to find reduced prefrontal gray matter volume and reduced autonomic activity in people diagnosed with antisocial personality disorder (Raine, Lencz, Bihrle, et al. 2000). By this time, they were able to refer to more than a dozen studies that had used different brain imaging techniques to explore anomalies in the brains of alcoholics and other substance abusers, those diagnosed with sociopathic behavior or antisocial personality disorder with convictions for violence, as well as those diagnosed with mood disorders or schizophrenia, and of course their own studies of \"murderers.\" Their conclusion was that prefrontal structural deficits may underlie the low arousal, poor fear conditioning, lack of conscience, and decision-making deficits in antisocial, psychopathic behavior.\n\nSome forensic psychiatrists and neurobiologists expressed caution about the claims that frontal lobe dysfunction was strongly associated with, or predictive of, violent behavior (Brower and Price 2001). But despite such doubts, in the first decade of the twenty-first century, an expanding research program in what Raine termed \"neurocriminology\" took shape in many labs and in many countries, using brain imaging techniques to seek the neurological basis of psychopathy, antisocial behavior, impulsive violence, and aggression (Blair 2004, 2005; Blair, Newman, Mitchell, et al. 2006; Rogers, Viding, Blair, et al. 2006; Crowe and Blair 2008). Biological criminology was no longer, it seemed, linked inseparably with the pseudoscience of criminal anthropology and its focus on the exterior of the bodies of those forming a criminal class. The gaze of the neurocriminologist could now plunge into the interior of the living criminal brain and discover therein the roots of the violence and failures of impulse control in each dangerous individual. But with what consequences? For if the roots of such socially undesirable behavior were neural, was that exculpatory or inculpatory? Was it grounds for mitigating the responsibility and the culpability of offenders because their capacities to constrain their conduct were diminished? Or did it increase the need for their incarceration and exclusion from society on the grounds of their incorrigibility? On these crucial matters, the leading researchers remained ambivalent.\n\nNeurolaw?\n\nWhat, then, would be the impact of this research in neurocriminology within the legal system? When the _neuro_ -prefix came to law in the 1990s, neurolaw was initially focused on the question of traumatic brain injury and the role of neuropsychologists as expert witnesses in the increasing number of cases involving claims for damages (Taylor, Harp, and Elliott 1991; Taylor 1995, 1996). But by 2004, when the Dana Foundation convened a meeting of twenty-six neuroscientists for a conference on law and neuroscience, the focus of the debate was firmly on criminal law and the relations of the brain to the criminal justice system (Garland 2004). The commissioned papers marked out what was to become the territory for neuroethical discussions in this area for the next decade.\n\nWhat, if any, were the implications for the legal doctrines of free will and responsibility? asked Michael Gazzaniga and Megan Steven. Stephen Morse, writing under the title \"New Neuroscience, Old Problems,\" rehearsed his argument that legal systems operated with their own \"folk psychological\" conception of human beings as intentional persons possessing mental states that were the causes of their actions, and hence could be held responsible for them, and that neuroscientific evidence was not likely to pose a radical challenge to this view. And Henry (Hank) Greeley discussed issues of \"Prediction, Litigation, Privacy and Property,\" focusing, presciently, on the likelihood that the real impact of neuroscience would probably not be in the courtroom, where legal reasoning and evidential rules were likely to retain hegemony, but would lie outside the courtroom, in the pretrial and posttrial practices of the criminal justice system. This overall verdict was reiterated a couple of years after that event by the editor of the DANA volume: \"Much discussion has focused on 'ultimate' issues such as free will, determinism (genetic or mechanistic), and their effect on whether the concept of criminal culpability will be undone by new scientific discoveries. This seems unlikely, at least in the near future\" (Garland and Frankel 2006, 103).\n\nThis has not deterred those who continue to speculate about these themes. However, as predicted by most of the contributors to the DANA debate, the courts or juries, at least in adversarial criminal justice systems, have proved resistant to changing their own conceptions of responsibility, or their ways of attributing guilt, in the light of neurobiological evidence (Rose 2000, 2007c, 2008). They do not seem to find evidence from the neurosciences about factors predisposing to a criminal act any more relevant to legal notions of responsibility than arguments or evidence from the other 'positive sciences' of human conduct\u2014psychiatry, psychology, sociology\u2014despite the frequent suggestions by commentators that the rhetoric of objectivity surrounding brain scans and other neurobiological evidence will radically enhance their plausibility. Anglo-American legal systems conceptualize their subjects\u2014with specific exceptions\u2014as individuals with minds, or mental states, who intend the acts they commit, and who foresee their outcome to the extent that any reasonable person could so do (Morse 2004, 2006, 2008; Morse and Hoffman 2007). If they are to mitigate this presupposition, they require compelling evidence that some state or event\u2014an illness, sleepwalking, coercion from a third party\u2014was directly and causally related to the commission of the act in question. Probabilistic arguments, to the effect that persons of type A, or with condition B, are in general more likely to commit act X, or fail to commit act Y, hold little or no sway in the process of determining guilt.\n\nFurther, as we have seen in chapter 2, evidence from brain scans or other neurobiological tests does not 'speak for itself'\u2014it must be spoken for. Images do not convince by means of their own intrinsic plausibility: interlocutors are required, and expert witnesses such as the clinicians who have requested and interpreted the brain scans of the accused must make the claim that the scan shows relevant anomalies. As in other areas of criminal trials in adversarial systems, these claims will usually be contested by other expert witnesses, who argue that it shows no such thing. Judges advise juries to take into account many factors, including their own judgments as to what might be a reasonable and plausible account of the circumstances that led to the commission of the act in question. It is no surprise, therefore, to find that despite the repetitive discussion of this issue by philosophers and ethicists, there is no evidence, to date, of neurobiological testimony concerning _functional_ abnormalities in the brain of the accused affecting the verdict in any recent murder trial in the United States or the United Kingdom (Rose 2007c, chap. 8).\n\nBut this is not to say that neurobiological arguments about the neural basis of violent or antisocial conduct will have no traction in the criminal justice system or in crime control policy. Initially, as might be expected, the effects are likely to appear in relation to those kinds of persons who have long been treated differently by the legal system\u2014notably children and women, but also those who are thought to be incapable of understanding the nature or meaning of their acts, and hence, in the criminal law at least, not capable of bearing responsibility. As far as children are concerned, the age of legal subjectivity for the purpose of attributing criminal responsibility has always been somewhat arbitrary, contested, and variable across jurisdictions. There is some evidence that neurobiological arguments may have an impact here, for example, in the much-discussed judgment of the U.S. Supreme Court in _Roper v. Simmons_ , which barred capital punishment for juvenile offenders under the age of eighteen. The Court was presented with an amicus brief drawn up by a group of New York lawyers at the request of a number of key American professional organizations, including the American Medical Association, the American Psychiatric Association, the American Society for Adolescent Psychiatry, and the National Mental Health Association (Haider 2005). Taking advice from a panel of scientists, the brief argued that juvenile brains are anatomically different and that the frontal lobes, \"the part of the brain responsible for reasoning, impulse control, cost-benefit calculation and good judgment is not fully developed. This means that adolescents are inherently more prone to risk-taking behavior, and less capable of governing impulses, than adults.... These studies were presented to the Court as evidence that adolescents are biologically different\" (Haider 2005, 371\u201372).\n\nWe should, however, be wary of reading too much into this case. The judgment itself did not explicitly refer to neurobiological evidence, or the adolescent brain, although it did refer to some sociological research on adolescence, and of course to commonsense knowledge about the impulsiveness of youth. The brief was submitted in the context of a fairly major mobilization of liberal U.S. academics, lawyers, and medical professionals against the death penalty, seeking any opportunity to mitigate or limit its use. Nonetheless, despite the well-known cultural and historical specificity of the notion of adolescence, and the relative recency of the association of this period in life with risk taking and poor impulse control\u2014which would rule out any underlying evolutionary changes in the rate of brain development\u2014a number of U.S. researchers argue that such characteristics are a consequence of 'the developing brain' and the neural mechanisms responsible for processing emotions and incentives (Casey, Jones, and Hare 2008). It is doubtful whether such arguments will have much influence on questions of _culpability_ in the courtroom, but they are being referred to in debates on the age of criminal responsibility. And in the United States, there are suggestions that they will increasingly impact on sentencing decisions for adolescents, especially those concerning the legitimacy of the death penalty and the sentence of life imprisonment (Maroney 2009, 2011).\n\nWill neurobiological arguments reshape those other categories in which persons are released from the category of legal subject\u2014for example, in relation to the question of unfitness to plead? It is too early to tell, but in any event, such cases are rare. It is more likely that neuroscience, like the other positive sciences since the nineteenth century, will gain its traction outside the agonistic space of the courtroom. We will see its impact in criminal justice policy, notably policies aimed at prevention, in the identification of risky persons, and in the agonized debates over the existence and management of psychopathy. Further, we will see the effects of neuroscience in the investigatory process and in the procedures following arrest and leading up to trial\u2014these are crucial, since only a small percentage of cases actually reach trial, as in many instances the suspect is either released or pleads guilty prior to trial, sometimes to a lesser charge.\n\nAnd we will also see the impact after the verdict has been delivered, in the determination of sentence and the appropriate institutional disposition, in decisions as to release from prison, and of course, in the probation service. Indeed, in the DANA event mentioned earlier, one of the neuroscientists expressed concerns over just these issues: \"[A significant fear], both in the behavioral genetics area and with [neuroscience], is that there are no [rules of evidence] that control the use of these kinds of technologies in the preformal stages of criminal processes. When it gets to the formality of sentencing, the cry will come up, but the ability of judges and prosecutors to make decisions about whether they're going to initiate charges, [whether] they're going to accept diversion [from criminal prosecution] for people, et cetera\u2014using [neuroscience tests] that haven't been validated\u2014is a serious risk that the technology poses\" (quoted in Garland and Frankel 2006, 106).\n\nBut before turning to examine some areas where notions of the antisocial brain are indeed entering these arenas, let us turn from evidence about brain development to examine the challenges posed by research in behavioral genomics.\n\nThe Genetics of Control\n\nAdrian Raine's 1993 book, _The Psychopathology of Crime_ , contained one chapter on the genetics of crime. It was largely concerned with defending those who were undertaking this work at the time against the charges of genetic reductionism, political bias, racism, or eugenics; from allegations that they rule out environmental factors; and from accusations that they believe that genetics is destiny. Nonetheless, he argued: \"Overall, data from genetic studies [he is referring to twin and adoption studies] supports the prediction made by sociobiological theory that heritable influences in part underlie criminal behavior\" (Raine 1993, 79). Brain scanning studies of violence and personality disorder in the 1990s made little reference to genetic research, and, when they did, generally noted that they were unable to determine whether the anomalies that they reported had a genetic base or resulted from environmental insults. But a new genomic approach to antisocial conduct was taking shape that would prove more compatible with the emerging image of the impulsive brain.\n\nThis is not the place to rehearse the depressing history of research on the genetics of criminality. From about 1990, something began to change in the way in which the relations between genetics, neurobiology, and crime were construed. It was no longer a question of the search for a gene for crime, or even of a gene for aggression (even though this was the way that it was sometimes reported in the popular press). Indeed, these studies no longer sought to explain criminality in general, but focused on the impulsive behaviors that were thought to be involved in many criminal or antisocial acts, in particular, acts of aggression. These behaviors seemed to involve something that would once have been understood in terms of the will but that now fell under the rubric of _impaired impulse control_. And those searching for a genetic basis for such impairment now conceptualized the issue in neuromolecular terms\u2014that is to say, they tried to identify variations in SNPs in the coding sequences that affected neuronal circuits in the brain, notably in the neurotransmitter system.\n\nAt the risk of repeating a familiar story, let us begin with the paper by Han Brunner and his team\u2014based in Nijmegen in the Netherlands\u2014published in _Science_ in 1993 under the title \"Abnormal Behavior Associated with a Point Mutation in the Structural Gene for Monoamine Oxidase A\" (Brunner, Nelen, Breakefield, et al. 1993). For if there was one paper that can be said to mark a mutation in the thought style of neurocriminology, this was it. Like much genetic research at the time, Brunner's team was conducting a _kindred study_ \u2014that is to say, the researchers studied a problem that seemed to pass down a lineage. In this case, it was \"a large kindred in which several males are affected by a syndrome of borderline mental retardation and exhibit abnormal behavior, including disturbed regulation of impulsive aggression\" (ibid., 578). It seems that the kindred in question came to light because an unaffected maternal great-uncle, aware that there was a pattern of violent behavior among his male relatives, perhaps going back to the eighteenth-century, had constructed a detailed family history of what he thought was an inherited mental disability; this led a sister of one of the affected males to come to Brunner's genetic clinic seeking a genetic test to see if she was a carrier of this hereditary trait.\n\nBrunner and his team collected samples and histories from fourteen affected males and ten nonaffected individuals in the extended family; their first report, initially submitted to the _American Journal of Human Genetics_ in 1992, focused largely on the question of X-linked mental retardation. It did, however, relate this to previous research on the neurotransmitter anomalies that might underlie disturbed aggression regulation, notably the work by a veteran of earlier struggles over the legitimacy of biological psychiatry, Herman van Praag (van Praag, Asnis, Kahn, et al. 1990; van Praag 1991; van Praag, Brown, Asnis, et al. 1991). The later paper in _Science_ , however, specifically made the connection between human impulsive aggression and low or absent monoamine oxidase A (MAOA); it placed this in the context of a dozen studies of aggressive behavior in animals and humans published over the previous decade that had implicated altered metabolism of neurotransmitters\u2014serotonin, and to a lesser extent dopamine and noradrenaline\u2014and suggested an as yet unknown genetic basis.\n\nBrunner and his colleagues were aware that their kindred was rather special; all the affected males had a single point mutation, in which a C was replaced by a T at nucleotide 296 in the coding sequence, changing a gluta-mine (CAG) codon to a termination (TAG) codon; this resulted in complete deficiency (that is to say, total absence) of MAOA in affected males. MAOA is specifically implicated in the breakdown of serotonin, norepinephrine, and epinephrine, and therefore it seemed reasonable to postulate that a lack or deficiency in this enzyme could be related to an increase in available levels of these neurotransmitters in the central nervous system (and indeed in the other organs where it is present, such as the liver and gastrointestinal tract). Actually, although this was not a concern of Brunner and his group, one might wonder how, in the absence of such a key enzyme for neurotransmitter functioning, these unfortunate individuals survived at all\u2014a testament to the redundancy within human neurotransmitter systems and its homeodynamic mechanisms.\n\nBrunner and his colleagues reported that impulsive, rather than premeditated, aggression in humans had been linked to low concentrations of the breakdown product of serotonin, 5-HIAA,  in cerebrospinal fluid, and that \"this may be caused by absent MAOA activity in these subjects\"; they also noted that \"inhibition of MAOA activity has not been reported to cause aggressive behavior in humans,\" although they speculated that \"deficiencies throughout adult life might have different consequences\" (Brunner, Nelen, Breakefield, et al. 1993, 579). They concluded their paper with the suggestion that would spark a whole research program. For while their kindred was marked by complete absence of MAOA, they pointed to the wide range of MAOA activity in the normal population: \"one could ask whether aggressive behavior is confined to complete MAOA deficiency\" (ibid., 590). Could this, then, be some kind of dimension, where levels of aggression were linked to variations in MAOA activity, rather than the complete absence of the enzyme?\n\nThis paper attracted great interest, not only among researchers but also in the international press, who dubbed the mutation that had been identified \"the aggression gene,\" and in the legal profession\u2014very soon after publication the defense lawyers in the murder trial of Stephen Mobley, in the U.S. state of Georgia, sought unsuccessfully to introduce it as evidence to mitigate their client's responsibility for the crime for which he had been convicted. Brunner himself, clearly troubled by the implications, attempted to cast doubt on extrapolations from this rare kindred to more general genetic explanations of aggression and violence. By 1996, in a CIBA Foundation event on the genetics of crime, he was arguing that his research gave no support for the notion of an aggression gene, despite having been interpreted in this way by the popular press: \"[T]he notion of an 'aggression gene' does not make sense, because it belies the fact that behavior should and does arise at the highest level of cortical organization, where individual genes are only distantly reflected in the anatomical structure, as well as in the various neurophysiological and biochemical functions of the brain.... [A]lthough a multitude of genes must be involved in shaping brain function, none of these genes by itself encodes behavior\" (Brunner 1996, 16).\n\nBrunner soon turned away from this area of work, but this paper sparked a veritable industry of research, both in humans and in animal models, on the relations between aggression and monoamine oxidase, and more generally on neurotransmitter anomalies that might be correlated with aggression. As far as the animal studies are concerned, one of the leading labs was that of Klaus Miczek at Tufts University. Miczek, who we mentioned briefly in chapter 3, had been working on animal models of aggression since the early 1970s, initially examining the effects of various drugs of abuse\u2014cannabis, amphetamines, alcohol\u2014and later focusing on the role of the monoamines. He was also a member of the National Academy of Sciences's somewhat controversial panel on \"Understanding and Preventing Violence\" from 1989 to 1992. Throughout the 1990s, he and his research group at Tufts published a series of papers arguing for the importance of experimental ethological studies of aggression in animals, mostly in rodents, to pinpoint the most appropriate selection of pharmaceutical interventions in clinical situations to modify aggressive behavior in humans. They suggested that such studies would enable one to select precise receptor sites that could be targeted by drugs to reduce situationally specific forms of aggressive, defensive, and submissive behavior (e.g., Miczek, Weerts, Haney, et al. 1994).\n\nReviewing their own and other relevant research almost a decade later, Miczek and his team asserted: \"Aggressive outbursts that result in harm and injury present a major problem for the public health and criminal justice systems, but there are no adequate treatment options\" (Miczek, Fish, DeBold, et al. 2002, 434). It seemed that obstacles \"at the level of social policy, institutional regulation, and scientific strategy in developing animal models continue to impede the development of specific anti-aggressive agents for emergency and long-term treatments\" (ibid.). There were, they conceded, no such things as specifically pathological _mean genes_ , as \"aggressive behaviors serve mostly adaptive functions in all phyla, rather than being behavioral aberrations\"; however, the authors nonetheless argued that \"[b]ehavioral and neurobiological analyzes of aggression in various animal species contribute to understanding human violence and to the development of therapeutic interventions\" (ibid., 435). Their aim was to identify the neural circuits underlying different types of aggression, so as to ascertain the particular serotonin, dopamine, and GABA receptor sites that could be targeted by psychopharmaceuticals in order to modulate human aggression.\n\nThe authors noted that a usual definition of aggression in humans entails an _intent_ to do harm. However, like others working in this field, they were not detained for long by the problems that this invocation of a mental state might entail. They proceeded on the basis that certain behavioral patterns in animals can be used as models for aggression in humans, supporting their argument with reference to studies of higher primates; laboratory studies with humans, for example, those involving simulation of violent or aggressive encounters with fictional opponents; and the effects of various forms of reinforcement or drug treatment. They also pointed to neurobiological evidence concerning the effects of varying levels of neurotransmitter activity in humans, primates, and rodents, which seemed to demonstrate a homology between the neurobiological mechanisms in human and animal aggression. This enabled them to draw upon their rodent models to explore the specific neurotransmitters and receptors that seem to be entailed in either activation or reduction of different types of aggression, with a special interest in individual differences in escalated\u2014that is, non\u2013species typical\u2014aggressive behavior. The premise of the argument was that this neuromolecular dissection of the bases of aggression might lead to the development and use of pharmacological interventions to control escalated aggression in humans.\n\nThis argument for a \"pharmacotherapeutic approach for managing violent and aggressive [human] individuals\" was made more explicit in a paper published two years later, in which the authors lamented the fact that\n\n[t]he development of selective anti-aggressive agents, once referred to as \"serenics,\" [here they refer to the work of Berend Olivier who proposed this term (Olivier, Mos, Raghoebar et al., 1994)] has been sporadic and, at present, appears to be inactive. There are many reasons for this calamitous situation, including a lack of enthusiasm by regulatory agencies to approve medicines for a non-disease and the reluctance of targeting neurobiological sites for an ostensibly social dysfunction. The latter issue derives from a conceptual problem that divorces aggressive experiences from neurobiological mechanisms. (Miczek, Faccidomo, de Almeida, et al. 2004, 344)\n\nDespite this \"calamitous\" situation and the reluctance of authorities to license pharmaceuticals whose main indication for use was behavioral control, the authors conclude: \"It can be anticipated that currently developed tools for targeting the genes that code for specific subtypes of serotonin receptors will offer new therapeutic options for reducing aggressive behavior, and the 5-HT1B receptor appears to be a promising target\" (ibid., 336).\n\nBy 2007, this time writing with Adrian Raine, Miczek noted with regret that the 2002 WHO _World Report on Violence and Health_ completely ignored neuroscience; nonetheless, they argued, neurobiological research on aggressive behavior was emerging from its shameful past of eugenics and lobotomies, and that \"the schism between these approaches [social and biological] promises to be overcome by advancing our knowledge of the molecular events through which social experiences sculpt future aggressive acts. Insights into the gene-environment interactions are critical for the way in which the criminal justice and the public health systems deal with aggression and violence.... [E]merging successes in behavioral and molecular biology of aggression research... may have important implications not only for diagnosis, prevention, and treatment but also for guidance of public and judicial policies\" (Miczek, de Almeida, Kravitz, et al. 2007, 11,803).\n\nYet despite this apparent openness to social and environmental factors in the genesis of aggressive and violent conduct, they summed up their argument in their abstract, cited in chapter 3, suggesting that genetic and imaging research on aggression in fruit flies and feral rats leads to the hypothesis that \"antisocial, violent, and psychopathic behavior may in part be attributable to impairments in some of the brain structures (dorsal and ventral PFC, amygdala, and angular gyrus) subserving moral cognition and emotion\" (ibid.). Despite the fact that this argument would have most human scientists, and many neurobiologists working with animal models, reeling at the bizarre jumps of logic entailed in the connections between flies, rats, and humans, they concluded by arguing for a \" _neuroethical_ discussion\" of the implications among representatives of the criminal justice system, psychiatry, neuroscience, and the social sciences (ibid., 11,805). One might be forgiven for thinking that critical scientific analysis of the conclusions drawn by these researchers might preclude the necessity for discussion of their supposed implications.\n\nDespite the publicity around Han Brunner's study discussed earlier, the specific role of MAOA in aggression was not central to animal studies in the 1990s, with the exception of the work of Isabelle Seif and colleagues based at the CNRS in Paris. Referring directly to Brunner's work, Seif and her group created a line of transgenic mice with a deletion in the gene encoding MAOA, thus providing an animal model of MAOA deficiency. This increased serotonin concentrations in the brains of the mouse pups by up to ninefold, and also increased levels of norepinephrine concentrations in pup and adult brains. It appeared that (perhaps unsurprisingly given such an uplift in neurotransmitter levels at an early stage in brain development), behavioral abnormalities followed: \"Adults manifested a distinct behavioral syndrome, including enhanced aggression in males,\" and the authors concluded that their study \"supports the idea that the particularly aggressive behavior of the few known human males lacking MAOA is not fostered by an unusual genetic background or complex psychosocial stressors but is a more direct consequence of MAOA deficiency\" (Cases, Seif, Grimsby, et al. 1995, 1763, 1766). However, by 1999, Schuback, and a group that included one of the researchers on Brunner's original study, Xandra Breakefield, screened a large sample, including males with mental retardation, those with a history of sexually deviant behavior, and other patient groups, and found no evidence at all for mutations disrupting the MAOA gene; they concluded that such mutations were not common in humans (Schuback, Mulligan, Sims, et al. 1999). One might have thought that this would spell the end, or at least the beginning of the end, for MAOA-linked hypotheses concerning impulsive and violent criminal behavior. But this was not to be the case.\n\nLacking much else to go on, researchers would continue to search for MAOA links whenever they had the chance. And MAOA was to come back into prominence via another route, with the first significant publication from Avshalom Caspi and Terrie Moffitt and their team from their work on the Dunedin Multidisciplinary Health and Development Study. This was a cohort study of 1,037 people born in a coastal region of the South Island of New Zealand between April 1, 1972 and March 31, 1973, and still living in the area three years later, who were assessed every few years up to and beyond the age of twenty-six.  Caspi and Moffitt and their team drew on the earlier studies of the links between deficiencies in MAOA activity and aggression in mice and humans\u2014including of course, that of Brunner's group\u2014and argued that although \"[e]vidence for an association between MAOA and aggressive behavior in human populations remains inconclusive,... [c]ircumstantial evidence suggests that childhood maltreatment predisposes most strongly to adult violence among children whose MAOA is insufficient to constrain maltreatment-induced changes to neurotransmitter systems\" (Caspi, McClay, Moffitt, et al. 2002, 851).\n\nThey supported this claim with reference to animal studies showing that early stress alters levels of norepinephrine, serotonin, and dopamine in ways that can be long-lasting (Francis and Meaney 1999; Bremner and Vermetten 2001) and reports linking variations in norepinephrine and serotonin levels to aggressive behavior in humans, although they did acknowledge that no study had shown that MAOA plays a role in these variations. Nonetheless, they proceeded to test the hypothesis \"that MAOA genotype can moderate the influence of childhood maltreatment on neural systems implicated in antisocial behavior\" by seeking to correlate the number of tandem repeats in the promoter region of the MAOA gene and response to childhood maltreatment. Dividing the sample on the basis of repeat numbers into \"low MAOA activity\" and \"high MAOA activity\"; classifying childhood maltreatment as severe, probable, and none; and assessing outcomes in terms of _DSM-IV_ conduct disorder, convictions for violent crimes, personality assessments of disposition toward violence, and anecdotal reports of antisocial personality disorder, they generated the finding that was to launch a host of studies of 'gene-environment interaction.' Maltreated males with high levels of MAOA activity did not have elevated antisocial scores, while maltreated males with low levels of MAOA activity were more likely to have adolescent conduct disorder, violent convictions, and to score high on measures of antisocial conduct. Hence the conclusion: \"a functional polymorphism in the MAOA gene moderates the impact of early childhood maltreatment on the development of antisocial behavior in males\" (Caspi, McClay, Moffitt, et al. 2002, 853). It appeared that some genetic variants could both _increase_ risk of antisocial behavior in the face of stressful childhood experiences, while other variants might be protective. The team speculated that the findings had practical implications for drug treatment. \"Both attributable risk and predictive sensitivity indicate that these findings could inform the development of future pharmacological treatments\" (ibid.).\n\nIn the subsequent eight years, this study was cited some 1,700 times. Some tried to replicate it and failed; others criticized various aspects of the methodology or the analysis. However, from our perspective, these problems are not the key issue. More to the point is that, as with the Brunner study, this argument seemed to encapsulate a whole style of thought concerning the role of genetic variation in generating behavioral phenotypes, not just violent and antisocial conduct but a whole range of psychiatric conditions and problematic conduct. Caspi and Moffitt made this explicit in a paper published four years later. Rather than proceeding by trying to link genetic variations to disorders, or even seeking to find endophenotypes, they suggested that the \"gene-environment interaction approach assumes that genes moderate the effect of environmental pathogens on disorders\" (Caspi and Moffitt 2006, 584). Given that we know a great deal about the environmental pathogens and risk factors for many mental disorders from depression to antisocial behavior, and heterogeneity of response between individuals characterizes even the most overwhelming of environmental traumas, we can now look to genetics to help us understand why some succumb and others do not: \"The hypothesis of genetic moderation implies that differences between individuals, originating in the DNA sequence, bring about differences between individuals in their resilience or vulnerability to the environmental causes of many pathological conditions of the mind and body.\" (Caspi and Moffitt 2006, 584). And they suggested that we should go beyond genetic epidemiology: \"Neuroscience can complement psychiatric genetic epidemiology by specifying the more proximal role of nervous system reactivity in the gene-environment interaction\" (ibid.).\n\nIn particular, Caspi and Moffitt's group focused on three genes where high and low activity variants could be linked to susceptibility or resilience. The first concerned variants of the MAOA genotypes and their link with susceptibility to childhood maltreatment, which we have already discussed. The second concerned the long and short versions of the promoter region of 5-HTT, the serotonin transporter gene, where individuals carrying one or two copies of the short version were believed to be more susceptible to depression following stressful life events (Caspi, Sugden, Moffitt, et al. 2003). The third was the influence of a polymorphism in the catechol-O-methyltransferase (COMT) gene, in which individuals carrying the valine allele were thought likely to develop severe psychiatric symptoms following cannabis use, while those with two copies of the COMT methionine allele seemed to exhibit no such adverse effects (Caspi, Moffitt, Cannon, et al. 2005).\n\nWe were, it seems, ready for a new relationship between psychiatric genetics and neuroscience, in which they would work together to identify the neurobiological pathways that accounted for the variations in susceptibility or resilience between individuals to environmental insults, in order to clarify \"[h]ow an environmental pathogen, especially one that is psycho-social in nature, get[s] under the skin to alter the nervous system and generate mental disorders\" (Caspi and Moffitt 2006, 589). Despite its neuromolecular form, the basic form of this argument is reminiscent of debates in the mid-nineteenth century on hereditary dispositions, predisposing and exciting causes, and the like in the inheritance of insanity and all manner of socially problematic conduct. So what, today, does this imply for understanding of, and intervention into, problems of antisocial and aggressive conduct?\n\nIn 2008, Joshua Buckholtz and Andreas Meyer-Lindenberg summed up current thinking on the neurobiology of antisocial conduct along the following lines (Buckholtz and Meyer-Lindenberg 2008). Antisocial and violent conduct is a major social problem, which also generates significant economic costs, and is hence an important target for government intervention. Such conduct runs in families, and a small proportion of families in any community account for a large proportion of its violent crime. Hence risk for antisocial aggression is transmitted intergenerationally. While twin studies have shown significant heritability, they have been unable to identify the specific genetic bases of risk. However, they say, Brunner's study began to clarify this, by demonstrating the link between MAOA deficiencies and human aggression. This link has been further demonstrated in rodents, where MAOA knockouts demonstrate increased aggression, which is correlated with elevated levels of serotonin and noradrenaline. MAOA has a key role in regulating release and clearance of serotonin and noradrenaline in monaminergic synapses in brain, suggesting that aggression is also regulated by such levels. Levels of MAOA at or before birth have long-term effects into adulthood. While the complete deficiency of MAOA in the population is rare, there are polymorphisms in the MAOA gene\u2014basically long and short versions of a VNTR (variable-number tandem repeat). This determines whether an individual has a low level of monoamine oxidase activity (MAOA-L) or a high level (MAOA-H). In vitro studies have failed to demonstrate the relevance of these differences for in vivo levels of MAOA-activity in adults; nonetheless, much research has sought to link these differences to aggression and impulsivity in animals and humans.\n\nBuckholtz and Meyer-Lindenberg note that direct association studies have been inconclusive but argue that gene-environment studies have shown a consistent relationship between MAOA-L and the risk of impulsive violence in those males who have experienced early-life adversity. Other studies in animals have also shown a link with variations in other genes that modulate serotonin levels in brain, such as the promoter region of the serotonin transporter gene. Neuroimaging studies are beginning to demonstrate that there are differences between MAOA-L and MAOA-H alleles in cortical circuitry relevant to emotional regulation, notably in the medial prefrontal cortex, which has a role in modulating amygdala function, which is well known to be crucial in fear extinction, emotion regulation, and temperamental variation; the medial prefrontal cortex is also well known to be modulated by serotonin levels. These variations in neural circuitry can be shown empirically to be associated with individual differences in temperamental traits, notably increased reactivity to threat cues; increased tendency to experience anger, frustration, and bitterness; and reduced sensitivity to cues for prosocial behavior. These alterations in corticiolimbic structure, function, and connectivity may underlie MAOA's role in genetic susceptibility for aggression as a result of the crucial role played by the implicated circuitry in social evaluation and decision making. Thus, they conclude, \"although MAOA is not a 'violence gene' per se, susceptibility alleles might bias brain development towards alterations in function and structure which, in combination with other factors, predispose the development of antisocial behavior.\" Yet they also admit that in the absence of such factors, inheritance of the low-activity version of MAOA \"is completely compatible with psychiatric health\" (Buckholtz and Meyer-Lindenberg 2008, 127).\n\nOnce again, we can see the logic of 'bioprediction' that is taking shape here: screen and intervene. This is not a search for the biological roots of crime but for the biological susceptibilities that increase the likelihood of manifesting undesirable behavior involving violent, impulsive, or aggressive conduct, and the apparent weakening of the conventional workings of guilt and remorse. The focus is on risk identification, intervention, precaution, and prevention. The neurobiological basis here is not conceived of as genes for crime or even genes for aggression, but rather as specific variations at the level of SNPs, in the sequences that are believed to code for the various neurobiological components of behavior control and the neurochemical anomalies that correlate with low impulse control or aggression. This genomic analysis is combined with imaging research on localization of functions, seeking to identify the brain regions or neural circuits activated in aggression or impulsivity, carried out using brain scanning techniques to identify characteristic patterns of brain activity. This neurobiological approach allies itself well with its sociopolitical milieu, for it has taken shape in a context in which crimes of this sort\u2014impulsive, aggressive, antisocial\u2014are understood not merely as infractions of the law but as problems of public insecurity and generators of economic burden. Within these control strategies of precaution, prevention, and preemption, the question shifts from that of response to the offense after the act, to programs of prediction and prevention that identify those at risk on the basis of a kind of algorithm that combines genetic and neurobiological factors with those relating to family life, parental behavior, poverty, housing, and other environmental factors. For these violent or impulsive behavior at least, crime, is reframed as a problem of public health.\n\nThe stage is set for the reinvention of strategies for governing childhood and family life in the name of crime prevention. On the one hand, we can find approaches that focus on the neurobiological underpinnings of those at risk of antisocial conduct or psychopathy and advocate screening to identify children at risk, initially using well-known scales, but hopeful of the possibility of identifying biomarkers in brains or genes. On the other, we can see approaches that seek to act upon the developing brain of the child who is at risk by shaping his or her interpersonal milieu; they aim to maximize the potential of each child by targeting those 'incredible years.' But, as we will see, strategies developed in the second approach merge with those proposed from the first\u2014and for both, the key actors are not the child, but the parents.\n\nNipping Budding Psychopaths in the Bud\n\nShould one screen children to identify those at risk of developing antisocial behavior or even psychopathy? In the 1990s, the case for this approach was made by Donald Lynam, first at the University of Kentucky and later at Purdue University (Lynam 1996, 1998; Lynam and Gudonis 2005). But if screeing is desirable, what methods might be appropriate? Population-level screening is controversial in many regions, for example, in the United Kingdom, though some argue for its cost-effectiveness and utility even at the preschool age, given certain conditions (Wilson, Minnis, Puckering, et al. 2009). In some areas of the United States, screening programs for children's behavioral problems using non-neurobiological forms of assessment have already been tried. The most controversial was the Texas Childhood Medication Algorithm Project (TCMAP)\u2014a development of the adult version (TMAP), which was designed to screen adults for major psychiatric conditions. The version for children proved particularly contentious, with claims that it was acting as a powerful marketing tool for pharmaceutical companies: it was suspended in September 2008. Other U.S. screening programs for children have included Teenscreen, employed for the early identification of mental illness in teenagers, notably screening for depression to reduce suicide risk.\n\nWhile there are a multitude of screening programs that seek to predict future violence on the basis of current behavior or symptoms, at the time of writing, there seem to be no screening programs in general use for antisocial conduct that involve biomarkers (genetic profiling, brain imaging, etc.) or endophenotypes, such as hormone levels. Indeed, as we discuss in chapter 4, despite the hopes raised by developments in genomics and in brain imaging, it has proved difficult, if not impossible, to develop validated and reliable biomarkers for _any_ psychiatric condition that can be used to make a diagnosis, even in a clinical context. Thus, those researching the possibilities of screening for future antisocial behavior have tended to rely largely on a behavioral assessment of features, notably those termed \"callous and unemotional traits\" (J. Hill 2003; Moran, Ford, Butler, et al. 2008), derived ultimately from Cleckley's _Mask of Sanity_ \u2014published in 1941 (Cleckley [1941] 1976), operationalized by Robert Hare in _The Hare Psychopathy Check List\u2014Revised_ (Hare 1991; cf. Hare 1999), and then reformatted for children (Frick and Hare 2001). But endeavors to go beyond the behavioral and the symptomatic, to diagnose through the brain itself, are certainly at the research stage.\n\nLet us take one extremely influential example to illustrate this line of thinking: the program of research funded by the United Kingdom's Medical Research Council, the Department of Health, and the Home Office, and carried out at the Institute of Psychiatry, King's College London (Viding, Blair, Moffitt, et al. 2005; Odgers, Moffitt, Poulton, et al. 2008; Viding, Jones, Frick, et al. 2008; Viding, Larsson, and Jones 2008). The research has argued as follows: First, that one particular subtype of antisocial behavior, that with \"callous and unemotional traits\" (AS-CU) is a precursor of adult psychopathy. Second, that the characteristics of childhood AS-CU and adult psychopathy map onto one another: in both children and adults we see lack of empathy, lack of guilt and remorse, and shallow affect and manipulative conduct, and in such children we can also see precursors of adult violence, such as cruelty to animals and enjoyment of aggression. Third, if we look at studies of psychopaths, psychological tests show them to be poor at empathizing with others and bad at recognizing their fear and sadness, and brain scans show them to have a disruption of one particular part of the brain, the amygdala, which is, so it seems, implicated in these affective defects. Fourth, if we take twin pairs aged around seven years, some monozygotic and some dizygotic, who have been assessed for AS-CU and carry out fMRI scans on them, we find the same deficits in the brain's \"affect circuitry\" in the AS-CU subjects as we see in adult psychopaths. Finally, if we use classical twin study methods, taking environmental factors into account, we find a much higher correlation of these brain patterns in the genetically identical twins than in nonidentical twins\u2014that is, the trait is highly heritable and suggests a strong genetic vulnerability. Hence, it is argued, we should search for the precise SNP-level variations that underlie this vulnerability. We should uses SNPs and scans to search for budding psychopaths.\n\nAs is now obvious, what these researchers are searching for is a vulnerability, a _susceptibility_. It is not surprising, then, that they are closely linked to the Caspi and Moffitt research group and hope to identify the gene-environment interactions that provoke vulnerability into frank psychopathy (Caspi, Mc-Clay, Moffitt, et al. 2002; Kim-Cohen, Moffitt, Taylor, et al. 2005; Odgers, Moffitt, Poulton, et al. 2008). Their message, they insist, is _not_ fatalism. This is how Viding and McCrory put it in a presentation to a 2007 conference commissioned by the United Kingdom's Department of Health; the Department for Children, Schools and Families; the Youth Justice Board; and the Cabinet Office: \"the goal of early identification is successful intervention.\" And the means to be used were multiple\u2014perhaps behavior therapy, cognitive therapy, and even psychopharmaceuticals\u2014for the aim is to reshape brain mechanisms in order to nip those budding psychopaths in the bud.\n\nIn fact, the path most emphasized is one that addresses the problem indirectly. The route to the problematic child, as so often in the past, is to be through the parents. For research now claims that these undesirable traits can be ameliorated by such means (Dadds, Fraser, Frost, et al. 2005; Hawes and Dadds 2005, 2007). That is to say, one can modulate the traits, and perhaps even their neural underpinnings, by training and 'empowering' parents\u2014or rather 'caregivers'\u2014in parenting skills. Perhaps, some say, what is required is \"multisystemic therapy\" that will improve parental disciplinary practices, increase family affection, divert children from antisocial peers to prosocial ones, improve schoolwork, engage children in positive recreation, improve family-community relations, and empower the family to solve future difficulties. But in any event, the familiar answer is that one should govern the child at risk by governing the risky family.\n\nSculpting the Brain in Those Incredible Years\n\nWho could question that the child is a most incredible human being? And that the child needs everything that he or she can receive in order to withstand the emotional and social challenges that life will inevitably bring, especially in the teenage years? And who could doubt the virtue of interventions that seek both to ensure and sustain resilience in the child, to prevent a future of delinquency, drug abuse, and violence, with all the accompanying misery to child, family, and victims, not to mention the economic costs? Thus, in the United States more than a decade ago, Mark Cohen calculated the various lifetime costs associated with a typical criminal career, and based on the fact that such careers start young, and in an attempt to provide a basis for the cost-effectiveness of early preventive intervention programs, estimated that the \"monetary value of saving a high-risk youth\" was between $1.7 million and $2.3 million (Cohen 1998, 5). In the United Kingdom, in 2006, Stephen Scott, Martin Knapp, and their colleagues estimated that individuals who show conduct disorder at the age of ten will, by the time they are twenty-eight, have \"cost society\" up to ten times more than controls without this diagnosis (Scott, Knapp, Henderson, et al. 2001; Romeo, Knapp, and Scott 2006). All seem agreed about the implications: surely we need strategies for early identification and intervention to safeguard our children from such miserable futures, and our societies from such a social and economic burden (Harrington and Bailey 2003; Kim-Cohen, Moffitt, Taylor, et al. 2005; Margo and Stevens 2008).\n\nNo wonder, then, that we see a whole array of individuals, pressure groups, and organizations seeking to promote early intervention in the name of prevention\u2014many of which can be found on the pages of the website Prevention Action. These programs are often pioneered by individuals with an almost evangelical zeal and commitment. There is Carolyn Webster-Stratton with her \"Incredible Years\" training series, which has expanded from its start in the United States to England, Wales, Ireland, Norway, Australia, and New Zealand. There is Clay Yeager, a onetime probation officer, turned Pennsylvania oilman, with his consultancy working to introduce evidence-based programs for prevention such as \"Nurse Family Partnerships\" and \"Communities That Care\" into child welfare and youth justice systems in Florida and several other U.S. states. There is Steve Aos in Washington, advising the legislature on issues such as \"the economic costs and benefits of investment choices in juvenile justice.\" Of course, much of this work does not explicitly refer to brains, let alone to neurobiology\u2014Webster-Stratton, for example, relies on theories of social learning\u2014but others, such as Tom Dishion, combine their practical work promoting the importance of early intervention with brain imaging research\u2014the article on his work found at Prevention Action is titled \"Putting Brain Science Back on the Streets of Los Angeles.\"\n\nIn the United Kingdom, this agenda was proposed most passionately by Iain Duncan Smith's Institute of Social Justice. Duncan Smith, a former leader of the Conservative Party, teamed up with Graham Allen, a member of Parliament from the Labour Party, to produce a report in 2008 titled _Early Intervention: Good Parents, Great Kids, Better Citizens_ (Allen and Duncan Smith 2008). After outlining the problems and costs of social dysfunction, violence, drugs, alcohol, and family breakdown, they argued that from birth through age three was the vital period when the right social and emotional inputs must be made to build the human foundations of a healthy, functioning society and that the key agents to provide those inputs were not the state but the parents. Why this age range? How many times have we heard this period emphasized in social policy, most recently in the arguments in the 1970s concerning the cycle of deprivation and the need for policies of intervention in the preschool years, such as the Head Start program in the United States? The report refers to many longitudinal studies to make its case that early neglect and lack of appropriate parental input leads to these later problems, and that youngsters who do not have the right kind of emotional and familial input at this age grow up to be antisocial adults who go on to raise antisocial children\u2014thus perpetuating the cycle.\n\nWhile the conceptual bases of Head Start and analogous schemes for preschool intervention in the United Kingdom were psychological, the rationale is now articulated in terms of the brain\u2014because the brain's capacity for change is believed to be at its greatest in this period: \"the human brain has developed to 85 per cent of its potential at age three (and 90 per cent at age four)\" (Allen and Duncan Smith 2008, 48). Because the human being is born with the brain underdeveloped, and its completion depends on input after birth, \"sculpting the young brain\" and programming the development of the baby from the first moment after birth is of the highest importance. \"The structure of the developing infant brain is a crucial factor in the creation (or not) of violent tendencies, because early patterns are established not only psychologically but at the physiological level of brain formation\" (ibid., 57). The mechanism is the growth and pruning of synapses in response to experience\u2014synapses that become \"hard-wired\" by repeated use.\n\nBut not only that\u2014the brains of deprived children are actually smaller, or so it is claimed: \"The brain of an abused or neglected child is significantly smaller than the norm: the limbic system (which governs emotions) is 20\u201330 per cent smaller and tends to have fewer synapses; the hippocampus (responsible for memory) is also smaller. Both of these stunted developments are due to decreased cell growth, synaptic and dendrite density\u2014all of which are the direct result of much less stimulation (e.g. sight, sound, touch) than is required for normal development of the brain\"; this claim is supported by the reproduction of images from Bruce Perry's work at the Child Trauma Academy (Perry 2002). The role of cortisol, neurotransmitter modulation, sensitive windows, and the whole repertoire of neurobiological accounts of child development is deployed to produce the objectivity effect that in previous periods was generated by reference to dynamic and developmental psychology. Even attachment, that stalwart of developmental psychopathology, is now inscribed in the brain: \"Babies who are healthily attached to their carer can regulate their emotions as they mature because the cortex, which exercises rational thought and control, has developed properly. However, when early conditions result in underdevelopment of the cortex, the child lacks an 'emotional guardian' \" (ibid., 62). It seems obvious that intensive intervention on early parenting, on the parents of today, and on those at risk of being the dysfunctional parents of tomorrow is the path required to break the cycle of antisocial and violent conduct that destroys lives and costs our societies so dearly. Who could disagree?\n\nWell, as it happens, in April 2010, this question of whether there was a link between child deprivation, brain development, and future social problems became rather controversial. Dr. Bruce Perry reproached Iain Duncan Smith\u2014who was about to become a minister in the Conservative-led coalition government that came to power in the United Kingdom in May 2010\u2014for using his brain scan images of children who had suffered extreme neglect to illustrate a more general claim that neglect or family breakdown changes brain development. Perry himself had written extensively on the neurodevelopmental consequences of ill treatment and neglect of children, notably opening one of his more cited pieces with the arresting phrase \"Children are not resilient, children are malleable\" (Perry 1997). In this article, he drew on neurobiological research and studies of neglected children, including the Romanian orphans who were discovered living in appalling conditions in Romania in the years following the fall of the Ceausescu regime in 1989, to argue for the malign consequences of early violence and neglect on different brain areas and functions, and in particular, claiming that the consequences were that those who had suffered in these ways were themselves more prone to violence and aggression in adolescence and adulthood as a result. Perry called for policies that provided parents with the resources and information to optimize their children's developing brains, an argument he developed in a number of other scientific publications (Perry 2002, 2008), and in a popular book arguing for the crucial role of empathy, its roots in the developing brain, and its social and personal consequences\u2014apparently under threat from current cultural and technological changes (Szalavitz and Perry 2010).\n\nThese disputes about whether one could extrapolate from the neurobiological consequences of cases of extreme neglect did not deflect those who argued for early intervention in the name of the brain. In the U.K. debate, Duncan Smith was backed by Camila Batmanghelidjh, charismatic founder of one of the country's leading early intervention charities, Kids Company, arguing that lack of care does affect brain development, and can be com-bated by intensive interactions in preventive interventions. A month later, Kids Company launched \"Peace of Mind,\" a major campaign to raise \u00a35 million to fund research into vulnerable children's brains. Supporters were asked to go online to access a virtual brain with one million neurons; for each \u00a35 they donated, they received a \"virtual neuron,\" and they were asked to invite their social networks to do the same\u2014the virtual neurons they purchased would connect together to form clusters in the virtual brain. Supported by a section of the website summarizing genetic and neurobiological research on child maltreatment and the brain, the conclusion was that \"[s]ustained child abuse and neglect has a devastating impact on a child's brain often creating a lifetime of vulnerability, tragically increasing the risk of suicide, violence, anti-social behavior, depression and drug addiction.\" This was, it seemed, a nonpartisan issue: in January 2011, Graham Allen, still a Labour member of Parliament, was asked by the Conservative British Prime Minister David Cameron to produce a report on early intervention. Allen used the very same brain images on its cover and deployed essentially the same brain-based arguments in his proposals for intensive early intervention for preschool children (Allen 2011).\n\nThese arguments for the benefits of early intervention seem hard to deny. As in earlier programs, such as Head Start, they have generated considerable research seeking to evaluate preventive programs for intensive intervention for those thought to be at risk. As we have noted, currently, children at risk are not identified using biomarkers but because either they, or their parents, have come to the notice of social workers, teachers, doctors, or other authorities. And the intervention programs do not use interventions targeted directly at neural processes. As we have seen, the key is thought to be the training of parents\u2014and teachers\u2014in managing the behavioral difficulties of their children. Consider, for example, the randomized controlled trial by Stephen Scott at the Institute of Psychiatry in London, evaluating an intervention using the Incredible Years program on six-year-old children identified by screening all children of this age at eight schools for antisocial behavior. The study concluded that, at the cost of \u00a32,380 ($3,800) per child, a twenty-eight-week program showed that by targeting multiple risk factors (ineffective parenting, conduct problems, ADHD symptoms, and low reading ability), and by training parents, \"[e]ffective population based intervention to improve the functioning of [children] with antisocial behavior is practically feasible.... Including halving the rate of oppositional defiant disorder... there is the prospect that children's long term mental health will be improved, including better school attainments and less violence\" (Scott, Sylva, Doolan, et al. 2010, 48, 56).\n\nBy way of the brain, then, we reach a conclusion that does not differ greatly from arguments reaching back to the late nineteenth century about the effects of the early years on later propensities to problematic conduct (Platt 1977; Donzelot 1979; Rose 1985). From Mary Carpenter's campaigns for colonies for dangerous and perishing children (Carpenter 1851), through the social problem group and \"the submerged ten percent\" in the early twentieth century, via the mental hygiene movement in the 1930s, and the arguments for setting up child welfare services in the years after the Second World War (Rose 1985), to the contentious concept of the \"cycle of deprivation\" in the 1970s (Joseph 1972; Jordan 1974), and the interventions from the Head Start program to the Sure Start program\u2014we find the repeated arguments that one should minimize a host of social ills, including criminal and antisocial conduct, by governing the child through its family. In each generation, unsurprisingly, these arguments are made on the basis of whatever happens to be the current mode of objectivity about the development of children\u2014habits, the will, instinct theory, psychoanalysis, and today the brain. Social justice, it seems, lies not in tackling the causes of structural inequality, poverty, poor housing, unemployment, and the like, but in managing parents in the name of the formation of good citizens.\n\nGoverning Antisocial Brains\n\nIt may seem odd to have concluded our discussion of antisocial brains not by debating questions of free will and criminal responsibility, but by exploring proposals to train parents in ways of rearing their young children. But if there is one key lesson that should be learned from the genealogy of crime-control strategies, it is that the criminal justice system itself has rarely been considered the most important strategic site for interevention (D. Garland 1985; Rose 1985). The most significant changes occurring today at the intersection of crime-control strategies and neuroscience do not take the form that concerns many neuroethicists. They do not entail a challenge to doctrines of free will in the courtroom\u2014despite the flurry of books claiming and discussing such a shift (Libet, Freeman, and Sutherland 1999; Dennett 2003a; B. Garland 2004; Spence 2009). Nor do they undermine the notion of the autonomous legal subject. Indeed, the reverse is perhaps closer to the truth\u2014strategies seek to create the kinds of persons who _can_ take responsibility for their actions, and they attempt to enhance such self-control by acting on the brain.\n\nDespite the concerns of those who raise neurobiological doubts about autonomy and free will, these kinds of interventions go entirely with the grain of folk psychology, with its long-standing emphases on the importance of the early years\u2014creating the adult through shaping the child. Indeed, they are entirely consonant with programs, strategies, and techniques since the second half of the nineteenth century that have sought (and usually failed) to address the problem of crime by early intervention to shape the family into a mechanism for creating civilized citizens (Donzelot 1979; Rose 1989; Parton 1991). Today, it is _brains at risk_ \u2014at risk of becoming risky brains\u2014that are to be addressed indirectly and preventively. As in earlier strategies, two senses of risk are brought into alignment. The first is the desire to identify _risky individuals_ \u2014that is to say, those who will present a future risk to others\u2014before the actual harm is committed. The second is the hope that one might be able to identify _individuals at risk_ \u2014those whose particular combination of biology and life history makes them themselves susceptible to some future condition\u2014here personality disorder, impulsivity, aggressivity, or whatever, but more generally susceptibility for any psychiatric disorder. And of the many options available once one has identified such children, the strategies that are emerging most forcefully, at least in the United States and the United Kingdom, are strategies of _optimization_ and strategies of hope\u2014strategies that aim, in the words of the Kids Company Peace of Mind campaign, to address both \"[t]he individual cost to the young person in terms of emotional wellbeing, mental and physical health, and education\" and \"[t]he cost to society of antisocial behavior in terms of police and criminal justice resources, public safety, NHS resources, and the continuation of the cycle of abuse and violence.\"\n\nIt is too early to say whether neurogenetics and brain imaging will play an important role in the screening programs to identify those at risk. And it is too early to say whether interventions directly addressing the brain, perhaps by drugs, will come to supplement or supplant those based on parent, teacher, and nurse training. But it is undoubtedly the case that the reference to neurobiological consequences of childhood neglect will continue to provide such programs with crucial support, that research into such consequences will expand, and that the brain will increasingly be seen to lie at the root of anti-social and dangerous conduct, even if its effects are manifested psychologically in poor impulse control and failures of the will. Whatever the fate of the high-profile endeavors to identify anomalies in the brains of adult murderers, or to discover the neural anomalies that might finally resolve disquiets over the category of psychopathy, we can certainly anticipate future strategies to govern antisocial citizens by acting upon their developing brains.\nChapter Seven\n\nPersonhood in a Neurobiological Age\n\nIn the course of centuries the _na\u00efve_ self-love of men has had to submit to two major blows at the hands of science. The first was when they learnt that our earth was not the centre of the universe but only a tiny fragment of a cosmic system of scarcely imaginable vastness. This is associated in our minds with the name of Copernicus, though something similar had already been asserted by Alexandrian science. The second blow fell when biological research destroyed man's supposedly privileged place in creation and proved his descent from the animal kingdom and his ineradicable animal nature. This re-evaluation has been accomplished in our own days by Darwin, Wallace and their predecessors, though not without the most violent contemporary opposition. But human megalomania will have suffered its third and most wounding blow from the research of the present time which seeks to prove to the ego that it is not even master in its own house, but must content itself with scanty information of what is going on unconsciously in its mind. We psycho-analysts were not the first to utter this call to introspection; but it seems to be our fate to give it its most forcible expression and to support it with empirical material which affects every individual.\n\n\u2014 **Sigmund Freud** , _Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis_ , 1916\n\nHumans are probably the only animals that have made conjectures about what goes on inside the body.... Today we are engaged in the quest of understanding our brain. When we have finally worked out the details, this remarkable organ, for all of its lofty pretensions\u2014seat of intellect, home of the soul\u2014will very likely join other remarkable pieces of biological machinery. Remarkable, certainly, but not mysterious or possessed of any supernatural qualities.\n\n\u2014 **Mark Bear and Leon Cooper** , \"From Molecules to Mental States,\" 1998\n\nSometime in the twenty-first century, science will confront one of its last great mysteries: the nature of the self. That lump of flesh in your cranial vault not only generates an \"objective\" account of the outside world but also directly experiences an internal world\u2014a rich mental life of sensations, meanings, and feeling. Most mysteriously, your brain also turns its view back on itself to generate your sense of self-awareness.\n\n\u2014 **V. S. Ramachandran** , _The Tell-Tale Brain: Unlocking the Mystery of Human Nature_ , 2011\n\nThe self an illusion created by our brain. This is the message of a host of recent semipopular books published by neuroscientists over the past decade. Not long ago, few would have had the temerity to approach this issue in such a direct manner. But now many neuroscientists are willing to take up the challenge posed by Freud at the start of the previous century: to find the neural bases of the processes that he lodged, in his view only provisionally, in the psyche (Pribram and Gill 1976). Like Freud, today's neuroscientists challenge the view that consciousness is the master in its own house and argue that much that is conventionally ascribed to the realm of the mental, of conscious deliberation and willed intention, actually occurs somewhere else\u2014now not in some immaterial unconscious but in the brain.\n\nIn one of the earlier and most provocative formulations, Francis Crick asserted: \"You, your joys and your sorrows, your memories and your ambitions, your sense of personal identity and free will, are in fact no more than the behavior of a vast assembly of nerve cells and their associated molecules. As Lewis Carroll's Alice might have phrased it: 'You're nothing but a pack of neurons' \" (Crick 1994). In similar vein, Patricia Churchland claimed: \"Bit by experimental bit, neuroscience is morphing our conception of what we are. The weight of evidence now implies that it is the _brain_ , rather than some non-physical stuff, that feels, thinks, and decides. That means there is no soul to fall in love. We do still fall in love, certainly, and passion is as real as it ever was. The difference is that now we understand those important feelings to be events happening in the physical brain\" (Churchland 2002, 1).\n\nRather less boldly, this is how Joseph LeDoux opens his book _The Synaptic Self_ : \"The bottom-line point of this book is 'You are your synapses.' Synapses are the spaces between brain cells, but are much more. They are the channels of communication between brain cells, and the means by which most of what the brain does is accomplished\" (LeDoux 2002, ix). For the psychologist-turned-neuroscientist, Chris Frith, in his book _Making Up the Mind: How the Brain Creates Our Mental World_ , it is the brain that \"creates the world,\" producing not only \"the illusion that we have direct contact with objects in the physical world\" but also that \"our own mental world is isolated and private\": \"through these two illusions we experience ourselves as agents, acting independently upon the world\" (Frith 2007a, 17). For the philosopher Thomas Metzinger, writing under the title _The Ego Tunnel: The Science of the Mind and the Myth of the Self_ , despite the way we think and talk, \"nobody has ever _been_ or _had_ a self\": conscious experience is a creation of our brains, an internal construct in what he terms \"the ego tunnel,\" which also creates \"an internal image of the person-as-a-whole,\" which is \"the phenomenal ego, the 'I' or 'self' as it appears in conscious experience.\" But \"you are constitutionally unable to realize that all this is just the content of a simulation in your brain... not reality itself but an image of reality... a complex property of the global neural correlate of consciousness\" (Metzinger 2009, 1\u201312).\n\nHow should we assess such claims? Many from the social and human sciences regard this neurobiologization of the self as the most challenging feature of contemporary neuroscience. It seems to threaten the very conception of the human being that lies at the heart of their work: the idea that personhood is a matter of internal mental states\u2014consciousness, intention, beliefs, and the like\u2014existing in a uniquely human psychological realm of mind, embodied in a self-conscious subjectivity, and created in a world of meaning, culture, and history. Thus the French sociologist Alain Ehrenberg, writing in 2004, suggested that some neuroscientists were going beyond explorations of the neuronal machinery, and hopes for a new neuropsychiatry, to argue for a philosophical identity between knowledge of the brain and knowledge of the self: the \"sujet parlant\" was giving way to the \"sujet c\u00e9r\u00e9bral\"\u2014a \"cerebral subject\" (Ehrenberg 2004).\n\nThe \"Brainhood Project,\" established by Fernando Vidal and colleagues in 2006, took up this idea: \"Starting in the second half of the 20th century, the quality or condition of being a brain ranked as the defining property of human beings.... From science fiction in writing and film to neurophilosophy and the practices of intensive care and organ transplantation, humans came to be thought of not merely as having a brain, but as being a brain. Of course, many other properties of human persons were recognized. Nevertheless, whole or in part, the brain emerged as the only organ truly indispensable for the existence of a human self and for defining individuality.\"\n\nIn this chapter we take a different approach. The conception of the person that is emerging in neurobiology does not quite match the version attacked by critics from the _Geisteswissenschaften_. Indeed, neurobiological arguments in this area are beset with slippages and confusions, both linguistic and conceptual, between different notions of person and self, of consciousness and its relation to selfhood, of identity and personhood, of the relevance of questions of will and intention to self and consciousness, and much more. Further, the social and human sciences have not been so committed to the psychological ideal of the person or the self as is sometimes suggested. Before turning to neuroscience, then, it is worth beginning by reminding ourselves of some earlier challenges from within the human sciences to the idea of the bounded, conscious, constitutive self.\n\nThe Challenged Self\n\nIn our 'individualist' times, almost all aspects of political, ethical, and cultural thought hinge upon the things we believe about persons: their nature, their capacities, their freedoms and self-actualization, their rights and duties. These ideas about ourselves are central to debates about law, morality, justice, and the rights of minorities; about sexual relations, lifestyles, marriage, parenthood, and bioethical issues related to the beginning and end of life; about consumption, tastes, marketing and economic life; about politics and conflicts over national identities; and much more. They are entangled with other notions such as autonomy, agency, individuality, control, choice, self-realization, self-esteem, free will, and liberty. Human beings who inhabit our contemporary Western cultures understand themselves in terms of a kind of 'inwardness,' as endowed with a personal interiority, to which only they have direct access, in which lies their deepest truths and their truest thoughts, feelings, and wishes. It is this inwardness, inscribed in memories, capacities, and habits, that assures human beings that they _are_ \u2014that they have an enduring identity rather than being an ever-changing matrix of fleeting thoughts, feelings, and desires. This individualized inwardness, with its interiority and its continuity, is both unique to each and common to all (it was not always so, consider slaves, women, 'primitives,' children, idiots, the mad): it grounds the claim of each individual to membership in the human race and to the consideration that such membership implies.\n\nIn the 1970s and 1980s, many social historians, anthropologists, and sociologists turned their attention to the question of 'the person' and 'the self' and their historical and cultural variability. In the last essay he published\u2014delivered in French as the Huxley Memorial Lecture in 1938\u2014Marcel Mauss asserted his belief that \"there has never existed a human being who has not been aware, not only of his body, but at the same time also of his individuality, both spiritual and physical.\" But, he argued, the _notion_ or _concept_ of the person or the self was \"a category of the human mind\" that had evolved over time, and has taken a different form in different societies, according to their \"systems of law, religion, customs, social structure and mentality\": the \"cult of the self\" and the respect for the self was very recent (Mauss [1938] 1985, 3). Almost four decades later, Clifford Geertz argued something similar, writing that \"[t]he Western conception of the person as a bounded, unique, more or less integrated motivational and cognitive universe, a dynamic center of awareness, emotion, judgment and action, organized into a distinctive whole and set contrastively against other such wholes and against a social and natural background is, however incorrigible it may seem to us, a rather peculiar idea within the context of the world's cultures\" (Geertz 1974, 31).\n\nIn the years that followed, in the growing literature on the historical and cultural variability of conceptions of personhood and ideas of the self, most historians, philosophers, anthropologists, and sociologists agreed with Mauss and Geertz, as did many social psychologists engaged in comparative research on 'self-concepts' in different cultures (Dodds 1968; Shweder and LeVine 1984; Marsella, De Vos, and Hsu 1985; Roland 1988; Sampson 1988; Markus and Kitayama 1991). In different ways, they argued that ideas of the self or the person in Japanese society, among the native people of North America, in ancient Greece, in premodern Europe were different: they did not share our sense of personal uniqueness, of individual autonomy, of bodily integrity and biographical continuity. The contemporary Western conception of the self\u2014individualized, bounded, with interior depth and temporal continuity, self-possessed, autonomous, free to choose\u2014was not natural, given, or universal, it was a historical and cultural achievement.\n\nMore radically, some social theorists returned to Sigmund Freud and to the blow that psychoanalysis struck to human narcissism, arguing that the sense of oneself as having full insight into one's own interior psychological world, let along mastery over it, is an illusion. As Freud put it: \"the ego... is not even master in its own house, but must content itself with scanty information of what is going on unconsciously in its mind\" (Freud [1916] 1953\u201374, 285). Jacques Lacan, interpreting Freud in the spirit of French postwar structural linguistics, asserted that the self is radically excentric to itself: \"the philosophical _cogito_ is at the centre of the mirage that renders modern man so sure of being himself,... but yet I am not what I think I am or where I think I am\" (Lacan [1957] 1977, 165, 171). A critical evaluation of a certain narcissistic mirage, image or 'ideology' of the universal, individuated, self-aware, self-conscious person, as both eternal fact and unimpeachable value, thus lay at the heart of much critical social thought in the closing decades of the twentieth century (Rose 1996).\n\nIn this light, the character of the current debate between the human sciences and the neurosciences seems paradoxical. While the human sciences have been happy to accept that our current conception of the 'naturally' autonomous, self-conscious person is an artifact of history, culture, meaning, and language, and that consciousness is far from sovereign in human affairs, most react with hostility when practitioners of the new sciences of the brain announce, usually with an irritating sense of daring, the death of our illusions about this same conscious, self-identical, autonomous person. It would seem prudent, therefore, to abstain from both celebration and critique, in order to explore the extent to which a new image of the self or person is taking shape, where, and with what consequences.\n\nIn his magisterial survey, _Sources of the Self_ , the philosopher Charles Taylor traced the formation of the notion of the self, our modern sense of self, through the canonical works of Western philosophy (Taylor 1989). He argued that while there were deep and distributed supports in contemporary culture for the forms of thought that underpin psychological notions of selfhood\u2014autonomy, depth, the capacity to choose and bear responsibility for those choices\u2014this was nonetheless a function of a historically limited mode of self-interpretation, which had spread from the West to other parts of the globe, but which had a beginning in time and space and may have an end.\n\nFrom a different perspective, that of the genealogy of personhood, we come to a similar conclusion. But, we suggest, we need to look beyond philosophy if we are to discern the signs of any such 'end' of this mode of self-interpretation today. For philosophers do not live in a separate world, at least when it comes to arguments concerning human nature or ideas of self and identity. It is not only that their arguments need to be located 'in context' as the saying goes (Tully 1988, 1993), but that philosophers draw, sometimes explicitly but usually implicitly, upon the empirical knowledge and cultural beliefs of the times and places they inhabit. Their apparently abstract considerations of the nature of humans have been bound up in all kinds of interesting ways with endeavors to shape, train, and govern those human beings, both individually and collectively. Descartes drew upon his experiences witnessing dissections and on contemporary anatomical knowledge of the body and brain to articulate his ideas for the location of the soul and his doctrines of healthy living; Locke, Condorcet, and others drew upon images and stories of wild children in their thought experiments about the existence of innate ideas and the role of the sensations (Rose 1985). Despite their often expressed disdain for 'folk psychology,' philosophers since at least the mid-nineteenth century have, explicitly or implicitly, taken up ideas from the knowledges about human beings articulated in the positive sciences\u2014biology, psychology, neurology, and the brain sciences\u2014even when apparently in dispute with them.\n\nIf we are considering the transformations immanent in our present, then, we would do better to turn our gaze away from the great thinkers of our age and to explore the changes in language, technique, and judgment that arise in more mundane settings, in the face of more pragmatic concerns about the government of conduct. That is to say, we should examine mutations in knowledges with a lower epistemological profile\u2014not so much in philosophy as in the human sciences and indeed in neuroscience itself. As for neuroscience, we will find once more, to paraphrase Canguilhem, that when it comes to matters of our ontology, while the normal seems prior to the abnormal, it is historically secondary. Again and again, in what follows, we will see the extent to which it is through the analysis of pathology\u2014accidental, temporarily induced, or experimentally produced\u2014that neurobiology has made its assault on the question of the mind and the self.\n\nFrom the Pathological to the Normal\n\nEarly on in his genial book _Making Up the Mind: How the Brain Creates Our Mental World_ , Chris Frith wrestles with the question of dualism and materialism. \"There can,\" he writes, \"be changes in the activity in my brain without any changes in my mind. On the other hand I firmly believe that there cannot be changes in my mind without there also being changes in brain activity\"\u2014a sentence that he annotates with a footnote declaring, \"I am not a dualist\" (Frith 2007a, 23). However, he immediately follows this with the following somewhat dualist pronouncement that \"everything that happens in my mind (mental activity) is caused by, or at least depends upon, brain activity\"\u2014a sentence that he annotates with a footnote declaring, \"I am a materialist. But I admit that I sometimes sound like a dualist\" (ibid.). He says that he talks of \"the brain 'not telling me everything it knows' or 'deceiving me'... because this is what the experience is like\" (ibid.). So we can ask questions like \"How does my brain know about the physical world?\"\u2014that is to say, we can ask what he terms \"a mind question\" as if it was a brain question. It is not clear how far this gets us in resolving those complex and slippery ways in which we are coming to shuffle the ways we speak of minds, brains, bodies, selves, persons, conscious intentions, unconscious decisions, and so forth. Frith's book is conducted as an imaginary debate with a mythical professor of English who points out the obvious error that brains can no more 'know' things than an encyclopedia that contains information about the world 'knows' about the world: even if the information is encoded in neurons rather than letters, we still seem to require some entity to 'read' it.\n\nBut nonetheless, his book is devoted to demonstrating that it is indeed the brain, not the mind, nor the conscious self, that creates the mental world in which humans live, including their capacity to act, interpret the actions of others, and inhabit a realm of meaning and culture. The route to this conclusion is an experimental one, making use of evidence from neuropathologies, or of the creation in the laboratory of some kind of artificial pathology, where damage to an area of the brain creates anomalies in what seems to be the normal experience of selfhood. In each case, that is to say, the technology for generating evidence depends upon breaching of the normal ways in which we inhabit our worlds. Breaching here, not in the sociological sense, where breaching is a method to render visible the taken for granted rules and presuppositions that make the micropractices of everyday life possible. But breaching the usual relations that hold between the brain and the world. And in so doing, the accidents and experiments that are drawn upon seem to demonstrate that certain central capacities of normal personhood are, in fact, creations of nonconscious neural mechanisms and that it is these nonconscious mechanisms that create the illusions within each individual's self-awareness\u2014the illusions of coherent, conscious, self-controlling capacities that are attributed to the normal person.\n\n**Lessons from Lesions**\n\n\"By studying patients... who have deficits and disturbances in the unity of self, we can gain deeper insights into what it means to be human\" (Ramachandran 2011, 288). Perhaps it is obvious that the pathway from mind to brain should begin with lesions. What could give a clearer indication of the role of brain in mental life than the lacks, distortions, and other strange consequences of physical damage to particular regions of the brain? As we have seen in previous chapters, contemporary histories of brain localization ritualistically invoke Phineas Gage and his unfortunate accident with that tamping iron (Macmillan 2000), and our current knowledge of functional brain regions still bears the names of neurologists (Broca, Wernicke, Fleschig) who studied lesions to cognitive functions such as speech and language. The 1987 edition of the translation of the Soviet neurologist, A. R. Luria's _The Man with a Shattered World_ (Luria 1973), the account of a man who loses his speech ability following a brain trauma during the Second World War, was introduced by Oliver Sacks, whose own romantic stories of the strange, sometimes wonderful, sometimes poignant worlds of those with damaged brains have become so popular (Sacks 1976, 1984, 1985, 1991). And yet, at least up to the 1990s, these authors did not frame their research, their findings, or their narratives in the way that has become routine today: in terms of the lessons that we could learn from such episodes about the ancient problem of the relations between mind and brain.\n\nWhat, then, are the contemporary neurobiological 'lessons from lesions' about the self\u2014the study of what the neurologist and psychiatrist Todd Feinberg terms \"neuropathologies of the self,\" where \"a brain lesion causes a profound and specific alteration in the patient's personal identity or personal relationships between the self and the world\" (Feinberg 2011, 75)? We can start with the famous split-brain experiments dating back to the early 1960s conducted by Michael Gazzaniga, with Roger Sperry, Joseph Bogen, and P. J. Vogel (the history of these experiments is reviewed in Gazzaniga 2005). These _callostomies_ involved severing the corpus callosum in human patients suffering from intractable epilepsy in an attempt to control the seizures. While it was initially claimed that they had no cognitive effects in humans, Roger Sperry and his colleagues showed that similar operations in animals led to very severe and profound deficits. Much research followed on the consequences in humans, for instance, in relation to the hemispheric localization of different aspects of language, vision, and causality, but only one aspect is relevant here\u2014that bearing on issues of the self.\n\nWhen a patient has his or her corpus callosum severed, Gazzaniga asks, \"does each disconnected half brain have its own sense of self... could it be that each hemisphere has its own point of view, its own self-referential system that is truly separate and different from the other hemisphere?\" He argues that there is indeed a lateralization, although not a complete one, in which \"the left hemisphere is quick to detect a partial self-image, even one that is only slightly reminiscent of the self, whereas the right brain needs an essentially full and complete picture of the self before it recognizes the image as such.... [T]he data indicate that a sense of self arises out of distributed networks in both hemispheres\" (Gazzaniga 2005, 657, 658). But however it may be affected by the operation, Gazzaniga's premise is clear: that it is indeed the brain that, through its patterned networks of neurons, produces the sense of self.\n\nOthers draw their evidence for the neural creation of the illusion of self from disturbances concerning the boundaries and components of the body. One that is regularly cited is the 'rubber hand' phenomenon (see, e.g., Metzinger 2009). Here individuals observing a rubber hand will sometimes attribute sensation to that hand rather than to their own. For example, experimental subjects will make this false attribution if they see the 'alien hand' being stroked by a brush while their own equivalent hand is stroked in the same way but is hidden from sight. After a few minutes, they will 'feel' the stroking on the rubber hand, even though it is separate from their body, rather than in their own, hidden, hand. It seems that the brain has attributed the sensation to a physically distinct object within its field of vision, and in the process, it has somehow incorporated that alien object into the body (Botvinick and Cohen 1998; Tsakiris and Haggard 2005).\n\nAnother lesson along these lines comes from the phenomenon of 'phantom limbs.' It has long been recognized in the literature that patients who have had a limb amputated often continue to experience sensations from that missing limb, sometimes believing that they can still move the absent hand or fingers, or that the amputated limb is present but locked in space, or, worse, feeling excruciating pain arising from that absent part of the body. This evidence shows, suggests Frith, that these are \"phantoms created in the brain\"; a conclusion that is further strengthened by the reverse situation, where individuals who have suffered damage to a particular area of the brain feel that they have had a limb amputated\u2014that they have 'lost' their hand, arm, leg, or foot. This shows, for those who think like Frith, that \"you do not have privileged access to knowledge about your own body\"\u2014that our feeling of effortless conscious control over our physical being in the world is an illusion created by the brain by \"hiding from us all the complex processes that are involved in discovering about the world\" (Frith 2007a, 72, 81).\n\nHence, as Gazzaniga and Cooney put it, neurological disorders illuminate the structure of human consciousness: \"subjective awareness emerges from the interactions of specialized, modular components in a distributed neural network. In addition, the activity of such components is united cognitively by an interpretive process that occurs in the left hemisphere of the human brain.... [T]he specialized nature of the component neural processors suggests a potential explanation for how specific lesions can selectively alter or eliminate the contents of particular aspects of subjective experience, with no resulting experience of deficit for the brain-damaged individual\" (Cooney and Gazzaniga 2003, 164). These, then, are the lessons from lesions.\n\n**Irreal Visions of a Real World**\n\nFrith, provocative as ever, titles chapter 5 of his book \"Our Perception of the World Is a Fantasy That Coincides with Reality.\" \"The remarkable thing about our perception of the physical world in all its beauty and detail is that it seems so easy.... But this very experience that our perception of the physical world is easy and immediate is an illusion created by our brains\" (Frith 2007a, 111). He points to various contributions to this way of understanding the work of the brain\u2014information theory, for example, which shows that messages can be recreated from physical events by eliminating noise and errors, and by the use of redundancy. He also notes the evidence that expectations and prior knowledge shape perception and that some of this prior knowledge is \"hard wired into the brain through millions of years of evolution\"\u2014for example, that light comes from above (the sun), and so our interpretation of patterns of shadows on objects interprets them as convex or concave on that assumption, as many optical illusions show (ibid.).\n\nThen there is Bayesian theory and what it tells us about the ways the brain creates beliefs or models of the world on the basis of successive predictions that are then compared with the patterns of activity detected from the senses, predictions that are linked to our actions in the world and the feedback they provide. What I perceive, then, is not the world, but \"my brain's model of the world,\" which combines the ambiguous cues from all my senses with a picture built up by past experience to generate predictions of what ought to be out there in the world, which I constantly test and refine through my actions (Frith 2007a, 132). This, it seems, is what is demonstrated by all those familiar optical illusions, from the Ames room through the Necker cube to the Rubin vase figure: \"our perceptions are fantasies that coincide with reality\"\u2014or perhaps we should say, that \"usually\" coincide with reality. It is not so much a question, says Frith, of whether the brain's model of the world is true, but whether it works\u2014enables us to take appropriate actions in order to survive. And all this happens effortlessly, outside of any consciousness. Our perception of the physical world is, in short, a fantasy constructed by our brains. And as for the physical world, so for the mental world\u2014we create models of the mental world of others in the same way, recognizing the motion of dancing figures from patterns of spots of light alone, inducing the goals and intentions of others into their movements and the direction of their eyes, imitating others, actually or mentally, and automatically imputing to them the same intentions as we ourselves would have if we were acting in this way (the line of thought extrapolated in the rhetoric of mirror neurons discussed in chapter 5) and much more.\n\nFrith, as we have noted, conducts his book as an imaginary debate with a skeptical professor of English, into whose mouth he places the supposed objections from the human sciences. As one would anticipate, she is distressed by the absence of meaning, language, and culture from these accounts, and the attribution to brains of capacities that should properly only be attributed to persons\u2014thinking, feeling, wanting, knowing, and so forth. But, beyond such objections, how should the human sciences respond to the fundamental proposition that the world we humans live in is not an immediate perception of some external reality? As we have seen, this has, in fact, been the founding presumption of much contemporary social thought, enabling a historical and cultural interrogation of both the form and the function of changing beliefs about persons and selves. If one was of a radical political bent, one could look to the French Marxist philosopher Louis Althusser, to whom the autonomous self is the central element in contemporary ideology, \"a representation of the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence\" (Althusser 1971, 153). Or if one was of a more philosophical bent, one could look to the American philosopher Nelson Goodman's notion of \"irrealism\"\u2014which he describes as a kind of radical relativism with rigorous constraints, in which many world versions\u2014some conflicting and irreconcilable with others\u2014are equally right (Goodman 1978, 1983). But it seems that, in the matter of the creation of worlds, dethroning the self-possessed self and its illusions of reality by culture and language is one thing, and dethroning the perceptual capacities of the self-possessed self by the nonconscious, automatic, evolutionarily shaped functioning of neurons and their hard- and soft-wired interconnections is quite another.\n\n**Libetism**\n\nIn 1983, Benjamin Libet and his colleagues published an article in _Brain_ titled \"Time of Conscious Intention to Act in Relation to Onset of Cerebral Activity (Readiness-Potential): The Unconscious Initiation of a Freely Voluntary Act\"\u2014an article that has become a standard reference for almost every account of the implications of neurobiology for mind-brain relations and the idea of free will. Perhaps it is not too much to describe the way of thinking that was engendered by this article as _Libetism_. What then is Libetism?\n\nLibet's experiment relied on a finding that a certain pattern of brain activity in prefrontal motor areas that is termed the \"readiness-potential\" (RP), which can be measured by electrodes placed (externally) on the scalp, had been observed to occur up to a second or more before an individual is aware of having initiated an act. Libet and his colleagues worked with six college students, divided into two groups of three, each sitting in a \"partially reclining position in a lounge chair\" with recording equipment attached to their heads and a cathode ray oscilloscope in front of them into which they were to stare without blinking. They instructed each subject \"when he felt like doing so, to perform the quick, abrupt flexion of the fingers and\/or the wrist of his right hand.\" In a second experiment, they instructed each subject \" 'to let the urge to act appear on its own at any time without any preplanning or concentration on when to act,' that is, to try to be 'spontaneous' in deciding when to perform each act; this instruction was designed to elicit voluntary acts that were freely capricious in origin\" (Libet, Gleason, Wright, et al. 1983, 625). The time of initiation of the RP was recorded using the monitoring equipment attached to the scalp.\n\nWhy were the subjects asked to stare without blinking at the oscilloscope? Well, this had a revolving beam like the second hand of a clock, with spots marked on the circumference, and the subjects had to remember, and subsequently report, the \"clock position\" on that oscilloscope. In some trials each had to report the position at \"the time of appearance of his conscious _awareness of 'wanting' to perform_ a given self-initiated movement. The experience was also described as an 'urge' or 'intention' or 'decision' to move, though subjects usually settled for the words 'wanting' or 'urge.' \" In other trials they had to report \"the time of subject's _awareness_ that he\/she _'actually moved'_ \" or, in a third series, where the movement was triggered by an external stimulus, the \"time of _awareness of the sensation_ elicited by the near-threshold stimulus pulse to the back of the hand, delivered at randomly irregular times unknown to the subject\" (Libet, Gleason, Wright, et al. 1983, 627). Of course, there were many other technical details and much statistical analysis of the results. And the conclusion?\n\n\"It is clear that neuronal processes that precede a self-initiated voluntary action, as reflected in the readiness-potential, generally begin substantially _before_ the reported appearance of conscious intention to perform that specific act. This temporal difference of several hundreds of milliseconds appeared fairly consistently\" (Libet, Gleason, Wright, et al. 1983, 635). Thus, it seems, \"the brain decides\" to act before awareness of, or conscious initiation of, that act:\n\nSince onset of RP regularly begins at least several hundreds of milliseconds before the appearance of a reportable time for awareness of any subjective intention or wish to act, it would appear that some neuronal activity associated with the eventual performance of the act has started well before any (recallable) conscious initiation or intervention could be possible. Put another way, the brain evidently \"decides\" to initiate or, at the least, prepare to initiate the act at a time before there is any reportable subjective awareness that such a decision has taken place. It is concluded that cerebral initiation even of a spontaneous voluntary act, of the kind studied here, can and usually does begin _unconsciously._ The term \"unconscious\" refers here simply to all processes that are not expressed as a conscious experience; this may include and does not distinguish among preconscious, subconscious or other possible nonreportable unconscious processes.... These considerations would appear to introduce certain constraints on the potential of the individual for exerting conscious initiation and control over his voluntary acts. (Ibid., 640)\n\nSo, if the brain decides to act prior to conscious initiation of an act, where then lies the possibility for free will\u2014a retrospective rationalization of the act, giving the subject the illusion that he or she has actually consciously willed it, whereas in fact it was the brain that decided? Libet and his colleagues allow two ways out\u2014the subject might decide to veto or abort the performance\u2014for both the RP and the awareness of the decision appeared _before_ the actual movement in question. Or \"[i]n those voluntary actions that are not 'spontaneous' and quickly performed, that is, in those in which conscious deliberation (of whether to act or of what alternative choice of action to take) precedes the act, the possibilities for conscious initiation and control would not be excluded by the present evidence\" (Libet, Gleason, Wright, et al. 1983, 641). This is what we have termed _Libetism_.\n\n\"The result,\" observes Frith, \"had such a vast impact outside psychology because it seemed to show that even our simplest voluntary actions are predetermined. We think we are making a choice when, in fact, our brain has already made the choice\" (Frith, 2007a, 67). Of course, to most people who pause to consider this experiment, the idea that this tells us anything about the exercise of human will in any of the naturally occurring situations where individuals believe they have made a conscious choice\u2014to take a holiday, choose a restaurant, apply for a job, vote for a political party, approach a potential girlfriend or boyfriend, write a letter of complaint to some authority\u2014is absurd. Not only is the task involved in Libet-like experiments trivial, and the perspective of the subjects of the experiment on their role ignored, but the results simply meant that those subjects reported their awareness of that decision\u2014the \"urge\"\u2014a few milliseconds after a brain change occurred\u2014a fact that seems to be about the process of reporting rather than the process of deciding. Actually, one has to be a strange kind of dualist, first to distinguish, and then to reconnect these two in a relation of causality. And, of course, even experimental psychologists find flaws in the welter of conclusions about free will that Libet and others built on such findings. For example, Frith points out that, to put it mildly, the freedom of these subjects was somewhat constrained\u2014they had a task to perform and an experimenter to satisfy: \"The participants are not actually making free choices about action. They are playing a complex game with the experimenter\" (ibid., 187).\n\nAlthough current neurobiological understandings of volition are significantly more complex and subtle (see Haggard 2008 for an excellent review), Libetism is alive and well, especially in debates with neuroscientists and philosophers about the idea of free will (Frith 2002; Wegner 2002). When the minds (or brains) of those who think like this turn to the implications for the law and legal notions of responsibility, Libetism is often coupled with some of the other arguments we have reviewed in this section and presented without the qualifications that Libet himself makes. Here, for instance, was the British neuropsychiatrist Sean Spence, whose brain presumably initiated the writing of this in the mid-1990s:\n\nThe purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that a conscious free will (in the sense of consciousness initiating action) is incompatible with the evidence of neuroscience, and the phenomenology described in the literature of normal creativity, psychotic passivity, and the neurological syndrome of the alien limb or hand. In particular the work of Libet and others who have directly stimulated the brain and measured activity from its surface leads to the conclusion that subjective states (be they sensory or intentional) are preceded by predictive neural activity... \"decisions\" to act arise prior to our conscious awareness of them. Thus our \"decision\" or \"freedom\" is illusory (if by these terms we mean conscious phenomena). It occurs after activity has been initiated.... The decision does not make itself. It is a product or correlate of preceding neuronal events. (Spence 1996, 75, 83\u201384)\n\nMichael Gazzaniga is a little more cautious, writing in _Neuron_ in 2008 under the title \"The Law and Neuroscience\":\n\nOne thing we are certain of is that the \"work\" in the brain happens before we are consciously aware of our mental struggles. Researchers have, since as early as 1965, advanced our understanding of the fact that much of the work is done at the subconscious level (Kornhuber and Deecke, 1965; Libet et al., 1979; Soon et al. 2008). A decision, for example, can be predicted several seconds before the subject consciously decides. If it is simply the brain, working up from its unconscious neural elements, that causes a person to act (even before he or she is aware of making a decision), how can we hold any person liable for his or her mental decisions? To hold someone responsible for his or her actions, one must find a \"there\" there. Is a little guy pulling the levers in your head producing a free-floating you? Modern neuroscience, of course, tells us the answer is \"no.\" (Gazzaniga 2008b, 413)\n\nWhere, then, does this leave the question of the self and the person? In the brief epilogue at the end of his book, Frith turns his mind, or his brain, to this issue. With all this talk of the brain, and how much it achieves without any conscious or willed engagement, without thought or awareness, how is one to account for the feeling of \"I\"\u2014that I think, that I intend, that I act? Perhaps there is an area in the brain that corresponds to this \"I\"ness\u2014but surely not a kind of homunculus, for that would merely be to replicate the question that it was intended to solve. No, if the brain does so much that we usually attribute to consciousness, then the perception that one is a conscious \"I\"\u2014and that others are also such \"I\"s\u2014must itself be produced by the brain as a result of evolution: \"This is my brain's final illusion:... [to] create an autonomous self.\" But he goes on to tell us that his is not a book about consciousness, although, as he points out \"[a]fter the age of about 50, many neuroscientists feel they have sufficient wisdom and experience to set about solving the problem of consciousness\" (Frith 2007a, 189). He adds the acerbic footnote: \"Whether or not they have ever done any experimental work on the topic.\"\n\nPerhaps it would be unfair to think of Thomas Metzinger in the context of this remark, for although he is a theoretical philosopher, he works closely with cognitive neuroscientists. Nonetheless, his argument is put provocatively: human beings \"do not have selves.\" He argues that \"we live our conscious lives in our own Ego Tunnel, lacking direct contact with outside reality but possessing an inward, first person perspective.\" This ego tunnel, which has evolved for controlling and predicting our behavior and understanding the behavior of others, creates a robust feeling of being in contact with an outside world, and a sense of immediate contact with our selves\u2014\"the self is not a thing but a process... we are 'selfing' organisms: At the very moment we wake up in the morning, the physical system, that is\u2014ourselves\u2014starts the process of 'selfing' \" (Metzinger 2009, 207\u20138). But do those who have done the experimental work on this topic share this view of the constitutive illusion of the human self?\n\nThe Self: From Soul to Brain\n\n\"An Ape with a Soul\" is the title that V. S. Ramachandran gives to the penultimate chapter of his popular book _The Tell-Tale Brain: A Neuroscientist's Quest for What Makes Us Human_ (2011). It opens it with an account of a patient called Jason, who suffered a serious head injury in a car accident, followed by a long period in a semiconscious state of akinetic mutism. Jason seemed alert, could move his eyes, but could not recognize anyone, talk, or comprehend speech\u2014except in one context. If his father, whom he neither recognized nor spoke to directly, telephoned him from another room, he became alert and talkative on the phone. For Ramachandran, Jason was a person when he was on the phone but not otherwise\u2014a person, he suggests, requires \"the ability to form rich, meaningful metarepresentations, which are essential not only to our uniqueness as a species, but also our uniqueness as individuals and our sense of self\" (Ramachandran 2011, 246).\n\nIt is, it seems, _metarepresentations_ that are the key. Like other neuroscientists, despite some difference of terminology, Ramachandran distinguishes between what he terms first-order sensory representations of external objects\u2014which evolved earlier, and humans share with many other animals\u2014and metarepresentations\u2014representations of representations, created by a part of the brain that evolved later and works \"by processing the information from the first brain into manageable chunks that can be used for a wider repertoire of more sophisticated responses, including language and symbolic thought\" (Ramachandran 2011, 246). He distinguishes seven dimensions, which together create a sense of self \"in the normal human brain,\" each of which may be disrupted or eliminated where a region of the brain is damaged or nonfunctional: _unity_ \u2014a myriad of sensory experiences somehow cohere to give the sense that one is a single individual; _continuity_ \u2014the ability to project oneself back and forward in time with a continuing identity; _embodiment_ \u2014the sense that one's body, and only parts of one's own body such as one's limbs, belong to oneself; _privacy_ \u2014that one's experiences of sensations, qualia, and one's mental life are one's own, alone; _social embedding_ \u2014Rose. that we are part of, and can interact with, a social environment; _free will_ \u2014that one is able consciously to \"choose between alternative courses of action with the full knowledge that you could have chosen otherwise\" (ibid., 252); and _self-awareness\u2014_ an aspect of selfhood that is, for Ramachandran, axiomatic.\n\nIt is hardly necessary to point out that Ramachandran's sense of self consists precisely in those features of selfhood that Charles Taylor suggests arise from a historically limited mode of self-interpretation. For the human sciences, the time of such a history is that of human culture. For Ramachandran, the time is that of evolution: these features are indeed understood as the outcome of evolved features of human neurobiology, creating the sense of unified selfhood arising from the human brain itself\u2014seemingly independent of its historical or cultural moorings. At the root of his analysis, as for many other neurobiologists, is the view that neural organization is not a unitary whole but a multiplicity, an assemblage that has come together over the course of evolution.\n\nAs Francisco Varela puts it: \"brains are not logical machines, but highly co-operative, nonhomogeneous.... [T]he entire system resembles a patchwork of subnetworks assembled by a complicated history of tinkering, rather than an optimized system resulting from some clean unified design... networks whose abilities are restricted to specific, concrete, cognitive activities as they interact with each other\" (Varela 1992, 321). Whether it is Michael Gazzaniga's modular conception of the brain as \"organized into relatively independent functioning units that work in parallel\" apart from our conscious verbal selves, contributing to consciousness but often producing behavior without conscious intervention (Gazzaniga 1985b, 4), or Marvin Minsky's idea of mind as a society of multiple agents with limited and circumscribed abilities (Minsky 1986), the message is clear: mental activity is made up from the interconnections and interactions between many relatively distinct components, each with its own mode of action. And yet, out of this assemblage, for humans at least, unless interrupted by pathology or tricked by experiment, a sense of a punctual, unified, continuous, autonomous, and self-conscious self always emerges.\n\nThe neurobiological self, then, is not to be equated with consciousness. Presenting a paper at an event he co-organized under the auspices of the New York Academy of Sciences titled \"The Self: From Soul to Brain,\" Joseph LeDoux sought to characterize an emerging body of thought within neuroscience that articulated this \"broader view of the self\" as a multiplicity with several distinct aspects, many of which are nonconscious (LeDoux 2003, 296\u201397). He argued that the notion of the self can be thought of along an evolutionary continuum: while only humans have the unique aspects of the self that are made possible by their brains, other animals have the kinds of selves made possible by _their_ brains. As summarized by Henry Moss, in his review of the conference, for LeDoux: \"our 'selves' are our brains, or, more accurately, the synaptic connections and systems that capture our experiences and memories, and express our habits and dispositions\" (Moss 2003, 2). \"Because you are a unique individual, the particular multifaceted aspects of the self that define 'you' are present in your brain alone. And in order for you to remain who you are from minute to minute, day to day, and year to year, your brain must somehow retain the essence of who you are over time.... [T]he self is essentially a memory, or more accurately, a set of memories\" (LeDoux 2003, 298).\n\nBut LeDoux is at pains to stress that this way of understanding our selfhood is not at the expense of all others\u2014the view of the self as psychological, social, or spiritual in nature and not neural: \"My assertion that synapses are the basis [of] your personality _does not assume that your personality is determined by synapses; rather, it's the other way around._ Synapses are simply the brain's way of receiving, storing, and retrieving our personalities, as determined by all the psychological, cultural, and other factors, including genetic ones.... A neural understanding of human nature in fact broadens rather than constricts our sense of who we are\" (LeDoux 2003, 302\u20133; emphasis added). The self _is_ the brain, the self is _based on_ the synapses, the synapses are ways of storing a multitude of inputs that constitute our personality, and the self is a set of memories. One suspects this constant slippage of terminology masks a deeper confusion about what it is that is being written about here. And the matter is made even less clear when LeDoux invokes the preeminently psychological concept of _personality_ , which he does not define, as the locus where nature and nurture interact in the \"wiring of synapses\" that makes possible the self, while still arguing that the source of identity and continuity of the person remains nonconscious\u2014the brain itself.\n\nDespite these diverse, terminologically slippery, and somewhat confused accounts, neuroscientists such as Ramachandran and LeDoux consider that _coherence_ is the very condition of normal selfhood. LeDoux is typical in suggesting that when such coherence fails, mental health deteriorates\u2014indeed mental illness, it seems, centrally involves the failure of that sense of coherent selfhood. But if the self is, or arises from, or is based upon, a multiplicity, how does the _impression_ of unity and coherence necessary for normality emerge? LeDoux is somewhat vague, suggesting that all the different systems in the brain experience the same world, and that all the systems are interconnected and use the same monoamines, and that this, somehow, enables most of us, most of the time, to hold our self together.\n\nIn her contribution to the event, Patricia Churchland, however, addresses the problem of coherence directly. She focuses on what she terms the \"self-concept.\" \"[I]t is useful to start,\" she says, \"with the idea that one's self-concept is a set of organizational tools for 'coherencing' the brain's plans, decisions, and perceptions,\" and it turns out that there are remarkably diverse ways in which individuals refer to themselves; thinking of these in terms of \"the self-representational capacities of the brain thus deflates the temptation to think of the self as a singular entity and encourages the idea that self-representing involves a plurality of functions, each having a range of shades, levels, and degrees\" (Churchland 2003, 32). This suggests that various levels of such coherencing can be found in other species, as a result of the nature of their particular brains. She draws on diverse evidence for her suggestion that there is a physical basis in the brain for the capacities for self-representation\u2014not just evidence of the neural bases for the representation of the functions of the internal milieu of the body, but also split-brain studies, developmental studies of the capacity for self-representation in children and the fading of such capacities in dementia, studies of amnesic subjects with various lesions who seem to have lost all their autobiographical information, confusion about self\/nonself boundaries in schizophrenia, patients with lesions in various regions who show limb-denial, alien hand syndrome, personality change, and the like.\n\nAnd she follows Damasio in arguing that the self\/nonself distinction provides the basis for consciousness, as it builds capacities to distinguish between internal and external representations, creating a metarepresentational model of the relation between inner and outer worlds: \"as wiring modifications enable increasingly sophisticated simulation and deliberation, the self-representational apparatus becomes correspondingly more elaborate, and therewith the self\/not-self apparatus. On this hypothesis, the degrees or levels of conscious awareness are upgraded in tandem with the self-representational upgrades\" (Churchland 2003, 37). \"The self thus turns out to be identifiable not with a nonphysical soul, but rather with a set of representational capacities of the physical brain\" (ibid., 31).\n\nNow this is clearer, and indeed accords with the kinds of arguments made in the human sciences\u2014the self is an imaginary representation of the real relations that any human being has to its internal world and external milieu. Leaving aside the _re_ -in representation\u2014which always misleadingly directs us to asking what is it that is present prior to its re-presentation\u2014we can now ask the interesting questions about how experience, culture, language, and so forth shape these representations. But that is not the direction pursued by most neuroscientists. Instead, some, entranced by the apparent capacities of neuroimaging to localize anything referred to by a 'mind' kind of word in some brain region activated during a task carried out in a scanner, ask where in the brain this representational self can be found (Feinberg and Keenan 2005; Northoff, Qin, and Feinberg 2011). One way to approach this is familiar: study those who appear to have a deficit in some aspect of self-representation (Sinigaglia and Rizzolatti 2011, 71).\n\nThus Baron-Cohen and others committed to the importance of theory of mind have suggested that the \"mindblindness\" or theory of mind deficits they find in those diagnosed with autism spectrum disorders may also affect the ways in which the individual becomes aware of his or her own experience and can use that self-awareness in understanding the experience, or the minds, of others (Carruthers 2009). Some suggest that perhaps this might be located in an anomaly in the right temporo-parietal junction, which may be part of a distributed network of brain regions that is 'recruited' for mentalizing about both self and other (Lombardo, Chakrabarti, Bullmore, et al. 2010; Lombardo and Baron-Cohen 2011). Others have taken different routes to discover the neural correlates of the various components of such metarepresentational capacities, seeking to identify and localize the neural systems of subsystems responsible for each aspect considered crucial for the emergence of the self: first-person perspective in spatial navigation, first-person narrative comprehension, self-face recognition, self-memory, awareness of the boundaries of one's own body, awareness of relation of self to social environment, and much more. These studies are well reviewed by Gillihan and Farah, who conclude that \"many of the claims for the special status of self-related processing are premature given the evidence and that the various self-related research programs do not seem to be illuminating a unitary, common system, despite individuals' subjective experience of a unified self\" (Gillihan and Farah 2005).\n\nThis is not surprising given the fact that most of those carrying out these studies are either confused or imprecise about what they mean by 'the self,' and this imprecision is manifested when they redeploy brain imaging tasks and procedures devised for other purposes to try to localize 'selfhood' in a particular brain region (Zahavi and Roepstorff 2011). Paradoxically, however, the weaknesses of attempts to 'locate' the self in the brain serves to support the general thesis\u2014that the conscious feeling of selfhood, as self-awareness, coherent identity, willful agency, and the like emerges out of the transactions among a whole array of evolutionarily distinct and functionally separate subsystems, whose modes of operation not only exceed that self-awareness and constitute it, but are, in principle, unavailable to it.\n\nThere is, as we have already mentioned, a long tradition of research on cultural variability in self-concepts. There was a revival of interest in this work in the sociology and anthropology of the 1980s: most argued that cultures shaped the self by acting on collective beliefs, practices of socialization, and individual psychologies. Can the brain take on the role that the psyche once occupied\u2014can these brain-based conceptions of the self open themselves to culture? Today, it seems, the answer is yes: for as we have seen in previous chapters, the twenty-first century brain is not an organ whose fate is fixed at the moment of conception or birth, but is plastic and open to external influences throughout development and indeed throughout life.\n\nFor LeDoux, as we have seen, selves are memories, and memories are patterns of synaptic interconnections. How are these patterns of synaptic interconnections established? In a tradition that goes back to Donald Hebb's maxim that \"what fires together, wires together\" (Hebb 1949), it is now 'experience' that shapes the patterns of neural connections that are strengthened\u2014and what is experience, if not cultural? This, for example, is the argument developed by Naomi Quinn in her contribution to _The Self: From Soul to Brain_ , titled \"Cultural Selves\": \"Thus, to LeDoux's picture of how neural processes engage multiple neural systems to endow each person with a self, must be added a description of how a very different set of processes, those that enter the cultural patterning of experience, shape and enhance that self.... The cultural patterning of the world we live in is so far-reaching and so all-encompassing that it cannot help but pattern our synaptic connections\" (Quinn 2003, 146). In this neural version of the social shaping of the self, all culturally variable aspects of selfhood familiar from psychological accounts\u2014habit, comportment, distinctions between good and bad behavior, practices for self-management, \"cultural schema\"\u2014are inscribed into the developing brain itself through the patterns of synaptic connections formed during child rearing and socialization.\n\nYet despite this belated entry of culture, we are left with something of a paradox. For while evolved neural processes and pathways provide the _capacities_ for self-representation, for this metarepresentation of representations that becomes conscious and amenable to awareness, what accounts for the _form_ of such representations? By this we mean, not the 'content' of the self\u2014for this is what is addressed by the claims about the role of cultural schema and the like\u2014but the _sense of self_ itself. Is that form\u2014unitary, punctual, continuing, attributing autonomy and free will to itself\u2014given in the neural capacities and hence universal? Or is it socially and historically variable, as argued by the cultural and historical sciences?\n\nPerhaps this is merely a new version of that double-faced conception of the self that was articulated by Marcel Mauss many decades ago. Mauss, as we have seen, argued that the _category_ of the self or the person is historically and culturally variable\u2014by which he means, he says, the notion or concept that people in different ages have formed of it. Yet, to repeat, he asserts that \"there has never existed a human being who has not been aware, not only of his body, but at the same time also of his individuality, both spiritual and physical.\" In other words, while the _form_ of the self is variable across cultures and epochs, he believes that the _sense of self_ is universal. It is worth quoting the remarks with which he continues: \"The psychology of this awareness has made immense strides over the last century, for almost a hundred years. All neurologists, French, English and German, among them my teacher Ribot, our esteemed colleague Head, and others, have amassed a great deal of knowledge about this subject and the way this particular awareness is formed, functions, deteriorates, deviates and dissolves.... My subject is entirely different and independent of this\" (Mauss [1938] 1985, 2).\n\nShould we be content with this distinction between what we owe to nature and what we owe to culture? Should we delegate the task of understanding the biological conditions of awareness, consciousness, and the sense of self to neurobiology and allocate to an \"entirely different\" enterprise the task of exploring the ways that humans at different times and places come to speak about selves, allocate statuses and capacities to them, mark them culturally, differentiate among them, and so forth? These questions undoubtedly inhabit distinct registers. But the distinction between an esoteric scientific discourse and an everyday lay understanding is itself a fact of history\u2014scientific truths and cultural truths are not always so distinct. What happens, then, when these two dimensions transect and intertwine? What happens when the quotidian conception that human beings have of themselves is itself shaped in part by the truth claims made in an esoteric language of science? This certainly was the case for psychological conceptions of personhood across the twentieth century. Is it also our contemporary condition in relation to neurobiology?\n\nA Mutation in Ethics and Self-Technologies?\n\nDespite their many differences, it is possible to identify a general picture of 'the self' and 'the person' emerging from contemporary developments in the brain sciences. In this picture, consciousness, with its image of the person as unified, purposive, intentional, and self-aware, is by no means the master in its own house. Consciousness is an effect, a metarepresentation, which creates an illusory, but probably evolutionarily advantageous, sense of coherence and self-direction. In fact, however, our conscious selves are not aware of, let alone in control of, the multitude of neural processes that enable us to live our lives: to receive, interpret, and respond to sensory inputs, to create an internal sense of our embodiment, to manage our motor skills and comportment, to remember and sometimes to recall previous experiences, to respond to many features in our environment and to humans and other animate entities, and to select among, and carry out, various options for action. It is not just that these, and many other processes essential to survival happen outside of our consciousness. It is that they are _in principle_ unavailable to consciousness in normal circumstances, although some can become amenable to conscious control under particular conditions or with appropriate training.\n\nThere is not much in this account that is new or startling to those from the _Geisteswissenschaften._ The novelty of contemporary neurobiological arguments lies elsewhere, in the claims about the processes that enable all this to occur. But does this renewed recognition of the limits of our awareness and conscious control over the neural infrastructure that enables us to consider ourselves as selves have any relevance to the way in which we are, to use Foucault's phrase, \"constituted as moral subjects of our own actions\" (Foucault 1984, 49)? Is it now these nonconscious neural processes that are considered as the constitutors of moral action, the origin of morally relevant conduct, the subject of moral evaluation, the target of self-improvement? Has the new prominence of the brain in these truth discourses effaced older forms of selfhood, rendering personhood exclusively, or largely, a matter of brains? The answer to the first set of questions is a qualified yes\u2014at least for some of our authorities, though perhaps not yet for many individuals themselves, those neural processes, now attributed names, locations, and mechanisms, have achieved salience and acquired a seeming practicability. But the answer to the latter is certainly no: personhood has not become 'brainhood.'\n\nThe brain has certainly become a rich register for narratives for self-fashioning. There are now many neurobiological technologies of selfhood, that is to say, practices that seek to mold, shape, reform, or improve aspects of one's person\u2014moods, emotions, cognition, desire\u2014by acting on or through the brain. But with what consequences for personhood? Let us briefly consider perhaps the longest established of these contemporary neurotechnologies\u2014psychopharmaceuticals.\n\nDespite the claims of some that such drugs promise a painless modulation of personality (Kramer 1992), and the reciprocal worries of some who believe the drugs offer a shallow and facile chemical manipulation of one's selfhood (President's Council on Bioethics (U.S.) and Kass 2003), there is little evidence here of a reduction of personhood to the brain. It is not only that the drugs do not work as advertised\u2014they do not have the remarkable therapeutic properties once claimed for them, and their mode of operation is far less specific than initially thought (Moncrieff and Cohen 2005; Moncrieff 2008). It is also that what such drugs promise is not designer moods or designer selves; they do not offer a limitless and painless recrafting of one's personhood through a simple chemical redesign of the brain (Rose 2003, 2007). The image that they offer is different, and it appeals to those who believe that, for whatever reason, they have lost touch with themselves, that they fail to recognize themselves in the person that they have become. The promise they offer is not that you will become someone new, but that you may be able to get your life back, to become yourself again, to feel, once more, like the \"real me\" or \"better than well\" (Kramer 1992, x). And to get your life back, to return to the 'real you' that you were once, that you that your loved ones remember, you must do more than consume a pill: this requires work on the self\u2014introspection, self-monitoring, perhaps cognitive behavior therapy\u2014all implying the existence of persons with brains, not persons who are their brains.\n\nThe two most powerful empirical studies of the way in which individuals engage psychopharmaceuticals in their everyday lives and practices of self-fashioning are David Karp's _Is It Me or My Meds?_ (Karp 2006) and Emily Martin's _Bipolar Expeditions_ (Martin 2007; see also Martin 2006). Each contains compelling firsthand accounts of individuals seeking to manage psychiatric conditions that they consider, at least in part, to be biological, based upon, arising from, or otherwise linked to, anomalies in their neurobiology. But in no case do these individuals consider themselves to be mere fleshly puppets of their brains or their neurotransmitters: they are persons with brains, and persons who believe that they experience their brain states by means of what we might loosely call a psychological sense of their own consciousness, and who need, as a matter of their psychological and subjective responsibilities, to manage their moods through the modulated use of psychoactive medication. It is true that they employ a vocabulary in which their personhood is shaped by their biology, and altered by their medication. And they wonder if their changing moods are caused by the condition itself, by the interaction of the medication upon the condition, or by their own actions and their interactions with family, friends, or professionals.\n\nWhile it has certainly become possible for human beings today to understand their actions, emotions, desires, and moods in a neurobiological language, their sense that they are inhabited by a psychology remains, and remains crucial. For it is through that psychological selfhood that they are required to enact the responsibilities that they have now acquired over the consequences of their troubled and troublesome brains. While one might now have the opportunity of modulating specific aspects of personhood by neurochemical means, it remains the responsibility of the person to manage himself or herself by acting on the brain. Indeed this reminds, us, if we need reminding, that our own time is not unique in having multiple and often inconsistent and contradictory repertoires for describing and managing personhood and selfhood, which are activated and deployed in different contexts and practices, and in different departments of life. If over the past century a psychological sense of the person has come to dominate in our ways of thinking, speaking, and acting in so many practices, and interpreting the actions of others, it is unlikely easily to be effaced by neurobiology.\n\nBut drugs are not the only neurotechnologies. There are now multiple attempts to persuade individuals to adopt or use technologies that claim to act directly to modulate the brain and its development. For example, we have seen the emergence of 'brain education' or 'brain awareness programs.' The Dana Foundation, in partnership with the Society for Neuroscience, runs Brain Awareness Weeks, described as \"the global campaign to increase public awareness about the progress and benefits of brain research. Every March BAW unites the efforts of organizations worldwide in a week-long celebration of the brain. During BAW campaign partners organize activities to educate and excite people of all ages about the brain and brain research. Events are limited only by the organizers' imaginations. Examples include open days at neuroscience laboratories; museum exhibitions about the brain; lectures on brain-related topics; displays at malls, libraries, and community centers; and classroom workshops.\" They involve downloadable coloring sheets for children, based on the Dana Alliance's Mindboggling booklet series; downloadable puzzles for all ages, based on the content of Dana Alliance publications; tests of neuroscience know-how; tools for educating policymakers; and activities organized by many universities and organizations in the United Kingdom and the United States, as well as in many other countries, such as Malaysia.\n\nPlasticity plays an explicit rhetorical role in arguments for such interventions on the brain. Thus the International Brain Education Association supports brain education across the world, basing its philosophy on neuroplasticity:\n\nA few decades back, scientists thought that people could have very limited influence over their brains. It was assumed that by the time people reached adulthood, their brain connections were permanently and indelibly in place.... Recently we have discovered the neuroplasticity of the brain. Right up to the end of your life, you can restructure and adapt your brain according to your needs. Your capacity to change your brain depends on your choice, nothing is predetermined.... The brain is the only organ that exerts influence on the world outside your body as well as inside your body.... IBREA's message is that if we all chose to use our brains to pursue the common good and bring humanity together under a common system of life values, our lives and our experience in this Earth will become much more meaningful and hopeful.\n\nOr consider Power Brain Education, which disseminates programs that \"teach how to use the brain well, through physical conditioning and balance, sensory awareness, emotional regulation, concentration, and imagination.\" There is also the Brain Gym movement founded by Paul Dennison, although its promoters are honest enough to explain: \"The investigation of the neuroscience that underpins Brain Gym is an eagerly awaited project for the future. We can only at the present time hypothesise about why without actually knowing.\" And this is not to mention all the organizations offering techniques for brain fitness, brain health, or brain improvement, such as SharpBrains, whose 2011 summit was titled \"Retooling Brain Health for the 21st Century,\" or Neurobics, \"a unique new system of brain exercises based on the latest scientific research from leading neurobiology labs around the world... the first and only program scientifically based on the brain's ability to produce natural growth factors called neurotrophins that help fight off the effects of mental aging.\" And, closely related, one sees the invention or rebranding of an array of nutritional products or other devices purporting to improve brain fitness\u2014brain foods, brain drinks, brain-boosting games for Nintendo, and so forth.\n\nBut one can also act on one's brain by acting on one's mind. This is most clearly exemplified in the intersections of neuroscience and Buddhism, both in its pure versions in the Mind and Life Institutes and in the somewhat de-based version of 'mindfulness' being taught in sites ranging from psychotherapy to business management. But there is much more. A few minutes on the Internet will lead to dozens of philanthropic organizations, quasi-religious evangelicals for peace, and profit-seeking enterprises organized around this premise\u2014your brain is amazing; it is flexible; it can be trained, developed, improved, optimized: learn to use it well for your own benefit and for that of your society, perhaps even for the world. It is not that you have _become_ your brain, or that you are identical with your brain, but you can act on your brain, even if that brain is not directly available to consciousness, and in so acting, you can improve yourself\u2014not as a brain, but as a person.\n\nCaring for the Neurobiological Self\n\nOur argument in this chapter has been that the emerging neuroscientific understandings of selfhood are unlikely to efface modern human beings' understanding of themselves as persons equipped with a deep interior world of mental states that have a causal relation to our action. Rather, they are likely to add a neurobiological dimension to our self-understanding and our practices of self-management. In this sense, the \"somatic individuality\" (Novas and Rose 2000; Rose 2007c), which was once the province of the _psy_ -sciences, is spreading to the _neuro_ -sciences. Yet _psy_ is not being displaced by _neuro_ : neurobiological conceptions of the self are being construed alongside psychological ones. We extend our hopes and fears over our biomedical bodies to that special organ of the brain; act upon the brain as on the body, to reform, cure, or improve ourselves; and have a new register to understand, speak, and act upon ourselves\u2014and on others\u2014as the kinds of beings whose characteristics are shaped by neurobiology.\n\nThis is not a biology of fate or destiny\u2014although we may sometimes describe ourselves as fated, for example, when diagnosed with a neurodegenerative disorder\u2014but a biology that is open for intervention and improvement, malleable and plastic, and for which we have responsibility to nurture and optimize. If our contemporary ethical practices are increasingly 'somatic,' that is to say, organized around the care of our corporeal selves, aided by rules for living articulated by somatic experts from doctors to dieticians, we should not be surprised if care of the brain becomes one aspect of this 'somatic ethics' (Rose 2007c). But in all these neurotechnologies, the self that is urged to take care of its brain retains the form of selfhood that took shape in the late twentieth century\u2014the commitment to autonomy and self-fulfillment, the sense of personal responsibility for one's future, the desire for self-optimization, the will, often the obligation, to act on our selves to improve ourselves over the whole of our lives. That is to say, we are not seeing personhood replaced by brainhood, but the emergence of a new register or dimension of selfhood, _alongside_ older ones\u2014a dimension in which we can understand and take care of ourselves, in part, by acting on our brains.\n\nAdded those other obligations, we are now acquiring a new one: the obligation to take care of our brain\u2014and of the brains of our families and children\u2014for the good of each and of all. For as we have seen throughout the book, brains are now construed as persistently plastic, molded across the life-course and hence requiring constant care and prudence. There is clearly an \"elective affinity,\" to use Max Weber's term, between this emphasis on plastic, flexible brains and more general sociopolitical changes that prioritize individual flexibility across the life span to accommodate to rapidly changing economic demands, cultural shifts, and technological advances\u2014and that demand a constant labor of self-improvement on the part of today's citizens. Indeed, that link is made explicitly in the marketing of many of the neurotechnologies we have discussed. But it would be too easy to merely map the neural onto the social in this way. Such socioreductionism would be a short-cut, sidestepping the work of analysis required to link these developments in the neurosciences and neurotechnologies with their sociopolitical context. The wish to fashion the self is not a recent phenomenon, nor is the belief that the continuous work of improving the self is a virtuous exercise of freedom. In the liberal societies of the West, from around the 1960s, at least for some of the middle classes and for many young people, such self-fashioning became no longer the privilege of the elite, the philosopher, the dandy, or the aesthete. The radical democratization of self-fashioning over the closing decades of the twentieth century has been taken into new territory with the spectacular diversification of authorities of the self in the age of the Internet. What is novel, then, is not the aspiration to shape, improve, fashion oneself, but the source of authority that underpins it, the technologies that it deploys, and the target or substance upon which it operates\u2014the brain itself.\nConclusion\n\nManaging Brains, Minds, and Selves\n\nAre developments in the neurosciences transforming our conceptions of what it is to be a human being? If so, how have they come to achieve this role, what forms are these transformations taking, and with what consequences? These questions, with which we began this book, lead to a subsidiary one, for if such transformations are occurring, how should the social and human sciences respond, given that individual and collective human beings are their own privileged objects of investigation? Of course, it is far too early to reach any definitive diagnosis. As we have argued, while investigations into the brain and nervous system can be traced back many centuries, _neuroscience_ is barely half a century old. And it would be misleading to search for any single figure of the human that inhabits all practices at any time and place, let alone across an epoch: many different conceptions of personhood can and do coexist, often incompatible and sometimes contradictory. Further, we need to be wary of the tedious tendency to proclaim the novelty of our own times, or to suggest that we are at the end of one age or on the verge of something new. Yet it is hard to ignore the pervasiveness of references to the brain and neuroscience, the growth of research and scientific publishing that we have documented, and the frequency of popular accounts of new discoveries about the brain in the mass media and in popular science books. Even more significant, we are beginning to see neuroscientific arguments deployed in relation to questions of policy and practice in areas ranging from child rearing to behavioral change. How, then, should we assess these developments?\n\nA Neurobiological Complex\n\nIn this book, we have described some of the key mutations\u2014conceptual, technological, economic, and biopolitical\u2014that have enabled the neurosciences to leave the enclosed space of the laboratory and gain such traction in the world. In this process, the human brain has come to be anatomized at a molecular level, understood as plastic, and mutable across the life-course, believed to be exquisitely adapted to human interaction and sociality, and open to investigation at both the molecular and molar scales in a range of experimental setups, notably those involving animal models and those utilizing neuroimaging technologies. However, the hopes that advances in basic neurobiological knowledge would translate into radical improvements in our capacities to understand and treat troubled and troublesome individuals have largely been disappointed. Nor has it yet proved possible to articulate clearly the way in which brain states give rise to mental states, and still less how they enable conscious experience: despite the proliferation of terms to describe this relationship, the explanatory gap remains.\n\nThe avalanche of neuroscientific research and its popular presentations are generating a growing belief, among policymakers and in public culture, that human neurobiology sets the conditions for the lives of humans in societies and shapes human actions in all manner of ways not amenable to consciousness. Yet, contrary to the predictions of many neuroethicists and social critics, neurobiological conceptions of personhood do not portray humans as mere puppets of their brains and have not effaced other conceptions, notably those from psychology, of who we are as human beings. Nor have they presented a monotonous picture of 'neuronal man' as isolated, individualized, and asocial. Instead, they have argued that the human brain, like that of some of our primate forebears, is evolved for a collective form of life, to make the attributions of internal mental states, beliefs, and intentions to our conspecifics that enable interaction among conspecifics, and the formation of groups both small and large to pursue common aims. And, as a corollary, neuroscientists have argued not only that human interactions in dyads, groups, and larger collectivities depend on these features of our neurobiology, but also that some of the difficulties suffered by those diagnosed with psychiatric disorders arise from problems within the neurobiological circuits that underpin and sustain these capacities for interaction with others. In these and many other ways, then, the normal functioning of the human brain has been constituted as crucial for sociality, and all manner of problems of sociality have been linked back to anomalies in neurobiology. This has enabled neurobiological ways of thinking to infuse the analyses of problems of individual and collective human conduct in the many sites and practices that were colonized by the _psy_ -disciplines across the twentieth century.\n\nThe proliferation of the _neuro_ -prefix is, no doubt, often merely a matter of fashion. Yet when 'neuro-drinks' promise to improve our brain power, or when 'neuro-trainers' claim that their courses will enable us to take full control of our lives, we can recognize the growing power of the belief, however banal, that by acting on our brains, we can improve our mental life and enhance our everyday capacities to meet the ceaseless demands for self-development and self-management that characterize our contemporary form of life. When various kinds of neurotherapy offer to make invisible mental processes visible, for example, via neurofeedback, and to give us the power to transform them by specialized techniques, we see something of the new configuration of personhood, in which the human mind can know and act on the brain that gives birth to it, in order to transform itself. When legal debates have to confront arguments from neuroscience, and neuroscientists argue that their research has relevance for issues from the sentencing of offenders to the age of criminal responsibility, we can see the growing salience of this new topography of the human being, even where brain-based claims do not displace psychological accounts and fail to convince judges and juries in the courtroom.\n\nWhen some authorities look to neuroscience to help resolve the intractable difficulties of risk predictions\u2014whether it be risk of developing a mental disorder or risk of committing a violent offence\u2014we can see signs of the rise of new forms of expertise whose apparent access to objective knowledge of the determinants of human conduct can legitimate the exercise of social and political authority. When contemporary proponents of long-standing arguments about the importance of a child's earliest years in determining its character and shaping its future life chances try to influence policy by reframing these in terms of our growing knowledge of the vulnerable developing brain, and supplement their arguments with images from brain scanning and data from neuroscientific experiments, we can see signs of the potential emergence of a new regime of truth about our nature as human beings.\n\nIt is too early to diagnose the emergence of a full-blown 'neurobiological complex,' or a radical shift from _psy_ -to _neuro_ -. But neurobiology is undoubtedly reconfiguring some of the ways in which individual and collective problems are made intelligible and amenable to intervention. The passage of neuroscience from the seclusion of the laboratory to the unruly everyday world, and the new styles of thought concerning the intelligible, visible, mutable, and tractable brain that characterize the new brain sciences are beginning to reshape some of the ways in which human beings, at least in advanced liberal societies, are governed by others. They are also providing those of us who live within their purview with new techniques by which we can hope to improve ourselves, manage our minds, and optimize our life chances by acting on our brains.\n\nBrains In Situ?\n\nHow should the social and human sciences respond to these developments? The most common response has been to argue that neuroscience is reductionist. Of course, there are many sophisticated philosophical discussions of reductionism, but this book is not a philosophical treatise, and our discussion here is not intended to be a contribution to philosophy. Rather, we want to consider some of the different ways in which this allegation has been made from the social and human sciences and consider where we stand today, in the light of our discussion in previous chapters.\n\nA first question of reductionism concerns the relation between the laboratory and the world, between the necessary simplification of the experimental setup in neuroscientific research and the inescapable complexity and messiness of the world in which humans and other animals live their lives. Of course, all experimental setups, even 'naturalistic,' observational ones, require a certain simplification, and there are many virtues in the quest of the laboratory sciences for the elimination of extraneous variables and the rigorous paring down that is required to demonstrate causal relations. But we have suggested that the persistent failure to translate laboratory findings to real-world situations\u2014for example, in animal models of psychiatric conditions or in brain imaging experiments of human volition\u2014may represent problems that are not technical but fundamental.\n\nFor, as so many ethnographic studies of laboratory life have shown, the laboratory is not a 'non-space': it is itself a real configuration of persons, devices, and techniques, which imposes its own characteristics on the data generated, as well as the interpretations made of them, and all the more so when the subjects are individual living creatures, be they humans or other animals. This is not a critique of artifice or artificiality, merely a recognition that the things that are made to appear in these laboratory setups are not those that appear in non-laboratory spaces, and their relation to what occurs in such other places and spaces is far from simple. All too often, as we have pointed out, these issues are ignored or set to one side by laboratory researchers. There are certainly some within the research community of neuroscience who recognize these problems and are seeking ways\u2014both conceptual and methodological\u2014to address them. Sometimes they can be addressed in part by seeking more ecological validity in the lab itself. Sometimes they can be addressed by trying to explore the ways the laboratory situation itself shapes the data that are generated. The first step on this journey, however, is to recognize the issue and to acknowledge it, however slightly, in the reports and interpretation of experimental results.\n\nAmong science policymakers, and among many researchers, there is now a ritual repetition of the theme that 'translation' from laboratory findings to clinical applications is the major challenge for the twenty-first century. We would agree. But we have also argued that the current pressures for neuroscientists to make premature claims of applicability may have perverse effects. Neuroscientists might well be advised to be frank about the conceptual and empirical questions that translation entails, rather than suggesting that the outcome of a series of experiments with fruit flies or feral rats has something to tell us about human violence, or that brain scans of individuals when they are exposed to images of differently colored faces in an fMRI machine has something to tell us about the neurobiological basis of racism.\n\nThe _translational imperative_ under which all are now forced to work in-duces such reckless extrapolations. Perhaps one can have some sympathy for the researchers' dilemma, caught between the necessary simplifications of the experimental design and the promises of rapid applicability demanded by those who fund the research. There is a role for the social sciences here in defending scientists from these demands. For there is a wealth of historical and sociological research on the relations between scientific findings and social innovations that undermines these naive views of linear translational pathways and their associated 'roadmaps.' Social research also suggests that the translational imperative, leading as it does to cycles of promises and disappointments, is likely to fuel just that distrust in science that it is intended to alleviate.\n\nIt is not entirely misleading to suggest that the move from the lab to the social world is a move from the simple to the complex\u2014although the lab itself is complex in its own way. We will address this issue later, for it goes to the heart of the criticism that neuroscience 'reduces' the social and cultural. However, there is another criticism of reductionism that concerns complexity. It addresses the approach that we described in our account of the early work carried out under the neuromolecular style of thought\u2014the idea that one should first observe the basic neuromolecular processes in the simplest possible systems and then, scale up to the level of intracellular transactions, circuits, networks, regions, and finally to the scale of the whole brain. This kind of reductionism has taught us a great deal. However, such a bottom-up approach also presents enormous difficulties in moving up the scales, and in addressing the kinds of phenomena that are created when tens, dozens, thousands, millions of neurons are in communication and transaction with one another and with their milieu.\n\nSome neuroscientific projects are directly addressing this issue, for example, in the work on phenomics that we cited in an earlier chapter, where it is framed in terms of the challenge of relating phenotypes to genotypes, and seeks to go beyond the impoverished explanatory architecture of interaction ritually invoked in the expression _GxE_. But the issues are not merely those concerning the technical complexity of mapping multiplicities of transactions, cascades, circuits, and feedback loops. They are also conceptual. At what scale _should_ different processes or functions of the brain be conceptualized? This raises a rather fundamental issue about the kind of biology that is appropriate here. We have much sympathy with the view of the microbiologist and physicist Carl Woese, when he argued that we need a new biology for a new century: criticizing mechanistic models that have transformed biology into an engineering discipline focused on applications at the expense of understanding, he argued that \"biology is at the point where it must choose between two paths: either continue on its current track, in which case it will become mired in the present, in application, or break free of reductionist hegemony, reintegrate itself, and press forward once more as a fundamental science. The latter course means an emphasis on holistic, 'nonlinear,' emergent biology\u2014with understanding evolution and the nature of biological form as the primary, defining goals of a new biology\" (Woese 2004, 185). Yet despite the great interest in studying the emergent properties of networks within complex systems that one can see in many scientific domains\u2014atomic physics, information science, and of course in neuroscience\u2014these remain exceptionally difficult to specify with precision. It has to be said, however, that the social and human sciences are hardly exemplary here: too often, appeals to complexity are a sign of explanatory failure, not explanatory success. Here, then, is a further challenge for genuine conceptual collaboration across the human sciences and the life sciences.\n\nThere is a further dimension to the charge of reductionism from the social and human sciences. This is the argument that neuroscience, in isolating brains and their components as the focus of investigation and explanation, ignores or denies the fact that, in humans and other animals, brains only have the capacities that they do because they are embodied, organs in a body of organs with all its bloody, fluid, and fleshly characteristics. There is, of course, a long philosophical debate about brains in vats (Putnam 1981), but the problems of solipsism and the like are not our concern here. Rather, like our colleagues from the social and human sciences, we are troubled by the misleading assumption that one can understand neural processes outside those of the bodies that they normally inhabit. To put it simply, as far as vertebrates are concerned at least, brains in situ function within complex pathways of afferent and efferent nerves reaching both the interior and the periphery of the body; brains are infused with blood containing all manner of active chemicals that carry nutrition, hormonal signals, and much else. And all of this and more is shaped by time\u2014at levels from the microsecond to the hour, by the times of circadian rhythms, and by the times of cell growth and cell death. Stomachs, intestines, lungs, kidneys, and livers\u2014let alone limbs\u2014do these play no part, or merely a peripheral one, in the faculties and functions studied by neuroscience\u2014in memory, in thought, in feelings, in desires? Psychiatric conditions shape and are shaped by mobilizations of feelings and functions across the body. Emotions course through the veins, engage the heart and the lungs, the bowels and the genitals, the muscles, the skin and face. As for cognition, do we not think, literally here, with hands and eyes? As Elizabeth Wilson puts it, an exclusive focus on the brain \"narrows the geography of mind from a diverse, interconnected system (a mutuality of moods-objects-neurotransmitters-hormones-cognitions-affects-attachments-tears-glands-images-words-gut) to a landscape within which the brain, as sovereign, presides over psychological events\" (Wilson 2011, 280). This not a plea for some kind of mystical recognition of wholeness: to criticize the isolation of the properties of the brain from those of the organism of which it is a part is to demand that neurobiology addresses more adequately the biological reality of the processes it seeks to explain.\n\nA further problem of reductionism, perhaps the most crucial challenge from the social and human sciences, concerns sociality, culture, and history. This is the argument that the neurosciences, even when they make reference to the environment, and even when they accept a role for social and cultural factors, perhaps even when they ask how experience gets under the skin, reduce this complex extraneuronal milieu\u2014of practices, meanings, symbols, swarming collectivities, multiplicities of historically sedimented human practices\u2014to a small number of discrete 'inputs' into neurobiological systems, ideally able to be represented in the form of quantifiable variables. Hence the repeated, not always playful, challenge to sociologists to identify 'the socio-ome' to be set alongside the genome, the proteome, the metabolome and all the other '-omes' so beloved of the biosciences at the end of the twentieth century.\n\nThe belief that one might be able to specify a stable, objectively given, factorially representable, quantitatively measurable socio-ome, generalizable across time and space, is anathema to most from the social and human sciences. It is, however, possible to identify some ways in which a more limited engagement might be possible. We have already contrasted two ways of thinking about sociality in social neuroscience: On the one hand, we find the impoverished conception of sociality that can be found in most research that utilizes brain imaging in laboratory settings\u2014where 'social' seems to refer to sequential transactions between isolated individuals or simulations of such transactions in scanners. On the other, we encounter the more subtle arguments of those who seek to understand sociality in terms of the multiple networks of collective association that characterize human existence, in families, groups, villages, towns, nations, and beyond, and the neurobiological consequences of isolation for humans evolved to live in such ecological settings. We have argued that the latter, for all their current weaknesses, open a pathway for collaboration beyond critique.\n\nConsider, for example, the way we might explore the mental consequences of urban life. The differences, and the potential linkages, between sociological and neurobiological approaches can be seen if we contrast the recent work of Meyer-Lindenberg's group on urbanicity, stress, and mental disorder with Georg Simmel's classic study of the metropolis and mental life. Meyer-Lindenberg and his group \"show, using functional magnetic resonance imaging in three independent experiments, that urban upbringing and city living have dissociable impacts on social evaluative stress processing in humans. Current city living was associated with increased amygdala activity, whereas urban upbringing affected the perigenual anterior cingulate cortex, a key region for regulation of amygdala activity, negative affect and stress\" (Lederbogen, Kirsch, et al. 2011, 498). Simmel locates the psychological form of metropolitan individuality in the shift of humans from rural to urban living, in the space, texture, and temporality of the urban experience, in the constant encounter with differences in urban interactions, in the novel economic and occupational forms that enmesh those who live in cities, and in the constant tension between the equalization of all and the uniqueness of each that traverses the collective life of the metropolis (Simmel 1903). The neuroscientists argue that their work provides the basis for \"a new empirical approach for integrating social sciences, neurosciences and public policy to respond to the major health challenge of urbanization\" (Lederbogen, Kirsch, et al. 2011, 500). Yet they ignore a century of empirical research and conceptualization in sociology, social history, and cultural geography on these issues, on the ways in which they play out in the mental lives of the inhabitants of these environments, and on the policy difficulties that are entailed in transforming the experiences and consequences of contemporary forms of urban life. The challenge both to neuroscientists and to social scientists is to go beyond mutual critique\u2014with each side accusing the other of gestural reference to the mental or the social\u2014to a kind of conversation in which experimental reductionism does not imply the mindless empiricism so long criticized in the social sciences, and where experimental rigor does not become the enemy of social, historical, and cultural complexity.\n\nCoda: The Human Sciences in a Neurobiological Age\n\nFor the human sciences, we suggest, there is nothing to fear in the rise to prominence of neurobiological attempts to understand and account for human behavior. It is important to point out the many weakness in the experimental setups and procedures, for example, in the uses of animal models and in the interpretations of brain imaging data generated in the highly artificial social situations of the laboratory. It is also important to challenge the attempts by neuroscientists and popular science writers to extrapolate wildly from small experiments to human practices, to attach the _neuro_ -prefix to so many areas, and to overclaim the novelty of their findings and their implications for everything from child rearing to marketing, and from criminal justice to political strategy. However, we should not be surprised to find, in contemporary neurosciences, all the features of inflated expectations, exaggerated claims, hopeful anticipations, and unwise predictions that have been so well analyzed in other areas of contemporary biotechnologies (Brown, Rappert, and Webster 2000; Webster, Brown, and Rappert 2000; Brown 2003; Brown and Michael 2003; Brown and Webster 2004).\n\nHistorical and genealogical analysis can and should identify the conditions of possibility for the current prominence of neuroscientific styles of thought and the practices where these have gained traction. Science and technology studies can and should analyze the setups that have generated the truths of contemporary neuroscience and the impact of the sociopolitical shaping of contemporary science on these expectational and promissory landscapes. We need detailed social research to map out the interconnections between pathways for the production of truth and hopes about the generation of profit that have shaped investment, research priorities, and the interpretation of evidence and its implications. We need to analyze the new practices for governing human conduct that are taking shape, the new powers of authority and expertise that deploy the _neuro_ -prefix to legitimate themselves, the new ethical obligations associated with the valorization of the brain as a key sociopolitical resource, and the new modes of subjectivation that are being born. While we are not witnessing a wholesale revolution, in which the psychological domain brought into existence in the twentieth century is consigned to history by the rise of neuroscience, our conceptions of human personhood, of the topography of the human being, are undoubtedly being reshaped by these processes.\n\nIt is important constantly to remind neuroscientists that neither animal nor human brains exist in individualized isolation. That if evolution has acted on the brain, it has done so to the extent that brains are constitutively embodied in living creatures, dwelling in space and in time, interacting in small and large groups on which they depend for their existence, striving to survive, inhabiting and remaking their milieu across the course of their lives. That when it comes to humans, and perhaps other primates, cognitive capacities, affective flows, and the powers of volition and the will are not individuated, but distributed. That they are enabled by a supra-individual, material, symbolic, and cultural matrix\u2014a matrix that the capacities of the human brain have themselves made possible, and that shapes the developing human brain (and the body within which it is situated) from the moment of conception to the moment of death. Whatever the virtues of reductionism as a research strategy, then, an account of the operation of the living brain in a living animal that does not recognize these transactions, that does not realize that the boundaries of skull and skin are not the boundaries of the processes that shape the irreal interior world in the brain, that does not recognize that human capacities and competencies emerge out of, and are possible only within, this wider milieu made and remade by living creatures, shaped by history, marked by culture in ways ranging from the design of space and material objects to the management of action and interaction and organization of time itself, will be scientifically flawed.\n\nIn the necessity for this criticism, there is also opportunity. There are many opportunities for a more positive role for the social and human sciences that engages directly with these truth claims, that seizes on the new openness provided by conceptions of the neuromolecular, plastic, and social brain to find some rapprochement. Opportunities exist to bring to bear the evidence from more than a century of empirical research on all those simplifications about sociality that currently inform even the most sophisticated accounts of the interactions between neurogenetics, brain development, and milieu, even the most subtle explanations of the affective shaping of human interaction, even most social theories of social neuroscience. The human sciences have nothing to fear from the argument that much of what makes us human occurs beneath the level of consciousness or from the endeavors of the new brain sciences to explore and describe these processes. If we take seriously the combined assault on human narcissism from historical and genealogical investigations, from cultural anthropology, from critical animal studies, and from contemporary neurobiology, we may indeed find the basis of a radical, and perhaps even progressive, way of moving beyond illusory notions of human beings as individualized, discrete, autonomous, coherent subjects who are, or should be, 'free to choose.'\n\nWe will undoubtedly find support for the core contention of the human sciences, that human societies are not formed by aggregations of such isolates, each bounded by the surfaces of its individual body. We will find much evidence that disproves the idea that the nature of humans is to seek to maximize self-interest, and hence to challenge the view that to govern in accord with human nature is to require each individual to bear the responsibilities and culpabilities of his or her selfish choices. Such unpredictable conversations between the social sciences and the neurosciences may, in short, enable us to begin to construct a very different idea of the human person, human societies, and human freedom. We have tried to show, in this book, how neuroscience has become what it is today; let us conclude with a simple hope for the future: that neuroscience should become a genuinely human science.\nAppendix\n\nHow We Wrote This Book\n\nIn this book we have drawn principally on arguments made by 'authorities,' that is to say, by those who claim to speak authoritatively about scientific research on the brains of human beings and other animals, and how humans should, in the light of that, be governed. We have examined the scientific literature as published in book and articles in the peer-reviewed journals, as well as popular books written by neuroscientists. We have looked at legal debates and law cases where neuroscientific evidence has been drawn on or referred to. We have researched the policy literature and policy proposals that make reference to neurobiology. We are aware, of course, that many of these matters have been the topic of public debate in the mass media and on the Internet, but, with some limited exceptions, we have not investigated these wider discussions and responses\u2014while undoubtedly of great significance, they would have required a different kind of study.\n\nWe have, however, drawn extensively on a wider array of informal interactions with neuroscientists, lawyers, and regulators. Many of these have been made possible through the work of the European Neuroscience and Society Network (ENSN) funded by the European Science Foundation (ESF), which has brought neuroscientists, psychiatrists, social scientists, historians, philosophers, regulators, and lawyers together in conferences, workshops, symposia, and neuroschools over the past five years. In addition to the many opportunities to explore the key issues in intense yet informal dialogue, we have also been fortunate to be able to spend time with researchers in a number of laboratories, notably Cornelius Gross's laboratory at the European Molecular Biology Laboratory facility, Monterotondo, outside Rome; the imaging facilities at the University of Vienna; Klaus-Peter Lesch's Laboratory of Translational Neuroscience in the Department of Psychiatry, Psychosomatics and Psychotherapy at the University of Wurzburg; and Kenneth Hugdahl's Bergen fMRI Group, at the Department of Biological and Medical Psychology of the University of Bergen.\n\nOur research on the legal issues raised by the new brain sciences was informed by a special interdisciplinary conference on Law and Neuroscience, also funded by the ESF, which we helped organize and which took place in Italy in October 2009, and by the involvement of one of us in the law and neuroscience module of the U.K. Royal Society's Brain Waves project. Our research on animal models was informed by our involvement in some heated discussions at a major international conference of animal modelers at the European Molecular Biology Laboratory facilities in Heidelberg, and by the involvement of one of us in the U.K. Academy of Medical Sciences working group on research with animals containing human materials, which involved quite extensive discussion of animal modeling in neuroscience. And one of us has also been involved in many discussions of these issues with regulators and lawyers, through membership of the U.K.'s Nuffield Council on Bioethics and other advisory groups. While we do not directly refer to these and other interactions, in Europe, North America, China, and Latin America, they have engaged us within a community of interlocutors, who have helped us form, test, and revise the arguments we make in this book. None of our colleagues in any of these encounters bears any responsibility for the arguments we make here, but their openness and friendship have shaped the tone of our argument, our belief in the possibilities of critical and affirmative dialogue, and our wish to avoid the many simplistic stereotypes that can be found in much critical writing on neuroscience from the side of the social sciences.\nNotes\n\n**Introduction**\n\n. Our focus in this book is on \"advanced liberal\" societies (Rose 1999), but we should note that these developments are by no means confined to Europe, the Americas, and Australasia, and indeed that we have seen many novel attempts at rapprochement, via the brain, with practices of meditation, especially those from the Buddhist tradition (see for example, the activities of the Mind and Life Institute: <http:\/\/www.mindandlife.org>). Further, there is another whole pathway of research that we barely touch on in the account that follows\u2014cognitive science and artificial intelligence. While there are many links between those developments and the ones we analyze in this book, to address them in any detail would overburden an already lengthy account. A good starting point for interested readers would be Elizabeth Wilson's study of Alan Turing (Wilson 2010). See also the discussion of the work of Warren McCulloch by Lily Kay (Kay 2002).\n\n. There is a growing body of work in the human sciences that shares this view, recognizing that human beings are, after all, living creatures, and seeking a more affirmative relation with biology. We can see this in the rise of 'corporeal' feminism, in 'affect studies,' and in projects to create a new materialism. While we do not discuss these endeavors here, we are sympathetic to them, although we are critical of the way in which some authors in this vein borrow very selectively from work in the life sciences to support pre-formed conceptual, political, or ethical commitments. In the main, however, we have not engaged with this literature in the present study.\n\n. Quoted from Lewis (1981, 215). We have drawn extensively on Lewis's account of this debate in this paragraph. Although it is undoubtedly true that the question dates back to Aristotle and was posed again by Descartes, the idea that it was answerable by a positive knowledge, rather than by philosophy, dates back to the start of the nineteenth century.\n\n. The phrase \"the physical basis of mind\" has a long history\u2014for example, it is the title of a nineteenth-century book by George Henry Lewes (Lewes 1877). Contributors to the BBC series included Edgar Adrian, who was Sherrington's pupil and shared the Nobel Prize with him in 1932 for his work on the function of neurons; Elliot Slater, who was a central figure in psychiatric genetics in the postwar years; Gilbert Ryle, who rehearsed his critique from _The Concept of Mind_ written the year before (Ryle 1949) that there was no \"ghost in the machine\"; and Wilder Penfield, pioneer of neurosurgery in epilepsy, who argued that there was a coordinating center in the upper brain stem that, together with areas of the cortex, was the seat of consciousness and that this was \"the physical basis of mind\"\u2014not mind itself, but the place through which \"the mind connected to the brain\" (a view he was to elaborate in subsequent years; cf. Penfield 1975).\n\n. The set of essays was later published as a book simply titled _The Brain_ (Edelman and Changeux 2001).\n\n. As we discuss in chapter 1, Francis O. Schmitt of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology used it in 1962 to designate his Neurosciences Research Program, and the term _neuroscientist_ was first used soon after (Swazey 1975).\n\n. Data from <http:\/\/www.sfn.org\/static\/amstats\/amstatsgraph.html>; consulted December 2010. By the end of the decade, annual attendance at this event was more than thirty thousand scientists, and around four thousand nonscientists, including many staffing industry or pharmaceutical displays.\n\n. Data from LSE's Brain, Self, and Society project, 2007\u201310 (<http:\/\/www.esrc.ac.uk\/my-esrc\/grants\/RES-051-27-0194\/read>).\n\n. The British Library catalog lists 433 books with the terms _mind_ and _brain_ in the title, the earliest, by Spurzheim and Gall, dating from 1815. It contains 62 books with the words _mind_ and _brain_ in their titles published in the thirty-five years between 1945 and 1980. A further 68 were published in the decade between 1981 and 1990, 109 between 1991 and 2000, and 122 between 2001 and 2009. By 1984, John Searle thought he had resolved this problem (Searle 1984, 1992), as did Jean-Pierre Changeux, whose _Neuronal Man_ was published in English a year after Searle's lectures (Changeux 1985), although many, including Paul Ricoeur, were not convinced (Changeux and Ricoeur 2002). Francis Crick, whose reductionist text _The Astonishing Hypothesis_ was published in 1994 argued for a physical basis for consciousness\u2014the \"claustrum\" in his last paper written with Christof Koch (Crick and Koch 2005). We will come across many versions of these debates and many words used to characterize the mind-brain relation in the course of this book, and we will return to this issue in our conclusion.\n\n. There have been earlier uses of the prefix. For example in his biography of Wilder Penfield cited above, Lewis notes that, in the 1940s, whenever a new researcher was recruited to the Montreal Neurology Institute, Penfield \"would add the prefix 'neuro' to his or her speciality\": thus when a chemist was recruited his speciality would become Neurochemistry, photography would become Neurophotography, and there was Neuropsychology, Neurocytology, Neuropathology and Neuroanatomy\u2014the prefix was intended to draw all together towards a common purpose (Lewis 1981, 192).\n\n. In 1996, Peter Shizgal and Kent Conover sought to describe the neurobiological substrate for choice in rats using a normative economic theory, followed in 1999 by Michael Platt and Paul Glimcher's publication in _Nature_ of \"Neural Correlates of Decision Variables in Parietal Cortex\"; by the early years of this century, there was a steady trickle of publications on these issues (Montague 2003; Sanfey, Rilling, Aronson, et al. 2003; Schultz 2003). A Society for Neuroeconomics was established in 2005; neuroeconomics programs and laboratories were set up at a number of U.S. universities (e.g., Caltech, UC Berkeley, UCLA, Stanford, Duke University); several handbooks and textbooks have now been published under titles such as _Decision Making and the Brain_ (Glimcher 2003, 2009); and popular magazines began to report excitedly on the new science of decision making (Adler 2004).\n\n. For Johns Hopkins, see <http:\/\/education.jhu.edu\/nei>; for developments at the University of London on \"educational neuroscience,\" see <http:\/\/www.educationalneuroscience.org.uk>.\n\n. <http:\/\/www.informaworld.com\/smpp\/title~db=all~content=t741771143>; consulted April 2010.\n\n. The report is titled _MINDSPACE: Influencing Behavior through Public Policy_ and can be downloaded at <http:\/\/www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk\/content\/133\/mindspace-influencing-behavior-through-public-policy>; consulted January 2011.\n\n. <http:\/\/royalsociety.org\/policy\/projects\/brain-waves>.\n\n. The program is called \"Neurosciences et politiques publiques\" (<http:\/\/www.strategie.gouv.fr\/article.php3?id_article=1029>; consulted January 2011).\n\n. Although the term was apparently coined by Yuri Olesha, it is conventionally attributed to Josef Stalin, who used it in a speech to Soviet writers at the house of Maxim Gorky in 1932: \"The production of souls is more important than the production of tanks.... And therefore I raise my glass to you, writers, the engineers of the human soul\" (for some details, see <http:\/\/www.newworldencyclopedia.org\/entry\/Yury_Olesha>).\n\n. We have omitted most references here, as each of the points that we make in this overview is discussed in detail in the chapters that follow.\n\n. We use the term _complex_ to bring to mind the interconnected resonances of this term. The _Oxford English Dictionary Online_ includes the following: \"A whole comprehending in its compass a number of parts, _esp._ (in later use) of interconnected parts or involved particulars,... An interweaving, contexture.... A group of emotionally charged ideas or mental factors, unconsciously associated by the individual with a particular subject... hence _colloq._ , in vague use, a fixed mental tendency or obsession.\"\n\n. The critical literature here is large, and we can only cite some representative samples. David Healy has been the most significant chronicler of the history of the links that we outline here, and the most persistent critic of the overclaiming made by the pharmaceutical companies (Healy 1996, 1997, 1998, 2000, 2004). Some of these points were tellingly made by Lauren Mosher, in his letter of res-ignation from the American Psychiatric Association after thirty-five years\u2014he said it should now be known as \"the American Psychopharmacological Association\"; see <http:\/\/www.successfulschizophrenia.org\/stories\/mosher.html>. Recently, Marcia Angell, former editor of the _New England Journal of Medicine_ , has also become an outspoken critic (Relman and Angell 2002; Angell 2004); see also her 2011 review of a number of polemical books on the \"epidemic of mental illness\" (<http:\/\/www.nybooks.com\/articles\/archives\/2011\/jun\/23\/epidemic-mental-illness-why\/?pagination=false>). The most persistent, and perceptive, critic of \"medicalization\" in psychiatry has been Peter Conrad (Conrad 1976, 2005; Conrad and Schneider 1992). Our own view of the limits of the medicalization thesis and our alternative approach has been spelled out in a number of places, and we will not repeat it here (Rose 1994, 2006a, 2007a).\n\n. These transformations in genomics are discussed in much more detail in Rose (2007c). We can note here that in this new vision, it was also at this molecular level that evolutionary pressures operated, and that evolved species' differences in behavior were to be understood. We discuss this further in relation to animal models in chapter 3, and also in relation to the 'evolution of the social brain' in chapter 5.\n\n. The intriguing title of the U.K. House of Commons Public Administration Select Committee's Second Report for the Session 2006\u20137 was indeed \"Governing the Future\"; see <http:\/\/www.publications.parliament.uk\/pa\/cm200607\/cmselect\/cmpubadm\/123\/123i.pdf>; consulted July 1, 2011.\n\n. In the case of the NRP, funding was chiefly drawn from federal agencies\u2014not only from the NIH and later the NIMH, but also NASA, NSF, and even the Office of Naval Research (ONR). This was complemented by funds from the Rockefeller Foundation and a private charity fund related to the NRP: the NRF, or Neurosciences Research Foundation (Schmitt 1990).\n\n. This is the widespread belief in biomedicine that Charles Rosenberg calls \"reductionist means to achieve necessarily holistic ends\" (Rosenberg 2006).\n\n. For example, the World Alzheimer Reports. The one for 2009 contained estimates of future prevalence (<http:\/\/www.alz.co.uk\/research\/files\/WorldAlzheimerReport.pdf>). That for 2010 focused on the economic cost (<http:\/\/www.alz.co.uk\/research\/files\/WorldAlzheimerReport2010ExecutiveSummary.pdf>).\n\n. As the reputable and influential commentator Polly Toynbee put it in the _Guardian_ newspaper, December 4, 2010, \"the brain hardens\" by the age of three.\n\n. The quote is from a presentation by Viding and McCrory to a 2007 conference commissioned by the United Kingdom's Department of Health; the Department for Children, Schools and Families; Youth Justice Board; and the Cabinet Office that followed the publication of the Social Exclusion Action Plan (2006) and the Care Matters white paper (2007). See <http:\/\/www.personalitydisorder.org.uk\/resources\/emerging-pd>; consulted January 4, 2011.\n\n. See, for example, Beddington, Cooper, Field, et al. (2008), framed recently in the form of a \"Grand Challenge of Global Mental Health\" (Collins, Patel, Joestl, et al. 2011).\n\n. According to the _NIH Almanac_ (<http:\/\/www.nih.gov\/about\/almanac>), funding for the NIMH remained more or less constant in the five years from 2005 to 2010, at between $1.4 billion and $1.5 billion, despite inflation at around 4% over this period. However, this was a significant increase from 1995, where the figure was just over $0.5 billion, and indeed from 1965, where it was around $186 million (data from <http:\/\/www.nih.gov\/about\/almanac\/appropriations\/index.htm#one>; consulted July 18, 2011). An indication of the complexity of deriving meaningful data in this area is that this covers all grants from the NIMH, not only for neuroscience, and that, as Dorsey et al. point out \"NIMH separated from NIH in 1967 and was raised to bureau status in PHS, became a component of PHS's Health Services and Mental Health Administration (HSMHA), later became a component of ADAMHA (successor organization of HSMHA), and rejoined the NIH in 1993.\" Another estimate shows significant variations in NIH funding for research in different mental disorders over the period from 2005 to 2009 (<http:\/\/report.nih.gov\/rcdc\/categories>); while NIH funding for some disorders\u2014notably depression and autism\u2014had increased by between 20% and 25% in the five years from 2005 to 2009, that for other conditions such as schizophrenia had decreased by the same amount, and funding for research on Parkinson's, Alzheimer's, and ADHD had actually decreased by between 30% and 40%\u2014<http:\/\/brainposts.blogspot.com\/2009\/08\/nih-trends-in-clinical-neuroscience.html>; consulted July 18, 2011. Of course, these figures represent only a very partial glimpse of public funding for neuroscience and do not take account of inflation, which was between 3% and 4% over the first decade of the twenty-first century.\n\n. These data are from a presentation given by Zack Lynch in 2010 at the fifth annual Neurotech Investing and Partnering Conference; we would like to thanks Zack Lynch for making this presentation available to us and allowing us to quote from it.\n\n. In 2011, the European College of Neuropsychopharmacology (ECNP) expressed concern that pharmaceutical companies were withdrawing their own research funding in this area, despite the growing burden of brain diseases (see http:\/\/www.guardian.co.uk\/science\/2011\/jun\/13\/research-brain-disorders-under-threat; consulted July 1, 2011).\n\n. See <http:\/\/www.bbsrc.ac.uk\/funding\/news\/2011\/110211-bbsrc-neuroscience-funding.aspx>; consulted July 1, 2011.\n\n. For IMS Health (\"revealing the insights within the most comprehensive market intelligence available\"), see <http:\/\/www.imshealth.com\/portal\/site\/imshealth>. For NeuroInsights (\"track market dynamics, develop investment strategies, identify partnering opportunities, and analyze comparables across this $143 billion global industry), see <http:\/\/www.neuroinsights.com>.\n\n. Sir David Cooksey, who reviewed U.K. health research funding at the request of the then government, concluded that the United Kingdom was at risk of failing to reap the full economic, health, and social benefits that its public investment in health research should generate, and argued that there were \"two key gaps in the translation of health research: translating ideas from basic and clinical research into the development of new products and approaches to treatment of disease and illness; and\u2014implementing those new products and approaches into clinical practice\" (Cooksey 2006, 3). It is these translational gaps that led to attempts to reform the whole research funding system to overcome professional, financial, and institutional barriers to translation.\n\n. These issues are discussed in more detail in _Translating Neurobiological Research_ , a 2009 report produced by the LSE's BIOS Centre for the Medical Research Council.\n\n. We use the term _translational platforms_ for zones of knowledge exchange and hybridization of techniques, practices, and styles of thought whose driving rationale is the translation of potential products and artifacts produced in the lab or the clinic into meaningful and useful clinical and social applications of clinical, commercial, or social value. They can be thought of as a special case of what Peter Keating and Albert Cambrosio call \"biomedical platforms\" (Keating and Cambrosio 2003). The idea of a translational platform derived from our mapping of seventy thousand peer-reviewed articles published in 2008 in almost three hundred high-impact journals; see Abi-Rached (2008); Abi-Rached, Rose, and Mogoutov (2010).\n\n. This is especially problematic in the much-criticized links between psychiatrists and the pharmaceutical companies. One particularly notorious example was the promotion of the diagnosis of pediatric bipolar disorder in the United States by Dr. Joseph Biederman, leading to a fortyfold increase in the diagnosis over the decade from 1994 to 2003 and the off-label use of antipsychotics, notably Risperdal, manufactured by Janssen, a division of Johnson and Johnson, who funded the research center that he directed. Some details of this case are given in a press report in the _New York Times_ in November 2008 (http:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/2008\/11\/25\/health\/25psych.html?bl&ex=1227762000&en=ab700f6adb9c70e5&ei=5087%0A; consulted April 4, 2011).\n\n. <http:\/\/www.lrb.co.uk\/v30\/n06\/shap01_.html>; consulted April 4, 2008.\n\n. The following passage derives more or less verbatim from a paper given by NR, \"Commerce versus the Common Good,\" at the LSE Asia Forum in Singapore in April 2008, and subsequently published as Rose (2009). Note that in theory the federal government retains the right to reclaim intellectual property and real-locate it elsewhere\u2014the so-called march-in provision. The march-in provision of the act, 35 U.S.C. \u00a7 203, implemented by 37 C.F.R. \u00a7 401.6, authorizes the government, in certain specified circumstances, to require the funding recipient or its exclusive licensee to license a federally-funded invention to a responsible applicant or applicants on reasonable terms, or to grant such a license itself.\n\n. For example, according to the U.S. Association of University Technology Managers Report in 2006, $45 billion in R&D expenditures were received by U.S. academic centers in that year alone; 697 new products were introduced into the market; and as a result of these relations, a total of 4,350 new products were introduced from Financial Year 98 through Financial Year 06; 12,672 licenses and options were managed, each yielding active income to a university, hospital, or research center; and 5,724 new spinouts were launched from 1980 to 2006 (Association of University Technology Managers, 2007); <http:\/\/www.autm.net\/Surveys.htm>; consulted July 1, 2011.\n\n. Quoted from its press release of August 29, 2002 (<http:\/\/royalsociety.org\/news.asp?id=2507>). The report published in 2003 concluded: \"Intellectual property rights (IPRs) can stimulate innovation by protecting creative work and investment, and by encouraging the ordered exploitation of scientific discoveries for the good of society.... A narrow focus on research most likely to lead directly to IPRs would damage the health of science in the longer term.... Patents can provide valuable, although sometimes expensive, protection for inventions. They therefore encourage invention and exploitation, but usually limit competition. They can make it impracticable for others to pursue scientific research within the areas claimed, and because inventions cannot be patented if they are already public knowledge, they can encourage a climate of secrecy. This is anathema to many scientists who feel that a free flow of ideas and information is vital for productive research. Additionally, research by others may be constrained by patents being granted that are inordinately broad in scope\u2014a particular risk in the early stages of development of a field. This is bad for science and bad for society\" (Royal Society of London 2003, v).\n\n. For example, in the celebrated Berkeley-Novartis deal, a pharmaceutical company, Novartis, gave UC Berkeley $25 million over five years, in exchange for the first rights to license any discovery that was made on the basis of research that was supported by Novartis funds; critics of such arrangements within the university were reported to have suffered various forms of disadvantage, including in relation to tenure processes (Triggle 2004, 144).\n\n. It is notable that bodies such as the NIH have recently begun to address this issue of conflicts of interest\u2014see its 2004 \"Conflict of Interest\" report (<http:\/\/www.nih.gov\/about\/ethics_COI_panelreport.pdf>). The scientific journals are also increasingly preoccupied with this issue.\n\n. While some have argued that neuroscience will challenge ideas of free will and responsibility in the criminal justice system, given evidence on the nonconscious initiation of apparently willed acts (Greene and Cohen 2004), this does not seem to be the case. As we discuss in chapter 6, while neurobiological evidence from CT and MRI scans showing structural damage or anomalies in the brain has begun to play a role, for example, in claims for compensation after injury, this has not fundamentally challenged the logics of personhood within those systems. Indeed, to the extent that individual' responsibility does come to be understood as somehow compromised by their neurobiology, as in the case of psychopathy, the response of the authorities of control, in a sociopolitical context that emphasizes precaution and preemption, is likely to be more, rather than less, severe\u2014as in the rising numbers of individuals who are already detained, without reference to neuroscientific evidence, on the grounds that they pose a significant and continuing risk to others. This issue is discussed further in the \"Neuroscience and Law\" module of the U.K. Royal Society's Brain Waves project, in which one of us was involved (Royal Society 2011).\n\n. On inhibition, see R. Smith (1992).\n\n. We can see similar arguments coming from the Social Brain project in the United Kingdom (Rowson 2011).\n\n. These self-technologies have been the subject of research by Francisco Ortega, who uses the term _neuroascesis_ to describe them (<http:\/\/www.neuroculture.org\/brain_gym.pdf>; consulted July 1, 2011).\n\nChapter One. The Neuromolecular Brain\n\n. Schmitt is quoted from Worden, Swazey, Adelman, et al. (1975, 529\u201330).\n\n. This chapter draws on earlier analyses published as Abi-Rached and Rose (2010). Some of the information is presented in more detail in three working papers for the Brain, Self, and Society project written by JAR (<http:\/\/eprints.lse.ac.uk\/view\/lseauthor\/Abi-Rached,_Joelle_M=2E.xhtml>). Some parts are also derived from a series of talks given by NR at the University of California in February and March 2007. Thanks to Sara Lochlan Jain for the invitation to Stanford, to Charis Thompson for the invitation to UC Berkeley, to Jenny Reardon for the invitation to UC Santa Cruz, to Norton Wise for the invitation to UCLA, and to all those who participated in the discussions. A version of the paper was given by NR as the Bochner Lecture delivered at the Scientia Institute of Rice University in Houston, Texas on March 9, 2009. NR wishes to thank his hosts, especially Susan Macintosh, and those at Rice and at Baylor College of Medicine who commented on the presentation. We have also drawn on an unpublished research report, \"The Age of Serotonin,\" funded by the Wellcome Trust Biomedical Ethics Program, and jointly written by NR, Mariam Fraser, and Angelique Pratt.\n\n. Schmitt uses \"wet, dry, and moist\" to refer to three different kinds of biophysics. \"Wet biophysics\" refers to the biochemical study of macromolecules and other cellular elements in their \"normal aqueous environment.\" \"Dry biophysics\" is concerned with the study of cellular constituents or organisms as \"systems\" in mathematical or natural models. Finally, \"moist biophysics\" is the study of properties of the central nervous system through \"bioelectric studies.\" See Swazey (1975, 532); Schmitt (1990, 199).\n\n. The citation to the first usage is given in the _Oxford English Dictionary Online._\n\n. SfN was founded in 1969 (see <http:\/\/web.sfn.org\/home.aspx>; consulted April 2010). It is the world's largest association for neuroscience, with more than forty thousand members by 2010. For a historical account of the SfN, see Doty (1987). Six autobiographical volumes from the SfN are available at <http:\/\/www.sfn.org\/index.cfm?pagename=HistoryofNeuroscience_autobiographies>; consulted April 2010. Similarly, interviews with prominent British neuroscientists have been conducted in a project at UCL titled \"Today's Neuroscience, Tomorrow's History\" and supported by a Wellcome Trust Public Engagement grant in the History of Medicine (<http:\/\/www.ucl.ac.uk\/histmed\/audio\/neuroscience>; consulted April 2010).\n\n. There is a plethora of books and articles on brain scientists and their particular contributions to the neurosciences. For example, Changeux's _Neuronal Man_ (1985, 1997), Gross's _Brain, Vision, Memory_ (1999), or Finger's _Origins of Neuroscience_ (1994). Some other examples include a recent book by leading French scholars on the contribution of prominent French scientists to the neurosciences (Debru, Barbara, and Cherici 2008); numerous references on the contribution of British neuroscientists (Gardner-Thorpe 1999; Rose 1999; C.U.M Smith 1999, 2001; Parkin and Hunkin 2001; Wade and Bruce 2001; Laporte 2006); a special double issue of the _Journal of the History of the Neurosciences_ 16 (1\u20132) (January\u2013June 2007) on the contribution of Russian neuroscientists; and numerous references on the contribution of this or that Nobel laureate to our understanding of the brain and the nervous system (Sourkes 2006; Langmoen and Apuzzo 2007).\n\n. In this account we have drawn on Rose (1996, 42\u201343).\n\n. Cajal's lecture was titled \"The Structure and Connexions of Neurons\" (<http:\/\/nobelprize.org\/nobel_prizes\/medicine\/laureates\/1906\/cajal-lecture.xhtml>), and Golgi's bore the title \"The Neuron Doctrine\u2014Theory and Facts\" (<http:\/\/nobelprize.org\/nobel_prizes\/medicine\/laureates\/1906\/golgi-lecture.xhtml>).\n\n. For more on the beginnings of neurochemistry, see McIlwain (1985, 1988); Bachelard (1988); Agranoff (2001).\n\n. In the early 1960s, he named his laboratory \"Groupe de Neuropsychologie et de Neurolinguistique\" (Boller 1999).\n\n. An overview of its historical development can be found in Boller (1999).\n\n. Of course, one could mention various other trajectories, for example, those of neural networks, cybernetics, communication theory, computing, and artificial intelligence, the latter of which was, of course, bound up with hopes for its usefulness for military and intelligence applications, which provided funding and support. Warren McCulloch also thought that these developments had significant implications for psychiatry, though his argument seems not to have convinced others. Kay argues that \"the particular configurations of these tools and images bore the unmistakable marks of a new, postindustrial episteme: an emergent military technoculture of communication, control, and simulations. Within its regimes of signification, life and society were recast as relays of signals and as information systems... exemplifying the new episteme of the information age\" (Kay 2002, 610). And we could also consider the borderlands with psychology, as it disciplined itself over the first half of the twentieth century, especially the intersections with psychophysiology. But this is not the place to write this history.\n\n. For more, see Bigl and Singer (1991); Marshall, Rosenblith, Gloor, et al. (1996).\n\n. J. Richter (2000) argues that the IBRO was the successor of the Brain Commission founded in 1903 in London. Although the commission was dissolved at the outbreak of the First World War, it was the first international organization whose aim was the creation of national brain research institutes and the promotion of international cooperation. One notable example is the Russian psychiatrist, Bechterev, who served on the Brain Commission and who pioneered long before neuroanatomist David McKenzie Rioch (mentioned by Cowan, Harter, and Kandel 2000) the physiological underpinnings of psychiatric illness and mental behavior. Bechterev was actually the founder of the first institute that looked at psychiatry from a physiological perspective, the so-called Psycho-Neurological Institute, founded in 1907 in St. Petersburg (Richter 2000).\n\n. In organizational terms, the United Kingdom seems to have lagged behind: the Brain Research Association (BRA) was founded in 1968. In 1996, the association decided to rebrand itself by changing the name to the British Neuroscience Association (Abi-Rached 2012).\n\n. We discuss Moniz's techniques of cerebral angiography using X-rays to visualize intracranial tumors, vascular abnormalities, and aneurysms in a subsequent chapter.\n\n. Moniz shared the Nobel Prize with Walter Hess, who developed an early brain mapping technique focused on the diencephalon (<http:\/\/nobelprize.org\/nobel_prizes\/medicine\/laureates\/1949\/hess-lecture.xhtml>). He was, of course, not the first to intervene on the brain. Those who have written on this history, notably Valenstein (1986) and Swayze (1995), point out that Burckhardt, the superintendent of a Swiss mental hospital, conceived neurosurgical approaches based on early studies in cerebral localization. He reported his results in 1891. However, his procedure was considered reckless, since one of his patients died soon after the surgery and two others developed seizures. There were no further attempts until 1910: Puusepp, a Russian neurosurgeon, resected fibers in the parietal and frontal lobes of patients suffering from manic-depressive psychosis. But results were published after the advent of prefrontal leucotomy, and in any case the procedure had limited success. In 1936, the Geneva neurosurgeon Ody resected the right prefrontal lobe of a patient suffering from \"childhood-onset schizophrenia.\" The result was published before Moniz's first publication and was inspired by Cushing's belief that mental symptoms could be reversed by resection of cerebral (frontal lobe) tumors. In 1935, Moniz attended the Second International Neurologic Congress in London where Charles Jacobsen presented work that he and John Fulton had done in bilaterally ablating the prefrontal cortex of two chimpanzees. Swayze comments: \"Although in his memoirs Moniz downplayed the influence of this report, stating that he had conceived the idea of a neurosurgical approach 2 years before, most observers, including Fulton and Freeman, believed that the animal results were the primary impetus for his taking such a bold step in November 1935\" (Swayze 1995).\n\n. See Cobb's obituary (<http:\/\/www.harvardsquarelibrary.org\/unitarians\/cobb.xhtml>).\n\n. Note that there are more interconnections than our \"three paths\" might imply: Richter was one of the pioneers in neurochemistry and was instrumental in establishing the IBRO under the aegis of UNESCO in 1961. He also helped establish\u2014though the extent of his involvement is disputed\u2014the Brain Research Association (BRA) in 1968, which was renamed in 1997 as the British Neuroscience Association (BNA). For more on the history of the BRA, see Abi-Rached (2012).\n\n. A further related element, which we will not discuss here, is the history of the medical uses of LSD (Dyck 2008).\n\n. See his 2001 lecture on acceptance of the Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine, reprinted as Carlsson (2001).\n\n. Some very useful papers on these issues are contained in a special issue of _Science in Context_ 14 (4) (2001), edited by Michael Hagner and Cornelius Borck. There is much more sociological work on the history and anthropology of psychiatry, some of which touches on biological psychiatry, usually in the context of reductionism and eugenics. And there is a growing body of ethnographic work that touches on disputes over biological psychiatry. A few empirical investigations have been carried out by social scientists. Historians of science have charted changing ideas of mind and brain (Harrington 1987, 2008). There are also studies of changing treatment of depression in clinical practice (Healy 1997, 2004; Kramer 1997; Elliott 2003); narratives of users of antidepressants (Stepnisky 2007); ethnographic accounts of transformations in psychiatric training and clinical practice (Lakoff 2005); and investigations of specific disorders: for example, post traumatic stress disorder (A. Young 1995), bipolar affective disorder (E. Martin 2007), and autism spectrum disorder (Silverman 2004). Others have studied the cultural impact of brain imaging (Dumit 1997, 2003; Beaulieu 2000b; Joyce 2008).\n\n. Susan Leigh Star was at the forefront of reflections on infrastructure from the perspective of ethnography and science studies (Star 1999). We share her emphasis on the importance of this, but, for present purposes, not the inventory of issues that were relevant for her ethnographic attention to the minutiae of space and interactions.\n\n. Horace Magoun has pointed to the key role of such research institutes in the twentieth-century history of neurology and brain research\u2014for example, of Ranson's Institute of Neurology at Northwestern University, with its work on the role of the hypothalamus and the lower brainstem in the 1930s\u2014pointing to the way that this can stabilize the lives of young scientists by providing them with space, equipment, mentors, and collaborators and by fostering a particular style of work (Magoun 1962, 1974).\n\n. Of course, those writing these histories tend to give the credit to those with whom they worked: Kandel worked in Kuffler's department, while Rioch is not mentioned in the 622 pages of _The Neurosciences: Paths of Discovery_ , which celebrates Schmitt and the NRP (Worden, Swazey, Adelman, et al. 1975).\n\n. In his autobiographical account on his website (<http:\/\/hubel.med.harvard.edu\/bio.htm>).\n\n. Purves's autobiographical account of his own movement, and his training at the hands of mentors including Eccles, Katz, Kuffler, and many others, provides a telling example of the ways in which these conceptual, methodological, and personal interconnections formed.\n\n. Among many honors, Kuffler was awarded the F. O. Schmitt Prize in Neuroscience in 1979.\n\n. Those approaching the issue from the perspective of investment opportunities and marketing divide the field differently; thus the entrepreneurial market analyst Zack Lynch maps the \"neurotechnology industry\" into three main sectors: neuropharmaceutical, neurodevices, and neurodiagnositic (Lynch and Lynch 2007).\n\n. See, for example, Aaron Panofsky's analysis of the diverse and rivalrous research groups working on the genetics of behavior, which we draw upon below (see note 32). Thanks to Aaron Panofsky for discussing this with NR and for letting him see three chapters of his doctoral thesis, which discuss these issues in great detail, as well as considering some of the issues of scientific fields, which we also consider here (Panofsky 2006).\n\n. See the acclaimed biography of Benzer, _Time, Love, Memory: A Great Biologist and His Quest for the Origins of Behavior_ (Weiner 1999).\n\n. Aaron Panofsky has analyzed differentiation of those who work on the genetics of behavior into a number of separate yet overlapping groups and associations (Panofsky 2006).\n\n. Of course, others had questioned this division before this time, for example, Sir Archibald Garrod in his idea of \"chemical individuality\" (Garrod 1902; Childs 1970).\n\n. This distinction was not merely a semantic or institutional one. For example, in the United Kingdom, this conception of the difference between treatable states of illness and untreatable variations in personality meant that those problematic individuals with \"personality disorder\" could not be legally confined under various Mental Health Acts until 2007\u2014confinement had to enable treatment, and a personality disorder, a \"trait,\" was not treatable.\n\n. For the rising rates of the use of psychiatric drugs, see Rose (2003a, 2004, 2006a, 2006b) and chapter 7 of _The Politics of Life Itself_ (Rose 2007c).\n\n. <http:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Neuroplasticity>; consulted December 2010.\n\n. Wikipedia provides a good account of the developments that led up to the investigations of the brains of these monkeys in 1990, despite earlier decisions by NIH that no further research should be carried out on them, and that in 1990 indicated significant reorganization of the sensory cortex (<http:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Silver_Spring_monkeys>; consulted December 2010).\n\n. For Taub's official biography at the University of Alabama, which makes a rather brief reference to the research on monkeys, see <http:\/\/www.uab.edu\/psychology\/primary-faculty\/11-primary-faculty\/27-dr-edward-taub>. For the therapy, see his statement at <http:\/\/www.taubtherapy.com>; consulted December 2010: \"Providing The Most Effective Stroke Therapy In The World. Taub Therapy, widely recognized as the most innovative form of CI therapy, empowers people to improve the use of their limbs, no matter how long ago their stroke or traumatic brain injury (TBI) occurred. The most effective stroke rehabilitation program in the world, Taub Therapy has been proven to be over 95% successful in helping patients in the clinic regain significant movement. Through the one-on-one encouragement of a therapist, patients can relearn to use their affected limb by restricting the use of the unaffected one. By causing neurons to 'rewire' themselves, Taub Therapy not only changes the brain, it changes lives.... Taub Therapy gives patients hope that they can recapture the life they had before suffering a stroke or TBI.\"\n\n. For Scientific Learning (\"Fit Brains Learn Better\"), see <http:\/\/www.scilearn.com\/our-approach\/our-scientists\/merzenich>; for Posit Science (\"Proven in Labs and Lives: The Posit Science Brain Fitness Programs Dramatically Improve Cognitive Performance\"), see <http:\/\/www.positscience.com\/science\/global-science-team\/merzenich>.\n\n. This story has been told many times with different emphases (Gross 2000; Gage 2002; Rubin 2009); for our present purposes, this brief outline is sufficient.\n\n. In the wake of her publications on these issues, Gould was invited to speak at many debates on exactly this topic, for instance at the United Kingdom's Royal Society of Arts in 2010 (<http:\/\/www.thersa.org\/events\/video\/archive\/elizabeth-gould>).\n\n. Some have suggested a link, perhaps even a causal one, between the popularity of these ideas of plasticity and a sociopolitical emphasis in \"neo-liberalism\" on flexibility in employment relations (Rubin 2009). Catherine Malabou has tried to distinguish this sociopolitical emphasis on flexibility from a more progressive idea of plasticity (Malabou 2008). The affinities are intriguing. However, we do not find it useful to invoke some generalized actor such as neo-liberalism in explaining either their origins or their implications. Rather, as we have suggested in this chapter, ideas of plasticity bring the brain sciences into line with the 'hopeful' ethos of the life sciences in contemporary societies\u2014that we can, and should, seek to improve ourselves by using techniques based in biomedical knowledge to act on our biology. This opens multiple routes for authorities, and individuals themselves, to act on human conduct and capacities by means of, and in the name of, the brain.\n\n. <http:\/\/www.best-personal-growth-resources.com\/brain-plasticity.xhtml>.\n\nChapter Two. The Visible Invisible\n\n. Writing in the U.K. _Times Literary Supplement_ on November 28, 2007 (<http:\/\/entertainment.timesonline.co.uk\/tol\/arts_and_entertainment\/the_tls\/article2960112.ece>).\n\n. Of course, much philosophical ink has been spent on debating this issue, and some philosophical critics claim it has merely been misleadingly reframed by attributing to brains and their components matters that can only properly be attributed to organisms, and in particular to humans (see Bennett and Hacker 2003).\n\n. As we shall see throughout this book, a variety of terms are used to express this relationship, all of them somewhat vague, and none of them specifying precisely how to overcome the explanatory gap between the activities of molecules within the human brain and the phenomenology of the experience of an inner world of thoughts, feelings, memories, and desires by a human being. We return to this question in our conclusion.\n\n. The English version of the title of chapter 9 of that book is \"The Visible Invisible.\"\n\n. These were shown in a wonderful exhibition produced at the turn of the century titled \"Spectacular Bodies\" (Kemp and Wallace 2000).\n\n. Foucault's well-known words are worth repeating: \"The gaze plunges into the space that it has given itself the task of traversing.... In the anatomo-clinical experience, the medical eye must see the illness spread before it... as it penetrates into the body, as it advances into its bulk, as it circumvents or lifts its masses, as it descends into its depths. Disease is no longer a bundle of characters disseminated here and there over the surface of the body and linked together by statistically observable concomitances and successions.... [I]t is the body itself that has become ill\" (Foucault [1963] 1973, 136).\n\n. We repeat in this section some of the arguments that can be found in chapter 7 of Rose (2007c).\n\n. Of course, as many careful histories show, one should take this triumphalism with a pinch of salt\u2014see, for example, Goldstein (2002).\n\n. The title page of the 1595 edition shows an image of a man, presumably Mercator, measuring a globe held in his hands; the image of Atlas replaced this in later editions: see, for example, that of 1633. There is a considerable historiographical literature on these issues, with some dispute about timing and rationale for the use of the term _atlas_ , which we do not discuss here. The more familiar image of Atlas with the globe on his shoulders dates back at least to Roman times but is often wrongly attributed to Mercator's collections of maps.\n\n. Diamond was founder and president of the Royal Photographic Society of London, established in 1853, and of the _Photographic Journal_ : he is often credited with taking the first photographs of asylum inmates in the Surrey County Asylum in 1851. On Diamond, see Didi-Huberman, cited below, and Packard (1962).\n\n. These are presented and discussed in chapter 3 of Didi-Huberman (1982) (see also Didi-Huberman and Charcot 2003), who also notes that a session of the French Medico-Psychological Society in Paris in 1867 was organized around the theme of the application of photography to the study of mental illness.\n\n. There is a close relation between photography in the asylum and the use of photography in the form of criminal anthropology by the police forces that were established in many countries at this time: we discuss some of this in a later chapter.\n\n. We have drawn on aspects of the analysis provided by Georges Didi-Huberman, cited above, although not its psychoanalytic interpretations. We have had to sidestep a large literature on the historical transformation of modes of scientific representation and the history of 'truth to nature' in the image, most tellingly analyzed by Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison in their account of how objectivity, as truth to nature, shifts in the nineteenth century from the image of the ideal form hidden within the empirical exemplars, to the image of the example itself, in all its anomalies and specificities (Daston and Galison 1992). We will return to some of these issues later in the chapter.\n\n. Finger credits Emanuel Swedenborg's work as an earlier example, though his treatises on the brain were only 'discovered' in 1868 (Finger 2000, 119).\n\n. The term was not used by Gall, and according to the _OED_ , was probably coined by the American psychiatrist Benjamin Rush in 1811 to designate the science of the mind.\n\n. Supporters of Gall argued that such animal experiments were beside the point, but they did not prevail against their critics.\n\n. Many of these images collected together by John van Wyhe can be found at <http:\/\/www.historyofphrenology.org.uk\/overview.htm>.\n\n. Stephen Jay Gould has discussed these attempts in detail, reanalyzed the available data, and pointed to the many ways in which those engaged in these brain-measuring activities fudged and distorted their data to fit their preconceptions concerning the differences in relative size of brain regions\u2014for example, frontal versus posterior cranial regions\u2014in \"inferior\" versus \"superior\" races, and between men and women (S. Gould 1981, see chap. 3).\n\n. Golgi and Cajal were jointly awarded the Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine in 1906 despite their bitter rivalry over this issue.\n\n. We will come across Vogt's work again in our investigation of \"the antisocial brain.\"\n\n. We will not deal directly with brain banking here. Cathy Gere tells us that what happened was a remarkable shift not only in the techniques of preservation of specimens (from chemical fixation to cryopreservation) but perhaps a more remarkable change in the rationale of their collection and the wider web of entanglements they found themselves part of. She argues: \"In the 1960s, brain archiving underwent the greatest social, technological, and organizational transformations in its two hundred year history. Brains began to be archived prospectively, rather than for specific research projects, with tissue samples made available upon application\u2014the advent of brain 'banking' \" (Gere 2003, 408). To fulfill that prospective usage, brains had to be frozen rather than fixed, which also meant that the biochemical processes that were preserved could later be studied at the molecular level. The shift from brain collections to brain banks indicates another change. A bank does not merely refer to a store of things for future use, it also refers to a stock that has some value; in other words, it refers to some sort of capital. Because these vital processes could now be stored, brain banks became part of a broader \"economy of vitality.\"\n\n. The use of thorium was unfortunate, as this substance often leaked into the brain, causing brain tumors.\n\n. We have drawn on the account given by Penfield's biographer (Lewis 1981). Penfield's work inaugurated a continuing technique for exploring the living brain using the opportunity presented by patients awaiting surgery for the removal of the localized brain lesions thought to be the focal points triggering seizures. For a recent example, see Abott (2010).\n\n. Another imaging technology was ultrasound. In 1937, Karl and Friedrich Dussik used ultrasound to obtain rather crude images of the brain. In 1953, Lars Leksell used ultrasound to diagnose a hematoma in an infant's brain\u2014a technique he used in 1956 to identify the midline in the adult brain. However, although ultrasound was used as a diagnostic tool, it did not play a major role in brain visualization.\n\n. The history of MRI and the controversy over the respective contributions of Lauterbur and Damadian are discussed by Amit Prasad (Prasad 2005, 2007).\n\n. We discuss some subsequent uses of brain scans in the courtroom in chapter 6. See also chapter 8 of Rose (2007c).\n\n. The first symposium on the topic of molecular neuroimaging, with the theme \"envisioning the future of neuroscience,\" was held in May 2010 at the National Institutes of Health in Bethesda, Maryland, to provide \"an overview of the potential of molecular neuroimaging in improving our understanding and management of critical CNS pathophysiological processes, such as neurodegeneration, brain tumors, and psychiatric disease.\" The conference program is available at www.molecularimagingcenter.org\/docs\/Brain2010\/MI_Brain_PrelimProgram.pdf; consulted July 2010.\n\n. Many new technologies are currently under development to increase the acuity of imaging and to reduce the need for cumbersome apparatus so that imaging may occur in more naturalistic settings. For example, there are developments in the use of the EEG to investigate connectivity between brain regions, and, more particularly, in the use of near infrared spectroscopy (NIRS).\n\n. In 2009, there were two widely cited indications of this disquiet. First was the widely reported fMRI experiment by Craig Bennett and colleagues that showed apparent variations in levels of brain activation in a dead salmon when exposed to various tasks. The poster by Craig Bennett, Abigail Baird, Michael Miller, and George Walford was titled \"Neural Correlates of Interspecies Perspective Taking in the Post-Mortem Atlantic Salmon\" and pointed out the dangers of false positives and the need for correction for chance (<http:\/\/prefrontal.org\/files\/posters\/Bennett-Salmon-2009.pdf>), but it received much wider attention when reported in _Wired_ magazine (<http:\/\/www.wired.com\/wiredscience\/2009\/09\/fmrisalmon>). Second was the paper by Ed Vul and colleagues, widely circulated under its original title of \"voodoo correlations,\" arguing that mistakes in statistical procedures in many cases had led to the \"Puzzlingly High Correlations in fMRI Studies of Emotion, Personality, and Social Cognition\" (Vul, Harris, et al. 2009).\n\n. Personal communication.\n\n. This, perhaps, suggests some caution in relation to recent attempts to image activity in single neurons and relate this to specific tasks or even specific thoughts.\n\n. Science and technology scholars have addressed similar issues in relation to digital images in other areas, for example, in Lynch's examination of digital image processing in astronomy (M. Lynch 1991). More recently, the manipulation of images in scientific publications, with the ready availability of software packages to manage such processes, has become a matter of controversy: see the discussion of this issue in _Nature_ in 2009 (<http:\/\/www.nature.com\/news\/2009\/091009\/full\/news.2009.991.htm>). Note that there are differences between different kinds of data manipulation. A technology such as fMRI requires choice of parameters such as those of threshold and color; it is good practice to note these explicitly in the publication. This differs from the silent use of techniques to enhance the visibility of an effect in an illustration in a scientific article. It is different again from the deliberate manipulation of data to mislead readers. However, the precise borderlines are sometimes difficult to define.\n\n. SPM is usefully discussed by researchers at the UCL Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging (<http:\/\/www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk\/spm>).\n\n. See our discussion of the antisocial brain in chapter 6.\n\n. Thanks to Hauke Heekeren, now of the Max Planck Institute for Human Development, for his account of these problems at an ENSN workshop, which we have reproduced here.\n\n. Molecules and Minds was the title of a provocative collection of essays by the neurobiologist Steven Rose (1986), whose critique of reductionist explanations has many similarities to our own position.\n\nChapter Three. What's Wrong with Their Mice?\n\n. Voltaire, _The Philosophical Dictionary_ , trans. H. I. Woolf (New York: Knopf, 1924), available at <http:\/\/history.hanover.edu\/texts\/voltaire\/volanima.xhtml>.\n\n. This chapter had its origin in discussions at the ENSN Neuroschool on Behavioral Genetics held in 2008 at the European Molecular Biology Laboratory (EMBL) outside Rome, and we benefited from reading the work in progress by one of those who attended that event. Nicole Nelson's doctoral dissertation is now completed (\"Epistemic Scaffolds in Animal Behavior Genetics,\" PhD diss., Cornell University), and an abstract is available at <http:\/\/nicolenelson.net\/abstract.xhtml>. An earlier version of the chapter was presented as a keynote lecture at the EMBL conference on \"Translating Behavior: Bridging Clinical and Animal Model Research,\" held in Heidelberg in November 2009, and we would like to thank Cornelius Gross, Klaus-Peter Lesch, and Haldor Stefansson for their invitation to give \"the social science lecture\" at that event and the participants in the conference for their critical comments. The preparation of this paper was greatly facilitated by the comments of our colleague Carrie Friese on an early draft, and we also thank her for letting us see some of her own forthcoming work on this topic, especially a draft version of her paper \"Models of Cloning, Models for the Zoo: Rethinking the Sociological Significance of Cloned Animals\" (now published as Friese [2009]).\n\n. Thanks to Carrie Friese for pointing us to this ethnographic and sociological literature on models.\n\n. Although, as we shall discuss later, evolutionary theory has also been used by some to argue against animal experimentation, explicitly contesting the principle of conservation (LaFollette and Shanks 1996).\n\n. Note that Wittgenstein is not so clearly on the side of those who draw a bright line between humans and other animals. See also Vicki Hearne's impassioned argument that some animals also have desires to achieve goals and the capacity for moral understanding (Hearne 1986). Thanks to one of our reviewers for suggesting that we make this point more explicit.\n\n. The mereological fallacy is that of ascribing to the part that which is properly a property of the whole.\n\n. Nicole Nelson's ethnographic research provides us with several examples of these arguments and of the anxiety (if we may put it like that) expressed by the behavioral geneticists about their validity: see her dissertation, cited in note 2.\n\n. See, for example, Hogg (1996); Geyer and Markou (2000); Richter, Garner, and W\u00fcrbel (2009).\n\n. These issues have certainly been addressed in the literature on animal models; for example, Geyer and Markou distinguish a number of different types of validity: predictive, constructive or convergent, discriminant, etiological, and face validity (Geyer and Markou 2000). This characterization problem is precisely the issue addressed by Jacqueline Crawley.\n\n. Of course, as we saw with brain imaging in the previous chapter, this question arises in different ways in all laboratory research in neuroscience.\n\n. Of course, this was a key argument in the work of Ludwik Fleck, who had a particular interest in the training in these ways of seeing (Fleck [1935] 1979).\n\n. Lynch provides us with some compelling ethnographic descriptions of the transformation of individual living creatures into data (M. Lynch 1989).\n\n. The _OED_ gives the following: \"1605 TIMME _Quersit._ III. 191 Wee commonly prouide that they bee prepared in our laboratorie. 1637 B. JONSON _Mercury Vind._ Induction, A Laboratory or Alchymist's workehouse.\"\n\n. We say \"rhetoric of replication\" because, of course, few have an interest in precisely replicating a published study, so replication is almost conducted through a series of displacements.\n\n. Ian Hacking is having fun by emphasizing the stability of the sciences against all the talk in the philosophy of science about scientific revolutions and so forth. So we are more than a little mischievous in using his arguments here.\n\n. Note that the term _model organism_ is a relatively recent addition to the terms used to describe these experimental animals and animal models. As argued by Jean Gayon, the expression emerged in the 1980s, notably in relation to the funding priorities of the U.S. National Institutes of Health (Gayon 2006).\n\n. This quote is also used by Angela Creager, Elizabeth Lunbeck, and Norton Wise in the introduction to their interesting collection of essays on the roles of models, cases, and exemplary narratives in scientific reasoning (Creager, Lunbeck, and Wise 2007).\n\n. Note that Steven Rose, arguing that the \"young chick is a powerful model system in which to study the biochemical and morphological processes underlying memory formation\" titles his article \"God's Organism?\"\u2014albeit with a question mark (Rose 2000).\n\n. Logan quotes Krogh: \"[T]he route by which we can strive toward the ideal [of generality] is by a study of the vital functions in all their aspects _throughout the myriad of organisms_. We may find out, nay, we will find out before very long the essential mechanisms of mammalian kidney function, but the general problem of excretion can be solved only when excretory organs are studied wherever we find them and in _all their essential modifications_ \" (C. Logan 2002, 331; Logan's emphasis).\n\n. Creager et al. also make this point, citing the work of Jessica Bolker to point out that \"some biologists argue that the highly canalised development of _Drosophila_ that makes its development so easy to study in the laboratory also makes it a relatively poor evolutionary representative of its own phylum\" (Creager, Lunbeck, and Wise 2007, 6; referring to Bolker [1995]). It is also relevant to note that the selection of the so-called wild type\u2014against which the models are compared\u2014is also a complex matter, as Rachel Ankeny points out in the same collection (Ankeny 2007).\n\n. There are, of course, many different classifications of types of model. One distinction, that we believe goes back to Clifford Geertz, is the distinction between \"models of,\" which are representations or devices of things that are seemingly inaccessible to vision, and \"models for,\" which can be thought of as designs that might aid in the later construction of an actual artifact (Geertz 1973). Some of these issues are helpfully discussed in McCarty (2003). For other classification schemes and discussions, see, for example, Black (1962); Suppes (1962); Achinstein (1968); Nouvel (2002); Harr\u00e9 (2009).\n\n. There are many different versions of the idea of a conceptual model, many of which are well discussed in Morrison and Morgan (1999).\n\n. As we suggested in earlier chapters, this model is almost certainly misleading, perhaps fundamentally mistaken. In the first decade of this century, researchers increasingly questioned the model proposed by Schildkraut, grounded in levels of neurotransmitter present in the synaptic cleft, and argued that that the principal mode of action of the selective serotonin class of psychopharmaceuticals is not an increase in the availability of neurotransmitter in the synapse, but effects on gene expression and neurogenesis (Santarelli, Saxe, Gross, et al. 2003; Sapolsky 2004). However, this model was the basis of one of the foundational myths of psychopharmacology.\n\n. For them, the other two dimensions are theories and experiments.\n\n. Besides animals (like rodents, frogs, dogs, rabbits, and fruit flies), model organisms also include plants (see Leonelli [2007]) and microorganisms such as _Escherichia coli_ and yeasts\u2014the latter are especially popular in molecular and cellular biology. For more on the evolution of model organisms and their phylogenetic diversity and relatedness see Hedges (2002).\n\n. Katz was awarded the Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine in 1970 for his discoveries, together with Ulf von Euler and Julius Axelrod (<http:\/\/nobelprize.org\/nobel_prizes\/medicine\/laureates\/1970\/katz-bio.xhtml>).\n\n. Dale Purves, who provides a very good account of this early work, argues that the entry of molecular biologists such as Sydney Brenner, Seymour Benzer, and others into neurobiology in the 1970s \"rapidly changed the scene with respect to simple nervous systems. With surprising speed, the neurogenetics and behavior of rapidly reproducing invertebrates, such as the roundworm _Cenorhabitis elegans_ and the fruit fly _Drosophila melanogaster_ , supplanted leeches, lobsters, and sea slugs as the invertebrates of choice, with molecular genetics considered the best way to ultimately understand their nervous systems\" (Purves 2010, 32).\n\n. Other models, for example, those in chemistry, can now include a temporal dimension through the use of computer animation and simulation (Francoeur and Segal 2004). Thanks to one of our reviewers for pointing to this work.\n\n. The question of the 'simplification' of the environment is now coming under scrutiny, with critics within the animal modeling community arguing for the replacement of the impoverished environment that has been conventional with an 'enriched' environment thought to confer more 'ecological validity' on the animals' behavior and their neural development: recent research has explored the behavioral and neurobiological changes that occur when animals are placed in such environments and has considered the implications for previous work using animal models of mental disorder (Laviola, Hannan, et al. 2008).\n\n. Friese, whose work (2009) has focused on the cloning of model animals in the preservation of endangered species in zoos, develops this term drawing on the terminology of Deleuze and Guattari ([1980] 1987). She suggests that the cloned animals function as models that validate in practice the theoretical assumptions of somatic cell nuclear transfer, especially interspecies transfer, as well as models for a particular way in which research on reproduction could be conducted in order to improve biomedical technologies and outcomes that might have important commercial applications\u2014see also Sarah Franklin's work on the creation of \"Dolly\" by somatic cell nuclear transfer (Franklin 2007).\n\n. \"Tout ce qui est vrai pour le Colibacille est vrai pour l'\u00e9l\u00e9phant\" (Jacob 1988). Note that Mark Pallen, from whom we have quoted the French original of this remark, has demonstrated that, as he puts it: \"By contrast, in the postgenomic era, our bioinformatics and laboratory-based studies lead us to conclude that what is true of one strain of _E. coli_ is not even true of another strain from within the same species!\"\u2014a finding that rather confirms our own view, and that of Canguilhem (and indeed, according to Pallen, that of Charles Darwin) (Pallen 2006, 116).\n\n. See chapters 5\u20136 in LaFollette and Shanks (1996) and Pallen (2006).\n\n. It is relevant to point out that Insel himself has long made use of voles as a model organism to study the adult human social brain, or at least with the aim of exploring some aspects of human behavior, and he makes frequent references to the probable implications for psychiatric disorders such as autism (e.g. Insel, O'Brien, and Leckman 1999), although he argues that the work with animals and other genomic research should only be the precursors to suggest hypotheses to be followed up in clinical studies in humans. Thanks to Zoltan Sarnyai for forcefully pointing this out to us at the event we cite in note 2 above.\n\n. The director of the West Riding Lunatic Asylum was James Crichton-Browne: as we saw in chapter 1, Ferrier and Crichton-Browne, together with Hughlings Jackson, founded the journal _Brain_ in 1878. We discuss some further aspects of this work in chapter 6.\n\n. Harlow's work has been continued into the genomic era by Stephen Suomi. Suomi, working with Klaus-Peter Lesch, who is credited with discovering the effects of the short or long alleles of the promoter region of the serotonin transporter gene on risk for various psychiatric problems, now correlates the responses of infant monkeys to styles of mothering with single nucleotide polymorphism (SNP) variants affecting the activity of the serotonin transporter gene (Lesch, Bengel, Heils, et al. 1996; Bennett, Lesch, Heils, et al. 2002).\n\n. This injunction is the title of one of the manuscripts by Nicole Nelson referred to earlier, and she also points out, on the basis of ethnographic observation in labs, how difficult this is for those working in the area to achieve.\n\n. See also Scott (1958).\n\n. This from an author who, elsewhere, has given some serious and thoughtful consideration to problems in translation and in animal models (Miczek and de Wit 2008).\n\n. The authors conclude their paper by asserting: \"Neuroethical concerns require discussion in open discourse among representatives of the criminal justice system, psychiatry, neuroscience, and the social sciences.\" (Miczek, de Almeida, Kravitz, et al. 2007, 11,805). Perhaps, however, it would be well for them to consider their own conceptual problems before suggesting that others need to consider the consequences of their tendentious extrapolations. We will come across Miczek and his group again in chapter 6, where we discuss the neurobiology of aggressive and impulsive conduct and its implications for the criminal justice system.\n\n. This despite explicit arguments to the contrary, for example, by John Paul Scott (Scott 1969). Of course, there is a huge literature here that we cannot discuss\u2014for example, the careful argument by Tinbergen (1968). One could also argue that the issue of internal states could be eliminated altogether if it could be established or proved that aggressive behavior in humans (rape, fighting) is correlated with brain states and\/or genomics, and that such similar states could be replicated in animals, but this nonetheless runs the risk of self-vindication. We return to some of these issues in chapter 6.\n\n. Note that Rodgers has pointed to some similar difficulties with the modeling of 'anxiety' in animals as if it were a unitary phenomenon (Rodgers 1997).\n\n. Chlorpromazine was marketed as Thorazine in the United States and as Largactil in Europe. Animal work actually began soon after the compound known as RP-4560 was first synthesized by the chemist Paul Charpentier in December 1950, and before it was made available for clinical use in 1951; however, the results were not published until after the clinical reports. See Lopez-Munoz, Alamo, Cuenca, et al. (2005, 117).\n\n. The elevated plus maze consists of a crosslike structure of four arms elevated above the floor, two of which are open, and two of which are enclosed at the sides (though open at the top), meeting at an open platform at the junction of the arms. The experimenters measure the amount of time the mouse spends in each arm (together with other behavior, such as 'nose poking,' when the mouse peers out from an enclosed arm into the open platform).\n\n. Some suggest an interpretation that is precisely the reverse: that the more alert the mouse, the quicker it will recognize that escape is impossible in these circumstances, and will preserve its energy by ceasing futile struggle.\n\n. Fragile X is a genetic condition in humans that leads to mental impairments of a range of severity: it is commonly believed to arise from a triplet repeat (GCG) on the X chromosome that affects the proteins involved in neural development.\n\n. There is a long history of the creation of simulacra in biology that are then taken to exemplify real features of the phenomenon simulated. Evelyn Fox Keller gives us the example of St\u00e9phane Leduc's attempts in the first decades of the twentieth century to overcome the distinction between life and non-life by creating \"osmotic organisms\" by introducing metallic salts and alkaline silicates into a solution of water glass, thus generating structures showing \"a quite dramatic similarity to the growth and form of ordinary vegetable and marine life\" (Keller 2002, 26).\n\n. These debates were central to the so called _methodenstreit_ at the end of the nineteenth century about the distinct epistemological character of the human and social sciences, supposedly arising from their distinct ontologies, and has continued across the history of sociology and allied disciplines. The argument for a fundamentally distinct epistemology in the social sciences is particularly associated with German thought and the work of Max Weber, but it came to the boil again in the 1970s, for example, in the writings of Peter Winch and Alasdair MacIntyre (MacIntyre 1962; Winch 1990).\n\n. We explore these questions further in chapter 4.\n\n. As we were writing an early draft of this paper, _Le Monde_ held a three-day public event under the title \"Qui sont les animaux?\" as part of the twenty-first annual forum \"Le Monde Le Mans,\" November 13\u201316, 2009 (http:\/\/forumlemans.univ-lemans.fr\/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=12&Itemid=27; consulted November 24, 2009).\n\n. Patton was writing in the context of a wave of recent philosophical and conceptual work on animals in the human sciences, notably by Vicki Hearne (1986). Much of this is discussed helpfully by Cary Wolfe (2003).\n\n. On the application of the idea of \"forms of life\" across species, see J. Hunter (1968).\n\n. Animal experiments in medical research, while contentious, are rigorously regulated in most countries, requiring specific ethical approval, licenses, assurances of good practice in the animal facilities, and the general principles of \"the three R's\"\u2014replacement, reduction, and refinement\u2014see, for example, <http:\/\/www.understandinganimalresearch.org.uk\/homepage>.\n\n. A somewhat similar view has been expressed by Francesco Marincola, editor in chief of the _Journal of Translational Medicine_ , in the editorial quoted earlier (Marincola 2003).\n\n. This is, of course, a proposal that has been made many times since Claude Bernard wrote: \"Certains chimistes... raisonnent du laboratoire \u00e0 l'organisme, tandis qu'il faut raisonner de l'organisme au laboratoire\" (Bernard 1858\u201377, 242).\n\n. There is a parallel argument in contemporary genomics, where Caspi and Moffitt have suggested that one should not frame explanations in terms of genetic causes of particular types of behavior modified by environmental effects, but in terms of environmental causes of disorders, and then seek the genomic variants that increase or decrease susceptibility or resilience to those environmental causes (Caspi and Moffitt 2006).\n\n. \"Hopkins Team Develops First Mouse Model of Schizophrenia,\" July 30, 2007 (<http:\/\/www.physorg.com\/news105036711.xhtml>; consulted November 2009).\n\n. To complicate the picture, since the turn of the century, many have begun to argue that the comorbidity between these disorders arises because they are linked neurodevelopmental disorders, whose commonalities are masked by diagnostic and clinical practice (Rutter, Kim-Cohen, et al. 2006; Owen, O'Donovan, et al. 2011). We return to this issue in a later chapter, in relation to arguments for screening and early intervention.\n\n. The research on DISC 1 and neural development has, in the main, been carried out in rodents (for example, in Brandon, Handford, Schurov, et al. [2004], all the primary references cited are to work on the rodent brain).\n\n. Although three papers published in _Nature_ in mid-2009 were optimistic in their claims (International Schizophrenia Consortium, 2009), most commentary on the papers was downbeat; for example, the discussion in the Schizophrenia Research Forum (dated July 3, 2009) pointed out: \"There are no break-out candidate genes, though there is support for previous linkage findings, several new candidates, as well as statistical modeling that supports the notion of genetic overlap between schizophrenia and bipolar disorder. Perhaps surprisingly, none of the studies alone identified any genetic marker with significant association to the disease (by the commonly applied genome wide significance benchmark of p < 5 \u00d7 10\u20138 [i.e., p < 5 \u00d7 10-8])\" (<http:\/\/www.schizophreniaforum.org\/new\/detail.asp?id=1532>; consulted November 20, 2009).\n\n. Some of these problems are alluded to in a discussion by John Medina (2008).\n\n. This is one use suggested for the synthetically engineered cells created by Craig Venter and his team (Gibson, Glass, Lartigue, et al. 2010); other work is currently under way with stem cell lines created by the induced pluripotent stem cell technique (iPS cells) from people diagnosed with neurodegenerative diseases, as discussed at <http:\/\/www.timesonline.co.uk\/tol\/news\/science\/medicine\/article7005401.ece>; consulted June 2011).\n\n. This is one of the promises of the Human Brain Project (<http:\/\/www.humanbrainproject.eu>; consulted June 1, 2011).\n\n. For an example of the use of virtual reality\u2013based experiments, see Baas, Nugent, Lissek, et al. (2004).\n\n. This way of putting things was suggested to us by Carrie Friese.\n\nChapter Four. All in the Brain?\n\n. Thanks to Peter Kinderman, who drew our attention to this quote.\n\n. Vol. 8 of _American Handbook of Psychiatry_ (New York: Basic Books, 1986), xiv.\n\n. Our title for this chapter is an allusion to that well-known aphorism, that this or that experience is nothing to worry about\u2014it is \"all in the mind\"\u2014which is also the title of a program on mental health issues on BBC radio.\n\n. Some will remember this phrase from the title of a 1966 movie directed by Karel Reisz that raises the question of the borderlines of eccentricity and mental disorder.\n\n. For a review of the concept of neuropsychiatry, see Berrios and Markov\u00e1 (2002).\n\n. In the French medical literature, Dr. Lucien Lagriffe used the term _neuro-psychiatrie_ in a 1910 article titled \"A propos du diagnostic de la paralysie g\u00e9n\u00e9rale\" in _Annales_ M\u00e9dico-Psychologique (June 27, 1910: 323): \"... le diagnostic s'impose \u00e0 quiconque a des notions, m\u00eame seulement \u00e9l\u00e9mentaires, de neuro-psychiatrie.\" In the Anglo-American literature, a few articles published in the 1920s mention neuropsychiatry as a 'synthetic' specialty encompassing clinical as well as anatomical and physiological aspects of the nervous system and approaches to mental and psychological conditions (e.g., Schaller 1922). _Neuropsychiatry and the War_ , a literature review on military neuropsychiatry, was published by the War Work Committee of the U.S. National Committee for Mental Hygiene in 1918. A neuropsychiatric branch of the U.S. Army Medical Department was founded in 1942. A year later it became a full-fledged division because of the increasing demand for 'neuropsychiatrists' during the Second World War; the division encompassed psychiatry, neurology, preventive psychiatry, and clinical psychology (Anderson, Bernucci, et al. 1966).\n\n. Thomas Willis, Sedleian Professor of Natural Philosophy at Oxford, was a neuroanatomist and the author of the very influential _Anatomy of the Brain_ , which assigned to the striatum the function of linking brain with mind. Of course, it is possible to find earlier uses of the term. Gaspar Peucer (1525\u20131602), a German physician, mathematician, reformer, and scholar, wrote about doctors' \"signs and diagnosis\" in his popular _Commentarius de praecipuis divinationum generibus_ published in Wittenberg in 1553, which was translated into French by Simon Goulard in 1584 as _Les devins ou commentaries des principales sortes de divinations_ (Anvers 1584). Peucer tells us that the signs are themselves divided into \"healthy, sick or neutral,\" that is, they reflect the bodily \"constitutions.\" They get further divided into \"diagnosis, prognosis and anamnestics.\" Diagnosis, Peucer writes, is a heuristic device, as it \"helps discover the exact disease which is presently in the ailed body.\" This definition of _diagnosis_ is repeated in Blankaart's _A Physical Dictionary_ of 1684, and extended to include the cause of the disease and the affected bodily part besides the disease process itself: \"Diagnosis is the knowledge of present signs or a knowledge whereby we understand the present condition of a Distemper; and it is three-fold, either a right instigation of the _part affected_ , of the _disease itself_ , or of its _cause_.\"\n\n. We have discussed some of these early attempts in Chapter 2, in connection with the question of visualizing mental states.\n\n. Allan Young has argued that those who were responsible for drafting _DSM-III_ \u2014notably Robert Spitzer\u2014\"identified themselves, in a self-conscious way, with the nosological perspective of... Emil Kraepelin\" (A. Young 1995, 95). Spitzer himself denies that he was a neo-Kraeplinian (Horwitz and Wakefield 2007).\n\n. Actually, much of the credit for these goes to Eli Robins, a biological psychiatrist, head of the Department of Psychiatry at Washington University School of Medicine (Kendler 2009): he was awarded the APA Foundations' Fund Prize in 1982 for his contributions.\n\n. While the 'molar' level is the tangible and visible body, the body of organs, of tissues and limbs, the 'molecular' body is, as we have seen in chapter 1, the one envisaged by the molecular gaze at the scale of neurotransmitters, of molecules and ionic pumps, of receptors and signals across neural networks. For more, see the chapter \"Molecular Biopolitics\" in Rose (2007c).\n\n. By this, we do not mean that it was uncontested\u2014of course, the contemporary history of psychiatry is riven by conceptual and factual disputes, and this extends to the criteria for diagnosis and the utility of the _DSM_. But the idea of a single discipline, with an explanatory regime that should embrace all these conditions nonetheless is the premise for the contemporary discipline of psychiatry.\n\n. <http:\/\/www.in-cites.com\/papers\/DrRonaldKessler.xhtml>; consulted June 2010. Lee Robins is the wife of Eli Robins, whose work on the Feigner criteria we discussed earlier.\n\n. There have been numerous other studies in the United States along these lines, such as the Epidemiological Catchment Area Study (Regier and Robins 1991). One of the authors (Darrel Regier) has had a key role in the task force developing _DSM-5_.\n\n. The EBC includes both the direct costs of medical and social care and the indirect costs of lost workdays and productivity: \"Direct medical expenditures alone totalled \u20ac135 billion, comprising inpatient stays (\u20ac78 billion), outpatient visits (\u20ac45 billion) and drug costs (\u20ac13 billion). Attributable indirect costs resulting from lost workdays and productivity loss because of permanent disability caused by brain disorders and mortality were \u20ac179 billion, of which the mental disorders are the most prevalent. Direct non-medical costs (social services, informal care and other direct costs) totalled \u20ac72 billion. Mental disorders amounted to \u20ac240 billion and hence constitute 62% of the total cost (excluding dementia), followed by neurological diseases (excluding dementia) totalling \u20ac84 billion (22%). Neurosurgical diseases made up a smaller fraction of the total cost of brain disorders\" (European Brain Council 2005, x).\n\n. <http:\/\/www.in-cites.com\/papers\/DrRonaldKessler.xhtml>; consulted June 2010.\n\n. Note that some similar issues arose in earlier epidemiological studies, for example, the work of Hollinshead and Redlich (Hollinshead 1999) and the Midtown Manhattan Study (Srole, Langner, et al. 1962).\n\n. There is, of course, a tradition of critique of medicalization in the social sciences, most recently focusing on the role of the pharmaceutical industry in expanding the empire of conditions amenable to treatment with drugs. On \"the new engines of medicalization,\" see Conrad (2005). We have discussed this kind of analysis in detail elsewhere and will not rehearse our views here (Rose 1994, 2006a): our focus in this chapter is specifically on its implications of, and for, neuroscience.\n\n. Note that Kessler and colleagues argue precisely the reverse\u2014that it is important to include mild disorders in _DSM-5_ because mild disorders may progress to major ones, and diagnosis at an early stage provides an opportunity for preventive intervention (Kessler, Merikangas, Berglund, et al. 2003).\n\n. This criterion was introduced into _DSM-IV_ largely as a result of the leadership of Allen Frances.\n\n. Wakefield has argued repeatedly that the so-called harmful dysfunction criterion could enable a completely \"factual\" basis for determining that a mental condition is a medical one: \"According to the HD analysis, a condition is a disorder if it is negatively valued ('harmful') and it is in fact due to a failure of some internal mechanism to perform a function for which it was biologically designed (i.e., naturally selected)\" (Wakefield 2007, 149). This will, he believes, enable medical practitioners to distinguish disorders from negative mental conditions that should not be disorders: he is referring to conditions such as ignorance, lack of skill, lack of talent, low intelligence, illiteracy, criminality, bad manners, foolishness, and moral weakness.\n\n. Indeed, this route seems to be implied by Wakefield's rather different appeal to biology as a means to protect contemporary _DSM_ -based psychiatry against a repeat of the earlier backlash from antipsychiatry on the grounds that it is again, pathologizing and medicalizing difference.\n\n. According to the American Psychiatric Association's _DSM-5_ website in March 2010, the process for revising the _DSM_ began with a brief discussion between Steven Hyman, MD (then-director of the NIMH), Steven M. Mirin, MD (then-medical director of the APA), and David J. Kupfer, MD (then-chair of the American Psychiatric Association Committee on Psychiatric Diagnosis and Assessment) at the NIMH in 1999. The planning process included experts in family and twin studies, molecular genetics, basic and clinical neuroscience, cognitive and behavioral science, development throughout the life span, and disability. Planning work groups were created, including groups covering developmental issues, gaps in the current system, disability and impairment, neuroscience, nomenclature, and cross-cultural issues. Darrel A. Regier was recruited from the NIMH to serve as the research director for the APA and to coordinate the development of _DSM-5_. A series of five white papers were published together in a volume titled _A Research Agenda for DSM-5_ , published in 2002; other papers were published; research was undertaken by the American Psychiatric Institute for Research and Education (APIRE), with Regier as the principal investigator; and thirteen conferences were held from 2004 to 2008 to help develop the research base for the _DSM-5_ task force and work groups and for WHO as it develops revisions of the International Classification of Diseases. In 2006, Kupfer was appointed as chair and Regier as vice-chair of the task force to oversee the development of _DSM-5_. The work groups have developed draft _DSM-5_ diagnostic criteria, with the release of the final, approved _DSM-5_ planned for May 2013. See <http:\/\/www.dsm5.org\/about\/Pages\/DSMVOverview.aspx>.\n\n. They added: \"Ethnicity and culture represent important factors that should be included in all of these research endeavors,\" but little was said to indicate that they believed this suggestion had serious epistemological implications, rather than being merely a nod to political correctness.\n\n. Indeed, it has been argued by several critics that this very claim of specificity owed more to marketing than to either neurobiology or to the results of clinical trials.\n\n. Perhaps the most concerted attempt to recognize the complexity of the interactions that generate \"phenotypes\" of mental disorder is being undertaken by the Consortium for Neuropsychiatric Phenomics at UCLA (<http:\/\/www.phenomics.ucla.edu>).\n\n. <http:\/\/www.dsm5.org\/Newsroom\/Pages\/PressReleases.aspx>.\n\n. <http:\/\/www.corepsychblog.com\/2010\/02\/psychiatric-diagnosis>; consulted June 2010.\n\n. Van Os, a Dutch psychiatrist and epidemiologist, had earlier written an editorial for the _British Journal of Psychiatry_ , based on epidemiological and related research, arguing that the diagnosis of schizophrenia should be abolished, in favor of \"salience syndrome,\" on the basis that psychosis was best understood as aberrant salience regulation (van Os 2009).\n\n. Note that David Kingdon, Lars Hansen, and Douglas Turkington, writing in the same issue of _Psychosis_ and also aware of the problem that the diagnosis \"extends the breadth of conditions included as mental disorders and could lead to stigmatization and inappropriate treatment with associated side-effects for individuals, most of whom will never develop psychosis,\" think that nonetheless it \"would focus attention on provision, and improve evaluation of, early intervention services. It might also lead to earlier availability of evidence based interventions, stimulate research and provide an agreed definition of psychosis risk\" (Kingdon, Hansen, and Turkington 2010).\n\n. This despite the fact that in the article they reference, van Os and Kapur point to \"key developments in biology, epidemiology, and pharmacology of schizophrenia\" such as recent molecular genetic findings, demonstrable alterations in brain structure and changes in dopamine neurotransmission, and the effectiveness of pharmacological treatments that block the dopamine system on delusions and hallucinations. They argue that a \"clear genetic susceptibility exists in schizophrenia; however, what one inherits is not the illness, but altered brain development, shared partly with developmental disorders, such as autism, and partly with affective disorders such as bipolar disorder.\" But the susceptibility only leads to the abnormal dopamine release that causes frank psychotic symptoms when this vulnerability is combined with environmental insults. Nevertheless, \"100 years after being so named, research is beginning to understand the biological mechanisms underlying the symptoms of schizophrenia and the psychosocial factors that moderate their expression\" (van Os and Kapur 2009, 641).\n\n. There is a proposal to rename this category \"Attenuated Psychotic Symptoms Syndrome\" (Cornblatt and Correll 2010).\n\n. AD is Alzheimer's disease; FDG-PET is fluorodeoxyglucose positron emission tomography; and CSF is cerebrospinal fluid.\n\n. The very diagnosis of Mild Cognitive Impairment is somewhat controversial (see Macher 2004; Rose 2010a). \"Some claim that the diagnosis can be made with relative certainty, others say that the phenotype is too blurry to be of much clinical or predictive use. Estimates of prevalence in those aged over 65 range from 5.2% to 16.8% (Golomb, Kluger, Ferris, et al. 2004, 354). Some claim MCI is an early stage of Alzheimer's and will progress to full Alzheimer's; others dispute this inevitable progression. Some claim that recent advances in brain imaging enable the visualization of plaques and tangles at an early stage, and hence allow prediction of which among those who meet the behavioral criteria of MCI will progress to Alzheimer's, although the evidence from the Nun Study and elsewhere suggests we should be wary. Some say that the diagnosis enables early treatment, which will slow progression; others doubt that such treatment is available. There is much to be said, here, given the blurry character of Alzheimer's itself, of the apparent capacity of a diagnosis of MCI to shift an individual onto a social and experiential pathway to Alzheimer's. Nonetheless, since the naming of this phenomena in 1988 re-organised a complex and competing field of categories and definitions, citations have increased exponentially\u2014according to the Institute for Scientific Infor-mation's Web of Science, there was one article on this topic in 1990, 158 in 2000, and 943 in 2007\" (Rose 2010a, 77). A further 2,017 papers were published on this topic from 2008 to July 2011. For helpful discussions of the utility of this diagnosis, see Brayne (2007); Whitehouse and George (2008).\n\n. We discuss self-vindication in chapter 3.\n\n. This is also true of many common complex, nonpsychiatric conditions; see Rose (2007c).\n\n. As we discuss in a subsequent chapter, the logics of screen and intervene have recently come into question in relation both to breast cancer (G\u00f8tzsche and Nielsen 2009) and to prostate cancer\u2014in the latter case, Richard Ablin, the inventor of the prostate specific antigen test, widely used in the United States as a screening test, referred to the screening program as a \"public health disaster\" (<http:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/2010\/03\/10\/opinion\/10Ablin.xhtml>).\n\nChapter Five. The Social Brain\n\n. A first version of this chapter was given by Nikolas Rose at the \"Global Minds\" conference held at Aarhus University, Denmark, in November 2008. Thanks to Andreas Roepstorff and Nils Buband for organizing the event, and to those participants who gave helpful comments. In developing it for this chapter, we would like to thank John Cacioppo for responding to an e-mail out of the blue, and for sending us some very helpful papers prior to publication.\n\n. Book 2 of _The Second Sex_ opens with, \"One is not born, but rather becomes, a woman\" (Beauvoir 1952).\n\n. Of course, wild children have historically been enrolled in many different arguments for different purposes, for example, by Locke, Condillac, and the sensationalist philosophers in relation to the issue of innate ideas, and more recently, in debates over \"critical periods\" in the development of capacities such as vision and language. Some of these issues are discussed in Rose (1985).\n\n. We discuss these split-brain experiments in chapter 7.\n\n. A rather different version of the modularity thesis was asserted a little earlier by Jerry Fodor, although his modules were delineated in terms of their functional properties, not their localizability in the brain (Fodor 1983). Of course, to some extent, modularity is both premise and outcome of the work on visualization discussed in chapter 2, and indeed, as we saw, Fodor\u2014for whom modularity is a conceptual and philosophical issue rather than an anatomical one\u2014is one of those who have cast doubt on the significance of that project of localization.\n\n. In 2009, Dunbar was the recipient of an award from the United Kingdom's British Academy for a project titled \"From Lucy to Language: The Archaeology of the Social Brain,\" which \"aimed to bring together archaeologists, evolutionary psychologists, social anthropologists, sociologists and linguists to reconstruct our ancestors' social lives and behavior from the archaeological evidence of bones and tools. New models developed for understanding primate behavior can now be applied to the hard evidence of our ancestors to help us understand how our brains have enlarged three-fold since early hominid Lucy, four million years ago\" (<http:\/\/www.britac.ac.uk\/arp>; consulted April 2011).\n\n. Dunbar gives a convenient account of this thesis in a lecture given at Gustavus Adolphus College in September 2009 (<http:\/\/www.youtube.com\/watch?v=i98XpBFWPrI>). Dunbar also makes a great deal of the role of brain size for pair bonding, and the anthropomorphic and somewhat teleological style of thought here is characteristic.\n\n. \"Mirror Neurons and the Brain in a Vat\" (<http:\/\/www.edge.org\/3rd_culture\/ramachandran06\/ramachandran06_index.xhtml>). See also Ramachandran's earlier essay, \"Mirror Neurons and Imitation Learning as the Driving Force behind the 'Great Leap Forward' in Human Evolution\" (<http:\/\/www.edge.org\/3rd_culture\/ramachandran\/ramachandran_p1.xhtml>; both consulted on November 12, 2008).\n\n. While the original observations of mirroring of actions seem to have occurred when monkeys observed human actions, there seems to be some ambiguity in the literature as to whether the mirroring that supposedly underpins empathy for the emotions of another is limited to cases where that other is of the same species, and whether it is more pronounced when that other has a prior emotional relationship with the subject.\n\n. <http:\/\/www.edge.org\/3rd_culture\/ramachandran\/ramachandran_p1.xhtml>. We would like to thank Daniel Margulies for sharing the research that he conducted in 2009 in the LSE's BIOS Centre on the rise and fall of mirror neuron theory.\n\n. See, for example, Olivier Morin's blog written in November 2008, <http:\/\/www.cognitionandculture.net\/Olivier-s-blog\/do-we-have-mirror-neurons-at-all.xhtml>; consulted April 1, 2010).\n\n. See, for example, the dispute over a 2010 paper from Marco Iacoboni's group claiming for the first time to have made recordings from human mirror neurons (Mukamel, Ekstrom, et al. 2010), also at <http:\/\/neurocritic.blogspot.com\/2010\/04\/mirror-neurons-join-marilyn-monroe.xhtml>.\n\n. Tania Singer, now at University College London, was a key early proponent of this line of work (e.g., Singer, Seymour, O'Doherty, et al. 2006). Another key figure is Ernst Fehr, who is based at the University of Zurich (<http:\/\/www.econ.uzh.ch\/faculty\/fehr.xhtml>). They are joined by a growing number of behavioral economists whose research usually entails various game playing scenarios.\n\n. Some anthropologists, notably Eve Danziger, have argued that capacities such as the ability to read the intentions of others are by no means universal, but are culturally specific (Danziger 2006, 2010).\n\n. This suggestion has troubled some, who wonder why, if the social brain arises in response to evolutionary pressures, such pathologies have persisted. Some suggest that they are the price that humans pay for other valuable attributes, such as language (Crow 2004); others hypothesize that they confer evolutionary advantages in certain settings (Bosman, Brunetti, and Aboitiz 2004); others believe that they persist because they share a common genetic basis with the evolving circuitry of the social brain (Burns 2004, 2006). This is not the place critically to evaluate these forms of argument.\n\n. They drew on their own earlier work (Oberman, Hubbard, McCleery, et al. 2005; Oberman and Ramachandran 2007) as well as the claims by Rizzolatti and Gallese cited above. See also Dapretto, Davies, Pfeifer, et al. (2005).\n\n. According to Essential Science Indicators, this paper had been cited 1,160 times by May 2007.\n\n. See the very helpful interview with Lesch (<http:\/\/www.in-cites.com\/papers\/KPLesch.xhtml>; consulted November 13, 2008).\n\n. See also Canli and Lesch (2007); Lesch (2008).\n\n. Thanks to John Cacioppo for letting us see a version of this history prior to publication.\n\n. Data derived from Web of Science citation index (November 2010) for articles with the topic \"social neuroscience.\"\n\n. http:\/\/mitpress.mit.edu\/catalog\/item\/default.asp?ttype=2&tid=10683; consulted November 18, 2010).\n\n. <http:\/\/ccsn.uchicago.edu>. The Social Neuroscience Lab at NYU, directed by a psychologist, David Amodio, was established at around the same time (<http:\/\/www.psych.nyu.edu\/amodiolab>), and many other similar centers and labs followed, from Queensland, Australia, to Beijing, China. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to map out the networks of collaboration among a relatively small number of enthusiasts that established the basis for this new discipline.\n\n. \"The social environment, therefore, is fundamentally involved in the sculpting and activation\/inhibition of basic structures and processes in the human brain and biology.... [S]ocial isolation or perceived social isolation (loneliness) gets under the skin to affect social cognition and emotions, personality processes, brain, biology, and health.\" Both this quotation and the one in the text are from his website at the University of Chicago (<http:\/\/psychology.uchicago.edu\/people\/faculty\/cacioppo\/index.shtml>; consulted November 1, 2010).\n\n. Lieberman had hosted an early conference on social cognition at UCLA in 2001. On Lieberman, see <http:\/\/www.scn.ucla.edu\/people\/pdf\/APA07.pdf>. Lieberman has published extensively with his wife, Naomi Eisenberger, on the neural basis of social rejection, notably \"Why Rejection Hurts\" (Eisenberger, Lieberman, and Williams 2003), which we discuss later, and which is seen by many neuroimagers as a textbook example of the flawed reasoning known as \"reverse inference.\"\n\n. <http:\/\/www.psy.pku.edu.cn\/LABS\/CSCN_lab\/research.xhtml>; consulted November 26, 2010.\n\n. <http:\/\/s4sn.org\/drupal>; consulted November 26, 2010.\n\n. <http:\/\/s4sn.org\/drupal\/?q=node\/3>; consulted November 30, 2010.\n\n. They refer here to two histories: Cacioppo, Berntson, and Decety (2011); Matusall, Kaufmann, and Christen (2011).\n\n. <http:\/\/grants.nih.gov\/grants\/guide\/rfa-files\/RFA-DA-06-004.xhtml>; consulted November 15, 2008.\n\n. http:\/\/www.esrc.ac.uk\/ESRCInfoCentre\/about\/CI\/CP\/research_publications\/index27.aspx?ComponentId=6545&SourcePageId=6557; consulted November 15, 2008.\n\n. It called for applications focused on \"[u]nderstanding normal and abnormal cognition, social and economic behavior of individuals and groups, and the neuropsychological basis of such behavior (including, associated disorders), particularly utilising innovative tools and methods\" and on \"[s]ocial, economic and occupational factors affecting mental health, mental wellbeing and mental illness\" (ESRC website; consulted November 15, 2008; page no longer active).\n\n. Posted on <http:\/\/neuroanthropology.net\/2008\/03\/04\/neuroanthropology-session-at-the-aaa-conference>; consulted November 15, 2008.\n\n. <http:\/\/www.nyas.org\/valconf>; consulted November 15, 2008.\n\n. This is at the heart of Alain Ehrenberg's critique of the social brain\u2014that the social is reduced to the interaction between two naturalized human individuals, whereas humans as social actors operate in a shared world of cultures, institutions, meanings, and values, and human affects such as empathy arise only in certain kinds of societies and in relation to those persons to whom those societies deem it appropriate to empathize\u2014they are not natural but social (Ehrenberg 2008). However, presumably, social neuroscientists would retort that features of the brain provide the _capacity_ for empathy, but that different societies and cultures shape it in particular historically contingent ways.\n\n. <http:\/\/psychology.uchicago.edu\/people\/faculty\/cacioppo\/index.shtml>; consulted November 2010.\n\n. Ibid.\n\n. Note that they refer to this as a neurosociologic theory, not a neurosociology.\n\n. Franks also wrote the entry on neurosociology under this name for the online _Blackwell Encyclopedia of Sociology_ and, in an interesting case of conceptual entrepreneurship, he also seems to have been responsible for the Wikipedia entry\u2014comments by those editing that entry argue that the term is now obsolete and is synonymous with _social neuroscience_ : see <http:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Neurosociology>.\n\n. One important social science discipline that has shown an openness to these new ways of thinking is economics. A number of economists have used versions of social neuroscience to explore decision making in consumption, trading, and other areas of economic activity, contesting images of rational choice, most often using the game-playing methodologies that have become habitual, and which are conveniently adaptable for use in brain scanners. While these endeavors have, to date, remained largely in the world of academia, another version, claiming to be based on an understanding of the brain, has achieved much popular exposure and has been picked up by governments in the United Kingdom and elsewhere. So-called 'nudge' techniques seek to make it easier for people to make behavioral change in desired directions, not by instructing them but by changing the incentive structures in their environment and the largely nonconscious influences on decisions (Thaler and Sunstein 2008). The claim of such arguments to rest on an understanding of the brain derived from neuroscience is hollow, however, and the suggestion that these indirect modes of behavior shaping are in some way novel is historically ignorant\u2014governments and other authorities have utilized such techniques since at least the mid-nineteenth century (Rose and Miller 1992; Miller and Rose 2008).\n\n. <http:\/\/www.thersa.org\/events\/vision\/vision-videos\/matthew-taylor>.\n\n. Grist was the lead researcher on the Social Brain project, a role later taken over by Jonathan Rowson.\n\n. This phrase was also the title of an anthology of papers on ethology published in 1969 (Parkin 1969) and an introductory sociology book favoring an approach loosely based on social evolution (Runciman 1999).\n\n. Emily Martin, whose excellent work in this area we have already discussed, has consistently warned of the danger of neuroreductionism, suggesting that brain-based views of personhood were intrinsically reductionist, but that they would only become widely deployed in a culture in which a \"brain-centered\" view of the person made cultural sense (Martin 2000); however, we argue that a different path has been followed by many, in which brain-based views of personhood come more closely into alignment with what Martin refers to as \"our everyday mental concepts\"\u2014that is to say, an ontology informed by a century of cultural assimilation of psychological conceptions of human beings.\n\nChapter Six. The Antisocial Brain\n\n. Significantly, this passage was quoted by Graham Allen in his _Early Intervention: The Next Steps; An Independent Report to Her Majesty's Government_ (2011).\n\n. <http:\/\/news.sky.com\/home\/world-news\/article\/15620258>; consulted December 1, 2010.\n\n. Another individual who has made something of a media career out of these claims is James (Jim) Fallon of the University of California, Irvine\u2014see for instance, his recent appearance on U.S. National Public Radio (NPR) (<http:\/\/www.npr.org\/templates\/story\/story.php?storyId=127888976>).\n\n. <http:\/\/www.abc.net.au\/news\/2010-04-27\/carl-williams-brain-unlikely-to-reveal-secrets\/412892>; consulted December 1, 2010.\n\n. <http:\/\/www.nature.com\/news\/2010\/100317\/full\/464340a.xhtml>; consulted December 1, 2010.\n\n. This shift is discussed in more detail in chapter 8 of Rose (2007c).\n\n. Our account here depends on that given by Robert M. Young (1970, 39). Young points to the crucial difference between Gall's work and that of later localization researchers such as Ferrier\u2014Gall's faculties were hypothesized, then localized, whereas the work of such researchers as Ferrier started from evidence derived from accidental or artificial brain lesions in humans or in animals (Gall was opposed to animal experiments on the grounds of their cruelty).\n\n. Note that Benedikt's argument was criticized at the time by the celebrated psychiatrist and neurologist Theodor Meynert, who in 1876 wrote: \"[A]ttempts to localize complex phenomena of cerebral life, which only find expression in contact with social life, are not worthy of discussion. The scientific research towards the localization of cerebral powers has to restrict itself to simple functional energies, such as perception, motion, association, judgement or moods\" (quoted in Verplaetse 2004, 314).\n\n. We discuss the Society for Mutual Autopsy in chapter 2. Note that this was just one of a number of similar societies that, unhappy with the fact that most brains for study were those obtained from asylums, prisons, or almshouses, sought to collect, study, and preserve the brains of eminent persons, and to examine them in an attempt to identify the physical basis of their prowess in the size of the brain or the convolutions of the cortex (Gere 2003, 403\u20136). We will not repeat here the now familiar criticisms of craniometry in general, and Broca in particular, for their attempts to identify the peculiarities of the brains of different and inferior races, or to find, in the morphology of the brain, the basis for the differences between men and women (Gould 1981).\n\n. In 1880, the year of Broca's own death, a large study showed an average increase of 11 grams in the brains of 119 assassins, murderers, and thieves when compared with brains from non-criminals.\n\n. We can also note the work of Lorenzo Tenchini, who founded the Museum of Criminal Anthropology in Parma, and, alongside his other work in medicine and psychiatry, engaged in a lifelong study of the brains of criminals and the relationship between brain anatomy and criminal behavior (Lorusso, Cristini, and Porro 2007).\n\n. We have drawn on David Garland's helpful discussion here (Garland 1988).\n\n. Note that, in his contribution to the discussion that followed this address, Thomas Clouston, himself a former president of the association, disagreed strongly: \"No doubt most of us who have looked through the books of Lombroso and Havelock Ellis and others are inclined to admit that it is a little overdone by some of our continental brethren, but to say that the mass of criminals in this country are merely criminals by want of opportunity of doing good, by want of education, and not by their organization, is absolutely contrary to the results of psychological investigation for the last fifty years. I once had occasion to carefully examine the inmates of the Edinburgh prison, and if there was one thing that impressed itself upon me it was that I had to do with a degenerate aggregation of human beings\"(Clouston, in discussion following Nicolson 1895, 589). Other contributors to the discussion supported Clouston in this debate.\n\n. We have drawn on Hagner's excellent account in what follows.\n\n. Vogt, who had links with the Moscow Brain Institute, was called as a neurologist to consult on Lenin's illness; after his death he received Lenin's brain for histological study: the story is told by Paul Gregory (2008). Vogt had been Forel's pupil and then his collaborator\u2014they cofounded the _Journal f\u00fcr Psychologie und Neurologie_ , later renamed the _Journal f\u00fcr Hinforschung_ (Journal of Brain Research). As for Tonnies, he came from Vogt's hometown and had been his mentor and friend (see \"Vogt, Oskar Georg Dieckmann,\" _Complete Dictionary of Scientific Biography_ (<http:\/\/www.encyclopedia.com\/doc\/1G2-2830906176.xhtml>; consulted July 29, 2011).\n\n. Volkow, later to become director of NIDA, is Leon Trotsky's great-granddaughter; she grew up in the house in Mexico City where Trotsky was killed by a blow from an ice axe to his brain, though not from a repetitively violent offender, but from an undercover NKVD agent.\n\n. Then at the Forensic Neuropsychology Laboratory, Kirby Forensic Psychiatric Center, and Nathan S. Kline Institute for Psychiatric Research, New York University School of Medicine.\n\n. See, for example, presentations from Kent Kiehl and Adrian Raine at the March 2011 symposium on neuroscience and the law organized by the U.K. Royal Society's Brain Waves project and the U.S. Sackler Foundation. Transcripts of their talks (and talks from some of the other key figures in this debate such as Hank Greely and Stephen Morse) are available at <http:\/\/sites.nationalacademies.org\/PGA\/stl\/PGA_062477>; consulted July 10, 2011.\n\n. We will not discuss developments in other legal areas, for example, in civil law and in claims for damages relating to brain injury (where the term _neurolaw_ was originally coined), where things are very different; see our earlier note on this.\n\n. Jurisdictions vary in how they make such exceptions in relation to age, gender, medical conditions, and the like, some of which we discuss below. Of course, as noted above, there are differences between different domains of law\u2014tax law, shipping law, the law relating to specific types of activity such as driving a motorized vehicle, and so forth. Our discussion here focuses on the criminal justice system in jurisdictions with common law and adversarial systems, where the court acts as a supposedly impartial overseer of a combat between prosecution and defense, rather than, as in inquisitorial systems such as those in most countries in continental Europe, where the court is actively involved in the investigation of the offense. It is a regrettable fact that most published debate on the matters under discussion in this chapter also relates to such systems, and there is little published information on how these issues are being worked out in other jurisdictions.\n\n. Probabilities do, of course, figure in deliberations in civil cases, where the standard of proof is not 'beyond reasonable doubt' but 'the balance of probabilities.' As one reviewer of an earlier draft pointed out, there have been discussions of the use of Bayesian statistics in legal proceedings, but so far with little evidence of success (Fienberg and Kadane 1983; Taroni, Bozza, et al. 2010).\n\n. This issue is tellingly illustrated in the attempts by Dr. Richard J. Konkol to explain what was shown on his SPECT scans, when he gave evidence at the 1999 trial of Kip Kinkel, who was accused of the Oregon school shootings. In this case, the State chose not to cross-examine Konkol. The transcript is available at <http:\/\/www.pbs.org\/wgbh\/pages\/frontline\/shows\/kinkel\/trial\/konkol.xhtml>; consulted June 1, 2010.\n\n. There are many cases where brain scan evidence of structural abnormalities has been introduced, where this is relevant to questions of brain damage, as in cases where compensation is at stake. At the time of writing, December 2011, these are currently under research by Susan Wolf in the United States (<http:\/\/www.law.umn.edu\/facultyprofiles\/wolfs.xhtml#I4thmUSlx6Uir73faZ-K_w>) and by Lisa Claydon in Europe (<http:\/\/law.uwe.ac.uk\/staff-directory\/dol-staff\/lisa-claydon.aspx>); results are not yet published. In criminal trials in the United States, there was, of course, the famous case of John Hinckley Jr., found not guilty by reason of insanity in his 1982 trial after shooting Ronald Reagan: a CAT scan was introduced as part of the psychiatric evidence for the defense, although there is no indication that this was decisive. After this verdict, many U.S. states changed their legal codes to abolish the verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity, which mandates a psychiatric disposal, and replaced it with the verdict of guilty but insane, which allows the courts to choose among the full range of options for sentence.\n\n. We confine ourselves here to questions of violent or antisocial conduct in the criminal justice system and crime control policy. We will not discuss the many other areas where neurobiological evidence may be considered relevant, for example, in witness credibility, capacity to stand trial, etc.\n\n. There is no evidence that we know of, as yet, of neurobiological arguments being brought to bear in cases of infanticide\u2014one key area where the English law, since the 1920s, has established a partial defense in murder cases, as juries were reluctant to convict mothers who killed their newborn children if this meant a mandatory death sentence. The Law Commission of England and Wales reviewed this legislation in 2006, but it remains in force at the time of writing.\n\n. Jay Aronson has provided some helpful discussions of these issues (J. Aronson 2007, 2009).\n\n. For example, in 2002, the Supreme Court ruled by a majority of six to three, in the case of _Atkins v. Virginia_ , that executing individuals who are mentally retarded or mentally handicapped violated the Eighth Amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishment; the threshold for such a ban was left to individual states, but is usually deemed to come into effect with an IQ below 70. This case engendered much discussion. Wikipedia provides an accessible account of the case (<http:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Atkins_v._Virginia>). Despite this Supreme Court ruling, and the appeals to it by his lawyers, in 2009 Bobby Wayne Woods, with an IQ below the threshold, was put to death by lethal injection for the rape and murder of the eleven-year-old daughter of his girlfriend (<http:\/\/www.guardian.co.uk\/world\/2009\/dec\/04\/texas-execution-mental-disability-iq>; both websites were consulted in July 2011).\n\n. Note that, in England, this issue is under investigation by the Law Commission as we write (<http:\/\/www.justice.gov.uk\/lawcommission\/areas\/unfitness-to-plead.htm>; consulted July 10, 2011). The commission published a consultation paper in October 2010, which does discuss issues of brain damage in relation to unfitness to plead, but apart from recommending the continued involvement of psychiatrists in the assessment, makes no reference to evidence from neuroscience. Some of these issues are discussed in Peay (2010).\n\n. Again note that our focus here is on the antisocial brain; we will therefore not discuss the use of neuroscientific arguments and neurotechnologies in other legal areas, for example, in relation to 'deception'\u2014as in the invention of neural lie detector technology. These issues are under ongoing investigation by Andrew Balmer of the University of Sheffield and have been discussed in a number of helpful conference papers (<http:\/\/sheffield.academia.edu\/AndrewBalmer\/CurriculumVitae>). See also Moriarty (2009). However, there is one emerging possibility here that is relevant\u2014the potential use of neural lie detection technologies in risk assessment of certain groups of offenders, for example, sexual offenders.\n\n. For more detail see Rose (2007c).\n\n. The online edition of the MIT newspaper, the _Tech_ , of October 22, 1993, reported it thus: \"More than three decades ago, a Dutch schoolteacher, troubled by a pattern of violence among his male relations, traced the pattern's origin to a couple who married in 1780. He concluded his kin must be suffering from an inherited mental disability. Pretending to be a dispassionate outsider, he then wrote up his notes under the title 'A Curious Case.' The teacher has long since died. But Friday, his 'curious case' earns a page in the annals of science, as a team of researchers from the Netherlands and the United States report that some men in his family harbor a mutant gene that predisposes them to aggressive behavior\" (<http:\/\/tech.mit.edu\/V113\/N51\/agression.51w.xhtml>; consulted June 10, 2010).\n\n. Van Praag was one of the group of researchers in the 1960s, influenced by the emergence of the first antidepressants and antipsychotic drugs, as well as the evidence from the use of LSD, who argued that psychiatric disorders had a biological basis. Initially working on the biological basis of endogenous depression and its links with serotonin, he later argued that genetically based variations in serotonin levels were linked to aspects of personality such as impulsivity and irritability. According to David Healy and others, his lectures on biological psychiatry in the Netherlands were picketed by students and he received death threats from antipsychiatry activists (Healy 1997). Further details of his work can be found in an interview conducted with him when he was elected to become an honorary member of the European College of Neuropsychopharmacology in 2007: (<http:\/\/matters.ecnp.nl\/number13\/interview3.shtml>; consulted December 1, 2010).\n\n. 5-hydroxyindoleacetic acid (5-HIAA), the main metabolite of serotonin in the human body, is used in urine samples to determine the body's levels of serotonin.\n\n. For further details, including the Mobley trial, see Rose (2007c).\n\n. As of June 2010, Brunner was professor of medical genetics and head of the department of human genetics at the Radboud University Nijmegen Medical Centre, focusing his work on the genetics of disease (<http:\/\/www.ncmls.eu\/NCMLS\/MenuStructures\/PI\/theme3\/HanBrunner.asp>; consulted June 10, 2010).\n\n. For Miczek's biography, see <http:\/\/ase.tufts.edu\/psychology\/peopleMiczek.htm>; consulted December 1, 2010.\n\n. The work of this panel is discussed in chapter 8 of Rose (2007c).\n\n. The members of this cohort were assessed on a range of measures at age three, and then at ages five, seven, nine, eleven, thirteen, fifteen, eighteen, twenty-one, and twenty-six, with future assessments scheduled for ages thirty-two, thirty-eight, forty-four, and fifty. Retention rates at age twenty-six were over 95%.\n\n. We discuss this discovery by Klaus Peter Lesch in chapter 5.\n\n. Much of the text in this section is derived verbatim from Rose (2010a).\n\n. Interestingly, Lynam's early research was carried out with Terrie Moffitt.\n\n. <http:\/\/www.dshs.state.tx.us\/mhprograms\/tmapover.shtm>; consulted February 24, 2009.\n\n. <http:\/\/www.pharmalot.com\/2008\/08\/texas-suspends-psych-drug-program-for-kids>; consulted December 1, 2010.\n\n. <http:\/\/www.teenscreen.org\/about>. For the controversy, see, for example, <http:\/\/www.teenscreentruth.com>; both websites consulted January 4, 2011. Note that many of the critics are widely believed to be organized by the Citizens Commission on Human Rights (CCHR), which is funded by Scientology.\n\n. The problems surrounding the use of biomarkers as predictors in psychiatry are discussed in detail in Singh and Rose (2009).\n\n. Those who work in this area distinguish between a relatively large group of children with 'conduct disorder' (around 7%), a smaller group within this with 'anti-social personality' (around 3%), and an even smaller group with 'psychopathy' (1%), and argue that each has its own characteristic pattern of neural anomalies. Some suggest that research is needed to establish which particular interventions are most appropriate for which group. For our purposes, these distinctions are not relevant.\n\n. This work is based on the Twins Early Development Study (TEDS) (<http:\/\/www.iop.kcl.ac.uk\/departments\/?locator=336>): \"a large-scale longitudinal study of twins from early childhood through adolescence. The twins were assessed longitudinally at 2, 3, 4, 7, 9, 10, 12, 14 and currently 16 years of age in order to investigate genetic and environmental contributions to change and continuity in language, cognitive and academic abilities and behavior problems from multivariate quantitative and molecular genetic perspectives. The twins were identified from birth records of twins born in the UK in 1994\u201396. More than 15,000 pairs of twins have been enrolled in TEDS and the participating families are representative of the UK population. TEDS data indicate that both genetic and environmental influences are important in nearly all areas of behavioral development.... The TEDS dataset is proving valuable in genome-wide association research that tries to identify some of the many genes responsible for the ubiquitous heritability of behavior.\" See also <http:\/\/www.teds.ac.uk>; consulted January 4, 2011.\n\n. The conference followed the publication of the Social Exclusion Action Plan (2006) and the \"Care Matters\" white paper (2007). See <http:\/\/www.personalitydisorder.org.uk\/resources\/emerging-pd>; consulted January 4, 2011.\n\n. These are the aspects emphasized in the presentation on \"Multi-Systemic Therapy\" by Brigitte Squire at the 2007 conference cited above (<http:\/\/www.personalitydisorder.org.uk\/news\/wp-content\/uploads\/brigitte-squire.pdf>; consulted January 4, 2011).\n\n. The phrase _incredible years_ derives from the well-known training series, described as follows on the organization's website: \"The Incredible Years, our award-winning parent training, teacher training, and child social skills training approaches have been selected by the U.S. Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention as an 'exemplary' best practice program and as a 'Blueprints' program. The program was selected as a 'Model' program by the Center for Substance Abuse Prevention (CSAP).... The Incredible Years Parents, Teachers, and Children Training Series has two long-range goals. The first goal is to develop comprehensive treatment programs for young children with early onset conduct problems. The second goal is the development of cost-effective, community-based, universal prevention programs that all families and teachers of young children can use to promote social competence and to prevent children from developing conduct problems in the first place. The purpose of the series is to prevent delinquency, drug abuse, and violence\" (<http:\/\/incredibleyears.com>; consulted January 4, 2011).\n\n. The details for the United States that follow in this paragraph are derived from the Prevention Action website (<http:\/\/www.preventionaction.org>; consulted January 4, 2011).\n\n. <http:\/\/www.preventionaction.org\/putting-brain-science-back-streets-los-angeles>.\n\n. <http:\/\/www.ChildTrauma.org>; consulted January 4, 2011.\n\n. According to the _Guardian_ on April 9, 2010, in a speech recorded by a member of the audience, Duncan Smith said: \"We keep going back, and as you track back you begin to realise that actually, for far too many people in society crime began before they were born. And that is a really strongly held belief of mine now, and more and more work was done in both social science, but even particularly now backed up by neuroscience demonstrates that the damage that we start children with, is damage that they keep, and that damage becomes more and more difficult as they go through.... We now know that we can pretty much figure out where an 18-year-old will be at the time that they are two and a half or three years old.\" He added the inability of a child to have \"imbibed the concept of empathy\" from its parent could have profound impacts on its later life. Perry said that these remarks were \"an oversimplification\" that \"greatly misrepresents the way we would explain the impact of neglect or trauma on the developing brain.\" He added: \"to oversimplify this way is, essentially, to distort.\" \"I do believe that overstating and misunderstanding the neurobiology can lead to confusion, anger, distortion and potentially to bad policy,\" he said, adding that the claims appeared to be \"a terrible distraction from the important issues related to the need to create family friendly, and developmentally informed policy that is aware and informed about the importance of early childhood and brain development\" (<http:\/\/www.guardian.co.uk\/politics\/2010\/apr\/09\/iain-duncan-smith-childrens-brains>; consulted January 4, 2010).\n\n. There were a number of studies of the developmental consequences of the extreme neglect suffered by Romanian orphans (Rutter, Beckett, Castle, et al. 2007; Rutter, Sonuga Barke, and Castle 2010). Brain images from the Romanian orphans, and stories of their neglect and recovery, gained considerable popular attention. For an example of the public reporting, see <http:\/\/americanradioworks.publicradio.org\/features\/romania\/b1.xhtml>; consulted 4 January 4, 2011.\n\n. <http:\/\/www.kidspeaceofmind.org>; consulted January 4, 2011.\n\n. For other evaluations of parenting programs in the United Kingdom, including those using the Incredible Years approach, see Edwards, C\u00e9illeachair, Bywater, et al. (2007); Hutchings, Bywater, Daley, et al. (2007); Jones, Daley, Hutchings, et al. (2008).\n\n. <http:\/\/www.kidspeaceofmind.org>; consulted January 4, 2011.\n\nChapter Seven. Personhood in a Neurobiological Age\n\n. Earlier versions of this chapter were presented at various places, including the University of California Los Angeles, the Centre for Research on Socio-Cultural Change, and the Universities of Durham and Exeter. Thanks to all for comments. We also return here to some themes discussed in a number of papers dating back to the 1980s, some of which were brought together under the title _Inventing Ourselves: Psychology, Power, and Personhood_ (Rose 1996).\n\n. For a very small selection of neuroscience books on these issues written for a non-specialist audience, in addition to the work of Francis Crick, Joseph LeDoux, Chris Frith, Thomas Metzinger, Julian Baggini, and the Churchlands cited below, see Gazzaniga (2008a); Greenfield (2008); Damasio (2010); Baggini (2011).\n\n. We should note that one of the present authors suggested some time ago that we had witnessed the birth of what he termed \"the neurochemical self\" (Rose 2003a, 2003b, 2004)\u2014a term that was meant to imply, not a wholesale mutation in personhood, but the availability of a neurochemical register within which individuals could describe, judge, and seek to modulate their mental states and ailments.\n\n. <http:\/\/www.brainhood.net>; consulted June 2009.\n\n. We use this compendious German term for the sciences of the spirit, incorporating the humanities, the social sciences and many other disciplines, as opposed to the natural and mathematical sciences, the _Naturwissenschaften_.\n\n. Of course, discussion of what Mauss really meant depends a great deal on questions of translation. We return to this question later in this chapter. See also note 18, below.\n\n. By the phrase _positive science_ we do not mean to imply approval of their epistemological bases, let alone of their normative claims\u2014merely that these endeavors justify their truth claims by reference to empirical evidence in a characteristic manner.\n\n. We should note that each author finds his or her own way of making sense of these; for example, Feinberg chooses a quasi-Freudian language when he asserts: \"The neuropathologies of the self are a group of highly complex and multi-determined syndromes in which brain dysfunction causes a profound and specific disturbances [ _sic_ ] of ego boundaries and ego functions (ego disequilibrium). This disturbance facilitates the emergence of primitive ego functions and primitive psychological defenses that are essential for full creation of the NPS. The neuropathology in the majority of these cases involves the right hemisphere with a predilection for frontal involvement especially within right medial heteromodal association cortices. This latter region is hypothesized to play a critical role in the establishment of ego boundaries and to mediate the relationship between self and world. According to this hypothesis, the preservation and activation of the largely verbal defenses, such as verbal denial, projection, splitting, and fantasy may be the result of the remaining, and presumably relatively intact left verbal hemisphere. The evidence suggests that given the fact these immature defenses and fantasies are preserved and even activated in the presence of right hemisphere damage, the emergence of the mature defenses in childhood, and their functioning in adulthood, critically depends up [ _sic_ ] right hemisphere functions\" (Feinberg 2011, 79).\n\n. We have discussed some aspects of these experiments, and of Gazzaniga's conclusions from them, in previous chapters.\n\n. The references that Gazzaniga draws on to reach this conclusion include Turk, Heatherton, Kelley, et al. (2002); Cooney and Gazzaniga (2003); Turk, Heatherton, Macrae, et al. (2003).\n\n. Oliver Sacks recounts a particularly striking case of this phenomenon, one he terms \"internal amputation\" in _A Leg to Stand On_. However, his experience comes, not from brain damage but from the immobilization of his badly broken leg in a plaster cast for several months\u2014suggesting that the relation between the limb and the brain can equally work in the reverse direction (Sacks 1984).\n\n. The philosopher Daniel Dennett has been a persistent critic of Libet's work and his conclusions (Dennett 2003a, 2003b).\n\n. The title of this section is taken from a conference held by the New York Academy of Sciences on September 26\u201328, 2002, and a subsequent volume containing essays by many of the participants (LeDoux, Debiec, and Moss 2003).\n\n. This has been an argument particularly developed by Jaak Panksepp, who has suggested that humans share with many other animals what he terms a \"core self\" that is capable of integrating information about the animals' (or humans') own internal body states and their goal orientations, generating the affects or emotions that promote the behaviors required for survival; see, for example, Panksepp (2005); Northoff and Panksepp (2008).\n\n. Theory of mind is discussed in chapter 5.\n\n. Others follow a similar route in suggesting that it is humans' access to their own experiences of self that underpins insight into the mental states of others considered as similar selves. Thus those committed to the significance of mirror neurons, discussed in chapter 5, also draw on evidence from those diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder, claiming this is linked to a disruption in the capability of the mirror neuron system to represent the action goals of others, and to link those to the self's own action goals\u2014for it is this that \"critically contributes to shaping our experience of ourselves and of other selves, providing us with a multilayered motor representation both of our own and of others' action possibilities [and] paves the way for the higher-level forms of self-and other-awareness generally thought to be at the core of our full-fledged sense of self and sense of others\" (Sinigaglia and Rizzolatti 2011, 72).\n\n. Of course, not all of those who contribute to the emerging discipline of cultural neuroscience frame their arguments in terms of neuroplasticity; others prefer to think in terms of gene-environment interactions and consequential cultural variation in patterns of gene expression in neural development and pathways (Chiao 2009). This is not the place to review the very extensive neurobiologically inflected literature on culture and cognition.\n\n. Many have sought to clarify Mauss's argument. When he titled his talk \"Une cat\u00e9gorie de l'esprit humanine: La notion de personne, celle de 'moi',\" what exactly did he mean by these terms? (Carrithers, Collins, and Lukes 1985). As we have mentioned earlier, the issue is somewhat bedeviled by translation. The original text, in French, reads: \"Pas plus que de linguistique, je ne vous parlerai de psychologie. Je laisserai de c\u00f4t\u00e9 tout ce qui concerne le 'moi,' la personnalit\u00e9 consciente comme telle. Je dirai seulement: il est \u00e9vident, surtout pour nous, qu'il n'y a jamais eu d'\u00eatre humain qui n'ait eu le sens, non seulement de son corps, mais aussi de son individualit\u00e9 spirituelle et corporelle \u00e0 la fois.... Mon sujet est tout autre, et est ind\u00e9pendant. C'est un sujet d'histoire sociale. Comment, au cours des si\u00e8cles, \u00e0 travers de nombreuses soci\u00e9t\u00e9s, s'est lentement \u00e9labor\u00e9, non pas le sens du 'moi,' mais la notion, le concept que les hommes des divers temps s'en sont cr\u00e9\u00e9s? Ce que je veux vous montrer, c'est la s\u00e9rie des formes que ce concept a rev\u00eatues dans la vie des hommes des soci\u00e9t\u00e9s, d'apr\u00e8s leurs droits, leurs religions, leurs coutumes, leurs structures sociales et leurs mentalit\u00e9s\" (<http:\/\/classiques.uqac.ca\/classiques\/mauss_marcel\/socio_et_anthropo\/5_Une_categorie\/Une_categorie.xhtml>; consulted July 1, 2011). It is often argued that Mauss was trying to 'sociologize' Kant's universal categories, but as Steven Lukes points out, for Kant \"the self, or thinking subject ( _das Ich_ ), is _not_ a category, but 'the vehicle of all concepts' and itself transcendental but not knowable,\" presupposed by all experience but not amenable to knowledge (Carrithers, Collins, and Lukes 1985, 283). And when Mauss spoke of ideas, was he concerned with specialized, articulated knowledge, with more or less formalized discourses, or was he concerned with the implicit presuppositions of lay beliefs or indigenous psychologies? These and other issues are debated in the volume cited above.\n\n. As Mauss refers to Ribot, we might note here that Th\u00e9odule Ribot was one of many in the late nineteenth century (including Sigmund Freud) who argued that consciousness is but a small part of a much larger domain of mental life\u2014for example, asserting in his _Maladies de la personalit\u00e9_ of 1885 that \"what emerges of the _moi_ into full consciousness is only a small part of what remains buried although active. The conscious personality is never more than a small part of physical personality.... [I]t is by studying how the _moi_ unravels [ _se defait_ ] that we can understand how it was originally constructed\" (quoted in Nicolas and Murray 1999, 290).\n\n. The idea of \"self-fashioning\" was most articulately developed by Stephen Greenblatt in his study _Renaissance Self-Fashioning: From More to Shakespeare_ (1980). Self-fashioning, for Greenblatt, is the self-conscious process of fashioning character or identity, which almost always occurs in relation to one or more authorities, often in competition, and usually in order to exclude or minimize some other form of the self that is perceived as alien, strange, or in some way threatening. We differ in our usage here, placing less emphasis on fashioning that concentrates on the outward person, and in our recognition that self-fashioning is not a process primarily undertaken in the element of language.\n\n. We know a great deal about the history of the use of these drugs and the rise in consumption of the different classes of psychiatric drugs in different countries and geographical regions over the last two decades of the twentieth century, especially of those newer drugs claiming to be based on neurobiological research and to target precise neural pathways that underpin disorders such as depression, anxiety, or attention deficit hyperactivity disorder. See chapter 7 of Rose (2007c) and also Rose (2006b).\n\n. There have been many fictional versions of such a fantasy, and its costs, most recently in Alan Glynn's _Limitless_ (2011).\n\n. <http:\/\/www.dana.org\/brainweek>; consulted April 1, 2011.\n\n. <http:\/\/ibreaus.org\/site\/why-brain-education\/>; consulted April 1, 2011. The IBREA also enunciated the \"Brain Declaration\": \"World-renowned scholars, thinkers, and social activists gathered in Seoul, South Korea on June 15, 2001, to attend the New Millennium World Peace Humanity Conference. It was the first Humanity Conference held to highlight the values of Humanity, the Earth, and the Brain.... The adoption of the Declaration of Humanity reflected a fundamental shift in consciousness, capable of resolving the problems facing the human race. The Declaration became the philosophical foundation of Brain Education and was later adapted and renamed the Brain Declaration. Essentially, the Brain Declaration is a set of statements that affirm the power of the human brain: I declare that I am the master of my brain; I declare that my brain has infinite possibilities and creative potential; I declare that my brain has the right to accept or refuse any information or knowledge that it is offered; I declare that my brain loves humanity and the earth; I declare that my brain desires peace\" (<http:\/\/www.ibreaus.org\/newdesign2011\/?page_id=13>).\n\n. <http:\/\/www.powerbrainedu.com>; consulted April 1, 2011.\n\n. <http:\/\/www.braingym.org.uk\/about\/about.htm>; consulted April 1, 2011.\n\n. See, for example, SharpBrains (<http:\/\/www.sharpbrains.com>; consulted April 1, 2011).\n\n. <http:\/\/www.neurobics.com\/explain.xhtml>; consulted April 1, 2011\u2014one of many such programs that appears to be a commercial spin-off developed by a research neurobiologist.\n\n. For the Mind and Life Institute, see <http:\/\/www.mindandlife.org>; consulted April 1, 2011. The work of Francisco Varela was one important element in this relationship, and he is remembered in the institute's annual Varela Awards. Varela was trained in medicine and biology and did his doctorate on information processing in the retina with Torsten Wiesel. He trained as a Buddhist monk in Tibet in the 1970s (Hayward and Varela 1992; Varela, Thompson, and Rosch 1993).\n\n. For example, Ilchi Lee (<http:\/\/www.ilchi.com>; consulted April 1, 2011): \"Ilchi Lee is a pioneering Brain Philosopher and Educator. He has developed brain training programs that are widely used in many organizations around the world. In his homeland, South Korea, his programs have been adopted as mind and body training methods in the Ministry of Education, Samsung Corporation, and the Korean Army.... Ilchi Lee has spent several decades investigating ways to develop the potential of the human brain. Through his life-long pursuit of brain-centered training methods and programs, hundreds of thousands of people around the world have achieved the benefits of healthier bodies, improved learning, business success, and personal empowerment.\"\n\nConclusion. Managing Brains, Minds, and Selves\n\n. To aid the readability of our conclusion, we have chosen, in the main, not to include bibliographic references where we are summarizing arguments made in previous chapters.\n\n. Neuronal Man is the title of a much-reprinted book by the eminent French neuroscientist Jean-Pierre Changeux (1985, 1997).\n\n. GxE is the conventional notation used to indicate that there are \"interactions\" between genes\u2014or a specific genomic sequence\u2014and environmental factors.\n\n. Woese distinguishes what he terms \"empirical reductionism\"\u2014the methodological analysis of constituent parts and their relations\u2014from \"fundamentalist reductionism\"\u2014by which he means a metaphysical belief that living systems can be completely understood in terms of the specific properties of their constituent parts\u2014a view that came to prominence with the rise of molecular genetics, and that, in his view, denies what classically trained biologists took for granted: the existence of emergent properties.\n\n. This issue is perceptively discussed in two papers by Cathy Gere (2004a, 2004b).\n\n. The theorist who has pursued this line of thought most rigorously is Elizabeth Wilson, and there are many affinities between her project of \"gut feminism\" and the issues that we raise here. For some early products of this work, see Wilson (2004a, 2004b).\nReferences\n\nAbi-Rached, J. M. 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See also antisocial behavior\n\nAlexander, Franz,\n\nAllen, Graham, ,\n\nAllport, Gordon,\n\nAlthusser, Louis,\n\nAlzheimer's disease, , , , , 261n34\n\nAmerican Society for Neurochemistry, ,\n\nAndriezen, W. Lloyd,\n\nanimal models: anthropomorphism and, , 97\u201398, 103\u20134; and artificiality of laboratory as research setting, 85\u201392; behavioral studies, , , , 96\u201399; cerebral localization and, ; computer simulations as replacement for, 108\u20139; and conceptual models, ; and DSM categories, 105\u20138; ethics of animal-based research, , 247n37; generalization and, 94\u201395; and human psychopathologies, , 99\u2013102, ; and human sociality, , 150\u201351; and human specificity, 102\u20134; vs. mechanical or material models, 92\u201393; mereological fallacy and, 83\u201384; reverse translation, 106\u20137; self-vindication and laboratory research, 88\u201389, 92\u201393, , 105\u20139; \"setup\" and, , 85\u201389, , , ; species selection for, 89\u201390; specificity of individual organisms, 94\u201395; and stabilization of the experimenter, 85\u201386; stabilization (standardization) of animals used, 89\u201391; structures, functions, and disease models (models3), 92\u201395; \"style of reasoning\" and, 82\u201383; translation of findings, , , 95\u201396, 104\u20138\n\nantisocial behavior: \"bioprediction\" of, ; brain imaging and, , 165\u201366; and \"callous and unemotional traits\" (AS-CU), ; costs of, , 192\u201393, , ; diagnosis of antisocial personality disorders, 102\u20133, , 176\u201377; and environmental influences on brain development, , , 187\u201390; gene-environment interaction and, ; genomics and, , , 180\u201390, 181\u201389, 261n31, 269n31; linked to physical abnormalities in the brain, , , , , ; as neurobiological in origin, ; parental input and, ; preventive interventions, , 15\u201316, 188\u201396; \"screen and intervene\" control strategy, , , 166\u201367, 189\u201391, . See also criminality; criminal justice system\n\nAos, Steve,\n\nAronson, Elliot,\n\nasylums: \"asylum psychiatry\" and treatment of mental disorders, ; and clinical gaze, 55\u201359, , , 249n10, 249n12; as setting for research, , ; as setting for treatment of mental disorders, , , ,  Atkins v. Virginia, 268n27 autism spectrum disorders: and abnormal social cognition in, 148\u201350; as developmental, , , ; diagnosis of, , , 240n29; mentalizing deficits and, 148\u201350, 216\u201317, 273n16; mirror neurons and, 273n16\n\nautopsies, 61\u201365, 165\u201366, , 266n9\n\nBach-y-Rita, Paul,\n\nBakker, C.,\n\nBarlow, David,\n\nBaron-Cohen, Simon, ,\n\nBateson, Gregory,\n\nBatmanghelidjh, Camila,\n\nBayh-Dole Act (1980), 19\u201320\n\nBear, Mark,\n\nBegley, Sharon,\n\nbehavior: animal models and, 96\u201399; nonconscious processes and, 21\u201323, 161\u201362, , 265n40. See also antisocial behavior\n\nBelmonte, M.,\n\nBenedikt, Moriz,\n\nBennett, M. P., 83\u201384\n\nBenzer, Seymour,\n\nBerger, Hans,\n\nBerger, Philip,\n\nBernard, Claude, ,\n\nBernard, Jean,\n\nBerntson, Gary, 152\u201353\n\nBeyesian theory,\n\nbiopolitics, , 13\u201316,\n\nbipolar disorder, , , , , , 241n37, 257n59\n\nBlakemore, Sarah-Jayne, ,\n\nBloch, Felix,  blood flow, brain function imaging and, , 71\u201373\n\nBotteron, Kelly,\n\nBrady, Joseph,\n\nbrain: anatomical structures in, , ,  (see also localization of brain functions); autopsy and investigation of the, 61\u201365, 165\u201366, , 266n9; conceptualization of, 216, 225\u201326,  (see also social brain); evolution and structures in, , 243\u201344; as focus of research, 32\u201333; function as observable,  (see also function, visualization of brain); interconnected synaptic network of neurons in, , , , ; mental processes as brain events, ; mereological fallacy and, 83\u201384; mind\/brain relationship, 3\u20134, , , , 204\u20135, ; the molecular brain, 9\u201310, , 225\u201326; as object, , , ; as organ, , 32\u201333, 43\u201344, , , ; as part of interconnected system of the body, ; physical measurement of, , 168\u201369, ; self and, , , 205\u20137, 212\u201317; \"social brain\" hypothesis (see social brain)\n\nbrain education, , 221\u201322\n\nBraitenberg, Valentino,\n\nBreakefield, Xandra,\n\nBrenner, Sydney,\n\nBroca, Paul, , , 62\u201363,\n\nBrodie, Bernard \"Steve,\"\n\nBrodmann, Korbinian, , ,\n\nBrooks, David, 161\u201362\n\nBrothers, Leslie, ,\n\nBrowne, James Crichton,\n\nBrunner, Han, 181\u201383, 185\u201386,\n\nBuckholtz, Joshua, 188\u201389\n\nBucknill, John C., , , ,\n\nBurton, Robert,\n\nBush, George H. W.,\n\nBush, Vannevar, 26\u201327\n\nByatt, A. S.,\n\nCacioppo, John, 152\u201356,\n\nCalhoun, John C.,\n\nCameron, David,\n\nCameron, J.,  Canguilhem, Georges, 29\u201331, , , 94\u201395, ,\n\nCarlsson, Arvid, , 36\u201337\n\nCarter, Rita,\n\nCartwright, Nancy,\n\nCaspi, Avshalom, 186\u201388, 191\u201392, 256n55\n\nCAT scans (computerized axial tomography), 68\u201370\n\nChadarevian, Soraya de,\n\nChangeux, Jean-Pierre, ,\n\nCharcot, Jean-Martin, , , ,\n\nCharney, Dennis,\n\nchemical neurotransmission, 29\u201332,\n\nchildren: attribution of criminal responsibility to, ; brain development of abused or neglected, , 186\u201390, 193\u201396, 271n54, 271n55; childrearing and neuroscience, 8\u20139; diagnosis of mental disorders in, , , 241n37; and governing through the brain, ; preventive intervention during childhood, 15\u201316, , 190\u201398; psychopharmaceuticals and, , 241n37; and social neuroscience,\n\nChou, I. H.,\n\nChouard, T.,\n\nChurchland, Patricia, , 215\u201316\n\nclinical gaze: asylums as site of, 55\u201359, , , 249n10, 249n12; individualization and, , 57\u201361, , , 86\u201387, 103\u20136; and neuromolecular research, ; object\/subject relationship and, ; as practice of seeing, 55\u201356; spatial and temporal dimensions of, ; technology and (see imaging technologies)\n\nClouston, Thomas,\n\nCobb, Stanley,\n\nCohen, Jonathan,\n\nCohen, Mark,\n\nCohn, Simon, 76\u201377\n\nCombe, George, 61\u201362\n\nCooney, J. W.,\n\nCooper, Leon,\n\nCormack, A. M.,\n\ncortical stimulation,\n\nCoryell, Charles,\n\nCrawley, Jacqueline, , , , 99\u2013101\n\nCrichton-Browne, James, , 59\u201360, ,\n\ncriminality: anatomy and, 167\u201377; criminal anthropology as field of study, 167\u201372, , 249n12; diagnostic criteria and, ; free will and criminal responsibility, , , 177\u201378, 196\u201397, 242n44; as insanity, ; and lack of empathy, , , 271n54. See also criminal justice system\n\ncriminal justice system: attribution of criminal responsibility, ; brain images as evidence in criminal court, , ; deceit and lie detection, 269n29; insanity as exculpatory (NGRI), ; intent and criminal responsibility, ; mental capacity and criminal responsibility, , 268n27\n\nCT scans (computerized axial tomography), 68\u201370\n\nDagonet, Henri,\n\nDale, Henry,\n\nDamadian, Raymond,\n\nDANA foundation, , 177\u201378,\n\nDandy, Walter,\n\nDarwin, Charles, ,\n\nDean, Brian, 165\u201366\n\nde Beauvoir, Simone,\n\nDecety, Jean,\n\ndecision making: Libetism and awareness of intent, 209\u201313; nonconscious processes and, , 21\u201323, 161\u201362, , , 209\u201315\n\nDeiters, Otto,\n\nDelay, Jean, 35\u201336\n\ndementia, 14\u201315, , , ,\n\nDeniker, Pierre,\n\nDennison, Paul,\n\ndepression, ; costs of, , ; diagnosis of, , , 125\u201327, , 240n29; monoamine hypothesis and, , , 92\u201393, 134\u201335; and pharmaceutical intervention, , , ; screening and suicide prevention, ; serotonin and, 150\u201351, , 269n32\n\nDespine, Prosper,\n\ndiagnosis: antipsychiatry and critiques of, ; and classification or categorization of disorders, , , , 114\u201316, 118\u201320, 122\u201324, , , , , , ; and definition of insanity, 110\u201312, ; errors in (including false positives), , , , 129\u201330, 250n29; estimated prevalence of mental disorders, , 127\u201329, ; Feighner criteria, 120\u201321; genetic testing and, 130\u201332; manuals for, ,  (see also Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM)); neuroimaging technology and, , , 250n29; objectivity and, 4, 111\u201316, 130\u201333, 137\u201338, ; population demographics and, 115\u201316, , ; of prodromal or mild disorders, , , , , , 136\u201337, 259n19; of Psychosis Risk Syndrome, 136\u201337; self-vindication and, 105\u20138, 138\u201339; and threshold of disorder or abnormality, , , ,  (see also of prodromal or mild disorders under this heading); and visualization, 60\u201361\n\nDiagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), 105\u20138, 131\u201337; causal assumptions avoided in, 118\u201319; DSM II revision, 118\u201320; DSM III revision, 99\u2013100, 114\u201315, 120\u201322; DSM IV revision, 123\u201325; DSM 5 revision, , , 131\u201337, 259n19, 260n23; first formulation of, ; self-vindication and, 105\u20138\n\nDiamond, Hugh, ,\n\nDidi-Huberman, Georges,\n\nDishion, Tom,\n\nDomasio, Antonio,\n\ndopamine hypothesis, , 36\u201337\n\ndrugs: substance abuse as mental disorder, , , , 176\u201377. See also pharmaceuticals\n\ndualism, 204\u20135\n\nDumit, Joseph, ,\n\nDunbar, Robin, ,\n\nDuncan, G. J.,\n\nEccles, John, ,\n\neconomics: brain education products and, 222\u201323; costs of antisocial behavior, , 192\u201393, , ; costs of intervention, 136\u201337, , , , ; costs of mental disorders, , 16\u201317, , , 259n15; intellectual property rights and research, 19\u201320; market for pharmaceuticals, ; neuroeconomics as discipline, , 265n40; profit as research motive, , ; of research, 15\u201319, 232\u201333\n\nelectrical neurotransmission, 29\u201332,\n\nelectroencephalography (EEG), ,\n\nEllis, Havelock, 167\u201369\n\nembodiment: and brain as part of interconnected system, ; of mental disorders, 56\u201361; neural process as embodied, ; \"rubber hand\" and phantom limb phenomena, ; and selfhood,\n\nempathy, , 21\u201322, 141\u201342, 146\u201349, , 157\u201358, , ; as biological in origin, 143\u201344; criminal behavior and lack of, , , 271n54; mirroring and, 263n9; social cognition and, 143\u201344; as social rather than biological in origin, 264n35\n\nenvironment: and antisocial behavior, , , 187\u201390; gene-environment interactions, , , , 191\u201392, 256n55, 261n31,\n\n270n47, 273n17, 275n3; influences on brain development, , , , , , ; intervention and, 15\u201316; laboratory setting as, , , ; milieu, transaction or interaction with, 23\u201324, , , , 103\u20134, , , , , , , ; plasticity and response to, ; resilience and, , , 187\u201388, ; social brain and, 150\u201351, 159\u201362, 264n24; social interaction as, 230\u201332,\n\nepigenetics, , , , , ,\n\nErlanger, Joseph,\n\nEsquirol, Jean, 57\u201359,\n\neugenics, , , , , , , , , 180\u201381, 246n22\n\nEuropean Brain and Behavior Society,\n\nEuropean Neuroscience and Society Network,\n\nEuropean Society for Molecular Imaging (ESMI),\n\nevolution: of brain and neurons, , 243\u201344;\n\nand conservation across species, , , 90\u201391, ; social behavior and brain, 143\u201352, , , ; and use of animal models, , 90\u201395; variation and, . See also evolutionary psychology\n\nevolutionary psychology, , , 143\u201344,\n\nFaraday, Michael,\n\nFarah, M. J.,\n\nFeighner, John,\n\nFeighner criteria, 120\u201321\n\nFenton, W. S., 128\u201329\n\nFernald, Russell,\n\nFerrier, David, , 64\u201365, ,\n\nFirst, Michael,\n\n5-HTT (serotonin) transporter gene, , 187\u2013188\n\nFlechsig, Paul, , , 62\u201363,\n\nFleck, Ludwick, 42\u201343\n\nFlourens, Pierre,\n\nFodor, Jerry, , 262n5\n\nFood and Drug Administration (US FDA),\n\nForel, August, 172\u201373\n\nFoucault, Michel, , , , , , 248n6. See also clinical gaze\n\nFox, N. A.,\n\nFragile X syndrome, 101\u20132\n\nFrances, Allen,\n\nFranks, David,\n\nFreeman, Walter, , 245n17\n\nfree will, ; and criminal responsibility, , , 177\u201378, , 196\u201397, 242n44; impulse control and, ; Libetism and, , -Rose. 14; nonconscious processes and, 21\u201323, 209\u201319, 242n44; self-awareness and, , , 209\u201319\n\nFreud, Sigmund, 6\u20137, , , , , , 199\u2013200,\n\nFriese, Carrie,\n\nFrith, Chris, , , , 200\u2013201, 204\u20135, 207\u20139, 211\u201312\n\nFrith, Uta,\n\nFritsch, G.,\n\nfunction, visualization of brain, 74\u201380; blood flow and, , 71\u201373; functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), , , , , , 165\u201366; and localization, 75\u201376, ; vs. structural, , 69\u201370\n\nfunctional MRI (fMRI), , , , , , 165\u201366\n\nfunding for research: activist groups and, 18\u201319; brain disorders and, ; public vs. private industrial research, 16\u201318; in social neuroscience, 156\u201357\n\nFuortes, M.G.F.,\n\nfuturity, 13\u201314\n\nGage, Phineas, , 205\u20136\n\nGalambos, Robert,\n\nGall, Franz Joseph, 61\u201362, 167\u201368, 266n7\n\nGarner, Joseph, 88\u201389\n\nGasser, Herbert,\n\nGastaut, Henri,\n\nGawrylewski, Andrea,\n\ngaze. See clinical gaze\n\nGazzaniga, Michael, 4\u20135, , 177\u201378, 206\u20137, ,\n\nGeertz, Clifford,\n\ngenetics, ; and animal models, ; antisocial behavior and, , , 180\u201390, 181\u201389, 261n31, 269n31; diagnosis and genetic testing, 130\u201332; epigenetic factors, , , , , , ; 5-HTT (serotonin) transporter gene, , 187\u201388; gene-environment interactions, , , , 191\u201392, 256n55, 261n31, 270n47, 273n17, 275n3; genomics and therapeutic advances, 131\u201332, ; mental disorders as inheritable, 33\u201334, 133\u201334, 257n59, 261n13; molecular genomics, 44\u201345; neurogenetics and mutation, ; neurogenomics, 11\u201312, , , ; phenomics and genomics, ; psychiatric genomics, , 131\u201332, 180\u201390; sequencing of human genome, 44\u201345; and social neuroscience, 151\u201352\n\nGere, Cathy,\n\nGigerenzer, Gerd,\n\nGillihan, S. J.,\n\nGilman, Sander, 56\u201359\n\nGlueck, Bernard,\n\nGoffman, Erving,\n\nGoldman, David,\n\nGoldstein, Kurt,\n\nGolgi, Camillo, 31\u201332,\n\nGolla, Frederick,\n\nGould, Elizabeth,\n\nGould, Stephen Jay, , 249n18\n\ngoverning through the brain, , 13\u201316; environment and brain development, ; intervention and preemptive crime control, 166\u201367, 197\u201398; intervention to influence brain development, 195\u201398; neuroscience as influence on policy, ; and nonconscious processes, 21\u201322; personal intention free choice and accountability, ; plasticity and, , ; \"screen and intervene\" policies and, , 166\u201367, 189\u201391, ; social brain theory and, , 160\u201363\n\nGreeley, Henry \"Hank,\"\n\nGriesinger, Wilhelm, ,\n\nGrisso, Thomas,\n\nGrohmann, Johann Christian August,\n\nGruenberg, Ernest, 118\u201319\n\nGur, Raquel,\n\nGur, Ruben,\n\nHaag, Amanda, 110\u201311\n\nHacker, P.M.S., 83\u201384\n\nHales, R. e., 111\u201312\n\nHandesman, Josef,\n\nHaraway, Donna,\n\nHarlow, Harry, 96\u201397\n\nHaynes, John-Dylan, 53\u201354\n\nHearne, Vicki, 252n5\n\nHebb, Donald,\n\nH\u00e9caen, Henry,\n\nHecht, Jennifer,\n\nHering, Henry,\n\nHervsey, Georg Van,\n\nHess, Walter, 245n17\n\nHill, Alex,\n\nHill, Denis,\n\nHinde, Robert,\n\nHis, Wilhelm, Sr.,\n\nHitzig, E.,\n\nHodgkin, Alan, ,\n\nHolley, Andr\u00e9, ,\n\nHood, William,\n\nHopwood, Nick,\n\nHorwitz, Allan,\n\nHounsfield, Godfrey N.,\n\nHubel, David,\n\nHughes, Virginia, 165\u201366\n\nHuxley, Andrew, , ,\n\nHyman, Steven, , 127\u201328, , 133\u201334\n\nhysteria, , , ,\n\nIacoboni, M.: mirror neuron theory, 145\u201346, , , 160\u201361\n\nimaging technologies: computerized tomography (CT), 12\u201313; diagnosis and, ; electroencephalogram, ; electroencephalography (EEG), , ; as evidence in criminal cases, , ; fMRI and the functioning brain, , , , , , 165\u201366; and images as artifacts or simulations, 77\u201379, ; interpretation of, ; magnetic resonance imaging (MRI), , 68\u201369, 72\u201373, , ; and objectivity, , 158\u201359, ; photography, 59\u201361, 249n12; positron emission tomography (PET), 70\u201371, ; and processes in the living brain, 53\u201354, 65\u201374 (see also fMRI and the functioning brain under this heading); single photon emission computerized tomography (SPECT), ; and social brain, ; staining and, ; structural vs. functional, , 69\u201370; X-rays, , 66\u201368\n\nindividualization, ; and the clinical gaze, , 57\u201361, , , 86\u201387, 103\u20136; and objectification, ; and organisms used in animal research, 90\u201391, 94\u201395; reductionism and, 20\u201321, ; social neuroscience and the individual, 151\u201352, 160\u201361; and visualization of the brain, 20\u201322\n\ninfrastructures for neuroscience, 38\u201341, 151\u201356\n\nInsel, Thomas, , 101\u20132, 105\u20137, 128\u201329, 149\u201350, 254n33\n\nintellectual property rights, 19\u201320\n\ninterdisciplinary nature of neuroscientific research, 25\u201328, 39\u201342, , 155\u201356, 229\u201330\n\nInternational Brain Research Organization\n\n(IBRO), ,\n\nInternational Neuropsychological Symposium, ,\n\nInternational Society for Neurochemistry,\n\nintervention: during childhood brain development, 15\u201316, , 190\u201398; costs of, 136\u201337, , , , ; focus on the developing brain, ; genetic predisposition and, ; parental involvement and, 15\u201316; prodromal diagnosis and, , 136\u201337, 259n19; risk and, 117\u201318, , ; \"screen and intervene\" logic of, , , , 166\u201367, 189\u201390, 197\u201398, 262n37; and susceptibility, 191\u201392\n\n\"invisible college\" and neuroscience research, , ,\n\nJackson, John Hughlings,\n\nJasper, Hebert,\n\nKandel, Eric,\n\nKarp, David,\n\nKatz, Bernard, , 254n26\n\nKaymaz, Nil, 136\u201337\n\nKeller, Evelyn Fox, 91\u201392, 256n36\n\nKendell, Robert,\n\nKessler, Ronald, 125\u201329, 259n19\n\nKety, Seymour,\n\nKevles, Bettyann Holzmann, , ,\n\nKiehl, Kent,\n\nKieser, Dietrich George,\n\nKlerman, Gerald, 120\u201321\n\nKnapp, Martin,\n\nKoyr\u00e9, A.,\n\nKraepelin, Emil, 60\u201361\n\nKramer, Morton,\n\nKrausse, J.,\n\nKrishnan, V.,\n\nKuffler, Stephen, 39\u201341,\n\nKuhl, David,\n\nKupfer, David,\n\nlaboratory as setting for research, 76\u201377; artificiality of, 85\u201392, ; and diagnostic criteria, ; as impoverished environment, 254n29; reductionism and, 228\u201329; self-vindication and, ; \"setup\" and, 76\u201378, 85\u201389, , ; sociality and, 158\u201359; social world as alternative to, 228\u201332; \"truth-making\" and, 87\u201388\n\nLaborit, Henri,\n\nLamm, Claus, 141\u201342,\n\nLatour, Bruno, , ,\n\nLauterbur, Paul,\n\nLawrence, Ernest,\n\nLeDoux, Joseph, 214\u201315\n\nlegal system. See criminal justice system\n\nLeidsdorf, Max,\n\nLesch, Klaus-Peter, 150\u201351, 255n35\n\nLevi-Montalcini, Rita,\n\nLiddell, H. S.,\n\nLin, Keh-Ming,\n\nlobotomies, 34\u201335, ,\n\nlocalization of brain functions: and complex or social function, 31\u201333, 266n8; imaging technologies and, , 75\u201379, , 154\u201355, 158\u201359, , 175\u201376; lesions and evidence of, , 61\u201362, , 205\u20136, 266n7; modularity thesis and, , 262n5; physical experimentation (surgery, direct stimulation, ablation) and, , 61\u201365, , , 245n17, 250n23; and selfhood, 216\u201317; social brain and, ; \"theory of mind\" or mentalizing and, , 144\u201348, 216\u201317\n\nLogan, Cheryl,\n\nLogothetis, Nikos, ,\n\nLombroso, Cesare, 168\u201369\n\nL\u00f3pez, Juan,\n\nLorenz, Konrad,\n\nLynch, Zack,\n\nmagnetic resonance imaging (MRI), , 68\u201369, 72\u201373, ,\n\nMansfield, Peter,\n\nMarincola, Francesco,\n\nMartell, Daniel,\n\nMartin, Emily,\n\nMason, John,  Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), 25\u201326\n\nmaterialism, , , , , 204\u20135, 237n2\n\nMaudsley, Henry, 168\u201371\n\nMauss, Marcel, , , 273n18\n\nMayberg, Helen,\n\nMaynard, Patrick,\n\nMead, George Herbert,\n\nMeador-Woodruff, James,\n\nMeaney, Michael,\n\nmedia and popular culture, 53\u201354, 225\u201326\n\nMedical Research Council (UK),\n\nmemory, , , , , , ,\n\nMenninger, William C., 117\u201318\n\nmental disorders: costs of, , 16\u201317, , 259n15; defined as deviance or abnormality, ; deinstitutionalizing, 122\u201323; embodiment of, 56\u201361; environment and psychosocial concept of, 117\u201318; estimated prevalence of, 125\u201329; minor mental problems treated as, , 116\u201317, , 122\u201325, 136\u201337; organic vs. functional, ; in popular culture, ; psychopathology and the social brain, 148\u201351; risk as motive for intervention or treatment, 117\u201318, , ; \"social brain\" and, 148\u201351; stereotyped or posed images of, 60\u201361; visualization of madness or insanity, 56\u201361. See also specific disorders\n\nMerzenich, M.,\n\nMetzinger, Thomas, 212\u201313\n\nMeyer-Lindenberg, Andreas, 188\u201389,\n\nMeynert, Theodore,\n\nMiczek, Klaus, 97\u201398, 183\u201385, 255n39\n\nMild Cognitive Impairment, , , 261n34\n\nmind, physical basis of, 3\u20134, , , 73\u201374, , 237n4, 238n9; mind\/brain relationship, 3\u20134, , , , , 204\u20135, , . See also brain\n\nmind, theory of, 144\u201345; localization and, , ; \"mindblindness\" and autism spectrum disorders, 216\u201317\n\nmindfulness, , ,\n\nMinsky, Marvin,\n\nmirror neurons, 145\u201352, , 160\u201361, , 263n8, 263n9, 273n16\n\nMobley, Stephen,\n\nmodularity thesis, 75\u201376, , , 262n5\n\nMoffitt, Terrie, 186\u201388, 191\u201392, 256n55\n\nMoldin, Steven,\n\nmolecular brain, 9\u201311, 30\u201331, 38\u201339, , 46\u201347, 225\u201326\n\nmolecular imaging, 71\u201372,\n\nMoniz, Egas, , 66\u201367, 245n17\n\nmonoamine hypothesis, , , , 92\u201393, 134\u201335\n\nMorel, B\u00e9n\u00e9dict, 33\u201334,\n\nMorse, Stephen, 177\u201378\n\nMorton, Samuel,\n\nMoss, Henry, 214\u201315\n\nMosso, Angelo, 72\u201373\n\nMountcastle, Vernon, 3\u20134, 39\u201340\n\nNational Institutes for Health (NIH),\n\nNauta, Walle,\n\nNerve Growth Factor (neurotrophins), 48\u201349,\n\nnerves: brain as part of nervous system, 32\u201333, , , ; \"Doctrine of Nerves,\" 31\u201332; neurogenesis and plasticity, ; neurotransmission, , ; as single, continuous network, 31\u201332, 64\u201365; staining and visualization of, 31\u201332, ; and study of neurology, 31\u201332\n\nNestler, Eric, ,\n\nneuro: use of term, , , 226\u201327, 232\u201333\n\nneuroaesthetics,\n\nneuroanthropology,\n\nneuroeducation,\n\nneuroembryology,\n\nneuroergonomics,\n\nneuroethics, , , ; and neurolaw, 177\u201380, , , 255n39; and personhood,\n\nneurogenesis,\n\nneurogenomics,\n\nneurolaw, , 177\u201380, , , 255n39\n\nneuromarketing,\n\nneuromolecular research: emergence of molecular biology and, 26\u201328; genomics and, 11\u201312, , ; molecular imaging, 71\u201372, ; pharmaceuticals and, , 46\u201347; plasticity of the brain, ; as style of thought, 41\u201351; and vision of the neuromolecular brain, 9\u201311, 30\u201331, 38\u201339, 46\u201347\n\nneurophilosophy,\n\nneuropsychiatry, , 127\u201328; and the identification of insanity, 110\u201312; use of term,\n\nneuroscience: economic research and, 265n40; growth of field, ; as interdisciplinary, 25\u201328, 39\u201342, , 155\u201356, 229\u201330; \"invisible college\" and, , , ; profit motive and, 232\u201333; social sciences and, 228\u201334; as style of thought, 41\u201351, 232\u201333; use of term, ,\n\nNeurosciences Research Program (NRP), , , , 38\u201339\n\nneurosociology. See social neuroscience neurotransmitters, , 253n23; electrical vs. chemical transmission debate, 29\u201332, ; functional brain imaging and, 73\u201374; genetics and, , , , ; pyscho-pharmaceuticals and, , 46\u201347, 184\u201385, 253n23. See also dopamine hypothesis; monoamine hypothesis\n\nNissl, Franz, 64\u201365\n\nnonconscious processes, , 21\u201323, 161\u201362, ; and self-awareness, , , 214\u201315\n\nnormality\/abnormality, 7\u20138; criminality linked to physical abnormality, 167\u201368; diagnostic thresholds for disorders, , , , ,  (see also prodromal diagnoses); mental disorders linked to brain abnormalities, , 110\u201312, 167\u201368 (see also specific disorders); minor mental problems treated as abnormal, 136\u201337; normal mentation, studies of, 45\u201346; normal reactions as \"symptoms,\" 129\u201330; and observation of process in the brain, ; and pervasive diagnosis of mental disorders, 125\u201329; visualization of pathology,\n\nNovas, Carlos,\n\nnuclear magnetic resonance (NMR), 68\u201369\n\nNutt, David,\n\nOberman, L. M.,\n\nobjectivity: and the brain as self, ; child development and, , , ; diagnosis of mental disorders, 111\u201314, 130\u201333, 137\u201338; experimental \"setup\" and, 76\u201378; imaging technology and, , 79\u201381, ; interpretation and visualization of the brain, 79\u201380; laboratory experimentation and, ; objective measures and psychological evaluation, , ; \"objectivity effect,\" , 79\u201381, ; and scientific tools as neutral, ; social neuroscience and, , 160\u201362; and stabilization of the experimenter, 85\u201386; and stabilization of the \"setup,\" 85\u201389; and \"truth to nature,\" 249n13. See also truth\n\nOgawa, Seiji,\n\nParker, Charles, 135\u201336\n\npatents, , , 19\u201320, 242n41\n\nPatton, Paul,\n\nPauling, Linus,\n\nPavlov, Ivan,\n\nPenfield, Wilder,\n\nPerry, Bruce, 194\u201395, 271n54\n\npersonhood, 20\u201323, 226\u201327; and animal research, 83\u201384; of the mental patient, . See also selfhood\n\nphantom limb phenomenon,\n\npharmaceuticals: animal models and drug development, 99\u2013100; antipsychiatric movements and, ; children and psychopharmaceuticals, ; genomics and psychopharmaceuticals, 131\u201332; industrial investment in brain research, ; intervention and use of, 46\u201347, , , 183\u201385; and management of everyday life, , ; and neuromolecular brain, , 46\u201347; and self-fashioning or modification of personality, 220\u201321\n\nPhelps, Michael,\n\nphenomics,\n\nphotography, 59\u201361, 249n12\n\nphrenology, , 61\u201362\n\nThe Physical Basis of Mind (BBC radio series), 3\n\nphysiognomy, ,\n\nPinel, Philippe,\n\nplasticity, , 11\u201312, 225\u201326; animal research and evidence for, 48\u201351; and brain education technologies, , 221\u201322; discovery of nerve growth factor and, 48\u201349; and intervention, ; neuroplasticity defined, ; selfhood and social or cultural influence, ; and synaptic networks in the brain, ,\n\nPlayfair, William,\n\nPoldrack, Russell, 75\u201376\n\npopular culture, 225\u201326\n\nPordage, Samuel,\n\npositron emission tomography (PET), 70\u201371,\n\nPremack, D., 144\u201345\n\npresentation of data, decisions regarding,\n\nprodromal diagnoses, , , , , , 136\u201337\n\npsychiatric genetics\/genomics, ; antisocial behavior and, 180\u201390; eugenics and, ; intervention and genetic predisposition, ; and psychopharmaceuticals, , 131\u201332\n\npsychiatry, ; neuroscience and, 6\u20137; as preventive, ; shift away from asylum, 122\u201323\n\npsychoanalysis,\n\npsychology,\n\npsychopharmacology, 10\u201311, 35\u201337, 46\u201347, 132\u201333, 220\u201321, 239n20, 253n23\n\nPsychosis Risk Syndrome, 136\u201337\n\npsychosurgery, 34\u201335, 245n17; animals and experimental, ; lobotomies, 34\u201335, ,\n\nQuinn, Naomi, 217\u201318\n\nracism, , 115\u201316\n\nRaine, Adrian, 175\u201377, 180\u201381,\n\nRakic, Pasko,  Ramachandran, V. S., , , , , 213\u201314\n\nRam\u00f3n y Cajal, Santiago, , 31\u201332, 48\u201349,\n\n\"recurrent history,\" 29\u201331,\n\nreductionism, 20\u201321, 43\u201344, 51\u201352, 228\u201331,\n\nRegier, Darrel,\n\nReiss, Max,\n\nresilience, , , 187\u201388, ,\n\nRheinberger, Hans-J\u00f6rg,\n\nRichter, Curt, 89\u201390\n\nRichter, Derek,\n\nRichter, Helene, 88\u201389\n\nRioch, David, 39\u201340\n\nrisk: neuroscience and risk prediction, ; preventive intervention and, 117\u201318, ,\n\nRoepstorff, Andreas,\n\nRoper v. Simmons,\n\nRosenhan, David, , ,\n\nRowell, Thelma, 86\u201387\n\nRoy, Charles,\n\n\"rubber hand\" phenomenon,\n\nSawa, Akira,\n\nSchildkraut, Joseph, , , 253n23\n\nschizophrenia, 36\u201337; abnormality of the brain and, 69\u201370, 176\u201377, , 245n17; animal models and, 106\u20138; costs of, ; as developmental, , 261n13; diagnosis of, , , , 118\u201319, , 240n29, 260n29; dopamine hypothesis and, , 36\u201337; genetics and heritability of, 133\u201334, 257n59, 261n13; incidence of, ; mentalizing deficits and abnormal social cognition in, 148\u201350; pharmaceutical treatment of, ,\n\nSchmidt, Carl,\n\nSchmitt, Francis O., 25\u201328, 38\u201341, , 45\u201346\n\nSchopenhauer, Arthur,\n\nSchreber, Daniel Paul, 62\u201363\n\nSchwartz, Jeffrey,\n\nScott, John Paul,\n\nScott, Stephen,\n\nSeif, Isabelle, 185\u201386\n\nself-fashioning, 21\u201322, 220\u201321, , 274n20\n\nselfhood: brain as generator of, , , 205\u20137, 212\u201315; \"brainhood\" as dimension of, , , , ; brain injury and neuropathologies of the self, 205\u20137, ; coherence and, 215\u201316; consciousness and, 214\u201316, 274n19; continuity or coherence and, 202\u20133, 213\u201316; as cultural construct, 202\u20134, 217\u201318; as embodied in the brain, 214\u201315, ; free will and, 209\u201315; interiority and, 202\u20133, ; and mentalizing or theory of the mind, 216\u201317; mereological fallacy and, 83\u201384; and metarepresentation, 213\u201318; personality and, , ; responsibility for the neurobiological self, 223\u201324; self-fashioning, 21\u201322, 220\u201321, , 274n20; subjective awareness, , , , , , , 217\u201318\n\nself-vindication, 88\u201389, 92\u201393, , 105\u20139, 138\u201339\n\n\"setups,\" experimental, 76\u201377; and animal-model research, , 85\u201389, , , ; and brain imaging, ; and laboratory as setting for research, , ; and objectivity, 76\u201378, 85\u201389; stabilization of, 85\u201389\n\nShapin, Steven, ,\n\nSheridan, Alan,\n\nSherrington, Charles, , , , ,\n\nshock therapies, ,\n\nShorter, Edward,\n\nSidman, Murray,\n\nSimmel, Georg,\n\nSinger, Jay,\n\nSinger, Tania, 141\u201342, ,\n\nsingle photon emission computerized tomography (SPECT),\n\nSj\u00f6gren, Torsten,\n\nskull: as barrier to imaging via X-ray, , 66\u201367; physiognomy or phrenology, , 61\u201362, 167\u201368\n\nSmith, Iain Duncan, 193\u201395, 271n54\n\nsocial brain: autism spectrum disorders and, , 216\u201317; described and defined, ; evolution and, 143\u201352, , , ; funding for research on, 156\u201357; imaging technologies and, , 158\u201359; intersubjectivity and, ; localization of function and, ; mirror neuron theory and, 145\u201352, , , , 263n8, 263n9, 273n16; pychopathology and, 148\u201351; \"social brain\" hypothesis, 143\u201348; and social world as research setting, 228\u201332; visualization of,\n\nsociality: brain evolution for, 143\u201352, , , ; and laboratory as setting for research, 158\u201359; neurobiology and emergence of, ; social cognition, 143\u201344; social group, defined, ; and social world as research setting, 227\u201334. See also social brain\n\nsocial neuroscience: anthropology and, 158\u201359; and biological explanations for human behavior, 151\u201354, , ; as emerging discipline, 151\u201355; funding for, 156\u201357; genetics and, 151\u201352, ; and the individual, 151\u201352, 160\u201361; objectivity and, , 160\u201361; social brain theory and, 144\u201345, , ; sociality and, , , , ; social psychology and, 159\u201362, ; sociology and, ; \"theory of mind\" and, 144\u201345\n\nSociety for Biological Psychiatry,\n\nSociety for Molecular Imaging (SMI),\n\nSociety for Mutual Autopsy, , , 266n9\n\nSociety for Neuroscience (SfN), , 28\u201329\n\nSociety for Social Neuroscience, 155\u201356\n\nsociology, 159\u201360\n\nsoul, , , , 199\u2013200, , ; madness and notions of, , ; self concept and, , 213\u201318\n\nSpatz, Hugo,\n\nSpence, Sean, 211\u201312\n\nSperry, Roger, ,\n\nSpitzer, Robert, , , , ,\n\nSpurzheim, Johann, 61\u201362\n\nstaining,\n\nstates vs. traits,\n\nSteven, Megan, 177\u201378\n\n\"style of thought\": and neuroscience, 41\u201351, 232\u201333; and use of animal models, 82\u201383\n\nsubjectivity: neuroscience and subjectivation, . See also objectivity\n\nSuomi, Stephen, 255n35\n\nSwazey, Judith, 26\u201328\n\nSydenham, Thomas,\n\nTancredi, Lawrence, 173\u201374\n\nTaub, Edward, 49\u201350\n\nTaylor, Charles, ,\n\nTenHouton, Warren, 159\u201360\n\nTer-Pogossian, Michael, 70\u201371\n\n\"theory of mind\": and autism disorders, 216\u201317; localization and modular, , 144\u201345; mentalizing and, 145\u201348, 216\u201317; \"mindblindness\" and autism disorders, 216\u201317; social brain hypothesis and, 143\u201345\n\nThomson, J. Bruce,\n\nTonkonogy, Joseph,\n\ntranslation of findings: and improved treatments, ; translational imperative as context for research, 228\u201329; unjustified extrapolation and,\n\ntruth, ; histories and, ; images and objective, , , 78\u201381, , 249n13; laboratory science and, , 87\u201389, ; neuroscience and, , , ; research and truth-making, 232\u201333; science and truth claims, 172n7, , 232\u201333\n\nTuke, Daniel Hack, , , , 170\u201371\n\nVallabhajosula, Shankar,\n\nvan Os, Jim, 136\u201337\n\nVarela, Francisco, , 275n29\n\nvisualization of the brain, , 225\u201326; artifactual nature of images, 78\u201381; the clinical gaze and, 55\u201356; interpretation and, 79\u201380; and the mind or the interior, 59\u201361. See also imaging technologies\n\nVogt, C\u00e9cile, 172\u201373\n\nVogt, Oscar, , 172\u201373\n\nVolkow, Nora, 173\u201374\n\nVoltaire,\n\nvon K\u00f6lliker, Albert,\n\nWagner, Henry, 70\u201372\n\nWakefield, Jerome,\n\nWaldeyer, Wilhelm,\n\nWalter, William Grey,\n\nWatson, Stanley,\n\nWatts, James,\n\nWeber, Max,\n\nWebster-Stratton, Carolyn,\n\nWernicke, Carl, , , ,\n\nWiesel, Torsten,\n\nWilliams, Carl, 165\u201366\n\nWillis, Thomas, , , 258n7\n\nWilson, Elizabeth,\n\nWittgenstein, L., , , 252n5\n\nWoese, Carl,\n\nWoodruff, G., 144\u201345\n\nWright, Harold,\n\nW\u00fcrbel, Hanno, 88\u201389\n\nX-rays, , 66\u201368\n\nYeager, Clay,\n\nYellowlees, Henry,\n\nYoung, J. Z., ,\n\nYoung, R.,\n\nYudofsky, S. C., 111\u201312\n\nZalcman, Steven,\n\nZubin, Joseph, 34\u201335\n","meta":{"redpajama_set_name":"RedPajamaBook"}}
+{"text":"\n\nImmanuel Kant (1724\u20131804).\nKANT\n\n_Roger Scruton_\n\nSTERLING and the distinctive Sterling logo are registered trademarks of   \nSterling Publishing Co., Inc.\n\n**Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data**\n\nScruton, Roger.   \nKant : a brief insight \/ Roger Scruton. -- Illustrated ed.   \np. cm.   \nISBN 978-1-4027-7901-5   \n1. Kant, Immanuel, 1724-1804. I. Title   \nB2798.S37 2010   \n193--dc22\n\n2010013457\n\n10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1\n\nPublished by Sterling Publishing Co., Inc.   \n387 Park Avenue South, New York, NY 10016\n\nPublished by arrangement with Oxford University Press, Inc.\n\n\u00a9 1982, 2001 by Roger Scruton   \nIllustrated edition published in 2010 by Sterling Publishing Co., Inc.   \nAdditional text \u00a9 2010 Sterling Publishing Co., Inc.\n\nDistributed in Canada by Sterling Publishing   \n  Canadian Manda Group, 165 Dufferin Street   \nToronto, Ontario, Canada M6K 3H6\n\nBook design: The DesignWorks Group\n\nPlease see picture credits for image copyright information.\n\nPrinted in China   \nAll rights reserved\n\nSterling ISBN 978-1-4027-7901-5\n\nFor information about custom editions, special sales, premium and   \ncorporate purchases, please contact Sterling Special Sales   \nDepartment at 800-805-5489 or specialsales@sterlingpublishing.com.\nPREFACE TO THE   \nREVISED EDITION\n\nIN REVISING THIS INTRODUCTION I have tried to take account of recent scholarship, and to offer a more reliable guide to both primary and secondary sources. I have also amended the text where it seemed to me to be inaccurate or misleading, and added a chapter on Kant's political philosophy\u2014a subject that has attracted increasing attention in the twenty years since this book first appeared. The interpretation of Kant that I offer is by no means the only one, and I have had to take sides in controversies that are of ever-increasing intricacy. In the guide to Further Reading I indicate books that will help to rectify the inevitable one-sidedness of an introduction.\n\n_Malmesbury_  \nJANUARY 2001 \nPREFACE TO THE   \nFIRST EDITION\n\nI HAVE TRIED TO PRESENT Kant's thought in a modern idiom, while presupposing the least possible knowledge of philosophy. Since Kant is one of the most difficult of modern philosophers, I cannot hope that I have made every aspect of this thought intelligible to the general reader. It is not clear that every aspect of his thought has been intelligible to anyone, even to Kant. The depth and complexity of Kant's philosophy are such that it is only after complete immersion that the importance of its questions, and the imaginative power of its answers, can be understood. Kant hoped to draw the limits of the human understanding; he found himself compelled to transcend them. Readers should therefore not be surprised if they have to read this introduction more than once in order to appreciate Kant's vision. To share that vision is to see the world transformed; to acquire it cannot be the labor of a single day.\n\nThe first draft of this book was written in Prague. I am grateful to Dr. Ladislav Hejd\u00e1nek, not only for the invitation to speak to his seminar on the topic of the categorical imperative, but also for the example he has set in obeying it. I have benefited from Ruby Meager, Mark Platts, and Dorothy Edgington, who commented on a later draft, and from the students of London University who have, over the last decade, made the teaching of Kant's philosophy so rewarding. I have also benefited, in more ways than I can express, from the kindness of Lenka  , to whom this book is dedicated.\n\n_London_  \nMAY 1981 \nCONTENTS\n\n**ONE**| Life, Works, and Character  \n---|---  \n**TWO**| The Background of Kant's Thought  \n**THREE**| The Transcendental Deduction  \n**FOUR**| The Logic of Illusion   \n**FIVE**| The Categorical Imperative   \n**SIX**| Beauty and Design   \n**SEVEN**| Enlightenment and Law  \n**EIGHT**| Transcendental Philosophy  \n|   \n_Further Reading_  \n _Index_  \n _Picture Credits_\nABBREVIATIONS\n\nQUOTATIONS ARE MOSTLY FROM the English translations referred to in the Further Reading. However, where these translations have seemed to me to be misleading or inelegant, I have used my own.\n\nA. _Critique of Pure Reason_ , first edition\n\nB. _Critique of Pure Reason_ , second edition\n\n_P. Critique of Practical Reason_\n\n_J. Critique of Aesthetic Judgement_\n\n_T. Critique of Teleological Judgement_\n\n_G. Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals_\n\n_F. Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics_\n\n_M. The Metaphysics of Morals_\n\nPage references to those works are to the standard German edition, or else, in the case of the _Critique of Pure Reason_ , to the original pagination of the first and second editions. For English translations, see Further Reading.\n\nI have also occasionally referred to the following:\n\nI. \"Inaugural Dissertation,\" contained in G. B. Kerferd, D. K. E. Walford, and P. G. Lucas (eds.), _Kant: Selected_ _Pre-Critical Writings_ (Manchester, 1968)\n\n_K. The Kant\u2013Eberhard Controversy_ , by H. E. Allison (Baltimore and London, 1973)\n\n_L. Lectures on Ethics_ , tr. L. Infield, new edition (New York, 1963)\n\n_C. Kant's Philosophical Correspondence: 1759\u201399_ , ed. and tr. Arnulf Zweig (Chicago, 1967)\n\nR. Hans Reiss (ed.), _Kant: Political Writings_ , tr. H. B. Nisbet (Cambridge, 1970). This contains three works that I refer to: _An Answer to the Question: \"What Is Enlightenment?\"_ ( _What Is Enlightenment?_ , for short); _On the Common_ _Saying: \"This may be true in theory, but it does not apply in_ _practice\"_ ( _Common Saying_ , for short), and _Perpetual Peace:_ _A Philosophical Sketch_ ( _PP_ for short).\n\nAll italics that appear in quotations from Kant are his own.\n\n**Kant's early life and education,** as well as his later moral thinking, were shaped by the German pietism movement, which stressed work, duty, and prayer. \"The Broad and Narrow Road,\" an illustration depicting the principles of the pietist movement, draws on Matthew 7:13\u201314: \"Enter through the narrow gate. For wide is the gate and broad is the road that leads to destruction, and many enter through it. But small is the gate and narrow the road that leads to life, and only a few find it.\"\n[ONE\n\nLife, Works, and Character ](Roge_9781402782107_epub_c7_r1.html#d6e1)\n\nTHE GREATEST MODERN PHI LOSOPHER was moved by nothing more than by duty. His life, in consequence, was unremarkable. For Kant, the virtuous man is so much the master of his passions as scarcely to be prompted by them, and so far indifferent to power and reputation as to regard their significance as nothing beside that of duty itself. Having confined his life so that he could act without strain according to this ideal, Kant devoted himself to scholarship, entirely governed by congenial routines. The little professor of K\u00f6nigsberg has thus become the type of the modern philosopher: bounded in a nutshell, and counting himself king of infinite space.\n\nImmanuel Kant was born in K\u00f6nigsberg in 1724, the fourth of the nine children of a poor harness maker. Kant's parents were simple people and devout pietists. At that time, pietism, a reformist movement within the Lutheran Church, held powerful sway among the lower and middle classes in Germany, consoling hardship with the idea of the sacredness of work, duty, and prayer; its vision of the sovereignty of conscience was to exert a lasting influence on Kant's moral thinking. Although in some respects anti-intellectual, it was also one of the major forces behind the spread of education in late-seventeenth-century Germany, and a pietist school had been established in K\u00f6nigsberg. To this school Kant, whose talents had been recognized by a wise and benevolent pastor, was sent at the age of eight. It is fortunate for posterity that such an education should have been offered to one of Kant's lowly origins; it was perhaps less fortunate for the young Kant himself, whose gratitude toward his tutors was so mingled with distaste for their oppressive zeal that in later years he forbore all mention of his early schooling. Some impression of its nature can be gathered from a remark in the little treatise on education, edited from Kant's lecture notes late in his life:\n\nMany people imagine that the years of their youth are the pleasantest and best of their lives; but it is not really so. They are the most troublesome; for we are then under strict discipline, can seldom choose our friends, and still more seldom have our freedom.\n\nIn a letter sent to Kant by a former school friend, at a time when both had become famous, the philologist David Ruhnken remarked: \"Thirty years have passed since the two of us groaned beneath the pedantically gloomy, but not entirely worthless, discipline of those fanatics.\" And it is undeniable that Kant emerged from his schooling with a considerable weight of gloom, together with a remarkable self-discipline. His early manhood was partly devoted to using the second to overcome the first. In this he was almost completely successful. Despite straitened circumstances, a deformed and diminutive body, and the loss both of a father whom he respected and of a mother whom he deeply loved, Kant soon became one of the most popular citizens of K\u00f6nigsberg, welcomed everywhere for his grace, wit, and ready conversation.\n\nKant entered the university of his native city at the age of sixteen and graduated from it six years later. Being unable to secure an academic position, he took work as a private tutor in various households. It was not until the age of thirty-one that he obtained a post at the university, as private docent, an unsalaried employment that conferred the privilege of giving public lectures, and the chance of securing a meagre reward through private tuition. By then Kant had already published works on dynamics and mathematics. He had also acquired, through the connections that his position as private tutor made available, the social ease that was to earn him the title of _der sch\u00f6ne Magister_.\n\n**Kant's home** in K\u00f6nigsberg, Germany.\n\nK\u00f6nigsberg was then a city of some dignity, with fifty thousand inhabitants and an important garrison. As a seaport serving the trading interests of Eastern Prussia, it contained a bustling and variegated population, including Dutch, English, Poles, and Russians. The university, founded in 1544 as the Collegium Albertinum, was a cultural center of some importance, although so much sunk in provincial obscurity by the mid-eighteenth century that Frederick the Great, visiting the city as crown prince in 1739, described it as \"better suited to the training of bears than to becoming a theatre of the sciences.\" Frederick ascended the throne the following year, and did his best to spread into this corner of his kingdom the high culture and intellectual toleration that characterized his reign. Kant, who had already determined to value truth and duty above all things, was therefore fortunate to find that his university offered no major impediments to the pursuit of either. It was perhaps this, as much as his passionate attachment to his birthplace, that prompted him to wait so long for his first appointment, and to continue waiting thereafter, for another fifteen years, before being granted the professorship that he desired. During this period Kant several times refused offers from other German universities, and continued conscientiously to deliver, in the house where he lodged, the lectures that established his reputation. His intellectual labors were devoted mainly to mathematics and physics, and at the age of thirty-one he published a treatise on the origin of the universe that contained the first formulation of the nebular hypothesis. His duties required him, however, to lecture on a wide variety of subjects, including physical geography, about which he became, perhaps because of his reluctance to travel, an acknowledged authority and, in the opinion of one Count Purgstall (who admired the philosopher greatly), a conversational bore.\n\nIt is to some extent by chance that Kant's professorship was in metaphysics and logic, rather than in mathematics or natural science. From this point in his career, however, Kant devoted his energies entirely to philosophy, rehearsing in his lectures the thoughts that he was to publish, ten years later, in works that earned him a reputation as the greatest luminary in Germany. The philosopher J. G. Hamann records that it was necessary to arrive in Kant's lecture room at six in the morning, one hour before the professor was due to appear, in order to obtain a place, and Kant's pupil Jachmann has this to say of the performance:\n\nKant had a peculiarly skilful method of asserting and defining metaphysical concepts, which consisted, to all appearances, in carrying out his inquiries in front of his audience; as though he himself had just begun to consider the question, gradually adding fresh determining concepts, improving bit by bit on previously established explanations, and finally arriving at a definitive conclusion of his treatment of the subject, which he had thoroughly examined from every angle, having given the completely attentive listener not only a knowledge of the subject, but also an object lesson in methodical thought . . .\n\nAnd in a letter to a friend, the same writer speaks of Kant's lectures on ethics:\n\nIn these he ceased to be merely a speculative philosopher and became, at the same time, a spirited orator, sweeping the heart and emotions along with him, as well as satisfying the intelligence. Indeed, it was a heavenly delight to hear his sublimely pure ethical doctrine delivered with such powerful philosophic eloquence from the lips of its very creator. How often he moved us to tears, how often he stirred our hearts to their depths, how often he lifted up our minds and emotions from the shackles of self-seeking egoism to the exalted self-awareness of pure free-will, to absolute obedience to the laws of reason and to the exalted sense of our duty to others!\n\nJachmann is more fulsome than false, and Kant's fame as a speaker, both in private and in public, earned him wide recognition, long before the publication of his greatest works.\n\nKant's private life is often parodied as one of clockwork routine, fastidious, donnish, and self-centered. It is said (because Heine said it) that the housewives of K\u00f6nigsberg would set their clocks by his time of passing; it is said (because Kant once said it) that his constant concern for his bodily condition displayed a morbid hypochondria; it is also said that the bareness of his house and furnishings displayed an indifference to beauty, and that the punctuality of his routine disguised a cold and even frozen heart.\n\nIt is true that Kant's life was, if not mechanical, at least highly disciplined. His manservant had instructions to wake him each morning at five and to tolerate no malingering. He would work until seven at his desk, dressed in nightcap and robe, changing back into these garments at once when he had returned from his morning lectures. He remained in his study until one, when he took his single meal of the day, following it, irrespective of the weather, by a walk. He took this exercise alone, from the eccentric conviction that conversation, since it causes a person to breathe through the mouth, should not take place in the open air. He was averse to noise, twice changing lodging in order to avoid the sound of other people, and once writing indignantly to the director of police, commanding him to prevent the inmates of a nearby prison from consoling themselves with the singing of hymns. His aversion to music other than military marches was indeed notorious, as was his total indifference to the visual arts\u2014he possessed only one engraving, a portrait of Rousseau, given to him by a friend.\n\n**An engraved portrait** of Swiss-born French philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712\u201378) was the only picture in Kant's possession.\n\nKant was aware of the accusations that the intellect draws to itself. And it was to the subject of this engraving that he turned in self-justification, saying that he should have regarded himself as much more worthless than the common laborer had not Rousseau convinced him that the intellect could play its part in restoring the rights of man. Like all people given to the life of the mind, Kant was in need of the discipline that he imposed on himself. Far from crippling his moral nature, his routine enabled him to flower in the ways best suited to his genius. His love of solitude was balanced by an equal love of company. He would invariably have guests at his midday meal, inviting them on the same morning lest they should be embarrassed by the need to refuse some other invitation, and providing for each a pint of claret, and, if possible, some favorite dish. He conversed, to the delight and instruction of his companions, until three, endeavoring to end the meal in laughter (as much, however, from a conviction that laughter promotes digestion, as from any natural inclination toward it). Kant's writings contain many flashes of satire, and satire, indeed, was his favorite reading. His indifference to music and painting must be set against his love of poetry; even his concern for his health was little more than a consequence of the Kantian philosophy of duty. He neither admired nor enjoyed the sedentary life, but regarded it, nevertheless, as indispensable to the exercise of his intellect. Herder, one of the greatest and most passionate writers of the Romantic movement, attended Kant's lectures and afterward vigorously opposed their influence. He nevertheless thought highly of Kant himself, and summarized his character in these words:\n\nI had the good fortune to make the acquaintance of a philosopher, who was my teacher. Though in the prime of life, he still had the joyful high spirits of a young man, which he kept, I believe, into extreme old age. His open brow, built for thought, was the seat of indestructible serenity and gladness. A wealth of ideas issued from his lips, jest and wit and good humour were at his bidding, and his instructional lecture was also the most fascinating entertainment.\n\n**Kant and his table partners** by Emil Doerstling, ca. 1900.\n\nWith the same spirit with which he examined Leibniz, Wolff, Baumgarten, Crusius and Hume, and analysed the laws of nature expounded by the physicists Kepler and Newton, he appraised the currently appearing writings of Rousseau, his _Emile_ and his _H\u00e9loise_ , as he did every fresh discovery in natural science which came to his notice, estimated their value and returned, as always, to an unbiased knowledge of nature and of the moral worth of man.\n\nThe history of mankind, of nations and of nature, natural science, mathematics and his own experience were the well-springs which animated his lectures and his everyday life. He was never indifferent to anything worth knowing. No intrigue, no sectional interests, no advantage, no desire for fame ever possessed the slightest power to counteract his extension and illumination of truth. He encouraged and gently compelled people to think for themselves: despotism was alien to his nature. This man, whom I name with the deepest gratitude and reverence, is Immanuel Kant; I recall his image with pleasure.\n\nKant's duties as a university teacher required him to lecture on all aspects of philosophy, and for many years he devoted the major part of his intellectual efforts to teaching, and to publishing short and undeveloped books and papers. His greatest achievement\u2014the _Critique of Pure_ _Reason\u2014_ was also his first major publication, appearing in 1781, when Kant was fifty-seven. Of this work he wrote to Moses Mendelssohn: \"Although the book is the product of twelve years of reflection, I completed it hastily, in perhaps four or five months, with the greatest attentiveness to its content but less care about its style and ease of comprehension\" ( _C._ 105\u20136). In an attempt to alleviate the difficulties presented by the _Critique_ , he published a short _Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysic Which Shall Lay_ _Claim to Being a Science_ (1783), in which brilliant polemic is combined with an obscure condensation of the _Critique_ 's most offending passages. For the second edition of the _Critique_ , in 1787, Kant rewrote the most forbidding sections; since the result is equally difficult, commentators have come to agree that the opacity of Kant's work stems not so much from the style as from the thought itself. Despite its difficulty, however, the work rapidly became so famous that the \"critical philosophy\" was being advocated, taught, opposed, and sometimes even censored and persecuted, throughout the German-speaking world. Kant's self-confidence increased, and he was able to write in 1787 to K. L. Reinhold (who did much to popularize Kant's ideas): \"I can assure you that the longer I continue in my path the less worried I become that any contradiction . . . will ever significantly damage my system\" ( _C._ 127). The influence of Kant's first _Critique_ is justly summarized by Mme. de Sta\u00ebl, when, thirty years after the first edition, she wrote that \"when at length the treasures of thought which it contains were discovered, it produced such a sensation in Germany, that almost all which has been accomplished since, in literature as well as in philosophy, has flowed from the impulse given by this performance.\"\n\nDuring the twelve years of reflection to which Kant refers in his letter to Mendelssohn he published almost nothing, and his earlier (\"precritical\") writings are of peripheral interest to the student of his mature philosophy. However, once the critical philosophy had achieved expression, Kant continued, with increasing confidence, to explore its ramifications. The _Critique of Pure Reason_ dealt in a systematic way with metaphysics and the theory of knowledge; it was followed by the _Critique of Practical_ _Reason_ (1788), concerned with ethics, and the _Critique of Judgement_ (1790), concerned largely with aesthetics. Many other works were added to those, and Kant's collected writings in the so-called _Berliner Ausgabe_ now fill thirty-two volumes. Of these other works, three will particularly concern us: the _Prolegomena_ , already mentioned, the _Groundwork of the_ _Metaphysic of Morals_ , which appeared in 1785, before the second _Critique_ , and contains a compelling expression of Kant's moral theory, and _The Metaphysics of Morals_ , a late work published in 1797, which contains Kant's ideas on politics and law.\n\nDuring the reign of Frederick the Great, K\u00f6nigsberg breathed the air of enlightenment, and Kant enjoyed the esteem of Frederick's ministers, in particular of von Zedlitz, the minister of education, to whom the _Critique of Pure Reason_ is dedicated. A marked change occurred when Frederick William II ascended the throne. His minister, Woellner, exerted great influence, and, becoming responsible for religion in 1788, attempted to bring religious toleration to an end. Kant's _Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone_ was published in 1793, under the imprint of the K\u00f6nigsberg philosophy faculty, thus escaping censorship on a point of law. Woellner, mightily displeased, wrote in the king's name to Kant, charging him to give an account of himself. Kant replied with a solemn promise to his sovereign not to engage in public discussion of religion, either through lectures or through writings. Kant regarded himself as absolved from this promise by the monarch's death. Nevertheless, this conflict with authority caused him much pain and bitterness. Kant prided himself on being a loyal subject, despite republican sympathies, which he once expressed in the presence of an Englishman with such vivacity as to call forth a challenge to a duel, and with such eloquence as to overcome both the challenge and the opinions of the man who had offered it. (The man in question, Joseph Green, was a merchant in K\u00f6nigsberg, and subsequently became Kant's closest friend.)\n\nKant enjoyed the company of women (provided that they did not pretend to understand the _Critique of Pure Reason_ ) and twice contemplated marriage. On each occasion, however, he hesitated long enough to ensure that he remained unwed. One day, his disreputable and drunken manservant appeared at table in a yellow coat. Kant indignantly ordered him to take it off and sell it, promising to make good the financial loss. He then learned with amazement that the servant had been married, was a widower, and was now to marry again, the yellow coat having been purchased for the occasion. Kant was appalled at these revelations, and never again looked on his servant with favor. His attitude to marriage was curiously disenchanted, and, although he defended the institution in _The_ _Metaphysics of Morals_ , he also described the married state as an agreement between two people for the \"reciprocal use of each other's sexual organs\" ( _C._ 235, _M._ 277). However, in his early _Observations on the Sentiment of_ _the Beautiful and the Sublime_ (1764), Kant had written eloquently on the distinction between the sexes. He was radically opposed to the view that men and women partake of a common nature, which alone suffices to determine the character of their relations; instead, he assigned to women a charm, beauty, and capacity to melt the heart that are foreign to the more \"sublime,\" \"principled,\" and \"practical\" sex to which he belonged. This description of women accords with Kant's description of natural beauty. It was nature, above all, that stirred his emotions, and it was to scenes of natural beauty that his mother had taken him as a child, so as to awaken his feelings toward the things she loved. It is possible to discern in his evocations, both of feminine charm and of natural beauty, the residue of erotic feelings which, had they been more actively expressed, might well have broken the routine to which our intellectual history is so heavily indebted.\n\n**K\u00f6nigsberg university's** \"old building,\" where Kant taught.\n\nKant gave his last official lecture in 1796. By that time his faculties had begun to decline and a somber melancholy had replaced his former gaiety. Fichte describes him as seeming to lecture in his sleep, waking with a start to his half-forgotten subject matter. Soon he lost his clarity of mind, his ability to recognize old friends, even his ability to complete simple sentences. He faded into insensibility, and passed from his blameless life on February 12, 1804, unaccompanied by his former intellectual powers. He was attended to his grave by people from all over Germany, and by the whole of K\u00f6nigsberg, being acknowledged even in his senility as the greatest glory of that town. His grave crumbled away and was restored in 1881. His remains were moved in 1924, to a solemn neoclassical portico attached to the cathedral. In 1950 unknown vandals broke open the sarcophagus, and left it empty. By that time K\u00f6nigsberg had ceased to be a center of learning, had been absorbed, following its brutal destruction by the Red Army, into the Soviet Union, and had been renamed in honor of one of the few of Stalin's henchmen to die of natural causes. A bronze tablet remains fixed to the wall of the castle, overlooking the dead and wasted city, bearing these words from the concluding section of the _Critique of_ _Practical Reason_ :\n\n**This copy of the memorial tablet** for Kant that appears in the castle wall is on the base of a bust of Kant at the Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais in Brazil.\n\nTwo things fill the heart with ever renewed and increasing awe and reverence, the more often and the more steadily we meditate upon them: _the starry firmament above and the moral law within._\n\nIt is fortunate for the inhabitants of Kaliningrad that they are daily reminded of two things that they may still admire.\n\n**Title page of the first edition** of Kant's _Critique of Pure Reason_.\n[TWO\n\nThe Background of Kant's Thought ](Roge_9781402782107_epub_c7_r1.html#d6e2)\n\nTHE _CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON_ is the most important work of philosophy to have been written in modern times; it is also one of the most difficult. It poses questions so novel and comprehensive that Kant judged it necessary to invent technical terms with which to discuss them. These terms have a strange beauty and compulsion, and it is impossible to acquire a full appreciation of Kant's work without experiencing the order and connectedness that his vocabulary imposes upon the traditional problems of philosophy. Nevertheless, the gist of Kant's thought can be expressed in a lowlier idiom, and in what follows I shall try to eliminate as many of his technicalities as I can. The task is not easy, since there is no accepted interpretation of their meaning. While a \"picture\" of the Kantian system is common to all who have commented on it, there is no agreement whatsoever as to the strength, or even as to the content, of his arguments. A commentator who presents clear premises and clear conclusions will invariably be accused of missing Kant's argument, and the only way to escape academic censure is to fall into the verbal mannerisms of the original. It has become, in recent years, slightly easier to risk this censure. Contemporary Kantian studies\u2014in particular in Britain and America\u2014have tended to the view that the obscurity of Kantian scholarship is often a product of its confusion. In order not to attribute the confusion to Kant, scholars have labored hard to elicit from, or at least to impose upon, the first _Critique_ an interpretation that renders it intelligible. I shall try to do the same, and shall be more influenced by these contemporary studies than I am able to acknowledge.\n\nThe first problem posed by the interpretation of the _Critique of Pure_ _Reason_ is this: what are the questions that it hopes to answer? Kant wrote, in the preface to the first edition:\n\nIn this enquiry I have made completeness my aim, and I venture to assert that there is not a single metaphysical problem which has not been solved, or for the solution of which the key at least has not been supplied. (A., p. xiii)\n\nWhile this represents the ambition, if not the achievement, of the first _Critique_ , Kant was in fact motivated by more specific interests. If we turn to the historical antecedents of Kant's argument, we can extract from the philosophical controversies that influenced him certain major subjects of dispute. The most important we find to be the problem of objective knowledge, as this had been posed by Descartes. I can know much about myself, and this knowledge often has a character of certainty. In particular it is senseless, according to Descartes, to doubt that I exist. Here, doubt only confirms what is doubted. _Cogito ergo sum_. In this case, at least, I have objective knowledge. The fact that I exist is an objective fact; it is a fact about the world and not just about someone's perception. Whatever the world contains, it contains the thinking being who I am. Kant's contemporary Lichtenberg pointed out that Descartes ought not to have drawn this conclusion. The \"cogito\" shows that there is a thought, but not that there is an \"I\" who thinks it. Kant, similarly dissatisfied with Descartes's argument, and with the doctrine of the soul that flowed from it, felt that the certainty of self-knowledge had been wrongly described. It is true that, however skeptical I may be about the world, I cannot extend my skepticism into the subjective sphere (the sphere of consciousness): so I can be immediately certain of my present mental states. But I cannot be immediately certain of what I am, or of whether, indeed, there is an \"I\" to whom these states belong. These further propositions must be established by argument, and that argument had yet to be found.\n\n**French philosopher** Ren\u00e9 Descartes (1596\u20131650), who coined the famous phrase \" _Cogito ergo sum_ \" (\"I think, therefore I am\"), is shown here in a portrait (1649) by Dutch painter Frans Hals.\n\nWhat is the character of this immediate and certain knowledge? The distinguishing feature of my present mental states is that they are as they seem to me and seem as they are. In the subjective sphere, being and seeming collapse into each other. In the objective sphere they diverge. The world is objective because it can be other than it seems to me. So the true question of objective knowledge is: how can I know the world as it is? I can have knowledge of the world as it _seems_ , since that is merely knowledge of my present perceptions, memories, thoughts, and feelings. But can I have knowledge of the world that is _not_ just knowledge of how it seems? To put the question in slightly more general form: can I have knowledge of the world that is not just knowledge of my own point of view? Science, common sense, theology, and personal life all suppose the possibility of objective knowledge. If this supposition is unwarranted, then so are almost all the beliefs that we commonly entertain.\n\nAmong Kant's immediate predecessors, two in particular had provided answers to the question of objectivity that were sufficiently decisive to command the attention of the intellectual world. These were G. W. Leibniz (1646\u20131716) and David Hume (1711\u201376); the first claimed that we could have objective knowledge of the world uncontaminated by the point of view of any observer; the second claimed (or at least seemed to his contemporaries to claim) that we could have objective knowledge of nothing.\n\nLeibniz was the founding father of Prussian academic philosophy. His thought, left to the world in succinct and unpublished fragments, had been built into a system by Christian von Wolff (1679\u20131754), and applied and extended by Wolff's pupil, the former pietist A. G. Baumgarten (1714\u201362). The Leibnizian system had met with official censure during Kant's youth, since it made such claims for reason as to threaten those of faith; for a time Wolff was forbidden to teach. But the system was restored to favor under Frederick the Great, and became the orthodox metaphysics of the German Enlightenment. Kant respected this orthodoxy, and to the end of his days would use Baumgarten's works as texts for his lectures. But Hume's skepticism made a deep impression on him, and introduced new problems that he felt could be answered only by overthrowing the Leibnizian system. These problems, concerning causality and a priori knowledge (that is, knowledge not based in experience), were combined with the question of objectivity to form the peculiar subject matter of the first _Critique_.\n\nLeibniz belonged to the school of thought now generally labeled \"rationalist,\" and Hume to the school of \"empiricism,\" which is commonly contrasted with it. This convenient, though contentious, division of his predecessors into rationalists and empiricists is in fact due to Kant. Believing that both philosophies were wrong in their conclusions, he attempted to give an account of philosophical method that incorporated the truths, and avoided the errors, of both. Rationalism derives all claims to knowledge from the exercise of reason, and purports to give an absolute description of the world, uncontaminated by the experience of any observer. It is an attempt to give a God's-eye view of reality. Empiricism argues that knowledge comes through experience alone; there is, therefore, no possibility of separating knowledge from the subjective condition of the knower. Kant wished to give an answer to the question of objective knowledge that was neither as absolute as Leibniz's nor as subjective as Hume's. The best way to make his unique position intelligible is to begin by summarizing the two views that he strove to reject.\n\nLeibniz believed that the understanding contains within itself certain innate principles, which it knows intuitively to be true, and which form the axioms from which a complete description of the world can be derived. These principles are necessarily true, and do not depend upon experience for their confirmation. Hence they lead to a description of the world as it is, not as it appears in experience or to a circumscribed \"point of view.\" At the same time, the \"points of view\" that are characteristic of individuals can be fitted into the rational picture of the world. Leibniz recognized a division in thought between subject and predicate (in the sentence \"John thinks,\" the subject-term is \"John\" and the predicate-term is \"thinks\"). He believed that this division corresponds to a distinction in reality between substance and property. The fundamental objects in the world are substances. These, he thought, must be self-dependent, unlike the properties that inhere in them: for example, a substance can exist without thinking, but no thinking can exist without a substance. Being self-dependent, substances are also indestructible, except by a miracle. He called them \"monads,\" and his model for the monad was the individual soul, the thinking substance, as this had been described by Descartes. From this idea, he derived his \"perspectiveless\" picture of the world, relying on two fundamental laws of reason: the Principle of Contradiction (a proposition and its negation cannot both be true), and the Principle of Sufficient Reason (nothing is true that has no sufficient explanation). By means of ingenious and subtle arguments and making the fewest possible assumptions, he arrived at the following conclusions.\n\n**German philosopher** Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1696\u20131716) is shown here in a portrait by Johann Friedrich Wentzel from about 1700.\n\nThe world consists of infinitely many individual monads, which exist neither in space nor in time, but eternally. Each monad is different in some respect from every other (the famous \"identity of indiscernibles\"). Without that assumption objects cannot be individuated in terms of their intrinsic properties; a point of view then becomes necessary from which to tell things apart, and it is Leibniz's contention that the real nature of the world can be given from no point of view. The point of view of each monad is simply a way of representing its internal constitution; it does not represent the world as it is in itself. Each monad mirrors the universe from its own point of view, but no monad can enter into real relation, causal or otherwise, with any other. Even space and time are intellectual constructs, through which we make our experience intelligible, but which do not belong to the world as such. However, by the principle of \"pre-established harmony,\" the successive properties of every monad correspond to the successive properties of every other. So we can describe our successive states of mind as \"perceptions,\" and the world will \"appear\" to each monad in a way that corresponds to its appearance to every other. There is a system among appearances, and within this system it makes sense to speak of spatial, temporal, and causal relations; of destructible individuals and dynamic principles; of perception, activity, and influence. These ideas, and the physical laws that we derive from them, depend for their validity on the underlying harmony among points of view that they describe. They do not yield knowledge of the real world of monads except indirectly, on account of our assurance that the way things appear bears the metaphysical imprint of the way things are. When two watches keep exact time together I might be tempted to think that the one causes the other to move. This is an example of a merely apparent relation. In some such way Leibniz argued that the whole world of commonsense belief and perception is no more than an appearance or \"phenomenon.\" But it is, Leibniz said, a \"well-founded phenomenon.\" It is no illusion, but a necessary and systematic offshoot of the operation of those rational principles that determine how things really are. The real substances, because they are described and identified from no point of view, are without phenomenal characteristics. Reality itself is accessible to reason alone, since only reason can rise above the individual point of view and participate in the vision of ultimate necessities, which is also God's. Hence reason must operate through \"innate\" ideas. These are ideas that have been acquired through no experience and that belong to all thinking beings. They owe their content not to experience but to the intuitive capacities of reason. Among these ideas is that of substance, from which all Leibniz's principles ultimately flow.\n\nHume's vision is in some measure the opposite of Leibniz's. He denies the possibility of knowledge through reason, since reason cannot operate without ideas, and ideas are acquired only through the senses. The content of every thought must be given, in the last analysis, in terms of the experiences that warrant it, and no belief can be established as true except by reference to the sensory \"impressions\" that provide its guarantee. (This is the general assumption of empiricism.) But the only experience that can confirm anything for me is my experience. The testimony of others, or of records, the formulation of laws or hypotheses, the appeal to memory and induction\u2014all these depend for their authority on the experiences that guarantee them. My experiences are as they seem, and seem as they are, for here \"seeming\" is all that there is. Hence there is no problem as to how I can know them. But in basing all knowledge on experience, Hume reduces my knowledge of the world to knowledge of my point of view. All claims to objectivity become spurious and illusory. When I claim to have knowledge of objects existing externally to my perceptions, all I can really mean is that those perceptions exhibit a kind of constancy and coherence that generates the (illusory) idea of independence. When I refer to causal necessities, all I am entitled to mean is the regular succession among experiences, together with the subjective sense of anticipation that arises from that. As for reason, this can tell us of the \"relations of ideas\": for example, it can tell us that the idea of space is included in that of shape, or that the idea of a bachelor is identical with that of an unmarried man. But it can neither generate ideas of its own, nor decide whether an idea has application. It is the source only of trivial knowledge derived from the meanings of words; it can never lead to knowledge of matters of fact. Hume took his skepticism so far as to cast doubt upon the existence of the self (the entity that had provided the model for Leibniz's monad), saying that neither is there a perceivable object that goes by this name, nor is there any experience that would give rise to the idea of it.\n\nSuch skepticism, reaching back into that very point of view from which skepticism begins, is intolerable, and it is not surprising that Kant was, as he put it, aroused by Hume from \"dogmatic slumbers\" ( _F._ 9). The parts of Hume's philosophy that most disturbed him concerned the concept of causality. Hume had argued that there is no foundation for the belief in necessities in nature: necessity belongs to thought alone, and merely reflects the \"relations of ideas.\" It was this that led Kant to perceive that natural science rests on the belief that there are real necessities, so that Hume's skepticism, far from being an academic exercise, threatened to undermine the foundations of scientific thought. Kant did indeed have a lasting quarrel with Leibniz, and with the Leibnizian system. But it was the sense that the problems of objectivity and of causal necessity are ultimately connected that led him toward the outlook of the _Critique of Pure Reason_. It was only then that he perceived what was really wrong with Leibniz, through his attempt to show what was really wrong with Hume. He came to think as follows.\n\n**English philosopher** David Hume (1711\u201376) is shown here in an engraving after an original portrait by G. Phillips.\n\nNeither experience nor reason is alone able to provide knowledge. The first provides content without form, the second form without content. Only in their synthesis is knowledge possible; hence, there is no knowledge that does not bear the marks of reason and of experience together. Such knowledge is, however, genuine and objective. It transcends the point of view of the person who possesses it, and makes legitimate claims about an independent world. Nevertheless, it is impossible to know the world \"as it is in itself,\" independent of all perspective. Such an absolute conception of the object of knowledge is senseless, Kant argues, since it can be given only by employing concepts from which every element of meaning has been refined away. While I can know the world independently of my point of view on it, what I know (the world of \"appearance\") bears the indelible marks of that point of view. Objects do not depend for their existence upon my perceiving them; but their nature is determined by the fact that they _can_ be perceived. Objects are not Leibnizian monads, knowable only to the perspectiveless stance of \"pure reason\"; nor are they Humean \"impressions,\" features of my own experience. They are objective, but their character is given by the point of view through which they can be known. This is the point of view of \"possible experience.\" Kant tries to show that, properly understood, the idea of \"experience\" already carries the objective reference that Hume denied. Experience contains _within_ itself the features of space, time, and causality. Hence, in describing my experience I am referring to an ordered perspective on an independent world.\n\nIn order to introduce this novel conception of objectivity (to which he gave the name \"transcendental idealism\") Kant began from an exploration of a priori knowledge. Among true propositions, some are true independently of experience, and remain true however experience varies: these are the a priori truths. Others owe their truth to experience, and might have been false had experience been different: these are the a posteriori truths. (The terminology here was not invented by Kant, although it owes its popularity to Kant's frequent use of it.) Kant argued that a priori truths are of two kinds, which he called \"analytic\" and \"synthetic\" (A. 6\u201310). An analytic truth is one like \"All bachelors are unmarried\" whose truth is guaranteed by the meaning, and discovered through the analysis, of the terms used to express it. A synthetic truth is one whose truth is not so derived but that, as Kant puts it, affirms something in the predicate that is not already contained in the subject. It is a truth like \"All bachelors are unfulfilled,\" which (supposing it to be true) says something substantial about bachelors and does not merely reiterate the definition of the term used to refer to them. The distinction between the analytic and the synthetic involved novel terminology, although similar distinctions can be found in earlier philosophers. Aquinas, inspired by Boethius, defines a \"self-evident\" proposition as one in which the \"predicate is contained in the notion of the subject,\" and a similar idea is to be found in Leibniz. What is original, however, is Kant's insistence that the two distinctions (between the a priori and the a posteriori, and between the analytic and the synthetic), are of a wholly different nature. It is mere dogmatism on the part of empiricists to think that they must coincide. And yet for the empiricist view to be true, there cannot be synthetic a priori knowledge: synthetic truths can be known only through experience.\n\nThe empiricist position has been taken in recent times by the logical positivists of the \"Vienna Circle,\" who argued that all a priori truths are analytic, and drew the conclusion that any metaphysical proposition must be meaningless, since it could be neither analytic nor a posteriori. It was already apparent to Kant that empiricism denies the possibility of metaphysics. And yet metaphysics is necessary if foundations are to be provided for objective knowledge: without it, there is no conceivable barrier against the skepticism of Hume. So the first question of all philosophy becomes \"How is synthetic a priori knowledge possible?\" Or, to put it another way, \"How can I come to know the world through pure reflection, without recourse to experience?\" Kant felt that there could be no explanation of a priori knowledge that divorces the object known from the perspective of the knower. Hence he was skeptical of all attempts to claim that we can have a priori knowledge of some timeless, spaceless world of the \"thing-in-itself \" (that is, any object defined without reference to the \"possible experience\" of an observer). I can have a priori knowledge only of the world that I experience. A priori knowledge provides support for, but it also derives its content from, empirical discovery. Kant's _Critique_ is directed in part against the assumption that \"pure reason\" can give content to knowledge without making reference to experience.\n\n**German philosopher** Moritz Schlick (1882\u20131936), leader of the Vienna Circle, is shown here in a photograph taken ca. 1935.\n\nAll a priori truths are both necessary and absolutely universal: these are the two signs whereby we can discern, among our claims to knowledge, those items that, if they are true at all, are true a priori. For it is obvious that experience could never confer necessity or absolute universality on anything; any experience might have been otherwise, and experience is necessarily finite and particular, so that a universal law (which has indefinitely many instances) could never be truly confirmed by it. No one should really doubt that there is synthetic a priori knowledge: Kant gave as the most conspicuous example mathematics, which we know by pure reasoning, but not by analyzing the meanings of mathematical terms. There ought to be a philosophical explanation of the a priori nature of mathematics, and Kant attempted to provide it in the opening sections of the _Critique_. But he also drew attention to other examples, of a more puzzling kind. For instance, the following propositions seem to be true a priori: \"Every event has a cause\"; \"The world consists of enduring objects which exist independently of me\"; \"All discoverable objects are in space and time.\" These propositions cannot be established through experience, since their truth is presupposed in the interpretation of experience. Moreover, each claims to be true, not just on this or that occasion, but universally and necessarily. Finally, it is just such truths as these that are required for the proof of objectivity. Hence the problem of objectivity and the problem of synthetic a priori knowledge are ultimately connected. Moreover, the vital role played by the truths given above in all scientific explanation persuaded Kant that a theory of objectivity would also provide an explanation of natural necessity. Such a theory would then give a complete answer to the skepticism of Hume.\n\nWhat, then, are Kant's aims in the first _Critique_? First, in opposition to Hume, to show that synthetic a priori knowledge is possible, and to offer examples of it. Second, in opposition to Leibniz, to demonstrate that \"pure reason\" alone, operating outside the constraints placed on it by experience, leads only to illusion, so that there is no a priori knowledge of \"things-in-themselves.\" It is normal to divide the _Critique_ into two parts, in accordance with this division of the subject, and to describe the first part as the \"Analytic,\" the second as the \"Dialectic.\" While this division does not correspond exactly to Kant's division of chapters (which is exceedingly complex and bristles with technicalities), it is sufficiently close not to be misleading. The terms \"analytic\" and \"dialectic\" are Kant's: and so is the bifurcation of the argument. In the first part Kant's defense of objectivity is expounded, and it is with the argument of the \"Analytic\" that I shall begin, for, until it is grasped, it will be impossible to understand the nature either of Kant's metaphysics, or of the moral, aesthetic, and political theories that he later derived from it.\n\n**The subjective deduction,** in trying to show what is involved in making a judgment, concentrates on the nature of the mind, particularly on the nature of belief, sensation, and experience. This image of the human head in profile, labeled with brain functions, is by German philosopher and theologian Albertus Magnus (ca. 1200\u20131280) and appeared in his _Philosophia pauperum, sive_ _Philosophia naturalis_.\n[THREE\n\nThe Transcendental Deduction ](Roge_9781402782107_epub_c7_r1.html#d6e3)\n\nKANT'S ANSWER TO THE FUNDAMENTAL question of metaphysics\u2014 \"How is synthetic a priori knowledge possible?\"\u2014contains two parts. I shall call these, following Kant's own terminology (A., p. xvi), the \"subjective\" and the \"objective\" deductions. (Kant uses the term _deduction_ in the legal sense, as in the deduction of a title to land\u2014that is, a proof that we have the right to something, in this case, the right to apply certain concepts or \"categories.\") The subjective deduction had been partly adumbrated in Kant's inaugural dissertation of 1770 (I. 54 ff.), and consists in a theory of cognition. It tries to show what is involved in making a judgment: in holding something to be true or false. It concentrates on the nature of the mind, in particular on the nature of belief, sensation, and experience. Its conclusions are presented as part of a general theory of the \"understanding\" (the faculty of judgment). Kant repeatedly emphasizes that the theory is not to be construed as empirical psychology. It is not, nor does it purport to be, a theory of the workings of the _human_ , as opposed to some other, intelligence. It is a theory of the understanding as such, telling us what it is, and how it must function if there are to be judgments at all. In all philosophical discussion of these matters, Kant argues, we are talking \"not about the origin of experience, but about what lies in it\" ( _F._ 63). And he compares such purely philosophical questions to that \"analysis of concepts\" that has since become so fashionable. Kant wishes to draw the limits of the understanding. If there are things that cannot be grasped by the understanding, then all assertions about them are meaningless.\n\nThe objective deduction consists in a positive attempt to establish the content of a priori knowledge. The argument here proceeds, not by an analysis of the faculties of knowledge, but by an exploration of its grounds. What are the presuppositions of experience? What has to be true if we are to have even that bare point of view that the skeptics ascribe to us? If we can identify these presuppositions, then they will be established as true a priori. For their truth follows, not from the fact that we have this or that experience, but from the fact that we have experience _at_ _all_. Hence they depend upon no particular experience for their verification, and can be established by reasoning alone. They will be true in every world where the skeptical question can be asked (in every comprehensible world). And this is tantamount to their being necessary. I cannot conceive of their falsehood, since I cannot conceive of myself as part of a world that refutes them.\n\nKant calls this argument the \"transcendental deduction,\" and the resulting theory \"transcendental idealism.\" The word _transcendental_ needs some explanation. An argument is transcendental if it \"transcends\" the limits of empirical enquiry, so as to establish the a priori conditions of experience. We must distinguish transcendental from empirical argument (B. 81); the former, unlike the latter, leads to \"knowledge which is occupied not so much with objects as with the mode of our knowledge of objects _in so far as this mode of knowledge is possible a priori_ \" (B. 25). The word _transcendental_ is also used by Kant in another sense, to refer to \"transcendental objects.\" These are objects that transcend experience\u2014 that is, objects which are not disclosed to empirical investigation, being neither observable themselves, nor causally related to what is observable. These \"transcendental objects\" present a problem of interpretation to which I shall return in Chapter 4.\n\nI shall also return to the interpretation of \"transcendental idealism.\" Briefly, this theory implies that the laws of the understanding, laid down in the subjective deduction, are the same as the a priori truths established in the objective deduction. It implies, in other words, a very special kind of harmony between the capacities of the knower and the nature of the known. It is because of this harmony that a priori knowledge is possible.\n\nIt follows from this theory that the \"forms of thought\" that govern the understanding, and the a priori nature of reality, are in exact correspondence. The world is as we think it, and we think it as it is. Almost all the major difficulties in the interpretation of Kant depend upon which of those two propositions is emphasized. Is it our thought that determines the a priori nature of the world? Or is it the world that determines how we must think of it? The answer, I believe, is \"neither, and both.\" But only at the very end of this book will that answer be clear.\n\nSelf-Consciousness\n\nI have referred, adopting Kant's usage, to \"our\" understanding and experience. Who are \"we\"? Kant's use of the first person plural is a device of a very special character. He is not, as I said, engaging in a psychological study of \"creatures like us.\" Nor is he speaking with some abstract authorial voice for which no true subject can be found. He means the term \"we\" to denote indifferently any being who can use the term \"I\": anyone who can identify himself as the subject of experience. The starting point of all Kant's philosophy is the single premise of self-consciousness, and the first two of his three _Critiques_ concern themselves respectively with the questions: \"What must a self-conscious being think?\" and \"What must he do?\" Self-consciousness is a deep phenomenon, with many layers and aspects. It is not every being that can know his own experience (for whom the \"I think\" can accompany all his perceptions, as Kant expresses his crucial emendation of Descartes [B. 131\u201332]). But it is only such a being who can pose the skeptical question: \"Are things as they seem to me (as my experience represents them)?\" The argument explores, therefore, the presuppositions of this self-consciousness. Kant's conclusion can be summarized thus: the conditions that make skepticism possible also show it to be false.\n\nThe Transcendental Synthesis\n\nI shall deal first with the subjective deduction\u2014the theory of the \"subjective conditions\" of judgment. There are two sources from which our knowledge is drawn: sensibility and understanding. The first is a faculty of intuitions ( _Anschauungen_ ): it includes all the sensory states and modifications that empiricists think to be the sole basis of knowledge. The second is a faculty of concepts. Since concepts have to be _applied_ in judgments, this faculty, unlike sensibility, is active. It is a mistake of empiricism, Kant argued, not to have understood this crucial point, and to have construed all concepts of the understanding on the model of sensations. (Thus for Hume a concept is simply a faded relict of the \"impression\" from which it derives.) The corresponding mistake of rationalism is to think of sensation as a kind of confused aspiration toward conceptual thought. Thus Kant summarized the famous dispute between Leibniz and Locke in the following way: \"Leibniz _intellectualised_ appearances, just as Locke . . . _sensualised_ the concepts of the understanding.\" In fact, however, there are two faculties here, irreducible the one to the other; they \"can supply objectively valid judgements of things only in _conjunction_ with each other\" (A. 271, B. 327).\n\nJudgment requires, then, the joint operation of sensibility and understanding. A mind without concepts would have no capacity to think; equally, a mind armed with concepts, but with no sensory data to which they could be applied, would have nothing to think about. \"Without sensibility no object would be given to us, without understanding no object would be thought. Thoughts without content are empty; intuitions without concepts are blind\" (A. 51, B. 75). Judgment requires what Kant calls a \"synthesis\" of concept and intuition, and only in this synthesis is true experience (as opposed to mere \"intuition\") generated. This synthesis is somewhat confusingly described by Kant: sometimes it seems to be a \"process\" whereby experience is generated, at other times a kind of \"structure\" that experience contains. In any event, it seems to have two stages: the \"pure\" synthesis, whereby intuitions are grouped together into a totality, and then the act of judgment, in which the totality is given form through a concept (A. 79, B. 104). This synthesis is not meant to be a psychological fact; it is a \"transcendental\" as opposed to an \"empirical\" synthesis. In other words, it is presupposed in (self-conscious) experience, and not derived from it. I do not lay hold of my experience and then subject it to synthesis. For the very act of \"laying hold\" presupposes that this synthesis has occurred. Suppose I attempt to describe how things seem to me, as I sit writing at this desk. I am at once engaged in the activity of subsuming my sensory awareness under concepts (such concepts as those of desk and writing). I can represent my experience to myself only by describing \"how things seem\": and that is to use the concepts of the understanding. Conversely, none of my concepts would be intelligible without the experiences that exhibit their application.\n\nA Priori Concepts\n\nIt is an assumption of empiricism that all concepts are derived from, or in some manner reducible to, the sensory intuitions that warrant their application. There can be no concept without the corresponding sensory stimulus, and it is in terms of such stimulus that the meaning of a concept must be given. Kant argued that this assumption is absurd. The empiricists confuse experience with sensation. Experience can provide the grounds for the application of a concept, because it already contains a concept, in accordance with the \"synthesis\" just described. Sensation, or intuition, contains no concept, and provides grounds for no judgment. Until transformed by mental activity, all sensation is without intellectual structure, and therefore provides grounds for no belief. If we understand experiences, then it is because they already contain within themselves the concepts that we supposedly derive from them. Whence came these concepts? Not from the senses. There must therefore be some repertoire of concepts contained within the understanding itself, and which defines the forms of its activity.\n\nIt follows that the Leibnizian theory of \"innate ideas\" is substantially correct. There are concepts that cannot be given through experience because they are presupposed in experience. They are involved in every apprehension of the world that I can represent as mine; not to possess them is to have, not experience, but mere intuition, from which no knowledge can be derived. These \"a priori concepts\" of the understanding prescribe the basic \"forms\" of judgment. All other concepts can be seen as \"determinations\" of them\u2014that is, as special cases, more or less adulterated by the reference to observation and experiment.\n\nKant called these fundamental concepts \"categories,\" borrowing a term that had been put to similar (but less systematic) use by Aristotle. The categories are our forms of thought. One such category is the concept that lies at the origin of the Leibnizian system: the category of substance. A substance is that which is able to exist independently, and which supports the properties that depend upon it. The concept \"chair\" is a special, empirical determination of the general concept of substance. It can be acquired only by someone who already grasps that general concept, for only such a person would be able to interpret his experience in the requisite way. Another category is the one that had been subjected to such skeptical attack by Hume: the category of cause. It is not surprising that much of the argument of the Analytic concerns the ideas of substance and causality, as Kant wished us to understand them. However, he gave a list of twelve categories in all, and found to his satisfaction that they corresponded to all the disputes of traditional metaphysics.\n\nThe Subjective Deduction\n\nIt seems to follow from the above account that, if we are to have knowledge at all, our intuitions must permit application of the categories. To speak more directly: it must seem to us that we are confronted by substances, causes, and the rest. So we can know a priori that every comprehensible world (every world that could contain self-consciousness) must also have the appearance dictated by the categories. It can have that appearance only if it appears to obey certain \"principles.\" A principle specifies the conditions under which a category gains application. The sum of all principles defines the extent of our claims to a priori knowledge.\n\nWhat does this \"subjective deduction\" of the categories establish? The answer seems to be this: we must think in terms of the categories, and must therefore accept as true the principles that govern their application. So the world must ordinarily appear to us in such a way that we _can_ accept these principles. Self-consciousness requires that the world must appear to conform to the categories. This assertion contains the essence of what Kant called his \"Copernican Revolution\" in philosophy. Previous philosophers had taken nature as primary, and asked how our cognitive capacities could lay hold of it. Kant takes those capacities as primary, and then deduces the a priori limits of nature. This is the first important step in his answer to Hume. It is well for Hume to assert that our knowledge has its foundation in experience. But experience is not the simple concept that Hume supposed it to be. Experience contains intellectual structure. It is already organized in accordance with the ideas of space, time, substance, and causality. Hence there is no knowledge of experience that does not point toward a world of nature. Our point of view is intrinsically a point of view _on_ an objective world.\n\n**This portrait of Immanuel Kant** at the age of forty-four was created by Johann Gottlieb Becker in 1768.\n\nBut does that answer the skeptic? Surely, he will say, even if Kant were right, and the world must appear to us in this way, does it also have to _be_ as it _appears_? Even if we are compelled to think that the categories apply, it does not follow that they really _do_ apply. We have yet to pass from the description of our point of view to a description of the world. The problem therefore remains, how \"subjective conditions of thought can have objective validity\" (A. 89, B. 122). As Kant argues (B. 141), there can be no judgment without objectivity. Clearly then, an \"objective deduction\" of the categories is required: an argument that will show that the world, and not just our experience of the world, is in conformity with the a priori principles of the understanding.\n\nForms of Thought and Forms of Intuition\n\nBefore proceeding to that objective deduction, we must return to the earlier sections of the _Critique of Pure Reason_ , in which Kant writes in general terms about the nature of sensibility. Kant believed that he had arrived at his list of categories by a process of abstraction. Suppose I describe what I now see: a pen writing. The concept \"pen\" is a special \"determination\" of the wider concept \"artifact,\" itself a determination of \"material object,\" and so on. The limit of this train of abstraction is the a priori concept that each stage exemplifies: the concept of substance. Beyond that point we cannot abstract further, without ceasing to think. Likewise \"writing\" is a determination of \"action,\" which is a determination of \"force,\" and so on: the category here being that of cause or explanation, beyond which the understanding cannot proceed. By these, and similar, thought experiments, Kant supposed that he had isolated, through his list of the twelve categories, all the forms of judgment, and so given an exposition of the concept of objective truth. Hence the proof of the objectivity of our claims to knowledge involves the demonstration of the \"objective validity\" of the categories, and of the principles presupposed in their application.\n\nThere are two ideas, however, that, despite their importance to science and to the objective view of the world, are not included in Kant's list of categories. These are the ideas of space and time, which he described, not as concepts, but as forms of intuition. Space and time are discussed in the opening section of the first _Critique_ , the \"Transcendental Aesthetic.\" The word _aesthetic_ here derives from the Greek for sensation, and indicates that the subject matter of this section is the faculty of sensibility, considered independently of the understanding. Kant argued that space and time, far from being concepts applicable to intuitions, are basic _forms_ of intuition, meaning that every sensation must bear the imprint of temporal, and sometimes of spatial, organization.\n\nTime is the form of \"inner sense,\" that is, of all states of mind, whether or not they are referred to an objective reality. There could not be a mental state that is not in time, and time is made real to us through this organization in our experience. Space is the form of \"outer sense\"\u2014that is, of those \"intuitions\" that we refer to an independent world and that we therefore regard as \"appearances\" of objective things. Nothing can appear to me as independent of myself without also being experienced as \"outside,\" and therefore as spatially related to, myself. Space, like time, forms part of the organization of my sensibility. My very sense-impressions bear the form of space, as is evidenced in the phenomenon of the \"visual field.\"\n\nBut why deny that space and time are a priori concepts? They are a priori, but they cannot be concepts, since concepts are general, admitting of a plurality of instances. Kant argued that there is of necessity only one space, and only one time. All spaces form parts of a single space, and all times parts of a single time. Kant sometimes expresses this point by saying that space and time are not concepts but \"a priori intuitions.\"\n\nThere is, in Kant's philosophy, a rage for order that leads him to attempt to solve as many philosophical questions as possible through each distinct part of his system. One motive for treating space and time separately from the categories of the understanding is in order to suggest an explanation for the fact that there are two kinds of synthetic a priori truth: mathematics and metaphysics. It seems that there ought to be a different explanation for each, since mathematics is self-evident, and obvious to all thinking beings, whereas metaphysics is essentially disputed, a matter over which people argue interminably; \"infinitely removed from being as evident as the proposition that twice two makes four\" (A. 733, B. 761). Mathematics possesses, indeed, all the immediacy and indubitability of intuition itself, whereas the metaphysical principles, which derive from thought alone, are necessarily contentious. By construing mathematics as an a priori science of intuition, Kant thought that he could show why this is so. In mathematics we are dealing with \"a priori intuitions\"; this automatically gives a content to our thought that is absent from the abstract employment of the categories. The conclusions of mathematics are arrived at both \"a priori and immediately\" (A. 732, B. 760), whereas those of metaphysics must be derived by laborious argument.\n\nWhether or not we accept Kant's explanation, it is a distinctive feature of his philosophy that he took mathematical truths to be synthetic a priori. At the same time he refused to countenance Plato's explanation of this synthetic a priori status, as deriving from the peculiar nature of mathematical objects: the abstract, immutable numbers and Forms. Kant also disagreed with Hume and Leibniz, both of whom had argued that mathematics is analytic. The question is, therefore, how can mathematics be synthetic a priori, and yet not provide knowledge of some mysterious and unobservable realm? In the _Inaugural Dissertation_ Kant argued that the a priori nature of geometry derives from the subject, rather than from the object, of mathematical thought (I. 70\u201372). It is this that led to his mature view that there can be a priori knowledge of space only if space enters into the nature of perception. Hence the theory of space as a \"form\" of intuition.\n\nObjective knowledge has, then, a double origin: sensibility and understanding. And, just as the first must \"conform to\" the second, so must the second \"conform to\" the first; otherwise, the transcendental synthesis of the two would be impossible. What does it mean to say that the understanding must \"conform to\" the sensibility? Since time is the general form of all sensibility, the claim amounts to this: the categories must find their primary application in time, and be \"determined,\" or limited, accordingly. Thus the concept of substance must have, as its primary instance, not the monads of Leibniz, nor the abstract objects of the Platonic supersphere, but ordinary temporal things, which endure through time, and are subject to change. If such things are objective, then, by the theory that space is the form of outer sense, they must also be spatial. So to prove the \"objective validity\" of the concept of substance is not to prove that the world consists of monads. The world consists rather of ordinary spatio-temporal objects. The philosophical proof of objectivity establishes the existence, not of an abstract, perspectiveless, world, but of the commonsense world of science and everyday perception: the very world that both Humean skepticism and Leibnizian metaphysics had thrown in doubt. It was therefore important to Kant to show, in his proof of objectivity, that the beliefs that he justified corresponded exactly to the laws that Newtonian science had laid down for all perceivable things.\n\nThe Transcendental Unity of Apperception\n\nThe \"objective\" deduction of the categories begins from the premise of self-consciousness, described, in characteristic language, as the \"transcendental unity of apperception.\" It is important to understand this phrase, which contains in embryo much of Kant's philosophy. \"Apperception\" is a term taken from Leibnizian metaphysics; it refers to any experience of which the subject is able to say \"this is mine.\" In other words, \"apperception\" means \"self-conscious experience.\" The unity of apperception consists in the \"'I think' which can accompany all my perceptions\" (B. 131\u201332), to borrow again Kant's version of Descartes. It consists of my immediate awareness that simultaneous experiences belong to me. I know immediately that this thought, and this perception, are equally mine, in the sense of belonging to the unity of consciousness that defines my point of view. Doubt is here impossible: I could never be in the position that Dickens in _Hard Times_ attributes to Mrs. Gradgrind on her deathbed, knowing that there is a pain in the room somewhere, but not knowing that it is mine. This apprehension of unity is called \"transcendental\" because I could never derive it from experience. I could not argue that, because this pain has such a quality, and this thought such another, they must belong to a single consciousness. If I did that, I could make a mistake; I could be in the absurd position of ascribing to myself some pain, thought, or perception that belonged, not to me, but to someone else. So the unity that I apprehend in my point of view is not a conclusion from experience, but a presupposition of experience. Its basis \"transcends\" anything that experience could establish. As Kant sometimes puts it, the unity of consciousness \"precedes\" all the data of intuition (A. 107).\n\nThe transcendental unity of apperception provides the minimal description of our point of view. I can know at least one thing: that there is a unity of consciousness. To doubt this is to cease to be self-conscious, and so to cease to find significance in doubt. The task is to show that this point of view is possible only in an objective world.\n\nThe Transcendental Deduction\n\nThe objective deduction has the same \"transcendental\" character as its premise. It is concerned to show that the truth of its conclusion is not a deduction from experience but presupposed in the _existence_ of experience. The transcendental unity of apperception is possible only if the subject inhabits the kind of world that the categories describe: an objective world, in which things may be other than they seem. To put the argument in a nutshell: the unity of apperception describes the condition of subjectivity, in which everything is as it seems and seems as it is. But no one can have the point of view of subjectivity who does not have knowledge of objective truths. He must therefore belong to a world of things that can be other than they seem and that exist independently of his own perspective.\n\nAn argument to that effect is hard to find, and it is significant that Kant was so dissatisfied with \"The Transcendental Deduction\" that he rewrote it entirely for the second edition of the _Critique_ , changing its emphasis from the subjective conclusion given above toward the objective deduction presently under discussion. Even so, the result is very obscure and a further passage\u2014\"The Refutation of Idealism\"\u2014was added in order to make the emphasis on objectivity more persuasive. The point of this \"refutation\" was to show \"that we have experience, and not merely _imagination_ , of outer things\" by demonstrating that \"even our inner experience [ _Erfahrung_ ], which for Descartes is indubitable, is possible only on the assumption of outer experience [i.e., experience of an objective world]\" (B. 275). The flavor of the argument is more apparent than its substance. At least the following three thoughts seem to be involved in it:\n\n(i) _Identifying experience_. It is a common empiricist assumption that I can know my experience simply by observing it. But this is not so. I do not observe my experience, but only its object. Any knowledge of experience must therefore involve knowledge of its object. But I can have knowledge of the object only if I identify it as continuous. Nothing can have temporal continuity without also having the capacity to exist when unobserved. Its existence is therefore independent of my perception.\n\n(ii) _Identity through time_. I can identify experience as mine only if I locate it in time. I must therefore ascribe it to a subject who exists in time and endures through time. My unity requires my continuity. But to endure is to be substantial, and nothing can be substantial unless it also enters into causal relations. I endure only if my past explains my future. Otherwise there is no difference between genuine duration and an infinite sequence of momentary selves. If I can be conscious of my experience at all, I can therefore conclude that I belong to a world to which such categories as substance and cause are correctly applied, since they are correctly applied to me. A condition of self-consciousness is, therefore, the existence of just that objective order which my experience suggests to me.\n\n(iii) _Ordering in time_. I have privileged knowledge of present experience. To know my experience is therefore to know it as present. This is possible only if I distinguish in experience between now and then. Hence there is a \"temporal order\" inherent in perception, and I must know this order if I am to know myself. But I can know it only if I can make reference to independent objects, and the regularities that govern them. Only then will I be able to describe time as a dimension in which experience occurs, rather than as a series of unrelated instants. The reality of time is presupposed in experience. And the reality of time presupposes the reality of an objective sequence. It is only by reference to that sequence, and to the enduring objects that structure it, that I can identify my own perception.\n\nNone of those thoughts is clearer in the original than in my brief r\u00e9sum\u00e9. It is fair to say that the transcendental deduction has never been considered to provide a satisfactory argument. In all its versions it involves a transition from the unity of consciousness to the identity of the subject through time. Hume pointed out that the slide from unity to identity is involved in all our claims to objective knowledge; he also thought that it could never be justified. Kant did not find the terms with which to answer Hume. Nevertheless his enterprise has appealed to many subsequent philosophers, and arguments similar to those adumbrated in the transcendental deduction have been revived in recent years, most notably by Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889\u20131951). In the famous \"private-language\" argument in his _Philosophical Investigations_ Wittgenstein argues that there can be no knowledge of experience that does not presuppose reference to a public world. I can know my own experience immediately and incorrigibly, but only because I apply to it concepts that gain their sense from public usage. And public usage describes a reality observable to others besides myself. The publicity of my language guarantees the objectivity of its reference. Wittgenstein's argument\u2014which has seemed persuasive to many\u2014shares the premise and the conclusion of the transcendental deduction. It relies, however, not on metaphysical doctrines about time, but on theories of reference and meaning. It does not argue directly that subjects depend upon objects. Instead it shows that subjects depend upon _communities_ of subjects, and therefore on the publicly observable world that establishes their shared frame of reference.\n\nIf valid, the transcendental deduction achieves a result of immense significance. It establishes the objectivity of my world while assuming no more than my point of view on it. Descartes, in the proof of the external world offered in his _Meditations_ , tried to step outside the point of view of the subject by establishing the existence of an omniscient God: the world is then validated as an object of God's (perspectiveless) awareness. The essence of Kant's \"transcendental\" method lies in its egocentricity. All the questions that I can ask I must ask from the standpoint that is mine; therefore, they must bear the marks of my perspective, which is the perspective of \"possible experience.\" The answer to them is not to be found in the attempt to rise to the standpoint of the reasoning being who knows without experience, but to find, within my experience itself, the response to skeptical enquiry. The transcendental method finds the answer to every philosophical question in the presuppositions of the perspective from which it must be asked.\n\nPrinciples\n\nKant argues that every category corresponds to a principle, whose truth is presupposed in its application. Principles are \"rules for the objective employment\" of the categories (A. 161, B. 200). These principles are a priori truths, and they have two aspects. They say how we must think if we are to think at all; and, in their objective aspect, they say how the world must be if it is to be intelligible. Through these principles, the categories \"prescribe laws a priori to appearances, and therefore to nature\" (B. 163). That is to say, they lay down synthetic a priori truths concerning the world of everyday and scientific observation. They are not a priori truths about \"things-in-themselves.\" They do not give knowledge of a world described without reference to our perception. Synthetic a priori knowledge is only of \"things which may be the objects of possible experience\" (B. 148). In this area, the principles state objective and necessary truths, since the categories \"relate of necessity and a priori to the objects of experience, for the reason that only by means of them can any object of experience be thought\" (A. 110). The limitation to the \"objects of possible experience\" is vital to Kant's philosophy, and he repeatedly emphasizes that \"outside the field of possible experience there can be no synthetic a priori principles\" (A. 248, B. 305). We must always bear in mind that Kant wishes to admit a priori knowledge, but also to deny the possibility of the perspectiveless metaphysics of Leibniz.\n\nI have chosen to concentrate on the categories of substance and cause. Kant associated these with a third, that of community, or reciprocal interaction. These concepts had been the principal objects of Hume's skeptical attack. They were also crucial to Leibniz's metaphysics, substance being the idea from which Leibniz began, and the \"Principle of Sufficient Reason,\" associated by Kant with causality (A. 200\u2013201, B. 246), being the principle that governed his argument. Kant's discussion of these concepts is of great and lasting interest. He placed them at the heart of the question of objectivity, and expressed, in their analysis, what he took to be the metaphysical foundations of physical science. He derives their associated principles in a section called \"Analogies of Experience,\" and it is here that Kant makes some of his most revolutionary suggestions concerning the nature of objective knowledge.\n\nKant's division of all philosophical thought into elements of four and three is obsessive. But there is a special reason, when talking of substance and causality, for his insistence that there should be a third basic concept associated with these; namely, that Kant wished his results to correspond to the three Newtonian laws of motion. Scientific explanation depends upon principles of method: being presupposed in scientific enquiry, these principles cannot be proved through it. Kant believed that such principles would be reflected in basic scientific laws; and it is one of the tasks of metaphysics to provide grounds for their acceptance.\n\nThe physical science of Kant's day seemed to assume a priori the existence of universal causation, and of reciprocal interaction. It assumed that it must explain, not the existence of matter, but the changes undergone by it. It assumed the need for a law of conservation, according to which, in all changes, some fundamental quantity remains unaltered. It is just such assumptions, Kant thought, that had guided Newton in the formulation of his laws of motion. Kant therefore attempts, in deriving his principles, to establish the \"validity of universal laws of nature as laws of the understanding\" ( _F._ 74), arguing further that all the fundamental laws of the new astronomy can be seen, on reflection, to rest on principles that are valid a priori ( _F._ 83).\n\nThe attempt to uphold the Newtonian mechanics is mixed with an attack on Hume's skepticism about causality. Kant tries to show that causal relations are necessary, both in the sense that it is necessary that objects enter into them (there is no event without a cause), and also in the sense that they are themselves a species of necessary connection.\n\n**Newton's** ** _Principia_** **:** the mathematics of motion.\nThe \"Analogies\" contain too many arguments to be treated in detail here. Like other crucial passages of the Analytic, they were substantially rewritten for the second edition, the actual statement of the \"principles\" undergoing significant revisions. But two theses deserve singling out on account of their subsequent importance. First, Kant argues that all explanation of change requires the postulation of an unchanging substance, and uses this as proof of the validity of a fundamental \"law of conservation\" in science. His arguments provide one of the most important insights into the nature of scientific method since Descartes, and a clear move in the direction of the modern idea of the \"unity of science.\" According to one version of this idea, there is a single law of conservation involved in the explanation of every change, and hence a single stuff (for example, energy), whose laws of transformation govern the whole of nature.\n\nSecond, Kant defends, in the second Analogy, the important metaphysical thesis that \"the relation of cause to effect is the condition of the objective validity of our empirical judgements\" (A. 202, B. 247). It is only because we can find causal connections in our world that we can postulate its objectivity. This is a consequence of the connection between objectivity and duration: it is because things endure that I can distinguish their appearance from their reality. But they can endure only if there is a thread of causal connection that unites their temporal parts. This table is as it is _because_ it was as it was. The dependence of objectivity on causality is matched by a similar dependence of causality on substance: it is only on the assumption of enduring things that our causal laws gain application. \"Causality leads to the concept of action, this in turn to the concept of force, and thereby to the concept of substance\" (A. 204). We could put the point briefly by saying that we discover how things really are only by finding causes for how they seem, and we find causes only by postulating a realm of enduring things.\n\nSo the thought of an independent object involves thoughts about causality, and causality, Kant argues, is a species of necessity. To know any truth about the world is therefore to have knowledge of necessities: of what must be and of what might have been. This thesis radically contradicts the empiricist view that there are no necessities in nature, and also those modern theories that believe that our basic thoughts about the actual involve mental operations that are simpler than those involved in grasping the necessary and the possible.\n\nAll these striking theses emerge from an attempt to give what one might call a fully \"enriched\" account of the objectivity of the physical world. Any philosopher who takes Kant's arguments seriously will see how difficult it is to \"reduce\" the idea of an objective order to a mere synopsis of experience. Hence he will recognize the implausibility, not only of the skepticism that Kant attacked, but also of the empiricist theory of knowledge from which it began.\n\nConclusion\n\nThe principles are valid a priori, but only in the case of the \"objects of possible experience.\" The empiricists were wrong in rejecting the possibility of such a priori principles, but right in their assumption that our own perspective on the world is in some measure a constituent of our knowledge. We can know the world a priori only insofar as it is possible for it to present an appearance to our point of view. It is vain to attempt to rise above that point of view and know the world \"as it is in itself,\" independently of any possible perception. Thus all attempts to prove Leibniz's Principle of Sufficient Reason \"have, by the universal admission of those concerned, been fruitless\" (A. 783, B. 811). But the \"transcendental\" equivalent of the principle, Kant argues, is provable: the principle of sufficient reason then becomes the law of causality, the law that every event in the empirical world is bound by causal connections. This is an a priori truth, but only of the \"world of appearance,\" and therefore only of events in time. Despite Kant's swaggering self-confidence in this matter, many Leibnizians felt that they _had_ offered a proof of the Principle of Sufficient Reason\u2014Baumgarten, for one. And one of Baumgarten's disciples, Eberhard, attempted to show that the critical philosophy was no more than a restatement of the Leibnizian system, the Principle of Sufficient Reason being both necessary to Kant's enterprise and provable a priori. This was one of the few criticisms of the _Critique_ to which Kant felt obliged to reply (in _On a Discovery_ , published in 1790). Kant demonstrates the impossibility of proving the Principle \"without relation to sensible intuition\" ( _K._ 113), and emphasizes the helplessness of pure reason to advance beyond concepts to any substantial truth about the world. The Principle of Sufficient Reason can be established, he argues, only by his \"transcendental\" method, which relates the objects of knowledge to the capacities of the knower, and proves a priori only those laws that determine the conditions of experience.\n\nThe vain attempt of the Leibnizians to found knowledge in \"pure reason\" alone is the topic of the Dialectic. In following the outline of Kant's criticisms we shall be able to see exactly what he meant by \"transcendental idealism,\" and why he thought it could provide the middle course between empiricism and rationalism.\n\n**Kant divided metaphysics into three parts:** rational psychology, cosmology\u2014represented in this engraving by the armillary sphere at Kant's side\u2014and theology.\n[FOUR\n\nThe Logic of Illusion ](Roge_9781402782107_epub_c7_r1.html#d6e4)\n\nWHILE THE UNDERSTANDING, properly employed, yields genuine, objective, knowledge, it also contains a temptation to illusion. It is this temptation that Kant attempts to diagnose and criticize in his examination of \"pure reason,\" and once again his argument has a subjective and an objective side. He describes a particular faculty, reason, in its illegitimate employment; he also demolishes all the claims to knowledge that this faculty tempts us to make. His subject matter in the Dialectic is rationalist metaphysics, and he divides metaphysics into three parts\u2014rational psychology, concerning the nature of the soul; cosmology, concerning the nature of the universe and our status within it; and theology, concerning the existence of God. He then goes on to argue that each proceeds in accordance with its own kind of illusory argument, not toward truth, but toward fallacy. The diagnosis of these errors follows a common pattern. Each attempt by pure reason to establish the metaphysical doctrines toward which it is impelled transgresses the limits of experience, applying concepts in a manner that is \"unconditioned\" by the faculty of intuition. Since it is only through the synthesis of concept and intuition that judgment is formed, this attempt cannot produce knowledge. On the contrary, concepts, divorced from their \"empirical conditions,\" are empty. \"The pure concepts of the understanding can _never_ admit of _transcendental_ but _always_ only of _empirical_ employment\" (A. 246, B. 303). At the same time, since concepts contain within themselves this tendency toward \"unconditioned\" application, it is an inevitable disease of the understanding that \"pure reason\" should usurp its functions, and the categories be transformed from instruments of knowledge into those instruments of illusion that Kant calls \"ideas.\"\n\nHere we need to take another look at transcendental idealism, in order to see exactly what it is that Kant regards himself as having established in the Analytic. We find a crucial ambiguity in Kant's doctrines, which persists through the second and third _Critiques_.\n\nAppearance and Reality\n\nKant often describes transcendental idealism as the doctrine that we have a priori knowledge only of \"appearances\" and not of \"things as they are in themselves\" (or \"things-in-themselves\"). His followers and critics disputed heatedly over the \"thing-in-itself.\" Moses Mendelssohn thought of it as a distinct entity, so that an appearance is one thing, the thing-in-itself another. Others, under the influence of Kant's pupil J. S. Beck, took the phrase \"thing-in-itself\" to refer to a way of describing the very same object that we also know as an appearance. Kant lends support to this second interpretation in his correspondence with Beck, in many passages of the _Critique of Practical Reason_ , and in a letter to one of its principal advocates: \"All objects that can be given to us can be conceptualised in two ways: on the one hand, as appearances; on the other hand, as things in themselves\" ( _C._ 103n). But there is no doubt that his mind was not made up about the matter, and this led to a crucial ambiguity in the critical philosophy.\n\nKant also says that the categories can be applied to \"phenomena,\" but not to \"noumena.\" A phenomenon is an \"object of possible experience,\" whereas a noumenon is an object knowable to thought alone, and which it does not make sense to describe as an object of experience. It is natural to connect the two distinctions, and to assume that Kant believes appearances, or phenomena, to be knowable through experience, and \"things-in-themselves\" to be mere noumena, not knowable at all since nothing is knowable in thought alone. Kant says, for example, that the concept of a \"noumenon\" can be used only negatively, to designate the limit of our knowledge, and not positively, to designate things as they are in themselves. So that \"the division of objects into phenomena and noumena, and the world into a world of the senses and a world of the understanding, is . . . quite inadmissible in the positive sense\" (A. 255, B. 311). In which case, the \"thing-in-itself \" is not an entity, but a term standing proxy for the unrealizable ideal of perspectiveless knowledge.\n\nThe ambiguity in Kant's account is illustrated by the term \"appearance,\" which is taken sometimes in a transitive, sometimes in an intransitive, sense. Kant sometimes writes as though appearances are \"appearances _of_ \" something, whose reality is hidden from us. At other times, he writes as though appearances were independent entities, which derive their name from the fact that we observe and discover their nature. In this second sense, the word _appearance_ corresponds to our idea of a physical object. An appearance can be observed; it is situated in space; it enters into causal relations with other appearances and with the being who observes them. It is governed by scientific laws, and is or can be an object of discovery. It may be as it seems, and also other than it seems. It can have both secondary qualities (qualities that an object possesses only in relation to a particular sensory experience) and primary qualities (qualities that belong to its inner constitution) (A. 28\u201329). In short, appearances possess all the characteristics of physical objects. To say that an appearance, so understood, is also an appearance _of_ something is surely incoherent. For, by Kant's own theory, the \"something\" that supposedly underlies appearance could only be a \"noumenon,\" and about noumena nothing positive can be said. In particular, it makes no sense (or, at least, is devoid of content) to say that a noumenon causes, or stands in any other relation to, an appearance. (Kant's critics\u2014such as Mendelssohn and G. E. Schulze\u2014were quick to seize on this point, and put it forward as the principal weakness of the transcendental philosophy.) Sometimes indeed Kant writes as though every object is an appearance of some \"thing-in-itself,\" arguing that appearances must be \"grounded\" in a \"reality\" that is itself not merely appearance. But, since this is inconsistent with his theory of knowledge (which allows him neither to know nor even to mean what he purports to say), we must, for the moment, consider the thing-in-itself to be a nonentity. As we shall see, there are countervailing reasons that caused Kant to deny his own official theory. But it is impossible to proceed if we allow these reasons, and the rival doctrines that stem from them, to gain precedence at this juncture.\n\nPhenomena and Noumena\n\nThe first edition of the _Critique_ contained a lengthy exposition of the theory of transcendental idealism. This was deleted by Kant from the second edition, perhaps because it gave too much encouragement to the ambiguity described above. Kant also added the section called \"The Refutation of Idealism\" (see above), which attempts to provide a positive proof of objectivity, and a disproof of the \"empirical idealism\" attributed to Berkeley. Empirical idealism is the view that \"empirical\" objects are nothing but perceptions, and that the world of science has no reality beyond the experience of the observer. All empirical objects become \"ideal\" entities, with no reality outside our conception of them. By contrast, Kant argues, transcendental idealism is a form of empirical realism: it implies that empirical objects are real.\n\nKant's assertion that transcendental idealism entails empirical realism is difficult to interpret. He argues, for example, that space and time are empirically real and also transcendentally ideal (A. 28, B. 44). This could mean that, if we take an empirical perspective, so to speak, then we acknowledge the reality of space and time; while, from the transcendental point of view, these things are \"nothing at all\" (A. 28, B. 44). However, the idea of a transcendental point of view is, as Kant recognizes, highly contentious. It is not a point of view that is available to us, and therefore not something of which we can have a positive conception. A simpler reading of Kant's theory is the following: empirical objects are real, whereas transcendental objects are ideal. A transcendental object is not perceivable, and does not belong to the world of space, time, and causality. The \"monad\" of Leibniz is such an object, and must therefore always remain a mere idea in the mind that conceives it, with no independent reality. But what are empirical objects? The answer that suggests itself is \"whatever objects are discovered or postulated through experience.\"\n\nThe above states a metaphysical view that exactly corresponds to Kant's theory of knowledge. In the last analysis, it does not matter whether we describe the distinction between the empirical and the transcendental object as a distinction between that which exists and that which does not, or as a distinction between that which is knowable and that which is not. For, to borrow a remark of Wittgenstein's, \"a nothing would do as well as a something about which nothing can be said.\" It seems then that the distinction between empirical and transcendental objects corresponds again to that between phenomena and noumena, the first being knowable, the second unknowable, since the concept of a noumenon can be employed only negatively, in order to mark out the limits of experience. All noumena are transcendental objects, and all transcendental objects, being merely \"intelligible\" (that is, not knowable through experience), are noumena. So it would seem that the three distinctions coincide: phenomenon\/noumenon; empirical object\/transcendental object; appearance\/thing-in-itself. In a lengthy discussion of Leibniz, which forms the bridging passage between the Analytic and the Dialectic, this is, in effect, what Kant says (especially A. 288\u201389, B. 344\u201346). Many scholars do not accept this interpretation; but it seems to me that, if we do not accept it, we attribute to Kant more inconsistency than his dexterity can sustain.\n\nIt is not surprising, therefore, to find that the ambiguity that surrounds Kant's conception of \"appearance\" attaches also to that of the \"phenomenon.\" This term is interpreted, sometimes as denoting a real perceivable object that exists independently of the observer, sometimes as denoting a mental \"representation\" (or, in modern parlance, \"intentional object\"). Under the latter interpretation the phenomenon becomes subjective (it is as it seems, and seems as it is). To establish its existence is to provide no guarantee of objectivity. No significant distinction would then remain between Kant's position (that we can have knowledge of phenomena) and the empirical idealism that he claims to reject. Even Leibniz admitted more objectivity into our \"point of view\" than the empirical idealist, since he introduced the notion of the \"well-founded phenomenon\" (see above), according to which the stability of appearances is sufficient to warrant the distinction between being and seeming. Leibniz's approach to the \"phenomenal world\" certainly influenced Kant, more perhaps than he cared to admit. But he wanted to go further in the direction of establishing the objectivity of the world of appearance, not less far.\n\nIt is clear from all this that the only acceptable interpretation of the terms _phenomenon_ , _appearance_ , and _empirical object_ is as denoting items in the physical world. Appearances include tables, chairs, and other such visible things; they also include entities that are observable only through their effects, such as atoms (A. 442, B. 470) and the most distant stars (A. 496, B. 524). These \"theoretical\" entities also have the reality that comes from existence in space and time, and from the order imposed by the categories. They too are perceivable, in the sense of entering into specific causal relations with the mind that knows them. In other words, any object of scientific investigation is a \"phenomenon,\" and all phenomena are knowable in principle. But nothing else is knowable. \"Nothing is really given us save perception and the empirical advance [i.e., scientific inference] from this to other possible perceptions\" (A. 493, B. 521). As for the idea of a noumenon, this is \"not the concept of an object\" but a \"problem unavoidably bound up with the limitation of our sensibility\" (A. 287, B. 344).\n\nThe Unconditioned\n\nKant's intention in the Dialectic is to show that we cannot know the \"world as it is,\" meaning the world conceived apart from the perspective of the knower. We must not, as Kant puts it, aspire to \"unconditioned\" knowledge. At the same time, it seems inevitable that we should do so. Every time we establish something by argument, we assume the truth of the premise. The premise therefore describes the \"condition\" under which the conclusion is true. But what about the truth of this condition? That too must be established by argument, and will turn out to possess its truth only \"conditionally.\" Hence reason (in its guise as inference) inevitably leads us to search for the \"unconditioned,\" the ultimate premise whose truth is derived from no other source. This \"idea\" of reason contains the source of all metaphysical illusion. For all knowledge that we can legitimately claim is subject to the \"conditions\" of possible experience. To aspire to knowledge of the unconditioned is to aspire beyond the conditions that make knowledge possible.\n\nThe effort of transcendence is, Kant argues, inevitable. Not only do we seek to transcend the conditions contained in the possibility of experience. We also seek to know the world \"as it is,\" free from the conditions to which it may be subject by such categories as substance and cause. These enterprises are in fact one and the same; for, as the Analytic shows, the two sets of conditions are identical. In each case the advance of reason toward the \"unconditioned\" is the pursuit of knowledge untainted by perspective. Reason always aims to view the world, as Leibniz had viewed it, from no point of view.\n\n\"Pure Reason\"\n\nFrom the standpoint of Kant's theory of knowledge, reason must be seen as the highest of cognitive faculties, under which all that is distinctive of self-knowledge is subsumed. Apart from its use in understanding (forming judgments), reason can be employed legitimately in two further ways: practically, and in carrying out inferences. Practical reason cannot be regarded as a branch of the understanding, since it does not issue in judgments (it makes no claims about the true and the false). Nevertheless its use is legitimate: I can reason what to do, and my action can be a legitimate outcome of this process. Inference, which is the practice of deriving the logical consequences of a judgment, is also legitimate. But, unlike understanding, it employs no concepts of its own (for an inference that, as it were, \"adds a concept\" to the premise is for that reason invalid).\n\nIt is only when _pure_ reason enters our thoughts that the \"logic of illusion\" begins to beguile us. Pure reason is distinguished by the fact that it tries to make judgments of its own, using, not concepts, but \"ideas\" from which all empirical conditions have been removed. The logic of illusion is \"dialectical\": it must inevitably end in fallacy and contradiction. This tendency toward fallacy is not accidental, but intrinsic. There is no way in which reason can set out to know the world through \"ideas\" and avoid the errors that lie in wait for it. These errors have already been committed, just as soon as we leave the knowable realm of experience and embark on the journey toward the \"unconditioned\" world beyond. At the same time there is no way in which we can avoid the temptation toward this vain journey into the transcendental. Our very possession of a point of view on the world creates the \"idea\" of a world seen from no point of view. Thus we strive always \"to find for the conditioned knowledge of the understanding, the unconditioned, whereby its unity might be brought to completion\" (A. 307, B. 364).\n\nPure Reason and Metaphysics\n\nI have already drawn attention to Kant's important threefold division of the subject matter of speculative metaphysics. In \"transcendental psychology,\" reason generates its doctrines of the soul; in rational cosmology, it attempts to describe the world in its \"unconditioned totality\"; in theology, it creates the idea of the perfect being who presides over a transcendent world. By a contrivance, Kant reconciles this division with the traditional view, that \"metaphysics has as the proper object of its enquiries three ideas only: God, freedom and immortality\" (B. 395n). The idea of freedom is assigned to cosmology, on the grounds that all the metaphysical problems created by this idea stem from the belief that there is something\u2014the moral agent\u2014that is both in the world of nature and also outside it. This is one of the most important of Kant's theories. But I shall postpone discussion of it until the chapter that follows.\n\nCosmology\n\nThe illusions of cosmology are called \"antinomies.\" An \"antinomy\" is the peculiar fallacy which enables us to derive both a proposition and its negation from the same premise. According to Kant, antinomies are not genuine contradictions, since both of the propositions that constitute them are false, being based on a false assumption. He entitles this \"kind of opposition _dialectical_ , and that of contradictories _analytical_ \" (A. 504, B. 532). He offers various tortuous explanations of how a proposition and its negation can both be false, and it is perhaps unnecessary to be detained by this puzzling piece of logic. Kant's point is that, in deriving each side of an antinomy, the same false assumption must be made. The purpose of his \"critique\" is to root out this false assumption and show it to stem from the application of one of reason's \"ideas.\" The assumption involved in cosmology is that we can think of the world in its \"unconditioned totality.\" This would be possible only by transcending the perspective of \"possible experience\" and trying to see all nature as a whole, from a point of view outside of it. The illusory nature of this idea is displayed by the fact that, from the premise of such a transcendent perspective, a \"dialectical\" contradiction follows.\n\nSuppose, for example, that I allow myself to entertain the idea of the whole world of nature, as it is situated in space and time. If I now attempt to apply the idea in judgment, I must pass beyond my empirical vision in order to grasp the totality of all objects of experience. I must attempt to envisage the whole of nature, independently of my particular perspective within it. If I could do that, I could ask myself: Is this totality limited or unlimited in space and time? Does it, or does it not, have boundaries? I find myself equally able to prove both conclusions. I can prove, for example, that the world must have a beginning in time (otherwise an infinite sequence of events must have already elapsed, and, Kant argues, a \"completed infinity\" is an absurd idea). I can equally prove that it must have no beginning in time (for if it had a beginning, then there must be a reason why it began when it did, which is to suppose, absurdly, that a particular time has a causal property, or a capacity to \"bring into being,\" independently of the events that occupy it).\n\nA similar contradiction can be derived from the assumption that the world as a whole has an explanation for its existence. From that assumption, I can prove that the world is causally self-dependent, consisting of an infinite chain of causes linking each moment to its predecessor. For the idea of a beginning to this series\u2014the idea of a \"first cause\"\u2014is absurd, leading automatically to the question \"What caused the beginning?,\" to which there is no coherent answer. I can equally prove that the world is causally dependent, deriving its existence from some being that is \"cause of itself,\" or _causa sui_. For if there were no such being, then none of the causes in the sequence of nature would explain the existence of its effect. In which case, nothing in nature would have an explanation, and it would be impossible to say why anything should exist at all.\n\nSuch antinomies result from the attempt to reach beyond the perspective of experience to the absolute vantage point from which the totality of things (and hence the world \"as it is in itself\") can be surveyed. If we suppose nature to be a thing-in-itself\u2014that is, if we remove from the concept of nature the reference to any possible experience through which it is observed\u2014then the proofs of the antinomies are well grounded. \"The conflict which results from the propositions thus obtained shows, however, that there is a fallacy in this assumption, and so leads us to the discovery of the true constitution of things, as objects of the senses\" (A. 507, B. 537). The idea of \"absolute totality\" holds only of \"things-in-themselves\" (A. 506, B. 534), which is to say, of nothing knowable. For example, the concept of cause, which we can apply within the realm of empirical objects in order to designate their relations, becomes empty when lifted out of that realm and applied to the world as a whole. It is then applied beyond the empirical conditions that justify its application, and so leads inevitably to contradiction.\n\nNevertheless, Kant argues, these antinomies are not to be lightly dismissed as errors no sooner perceived than avoided. The assumption of totality that generates them is both the cause and the effect of all that is most serious in science. Suppose we were to accept the \"big bang\" hypothesis concerning the origin of the universe. Only a shortsighted person would think that we have then answered the question of how the world began. For what caused the bang? Any answer will suppose that something already existed. So the hypothesis cannot explain the origin of things. The quest for an origin leads us forever backward into the past. But either it is unsatisfiable\u2014in which case, how does cosmology explain the _existence_ of the world?\u2014or it comes to rest in the postulation of a _causa sui_ \u2014in which case, we have left the scientific question unanswered and taken refuge in theology. Science itself pushes us toward the antinomy, by forcing us always to the limits of nature. But how can I know those limits if I cannot also transcend them?\n\nKant engages in an elaborate diagnosis of the antinomies, arguing that the two sides always correspond to rationalism and empiricism, respectively, and he takes the opportunity to explore again the various errors of those philosophies. The resulting discussion is exceedingly complex, and has produced as much philosophical commentary as anything in the first _Critique_. Kant's love of system leads him to combine arguments of very different import and quality. But behind the profusion of reasoning lies one of the acutest discussions of scientific method to have issued from the pen of a philosopher. A reading of Kant's discussion inspired thinkers as diverse as Hegel and Einstein, and few can fail to be puzzled by the problems that Kant unearths. How _can_ I view the world in its totality? And yet, how can there be explanation if I cannot? How can I explain the existence of anything, if I cannot explain the existence of everything? If I am confined forever within my own point of view, how can I penetrate the mystery of nature?\n\nTheology\n\nI have discussed the first and fourth of Kant's antinomies. The latter brings us to theology, and to Kant's subsequent suggestion that the idea of a _causa sui_ is itself empty, and can be applied in judgment only so as to generate a contradiction. In the chapter entitled \"The Ideal of Reason,\" Kant reviews the traditional arguments for the existence of God, and imposes upon them a now famous classification. There are, he says, only three kinds of argument for God's existence, the \"cosmological,\" the \"ontological,\" and the \"physico-theological.\" The first kind comprises all arguments which, proceeding from some contingent fact about the world, and from the question \" _Why_ is it so?,\" postulate the existence of a necessary being. A version of this is the \"first cause\" argument discussed above: only if the series of causes begins in a _causa sui_ can any contingent fact be finally explained. Of the second kind are all arguments which, in order to free themselves from contingent premises (which, because they might be false, might also be doubted), attempt to prove the existence of God from the concept of God. Of the third kind are all arguments from \"design,\" which begin from the premise of some good in nature, and argue by analogy to the perfection of its cause.\n\nKant says of the argument from design that it \"always deserves to be mentioned with respect. It is the oldest, the clearest, and the most consonant with human reason. It enlivens the study of nature, just as it itself derives its existence and gains ever new strength from that source\" (A. 623, B. 651). In the third _Critique_ he explains in more detail why this argument appealed to him. Kant was no atheist, and was perturbed by Hume's posthumous _Dialogues on Natural Religion_ , the German version of which appeared as the _Critique_ was being prepared for the press. There was time for Kant to wonder about Hume's motives, but not to consider his arguments (A. 745, B. 773). Hume foreshadows Kant's own critique of rational theology. But he is particularly dismissive of the argument from design, arguing that it proves either nothing at all (since there is no genuine analogy between the perfections of nature and the perfections of art) or, at best, the existence of a being no more perfect than the world of his creation. Kant too was unsatisfied by the argument from design. But, although he thought of it as invalid, at the same time he felt it to be the expression of a true presentiment. Hence he tried to provide a wholly novel elucidation of it, from the point of view not of the first but of the third _Critique._\n\n**Kant claimed that there are only three kinds** of argument about the existence of God: cosmological, ontological, and physico-theological. This manuscript illumination from a thirteenth-century French Bible posits God in the cosmological sense, as the great architect of the universe.\n\nConsidered as an intellectual proof, the argument from design can never be more cogent than the cosmological proof, upon which it depends (A. 630, B. 658). For design can be imputed to the world only on the assumption that the world has an explanation. That assumption carries no weight unless the cosmological proof is valid. We must show that we can step outside nature, in order to postulate the existence of a transcendent, necessary being\u2014a being upon whom the entire order of things depends. Such a being must be self-caused; moreover, his existence cannot be a merely contingent fact, since, if that were so, he would be part of the chain of natural events, rather than an explanation of them. Something can exist necessarily only if its existence is implied by its concept. The existence of God must _follow_ from the concept of God, since it is only by logical relations that a concept can explain anything. So, in the end, all three arguments reduce to the ontological argument, which tells us that God must exist, since existence belongs to the very concept of God.\n\nIn its traditional forms the ontological argument proves not only the existence, but also the perfection, of God. Neither of the other arguments seems able to prove God's absolute perfection: once again, they must rely on the ontological argument to give intellectual grounds for religious sentiment. The ontological argument proceeds as follows. God is an all-perfect being. Among perfections we must count moral goodness, power, and freedom. But we must also count existence. For the concept of an existent _x_ is the concept of something more perfect than an _x_ ; to take away existence is to take away perfection. So existence is a perfection. Hence it follows from the idea of God, as an all-perfect being, that God exists.\n\nKant's rebuttal of this argument is famous for its anticipation of a doctrine of modern logic\u2014the doctrine that existence is not a predicate. (When I say that John exists, is bald, and eats oysters, I attribute to John not three properties, but two.) Leibniz, in his discussion of contingency, had already recognized that existence is quite different from ordinary predicates. Nevertheless, he accepted the ontological argument, and did not see the logical consequence for his philosophy. To say that an _x_ exists is to add nothing to its concept: it is to say that the concept has an instance. Indeed, there is already a fallacy (Kant even says a contradiction) involved in introducing existence into the concept of a thing (A. 597, B. 625). For it then becomes empty to assert that the thing exists. The assertion makes no advance from concept to reality. And so it affirms the existence of nothing. The ontological argument says that existence is a perfection. But it cannot be a perfection, since it is not a property. If the argument were valid, Kant thinks, it would follow that the judgment that God exists expresses an analytic truth. The theory that existence is not a predicate implies, however, that all existential propositions are synthetic (A. 598, B. 626).\n\nThe Regulative Employment of the Ideas of Reason\n\nHaving completed his denunciation of the \"logic of illusion,\" Kant goes on to argue, at considerable length, and in a relaxed, expansive style appropriate to a writer whose intellectual labor is ended, that there is, after all, a legitimate use for the ideas of reason. Such ideas as that of unconditioned totality, and of the perfect creator who exists of necessity, generate illusions when considered in their \"constitutive\" role: that is, when considered as descriptions of reality. The correct way to see them, however, is as \"regulative principles\" (A. 644, B. 672). If we act as if these ideas were true of reality, then we are led to formulate true hypotheses. The ideas of order and totality, for example, lead us to propose ever wider and simpler laws, in terms of which the empirical world becomes ever more intelligible. This \"regulative\" employment of the ideas is an employment from within the standpoint of experience. The constitutive employment attempts to transcend that standpoint, into the illusory realm of reason. The contradictions do not stem from the ideas themselves (which are not contradictory but merely empty); they stem from their wrong application. By way of emphasizing their regulative function, Kant sometimes refers to the ideas of reason as _ideals_.\n\nThus \"the ideal of a supreme being is nothing but a _regulative principle_ of reason, which directs us to look upon all connection in the world as if it originated from an all-sufficient and necessary cause\" (A. 619, B. 647). Considered thus it is the source, not of illusion, but of knowledge. The knowledge that it leads to remains circumscribed by the conditions of possible experience: in other words, it conforms to the categories, and does not reach beyond their legitimate territory into a transcendent realm. The idea \"does not show us how an object is constituted, but how, under its guidance, we should _seek_ to determine the constitution and connection of the objects of experience\" (A. 671, B. 699). Thus reason is led back from its vain speculations to the empirical world, trading the illusions of metaphysics for the realities of empirical science.\n\nThe Soul\n\nKant's discussion of the soul, and of the concept of the \"self\" from which it gains its initial description, is among the most subtle parts of his philosophy. The account is given in two complex arguments: the first at the beginning of the Dialectic, in which he attacks the rationalist doctrines of the soul; the second in the third antinomy, and in the _Critique of Practical_ _Reason_ , in which he describes the nature of morality.\n\nThe \"Paralogisms of Pure Reason,\" which deal with the rationalist doctrines of the soul, were substantially revised for the second edition, perhaps because this aspect of the critical philosophy forms part of the multifaceted argument of the transcendental deduction, with which Kant had remained so dissatisfied. Kant's argument in the Analytic had begun by recognizing the peculiar reality of self-consciousness. I have a privileged awareness of my states of mind, and this is an \"original\" or \"transcendental\" act of understanding. The rationalists had sought to deduce from this privileged knowledge a specific theory of its object. They had thought that, because of the immediacy of self-awareness, the self must be a genuine object of consciousness. In the act of self-awareness I am presented with the \"I\" that is aware. I can maintain this self-awareness even while doubting every other thing. Moreover, I am necessarily aware of my unity. Finally, I have an intuitive sense of my continuity through time: this cannot be derived from the observation of my body, or from any other external source. It therefore seems natural to conclude that I know myself to be substantial, indivisible, enduring, perhaps even immortal, on the basis of self-awareness alone. Such, Kant thought, was Descartes's argument. Nor is the conclusion an eccentricity of the \"Cartesian\" view of consciousness. Like all the illusions of reason, it is one into which we are tempted just as soon as we begin to reflect on the datum before us. Every rational being must be tempted to think that the peculiar immediacy and inviolability of self-awareness guarantee its content. In the midst of every doubt, I may yet know this thing that is me, and, reason assures me, this intimate acquaintance with my own nature gives grounds for the belief in the immateriality of the soul. Furthermore, I cannot conceive of my own nonexistence, since every attempt to do so postulates the \"I\" as conceiver.\n\nThe reasoning is erroneous, since it moves from the purely _formal_ unity of apperception to the substantial unity affirmed in the doctrine of the soul. \"The unity of consciousness which underlies the categories is . . . mistaken for an intuition of the subject as object, and the category of substance is then applied to it\" (B. 421). Although the transcendental unity of apperception assures me that there is a unity in my present consciousness, it tells me nothing else about the kind of thing that bears it. It does not tell me that I am a substance (that is, an independently existing object) as opposed to an \"accident\" or property. (For example, it does not refute the view that the mind is a complex property of the body.) It is \"quite impossible, by means of . . . simple self-consciousness, to determine the manner in which I exist, whether it be as substance or accident\" (B. 420). If I cannot deduce that I am a substance, so much the less can I deduce that I am indivisible, indestructible, or immortal. The unity of consciousness does not even assure me that there is something in the empirical world to which the term _I_ applies. For the peculiar features of self-consciousness summarized under the idea of a transcendental unity of apperception are simply features of a \"point of view\" on the world. The \"I\" as thereby described is not part of the world but a perspective upon it (a way things seem). \"For the I is not a concept but only a designation of the object of inner sense in so far as we know it through no further predicate\" ( _F._ 98). To study the peculiarities of our self-awareness is, then, to study no item _in_ the world. It is rather to explore that limiting point of empirical knowledge. \"The subject of the categories cannot by thinking the categories acquire a concept of itself as an object of the categories\" (B. 422). It is no more possible for me to make the \"I\" into the object of consciousness than it is to observe the limits of my own visual field. \"I\" is the expression of my perspective, but denotes no item within it. To suppose otherwise is to pass illegitimately from subject to object; it is to suppose that the subject of consciousness can also, _as subject_ , be the object of its own awareness.\n\nThe conclusion that Kant draws is this. There is a gap between the premise of \"transcendental psychology\"\u2014the transcendental unity of apperception\u2014and its conclusion\u2014the substantiality of the soul. Because the first describes a point of view on the world, and the second an item in the world, it is impossible that reason should take us validly from the one to the other. Whether correct or not, Kant's suggestion has provided the cornerstone of many subsequent philosophies of the self, from that of Schopenhauer to those of Husserl, Heidegger, and Wittgenstein.\n\nSometimes Kant implies that the \"I\" of self-awareness refers to a transcendental object. For it might seem that, having proved that the \"I\" is not part of the empirical world, Kant has given us reason to refer it to the world of the thing-in-itself that lies beyond experience. This is not a legitimate conclusion from his argument, but, on the contrary, another, more subtle reiteration of the fallacy that it was designed to expose. Nevertheless, it is a conclusion that Kant was inclined to countenance, since, without it, he thought morality would not be possible. Kant sought for a positive theory of the soul, not through pure reason, but through practical reason (B. 430\u201331). In order to understand this theory we must therefore explore his description of the moral life of the rational agent.\n\n**Detail from a game board** for the Mansion of Happiness, \"an instructive, moral, and entertaining amusement.\"\n[FIVE\n\nThe Categorical Imperative ](Roge_9781402782107_epub_c7_r1.html#d6e5)\n\nKANT'S _CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON_ was preceded by a brilliant r\u00e9sum\u00e9 of his moral viewpoint, the _Groundwork of the Metaphysic of_ _Morals_. These works treat of \"practical reason\": in using this expression Kant was consciously reviving the ancient contrast between theoretical and practical knowledge. All rational beings recognize the distinction between knowing the truth and knowing what to do about it. Judgments and decisions may each be based on, and amended through, reason, but only the first can be true or false. Hence there must be an employment of our rational faculties that does not have truth, but something else, as its aim. What is this something else? Aristotle said happiness; Kant says duty. It is in the analysis of the idea of duty that Kant's distinctive moral vision is expressed.\n\nSuppose we establish the objectivity of judgment, and provide the necessary metaphysical grounding to those scientific principles that underlie the process of discovery. There remains another problem of objectivity, raised by practical, rather than theoretical, knowledge. Can we know what to do objectively, or must we simply rely on our subjective inclination to guide us? It is to this problem that Kant addressed himself, producing the most metaphysical and abstract basis that has ever been given for the common intuitions of morality.\n\nThe Antinomy of Freedom\n\nThe starting point of Kant's ethics is the concept of freedom. According to his famous maxim that \"ought implies can,\" the right action must always be possible: which is to say, I must always be free to perform it. The moral agent \"judges that he can do a certain thing because he is conscious that he ought, and he recognises that he is free, a fact which, but for the moral law, he would never have known\" ( _P._ 30). In other words, the practice of morality forces the idea of freedom upon us. But, Kant argues, this idea, viewed theoretically, contains a contradiction, and he displays this contradiction in the third antinomy of the first _Critique._\n\nEvery change that occurs in the order of nature has a cause: this is an \"established principle\" of the Analytic, and \"allows of no exception\" (A. 536, B. 564). If this is so, then every event in nature is bound in chains of ineluctable necessity. At the same time I think of myself as the originator of my actions, giving rise to them spontaneously, under the influence of no external constraint. If my action is part of nature, this seems to contradict the view that every event in nature is bound by causal necessity. If it is not part of nature, then it falls outside the realm of causal connection, and my will is the originator of nothing in the natural world.\n\nThere is only a contradiction here if I really am free. Kant is sometimes content to argue merely that I must think of myself as free. It is a presupposition of all action in the world\u2014and hence of reasoned decisions\u2014that the agent is the originator of what he does. And, Kant suggests, I cannot forsake this idea without losing the sense of myself as agent. The very perspective of reason that sees the world as bound in chains of necessity also sees it as containing freedom. Occasionally Kant goes further, and argues for the \"primacy\" of practical reason ( _P._ 120\u201321), meaning that all thought is an exercise of freedom, so that, if practical reason were impossible, we could not think coherently. In which case, the certainty of my freedom is as great as the certainty of anything. (This argument occurs, in more rhetorical form, in the writings of Sartre, whose existentialist doctrine of the moral life owes much to Kant.) If this is true, then of course the antinomy of freedom becomes acute: we are compelled by practical reason to accept that we are free, and by understanding to deny it.\n\nKant felt that there must be a solution to this antinomy, since in the practical sphere the employment of reason is legitimate. It is indeed practical reason that tells me what I am. The illusory progress of pure reason toward self-contradiction ought not to forbid practical reason, through which the antinomy must therefore be resolved. Pure reason leaves, as it were, a \"vacant place\" in its account of the world, where the moral agent should be. \"This vacant place is filled by pure practical reason with a definite law of causality in an intelligible world . . . namely, the moral law\" ( _P._ 49). This new \"law of causality\" is called \"transcendental freedom,\" and it defines the condition of the moral agent. The law of cause and effect operates only in the realm of nature (the empirical realm). Freedom, however, belongs, not to nature, but precisely to that \"intelligible\" or transcendental realm to which categories like causality do not apply. I exist in the world of nature, as one \"appearance\" among others. But I also exist as a \"thing-in-itself,\" bound, not by causality, but by the laws of practical reason. It is not that I am two things, but rather one thing, conceived under two contrasting aspects. Thus, \"there is not the smallest contradiction in saying that a thing in appearance (belonging to the world of sense) is subject to certain laws, from which the very same as a thing in itself is independent.\" Moreover, the moral agent must always \"conceive and think of himself in this two-fold way\" ( _G._ 453). Freedom, then, is a transcendental \"idea,\" without application in the empirical world. And, in knowing ourselves to be free, we know ourselves at the same time as part of nature and as members of a transcendental world.\n\n**Title page from** the first edition of Kant's _Grundlegung zur Metaphysik_ _der Sitten_ ( _Groundwork of the_ _Metaphysic of Morals_ ).\n\nThe Transcendental Self\n\nThe doctrine of transcendental freedom is both puzzling and appealing. Its appeal lies in its promise of access to the transcendental; its puzzling quality comes from Kant's previous proof that such access is impossible. By Kant's own argument, there is nothing to be known, and nothing meaningfully to be said, about the transcendental world. Kant recognizes the difficulty, and admits that the \"demand to regard oneself _qua_ subject of freedom as a noumenon, and at the same time from the point of view of physical nature as a phenomenon in one's own empirical consciousness\" is \"paradoxical\" ( _P._ 6). And he even goes so far as to say that, while we do not comprehend the fact of moral freedom, \"we yet comprehend its _incomprehensibility_ , and this is all that can fairly be demanded of a philosophy which strives to carry its principles to the very limit of human reason\" ( _G._ 463).\n\nWe can go some way toward explaining Kant's doctrine if we relate the \"transcendental freedom\" that underlies practical reason to the \"transcendental unity of apperception\" that underlies our knowledge of nature. Our perspective on the world contains two distinct aspects; and neither the unity of consciousness, nor transcendental freedom, can be deduced from our knowledge of the empirical world. But they are each guaranteed a priori as preconditions of the knowledge that we have. The first is the starting point for all our knowledge of truths; the second the starting point for all deliberation. They are transcendental, not in the positive sense of involving knowledge of a transcendental object, but in the negative sense of being presupposed by the legitimate employment of our rational powers. Hence they lie at the limit of what can be known. Freedom, being a perspective _on_ the empirical world, cannot also be part of it. The knowledge of our own freedom is therefore a part of the \"apperception\" that defines our perspective. (Authority for this interpretation can be found in the first _Critique_ , notably A. 546\u201347, B. 574\u201375.)\n\nPure reason attempts to know the transcendental world through concepts. In other words, it attempts to form a positive conception of noumena. This attempt is doomed to failure. Practical reason, however, not being concerned in the discovery of truths, imposes no concepts on its objects. It will never, therefore, lead us into the error of forming a positive conception of the transcendental self. We know this self only practically, through the exercise of freedom. While we cannot translate this knowledge into judgments about our nature, we can translate it into some other thing. This other thing is given by the laws of practical reason, which are the synthetic a priori principles of action. Just as there are a priori laws of nature that can be derived from the unity of consciousness, so too are there a priori laws of reason that can be derived from the perspective of transcendental freedom. These will not be laws about the true and the false: they will have no part to play in description, prediction, and explanation. They will be practical laws, concerning what to do. The free agent will be bound by them in all his practical reasoning, since acceptance of them is a presupposition of the freedom without which practical reason is impossible.\n\nIt is true that Kant wavers between the view that the transcendental self is a kind of perspective, and the view that it is a distinct noumenal thing. He even attempts to resuscitate through practical reason all those theoretical conclusions concerning God, the soul, and immortality that had been dismissed as illusions of pure reason. I shall not, for the present, follow Kant into these mysterious regions. But the reader should bear in mind that I have only postponed the deep metaphysical problem that Kant's ethical doctrine creates.\n\nThe Problem of Practical Reason\n\nKant's idea of freedom becomes clearer when seen in the context of the problem that it was supposed to solve. Rational beings exist not only as self-conscious centers of knowledge, but also as agents. Their reason is not detached from their agency, but forms a constitutive part of it; which is to say that, for a rational being, there is not only action, but also the _question_ of action (the question \"What shall I do?\"), and this question demands a reasoned answer. My rationality is expressed in the fact that some of my actions are intentional (they issue, to use Kant's term, from my \"will\"). Of all such actions the question can be asked: Why do that? This question asks, not for a cause or explanation, but for a reason. Suppose someone asks me why I struck an old man in the street. The answer: \"Because electrical impulses from my brain precipitated muscular contractions, and this resulted in my hand making contact with his head\" would be absurd and impertinent, however accurate as a causal explanation. The answer: \"Because he annoyed me\" may be inadequate, in that it gives no good reason, but it is certainly not absurd. Reasons are designed to justify action, and not primarily to explain it. They refer to the grounds of an action, the premises from which an agent may conclude what to do.\n\nPractical reasons concern either ends or means. If I have an end in view, then I may deliberate over the means to achieve it. All philosophers agree that such reasoning exists; but many of them think that it shows no special \"practical\" employment of the rational faculties. It is merely theoretical reason, put to use. Kant himself is of this view, arguing that \"precepts of skill\" (how to find the means to one's ends) are merely theoretical principles ( _P._ 25\u201326). Skeptical philosophers go further, and argue, with Hume, that there is no other use for reason in practical matters. All reasoning concerns means. Reason can neither generate, nor justify, the ends of our activity, since, in Hume's words, \"reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions.\" It is from the \"passions\" that our ends are drawn, since it is passion, and passion only, that provides the ultimate motive to act. Reason can persuade us to act only when we are already motivated to obey it. If that is the case, then, Kant held, there can be no objective practical knowledge. For there can be no way in which reason will settle the question of what to do.\n\n**David Hume's claim** that \"reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions\" appeared in _A Treatise of Human Nature_ (1739), the first-edition title page of which is shown here.\n\nKant held that practical reason is possible. He affirmed the (commonsense) belief that reason may constrain and justify, not only the means, but also the ends. In which case there may be an objective exercise of practical reason. It would be objective because based in reason alone, recommending ends of action to all rational beings, irrespective of their passions, interests, and desires. For this to be possible, however, reason must, as Hume argued, not only justify but also motivate our actions. If reason did not also _prompt_ me to act, then reason would play no part in the process of decision making. So it would not be practical. Now, if reason generates only judgments about the world and inferences therefrom, it is hard to see how it _can_ be a motive to act. That such and such a judgment is true or false may prompt me to all kinds of action, depending upon my ends. If these ends stem from the \"passions,\" then reason has no part in determining them. The only way in which reason can become practical, therefore, is by issuing not in judgments but in imperatives. An imperative does not describe the world; it addresses itself to an agent, and, if he accepts it, determines what he does. If, therefore, there are imperatives that arise simply from the exercise of reason, then reason alone can move us to action. \"In a practical law, reason determines the will immediately\" ( _P._ 25).\n\nAutonomy of the Will\n\nKant's moral philosophy emerges from the amalgamation of the idea of transcendental freedom with that of an imperative of reason. He believes that reasoning about ends must always suppose just the kind of transcendental freedom that his metaphysics claims to be possible. Freedom is the power to will an end of action for myself. Any derivation of my ends from an external source is at the same time a subjection of myself to that source. And any natural process that governs my action confers on me the unfreedom of its cause. I then become the passive channel through which natural forces find their enactment. If my action is called unfree, it is because there is a sense in which it is not truly _mine._\n\nAn action that originates in me can be attributed only to me, and is therefore in a real sense mine. In respect of such an action I am free. I act freely whenever I act, and unfreely whenever some other agency acts through me. This raises the question what am I? The obvious answer is \"a transcendental self,\" since that explains my freedom from the causality of nature. But Kant now supplements this answer with a theory of the will. An action originates in me whenever I decide on the action, simply on the basis of considering it. I do not consult my desires, interests, or any other \"empirical conditions,\" since that is to subject myself to the causality of nature. I simply reflect on the action, and choose it for its own sake, as an end in itself. This is the paradigm of a free action: one that is brought into being by reason alone. Such an action can be attributed, Kant thought, to no \"natural\" force, no chain of \"empirical\" causality. It arises spontaneously out of the rational processes that constitute my will.\n\nFreedom, then, is the ability to be governed by reason. The imperatives of reason discussed in the last section are \"laws of freedom\": principles whereby reason determines action. Hence there is a \"causality of freedom\" in addition to the \"causality of nature,\" and freedom is nothing more than obedience to the first, perhaps in defiance of the second. This ability to be motivated by reason alone Kant called the autonomy of the will, and he contrasted it with the \"heteronomy\" of the agent whose will is subject to external causes. Kant designates as external any cause that belongs to the \"causality of nature\"\u2014that is, any cause that is not founded in reason alone. An action that springs from desire, emotion, or interest is therefore \"heteronomous.\"\n\nKant now develops his conception of the autonomous agent. This is an agent who is able to overcome the promptings of all heteronomous counsels, such as those of self-interest and desire, should they be in conflict with reason. Such a being postulates himself as a \"transcendental being\" in that he defies the causality of nature and refers the grounds of his actions always to the \"causality of freedom.\" Only an autonomous being has genuine ends of action (as opposed to mere objects of desire), and only such a being deserves our esteem, as the embodiment of rational choice. The autonomy of the will, Kant goes on to argue, \"is the sole principle of all moral laws, and of all duties which conform to them; on the other hand, heteronomy of the will not only cannot be the basis of any obligation, but is, on the contrary, opposed to the principle thereof, and to the morality of will\" ( _P._ 43). Because autonomy is manifest only in the obedience to reason, and because reason must guide action always through imperatives, autonomy is described as \"that property of the will whereby it is a law to itself\" ( _G._ 440). It is also \"the ground of the dignity of human nature and of every rational nature\" ( _G._ 436).\n\nMetaphysical Difficulties\n\nWe must now return to the metaphysical problem of transcendental freedom. Two difficulties in particular stand out, since they correspond to difficulties that Kant himself had discovered in the rationalist metaphysics of Leibniz. First, how is the transcendental self to be individuated? What makes _this_ self _me_? If the essential feature is reason and the agency that springs from it, then, since the laws of reason are universal, how am I to be distinguished from any other being who is subject to them? If the essential feature is my \"point of view\" on the world, how is Kant to avoid the Leibnizian view of the self as a monad, defined by its point of view, but existing outside the world that it \"represents\" thereby, incapable of entering into real relation with anything contained in it?\n\nSecond (or rather to continue the objection), how is the transcendental self related to the empirical world? In particular, how is it related to its own action, which is either an event in the empirical world or else totally ineffective? I must exist, as Kant acknowledges, both as an \"empirical self,\" within the realm of nature, and as a transcendental self, outside it. But, since the category of cause applies only to nature, the transcendental self remains forever ineffective. In which case, why is its freedom so valuable? Kant relies on the view that the category of cause denotes a relation in time (of before and after); whereas the relation of a reason to that which springs from it is not temporal at all ( _P._ 94\u201395). His tortuous discussion of this in the first _Critique_ (A. 538\u201341, B. 566\u201369) fails to make clear how a reason offered to the transcendental self can motivate (and so explain) an event in the empirical world.\n\nKant's preferred stance toward these difficulties is summarized in the assertion that the idea of ourselves as members of a purely \"intelligible\" realm to which categories do not apply \"remains always a useful and legitimate idea for the purpose of rational belief, although all knowledge stops at its threshold\" ( _G._ 462). At the same time, Kant continued to regard the paradox of human freedom as unavoidable: we could never solve it through theoretical reason, while practical reason assured us only that it _has_ a solution. However, we must acknowledge \"the right of pure reason in its practical use to an extension which is not possible in its speculative use\" ( _P._ 50). Hence we can accept the verdict of practical reason on trust. Of course, we can always raise the question of freedom anew: it then becomes \"How is practical reason possible?\" We know that it _is_ possible, for without it our perspective on the world would vanish. But \"how pure reason can be practical\u2014 to explain this is beyond the power of human reason\" ( _G._ 461).\n\nKant is able to derive, with compelling logic, an entire system of commonsense morality from the premise of transcendental freedom. Since the paradox of freedom remains unsolved at the end of this derivation, Kant may not be wholly wrong in his suggestion that we shall never be able to comprehend it.\n\nHypothetical and Categorical Imperatives\n\nThere is a division in practical thought between hypothetical and categorical imperatives. The first typically begin with an \"If . . . ,\" as in \"If you want to stay, be polite.\" Here the end is hypothetical, and the imperative states the means to it. The validity of all such imperatives can be established in accordance with the \"supreme principle\" that \"whoever wills the end, wills the means.\" This principle, Kant argues, is analytic (it derives its truth from concepts alone). But, although hypothetical imperatives may be valid, they can never be objective, since they are always _conditional_. They give a reason only to the person who has the end mentioned in the antecedent (in the example given above, the person who wants to stay), and are binding on no one else. This is true even of the \"counsels of prudence,\" which tell us what to do in order to be happy. For the concept of happiness refers to what we unavoidably desire, by virtue of our human nature; the hypothetical imperatives that refer us to our happiness apply universally, since human nature is the common condition of all rational agents; but they do not apply _necessarily_. \"What everyone already wants unavoidably, of his own accord, does not belong under the concept of _duty_ ; for duty is a _necessitation_ to an unwillingly adopted end\" ( _M._ 385). It seems then that all hypothetical imperatives remain subjective, conditional on the individual's desires, and none of them corresponds to a true \"command of reason.\"\n\nCategorical imperatives do not typically contain an \"if.\" They tell you what to do _unconditionally_. They may nevertheless be defended by reasons. If I say \"Shut the door!,\" then my command is arbitrary unless I can answer the question \"Why?\" If I answer it to your satisfaction, then the imperative binds you. If the answer refers to some independent interest of yours, however, the imperative also ceases to be categorical, as in \"If you want to avoid punishment, shut the door.\" Only if the answer represents the action _itself_ as an end do we have a nonarbitrary categorical imperative. The signal of this is the presence of an \"ought\": \"You ought to shut the door.\" In the categorical \"ought\" we have the true imperative of reason.\n\nIt is not implausible to follow Kant in aligning this familiar distinction between hypothetical and categorical imperatives with the distinction between reasoning over means and reasoning over ends. The problem of practical reason then becomes \"How are categorical imperatives possible?\" Furthermore, Kant argues, morality can be expressed only in categorical imperatives. \"If duty is a conception that is to have any import and real legislative authority for our actions, it can only be expressed in categorical imperatives and not at all in hypothetical imperatives\" ( _G._ 425). Obedience to a hypothetical imperative is always obedience to the condition expressed in its antecedent. It therefore always involves heteronomy of the will. Obedience to a categorical imperative, however, since it springs from reason alone, must always be autonomous. Thus, Kant also aligns the distinction between the two kinds of imperatives with that between heteronomy and autonomy, and thereby associates the problem of categorical imperatives with that of transcendental freedom: \"what makes categorical imperatives possible is this, that the idea of freedom makes me a member of an intelligible world\" ( _G._ 454).\n\nBut, if categorical imperatives are to be possible, they too require a supreme principle, which will show how reason discovers them. Hence, practical reason is faced with a problem as general as the problem of theoretical reason, and requiring the same kind of answer. We must show how synthetic a priori _practical_ knowledge is possible. The supreme principle of hypothetical imperatives is, as we have seen, analytic. Hence, hypothetical imperatives make no real demands on the agent, but simply relate his ends to the means needed to secure them. Categorical imperatives, however, make real and unconditional demands: they are, in that sense, synthetic. Moreover, since their foundation lies in reason alone, they must be based a priori. The very form of a categorical imperative prevents it from deriving authority from any other source\u2014for example, from a desire, need, or interest, or any other \"empirical condition\" of the agent. In particular, there is no way in which categorical imperatives can be deduced from \"the particular attributes of human nature\" ( _G._ 425). Thus, Kant rejects all the usual systems of ethics of his day, arguing that they are unable to explain the \"unconditional necessity\" that attaches to the moral law. This necessity is explained only by a theory with an a priori basis. Hence, all reference to empirical conditions\u2014even to the most established facts of human nature\u2014must be excluded from the grounds of morality ( _G._ 427).\n\nThe Categorical Imperative\n\nThe supreme principle of categorical imperatives is called _the_ categorical imperative, on the assumption that there is, or ought to be, only one such principle (perhaps to avoid the possibility of conflicting duties [ _L._ 20]). In fact, the principle is restated in five variant forms, two of which involve new conceptions. It is therefore normal to consider the categorical imperative as a composite law of reason, with at least three separate parts. The law is derived, in its first and most famous formulation, as follows.\n\nIf we are to find an imperative that recommends itself on the basis of reason alone, then we must abstract from all the distinctions between rational agents, discounting their interests, desires, and ambitions, and all the \"empirical conditions\" that circumscribe their actions. Only then will we base our law in practical reason alone, since we will have abstracted from any other ground. By this process of abstraction I arrive at the \"point of view of a member of an intelligible world\" ( _G._ 454). This is a point of view outside my own experience, which could therefore be adopted by any rational being, whatever his circumstances. The law that I formulate will then be an imperative that applies universally, to all rational beings. When deciding on my action as an end, I will be constrained by reason to \"act only on that maxim which I can at the same time will as a universal law\" (my paraphrase from _G._ 421). (The term _maxim_ means both \"principle\" and \"motive\": a categorical imperative always commands, and always lays down a law.) The principle is in one sense \"formal\": that is, it commands nothing specific. At the same time it is synthetic, since it legislates among all the possible ends of action, allowing some, and forbidding others. For example, it forbids the breaking of promises, for to will the universal breaking of promises is to will the abolition of promising, hence to will the abolition of the advantage that accrues to breaking promises, and so to will the abolition of my motive. Such forbidden ends of action are shown, by their confrontation with the supreme moral law, to involve the agent in a contradiction.\n\nKant regarded this first formulation of the categorical imperative as the philosophical basis of the famous golden rule, that we should do as we would be done by. It is a priori in that it is based in what can recommend itself to reason alone. This explains its right to a \"universal\" form, and to the kind of necessity embodied in the categorical \"ought.\"\n\nThe categorical imperative finds the ends of action by abstracting from everything but the fact of rational agency. Rational agency must therefore provide its own ends. The autonomous being is both the agent and the repository of all value, and exists, as Kant puts it, \"as an end in himself.\" If we are to have values at all, we must value (respect) the existence and endeavors of rational beings. In this way autonomy prescribes its own limit. The constraint on our freedom is that we must respect the freedom of all: how else can our freedom issue in _universal_ laws? It follows that we must never use another without regard to his autonomy; we must never treat him as a means. This brings us to the second major formulation of the categorical imperative, as the law that I must \"so act as to treat humanity, whether in my own self or in that of another, always as an end, and never as a means only\" (my paraphrase from _G._ 429). \"Humanity\" here covers all rational beings, and the distinction between those beings that can and those that cannot be regarded as mere means is what we are referring to in distinguishing _things_ from _persons_. This distinction is the foundation of the concept of a \"right.\" If someone asks whether an animal, a child, or an inanimate object has rights, he is asking whether the categorical imperative applies to it, in this second, most powerful, form.\n\nWe cannot, then, treat rational agents merely as the means through which external forces operate: to do so is to deny their autonomy and therefore to violate their claim to our respect. In abstracting toward the moral law, I am always deferring to the sovereignty of reason. So, while the form of my law is universal (the first imperative), its content must derive from its application to rational beings as ends in themselves (the second imperative). Hence I must always think of the moral law as a piece of universal legislation, which binds rational beings equally. I am thereby led to the idea of \"the will of every rational being as a universally legislative will\" ( _G._ 449). This conception in turn leads to another, that of a \"kingdom of ends,\" in which the universal legislation to which we all willingly bow when acting autonomously has become a law of nature. So \"every rational being must so act as if he were by his maxims in every case a legislating member of the universal kingdom of ends\" (my paraphrase from _G._ 433\u201335). This third imperative suggests that all speculation about ends is also the postulation of an ideal world, in which things are as they ought to be and ought to be as they are. In this kingdom nothing conflicts with reason, and the rational being is both subject and sovereign of the law that there obtains.\n\nMoral Intuitions\n\nKant believes that the various formulations of the categorical imperative can be derived by reflection on the single idea of autonomy, and that this alone is sufficient to recommend them to every rational being. He also thinks that they lend support to ordinary moral thought, just as the synthetic a priori principles of the understanding uphold our common scientific knowledge. It is a singular merit of Kant's moral system that it imposes order on an intuitive vision of morality. This vision is not the property of one person only, but (as Kant and many others have thought) of all people everywhere. Kant had been much influenced by the third Lord Shaftesbury (1671\u20131713) and his followers\u2014the so-called British Moralists\u2014who had argued that certain fundamental moral principles were not matters of individual preference, but rather, when reduced to their true basis in the human soul, universally acceptable, recording the unspoken agreement of rational beings everywhere. Kant accepted that view. But he attempted to free it from the study of \"the niggardly provision of our stepmother, nature\" ( _G._ 394). It was of the greatest importance to him, therefore, that his theory should generate the axioms of an intuitive morality. \"We have simply showed by the development of the universally received notion of morality that an autonomy of the will is inevitably connected with it\" ( _G._ 449). It is instructive to list some of the common intuitions that Kant's theory explains.\n\n(i) _The content of morality_. Common morality enjoins respect for others and for oneself; it forbids exceptions in one's own favor; it regards all people as equal before the moral law. These are immediate consequences of the categorical imperative. In its second formulation, moreover, the imperative lends support to quite specific, and universally accepted, laws. It forbids murder, rape, theft, fraud, and dishonesty, along with all forms of arbitrary compulsion. It imposes a universal duty to respect the rights and interests of others, and a rational requirement to abstract from personal involvement toward the viewpoint of the impartial judge. Thus it encapsulates fundamental intuitions about justice, together with a specific and intuitively acceptable moral code.\n\n**Kant was influenced by English philosopher** and politician Anthony Ashley-Cooper, third Earl of Shaftesbury, who, with the other British Moralists, argued that certain moral principles were universally acceptable, not matters of personal preference.\n\n**Justice** \"giving to each that which is owed to him.\" This allegorical engraving of Justice was made in the late nineteenth century for the U.S. Bureau of Engraving and Printing.\n\n(ii) _The force of morality_. In Kant's view, the motive of morality is quite different from that of interest or desire. It rules us absolutely and necessarily; we feel its power even when we are most defying it. It is not one consideration to be balanced against others, but rather a compelling dictate that can be ignored but never refuted. This accords, he thinks, with common intuition. If someone is told that he can satisfy the greatest of his lusts, only on condition that he will afterward be hanged, then he is sure to refuse the offer. But if he is told that he must betray his friend, bear false witness, kill an innocent, or else be hanged, then his interest in his own life counts for nothing in determining what he ought to do. He may bow to the threat; but only with a consciousness of doing wrong; and the moral law itself, unlike any motive of desire, propels him onward to destruction.\n\n(iii) _The good will_. In the moral judgment of action we refer the consequences produced to the agent who produced them. Unlike the intentional or the negligent, the unforeseeable and unintended are never blamed. Moral judgment is directed, not to the effects of an action, but to the good or bad intention that it shows. Hence, in Kant's famous words, \"nothing can possibly be conceived in the world, or even out of it, which can be called good without qualification, except a good will\" ( _G._ 393). Kant's theory accords exactly with this common intuition. All virtue is contained in autonomy, all vice in its absence, and all morality is summarized in the imperatives that guide the will.\n\n(iv) _The moral agent_. Underlying intuitive morality is a view of the moral agent. Moral agents are differently motivated and differently constituted from agencies that occur in nature. Their actions have not only causes, but also reasons. They make decisions for the future, and so distinguish their intentions from their desires. They do not suffer their desires always to overcome them, but sometimes resist and subdue them. In everything they are both active and passive, and stand as legislators among their own emotions. The moral agent is an object not only of affection and love (which we may extend to all of nature) but also of esteem, and commands our esteem to the extent that the moral law is manifest in him. In all these intuitive distinctions\u2014between reason and cause, intention and desire, action and passion, esteem and affection\u2014 we find aspects of the vital distinction that underlies them, that between person and thing. Only a person has rights, duties, and obligations; only a person acts for reasons in addition to causes; only a person merits our esteem. The philosophy of the categorical imperative explains this distinction and all those that reflect it. It also explains why the \"respect for persons\" lies embedded in every moral code.\n\n(v) _The role of law_. Someone may act as the good person acts, but this fact cast no credit on him, since his motive is self-interest. The person who helps another in distress only when he sees some advantage to himself in doing so is not acting out of duty, even if he is doing what duty commands. Hence we must distinguish action _according to_ duty from action _from_ duty, and confine our praise to the second. \"The former ( _legality_ ) is possible even if inclinations alone have been the determining principles of the will; but the latter ( _morality_ ) has moral value, which can be placed only in this: that the action is done out of duty\" ( _P._ 81). This is a clear and intuitively acceptable consequence of Kant's theory. So too is the more theoretical proposition, that the fundamental concept in moral thought is not goodness, but obligation ( _P._ 60\u201365).\n\n(vi) _Reason and the passions_. We recognize in all our moral efforts that there may be a conflict between duty and desire. There thus arises, in every moral being, the idea of conscience as an independent motive, able to legislate among desires and so to forbid or permit them. Kant distinguishes the \"good will\" of the moral agent from the \"holy will\" that acts always without resistance from desire. The \"holy will\" needs no imperative ( _P._ 32), since it bends automatically in the direction of duty, whereas the ordinary agent stands always in need of principles, since his inclination is to thwart them. This sense of the conflict between reason and the passions is a widespread intuition. Kant takes it, however, to somewhat counterintuitive extremes. He believes that the motive of benevolence, so dear to empiricist morality, is a species of mere inclination, and therefore morally neutral. \"It is a very beautiful thing to do good to men from love to them and from sympathetic benevolence, or to be just from love of order, but this is not yet the true moral maxim\" ( _P._ 82). Kant seems to have more praise for the misanthropy that does good against every inclination, than for the expressions of cheerful benevolence. It is in his ability to _resist_ inclination that the worth of the moral agent resides. When, for example, someone who desires death goes on living out of a duty of self-preservation, only then, and for the first time, does self-preservation, in ceasing to be an instinct, become a sign of moral worth.\n\n(vii) _Intention and desire_. Kant's moral philosophy also helps us to understand our peculiar predicament in another way, by highlighting the fact that we, as moral agents, can intend what we do not desire, and desire what we do not intend. This distinction between intention and desire has no place in animal behavior: we explain what animals do in terms of what they want, with no remainder. But human motivation lies across a metaphysical divide\u2014the very same divide between freedom and nature, reason and cause, subject and object, person and thing, which Kant tried to expound, explain, and justify in terms of his transcendental philosophy. Through reasoning we make up our mind to act; and having done so we _intend_ what we have also decided, regardless of whether we want it. This extraordinary feature of the human condition invites an explanation: and Kant is one of the few philosophers to have provided one.\n\nMorality and the Self\n\nThose intuitions already lead us, Kant thinks, toward the idea of a transcendental freedom. If that idea is nonsense, then so is all our moral and practical thought. For, if we examine the intuitions systematically, we see that they distinguish the moral agent from his desires, and the free, reason-governed, autonomous nature of the person, from the unfree, passive (or, in Kant's term, \"pathological\") nature of the animal. Surely, then, we must face up to the paradox of freedom. For we do think of ourselves both as empirical beings, bound by the laws of causality, and as transcendental beings, obedient to imperatives of reason alone.\n\nWe must remind ourselves again of the methodological character of the \"transcendental object.\" This phrase designates, not an object of knowledge, but a limit to knowledge, defined by the perspective of practical reason. I am constrained by reason to view the world as a \"field of action,\" and hence to postulate the freedom of my will. Only from that postulate can I deliberate at all. From this perspective of practical reason I arrive inexorably at the categorical imperatives that compel my action. In one interpretation, the theory of the self and its agency is not a theory of how things _are_ in a transcendental world, but of how things _seem_ in the empirical world. \"The conception of an intelligible world is then only a _point of view_ which reason finds itself compelled to take outside appearances, _in order to conceive itself as_ _practical_ \" ( _G._ 458). The rational agent requires, then, a special perspective on the world: he sees his actions under the aspect of freedom, and, while what he sees is the same as what he sees when studying the world scientifically, his practical knowledge cannot be expressed in scientific terms. He seeks not causes but reasons, not mechanisms but rational ends, not descriptive laws but imperatives. Thus Kant answers in the affirmative the question posed in the first _Critique_ : \"is it possible to regard one and the same event as being in one aspect merely an effect of nature and in another aspect due to freedom?\" (A. 543, B. 571). But the answer, referring as it does to a transcendental perspective, is such that we can comprehend only its incomprehensibility ( _G._ 463).\n\nThe Objectivity of Morals\n\nIf my freedom and the laws that guide it are constituted by a particular way things seem, how can I consider the commands of morality to be objectively valid? Reason alone, Kant argues, compels me to accept the categorical imperative; hence it has \"objective necessity.\" It does not matter that this compulsion issues from a point of view. For the same is true of the compulsion to accept the a priori laws of science. If reason is both a motive to action, and also impelled by its nature toward definite precepts, what more can be demanded by way of objectivity? When someone asks \"Why should I be moral?,\" he is asking for a reason. An answer that refers to his interests binds him only \"conditionally\": if his interests change, then the answer loses its force. But the perspective of practical reason is able to rise above all \"conditions,\" and this is part of what is implied in its \"transcendental\" nature. It generates imperatives that bind unconditionally. In which case it answers the question \"Why be moral?\" for all rational agents, irrespective of their desires. The person with evil desires can no more escape the force of reason's answer than the person who desires what is right.\n\nSo conceived, the task of proving the objectivity of morality is less great than that of proving the objectivity of science, despite popular prejudice to the contrary. For the faculty of the understanding requires two \"deductions,\" one to show what we must believe, the other to show what is true. Practical reason, which makes no claims to truth, does not stand in need of this second, \"objective,\" deduction. It is enough that reason compels us to think according to the categorical imperative. There is nothing further to be proved about an independent world. If sometimes we speak of moral truth, and moral reality, this is but another way of referring to the constraints that reason places on our conduct.\n\nThe Moral Life\n\nThe moral nature of rational beings resides in their ability to impregnate all their judgments, motives, and affections with the universal demands of practical reason. Even in our most private and intimate encounters, reason covertly abstracts from the immediate circumstances and reminds us of the moral law. Those philosophers\u2014such as Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, and Hume\u2014who had stressed the importance to morality of the emotions were not wrong, except in their faulty concept of emotion. The moral life involves the exercise of anger, remorse, indignation, pride, esteem, and respect. And these are all emotions, since they are not subject to the will. But at the heart of such emotions is a respect for the moral law, and an abstraction from present and immediate conditions. It is this that justifies their place in the moral life of rational beings. \" _Respect_ is a _tribute_ which we cannot refuse to merit, whether we will or not; we may indeed outwardly withhold it, but we cannot help feeling it inwardly\" ( _P._ 77). Kant's discussion of pride and self-respect ( _L._ 120\u201327) is remarkably acute. By emphasizing the element of reason that lies embedded in human emotion, he is able to rebut the charge that \"moral feeling\" plays no part in the motivation of the rational person ( _L._ 139). But any theory that pays attention to the complexity of moral feeling must emphasize the imperative that lies at its heart.\n\nThe process of abstraction leads us, Kant thought, in a metaphysical direction. The moral life imposes an intimation of transcendental reality; we feel compelled toward the belief in God, in immortality, and in a divine ordinance in nature. These \"postulates of practical reason\" are as ineluctable a product of moral thought as the imperative that guides us. Pure reason falls over itself in the attempt to prove the existence of God and the immortality of the soul. But, \"from the practical point of view the _possibility_ [of these doctrines] must be assumed, although we cannot theoretically know and understand it\" ( _P._ 4). This obscure concession to the claims of theology is hard to accept. But some light is cast on Kant's intention by the third of his _Critiques_ , to the examination of which we now must turn.\n\n**Kant suggested that only in the** aesthetic experience of nature could people grasp the relation of their faculties to the world\u2014insight granted through natural beauty. _Chalk Cliffs on R\u00fcgen_ (1818), by German Romantic landscape painter Caspar David Friedrich (1774\u20131840), was inspired by Kant.\n[SIX\n\nBeauty and Design ](Roge_9781402782107_epub_c7_r1.html#d6e6)\n\nIT IS NOT GOD'S COMMAND that binds us to morality, but morality that points to the possibility of a \"holy will.\" Kant warns against the \"fanaticism, indeed the impiety, of abandoning the guidance of a morally legislative reason in the right conduct of our lives, in order to derive guidance directly from the idea of the Supreme Being\" (A. 819, B. 847). Kant's writings on religion exhibit one of the first attempts at the systematic demystification of theology. He criticizes all forms of anthropomorphism, and expounds, in his _Religion Within the Limits_ _of Reason Alone_ (1793), a \"hermeneutical rule\" of \"moral interpretation.\" All scripture and religious doctrine that conflict with reason must be interpreted allegorically, so as to express moral insights that gain vivacity, rather than validity, from their religious expression. The attempt to make the idea of God intelligible through images, and so to subsume God under the categories of the empirical world, is self-contradictory. If God is a transcendental being, then there is nothing to be said of him from our point of view except that he transcends it. If he is not a transcendental being, then he no more deserves our respect than any other work of nature. Under the first interpretation we can respect him only because we respect the moral law that points toward his existence. In the second interpretation, we could respect him only as a subject of the moral law that governs his activity.\n\nKant's demythologized religion was not uncommon among his contemporaries. He differed, however, in appropriating the images of traditional religion for the veneration of morality. The worship due to God becomes reverence and devotion for the moral law. The faith that transcends belief becomes the certainty of practical reason that surpasses understanding. The object of esteem is not the Supreme Being, but the supreme attribute of rationality. The moral world is described as the \"realm of grace\" (A. 815, B. 844), the actual community of rational beings as the \"mystical body\" in the world of nature (A. 808, B. 836), and the Kingdom of God to which mortals aspire is transmuted into the Kingdom of Ends that they make real through their self-legislation. It is not surprising to learn from one of Jachmann's letters that \"many evangelists went forth [from Kant's lectures on theology] and preached the gospel of the Kingdom of Reason.\"\n\nNevertheless, Kant accepted the traditional claims of theology, and even tried to resuscitate them under the obscure doctrine of the \"postulates of practical reason.\" Moreover, he felt that one of the traditional arguments for God's existence, the argument from design, contains a vital clue to the nature of creation. It is in the third _Critique_ , at the end of an account of aesthetic experience, that Kant attempts to reveal his meaning.\n\nThe Third Critique\n\nThe _Critique of Judgment_ is a disorganized and repetitious work, which gains little from Kant's struggle to impose on its somewhat diffuse subject matter the structure of the transcendental philosophy. A contemporary who attended Kant's lectures on aesthetics recorded that \"the principal thoughts of his _Critique of Judgment_ [were] given as easily, clearly, and entertainingly as can be imagined.\" Kant was seventy-one when he came to write the work, however, and there seems little doubt that his mastery of argument and of the written word was beginning to desert him. Nevertheless, the third _Critique_ is one of the most important works of aesthetics to have been composed in modern times; indeed, it could fairly be said that, were it not for this work, aesthetics would not exist in its modern form. Kant's most feeble arguments were here used to present some of his most original conclusions.\n\nKant felt the need to explore in the _Critique of Judgment_ certain questions left over from the first two _Critiques_. Moreover, he wished to provide for aesthetics its own \"faculty,\" corresponding to understanding and practical reason. The faculty of judgment \"mediates\" between the other two. It enables us to see the empirical world as conforming to the ends of practical reason, and practical reason as adapted to our knowledge of the empirical world. Kant believed that \"judgment\" has both a subjective and an objective aspect, and divided his _Critique_ accordingly. The first part, concerned with the subjective experience of \"purposiveness\" or \"finality,\" is devoted to aesthetic judgment. The second, concerned with the objective \"finality\" of nature, is devoted to the natural manifestation of design. I shall concentrate on the first, which ties up the loose ends of the critical system.\n\nThe eighteenth century saw the birth of modern aesthetics. Shaftesbury and his followers made penetrating observations on the experience of beauty; Burke presented his famous distinction between the beautiful and the sublime; Batteux in France and Lessing and Winckelmann in Germany attempted to provide universal principles for the classification and judgment of works of art. The Leibnizians also made their contribution, and the modern use of the term _aesthetic_ is due to Kant's mentor A. G. Baumgarten. Nevertheless, no philosopher since Plato had given to aesthetic experience the central role in philosophy that Kant was to give to it. Nor had Kant's predecessors perceived, as he perceived, that both metaphysics and ethics must remain incomplete without a theory of the aesthetic. Only a rational being can experience beauty; and, without the experience of beauty, the exercise of reason is incomplete. It is only in the aesthetic experience of nature, Kant suggests, that we grasp the relation of our faculties to the world, and so understand both our own limitations, and the possibility of transcending them. Aesthetic experience intimates to us that our point of view is, after all, only _our_ point of view, and that we are no more creators of nature than we are creators of the point of view from which we observe and act on it. Momentarily we stand outside that point of view, not so as to have knowledge of a transcendent world, but so as to perceive the harmony that exists between our faculties and the objects in relation to which they are employed. At the same time we sense the divine order that makes this harmony possible.\n\nThe Problem of Beauty\n\nKant's aesthetics is based on a fundamental problem, which he expresses in many different forms, eventually giving to it the structure of an \"antinomy.\" According to the \"antinomy of taste,\" aesthetic judgment seems to be in conflict with itself: it cannot be at the same time aesthetic (an expression of subjective experience) and also a judgment (claiming universal assent). And yet all rational beings, simply in virtue of their rationality, seem disposed to make these judgments. On the one hand, they feel pleasure in an object, and this pleasure is immediate, not based in any conceptualization of the object, or in any inquiry into cause, purpose, or constitution. On the other hand, they express their pleasure in the form of a judgment, speaking \"as if beauty were a quality [ _Beschaffenheit_ ] of the object\" ( _J._ 211), thus representing their pleasure as objectively valid. But how can this be so? The pleasure is immediate, based in no reasoning or analysis; so what permits this demand for universal agreement?\n\nHowever we approach the idea of beauty, we find this paradox emerging. Our attitudes, feelings, and judgments are called aesthetic precisely because of their direct relation to experience. Hence no one can judge the beauty of an object that he has never heard or seen. Scientific judgments, like practical principles, can be received \"at second hand.\" I can take you as my authority for the truths of physics, or for the utility of trains. But I cannot take you as my authority for the merits of Leonardo, or for the beauties of Mozart, if I have seen no work by the one or heard none by the other. It would seem to follow from this that there can be no rules or principles of aesthetic judgment. \"A principle of taste would mean a fundamental premise under the condition of which one might subsume the concept of an object, and then, by a syllogism, draw the inference that it is beautiful. That, however, is absolutely impossible. For I must feel the pleasure immediately in the perception of the object, and I cannot be talked into it by any grounds of proof\" ( _J._ 285). It seems that it is always experience, and never conceptual thought, that gives the right to aesthetic judgment, so that anything that alters the experience of an object alters its aesthetic significance (which is why poetry cannot be translated). As Kant puts it, aesthetic judgment is \"free from concepts,\" and beauty itself is not a concept. Hence we arrive at the first proposition of the antinomy of taste: \"The judgement of taste is not based on concepts; for, if it were, it would be open to dispute (decision by means of proofs)\" ( _J._ 338).\n\nHowever, such a conclusion seems to be inconsistent with the fact that aesthetic judgment is a form of _judgment_. When I describe something as beautiful, I do not mean merely that it pleases _me_ : I am speaking about _it_ , not about myself, and, if challenged, I try to find reasons for my view. I do not _explain_ my feeling, but give _grounds_ for it, by pointing to features of its object. And any search for reasons has the universal character of rationality. I am in effect saying that others, insofar as they are rational, ought to feel just the same delight as I feel. This points to the second proposition of Kant's antinomy: \"the judgement of taste is based on concepts; for otherwise . . . there could be no room even for contention in the matter, or for the claim to the necessary agreement of others\" ( _J._ 338\u201339).\n\nThe Synthetic a Priori Grounds of Taste\n\nKant says that the judgment of beauty is grounded not in concepts but in a feeling of pleasure; at the same time this pleasure is postulated as universally valid, and even \"necessary.\" The aesthetic judgment contains an \"ought\": others ought to feel as I do, and, to the extent that they do not, either they or I am wrong. It is this that leads us to seek reasons for our judgments. The terms \"universality\" and \"necessity\" refer us to the defining properties of the a priori. It is clear that the postulate that others ought to feel as I do is not derived from experience: it is, on the contrary, a presupposition of aesthetic pleasure. Nor is it analytic. Hence its status must be synthetic a priori.\n\nThe argument is very slippery. The \"necessity\" of the judgment of taste has little to do with the necessity of the a priori laws of the understanding, nor does its universality issue in a definite principle. Kant sometimes recognizes this, and speaks of aesthetic _pleasure_ rather than aesthetic judgment as universally valid, and so a priori ( _J._ 289). Nevertheless, he was convinced that aesthetics raises precisely the same problem as all philosophy. \"The problem of the critique of judgement . . . is part of the general problem of transcendental philosophy: How are synthetic a priori judgements possible?\" ( _J._ 289).\n\nKant offers a \"transcendental deduction\" in answer. It is only fifteen lines long, and wholly inadequate. He lamely says: \"what makes this deduction so easy is that it is spared the necessity of having to justify the objective reality [= application] of a concept\" ( _J._ 290). In fact, however, he argues independently for an a priori component in the judgment of taste, and for the legitimacy of its \"universal\" postulate.\n\nObjectivity and Contemplation\n\nKant's concern is, as always, with objectivity. Aesthetic judgments claim validity. In what way can this claim be upheld? While the objectivity of theoretical judgments required a proof that the world is as the understanding represents it to be, no such proof was necessary for practical reason. It was enough to show that reason constrained each agent toward a set of basic principles. In aesthetic judgment the requirement is weaker still. We are not asked to establish principles that will compel the agreement of every rational being. It is sufficient to show how the thought of universal validity is possible. In aesthetic judgment we are only \"suitors for agreement\" ( _J._ 237). It is not that there are valid rules of taste, but rather that we must _think_ of our pleasure as made valid by its object. People may doubt that aesthetic judgment contains even a _claim_ to objectivity. But that is usually because they fail to consider the aesthetic judgments that really matter to them. When a beloved landscape is vandalized or a beautiful old town laid waste, people feel affronted, wounded, and indignant. They agitate for laws that will prevent such things, form committees to protect what they love, and campaign with all their energies to deter the spoilers. If this does not suggest a claim to objective validity, it is hard to know what does.\n\nKant distinguishes sensory from contemplative pleasures. The pleasure in the beautiful, although it is \"immediate\" (arising from no conceptual thought), nevertheless involves a reflective contemplation of its object. The pure judgment of taste \"combines delight or aversion immediately with the bare contemplation of the object . . .\" ( _J._ 242). Aesthetic pleasure must therefore be distinguished from the purely sensuous pleasures of food and drink. It can be obtained only through those senses that also permit contemplation (which is to say, through sight and hearing).\n\nThis act of contemplation involves attending to the object not as an instance of a universal (or concept), but as the particular thing that it is. The individual object is isolated in aesthetic judgment and considered \"for its own sake.\" But contemplation does not rest with this act of isolation. It embarks on a process of abstraction that exactly parallels the process whereby practical reason arrives at the categorical imperative. Aesthetic judgment abstracts from every \"interest\" of the observer, who does not regard the object as a means to his ends, but as an end in itself (although not a moral end). The observer's desires, aims, and ambitions are held in abeyance in the act of contemplation, and the object regarded \"apart from any interest\" ( _J._ 211). This act of abstraction is conducted while focusing on the individual object in a \"singular [ _einzelne_ ] judgement\" ( _J._ 215). Hence, unlike the abstraction that generates the categorical imperative, it leads to no universal rule. Nevertheless, it underlies the \"universality\" of the subsequent judgment. It is this that enables me to \"play the part of judge in matters of taste\" ( _J._ 205). Having abstracted from all my interests and desires, I have, in effect, removed from my judgment all reference to the \"empirical conditions\" that distinguish me, and referred my experience to reason alone, just as I refer the ends of action when acting morally. \"Since the delight is not based on any inclination of the subject (or on any other deliberate interest) . . . he can find as reason for his delight, no personal conditions to which his own subjective self might alone be party\" ( _J._ 212). In which case, it seems, the subject of aesthetic judgment must feel compelled, and also entitled, to legislate his pleasure for all rational beings.\n\nDisinterest is the sign of an \"interest of reason,\" and occurs whenever rational agents set aside their own desires and strive to look on the world as God might look on it, with a view to judgment. This we do when deciding what is right, when presiding in a court of law, when assessing a proof, and\u2014strange though it may seem\u2014when contemplating the world of appearances. Disinterested contemplation is a recognition that the object matters\u2014matters so much that our interests have no bearing on our judgment. If you find this thought both strange and persuasive, then you will also recognize the genius of Kant, in making it the central premise of his aesthetics.\n\nImagination and Freedom\n\nWhat aspect of rationality is involved in aesthetic contemplation? In the \"subjective deduction\" of the first _Critique_ (see above, p. 39), Kant had argued for the central role of imagination in the \"synthesis\" of concept and intuition. Imagination transforms intuition into datum; we exercise imagination whenever we attribute to our experience a \"content\" that represents the world. When I see the man outside my window, the concept \"man\" is present in my perception. This work of impregnating experience with concepts is the work of imagination.\n\nKant thought that imagination could also be \"freed from\" concepts (that is, from the rules of the understanding). It is this \"free play\" of the imagination that characterizes aesthetic judgment. In the free play of imagination, concepts are either wholly indeterminate, or if determinate not applied. An example of the first is the imaginative \"synthesis\" involved in seeing a set of marks as a pattern. Here there is no determinate concept. There is nothing to a pattern except an experienced order, and no concept applied in the experience apart from that indeterminate idea. An example of the second is the \"synthesis\" involved in seeing a face in a picture. Here the concept \"face\" enters the imaginative synthesis, but it is not applied to the object. I do not judge that this, before me, is a face, but only that I have imaginative permission, as it were, so to see it. The second kind of \"free play\" is at the root of our understanding of artistic representation. Kant was more interested in the first kind, and this led him to a formalistic conception of the beautiful in art.\n\nThe free play of the imagination enables me to bring concepts to bear on an experience that is, in itself, \"free from concepts.\" Hence, even though there are no rules of taste, I can still give grounds for my aesthetic judgment. I can give reasons for my pleasure, while focusing on the \"singularity\" that is its cause.\n\nHarmony and Common Sense\n\nKant valued art less than nature, and music least among the arts, \"since it plays merely with sensations\" ( _J._ 329). Nevertheless, the example of music provides a good illustration of Kant's theory. When I hear music, I hear a certain organization. Something begins, develops, and maintains a unity among its parts. This unity is not indeed _there_ in the notes before me. It is a product of my perception. I hear it only because my imagination, in its \"free play,\" brings my perception under the indeterminate idea of unity. Only beings with imagination (a faculty of reason) can hear musical unity, since only they can carry out this indeterminate synthesis. So the unity is a perception of mine. But this perception is not arbitrary, since it is compelled by my rational nature. I perceive the organization in my experience as objective. The experience of unity brings pleasure, and this too belongs to the exercise of reason. I suppose the pleasure, like the melody, to be the property of all who are constituted like me. So I represent my pleasure in the music as due to the workings of a \"common sense\" ( _J._ 295), which is to say, a disposition that is at once based in experience, and common to all rational beings.\n\nBut how is it that the experience of unity is mixed with pleasure? When I hear the formal unity of music, the ground of my experience consists in a kind of compatibility between what I hear and the faculty of imagination through which it is organized. Although the unity has its origin in me, it is attributed to an independent object. In experiencing the unity I also sense a harmony between my rational faculties and the object (the sounds) to which they are applied. This sense of harmony between myself and the world is both the origin of my pleasure and also the ground of its universality.\n\nOne who feels pleasure in simple reflection on the form of an object, without having any concept in mind, rightly lays claim to the agreement of everyone, although this judgement is empirical and a singular judgement. For the ground of this pleasure is found in the universal, though subjective, condition of reflective judgements, namely the final harmony of an object . . . with the mutual relation of the faculties of cognition (imagination and understanding), which are requisite for every empirical cognition. ( _J._ 191)\n\nForm and Purposiveness\n\nIt seems, then, that our pleasure in beauty has its origin in a capacity, due to the free play of imagination, first to experience the harmonious working of our own rational faculties, and second to project that harmony outward on to the empirical world. We see in objects the formal unity that we discover in ourselves. This is the origin of our pleasure, and the basis of our \"common sense\" of beauty. And it is \"only under the presupposition . . . of such a common sense that we are able to lay down a judgement of taste\" ( _J._ 238).\n\nKant distinguishes \"free\" from \"dependent\" beauty, the first being perceived wholly without the aid of conceptual thought, the second requiring prior conceptualization of the object. When I perceive a representational picture, or a building, I can have no impression of beauty until I have first brought the object under concepts, referring in one case to the content expressed, in the other to the function performed ( _J._ 230). The judgment of such \"dependent\" beauty is less pure than the judgment of \"free\" beauty, and would become pure only for the person who had no conception of the meaning or function of what he saw ( _J._ 231). The purest examples of beauty are therefore \"free.\" Only in the contemplation of such examples are our faculties able to relax entirely from the burdens of common scientific and practical thought, and enter into the free play that is the ground of aesthetic pleasure. Examples of this free beauty abound in nature, but not in art.\n\nThe unity that we perceive in the free beauties of nature comes to us purified of all interests: it is a unity that makes reference to no definite purpose. But it reflects back to us an order that has its origin in ourselves, as purposive beings. Hence it bears the indeterminate marks of purpose. As Kant put it, aesthetic unity displays \"purposiveness without purpose.\" Aesthetic experience, which leads us to see each object as an end in itself, also leads us to a sense of the purposiveness of nature.\n\nThe perception of \"purposiveness,\" like the regulative ideas of reason (see above, p. 73), is not a perception of what is, but a perception \"as if.\" However, it is an inescapable \"as if \": we _must_ see the world in this way if we are to find our proper place in it, both as knowing and as acting creatures. Aesthetic judgment, which delivers to us the pure experience of design in nature, frees us both for theoretical insight and for the endeavors of the moral life. It also permits the transition from the theoretical to the practical: finding design in nature, we recognize that our own ends might be realized there ( _J._ 196). Moreover, and again like the ideas of reason, the concept of purposiveness is \"supersensible\": it is the idea of a transcendental design, the purpose of which we cannot know.\n\nAesthetic experience is the vehicle of many such \"aesthetic ideas.\" These are ideas of reason that transcend the limits of possible experience, while trying to represent, in \"sensible\" form, the inexpressible character of the world beyond ( _J._ 313\u201314). There is no true beauty without aesthetic ideas; they are presented to us both by art and by nature. The aesthetic idea imprints on our senses an intimation of a transcendental realm. The poet, even if he deals with empirical phenomena, \"tries by means of the imagination . . . to go beyond the limits of experience and to present [these things] to sense with a completeness of which there is no example in nature\" ( _J._ 314). This is how Kant explains the effect of aesthetic condensation. For example, when Milton expresses the vengeful feelings of Satan, his smoldering words transport us. We feel that we are listening not to this or that, as one might say, \"contingent\" emotion, but to the very essence of revenge. We seem to transcend the limitations contained in every natural example and to be made aware of something indescribable that they palely reflect. When Wagner expresses through the music of _Tristan_ the unassuageable longing of erotic love, it is again as though we had risen above our own circumscribed passions and glimpsed a completion to which they aspire. No concept can allow us to rise so far: yet the aesthetic _experience_ , which involves a perpetual striving to pass beyond the limits of our point of view, seems to \"embody\" what cannot be thought.\n\nTeleology and the Divine\n\nKant attempts, then, to move from his philosophy of beauty to an account of our relation to the world that will be free of that limitation to our own perspective that he had argued, in the first _Critique_ , to be a necessary condition of self-consciousness. In aesthetic experience we view ourselves in relation to a supersensible (that is, transcendental) reality that lies beyond the reach of thought. We become aware of our own limitations, of the grandeur of the world, and of the inexpressible good order that permits us to know and act on it. Kant has recourse to Burke's distinction between the beautiful and the sublime. Sometimes, when we sense the harmony between nature and our faculties, we are impressed by the purposiveness and intelligibility of everything that surrounds us. This is the sentiment of beauty. At other times, overcome by the infinite greatness of the world, we renounce the attempt to understand and control it. This is the sentiment of the sublime. In confronting the sublime, the mind is \"incited to abandon sensibility\" ( _J._ 246).\n\nKant's remarks about the sublime are obscure, but they reinforce the interpretation of his aesthetics as a kind of \"premonition\" of theology. He defines the sublime as \"that, the mere capacity of thinking which, evidences a faculty of mind transcending every standard of taste\" ( _J._ 250). It is the judgment of the sublime that most engages our moral nature. It thereby points to yet another justification of the \"universality\" of taste, by showing that, in demanding agreement, we are asking for complicity in a moral sentiment ( _J._ 265). In judging of the sublime, we demand a universal recognition of the immanence of a supersensible realm. A person who can feel neither the solemnity nor the awesomeness of nature lacks in our eyes the necessary sense of his own limitations. He has not taken that \"transcendental\" viewpoint on himself from which all true morality springs.\n\n**Kant draws on Anglo-Irish philosopher** and statesman Edmund Burke's (1729\u201397) concepts of the sublime and the beautiful in his discussion of aesthetic experience. Burke is shown here in a 1770 engraving by James Watson after a portrait by Sir Joshua Reynolds.\n\nIt is from the presentiment of the sublime that Kant seems to extract his faith in a Supreme Being. The second part of the _Critique of Judgment_ is devoted to \"teleology\": the understanding of the ends of things. Here Kant expresses, in a manner that has proved unsatisfactory to many commentators, his ultimate sympathy for the standpoint of theology. Our sentiments of the sublime and of the beautiful combine to present an inescapable picture of nature as created. In beauty we discover the purposiveness of nature; in the sublime we have intimations of its transcendent origins. In neither case can we translate our sentiments into a reasoned argument: all we know is that we know nothing of the transcendental. But that is not all we _feel_. The argument from design is not a theoretical proof, but a moral intimation, made vivid to us by our sentiments toward nature, and realized in our rational acts. It is realized, in the sense that the true end of creation is intimated through our moral actions: but this intimation is of an ideal, not of an actual, world. So we prove the divine teleology in all our moral actions, without being able to show that this teleology is true of the world in which we act. The final end of nature is known to us, not theoretically, but practically. It lies in reverence for the pure practical reason that \"legislates for itself alone.\" When we relate this reverence to our experience of the sublime, we have a sense, however fleeting, of the transcendental ( _T_. 446).\n\nThus it is that aesthetic judgment directs us toward the apprehension of a transcendent world, while practical reason gives content to that apprehension, and affirms that this intimation of a perspectiveless vision of things is indeed an intimation of God. This is what Kant tries to convey both in the doctrine of the aesthetic ideas and in that of the sublime. In each case we are confronted with an \"employment of the imagination in the interests of mind's supersensible province\" and a compulsion to \"think nature itself in its totality as a presentation of something supersensible, without our being able to put this presentation forward as objective\" ( _J._ 268). The supersensible is the transcendental. It cannot be thought through concepts, and the attempt to think it through \"ideas\" is fraught with self-contradiction. Yet the ideas of reason\u2014God, freedom, immortality\u2014are resurgent in our consciousness, now under the guise of imperatives of action, now transformed by imagination into sensuous and aesthetic form. We cannot rid ourselves of these ideas. To do so would be to say that our point of view on the world is all that the world consists in, and so to make ourselves into gods. Practical reason and aesthetic experience humble us. They remind us that the world in its totality, conceived from no finite perspective, is not ours to know. This humility of reason is also the true object of esteem. Only this is to be reverenced in the rational being, that he feels and acts as a member of a transcendental realm, while recognizing that he can know only the world of nature. Aesthetic experience and practical reason are two aspects of the moral: and it is through morality that we sense both the transcendence and the immanence of God.\n\n**An allegorical representation** of the _D\u00e9claration des Droits de L'homme et du Citoyen_ (Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen), a symbol of the French Revolution. Although Kant did not support the Revolution, he harbored republican sympathies and shared the Enlightenment vision of many of his contemporaries.\n[SEVEN\n\nEnlightenment and Law ](Roge_9781402782107_epub_c7_r1.html#d6e7)\n\nTHE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY EXAMINES the structure of thought, and tells us what can and cannot be proved by it. It stands in judgment over all philosophies, and its theorems are not ordinary proofs, but proofs about the provable. In short, it is a metaphilosophy, a philosophy about philosophy. It foreshadows the metalogic and metamathematics that, in the hands of Tarski and G\u00f6del, have altered our conception of mathematical reasoning, and undermined some of the criticisms made of Kant's view of mathematics, as a body of synthetic a priori truth.\n\nThis does not mean that Kant's philosophy was without results, or unable to challenge prevailing orthodoxy. On the contrary, in the practical sphere, Kant believed, the critical method made direct contact with moral judgment, and delivered conclusions that must be accepted, even if people should have an interest in denying them. Morality is the core of practical reasoning; but it is not the whole of it, and in his last years Kant turned his attention to politics, hoping by the use of the critical method to settle some of the vexing questions of legitimacy and right.\n\nOf ever-increasing importance to Kant's contemporaries, and also to Kant himself, was the vision of human society and institutions that had been put forward by Rousseau, and that made the self-legislation of the free individual into the foundation of legitimate political order. This vision encouraged an increasing skepticism toward authority; it gave precedence to the individual conscience over the dictates of church and state; and it fed the belief in progress, as the natural condition of humanity when freed from superstitious obedience. Kant's moral philosophy, which derived a complete system of duty from the idea of self-legislation, gave the ultimate philosophical endorsement to the new vision of politics, and the Enlightenment ( _Aufkl\u00e4rung_ ), as it was to be known, is indelibly associated with Kant, as its most explicit and articulate exponent. Indeed, it was Kant who first ventured to define Enlightenment, as \"the liberation of man from his self-imposed minority,\" adding that this minority lies \"not in lack of understanding, but in a lack of determination and courage to use it without the assistance of another\" ( _What Is Enlightenment?_ , R. 54).\n\nKant's republican sympathies were well known in his day, though he was an articulate opponent of revolution, seeing it as a return to the state of nature\u2014a return that could never be rationally justified, since it rendered the rule of reason impossible. The violence of the French Revolution confirmed Kant's suspicion of the revolutionary project; but it did not diminish his admiration for Rousseau, or his commitment to the Enlightenment vision that he shared with so many of the revolutionaries.\n\n**Kant's admiration for Rousseau** did not diminish despite his opposition to the French Revolution. In this engraving, which appeared over the caption \" _C'est ainsi qu'on se venge des traitres_ \" (Thus we will avenge the traitors), French revolutionaries carry the heads of the Marquis de Launay, a governor of the Bastille, and public servant Jacques de Flesselles on pikes after the storming of the Bastille.\nThe Unwritten Critique\n\nKant's writings on politics belong to the last decade of his active life. The most important of them is generally known in English as the _Metaphysical_ _Elements of Justice_ , which forms the first part of _The Metaphysics_ _of Morals_ , published in 1797, with a second edition in 1798. The texts of both editions contain lapses and obscurities that have suggested to many commentators that Kant's powers were already failing, and that the grounds of his political philosophy had not been properly worked out. Recent scholarship, however, has tended to the view that lecture notes and other extraneous material might have been included in the text, Kant being increasingly dependent on an amanuensis when transcribing his drafts. Whatever the truth about the composition of _The Metaphysics of_ _Morals_ , one thing is certain, which is that it contains no \"Critique of Political Reasoning,\" nor anything that might be regarded as a derivation from a priori principles of the idea of legitimate political order. Equally certain, to my mind, is that there is contained in Kant's later writings the seeds of a critical philosophy of politics, and that this unwritten fourth critique is as worthy of study as the other three.\n\nUniversalism\n\nKant was the prophet of \"Enlightenment universalism.\" He believed in a single, universal human nature, to which appeal should be made when examining the legitimacy and authority of our local arrangements. Since practical reason is valid for all people everywhere, there can be no special pleading on behalf of authorities whose sole claim to obedience is that history has placed them where they are. On the other hand, it is never possible in human affairs to wipe away the legacy of history\u2014not without risking a return to the state of nature and the war of all against all. Hence, Kant thought, the appeal to universal humanity must take the form of a regulative, rather than a constitutive, idea. We should not seek to establish a single set of laws for all mankind; rather, we should judge each jurisdiction in terms of certain a priori constraints, conformity to which would be the sign of its legitimacy.\n\nFurthermore, since the source of all authority in human affairs is reason, and since reason is common to us all, we must recognize that the benefits and burdens of political order lie equally on everyone. On this basis, slavery is clearly ruled out; so too are arbitrary distinctions whose sole purpose is to give one person power over another, or one class of persons privileges that confer no benefits on those who do not possess them. Hence, in his political writings, Kant writes as though distinctions of race and class are of no intrinsic political significance, and as though citizenship is and ought to be the aspiration of all mankind.\n\nIndeed, Kant goes further than most of his contemporaries in mounting, in _Perpetual Peace_ (1795), the first systematic argument for a universal form of government\u2014one that will transgress national boundaries and erase the arbitrary divisions among people that, in Kant's view, are the true cause of hostilities between them. It is to Kant that the idea of a \"league\" or \"federation of nations\" is due; and Kant's theory has been embodied in our modern structures of transnational legislation.\n\nThe Social Contract\n\nAs we should expect, given the legalistic form of his ethical theory, Kant's political thought is jurisprudential. For Kant a political order is, first and foremost, a system of laws. At the same time he followed Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau in proposing the social contract as the ultimate test of political legitimacy. Only if a political order can command the consent of those who are subject to it can it claim objective authority. The social contract is therefore \"a contract on which alone a civil and thus completely lawful constitution can be based and a community established\" ( _Common Saying_ , R. 79). However, there is a crucial difference between Kant and his predecessors. The social contract is not, for Kant, a constitutive but a regulative principle. We should not suppose that there is an actual contract, whether explicit or implied, at the heart of legitimate social order. Societies arise in another way, and are always burdened by a historical legacy that cannot be undone without injustice or violence. We should consider the social contract, therefore, only as a limiting idea of reason\u2014as a test that any actual legal order must pass, if it is to be legitimate. The social contract therefore takes the following form: \"if a law is so framed that a whole people _could not possibly_ give it their consent . . . the law is unjust; but if it is _at all possible_ that a people might agree on it, then the people's duty is to look on the law as just, even assuming that their present way of thinking were such that, if consulted, they would probably refuse to agree\" ( _Common Saying_ , R. 79).\n\nThe definition is critically ambiguous, shifting loosely between \"a whole people,\" \"a people,\" and \"the people.\" The most favorable construction, it seems to me, is this: each citizen has an absolute veto over every law, but he can exercise this veto only if he _could_ not agree to the law. The fact that he _does_ not agree is insufficient grounds for dissent. This is because what we _in fact_ agree to depends upon our desires, circumstances, and \"empirical conditions.\" We must discount all such conditions, if we are to address our question to reason alone. (Note the parallel with the categorical imperative.) In speaking of a social contract, therefore, we are referring not to an actual agreement between empirical selves, but to a hypothetical agreement between purely noumenal beings. Each of us, considered from the point of view of pure practical reason, is such a noumenal being.\n\nThe idea of such a hypothetical social contract, arrived at by a process of abstraction, has been revived in recent times by John Rawls, who uses it as a test for the just distribution of goods in a society. Kant was not interested in distributions, however, but only in laws, and, although he regarded all citizens as equal in their citizenship, and therefore in their rights and responsibilities, modern ideas of \"social justice\" were remote from his concerns. Although Kant believed in equality under the law, and equal rights of citizenship, he believed this to be compatible with the greatest inequality in possessions ( _Common Saying_ , R. 75).\n\nNatural Law\n\nThe system of law prevailing in Prussia was derived directly from Roman law, which Kant held in great esteem, not least because it was an attempt at a universal code, giving weight not only to local traditions and historical institutions, but also to philosophical principles applicable to all mankind. In particular, the Roman law distinguished the civil law, which was the province of earthly rulers, from natural law, which owed its authority to human nature and which stood higher than any local system of command. Thus, the civil law could uphold slavery and define the rights and duties of a slave, but the natural law, which was derived from reason alone, could recognize no such relation.\n\nMedieval jurists and philosophers had devoted much attention to the concept of natural law, believing it to be an attempt to transcribe in legal form the revealed will of God. Kant saw it in another way, as a vindication of the critical philosophy. The natural law, for him, was nothing less than a judicial translation of the categorical imperative. In the Roman law, therefore, Kant saw the proof that legal reasoning led of its own accord to the synthetic a priori principles of practical reason for which he had found the transcendental proof ( _M._ 236\u201337).\n\nPersons and Things\n\nKant's moral philosophy had also given cogency to another concept taken from Roman law: the concept of the person. Originally _persona_ meant a mask, and it described the character worn by the actor on the stage. The Roman law borrowed the term to denote the litigant in a court of law, whose rights and duties were defined by the law and who was in a certain sense the creation of the law before which he appeared. The legal person is the bearer of legal privileges (rights, freedoms, etc.) and legal burdens (duties, penalties, etc.). As Kant rightly saw, this concept is ultimately not legal but metaphysical, and assumes a distinction in reality between free _subjects_ and empirical _objects_. Rights and duties cannot attach to objects, which are bound by empirical conditions and laws. They can attach only to subjects who are free, in just the sense defined in Kant's moral philosophy. Law, by which human societies are governed, is addressed to the noumenal self.\n\nThree features of persons stand out in the context of political thinking: their accountability, their power of self-legislation, and their nature as ends in themselves. Because they are accountable for their actions, persons stand in a special relation to one another, and this relation is the basis of political order. Changes in the world can be _imputed_ to people, whenever these changes arise through action or neglect ( _M._ 239). Through law, imputation becomes a universal relation, binding each person to society, and making each person answerable for his acts and omissions.\n\nBecause persons are self-legislating members of the kingdom of ends, they are subject to two kinds of constraint\u2014internal and external. Internal legislation is demanded by the categorical imperative, and no just law can conflict with it. But there is also external legislation, in which some action that is neither demanded nor forbidden by the moral law is nevertheless commanded or forbidden by the state. The social contract (as defined above) is the test of the legitimacy of this external legislation, and it goes without saying that such legislation could never be accepted, if it set out to override the internal dictates of duty.\n\nFurthermore, law must respect the nature of persons, as ends in themselves. Slavery, fraud, and tyrannical oppression all conflict with the categorical imperative, and it is a core requirement of political order that people should be able to relate to each other and to the state as ends, and not as means only.\n\nHuman Rights\n\nLaw, for Kant, has the same metaphysical basis as morality, and is therefore grounded a priori in the idea of transcendental freedom. He identifies a single universal principle of justice, which he states in the following obscure words: \"Every action is just [ _recht_ ] if it or its maxim allows each person's freedom of choice to coexist together with the freedom of everyone in accordance with a universal law\" ( _M._ 230). It is a well-known problem for translators that the noun _Recht_ means both \"right\" and \"law,\" and the adjective _recht_ both \"just\" and \"right.\" The adjective occurs here in the context of a theory of justice, the principal purpose of which is to connect the ideas of justice and freedom: hence my translation. To put Kant's universal principle more perspicuously: an action is just if it respects the freedom of others, and does so not accidentally but on principle. Every free action must accommodate the freedom of others. For Kant this was simply another way of stating the basic requirement of justice, that all persons are to be treated as ends in themselves, and never as means only.\n\nThis universal principle is not incompatible with coercion, but coercion should always have, as its ultimate goal, the establishment of an order in which justice\u2014and therefore mutual freedom\u2014prevails. This was Kant's judicious way of amending Rousseau's notorious maxim, that, in a state founded on the social contract, the dissenter must be \"forced to be free.\"\n\nIt follows from Kant's view of justice that there is only one innate or \"natural\" right, which is that of freedom itself: \"Freedom (independence from the constraint of another person's will), in so far as it is compatible with the freedom of everyone else in accordance with a universal law, is the one sole and original right belonging to every person by virtue of his humanity\" ( _M._ 237). The qualification here is important: I do not have a natural right to do as I please; rather, I have a right to exercise such freedom as does not limit the freedom of others. This principle is the basis of \"classical liberalism\" and is still an unwritten law of many Western constitutions.\n\nIt is a small step from those a priori principles to the idea of human rights, as the one universal constraint on government. In describing rights as \"human,\" rather than \"civil,\" we invoke the natural law, and with it the universal principles that set limits to legislation in every place and time. Moreover, Kant's powerful idea of the person as an end in himself suggests the basic form of these universal rights: they are vetoes in the hands of the one who possesses them. There are certain things that you must not do to me without my consent, and this fact gives me a kind of sovereignty over my life that you cannot legitimately invade or diminish. This individual sovereignty translates into law as a system of rights: the right to life, limb, and property; the right to proceed peacefully about my own purposes; the right to engage in lawful relations with others, and so on.\n\nWhile Kant can be seen, in this way, as the greatest precursor of the modern doctrine of human rights, he was not so feebleminded as to suppose (as many people now suppose) that there can be rights without duties. Indeed, for Kant the concept of right is secondary to that of duty. What gives reality to my rights is your duty to respect them; and it is the motive of duty that is being obliquely invoked in all reference to the rights of the citizen ( _M._ 239). And I can claim rights only if I am prepared to pay the price, which is the acceptance of the very same duties that I impose upon you through my claim. In particular, I have a duty to uphold the universal principle of justice, and this means that I must accept and endorse the system of punishment without which there would be no law and no lasting community ( _M._ 331\u201332).\n\nThe Republican Ideal\n\nKant regarded legitimate political order as a legal system, founded in the respect for persons, and organized according to republican principles. Kant was influenced by French Enlightenment thinkers, notably by Montesquieu, into thinking of a republic as a distinct form of government, conferring a distinct status on its members. While you can be the _subject_ of an absolute ruler, you can be the _citizen_ only of a republic: the concepts of citizen and republic are mutually dependent parts of a single complex idea. In a republic the people themselves are the authors of the laws that govern them, and these laws express the \"general united Will\" (as Kant, echoing Rousseau, describes it) by which the consent of the governed is secured ( _M._ 313\u201314).\n\nA republic exists only if there is representative government, in which the people as a whole are represented in the legislature. The process of representation translates the inherent sovereignty of the people into an actual sovereign power, which Kant sees on the model of a legal person: a forum of collective decision making, in which the interests of the people as a whole are advanced through law, but which is itself answerable to the law that it lays down ( _M._ 341). Quite how representative government is achieved is one of the obscurities (some would say culpable obscurities) in Kant's political philosophy. At one point Kant argues that \"only fitness for voting qualifies someone to be a citizen\" ( _M._ 314). While this suggests that Kant was an advocate of democracy, he at once qualifies his remark by following the French revolutionary Abb\u00e9 Siey\u00e8s in distinguishing the active from the passive citizen\u2014the latter class enjoying no right to vote, and including all who are not fully independent. Among passive citizens he includes servants, minors, apprentices, and all women, adding that \"all such people lack civil personality,\" a fact that is, however, \"by no means opposed to the freedom and equality that such persons have as _human beings_ who together make up a people\" ( _M._ 315). Elsewhere he criticizes democracy as a form of despotism ( _PP_ , R. 101), and insists that the idea of republican government has no intrinsic connection with democratic choice. Without going into the matter in depth, the least that can be said is that Kant's conception of citizenship is a long way from the views of modern democrats, however much it may have set him at odds with the forms of government that then prevailed in Central Europe.\n\n**Charles de Secondat,** baron de Montesquieu (1689\u20131755).\n\nThe Separation of Powers\n\nThis defective account of representation is to some extent mitigated by Kant's subtle defense of the separation of powers\u2014an idea introduced into political philosophy by Locke and further developed by Montesquieu. Like Montesquieu, Kant distinguishes the legislative, judicial, and executive powers in a state, arguing that each must be considered as a \"moral person\" (that is, an accountable agent, with rights and duties of its own), while recognizing that they cannot exist in isolation, being both mutually dependent and mutually subordinate to one another ( _M._ 316). The business of government consists in maintaining the equilibrium between these powers, and so enabling the \"general united will\" of the people to find expression in the legislative assembly. Kant was clearly of the view that majority voting does not in itself produce legitimate law. What is required is a legislative _process_ , in which the competing interests of the people can be brought into equilibrium and subjected to judicial review. Only then can the rights of each citizen be guaranteed, and the threat of tyranny avoided.\n\nThis partly explains Kant's hostility to democracy. In a pure democracy, he thought, government and governed are one and the same. In such circumstances, the arbitrary desires of majorities pass immediately into law, regardless of whether the rights and freedoms of everyone are thereby respected. Respect for freedom requires a brake upon the hasty exercise of power. Laws should therefore be made by one body, applied by another, and adjudicated by a third, and certainly not made and applied by the majority.\n\n**This British cartoon** depicting the execution by guillotine of French king Louis XVI was published on January 25, 1793, four days after the king's death. Devils fly above the guillotine among the words _Vive la nation_ (Long live the nation) and _Ca ira_ , from the song \" _Ah! \u00e7a ira_ \" (Oh! it'll be fine), a song composed in 1790 and emblematic of the French Revolution.\n\nKant's republic was not incompatible with constitutional monarchy, although in many places he expresses his hostility to inherited powers, and especially to the inherited privileges of the nobility. In the end he fails to declare an alternative to democracy, and leaves the reader uncertain as to how the legislative chamber of a republic is supposed to be filled, and what conditions must be met, if it is to be representative of the people as a whole. It seems as though Kant regarded the representative republic as an Ideal of Reason, which we may approximate but never achieve. He argues powerfully against all forms of abrupt transition, and for a general attitude of obedience toward any form of sovereignty that is not plainly in violation of the categorical imperative. The recent events of the Terror had set his heart against revolution in general and regicide in particular, and his attitude to democracy can best be summarized in the words that Gandhi used of Western civilization, that \"it would be a good idea,\" with the proviso that, for Kant, an idea is always an \"idea of reason\"\u2014that is, a guide to practice, not a description of some possible reality.\n\nPrivate Property\n\nAmong the rights that belong to the citizen by virtue of the universal principle of justice, Kant identified the right of property as all-important, attempting a kind of transcendental deduction of ownership, in answer to the question \"how is it possible for an object to be mine?\" ( _M._ 249). He distinguished _sensible_ from _intelligible_ possession, the first being an empirical relation, the second a relation of right (M. 245). All general propositions about rights, he argued, are a priori, since they are laws of reason: hence their reference to the intelligible or noumenal realm, of which, from the point of view of practical reason, I myself am a part.\n\nProperty rights are not merely grounded a priori: they involve a _synthetic_ a priori imperative, like the imperatives of the moral law. To say that an object is mine is to add something positive to my sovereignty as a free being\u2014something that is not merely contained in the concept of freedom. Philosophers had striven in vain to justify this addition, but had not seen that it could be justified only by some kind of transcendental argument, which would show the possibility of ownership to be among the preconditions of practical reason. Kant does not succeed in producing this argument: but he rightly suggests that the essence of the right of property is revealed in the violation suffered when that right is abused. This violation involves a refusal to recognize the existence of the other as an end in himself, and therefore contradicts the supposition that he is a free, rational agent.\n\nKant's argument was later taken up by Hegel, who represented private property as the instrument through which the autonomy and self-identity of the rational agent is realized in an objective world. Through Hegel, Kant's conception of property became the focus of the leading political debate in nineteenth-century intellectual life: the debate between socialists and their opponents.\n\nCivil Society\n\nIn the course of his writings on politics, Kant offers a description of the \"civil society\"\u2014meaning a society organized by law, under a sovereign legislative power ( _M._ 256\u201357). In such a society, he argues, there must be property, contract, and the law that upholds them both. There must also be economic life and the means to facilitate contracts between strangers. Kant therefore offers a theory of money, and its representational nature, arguing that money is \"a thing the use of which is only possible through its being alienated\" ( _M._ 286)\u2014a peculiar feature that indicates that the possession of money must stand proxy for possession of another kind, in effect, possession of power over other people's labor. Kant therefore offers a \"real definition\" of money, as \"the universal means by which the labour of people can be exchanged\" ( _M._ 287). This definition foreshadows the nineteenth-century discussions of alienated labor, to which Kant's theory of the person gave additional force.\n\nKant was unusual among political philosophers in discussing the place of sex and sexual relations in civil society. He recognized that sexual morality presents a problem to the liberal worldview. Why should the behavior of \"consenting adults in private\" be the concern of the state? Indeed, why should it be the concern of morality, if no harm ensues to the parties, and no harm is inflicted on anyone else? How can the philosopher of freedom avoid endorsing sexual freedom, both as a political necessity and as a moral ideal?\n\nIn facing up to this question Kant drew once again on his concept of the person as end in himself. He boldly (and rightly) affirmed that there are sexual acts in which the other is treated not as a person but as a thing, in which the subject is, so to speak, eclipsed by the object. This is what we mean, or ought to mean, by perversion, and it violates a fundamental duty to the other and to oneself ( _M._ 278\u201379). The details of Kant's sexual morality (which coincide with the Christian-inspired view of marriage, as it was current in his day) may not appeal to all his modern readers. However, he made the first steps toward understanding what is at stake in sex, why someone can be jeopardized by another's desire, and why the personality is at risk in our sexual encounters. His ability to cast light on this difficult topic further confirmed his belief that he had identified, through his theory of the person, the metaphysical predicament in which we human beings stand.\n\nPerpetual Peace\n\nKant defended the republican ideal\u2014the ideal of free and equal citizenship, in which law is self-legislated by the people as a whole\u2014on two grounds. First, he considered it to be an a priori consequence of the categorical imperative. Second, he held that republican government is the precondition of peace between nations. Wars result when individual self-interest overrides the requirements of justice, and when a despotic power sees advantage to itself in the violent imposition of its will. If the nations of the world are organized as republics, so that no decision is taken except with the consent of the citizens as a whole, then the a priori laws of practical reason would have a voice in political decisions. War would be ruled out, not only as an unjust means of prosecuting collective purposes, but as an act of folly that runs counter to the common interest. In other words, it would be seen to conflict both with the categorical imperative of morality, and with the hypothetical imperative of survival.\n\nHowever, the condition of \"perpetual peace\" could not be brought about at once or by fiat. For, even if organized as republics, the nations are in a state of nature vis-\u00e0-vis one another, and therefore each nation is a \"standing offence\" to its neighbor ( _PP_ , R. 102). Positive steps must be taken to break down the barriers between the peoples of the world. Just as it is in the interests of individuals to abolish the state of nature and to enter into a civil society, so as to enjoy the freedom that is theirs by right, so it is in the interest of the nations to submit to a common rule of law, and to overcome the state of nascent belligerence that has afflicted the history of mankind. We should therefore be guided by the Idea of a \"world republic\" ( _PP_ , R. 105)\u2014a condition that is not in fact achievable but that could nevertheless regulate the dealings between individual states, and draw them insensibly into federation. Such a federation of republics, united by international law, would guarantee peace between nations. Each republic would have an interest in maintaining the law that protects it from aggression, and each would subscribe to a universal doctrine of rights that would ensure just dealings between them.\n\nLike many of the intellectual constructions that inform his political thinking, Kant's \"world republic\" is an Ideal of Reason. His theory of the ideal is expressly anti-utopian. The utopian is the one who thinks that the ideal can be realized, and who therefore sets out to destroy the obstacles that stand in its way. The Kantian believes that ideals cannot be realized, since we live in an imperfect world, impeded by empirical circumstances. Ideals must be construed as regulative principles, which guide us down the path of amelioration. Hence we must strive always to amend things, and never to tear them down.\n\nIn the course of exploring his ideal of world government, Kant makes trenchant criticisms of colonialism, and argues that it is only within a federal union of republics that politics and morality can be in agreement with each other. Until that union is achieved, the statesman is always dependent on cunning, lies, and subterfuge if he is to advance the national interest. Habits of secrecy, made necessary by the actual relations between states, violate the \"transcendental formula of public right,\" which is that an action is wrong if it is not compatible with being made public ( _PP_ , R. 126). We should work toward the condition of open government, in which the dealings between states are informed by the same integrity and honesty as the dealings between people, when these are guided by the categorical imperative. The respect for persons should be extended to the states that represent us, since they too are persons, whose rights and duties should be defined, as ours are, by a single moral law.\n\nKant's political vision has appealed to many subsequent philosophers and jurists, and has lost none of its relevance in the two centuries since his death. Subsequent wars and revolutions have made Kant's optimism unfashionable. But his appeal to natural law and human rights, and his attempt to derive a theory of justice from the premise of transcendental freedom, are of abiding relevance. Had Kant foreseen the events that led (among countless other calamities) to the destruction of his beautiful birthplace and the wholesale murder of its inhabitants, he would perhaps have lost some of the faith in human nature that shines through even his most abstract arguments about justice. But that faith remains an inspiration to those who believe, as Kant believed, that Reason can guide us both through its immediate imperatives, and through its unrealizable Ideals.\n\n**Kant's work was widely influential** and gave rise to important schools of thought. This photograph, taken on June 27, 1992, shows the inauguration ceremony for a statue of Immanuel Kant in the Russian city of Kaliningrad (formerly Kant's hometown of K\u00f6nigsberg), part of the city's recognition of the two hundredth anniversary of the German philosopher's death.\n[EIGHT\n\nTranscendental Philosophy ](Roge_9781402782107_epub_c7_r1.html#d6e8)\n\nKANT WAS REGARDED by his immediate successors as having irreversibly changed the course of philosophy. But already in Kant's lifetime the intellectual world was torn by controversy over the meaning of his critical system. Was Kant really a Leibnizian after all, as Eberhard had accused him of being ( _K._ 107)? Did he believe that the world of nature is nothing but a \"well-founded phenomenon,\" reality itself consisting in timeless, spaceless, noumenal substances whose attributes are derived from reason alone? Is the \"thing-in-itself\" the underlying substance that sustains appearances? In a series of letters to the aging Kant, his pupil Jakob Beck rehearsed this interpretation, and sought to demonstrate its untenability. But, if the transcendental philosophy is not a version of Leibnizian rationalism, why is it not, then, a repetition of the skeptical empiricism of Hume? Kant's philosophy is very much clearer in its negative than in its positive aspect, and in his day he had been called (by J. G. Hamann) \"the Prussian Hume.\" In the long peroration that concludes the \"Antinomy\" of the first _Critique_ , Kant emphasizes this negative aspect, and writes with pride of the method that has enabled him to rise above all preexisting argument in order to show that certain conclusions are not just undemonstrated, but indemonstrable.\n\nNeither the Leibnizian nor the Humean interpretation is really tenable. It is true that Kant sometimes speaks of concepts as \"rules\" for organizing our perceptions (e.g., A. 126), a conclusion that is reminiscent of Hume. It is also true that he is tempted by the \"transcendental hypothesis\" of a realm of \"things as they are\" (e.g., A. 780, B. 808), a conclusion that would align him with Leibniz. But these remarks are aberrations. Kant's true critical philosophy can be assimilated to neither of its antecedents, since it removes the grounds from both.\n\nThe first important school of thought to arise out of Kantian philosophy was the \"subjective idealism\" of Fichte (1762\u20131814), Schelling (1775\u20131854), and Hegel (1770\u20131831). According to these philosophers, the critical philosophy, in arguing away the \"thing-in-itself,\" had shown that reality is to be conceived in mental terms. Knowledge of an object is construed as \"positing\" ( _setzen_ ), rather than \"receiving.\" For Fichte, Kant's great achievement was to have shown that the mind has knowledge only through its own activity; in an important sense, therefore, the objects of knowledge are a _product_ of that activity. Thus Fichte wrote to a friend: \"I suppose I am more strictly a transcendental idealist than Kant; for he still admits a manifold of appearance, but I assert in plain terms that even this is produced by us, by means of a creative power.\" The mind is identified with the \"transcendental self,\" construed as the one noumenal object with which we are acquainted. But who, once again, are _we_? In Fichte's philosophy the transcendental self becomes a kind of universal spirit by which the separate empirical selves are constructed, along with the \"world of appearance\" in which they expend their energies, the whole depending on an unknowable synthesis that generates nature from the inexhaustible reservoir of the \"thing-in-itself.\"\n\nSchopenhauer too (1788\u20131860) was influenced by this interpretation, believing that Kant had rightly identified the \"transcendental self\" with the will (which is therefore the true \"substance\" behind appearances). For Schopenhauer, scientific concepts such as space, time, and causality apply only in appearance, imposing order on the world of appearance (or the \"veil of Maya\"\u2014the term Schopenhauer borrowed from oriental mysticism). Behind this veil the will takes its endless, unknowable, and unsatisfiable course. Hegel, by contrast, developed Fichte's idea of the known as \"posited\" by the knower. He tried to show that the objective reference justified in the transcendental deduction is but the first stage in an expanding process of self-knowledge. Mind ( _Geist_ ) comes to know itself through the positing of an ever more complex world. Hegel described this process as \"dialectical,\" meaning not to bury but to praise it. He believed that Kant's first _Critique_ had displayed, not the errors of pure reason, but the dynamic process of conjecture and refutation whereby reason constantly negates its own advances, achieving from the ruin of partial knowledge an ever more complete, more \"absolute,\" picture of reality.\n\n**Arthur Schopenhauer** (1788\u20131860).\n\nKant would have rejected that return to the Leibnizian vision. \"The light dove,\" he wrote, \"cleaving the air in her free flight, and feeling its resistance, might imagine that flight would be still easier in empty space\" (A. 5, B. 8). Thus he dismissed as insubstantial any pretence to an absolute form of knowledge, which seeks to soar above the resistant medium of experience. The notion of a transcendental object is misunderstood when considered as referring to a real thing. The idea is posited only as a \"point of view\" (A. 681, B. 710), in order to make clear that \"the principles of pure understanding can apply only to objects of the senses . . . never to things in general without regard to the mode in which we are able to apprehend them\" (A. 246, B. 303). There is no description of the world that can free itself from the reference to experience. Although the world that we know is not our creation, nor merely a synopsis of our perspective, it cannot be known except from the point of view that is ours. All attempts to break through the limits imposed by experience end in self-contradiction, and, although we may have intimations of a \"transcendental\" knowledge, that knowledge can never be ours. These intimations are confined to moral life and aesthetic experience, and, while they tell us, in a sense, what we really are, they can be translated into words only to speak unintelligibly. Philosophy, which describes the limits of knowledge, is always tempted to transcend them. But Kant's final advice to it is that given in the last sentence of Wittgenstein's _Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus_ : That whereof we cannot speak, we must consign to silence.\nFURTHER READING\n\nWritings by Kant\n\nThe standard edition of Kant's works is published by the Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften, as _Kants gesammelte Schriften_ (Berlin, 1900\u2013). It is now the general practice to include the page numbers of this edition in the margins of English translations. Hence, where practical, my page references are to the standard German text. However, until recently, there has been no attempt at a systematic English edition of Kant's works, and many of the writings are still most conveniently obtainable in editions that make no reference to the German pagination. In these cases I have indicated in the list of abbreviations at the beginning of this book which edition I have used.\n\nThe enterprise of providing authoritative and scholarly translations of Kant's works has been undertaken by Paul Guyer and Allen Wood, as general editors of the _Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel_ _Kant_ (Cambridge, 1993\u2013), which is destined to be the standard English edition. Guyer and Wood have themselves translated the first _Critique_ for this edition, though the excellent translation by Norman Kemp Smith (London, 1929) remains the source most frequently used. Both translations contain marginal references to the page numbering of the original first and second editions (A and B). The volume of the Cambridge edition entitled _Practical Philosophy_ , translated by Mary Gregor, contains most of Kant's moral and political works in an accurate translation. There is also a good translation of the _Critique of Practical_ _Reason_ and the _Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals_ by L. W. Beck, in his _Kant's Critique of Practical Reason and Other Writings in_ _Moral Philosophy_ (Chicago, 1949). Translations of the _Critique of Judgment_ have been less successful. The one now most frequently referred to is that by W. Pluhar (Hackett, Indianapolis, 1987), though the previous standard edition (tr. J. C. Meredith, Oxford, 1928) is still usable. Such problems as these translations present are due more to Kant than to the translators. The first part of the _Metaphysics of Morals_ is available in a translation by John Ladd as _Metaphysical Elements of Justice_ (2nd edition, Indianapolis, 1999), while the whole work is contained in Mary Gregor's volume. Ladd rearranges Kant's text, for reasons both editorial and philosophical. Other works on political philosophy can be found in Hans Reiss (ed.), _Kant: Political Writings_ , tr. H. B. Nisbet (Cambridge, 1970).\n\nKant's writings on theology, including _Religion Within the Limits of_ _Reason Alone_ (translated as _Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason_ ) are contained in _Kant: Religion and Rational Theology_ , tr. and ed. Allen Wood and George di Giovanni (Cambridge, 1996 [part of the Cambridge edition]).\n\nThere is no adequate selection in English from Kant's voluminous writings. The student cannot avoid jumping in at the deep end, with the _Critique of Pure Reason._\n\nWritings About Kant\n\nThe few biographies of Kant make unexciting reading. The fullest, although not the most accurate, is that of J. H. W. Stuckenberg, _The Life_ _of Immanuel Kant_ (London, 1882). That by Ernst Cassirer, entitled _Kant's_ _Life and Thought_ (New Haven, 1981), casts considerable light on Kant's philosophical development.\n\nCommentaries are legion. A growing interest in Kant among English-speaking philosophers has led to many works of high quality and lucidity. That by P. F. Strawson, _The Bounds of Sense_ (London, 1966), contains a thorough exposition, and partial defense, of the argument of the first _Critique_ , in its \"objective\" interpretation. The \"subjective\" rejoinder from Ralph Walker ( _Kant_ , in the series Arguments of the Philosophers, London, 1979), is clear and scholarly, although rather less persuasive. Those interested in a vigorous empiricist interpretation will enjoy Jonathan Bennett's two commentaries, _Kant's Analytic_ (Cambridge, 1966) and _Kant's Dialectic_ (Cambridge, 1974). The best short introduction in English remains that of A. C. Ewing (London, 1938) entitled _A Short Commentary_ _on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason_. More recent work has made a conscientious attempt to remain true to Kant's own intellectual concerns, and has therefore avoided reading the controversies of contemporary academic philosophy into his often obscure arguments. Exemplary in this respect are H. E. Allison, _Kant's Transcendental Idealism: An Interpretation_ _and Defense_ (New Haven, 1983), and Sebastian Gardner, _Kant_ _and the Critique of Pure Reason_ (London, 1999). Neither the second nor the third _Critique_ has received commentary of the same quality. On the ethics, I recommend H. J. Paton, _The Categorical Imperative_ (London, 1947), R. B. Sullivan, _Immanuel Kant's Moral Theory_ (Cambridge, 1989), and C. M. Korsgaard, _Creating the Kingdom of Ends_ (Cambridge, 1996). On the aesthetics there is much to be gained from Donald W. Crawford, _Kant's Aesthetic Theory_ (Wisconsin, 1974), and Paul Guyer, _Kant and the_ _Claims of Taste_ (Cambridge, Mass., 1979). Kant's political theory has been comprehensively summarized by Howard Williams in _Kant's Political Philosophy_ (Oxford, 1983), and aspects of it treated in depth in Howard Williams (ed.), _Essays on Kant's Political Philosophy_ (Cardiff, 1992).\nINDEX\n\nNote: Page numbers in _italics_ include illustrations and photographs\/captions.\n\naesthetics, \u2663, \u2666, \u2665, _\u2660_\u2013 \u2020, \u2021, \u0394,   \n\u2207\n\nantinomies, \u2663, \u2666, \u2665, \u2660, \u2020,   \n\u2021, \u0394\n\na posteriori knowledge\/truth, \u2663, \u2666\n\nappearance and reality, \u2663, \u2666\n\napperception, transcendental unity of, \u2663,   \n\u2666, \u2665, \u2660, \u2020\n\na priori knowledge\/truths   \ncausality and, \u2663  \nconcepts and, \u2666, \u2665  \nobjective deduction and, \u2660  \nprinciples as, \u2020  \nspace\/time and, \u2021  \nsynthetic, \u0394, \u2207, \u039f, \u25ca, \u2205, \u2217,   \n\u2295, \u2297  \ntranscendentalism and, \u221e, \u2202  \nunderstanding and, \u03b1, \u03b2, \u03b3\n\nAristotle, \u2663, \u2666\n\nAshley-Cooper, Anthony. _see_ Shaftesbury,   \nthird Earl of\n\nBatteux, l'abb\u00e9 Charles, \u2663\n\nBaumgarten, A. G., \u2663, \u2666, \u2665, \u2660, \u2020\n\nbeauty, \u2663, _\u2666\u2013_ \u2665, \u2660, \u2020, _\u2021_\n\nBecker, Johann Gottlieb, _\u2663_\n\nBeck, J. S., \u2663, \u2666\n\nBerkeley, G., \u2663\n\nBoethius, \u2663\n\nBritish Moralists, \u2663, _\u2666_\n\n\"Broad and Narrow Road,\" _xii_ \u2013 \u2663\n\nBurke, Edmund, \u2663, _\u2666_\n\ncategorical imperatives, \u2663, \u2666, \u2665,   \n\u2660\n\ncategories, \u2663, \u2666, \u2665, \u2660, \u2020,   \n\u2021, \u0394\n\ncausality, \u2663  \ncosmology and, \u2666, \u2665  \nexperience and, \u2660  \nfreedom and, \u2020, \u2021, \u0394  \nHume and, \u2207, \u039f, \u25ca  \nidentity and, \u2205  \nmonads and, \u2217  \nobjectivity and, \u2295\n\ncivil society, \u2663\n\n_Cogito ergo sum_ , _\u2663_\n\ncommon sense, \u2663\n\nconcepts, \u2663, \u2666, \u2665, \u2660, \u2020,   \n\u2021\n\nconservation, law of, \u2663, \u2666\n\ncontemplation, \u2663\n\nCopernican Revolution, \u2663\n\ncosmology, _\u2663_\u2013 \u2666, \u2665\n\nCrusius, C. A., \u2663\n\n_D\u00e9claration des Droits de L'homme et du_  \n _Citoyen_ , _\u2663_\u2013 \u2666\n\ndemocracy, \u2663, \u2666\n\nDescartes, Ren\u00e9, \u2663\u2013 _\u2666_, \u2665, \u2660, \u2020, \u2021,   \n\u0394, \u2207\n\ndesign arguments, \u2663, \u2666, \u2665, \u2660\n\nDoerstling, Emil, _\u2663_\n\nduty, _xii_ \u2013 \u2663, \u2666, \u2665, \u2660, \u2020, \u2021, \u0394, \u2207\n\nEberhard, J. A., \u2663, \u2666\n\nEinstein, A., \u2663\n\nempiricism   \nantinomies and, \u2663  \nconcepts and, \u2666, \u2665  \nexperience and, \u2660, \u2020  \nHume supporting, \u2021, \u0394  \nidealism and, \u2207  \nnecessities and, \u039f  \nobjectivity and, \u25ca  \nsynthetic a priori knowledge and, \u2205  \ntranscendental arguments and, \u2217\n\nEnlightenment, \u2663, _\u2666_\u2013 \u2665, \u2660, \u2020\n\nethics, \u2663, \u2666, \u2665\n\nexistentialism, \u2663\n\nexperience   \na priori knowledge and, \u2663, \u2666  \naesthetics and, \u2665, \u2660, _\u2020_  \ncausal necessities and, \u2021  \nknowledge and, \u0394, \u2207, \u039f, \u25ca, \u2205, \u2217  \nobjectivity and, \u2295, \u2297  \nobjects of, \u221e, \u2202, \u03b1, \u03b2  \nperspectives and, \u03b3, \u03ba  \nrationalism and, \u0398  \nself-consciousness and, \u03a6  \nspace\/time and, \u03b4, \u03bb  \nsynthesis and, \u03c8  \ntranscendental objects and, \u03d6  \nunderstanding and, \u03d1\n\nFichte, J. G., \u2663, \u2666\n\nform, \u2663\n\nFrederick the Great, \u2663, \u2666, \u2665\n\nFrederick William \u2663, \u2666\n\nfreedom, \u2663, \u2666, \u2665, \u2660, \u2020\n\nFrench Revolution, _\u2663_\u2013 \u2666, _\u2665_, _\u2660_\n\nFriedrich, Caspar David, _\u2663_\u2013 \u2666\n\nGandhi, M., \u2663\n\nGod, \u2663, \u2666, \u2665, \u2660  \nexistence of, \u2020, _\u2021_, \u0394, \u2207, \u039f  \njudgment of, \u25ca  \nmetaphysics and, \u2205  \nnature of, \u2217  \npractical reason and, \u2295\n\nG\u00f6del, K., \u2663\n\nGreen, Joseph, \u2663\n\nHals, Frans, _\u2663_\n\nHamann, J. G., \u2663, \u2666\n\nhappiness, _\u2663_\u2013 \u2666, \u2665\n\nharmony, \u2663\n\nHegel, G. W. F., \u2663, \u2666, \u2665, \u2660\n\nHeidegger, M., \u2663\n\nHeine, Heinrich, \u2663\n\nHerder, J. G., \u2663\n\nHobbes, T., \u2663\n\nhuman rights, \u2663\n\nHume, David, \u2663, _\u2666_, \u2665  \ncausality and, \u2660, \u2020, \u2021  \nconcepts and, \u0394  \nempiricism of, \u2207, \u039f  \nidentity and, \u25ca  \nobjective knowledge and, \u2205  \nreason and, \u2217, \u2295 _\u2013\u2297_  \nskepticism of, \u221e, \u2202, \u03b1, \u03b2, \u03b3  \ntheology and, \u03ba\n\nHussert, Edmund, \u2663\n\nHutcheson, Francis, \u2663\n\nhypothetical imperatives, \u2663\n\nidealism, \u2663, \u2666, \u2665, \u2660, \u2020, \u2021\n\n\"Ideal of Reason,\" \u2663\n\nidentity, \u2663, \u2666, \u2665\n\nillusion, \u2663, \u2666, \u2665, \u2660, \u2020\n\nimagination, \u2663, \u2666\n\ninnate ideas, \u2663, \u2666\n\nintentional objects, \u2663\n\nintuition   \nconcepts and, \u2663, \u2666  \nconsciousness and, \u2665  \nforms of, \u2660  \nimagination and, \u2020  \nknowledge and, \u2021, \u0394  \nmetaphysics and, \u2207  \nmorality and, \u039f, \u25ca  \nsensory, \u2205, \u2217, \u2295  \nspace\/time and, \u2297, \u221e\n\nJachmann, R. B., \u2663, \u2666\n\njudgment   \naesthetics and, \u2663, \u2666, \u2665, \u2660  \nconcepts and, \u2020  \ncontemplation and, \u2021, \u0394  \nempirical, \u2207  \nintellectualizing\/sensualizing and, \u039f  \nreason and, \u25ca  \nsubjective deduction and, _\u2205_\u2013 \u2217, \u2295  \nsynthetic a priori, \u2297  \nunderstanding and, \u221e, \u2202  \nwritings on, \u03b1, \u03b2, \u03b3\n\njustice, _\u2663_, \u2666, \u2665, \u2660, \u2020\n\nKant, Immanuel, _ii_ \u2013\u2663, _\u2666_, _\u2665\u2013_ \u2660,   \n_\u2020_\u2013 \u2021  \ncharacter of, \u0394  \ndeath of, _\u2207_\u2013 \u039f  \nearly life of, _\u25ca_  \nas teacher, \u2205, \u2217, \u2295, _\u2297_  \nwomen and, \u221e, \u2202\n\nKepler, J., \u2663\n\nKingdom of Ends, \u2663, \u2666\n\nK\u00f6nigsberg, Germany, \u2663, \u2666, \u2665, _\u2660_, \u2020,   \n_\u2021_\u2013 \u0394\n\nlaw and morality, \u2663\n\nlaw, role of, \u2663\n\nLeibniz, G. W., \u2663, _\u2666_, \u2665  \naesthetics and, \u2660  \nexistence and, \u2020  \ninnate ideas and, \u2021  \nintellectualizing appearances and, \u0394  \nmetaphysics of, \u2207, \u039f, \u25ca, \u2205  \nmonads and, \u2217, \u2295, \u2297  \nobjective knowledge and, \u221e  \nrationalism of, \u2202  \nreason and, \u03b1, \u03b2  \nwritings on, \u03b3, \u03ba, \u0398\u2013 _\u03a6_\n\nLessing, G. E., \u2663\n\nLichtenberg, G. C., \u2663\n\nLocke, John, \u2663, \u2666, \u2665\n\nlogical positivism, \u2663\n\nLouis \u2663, _\u2666_\n\nMagnus, Albertus, _\u2663_\u2013 \u2666\n\nmathematics, \u2663, \u2666, \u2665, \u2660, \u2020\n\nMendelssohn, Moses, \u2663, \u2666, \u2665, \u2660\n\nmetaphysics, _\u2663_\u2013 \u2666  \naesthetics and, \u2665  \ncategories and, \u2660  \ndivisions of, \u2020  \nempiricism and, \u2021  \nLeibnizian system and, \u0394, \u2207, \u039f, \u25ca  \nproblems with, \u2205  \npure reason and, \u2217  \nscientific laws and, \u2295  \nsubstances and, \u2297  \nas synthetic a priori truth, \u221e, \u2202  \nwritings on, \u03b1, \u03b2, \u03b3, _\u03ba_, \u0398\n\nMilton, John, \u2663\n\nmonads, \u2663, \u2666, \u2665, \u2660, \u2020\n\nmoney, \u2663\n\nMontesquieu, baron de, \u2663, _\u2666_, \u2665\n\nmorality, \u2663, _\u2666_\u2013 \u2665  \ncategorical imperatives and, \u2660  \nGod and, \u2020  \nintuition and, \u2021, \u0394  \nobjectivity and, \u2207  \npractical reason and, \u039f  \nself and, \u25ca  \nuniversality of, \u2205  \nwill and, \u2217  \nwritings on, \u2295, \u2297, \u221e, _\u2202_\n\nmotion, law of, \u2663, _\u2666_\n\nmusic, \u2663, \u2666\n\nnatural law, \u2663, \u2666, \u2665, \u2660\n\nnecessity, \u2663, \u2666, \u2665, \u2660\n\nNewton, Isaac, \u2663, \u2666, \u2665, _\u2660_\n\nnoumena, \u2663, \u2666, \u2665, \u2660, \u2020,\n\n\u2663, \u2666, \u2665\n\nobjective deduction, \u2663, \u2666, \u2665, \u2660, \u2020,   \n\u2021, \u0394\n\nobjectivity   \ncausality and, \u2663, \u2666  \ncontemplation and, \u2665  \nempirical, \u2660  \nillusion of, \u2020  \njudgment and, \u2021, \u0394  \nknowledge and, \u2207, \u039f  \nnatural necessity and, \u25ca  \ntranscendental idealism and, \u2205  \nvalidity and, \u2217\n\nontological argument, \u2663, \u2666\n\npeace, \u2663\n\npersons, \u2663, \u2666\n\nphenomena, \u2663, \u2666, \u2665, \u2660\n\nPhillips, G., _\u2663_\n\npietism, _xii_ \u2013 \u2663, \u2666\n\nPlato, \u2663, \u2666\n\npleasure, \u2663, \u2666, \u2665, \u2660,   \n\u2020\n\npolitics, \u2663, \u2666\n\nPrinciple of Contradiction, \u2663\n\nPrinciple of Sufficient Reason, \u2663, \u2666,   \n\u2665\n\nprinciples, \u2663, \u2666\n\n\"private language\" argument, \u2663\n\nproperty, \u2663\n\npsychology, rational, _\u2663_\u2013 \u2666\n\nPurgstall, Count, \u2663\n\npurposiveness, \u2663, \u2666, \u2665\n\nrationalism, \u2663, \u2666, \u2665, \u2660\n\nRawls, J., \u2663\n\nreason   \naesthetics and, \u2663  \nfaith and, \u2666  \nfreedom and, \u2665  \nHume and, \u2660, \u2020\u2013 _\u2021_  \nideas of, \u0394, \u2207, \u039f, \u25ca  \nillusion and, \u2205  \nknowledge and, \u2217  \nmetaphysics and, \u2295  \npassion and, \u2297  \npractical, \u221e, \u2202, \u03b1, \u03b2, \u03b3,   \n\u03ba, \u0398, \u03a6  \npure, \u03b4, \u03bb, \u03c8, \u03d6, \u03d1  \nrationalism and, \u039b  \nreality and, \u03a0  \nregulative principles of, \u03a3  \nrelations of ideas and, \u2663\u2663  \ntranscendental self and, \u2666\u2666  \nuniversalism and, \u2665\u2665  \nwritings on, \u2660\u2660, \u2020\u2020, _\u2021\u2021_\u2013 \u0394\u0394, \u2207\u2207, \u039f\u039f,   \n\u25ca\u25ca, \u2205\u2205\n\n\"Refutation of Idealism,\" \u2663, \u2666\n\nregulative principles, \u2663, \u2666, \u2665\n\nReinhold, K. L., \u2663\n\nrelations of ideas, \u2663, \u2666\n\nreligion\/theology, \u2663, \u2666, _\u2665_\u2013 \u2660, \u2020,   \n\u2021, \u0394, \u2207\n\nrepublicanism, \u2663, \u2666, \u2665, \u2660,   \n\u2020\n\nrespect for others, \u2663, \u2666,   \n\u2665\n\nReynolds, Joshua, _\u2663_\n\nRoman law, \u2663, \u2666\n\nRousseau, Jean-Jacques, _\u2663_, \u2666, \u2665, \u2660, _\u2020_,   \n\u2021, \u0394, \u2207\n\nRuhnken, David, \u2663\n\nSartre, J.-P., \u2663\n\nSchelling, F. W. J. von, \u2663\n\nSchlick, Moritz, _\u2663_\n\nSchopenhauer, Arthur, \u2663, _\u2666_\u2013 \u2665\n\nSchulze, G. E., \u2663\n\nSecondat, Charles de. _see_ Montesquieu,   \nbaron de\n\nself   \nexistence of, \u2663  \nHume doubting, \u2666  \nissues of, \u2665  \nmorality and, \u2660  \nsoul and, \u2020\n\nself-consciousness, \u2663, \u2666, \u2665, \u2660, \u2020,   \n\u2021, \u0394\n\nself-evidence, \u2663\n\nsensibility, \u2663, \u2666, \u2665, \u2660\n\nseparation of powers, \u2663\n\nsexuality, \u2663, \u2666\n\nShaftesbury, third Earl of, \u2663, _\u2666_, \u2665,   \n\u2660\n\nSiey\u00e8s, Abb\u00e9, \u2663\n\nslavery, \u2663, \u2666, \u2665\n\nsocial contract, \u2663, \u2666, \u2665\n\nsoul, \u2663, \u2666, \u2665, \u2660\n\nspace\/time, \u2663, \u2666, \u2665, \u2660  \nappearance and, \u2020  \nboundaries of, \u2021  \nempirical reality of, \u0394, \u2207  \nidentity through, \u039f  \nordering in, \u25ca\n\nSta\u00eb\u2663, Mme. de, \u2666\n\nsubjective deduction, _\u2663_\u2013 \u2666, \u2665, \u2660,   \n\u2020, \u2021\n\nsublime, \u2663, \u2666, \u2665, _\u2660_\u2013 \u2020\n\nsubstances, \u2663, \u2666, \u2665, \u2660, \u2020\n\nsynthesis, \u2663\n\nsynthetic truths, \u2663, \u2666, \u2665, \u2660\n\nTarski, A., \u2663\n\ntaste, \u2663, \u2666, \u2665, \u2660\n\n\"thing-in-itself,\" \u2663, \u2666, \u2665, \u2660, \u2020,   \n\u2021, \u0394, \u2207\n\ntranscendental   \ndeduction, \u2663, \u2666, \u2665, \u2660, \u2020,   \n\u2021  \nfreedom, \u0394, \u2207, \u039f, \u25ca, \u2205  \nidealism, \u2217, \u2295, \u2297, \u221e, \u2202  \nobjects, \u03b1, \u03b2, \u03b3, \u03ba, \u0398, \u03a6  \npsychology, \u03b4  \nself, \u03bb, \u03c8, \u03d6, \u03d1  \nunity of apperception, \u039b\n\nunconditioned knowledge, \u2663\n\nuniversalism, \u2663, \u2666, \u2665\n\nVienna Circle, \u2663, _\u2666_\n\nvon Zedlitz, H., \u2663\n\nWagner, Richard, \u2663\n\nWatson, James, _\u2663_\n\nWentzel, Johann Friedrich, _\u2663_\n\nwill, \u2663, \u2666, \u2665, \u2660, \u2020\n\nWinckelmann, H., \u2663\n\nWittgenstein, Ludwig, \u2663, \u2666, \u2665,   \n\u2660\n\nWoellner, K. von, \u2663\n\nWolff, Christian von, \u2663, \u2666\n\nwomen, \u2663\nPICTURE CREDITS\n\n**BRIDGEMAN ART LIBRARY** :\u2666; \u2660; \u2665\n\n**CORBIS** :\u2663: \u00a9 Bettmann\/CORBIS\n\n**GETTY IMAGES** :\u03b6: Imagno\/Contributor\/Getty Images;\n\n\u2020: AFP\/Getty Images\n\n**GOOGLE BOOKS** :\u03c0; \u03bb\n\n**THE GRANGER COLLECTION, NEW YORK** :\u03b4; \u03c8\n\n**LEBRECHT PHOTO LIBRARY** :\u00ac\n\n**MARY EVANS PICTURE LIBRARY** :\u0398\n\n**NATIONAL LIBRARY OF MEDICINE** :\u00b1\n\n**COURTESY OF PRINTS & PHOTOGRAPHS DIVISION, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS**:\n\n\u03b1: LC-USZ62-51093;\n\n\u03b3: LC-USZC4-5133;\n\n\u00de: LC-USZ62-61713;\n\n\u0394: LC-USZ62-48733;\n\n\u2021: LC-USZC4-12944;\n\n*: LC-USZ62-130773;\n\n\u00a5: LC-DIG-ppmsca-10742\n\n**COURTESY OF WIKIMEDIA COMMONS** :\n\n\u00a7: Charlotte Reihlen (idea), Paul Beckmann (execution), _Der breite und der schmale Weg_ ;\n\n\u00b6: Emil Doerstling, _Kant and Friends at Table_ , ca. 1900;\n\n\u03a0: Alte Universit\u00e4t Koenigsberg;\n\n\u03a3: Immanuel Kant statue, in Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais, Belo Horizonte\/Upload by Andrevruas;\n\n\u03a6: Frans Hals, _Ren\u00e9 Descartes_ (1649);\n\n\u00a4: Johann Friedrich Wentzel, _Gottfried Wilhelm_ _Leibniz_ , ca. 1700;\n\n\u25ca: Anthony Ashley-Cooper 3rd Earl of Shaftesbury, Engraving by Gribelin Sculp after a painting by J. Closterman Pinx, in _Characteristicks of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times_ , 5th ed., 1732;\n\n\u00b5: Caspar David Friedrich, _Chalk Cliffs on R\u00fcgen_ , ca. 1818;\n\n\u03ba: Representation of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, 1789;\n\n\u03b7: Ludwig Sigismund Ruhl, _Arthur Schopenhauer_ , ca. 1818 \nBRIEF INSIGHTS\n\nA series of concise, engrossing, and enlightening books that explore   \nevery subject under the sun with unique insight.\n\n_Available now or coming soon:_\n\n**THE AMERICAN  \nPRESIDENCY**\n\n**ARCHITECTURE**\n\n**ATHEISM**\n\n**THE BIBLE**\n\n**BUDDHISM**\n\n**CHRISTIANITY**\n\n**CLASSICAL  \nMYTHOLOGY**\n\n**CLASSICS**\n\n**CONSCIOUSNESS**\n\n**THE CRUSADES**\n\n**ECONOMICS**\n\n**EXISTENTIALISM**\n\n**GALILEO**\n\n**GANDHI**\n\n**GLOBALIZATION**\n\n**HISTORY**\n\n**HUMAN  \nEVO LUTION**\n\n**INTERNATIONAL  \nRELATIONS**\n\n**JUDAISM**\n\n**KAFKA**\n\n**KANT**\n\n**LINCOLN**\n\n**LITERARY THEORY**\n\n**LOGIC**\n\n**MACHIAVELLI**\n\n**MARX**\n\n**MATHEMATICS**\n\n**MODERN CHINA**\n\n**MUSIC**\n\n**NELSON MANDELA**\n\n**PAUL**\n\n**PHILOSOPHY**\n\n**PLATO**\n\n**POSTMODERNISM**\n\n**PSYCHOLOGY**\n\n**THE REAGAN  \nREVOLUTION**\n\n**RELATIVITY**\n\n**RENAISSANCE ART**\n\n**RUSSIAN  \nLITERATURE**\n\n**RUSSIAN  \nREVO LUTION**\n\n**SEXUALITY**\n\n**SHAKESPEARE**\n\n**SOCIAL AND CULTURAL  \nANTHROPOLOGY**\n\n**SOCIALISM**\n\n**STATISTICS**\n\n**THE TUDORS**\n\n**THE VOID**\n","meta":{"redpajama_set_name":"RedPajamaBook"}}
+{"text":"\n\n\n\nProduced by deaurider, Paul Clark and the Online Distributed\nProofreading Team at http:\/\/www.pgdp.net (This file was\nproduced from images generously made available by The\nInternet Archive)\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n                                  THE\n                           SLAVERY QUESTION.\n\n                                  BY\n\n                            JOHN LAWRENCE,\n\n      AUTHOR OF \"PLAIN THOUGHTS ON SECRET SOCIETIES,\" AND \"BRIEF\n                    TREATIES ON AMERICAN SLAVERY.\"\n\n                            THIRD EDITION.\n\n    THE DISCUSSION OF SLAVERY WILL PROCEED, WHEREVER TWO OR\n    THREE ARE GATHERED TOGETHER--BY THE FIRESIDE, ON THE HIGHWAY,\n    AT THE PUBLIC MEETING, IN THE CHURCH. THE MOVEMENT\n    AGAINST SLAVERY IS FROM THE EVERLASTING ARM.\n\n                                                  CHARLES SUMNER.\n\n                              DAYTON, O.,\n\n     PUBLISHED BY ORDER OF THE TRUSTEES OF THE CONFERENCE PRINTING\n            ESTABLISHMENT OF THE UNITED BRETHREN IN CHRIST.\n\n                      VONNIEDA & KUMLER, AGENTS.\n\n                                 1854.\n\n\n\n\n      Entered according to act of Congress, in the year 1854, by\n\n                          VONNIEDA & KUMLER,\n\n         in the Clerk's Office of the District Court of Ohio.\n\n\n\n\nPREFACE.\n\n\nAmerican slavery is a great sin--a complicated iniquity--a gigantic\nbarbarism--and it \"is evil, only evil, and that continually.\" But the\ndepth of this wickedness is not very frequently sounded, if, indeed it\ncan be sounded. The magnitude of this crime is not often measured, if,\nindeed it is possible to determine its dimensions.\n\nSlavery has narcoticized the consciences of the American people to a\nmost alarming extent. A deep sleep has come over the moral sense, which\nit would seem cannot be broken by the cries and entreaties of three\nmillions of wretched bondmen. Are we not in imminent danger of being\ncursed with Pharaoh's hardness of heart? May we not be visited speedily\nwith judicial blindness such as was inflicted upon the doomed nations\nand cities of antiquity?\n\nThe standard of national morality has been degraded to the level of an\ninfamous lower law enacted by scheming political traders.\n\nOur national government, in all its departments--Executive, Judicial\nand Legislative--has been transformed into a pliant tool in the hands\nof an unscrupulous oligarchy.\n\nThe powerful American Churches have ceased to be asylums for the\noppressed, defenders of the down trodden, uncompromising foes of\ntyranny, and they have become, on the contrary, the apologists of\noppressors, a terror to the oppressed, and the only reliable bulwark of\nAmerican slavery.\n\nThe author has aimed to present in the following pages such a\ndiscussion of the general subject of slavery as would be calculated\nto awaken the thoughts, and feelings, especially of those who have not\nhad an opportunity of examining this question in larger and more ably\nwritten productions. There are thousands of honest people who would\ntake a decided position on a Christian anti-slavery platform, and\nthrow their whole influence in the right direction if they were made\nacquainted with slavery as it is, and with their duties religiously\nand politically in relation to it. It is with the design of benefiting\nthe common people--the people of plain sense--who are not offended at\nplain talk and plain facts, that the following work is published. If\nthe workingmen of the free and slave States can be aroused into action,\nslavery must fly from the churches and perish from the nation.\n\nWith this purpose in view, we have sketched a history of the\nAfrican slave trade, showing how slavery originated; have defined\nslavery--proving that its essential principle is property in a human\nbeing; and laws, facts and incidents have been adduced to illustrate\nthe system so that even a child may see and feel its enormity.\n\nAnd, as a corrupt moral sense has been still more corrupted by efforts\nto bring revealed religion to the support of slavery, particular pains\nhave been taken to prove that not a single word, nor precept, nor\nexample can be adduced from the Bible which sanctions any such system;\nand that the whole spirit of religion as revealed under the old economy\nand the new, is utterly and irreconcilably opposed to all slavery.\n\nIt has been thought proper to present a concise view of the position\noccupied by the American Churches upon this question. No church can\ncomplain when its ecclesiastical action on so grave a subject is\nre-published. And besides, it is quite necessary for honest people to\nknow on what platforms the religious denominations of the country stand.\n\nThe true position of a religious society or church in relation to\nslavery is exhibited. This is a point of more than ordinary importance.\nThe doctrine is maintained that the honor of the Bible, the purity,\npower, peace, and success of the Church, its duty to God, to freedom,\nto slaveholders and especially to slaves, demand that it have no\nfellowship with slaveholding.\n\nParticular pains have been taken to point out the political duties of\nChristians in relation to slavery.\n\nThe inquiry, \"how are we to get rid of slavery?\" is taken up, and the\nposition assumed and defended that it ought to be abolished immediately.\n\nThe book closes with a glance at the prospects. The watchman tells\nus that the sky from many points of observation is dark, but still\nthat there are some very encouraging indications. The uncorrupted\nconscience, reason, truth, Christianity and prayer, are on the side of\nthe oppressed; and God, who is love, is their hope, and cannot fail\nto come to their help and bring them forth with a mighty hand and an\nout-stretched arm.\n\nQuite a number of works on slavery have been consulted in the\npreparation of this discussion, among which may be mentioned, \"American\nSlave Code\" by Mr. Goodell; \"Barnes on Slavery;\" \"Bible Servitude,\" by\nE. Smith; \"Elliott on American Slavery;\" \"Slavery and the Church,\" by\nMr. Hosmer; \"Debate on Slavery by Blanchard & Rice;\" \"Non-fellowship\nwith Slaveholders,\" by Mr. Fee; \"Sermon on the Slave Trade\" by Jonathan\nEdwards; and \"Thirteenth Annual Report of the American and Foreign\nAnti-slavery Society.\"\n\nNo \"mealy words\" have been used in this book. I have only aimed to\npresent the plain truth, and shall be rewarded in whatever mite of\ninfluence it may cast on the side of liberty.\n\n\n\n\nCONTENTS.\n\n\n CHAPTER I.\n\n ORIGIN OF AMERICAN SLAVERY.\n\n THE SLAVE TRADE.\n\n Seven millions of slaves in America--Slavery originated in the\n African slave trade--Slave-trade unprovoked--Excited by lust for\n gold--Commenced by the Portuguese in 1434--Spaniards in 1511--English\n in 1556--President Edwards quoted--100,000 annually destroyed--Report\n made to the British House of Commons--Startling statistics--A slave\n ship described--Slave-trade declared to be piracy and abolished\n                                                                 page 13\n\n\n CHAPTER II.\n\n SLAVERY DEFINED.\n\n PROPERTY IN A HUMAN BEING.\n\n A slave is a chattel--Authorities quoted--Advertised and sold as\n property--Facts adduced--sale of a boy--a woman with an infant in her\n arms--a mother--American slave-code identical in principle with the\n Roman                                                           page 30\n\n\n CHAPTER III.\n\n SLAVERY ILLUSTRATED.\n\n THE CHATTEL PRINCIPLE IN PRACTICE.\n\n Slaves denied an education--Laws--Instances--Slavery disregards\n matrimonial connections--Painful facts                          page 41\n\n\n CHAPTER IV.\n\n SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED.\n\n Slavery disregards the parental and filial\n relations--Facts--Slave-mother's lament                         page 56\n\n\n CHAPTER V.\n\n SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED.\n\n Slavery utterly impoverishes its victims--Exposes them to unbridled\n lust--unrestrained passion--irresponsible tyranny--Heart-rending\n incidents!                                                      page 64\n\n\n CHAPTER VI.\n\n SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED.\n\n Severity of laws against slaves--partial--unreasonable and\n cruel--Practice worse than the laws--Burning of slaves--Horrible\n examples                                                        page 80\n\n\n CHAPTER VII.\n\n SLAVERY AND RELIGION.\n\n CURSE OF CANAAN--Doubtful authority--Did not allude to slavery--A mere\n prediction at best--Africans not the descendants of Canaan      page 88\n\n\n CHAPTER VIII.\n\n SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED.\n\n PATRIARCHAL SERVITUDE AND SLAVERY--No patriarch ever owned\n a slave--Slavery had no existence in the time of the\n patriarchs--Diodorus, Athenaeus and Rollin quoted--The Hebrew word\n SERVANT not equivalent to the English word SLAVE--Abraham's servants\n converts from idolatry                                          page 94\n\n\n CHAPTER IX.\n\n SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED.\n\n LAW OF MOSES AND SLAVERY--Levitical statutes not perfect--Allowed what\n it would now be wrong to practice--Dr. Stowe quoted--Servitude under\n the law of Moses essentially different from American slavery--Meaning\n of \"buy,\" \"heathen,\" \"bondmen,\" and \"forever,\"--Servants not\n stolen--Voluntary--Provision for religious improvement--Kind\n treatment--Could not be sold--Equal to their masters--Certain\n emancipation--Salvation of the heathen the primary design of\n introducing foreign servants                                   page 107\n\n\n CHAPTER X.\n\n SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED.\n\n NEW TESTAMENT AND SLAVERY--SERVANTS mentioned but not SLAVES--DOULOS\n does not mean SLAVE--New Testament does not regulate slavery\n because it cannot be regulated--Slaveholders not addressed by the\n Apostles--Onesimus not a slave--Character of Roman slavery--Contrary\n to the fundamental principles of revealed religion--The character of\n God--Common origin of man--General Redemption--Moral precepts--And is\n necessarily unjust and unequal                                 page 124\n\n\n CHAPTER XI.\n\n AMERICAN CHURCHES AND SLAVERY.\n\n THE POSITION THEY OCCUPY.\n\n Presbyterians (O. S. and N. S.)--Congregational--Methodist\n Episcopal, North and South--Methodist Protestant--Wesleyan Methodist\n Connection--Baptist, Regular--Freewill--Seventh Day--Evangelical\n Association--United Brethren--Various Churches--Summary View   page 149\n\n\n CHAPTER XII.\n\n SLAVERY AND THE CHURCH.\n\n NON-FELLOWSHIP WITH SLAVEHOLDERS.\n\n Scriptural view--Church must keep slaveholders out--If they get\n in, it must expel them--If the Church sanction slavery officially\n or practically, withdraw from it--Non-slaveholding required\n that it may be holy--The pillar of truth--That it may honor the\n Scriptures--Convert the world--Be faithful to slaveholders and to\n slaves--Non-fellowship required by decency--humanity--If fellowshiped,\n we shall have slaveholding preachers, and women-sellers and\n cradle-plunderers for class-mates--Cases given                 page 169\n\n\n CHAPTER XIII.\n\n SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED.\n\n OBJECTIONS ANSWERED.\n\n Kind slaveholders--Examples--Excusable slaveholders--Slavery a\n political matter--Fault of the public corruption--Fault of the\n laws--Slaveholders from necessity--Slaves their property--All right\n ONLY this one thing--Take them in to convince them of the wrong--Mr.\n Fee's opinion                                                  page 184\n\n\n CHAPTER XIV.\n\n POLITICAL DUTIES OF CHRISTIANS.\n\n EXTIRPATION OF SLAVERY FROM THE WORLD.\n\n Necessity of government--Obligation of political action--Voters\n responsible for slavery--United States Constitution does not endorse\n slavery--Founders of the Republic intended that slavery should die\n out speedily--Character of the government changed--Great work for\n Christian citizens--Slavery in the District--Territories--Slave\n States--Throughout the world                                   page 195\n\n\n CHAPTER XV.\n\n ABOLITION OF SLAVERY.\n\n IMMEDIATE EMANCIPATION.\n\n The duty plain and scriptural--Break every yoke--proclaim a year of\n Jubilee--Slavery cannot be reformed--Slaves prepared for freedom--Free\n people of color--Fugitives in Canada--West India emancipation--<DW52>\n people not dangerous when free--Amalgamation--Our fears originate\n in our guilt--Colonization scheme impracticable--Wrong--Watkins\n quoted--All objections mere excuses--We must emancipate to escape the\n judgments of God--Too long delayed--A good example             page 206\n\n\n CHAPTER XVI.\n\n WHAT OF THE NIGHT?\n\n THERE IS HOPE IN GOD ONLY.\n\n The government intensely pro-slavery--Political horizon lowering--The\n great denominations and benevolent societies heartily supporting\n slavery--Ecclesiastical heavens dark--Deep prejudices in the masses of\n the people--Douglass quoted--God is on the side of the oppressed--He\n is stirring the nation--Question cannot rest--Agitation goes on--Truth\n is on the side of the slave--Literature coming to his aid--A pure\n Church arising to plead his cause--\"TOIL AND TRUST.\"           page 219\n\n\n\n\nAMERICAN SLAVERY.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER I.\n\nOrigin of American Slavery.\n\nTHE SLAVE TRADE.\n\n\nOn the continent of America and adjacent Islands there are more than\nseven millions of slaves. Between three and four millions of these\nare enslaved by the most liberal, enlightened and prosperous nation\non the Globe. The American _Republic_ is a great slaveholding nation,\nand, viewed in its slaveholding character, might fitly be termed also,\nthe American _Despotism_. The highest form of freedom is here enjoyed\nby about twenty millions of persons and the lowest type of slavery\nsuffered by more than three millions. One seventh of all born under our\nDemocratic Constitution and under our world-renowned stars and stripes,\nare hereditary slaves.\n\nAmerican slavery has flourished three hundred years, being coeval with\nthe Reformation, and running back over one twentieth part of the whole\nperiod of time since Adam. Nine generations of slaves, under a crushing\nweight of despotism, have toiled and suffered on through a wretched\nlife, and have gone murmuring down to the grave.\n\nWe shall now inquire into the origin of this immense iniquity. American\nslavery originated directly in the African slave trade; a trade most\ndishonorable to human nature, bad as that nature is admitted to be,\nand most disgraceful to christian civilization. Its history, although\nnot fully written, except by heaven's recording angel, cannot be read\nby a humane person, even in its fragmentary form, without the deepest\nsorrow. It is a history of villainy, of relentless cruelty, of raging,\nhollow-hearted avarice and of unmitigated diabolism on the one side;\nand of wrongs, wretchedness and writhing anguish on the other.\n\nNothing had occurred to provoke a marauding attack upon the Africans.\nThey were a peaceable and harmless people, and had no means of exciting\neither the jealousy or the displeasure of Europeans. They had not\nviolated treaties, nor declared wars. The bloody wars among the African\ntribes, of which we hear so much from those who would palliate the\natrocities of the slave trade, were excited by the traders themselves,\nand so far from palliating, only add _blackness_ to the darkness of\ntheir crimes. The old Roman soldier, who enslaved a national enemy whom\nhe valiantly met and conquered in what is called honorable warfare,\nmight have claimed, with the semblance of plausibility, that the life\nhe had spared legitimately belonged to him. But the African slave\ntrader could not plead even this unmanly and unmerciful apology. The\nAfricans were not national enemies, and were not in arms.\n\nNo, it was not revenge, ambition, or patriotism, but CUPIDITY which\nprompted the slave trade--\n\n    \"The lust of gold, unfeeling and remorseless!\n    The last corruption of degenerate man.\"\n\nAvaricious men launched and manned the slave ship, unfurled the sails\nand stood at the helm. In their perilous voyage over the wide ocean,\namid storms and tempests, not one noble impulse swelled their bosoms;\nnot one philanthropic purpose strengthened their courage; not one\nhumane pulsation throbbed in their hearts. The slaver went on its long\nvoyage under the patronage of the Prince of darkness, for the one and\nonly purpose of making gold out of the sale of the bodies and souls of\nmen; of distilling wealth from blood and tears and agony. Montgomery\nsaid truly--\n\n    \"Cruel as death, insatiate as the grave,\n    False as the winds that round his vessel blow;\n    Remorseless as the gulf that yawns below,\n    Is he who toils upon the wafting flood,\n    A CHRISTIAN BROKER IN THE TRADE OF BLOOD!\"\n\nBut it was not avarice in the crew of the slave ship alone which\nincited and drove this iniquitous business. The prime movers were\nthe owners of the estates to be worked. Had those men been unwilling\nto grow rich upon unrewarded toil, the _slaver_ never would have\nsailed to Africa and plundered its shores. But the piratical crew and\nthe purchasers of the victims of their nefarious traffic were in a\nvillainous co-partnership.\n\nWhen the slaver had reached its destination and had anchored off the\nslave coast, the following methods were employed in securing a cargo.\n1st. Declarations of friendship were made and many of the unsuspecting\nnatives were induced, out of curiosity or for trade, to go aboard the\nvessel, and when there were suddenly confined and permitted no more to\nreturn. 2d. Parties of the crew were sent out to surprise and carry\noff innocent children and youth as they went to the fields or gathered\nin groups to play in the groves. Think of the anguish of those African\nmothers and of the distress of their affrighted children! 3d. Villages\nwere fired in the night, and as many of the defenseless inhabitants as\ncould be captured by force of arms were carried off. 4th. The chiefs\nof different tribes were hired to act as the agents of the slaver in\nprocuring slaves. Rum, of which all savages are extremely fond, was the\nprincipal incentive. Inflamed by this demon, the native chiefs made war\nupon each other, and sold the prisoners captured to the traders for a\nfresh supply of rum.\n\nThe African slave trade was commenced on a small scale a few years\nbefore the discovery of America. We learn from the Encyclopedia\nAmericana \"that, in 1434, a Portuguese captain name _Alonzo Gonzales_,\nlanded in Guinea, and carried away some  lads, whom he sold\nadvantageously to Moorish families settled in the South of Spain.\nSix years after, he committed a similar robbery, and many merchants\nimitated the practice, and built a fort to protect the traffic.\"\n\nAfter a discovery of the Gold Mines of America, quite a number of\n<DW64>s were imported, first by the Portuguese then by the Spaniards,\nto labor in those mines. In 1511 Ferdinand, King of Spain, authorized\nthe importation of a large number. About this period it is said, and\ngenerally believed that _Bartolomeo las Cas_, a Catholic Priest,\ninfluenced by a feeling of pity toward the Indians, whom the Spaniards\nwere enslaving, proposed to Ximenes the regular importation of <DW64>s.\nWhether this be true or not, Charles the V. in 1517, granted the\nprivilege to Lebresa, of importing 4000 slaves to America annually.\nLebresa sold his right to import to Genoese merchants, for about\n$25,000. These merchants now commenced the slave trade in earnest.\n\n_Sir John Hawkins_ has the honor of being the first English captain\nwho engaged in the business of stealing <DW64>s. In 1556 he made an\nunsuccessful effort at <DW64> catching near Cape Verd. He made another\neffort at a different point; and after burning the towns, was so\nbravely resisted by the inhabitants, that he lost seven men, and only\ncaptured ten. He continued his depredations until his ship was loaded\nwith human beings, which he sold in America.[1] The trade was now\nvigorously prosecuted by the christian nations of Europe. It is said\nthat Charles the V., Louis XIII. and Queen Elizabeth had some trouble\nwith their consciences about this horrible trade, but they were quieted\nby the argument that it brought the African into a good situation to be\nconverted! Pope Leo X. declared that \"not only the christian religion\nbut nature itself cried out against a State of slavery.\"\n\nThese feeble expressions of disapprobation were scarcely heard and\nthe trade went on vigorously--cupidity triumphing over conscience and\nsilencing almost, for many years, the voice of humanity and religion.\n\nAn extract from a sermon preached on the slave trade by _President\nEdwards_, in the year 1791 will now be quoted. At the time this good\nman lifted his voice against this traffic, it will be remembered that\nit was authorized by the Constitution of the United States, and was a\nsource of great profit to those engaged in it.\n\n\"The slave trade is wicked and abominable on account of the cruel\nmanner in which it is carried on. Beside the stealing or kidnapping of\nmen, women and children, in the first instance, and the instigation\nof others to this abominable practice, the inhuman manner in which\nthey are transported to America, and in which they are treated on the\npassage and in their subsequent slavery, is such as ought forever to\ndeter every man from acting any part in this business, who has any\nregard to justice or humanity. They are crowded so closely into the\nholds and between the decks of vessels, that they have room scarcely\nto lie down, and some times not room to sit up in an erect posture,\nthe men at the same time fastened together with irons, by two and two:\nand all this in the most sultry climate. The consequence of the whole\nis, that the most dangerous and fatal diseases are soon bred among\nthem, whereby vast numbers of those exported from Africa perish in the\nvoyage; others in dread of that slavery which is before them, and in\ndistress and despair from the loss of their parents, their children,\ntheir husbands, their wives, all their dear connections, and their dear\nnative country itself, starve themselves to death, or plunge themselves\ninto the ocean. Those who attempt in the former of those ways to\nescape from their persecutors, are tortured by live coals placed to\ntheir mouths. Those who attempt an escape in the latter and fail, are\nequally tortured by the most cruel beating. If any of them make an\nattempt as they sometimes do, to recover their liberty, some, and as\nthe circumstance may be, many, are put to immediate death, others,\nbeaten, bruised, cut and mangled in a most inhuman and shocking manner,\nare in this situation, exhibited to the rest, to terrify them from the\nlike attempt in future: and some are delivered up to every species\nof torment, whether by the application of the whip, or of any other\ninstrument, even of fire itself, as the ingenuity of the ship master,\nor of his crew is able to suggest, or their situation will admit; and\nthese torments are purposely continued for several days before death is\npermitted to afford relief to these objects of vengeance.\n\n\"By these means, according to the common computation, twenty-five\nthousand, which is a fourth part of those who are exported from Africa,\nand by the concession of all, twenty thousand, annually perish, before\nthey arrive at the places of their destination in America.\"\n\nThe same writer computed that of the one hundred thousand slaves\nannually exported, 60,000 were captives taken in war, and that ten\npersons were killed in the capture of one. _Sixty thousand then in the\ntime of Jonathan Edwards were slain in battle, 40,000 destroyed on\nthe voyage_ and in the seasoning, making _an annual destruction of_\n100,000 men, woman and children, in order to procure 60,000 slaves!\nThis computation may be relied upon, as Jonathan Edwards was a careful\nwriter, and no enthusiast.\n\nFor three hundred years this horrible traffic had been prosecuted\nbefore Mr. Edwards delivered the sermon from which we have quoted,\nand at that period the annual slaughter was 100,000, and the annual\nenslavement 60,000! How many perished during those three hundred years\nGod only knows. Rum had excited wars among the natives, and the whole\ncoast, and far into the interior was turned into a battle field. No\none was safe. The poor African could not lie down securely at night,\nfor men-stealers were ransacking the country watching for their prey\nlike hungry tigers; villages were burned, property destroyed, and the\nwretched inhabitants, either captured, killed, or caused to fly from\ntheir homes, and perish perhaps with famine.\n\nIn a report made to the British House of Commons, it was estimated\nthat from 1807 to 1847, including a period of only forty years, _ten\nmillions_ of persons had been made the victims of this traffic! TEN\nMILLIONS; one-half of whom were murdered in Africa; one fourth during\nthe \"middle passage;\" and the remaining fourth reduced to _property_\nand doomed, with their posterity, to a life of degradation, suffering\nand toil! And all this gigantic robbery and murder perpetrated in the\nfavored nineteenth century!\n\nPermit me to direct your attention to a single slave ship which sailed\nonly a few years ago. This ship was examined by the officers of a\nBritish man-of-war. The following is from the pen of Mr. Walsh, an eye\nwitness of what he relates.\n\n\"The ship had taken in, on the coast of Africa, 336 males and 226\nfemales, making in all 562, and had been out 17 days, during which she\nhad thrown overboard _fifty five_!\n\n\"The slaves were all enclosed under grated hatchways between decks.\nThe space was so low, that they sat between each other's legs, and\nthey were stowed so close together, that there was no possibility\nof their lying down, or at all changing their position by night or\nday. As they belonged to, and were shipped on account of different\nindividuals, they were all branded like sheep, with the owner's marks\nof different forms. These were impressed under their breasts or on\ntheir arms, and as the mate informed me, with perfect indifference,\nquiemados pelo ferro quento--burnt with the red hot iron. Over the\nhatchway stood a ferocious looking fellow with a scourge of many\ntwisted thongs in his hand, who was the slave driver of the ship; and\nwhenever he heard the slightest noise below, he shook it over them,\nand seemed eager to exercise it. As soon as the poor creatures saw us\nlooking down at them their dark and melancholy visages brightened up.\nThey perceived something of sympathy and kindness in our looks which\nthey had not been accustomed to, and feeling instinctively, that we\nwere friends, they immediately began to shout and clap their hands.\nOne or two had picked up a few Portuguese words, and cried out _Viva!\nviva!_ The women were particularly excited. They all held up their\narms; and when we bent down and shook hands with them, they could not\ncontain their delight, they endeavored to scramble upon their knees,\nstretching up to kiss our hands; and we understood that they knew we\nhad come to liberate them. Some, however, hung down their heads, in\napparently hopeless dejection, some were greatly emaciated, and some,\nparticularly children, seemed dying. But the circumstance which struck\nus most forcibly, was, how it was possible for such a number of human\nbeings to exist, packed up and wedged together as tight as they could\ncram, in low cells, three feet high, the greater part of which, except\nthat immediately under the hatchways, was shut out from light or air,\nand this when the thermometer, exposed to the open sky, was stand-in\nthe shade, on our deck at 89 deg.. The space between the decks was divided\ninto two compartments, three feet, three inches high; the size of one\nwas 16 feet by 18 feet, and of the other 40 feet by 21 feet; into the\nfirst there were crammed the women and girls, into the second the men\nand boys; 226 fellow beings were thus thrust into one space 288 feet\nsquare, and 336 into another 800 feet square, giving to the whole an\naverage of 23 inches, and to each of the women, not more than thirteen.\nThe heat of these horrid places was so great and the odor so offensive,\nthat it was quite impossible to enter them even had there been room.\nThey were measured as above when the slaves had left them. The officers\ninsisted that the poor suffering creatures should be admitted on deck\nto get air and water. This was opposed by the mate of the slaver, who,\nfrom a feeling that they deserved it, declared they would murder them\nall. The officers (of the Eng. ship,) however, persisted, and the poor\nbeings were all turned up together. It is impossible to conceive the\neffect of this eruption; 507 fellow creatures of all ages and sizes,\nsome children, some adults, old men and women, all in a state of total\nnudity, scrambling out together to taste a little pure air and water.\nThey came swarming up like bees from the aperture of a hive, till the\nwhole deck was crowded to suffocation, from stem to stern; so that it\nwas impossible to imagine where they could all have come from, or how\nthey could all have been stowed away. On looking into the places where\nthey had been crammed, there were found some children next the sides\nof the ship, in the places most remote from light and air; they were\nlying in nearly a torpid state, after the rest had turned out. The\nlittle creatures seemed indifferent as to life or death; and when they\nwere carried on deck, many of them could not stand. After enjoying, for\na short time, the unusual luxury of air, some water was brought; it\nwas then that the extent of their sufferings was exposed in a fearful\nmanner. They all rushed like maniacs toward it. No entreaties, or\nthreats, or blows could restrain them; they shrieked, and struggled,\nand fought with one another, for a drop of this precious liquid, as\nif they grew rabid at the sight of it. When the poor creatures were\nordered down again, several of them came, and pressed their heads\nagainst our knees, with looks of the greatest anguish, at the prospect\nof returning to the horrid place of suffering below.\"[2]\n\nBut the English ship was obliged to release the slaver and abandon to\ndespair those defenseless victims, as it was found upon examination\nthat it had not violated a vile privilege then allowed Brazilian ships\nto obtain slaves south of a certain line.\n\nIt is a humiliating fact that for a period of three centuries the\nwhole christian world was engaged in plundering a heathen shore of\nits inhabitants, speculating in their bodies and souls and spreading\namongst them intemperance, war and all unutterable woes. The history of\nthis wickedness will never be fully known until the general judgment.\nThen will the ocean have a tale to tell of the thousands who were\nsmothered in the slave prisons which floated upon her bosom, and of the\nmultiplied thousands who were famished and buried in her deeps. The sea\nwill send up her witnesses, and Africa, wet with tears and blood, will\nbear a testimony before God in that day which will make the ears of all\nthat hear it to tingle!\n\nBut let us glance at a more hopeful view of the subject. In 1783 a\npetition was addressed to the house of Parliament, Great Britain, for\nthe abolition of this trade. THOMAS CLARKSON was the mover, and the\ngreat champion of the cause. In 1788 Mr. Pitt presented a petition\nagainst the trade and introduced the subject of its abolition into the\nhouse of Commons. The opposition to this measure was united, powerful\nand violent. At length in 1792 the house of Commons passed a bill for\nthe abolition of the slave trade to take place in 1795. This bill\nwas rejected in the House of Lords. About this time the _National\nAssembly_ in France, declared all the slaves in the French colonies\nfree. Mr. Wilberforce brought into the British Parliament another bill\nin 1796, which provided that this trade should be abolished forever\nafter 1797--but this bill was lost also. The efforts of the friends\nof humanity were redoubled, and in \"_1806 Fox moved that the House\nof Commons should declare the slave trade inconsistent with justice,\nhumanity and sound policy, and immediately take effective measures\nfor its abolition_.\" This measure passed by a large majority--and\nJan. 1808 was fixed as the time for its abolition. _In 1824 a law\nwas passed declaring the trade to be piracy._ Portugal provided for\nthe total abolition of this trade in 1823. France in 1815--Spain in\n1820--Netherlands in 1818--Sweden in 1813--Brazil in 1830--Denmark in\n1804. The United States prohibited it by Constitution in 1809--and in\n1814 engaged by the treaty of Ghent to do all in her power for its\nentire suppression.\n\nBut, notwithstanding these praiseworthy efforts, the trade continued,\nand with increased barbarity, and is even yet carried on to some extent\nin defiance of all the navies of the world.\n\nWe have now seen that _avarice_ was at the bottom of the slave trade;\nthat it was an unprovoked and unparalleled outrage upon the Africans;\nthat it was prosecuted without the slightest regard to the comfort\nor lives of the captured; that the whole civilized world, after an\nexperience of centuries, became horrified at its terrible iniquity;\nthat now the trade is declared to be PIRACY; that the slave-ship can\nbe protected by no flag under heaven; and that all who engage in the\ntrade may be captured and hanged up by the neck as the most execrable\nwretches.\n\nThus a traffic which received the sanction of the Pope of Rome, and\nwas prosecuted under the immediate auspices of Christian kings and\ngovernments for three centuries, was attacked by CLARKSON, WILBERFORCE\nand other agitators, and, though powerfully defended by avarice and\ninterest; though hoary with age; though protected by statesmen, by\nthe commercial and planting interests, that attack was vigorously\nfollowed up until reason, religion and humanity felt outraged by it,\nand demanded in a voice which rulers dared not refuse to hear, that it\nbe at once and forever abolished. So much for agitation! Thank God for\nthis progress!\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER II.\n\nSlavery Defined.\n\nPROPERTY IN A HUMAN BEING.\n\n\nThat we may proceed intelligently in the discussion of the subject\nupon which we have entered, it is important to understand precisely\nwhat American slavery is. Some learned men have confused this subject\nby confounding the relation of the slave with other relations from\nwhich it _essentially_ differs. An apprentice, a miner, hired laborer,\nserf or a villein is not a slave. All these relations lack, as we\nshall see, the distinguishing feature of slavery. The slave is placed\nin a condition far removed from any other class of human beings in\nenlightened, civilized, or savage society. He stands in a legal\nrelation below all others.\n\nThe American slave code describes the slave and slavery with remarkable\nprecision and horrible distinctness. According to that code a slave is\na CHATTEL. He is, body, soul and spirit, to all intents and purposes\nwhatsoever, PROPERTY--the property of the master to whom he belongs;\nand slavery is that \"peculiar institution\" which, originating in\npiracy, systematically despoils human beings of their manhood--of all\ninborn rights, degrades them to the state of chattelhood, and forcibly\ndetains them in that degradation. PROPERTY IN A HUMAN CREATURE is the\n_essential_ and _peculiar_ principle of slavery. This is the basis of\nthe system, and all laws, regulations, usages, deprivations, wrongs,\nsins, sufferings and miseries which belong to the system are built\nupon this foundation. Numerous and cruel systems of oppression have\nexisted but not one of them has ventured to lay sacrilegious hands\nupon \"the image of God,\" and convert it into a _thing_ to be bought,\nsold, executed for debt, willed, and used as an article of merchandise.\nSlavery alone has done this. Some authorities will now be cited to\nprove the correctness of this definition.\n\n\"The cardinal principle of slavery, that the slave is not to be ranked\namong sentient beings but among things, obtains in all these (slave)\nstates.\" (_Judge Stroud._)\n\n\"Slaves shall be claimed, held, taken, reputed, and adjudged in law, to\nbe chattels personal in the hands of their owners and possessors, and\ntheir executors, administrators and assigns to all intents and purposes\nwhatsoever.\" (_Law of South Carolina._)\n\n\"A slave is one who is in the power of the master to whom he belongs;\nthe master may sell him, dispose of his person, his industry, and his\nlabor; he can do nothing, possess nothing nor acquire anything but what\nmust belong to his master.\" (_Law of Louisiana._)\n\n\"A slave is in absolute bondage; he has no civil rights, and can hold\nno property, except at the will and pleasure of his master; a slave\nis a rational being, endowed with understanding like the rest of\nmankind; and whatever he lawfully acquires, and gains possession of by\nfinding or otherwise, is the acquirement and possession of his master.\"\n(_Wheeler._)\n\nA law of Mississippi reads thus: \"When any sheriff or other officer\nshall serve an attachment upon slaves, horses, or _other live stock_,\"\netc. \"Being property, slaves may be bought and sold by persons capable\nof buying and selling other property.\" (_Hon. J. K. Paulding._)\n\nHenry Clay said--\"I know that there is a visionary dogma which holds\nthat <DW64> slaves cannot be the subject of property. I shall not\ndwell on the speculative abstraction. _That is property which the\nlaw declares to be property._ Two hundred years of legislation have\nsanctified and sanctioned <DW64> slaves as property.\"\n\nAny one who will take up a southern newspaper will soon discover\nfrom the manner in which slaves are advertised for _sale_, that the\nlaws which reduce them to chattels are not _dead_ statutes. An\nadvertisement in the Richmond (Va.) Whig, is headed thus:\n\n\"Large sale of <DW64>s, horses mules and cattle.\" Among the articles\nto be sold are, 175 <DW64>s, among whom are some carpenters and\nblacksmiths, 10 horses, 33 mules, 100 head of cattle, 100 sheep and 200\nhogs. \"The <DW64>s will be sold for cash, the _other property_ on a\ncredit of nine months.\"[3]\n\nWhole volumes of such advertisements might be collected from the most\nrespectable and widely circulated southern journals, and I have seen a\nfew advertisements for the sale of men women and children, hogs, corn\nand cattle promiscuously, in respectable religious papers, sustained by\nchurches whose leading avowed object is, to \"spread scriptural holiness\nover these lands.\"\n\nAnd slaves are not only advertised but actually _sold as property\nis sold_. Raising slaves for the market, selling them, speculating\nupon them and driving them from one State to another, creates an\nextensive and lucrative trade. The _Virginia Times_ estimated that\nin 1836 the number of slaves exported from Virginia alone was _forty\nthousand_--worth $24,000,000. The _Natchez Courier_ estimated that\nin 1836 two hundred and fifty thousand slaves had been imported into\nLouisiana, Mississippi, Alabama and Arkansas, from the more Northern\nStates. The _Baltimore Register_ said, \"Dealing in slaves has become\na large business; establishments are made in several places in Md.\nand Va. at which they are sold like cattle.\" Prof. Dew said in 1831;\n\"Virginia is in fact a <DW64> raising State for the other states.\" _Judge\nUpshur_ of Va. said in the Va. Convention, 1831; \"The value of slaves\nas an article of property, depends much on the state of the market\nabroad. If it should be our lot, as I trust it will be, to acquire the\ncountry of Texas, their price will rise again.\" \"From the single port\nof _Baltimore_,\" says Mrs. Stowe \"in the last two years, a thousand and\nthirty slaves have been shipped to the southern market.\" Slaves now\nbring a very high price in cash. Only the other day a _brick-layer_ in\nS. C. sold for $1,905; three others at the same sale brought over $1000\neach.\n\nIn the prosecution of this traffic the feelings and interests, the\nparental, connubial and filial relations of slaves are utterly\ndisregarded. They are sold for the benefit of the _master_, as a\nhorse is sold, and bought _to suit the purchaser_. To all intents and\npurposes slaves are daily bought and sold like cattle. Alas, that my\npen is compelled to write this fact.\n\nA respectable gentleman (Dr. Elwood) was an eye witness to a sale of\nslaves in Petersburg, Va., in 1846. He saw some old men and women go\nupon the auctioneer's stand to be sold to the highest bidder. The case\nof a beautiful youth affected him most deeply. \"His hair,\" said Mr. E.\n\"was brown and straight, his skin exactly the hue of white persons,\nand no discernible trace of <DW64> features in his countenance. Some\nvulgar jests were passed on his color, and $200 was bid for him;\nbut the audience remarked that was not enough to begin on for such a\nlikely young <DW64>; some said a white <DW64> was more trouble than he\nwas worth. Before he was sold his mother rushed from the house upon the\nportico, crying in frantic grief, 'My son, O! my boy, they will take\naway my dear'--Here her voice was lost as she was rudely pushed back\nand the door closed. The sale was not for a moment interrupted, and\nnone of the crowd appeared to be affected by the scene. The poor boy\ntrembled and wiped the tears from his cheeks with his sleeves. He was\nsold for about 250 dollars.\"\n\nAfter this boy was sold a woman was called upon the stand. She had an\ninfant in her arms, but she dared not take it with her. \"She gave it\none wild embrace, before leaving it with an old woman, and hastened\nmechanically to obey the call; but stopped, threw up her arms, screamed\nand was unable to move!\" Those who know a mother's love can understand\nthe agony which raged in her maternal bosom.\n\nThe following is from the pen of an aged preacher, now living in\nCanada, who escaped from slavery some years since. When the master to\nwhom he belonged died, he, with his fellow slaves, were put up for\nsale. Said he--\n\n\"My brothers and sisters were bid off one by one, while my mother,\nholding my hand, looked on in an agony of grief, the cause of which I\nbut ill understood at first, but which dawned on my mind with dreadful\nclearness as the sale proceeded. My mother was then separated from me,\nand put up in her turn. She was bought by a man named Isaac R----,\nin Montgomery county, Md., and then I was offered to the assembled\npurchasers. My mother half distracted with the parting forever from all\nher children pushed through the crowd, while the bidding for me was\ngoing on, to the spot where R. was standing. She fell at his feet and\nclung to his knees, entreating him in tones that a mother only could\ncommand, to buy her _baby_ as well as herself, and spare to her _one_\nof her little ones at least.\" But this man thus appealed to \"disengaged\nhimself from her with such violent kicks and blows as to reduce her to\nthe necessity of creeping out of his reach and mingling the groan of\nbodily suffering with the sob of a broken heart.\"\n\nThese cases are presented as examples to show the meaning and intent of\nthe code which declares that a slave is _property_--and _has no rights\nor interests_; and they are not rare and extreme cases brought in here\nonly for effect, but are such as occur daily in all the slave states;\nand they are _perfectly in keeping_ with the spirit of American\nslavery. Those persons were sold precisely as _other property_ is sold.\n\nFrom these authorities and facts it is clear that a slave occupies a\nrelation as far beneath the apprentice, miner, hired laborer, or even\nthe villein of the Feudal Age, or the Russian serf, as mere _property_\nis beneath _manhood_ with all its possessions and God-like powers--as\nfar as a brute is below a man \"made in the image of God.\"\n\nThe American slave code is almost an exact copy of the old savage Roman\nslave code, which was conceived in the dark night of heathenism, and\nbrought forth reeking with blood in the unholy travail of sanguinary\nwars, before that empire had been enlightened and conquered by the\npeaceful and just Gospel of Christ. That it may be seen _where_ English\nand American law-makers obtained the spirit of the American slave code,\nthe following synopsis of the Roman law on slavery is inserted.\n\n\"By the Roman civil law, slaves were esteemed merely as chattels of\ntheir masters; they had no name but what the master was pleased to\ngive them for convenience. They were not capable of personal injuries\ncognizable by the law. They could take neither by purchase nor descent,\ncould have no heirs, could make no will. The fruits of their labor\nand industry belonged to their masters. They could not plead nor be\nimpleaded, and were utterly excluded from all civil concerns. They\nwere incapable of marriage, not being entitled to the considerations\nthereof. The laws of adultery did not (among themselves) effect them.\nThey might be sold, transferred, mortgaged, pawned. _Partus sequitur\nventrem_ was the rule indiscriminately applied to slaves and cattle.\"\n(_Harris and McHenry._)[4]\n\nAt a glance it will be seen that the Roman and American slave codes\nare identical in spirit--that the distinguishing principle of both is\nproperty in man. Our christian legislators therefore must acknowledge\nthemselves indebted to Pagan Rome for the type of slavery which they\nhave instituted and maintained in Christian America. All the main\nfeatures of cruelty, injustice and savageness, inherent in that ancient\nsystem of oppression, have been faithfully copied, and not in the\nslightest degree modified or softened.\n\nLet us recapitulate. A slave is property. His bones and sinews, genius,\nskill, virtue, mind, soul; all he is, all he may be, all he acquires\nin this life, belongs to his master and is put down in his ledger as\nworth so many dollars. He is without choice as to what he will do, what\namount of labor he will perform, or for whom he shall toil. He can own\nnothing, inherit nothing, will nothing. He cannot make a contract for\nhimself, nor claim the protection of the laws as a man. He is wholly\nin the power of his master and totally defenseless against his lusts,\navarice, or brutality. I defy human ingenuity, nay, if I may be so\nbold, I challenge Lucifer himself to invent a system of oppression\nwhich leaves a man more completely destitute, defenseless and degraded.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER III.\n\nSlavery Illustrated.\n\nTHE CHATTEL PRINCIPLE IN PRACTICE.\n\n\nWe will now enter more definitely into an examination of that terrible\ninstitution which practically justifies the African slave-trade by\nholding on to its victims and substituting in its stead an inter-state\nslave-trade in moral turpitude fully equaling it; which, in a land of\nfree institutions, holds in galling chains more than three millions of\nour dear fellow creatures; annually robs a hundred thousand American\nmothers of their babes; and despoils one hundred thousand children\nevery year of that precious freedom which is their birthright and\nreduces them to a level with unreasoning beasts. Our task will be\npainful, but let us proceed.\n\n1. _Slaves are denied an education._ I think it is universally admitted\nthat education and slavery are utterly incompatible, and that total\nignorance of letters and general imbecility of intellect are essential\nto its successful continuance, and indeed, its very existence in any\ncountry. Hence in the United States, where millions of dollars are\nannually expended for schools and colleges, and where it is almost\nuniversally believed that a sound education is conducive to good\nmorals, the spread of civilization, the preservation of liberty and the\nprogress of Christianity, even here nothing is done for the education\nof slaves. While millions of free children are annually gathered into\nschools and diligently instructed, the children of slaves, although\nequally capable, are permitted to grow up without the least attention\nto their mental culture. But this, though bad enough, is not the\nworst. If slaves were at liberty to follow out their own inclinations,\nthey might many of them, even without encouragement or help, acquire\na respectable education. But the laws _punish the slave with great\nseverity who, with any motive or under any circumstances_, may attempt\nto learn to read or write, and also any person who may teach him.\n\nSome of the laws and opinions relating to the education of slaves,\n(free <DW64>s generally included) will now be cited. \"Virginia Revised\nCode of 1819. That all meetings or assemblages of slaves or free\n<DW64>s, or free <DW64>s and mulattoes mixing and associating with\nsuch slaves at any meeting house or houses &c., in the night; or at\nany _school_ or _schools_ for teaching them reading or writing either\n_in the day or night_, under _whatsoever pretext_, shall be deemed and\nconsidered an UNLAWFUL ASSEMBLY; and any justice of a county wherein\nsuch assemblage shall be, shall issue his warrant, directed to any\nsworn officer or officers, authorizing him or them to enter the house\nor houses where such unlawful assemblages may be, for the purpose\nof apprehending or dispersing such slaves, and to inflict _corporal\npunishment_ on the offender or offenders, at the discretion of any\njustice of the peace not exceeding twenty lashes.\" (_Goodell's American\nSlave Code._)\n\nNo person in Virginia is allowed to open a school for the instruction\nof <DW52> persons or to teach them to read and write under a penalty\nof $100 and six months imprisonment. It may be thought that these\nlaws are not now enforced and stand as a dead letter upon the statute\nbook. But the following cool item of news published in the _Richmond\nExaminer_ under date of May 12th, 1853, will satisfy any one that they\nare enforced.\n\n\"BREAKING UP A <DW64> SCHOOL.--The officers at Norfolk made a descent\non Tuesday upon a <DW64> school, kept in the neighborhood of the\nStone Bridge, by a Mrs. Douglass and her daughter, and the teachers,\ntogether with their sable pupils, were taken before his Honor. They\nacknowledged their guilt, but pleaded ignorance of the law, and were\ndischarged, on a promise to do so no more; a very convenient way of\ngetting out of the scrape. The law of this State imposes a fine of one\nhundred dollars, and imprisonment for six months, for such offenses; is\npositive, and allows no discretion in the committing magistrate.\"\n\nIf a free <DW64> in North Carolina attempt to teach a slave to read, or\nif he give to a slave a religious tract, a spelling book or the bible,\nhe may be imprisoned or take _thirty-nine lashes_! If a white person\nattempt to teach a slave the laws subject him to a fine of $200 for\neach offense.\n\n\"In Georgia, if a white teach a free <DW64> or a slave to write he is\nfined $500, and imprisoned at the discretion of the Court; if the\noffender be a <DW52> man, bond or free, he may be fined or whipped at\nthe discretion of the Court. This law was enacted in 1829.\" (_Jay's\nInquiry._)\n\n\"In Louisiana the penalty for teaching slaves to read and write is one\nyear's imprisonment.\"\n\n\"In North Carolina, the patrols were ordered to search every <DW64>\nhouse for books or prints of every kind. Bibles and hymn books were\nparticularly mentioned.\" (_Goodell._)\n\n\"We have,\" said Mr. Berry in the Va. House of Delegates, \"_as far as\npossible closed every avenue by which light may enter their minds. If\nwe could extinguish the capacity_ to see the light, our work would be\ncompleted; they would then be on a level with the beasts of the field\nand we would be safe! I am not certain that we would not do it, if we\ncould find out the process, _and that on the plea of necessity_.\"\n\nWhen Frederick Douglass was a slave and belonged to Mr. Auld, his\nmistress, who had been lately married, manifested toward him true\nwomanly kindness and commenced to teach him the art of reading. \"But\nwhen my master heard of it,\" says Douglass in his Narrative, \"he at\nonce forbade Mrs. Auld to instruct me further, telling her among other\nthings, that it was unlawful, as well as unsafe to teach a slave to\nread. To use his own words further he said, 'If you give a <DW65> an\ninch he will take an ell. A <DW65> should know nothing but to obey\nhis master--to do as he is told to do. Learning would spoil the best\n<DW64> in the world. Now, said he, if you teach that <DW65> (speaking of\nmyself,) how to read there would be no keeping him. It would forever\nunfit him to be a slave. He would at once become unmanageable, and of\nno value to his master. As to himself it would do him no good, but a\ngreat deal of harm. It would make him discontented and unhappy.'\"\n\nIs not that a terrible institution which can only be sustained by\nenchaining the immortal mind and withholding entirely the advantages\nof education? Think of it. A slave's soul, as is often the case, is\npossessed with an unquenchable passion for improvement. He has a mind\nin constant unrest--active, elastic, aspiring. A benevolent friend\nengages to instruct him at night in the rudiments of learning, but\nwhile engaged in this good work the law seizes them, and hurries the\nslave to the whipping-post and the friend to prison. Twenty, thirty\nor forty lashes on the bare back are rather poor encouragement to the\nstudent, and a heavy fine and long imprisonment with felons hard pay\nfor a teacher. But slavery makes it a crime to learn to read even the\nbible, and a penitentiary offense to teach a slave the alphabet!\n\nThe object of this is plainly declared by Mr. Berry of Va., viz: to\nclose every avenue of light from the slave's mind--to debase him as\nlow as possible--and thus put resistance out of his power--that he may\nbecome a docile and profitable _chattel_.\n\nThese laws are a bold defiance of the Almighty who constructed the\nmarvelous powers of the human mind for improvement and activity and who\nrevealed in written language his word for the comfort and guidance of\nall his creatures. They interpose a barrier between the slave and his\nMaker and thus hinder his salvation. Even convicts in prison are taught\nto read the scriptures, and in this respect slavery is more severe with\nits victims than justice is with the worst criminals.\n\n2. _Slavery does not recognize the matrimonial connections of slaves._\nAs slaves are to be put as nearly as possible upon a level with\n\"_other_ property\" the slave code with singular meanness, but perfect\nconsistency, refuses to the slave a lawful marriage, subjects him\nto conditions which are inconsistent with that sacred relation, and\nexposes slave wives to the unbridled lust of masters and overseers!\n\n\"With the consent of their masters slaves may marry * * * but whilst in\na state of slavery it cannot produce any _civil effect_, because slaves\nare _deprived of all civil rights_.\" (_Judge Mathews._)\n\n\"A slave cannot even contract matrimony, the association which takes\nplace among slaves and is _called_ marriage, being properly designated\nby the word _contubernium_, a relation which has no sanctity, and to\nwhich no civil rights are attached.\" (_Judge Stroud._)\n\n\"A slave has never maintained an action against the violator of his\nbed.\" (_Daniel Dulany, Att'y Gen. Md._)\n\n\"Slaves were not entitled to the conditions of matrimony, and\ntherefore they had no relief in cases of adultery.\" (_Dr. Taylor._)\n\n\"Marriage is a civil ordinance they cannot enjoy. Our laws do not\nrecognize this relation as existing among them, and of course, do not\nenforce by any sanction, the observance of its duties. Indeed, until\nslavery waxeth old and tendeth to decay, there cannot be any legal\nrecognition of the marriage rite, or the enforcement of its consequent\nduties. For all the regulations on this subject _would limit the\nmaster's absolute right of property_ in the slaves. In his disposal\nof them he could no longer be at liberty to consult merely his own\ninterests. He could no longer separate the wife and the husband to suit\nthe convenience or interest of the purchaser.\" (_Address of the Synod\nof Ky._)\n\nThe laws intend to make slaves absolute property, and hence no relation\nis legalized which would detract from the value of that property. The\ninterest of the _owner_ alone is consulted. These laws, horrible as\nthey appear, are entirely consistent with _chattel slavery_. And the\ngeneral _practice_ upon these laws comes up fully to their spirit.\nWhenever the convenience, interest or passion of a master requires it,\nslaves are sold and scattered abroad without the slightest regard to\nthose dear and sacred connections, which they regard, and which God,\nno doubt, regards as marriage. In newspaper advertisements for runaway\nslaves it is frequently stated that the fugitive property was bought at\na certain place \"where he has a wife,\" and the probability is that he\nis \"lurking about that place.\" An advertisement in a New Orleans paper,\nafter describing the slave Charles, as \"six feet high,\" \"copper color,\"\nrather \"pleasing appearance,\" adds, in order that the pursuers may have\nsome clue to his whereabouts, \"it is more than probable that he will\nmake his way to Tennessee, as he has a wife now living there.\"\n\nAnother advertises the runaway \"Ned,\" of \"copper color, full forehead.\"\n\"Ned,\" continues the notice, \"was purchased in Richmond of Mr. Goodin,\nand has a wife in that vicinity.\"\n\nAnother describes a runaway woman, and suggests that she may be lurking\nabout \"in the country where her husband is owned.\"\n\nThese are very natural suggestions. A husband, though a slave, and\nbound to his wife by no legal tie, is not unfrequently to the slave\nwife all that _husband_ means, and if that wife escape from her\nunfeeling oppressors, who have carried her away to a distant State,\nit is quite natural that she should bend her steps toward the partner\nof her bosom, and subject herself to incredible hardships and dangers\nthat she might see his face once more, and unburden to him her\nsorrow-ladened heart.\n\nAnd that wife, though a slave, unprotected by the laws, driven by the\nshameful lash, insulted, disgraced and neglected, is a _wife_ still.\nAnd when \"Ned,\" as he is called, runs away, it is quite natural that\nhe should, impelled by a husband's love, seek out the hut where years\nbefore he had been suddenly separated from her. These advertisements\nfor husbands who are supposed to be \"lurking about\" in search of their\nwives, and of wives hunting for their husbands, tell a sad tale. What\nhusband or wife can read them without deep sorrow?\n\nThe following statement from the pen of an eye witness will illustrate\nscenes which are being enacted continually in the prosecution of the\ninter-state slave trade.\n\n\"As I went on board the steamboat I noticed eight <DW52> men,\nhandcuffed and chained together in pairs, four women and eight or ten\nchildren of the apparent ages of from four to ten years, all standing\ntogether in the bow of the boat, in charge of a man standing near them.\n* * * Coming near them, I perceived they were all greatly agitated;\nand, on inquiry I found they were all slaves, who had been born and\nraised in North Carolina and had just been sold to a speculator, who\nwas now taking them to the Charleston market. Upon the shore there\nwas a number of <DW52> persons, women and children, awaiting the\ndeparture of the boat; and my attention was particularly attracted\nby two  females of uncommonly respectable appearance, neatly\nattired, who stood together, a little distance from the crowd, and upon\nwhose countenance was depicted the keenest sorrow. As the last bell was\ntolling, I saw the tears gushing from their eyes, and they raised their\nneat cotton aprons and wiped their faces under the cutting anguish of\nsevered affection. They were the wives of two of the men in chains.\nThere, too, were mothers and sisters, weeping at the departure of their\nsons and brothers; and there, too, were fathers, taking the last look\nof their wives and children. My whole attention was directed to those\non shore, as they seemed to stand in solemn and submissive silence,\noccasionally giving utterance to the intensity of their feelings by a\nsigh or a stifled groan. As the boat was loosed from her moorings, they\ncast a distressed, lingering look to those on board, and turned away\nin silence. My eye now turned to those in the boat; and although I had\ntried to control my feelings amidst my sympathies for those on shore,\nI could conceal them no longer, and I found myself literally 'weeping\nwith those that wept.' I stood near them, and when one of the husbands\nsaw his wife upon the shore wave her hand for the last time, in token\nof her affection, his manly efforts to restrain his feelings gave\nway, and fixing his watery eyes upon her, he exclaimed, 'This is the\nmost distressing thing of all! My dear wife and children, farewell!'\nThe husband of the other wife stood weeping in silence, and with his\nmanacled hands raised to his face, as he looked upon her for the last\ntime. Of the poor women on board; three of them had husbands whom they\nleft behind. One of them had three children, another had two, and the\nthird had none. These husbands and fathers were among the throng upon\nthe shore, witnessing the departure of their wives and children, and\nas they took their leave of them, they were sitting together upon\nthe floor of the boat sobbing in silence, but giving utterance to no\ncomplaint. But the distressing scene was not yet ended. Sailing down\nthe Cape Fear river twenty-five miles, we touched at the little village\nof Smithport, on the south side of the river. It was at this place that\none of these slaves lived, and here was his wife and five children;\nand while at work on Monday last, his purchaser took him away from\nhis family, carried him in chains to Wilmington, where he had since\nremained in jail. As we approached the wharf, a flood of tears gushed\nfrom his eyes, and anguish seemed to have pierced his heart. The boat\nstopped but a moment, and as she left, he bid farewell to some of his\nacquaintances whom he saw upon the shore, exclaiming, 'Boys, I wish\nyou well; tell Molly (meaning his wife) and the children I wish them\nwell, and hope God will bless them.' At that moment he espied his\nwife on the stoop of a house some rods from the shore, and with one\nhand which was not in the handcuffs, he pulled off his old hat, and\nwaving it toward her, exclaimed, 'Farewell!' As he saw by the waving\nof her apron that she recognized him, he leaned back upon the railing,\nand with a faltering voice repeated, 'Farewell, forever.' After a\nmoment's silence, conflicting passions seemed to tear open his heart,\nand he exclaimed, 'What have I done that I should suffer this doom?\nOh, my wife and children, I want to live no longer!' and then the big\ntear rolled down his cheek, which he wiped away with the palm of his\nunchained hand, looked once more upon the mother of his five children,\nand the turning of the boat hid her face from him forever.\"\n\n\nANOTHER EXAMPLE.\n\n\"I shall never forget the scene which took place in the city of St.\nLouis while I was yet in slavery. A man and his wife, both slaves,\nwere brought from the country to the city for sale. They were taken to\nthe rooms of Austin & Savage, auctioneers. Several slave speculators,\nwho are always to be found at auctions where slaves are to be sold,\nwere present. The man was first put up and sold to the highest bidder.\nThe wife was next ordered to ascend the platform. I was present. She\nslowly obeyed the order. The auctioneer commenced, and soon several\nhundred dollars were bid. My eyes were intensely fixed on the face of\nthe woman, whose cheeks were wet with tears. But a conversation between\nthe slave and his new master soon arrested my attention. I drew near\nthem to listen. The slave was begging his new master to purchase his\nwife. Said he, 'Master, if you will only buy Fanny I know you will get\nthe worth of your money. She is a good cook, a good washer, and her\nmistress liked her very much. If you will only buy her how happy I will\nbe!' The new master replied that he did not want her, _but, if she\nsold cheap_, he would purchase her. I watched the countenance of the\nman while the different persons were bidding on his wife. When his new\nmaster bid you could see the smile on his countenance, and the tears\nstop, but as another would, you could see the countenance change, and\nthe tears start afresh. * * But this suspense did not last long. The\nwife was struck off to the highest bidder, who proved to be not the\nowner of her husband. As soon as they became aware that they were to\nbe separated, they both burst into tears; and as she descended from\nthe auction stand, the husband walking up to her and taking her by the\nhand, said, 'Well, Fanny we are to part forever on earth. You have been\na good wife to me. I did all I could to get my new master to buy you\nbut he did not want you. I hope you will try to meet me in heaven. I\nshall try to meet you there.' The wife made no reply but her sobs and\ncries told too well her own feelings.\" (_Narrative of William Brown._)\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IV.\n\nSlavery Illustrated--Continued.\n\nTHE CHATTEL PRINCIPLE IN PRACTICE.\n\n\n3. _Slavery disregards the parental and filial relations._ The family\nis a type of heaven. It is the foundation of the social system--of\nsocial order, refinement and happiness. Destroy this relation and the\nmost enlightened people will speedily relapse into barbarism. It is\na God-instituted relation, and around it Jesus Christ has thrown the\nsolemn sanction of his authority. Nature implants in the hearts of\nparents an affection for their offspring which is sweeter than life\nand stronger than death; and this affection, when associated with\nintelligence and religion, eminently fits them to care for helpless\ninfancy, to guide the feet of inexperienced youth, and to lead the\nopening heart and expanding mind to virtue and to God. Without the\nsoothing, ennobling and virtue-inspiring influences which emanate from\nthe domestic hearth, this world, I fear, would become a pandemonium.\n\nBut slavery, true to its leading principle, utterly disregards and\nruthlessly tramples upon the parental and filial relations. As soon as\na child is born of a slave-mother it is put down on the table of stock\nand is henceforth subject to the conditions of property. The father\ncannot say--\"This is my son. I will train him up in the fear of God,\nbestow upon him a liberal education and by help divine make a true man\nof him, that he may be my staff in old age.\" No, the slaveholder has\na usurped claim upon the boy, which, in the code of the \"lower law,\"\nannihilates entirely the father's claim. The mother is not permitted\nto press the new born babe to her throbbing bosom and rejoice over it,\nsaying--\"This is my daughter--I will by the assistance of grace give\nher tender mind a pious inclination, encourage her to walk in the path\nof virtue and religion, to seek the 'good part,' chosen by Mary of old,\nthat she may become an ornament of her sex.\" No, that female child is\na valuable part of the planter's stock, and the mother is encouraged\nto nurse it well that it may bring a high price in the market!\nParents have no more to say as to the disposition of their children\nthan animals have as to what shall be done with their young. There\nis not a law in any State, if we may except Louisiana, which imposes\nthe slightest restraint upon masters who may be disposed to sell the\nchildren of slaves. In Louisiana an old law prohibits the separation\nof slave children from their mothers before they are ten years of age.\nBut this law, were it not a dead letter as we are assured it is, would\nafford but a trifling mitigation of the wrong. At any time the master\nmay gather up all the saleable children on his plantation, submit\nthem to the inspection of a trader, strike a bargain for the lot, and\nthen start them off like a drove of young cattle, without saying one\nword about it to the fathers or mothers of those children. And it\noften occurs that when the slave mother returns from the field, weary\nwith the toils of the day, she finds her hut desolate. Where are my\nchildren? she asks. She calls--no answer--and is presently informed by\na fellow-slave that they are sold and gone! Yes--a christian (?) master\nhas taken advantage of her absence and sent them off without giving her\na parting word with them! They shall never more return! And yet this\ndistressed mother has no redress.\n\nMaternal love flows in a slave-mother's bosom with all its wonted\ndepth and intensity, and the total disregard of this affection is the\noccasion of the deepest sorrows recorded in the annals of slavery.\n\n\"In slaveholding States, except in Louisiana no law exists to prevent\nthe violent separation of parents from their children.\" (_Stroud._) A\nslave has no more legal authority over his child than a cow has over\nher calf. (_Jay._) John Davis, a dealer in slaves at Hamburg, S. C.,\nadvertises that he has on hands, direct from Va., \"one hundred and\ntwenty likely young <DW64>s of both sexes; among them small girls,\nsuitable for nurses, and several small boys without their mothers.\"\n\nFrederick Douglass relates that \"when he was three years old his mother\nwas sent to work on a plantation eight or ten miles distant, and after\nthat he never saw her except in the night. After her days toil she\nwould occasionally walk over to her child, lie down with him in her\narms, hush him to sleep in her bosom, then rise up and walk back again\nto be ready for her field work by daylight.\"--_Key to Uncle Tom's\nCabin._\n\nThe following incident occurred within the present year (1853.) We copy\nfrom the _Cleveland True Democrat_.\n\n\"It will be remembered by some of our citizens that about two or\nthree months since, a <DW52> man visited our city for the purpose of\nobtaining money enough to buy his child that was held as a slave in\nKentucky. Through the generosity of J. H. Smith and his congregation,\nwith some added by private individuals, the amount was raised, and the\nhappy <DW64> went on his way rejoicing. Now comes the saddest part of\nthe tale. When the poor <DW52> man arrived at his home, he immediately\nhanded the money, to obtain which had cost him so much labor, over\nto a friend, who started immediately to Kentucky. Arriving there, the\nmoney was laid before the master by the gentleman, when to the utter\nastonishment of the latter, the slaveholder burst into a fiendish\nlaugh, and said 'he'd be ---- if he would sell the boy at any price.'\nHe refused all terms, laughed at all exhortations, and finally ordered\nthe gentleman who wished to purchase the boy out of the house. He left\nsorrowfully, knowing how his bad success would affect the father, who\nwas in a delirium of joy at the idea of seeing his long lost son.\nImagine the feeling of that man when it was communicated to him that\nhis boy was lost forever. Our informant tells us that he said not a\nword, nor wept; but any one familiar with a human heart, could tell\nwhat agony that poor black man was in. He seems to have grown ten years\nolder, and it is feared, unless some change takes place, that he will\nsoon die. His life seems worse than death, and he loudly prays for the\nlatter to come.\"\n\nThe holder of that boy only did what the laws allowed him to do, and\nhis conduct was in perfect consistency with _chattel_ slavery. Men can\ndo as they like about selling the property which the law allows them.\n\nScenes of the most provoking and heart-rending character, scenes in\nwhich humanity is outraged, scenes which would bring the blood to the\ncheek of a savage, even to behold, are enacted in all the Southern\nStates from day to day, with seeming unconcern! The most bitter cries\npierce the skies and go up to heaven apparently unheard by man. \"Here\nis a man, a slave-trader, driving before him two boys with a hickory\nstick, and carrying a child under his arm. At a little distance is the\n_mother_ with chains on her wrists, stretching out her hand toward\nthe babe; but is prevented, because a strong man holds her while she\nendeavors to follow her shrieking babe and her sobbing boys. The owner\nwho sold the two boys, stands calmly, unmoved, smoking a cigar, while\nthe overseer holds the mother, and the trader whips off the boys and\ncarries with him the screaming child.\" This is precisely the way that\nother live stock is sold, and those dealers are only doing what the law\nallows. No one is surprised at them. They may be respectable citizens\nand good church members!\n\nChristian reader, pass not over these facts with a light heart. I\nbeseech you to think upon them as a man and a christian ought. You love\nhome, you esteem family relations the dearest and most sacred upon\nearth, and you would resist with all your power a tyranny which would\ninvade your own family circle and carry away your children for the\nexclusive benefit of others. For humanity's sake let your sympathies go\nout in behalf of the millions of your fellow creatures who are deprived\nof all the blessings of family and home. Have you not a heart to bleed\nfor those mothers whose children, in tender youth, are ruthlessly\ntorn away from them for no higher object than the pecuniary advantage\nof their masters? J. G. Whittier, the \"slave's poet,\" represents in\nmournful strains the Virginia slave mother's lament for her daughters,\nsold and gone to the far South.\n\n      Gone, gone--sold and gone,\n      To the rice-swamp dank and lone.\n    Where the slave-whip ceaseless swings,\n    Where the noisesome insect stings,\n    Where the fever demon strews\n    Poison with the falling dews,\n    Where the sickly sunbeams glare\n    Through the hot and misty air,--\n      Gone, gone,--sold and gone,\n      To the rice-swamp dank and lone,\n      From Virginia's hills and waters,--\n      Woe is me, my stolen daughters!\n\n      Gone, gone,--sold and gone,\n      To the rice-swamp dank and lone.\n    There no mother's eye is near them,\n    There no mother's ear can hear them;\n    Never, when the torturing lash\n    Seams their back with many a gash,\n    Shall a mother's kindness bless them,\n    Or a mother's arms caress them.\n      Gone, gone, &c.\n\n      Gone, gone,--sold and gone,\n      To the rice-swamp dank and lone.\n    O, when weary, sad, and slow,\n    From the fields at night they go,\n    Faint with toil, and racked with pain,\n    To their cheerless homes again,--\n    There no brother's voice shall greet them,\n    There no father's welcome meet them.\n      Gone, gone, &c.\n\n      Gone, gone,--sold and gone,\n      To the rice-swamp dank and lone.\n    From the tree whose shadow lay\n    On their childhood's place of play;\n    From the cool spring where they drank;\n    Rock and hill, and rivulet bank;\n    From the solemn house of prayer,\n    And the holy counsels there,--\n      Gone, gone, &c.\n\n      Gone, gone, sold and gone,\n      To the rice-swamp dank and lone;\n    Toiling through the weary day,\n    And at night the spoiler's prey.\n    O, that they had earlier died,\n    Sleeping calmly, side by side,\n    Where the tyrant's power is o'er,\n    And the fetter galls no more!\n      Gone, gone, &c.\n\n      Gone, gone,--sold and gone,\n      To the rice-swamp dank and lone.\n    By the holy love He beareth,\n    By the bruised reed He spareth,\n    O, may He to whom alone\n    All their cruel wrongs are known\n    Still their hope and refuge prove,\n    With a more than mother's love!\n      Gone, gone, &c.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER V.\n\nSlavery Illustrated--Continued.\n\nTHE CHATTEL PRINCIPLE IN PRACTICE.\n\n\n4. _Slavery utterly impoverishes its victims._ The earth is an\ninheritance bestowed upon man by the common Father of all; hence every\nhuman being has an indefeasible right to live upon it and to acquire a\npossession in it. This right is not simply conventional, but it belongs\nto man as _man_.\n\nNow slavery is directly opposed to this law of nature. It strips a\nslave of everything, and of the power to acquire anything. No one is\nso poor as a slave. He cannot own a coat, or a pair of shoes, a house,\nor a foot of land. No industry, economy, skill or patriotism can\nrelease him from this state of destitution, because it is a logical\nresult of the relation in which he is placed by the slave code. Being\nhimself a chattel, whatever he acquires or in any way gains possession\nof, is, as a matter of course, the acquirement and possession of his\nmaster. Hence, while living in a land of universal plenty, and toiling\nincessantly upon the fruitful earth, created and adorned for the use of\nevery man, no alms-house pauper is so wretchedly impoverished as the\nAmerican slave.\n\n\"Slaves have no legal rights in things, real or personal; but\nwhatever they may acquire, belongs in point of law to their masters.\"\n(_Stroud._) \"Slaves are incapable of inheriting or transmitting\nproperty.\" (_Civil Code._)\n\nHere is a case which will illustrate the point in hand. A slave by the\nname of Frederick enlisted and fought bravely through the American\nRevolution. In 1821 his name was found on the muster roll, and a\nwarrant was issued granting him the soldier's bounty of a thousand\nacres of land. Now whose land was that? Reason and justice would\nanswer, it belonged to the black veteran and his heirs forever. But the\nheirs of Frederick's old master understood something about slave law,\nand brought the case into court that it might be legally determined\nwho owned the bounty land. After much learned argument, Judge Catron\ndelivered the following decision:--\"Frederick, the slave of Col.\nPatton, earned this warrant by his services in the continental line.\nWHAT IS EARNED BY THE SLAVE BELONGS TO THE MASTER, by the common law,\nthe civil law, and the recognized rules of property in the slaveholding\nStates of this Union.\"\n\nThis was an extreme case, and as Pres. Blanchard observes, \"if\nShylock's bond of human flesh might have been relaxed, if ever the laws\nof slavery might have been mitigated in practice, it ought to have been\nin the case of this veteran soldier.\" But the \"pound of flesh\" was\nexacted. The law reducing slaves to utter pauperism is inexorable. Poor\nFrederick had no more claim to that land than Col. Patton's horse had.\n\n5. _Slavery authorizes the violation of the most solemn contracts._\nStrictly speaking, a slave cannot become a party to a legal contract.\nHis inability to do so arises out of his relation to society, and the\nevil genius which presides at all times over legislation for slaves\nis very careful to permit nothing to be enacted, unless from absolute\nnecessity, that can be construed into an acknowledgment that the slave\nis a man and has rights which he is authorized to maintain. Hence a\ncontract with a slave may be violated with impunity. He may suffer\nthe most flagrant wrongs, but is barred from courts of justice and can\nobtain no relief.\n\nOn this point the following authorities are quoted.\n\n\"Chancery cannot enforce a contract between a master and his slave\nthough the slave perform his part.\" (_Wheeler._) \"One principle\nprevails in all the States * * and that is that a slave cannot make a\ncontract, _not even the contract of marriage_.\" (_ib._)\n\n\"In the case of Sawney _vs._ Carter the court refused to enforce a\npromise by a master to emancipate his slave where the conditions of the\npromise had been partly complied with. The court proceeded upon the\nprinciple that it was not competent to a court in Chancery to enforce a\ncontract between a master and slave, even though the contract should be\nfully complied with on the part of the slave.\" (_Goodell._)\n\nIn numerous instances masters and other white persons have taken\nadvantage of this unjust and malicious feature of slave law. It is\nno uncommon occurrence for a slave to contract with his master for\nfreedom. He agrees to raise, by extra labor, a specified sum of money\nwhich is to be the price of his liberty. Animated with the hope of\nobtaining that precious right for which he has long sighed, he endures\nincredible hardships, toils night after night, and, at the end of\nmany weary years, lays before his master a part or the whole of the\nprice agreed upon. Now when this is done, the master may, in perfect\naccordance with American slave law, pocket the hard-earned money and\nsell the slave to the next trader, or keep him until death in his own\nservice. If the slave repine at this treatment, he may be whipped\ninto submission. If he run away, he may be pursued with revolvers and\nblood-hounds, and we are all required by the Fugitive Slave Law to help\ncatch him and carry him back to his faithless master. A case occurred\nwithin the present year in Ky., which illustrates this odious feature\nof slave law. Here is a brief statement of the facts.\n\n\"Sam Norris, a <DW52> man, has been living in Covington about five\nyears, has married a free <DW52> woman and has had by her several\nchildren. He belongs to a Mr. J. N. Patton, of Virginia, who permitted\nhim to come to Covington, and engage in whatever services he saw\nproper, on condition that Sam would pay him out of his earnings, a\nstipulated sum per annum, we believe, about $100. The surplus, whatever\nit might be, was to belong to the slave. Sam was punctual for several\nyears. He was sober and industrious, and in his humble way, very\nprosperous. About two years ago Mr. Patton came west on a visit and\nagreed with Sam that if he would pay him the sum of $400 he would give\nhim his freedom. Sam gratefully accepted the proposal, and at once paid\ndown out of his hard earnings $135 and has since given his master some\n$40 or $50 more.\n\n\"Patton now comes forward to rescind the contract and claim his slave.\nThe case was yesterday decided by the Hon. Judge Pryor, in favor of\nPatton. In delivering his decision, his Honor stated the following\nfacts:\n\n\"1st. That the laws of Kentucky recognize but two modes of liberating\nslaves, by will and by deeds of emancipation.\n\n\"2d. That a slave cannot make a contract.\n\n\"3d. That the contract was executory, and at the time fixed for the\n<DW64>'s freedom, future and contingent.\n\n\"4th. That so long as Sam was a slave, the master was entitled to his\nservices, and the money he (Patton) had received was in law his own.\n\n\"The opinion was able and elaborate, and the authorities numerous and\ndecided. His Honor characterized the case as one of great \"hardship and\ncruelty,\" and every one in the court room seemed to sympathize deeply\nwith the poor <DW64>.\"\n\nA lady at St. Louis, Mo., related to Mrs. F. D. Gage the following\ncircumstance, which transpired in that city a short time ago.\n\n\"I had, said the lady, an old <DW52> woman washing for me a few years\nago, for four or five years--one of the most faithful, truthful,\nand pious women, I ever knew--black or white. She was once a slave,\nbelonging to Davenport. But he was a kinder man than other men, and\ngave her the privilege of buying her freedom for one thousand dollars!\nThis sum the old and faithful creature earned and paid herself. Only\nthink of it!--one thousand dollars for the privilege of buying what our\nwise statesmen call the \"inalienable right of men,\" bestowed by the\nCreator. When free she stipulated for the freedom of her son, and this,\nwith years of toil, she earned; and when he came to manhood he too was\nfree.\n\n\"Think of this, fair mothers of our land! Ye who hug to your heart the\nchildren of your love, and feel a mother's love and this for them.\nYou work to clothe, to school and make comfortable those dependent\nupon your care; but which of you can measure the toil that this poor,\nstricken mother had to bear, ere she filed away the galling chains\nfrom the limbs of her child!\n\n\"Well, when the mother and son were free, they pledged themselves to\nthe owner of another plantation, to pay another thousand for the wife\nand child of the ransomed son. The master allowed the woman to come to\nthe city, and live with her husband, and work on her own hook--paying\nhim so much per month. Three hundred dollars has been paid. Some time\nin April, this oppressed class had a public tea-party and fair, to\ngather funds to furnish their church, a neat edifice on ---- St. The\nmother, son, and wife were there, returned home, or started home, about\nmidnight--the horses ran away, and George, attempting to get off the\ncarriage to assist the driver, fell, and his head was dashed to pieces\nagainst the corner of a curb-stone.\n\n\"He died instantly, and the morning papers announced the fact, and\nspoke of him as \"highly worthy and respectable, and a member of ----\nChurch.\" But no sooner had the owner of Susan, the wife, heard of\nGeorge's death, than he hurried to the city post-haste, and took the\nafflicted wife from their house, drove her to the Slave auction, and\nsold her to southern traders.\n\n\"Thus were the three hundred dollars lost to those who earned it, the\nold, toiling mother left childless; and the young wife, but yesterday\nrejoicing in the strength and hope of freedom and love, suddenly\nturned into a chattel, and sold \"away down South,\" to be a beast of\nburden--perhaps for a Legree.\"\n\n\"When did it happen inquired Mrs. Gage?\"\n\n\"Why, here, lately. I met the old mother as I came from the \"Fourth\"\nPic nic. She was dressed in deep mourning. I had not seen her for a\nlong time, for they had got them a home, and she did not wash any more.\nI asked her what had happened, and she told me all. O! Mrs. G., how it\nmade me feel! I celebrating our liberty, she, a woman--a wife--a mother\nmourning over enslaved and doubly-wronged children.\n\n\"\"I know there is a God, Mrs. Lilly,\" the poor bowed creature said to\nme, \"I know there is a good God, and a Jesus, or I should give up in\ndespair, and sometimes I do; I look up and down and all round, and\n_there is no light_!\"\"\n\n_Slavery leaves its victims a prey to unchecked avarice._ What\nprotection has a slave against the avarice of his master? Let us see. A\nlaw of South Carolina provides that slaves shall \"not labor to exceed\n_fifteen hours_\" out of twenty four. This is called protection!\n\n\"The slave is driven to the field in the morning about four o'clock.\nThe general calculation is to get them to work by day-light. The time\nfor breakfast is between nine and ten o'clock. This meal is sometimes\neaten 'bite and work,' others allow fifteen minutes, and this is the\nonly rest the slave has while in the field.\" (_G. W. Westgate._)\n\n\"In North Carolina, the legal standard of food for a slave must not be\nless than a _quart of corn per day_. In Louisiana the legal standard is\none barrel of Indian corn--or the equivalent thereof in rice, beans or\nother grain, and a pint of salt, every month.\" \"The quantity allowed by\ncustom,\" said T. S. Clay of Georgia, \"is a peck of corn per week.\"\n\nWhen they return to their miserable huts at night, they find not there\nthe means of comfortable rest, but on the cold ground they must lie,\nwithout covering, and shiver while they slumber.\n\n\"The clothing of slaves by day, and their covering by night, are\ninadequate either for comfort or decency, in any or most of the\nslaveholding States.\" (_Elliott._)\n\nIt is notorious that slaves, on large plantations especially, are\nmiserably fed, clothed and lodged, and during busy seasons of the year,\nmost unmercifully worked.\n\n6. _Slavery abandons its victims to unbridled lust._ Against a master's\nlusts a slave has no protection. It is an established principle of\nthe slave code that the _testimony_ of a slave against a white person\ncannot be received in a court of justice. A slave woman who may be\nabused cannot resort to the law. To whom can she appeal? To God only.\nThe master may torture her in any way, so that he take not her life, in\norder to _force_ a compliance with his base designs!\n\n\"A very beautiful girl belonging to the estate of John French, a\ndeceased gambler of New Orleans, was sold a few days since, for the\nround sum of _seven thousand dollars_! An ugly old bachelor, named\nGouch, was the purchaser. The _Picayune_ says that she was remarkable\nfor her beauty and intelligence; and that there was considerable strife\nas to who should be the purchaser.\" (_Elliott._)\n\nAny one can understand why that beautiful, intelligent slave girl\nbrought SEVEN THOUSAND DOLLARS! She was bought for a sacrifice to\nlust! And the law gave her no protection. It required her to submit\nunresistingly to the will of her owner and that owner was a base\nlibertine!\n\n7. _Slavery exposes its victims to the fury of unrestrained passion._\nA master in a violent passion may fall upon his slave, and beat him\nunmercifully without the slightest provocation and _the slave has no\nredress_.\n\n\"The master is not liable for an assault and battery committed upon the\nperson of his slave.\" (_Wheeler._)\n\nA Methodist minister, Rev. J. Boucher, relates the following incident:\n\n\"While on the Alabama circuit I spent the Sabbath with an old circuit\npreacher, who was also a doctor, living near 'the horse shoe,'\ncelebrated as Gen. Jackson's battle ground. On Monday morning early,\nhe was reading Pope's Messiah to me, when his wife called him out. I\nglanced my eye out of the window, and saw a slave man standing by, and\nthey consulting over him. Presently the doctor took a rawhide from\nunder his coat, and began to cut up the half-naked back of the slave.\nI saw six or seven inches of the skin turn up perfectly white at every\nstroke, till the whole back was red with gore. The lacerated man cried\nout some at first; but at every blow the doctor cried, 'won't ye hush?\nwon't ye hush?' till the slave finally stood still and groaned. As soon\nas he had done, the doctor came in panting, almost out of breath, and,\naddressing me, said, 'Won't you go to prayer with us, sir?' I fell on\nmy knees and prayed, but what I said I knew not. When I came out the\npoor creature had crept up and knelt by the door during prayer; and his\nback was a gore of blood quite to his heels.\"\n\nNow this slave could not appeal to the law for redress or protection;\nand the same cruel beating might have been repeated every week until\ndeath had come to his relief, and the poor wretch must only bear\nit--that is all. He was wholly at the mercy of the passions of his\nmaster.\n\n8. _Slavery subjects its victims to uncontrolled and irresponsible\ntyranny._ Irresponsible power cannot be safely entrusted with the\nwisest and most humane persons. It is always liable to great abuses.\nBut when all sorts of men are invested with it, when it can be\npurchased with money, terrible beyond conception are its results.\nWoe to the unhappy man who is put absolutely into the power of a\nhard hearted villain. But slaves are property and are exposed to the\nirresponsible power of their masters.\n\nA master or overseer may, with impunity inflict upon a slave, without\nthe slightest provocation, any kind of torture, which can be endured,\nand impose upon him all kinds of sufferings, hardships and insults.\n\nHe may clothe him in rags, feed him upon corn, lodge him in a mere\npen of poles, work him beyond his ability, kick him, cuff him, knock\nhim down, put him in stocks, strip him, tie him to a stake, and with\na keen lash lay on his bare back until the blood runs in a stream to\nhis heels. The laws not only allow this to be done, but it is done\ncontinually. _Women_, yes, tender, delicate women; daughters, sisters\nand mothers are unprotected by the laws. They may be, and are tied to\nthe whipping post; every day that we live, this _is_ done, and their\nquivering flesh mangled by the cow-skin.\n\nDr. Howe visited a prison in New Orleans, in which fugitive slaves are\nconfined, and to which many slaves are brought by their masters to be\nwhipped, for which punishment a small fee is paid. In a letter to Hon.\nCharles Sumner, he says:\n\n\"Entering a large paved court-yard, around which ran galleries filled\nwith slaves of all ages, sexes and colors, I heard the snap of a\nwhip, every stroke of which sounded like the sharp crack of a pistol.\nI turned my head, and beheld a sight which absolutely chilled me to\nthe marrow of my bones, and gave me, for the first time in my life,\nthe sensation of my hair stiffening at the roots. There lay a black\ngirl flat upon her face, on a board, her two thumbs tied, and fastened\nto one end, her feet tied, and drawn tightly to the other end, while\na strap passed over the small of her back, and, fastened around the\nboard, compressed her closely to it. Below the strap she was entirely\nnaked. By her side, and six feet off, stood a huge monster with a long\nwhip, which he applied with dreadful power and wonderful precision.\nEvery stroke brought away a strip of skin, which clung to the lash, or\nfell quivering on the pavement, while the blood followed after it. The\npoor creature writhed and shrieked, and in a voice which showed alike\nher fear of death and her dreadful agony, screamed to her master, who\nstood at her head, 'O, spare my life! don't cut my soul out!' But still\nfell the horrid lash; still strip after strip peeled off from the skin;\ngash after gash was cut in her living flesh, until it became a livid\nand bloody mass of raw and quivering muscle. It was with the greatest\ndifficulty I refrained from springing upon the torturer, and arresting\nhis lash; but, alas! what could I do, but turn aside and hide my tears\nfor the sufferer, and my blushes for humanity? This was in a public\nand regularly-organized prison; the punishment was one recognized and\nauthorized by the law. But think you that the poor wretch had committed\na heinous offense, and had been convicted thereof and sentenced to the\nlash? Not at all. She was brought by her master to be whipped by the\ncommon executioner, without trial, judge or jury, just at his beck or\nnod, for some real or supposed offense, or to gratify his own whim or\nmalice. And he may bring her day after day, without cause assigned, and\ninflict any number of lashes he pleases, short of twenty-five, provided\nonly he pays the fee. Or, if he choose, he may have a private whipping\nboard on his own premises, and brutalize himself there.\"\n\nAll this is done according to law. \"We cannot allow,\" said Judge\nRuffin, \"the right of the master to be brought into discussion in the\ncourts of justice. The slave, to remain a slave, must be made sensible\nthat there is NO APPEAL FROM HIS MASTER.\" The same Judge decided--that\n\"THE POWER OF THE MASTER MUST BE ABSOLUTE IN ORDER TO RENDER THE\nSUBMISSION OF THE SLAVE PERFECT.\" How dreadful is this tyranny!\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VI.\n\nSlavery Illustrated--Continued.\n\nSEVERITY OF THE LAWS AGAINST SLAVES.\n\n\nAs the laws provide for the degradation of the slave to a state of the\nmost stupid ignorance, it would naturally be supposed that little would\nbe required in the way of obedience, and that when a slave did trespass\na very light punishment would be meted out to him. Evidently this would\nbe the humane and just course, for where little is given little should\nbe required. In this, however, as in most other things slavery is\nprecisely contrary to nature, humanity and reason.\n\nSlaves are punished by the laws for numerous acts which are in\nthemselves perfectly right.\n\n\"For seeking liberty a slave is proclaimed an outlaw and may be\nlawfully killed.\" (_Goodell._) \"He may be punished for attending\nreligious meetings at night. He may be publicly whipped for keeping a\ngun, or a pistol. For visiting a wife or child without a written pass,\nhe may be whipped. For striking a white person, no matter how great the\nprovocation, whipping--and for the second or third offence, DEATH.\"\n(_Goodell._) These are but specimens of the cruel and vexatious laws\nby which the slave's life is embittered. He, poor wretch, must have so\nmany lashes on the bare back for almost every thing which his manhood\nprompts him to do. He must always be on the look out to act and feel\nas a mere brute--he must crouch and bend in constant abjectness or his\nback shall pay the penalty. But for _actual crimes_ the disproportion\nbetween the punishment of slaves and white persons is very great.\n\n\"In Va., by the revised code of 1819, there are seventy-one offenses\nfor which the penalty is death when committed by slaves and imprisonment\nwhen committed by the whites.\" (_Jay's Inquiry._)\n\n\"In Mississippi there are seventeen offenses punishable with death when\ncommitted by slaves, which, if committed by white persons, are either\npunished by fines or imprisonment, or punishment not provided for by\nthe statute or at common law.\" (_Goodell._)\n\nA law of Md., provides that--\"Any slave for rambling in the night,\nor riding on horseback or running away, may be punished by whipping,\ncropping and branding in the cheeks or otherwise, not rendering him\nunfit for labor.\"\n\nAnd yet, notwithstanding the extreme and unreasonable partiality and\nseverity of these laws, it is not unusual for the barbarous spirit of\nslavery to overleap them in its unmerciful punishment of the slave.\nWhen the slave commits a high crime, not unfrequently does a furious\nmob seize him, and hang him up without trial as if he were a mean dog.\nCalmness and solemnity, which should always characterize the punishment\nof the _greatest_ criminals in christian countries, give place to the\nmost violent and cruel passions. Judgment, mercy, law, humanity, God\nand Christianity, are all forgotten in the hasty and insane desire to\nhave the wretched bondman pushed out of the world. And perhaps the\ncrime which has so violently stirred up the community against him was\ncommitted under the greatest provocations. His soul may have been\nwrithing under a crushing sense of repeated wrongs. His wife may have\nbeen abused before his eyes while he was not permitted to defend her.\nHis daughter may have been dishonored, and he, without appeal for her\nprotection to church or State, compelled to suffer it in silence. And\nhis own back may have been smarting from the maddening lash--and in a\nmoment of frenzy or despair he may have smitten his oppressor to the\nearth.\n\nAnd, for this crime he is treated as a prince of criminals, is hung up\nwithout trial, or perhaps _burned alive_!\n\nOur souls have been harrowed up by a circumstance which transpired\nduring the present year (1853) in the State of Mo. Two <DW64> men for\nthe commission of murder were arrested and tied to a tree, near the\ncounty seat of Jasper co., a fire was kindled around them, and in\nthe presence of two thousand persons, they were burned to death! No\ntime for reflection or repentance was allowed. Not a word of warning\nor exhortation was permitted. Even a humane mode of being killed was\ndenied. But they were, in this year, during the Presidency of _Pierce_,\nin the State of Missouri, _burned without trial_!\n\nIn 1842 a <DW64> was burned at Union Point, Mississippi. The _Natchez\nFree Trader_ gives the following account of the horrible work.\n\n\"The body was taken and chained to a tree immediately on the bank\nof the Mississippi, on what is called Union Point. Fagots were then\ncollected, and piled around him to which he appeared quite indifferent.\nWhen the work was completed, he was asked what he had to say. He then\nwarned all to take example by him, and asked the prayers of all around;\nhe then called for a drink of water, which was handed to him; he drank\nit, and said, 'Now set fire--I am ready to go in peace!' The torches\nwere lighted and placed in the pile, which soon ignited. He watched\nunmoved the curling flame, that grew until it began to entwine itself\naround and feed upon his body: then he sent forth cries of agony\npainful to the ear, begging some one to blow his brains out; at the\nsame time surging with almost superhuman strength, until the staple\nwith which the chain was fastened to the tree (not being well secured)\ndrew out, and he leaped from the burning pile. At that moment the sharp\nringing of several rifles was heard: the body of the <DW64> fell a\ncorpse on the ground. He was picked up by some two or three, and again\nthrown into the fire and consumed--not a vestige remaining to show that\nsuch a being ever existed.\"\n\nA <DW52> man was burned in St. Louis, Mo., in 1836, in presence of an\nimmense throng of spectators. The _Alton Telegraph_ gives the following\ndescription of the scene.\n\n\"All was silent as death while the executioners were piling wood around\ntheir victim. He said not a word, until feeling that the flames had\nseized upon him. He then uttered an awful howl, attempting to sing\nand pray, then hung his head, and suffered in silence, except in\nthe following instance: After the flames had surrounded their prey,\nhis eyes burnt out of his head, and his mouth seemingly parched to\na cinder, some one in the crowd, more compassionate than the rest,\nproposed to put an end to his misery by shooting him, when it was\nreplied, \"that would be of no use, since he was already out of pain.\"\n\"No, no,\" said the wretch, \"I am not. I am suffering as much as ever;\nshoot me, shoot me.\" \"No,\" said one of the fiends, who was standing\nabout the sacrifice they were roasting, \"he shall not be shot. _I would\nsooner slacken the fire, if that would increase his misery._\"\"[5]\n\nIt may be said that we have in these illustrations of slavery,\nexaggerated. But this can not be the case, for we have given the\nlaws and the practice together, and have furnished the testimony of\neye-witnesses. And we could bring forward a thousand witnesses from\nthe midst of slavery, whose testimony would confirm all we have said.\nYea more; they would declare that half the extent of the evils of this\nhorrible institution are unknown. Hear if you please, a voice from\nNorth Carolina--Mr. Swain:\n\n\"Let any man of spirit and feeling for a moment cast his thoughts\nover this land of slavery--think of the nakedness of some, the hungry\nyearnings of others, the flowing tears and heaving sighs of parting\nrelations, the wailings of _woe_, the bloody cut of the keen lash,\nand the _frightful scream_ that rends the very skies--and all this to\ngratify ambition, lust, pride, avarice, vanity, and other depraved\nfeelings of the human heart. THE WORST IS NOT GENERALLY KNOWN. Were all\nthe miseries, the horrors of slavery, to burst at once into view, a\npeal of seven fold thunder could scarce strike greater alarm.\"\n\nHear the venerable John Rankin, a native and long resident of\nTennessee. (_See Elliot pp. 225._)\n\n\"Many poor slaves are stripped naked, stretched and tied across\nbarrels, or large bags, _and tortured with the lash during hours,\nand even whole days, till their flesh is mangled to the very bones_.\nOthers are stripped and hung up by the arms, their feet are tied\ntogether, and the end of a heavy piece of timber is put between their\nlegs in order to stretch their bodies, and so prepare them for the\ntorturing lash--and in this situation they are often whipped till\ntheir bodies are covered _with blood and mangled flesh_--and, in order\nto add the greatest keenness to their sufferings, their wounds are\nwashed with _liquid salt_! And some of the miserable creatures are\npermitted to hang in that position till they actually _expire_; some\ndie under the lash, others linger about for a time, and at length die\nof their wounds, and many survive, and endure again similar torture.\nThese bloody scenes are _constantly exhibiting in every slaveholding\ncountry--thousands of whips are every day stained in African blood_!\nEven the poor _females_ are not permitted to escape these shocking\ncruelties.\"\n\nAnd finally listen dispassionately to the _Presbyterian Synod of\nKentucky_, composed of those whose interest it was to present slavery\nin as favorable a light as possible. (_See Elliot pp. 225._)\n\n\"This system licenses and produces _great cruelty_. Mangling,\nimprisonment, starvation, every species of torture, may be inflicted\nupon him, [the slave,] and he has no redress. There are now in our\nwhole land two millions of human beings, exposed, defenseless, to\nevery insult, and every injury short of maiming or death, which\ntheir fellow-men may choose to inflict. They suffer all that can be\ninflicted by wanton caprice, by grasping avarice, by brutal lust, by\nmalignant spite, and by insane anger. Their happiness is the sport\nof every whim, and the prey of every passion that may, occasionally\nor habitually, infest the master's bosom. If we could calculate the\namount of woe endured by ill-treated slaves, it would overwhelm every\ncompassionate heart--it would move even the obdurate to sympathy.\nThere is also a vast sum of suffering inflicted upon the slave by\nhumane masters, as a punishment for that idleness and misconduct which\nslavery naturally produces. BRUTAL STRIPES and all the varied kinds of\npersonal indignities, are not the only species of cruelty which slavery\nlicenses.\"\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VII.\n\nSlavery and Religion.\n\n\"CURSED BE CANAAN.\"\n\n\nMany slaveholders and their apologists have sought to find authority\nfor the \"enormity and crime\" of slavery, in the Holy Bible. And we are\nnot surprised that the vile oppressor, smarting under the lashings of\na guilty conscience, and condemned by the united voice of reason and\nhumanity, should fly for refuge from public scorn and condemnation, to\na shelter, however insecure, erected by a perversion of the writings\nand example of those remarkable men, who fill a prominent place in\nsacred history. How consoling it must be to the slaveholder, while\nstanding upon the neck of an unresisting brother, and crushing his\nhumanity into the dust with heartless cruelty, to hear from a doctor\nof divinity that Noah countenanced the enslavement of a part of his\nposterity, that Abraham was an extensive slaveholder, that Moses\nincorporated the system into the only government ever instituted by\ndirect authority from Heaven, and that it received, in its very worst\nform, under the Roman government, the tacit, if not positive sanction\nof Jesus and the apostles.\n\nMy observation sustains me in saying that no class of slaveholders\nare more pertinacious and incorrigible than the religious class--the\nscripture-quoting class. If we are to believe them, slaveholding is not\na sin PER SE, but of itself is a perfectly innocent thing. The very\nbest of men hold slaves, yea, it is, they tell us, the duty of good men\nunder some circumstances to hold slaves. To be sure THEY do not hold\nslaves for \"gain,\" but from motives of pure \"charity,\" or from stern\n\"necessity.\" _They_ and _their_ slaves are ALWAYS in such peculiar\ncases that emancipation would be impolitic, impracticable, even a sin!\nStill, from all appearances, they are as careful to keep their slaves\nfrom running off as common sinners are--their slaves are fed, clothed,\nwhipped, worked, robbed and used up precisely as are the slaves of the\nmost notorious publicans.\n\nAfter having seen how slavery originated, and what it is in theory\nand practice, it may seem useless if not impious to inquire seriously\nwhether a system so manifestly unjust, cruel and diabolical, is\nsanctioned in the Bible; but the confidence with which slaveholders and\ntheir apologists quote it in defense of slavery, and the recklessness\nwith which it is denounced by a class of infidel abolitionists, impel\nus to enter into this inquiry; and in pursuing it we shall endeavor to\nexamine carefully all the arguments relied upon by the advocates of\nhuman bondage. The first passage in order is found in Genesis 9: 25.\n\"And he said, cursed be Canaan, a servant of servants shall he be to\nhis brethren.\"\n\nIt is assumed that this curse was pronounced by divine authority;\nthat the servitude here mentioned is identical with slavery; that the\nprediction of the oppression of a people justifies their oppressors;\nand finally, that American slaves are the identical posterity of Canaan.\n\n1. As it respects the authority of this curse, there is a circumstance\nintimately associated with its utterance which excites a shadow of\ndoubt with regard to its inspiration. \"And Noah awoke from his wine\"\nand pronounced this malediction. Is it not possible that these words\nwere the hasty expression of excited feeling and not the solemn\nenunciation of a divine anathema?\n\n2. But in order to prove the validity of the argument, it must be\nproved that servitude and slavery are relations of essentially the\nsame character, and this cannot be done. Neither philology nor history\naffords the slightest proof of the assumption that to be a servant of\nservants is equivalent to being a _slave of slaves_.\n\n3. But does the prediction of the oppression of a people justify that\noppression? Verily it does not. The Lord said unto Abraham that his\nseed should be afflicted in a strange land four hundred years. But who\nwill pretend to justify the Egyptian task-masters on the plea that the\naffliction of Israel had been predicted? The divine prescience sees all\nthings at one glance, and may inspire men to prophesy, but prophecy\ntouches not the moral agency of men. When our Lord was crucified, the\n\"scripture was fulfilled,\" but they who crucified him were murderers,\nnevertheless. Hence, even should we admit that the curse pronounced\non Canaan was of divine authority, and that it meant slavery, no\nstronger apology for slaveholding could be derived therefrom than\nEgyptian oppressors might have drawn from the words of Jehovah, for\nthe affliction of Israel in Egypt four hundred years. The cases are\nparallel.\n\n4. But the argument is utterly baseless because American slaves are not\nthe posterity of Canaan, upon whom the curse was pronounced, and hence\nthat anathema affords just as good an apology for the enslavement of\nEnglishmen as  Americans. Ham had four sons,--Cush, Misriam,\nPhut, and Canaan, and the curse was directed against _Canaan_ or\nCanaan's posterity. But, says one, are not the <DW64>s children of\nCanaan? By no means. No scholar has ever pretended that Canaan was the\nprogenitor of the <DW64> race.\n\nThe sacred penman is very careful to put this matter _beyond dispute_.\nHe says: \"And Canaan begat Sidon his first born, and Heth, and the\nJubisite, and the Amorite, and the Girgasite, and the Hivite, and the\nArkite, and the Sinite, and the Arvadite, and the Zemarite, and the\nHamathite; and afterward were the families of the Canaanites spread\nabroad. And the border of the Canaanites was from Sidon, as thou comest\nto Gerar, unto Gaza; as thou goest unto Sodom and Gomorrah, and Admah\nand Zeboim, even unto Lasha.\" Gen. 10: 15-19. Now these nations and\nboundaries were all located in Asia, and we have no evidence of the\nsubsequent removal of any of the posterity of Canaan to Africa except\nit be the founders of Carthage,--a city which was long mistress of\nthe sea, and the proud rival of imperial Rome. The Carthaginians were\nsupposed to be the descendants of Canaan.\n\nThis curse, therefore, did not allude to slavery, but servitude;\nand as it is a mere prediction of what would be the relation of\nCanaan's posterity it afforded no apology for the oppression of that\nposterity;[6] and finally the Africans and  Americans _are\nnot the descendants of Canaan_, and hence, the passage can have no\napplication to them; and affords _just as good authority_ for the\nenslavement of Englishmen, Dutchmen and Frenchmen as <DW64>s.\n\nHow absurd is the attempt to take this anathema, construe it to\n_mean_ and _justify_ chattel slavery, and then _stretch_ it over the\nposterity, not of Canaan, but of Cush even after the blood of the\nCushites (Moses' wife was a Cushite) has been mingled with the blood\nof the \"first families\" of Virginia, and of all the Southern states. A\nlarge number of slaves are white--much whiter than their masters and\nmistresses. The first Bible argument for slavery appears, when weighed,\n\n    \"Light as a puff of empty air.\"\n\nHave slaveholders no better? We will see.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VIII.\n\nSlavery and Religion--Continued.\n\nPATRIARCHAL SERVITUDE AND SLAVERY.\n\n\nThe next Bible argument for slavery, usually adduced, is founded upon\nthe assumption that the patriarchs were slaveholders, and particular\nstress is placed upon the example of Abraham, \"the friend of God,\" who,\nit is confidently asserted, was an extensive slaveholder.\n\nThe Harmony Presbytery, South Carolina, \"_Resolved_, that slavery has\nexisted from the days of those good old _slaveholders_ and patriarchs,\nAbraham, Isaac and Jacob.\"\n\nThe Presbytery of Tombecbee said: \"In the Bible the state of slavery is\nclearly recognized. Abraham the friend of God had slaves born in his\nhouse and bought with his money.\"\n\nDr. Fuller, in his controversy with Dr. Wayland, assumed that father\nAbraham was a slaveholder, and that his example was a sufficient\nwarrant for slaveholding in all ages. The same position was taken by\nDr. Rice in his debate with Mr. Blanchard. Mr. Fletcher, author of a\nlate voluminous defense of slavery, takes the same position.\n\nIt will be perceived that in this argument two things are assumed. 1st\nThat the patriarchs did hold slaves. 2d That the example of a patriarch\nis conclusive evidence in the case. If it should appear after an\nexamination of the case, that none of the patriarchs owned slaves, or\nthat the example of a patriarch is not conclusive evidence on all moral\nquestions, and may not, in every case, be safely followed, then this\nargument will also be found wanting.\n\nNow, I assume the position that neither Abraham, nor any other\npatriarch, ever owned a slave; and as evidence in support of this\nposition submit the following facts and considerations.\n\n1. The Bible does not record such a fact. In no chapter or verse\nis Abraham, Isaac or Jacob called a slaveholder, slave-driver,\nslave-trader, or by any other name indicative of such a relation. Nor\nis any man, or woman in their employ, either in the house or field,\nor in any way associated with them, called a slave or by any name\nindicative of that relation.\n\n2. The Bible records in connection with the history of the patriarchs,\nno circumstance from which slaveholding may be legitimately inferred.\nThose inseparable concomitants of slavery, the _whip_, _coffle_,\n_chain-gang_, _whipping-post_ and _overseer_, are not named in\npatriarchal history.\n\n3. Some circumstances are recorded from which we obtain presumptive\nevidence that they did not own slaves. Take for example, an incident in\nthe life of Abraham. He was sitting in his tent door in the cool of the\nday and saw at a little distance three strangers whom he immediately\napproached and invited, in the spirit of genuine hospitality, to tarry\nwith him and partake of some refreshments. When he had obtained their\nconsent, he hastened unto the tent to Sarah and requested her to bake\nsome cakes with all possible dispatch, while he should run to the herd\nand fetch a calf tender and good and have it dressed. The repast was\nsoon provided, the guests were seated around the wholesome meal, and\nAbraham stood by them under the tree while they ate. Now, I submit, had\nthis patriarch been a slaveholder, he would have ordered \"Cuffee\" to\nthe flock after the calf, and had Sarah been a mistress of slaves she\nwould have ordered \"Dinah\" to the kneading trough. In this incident\nthere is no mention of slaves. A \"young _man_\" is respectfully noticed\nwithout the slightest hint that he was a slave. Abraham and Sarah went\nabout preparing this entertainment precisely as good people do, who\nattend to their own work, and have no slaves to order around.\n\n4. We have good reasons for believing that chattel slavery had no\nexistence in the world at the time the patriarchs referred to,\nflourished. Abraham was born only two years after the death of Noah,\nand when as yet the postdiluvian world was in its infancy, and it\nis not probable, leaving history out of view, that slavery could\nhave been instituted at so early a period. But the most ancient and\nreliable history furnishes evidence that for a period after the flood,\nreaching down far this side the patriarchal age, universal freedom was\npreserved.[7]\n\nOn the authority of _Diodorus_, Shuckford says, that \"the nations\nplanted by Noah and his descendants, _had a law against slavery; for\nno person among them could absolutely lose his freedom and become a\nbondsman_.\" (_Shuckford's Connections, Vol. II, pp. 80._)\n\n\"Athenaus, a Greek historian of great merit, observes that the\nBabylonians, Persians, as well as the Greeks, and divers other nations,\ncelebrated annually a sort of Saturnalia, or feast, instituted most\nprobably IN COMMEMORATION OF THE ORIGINAL STATE OF FREEDOM, IN WHICH\nMEN LIVED BEFORE SERVITUDE WAS INTRODUCED; AND AS MOSES REVIVED SEVERAL\nOF NOAH'S INSTITUTIONS, so there are appointments in the law to\npreserve the freedom of the Israelites.\"\n\nFrom these authorities to which others might be added, we conclude that\nslavery had no existence among the nations which arose immediately\nafter the flood. Noah, it seems was a good democrat, and gave\nexistence to institutions which secured the personal freedom of his\ndescendants; and absolutely prohibited their enslavement. And it also\nappears that those institutions were for a long period observed, and\nfinally incorporated by Moses into the Law for the preservation of the\nliberties of the Israelites. Now, Abraham was contemporary with the\nsons of Noah, and was a governor of one of the very earliest nations\nalluded to by the historians above quoted; hence it is clear, that\nslavery had no existence in his day, and consequently he could not have\nbeen a slaveholder.\n\nAgainst this view it may be urged that slavery existed in Egypt in\nthe time of Joseph, that Joseph was sold as a slave, and that the\nIsraelites were slaves when in Egypt. To this objection we answer:\n\n1. The assumption that slavery existed in Egypt in the time of the\npatriarchs is without foundation. _Herodotus_, gives a \"true and full\"\naccount of the ancient Egyptians, specifies with great care the various\nclasses of men, but does not mention slaves. _Diodorus_, gives a\ncareful statement of the ancient Egyptian constitution, but is silent\nrespecting slavery.\n\n_Rollin_ says: \"Husbandmen, shepherds, and artificers formed the\nthree lower classes of lower life in Egypt, but were nevertheless had\nin _very great esteem_, particularly husbandmen and shepherds.\" We\nhave the best of reasons, therefore, for believing that the wholesome\ninstitutions of Noah were preserved for a long time in Egypt. That\na system of servitude existed in that country is true, but absolute\nslavery was not permitted. Parents possessed great authority over their\nchildren, and might sell them or their services, for a limited time,\nbut this was not slavery. A year of release was provided for all, so\nthat no one could, as Diodorus observes, \"absolutely lose his freedom\nand become a bondsman!\"\n\n2. Joseph was not a slave. He was doubtless sold as a servant for a\nlimited period, and evidently that period had expired before he arose\nto the high station of Steward of Potipher's house.\n\n3. The Israelites were not slaves in Egypt. They maintained their\nnationality, preserved their family relations, owned property, and\nwere not distributed throughout the country, as chattel slaves are.\nTheir servitude was national. Their task masters were appointed by the\ngovernment, and they labored for the public benefit. They were not\ndomestic slaves.\n\nThe position I think is invulnerable, that in the nations which\narose and peopled the earth, immediately after the flood, slavery\nhad no existence; and as the patriarchs flourished in that period,\nthe inference is clear that they did not own slaves, and were not\nslaveholders. Those holy men would hardly be the first to violate the\nfree institutions of Noah, and disgrace the golden age of freedom, by\nthe enslavement of their brothers.\n\nBut it is asserted with a show of confidence that the word servant,\nas applied in the scriptures to a class of persons, means precisely\nwhat our word slave means. Hence, when it is said that Abraham had\n_servants_, it is assumed that he had SLAVES. Now, although what has\nbeen proved, is altogether sufficient to exculpate that good man\nand all the patriarchs from the charge of slaveholding, we deem it\nimportant that the word translated servant be well understood; and with\nthe aid of the best authorities we shall now proceed to make it plain.\n\nThe Hebrew words translated servant, service, and servants, are derived\nfrom _abadh_, meaning to labor, _to work_, to do work. This word occurs\nin the Hebrew scriptures some hundreds of times, in various forms of\nthe word, and is never rendered _slaves_. Occasionally, our translators\nhave prefixed the word _bond_, and made it read _bond_-servant, but\nthis was done without authority, as precisely the same word is used in\nthe original. The original word is used to denote the following kinds\nof service: To work for another; Gen. 29: 20. To serve or be servants\nof a king; 2d Sam., 16: 19. To serve as a soldier; 2d Sam., 2: 12, 13,\n15, 30, 31. To serve as an ambassador; 2d Sam., 10: 2, 4. It is applied\nto a worshipper of the true God; Nehemiah, 1: 10. To a minister;\nIsaiah, 49: 6. It is also applied to king Rehoboam; 1st Kings, 11: 7,\nand to the Messiah, Isaiah, 42: 1.[8]\n\nIt is used in Gen. 2: 15. And the Lord God took the man, and put him in\nthe garden of Eden to DRESS IT. Adam was put into Eden, not to _serve_\nor _dress_ the garden as a SLAVE, but as a man. The same word is used\nto express the service performed for Laban by Jacob. The relation of\nJoshua to Moses is expressed by the same word; Ex., 33: 21. It is also\nused in the fourth commandment. Six days shalt thou _labor_, etc.\n\nFrom these examples of the use of the word it is clear that the idea of\nchattel slavery is not found in it. It is used to express all kinds of\nservice--the service of God, a king, a friend, or an employer.\n\nThe word _ama_, rendered _maid-servant_, _bond-maid_, _maid_,\n_hand-maid_, and the word _shiphhah_ with similar renderings, are\napplied to Hagar, Ruth, Hannah, Abigail, Bilhah and Zilpah, and\nevidently mean no more than our English word servant in its usual\nacceptation. Those women were not slaves, they were free women. It has\nbeen very properly remarked that if _chattel_ slavery existed among the\nHebrews at any time it is not a little surprising that the language\ncontains no word which expresses the relation.\n\nSome have endeavored to force into the word translated _servant_ &c.,\nthe idea of slavery because it is said that Abraham had servants\n\"bought with money.\" But from the ancient use of the word _buy_ or\n_bought_ we are not to infer that the persons bought became slaves.\nWives were procured in the times of the patriarchs by _purchase_.\nBoaz said--\"Moreover Ruth, the Moabitess, the wife of Mahlon, have\nI purchased to be my wife.\" The same word (_kanithi_) is used here\nto express the manner in which Boaz obtained his wife, that is used\nin Gen. to show how a part of Abraham's servants were obtained. But\nthe beautiful _Ruth_ was not a _slave_. Jacob purchased his beloved\nRachel, and less beloved Leah, but those wives and mothers of the\ntwelve patriarchs could not have been _slaves_. Had they been chattels,\nwhy, then, according to an essential feature of the American slave\ncode, the twelve patriarchs would all have been born in the same\ncondition. _Partus sequitur ventrem._ A Hebrew might sell himself on\na limited time, and he might be bought by a wealthy neighbor, but no\none, I believe, has ever pretended that he became a SLAVE thereby. The\ncontract was voluntary. The employer bought the services of his fellow,\nand paid in _advance_ for the same, not to a third person, but to the\nservant himself. God is said to have purchased (_kanitha_) his people;\nPs., 75: 2.\n\nHence from the scriptural use of the word buy, or bought, we are not\nauthorized to infer that the persons purchased became slaves. Such an\ninference would do violence to the holy word.\n\nThe true state of the matter in respect to Abraham, and his case is\nmainly relied upon, was without a doubt this. Abraham, being a wise,\nwealthy and good man, gathered around him many devoted friends who,\nupon his removal to a distant location, desired to accompany him,\nto receive the benefits of his friendship and counsels, live under\nhis patriarchship, as he was a prince, (see Gen., 23: 6,) and enjoy\nthe protection of his power. Some of these may have been involved in\npecuniary embarrassments or obligations of service to other persons,\nwhich made it necessary for the benevolent patriarch to release them by\npaying them in advance for many years of service.\n\nMany of these servants were doubtless converts from idolatry, which\nhad been made in Haran. In Gen. 12: 5, the fact is recorded of the\nremoval of Abraham, Sarai, their effects, and of \"the SOULS they\nhad gotten.\" This word \"gotten\" is translated, says Mr. Carothers,\nfrom _osa_, which is used in Ezekiel 18: 31, to express the work of\nconversion. \"Cast away from you all your transgressions, and make you a\nnew heart and a new spirit.\" And this rendering of the word \"gotten\" is\nconfirmed by the Chaldee paraphrase on this passage, which reads thus:\n\"Souls they had instructed or turned from idolatry and taught in the\ntrue religion.\" \"The Hebrews have a tradition,\" says Banberg, \"that\nAbraham brought over many men, and Sarah many women from infidelity\nto the knowledge and worship of the true God; and thus _made_ them\nspiritually.\" A similar mode of expression is used by St. Paul: \"I have\n_begotten_ you through the gospel.\" The idea that Abraham and Sarah\nmade slaves of their converts is simply preposterous.\n\nFrom the foregoing facts and considerations it is perfectly clear\nto my mind, that the effort to find an apology for slaveholding\nin patriarchal servitude is a total failure. The charge that the\npatriarchs held slaves is _wholly_ without foundation,--is a\ndisingenuous attack upon their reputation, and a miserable subterfuge\nfor hard-hearted oppressors, who are seeking an apology or excuse for\nsins which loudly cry for the vengeance of heaven! Could Father Abraham\narise from the dead, visit the South, and there behold thousands of\nhis spiritual children toiling without remuneration, shut out from\nthe blessings of family and home, denied an education and all means\nof intellectual improvement, driven by the keen lash of a brutal\noverseer, and then should he hear an appeal made to the patriarchs in\njustification of this system of unmingled tyranny, he would indignantly\nrepel the appeal as a base calumny!\n\nIt is surprising with what confidence the example of the patriarchs\nis urged in justification of slavery in the absence of all proof or\nsemblance of proof, that they were implicated in this practice. But\nour surprise is increased when we consider that, even could it be made\nappear that the patriarchs did hold slaves, this fact of itself, would\nafford not the slightest apology for slaveholding now. The patriarchs,\nit is admitted, had a plurality of wives, but their example is not now\na sufficient warrant for polygamy. There is not an ecclesiastical court\nin the United States and territories, if we may except the Mormon,\nUtah, which would accept the example of the patriarchs as an apology\nfor the man who should stand up before that court with two wives\nleaning on his arms. The argument therefore appears utterly worthless\nand shallow from every point of view.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IX.\n\nSlavery and Religion--Continued.\n\nLAW OF MOSES AND SLAVERY.\n\n\nIt is claimed by the advocates of human bondage that in the law\ndelivered by Moses for the government of the children of Israel, until\nthe establishment of the kingdom of Christ, slavery is distinctly\nrecognized, carefully regulated, and unequivocally sanctioned; and\nhence, that it is an institution upon which Jehovah now looks with\napprobation. We cannot believe, they argue, that it is wrong for\nchristians to practice what the law of Moses permitted or sanctioned.\nTo this argument we reply:--\n\n1. That many things were allowed by the law of Moses which are strictly\nprohibited by the law of Christ. That law was imperfect in its\ncharacter, limited in its application, and temporary in its design. It\ncontained a number of statutes which could by no means be incorporated\ninto the laws of a christian state.\n\nAmong the things commanded and allowed by the law under consideration,\nthe following may be specified:--\n\n1. It commanded a Hebrew, even though a married man, with wife and\nchildren living, to take the childless widow of a deceased brother, and\nbeget children with her; Deut., 25: 5-10.\n\n2. The Hebrews, under certain restrictions, were allowed to make\nconcubines, or wives for a limited time, of women taken in war; Deut.\n21: 10-14.\n\n3. A Hebrew who already had a wife, was allowed to take another also;\nprovided he still continued his intercourse with the first as her\nhusband, and treated her kindly and affectionately; Exodus 21: 9-11.\n\n4. By the Mosaic law, the nearest relative of a murdered Hebrew could\npursue and slay the murderer, unless he could escape to the city\nof refuge; and the same permission was given in case of accidental\nhomicide; Num. 35: 9-34.\n\n5. The Israelites were commanded to exterminate the Canaanites, men,\nwomen and children; Deut. 9: 12; 20: 16-18.\n\n\"Each of these laws, although in its time it was an ameliorating\nlaw, designed to take the place of some barbarous abuse, and to be\na connecting link by which some higher state of society might be\nintroduced, belongs confessedly to that system which St. Paul says made\nnothing perfect. They are a part of the commandment which he says was\nannulled for the weakness and unprofitableness thereof, and which, in\nthe time which he wrote, was waxing old, and ready to vanish away.\"\n(_Dr. Stowe._)\n\nNow, will any one pretend that it is proper for a christian, having\na wife, to take also the wife of a deceased brother? But the law of\nMoses authorized this as clearly as any one pretends that it authorized\nslavery. Is it allowable for a christian to take a concubine or marry\nthree or four wives? But the law of Moses allowed this as distinctly\nas any one believes that it allowed slavery. Would it be right for\na christian to pursue a neighbor who had committed accidental or\nintentional homicide, overtake and slay him? But the law of Moses\njustified the Jewish man-slayer as plainly as the most ultra defender\nof slavery maintains that it justified slaveholding. Suppose we\nadmit, for argument sake, that slavery was authorized by the law of\nMoses, does it follow as a matter of course, that the law of Christ\nauthorizes it? By no means; for we have seen that the former authorized\nconcubinage, polygamy, extermination of the heathen, and summary\nvengeance upon the unwitting murderer, all of which things are utterly\nincompatible with the precepts of the latter. And slavery might very\nproperly be placed in the category of those practices allowed by the\nlaw, but prohibited by the gospel. Thus the argument for slavery from\nthe law of Moses proves too much, and therefore proves nothing.\n\n2. But if, as is claimed, the Jews _were_ authorized to enslave their\nfellow men, which we by no means admit, it was by express authority\nfrom God, who alone may deprive any of his creatures of the rights\nwith which he has invested them. Express grants _were_ made to the\n\"chosen seed,\" as for instance, the forcible occupancy of the land of\nCanaan, and of the cities thereof. Now those grants were not made to\nAmericans, but to the ancient Israelites, and it is neither modest nor\nsensible for citizens of the United States to act under a charter which\nthey admit was made to an ancient nation, for a temporary purpose. Let\nthe American slaveholder show the same _authority_ for slaveholding\nwhich he maintains the Jew could produce. Has God ever made a grant to\n_Americans_ to enslave the Africans?\n\n3. Again, the passage mainly relied upon is found in Leviticus, 25:\n44-47; in which the Jews are authorized to procure servants of the\n_nations_, (not heathen, for _heathen_ is not in the original) round\nabout them. Now if this celebrated passage be at all to the purpose,\nit is, as Pres. Edwards has said, \"a permission to every nation under\nheaven to buy slaves of the nations round about them; to us, to buy\nof our Indian neighbors; to them, to buy of us; to the French to\nbuy of the English, and to the English to buy of the French; and so\nthrough the world. Thus according to this construction, we have here an\ninstitution of a universal slave trade, by which every man may not only\nbecome a merchant, but may rightfully become the merchandize itself of\nthis trade, and be bought and sold like a beast.\" Who is willing to\nadmit the consequences of this construction?\n\nWe might here rest the case, because these three considerations, taken\nseparately, or together, destroy entirely the whole force of the\nargument for American slavery predicated upon Levitical servitude.\n\nWe shall now inquire what kind of servitude _was_ recognized and\nregulated by the law of Moses. The particular statute upon which the\nmain reliance is placed, by the friends of slavery, and which is\nsupposed to contain the black and bloody _charter_ for the degradation\nof humanity, is found in Leviticus 25: 44-47, and reads as follows:--\n\n\"Both thy bondmen and thy bondmaids which thou shalt have, shall be of\nthe heathen that are round about you: of them shall ye buy bondmen and\nbondmaids. Moreover of the children of strangers that do sojourn among\nyou, of them shall ye buy, and of their families that are with you,\nwhich they beget in your land: and they shall be your possession. And\nye shall take them as an inheritance for your children after you, to\ninherit them for a possession, they shall be your bondmen forever.\"[9]\n\n1. The word _slave_, it will be observed, does not occur in this\npassage, nor does bondmen and bondmaids mean anything more than\nmen-servants and women-servants. The word _bond_, as we have seen, is\ngratuitously supplied by our translators, and is not in the original;\nand the word _servants_ means no more than _laborers_ or _workers_. All\nkinds of servants are described by the term here found, and hence from\nits use in this place, it cannot be inferred that the persons referred\nto were slaves. The passage clearly authorized the procurement of\nservants from adjoining nations, which was a thing perfectly right in\nitself, and that is all it did authorize.\n\n2. Nor does the fact that the passage allowed the _purchase_ of\nservants, prove that the persons purchased were slaves, or became\nslaves. Irishmen were, many of them, a few years since, \"bought\nservants.\" They were sold to pay for their passage to this country,\nbut the whole transaction was voluntary on the part of the \"sons of\nErin,\" and looked to their benefit. Jacob, as we have seen, purchased\nLeah and Rachel with fourteen years of labor. Our blessed Savior hath\npurchased us with his own blood. The idea of chattel slavery cannot\nbe associated with the word buy or bought, as used in the sacred\nwritings, without doing great violence to their meaning. The phrase,\n\"of them shall ye _buy_\" may be properly rendered, \"of them shall ye\n_get_, or _obtain_ servants.\" The word translated buy, in the passage\nbefore us, is in other places translated \"get\" or \"getteth.\" Thus, \"He\nthat beareth reproof _getteth_ understanding.\" Prov., 15: 32. \"He that\n_getteth_ wisdom, loveth his own soul.\" Prov., 19: 8. But the meaning\nof the word buy, and sell, as applied to the purchase and sale of men,\nis definitely settled by its use in the context of the passage which\nwe are examining. It is used in verse 47, \"if thy brother wax poor and\n_sell himself_\" etc. In verse 39, the reading is, \"and _be sold_.\"\nThese passages are intended to convey an idea of the same transaction,\nand that transaction was nothing more nor less than the voluntary sale\nof a poor man to a rich one, not as a slave, but as a servant. The sale\nwas made, and the _money was received by the servant who sold himself_,\nwith which he released himself and family from pecuniary embarrassment.\nIn this sale and purchase of a man, the idea of slavery is utterly\nexcluded. Now is it probable that the words buy, and sell, in this\nsame chapter, when applied to foreign servants, were used in a totally\ndifferent sense? To suppose this would be to charge Moses, as Wm. Jay\nobserves, with a fraudulent intent to render the meaning of his law\ndoubtful and unintelligible.\n\n3. Considerable stress is placed upon the phrase, \"shall be of the\n_heathen_,\" as if heathenism was a crime to be punished with a still\ndeeper degradation than idolatry can produce. \"The word heathen,\"\nsays Mr. Jay, \"is gratuitously inserted by our translators instead of\n_nations_, the meaning of the original.\"\n\n4. Permission was also given for the purchase of the \"children of\nthe strangers.\" \"'Children of the strangers' is an orientalism, for\nstrangers, as 'children of the East,' 'children of the Province,'\n'children of the Ethiopians.' Hence, the Jews, instead of buying little\nboys and girls of their parents, were to buy foreigners residing in the\ncountry; and not only foreigners, but their descendants, natives of\nPalestine.\" (_Jay._)\n\n5. \"They shall be your bondmen forever.\" In this phrase is supposed to\nbe found a charter for perpetual, hereditary, hopeless bondage. Mr.\nJay very justly remarks upon it as follows: \"The preconceived opinions\nof the translators tempted them to give such a color to this sentence\nas best accorded with their proslavery theory. Hence this strong\nexpression in the text, while in the _margin_ the _literal_ translation\nis honestly given, \"Ye shall serve yourselves with them forever.\" Not a\nword about bondmen, but merely an unlimited permission, as to time, to\nuse or employ foreigners or strangers.\"\n\nThe proslavery construction renders the permission absurd, because in\nthe first place it would be impossible for any one man literally to be\na bondman forever, unless servitude could be continued in heaven or\nhell. And, in the next place, it could not continue in the same person\nin Israel beyond the great jubilee.\n\nNow when this passage in Leviticus 25, is stripped of all the\nproslavery glosses of the translators, the following is, as the\nexcellent writer just quoted observes, its plain and obvious\nmeaning:--\"You may buy of themselves, for servants, men and women who\nare natives of the adjoining countries, just as you have already been\nauthorized to buy your own countrymen for servants. You may also buy,\nfor servants, strangers residing among you, and their descendants; and\nyour children after you may do the same. You may always employ them as\nservants.\"\n\nThe servitude permitted by the law of Moses has been most grossly\nmisrepresented, and misunderstood. It was not an institution looking\nmainly to the advantage of the rich and powerful, while it crushed the\npoor and defenseless into the dust, disregarding their interests and\ntheir sorrows, but it was a benificent arrangement intended to relieve\nthe unfortunate and open a door of hope to the Gentile inquirer of the\nway to Zion. Now observe carefully the following facts:--\n\n1. Servants were not kidnapped or stolen from the surrounding nations.\nThe stealing of a man was made a capital offense. He that stealeth a\nman and (_or_ it should be) selleth him, or if he be found in his hand,\nhe shall surely be put to death. Ex. 21: 16. Now, as all the slaves\nin America have been stolen, those who stole them, and those who hold\nthem, are worthy of death according to the law of Moses.\n\n2. All the servants obtained by the Jews from neighboring nations were\n_voluntary_ servants. This is proved in the following way. 1. Foreign\nservants, and native Hebrew servants were obtained in the same manner.\nNative Hebrews became servants (except in cases of crime) by voluntary\ncontract. 2. Obedience to the law of Moses was a condition of servitude\nin the Jewish state. An idolater was not allowed to remain in the land.\nAnd a bought servant was obliged to renounce idolatry, receive the\nrite of circumcision, and in all things conform to the law of Moses,\nas his master was required to do. Gen. 17: 10-15. Ex. 23: 15-20. Deut.\n16: 10-18. All were required to enter into the most solemn religious\ncovenant. \"Ye stand this day, all of you, before the Lord your God;\nyour captains of your tribes, your elders, and your officers, with\nall the men of Israel, your little ones, your wives, and thy stranger\nthat is in thy camp, _from the hewer of thy wood unto the drawer of\nthy water_; that _thou_ shouldest enter into covenant with the Lord\nthy God, and into his oath, which the Lord thy God maketh with thee\nthis day.\" Deut. 29. But conformity to the law of Moses was voluntary.\nWe cannot conceive that a Jew was allowed to buy a heathen servant\nagainst his will, tie him, inflict upon him the rite of circumcision,\nand then compel him to observe the great feasts ordained by the law,\nand, otherwise conform to the Jewish religion. Hence the acceptance\nof a place as a servant in a Jewish family was a matter of choice.\n3. Servants were not obliged to remain with their masters. If they\nsaw proper to change their situation, they had a perfect right to do\nso, just as laborers now have, and there was no fugitive slave law to\nprevent them from so doing. \"Thou shalt not deliver unto his master\nthe servant that is escaped unto thee. He shall dwell with thee, even\namong you, in that place he shall choose, in one of thy gates where it\nliketh him best: thou shalt not oppress him.\" Deut. 23: 15, 16. From\nthese facts, the conclusion is irresistible that servitude was not\n_forced_ upon a foreigner, but voluntarily accepted by him, and that\nhis continuance in that relation was voluntary. How great the contrast\nbetween this system and American slavery which utterly disregards the\n_will_ of slaves.\n\n3. Foreign servants were to be treated in all respects precisely as\nnative Hebrew servants were to be treated. \"Ye shall have one manner of\nlaw, as well for the stranger as for one of your own country, for I am\nthe Lord your God.\" Lev. 24: 22.\n\n4. Ample provisions were made for the religious improvement of servants\nof all classes and especially foreign servants. They were to observe\nthe sabbath, go up with their masters to the three great annual feasts\ncelebrated at Jerusalem, listen to the reading of the law, and in short\nenjoy all the advantages of the Jewish religion. Mr. Barnes estimates\nthat in a period of fifty years, not less than twenty three were\nappropriated to the exclusive benefit of servants, during which time\ntheir whole attention might be devoted to the interests of their souls.\nDoes not this indicate that the great design of the employment of\nforeign servants was religious? Is there the least similarity between\nthis system of servitude and American slavery?\n\n5. Special provisions were made to secure the kind treatment of all\nforeigners, foreign servants of course included. \"Thou shalt not vex\na stranger nor oppress him.\" \"Thou shalt not oppress a stranger, for\nye know the heart of a stranger.\" \"Cursed be he that perverteth the\njudgment of the stranger.\" \"The Lord your God regardeth not persons.\nLove ye therefore the stranger.\" But does not American slavery vex and\noppress the stranger and pervert his judgment? The wide world cannot\nproduce a class of persons who are, or ever have been oppressed, if\nAmerican slaves are not. The word oppression is too feeble to express\nthe tyranny suffered by the strangers in our land.\n\n6. Servants under the law of Moses could not be sold. No permission\nwas given for the sale of servants. They could not be taken for the\npayment of debts, or as pledges, or presents. _They never were sold_\nor given away. The reason of this is found in the fact that they were\nnot chattels,--they were recognized as men, and had made a contract for\nservice which their masters could not at pleasure annul. We have seen\nthat the trade in slaves is an extensive and lucrative business.\n\n7. The Hebrew law regarded servants as naturally equal to their\nmasters, and hence, they were allowed to marry into their master's\nfamily, and inherit, under some circumstances, their master's property.\nDeut. 21: 10-14. A slave is not regarded as a man, can own nothing,\nand inherit nothing. What a contrast! American slavery, and Hebrew\nservitude seem to be erected upon totally different foundations.\n\n8. At stated periods the mild form of servitude instituted by the law\nof Moses expired. A Hebrew who became a servant could not be required\nto continue in that relation more than six years. And every fiftieth\nyear was a grand Jubilee, at the commencement of which liberty was\nproclaimed throughout all the land unto _all the inhabitants thereof_.\nLev. 25: 10, 11. Contracts for service, under any circumstances, could\nnot hold beyond that great jubilee. It was a glorious institution, and\na type of the proclamation of the gospel. But American slavery knows no\njoyful jubilee! For three hundred years no proclamation of freedom has\nbeen made throughout all this land unto all the inhabitants thereof.\nNo, generation after generation of slaves goes down to their graves in\n_despair_! Slavery is without a jubilee.\n\n9. The grand design of the introduction of foreign servants into the\nJewish state was their salvation. From a careful examination of this\nwhole subject, we are fully satisfied that the 25th chapter of Lev.\ncontains, as Mr. Smith has said, \"the constitution of Heaven's first\nMissionary society, by which a door of mercy and salvation was opened\nto the heathen, through which they could obtain access to the altar of\nGod, find mercy and live.\"\n\nIt will be observed that a foreigner could obtain a permanent residence\nin Israel in but two ways,--1st By becoming a servant in a Jewish\nfamily, and, 2d By purchasing a house in a walled city. Now, when\nin connection with these facts, we consider that to the Jews were\ncommitted the \"lively oracles;\" that the only temple of God on earth\nwas erected on Mt. Moriah; that the divinely appointed priesthood\nand sacrifices were in Jerusalem; and also that a renunciation of\nidolatry and hearty acceptance of the God and religion of the bible\nwas absolutely required of those foreigners who desired to become\nservants; that when they did become servants they were blessed with all\nthe precious privileges of the Jewish religion, and after a few years,\nbecame, with their families, adopted members of the Jewish state,\nhaving all the rights, immunities and honors of the chosen people of\nGod; I say, when all these facts are impartially weighed, they convince\nus that the _end_ of the provision alluded to for the admission of\nforeign servants was religious--the salvation of those servants.\n\nAnd history affords a powerful argument in support of this position.\nWhat was the practical operation of the law of Moses in relation to\nforeign servants? If the pro-slavery view of that law be correct, then\nhistory would record the fact that the commonwealth of Israel was a\nslaveholding commonwealth. It would state that the Jews traded in men,\nand that this traffic was important. We should read of poor, ignorant,\nchained idolaters traveling in mournful procession to a great slave\npen at Jerusalem, situated under the shadow, perhaps of the temple of\nGod, and from thence into every part of the land. And when our Savior\nappeared, he would have come into contact with those wretched slaves,\nand would have said something about them. Do we find these facts in\nhistory? No, not one of them. Jerusalem, thank God, was a free city.\nJudea a free state. Foreigners were employed from age to age, as\nservants, but as was contemplated, they embraced the religion of God,\nbecame adopted citizens and were fully identified with the commonwealth\nof Israel. \"After circumcision they were,\" as Jahn says, \"recorded\namong the Hebrews,\" and after the jubilee they enjoyed all the\nimmunities of the children of Abraham. Such was the intention, and such\nthe results of Levitical servitude. Between that system and American\nslavery there is scarcely any thing in common. Slavery originated in\npiracy, is a system of savage tyranny, degrading to the intellect,\ndestructive of morality, blasting to hope and happiness, and tending to\nbarbarism and crime. Servitude under the law of Moses, originated in a\nbenevolent desire to open a door of hope to the heathen, was kind and\njust in its requirements, guarding with extreme jealousy the interest\nof servants, and admirably calculated to lead their minds to morality,\nvirtue and the knowledge of God. Slavery, therefore, can find no\nsanction in the law of Moses. Why, if that law were applied to American\nslavery it would abolish it. Compel slaveholders to use their slaves\nas the law of Moses required servants to be used, and you will soon see\nan end of slavery.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER X.\n\nSlavery and Religion--Continued.\n\nNEW TESTAMENT AND SLAVERY.\n\n\nOur Lord's New Testament is the bulwark of human freedom. Its great,\nbroad, solid truths constitute an impregnable foundation for a temple\nof liberty capacious enough to hold the entire human race. This is the\nlast book in the world to search in order to find any thing favorable\nto oppression; and oppressors have usually preferred to \"burrow amid\nthe types and shadows of the ancient economy.\" An effort has been made,\nhowever, to wrest a sanction for the abomination of slavery out of this\nlast and best revelation from heaven, and to convert some passages\nfound in the writings of the apostles into chains and fetters to bind\nin hopeless bondage those very persons for whom Christ died.\n\nWe will quote the passages usually adduced to prove that it is the duty\nof some men to be slaves, and of others to be slaveholders.\n\n\"Servants, be obedient to them that are _your_ masters according to\nthe flesh, with fear and trembling, in singleness of your heart, as\nunto Christ; not with eye-service, as men-pleasers; but as the servants\nof Christ, doing the will of God from the heart; with good will doing\nservice, as to the Lord, and not to men; knowing that whatsoever good\nthing any man doeth, the same shall he receive of the Lord, whether\nhe be bond or free. And ye masters, do the same things unto them,\nforbearing threatening: knowing that your Master also is in heaven;\nneither is there respect of persons with him.\" Eph. 6: 5, 6, 7, 8, 9.\n\"Servants, obey in all things _your_ masters according to the flesh;\nnot with eye-service, as men-pleasers; but in singleness of heart,\nfearing God.\" Col. 3: 22. \"Let as many servants as are under the yoke\ncount their own masters worthy of all honour, that the name of God and\n_his_ doctrine be not blasphemed. And they that have believing masters,\nlet them not despise _them_, because they are brethren; but rather do\n_them_ service, because they are faithful and beloved partakers of the\nbenefit. These things teach and exhort.\" 1st Tim. 6: 1, 2. \"_Exhort_\nservants to be obedient unto their own masters, _and_ to please _them_\nwell in all _things_; not answering again; not purloining, but showing\nall good fidelity; that they may adorn the doctrine of God our Saviour\nin all things.\" Titus, 2: 9, 10. \"Masters, give unto your servants that\nwhich is just and equal; knowing that ye also have a Master in heaven.\"\nCol. 4: 1.\n\nWe will inquire in the first place whether these passages teach that\nit is the duty of some persons to be _slaves_. And it may be remarked\nthat if a class of human beings _ought_ to sustain this horrible\nrelation, the law requiring them to do so, should be written in the\nplainest possible manner. If any one should claim _me_ and _my_ family\nas slaves, upon a pretense that God had authorized our enslavement,\nI would demand a warrant for so terrible a degradation, which no\nreasonable man could question. Let us see whether the scriptures cited\nprove _unquestionably_ that to live in a state of slavery is a duty\nwhich God requires.\n\n1. It will be seen at a glance that there is not a word said about\n_slaves_ in any of these quotations. The word _slave_ or _slaves_\nis not once used! And yet these passages, inculcating the duties\nof _servants_, have been rung in the ears of our poor _slaves_\nfor the last three hundred years, by hypocritical preachers and\nslaveholders, as if heaven were chiefly interested and delighted in\nthe perpetuation of an institution which degrades millions of men\nto a point as low as manhood can possibly descend. The whole gospel\npreached to slaves is mixed up with this satanic perversion. Even the\nsong of angels announcing \"peace on earth and good will to men,\" is\naccompanied to the ear of the American bondman, with the base, coarse\ncorruption,--\"_Slaves_, obey your masters.\"\n\n2. The word _servants_, used in these scriptures, is not synonymous\nwith the word _slaves_, as the preachers of oppression assume. The word\n_andrapodon_ means slave, but that word, the learned tell us, does not\noccur in the sacred writings. The word _douloi_, used in the above\nquotations, and translated servants, means precisely what our English\nword servants means, as that word is understood in free countries. \"Our\nEnglish word servant,\" says a good authority, \"is an exact translation\nof the Greek word _doulos_. And to translate it into the definite word\nslave is a gross violation of the original. Our translators of the\nscriptures have uniformly translated the word doulos into the word\nservant, _never_ into the word slave, and for the reason that it never\nmeans slave. The apostles addressed servants in general, but never\nslaves in particular; and therefore the term slave (andrapodon) is not\nfound in apostolic writings.\"\n\nThe word _doulos_ occurs in the New Testament one hundred and twenty\ntwo times,[10] and in no case has it been translated slave. To show\nthe utter fallacy of the assumption that it is synonymous with slave,\npermit us to supply _slave_ in a few passages where _doulos_ occurs,\ninstead of servant, for if slave and servant mean the same thing, they\nmay be used interchangeably without violating the sense. \"Paul and\nTimotheus the _slaves_ of Jesus Christ.\" \"These are the _slaves_ of the\nMost High God which do show unto us the way of salvation.\" \"And a voice\ncame out of the throne, saying, Praise our God all ye his _slaves_, and\nye that fear him small and great.\" \"I am thy fellow _slave_.\" We might\nextend these quotations indefinitely, but a sufficient number have been\ngiven to show the absurdity of the assumption that the words servant\nand slave describe the same relation. The pro-slavery rendering of\ndoulos, would make slaves of all the redeemed, and of the holy angels,\nand would, as Mr. Smith remarks, extend the territory of slavery over\nheaven itself.\n\n3. The phrase \"servants under the yoke\" means no more than obligation\nto perform service according to agreement or contract. He who had an\nengagement with an unbelieving master should perform his contract,\nor fulfill his obligation with scrupulous fidelity in order that the\nname of God and his doctrine be not blasphemed. The word \"yoke\" does\nnot necessarily imply slavery. Our Savior said \"take my _yoke_ upon\nyou,\" but certainly he did not invite any one to become a slave. The\nword yoke is used in the scriptures to represent the ceremonial law;\n\"dominion of Jacob over Esau, in the matter of his father's blessing;\"\npolitical subjugation of the Israelites; the authority of king David\nover his subjects, etc., etc.; but not in a single passage in the\nscriptures, unless it be in 1st Tim. 6: 1, does it describe the state\nof a domestic slave, and the assumption that it means slave in this\nplace is altogether without proof to sustain it.\n\n4. There is one passage in the New Testament addressed to servants\nwhich has not yet been quoted. \"Servants be subject to your masters\nwith all fear; not only to the good and gentle, but also to the\nfroward. For this is thank-worthy, if a man for conscience toward\nGod endure grief, suffering wrongfully.\" 1st Pet. 2: 18, 19. In this\npassage _doulos_ does not occur, but _oiketes_, which some suppose,\nmeans _slave_. But of this evidence is wanting. The same word is used\nfour times only in the New Testament, and is, in no case, translated\nslave. (See Luke 16: 13. Acts 10: 7. Rom. 14: 4. 1st Pet. as above.) In\none place it is rendered household-servant, and it seems to be used to\ndistinguish _house_-servants from others. \"The word comes from oikos, a\nhouse.\"[11]\n\n5. If the sacred writers above quoted had intended to address slaves,\nthey would, in the first place, have done so plainly by _calling_\nthem slaves. In the second place the directions would have been\napplicable to persons in a state of slavery. As to the terms used in\nthe directions, we have seen that they do not apply properly to slaves;\nand the directions themselves afford proof that they were given to\npersons who were not chattel slaves. The advice and exhortations imply\nfreedom from _absolute authority_ and a power of choice not compatible\nwith slavery. They are exhorted to perform service \"AS THE SERVANTS\nOF CHRIST, DOING THE WILL OF GOD FROM THE HEART.\" That is, they were\nto be actuated by the highest motives, and were not to toil as the\nservants of men, but of God. Again, they are advised not to \"DESPISE\"\ntheir masters. Such directions have no pertinence, if addressed to\nhuman chattels. To whom then were they addressed? We answer, to\nvoluntary laborers or servants who received a compensation for their\nwork. The relations of servant and master or laborer and employer are\nnecessary, legitimate and honorable relations. All men have not the\nskill to acquire or manage capital, and capital is essential to the\naccomplishment of great enterprises, to the march of improvement,\nand the progress of civilization. Capital invested in railroads,\ncanals, machinery, factories, ships, merchandise, etc., requires many\nlaborers to manage it; and the directions we are considering require\nthat those laborers be honest, faithful, pleasant, and industrious in\nthe discharge of the duties they engage to perform. And even though\nan employer be not a very good man, as is often the case with men of\ncapital, christian servants or laborers are instructed to attend to\ntheir duties in the fear of God and in a manner that will recommend to\nthose employers the religion which they profess. Yea, though servants\nhave an engagement with a hard-hearted, overbearing, abusive heathen\nmaster, the apostles would have them perform their part, with the\nutmost fidelity, suffering \"_wrongfully_\" if need be, for the sake of\nChrist. These directions are judicious, and their observance would work\nto the advantage of laborers in all countries.\n\nNow it is clear that those scriptures do not teach unquestionably\nthat it is the duty of some persons to be slaves. If the apostles had\nsaid, \"slaves be obedient to your masters for you are their _property_\nand they have a right to you and all you can earn, _because_ you are\nproperty,\" then the matter would have been settled. Then we should\nadmit that _some_ men ought to be slaves, but upon the heels of this\nadmission would follow a question very difficult to settle viz: _Who\nis to obey_ the command to be a slave? How is it to be determined who\nshall become a human chattel and who the owner of said chattel?\n\nBut the assertion that God requires men to be slaves is a wicked\nassertion. It charges God with folly and inconsistency. He desires\nthe elevation of man, but slavery brutalizes him. He encourages the\nenlightenment of the mind and the expansion of the understanding, but\nslavery darkens the mind and enchains the understanding. God cannot be\npleased with the ignorance, stupor, injustice and servile wretchedness\nwhich are necessary to the very existence of slavery, and hence he can\nnot make it the duty of any man to be a slave, for this would be the\nsame as to make it his duty to be stupid, ignorant and wretched. No,\nGod does not will that any man or woman should be a slave. Man was made\nin the image of God's independence and sovereignty. The instinct of\nfreedom is strong in his bosom. It has resisted oppression in all ages,\nand it will resist it, with God on its side, until it shall triumph!\n\nWe will now inquire whether the apostolic addresses to masters\nauthorize some men to sustain the relation of _slaveholders_. It\nshould be observed that there are but two places in the New Testament\nin which the duties of masters are pointed out. Permit us to repeat\nthose duties. \"And ye masters do the same things unto them, forbearing\nthreatening, knowing that your master also is in heaven.\" \"Masters give\nunto your servants that which is just and equal, knowing that ye also\nhave a master in heaven.\"\n\nIs it possible that from these words men will take license to seize\ntheir fellows and convert them into _property_; despoil them of all\ntheir rights; deny them an education; banish them from courts of\njustice; break up their homes; take their wages without compensation;\ndrive them in chain-gangs from state to state, and whip, beat, and\nabuse them until they perish from the earth? Yes, it is possible.\nThis has been done. \"Was there ever,\" said Dr. Wayland, \"such a moral\nsuperstructure raised on such a foundation? * * If the religion of\nChrist allows such a license from such precepts as these, the New\nTestament would be the greatest curse that ever was inflicted on our\nrace.\" We remark\n\n1. In these directions there is not the slightest intimation that the\nmasters addressed were _slaveholders_ and that the servants in their\nemploy were slaves. The term slaveholders (_andrapodistais_,) is not\nused in the above passages, and this term is only once found in the\napostolic writings.[12] It is found in the following text: \"Knowing\nthis that the law is not made for a righteous man, but for the lawless\nand disobedient, for the ungodly and for sinners, for the unholy\nand profane, for murderers of fathers and murderers of mothers, for\nmanslayers, for whoremongers, for them that defile themselves with\nmankind, for _andrapodistais_, (slaveholders or menstealers) for liars,\netc.\" 1st Tim. 1: 9, 10.\n\nAnd it is not only a fact that slaveholders are not addressed in these\npassages, but _the directions given are such as no slaveholder in the\nworld can observe_. How can a slaveholder give unto a _slave_ that\nwhich is _just_ and _equal_? The _slave_ can own nothing, will nothing,\ninherit nothing, and hence it is impossible, in the very nature of the\ncase, for his owner to give him a just compensation for his labor. And\nthe _slave_ has a just right to _himself_ to _liberty_ and the very\nfirst honest and enlightened effort of a slaveholder to give to his\nslave that which is just and equal would result in his _emancipation_!\n_Justice_ and _equality_ are incompatible with slaveholding.\n_Injustice_ and _inequality_ are its essential principles. Let us hear\nMrs. STOWE'S comment on what Christian legislators have seemed to\nconsider _just_ and _equal_ when making laws for slaves:--\n\n    \"First, they commence by declaring that their brother shall no\n    longer be considered as a person, but deemed, sold, taken, and\n    reputed, as a chattel personal.--This is \"just and equal!\"\n\n    This being the fundamental principle of the system, the following\n    are specified as its consequences:\n\n    1. That he shall have no right to hold property of any kind, under\n    any circumstances.--Just and equal!\n\n    2. That he shall have no power to contract a legal marriage, or\n    claim any woman in particular for his wife.--Just and equal!\n\n    3. That he shall have no right to his children, either to protect,\n    restrain, guide or educate.--Just and equal!\n\n    4. That the power of his master over him shall be ABSOLUTE, without\n    any possibility of appeal or redress in consequence of any injury\n    whatever.\n\n    To secure this, they enact that he shall not be able to enter suit\n    in any court for any cause.--Just and equal!\n\n    That he shall not be allowed to bear testimony in any court where\n    any white person is concerned.--Just and equal!\n\n    That the owner of a servant, for \"malicious, cruel, and excessive\n    beating of his slave, cannot be indicted.\"--Just and equal!\n\n    It is further decided, that by no indirect mode of suit, through a\n    guardian, shall a slave obtain redress for ill-treatment. (Dorothea\n    v. Coquillon et al, 9 Martin La. Rep. 350.)--Just and equal!\n\n    5. It is decided that the slave shall not only have no legal\n    redress for injuries inflicted by his master, but shall have no\n    redress for those inflicted by any other person, unless the injury\n    impair his property value.--Just and equal!\n\n    Under this head it is distinctly asserted as follows:\n\n    There can be no offence against the peace of the state, by the mere\n    beating of a slave, unaccompanied by any circumstances of cruelty,\n    or an intent to kill and murder. The peace of the state is not\n    thereby broken.\" (State v. Manner, 2 Hill's Rep. S. C.)--Just and\n    equal!\n\n    If a slave strike a white, he is to be condemned to death; but if a\n    master kill his slave by torture, no white witnesses being present,\n    he may clear himself by his own oath. (Louisiana.)--Just and equal!\n\n    The law decrees fine and imprisonment to the person who shall\n    release the servant of another from the torture of the iron collar.\n    (Louisiana.)--Just and equal!\n\n    It decrees a much smaller fine, without imprisonment, to the man\n    who shall torture him with red-hot irons, cut out his tongue, put\n    out his eyes, and scald or maim him. (Ibid.)--Just and equal!\n\n    It decrees the same punishment to him who teaches him to write as\n    to him who puts out his eyes.--Just and equal!\n\n    As it might be expected that only very ignorant and brutal people\n    could be kept in a condition like this, especially in a country\n    where every book and every newspaper are full of dissertations\n    on the rights of man, they therefore enact laws that neither he\n    nor his children to all generations, shall learn to read and\n    write.--Just and equal!\n\n    And as, if allowed to meet for religious worship, they might\n    concert some plan of escape or redress, they enact that \"no\n    congregation of <DW64>s, under pretence of divine worship, shall\n    assemble themselves; and that every slave found at such meetings\n    shall be immediately corrected _without trial_, by receiving on the\n    bare back twenty-five stripes with a whip, switch or cowskin.\" (Law\n    of Georgia, Prince's Digest, p. 447.)--Just and equal!\n\n    Though the servant is thus kept in ignorance, nevertheless in his\n    ignorance he is punished more severely for the same crimes than\n    freemen.--Just and equal!\n\n    By way of protecting him from over-work, they enact that he shall\n    not labor more than five hours longer than convicts at hard labor\n    in a penitentiary!\n\n    They also enact that the master or overseer, not the slave, shall\n    decide when he is too sick to work.--Just and equal!\n\n    If any master, compassionating this condition of the slave, desires\n    to better it, the law takes it out of his power, by the following\n    decisions:\n\n    1. That all his earnings shall belong to his master,\n    notwithstanding his master's promise to the contrary; thus making\n    him liable for his master's debts.--Just and equal!\n\n    2. That if his master allow him to keep cattle for his own use, it\n    shall be lawful for any man to take them away, and enjoy half the\n    profits of the seizure.--Just and equal!\n\n    3. If his master sets him free, he shall be taken up and sold\n    again.--Just and equal!\n\n    If any man or woman runs away from this state of things, and, after\n    proclamation made, does not return, any two justices of the peace\n    may declare them outlawed, and give permission to any person in the\n    community to kill then by any ways or means they think fit.--Just\n    and equal!\"\n\n                                                  (_See Key, pp. 241._)\n\nIf slaveholding is an illustration of what St. Paul meant by justice\nand equality, who can tell what is injustice and inequality? Let it be\nunderstood that a slaveholder cannot give to a slave, _while he holds\nhim as a slave_, that which is _just_ and _equal_, because the greatest\ninjustice and inequality enters into the very nature of the relation of\nslaveholder. Could a man be a _just_ robber or an _honest_ thief? No,\nbecause injustice and dishonesty enter necessarily into the business\nof robbing and stealing. Even so is it impossible for justice and\nequality to enter into slaveholding, because, it is in its very nature,\nrobbery, theft, extortion, oppression, and a complication of almost all\nvillainies.\n\nIt is clear from the examination of all the passages in the New\nTestament relating to masters and servants, that those masters were not\nslaveholders and that those servants were not slaves.\n\nBut it will be asked did not slavery exist in the apostles' days? We\nanswer it did exist. The Roman government tolerated chattel slavery.\nWhy then did not the apostles regulate it by prescribing the duties\nof slaveholders and slaves? It has been assumed, and justly too,\nthat \"slavery no more than murder _can_ be regulated. That which\nis essentially and eternally wrong has nothing in it on which the\nclaim of morality can rest. Morality requires its destruction, not\nits regulation.\"[13] The law of God does not point out the duties\nof liars, adulterers and thieves, because as such, they can have no\nduties. So God did not attempt to regulate Roman slavery which was a\nmost vile and crushing despotism. He did not intend that SLAVERY should\nbe continued, and hence it was not to be regulated but destroyed. We\nhave no evidence in the above passages that SLAVEHOLDERS were admitted\ninto the church of Jesus Christ by the apostles.\n\nSlaveholders and the upholders of the infamous Fugitive Slave Law,\nlay the case of Onesimus to their consciences as a healing unction\nwhen dogging down the fugitive slave. In their blindness they assume\nthat Philemon was a slaveholder, Onesimus a slave, and St. Paul a\nslave-catcher. But not a word of this is true.\n\n1. Onesimus was a SERVANT and not a SLAVE, and Philemon was not a\nSLAVEHOLDER. The assumption that the one was a slave and the other a\nslave-owner is altogether without support.\n\n2. Onesimus was not _forcibly_ sent back. St. Paul did not arrest\nhim, and send him in chains to Philemon, charging the expense to the\ngovernment.\n\n3. He was not sent back as a _servant_, much less a _slave_. How then?\nWhy as a \"brother beloved.\" \"Thou therefore receive him as mine own\nbowels-- * * receive him as myself.\" \"If he oweth thee ought put that\non mine account.\" These directions are wholly inconsistent with the\nidea of slavery. If Onesimus was the _property_ of Philemon, Paul\nknew that he owed the service of his whole life. But Onesimus was no\nslave. Had he been a slave Paul would have said, \"Receive him not as\na slave (_andrapodon_) but above a slave,\" instead of saying, \"not as\na servant (_doulos_) but above a servant.\" Onesimus was a relative of\nPhilemon, probably a natural brother,--brother \"in the flesh;\" as may\nbe inferred from Philem., verse 16. He was undoubtedly a young man of\ngreat promise, and was not only entrusted with the epistle of Paul to\nPhilemon, but jointly with Tychicus was the bearer of the venerable\napostle's letter to the church at Colosse. On the authority of Calmet,\nand indeed of Ignatius, it is affirmed that he succeeded Timothy as\nbishop of Ephesus.\n\nThey who affirm that the New Testament writers sanctioned Roman\nslavery, seem not to be aware of the serious imputation they cast upon\nthat book and its authors. Look at that awful despotism, that you may\nunderstand what a savage, scaly, bloody-mouthed beast was welcomed into\nthe church and baptized with a Christian baptism, if we may believe\nthe advocates of human bondage.\n\n1. \"The (Roman) slave had no protection against the avarice, rage, or\nlust of the master, whose authority was founded in absolute property;\nand the bondman was viewed less as a human being subject to arbitrary\ndominion, than as an inferior animal, dependent wholly on the will of\nhis overseer.[14]\n\n2. \"He might kill, mutilate or torture his slaves for any or no offence;\nhe might force them to become gladiators or prostitutes.\n\n3. \"The temporary unions of male with female slaves were formed and\ndissolved at his command; families and friends were separated when he\npleased.\n\n4. \"Slaves could have no property but by the sufferance of their\nmasters.\n\n5. \"While slaves turned the handmill they were generally chained, and\nhad a broad wooden collar to prevent them from eating the grain.\n\n6. \"The runaway when taken was severely punished, * * * sometimes with\ncrucifixion, amputation of a foot, or by being sent to fight as a\ngladiator with wild beasts; but most frequently by being branded on the\nbrow with letters indicative of his crime.\n\n7. \"By a decree passed by the Senate, if a master was murdered when his\nslaves might possibly have aided him, all his household within reach\nwere held as implicated and deserving of death.\"\n\nIs it possible that the holy apostles gave their sanction to a system\nbased on such laws?\n\nBut all the fundamental principles of revealed religion are against\nslavery.\n\n1. THE CHARACTER OF GOD.--God is _just_ and cannot favor a system which\ndisregards all the principles of justice. But slavery outrages every\nprinciple of justice: therefore God must be opposed to slavery. God\nis _impartial_,--no respecter of persons, and he cannot be favorable\nto a system which is based upon partiality. But slavery is a system\nof superlative partiality: hence God is opposed to slavery. God is\n_love_,--and love wills the highest happiness of the intelligent\nuniverse, and the removal of every obstruction to the progress of\nmen to that happiness. But slavery obstructs that progress. It is a\nbarbarizing system, necessarily involving millions of men in ignorance,\ncrime and misery: therefore God must will its extirpation. All the\ndivine attributes are hostile to slavery. \"Thus saith the Lord, execute\nye judgment and righteousness, and deliver the spoiled out of the hand\nof the oppressor.\" \"Learn to do well; seek judgment, relieve the\noppressed; judge the fatherless; plead for the widow.\"\n\n2. THE COMMON ORIGIN OF MAN.--The unity of the human race is admitted\nby all scientific men, and the bible plainly teaches us that \"out of\none blood hath God made all nations to dwell upon the face of the\nearth.\" Whatever difference of feature, color, intellect or stature,\nmay be found in the various parts of the globe, is attributable to\nmanners, climate, education, and the pleasure the Creator has in\nvariety. Every human being is a _man_, possessing all the rights of\na man. All men are brothers, born into the world on a common level.\nHence one man cannot claim his brother and his brother's family without\ncommitting an outrageous insult. If the right to claim belongs to\nany, it belongs to all, and now whose right shall hold? We say if\nthe right to enslave belongs to any it belongs to all, and how is it\nto be determined who will sink from the right to own slaves to the\ncondition of a SLAVE? Must the strong reduce to slavery the weak, and\nthus make might the _arbiter_? Such a conclusion would be contrary to\nthe plainest dictates of reason. If men have a common parentage, and\nare brothers, they inherit common rights, and those rights ought to be\nrespected. That system which authorizes one part of the common family\nof man to plunder another part of their dearest rights--of _all_ their\nrights, is a wrong system. But slavery authorizes this very thing:\ntherefore slavery is wrong.\n\n3. JESUS CHRIST IS THE REDEEMER OF ALL.--Jesus is the second Adam, and\nsustains a relation to the human family co-extensive with the first\nAdam. He is the Mediator, High Priest and Elder Brother of every child\nof man. All have been purchased with a priceless offering; and hence\nthe claims of Christ are paramount to all other claims, and no one can\nrightfully become the owner of a fellow-being, unless Christ as Creator\nand Redeemer first relinquish his claim. A system which should attempt\nforcibly, and without divine permission, to seize upon the Saviour's\npurchase, would be robbery--a robbery of God. But slavery does seize\nupon the purchase of a Saviour's blood without divine permission:\ntherefore slavery is robbery--robbery of God.\n\n4. THE MORAL PRECEPTS OF CHRISTIANITY.--The moral precepts\nof Christianity condemn slavery. Take for example the golden\nrule--\"Therefore all things whatsoever ye would that men should do unto\nyou, do ye even so unto them.\" Can any slaveholder obey this precept?\nIf that wealthy planter who stands at the head of a large family, were\na slave with all his household, what course would he have his owner\npursue? Would he not wish him to grant a deed of immediate manumission\nto all his family and to himself? Would he not urge the matter as\none of immense importance? Is it possible that he could desire to be\ndeprived of liberty, education, permanent family connections, and of\nthe proceeds of his toil? Could any sane man wish to have his sons and\ndaughters grow up in the stupor, ignorance, and miseries of slavery?\nNo, it is not possible. Every sound-minded man would regard the\nsubjugation of himself and family to slavery as a dreadful calamity,\nand would consider the man who should _hold_ them in that condition as\nan unfeeling, inhuman tyrant.--Therefore no sound-minded man can hold a\nslave without violating the golden rule--without doing unto others as\nhe would _not_ have others do to him.\n\n5. THE COMMANDMENTS ARE ALL AGAINST SLAVERY. \"Honor thy father and\nthy mother.\" But slavery places the master between the child and the\nparent, and makes it impossible for the child practically to obey this\ncommand, in the performance of those duties which cheer the hearts and\nlighten the burdens of parents, especially in old age. \"Thou shalt not\nkill.\" But slavery authorizes in many cases the killing of slaves.\n\"In North Carolina, any person may lawfully kill a slave who has been\noutlawed by running away or lurking in the swamps.\" \"By a law of South\nCarolina, a slave endeavoring to entice another slave to run away, if\nprovisions, etc., be prepared to aid in such running away, shall be\npunished with death.\" \"Another law of the same State, provides that if\na slave when absent from the plantation, refuse to be examined by any\nwhite person, such white person may seize and chastise him; and if the\nslave shall _strike_ such person, he may be _lawfully killed_.\"--\"Thou\nshalt not commit adultery.\" But female slaves are compelled to commit\nadultery. The law places them wholly within the power of their masters\nand overseers, and they dare not, they cannot resist their demands.\n\"Thou shalt not steal.\" But slavery exists by theft. Every slave is a\nstolen man. Every slaveholder is a man-stealer. The slave was stolen\nfrom Africa, or stolen from his rightful owner, himself, in America. No\nsophistry can make it plausible that the African slave trade is piracy,\nand that the _perpetuation_ of slavery is an innocent business. It is\ntheft as clearly to go to the <DW64> hut in Virginia and steal a babe as\nto go to a hut in Africa and do the same deed. Certainly a child born\nin our happy Republic is as free in the sight of God as one born under\nthe rule of the King of Dahomey! \"All are created free,\" hence the\nholding of any one as a slave is _theft_ persevered in. \"Thou shalt not\nbear false witness against thy neighbor.\" But slavery does bear false\nwitness against the slave, who is our neighbor. It denies his natural\nequality, his right to liberty, property--in short, his manhood.\nThis is all as _false_ as false can be. \"Thou shalt not covet.\" But\nslavery covets not only a man's property, but the man himself. We see\nthat slavery violates every commandment of the second table of the\nDecalogue, and indeed violates every precept of the first table, as\nmight readily be shown.\n\nIt is clear that slavery receives no sanction from the curse pronounced\nupon Canaan, from patriarchal servitude, from the law of Moses, nor\nfrom the law of Christ. In the light of the divine word it appears a\ngigantic barbarism, full of hate to the human brotherhood. It annuls\nthe law of God respecting the family and society. It obstructs the\nprogress of education and religion. It is condemned by the whole spirit\nof revealed religion. Only a devil could pray for its perpetuation\nand extension. It is not only a sin, but a combination of stupendous\nsins--\"the sum of all villainies,\" in the language of Wesley, \"an\nenormity and a crime, for which perdition has scarcely an adequate\npunishment,\" in the language of Clarke. \"Slavery,\" said the celebrated\nJabez Bunting, \"is always wrong, essentially, eternally, incurably\nwrong.\"\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XI.\n\nAmerican Churches and Slavery.\n\nTHE POSITION THEY OCCUPY.\n\n\nThe christian church ought to be a faithful exponent of the benevolent\nspirit and doctrines of Jesus Christ. Liberty, truth and humanity,\nthough insulted, betrayed and proscribed every where else, should find\nwithin its sacred enclosures a welcome, a refuge and a stronghold.\nIts watchmen ought to be faithful men, uninfluenced by flattery,\nuncorrupted by gold, unawed by the popular will. The church ought to\nbe the most independent body on earth. Standing as it does upon the\nEternal Rock, holding the promise of successful resistance against\nthe \"gates of hell,\" and of certain triumph over all the powers of\ndarkness, the oppressor ought to know that he could not intimidate it\nby menace, silence its witnesses, win its smiles, or by any means be\npermitted to set his unhallowed feet within its pale. The church ought\nto be a terror to slaveholders; and although usage, prejudice, pride,\npassion, wealth, literature, and the selfish interests of men should\nall be combined against the oppressed, they should be certain of an\nunswerving and powerful friend and advocate in the church.\n\nWe say such should be the acknowledged and indisputable character and\nconduct of that body popularly known as the church, because then it\nwould be a faithful exponent of the divine philanthropy of Jesus, of\nhis \"good will to men,\"--then it would be precisely what the church was\nwhen it acknowledged no law superior to the will of God.\n\nWe propose now to ascertain the position of the American churches in\nrelation to the slavery question. The most of them have been compelled\nto take some action on this exciting subject. We shall notice, more\nespecially, the late action of various denominations, both for and\nagainst slavery, that the reader may know precisely where each branch\nof the _Protestant_ churches of this country, may be found. We do not\ndeem it necessary to exhibit the relation of the _Catholic_ church to\nslavery. We may remark here, however, by the way, that this church, if\nit be proper to call it a church, is soundly pro-slavery, and is, in\nAmerica, as it is everywhere else, a staunch advocate of oppression.\nFew Protestant churches excel the Catholic in slaveholding.\n\n\nPRESBYTERIAN (OLD SCHOOL.)\n\nThe Presbyterian church (O.S.) stands fully and unequivocally on the\nside of the oppressor. It is true that a few earnest anti-slavery men\nmay be found in this denomination, but their influence upon it is\nscarcely felt. They are not able in the least to modify the decided,\nunfaltering pro-slavery position maintained by the General Assembly.\nSo far as I know, the most ultra friends of slavery are perfectly\nsatisfied with the late ecclesiastical action and influence of this\nchurch. It makes no pretensions to anti-slavery. The slaveholder is\nwelcomed to its communion, is authorized to preach and is elevated\nto the highest posts of honor. At the last General Assembly fifty\nslaveholding presbyteries were represented. The place of meeting was\nCharleston, South Carolina. Dr. Lord, author of a celebrated sermon in\nsupport of the fugitive slave law, was elected moderator. The General\nAssembly of 1845, by a vote of 168 to 13, \"Resolved, That the existence\nof domestic slavery, under the circumstances in which it is found in\nthe southern portion of this country, is no bar to Christian communion.\"\n\nThis church has been _progressing_ in the wrong direction. In 1818,\nbefore the excision of the Presbyteries which formed the New School\nbody, the General Assembly declared that \"the voluntary enslaving of\none part of the human race by another was a gross violation of the most\nprecious and sacred rights of human nature,\" \"utterly inconsistent\nwith the law of God,\" and \"totally irreconcilable with the spirit\nand principles of the gospel.\" This was a noble declaration, but\nslaveholders were not excluded from the church as they should have\nbeen, but continued to flock in, until in 1836, a _slaveholder_\npresided over the General Assembly who openly said--\"I draw my warrant\nfrom the Scriptures of the Old and New Testament to hold my slaves\nin bondage.\"--Since 1836 the General Assembly has been wholly under\nthe control of the pro-slavery interest. Her doctors of divinity have\nwritten learned treaties in defense of slavery, and slaveholders are\nat ease, yea, sleep undisturbed in her communion, and for all that that\nchurch is likely to say or do, will sleep on until they find themselves\nin company with Dives.\n\n\nPRESBYTERIAN (NEW SCHOOL.)\n\nWhen the New School General Assembly was organized only three\nslaveholding Presbyteries were represented. There are now about twenty.\nA very large proportion of the ministers and members of this church are\n_somewhat_ anti-slavery, and many of them _decidedly_ anti-slavery; but\nthe holding of slaves is not made a test of communion. Slaveholders\nhave been and are now flocking into it. Ministers of the sanctuary and\nmembers of the General Assembly are slaveholders. Nevertheless, the\naction of the General Assembly has been such as to keep up an agitation\nand render the southern portion of the church somewhat restless.\n\nThe following resolution was adopted by the General Assembly, which\nconvened at Detroit in 1850:\n\n    \"That the holding of our fellow-men in the condition of slavery,\n    EXCEPT in those cases where it is unavoidable by the laws of\n    the State, by the obligations of guardianship or the demands of\n    humanity, is an offense, in the proper import of that term, as\n    used in the Book of Discipline, chap. i., sec. 3, which should be\n    treated in the same manner as other offenses.\"\n\nThe _exceptions_ in this resolution are sufficient, especially when\nexplained at the south, to cover almost all cases of slaveholding.\n\nThe Assembly of 1853 adopted a report earnestly requesting the\nPresbyteries in the slaveholding States to lay before the next Assembly\ndistinct and full statements touching the following points:\n\n    \"1. The number of slaveholders in connection with the churches\n    under their jurisdiction, and the number of slaves held by them.\n\n    \"2. The extent to which slaves are held by an unavoidable\n    necessity, 'imposed by the laws of the States, the obligations of\n    guardianship, and the demands of humanity.'\n\n    \"3. Whether a practical regard, such as the Word of God requires,\n    is evinced by the Southern churches for the sacredness of the\n    conjugal and parental relations as they exist among slaves; whether\n    baptism is duly administered to the children of slaves professing\n    Christianity; whether slaves are admitted to equal privileges and\n    powers in the Church courts; and in general to what extent and in\n    what manner provision is made for the religious well-being of the\n    enslaved.\"\n\nThe debate on this report and the subsequent action of the southern\nPresbyteries prove conclusively that the Detroit resolution is utterly\nfutile, and that slaveholding goes on in the southern part of the\nchurch without interruption. On this report, Rev. Mr. McLain, of\nMississippi said:\n\n    \"We disavow the action of the Detroit Assembly. We have men in our\n    Church who buy slaves, and work them, because they can make more\n    money by it than any other way. All who can, own slaves; and those\n    who cannot, want to.\"\n\nRev. William Homes, of Mo., said:\n\n    \"The action of the Assembly of Detroit is null and void; for how\n    can any man be found, not to be included in one or the other of the\n    exceptions contained in it? All claim that their slaveholding is\n    involuntary and justifiable. He concluded by strenuously asserting\n    that the South would not submit to these inquiries.\"\n\nRev. William Terry, of Va., said:\n\n    \"He could not promise that the Virginia Presbyteries would give\n    any replies to these inquiries. There was no hope, so long as\n    slavery exists, that the church shall be free from it. If it has\n    come to be true that the feeling of the North will not suffer the\n    slaveholding ministers and members to remain in fellowship with the\n    Church, the South will not remain with you. They do not contemplate\n    a disconnection with slavery.\"\n\nSince the meeting of the Assembly the Presbyteries in the South have\nalmost unanimously protested against the action in relation to slavery\nas \"inquisitorial,\" and have resolved to disregard totally the \"earnest\nrequest\" of the General Assembly. They have also resolved that the\nagitation of the subject in the Assembly must cease as a _condition_ of\nthe continued union of the church. Whether the pro-slavery element of\nthis denomination will prevail, so as to \"bury out of sight the Detroit\nresolution, silence the General Assembly on slavery, and make the New\nSchool Presbyterian Church a quiet home for those who \"buy\" \"sell\" and\n\"work\" slaves \"because they can make money out of them,\" cannot now be\ndetermined. We hope not, but knowing the aggressive spirit of slavery,\nwe fear.[15]\n\n\nCONGREGATIONAL.\n\nIt is somewhat difficult to define with any great degree of\nprecision, the position of the Congregational churches in relation\nto slavery. Many of these churches are actively anti-slavery. The\nCongregationalists of Ohio, in a convention held at Mansfield:\n\n    \"Resolved That we regard American slavery as both a great evil and\n    a great violation of the law of God and the rights of man; and that\n    we deem it our sacred duty to protest, by every christian means,\n    against slaveholding, and against any and all acts which recognize\n    the false and pernicious principle that makes merchandise of man.\"\n\nThe largest representative body of congregationalists which has\nexpressed itself on the question of slavery recently was the Albany\nConvention which met in 1852. This body adopted the following\nresolution:\n\n    Resolved, That in the opinion of this Convention, it is the\n    tendency of the gospel, wherever preached in its purity, to correct\n    all social evils, and to destroy sin in all its forms; and that it\n    is the duty of Missionary Societies to grant aid to churches in\n    slaveholding States in the support of such ministers only as shall\n    so preach the gospel, and inculcate the principles and application\n    of gospel discipline, that, with the blessing of God, it shall\n    have its full effect in awakening and enlightening the moral\n    sense in respect to slavery, and in bringing to pass the speedy\n    abolition of that stupendous wrong; and that wherever a minister\n    is not permitted so to preach, he should, in accordance with the\n    directions of Christ in such cases \"depart out of that city.\"\n\nIt is believed that Congregationalists generally are _progressing_ in\nthe right direction.[16]\n\n\nMETHODIST EPISCOPAL CHURCH (NORTH AND SOUTH.)\n\nJohn Wesley pronounced slavery to be the \"sum of all villanies.\" The\ndiscipline of the Methodist Episcopal Church is quite positive in its\ncondemnation of slavery. Some of the early Methodist preachers gave\nno quarters to this sin. But as the church increased in numbers and\npopularity, slaveholders, who at first came in by mere sufferance,\nassumed a bolder position, and finally ruled the whole church \"with a\nrod of iron.\"\n\nThe General Conference which convened in Cincinnati in 1836, after a\nwarm discussion, adopted the following resolution:\n\n\"Resolved, By the delegates of the Annual Conferences, in General\nConference assembled, that we are decidedly opposed to modern\nabolitionism, and wholly disclaim any _right, wish, or intention to\ninterfere in the civil and political relation between the master and\nslave as it exists_ in the slaveholding States of this Union.\" Yeas\n120, nays 14.\n\nThis resolution was an offering to appease the bloody Moloch of\nslavery, which had been aroused somewhat by _Orange Scott_. At a Gen.\nConf. in 1840, held in Baltimore, a resolution was passed depriving\n<DW52> persons of the right of testifying against white persons. The\nresolution reads as follows:\n\n\"Resolved, That it is inexpedient and unjustifiable for any preacher to\npermit <DW52> persons to give testimony against white persons, in any\nState where they are denied that privilege by law.\"[17]\n\nThe division of this Church (or secession, as some call it, of the\nChurch South) has as yet resulted, so far as we can see, in no\nadvantage to the slave. The southern portion or branch is not more\npro-slavery than before; and the northern division occupies precisely\nthe ground maintained when the resolutions of 1836 and 1840 were\nadopted, and when there were embraced within her communion the owners\nof 200,000 slaves. SLAVEHOLDING IS NOT A BAR TO MEMBERSHIP IN THE\nMETHODIST EPISCOPAL CHURCH NORTH. Ten or eleven conferences are now\nslaveholding, and between 30 and 40,000 slaves are owned at the present\ntime by members of this church.\n\nThe Baltimore Conference, which belongs to the church North, passed in\n1836 the following resolution:\n\n    \"Resolved, That this Conference disclaims any fellowship with\n    abolitionism. On the contrary, while it is determined to maintain\n    its well known, and long established position, by keeping the\n    traveling preachers composing its own body, free from slavery; it\n    is also determined not to hold connexion with any ecclesiastical\n    body, that shall make non-slaveholding a condition of membership in\n    the Church.\"\n\nThis conference, so far from regarding slaveholding in the _membership_\na sin, seems to consider it a virtue, and a condition of fellowship.\n\nAn effort to introduce the slavery question into the last General\nConference was defeated, speakers were choked down, and the conference\nclosed in disorder. Since the meeting of that body a number of\nConferences have passed resolutions calling for the adoption of a rule\nwhich would exclude slaveholders from the church. Some strong men[18]\nseem determined not to rest the question until there is a semblance\nat least of consistency between the professions and practice of\nMethodism on slavery. This church has been \"as much as ever deploring\nthe evils of slavery,\"[19] for scores of years, and as _much as ever_\nstrengthening and building up the iniquity! And as a Methodist writer\nin the _Northern C. Advocate_ in a late article asks--\"Is it not high\ntime for honest and God-fearing anti-slavery ministers and members of\nthe Methodist Episcopal Church, to inquire whether in her official\nposition, her anti-slavery professions and character are not all a\n_mere sham_!\" It is to be feared that the good men of this church, who\nare laboring to effect its renovation from this foul sin, are doomed to\ndisappointment, as many others, who have preceded them, have been. The\nfact that three new slaveholding conferences will be represented in the\nnext General Conference of this body, augurs unfavorably.\n\n\nMETHODIST PROTESTANT CHURCH.\n\nThis branch of the Methodist family is fearfully involved in the sin\nof slaveholding.--Slavery has silenced the voice of the church organ.\nSlaveholders have free access to its communion. The discipline contains\na very disgraceful clause in relation to  members. Article 12,\nSec. 1st secures the right of suffrage to all male members who are\nWHITE. Article 7, Sec. 3, gives to each annual conference power to\nmake for  members of the church \"_such terms_ of suffrage\" as\nthey may think proper. In the same article the apparently neutral, but\nreally pro-slavery character of this church is seen in the following\nwords: \"But neither the General Conference nor any annual conference\nshall assume power to interfere with the constitutional powers of the\ncivil governments, _or with the operations of the civil laws_.\" The\ncivil law is the highest law recognized in this article, and where that\nmakes _chattels_ of men, this church is forbidden to interfere. In\nthese quotations the principles of _caste_ and _lower-lawism_, are most\nclearly inculcated. It is with surprise and sorrow that we find such\nodious features in the discipline of a church which boasts of MUTUAL\nRIGHTS.\n\n\nWESLEYAN METHODIST CONNECTION.\n\nThis denomination of Christians stands boldly and unequivocally upon\nthe solid bible anti-slavery platform; and although not a large body,\nits influence has already been widely felt. It comes behind in no\nanti-slavery gift or grace. Its pulpit and press _speak out_ earnestly\nand powerfully. The Syracuse Conference recently adopted the following\nresolutions, which are such as all the conferences of the connection\npass unanimously:\n\n    \"_Resolved_, That we hold--as ever--in abhorrence the _system_,\n    esteeming it as ranking first in the dark list of systematized\n    piracy, and all intelligent supporters of the abomination as being\n    nothing, less or more, than willing pirates.\n\n    \"_Resolved_, That to ask us to fraternize with any of the thousand\n    and one organized or unorganized influences, going directly or\n    indirectly to sustain the system, prominent among which are the\n    principal churches and the great political parties of the country,\n    is to offer direct insult to our sense of Christian propriety and\n    gentlemanly courtesy.\"\n\n\nBAPTISTS (REGULAR.)\n\nThe _Regular Baptist_ Church occupies a decidedly pro-slavery position.\nWhere slavery exists, it does not make slaveholding a bar to communion.\nIt is true that there is a division between the Northern and Southern\nBaptist churches in _benevolent operations_, but this division is\n\"one, not of principle, but of policy. Hence, there has been from the\nfirst, between the leaders of the Northern and Southern Associations,\na cordial fraternization.\"[20] This church is very influential in the\nSouth, and from no ecclesiastical organization has American slavery\nreceived a more powerful and hearty sanction. Many Baptists are,\nhowever, warm friends of the slave, but they have not been able to\nchange or modify in the slightest degree the pro-slavery position of\nthe general body.\n\n\nBAPTISTS (FREE-WILL.)\n\nThe _Free-will Baptist_ Church is decidedly anti-slavery. It stands\nin the front rank of those societies which are on the side of the\noppressed battling for humanity. Amongst other excellent resolutions\nsubmitted by the committee on slavery at the last General Conference\nthe following will show on what platform to look for a true Free-will\nBaptist:\n\n    \"_Resolved_, That we re-affirm our opposition to the whole system\n    of American Slavery; holding it to be absurd in the light of\n    Reason, infamous in the eye of Justice, a deadly foe to human\n    welfare, a libel on the Decalogue, and a reckless attack on the\n    religion of Christ; and the only change we would recommend in our\n    denominational attitude and policy on this subject, is, to take an\n    advanced position in our warfare against the system, and to give a\n    more open and public expression to our hostility.\"\n\n\nBAPTISTS (SEVENTH-DAY.)\n\nThe position of this branch of the Baptist family may be known from the\nfollowing resolution passed by the Eastern Association:\n\n\"_Resolved_, That we enter our solemn protest against the system of\nAmerican slavery, as a sin against God, and a libel on our national\ndeclaration, that \"all men are created free and equal.\"\"\n\n\nEVANGELICAL ASSOCIATION.\n\nThe Evangelical Association has inserted in its discipline the\nfollowing resolution which indicates its ecclesiastical position:\n\n    \"_Question._ What is to be done respecting slaveholders and the\n    slave-trade?\n\n    \"_Answer._ We have long since been convinced that the buying and\n    selling of men and women, and slavery, is a great evil, and ought\n    to be abhorred by every Christian: be it therefore known to all\n    fellow-members, that none shall be allowed, under any pretence or\n    condition whatever, the holding of slaves or the trafficking in the\n    same.\"\n\n\nTHE UNITED BRETHREN IN CHRIST.[21]\n\nThis church believes slavery to be in itself a sin. The Constitution,\nwhich can only be altered by a vote of two-thirds of all the members of\nthe society, declares that \"involuntary servitude shall in no way be\ntolerated.\" The 32d Section of Discipline reads as follows:\n\n    \"All slavery in every sense of the word is totally prohibited, and\n    shall in no way be tolerated in our Church. Should any be found in\n    our society who hold slaves, they cannot continue as members unless\n    they do personally manumit or set free such slaves. And when it is\n    known to any of our ministers in charge of a circuit, station or\n    mission, that any of its members hold a slave or slaves, he shall\n    admonish such member to manumit such slave or slaves; and if such\n    persons do not take measures to carry out the discipline, they\n    shall be expelled by the proper authorities of the church; and any\n    minister refusing to attend to the duties above described shall be\n    dealt with by the authorities to which he is amenable.\"\n\nThis section, substantially, has been in force since 1821. The United\nBrethren have congregations in Missouri, Kentucky, Virginia and\nMaryland.\n\n    At the General Conference, May 12, 1853, the _Southern delegates_\n    reported that there were twelve cases of legal connection with\n    slavery in the Church, but they were of a character so peculiar,\n    that a difference of opinion had arisen as to whether the\n    discipline _intended_ to exclude them. The opinion and advice of\n    the Conference was asked. The following answer, in substance, was\n    given:\n\n    \"All those cases reported are cases prohibited by the plain letter\n    of our Discipline. Execute papers of immediate emancipation.--The\n    sympathy of this Conference given to palliated cases of slavery\n    would be an entering wedge of slavery into our Church. The Church\n    must be disconnected with slavery in all its forms. The bishops are\n    instructed to carry out the _letter_ of Discipline.\"\n\n    The action in this case was taken without a dissenting vote, and\n    the delegates from the South assured the Conference that the\n    intention of the Discipline, as above explained, should be executed.\n\n    The General Conference made provision for the publication of a\n    monthly magazine. The following is from the Prospectus:\n\n    \"The immediate abolition of slavery; rejecting that most odious and\n    barbarous notion, that man has a right to hold property in man. The\n    position will be taken that this is a monster that can never be\n    tamed, a sin which violates every precept of the Bible. It will be\n    our object to show that slavery (by which we mean the holding of\n    property in man) is sinful, necessarily sinful, under all possible\n    and conceivable circumstances.\"\n\n\nVARIOUS CHURCHES.\n\nBesides the churches already mentioned the following are decidedly\nanti-slavery:--\"Associate Presbyterian,\" \"Reformed Presbyterian,\"\n\"Free Presbyterian,\" (of which the venerable John Rankin is a member,)\nmany local \"Independent\" churches, and the \"Friends\" or Quakers. The\nQuakers have a world-wide reputation for practical philanthropy. And\non the other hand the following large denominations are decidedly\npro-slavery:--\"German Reformed,\" \"Dutch Reformed,\" \"Cumberland\nPresbyterian,\" \"Lutheran\" and \"Disciple\" (or Campbellite.)\n\nThe following estimate made by W. G. Gephart, a Presbyterian minister,\nwill give a \"bird's eye view\" of the relation of the leading\ndenominations of this country to slavery as it stood a few years since.\nAt the present time they are only _more deeply_ involved in the trade\nin the souls of men, than they were when this estimate was made:\n\n DENOMINATIONS.                                        NO. OF SLAVES.\n   Methodists,                                             219,563\n   Presbyterian, Old and New School,                        77,000\n   Baptists,                                               125,000\n   Campbellites,                                           101,000\n   Episcopalians,                                           88,000\n   Allow for all other denominations,                       50,000\n                                                           -------\n Total number of slaves owned by ministers of the gospel\n   and members of the different Protestant churches,       660,563\n\n\"Now, suppose the average value of all these slaves be only $400 each,\nand it will give a capital of $264,225,200! invested in humanity, the\ninterests of 660,653 beings upon whom God has chartered immortality,\nand stamped it with the signet of his own image.\"\n\nFrom this review it will be perceived that the most influential\ndenominations have given their sanction to slavery. They have opened\nwide their doors to slaveholders, and have welcomed them to their\ncommunion. They have not advised nor commanded them to emancipate their\nslaves as a condition of admission to the church, to the Lord's table,\nto the pulpit, or even into heaven itself!\n\nDivines have, by a perversion of the Bible, corrupted the consciences\nof Southern, aye, even of Northern Christians, by the most subtle and\nmonstrous errors. The holy Bible has been made, in the language of\nBlanchard, a smith shop whence consecrated hands have brought fetters\nfor the feet, and manacles for the mind! \"We have,\" said Frederick\nDouglass, \"men-stealers for ministers, woman-whippers for missionaries,\nand cradle-plunderers for church-members. The man who wields the\nblood-clotted cow-skin during the week fills the pulpit on Sunday and\nclaims to be a minister of the meek and lowly Jesus. The man who robs\nme of my earnings at the end of each week, meets me as class-leader on\nSunday morning, to show me the way of life, and the path of salvation.\nHe who sells my sister, for purposes of prostitution, stands forth as\nthe pious advocate of purity. He who proclaims it a religious duty to\nread the Bible, denies me the right of learning to read the name of God\nwho made me. He who is the religious advocate of marriage, robs whole\nmillions of its sacred influence, and leaves them to the ravages of\nwholesale pollution. The warm defender of the sacredness of the family\nrelation is the same that, scatters whole families,--sundering husbands\nand wives, parents and children, sisters and brothers,--leaving the hut\nvacant, and the hearth desolate. We see the thief preaching against\ntheft, and the adulterer against adultery. We have men sold to build\nchurches, women sold to support the gospel, and babes sold to purchase\nBibles for the _poor heathen! all for the glory of God and the good of\nsouls!_ The slave auctioneer's bell and the church-going bell chime\nin with each other, and the bitter cries of the heart-broken slave\nare drowned in the religious shouts of his pious master. Revivals of\nreligion and revivals in the slave trade go hand in hand together.\nThe slave prison and the church stand near each other. The clanking\nof fetters and the rattling of chains in the prison, and the pious\npsalm and solemn prayer in the church may be heard at the same time.\nThe dealers in the bodies and souls of men, erect their stand in the\npresence of the pulpit, and they mutually help each other. The dealer\ngives his blood-stained gold to support the pulpit, and the pulpit, in\nreturn, covers his infernal business with the garb of Christianity.\"\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XII.\n\nSlavery and the Church.\n\nNON-FELLOWSHIP WITH SLAVEHOLDERS.\n\n\nWe shall now proceed to show what we conceive to be the true position\nof a Christian church in relation to slavery. It has been demonstrated\nthat slavery is a complicated and monstrous iniquity involving a\ndirect violation of the whole second table of the Decalogue. This being\nan established position it will not be difficult to determine the\nrelation which the church should sustain to this sin, and to those who\ncommit it.\n\nThe scriptural position of a Christian and a Christian society in\nrelation to sin, may be ascertained from the following quotations: \"But\nI have written unto you not to keep company--if any man that is called\na brother be a fornicator, or covetous, or an idolater, or railer, or\ndrunkard, or extortioner, with such an one, no, not to eat.\"\n\n\"Wherefore come out from among them, and be ye separate, saith the\nLord; and touch not the unclean thing, and I will receive you.\"\n\n\"And have no fellowship with the unfruitful works of darkness, but\nrather reprove them.\"\n\n\"Now we command you brethren, in the name of our Lord Jesus Christ,\nthat ye withdraw yourselves from every brother that walketh disorderly.\"\n\nIn these passages the duty of open and decided non-fellowship with\nsinners is unequivocally asserted. 1. Do not \"keep company\" with\ncovetous persons and extortioners. Do not \"eat\" with them at the\nsacramental table, for this would imply a sanction of their sin. 2.\n\"Come out from among them.\" Let there be between you a plain line of\ndemarcation so that the whole world will know that you are not in favor\nwith their sin, and are not a party to it. \"Have NO FELLOWSHIP.\" Be not\nunited in any associations which require it. Go not with them to the\nsacramental board. Unite not with them in benevolent efforts for the\nconversion of the world, for this would require fellowship. Have _no_\nfellowship. 4. \"In the name of the Lord Jesus withdraw yourselves\"--cut\noff all ties which imply fellowship. Do this solemnly--do it in the\nname of the blessed Jesus--do it for the glory of God--do it as an act\nof discipline--withdraw yourselves from _every_ disorderly walker--from\nevery \"darkness worker,\"--let them be unto you \"as a heathen man and a\npublican.\"\n\nNow how are these scriptures to be obeyed respecting the great sin of\nslavery? We answer: 1. The church should debar slaveholders from its\ncommunion. While they remain impenitent in relation to the monstrous\nsin of slavery and refuse to emancipate their slaves, they should be\nperemptorily refused admittance into the fellowship of saints. At the\n_door_ they ought to be met by an emphatic \"No sirs; your hands are red\nwith blood, your purses are filled with unjust gains, you rob the widow\nand the fatherless, you make merchandise of men, repent, reform, do\njustly, love mercy, or away ye men-stealers!\"\n\n2. If by any means slaveholders have obtained a place in the church,\nthey should be plainly dealt with, according to the directions given\nin such cases by the sacred writers, and in case of a refusal on\ntheir part to \"hear the church,\" they should be immediately thrust\nout--accounted as \"heathen\"--\"delivered unto Satan for the destruction\nof the flesh.\"\n\n3. But in case a church refuses to discipline slaveholders, as\nit disciplines other offenders against God, and on the contrary\npersistently retains them in its communion and officially recognizes\nthem as members of the household of faith,--as holy persons,--as good\nchristians, then a christian can do no better than to withdraw from\nthat church. He cannot remain in it without giving an expressed or\nimplied sanction to a slaveholding christianity. The whole force of\nhis piety and influence will go abroad to create the conviction that\nslavery is right and quite consistent with holiness.\n\nIn support of this view of the true position of a church and\nof christians in relation to slavery, the following additional\nconsiderations are submitted:\n\n1. The church is required to be holy. But it cannot approximate to\nholiness while welcoming into its pale sinners such as slaveholders\nare, and sanctioning such an impurity as is slavery.\n\n2. The Church is required to be the \"pillar and ground of the truth.\"\nBut a slaveholding church wofully perverts and corrupts the truth in\nmany important particulars. The truth that God hates oppression and\nrobbery for instance, is corrupted by it, for it pronounces the very\nchief oppressors and robbers the true children of God, and assures\nthe world that He approbates their conduct. It corrupts the truth in\nrelation to the true idea of a christian. It denies that justice,\nmercy and love, are essential attributes of a christian character, by\npassing off upon a deluded world a class of persons as christians who\nare pre-eminently unjust, unmerciful, and full of hate to the human\nbrotherhood.\n\n3. The church should honor the holy scriptures. But a slaveholding\nchurch necessarily dishonors them. The church is presumed to be a\nfaithful and competent expounder of the doctrines and moral precepts\nof the Bible, and hence what it approves, it is supposed, the Bible\nsanctions, and as it approves of slavery, it gives currency to the\nidea that the Bible is a pro-slavery book,--that Christianity is\nfavorable to oppression, and an enemy to equality and fraternity.\nThus a slaveholding church dishonors the Word of Truth and is an\ninfidel-making organization. Non-fellowship with slaveholding is\ndemanded as a condition of faithfulness to the Bible.\n\n4. The church is expected to convert the world to righteousness. But\nit can never do this while shielding the Leviathan of sins. Slavery is\na system of barbarism which must necessarily be destroyed in order to\nthe evangelization of America and of the world. The tyranny, injustice\nand cruelty of masters, and the ignorance, servility and general\ndegradation of slaves are inconsistent with christianity, and to\nsanction these is to sanction and sustain sin, and interpose a barrier\nto the progress of truth and righteousness. And in addition to this, a\nchurch must have a character to give it influence with men. A church\nwithout character for disinterestedness, benevolence and truth, will be\ndespised by men and forsaken of God. A slaveholding church is without\na good moral character, and hence lacks moral power. Men will be slow\nto believe that, while fiercely defending a monstrous national sin, it\nis in earnest in its opposition to lesser crimes and trivial wrongs.\nHow powerless is a body of christians whose virtue gives way under the\ntemptation of a popular and lucrative vice! How justly branded with\ncowardice and hypocrisy!\n\n5. Duty to slaveholders demands non-fellowship with slaveholding.\nThe course pursued by the popular churches involves the souls of\nslaveholders in imminent peril. Their consciences are lulled into\nquietude or narcoticized by deadly moral nostrums, skillfully prepared\nand treacherously administered by time-serving, fleece-seeking\nhirelings, who assume the sacred office of shepherds. Many of them are\nnot aware of their sin and danger, and how can they be aroused while\nhonored in the church and flattered as good christians, and imitators\nin the slaveholding business, of the good old patriarchs? To save these\nmen the church must be plain with them, and require repentance of _all_\ntheir sins, and _especially_ of the sin of slaveholding, as a condition\nof a place in the temple of God.\n\n6. Duty to the slave demands non-fellowship with slaveholding. The\noppressed have a claim upon the church, because Christ died for them,\nand they are, while enslaved, in such a situation that they can neither\nlove him with all their powers, nor do much to establish his church\nand publish his name in the earth. Hence it is the duty of christians\nand christian societies to break off the fetters which bind not only\ntheir limbs but their minds. THE AMERICAN CHURCH IS ABLE TO EMANCIPATE\nEVERY SLAVE IN THE LAND. Who doubts that it is its duty? But in order\nto do this glorious work, the principle of strict non-fellowship with\nslaveholders must be adopted. Let every church in America declare\nslavery to be a sin and exclude slaveholders from its communion, and\nthe doom of slavery will be sealed. All the laws and compromises and\ncompacts which the ingenuity of the prince of darkness could invent\nwould not preserve it. It is the church which is the bulwark of\nslavery. Not one day could it stand up in this country without the\nstrength imparted to it by a powerful but awfully corrupted church.\n\"Let all the evangelical denominations,\" says _Albert Barnes_, \"but\nfollow the simple example of the Quakers in this country, and slavery\nwould soon come to an end. There is not vital energy enough; there\nis not power of numbers and influence enough, out of the church, to\nsustain it. Let every religious denomination in the land _detach\nitself_ from all connection with slavery, without saying a word against\nothers; let the time come when, in all the mighty denominations of\nChristians, it can be announced that the evil has ceased _with\nthem_ FOREVER, and let the voice from each denomination be lifted up\nin kind, but firm and solemn testimony against the system--with no\n'mealy' words; with no attempt at apology; with no wish to blink it,\nwith no effort to throw the sacred shield of religion over so great\nan evil--and the work is done. There is no power _out_ of the church\nthat could sustain slavery an hour if it were not sustained _in_ it.\"\nHence the reasons for non-fellowship with slaveholding are as vast\nas the interests temporal and eternal of millions and millions of\nour fellow-creatures, and as vast as the treachery which leaves them\nin chains! Depend upon it the curse of God will come down upon the\nAmerican church in a storm of fiery vengeance if it arise not and do\njustice to the slave!\n\n7. If slaveholders are admitted to church-fellowship _no class of\nsinners on earth should be excluded_. The church cannot consistently\nexpel from its communion the rich man who grinds the face of the poor\nlaborer that reaps down his fields, and at the same time retain the\nslaveholder who lives _entirely_ upon the unpaid labor of the poor.\nHe who _occasionally_ cheats his neighbor out of a few dollars cannot\nconsistently be censured by the church while the man who cheats whole\nfamilies out of domestic comfort, home, education, and their all,\npasses without reproof. The occasional adulterer cannot receive church\ndiscipline in the presence of him who compels his slaves to live\ntogether without the sanction, and without the protection of the law.\nHe who steals a sheep cannot be cast out from a church in which he\nwho steals men occupies a high seat. As slaveholding is a violation\ndirectly or indirectly of every commandment of the Decalogue, if it\ncannot and must not be disciplined, then church discipline is useless;\nand all classes of sinners should be admitted and retained in this\nHoly Temple, unless the principle be established that he who commits\na _petty_ offense shall be cast out, but he who has the heart and\ncourage to commit a high offense, a daring crime, shall remain in full\nfellowship. I have wondered how slaveholding church members could try\nand expel from a religious society a poor <DW64> who, in addition to\nhis peck of corn per week, had stolen a little meat, while they were\nconscious of robbing that same <DW64> of the products of his daily toil,\nand of his own soul and body.\n\n8. To maintain its _independence_ the church must discard fellowship\nwith slaveholders.--In no case have slaveholders been willing to\noccupy an humble position in a religious body long. They assume to\nbe pre-eminently _the_ members of the church, and the press, pulpit,\nand General Assembly or General Conference, _must_, unequivocally,\nendorse, or patriarchalize their slaveholding. The history of all\nthe pro-slavery churches in America is proof of this remark. A few\nslaveholders are able to change entirely the action of a powerful\necclesiastical body--to range it on the side of oppression, to silence\nor subborn its witnesses, to shut up its sympathies and take away the\nbow of hope from the slave. How many of the hundreds of ministers in\nthe whole south are free to utter their convictions on slavery to\nday? How many religious presses are unfettered? If then the church\nwould stand upon the solid rock of truth, unawed by the popular will,\nuncorrupted with gold, the immutable friend of _man_, proclaiming\nand enforcing the _whole_ truth, it must keep out of her communion\nlegalized and practiced tyrants.\n\n9. Regard for decency, refined sensibility and common humanity, urges\nnon-fellowship with slaveholders. The members of a slaveholding church\nbecome insensible to the grossest outrages upon the better feelings\nof slaves, and they habitually commit acts, without a blush, which,\none should think, would pale the cheek of a demon. For illustration\ntake a well authenticated fact: \"A runaway slave in 1841, assigned the\nfollowing as the reason why he refused to commune with a church of\nwhich he was a member. 'The church,' said he, 'had silver furniture\nfor the administration of the Lord's supper, to procure which they\nsold _my brother!_ and I could not bear the feelings it produced to\ngo forward and receive the sacrament from the vessels which were the\npurchase of my brother's blood!'\" But the members of that church,\ngenerally, were altogether without feeling upon the subject, and were\nas little disturbed in selling a slave to purchase silver ware for the\nsacramental table, or to pay a parson, or to support a missionary, as\nin selling a mule for the same purposes.\n\n10. If slavery be fellowshiped in the church, then _slaveholding\npreachers_ will be coming around and preaching the gospel to us!\nA dealer in human flesh will undertake to teach us to be just and\nmerciful. We will be expected to receive the elements of the holy\nsacrament from hands that use the cowskin occasionally on the backs\nof slaves! It is notorious that churches which fellowship slavery\nhave an exceedingly dumb and callous ministry on the subject of\noppression. Frederick Douglass, I think it was, who said that the\nhardest master he ever served was a Methodist Protestant preacher.\nThe following incident will illustrate this thought: \"A minister of\nthe gospel owned a female slave, whose husband was owned by another\nman in the same neighborhood. The husband did something supposed to\nbe an offense sufficient to justify his master in selling him for the\nsouthern market. As he started, his wife obtained leave to visit him.\nShe took her final leave of him, and started to return to her master's\nhouse. She went a few steps and returned and embraced him again, and\nstarted a second time to go to her master's house; but the feelings of\nher heart again overcame her, and she turned about and embraced him\nthe third time. Again she endeavored to bear up under the heavy trial,\nand return; but it was too much for her--she had a woman's heart. She\nreturned the fourth time, embraced her husband--and turned about,--A\nMANIAC!\"--(Anti-slavery Record.)\n\nGood God! can any one plead for the admission of such cruelty into the\nbosom of the church and into the ministry?\n\nAnd let it be remembered that this preacher simply did what the legal\nrelation authorized, and what all slaveholding ministers may do without\necclesiastical censure.\n\n11. If slavery be fellowshiped in the church, then we shall be\ncompelled to sit in religious meetings, class-meetings and conference\nmeetings, and hear a good experience told by one who lives on the\ntoil of wretched slaves, and who would sell at public sale one of our\nown brethren in the Lord, yea, even ourselves, if the _laws_ would\nallow it. Take the following specimen of a Methodist _sister_, and ask\nyourselves how you would like to attend class with her.\n\n\"A poor woman was put in jail about a week since. It is the jail that\ncost the people of the United States nearly, or quite, $60,000. Had\nthis woman committed crime? Not the least in the world. Her mistress\nwants to sell her, and pocket the money--that's all. She puts her into\njail simply to know where she is when she finds a customer. This poor\nwoman, offered for sale, expects to be _confined_ in a few weeks. She\nhas a husband and mother, but neither of them are allowed to go into\nthe jail to visit her. The husband tried to talk with her through\nthe grated window, the other day, but was driven off by some menial\nof the establishment. Amanda, the slave-woman, is a member of the\nMethodist Church, which takes the name of Bethlehem. I hear she is in\ngood standing in the Church, and sustains a fair and good character\ngenerally. The mistress--the owner--the trader--who is she? She is\nMiss A. B., a venerable spinster, a few years ago from Virginia,\nand now residing in this city. She brought with her this woman, her\nmother, and two or three children, upon whose wages she has lived for\nyears past, and now proposes to put Amanda in her pocket. She (Miss\nA. B.) is a member of the Methodist Episcopal Church, belongs to the\nM'Kendree Chapel congregation, and attends _class_ regularly. I am\nglad to say some of the brethren are a little _stirred_ about this\ntransaction.\"--_Elliott_, _page 73._\n\n\"A _little stirred_!\" Indeed! One would think they would have stirred\nthat villainous woman out of the Church in short metre, or stirred out\nof it themselves. But no, they were _only_ \"_a little_ stirred!\"\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XIII.\n\nSlavery and the Church.\n\nOBJECTIONS TO THE EXCLUSION OF SLAVEHOLDERS ANSWERED.\n\n\n1. It has been objected that fellowship should not be withdrawn from\n_all_ slaveholders, because some of them are exceedingly kind to\ntheir slaves. To this it may be answered that it is impossible for a\nmaster to be really very kind to those he holds in slavery, because\nthe _holding_ of them in that relation is _extreme_ unkindness. A kind\nslaveholder? What entitles him to that character? Does he renounce the\nclaim of _property_ in his slaves? No. Does he _hire_ them to work for\nhim and _pay_ them when the work is done? No. Does he open a school on\nhis plantation for their mental and moral culture? No. Does he permit\nhis slaves to instruct each other in the rudiments of education? No.\nDoes he use his influence to have the diabolical laws enacted to crush\nthe manhood out of the <DW52> man, repealed? No. Does he secure his\nslaves against the chances of the inter-state slave trade--against\nsale at auction for his debts--against the lash of a Legree? No. What\nthen entitles him to the character of a _kind_ slaveholder? Why he\nsimply treats them as a good man treats a fine horse or a favorite dog.\nHe feeds them well, works them moderately, whips but little, but robs\nthem of _all_! We abuse language when we say--a _benevolent_ robber, a\n_gentlemanly_ pickpocket, an _honorable_ pirate or a _kind_ slaveholder.\n\nThe poet, _Longfellow_, while traveling in Va., became acquainted with\nan honest old slave owned by a fine specimen of a kind, Christian,\nPresbyterian slaveholder. Said he:\n\n\"Calling at a blacksmith's shop for a small job of work, I found the\nsmith was a slave. On inquiring to whom I should make payment, he told\nme I might to him. His practice was to receive all the money paid at\nthe shop, and pay it over to his master at night. I asked him how his\nmaster knew whether he rendered a just account. He replied, that he\nknew him too well not to trust him. That, as wrong as his master did\nby him, it was no excuse for him to do wrong by his master. He could\ndeceive his master, but he could not deceive God, to whom he must\nrender his final account. He said he was a Baptist, and had regular\nfamily prayers. His master was a Presbyterian, to whom he gave credit\nfor good usage and good training. But as he had faithfully served him\nfifty years, he did think that he ought to have the remainder of his\ndays to himself. He regretted that he could not read the Bible; and\nI was pained to hear him attempt to quote it, he made such blunders.\nThe tears started in the eyes of the poor man as he spoke of his\nhard condition, and looked forward to death only for release from\nhis bondage. He thanked God that he had no children to inherit his\nignorance and servitude.\"\n\nThe kindness of certain slaveholders might be mere favorably considered\nif it were productive of any permanent practical benefits to the slave;\nbut while it leaves him in the depth of his wretchedness,--exposed\nto all the horrors of the worst form of slavery, it is a meritless\nthing--unworthy the name of kindness. The kind slaveholder knows\nthat when he dies his slaves will be sold at auction together with\nhis horses, cattle, and plantation. What avails his fancied kindness\nwhen he knows the horrible chances to which he subjects his helpless\nvictims. And how deeply guilty is he in the sight of God for refusing\nto break every yoke when he has the opportunity! To illustrate this\nthought and show the sequel of kind slaveholding we will subjoin\na sketch of a woman's history who was the property of a _kind_\nslaveholder.\n\n\"A kind slave-master, in one of the Carolinas, had a large family,\nof various colors, some enslaved, some free. One of the slaves was\nhis favorite daughter, and much accomplished. Dying, he willed his\nheir, her brother, to provide for her handsomely, and make her free.\nBut her brother was a slave-master, and she was a slave. He kept and\ndebauched her. At the end of four years he got tired of her; and that\nnotorious slave-dealer, Woolfork, coming down to collect a drove, he\nsold his sister to him. \"There is her cottage,\" said he to Woolfork;\n\"she is a violent woman. I don't like to go near her; go and carry her\noff by yourself.\" Woolfork strode into the cottage, told her of the\nfact and ordered her to prepare. She was dreadfully agitated. He urged\nher to hasten. She arose and said, 'White man, I don't believe you. I\ndon't believe that my brother would thus sell me, and his children. I\nwill not believe unless he come himself.'--Woolfork coolly went, and\nrequired her brother's presence. The seducer, the tyrant came, and,\nstanding at the door, confirmed the slaveholder's report. 'And is it\ntrue? and have you sold me?' she exclaimed. 'Is it really possible?\nLook at this child! Don't you see in every feature the lineaments of\nits father? Don't you know that your blood flows in its veins? Have\nyou, have you sold me?' The terrible fact was repeated by her master.\n'These children,' said she, with a voice only half articulate, 'shall\nnever be slaves.' 'Never mind about _that_,' said Woolfork, 'go and get\nready. I shall only wait a few minutes longer.' She retired with her\nchildren. The two white men continued alone. They waited. She returned\nnot. They grew tired of waiting, and followed her to her chamber. There\nthey found their victims beyond the reach of human wickedness, bedded\nin their blood.\"--(Anti-Slavery Record.)\n\n2. Slaveholders ought not to be excluded from the church, it is argued,\nbecause their views and feelings on the subject of slavery have been\ncorrupted by the prevalence of this popular sin. They are not, it is\nmaintained, individually responsible--the fault--the sin, the shame\nattaches to a false public morality. Dr. McClintock offers this\nobjection in the following words: \"Their position,\" he says, \"has the\neminent unhappiness of almost necessitating a feeble or corrupt moral\nsense on this subject; they are carried along by a great movement that\nabsorbs their individuality, so to speak; the personal conscience is\nlost in the general sense of the community. The great work to be done\nis to purify that general sense; not to curse and malign individual\nslaveholders, but to break up the false public morality in which the\nsystem finds its main support.\"[22]\n\nWe answer that no man is excusable for falling in with a \"great\nmovement\" which is manifestly wicked. Noah, Lot, Abraham and Elijah\nwere not carried along with sin in this way. Their moral sense was\nneither enfeebled nor corrupted by the prevailing vices. The apostles\ndid not lose their \"personal conscience\" in the \"general sense\" of\nidolatrous communities, in the midst of which they labored. And in\n_no case_ does the Bible excuse a sinner because of the prevalence\nof sin.--Idolaters were not taken into church because that vice was\nsustained by law and prevailing custom. And he who lived in Corinth in\nthe days of St. Paul, found himself in the midst of gross, shameless\nsensuality--and it was quite easy for such a person to fall in with\nthe vices for which that city was notorious; and some Christians did\nfall in with those vices. But did St. Paul excuse them, and forbid\ntheir expulsion from the church, throwing the blame of their conduct\nupon the prevailing vice? Did he ordain that until the \"general\nsense\" were purified, the \"fornicator,\" the \"incestuous person\" and\nthe \"drunkard\" must remain in the church? By no means. He knew that\nthe _public_ conscience was made up of _individual_ consciences--that\npublic corruption was the aggregate of individual corruption--and hence\nthat the only possible method of reaching and purifying the general\nsense, was by reaching and purifying the individual sense. And hence\nindividual purity was required as a condition of church membership.\nChurches now proceed precisely upon this principle in relation to all\nsins, however prevalent, slavery excepted; and no good reason can be\noffered for making it an exception. And if slaveholders _have_ an\nenfeebled moral sense, which is certainly the case, it is because the\nministry and church have been recreant to duty and truth, and have\nsaid to them \"peace, peace, when God had not spoken peace.\" The only\nway to prevent them from being swept along by the flood tides of this\ndevastating iniquity until they launch upon the shoreless sea of wrath,\nis to sound the alarm! But alas, those watchmen who have their ear are\napt to say to them, do not be alarmed--the \"false _public_ morality\"\nwill be a satisfactory apology for your sins! When asked by the judge\nwhy you were an oppressor, you can answer, that you only followed the\nprevailing example!\n\n3. Slavery, it is objected, is a _political_ question and hence the\nchurch ought not to meddle with it. We answer, that slavery is not\nonly a political, but a moral question--it is a question concerning\nthe rights of man, and all that concerns _man_ concerns a christian.\nTemperance is made a political question, should the church therefore\nfellowship the drunkard? The observance of the Sabbath is a political\nquestion--must the church therefore drop it, lest it be entangled with\npolitics? The same may be said of gambling, perjury and theft.\n\n4. But, says one, the laws uphold slavery, and whatever of blame\nattaches to slaveholding is justly chargeable to the laws. To this\nit is answered that slaveholders are the _makers of their own laws_,\nand hence are responsible for them. But if they had no voice in the\ngovernment it would be impossible to shift the responsibility of\nslaveholding upon the laws, because, in the first place, a good man\ncannot innocently avail himself of the provisions of laws which permit\nhim to injure his fellow creatures; and in the next place, the laws\ncompel no one to hold slaves. They allow it, but do not require it.\n\n5. But some, it is urged, are slaveholders from necessity, hence they\nought not to be blamed. This cannot be. The laws do not compel people\nto buy, steal, trade for, receive as a gift, or inherit slaves. Any\none may refuse to own this kind of property unless he is an idiot or\na child. And if by any means a man finds himself in possession of\nslaves he can emancipate them. It is not far to the free states. Why do\nnot those pious Methodists and Presbyterians, who are always talking\nof the impossibility of \"_getting rid_\" of their slaves, permit the\nabolitionists to help them? They would cheerfully pilot them, or give\nthem a free passage on the Under-Ground Railroad! But all those pious\nslaveholders from necessity are ready to lynch or imprison any man who\nmay undertake to release them from the \"necessary evils\" of slavery. A\nslaveholder from necessity is one who holds slaves _because holding_\nthem is a necessary condition of _robbing_ them.\n\n6. But the church has no right to ask a man to give away his property\nand impoverish himself. Yes, the church has a right to require a man\nto restore stolen property, and this is the kind of property slaves\nare. As to impoverishing slaveholders, there is danger of that, but\npoverty is no crime and is often good for the soul. It is better to be\na Lazarus in this world with his future, than a Dives with his future.\nAnd besides, there is no law of God allowing a man to roll in wealth\nacquired by robbery.\n\n7. Nothing can be said against some slaveholders _only_ that they\nhold slaves. In every other respect they are christian-like in their\nconduct, and it seems hard to exclude such fine people from the church.\n\nAlas that any christian should speak of slaveholding as \"_only_\"\na small objection. But one sin may ruin the soul. Some men are in\nevery respect excellent persons _except_ that they are addicted\nto intemperate habits, to lying, or to licentiousness--shall they\ntherefore be excused for their besetting sin, and allowed to indulge\nit? One who has cheated a poor white neighbor out of only one year's\ntoil, ought never to be admitted into the church until he makes\nrestitution. So in the case of a slaveholder--let him be just to\n_every_ creature of God--let him give up his idol or serve it in its\nappropriate temple, and not disgrace the church of God with its image\nand worshiper.\n\n8. It has been maintained that slaveholders should be taken into the\nchurch that they may come under the direct influence of the gospel,\nthe tendency of which is to destroy slavery. We answer--_a._ The\nsame reason might be urged with equal force for the admission of the\ndrunkard, liar, thief or adulterer.\n\n_b._ Experience proves that slaveholders, when admitted to church\nfellowship, are not more likely to emancipate their slaves than others.\nThey are apt to settle down in the belief that it is right to hold\nslaves, and the height of impertinence for any one to meddle with them\nabout it. A minister in Kentucky, Rev. Mr. Fee, who is well acquainted\nwith this subject from experience and actual observation, says of the\nslaveholder--\"The way to lull his conscience on the subject is, to\nbring him into the church in the practice of his sin. I know repeated\ninstances of persons whose consciences and hearts, at the time of\ntheir awakening, seemed to be tender on the subject of slaveholding.\nBut after they had been fully received, and a few comfortable meetings\npassed over, they became wholly indifferent; and after hearing or\nreading one or two pro-slavery sermons, declaring slavery to be a Bible\ninstitution, they were almost ready to seize the torch, and apply the\nfires of persecution to the individual who would disturb their Zion.\nThe place to induce the slaveholder to give up his sin is at the\ntime, or before, he enters the door of the church; before he has been\npronounced as being in a salvable state; for 'all that a man hath will\nhe give for his life.'\"\n\nBut this is no abstruse question as \"cotton Divines\" would persuade\nus. Slaveholding is a wicked business and must be treated as such.\nIt is impossible to treat it as such while fellowship is extended to\nslaveholders. The christian is bound to refuse that fellowship. If any\nbranch of the church officially or practically sanctions slavery and\nendorses the piety of slaveholders, then, in order to be consistent and\nsafe, a christian must come out of that church, because in it, he will\nbe a partaker of its sins and a sufferer of its plagues.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XIV.\n\nPolitical Duties of Christians.\n\nTHE EXTIRPATION OF SLAVERY FROM THE WORLD.\n\n\nCivil government is necessary to the preservation, prosperity and\nsafety of society. In some important sense, \"the powers that be, are\nordained of God.\" It does not appear that the Creator has established\nany specific _form_ of government, but the genius of christianity is\nevidently democratic. The leading _objects_ of government are defined\nto be \"the punishment of evil doers and the praise of them that do\nwell.\" When a government fails to protect and encourage the good and to\npunish evil doers,--when it becomes a mighty engine of oppression, the\nobject of its institution is frustrated.\n\nIn the United States the voters are responsible for the character\nof the government. The people are the sovereign rulers. The ballot\nbox controls legislation. If our country is badly governed it is the\npeople's fault.\n\nThe free white people of America are responsible for the existence\nof American slavery. They could at the ballot box break every yoke.\nThey have the power to release more than three millions of slaves and\nthereby make heaven and earth rejoice!\n\nA weighty responsibility, therefore, rests upon voters in relation to\nslavery. If it continue, it will be because they shall will it, and\nexpress that will at the ballot box. He who votes for a representative\nthat is pledged to sustain slavery, becomes responsible for that\nrepresentative's acts on the slavery question. The responsibility\ncannot be shifted or dodged. Representatives consult the will of\ntheir constituents and act as they wish them to act. They are only the\npeople's agents, the echo of the people's voice.\n\nIn the light of these facts how can a christian vote for a slaveholder\nor a friend of slavery? How can he, by his vote, say that slavery\nshall be perpetual? Every pulsation of a christian's heart beats in\nharmony with liberty; he could not have slaves in his own hands. How\nthen can he, how dare he, by his vote, chain them and deliver them over\nto the slave driver? It is mean and wicked for a strong man to beat\na weak one, but it is equally as mean and wicked to _hold_ the weak\nman so that the strong one may beat him at his leisure and with ease.\nSo it is bad to own a slave and tax his sinews, sweat and blood, to\nbeat and bruise him, but it is equally wrong to hold the slave while\nthe southern slaveholder does the same thing. Hence, he who votes for\npro-slavery representatives, votes for slavery and all its swarms of\nevils, and is indirectly a slaveholder himself.\n\nLet it be distinctly understood, then, that political power has been\nentrusted to the christian people of America by the God of nations,\nwho holds them responsible for its proper exercise; and that acting\npolitically is a serious business, affecting the interests directly,\nin this country, of twenty millions of freemen, and more than three\nmillions of slaves; and also affecting indirectly, the interests of the\nwhole human family.\n\nIf the supporters of slavery continue to control the policy of the\nAmerican government; to trample under foot the \"higher law;\" to render\nthe Declaration of Independence a nullity; to denationalize liberty;\nto nationalize slavery and perpetuate and extend it; and thus to belie\nall our professions of Democracy, and render this government a Godless\ntyrant, delighting in crushed hopes and hearts--then the whole human\nrace may weep. That our government has been progressing toward this\nterrible consummation for the last thirty years is but too evident.\n\nThe Declaration of Independence is a sound anti-slavery document. It\ndoes not regard the right of all men to liberty as an unsettled opinion\nor a question to be proved by abstruse argument, but pronounces it a\n\"SELF EVIDENT TRUTH.\"\n\nThe Constitution in _form_ if not in fact, pretty fully embodies the\nsentiments of the Declaration. The word slave is not found in it, and\nit was kept out not accidentally, but purposely. The framers of the\nConstitution carefully guarded that instrument against any endorsement\nof slavery. In the convention which formed the Constitution, Gov.\nMorris of Pennsylvania said, \"He never would concur in upholding\ndomestic slavery. It was a nefarious institution.\" Mr. Getry, of\nMassachusetts, in the same convention said, \"we had nothing to do with\nthe conduct of the States as to slavery, _but we ought to be very\ncareful not to give any sanction to it_.\" The idea that there _could_\nbe property in man was carefully excluded from the Constitution. It was\nabout to be foisted into that instrument by the adoption of a report of\na committee fixing a tax on importations. But Mr. _Sherman_ was against\n\"_acknowledging men to be property_, by taxing them as such under\nthe character of slaves.\" _Madison \"thought it wrong to admit in the\nconstitution the idea that there could be property in man.\"_ But if the\nidea of property in man was carefully excluded from the Constitution,\nthen it is clear that chattel slavery is not in form recognized, much\nless established by that instrument.\n\nIt is evident that the framers of the Constitution expected the speedy\nabolition of slavery; and hence, while providing in fact though not\nin form, for its continuance under the constitution, by virtue of\n_local_ State laws, they so framed that instrument that it would not\ncountenance slavery or deny the glorious doctrines of the immortal\nDeclaration, which contained what Mr. Sumner calls \"the national heart,\nthe national soul, the national will, and the national voice.\"[23]\n\n_Washington_ said \"That it was among his _first wishes_ to see some\nplan adopted, by which slavery may be _abolished_ by law.\"\n\n_Adams_ regarded slavery as \"a sacrilegious breach of trust.\"\n\n_Hamilton_ considered slaves, \"though free by the law of God, held in\nslavery by the laws of men.\"\n\n_Jefferson_ said that the \"abolition of domestic slavery was the\ngreatest object of desire.\"\n\n_Patrick Henry_ said--\"I will not, I cannot justify it.\"\n\n_Benj. Franklin_, when 84 years of age, came up before Congress with\na petition from the \"Abolition Society of Pennsylvania, praying that\nbody to countenance the restoration of liberty to those unhappy men,\nwho alone, in this land of freedom are degraded into perpetual bondage,\nand who, amidst the general joy of surrounding freemen are groaning in\nservile subjection.\" This petition besought Congress to \"step to the\nVERY VERGE of the power vested in them for _discouraging_ every species\nof traffic in the persons of our fellow men.\"\n\nThese facts afford conclusive evidence, that the founders of the\nAmerican Republic did not intend to fasten upon the object of their\ntoils, perils and sacrifices, a monster which would speedily eat out\nits virtue, destroy its vitality and overthrow it forever.\n\nBut the policy of the government has been reversed. Millions of\nacres of territory have been purchased and annexed to make room for\nslavery, which has become a great national pet--the god before whom\naspiring politicians must kneel and worship as a condition of political\nelevation.\n\nThe President of the United States and his Cabinet, the Supreme\nCourt, and both Houses of Congress are all under the control of the\nSlaveocracy. No man can be a President of the United States unless he\nbows the knee and swears upon the altar of this modern Baal. Zeal for\nthe infamous Fugitive Slave Law is now a particular test of political\northodoxy. A Congressman who advocates the principles of Washington,\nFranklin and Jefferson is considered as standing outside of any\n\"healthy organization\" and is not deemed worthy of a place on the\nmost insignificant Congressional committee. Our government has been\nthoroughly changed from an anti-slavery to a pro-slavery government.\n\nIn view of these facts how important that the concentrated moral and\npolitical power of every American christian be brought to the rescue of\nour great Republic from the sin and shame of its present position.\n\nChristians, in the States where slavery exists, are under obligations\nto use their whole political and moral power to bring about the speedy\nrepeal of the entire slave code. That code is a miserable barbarism and\nshould be swept away forever from the statutes of Christian States.\nMy christian brethren in Virginia, Kentucky and Missouri, are you\nprepared to use all the power, moral and political, with which you\nare entrusted, as you shall answer to God, for the emancipation of\nyour suffering fellow citizens? Your political influence must tell\nsomewhere! Remember _that_.\n\nChristians in the free States are obliged to do what is in their\npower for the repeal of all laws which bear upon the <DW52> man\nbecause he is a _colored_ man. The word \"white\" ought to be erased\nfrom the statutes of all christian States. All \"black laws\" are\nanti-democratic, anti-christian, and not only insult and annoy, but\ndiscourage the <DW52> man and obstruct his progress in the path of\nimprovement.--Christian brethren of the free States, you have not done\nyour duty toward your  brother. You have sustained laws which\ngall his neck as a heavy yoke. You have treated him as an alien and an\nenemy. Will you henceforth do him justice, as you shall answer to God?\n\nChristian citizens of all the States are directly responsible for the\nexistence of slavery in the District of Columbia, and they should not\nbe content until that foul pollution is wiped away from the Capital of\nour country. Slavery at Washington is especially a national disgrace, a\nblistering shame, a satire upon our professions.\n\nWhen the foreign minister or visitor comes to our country, and goes\nto Washington, he sees in the streets, at the hotels, and everywhere,\na poor, stupid, oppressed people, whose very speech and looks betray\ntheir ignorance and servility. Ah! Is this American freedom? Equality?\nRepublicanism? Upon inquiry, he finds that one-seventh of all the\npeople are in this state of servile wretchedness.\n\nAnd when a member of Congress from a free State goes to the proud\nCapital of his country, he beholds passing by the tall and splendid\nbuildings of the government, droves of men, women and children, chained\ntogether,--some sullenly indifferent to their fate--others weeping as\nif their hearts would break.--Who are these? American citizens!\n\nMen, as white as some members of Congress, and women as fair as their\nwives and as virtuous as their daughters, are cried off at auction to\nthe highest bidder, in Washington!\n\nThere our senators and representatives sit and legislate, in sight\nof the slave prison, and slave market--in hearing of the clanking of\nchains, and coffles,--and of the wail of slave mothers, weeping for\ntheir children, because they are\n\n    \"Gone, gone, sold and gone.\"\n\nThey are also responsible for the extension of slavery into territory\nnow free. If they go not to the utmost verge of their power to save\nthe Lord's free earth from the overspreading and blighting curse of\nslavery, they cannot but be execrated by an enlightened posterity.\n\nBut more than all this. A christian is a citizen of the world, and\nhence is required to employ the whole force of his moral and political\npower for the extirpation of slavery from every State in the Union,\nand from every country on the globe. The influence of an intelligent,\nactive christian citizen is worldwide. He cannot be the dupe or tool\nof any party; he is never shackled by party organizations; he does not\ncommit the keeping of his conscience to political leaders. He sincerely\nloves God, believes the Bible, and loves his fellow-men, because\nthey are men. Prejudice, caste, and all other relics of barbarism,\nhe has thrown away. He talks, votes and prays for universal liberty\nand righteousness. In the pulpit, in the shop, on the farm, anywhere,\neverywhere the whole weight of his influence is thrown against slavery\nin the territories, in the District of Columbia, in the States, and\nagainst it wherever it exists in the world. As he seeks for the\nphysical, intellectual and moral improvement and happiness of all men,\nhe must desire intensely the speedy extirpation of slavery from the\nearth.\n\nChristian voter, when you approach the ballot box, think of the three\nmillions of bondmen who are holding up their hands \"all manacled and\nbleeding,\" pleading to you for deliverance!\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XV.\n\nAbolition of Slavery.\n\nIMMEDIATE EMANCIPATION.\n\n\n    \"Long has thy night of sorrow been,\n    Without a star to cheer the scene.\n    Nay; there was One that watched and wept,\n    When thou didst think all mercy slept;\n    That eye which beams with love divine\n    Where all celestial glories shine.\n    Justice shall soon the sceptre take;\n    The scourge shall fall, the tyrant quake.\n    Hark! 'tis the voice of One from heaven;\n    The word, the high command is given,\n    'Break every yoke, loose every chain,\n    To usher in the Savior's reign.'\"\n\nMany persons, who appear to be sensible of the evils of slavery, seem\nutterly at a loss for some feasible method of abolishing it. \"It is\nhere in our midst,\" say they, \"and how are we to get rid of it?\"\n\nTo this question we have a plain scriptural answer. \"LOOSE THE BANDS\nOF WICKEDNESS,\"--\"UNDO THE HEAVY BURDENS,\"--\"LET THE OPPRESSED GO\nFREE,\"--\"BREAK EVERY YOKE,\"--\"PROCLAIM LIBERTY THROUGHOUT ALL THE LAND,\nUNTO ALL THE INHABITANTS THEREOF.\"\n\nImmediate, unconditional, universal emancipation is the only just, the\nonly reasonable and the only possible method of adjusting the slavery\nquestion. To this measure the people of the United States _must_ come.\nA general Jubilee is inevitable. Slavery is an unmitigated wrong.\nEvery element of it is at variance with the happiness of man and the\nlaw of God. It is without a single redeeming principle, and hence its\ndestruction--its total annihilation is necessary.\n\nSince the gigantic wrongs of slavery have been so generally made known\nas somewhat to arouse the public conscience from its long sleep, some\nwriters, anxious to preserve the system, have proposed to _reform_ it.\nThey say, \"Slavery, of itself, is a very innocent relation, but its\nevils are horrible. Let us correct the evils and preserve the system.\"\n\nBut slavery cannot be reformed, so as to make it a tolerable\ninstitution because its essential feature--viz, _property in a human\nbeing_, is, wherever imposed, an outrageous, an insufferable wrong. Who\nwould think of reforming robbery--of making laws to regulate robbers\nin their trade--and to prevent brutal men from engaging in it? What if\nit should be enacted by grave senators that none but gentlemen should\nrob, and that they must do it genteelly--using no _unnecessary_ cruelty\nor coercion? All the world would laugh such senators to scorn. But\nslavery is from beginning to end a system of robbery, which it is as\nimpossible to reform, so as to take away its \"evils,\" as it is to so\nreform piracy as to destroy its evils, and make it a humane, just and\nchristian trade.\n\nBut the American slaves, it is maintained, are _not prepared for\nfreedom_. This objection is without foundation. God _creates_ men free,\nand sends them forth into the world with such endowments as are needed\nin a state of freedom, and as are suited to _no other_ state. To say\nthat a race, which God has _created_ free, is unprepared for freedom is\nto reproach the Maker. Freedom is the native element of man. And\n\n    \"The heavens, the earth, man's heart and sea,\n    Forever cry, _let all be free_!\"\n\n\"Not prepared for freedom?\" This has been the watchword of oppressors\nin all ages. The \"people,\" the uninformed \"masses,\" have, in the\nestimation of tyrants, always been prepared for slavery and injustice\nof every kind, but never for freedom. And it has ever been their policy\nto render them less fit for any station or any responsibility in life.\nThey never put forth an effort to prepare their victims for any higher\nbusiness than obsequious submission to usurped authority. True to this\nspirit, those who are most noisy about the unfitness of slaves for\nfreedom, are most zealous for the maintenance of those odious laws and\nusages which shut them out from all chance of mental and moral culture.\n\nAnd if the slaves are unprepared for freedom, what is to prepare them\nfor it? Their present degradation is owing to slavery, and it is not\nlikely that the continuance of the _cause_ of their degradation will\nelevate them. Remove the cause, and the effect will cease. Emancipate\nthe <DW52> man, open to him our schools and colleges, place before him\nmotives for action such as animate freemen, and swell the hearts of\nChristians, give him an _opportunity_ and he will prove himself every\nwhit a MAN. How mean and hypocritical the objection, that slaves are\nnot prepared for freedom, when we employ the whole weight of our laws\nand prejudices to crush out their manhood, and as far as possible unfit\nthem for any condition except that of working animals.\n\nBut thousands of slaves have fled from their oppressors, and, in the\nmidst of the greatest difficulties and embarrassments, have not only\nproved themselves prepared for freedom, but also to take a position\namongst the most cultivated and honored freemen.\n\nThe half-free <DW52> people of the United States _prove_ themselves\nworthy of all the rights of American citizens.\n\nThere are now in Canada about 35,000 fugitive slaves; and no\npeople have ever entered upon the possession of freedom under more\nembarrassing circumstances. They were born in chains. The iron yoke\nhad galled their necks. Their backs had felt the keen lash. In their\nflight they were pursued by hungry blood-hounds and more hungry\nmarshals.--Naked, broken in spirit, impoverished and uneducated, they\nreached a cold, ungenial clime. But they were free! And those 35,000\nescaped slaves are rapidly improving in wealth, intelligence, and in\nevery social virtue. In the town of Buxton 130 families reside who own\na body of 9,000 acres of land. The fugitive slaves of Canada West now\nown 25,000 acres of land. Were they not prepared for freedom?\n\nImmediate emancipation worked admirably in the British West Indies. The\nmasters were not murdered by the emancipated slaves, as was predicted,\nbut good order reigned everywhere. The liberated people have been\nrapidly improving in intelligence and wealth.--The terrible wrongs and\nmiseries of slavery are no more. Rev. Mr. Richardson, a missionary in\nJamaica, speaking of the moral condition of those islands, says:\n\n\"Marriage is much more common than formerly, and the blessings of\nthe family and social relations are much more extensively enjoyed.\nThe Sabbath is also more generally observed. The means of education\nand religious instruction are better enjoyed, although but little\nappreciated and improved by the great mass of the people. It is\nalso true, that the moral sense of the people is becoming somewhat\nenlightened. But while this is true, yet their moral condition is very\nfar from being what it ought to be.\n\n\"Our brightest hopes and fondest anticipations must and will centre\naround the YOUTH of this island. I see the hand of Providence steadily\nurging onward, with resistless might, the car of Progress. Gaunt\nPrejudice and grim Superstition gradually give way; Darkness and Error\nrecede before the sunlight of Truth; and even the demon of Lust and\nthe giant Intemperance (twin brothers in Satan's family) are bereft of\ntheir power, and chained for a season. I see intelligence, purity, and\npiety supplanting ignorance, licentiousness, and irreligion, and this\nmoral waste becoming transformed until it blooms and flourishes as the\ngarden of God.\"\n\n\"Immediate emancipation?\" exclaims a fearful friend, \"that will never\ndo! Murder, amalgamation, and many other evils will be inevitable\nconsequences of such a measure. Let us colonize the slaves. Send them\nback to their own country.\" To these objections it may be answered,\n\n1. <DW52> men are not more inclined to murder than are white men.\nAfricans have the same natural dispositions which distinguish other\nraces.\n\n2. Many masters have emancipated their slaves, and thereby secured\ntheir undying affection. Liberated slaves have never turned with bloody\nhands upon their liberators.\n\n3. In the West India Islands 800,000 slaves were emancipated in one\nday, and although sixteen years have since elapsed, none of the\nterrible massacres which were predicted by the opponents of the measure\nhave occurred.\n\n4. This fear of the vengeance of emancipated slaves arises, doubtless,\nfrom a guilty conscience--or a feeling that it is richly deserved. A\nhighwayman robs a man, and then says, if I let him go he may have me\narrested and punished, therefore I will kill him. Americans say, on the\nsame principle, we have most terribly abused our slaves, and hence, if\nwe let them go they will retaliate, therefore, we must continue the\nwrong for self preservation!\n\n5. As to amalgamation we have only to say that slavery is an extensive\nsystem of forced amalgamation. In the free States this much dreaded\nevil is of rare occurrence. Immediate emancipation would speedily\narrest the very thing here deprecated.\n\n_a._ The colonization scheme is impracticable. Between three and\nfour millions of people can never be shipped off to Africa. It is\nimpracticable to send even the annual increase of the free <DW52>\npopulation. There are in America now about twelve millions of <DW52>\npeople, and there is no power, civil or ecclesiastical, which can carry\nthem away to Africa.[24] A few will go and ought to go as missionaries,\nbut the great and rapidly increasing masses are firmly planted on this\ncontinent and here they must remain.\n\n_b._ Forcible colonization is wrong. <DW52> people have the same\nright to live in America that white people have. The Creator made the\nearth for the habitation of man, and He has never surrendered his\nownership of it to any government. The <DW52> man has a right to\nlive in any country on the globe--a right derived from the Creator.\nHas God said that every race under heaven may have a home in America\nbut the African? Never. It is impertinent as well as wicked for one\npeople to say to another, \"you shall not live in this State, nor on\nthis continent.\" Such people arrogate to themselves a prerogative which\nJehovah only possesses.\n\n_c._ The present popular scheme of colonization leaves unquestioned\nthe title of the slaveholder, encourages the doctrine that the Bible\nsanctions the institution, appeals to the basest prejudices of\nthe American people to induce them to countenance the scheme, and\nencourages the enactment of such laws as now disgrace the statutes of\nseveral of the free States, in order, it would seem, to harrass the\nfree <DW52> man until he shall be compelled to flee from the land of\nhis birth to a distant shore for refuge. One who speaks what he knows,\nsays,\n\n\"I speak the words of soberness and truth when I say that the most\ninveterate, the most formidable, the deadliest enemy of the peace,\nprosperity, and happiness of the <DW52> population of the United\nStates, is that system of African colonization which originated in and\nis perpetuated by a worldly, Pharaoh-like policy beneath the dignity\nof a magnanimous and Christian people;--a system which receives much\nof its vitality from _ad captandum_ appeals to popular prejudices,\nand to the unholy, groveling passions of the canaille;--a system that\ninterposes every possible obstacle in the way of the improvement and\nelevation of the <DW52> man in the land of his birth;--that instigates\nthe enactment of laws whose design and tendency are obviously to annoy\nhim, to make him feel, while at home, that he is a stranger and a\npilgrim--nay more,--to make him 'wretched, and miserable, and poor, and\nblind, and naked;'--to make him 'a hissing and a by-word,' 'a fugitive\nand a vagabond' throughout the American Union;--a system that is so\nirreconcilably opposed to the purpose of God in making 'of _one_ blood\nall nations for to dwell on _all_ the face of the earth,' that when\nthe dying slaveholder, under the lashes of a guilty conscience, would\ngive to his slaves unqualified freedom, it wickedly interposes, and\npersuades him that 'to do justly and love mercy' would be to inflict an\nirreparable injury upon the community, and that to do his duty to God\nand his fellow-creatures, under the circumstances, he should bequeath\nto his surviving slaves the cruel alternative of _either expatriation\nto a far-off, pestilential clime, with the prospect of a premature\ndeath, or perpetual slavery, with its untold horrors, in his native\nland_.\"--_Watkins._\n\nMany objections are offered against immediate emancipation, but they\nare evidently mere _excuses_. This may be laid down as a safe rule:\n_Offer no objection to the manumission of slaves which would not\nsatisfy you were you yourselves the slaves to be manumitted._ Tried\nby this reasonable and scriptural rule all apologies, objections and\nexcuses offered for the perpetuation of human bondage, vanish away.\nThere can be no good reason advanced for the continuance of this curse\na single year longer. Too long already has it dishonored our churches\nand our country. Too many souls have been already involved by it in\nhopeless ruin. Too many generations of slaves have already gone in\nsorrow and despair down to their graves. Too long has the public\nconscience been debauched. Justice, humanity and religion with united\nvoice call for immediate emancipation.\n\nIf our free institutions are to be preserved they must be released from\nthe folds and the deadly charm of this monster serpent. Freedom cannot\nflourish in its coils nor survive in its slimy embrace.\n\nIndividual and national repentance and reformation only can avert the\nterrible judgments of an offended God. The cries of the oppressed have\ngone up into the ears of the Lord of Sabaoth, and he will be avenged\nspeedily.\n\n    \"We have offended. O! my countrymen!\n    We have offended very grievously;\n    And been most tyrannous. From east to west\n    A groan of accusation pierces heaven!\"\n\nThere are not more than one hundred and twenty thousand slaveholders in\nthe United States, and it would be easy for them to settle this whole\nquestion in one year or even in a day. Let them simply be honest, be\njust, obey the Bible, overcome their pride, avarice, prejudices and\nlusts, and the work will be done. The example of _Freeborn Garretson_\nis commended to the special attention of all slaveholders, and\nespecially of those who profess religion. This good man says:\n\n\"As I stood with a book in my hand, in the act of giving out a hymn,\nthis thought powerfully struck my mind: 'It is not right for you to\nkeep your fellow-creatures in bondage; you must let the oppressed\ngo free.' I knew it to be that same blessed voice which had spoken\nto me before. Till then I had not suspected that the practice of\nslave-keeping was wrong; I had not read a book on the subject, nor\nbeen told so by any. I paused a minute, and then replied, 'Lord, the\noppressed shall go free.' And I was as clear of them in my mind, as if\nI had never owned one. I told them they did not belong to me, and that\nI did not desire their services without making them a compensation. I\nwas now at liberty to proceed in worship. After singing, I kneeled to\npray. Had I the tongue of an angel, I could not fully describe what I\nfelt: all my dejection, and that melancholy gloom which preyed upon me,\nvanished in a moment, and a divine sweetness ran through my whole frame.\n\n\"It was God, not man, that taught me the impropriety of holding slaves:\nand I shall never be able to praise him enough for it. My very heart\nhas bled, since that, for slaveholders, especially those who made a\nprofession of religion; for I believe it to be a crying sin.\"\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XVI.\n\nWhat of the Night?\n\nHOPE THOU IN GOD.\n\n\nAre there any prospects that the long and dreary night of American\ndespotism will speedily end in a joyous morning?\n\nIf we turn our eye towards the political horizon we shall find it\noverspread with heavy clouds portentous of evil to the oppressed. The\ngovernment of the United States is intensely pro-slavery. The great\npolitical parties, with which the masses of the people act, vie with\neach other in their supple and obsequious devotion to the slaveocracy.\nThe wise policy of the fathers of the Republic to confine slavery\nwithin very narrow limits, so that it would speedily die out and be\nsupplanted by freedom, has been abandoned; the whole spirit of our\npolicy has been reversed--and our national government seems chiefly\nconcerned for the honor, perpetuation and extension of slavery.\n\nThe powerful religious denominations have been following in the wake\nof the state. Their ancient and bold testimony against slavery has\nbeen expurgated from their confessions and disciplines, or completely\nneutralized.--Slavery _as it is_ receives their unqualified sanction.\nThe giant Christian publication societies of the day so completely\nignore the question of slavery that a reader of all their books would\nnot suspect that millions of slaves are groaning under an iron yoke\nin this country. Dark as a starless, moonless midnight, is the aspect\npresented by the heavens of the popular religious denominations.\n\nAmerican prejudice is yet very powerful. The polite, educated, and\ntalented free  traveler is exposed, in most parts of the Union,\nto the coarsest insults from this gaunt demon. He feels everywhere its\nhellish power. One who was more than twenty years a slave presents in\nthe following eloquent language a true picture of the present anomalous\ncondition of the children of Ham in the midst of the general joy of\nfreedom:\n\n\"The Hungarian, the Italian, the Irishman, the Jew and the Gentile,\nall find in this goodly land a home; and when any of them, or all of\nthem, desire to speak, they find willing ears, warm hearts, and open\nhands. For these people, the Americans have principles of justice,\nmaxims of mercy, sentiments of religion, and feelings of brotherhood\nin abundance. But for _my_ poor people, (alas, how poor!)--enslaved,\nscourged, blasted, overwhelmed, and ruined, it would appear that\nAmerica had neither justice, mercy, nor religion. She has no scales\nin which to weigh our wrongs, and no standard by which to measure our\nrights.... Here, upon the soil of our birth, in a country which has\nknown us for two centuries, among a people who did not wait for us\nto seek them, but who sought us, found us, and brought us to their\nown chosen land,--a people for whom we have performed the humblest\nservices, and whose greatest comforts and luxuries have been won from\nthe soil by our sable and sinewy arms,--I say, sir, among such a\npeople, and with such obvious recommendations to favor, we are far less\nesteemed than the veriest stranger and sojourner.... We are literally\nscourged beyond the beneficent range of both authorities--human\nand divine. We plead for our rights, in the name of the immortal\ndeclaration of independence, and of the written constitution of\ngovernment, and we are answered with imprecations and curses. In the\nsacred name of Jesus we beg for mercy, and the slave-whip, red with\nblood, cracks over us in mockery.... We cry for help to humanity--a\ncommon humanity, and here too we are repulsed. American humanity\nhates us, scorns us, disowns and denies, in a thousand ways, our very\npersonality. The outspread wing of American christianity, apparently\nbroad enough to give shelter to a perishing world, refuses to cover us.\nTo us, its bones are brass, and its feathers iron. In running thither\nfor shelter and succor, we have only fled from the hungry bloodhound to\nthe devouring wolf,--from a corrupt and selfish world to a hollow and\nhypocritical church.\"--_Fred. Douglass._\n\nBut dark as is this picture, there is still hope. The exorbitant\ndemands of the slave power, the extreme measures it adopts, the deep\nhumiliation to which it subjects political aspirants, will produce a\nreaction. Inflated with past success it is throwing off its mask and\nrevealing its hideous proportions. It is now proving itself the enemy\nof _all_ freedom.\n\nThe extreme servility of the popular churches is opening the eyes of\nmany earnest people to the importance of taking a bolder position.\nThey are finding out that it is a duty to come out from churches which\nsanction the vilest iniquity that ever existed, or exhaust their zeal\nfor the oppressed in tame resolves, never to be executed.\n\nThe truth is gaining ground that slaveholding is a great sin, that\nslaveholders are great sinners, and that he who apologises for the\nsystem is a participator in the guilt and shame.\n\nFree mission societies, reform publication societies, and free churches\nare rising up all over the country, in the free and in the slave\nStates. They take their stand upon a solid Bible platform, and their\npower will be rapidly augmented until the strongholds of oppression\nwill tremble at their approach.\n\nLiterature is coming to the rescue of the slave, and even now is\npleading his cause with astonishing power in all the languages of\nchristendom.\n\nChristianity is on the side of the slave, and its true spirit is\nbeginning to be practically applied.\n\nThousands of devout persons are found day and night pleading with God\nfor the speedy deliverance of the captive.\n\nBut a voice from heaven is heard saying, \"HOPE THOU IN GOD.\" God is\non the side of the oppressed. He will never abandon them. He approves\ntheir cause, hears their cries, and is interested in all their\nmovements. Those millions of  Americans are now in the fiery\nfurnace, but He will bring them out. From their house of bondage they\nwill come forth, and accomplish a glorious mission on the earth.\nGod has reserved for them some of the grandest achievements in music,\npoetry, science, arts, morals, freedom and religion. Never has he\npermitted a people to be more deeply humbled, and none will in the end\nbe more highly exalted. God's ways are not as our ways. He can make the\nwrath of man to praise him.\n\nThe day of deliverance is not distant. God is stirring up the nations.\nThe slavery question is agitating the whole enlightened world. It\ncannot be put to rest. Politicians pronounce it dead and solemnly bury\nit, but it rises before the third day and confronts them in every\nassembly. Church councils resolve to let it alone, but it will not let\nthem alone. They hate agitation, and cry for peace, but are answered,\n\"_first pure, then peaceable_.\"\n\nGod of liberty! hasten the hour when the reddening East shall authorize\nthe joyful announcement to American bondsmen--\"_the morning cometh_.\"\nTill then let us \"TOIL AND TRUST.\"\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[1] See Elliott on Slavery, p. 40.\n\n[2] R. Walsh, Encyclopedia Americana, Art. Slavery.\n\n[3] Here are a few advertisements taken from respectable southern\npapers, verbatim.\n\n    SLAVES WANTED.--We are at all times purchasing Slaves, paying the\n    highest cash prices. Persons wishing to sell will please call at\n    242 Pratt St. (Slatter's old stand.) Communications attended to.\n                                                B. M. & W. L. CAMPBELL.\n\n    A <DW64> FOR SALE.--I wish to sell a black girl about 24 years old,\n    a good cook and washer, handy with a needle, can spin and weave. I\n    wish to sell her in the neighborhood of Camden Point; if not sold\n    there in a short time, I will hunt the best market; or I will trade\n    her for two small ones, a boy and girl.\n\n    November 15, 1852\n                                                              M. DOYAL.\n\n    100 <DW64>s FOR SALE, at my depot on Commerce street, immediately\n    between the Exchange Hotel and F. M. Gilmer, Jr.'s Warehouse,\n    where I will be receiving constantly, large lots of <DW64>s during\n    the season, and will sell on as accommodating terms as any house\n    in this city. I would respectfully request my old customers, and\n    friends to call and examine my stock.\n\n    MONTGOMERY, November 2, 1852.\n                                                       JNO. W. LINDSEY.\n\n    GREAT SALE OF <DW64>s BY J. & L. T. LEVIN.--On Thursday, December\n    30, at 11 o'clock, will be sold at the Court House in Columbia, one\n    hundred valuable <DW64>s.\n\n    It is seldom such an opportunity occurs as now offers. Among them\n    are only four beyond 45 years old, and none above 50. There are\n    twenty five prime young men, between sixteen and thirty; forty of\n    the most likely young women, and as fine a set of children as can\n    be shown!\n\n    Terms, &c.\n                                                     December 18, 1852.\n\n[4] Prof. B. B. Edwards says--\"From the time of Augustus to Justinian\nwe may allow three slaves to one free man; we shall thus have a free\npopulation in Italy of 6,944,000; and of slaves 20,832,000.\"\n\nOn the treatment of Roman slaves _Guizot_ remarks that \"it would be\neasy to give the most frightful and heartrending accounts of the manner\nin which the ancient Romans treated their slaves. Entire volumes are\noccupied with the details.\" (_Hist. Civilization._)\n\n[5] These facts are well authenticated. The \"Union Point\" tragedy\ndid not occur in 1854, as reported recently, and denied by the \"Free\nTrader,\" _but it did occur_ in 1842, and we have quoted the \"Trader's\"\nown account.\n\n[6] Accepting this celebrated curse as an inspired prophecy, and we\nare inclined to receive it as such, it finds an easy fulfillment in\nthe conquests of Joshua over the Canaanites; in the oppression of\nthe Phoenicians, (who were descendants of Canaan,) by the Chaldeans,\nPersians and Greeks; and finally in the subjugation and destruction\nof the Carthaginians, by the Romans. This is the opinion of President\nEdwards, and it is entitled to respect.\n\n[7] I avail myself in what follows upon this point, of the\ninvestigations of Rev. E. Smith, who has thrown much light upon this\nsubject. See \"_Bible Servitude\" pp. 91_, for a full discussion of this\npoint.\n\n[8] For these criticisms on the Hebrew word the author is indebted to\nAlbert Barnes' 'Inquiry into the scriptural views of slavery.'\n\n[9] The passage in Ex. 21: 20, 21, applies, as all admit, mainly, if\nnot exclusively, to _native Hebrew servants_, and as no one finds in\nthe limited voluntary servitude of the native Hebrews a warrant for\nhereditary slavery, I have not thought it necessary to dwell upon it.\nIt may be observed, however, that the word \"_punished_,\" is rendered\nin the marginal reading, \"avenged;\" and the meaning of the law is that\nthe interest the master had in the life of the servant should be taken\nas _presumptive_ evidence that he did not intend to kill him, unless\nthe case was very clear, and hence that he should not be _avenged\nsummarily_, by a relative of the servant, but be regularly tried and\npunished by the appointed authorities.\n\n[10] See Barnes' Inquiry.\n\n[11] See Smith.\n\n[12] Tract of the American Reform Book and Tract Society.\n\n[13] Bible Servitude.\n\n[14] These facts are drawn by Jay from Blair's Inquiry into the state\nof slavery among the Romans.\n\n[15] Note. One little circumstance, which occurred in the General\nAssembly of 1853, indicates a remarkably conservative spirit in that\nbody. Dr. Judd, in writing the history of the division of the Old\nand New-Schools, put in _one_ chapter on slavery. This chapter made\nthe book _offensive_ to the south. To reconcile all parties, it was\nagreed that two editions of the work be printed, one for northern, the\nother for southern circulation--the latter to be _minus the chapter on\nslavery_!\n\n[16] The \"American Missionary Association,\" which has no fellowship\nwith slaveholding, and the American Reform Book and Tract Society,\nwhich is doing much for the dissemination of Christian anti-slavery\ndoctrines, are sustained mainly by Congregationalists. The main body of\nthe Congregationalists, however, adhere to the old Boards.\n\n[17] Can any one conceive of any _virtuous_ reason which prompted the\npassage of such a rule? Is there not a deep and dark iniquity among\nslaveholders which makes it not only necessary that slaves should be\nexcluded from civil, but also from ecclesiastical tribunals?\n\n[18] Amongst these, and at the head of them stands _Mr. Hosmer_, Editor\nof the Northern C. Advocate, author of \"_Slavery_ and the _Church_,\"\nand a number of other excellent books.\n\n[19] See Methodist Discipline.\n\n[20] Annual Report of American and Foreign Anti-slavery Society.\n\n[21] Distinguished from the Moravians, or old United Brethren by the\nadditional phrase--\"_in Christ_.\"\n\n[22] Methodist Quarterly.\n\n[23] Hon. Charles Sumner's speech on the Repeal of the Fugitive Slave\nBill, delivered in the Senate, August 1852, is one of the finest\nspecimens of eloquence in the English language. Its arguments too, are\nunanswerable.\n\n[24] The following estimate of their numbers and localities is taken\nfrom one of the able reports of the British and Foreign Anti-slavery\nSociety, carefully drawn up by its former Secretary, John Scoble, Esq.:\n\n United States,       3,650,000\n Brazil,              4,050,000\n Spanish Colonies,    1,470,000\n S. Amer. Republics,  1,130,000\n British Colonies,      750,000\n Hayti,                 850,000\n French Colonies,       270,000\n Dutch Colonies,         50,000\n Danish Colonies,        45,000\n Mexico,                 70,000\n Canada,                 35,000\n                     ----------\n Total,              12,370,000\n\n                               _Rep. Am. and For. Anti. Slav. Society._\n\n\n\n\n    Transcriber's Note:\n\n    Every effort has been made to replicate this text as faithfully as\n    possible. Some minor corrections of spelling and puctuation have\n    been made.\n\n    Italic text has been marked with _underscores_.\n    OE ligatures have been expanded.\n\n\n\n\n\nEnd of the Project Gutenberg EBook of The Slavery Question, by John Lawrence\n\n*** ","meta":{"redpajama_set_name":"RedPajamaBook"}}
+{"text":"\n\n# FOOD  \nIS THE  \nSOLUTION\n\n# WHAT TO EAT TO SAVE THE WORLD\n\n# 80+ RECIPES FOR A GREENER PLANET  \nAND A HEALTHIER YOU\n\nBegin Reading\n\nTable of Contents\n\nAbout the Author\n\nCopyright Page\n\n**Thank you for buying this**\n\n**Flatiron Books ebook.**\n\nTo receive special offers, bonus content,\n\nand info on new releases and other great reads,\n\nsign up for our newsletters.\n\nOr visit us online at\n\nus.macmillan.com\/newslettersignup\n\nFor email updates on the author, click here.\nThe author and publisher have provided this e-book to you for your personal use only. You may not make this e-book publicly available in any way. **Copyright infringement is against the law. If you believe the copy of this e-book you are reading infringes on the author's copyright, please notify the publisher at:<http:\/\/us.macmillanusa.com\/piracy>**.\nFor my sister, Hillary\u2014for opening my eyes and starting me on my path\n\nFor my mother, Janet\u2014for my senses of service and justice\n\nFor my wife, Lara\u2014for everything else in my world\n\n\"To ask the biggest questions, we can start with the personal: what do we eat? What we eat is within our control, yet the act ties us to the economic, political and ecological order of our whole planet. Even an apparently small change\u2014consciously choosing a diet that is good for both our bodies and the earth\u2014can lead to a series of choices that transform our whole lives.\"\n\n**\u2014FRANCES MOORE LAPP\u00c9, _DIET FOR A SMALL PLANET_**\n\n# FOREWORD\n\n# JAMES CAMERON\n\nIn 2012, my wife, Suzy, and I adopted a plant-based diet. Many people come to plant-based eating through health issues\u2014maybe they're facing a quadruple bypass, or want their family to eat better. For us, it was all about sustainability.\n\nI'd known for several years that the carbon footprint of animal agriculture is incredibly high. But I was under the impression that we need animal protein in our diets. Then I saw the film _Forks Over Knives_ and began reading into the topic. I learned that not only do we not _need_ animal proteins, but that they're actually _detrimental_ to us in many ways.\n\nSo, comfortable we were doing the right thing not just for the environment but also for ourselves, we went fully plant-based. We explored the huge variety of vegan foods that are out there. We got recipe books and checked out new restaurants. To our surprise, it was much easier than we thought it'd be.\n\nAnd we loved the food. When you start eating plant-based, your whole palate opens up\u2014your taste sensitivities change. There are countless species of plants with rich flavor profiles and aromas and nutrients. My diet is so much broader and more varied now than when I was eating a typical meat-based diet. And when we want those old comfort foods that taste like meat, there are so many good substitutes available\u2014and more coming into the market all the time. Plus, there are great ethnic options\u2014vegan ravioli and Thai food, Indian food, Mexican food, noodles\u2014things that we all recognize and love, and that always have plant-based options.\n\nThese foods are kinder to the land and kinder to our bodies. The fact is that eating more plant-based foods is the number one thing we can do for the environment\u2014for habitat loss, biodiversity loss, water pollution, and so many other issues. Almost every major environmental problem could be solved by a global shift toward plant-based eating. So the right choices to make for our health are also the right choices to make for the earth.\n\nMy recommendation? Read up on the issues. Arm yourself with the facts. There are plenty of good books on the topic of plant-based eating. The more you feel good about how you're eating\u2014that there's a higher purpose to your diet\u2014the more likely you are to stick with it. Program yourself for success. Try a twenty-one-day plant-based challenge. Figure out some recipes you want to make, try new foods and see what you like, find some great new restaurants to eat at. Plan your strategy a bit so you'll be successful with your new diet\u2014the fate of the planet depends on it.\n\n_James Cameron is an Academy Award\u2013winning director known for some of the biggest box-office hits of all time, including_ Titanic, The Terminator, Aliens, Avatar, _and more. He is also an oceanic explorer, having been the first person to reach the bottom of the Mariana Trench on a solo mission, and an environmental activist._\n\n\"Almost every major environmental problem could be solved by a global shift toward plant-based eating.\"\n\n\u2014 **JAMES CAMERON**\n\n# INTRODUCTION\n\n##\n\nFOOD IS THE SOLUTION\n\nWhen I was about ten years old, my father and I built a small backyard garden. In a sunny corner of our yard, we dug out a rectangle in the grass. We shoveled a trench along its edges, into which we laid bricks to create a border. We picked out stones and twigs from the dirt, breaking up the clumps with our hands until the soil was smooth and dropped easily through our fingers. We sowed seeds for green beans, carrots, radishes. From a garden center down the street, we bought seedlings for tomatoes, peppers, and eggplants, carefully transplanting them into the ground.\n\nRight around this time, I took an interest in cooking. I learned to make scrambled eggs\u2014albeit via microwave and mug (which tasted about as good as it sounds). I'd take great pride in organizing our spice cabinet, combining half-full jars of cinnamon and paprika, placing the most commonly used spices toward the front. I picked through my mother's favorite recipe clippings and pasted them into a homemade \"cookbook.\"\n\nAs my interest in food evolved, I progressed from microwaved eggs to stovetop cooking. I started inventing my own recipes. But my fascination with food mostly focused on growing, preparing, and eating it.\n\nThen, when I was twelve, my sister returned from school one day with an announcement: she had become a vegetarian.\n\n\"Mr. Thayer says there are antibiotics in chicken meat,\" she proclaimed. \"He says there are hormones and all kinds of other stuff in meat, too.\"\n\n_Vegetarian?_ It was the first time I'd ever even heard the word, let alone _known_ a vegetarian. No meat? Not even chicken? Fish? Bacon?! As any good little brother would do, I poked fun. At dinner, I'd gleefully place a chunk of bloody steak on the end of my fork and stick it into my sister's face while mooing loudly.\n\nMy mother took a different approach. Alongside a pot of beef chili for us, she'd have a bubbling pot of bean chili for my sister\u2014even using separate spoons for stirring. A dish of chicken enchiladas would sit side by side in the oven with a dish of veggie enchiladas.\n\nBecause I'd always loved food, I certainly wasn't averse to trying some of these mysterious new dishes. I'd eat one beef taco and one bean taco; I'd add bacon to a veggie burger. Slowly, my palate expanded and my culinary horizons broadened.\n\nLo and behold, I actually liked many of these new foods. I started ordering dishes with \"bean curd\" at our local Chinese restaurant\u2014not realizing until much later that bean curd is another term for tofu. I tried vegetarian chicken patties and, to my amazement, loved them. I'd order veggie fajitas at Mexican restaurants instead of meat fajitas. I was no vegetarian, but I liked the food. _Whodathunk it?_\n\nIt wasn't until later, in my teens, that I learned more about the social issues associated with food production. I learned that what we eat plays a central role in many of society's deepest problems, and can also help solve them.\n\nWhat I learned is that food can save the world.\n\nTake our own health, for example. Results from the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's (CDC) _2011\u20132012 National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey_ show that nearly 35 percent of U.S. adults ages twenty and older are overweight, more than 35 percent are obese, and nearly 10 percent are extremely obese. For children and adolescents, the numbers are also staggering, with nearly one in every five individuals between two and nineteen years old being obese.\n\nThis is a full-blown crisis. The human costs\u2014increased heart disease, diabetes, stroke, and more\u2014are staggering. And the economic costs are overwhelming: an obese individual pays thousands of dollars more in healthcare costs than a non-obese individual, according to one study published in the Journal of Health Economics. All told, that study found, obesity accounts for a whopping $200 billion\u2014more than 20 percent\u2014of all U.S. health expenses.\n\nAnd even though they can offer some help, we needn't rely on healthcare providers, government, or corporations to solve this crisis. The power to reclaim our health can be found in what we put on our plates.\n\n\"A diet higher in plant-based foods,\" concludes a Scientific Report of the U.S. Dietary Guidelines Advisory Committee, \"is more health promoting... than is the current U.S. diet.\"\n\nWhen we do a deep dive into virtually any major healthcare problem plaguing our population, we see a clear correlation to food and diet.\n\nHeart disease, for example, is the number-one killer in America\u2014responsible for a full quarter of all deaths. The causes of this killer are cholesterol (which is only found in animal products) and saturated fat (high levels of which are found in animal products). When our cholesterol and saturated fat levels rise\u2014through consuming too many foods high in them\u2014our arteries become blocked, leading to heart attacks.\n\nBut countless scientific studies have confirmed that plant-based whole-food diets can prevent and reverse heart disease in patients without the use of medical intervention.\n\nFor example, in 1948, the National Heart, Lung and Blood Institute and Boston University embarked on an ambitious project to identify risk factors for heart disease. Today, their Framingham Heart Study (FHS) continues, making it the longest-running clinical study in all of medical history.\n\n\"The American Heart Association recognizes the role of plant-based foods in a healthy dietary pattern. Use Meatless Mondays as another opportunity to eat a well-balanced diet.\"\n\n\u2014NANCY BROWN, AMERICAN HEART ASSOCIATION CEO\n\n\"The research shows one thing very clearly: we all need to eat more plants and less meat.\"\n\n\u2014AMERICAN INSTITUTE FOR CANCER RESEARCH\n\n\"If Americans adopted a vegetarian diet,\" said former FHS director Dr. William Castelli in a PBS interview, the heart disease epidemic \"would disappear.\"\n\nDiabetes is another epidemic, with 1.4 million people diagnosed with the disease each year, and one in every ten healthcare dollars going toward treating it.,\n\nAnd yet we know that by eating more plant-based foods, diabetics can get their blood sugar to drop and thus reduce or eliminate their dependence on insulin. In a study published in the _American Journal of Clinical Nutrition_ , insulin dependence dropped by about 60 percent\u2014with half the study's participants able to get off of insulin entirely\u2014within just sixteen days of adopting plant-based diets.\n\nThe list goes on: cancer, stroke, obesity, autoimmune disorders like rheumatoid arthritis\u2014so many of the health problems that weigh us down as individuals, and that weigh down our nation's healthcare system, can be prevented and reversed by eating more plant-based foods.\n\nImagine a world in which we all are healthier\u2014where we're happier with our bodies and suffer fewer aches and pains. Imagine a world in which we don't have to spend as much of our money on health services, leaving more to spend on our passions and allowing us all to be more generous and charitable. Imagine a world with less disease, fewer early deaths. That world is a happier world, a better world\u2014and plant-based foods are the solution to creating it.\n\nSuch a world is also a much kinder, gentler world\u2014one filled with more empathy and compassion.\n\nToday, nearly 80 billion land animals are raised and killed for food each year. These include mammals like pigs and cows, birds like turkeys and chickens. Of course, there are family farmers out there who provide good living environments for their animals\u2014but virtually all meat, dairy, and eggs eaten today come from factory-farmed animals.\n\nIn 1950, the total number of farm animals in the United States was somewhere near 100 million; by 2015, it had mushroomed to roughly 9.2 billion. According to USDA data, during the same period that the number of farm _animals_ increased by 9,400 percent, the number of _farms_ producing those animals decreased by 60 percent.\n\nThat, in a nutshell, is factory farming\u2014and its consequences are catastrophic.\n\n# BETTER YOU, BETTER WORLD\n\nMICHAEL GREGER, MD, FACLM\n\n**At sixty-five, my grandmother was given a** medical death sentence. Suffering from end-stage heart disease, wheelchair-bound, and out of surgical heart bypass options, her life was basically over.\n\nThen she heard about Nathan Pritikin.\n\nBorn in 1915, Pritikin was an inventor, nutritionist, and longevity researcher\u2014one of our country's earliest \"lifestyle medicine\" pioneers. At forty-two, after being diagnosed with heart disease himself, Pritikin began his search for treatment, eventually publishing his findings in his (now renowned) book _The Pritikin Diet_ , and later opening the Pritikin Longevity Center, offering diet and lifestyle coaching with the goal of preventing and reversing disease.\n\nSo when my grandmother, nearly on death's door, heard of Pritikin, she reached out, eventually coming to follow his program.\n\nSo what exactly was Pritikin's plan? His extensive research centered primarily on a low-fat, plant-based diet rich in fruits and veggies, beans, nuts, legumes, and whole grains. Just as we now know that eating more plant-based foods plays a critical role in preventing and reversing environmental catastrophes, we also know plant-based diets can play a central role in overall health and wellness by preventing and reversing many of the diseases that plague us most.\n\nTopping the list for the leading cause of disability and death in the U.S. is heart disease: America's number-one killer and the same disease that caused my grandmother to reach out to Nathan Pritikin. And high cholesterol levels are thought to be a primary cause of this leading killer.\n\nThis may help explain why a plant-based diet, which is free of cholesterol and saturated animal fats, has been so successful in preventing and treating the disease. Indeed, plant-based diets are the only type of diets ever proven not only to help prevent heart disease but also to reverse it in the majority of patients.\n\nFollowing heart disease is cancer, America's number-two killer. Here, too, the balance of evidence suggests that a whole-foods, plant-based diet may help prevent, treat, slow, and in some cases even reverse cancer progression.\n\nAs the American Institute for Cancer Research concludes, \"The research shows one thing very clearly: we all need to eat more plants and less meat.\"\n\nSome reasons why plant-based diets may be so effective include lowering cancer-promoting growth hormone levels, methionine intake, inhibiting angiogenesis, intercepting carcinogens, and increasing fiber and antioxidants. Additionally, eating lots of fruits and vegetables (e.g., nine daily servings) may boost detoxifying enzymes, lower inflammation, and make for healthier bowel movements, ridding the body of excess estrogen and cholesterol. It's no wonder populations eating diets centered on whole plant foods have lower cancer rates.\n\nAnother major health threat here in the United States is diabetes. And, as is the case with heart disease and cancer, plant-based diets may successfully prevent, treat, and even reverse type 2 diabetes\u2014including in children.\n\nExcluding meat, milk, and other animal products may reduce the risk of diabetes and gestational diabetes by increasing insulin sensitivity, boosting hormone-binding proteins, helping to prevent obesity, and reducing exposure to heme iron, dioxins, and PCBs.\n\nEggs may be particularly risky: eating only one egg a week is associated with nearly double the odds of getting diabetes. And fish, especially salmon, is one of the primary sources of PCBs and other industrial toxins, which may also play a role in the development of diabetes.\n\nOn the other hand, many plant-based foods appear to be protective. Beans may be especially beneficial when replacing meat or refined carbs, such as white rice. By eating plant-based and living a healthy lifestyle, up to 95 percent of type \u0662 diabetes cases are avoidable.\n\nOf course, simply preventing disease is not the only goal of good nutrition. Everyone, whether eating a plant-based diet or not, ought to be sure to get enough (but not too much) protein, calcium, and iron, for example.\n\nVitamin B12 is one important supplement for those eating plant-based diets. B12 is made by neither animals nor plants, but by microbes. And B12 deficiency may occur without supplementation. Thankfully, there are safe, cheap, convenient sources available widely. The simplest regimen is to take 2,500 micrograms of the cyanocobalamin form of B12 once a week.\n\nOmega-3 fatty acids are also essential. Plant-based sources of omega-3 include flaxseed or chia seed, walnuts, and algae-based DHA supplements, which are bioequivalent to fish oil omega-3 but without the harmful industrial pollutants often found in fish oils.\n\nCombined with even minimal supplementation, plant-forward eating has been definitively shown to prevent, treat, and reverse some of our nation's biggest killers while improving health, wellness, and longevity.\n\nNathan Pritikin knew this decades ago\u2014and that would ultimately save my grandmother's life. Pritikin actually chronicled her story in his biography: \"Mrs. Greger had heart disease, angina, and claudication,\" he wrote. \"Her condition was so bad she could no longer walk without great pain in her chest and legs. Within three weeks, though, she was not only out of her wheelchair but was walking ten miles a day.\"\n\nThanks to Pritikin, she was able to live another thirty-one years\u2014to the grand old age of ninety-six. His plant-based diet extended her life by nearly a full third.\n\nIndeed, debilitating, life-shortening diseases and other ailments don't have be a normal part of aging\u2014and they don't have to be your future. Like many of the most pressing environmental problems, they can instead be prevented, treated, _and even reversed_ with a healthier diet rich in whole, plant-based foods. So eat up, live long, and prosper!\n\n_A founding member and Fellow of the American College of Lifestyle Medicine, Michael Greger, MD, is a physician, author, and internationally recognized speaker on nutrition, food safety, and public health. He's a graduate of the Cornell University School of Agriculture and Tufts University School of Medicine. His book_ How Not to Die _became an instant_ New York Times _bestseller. He has videos on more than two thousand health topics freely available atNutritionFacts.org._\n\n# THANKS, GIVING\n\nJESSE EISENBERG\n\n**At some point in my twenties,** my family made the switch.\n\nI'd missed a few Thanksgiving dinners because of work, and when I finally returned home, my family cavalierly told me that they now celebrated Thanksliving. That's not a typo.\n\nThanksliving is just like Thanksgiving\u2014the fun holiday in November\u2014but with an _L_ instead of that fun _G_. Thanksgiving, with the _G_ , they explained, _is brutal and sanctifies slaughter. Thanksliving_ [with an _L_ ] _celebrates life. It's vegan and we honor two turkeys we've saved by placing their photos at the center of our table._\n\nWith no time to make other plans, I trudged to my family's house in New Jersey on the final Thursday of November 2009. We took a moment of silence to reflect on the horrors of the poultry industry. We talked about what virtue we were most proud of. And the coup de grace: My sister pulled out Jonathan Safran Foer's _Eating Animals_ and opened to a dogeared passage about the slaughter of turkeys. We sat around a plate of tofu, hearing of turkey-cide. She was not only preaching to the converted, she was nauseating them.\n\nLooking around the room\u2014these familiar faces, nodding empathically along to the stories of turkey death\u2014I suddenly realized: _my family has gone nuts._\n\nThe following year, I decided to skip Thanksliving. I wasn't opposed to the food; in fact, I have spent many years as a vegetarian and, of course, know that it's a far better diet for the health of the eater, the animals, and the environment. But I couldn't bear to see my family so earnest. These were funny people! People who would have laughed at the family that made Thanksliving dinner!\n\nI was working near Los Angeles, so I asked a producer friend if he'd have me over for dinner. He told me not to expect much. \"We just have a little turkey, stuffing, cranberry sauce\u2014nothing fancy.\" _Nothing fancy_ was exactly what I needed.\n\nThis producer\u2014I will call him John Doe\u2014had three young children and a wife who was a pediatrician. I had met the family several times and I always thought they were a perfect group. They were always making inside jokes and traveling as a team. And their dinner was unremarkable, for which I was very thankful. We just sat down and made stupid jokes and ate normal American food.\n\nHalfway through, Jane Doe mentioned going to her parents' house for next year's Thanksgiving. And John\u2014normally a mild-mannered guy\u2014blew up. \"I told you a thousand times, I am not stepping foot into that psychopathic house!\" This was clearly the middle of an ongoing fight.\n\nJane threw down her fork. \"Then I guess we'll just have to get divorced next year and you can go to your dysfunctional family's house and drink with your father until you pass out again.\"\n\nI stared at the Doe kids, shocked. They stared back, as if to say, \"Welcome to our every day.\"\n\nJane stormed into the kitchen. I suddenly longed for the newfound earnestness of my family, their moral eagerness, their progressive idealism. I realized every family is insane. But at least mine cared about the world.\n\n_Jesse Eisenberg is an Academy Award\u2013nominated actor and the author of_ Bream Gives Me Hiccups and Other Stories.\n\n\"Factory farming is not only unacceptably cruel, but unsustainably inefficient.\"\n\n\u2014JOHN SAUVEN, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF GREENPEACE UK\n\nAt these facilities, animals are routinely abused in ways that would be illegal if they were done to a cat or dog. Egg-laying hens are crammed into cages so small they can't spread their wings. Mother pigs are often forced to live in crates so tiny they can't even turn around. Chickens in the meat industry are bred to be Frankenbirds, growing too fat, too fast for their young bodies to keep up with and suffering crippling injuries as a result.\n\nThen there's fish. Worldwide, an estimated 2.7 _trillion_ fish are ripped from the oceans each year for food, suffering decompression as they're pulled from the water or being suffocated or crushed aboard fishing vessels. Countless more are raised on aquatic factory farms, where they're packed gill to gill in disease-ridden tanks; though no firm numbers exist for these aquaculture-raised fish, it's likely in the tens of billions.\n\nAll this suffering, on such a massive scale, is antithetical to what we believe about animals. We are a nation of animal lovers. We spend nearly $100 billion on our pets each year. We bird watch. We whale watch. We support, through donations, more than twenty thousand individual animal protection charities across the nation. Caring people in every corner of the country rescue and rehabilitate injured wildlife. People rush into flood zones and other disaster areas to rescue animals in need. We volunteer at shelters. The list of ways in which we share our lives with and help our fellow creatures is nearly limitless.\n\nOur compassion for animals extends to those caught up in the food-supply chain.\n\nThe Food Marketing Institute is the leading trade association for the grocery industry. \"When it comes to attributes beyond those that render personal benefits,\" concludes FMI in its \"Shopper Trends\" report, \"shoppers prioritize animal welfare second only to employment practices.\" And a study by the American Farm Bureau Federation\u2014a major lobbying force for factory farmers\u2014found that 95 percent of Americans believe animals on farms ought to be treated well.\n\nAnd yet, for some of us, there's a disconnect between what's on our plates and those values of compassion that we hold so dear: millions of us don't want animals to suffer and believe they should be treated well, yet also continue eating products from factory-farmed animals.\n\nIf more of us can connect those dots\u2014between what we already want for animals and how our food choices impact them\u2014we can better align our morals with our menus to create a kinder world.\n\nSuch a world would also be better for people. After all, at its root, our willingness to eat animals even when we know they've suffered comes down to our proclivity for placing animals in an \"other\" category\u2014focusing on how they may be different from we humans.\n\nOf course, fish were born with gills instead of lungs, chickens with wings instead of arms, pigs with hooves instead of feet. Humans were born with hair instead of fur and a spark of imagination that other species may lack. But while we humans are dissimilar to other animals in many ways, we also share so much in common with them. We feel pain and joy; we can suffer. So do other animal species. Anyone who's had beloved pets at home knows we share with other animals personal preferences unique to us as individuals (one of my cats is obsessed with peanut butter, while another loves spinach). Humans and other animals share a desire to live our lives according to our best interests, to engage in our natural behaviors, to have social interactions with others of our kind and even with other species.\n\nAnd if, through our diets, we can learn to focus more on those _similarities_ rather than our _differences_ , we may foster a deeper sense of empathy\u2014which could have powerful implications on how we treat one another.\n\nSay a person comes to the conclusion that simply because chickens were born with wings rather than arms we ought not to cause their suffering. Say they begin eating fewer chickens, or none at all. In making that switch, that person has widened their circle of compassion. Now, how likely would it be for that person, with their newfound empathy toward another species entirely, to lack empathy for fellow humans who were born, say, gay instead of straight, black instead of white, female instead of male, Middle Eastern instead of American?\n\nIndeed, being kind to animals can also make us kinder toward our fellow man. And conversely, people who are cruel to animals exhibit more dangerous and violent behaviors toward one another.\n\nThis is why law enforcement agencies like the FBI, police, and Department of Justice use cruelty to animals as a red flag when profiling violent criminals. One scientific study, published in the _Journal of Interpersonal Violence_ , concluded that \"animal abuse may be a red flag indicative of family violence in the home.\" In that study, a whopping 60 percent of participants who witnessed or took part in acts of animal cruelty as children also reported instances of child abuse or domestic violence.\n\nSo imagine a world where our relationships with animals were based less on abuse and suffering and more on kindness and respect. In that world, our circle of compassion would include not only the dogs and cats in our homes but also the chickens, cows, pigs, and fish on farms. Imagine that throughout the day, as we decide what to eat, we constantly flex that compassion by making kind choices.\n\nWhat impact could that constant compassion have on society? Racism, sexism, homophobia, xenophobia, war, hatred\u2014the more empathy we have and exhibit toward others, the more these poisons could begin to fade away.\n\nBut at the end of the day, even if we make ourselves healthier, in body and in spirit, we can't have the type of better world so many of us envision and hope for without a healthy planet on which to build it\u2014and it's clearer than ever that our planet is in peril.\n\nMost people are familiar with the mother of all environmental disasters: climate change. Erratic weather, rising sea levels, extreme heat and cold\u2014this catastrophe threatens nearly all life on earth. We're also losing rich, important ecosystems and biodiversity at an alarming rate, with up to one hundred thousand distinct species becoming extinct each year, according to the World Wildlife Fund. Our waterways are being impacted, too: in 2013, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) found that the majority of rivers and streams in America are too polluted to support healthy aquatic life, with 55 percent of our waterways rated as being in \"poor\" condition and only 21 percent of rivers considered \"healthy biological communities.\"\n\nSoil erosion, air pollution, overfishing, deforestation, water scarcity: The list of ways our earth is in jeopardy is virtually unending. For that reason, I've focused this book on the _environmental_ implications of our food choices: because what we eat is not only a major factor in deciding what kind of world we live in, but also in what kind of world we live _on_. And it's become clear that meat-heavy diets are destroying the planet.\n\n\"We all need protein,\" points out a Bill Gates video titled _The Science Behind Plant-Based Proteins_. \"But animals aren't the most efficient way to get it.\"\n\nIn fact, producing just one pound of meat means feeding an animal up to fifteen pounds of grains and other crops. That means growing massive amounts of feed, which often means destroying ancient forests to make room for farmland. It means spending huge quantities of fresh water to grow those crops.\n\nThen we take those crops (which we've put all those resources into growing), process them, and feed them to the tens of billions of farm animals used each year in the global agricultural system\u2014animals who themselves also require water to drink, land to live on, and other valuable inputs.\n\nThe caloric conversion is weak, too: according to a report produced in collaboration with the World Bank, even the most efficient sources of meat convert only around 11 percent of gross feed energy into human food. That means that even in the best cases, nearly 90 percent of what we put into turning animals into meat is wasted.\n\nIt's an inefficient system that taxes our planet's finite resources in incredible ways.\n\nSo it's no surprise that the livestock sector is now a leading greenhouse gas emitter, estimated to account for more direct emissions than the entire global transport sector, according to the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization.\n\nOur animal-heavy diet is also a major contributor to water degradation\u2014impacting fish populations and polluting our global waterways. And it's an incredibly thirsty system, with hundreds of gallons of water needed to produce a single pound of chicken or glass of milk, and dozens of gallons needed to produce a single egg.\n\nThis makes sense, considering the inherent inefficiencies that accompany a system in which we funnel massive amounts of grain and water through animals to produce protein, rather than converting plant matter to protein more directly. And they're precisely why global development and environmental advocates encourage a diet more focused on plants and less focused on animals.\n\n\"Eating plant-forward dishes can go a long way in reducing diet-related carbon emissions.\"\n\n\u2014NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL (NRDC)\n\n\"The more meat everybody eats, the more polluting it is and the more wasteful it is.\"\n\n\u2014BARACK OBAMA\n\n\"The reality is that it takes massive amounts of land, water, fertilizer, oil and other resources to produce meat,\" points out Oxfam America in an article promoting meat reduction. \"Significantly more than it requires to grow other nutritious and delicious kinds of food.\"\n\nLess resource use, more efficient resource allocation, more compassion toward animals, spreading empathy to one another, curing and preventing our most serious health crises: plant-based eating, in so many ways, is the common denominator that can solve many of our planet's problems and create a truly better world.\n\nThis is what I came to understand so many years ago, after beginning my own journey with plant-based foods, and it's what I've been fortunate to spend my career working toward. As a professional food advocate, I've helped major food companies extend their corporate circles of compassion by demanding better treatment for farm animals in their supply chains\u2014working with major brands like Burger King, McDonald's, and Walmart to move their suppliers in a more humane direction. I've also worked with the world's largest financial firms, which have invested hundreds of billions of dollars in animal agriculture, to leverage that power as a force for change. And I've worked with the food industry, consumers, and other advocates to share the myriad of benefits of eating more plants and less meat.\n\nOf course, I'm not alone in this quest. Countless other individuals and organizations are spreading these concepts as well. And millions of people are catching on.\n\nIn its July 2015 article \"Even Carnivores Are Putting More Fake Meat on Their Plates,\" NPR reported, \"Consumers\u2014and not just vegetarians\u2014are also warming up to products like tempeh, tofu, and seitan that can stand in for meat.\"\n\nThe meat industry has noticed. \"Plant protein is in,\" reports _Meatingplace_ \u2014an industry magazine. Even Tyson Foods\u2014one of world's largest meatpackers\u2014has taken a stake in a plant-based chicken company and announced a $150 million venture capital firm to focus on plant-based proteins.\n\n\"Plant-based protein is growing almost, at this point, a little faster than animal-based,\" said Tyson's CEO in 2017. \"So I think the migration may continue in that direction.\"\n\nIndeed, Americans are now featuring plant-based foods right smack dab in the center of our plates. And not just because doing so is healthier and better for the planet, but also because these foods taste great.\n\nI've always loved ice cream, for example, but not until I adopted a plant-based diet did I know the joys of eating ice cream made from, say, coconut milk. I was floored the first time I tried buffalo wings made from cauliflower instead of chicken. The first time I sprinkled nutritional yeast\u2014little yellow flakes that have a Parmesan-like flavor\u2014on popcorn, it was like fireworks of flavor were going off in my mouth.\n\nIndeed, once I started exploring this vibrant, rich, diverse array of plant-based foods that existed all around me, my long-standing interest in food only grew. What if my sister had never learned about antibiotics? What if she'd never become a vegetarian? I could have missed out on so much culinary variety, so many incredible foods that I now love and crave and get to enjoy every day.\n\nOf course, one needn't go fully vegetarian or vegan to enjoy these foods. In addition to lessening our environmental footprint, being healthier for us, and avoiding animal abuse, simply incorporating _more_ plant-based foods into our everyday diet can help expand our culinary repertoire and introduce us to all kinds of new tastes and flavors and textures.\n\nAnd we needn't let the perfect be the enemy of the good. Eating for a better world doesn't have to be an all-or-nothing endeavor. Certainly it's true that locally grown, minimally processed, whole, plant-based foods like organic produce and lentils have the least eco-impact of any foods we might choose to eat. But we needn't eat _only_ those foods to make a difference. Of course, to keep up any kind of diet\u2014be it for health or the environment\u2014we must find that diet to be attainable and _personally_ sustainable. After all, the most effective diet is always the one we stick with.\n\nSo while frozen plant-based nuggets are certainly not quite as healthy or environmentally friendly as, say, locally grown lentils, they're far better than chicken nuggets. A prepackaged black bean burger is not a zero-footprint product by any means, but it's much lighter on the planet and our bodies than a hamburger. Yes, almond milk requires land and water and other resources to produce, but compared to cow's milk? No contest.\n\nSo do what works for you\u2014what tastes good and is attainable and sustainable in your daily life. Try \"flexitarian\" approaches like Meatless Mondays. Try doing VB6 (eating vegan before six p.m., the approach suggested by author Mark Bittman). Try simply moving meat from the center of the plate to the side of the plate.\n\nAnd try new foods! Explore the rich array of colorful produce and interesting, delicious plant-based offerings now available at every turn. On this planet-in-peril\u2014with all the ecological, biological, and sociological problems plaguing our world at so many levels\u2014the more we each recognize that the solutions to these problems can be found in our food, the better off we'll all be. The power is on our plates\u2014let's use it.\n\n\"Anchoring a plate with a massive hunk of animal protein is so last century.\"\n\n\u2014WALL STREET JOURNAL\n\n# [PART ONE:  \nOUR PLANET](toc.xhtml#part01)\n\n# \"The future is about a plant-based diet.\"\n\n\u2014JAMIE OLIVER\n\n# EARTH\n\n_Imagine the Earth, spinning in orbit: our 197-million-square-mile, four-and-a-half-billion-year-old ball of nitrogen, oxygen, and carbon amid the quiet blackness of space._\n\n_But Earth is much more than that._\n\nZoom in through the outermost thermosphere, through the stratosphere, through the clouds. Pass over the North Pole's stark ice caps. Glide over Siberia, covered in snow-capped pine and birch trees. Watch the landscape move from white to green throughout Eurasia\u2014over Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan\u2014then to browns above the Middle East and northern Africa, and to blue over the Atlantic Ocean. Pass over New York City's gray skyscrapers, through the Shenandoahs, their chestnut and red oaks' brilliant shades of orange and yellow, and across the mighty Mississippi. Now slow yourself above the Midwest, above Missouri. Finally, pause above the tiny town of Arrow Rock\u2014a pixel on the planet.\n\nIt's here in Arrow Rock, Missouri, where Day and Whitney Kerr bought a Greek Revival cottage, a fixer-upper. That was in 1980, long before they could have known that purchase would turn their own story into one of an epic battle for their land and livelihoods, for the literal earth beneath their feet.\n\n\"It was in terrible shape,\" said Day, who, along with his wife, purchased and restored the home to its former 1860s glory. \"It never had indoor plumbing or central heating. No one had lived there for thirteen years. There were times when we thought we were just crazy, but Whitney and I are both committed to historic preservation. We respect history.\"\n\nAnd Arrow Rock's got history everywhere one looks: for over a half century, the _entire town_ has been registered as a National Historic Landmark. It was in Arrow Rock that Dr. John Sappington\u2014whose home the Kerrs also restored\u2014created the quinine pill; it was there that the Santa Fe Trail and Missouri River intersected, where lauded Missouri River artist George Caleb Bingham lived and worked.\n\nIt was also where, in 2007, hog farmer Dennis Gessling proposed building a massive factory farm that would confine nearly five thousand pigs\u2014ninety animals for each of the town's fifty-six residents\u2014and produce more than two million gallons of waste each year.\n\nAnd he wanted to build it just a quarter mile north of the Kerrs' home.\n\n\"This is a historic site for the state and nation,\" said local bed-and-breakfast owner Kathy Borgman. \"This is a spot where history was made. You can't move it. Who would want to come here if the air stinks so bad you cannot breathe it?\"\n\nAll across the country, communities are threatened by confined animal feeding operations (CAFOs) like the one proposed by Gessling.\n\n\"Factory farms can negatively affect rural historic areas in a number of ways,\" writes Jennifer Sandy of the National Trust for Historic Preservation. \"CAFOs obviously have an immediate and negative impact on the historic rural landscape. They are large in scale, housing thousands of animals, and generally consist of utilitarian metal buildings and manure retaining ponds.\"\n\nTascosa Feedyard, Bushland, Texas (2013). Courtesy the artist and Bruce Silverstein Gallery, New York. CREDIT: MISHKA HENNER\n\nIn these facilities, animals are confined by the thousands, tens of thousands, or even hundreds of thousands. In the case of pig-production facilities like the one proposed in Arrow Rock, breeding animals are most often confined inside individual gestation crates\u2014metal cages that are essentially the same length and width of the pigs' own bodies, preventing them from even turning around. These animals endure this confinement day and night for four months, while pregnant. As they're about to give birth, they're moved into another, similar, type of crate\u2014after which they're reimpregnated and put back in a gestation crate for the cycle to repeat. A mother pig lives like this for her entire four years on this earth.\n\nThese types of facilities are dramatically changing the American landscape, which was once dotted with more traditional-type farms\u2014indeed, what most of us imagine when we think of a _farm_.\n\nToday, those idyllic places are mostly gone\u2014and that's no accident.\n\n\"Forget the pig is an animal\u2014treat him just like a machine in a factory,\" recommended _Hog Farm Management_ magazine in 1976. Two years later, _National Hog Farmer_ advised: \"The breeding sow should be thought of, and treated, as a valuable piece of machinery whose function is to pump out baby pigs like a sausage machine.\"\n\nAnd so it was that factory farms were born\u2014leaving a lasting mark on animals, our planet, our nation, and on individual communities.\n\n\"As small- and medium-sized producers are forced out,\" Sandy reports, \"many historic farm structures are abandoned or demolished. Areas with factory farms also often see an increase in truck traffic, which can have visual and auditory impacts.\"\n\n\"Raising meat takes a great deal of land and...has a substantial environmental impact.\"\n\n\u2014BILL GATES\n\nThe citizens of Arrow Rock, Missouri were not going to have it in their backyard.\n\n\"These CAFOs spend as little money as they have to get as much money as they can out of the animal,\" Day Kerr observes. \"In the process, they do not protect the environment and have no regard for how they impact their neighbors.\"\n\nSo the Kerrs and their neighbors banded together and stood their ground, raising a stink with local and state governments about the proposed pig factory.\n\nThey incorporated as Citizens to Protect State Parks and Historic Sites. They formed alliances with other communities being impacted by CAFOs. They hired lawyers. They demanded reviews from the U.S. Department of Interior (since Arrow Rock is a national historic landmark). They generated press coverage and statewide buzz. They filed lawsuits\u2014including against the Missouri Department of Natural Resources and its director.\n\nAnd they won. After a prolonged battle, the people of Arrow Rock\u2014resting stop for Lewis and Clark, and a town nearly crippled by a massive pig factory\u2014claimed victory when Gessling officially withdrew his plans.\n\nBut things could have easily gone the other way.\n\nIn 2016, years after the controversy had been settled, I spoke to Kathy Borgman. She expressed concern that the same threat Gessling posed to her community still exists elsewhere.\n\n\"What we accomplished in Arrow Rock was successful in one regard,\" Borgman says. \"But the CAFO problem continues all over Missouri, all over the country.\"\n\nIndeed, elsewhere across the entire _planet_ , factory farms continue wreaking havoc on the earth beneath us.\n\nIn fact, globally, animal agribusiness is by far the single largest user of land, according to the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) report _Livestock's Long Shadow_. \"In all, livestock production accounts for 70 percent of all agricultural land and 30 percent of the land surface of the planet,\" found the FAO.\n\n# WHAT EXACTLY _IS A_ FACTORY FARM?\n\n_Factory farm_ refers to industrial farm animal production. Other terms\u2014like _concentrated animal feeding operation_ (CAFO) and _animal feeding operation_ (AFO)\u2014have legal definitions. \"AFOs congregate animals, feed, manure and urine, dead animals, and production operations on a small land area,\" describes the EPA. An AFO may be designated as a CAFO if it's considered \"large\" or \"medium\" or through special designation by the EPA. Regardless of terminology, these are all places where thousands or tens of thousands of animals live\u2014often crammed together or confined in cages\u2014and where environmental problems persist.\n\n# FROM THE HORSE'S MOUTH...\n\n**\"I moved from Switzerland in 1983, to my part of Missouri because of the wide-open spaces and clean environment. When Premium Standard Farms purchased four thousand acres next to my farm in 1993, I knew nothing about the company. But when I heard about the type of hog facility that they were intending to build there, I immediately opposed them. The facility next to my property has an eighty thousand hog-head capacity, which is replaced 2.8 times a year. This facility and others nearby generate so much waste that they have turned our land into waste-handling facilities, which is an immoral and unethical way to use the land.**\n\n**I can't describe how terrible the odor from the lagoons, spray fields, and barns often is. We can't keep our windows open, and sometimes you can even smell the odor through the shut windows. You open the door and the smell almost knocks you over. One of the worst parts of it is that the odor hits at unpredictable times so it is a constant threat. Breathing in such a terrible stench makes you feel desperate. One time I was planting soybeans on a field and I got so sick to my stomach that I had to stop planting. My wife has allergies, which are aggravated by the odor. She is in the health field, and she believes that many of her patients are also suffering from worse allergies from the hog odor. A year or so ago, I went on vacation to a beautiful national park; when I entered my house upon my return and smelled the terrible odor, I broke down and cried.**\n\n**\"As farmers and human inhabitants of this planet, we are but caretakers of what has been given to us. The tree in front of my house will be here long after I am gone. Every tree I plant will be for my grandchildren to enjoy. Everything I destroy will be gone forever. So will it be with the land.\"**\n\n\u2014ROLF CHRISTEN, GREEN CITY, MISSOURI\n\nThat's right: nearly a third of _all the land on the planet_ goes toward producing protein from animals. And that production isn't happening in deserts and on craggy cliffs that might otherwise go unused.\n\nSo, leaving Arrow Rock and the Midwest on our global journey, we head southeast\u2014over the Gulf of Mexico and western tip of Cuba, across the brilliant blue Caribbean Sea, eventually finding ourselves in perhaps the epicenter of factory farming's earthly impact: the Amazon rain forest.\n\nSeventy percent of previously forested land in the Amazon is now pasture for farm animals, with animal feed crops covering a large part of the remainder. There's no example in Earth's history of old-growth and primary forestland being more quickly converted to human land use.\n\nIn the southeastern Amazon, more than half the woodland-savannah ecosystem of the Cerrado has already been converted to agriculture, mostly for the production of meat and animal feed. And three countries away, in Costa Rica, roughly half the small nation's tropical forest land is now used for meat production. The list goes on: in Africa, Southeast Asia, and elsewhere across the globe, we're losing rich, diverse ecosystems on account of our meat-heavy diets.,\n\n\"The consumption of animal-sourced food products by humans is one of the most powerful negative forces affecting the conservation of terrestrial ecosystems and biological diversity,\" reports a study published in _Science of the Total Environment_. That's habitat loss for wild animals and native plant species, soil loss, water and nutrient pollution, and more.\n\nIf our diets don't change, things will get worse. Some countries, that same report found, may even require up to _50 percent increases_ in land used for meat production.\n\nSo how much land does it take, exactly, to produce meat for our diets? Looking squarely at the land impact of _American_ meat consumption, researchers from Bard College, the Weizmann Institute of Science, and Yale University found that the animal-based portion of an average American's diet requires over _150,000 square feet_ of crop and pasture land annually\u2014that's nearly the area of three NFL football fields used to produce meat, eggs, and dairy for each one of us, each year.\n\nBut the good news is, there's a solution. No, we don't all need to do as Day and Whitney Kerr, Kathy Borgman, and the other citizens of Arrow Rock, Missouri, did: we don't each need to take up legal and public battles against individual factory-farm operations.\n\nBut we can certainly stop funding the perpetrators.\n\nAfter all, though Arrow Rock managed to stave off its proposed factory farm, unless we curb our reliance on animal products\u2014by eating more plant-based foods\u2014other communities across the world won't be so lucky.\n\n\"They tell you we've got more money than God and will outspend you and outlast you,\" laments Borgman, referring to the power of industrial agriculture. \"So it'll be the tide of the markets and the tide of masses to really change things.\"\n\nBut how does each of us play a part in that growing tide? One way for us to help is dietary\u2014and delicious. Many people are now practicing the \"Three Rs\" of eating: 1) reducing meat and other animal products in their diets by 2) replacing those products with plant-based foods, and 3) refining our diets so as to avoid products from factory farms.\n\n# THE THREE RS OF EATING FOR A BETTER PLANET\n\n**1 REDUCE** our consumption of meat, dairy, eggs, and other animal-based foods.\n\n**2 REPLACE** animal-based foods in our diet with plant-based foods.\n\n**3 REFINE** any animal products we consume by avoiding foods from factory farms.\n\nCutting down forest land near Ecuador's Napo River in order to grow more livestock feed. CREDIT: TOMAS MUNITA\/CIFOR\n\nWe can enjoy more black bean burgers and fewer beef burgers, bean-and-rice burritos instead of chicken burritos, BBQ seitan or tofu instead of pulled pork, chick _pea_ salad instead of chick _en_ salad. We can try almond milk, soy milk, coconut milk, or any other variety of the myriad of nondairy alternatives now available at coffee shops and grocery stores nationwide.\n\nWe can participate in programs like Meatless Mondays\u2014enjoying the time-honored tradition of a once-weekly vacation from meat. In fact, it was the U.S. Food Administration that created Meatless Mondays over a century ago to save resources during WWI. The effort was brought back during WWII, and then revived in 2003 by the Johns Hopkins School of Public Health as a wellness and sustainability initiative. Countless individuals and even entire school districts (like Houston, Los Angeles, Detroit, and more) are now participating, and the idea has spread like wildfire across colleges, universities, hospital systems, and more.\n\nThese types of small actions can make a huge difference. In its 2016 report _Shifting Diets for a Sustainable Food Future_ , the World Resources Institute found that by reducing animal protein intake in regions that currently consume the most, like the United States, per-person diet-related land use could be nearly _cut in half_.\n\nConsidering the impact factory farming has made and continues to make, the importance of a 50 percent reduction in our diet-related land use can't be underestimated. At this very moment, the Amazon continues burning to accommodate our meat-heavy diets. Right now, communities like Arrow Rock are pushing back against land grabs by would-be factory farmers. Farms are shutting down, replaced with factories. Rural landscapes across the country and world are being industrialized\u2014forever changed because of our diets.\n\nThe evidence is clear: for the earth beneath and all around us\u2014composed of rich, varied, important ecosystems and communities\u2014we've all simply got to eat less meat and more plants.\n\nDeforestation vs. the Amazon CREDIT: GREENPEACE\/RICARDO BELIEL\n\n**70%** The amount of Earth's agricultural land used for livestock production.\n\n**30%** The amount of all Earth's land mass used for livestock.\n\n**Three Football Fields** The amount of land needed per person each year to sustain the animal-based portion of a standard diet.\n\n**50%** The amount each of us can decrease our diet-related land use by eating more plant-based foods.\n\n## DIRT FIRST!  \nSHEDDING SOIL BY THE TON\n\nBY DANIEL IMHOFF\n\nAgricultural production is the largest source of soil erosion in the United States, with 90 percent of croplands shedding soil above rates that are sustainable for the long term. Since the majority of the nation's cropland is used for growing animal feed, high rates of soil erosion are a direct consequence of industrial animal food production. By squandering the very foundation of agriculture itself\u2014productive soil\u2014animal factory farming is compromising the ability of future generations to meet their needs.\n\nAccording to the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, the world is losing an equivalent of 10 to 15 million acres of farmland through erosion each year. This is a land area the size of Belgium and the Netherlands combined. Some experts argue that soil loss is humanity's most serious environmental challenge.\n\nEach year, the United States loses nearly two billion tons of soil, making farmlands less fertile and setting off a cascade of destructive consequences. The loss of just a few centimeters of topsoil can reduce the productivity of good soils by 40 percent and that of poorer soils by 60 percent. With the flight of bare soil through wind or rain erosion go valuable organic matter and nutrients needed to grow healthy plants. The ability for soil to absorb, retain, and filter water also drastically declines. Estimates just to replace those nutrients and pump more water onto farmlands due to soil loss are over $30 billion per year.\n\nIncreasing demands for cattle feed and corn-based ethanol are putting even more strain on already overstressed farmland. Farmers are foregoing rotations of soybeans (which provide more soil protection) to grow more corn. And to grow corn they are moving land out of the USDA Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), a decades-old economic incentive program that has been fairly successful in protecting marginal soils from the plow.\n\n\u2014FROM _CAFO: THE TRAGEDY OF INDUSTRIAL ANIMAL FACTORIES_\n\n\"The nation that destroys its soil destroys itself.\"\n\n\u2014FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT\n\n## LIVESTOCK & LAND\n\nTurning animals into food requires enormous amounts of land\u2014to grow the crops to feed the animals, and for the animals themselves to live on.\n\n\"Many of us feel helpless in the face of environmental challenges, and it can be hard to know how to sort through the advice about what we can do to make a meaningful contribution to a cleaner, more sustainable, healthier world. Having one designated meat-free day a week is a meaningful change that everyone can make, that goes to the heart of several important political, environmental, and ethical issues all at once.\"\n\n\u2014PAUL MCCARTNEY\n\nCows grazing on land that used to be forest in Rio Branco, Brazil. CREDIT: KATE EVANS\/CIFOR\n\n\" **Diversify Your Diet.** Try to eat an all-veggie meal... instead of one meat meal a week. More natural resources are used to provide meat than plants.\"\n\n\u2014THE UNITED NATIONS FOOD & AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION\n\n## **IN A NUTSHELL**\n\n\u2022 Factory farms are destroying national and global landscapes and communities.\n\n\u2022 The introduction of large-scale CAFOs negatively impacts communities' livelihoods and well-being.\n\n\u2022 Historic areas and structures are being replaced with large-scale agricultural operations.\n\n\u2022 Our alarming loss of soil due to animal agriculture is making farmlands less fertile.\n\n\u2022 Producing animal proteins requires huge inputs of land\u2014for the animals, their feed, and more.\n\n\u2022 The Amazon is disappearing day by day to make room for more animal feed-crop production.\n\n\u2022 This is a major change in the landscape, and also loss of habitat for many native species.\n\n**Now for the good news!** Eating more plant-based proteins can help us each use less land for our diet, avoid destroying rain forests like the Amazon, and preserve local communities and landscapes. Of course, all types of agriculture alter landscapes, and there is no catchall solution, but plant-based food production tends to be less invasive than factory farms. A simple dietary shift can play a big role in protecting the earth beneath us.\n\n# WATER\n\nCREDIT: DANIEL WEDEKING\n\n_Continuing our global journey, imagine leaving Arrow Rock, Missouri, and heading east. Pass over the Missouri River, then the Mississippi, their muddy waters flowing south. Pass over Illinois's Carlyle Lake\u2014a 26,000-acre reservoir\u2014and Indiana's Wabash River. Head north, then east again, along the coast of Lake Erie. Take notice of all the communities, from rural towns to major cities, built near these rivers and lakes, so settlers would have clean, reliable sources of water for drinking, bathing, and farming\u2014for sustaining life. Finally, slow yourself over upstate New York's Finger Lakes region, and pause above one of those communities: the small town of Willet, nestled along the banks of the Ostelic River._\n\nIt was there in Willet, just a few days after Christmas 2008, that twenty-five-year-old Cody Carlson found himself hunched over, scraping frozen cow feces off a thick steel cable.\n\nCarlson grew up in Manhattan, though he had been living in Santa Cruz, earning his degree in community studies from the University of California. Back on the California beaches, it would have been hard to imagine his current position: an undercover factory-farm investigator working for an animal protection organization, freezing his ass off on a massive dairy complex.\n\nAfter graduating, Carlson landed a job at a Manhattan-based firm that conducts investigative research for corporations. There, he spent much of his time in the firm's pro bono division, offering free services to nonprofits. He'd been reaching out to environmental agencies he thought could use his services when, on the news, he learned about an animal cruelty expos\u00e9 conducted by the group Mercy For Animals (MFA). Carlson, a vegetarian since the age of thirteen, was intrigued. He got in touch.\n\n\"I remember e-mailing them and basically asking if they'd like some free research from us,\" recalls Carlson. But what the MFA could really use, they told him, was a full-time undercover investigator.\n\nNext thing he knew, he was quitting his job in the city, putting his belongings into storage, and driving upstate in search of work on a factory farm. After an unsuccessful attempt at getting hired at an egg-producing CAFO, Carlson saw a job posting for a \"maintenance technician\" at Willet Dairy in Locke, New York\u2014nestled in the state's picturesque Finger Lakes region.\n\nThough, as Carlson would learn, Willet Dairy was anything _but_ picturesque.\n\nThe company's 7,800 cows allowed it to ship about 40,000 gallons of milk every day. Those cows also produced roughly 314 _million_ pounds of manure in 2006, according to New York's Department of Environmental Conservation. That's equal, in weight, to almost 78,000 Ford F-150 trucks\u2014from just one dairy facility in one state in one year.\n\nIt's a lot of waste\u2014and helping manage it all was central to Carlson's role at the complex.\n\n\"When I went in for my interview, really the only substantive question they asked me was if I thought I could handle being ankle-deep in shit all day,\" he recalls. \"'It's not a job for everyone,' they said.\"\n\nDuring that interview, farm managers took Carlson on a walk-through to ensure he'd be up for the task.\n\n\"That was when I saw how these cows live\u2014basically standing in overcrowded concrete aisles all day long, hock-deep in their own waste,\" he recounts. \"Twice a day, they'd be moved out to a separate area, where they'd be hooked up to machines for milking. After that, they were brought back into the concrete aisles. That's basically their whole lives.\"\n\nIt was in those aisles where Carlson spent most of his time undercover as a farm \"technician,\" documenting this routine abuse.\n\n\"Yeah, it was a generous title,\" says Cody with a laugh. \"Basically, you've got all these cows standing there letting loose all day. There's an engine that pulls a V-shaped metal device along a steel cable to collect the manure. Eventually, it's pumped down to these massive lagoons that are basically poop ponds.\"\n\nHis job was primarily to fix the pulling and pumping system as it broke\u2014which happened a lot.\n\n\"The cable would fray and hit the cows. It'd get clogged up. It'd freeze. We'd have to scrape the frozen feces off and un-jam the thing\u2014basically like unclogging a gigantic toilet,\" said Carlson. \"It was always something different.\"\n\nAnd not just for Carlson.\n\n\"I can't even get a friggin' clean glass of water,\" said neighbor Karen Strecker, who described turning on her faucets only to find liquid manure pouring out. \"I've been taking a bath and actually had cow shit pour into the tub,\" she said. \"It's nasty.\"\n\nAnd not just to see and smell. For years, Strecker was consistently dosed with antibiotics to treat illnesses caused by her exposure to Willet's waste.\n\n\"Do people get sick when manure gets spread?\" Strecker's doctor, Ahmad Mehdi, asked rhetorically. \"Yes, it's a fact,\" he said. \"When you have ten thousand cows in one place, that's a lot of manure.\"\n\nAcross the country, factory farms house all this manure in massive lagoons, like those at Willet. And those lagoons are often close to rivers, lakes, tributaries, and other waterways, increasing the chances they'll harm local ecosystems and water supplies.\n\nNorth Carolina has been ground zero for this problem.\n\nOn September 16, 1999, Hurricane Floyd struck Cape Fear, along the state's coast, with 105 mph winds. Floyd flooded pig waste lagoons, unleashing millions of gallons of waste into nearby waterways. The county's environmental health director at the time reported that nearly one in ten private wells in the area\u2014families' drinking water\u2014tested positive for fecal bacteria in the storm's wake.\n\nAs it was, the Cape Fear area already had much to be afraid of from factory farms: a few years earlier, in New Hanover County, 2 million gallons of liquid hog waste from a lagoon spilled into a Cape Fear River tributary. Then a hole in a Duplin County pig waste lagoon spilled another 1.5 million gallons of manure and urine into a swamp adjoining the Persimmon Branch\u2014also a tributary of the river. In Jones County, 1 million gallons of liquid hog waste spilled into the Trent River. And in Sampson County, nearly 200,000 gallons spilled into Turkey Creek.\n\nTravel across the country and you see a similar trail\u2014or stream\u2014of aquatic destruction: About 1,000 miles northwest of Cape Fear\u2014near Elmwood, Illinois\u2014a dairy operator pumped 2 million gallons of waste from his 40 _million\u2013gallon_ lagoon into a ravine, draining into Kickapoo Creek and killing local fish populations;,  only 250 miles away, a massive spill in Missouri killed _all aquatic life_ in an 11-mile stretch of Mussel Fork Creek; about 1,800 miles southwest from there\u2014in Oakdale, California\u2014Pete Hetinga of 3H Dairy Farm admitted that over the course of four years, he had discharged wastewater polluted with cow urine and feces into streams that flow into the Tuolumne River and Sacramento Delta; and roughly 800 miles north of Oakdale, in Washington, two factory farms dumped the _entire contents_ of their lagoons, spilling a total of 2 million gallons of manure, near the Yakima River\u2014 _in the same week_.\n\nLike the one Cody Carlson worked at, dairy complexes often pollute waterways and threaten communities. CREDIT: JO-ANNE MCARTHUR\/WE ANIMALS\n\n\"For every pound of beef produced in the industrial system, it takes two thousand gallons of water. That is a lot of water, and there is plenty of evidence that the Earth cannot keep up with the demand.\"\n\n\u2014PRINCE CHARLES, FROM HIS _FUTURE OF FOOD_ SPEECH\n\nAnd of course, as the saying goes, all rivers flow to the sea\u2014including those flooded with toxic waste.\n\nAfter Hurricane Floyd, the tens of millions of gallons of escaped manure\u2014plus tens of thousands of dead pigs who'd drowned inside factory farms\u2014rushed into the Atlantic Ocean's Pamlico Sound, resulting in a \"dead zone\" hundreds of miles wide.\n\nA dead zone is an area of water where oxygen has been choked out, and thus oxygen-dependent life dies; they're caused by pollution, like from factory farms\u2014and they can be massive.\n\nIn 2015, the Gulf dead zone encompassed nearly 6,500 square miles; 2002's record-breaking 8,400-square-mile dead zone could have fit North _and_ South Carolina inside it.\n\nAt the same time runoff and spills from factory farms inland are crippling our nation's waterways and creeping into the ocean, much farther out at sea, our (meat-heavy) diets are also having a negative impact.\n\n\"Of all the threats facing the oceans today, overfishing takes the greatest toll on sea life,\" reports the Environmental Defense Fund. A whopping 2.7 trillion fish are estimated to be taken from our oceans each year\u2014that's more than thirty times the number of all chickens, pigs, cows, goats, sheep, and other livestock farmed globally each year combined.\n\nSo it's no surprise that one study published in the journal _Science_ predicts that by 2048, _all the world's fisheries_ will have collapsed.\n\nThis loss of fish life is devastating in its own right. These trillions of creatures may be dissimilar from pets and other animals we've come to personally know, but they're certainly smart, social beings.\n\nDr. Culum Brown at Macquarie University's Department of Biological Sciences knows this firsthand. He spent much of his childhood tagging along with his father in Southeast Asia. \"Much of that time I was in the water snorkeling,\" he told me. \"It doesn't take much to inspire a kid, and the underwater world was just awesome to me. I never looked back.\"\n\nToday, Dr. Brown is a professor at Macquarie University's Department of Biological Sciences, specializing in the behavioral ecology and evolution of fishes. \"Fish are more intelligent than they appear,\" he says. \"In many areas, such as memory, their cognitive powers match or exceed those of 'higher' vertebrates, including nonhuman primates.\"\n\nAnd even putting the fish themselves aside, the seafood trade is also complicit in killing other marine animals\u2014considered \"by-catch.\"\n\nGlobally, commercial fishing enterprises ravage the oceans for their \"target\" catch\u2014like tuna\u2014by dragging massive nets through the sea. In the process, these indiscriminating nets also scoop up innumerable other animals.\n\n\"Hundreds of thousands of marine mammals are injured or killed every year by fishermen around the world,\" reports NPR, because of \"our taste for seafood.\"\n\nA MESSAGE FROM\n\n## ENVIRONMENTAL WORKING GROUP PRESIDENT KEN COOK\n\n**Some of my earliest experiences with food** production came as a young kid when I spent summers working on my uncle's cattle ranch in Missouri. I then went on to study agriculture at the University of Missouri, where I received my master's in soil science. Since then, I've spent much of my career focused on farm and food policy.\n\nWhen I started EWG in 1993, our focus was on food. Agriculture is the leading cause of water pollution in this country, for example, and factory farms are one of the leading reasons. EWG recently mapped all the CAFO operations in North Carolina and we estimate that these CAFOs produce more than 10 billion gallons of wet animal waste alone every year.\n\nIf we're going to get serious about addressing water pollution, we're going to need to recognize that meat production, globally, is a leading factor. Here at home, Americans eat too much meat. We consume 60 percent more meat than Europeans, and we need to adjust our expectations of how much meat we should be eating way down, and eat less meat and cheese, period.\n\nThroughout my career, I've done my best to raise public awareness and outrage over the disastrous impacts large-scale agriculture has on our water systems and environment. And as each year passes, the sense of urgency only escalates.\n\nWith the rise of China and other big, emerging economies, there is a much greater demand for meat, which means more of the world's waterways will be polluted. However, there is good news to highlight, too. Never before have there been so many companies, organizations, and citizens mobilized around the various issues of food production and factory farming and how the industry adversely impacts the environment. And coupled with the power of social media and other tactics to harness and forge pressure, there is a real opportunity for organizations like EWG, its supporters and forward-thinking companies alike to bring about significant and positive changes in the way our food is produced.\n\n_Ken Cook is one of the environmental field's most influential critics of industrial agriculture. Under his leadership, EWG has pioneered digital technologies to expose the harm done by misconceived crop subsidies and runaway agricultural pollution, and empowered American families with easy-to-use tools to eat better, healthier, and more sustainably. Cook is a board member (and founding chairman) of Food Policy Action, Organic Voices, and the Amazon Conservation Team, and a former member of the board of the Organic Center._\n\nA catfish factory farm in Louisiana. CREDIT: SCOTT BAUER\/USDA\n\nA Natural Resources Defense Council study confirms that over 650,000 aquatic mammals are unintentionally killed each year in the global seafood trade\u2014including New Zealand sea lions, several different whale species, porpoises, dolphins, and more.\n\nUnfortunately, one way the industry has begun tackling this problem is, misguidedly, through aquaculture: fish factory farms.\n\nPicture a major dairy farm or a pig complex: animals packed next to one another, barely able to move, and producing huge amounts of waste. That's aquaculture\u2014and it's the fastest growing form of animal farming on the planet.\n\nAquaculture operations can either be established inland\u2014using gigantic tanks\u2014or in open waters, using a netting system instead.\n\nIn 2013, 155 _billion_ pounds of these factory-farmed fish were produced. That's the equivalent of almost 350,000 Statues of Liberty.\n\nAnd these fish factories come with their own set of ecological disasters.\n\nFor one, they often _use_ more fish than they produce\u2014by feeding fish to the fish they're farming. It sounds like a tongue twister, and is certainly twisted. It means that even if eating _farmed_ fish, one is likely still contributing to all the problems associated with _wild-caught_ fish, since wild-caught fish may be used as feed in aquaculture.\n\nThese operations can be highly damaging in other ways, too.\n\n\"Open net-cage salmon farming,\" for example, \"is currently one of the most harmful aquaculture production systems and poses environmental threats in all regions it is practiced,\" writes the Coastal Alliance for Aquaculture Reform.\n\n**When we think about water use, we tend to think of our showers. And when we think about water and _food_ , we may only think about the water we use to prepare it. But what about all the water used to _produce_ our foods?**\n\n\"They may breathe with gills instead of lungs and move with fins instead of feet, but fishes are every bit as intelligent, complex, and social as other animals we may be more familiar with, like dogs and cats.\"\n\n\u2014JONATHAN BALCOMBE, NEW YORK TIMES\u2013BESTSELLING AUTHOR OF _WHAT A FISH KNOWS: THE INNER LIVES OF OUR UNDERWATER COUSINS_\n\nThose threats include sea lice (marine parasites that can kill wild fish), algae blooms (which can release toxins into the water), high concentrations of waste\u2014which may be laced with antibiotics\u2014left on the ocean floor, and alien species being introduced into native waters.\n\nSo whether on one of the world's many fish factory farms or out in the open seas\u2014it's clear that the overconsumption of animal proteins is unleashing environmental disasters.\n\nThat is, of course, unless we continue shifting our diets toward more _plant-based_ foods\u2014which is exactly what Cody Carlson would like to see.\n\nIt's been more than seven years since Carlson ended his undercover investigation into Willet. In that time, the wind has indeed blown the buying public away from meat, seafood, and dairy\u2014and toward consuming more plants.\n\n\"Growing up in New York City, you know, I was raised on food like pizza and pastrami,\" he says. \"I've been vegetarian for almost twenty years now, and the last few years have definitely been, in my opinion, the best time for meat-free options.\"\n\nCarlson chalks up the increase in those options to the general public shifting more toward plant-forward fare. That added demand is already taking a bite out of factory farms.\n\n\"With plant-based diets all the rage in the U.S. currently, milk alternatives\u2014and particularly those from almonds\u2014are seeing strong sales growth and increased innovation, while sales of dairy milk are contracting,\" reports _Food Navigator_. \"In the past five years, sales of almond milk have grown 250 percent to more than $894.6 million... [while] the total milk market shrunk by more than $1 billion.\"\n\n\"It's inspiring,\" says Carlson, of this growth in the plant-based food sector. \"When I was working in that hellhole, it was easy to lose hope. But plant-based eating has just become so popular in the last few years. I think about everyone, everywhere, impacted by these factory farms. More people are going to continue making this shift\u2014I know it. Now I've got nothing _but_ hope for the future.\"\n\nA diver for the Philippine fishing vessel _Vergene_ at work in and around a skipjack tuna purse seine net. CREDIT: ALEX HOFFORD\/GREENPEACE\n\n\"The factory meat industry has polluted thousands of miles of America's rivers, killed billions of fish, pushed tens of thousands of family farmers off their land, sickened and killed... U.S. citizens, and treated millions of animals with unspeakable and unnecessary cruelty.\"\n\n\u2014ROBERT F. KENNEDY JR.\n\nNetted fish off the coast of South Africa. Global fish stocks are collapsing due to seafood-heavy diets. CREDIT: MATTHEW PRESCOTT\n\n## **IN A NUTSHELL**\n\n\u2022 Factory-farm waste causes massively contaminated runoff.\n\n\u2022 Storm water can mix with animal waste, carrying it into our rivers and oceans.\n\n\u2022 Growing huge quantities of grain and corn to feed animals uses vast amounts of water.\n\n\u2022 It can take hundreds of gallons of water to produce a single pound of meat.\n\n\u2022 The oceans are being destroyed by seafood overconsumption.\n\n\u2022 By 2048, all the world's fisheries could collapse.\n\n\u2022 Trawling vessels rip aquatic mammals, sea turtles, coral reefs, and more from the oceans.\n\n\u2022 Fish farms may use more fish to feed their fish than the total amount of fish they produce.\n\n\u2022 Open-net fish farms may introduce dangerous alien species to the waters in which they operate.\n\n**Now for the good news!** Eating more plant-based foods can help us tread lighter when it comes to water pollution and overuse. We of course need to use water to produce all foods, but producing plant-based foods is far less water-intensive (plus, no waste lagoons!), and eating less seafood can help us take a bite out of overfishing and destructive fish farming.\n\n# AIR\n\nLisa Inzerillo and her map showing the factory farms in her community. CREDIT: MATTHEW PRESCOTT\n\n_Leaving upstate New York on our quest, imagine heading south\u2014across Pennsylvania's Pinchot Forest, across the Delaware River\u2014to the Delmarva Peninsula: a 200-mile-long, 80-mile-wide peninsula wedged between the Chesapeake Bay and the Atlantic Ocean._\n\nThe Delmarva is almost a world unto itself. Herds of wild horses run on the peninsula's pristine beaches. Its fourteen-thousand-acre Chincoteague National Wildlife Refuge is home to elk and red foxes and ponies and pelicans. Historic farmhouses, quaint communities, cotton fields, and vineyards dot the landscape as you drive north from Virginia Beach into Maryland, then Delaware, up toward Philadelphia.\n\nBut life on the Delmarva isn't exactly what it seems.\n\n\"We're under attack,\" said resident Lisa Inzerillo. \"I'm afraid to even go outside.\"\n\nLisa and her husband, Joe, live on land that's been part of their family for four generations, since Lisa's great-grandparents first built there in 1875. Smack in the middle of the peninsula, between Assateague Island National Seashore to the east and Tangier Sound to the west, the Princess Anne, Maryland, property was idyllic.\n\nIn 2010, Lisa and Joe built a new home there. They dug a pond in the back for wildlife, built a small carriage house off to the side. They'd sit out back and relax on their little slice of paradise, breathing in the country air. It was, in a word, perfect. \"That is, until about three years ago,\" Joe told me when I visited them in 2017, \"when the chicken factories starting popping up.\"\n\nIt's those chicken factories\u2014and the harmful, putrid gases they emit into the neighborhood's air\u2014that cause Lisa and Joe to live in such fear.\n\nNowadays, Lisa and Joe are surrounded by dozens upon dozens of these industrial poultry complexes: a mile and a half south is one complex with thirty massive chicken sheds; a mile north, off Peggy Neck Road, there are another nine; three miles southwest, there are yet another nine. The list goes on.\n\nPicture driving through your average American small town\u2014modest split-level and ranch homes with front lawns, one after another, kids' toys in the front yards. But now picture that every fourth or fifth plot is not a house, but a mega poultry farm confining tens of thousands of birds\u2014mixed right in with the homes.\n\nMany of the farms, if you can call them that, are muddy and overgrown. Buzzards constantly circle overhead, ready to pick off dead birds. Huge tractor trailers\u2014carrying birds, feed, and equipment to and from the facilities\u2014now dominate the neighborhood's narrow streets. Ammonia from the birds' waste fills the air, as do flies. And the stench\u2014the stench ranges from sickening on good days to gut-churning on bad ones.\n\n\"This property's been in my family almost 150 years,\" said Lisa. \"We built this house ourselves just a few years ago. And now we'll have to sell it, probably at a loss. Who wants to buy a house in the middle of factory-farm hell, where the air smells so bad you can't even go outside?\"\n\nA glimpse inside a poultry warehouse. CREDIT: JO-ANNE MCARTHUR\/WE ANIMALS\n\nStories like Lisa's are common up and down the Delmarva. At any given time, the peninsula is home to nearly _600 million_ chickens. Kept in an estimated 4,600 massive warehouses that can reach 600 feet long and that look more like airplane hangars than farms, chickens now rule the region's roost: there are nearly 500 birds for each of the 1.4 million human residents.\n\nAnd residents are crying foul about it. \"I'm sick to death of them saying that these are family farms,\" said Somerset County's Thomas Kerchner, referring to poultry producers' proclivity for insisting that factory farms are _family_ -owned. \"They are _farms_ like a steel mill is a _blacksmith shop_. There's no comparison.\"\n\nHe and his wife, Sherri, put their home up for sale after deciding they simply could not live among the stench.\n\n\"Where you had fifty thousand chickens on a given plot of ground, you've got a half million or two million now\u2014which produces a huge problem of what to do with the manure,\" said Tom Horton, a columnist for Delmarva's _Bay Journal_.\n\nHorton, who covered environmental issues for three decades at the _Baltimore Sun_ , is concerned for the region. \"It's too much manure,\" he says. \"Too many animals.\"\n\nToo many animals indeed. Today, the United States produces nearly nine billion chickens every single year. That means that in this country, every minute of every day\u2014night and day\u2014we slaughter over seventeen thousand birds.\n\nThe vast majority of those birds have been genetically manipulated to grow unnaturally fat, unnaturally fast. In 1920, it took a chicken sixteen weeks to reach about two pounds; today's chickens may now reach nearly triple that in only _six_ weeks. According to a report in the journal _Poultry Science_ , it's the equivalent of a two-month-old human baby weighing six hundred pounds.\n\nBecause the birds are so young when they're killed\u2014at about forty-five days old\u2014their bones remain immature. So as they become more and more top-heavy throughout their short lives, countless animals suffer broken bones, unable to keep up with their rapidly growing size. They suffer heart attacks and their lungs fail\u2014also a result of their fast growth and enormous size. Nowhere else in the animal kingdom do we see baby animals several weeks old dying from heart attacks in such vast numbers.\n\nAnd their size isn't the only astronomically large thing about industrially produced farm animals: every single minute of every single day, farm animals nationwide produce 7 million pounds of waste. In Delmarva alone, chickens produce roughly 1.5 billion pounds of manure each year\u2014more than all the annual human waste from New York City, Washington, San Francisco, and Atlanta combined.\n\nLisa and Joe, Thomas and Sherri\u2014indeed, everyone else dealing with this problem on the Delmarva: they are not alone. Almost a thousand miles away in Calhoun, Kentucky, seventy-six-year-old Bernadine Edwards is surrounded by more than one hundred mega chicken factories within just a two-mile radius.\n\n\"There's a horrible odor, a stench, and I have flies and rodents digging in, trying to get into my house,\" said Edwards. \"I'm too old to start over,\" she lamented. \"I can't afford to.\"\n\nPerhaps not surprisingly, the rural areas where factory farms often set up shop are not wealthy neighborhoods full of luxury cars and new homes; rather, they tend to be concentrated in lower-income areas, particularly with non-white populations.\n\nEnvironmental justice advocates call this environmental racism. Unsavory and environmentally destructive facilities\u2014landfills, coal plants, toxic-waste dumps, and more\u2014are placed in lower-income neighborhoods, often inhabited by people of color. This goes for factory farms, too, which a University of North Carolina School of Public Health study found \"are disproportionately located in communities of color and regions of poverty.\"\n\nThat same study also found that schools with a significant number of white and higher-income students were located, on average, 10.8 miles away from CAFOs; schools with a significant number of non-white students and roughly half their students on lunch program assistance were located only 4.9 miles away.\n\n\"Jesus says of the birds of the air that 'not one of them is forgotten before God.' How then can we possibly mistreat them or cause them harm? I ask all Christians to recognize and to live fully this dimension of their conversion. May the power and the light of the grace we have received also be evident in our relationship to other creatures and to the world around us. In this way, we will help nurture that sublime fraternity with all creation which Saint Francis of Assisi so radiantly embodied.\"\n\n\u2014POPE FRANCIS\n\nThe poultry industry confines billions of birds in mega complexes nationwide. CREDIT: FRANCIS LEROY\n\n\"These companies seek rural areas where unemployment, or underemployment, is high and people are desperate,\" says Aloma Dew, a Sierra Club organizer in Kentucky. \"They assume that poor, country people will not organize or speak up, and that they will be ignorant of the impacts on their health and quality of life.\"\n\n\"Quality of life\" seems like a stretch here. Bernadine Edwards in Kentucky and the residents of the Delmarva are exposed to a litany of harmful gases in their air\u2014like hydrogen sulfide, which can cause skin, eye, and respiratory irritation; brain and heart disorders; and even death.\n\nBecause factory farms can confine hundreds of thousands of chickens or other animals at a single location, these gases may be emitted at high concentrations; that can be detrimental to nearby communities.\n\nIn fact, both North Carolina and Iowa\u2014two of our nation's largest factory-farming hubs\u2014have published controlled studies of CAFOs' ill effects on their neighbors. In Iowa, for example, increased instances of eye and upper respiratory problems persisted among people living within two miles of a factory farm.\n\nWhen I visited with Lisa and Joe on the Delmarva, they complained of respiratory problems. \"I'm an ER physician,\" Joe said. \"I'm around sickness all day but never get sick from that. It's the poultry farms that are the problem.\"\n\nThe fans attached to mega poultry facilities often blow \"CAFO dust\" that threatens communities for miles around. Lisa Inzerillo, on the Delmarva Peninsula, has felt (and breathed) these impacts firsthand. CREDIT: USDA\n\n\"Communities near industrial farm animal production facilities are subject to air emissions that... may significantly affect certain segments of the population. Those most vulnerable\u2014children, the elderly, individuals with chronic or acute pulmonary or heart disorders\u2014are at particular risk.\"\n\n\u2014THE PEW COMMISSION ON INDUSTRIAL FARM ANIMAL PRODUCTION, A PROJECT OF THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS AND JOHNS HOPKINS BLOOMBERG SCHOOL OF PUBLIC HEALTH\n\nAnd with that, he ducked out to pick up his respiratory medication at the pharmacy. He grabbed his keys and jacket and left through the side door. Lisa, saddened, chimed in: \"It's because all these mega chicken houses all around us have these giant fans on them. They're blowing God knows what into the air all day long. And we're breathing it in. When it's real windy, you can't even go outside. It's either the stench or the flies. We just stay inside mostly now.\"\n\nWhat keeps Lisa and Joe inside is the particulate matter\u2014including of the fecal variety\u2014that escapes from CAFOs and is carried by the wind. What they breathe in when they go outside is referred to as CAFO dust\u2014and it's incredibly dangerous: it's a top cause of bronchitis, can cause heart disorders like arrhythmia, and can even lead to heart attacks.\n\nAnd these ill effects are nothing new: we've known of them for years.\n\nOne report, conducted for the North Dakota Attorney General's office, analyzed fifty-six socioeconomic studies about the impact CAFOs have on local communities.\n\n\"Based on the evidence,\" the study concluded, \"public concern about the detrimental community impacts of industrialized farming is warranted.\" The report continued: \"This conclusion rests on five decades of government and academic concern with this topic... five decades of social science research which has found detrimental effects of industrialized farming on many indicators of community quality of life.\"\n\nFifty years of social science and government concern over this issue; living proof from communities on the Delmarva, in Kentucky, Iowa, and North Carolina; study after study, year after year: how is it that producers have been able to continue ravaging rural communities for so long?\n\nIn short, we let them.\n\nA MESSAGE FROM\n\n## OXFAM AMERICA CAMPAIGN MANAGER BEN GROSSMAN-COHEN\n\n**Right now, one person in nine** goes to bed hungry every night\u2014not because there isn't enough food to go around, but because of deep power imbalances and improper resource allocation. The reality is that eating meat requires way more energy, land, water, and other finite resources than other delicious foods. And individuals can help rectify this imbalance with their own diets simply by eating less meat.\n\nIndeed, our diets are deeply intertwined with a complex food system that greatly affects people all over the world. We've learned over decades of responding to humanitarian crises and working in some of the poorest places on the planet that ending poverty requires major shifts in how we grow, distribute, and consume food.\n\nFor example, Oxfam is working closely with workers in poultry-processing facilities throughout the United States who face some of the most dangerous and difficult jobs for extremely low wages. Many of the workers in these plants are people of color, often undocumented immigrants who lack basic workplace protections.\n\nAnd of course, we all vote when we make choices about what we eat. The more people are willing to adjust their diets\u2014like by eating less meat\u2014and use their voice, the more we can take the growing concern over how our food is produced and create systemic change. The more we can shift incentives for the food industry to produce more plant-based foods and build greater ties with like minds in developing countries to do the same at the local level, the more we can avoid the spread of the worst sins of our current production model.\n\nThe simple truth is that we cannot sustain the current model of production and consumption without regard for the effect on resources and our climate. Faced with constrained resources it is always the poorest and most vulnerable who lose out. The more we can do to use our voices to advocate for change and our pocketbooks to support those businesses who are doing the right thing, the better everyone will be.\n\n_Ben Grossman-Cohen is campaign manager for Oxfam America. Through its international confederation of organizations working together with partners and local communities in more than ninety countries, Oxfam mobilizes the power of people against poverty._\n\nCaged chickens in India used to support a growing dependence on animal proteins. CREDIT: FRANK LOFTUS\/THE HSUS\n\n\"When the poison control center official spoke to Julie Jansen, his words were shocking: Ma'am, the only symptoms of hydrogen sulfide poisoning you're not experiencing are seizures, convulsions, and death. Leave the area immediately. Panic-stricken, Jansen grabbed her six children and her friends' two children and drove away from her home. Jansen first thought the 11-year-old, home-based day care center she owned in Olivia, Minnesota had been hit by a flu bug. In the spring of 1995, 17 children ranging in age from newborn to 13 shared a long list of symptoms\u2013diarrhea, nausea, headaches, vomiting, teary eyes, and stuffy noses. She soon noticed that it only happened when the wind blew from the south. Two factory-scale hog farms had recently located not more than a mile and a half away. It turned out the hog operations were poisoning the air with toxic wastes.\"\n\n\u2014FROM THE NRDC REPORT _CESSPOOLS OF SHAME_\n\n\"The same factory farmers who intensively confine animals and deal them never-ending privation also release massive volumes of untreated animal waste, making life miserable for people and animals.\"\n\n\u2014WAYNE PACELLE, PRESIDENT AND CEO, THE HUMANE SOCIETY OF THE UNITED STATES\n\nActually, we _made_ them: in 1960, the average American ate only 34.3 pounds of poultry each year. In 2016, that amount had climbed to more than 108 pounds per person, according to the National Chicken Council.\n\nSo compared to 1960, today we have nearly twice as many people each eating more than twice as many birds.,  No wonder production has gotten so intensified, so concentrated, so dangerously out of control.\n\nThe good news is that we can each use the power of our plates to fix this problem, simply by cutting back on chicken and other poultry products in our diets.\n\nThat's exactly what Lisa Inzerillo has done. \"I can't even eat chicken anymore,\" she told me. \"I feel like I've gone through a grieving process and I just can't get past being angry over what they've done to us. They're ruining our lives, disrespecting animals, hurting our neighbors. So yeah, I just can't eat it anymore.\"\n\nFortunately for Lisa and countless other people cutting back on poultry, there are protein-packed plant-based foods that can help us live healthier and avoid supporting the types of industrial operations that are polluting our air and making life so difficult for so many communities. There are products like tempeh and seitan. The market for tofu is exploding as more Americans enjoy the product, going from a $1 billion industry to nearly a $5 billion industry. And a huge variety of chicken-like-but-chicken-free meatless products have taken off in the market and are now available virtually everywhere.\n\nMany restaurants now offer plant-based chicken products. Tropical Smoothie Caf\u00e9 offers customers the opportunity to replace chicken with a product called Beyond Meat in nearly any item. Beyond Meat, made entirely from plant-based ingredients, has the taste and texture of chicken, yet has 20 grams of protein in each 3-ounce serving, compared to 13 grams for the same portion of chicken.\n\nBesides Beyond Meat, there are brands like Gardein (meat-free chicken tenders, scaloppini, and more), Boca (plant-based chicken patties and nuggets), and Morningstar Farms (Buffalo wings and more)\u2014to name only a few.\n\nGrocery stores now offer entire sections of these products\u2014and not just Whole Foods: at Walmart, Kroger, Safeway, Albertsons, and nearly every other supermarket chain, one can find delicious plant-based \"chicken\" products. Target has even launched its own brand of vegetarian chicken. The company's Simply Balanced store brand meat-free \"meats\"\u2014like Korean BBQ Meatless Chicken, Teriyaki Meatless Chicken, Smoky Chipotle Meatless Chicken, and Mushroom Miso Meatless Turkey\u2014are available nationwide.\n\nThese products are certainly not zero-footprint foods. But their success is the result of millions more consumers now mixing meat-free meals into their diets. Just as many people are seeking out more humane products from local producers committed to higher animal welfare and environmental standards, countless people are also shifting to more plant-focused diets.\n\nSome do it for their own health, with data clearly showing that diets lower in meat and higher in plant proteins are better for us. Some do it for the animals\u2014perhaps uncomfortable with the way these chickens are warehoused, or with knowing that seventeen thousand of them are slaughtered for our plates every minute of every day.\n\nOthers are doing it for people like Bernadine Edwards in Kentucky and Lisa Inzerillo in Maryland\u2014for all the families and communities nationwide who, with each breath, are victimized by our nation's chicken addiction. They're opting, with every dinnertime decision, to use their forks as a force for change\u2014and each of us can, too.\n\n## **IN A NUTSHELL**\n\n\u2022 Air pollution from factory farms takes a toll on local communities.\n\n\u2022 Putrid odors can prevent people from going outside or opening their windows.\n\n\u2022 Dangerous gases like methane, ammonia, and hydrogen sulfide are emitted as waste breaks down.\n\n\u2022 Exposure to these gases can cause illness and neurological problems, including depression.\n\n\u2022 Factory farms tend to be concentrated in low-income areas.\n\n\u2022 Poor people and people of color are disproportionately impacted by factory farms' air pollution.\n\n\u2022 On Maryland's Eastern Shore, the poultry industry is ravaging poor communities and negatively affecting families who've lived on the peninsula for hundreds of years.\n\n**Now for the good news!** We can all rest\u2014and breathe\u2014a little easier knowing that plant-based foods are easier on the air. Producing, say, chick _peas_ instead of chick _en_ is less polluting and gentler on local communities. So simply by enjoying more of these types of foods\u2014even if meat is still sometimes on the plate\u2014we can each help play a significant role in cleaning the air.\n\n# FIRE\n\nCREDIT: RODRIGO BALEIA\/GREENPEACE\n\n\"Climate change is no longer some far-off problem. It is happening here. It is happening now. And it becomes more dramatic with each passing year.\"\n\n\u2014PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA\n\nFor the final stop on our worldwide voyage, we leave the Delmarva and head, this time, not to another place on the planet\u2014but to a spot far above it. Rise straight up: back through the clouds, into the stratosphere. Continue through the thermosphere until you have a clear view of the Earth below. From above, watch the erratic weather patterns\u2014the hurricanes, the tsunamis. Watch the ice caps shrink and coastal areas flood. This is the raging fire that is global warming; this is climate change. Its impacts are devastating\u2014and all around us.\n\nOne sweltering Sunday in the summer of 2014, my wife and I headed south from our home in New Orleans toward the Gulf of Mexico. We drove down state highway 90, across the Bayou des Allemands and through all the little Creole towns with names like LaRose and Galliano\u2014past Catfish Lake and Little Lake and Lake Jesse and North Lake and South Lake and Lake Palourde and Lake Laurier\u2014peppered with colorful houses built high up on wooden stilts or floating on empty fifty-five-gallon drums.\n\nThe region's so awash that on a map, it looks like a bright blue canvas painted, Jackson Pollock\u2013style, with only slight drizzles of intersecting green.\n\nSix thousand years ago, the region was entirely submerged. Melting glaciers eventually created Lake Pont-chartrain and carved out Pine Island, near present-day New Orleans. When the Mississippi changed course, heading toward the new island, it dumped sediment into the Gulf\u2014sediment that formed land and eventually connected with Pine Island, creating the land mass that, today, includes everything between the Gulf and the Big Easy.\n\nThat all played out at a snail's pace, over millennia.\n\nThen came climate change.\n\nThough Earth's climate has always been a work-in-progress, today's scientific consensus is that human activities are undoubtedly causing dangerous changes to it\u2014like progressively erratic weather patterns and increasing global temperatures.\n\nSea levels, too, are rising, which has Joann Bourg and her family gravely worried.\n\nJoann\u2014along with her sisters, mother, son, and niece\u2014are the third generation of Bourgs living on the family's land, about eighty miles south of New Orleans, in Isle de Jean Charles, which is essentially a floating town situated precariously between Lake Chien and Wonder Lake.\n\nBut it may not be afloat much longer: thanks to climate change, the region is essentially sinking back into the Gulf.\n\n\"Yes, this is our grandpa's land,\" Ms. Bourg told the _New York Times_ in a profile on the region's fate. \"But it's going under one way or another.\"\n\nIn 2016, a $48 million U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development grant became the first use of federal funds to relocate an entire community impacted by climate change.\n\nLouisiana is under constant threat of flooding due to the climate change. CREDIT: USDA\n\n\"We're going to lose all our heritage, all our culture,\" grieved Biloxi-Chitimacha-Choctaw Chief Albert Naquin. \"It's all going to be history.\"\n\nWorldwide, families like the Bourgs and people like Chief Naquin are at war with our changing climate\u2014a war for their land and lives.\n\nTuvalu\u2014a tiny island nation in the South Pacific, north of Fiji and east of Papua New Guinea, whose highest point is merely fifteen feet above sea level\u2014may be among Earth's first national victims of that war.\n\n\"Cyclones and tropical storms have been getting much worse since the 1980s,\" says Hilia Vavae, Tuvalu's chief meteorologist. \"We had a big drought starting in 1999. Flooding from extreme high tides is increasing also. In the late 1990s, water started coming out of the ground\u2014first puddles, then a whole sea.\"\n\nIt seems Tuvalu\u2014like southern Louisiana\u2014may soon meet a watery grave.\n\n\"If, as predicted, sea levels continue to rise,\" confirms the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, \"this string of low-lying islands in the southwest Pacific could gradually disappear.\"\n\nSo who's to blame? In the unending finger-pointing that often accompanies climate change discussions\u2014the few remaining deniers left misguidedly point to natural processes, scientists point to human-caused emissions, the solar industry points to coal, the coal industry to transport, and so on\u2014one thing has become inarguably clear: it's not our fingers we ought to be pointing, but our forks.\n\nThe consequences of meat overconsumption are undeniable\u2014on our land, in our waters, in our air. The Amazon being deforested for animal agriculture is a travesty in its own right, as is the oceanic devastation wrought by the seafood sector; Lisa Inzerillo on the Delmarva Peninsula certainly doesn't need any reason other than the attack on her own air quality to protest poultry production.\n\nScientists from ICESCAPE\u2014Impacts of Climate Change on the Eco-Systems and Chemistry of the Arctic Pacific Environment\u2014study the region's melting ice. CREDIT: NASA\/KATHRYN HANSEN\n\nBut making matters far worse is the fact that each of these ecological nightmares, as bad as they are individually, also plays into a much broader catastrophe: climate change.\n\n\"The livestock sector is a major stressor on many ecosystems and on the planet as a whole,\" opens _Livestock's Long Shadow_ \u2014that same UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) study that reported on animal agriculture's massive land requirements. \"Globally, it is one of the largest sources of greenhouse gasses.\"\n\nLivestock, the FAO reports, contribute a whopping 14.5 percent of _all_ greenhouse gas emissions worldwide.\n\nBut in its research, the FAO didn't even count fish or shrimp as \"livestock,\" focusing instead on mammals and birds. This is a grave omission of emissions, points out Risto Isom\u00e4ki in his 2016 book, _Meat, Milk and Climate: Why It Is Absolutely Necessary to Reduce the Consumption of Animal Products_. It means emissions from animal proteins\u2014not just land-based livestock, but _all_ animal proteins\u2014in our diet are actually vastly higher than reported.\n\nThink back to all those ocean-trawling vessels. On top of depleting fish stocks and killing marine mammals like dolphins and whales, all those ship fleets scouring the oceans worldwide also burn massive quantities of fossil fuels, emitting huge amounts of greenhouse gases in the process.\n\nMangrove canopy, Indonesia. Worldwide, millions of hectares of mangrove swamps have been converted to shrimp farms, emitting enormous quantities of carbon dioxide in the process. CREDIT: SIGIT DENI SASMITO\/CIFOR\n\n\"If every American skipped one meal of chicken per week and substituted vegetables and grains, for example, the carbon dioxide savings would be the same as taking more than half a million cars off of U.S. roads.\"\n\n\u2014ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND\n\nSOURCE: ENVIRONMENTAL WORKING GROUP\n\n\"Did you know that the meat industry is responsible for approximately 20 percent of the world's greenhouse gas emissions? In fact, producing one calorie of meat requires nearly twenty times the amount of energy as one plant calorie! With global meat consumption tripling over the last four decades, the meat industry now emits over 36 billion tons of greenhouse gases annually and is showing no signs of slowing down. If we want to make a real dent in the world's carbon footprint and reduce our own personal footprint, we need to eat less meat.\"\n\n\u2014EARTH DAY NETWORK\n\nThink back to aquaculture. Fish factory farms are to blame for much more than just localized water pollution. Millions of hectares of mangrove swamps, for example, have been converted to shrimp farms, emitting enormous quantities of carbon dioxide as they're destroyed. In fact, the World Watch Institute points out that _more than half_ the world's mangrove forests have been destroyed, with shrimp farming a main perpetrator in their destruction.\n\nAnd even with these omissions in the FAO's research, the numbers are still staggering.\n\nAs the FAO reports, livestock cause \"an even larger contribution [to emissions] than the transportation sector worldwide.\" That's right: our use of animals for food\u2014 _not even counting seafood_ \u2014contributes more to climate change than all the world's cars, trucks, trains, planes, and ships _combined_.\n\nMuch of the livestock sector's emissions are the result of the fact that all these animals we raise for food have to eat food themselves.\n\nThink of the 600 million chickens on the Delmarva, and the billions more throughout the country. Factory farms require massive amounts of feed.\n\nAs the _American Journal of Clinical Nutrition_ reports, in the United States, farm animals consume more than _700 percent_ the amount of grain than is eaten by the _entire_ American (human) population.\n\nWhere does that feed come from? Remember the Amazon and other tropical forest land being razed for meat production? Though some of that razing is done for _grazing_ , much is done to make room for _feed crops_. And during all that deforestation\u2014that converting of forest land to feed land\u2014grave quantities of greenhouse gases are spewed into the atmosphere.\n\nThen, once the land has been converted, managing those feed crops also requires profanely heavy fossil fuel consumption: running all the tractors and processors and cars and trucks and other industrial equipment deals yet another major blow to our climate.\n\nSo what about animals who eat grass instead of grain? Though \"grass-fed\" cows represent only a minuscule percentage of the entire livestock sector, they too are a significant contributor to greenhouse gas emissions.\n\nCows are very gaseous animals, and especially when they eat grass, their digestive processes emit colossal quantities of methane\u2014a greenhouse gas that's _30 times more potent_ than even carbon dioxide. Globally, farm animals are one of the most significant sources of anthropogenic methane, and are responsible for up to 40 percent of all methane emissions worldwide.,\n\nThis is why \"grass-fed meat is more, not less, greenhouse gas intensive,\" says Dr. Gidon Eshel, a climatologist at Bard College's Center for Environmental Policy.\n\nBut people need protein. And while industrial chicken, fish, pig, and cow operations of all kinds are extremely climate _un_ friendly, certainly it's true that growing, processing, and transporting food of _any_ kind (whether animal- or plant-based) requires resources.\n\nSo what would the impact on climate change be if we simply processed more plant foods into protein-packed products of their own, rather than funneling so many through animals? What if we cut out the middle _hen_?\n\nAccording to the Environmental Defense Fund, if each American replaced chicken with plant-based foods at _just one meal per week_ , the carbon dioxide savings would be the same as taking more than half a million cars off U.S. roads.\n\nAnd that's just chicken\u2014and just carbon dioxide.\n\nOn the whole, \"the production of animal-based foods,\" confirms a study published in the journal _Climate Change_ , \"is associated with higher greenhouse gas emissions than plant-based foods.\"\n\nGrass-fed cows emit huge amounts of methane, making grass-fed beef \"more, not less, greenhouse gas intensive,\" according to climatologist Dr. Gidon Eshel. CREDIT: JO-ANNE MCARTHUR\/THE GHOSTS IN OUR MACHINE\n\nA MESSAGE FROM\n\n## SIERRA CLUB DEPUTY EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR BRUCE HAMILTON\n\n**As the threat of climate disruption** becomes increasingly urgent, it makes sense that every source of greenhouse gas emissions should come under scrutiny. Both the reckless burning of fossil fuels and unsustainable agricultural practices are major contributors to greenhouse gas emissions. However, as the recent documentary film _Cowspiracy_ rightly points out, the latter are too often overlooked as a potential source of reductions.\n\nIn fact, how we farm and what we eat can make a real difference for our climate future, and that knowledge should inform not only our personal choices but also our public policies.\n\nEliminating or reducing meat consumption in your diet is one important way to reduce your contribution to climate change, since animal agriculture is the single largest source of global greenhouse gas emissions from food production. At the same time, the Sierra Club continues to support broader reforms in food production that will also help limit climate disruption.\n\nMany current agricultural practices, such as large-scale monocropping (the practice of growing a single crop year after year on the same land) and concentrated animal-feeding operations (CAFOs), consume disproportionate amounts of fossil fuels, pollute our water and air, deplete the soil, and diminish biodiversity. The good news is that we have many opportunities to improve in all of these areas.\n\nWe're calling for reform of industrial agricultural and food system practices, to minimize contributions to greenhouse gases and to maximize carbon sequestration in plants and soils. The pollution from concentrated animal-feeding operations in particular is grossly disproportionate to the amount of food produced. Growing heavily subsidized energy-intensive corn to convert to ethanol fuel makes no sense from an energy, food-supply, climate, or pollution standpoint, and it should be opposed.\n\nThe single greatest source of agricultural greenhouse gas emissions is livestock, particularly factory-raised animals. Cattle (for both beef and milk, as well as for inedible outputs like manure and draft power) are responsible for about two-thirds of livestock emissions.\n\nFortunately, we _can_ cut livestock emissions significantly not only by reducing personal meat consumption but also by following best practices and ending our reliance on concentrated animal-feeding operations. The Sierra Club continues to strongly oppose the establishment of new CAFOs and believes we should phase out existing operations as soon as possible.\n\nFurthermore, ensuring soil maintains its carbon stock is a highly effective means of carbon sequestration. Yet most agricultural soils have had their carbon stock dramatically reduced by soil loss, excessive tillage, overgrazing, erosion, and overuse of chemical nitrous fertilizers. In fact, the world's cultivated and grazed soils have lost 50 to 70 percent of their original carbon stock. In the process, billions of tons of carbon have been released into the atmosphere. That's why it's critical that we rebuild soil carbon through regenerative agricultural practices.\n\nMassive food production operations are at the root of many of these problems. Converting our natural landscapes into intensive agricultural operations can change land from carbon sinks to carbon sources. Deforestation, plowing up prairies, and filling wetlands destroys existing carbon sinks and releases that carbon into our atmosphere, increasing emissions.\n\nAs consumers, we each have a personal role to play as well, through our choices about the foods we eat:\n\n\u2022 Whenever possible, we can support locally owned and operated farms, which are generally far less destructive and far more productive. This also reduces the need for long-distance transportation of foods.\n\n\u2022 Striving to reduce food waste, through smaller serving sizes, composting, and recycling, will also reduce greenhouse gas emissions.\n\n\u2022 Organically grown foods that don't rely on chemicals are better for the soil, climate, and our health.\n\nAddressing climate disruption is important enough that we cannot afford to overlook any strategy for success. Fortunately, just as with transitioning from fossil fuels to clean energy, we can reap important collateral benefits by adopting more responsible and sustainable agricultural practices and by making smarter lifestyle choices.\n\n_Bruce Hamilton has worked for the Sierra Club for four decades. He's served on the Environmental Support Center Board of Directors, the U.S. Department of Energy Environmental Advisory Board, and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency National Advisory Council on Sustainable Economies._\n\n\"There is much the government can do and should do to improve the environment. But even more important is the individual... for it is the individual who himself benefits, and also protects a heritage of beauty for his children and future generations.\"\n\n\u2014Lady Bird Johnson\n\nFor that study, scientists looked at more than 55,000 individuals' diets\u2014including vegans, vegetarians, and meat-eaters\u2014aged twenty to seventy-nine years old. Their conclusions? Greenhouse gas emissions of those eating meat-heavy diets \"are approximately twice as high\" as individuals eating a plant-based diet. Thus, concludes the report, reducing our meat consumption would lead to lower greenhouse gas emissions.\n\nTime and again, study after study, leading scientists have urged that in order to curb climate change, we _must_ eat more plants and less meat.\n\n\"Shifting global demand for meat and dairy produce is central to achieving climate goals,\" concludes one report from Europe's most reputable think tank, the prestigious Royal Institute of International Affairs\u2014more commonly known as Chatham House.\n\n\"Globally we should eat less meat,\" found another Chatham House study. \"We cannot avoid dangerous climate change unless consumption trends change.\"\n\nThe message is clear.\n\nThe verdict is in.\n\nThe time is now.\n\nAt each meal, we make choices. Collectively, all those choices made throughout each day impact individuals and ecosystems across the planet. Pouring cow's milk on our cereal or putting it in our coffee every morning may cause people living next to dairy factory farms to suffer. A ham sandwich for lunch every day may support a pig factory farm. A tuna sandwich may kill whales. And chicken wings for dinner may degrade the lives of people like Lisa Inzerillo on the Delmarva.\n\nMoreover, all told, it's now clear that meat-and-milk-heavy meal plans indisputably and immensely contribute to climate change, putting families like the Bourgs, in Louisiana\u2014and of course, _all_ of Earth's inhabitants and ecosystems\u2014at extreme risk.\n\nOn the other hand, a diet higher in plant-based proteins can dramatically ease agriculture's planetary pitfalls, creating better outcomes for our neighbors, our waterways, animals, our land, and our climate.\n\nThis is certainly one reason why plant-based eating has grown in popularity in recent years, with millions more among us now focusing on plant-forward fare.\n\nAnd it's part of the reason why entire governments are now starting to try to shift the tides of consumption. In 2016, China announced plans to slash the entire country's meat consumption by 50 percent\u2014a move that was lauded by climate campaigners worldwide. The same year, it was reported that Chiara Appendino\u2014the mayor of Turin, Italy\u2014planned to make the entire city vegetarian by promoting meat-free eating as a matter of public policy.\n\nMeat's impact on our climate has also helped lead major school districts\u2014Los Angeles, Detroit, Houston, and many more\u2014along with countless colleges and universities to now have entirely meat-free days in their cafeterias. And it's also helped pique the interest of Silicon Valley, where venture capital firms are now pouring money into plant-based food startups.\n\nFishing trawlers in the Western Sahara. As high as the UN figures are for livestock-related greenhouse gas emissions, they don't even include emissions from the countless fishing ships constantly trawling our world's oceans. CREDIT: WESTERN SAHARA RESOURCE WATCH\n\n\"The growing meat intensity of diets around the world is one of the issues connected to this global crisis.\"\n\n\u2014Al Gore\n\nBut we don't need to be venture capitalists, school dining directors, or mayors to take part in this shift. Whether adopting a vegan or vegetarian diet, trying Meatless Mondays, drinking almond milk instead of cow's milk, or simply replacing meat with plants more often, there are a myriad of ways for everyone to eat more sustainably.\n\nIndeed, on this spinning ball of green and blue that we all call home, with all its ecological problems, eating more plants and less meat is the most important way\u2014and the tastiest\u2014to turn things around. So to those who've decided to make their tables sustainable by enjoying more food for a better planet, here's to you!\n\n## **IN A NUTSHELL**\n\n\u2022 Erratic weather patterns, the melting of our icecaps, and more\u2014scientists agree we're in a climate catastrophe.\n\n\u2022 Island nations are facing threats, like increased storms and flooding, from climate change.\n\n\u2022 In the United States, low-lying areas like southern Louisiana are sinking, displacing families and entire communities.\n\n\u2022 Scientists are clear that animal agriculture is a major driver of climate change.\n\n\u2022 Transforming our land to grow animal feed, raising and processing those crops, then funneling the feed through animals requires huge fossil fuel inputs.\n\n\u2022 Even \"locally produced\" animal proteins can be climate unfriendly, since animals are inefficient at converting natural resources into food.\n\n\u2022 All told, industrial animal agriculture contributes more greenhouse gases than the entire transportation sector\u2014than all trains, planes, cars, trucks, and ships combined.\n\n**Now for the good news!** All the lowest-emitting foods, when it comes to greenhouse gases, are plant-based. Beans emit less than 2 kg of CO2 per serving while beef emits 27 kg; tofu emits 2 kg while tuna emits 6 kg. This means that by simply enjoying more plant-based foods, we can\u2014in a very concrete, immediate way\u2014help curb climate change.\n\n# [PART TWO:  \nOUR PLATES](toc.xhtml#part02)\n\n# \"Eat food. Not too much. Mostly plants.\"\n\n\u2014MICHAEL POLLAN\n\n## CAN LENTILS SAVE THE WORLD?\n\nWell, maybe not on their own. But along with other protein-rich legumes and grains, hearty vegetables, wholesome seeds, and even plant-based \"meats\"\u2014eating more of these foods can play a pivotal role in reversing some of our planet's most serious problems.\n\nTake the humble lentil, for example. It weighs in at less than a single kilogram of carbon emissions per serving, while beef contributes a whopping 27 kilograms. No contest.\n\nBut so what? Isn't comparing lentils and beef like comparing apples and oranges? Work your way through these recipes and you'll find out firsthand that isn't the case. Enjoy a Spicy Lentil Burger instead of a hamburger, or Spaghetti with Lentil Meatballs, and you'll see that these protein-packed pulses can offer tastes and textures that are satisfying and delicious, with a much lighter environmental footprint.\n\nPlus, lentils (and other beans and legumes) can help conserve vast quantities of water. Consider Creamy Basil-Chick _pea_ \u2014instead of chick _en_ \u2014Lettuce Cups. According to the Water Footprint Network, a pound of chicken requires more than 570 gallons of water to produce, while it takes only 5 gallons to produce chickpeas and other beans. Or try a Spicy Chocolate Milk Shake with Whipped Coconut Cream for dessert \u2014instead of cow's milk (one glass of which takes _820 gallons_ of water to produce), this tasty treat uses soy milk (20 gallons per glass). That's a 97 percent reduction in water use just from one simple swap!\n\nConcerned not just about our water _use_ , but also what we're doing to our world's oceans through overfishing? Try crab-free Crab Cakes and Rainbow Veggie Sushi. These fish-free feasts are easier on our world's oceans, not to mention the aquatic animals that call those oceans home.\n\n\"Vegetables are, without a doubt, the most flavorful items on a plate.\"\n\n\u2014CHEF MARIO BATALI\n\nEnjoy recipes that utilize tree fruits\u2014knowing that trees help purify our air\u2014like Cherry Chia Puff Pastry Breakfast Tarts or Oatmeal with Chai-Poached Pears. And delight in ingredients that can help lower our land footprint\u2014like using rice paper instead of pork to make bacon or using tofu instead of eggs to make frittata.\n\nOf course, no foods have _zero_ footprint: living and eating on this earth will always mean consuming _some_ amount of resources. But all things considered, plant-based foods\u2014whether whole grains and vegetables, proteins like tofu, or even plant-based meat products\u2014tend to help us tread lighter. They can help us emit fewer greenhouse gases, use less water, save our oceans, reduce air pollution (and even help purify the air), and use less land.\n\nPlus, enjoying more of these delicious foods doesn't have to be a zero-sum endeavor: you needn't go whole hog toward veganism to make a difference. Even simply incorporating _more_ of these recipes into your normal repertoire can help you take a big bite out of so many of the problems that plague our planet. And you may discover new foods you love, or new ways to prepare foods you already love.\n\nSo eat up and enjoy, knowing you're helping save the planet\u2014one delicious bite after the next. Bon app\u00e9tit!\n\nBREAKFAST\n\nApple Cinnamon Pancakes\n\nBiscuits and Gravy\n\nBlack Bean Breakfast Burritos\n\nBlueberry Buckwheat Waffles\n\nBreakfast Banana Split\n\nCherry Chia Puff Pastry Breakfast Tarts\n\nClassic French Toast\n\nMix 'n' Match Superfood Smoothies\n\nOatmeal with Chai-Poached Pears\n\nPB&J Power Smoothies\n\nPea and Potato Frittata\n\nRice Pudding with Coconut and Cranberries\n\nRise 'n' Shine Breakfast Sandwich\n\nSweet Potato and Parsnip Hash\n\nTofu Scramble 101\n\nSOUPS, STEWS, SALADS, AND SANDWICHES\n\nBLT Bagel Sandwich\n\nBloody Beet Burgers\n\nBuffalo Cauliflower Wraps with Blue Cheese\n\nGinger-Sesame Soba Noodle Salad\n\nLoaded Black Bean Dogs\n\nMardi Gras Gumbeaux\n\nMassaged Kale Caesar with Pumpernickel Croutons\n\nReuben Sandwich\n\nRoasted Coconut-Beet Soup\n\nRoasted Root Vegetable and Quinoa Salad\n\nSesame Seaweed Salad\n\nSlawppy Joes\n\nSourdough Panzanella Salad\n\nSpicy Lentil Burgers\n\nVietnamese B\u00e1nh M\u00ec with Sriracha Chicken\n\nWild Mushroom Chili\n\nMAIN DISHES\n\nCashew Cream Mac 'n' Cheese\n\nChicken and Cabbage Wontons\n\nCoconut-Lemongrass Curry with Rice Noodles\n\nCreamy Basil-Chickpea Lettuce Cups\n\nGrilled Veggie Pizza with BBQ Sauce\n\nJerked Jackfruit Tacos with Grilled Pineapple\n\nMeat-Free Meat Loaf with Tomato-Maple Glaze\n\nMushroom and Kale Galette\n\nNo-Frills Cheese Pizza\n\nOyster Mushrooms \u00e0 la Marini\u00e8re\n\nPittsburgh Pierogis\n\nProtein-Packed Burrito Bowl\n\nRainbow Veggie Sushi\n\nSave-the-Bay Crab Cakes\n\nSmoky Seitan Kebabs with Peanut Sauce\n\nSpaghetti and Lentil Meatballs\n\nSteamed Buns with Tofu and Mushrooms\n\nSun-Dried Tomato and Basil Sausages\n\nWild Rice Risotto with Peas and Asparagus\n\nSIDES AND EXTRAS\n\nBlackened Brussels Sprouts with Capers and Raisins\n\nCreamy Herbed Mashed Potatoes\n\nCrispy Rice Paper Bacon\n\nEasy Cheesy Garlic Bread\n\nGreen Bean Casserole\n\nLonestar BBQ Beans\n\nMint and Tofu Summer Rolls\n\nMinted Green Pea Guacamole\n\nPistachio and Sunflower Seed Dukkah\n\nPlant-Based Parmesan\n\nQuick Country Coleslaw\n\nRoasted Red Pepper Hummus\n\nRosemary Cornbread Mini Muffins\n\nSpicy Sweet Potato Fries with Ranch\n\nSweet-and-Salty Curried Popcorn\n\nDESSERTS\n\nAll-the-Nut-Butters Cups\n\nApple-Pecan Crisp\n\nAvocado Chocolate Mousse with Vanilla Bean Whip\n\nChocolate Brownies with Puffed Quinoa\n\nClassic Pumpkin Pie\n\nCoconut Basbousa\n\nLemon-Ginger Blueberry Cake with Cream Cheese Frosting\n\nLemon Meringue Pie\n\nMinted Lemon-Cucumber Sorbet\n\nMom's Noodle Kugel\n\nPeanut Butter Chocolate Chip Cookie Ice Cream Sandwiches\n\nPeanut Butter Trail Mix Cookies\n\nRaw Chocolate-Hazelnut Truffles\n\nRaw Lemon Vanilla Raspberry Slab\n\nSmoky Maple-Pecan Cheesecake\n\nSpicy Chocolate Milk Shake with Whipped Coconut Cream\nBREAKFAST\n\nApple Cinnamon Pancakes\n\nBiscuits and Gravy\n\nBlack Bean Breakfast Burritos\n\nBlueberry Buckwheat Waffles\n\nBreakfast Banana Split\n\nCherry Chia Puff Pastry Breakfast Tarts\n\nClassic French Toast\n\nMix 'n' Match Superfood Smoothies\n\nOatmeal with Chai-Poached Pears\n\nPB&J Power Smoothies\n\nPea and Potato Frittata\n\nRice Pudding with Coconut and Cranberries\n\nRise 'n' Shine Breakfast Sandwich\n\nSweet Potato and Parsnip Hash\n\nTofu Scramble 101\nAPPLE CINNAMON PANCAKES\n\nI grew up in New Hampshire, across the street from a maple-sugar shack\u2014where sap is collected from sugar maple trees and boiled down into syrup. On weekends, the Sugar Shack, as we called it, served breakfast, and many people from the neighborhood and town would gather there for pancakes and fresh syrup. My favorite? Apple cinnamon. This recipe offers a healthier, more sustainable twist on those classic pancakes: because they use applesauce instead of eggs, they cut back on water usage and carbon emissions. Eat up!\n\nSERVES 2 PREP AND COOKING TIME: 35 MINUTES\n\nINGREDIENTS\n\n1\u00bd C all-purpose flour\n\n2 Tbsp sugar\n\n1 tsp baking soda\n\n2 tsp ground cinnamon\n\nPinch of salt\n\n1 C unsweetened applesauce\n\n1 tsp apple cider vinegar\n\n\u00be C almond milk\n\n1 Tbsp coconut oil, plus additional as needed\n\n1 apple, peeled, cored, and diced\n\nFresh fruit, for serving\n\nPure maple syrup, for serving\n\nMETHOD\n\nCombine the flour, sugar, baking soda, cinnamon, and salt in a large bowl. Make a well in the center.\n\nCombine the applesauce, vinegar, and almond milk in a small bowl or measuring cup. Pour the wet ingredients into the well in the dry ingredients, whisking as you go. Continue whisking until the mixture is smooth.\n\nSet a nonstick skillet over medium heat and let it get good and hot. Melt the coconut oil in the pan and swirl it around until the pan is evenly coated.\n\nPour about 3 tablespoons of the batter into the pan. Once it firms up a bit, sprinkle some of the diced apples on top. Cook until bubbles appear. Using a spatula, flip and cook for another couple minutes on the second side. The pancake will puff up and eventually stop growing. When this happens, it's ready. Transfer the pancake to a plate or serving platter.\n\nRepeat the above steps until all the batter has been used up, adding more coconut oil to the pan as needed.\n\nPile with whatever fresh fruit you have available and drizzle with maple syrup before devouring.\nBISCUITS AND GRAVY\n\nFlaky biscuits topped with rich, creamy gravy will start any morning off right. Because these buttermilk-style biscuits use neither butter nor milk (but rather almond milk mixed with cider vinegar, which creates a similar outcome), they're more environmentally friendly\u2014with almond milk requiring less water and emitting fewer greenhouse gases than cow's milk. The gravy is satisfying, nutritious, and filled with flavor.\n\nSERVES 4 PREP AND COOKING TIME: 40 TO 50 MINUTES\n\nINGREDIENTS\n\nFor the Biscuits:\n\n\u00be C plain almond milk\n\n2 tsp apple cider vinegar\n\n2 C all-purpose flour, plus more for dusting\n\n2 tsp baking powder\n\n\u00bd tsp baking soda\n\n\u00bd tsp salt\n\n\u00bc C margarine, chilled\n\nFor the Gravy:\n\n\u00bc C margarine\n\n\u00bd C all-purpose flour\n\n2 C plain almond or soy milk\n\n1 tsp salt\n\n1 tsp freshly ground black pepper\n\nOptional Toppings:\n\nChopped scallions\n\nShredded vegan cheese\n\nFresh or pickled jalape\u00f1os, sliced\n\nMETHOD\n\nFirst, make the biscuits:\n\nPreheat the oven to 450\u00b0F.\n\nCombine the almond milk and vinegar in a small bowl and set aside.\n\nIn a large bowl, combine the flour, baking powder, baking soda, and salt. Using your (clean) hands, work in the margarine until it's evenly distributed but still a bit chunky. Pour in the almond milk\u2013vinegar mixture, stirring gently. Use clean hands to lightly knead the dough, just enough so that everything sticks together and it has a nice, silky consistency.\n\nTransfer the dough to a generously floured work surface. Form it into a rectangle about 1 inch thick. Use a cookie cutter (or drinking glass) to cut biscuits, placing them on a lightly floured baking sheet as you go.\n\nAs you cut the biscuits, press the leftover dough together and cut more, until you've used up all the dough. (Avoid waste by pressing the last dough scraps together to create an off-shape biscuit.) Bake for 10 minutes, then remove and set aside.\n\nWhile the biscuits bake, make the gravy:\n\nMelt the margarine over medium heat in a large skillet or saucepan. Add \u00bc cup of the flour and stir continuously for 3 to 4 minutes to make a roux. Add the remaining \u00bc cup flour, the milk, salt, and pepper. Increase the heat to medium-high and whisk to combine thoroughly. Heat until the gravy thickens, stirring frequently\u2014about 4 minutes more. If too thick, remove from the heat and whisk in a little water.\n\nTo assemble:\n\nCut open two biscuits and place them in a bowl. Top with as much gravy\u2014and any optional toppings\u2014as you'd like.\n\n\"If the factory farming industry does indeed unravel\u2014and it must\u2014then there is hope that we can, gradually, reverse the environmental damage it has caused.... None of this will be easy. The hardest part about returning to a truly healthy environment may be changing the current totally unsustainable heavy-meat-eating culture of increasing numbers of people around the world. But we must try. We must make a start, one by one.\"\n\n\u2014DR. JANE GOODALL\nBLACK BEAN BREAKFAST BURRITOS\n\nThese breakfast burritos are a simple and delicious way to start any day. The black beans and tofu give a boost of planet-friendly protein, while the corn, spices, and toppings add additional flavor and texture. And because the filling is baked\u2014not fried\u2014it's not only better for the planet, but for you as well.\n\nSERVES 2 PREP AND COOKING TIME: 40 MINUTES\n\nINGREDIENTS\n\n2 garlic cloves, finely chopped\n\n3 scallions, finely chopped\n\n\u00bd tsp ground turmeric\n\n\u00bd tsp ground cumin\n\n\u00bd tsp salt\n\n\u00bd tsp paprika\n\n\u00bc tsp freshly ground black pepper\n\n2\u00bd Tbsp coconut oil\n\n1 C fresh, frozen, or canned corn kernels\n\n1 (15-oz) can black beans, drained\n\n1 (8-oz) block extra-firm tofu\n\n2 Tbsp nutritional yeast\n\n2 (8- or 12-inch) flour tortillas\n\n1 avocado, halved and pitted\n\n\u00be C chopped tomatoes (optional)\n\n2 Tbsp vegan sour cream (optional)\n\nCilantro (optional)\n\nHot sauce (optional)\n\nMETHOD\n\nPreheat the oven to 350\u00b0F.\n\nPut the garlic and scallions in a very large bowl. Add the turmeric, cumin, salt, paprika, pepper, coconut oil, and corn. Add the black beans. Stir to combine. Crumble the tofu into the bowl and add the nutritional yeast. Stir to combine everything well.\n\nTransfer the mixture to an 8-inch casserole or baking dish. Bake, uncovered, until the liquid has evaporated and the top is slightly browned, 20 to 25 minutes.\n\nRemove from the oven. Put the tortillas on a baking sheet and place in the oven for 1 minute to warm them up. Remove from the oven. Spread half an avocado onto each wrap. Add as much of the tofu\u2013black bean mixture as you'd like. Add whichever other toppings you're using\u2014chopped tomatoes, sour cream, cilantro, and\/or hot sauce\u2014then roll into burritos. Enjoy immediately.\n\nWant to go the extra eco-mile?\n\nCook the black beans from scratch and cut the corn freshly off the cob to cut down on packaging.\nBLUEBERRY BUCKWHEAT WAFFLES\n\nDespite its name, buckwheat is actually not related to wheat, but rather to sorrel and rhubarb. Its seeds are the part we eat, and they're rich in complex carbohydrates\u2014making it a healthier option than white flour, and giving the foods we cook with it an earthier flavor and color. And this recipe for buckwheat waffles uses almond milk instead of cow's milk, which cuts its water footprint down by 97 percent, and uses aquafaba (chickpea juice) instead of eggs, which reduces food waste and the dish's carbon emissions.\n\nMAKES 8 TO 10 WAFFLES PREP AND COOKING TIME: 30 MINUTES\n\nINGREDIENTS\n\n1\u00bd C buckwheat flour\n\n2 tsp baking powder\n\n1 tsp baking soda\n\n\u00bc tsp salt\n\n1 tsp ground cinnamon\n\n6 Tbsp aquafaba (chickpea juice; see here)\n\n2 Tbsp sugar\n\n1 C almond milk\n\n1 tsp pure vanilla extract\n\n3 Tbsp unsweetened applesauce\n\n1 C plain nondairy yogurt\n\n\u00bd C margarine, melted, plus more for greasing\n\n\u00bd C fresh or frozen blueberries\n\nPure maple syrup, for serving\n\nFlaked almonds, for serving (optional)\n\nFresh berries, for serving (optional)\n\nMETHOD\n\nIn a large bowl, combine the buckwheat flour, baking powder, baking soda, salt, and cinnamon.\n\nIn the bowl of a stand mixer fitted with the whisk attachment or in a large bowl using a handheld mixer, beat the aquafaba on medium speed until it holds soft peaks, 5 to 10 minutes. Add the sugar, a little at a time, as you go.\n\nIn a separate bowl, whisk together the almond milk, vanilla, applesauce, yogurt, margarine, and \u00bc cup water.\n\nPour the wet mixture into the dry mixture, add the blueberries, and stir to combine.\n\nCarefully fold the beaten aquafaba into the batter\u2014work gently so as to not deflate it too much.\n\nTurn on the waffle iron and let the waffle batter sit for 10 minutes while the waffle iron gets hot.\n\nLightly grease the waffle iron with margarine and pour in enough batter for one waffle (the amount will depend on your iron). Close and cook for 2 to 5 minutes, until done. Repeat until all the batter has been used up.\n\nTop with warm maple syrup, flaked almonds, berries, and\/or any other favorite toppings you have on hand.\n\n**Equipment Alert:** This recipe requires a waffle iron and stand mixer or some stamina with a handheld one.\nBREAKFAST BANANA SPLIT\n\nWho says banana splits are only for dessert? This healthier version of a banana split will start your day off right\u2014with fresh fruit, raw granola, and a jolt of espresso for that morning buzz.\n\nSERVES 2 PREP AND COOKING TIME: 15 MINUTES\n\nINGREDIENTS\n\nDouble shot of espresso\n\n\u00bc C sugar\n\n\u00bc C dates, pitted and chopped\n\n\u00bc C shredded coconut\n\n\u00bc C pecans, chopped\n\n4 Tbsp nondairy yogurt, any flavor\n\n2 bananas\n\n\u00bd C fresh berries\n\nMETHOD\n\nIn a small saucepan, combine the espresso and sugar and bring to a boil over medium-high heat. Lower the heat to maintain a simmer and cook, stirring continuously, for 5 minutes. Remove from the heat and refrigerate until completely cool.\n\nIn a food processor, combine the dates, coconut, and pecans. Pulse to combine well.\n\nSpoon 2 tablespoons of the yogurt onto each plate. Slice the bananas down the middle lengthwise and place on top. Top with the granola, berries, and espresso drizzle. Enjoy immediately.\n\n**Tip:** Don't own an espresso maker? Order a shot to go from your local coffee shop!\n\n**Equipment Alert:** This recipe requires a food processor.\n\n\"Go vegetable heavy. Reverse the psychology of your plate by making meat the side dish and vegetables the main course.\"\n\n\u2014CHEF BOBBY FLAY\nA MESSAGE FROM\n\n## GREENPEACE USA EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR ANNIE LEONARD\n\n**One of the most important shifts we've seen over** the past thirty years is that more and more people are realizing that while changing our personal eating habits is critical, we must also recognize the wider impacts of what we put on our plates, and act to change our society's relationship to agriculture and food. From the overfishing of our oceans, to exploited and underage migrant farm workers, to poisonous pesticide intensive farming and more: our food and agriculture system needs an overhaul.\n\nThe connection between human consumption of meat and dairy products and damage to our planet is now more widely recognized. Livestock is the most significant contributor to nitrogen and phosphorus pollution of streams, rivers, and coastal waters worldwide. They're also major emitters of greenhouse gas emissions. In fact, the livestock sector is responsible for about 14 percent of global emissions, as much as the transportation sector.\n\nThat's not to say that animal agriculture is the only problem; there are also plant-based ingredients that are causing severe environmental destruction. Take palm oil, for instance, which comes from tropical countries like Indonesia, Malaysia, and parts of Africa. As we've tried to ditch trans fats from our diets, demand for palm oil has shot up, and these countries are now chopping down thousands of acres of lush tropical rain forests to clear the way for palm tree plantations. Indonesia has lost over a quarter of its forest\u2014an area the size of Germany\u2014since 1990, which is a tragedy for the indigenous communities and tigers, orangutans, and other endangered species that need the forest to survive.\n\nA lot's changed since I turned vegetarian in the early '80s. Back then, I ate a lot of grilled cheese sandwiches because that was the only thing on the menu. These days, eating organic, vegetarianism, and trying to live more sustainably have become much more mainstream. If you're used to having meat with every meal, start experimenting with plant proteins like lentils and beans instead. As well as being meat substitutes, they're also a whole new cuisine to explore!\n\nI also recommend trying to eat food that's produced locally, that's in season, and that's organic where possible. If you have access to a CSA or a farmers' market, they're great. I get a box of fresh veggies delivered each week. It often includes things I never saw before. Thank goodness they include recipes.\n\nAnother key piece of the puzzle is wasting as little food as possible. Rotting food waste in landfills is a major source of climate-polluting methane. Composting is a great alternative, but if we can be smart about how much we buy and what we do with our leftovers, we can avoid that waste altogether.\n\nMuch of the world has become disconnected from the food we eat and lost knowledge about who grows it and how. It's important to remember that our power to change this doesn't just come from dollars we spend. Our voices and votes are essential in helping to fix our broken food system to make sure it's healthy for all eaters, workers, wildlife, and the planet.\n\n_Annie Leonard began her career at Greenpeace in 1988 and now serves as Executive Director for Greenpeace USA. She has decades of experience investigating and explaining the environmental and social impacts of our stuff: where it comes from, how it gets to us, and where it goes after we get rid of it. Her book,_ The Story of Stuff, _is a_ New York Times _bestseller, and her film of the same name blossomed into The Story of Stuff Project, which works to empower people around the globe to fight for a more sustainable and just future._\nCHERRY CHIA PUFF PASTRY BREAKFAST TARTS\n\nFlaky, airy, gooey, sweet\u2014these puff pastry tarts are wonderful for breakfast, parties, dessert, or any time of day. Nutrient-rich chia seeds help thicken the filling in a low-calorie and sustainable way, and cherry trees can have real benefits on our air quality: in addition to trees helping purify our air, a single cherry tree can also perfume the air with more than two hundred thousand flowers.\n\nMAKES 8 PREP AND COOKING TIME: 45 MINUTES\n\nINGREDIENTS\n\n2 (10 x 15-inch) sheets vegan puff pastry\n\n2 C frozen cherries\n\n1 C granulated sugar\n\n2 tsp fresh lemon juice\n\n1 tsp ground cinnamon\n\n1 tsp pure vanilla extract\n\n\u00bc C chia seeds\n\n2 Tbsp almond milk, plus more for brushing\n\n1 C confectioners' sugar\n\nMETHOD\n\nDefrost the puff pastry sheets according to the package directions on the counter in advance.\n\nPreheat the oven to 400\u00b0F.\n\nSet two of the cherries aside for the frosting and place the remainder in a small saucepan. Add the granulated sugar, lemon juice, cinnamon, and vanilla. Stir until the sugar is dissolved. Bring to a boil, decrease the heat to low, and simmer for 5 minutes, mashing the cherries as they cook. Stir in the chia seeds and cook to thicken, 5 minutes more. Remove from the heat and let cool for several minutes.\n\nLine a baking sheet with parchment paper. Cut the puff pastry into 16 rectangles (into quarters lengthwise and then in half crosswise) and then gently transfer 8 of them to the parchment-lined baking sheet. These will be the bottoms of the tarts. (You may need to do this in batches depending on the size of the baking sheet.)\n\nSpoon about 1 tablespoon of the filling onto the center of each of the 8 pastry rectangles on the baking sheet. Spread it around, leaving a border of about \u00bd inch around the edges. Top each with a matching rectangle and then press around the edges with a fork to seal. Pierce three holes in the top of each pastry with the tip of a sharp knife. Brush lightly with almond milk and bake for 20 minutes. Remove from the oven and set aside.\n\nMeanwhile, combine the confectioners' sugar and the almond milk in a small bowl. Stir until smooth. Take those two cherries you set aside earlier and squeeze their juice into the frosting. Stir to combine.\n\nDrizzle the frosting over the pastries while they are still warm.\n\n**Tip:** Want to save some time? Though not quite as good as making it yourself, you can use store-bought jam of any flavor you'd like as the filling.\nCLASSIC FRENCH TOAST\n\nWho doesn't love a nice, hot plate of French toast in the morning? But eggs and milk aren't the most eco-friendly way to make it. For example, it takes 53 gallons of water to produce a single egg and 820 gallons of water to produce just 8 ounces of milk (think of all the feed grown for the chickens and cows, for starters). This recipe uses almond milk, and is thickened with a little tofu and chia seeds instead. It fries up well and is super satisfying\u2014all while being a little lighter on the planet.\n\nSERVES 3 PREP AND COOKING TIME: 20 MINUTES\n\nINGREDIENTS\n\n1\u00bd C almond milk, plus more if needed\n\n\u00bd C firm tofu\n\n1 Tbsp pure maple syrup, plus more for serving\n\n2 Tbsp chia seeds\n\n1\u00bd Tbsp nutritional yeast\n\n1\u00bd tsp ground cinnamon\n\n\u00bc tsp ground nutmeg\n\nPinch of salt\n\n6 slices bread, about \u00be inch thick\n\n3 Tbsp margarine, for frying, plus more as needed\n\nFresh berries, for serving\n\nConfectioners' sugar, for serving\n\nMETHOD\n\nPut the almond milk, tofu, maple syrup, chia seeds, nutritional yeast, cinnamon, nutmeg, and salt in a food processor or blender and pulse until mixed and the tofu is almost smooth but a tiny bit crumbly. You want this liquidy enough to coat the bread with; if it's not, add some more almond milk, a little at a time, and pulse.\n\nPlace the bread slices neatly inside a large casserole dish and pour the almond milk mixture over the bread. Flip the slices to coat the other side and set aside to soak in the mix.\n\nIn a large skillet, melt the margarine over medium heat. Once the pan is hot, about 3 minutes, add a few slices of bread. Cook until golden brown on the first side, about 3 minutes, then flip to cook the other side until golden brown.\n\nStack on plates and serve topped with maple syrup, fresh berries, and confectioners' sugar.\n\n**Want to go the extra eco-mile?** Use bread that's on its last leg to avoid food waste! You don't want it stale, but it needn't be totally fresh, either, since it'll soften up once coated in batter.\nMIX 'N' MATCH SUPERFOOD SMOOTHIES\n\nJam-packed with phytonutrients, vitamins, and antioxidants, greens are true superfoods. Combined with other good-for-you-and-the-planet foods\u2014like fresh fruits and vegetables, nut butters, hemp seeds, turmeric, chia seeds, and more\u2014a green smoothie a day may literally help keep the doctor away. Just mix and match, using the options I've listed here as a guide. And don't be afraid to get creative with your smoothies. Drink up!\n\nSERVES 2 PREP AND COOKING TIME: 5 MINUTES\n\nINGREDIENTS\n\n2 C Greens\n\nArugula\n\nBeet greens\n\nBok choy\n\nBroccoli\n\nCollard greens\n\nDandelion greens\n\nKale\n\nRomaine lettuce\n\nSpinach\n\nSwiss chard\n\n2 C Liquid\n\nAlmond milk\n\nCoconut milk\n\nCoconut water\n\nHemp milk\n\nHerbal tea (cooled)\n\nOrange juice\n\nSoy milk\n\nWater\n\n3 C Fruits\/Veggies\n\nApple\n\nApricot\n\nBanana\n\nBlackberries\n\nBlueberries\n\nButternut squash\n\nCarrot\n\nCherries\n\nCucumber\n\nMango\n\nMelon\n\nPeaches\n\nPears\n\nPineapple\n\nRaspberries\n\nSweet Potato\n\nOptional Boosters\n\n2 Tbsp almond butter\n\n2 Tbsp peanut butter\n\n2 Tbsp raw cashews\n\n1 tsp ground cinnamon\n\n2 Tbsp chia seeds\n\n2 Tbsp flax meal\n\n1 tsp fresh ginger\n\n2 Tbsp hemp seeds\n\n4 Medjool dates\n\n1 tsp ground turmeric\n\n1 tsp pure vanilla extract\n\n2 Tbps hulled pumpkin seeds\n\n2 shots of espresso\n\n1 tsp spirulina\n\nMETHOD\n\nFirst, pick the combination you want. Start simple if you're new to green smoothies. Spinach, pineapple, raspberries, hemp seeds, and orange juice make a fruity combo if you like sweet smoothies. For something a little lighter on the carbs, try kale, cucumber, spirulina, and almond milk. Feeling adventurous? Swiss chard, banana, pumpkin, vanilla, cinnamon, ginger, coconut milk, and Medjool dates is outrageously good.\n\nOnce you're ready to roll, place everything in the blender and blend on high until well combined. (Blending time will depend on how powerful your blender is.) Adjust the liquid amount to reach your desired thickness. Pour into glasses and enjoy immediately. It's really that simple.\n\n**Want to go the extra eco-mile?** Use in-season produce (see here).\nOATMEAL WITH CHAI-POACHED PEARS\n\nWhen I was young, I lived within walking distance of my elementary school. On snowy New Hampshire mornings, my mom would send me off down the road with a stomach full of oatmeal. \"It sticks to your ribs,\" she'd say\u2014and I'd always arrive at school still feeling warm from my breakfast. This recipe uses pears poached in chai tea (yum!) to offer an extra-earthy start to any cold morning.\n\nSERVES 2 PREP AND COOKING TIME: 30 MINUTES\n\nINGREDIENTS\n\n2 small ripe pears\n\n\u00bc C sugar\n\n1 Tbsp pure vanilla extract\n\n2 chai tea bags\n\n1 C instant oats\n\n1 C almond milk\n\nPure maple syrup, for serving\n\nMETHOD\n\nPeel the pears, leaving the stems intact. Place in a small saucepan with the sugar, vanilla, and tea bags and add enough water so that the pears are just covered. If they're tall pears, lay them down. Bring to a boil, turn the heat down to low, and simmer for 20 minutes. (If your pears aren't ripe yet, add 5 minutes to the cooking time.)\n\nDrain the water and let the pears cool while you make the oatmeal.\n\nPlace the oats in a medium saucepan with 2 cups water and bring to a boil, then decrease the heat to low and simmer for 5 minutes or until thick. Remove from the heat and stir in the almond milk.\n\nSpoon the oatmeal into serving bowls. Slice the pears in half and place on top, then drizzle with maple syrup.\n\n\"Eating, for me, is how you proclaim your beliefs three times a day.\"\n\n\u2014NATALIE PORTMAN\nPB&J POWER SMOOTHIES\n\nI start almost every day with some variation of this simple smoothie. The chia, pumpkin, and hemp seeds\u2014as well as the peanut butter\u2014give a big ol' boost of protein, flavor, and fiber, while the flax offers a healthy dose of omega-3s.\n\nSERVES 2 PREP TIME: 5 MINUTES\n\nINGREDIENTS\n\n2 ripe bananas, frozen in chunks\n\n2 Tbsp peanut butter\n\n1 C frozen blueberries\n\n2 C almond milk\n\n2 tsp chia seeds\n\n2 tsp flax meal\n\n2 Tbsp hulled pumpkin seeds\n\n2 Tbsp hemp seeds\n\n1 Tbsp pure maple syrup (optional)\n\nMETHOD\n\nBlend all the ingredients in a blender until well combined and the seeds are liquefied. In a Vitamix or other high-speed blender on high, that's about 1 minute; in a standard blender, it may take longer. Pour into glasses and enjoy immediately.\n\nSMOOTHIE HACKS GALORE!\n\nAdd more almond milk if you prefer a smoother smoothie.\n\nIf you'd rather use store-bought protein powder (like Vega brand), you can omit the pumpkin, hemp, and chia seeds. Unless you want to be like Arnold\u2014in which case, go nuts.\n\nOr you can make your own protein powder in advance by blending chia seeds, flax meal, hulled pumpkin seeds, and hemp seeds. Just be sure to refrigerate it if you make it in advance\u2014it'll keep for up to 2 weeks.\n\nIf you've forgotten to freeze your bananas in advance, don't fret! They work well fresh, too.\n\nMaking this just for one person? Cut the amounts in half (duh).\n\n**Want to go the extra eco-mile?** Have bananas that are starting to turn brown? Avoid waste by peeling and freezing them in chunks before they go bad, then add them to your smoothies!\nPEA AND POTATO FRITTATA\n\nFrittata is an Italian egg dish\u2014similar to a quiche, but sans crust and filled with savory ingredients. Tasty, yes. Sustainable? Not so much. Enter tofu: it's protein-packed and holds vegetables well\u2014and it's more eco-friendly. (One egg may contribute to rain forests being destroyed for chicken feed, and an egg results in about 140 percent more greenhouse gas emissions than a serving of tofu does.) In this version of the classic Italian dish, arrowroot flour provides a smooth texture, nutritional yeast gives it a slightly sharp taste (like Parmesan might), and green peas add a little color and some extra protein.\n\nSERVES 4 PREP AND COOKING TIME: 1\u00bd HOURS\n\nINGREDIENTS\n\n2 Tbsp olive oil\n\n4 russet potatoes, cut into \u00bd-inch dice\n\n1 tsp black salt\n\n1 C frozen peas\n\n1 (14-oz) package silken tofu\n\n2 heaping Tbsp arrowroot flour\n\n\u00bc C nutritional yeast\n\n1 tsp onion powder\n\n\u00bd tsp garlic powder\n\n\u00bd tsp ground turmeric\n\nPinch of freshly ground black pepper\n\n\u00bc C chopped fresh parsley\n\n1 C shredded vegan cheese (optional)\n\nFresh spinach, for serving (optional)\n\nSriracha, for serving (optional)\n\nKetchup, for serving (optional)\n\nMETHOD\n\nPreheat the oven to 375\u00b0F. Pour the olive oil into an 8 x 12-inch casserole dish.\n\nAdd the potatoes, stirring to coat evenly. Sprinkle with \u00bd teaspoon of the salt and bake for 30 minutes.\n\nRemove the peas from the freezer and let them defrost while the potatoes cook.\n\nPlace the tofu, arrowroot flour, nutritional yeast, onion powder, garlic powder, turmeric, remaining \u00bd teaspoon salt, and the pepper in a food processor or blender. Puree until smooth.\n\nOnce the potatoes are cooked, loosen them from the bottom of the dish using a spatula. Add the peas and parsley. Fold in the tofu mixture. Sprinkle the top with cheese (if using) and return to the oven. Bake for 40 minutes more.\n\nRemove from the oven and let rest for 10 minutes before serving.\n\nServe the frittata on its own, or with fresh spinach, Sriracha, or ketchup.\n\n**Tip:** Want to make it even more colorful and healthy? Swap in sweet potatoes for the russet potatoes!\n\n\"We can make a commitment to promote vegetables and fruits and whole grains on every part of every menu.\"\n\n\u2014MICHELLE OBAMA\nRICE PUDDING WITH COCONUT AND CRANBERRIES\n\nRice pudding is a truly global dish, eaten in virtually every corner of the world. In Iraq, they call it _zarda wa haleeb_ , and eat it with date syrup. In India, they call it _dudhapak_ and prepare the dish with sugar, nuts, and saffron. In Italy, _budino di riso_ is made with milk and orange peel. And in Norway, _risengrynsgr\u00f8t_ is eaten around Christmas, often with cinnamon. This rice pudding is made with tart cranberries and rich coconut milk, sweetened with a bit of sugar, and rounded out with cinnamon and vanilla.\n\nSERVES 2 TO 4 PREP AND COOKING TIME: 50 MINUTES\n\nINGREDIENTS\n\n1\u00bd C short-grain white rice\n\n1 heaping tsp ground cinnamon, plus more for serving\n\n1 tsp pure vanilla extract\n\n\u00be C canned coconut milk\n\n\u2153 C sugar\n\n1 C fresh cranberries\n\n\u00bc C unsweetened coconut flakes\n\nMETHOD\n\nPlace the rice, cinnamon, vanilla, and 3 cups water into a medium saucepan. Cover and bring to a boil over high heat, then lower the heat to low and simmer for 25 minutes, or until almost all the liquid has been absorbed.\n\nAdd the coconut milk, sugar, and cranberries. Cover and bring the mixture to a boil, then lower the heat to maintain a simmer and cook, stirring occasionally, until all the coconut milk has been absorbed and the rice is thick and creamy, about 15 minutes. Be careful of the cranberries when you remove the lid to stir the pudding; they will pop as they cook!\n\nRemove from the heat and let rest for 5 minutes, uncovered. Give it another stir and then spoon into bowls and top with flaked coconut and a dusting of cinnamon.\nRISE 'N' SHINE BREAKFAST SANDWICH\n\nGo above and beyond with this delightful breakfast sandwich. A vegan sausage patty, an easy homemade egg-free patty using chickpea flour, and a slice of gooey vegan cheese all piled onto a toasted English muffin\u2014what a morning! And because chickpeas emit 60 percent less CO2 than eggs, this recipe is as environmentally conscious as it is tasty.\n\nSERVES 4 PREP AND COOKING TIME: 45 MINUTES\n\nINGREDIENTS\n\n\u00be C chickpea flour\n\n2 Tbsp nutritional yeast\n\n2 Tbsp olive oil\n\n\u00bd tsp black salt\n\n\u00bd tsp ground turmeric\n\n\u00bc tsp freshly ground black pepper\n\n1 Tbsp vegetable oil, plus more for greasing\n\n4 vegan sausage patties\n\n4 English muffins, toasted\n\nKetchup\n\n4 slices vegan cheese (optional)\n\nMETHOD\n\nWhisk together the chickpea flour, nutritional yeast, olive oil, salt, turmeric, pepper, and \u00be cup water until smooth. Let sit for 30 minutes, giving one final stir at the end. Don't be tempted to taste it yet\u2014chickpea flour tastes weird before it's cooked.\n\nIn a large skillet, heat the vegetable oil over medium-high heat. Oil the insides of four egg rings.\n\nPlace the egg rings in the pan and fill with the batter. Cook the first side for 3 minutes. Gently remove the egg rings, flip, and cook for 3 minutes more. Remove from the pan and set aside.\n\nAdd the vegan sausage patties to the pan and cook until browned, about 3 minutes per side.\n\nBuild each sandwich on an English muffin: a sausage patty, an egg patty, ketchup, and cheese!\n\n**Want to go the extra eco-mile?** Substitute a slice of the Sun-Dried Tomato and Basil Sausage for a store-bought patty, and replace the vegan cheese slices with avocado to cut down on packaging.\n\n**No egg rings? No problem.** Make DIY egg rings using round cookie cutters or the screw-on rings of mason jar lids. Just make sure they're clean and oiled before using. And when you flip the patties, use a spatula to flip the whole thing\u2014DIY ring and all\u2014rather than removing the ring first. When you go to pop the patty out at the end, carefully hold the ring using a fork and push the patty through the wide end.\n\n**Shopping Tip:** Chickpea flour is sometimes called garbanzo flour, gram flour, or _besan_.\nSWEET POTATO AND PARSNIP HASH\n\nNothing says earthy like root vegetables! Parsnips have cream-colored skin and flesh; left in the ground, they become sweeter after winter frosts. (If unharvested, they produce a stem topped by small yellow flowers.) Mixed with sweet potatoes, they make a wonderful morning hash. Some experts even say eating lots of sweet potatoes, considered a superfood, will help you live longer and healthier. How sweet is that?\n\nSERVES 2 AS A MAIN OR 4 AS A SIDE PREP AND COOKING TIME: 20 MINUTES\n\nINGREDIENTS\n\n1 Tbsp coconut oil\n\n1\u00bd C \u00bd-inch cubes sweet potato\n\n1\u00bc C \u00bd-inch cubes parsnip\n\n1 tsp Old Bay seasoning\n\n1 tsp onion powder\n\n\u00bd tsp freshly ground black pepper\n\n\u00bd tsp garlic powder\n\nMETHOD\n\nIn heavy-bottomed skilled, heat the coconut oil over medium-high heat.\n\nAdd the cubed vegetables and sprinkle with the Old Bay, onion powder, pepper, and garlic powder. Stir to coat thoroughly with the oil and seasonings. Cook for about 5 minutes, without stirring. Once the underside starts to brown, use a spatula to turn them all over and cook, stirring every minute or so, until all sides turn golden brown and soft, 5 to 10 minutes.\n\nRemove from the heat and let sit for 5 minutes before serving.\n\n**Want to go the extra eco-mile?** Make this recipe when sweet potatoes and parsnips are in season (see here).\n\n**Serving Suggestion:** I like to serve this with the Apple Cinnamon Pancakes or Blueberry Buckwheat Waffles to add a little something savory alongside something sweet.\nTOFU SCRAMBLE 101\n\nThere's nothing quite like waking up on a Sunday morning and spending a couple hours drinking coffee, listening to music, and whipping up a big breakfast. And no full breakfast would be complete without a scrumptious scramble. If you're looking for a zero-cholesterol, filling, planet-friendly recipe, this introductory scramble made with tofu instead of eggs is the perfect place to start.\n\nSERVES 2 PREP AND COOKING TIME: 20 MINUTES\n\nINGREDIENTS\n\n\u00bd tsp ground turmeric\n\n\u00bd tsp black salt\n\n\u00bc tsp garlic powder\n\n2 Tbsp nutritional yeast\n\n1 Tbsp canola oil\n\n4 scallions, finely chopped\n\n1 (16-oz) block extra-firm tofu\n\nFresh baby spinach, for serving\n\nKetchup, for serving\n\nMETHOD\n\nCombine the turmeric, salt, garlic powder, and nutritional yeast in a small bowl. Set aside.\n\nIn a large skillet, heat the canola oil over medium-high heat. Add the scallions. Cook for about 2 minutes.\n\nCrumble the tofu into the pan, making some chunks small and some larger.\n\nAdd the spice mixture, stirring to evenly coat the tofu.\n\nCook, stirring frequently to ensure it doesn't stick to the pan, until the liquid has evaporated, about 10 minutes.\n\nEnjoy immediately, served atop some fresh baby spinach and topped with ketchup.\n\n**Serving Suggestion:** Serve with some toast, Sweet Potato and Parsnip Hash, and Crispy Rice Paper Bacon alongside.\n\n**Note:** This is a basic scramble. Try adding fresh broccoli, kale, mushrooms, or all of the above! Just double the oil and add the vegetables with the scallions, cooking for a few minutes before adding the tofu.\n\n\"I don't eat meat, fish, or eggs... I eat a lot of tofu.\"\n\n\u2014SHANIA TWAIN\nSOUPS, STEWS, SALADS, AND SANDWICHES\n\nBLT Bagel Sandwich\n\nBloody Beet Burgers\n\nBuffalo Cauliflower Wraps with Blue Cheese\n\nGinger-Sesame Soba Noodle Salad\n\nLoaded Black Bean Dogs\n\nMardi Gras Gumbeaux\n\nMassaged Kale Caesar with Pumpernickel Croutons\n\nReuben Sandwich\n\nRoasted Coconut-Beet Soup\n\nRoasted Root Vegetable and Quinoa Salad\n\nSesame Seaweed Salad\n\nSlawppy Joes\n\nSourdough Panzanella\n\nSpicy Lentil Burgers\n\nVietnamese B\u00e1nh M\u00ec with Sriracha Chicken\n\nWild Mushroom Chili\nBLT BAGEL SANDWICH\n\nWhen I was growing up, my small town had one lunch spot where basically everyone would eat. We'd go every weekend, and my favorite was the BLT, which they did perfectly. But industrial pig farms take a toll on the communities where they operate. So here's a tasty, healthy, eco-friendly version using rice paper bacon instead of pork bacon.\n\nSERVES 2 PREP AND COOKING TIME: 15 MINUTES\n\nINGREDIENTS\n\n6 pieces Crispy Rice Paper Bacon\n\n2 bagels, any type\n\nVegan mayo\n\nA few lettuce leaves\n\n1 tomato, sliced\n\n1 avocado, sliced (optional)\n\n\u00bd medium cucumber, sliced (optional)\n\n2 radishes, thinly sliced (optional)\n\n1 small red onion, thinly sliced (optional)\n\n2 fresh chives, chopped (optional)\n\n2 Tbsp sprouts (optional)\n\nMETHOD\n\nBreak each piece of the rice paper bacon in half.\n\nSlice and toast the bagels.\n\nBuild your sandwiches on the bagels using the mayo, bacon, lettuce, and tomato. If desired, add the avocado, cucumber, radishes, onions, chives, and\/or sprouts.\nBLOODY BEET BURGERS\n\nBeets are healthy, versatile, and full of iron. With a single (beef-based) burger emitting a whopping 6.8 pounds of carbon, these bloody beet burgers are lighter on the planet and oh-so-tasty to boot!\n\nSERVES 4 PREP AND COOKING TIME: 50 MINUTES\n\nINGREDIENTS\n\nFor the patties:\n\n1 (15-oz) can green or black lentils, drained\n\n1 large beet, peeled and shredded (about 2 C)\n\n\u00bd C fresh parsley, finely chopped\n\n\u00bd C walnuts, coarsely chopped\n\n1 tsp onion powder\n\n1 tsp garlic powder\n\n1 tsp ground cumin\n\n1 tsp salt\n\n\u00bc tsp freshly ground black pepper\n\n\u00bd tsp liquid smoke\n\n\u00bd tsp soy sauce\n\n\u00bc C tahini\n\n\u00be C instant oats\n\n2 Tbsp tomato paste\n\nSqueeze of lemon juice\n\n4 Tbsp canola oil\n\nTo assemble:\n\n4 buns\n\nYour favorite burger condiments\n\nA few pickles, sliced (optional)\n\nFinely sliced red onion (optional)\n\n1 tomato, sliced (optional)\n\nMETHOD\n\nPut the lentils, shredded beet, parsley, and walnuts in a large bowl. Add all the remaining patty ingredients\u2014except the canola oil\u2014and stir to combine well. Let sit for 30 minutes.\n\nForm the mixture into four large balls. Flatten into patties and set aside on a plate or tray.\n\nIn a skillet, heat 2 tablespoons of the canola oil over medium heat. Cook the patties, two at a time, until golden brown, about 4 minutes per side, adding more oil as needed. (If cooking all four patties at once, use all 4 tablespoons oil.) Transfer to a paper towel\u2013lined plate.\n\nBuild the burgers on buns with your favorite condiments and any of the optional toppings.\n\n**Serving Suggestion:** Enjoy with a side of Quick Country Coleslaw and topped with the ranch dressing from the Spicy Sweet Potato Fries recipe.\n\n**Want to go the extra eco-mile?** Cook the lentils from scratch to cut down on packaging. You'll need 1\u00bd cups cooked lentils.\nBUFFALO CAULIFLOWER WRAPS WITH BLUE CHEESE\n\nMy mother was only twelve when upstate New York's Anchor Bar invented a new kind of hot wing. News of the dish spread like wildfire, and it quickly became a staple throughout her hometown of Buffalo. My mom is now a vegetarian and has made the switch from Buffalo chicken to Buffalo cauliflower. With low carbon and air footprints, cauliflower is a much more sustainable choice: all the kick without the cluck.\n\nSERVES 2 PREP AND COOKING TIME: 1 HOUR\n\nINGREDIENTS\n\nFor the cauliflower:\n\nVegetable oil, for greasing\n\n1 C rice flour\n\n\u00bd tsp baking powder\n\n\u00bd tsp garlic powder\n\n1 tsp salt\n\n1 medium head cauliflower, sliced\n\n2 Tbsp margarine\n\n\u2153 C Frank's Red Hot sauce\n\nFor the blue cheese:\n\n\u2154 C plain dairy-free yogurt\n\n1 C vegan mayo\n\n2 Tbsp apple cider vinegar\n\n1 Tbsp lemon juice\n\n2 Tbsp nutritional yeast\n\n1 tsp vegan Worcestershire (optional)\n\n1 tsp garlic powder\n\n1 tsp onion powder\n\n\u00bd tsp agave nectar\n\n\u00bc tsp salt\n\n\u00bc tsp freshly ground black pepper\n\nAbout \u00bc block firm tofu\n\nFor serving:\n\n2 flour wraps\n\nLettuce\n\nCelery sticks\n\nMETHOD\n\nFirst, make the Buffalo cauliflower:\n\nPreheat the oven to 400\u00b0F. Lightly oil a rimmed baking sheet.\n\nIn a large bowl, whisk together the rice flour, baking powder, garlic powder, salt, and 1 cup plus 2 tablespoons water. Coat the cauliflower pieces in the batter and place on the prepared baking sheet. Roast for 20 minutes.\n\nMelt the margarine in a saucepan on medium heat. Whisk in the hot sauce and remove from the heat.\n\nWhile the cauliflower is cooking, make the blue cheese dressing:\n\nCombine all the dressing ingredients except the tofu in a medium bowl and mix well. Crumble in the tofu and stir until combined. Set aside in the fridge.\n\nRemove the cauliflower from the oven and transfer to a bowl. Toss with the hot sauce\u2013margarine mixture and return to the baking sheet. Place back in the oven and roast for 10 minutes more. Remove from the oven and let cool for 5 minutes.\n\nServe the Buffalo cauliflower in the wraps with lettuce and celery and a liberal dose of blue cheese.\nGINGER-SESAME SOBA NOODLE SALAD\n\nI travel a lot for work, so I spend a lot of time in airplanes and hotel rooms. I feel like I'm in a constant war with germs. Enter: ginger. This immune-boosting wonder root can help keep you strong and healthy, and it packs a spicy little bite. Combined with sesame oil for some (good) fat, umami-rich soy sauce, edamame for added protein, and maple syrup for a sweet note, ginger shines in this cold salad.\n\nSERVES 4 PREP AND COOKING TIME: 30 MINUTES\n\nINGREDIENTS\n\n2 Tbsp toasted sesame oil\n\n1 garlic clove, finely minced\n\n1 tsp ginger, finely minced\n\n2 Tbsp rice vinegar\n\n2 Tbsp soy sauce\n\n2 Tbsp pure maple syrup\n\n2 C frozen shelled edamame\n\n2 tsp sea salt\n\n1 (10.5-oz) package buckwheat soba noodles\n\n2 large carrots, julienned\n\n1 red bell pepper, julienned\n\n1 large cucumber, julienned (optional)\n\n2 scallions, thinly sliced\n\n\u00bd C fresh cilantro, finely chopped (optional)\n\n2 Tbsp black sesame seeds\n\nMETHOD\n\nHeat the sesame oil in a small saucepan. Add the garlic and ginger and remove from the heat. Let the mixture sit for 5 minutes and then add the vinegar, soy sauce, and maple syrup. Stir until well combined and set aside.\n\nBring a medium pot of water to a boil. Add the edamame and 1 teaspoon of the salt and cook for 5 minutes. Remove the edamame with a slotted spoon or spider, transfer to a colander, and rinse under cold water. Set aside.\n\nReturn the water to a boil and cook the soba noodles according to the package instructions. Drain and rinse (to prevent sticking) and transfer to a large bowl.\n\nAdd the carrots, bell pepper, cucumber (if using), and edamame. Add the dressing and lightly toss. Sprinkle the scallions, cilantro (if using), and sesame seeds on top and serve.\n\nEnjoy at room temperature or chilled in the fridge for a few hours.\nLOADED BLACK BEAN DOGS\n\nThese black bean dogs are protein-packed and so flavorful. The liquid smoke and smoked paprika give them a nice, smoky flavor and the fresh cilantro gives a bit of a bite. Top 'em off with corn, avocado, sour cream, or really any other dog toppings you like. And because these dogs are all pup without the pork, you can enjoy them knowing your franks are easier on your waistline and the planet.\n\nSERVES 4 PREP AND COOKING TIME: 1\u00bd HOURS\n\nINGREDIENTS\n\nFor the dogs:\n\n\u00be C canned black beans\n\n2 Tbsp chopped fresh cilantro\n\n2 Tbsp olive oil\n\n2 Tbsp tomato paste\n\n1 tsp liquid smoke\n\n1\u00bd C vital wheat gluten\n\n1 heaping tsp onion powder\n\n\u00be tsp garlic powder\n\n1 tsp smoked paprika\n\n2 Tbsp nutritional yeast\n\n\u00be tsp sea salt\n\n\u00bd tsp freshly cracked black pepper\n\nFor the salsa:\n\n15 cherry tomatoes, quartered\n\n\u00bd C corn kernels, fresh or canned\n\n\u00bc C finely chopped red onion\n\n\u00bc tsp salt\n\n\u00bd tsp freshly ground black pepper\n\n\u00bd C finely chopped red bell pepper\n\n1 Tbsp distilled white or apple cider vinegar\n\nTo assemble:\n\n4 hot-dog buns\n\n2 Tbsp canola oil\n\n1 large avocado, pitted, peeled, and cut into \u00bc-inch chunks\n\n\u00bd C vegan sour cream\n\nChopped fresh cilantro\n\nMicrogreens\n\n1 jalape\u00f1o, sliced (optional)\n\nMETHOD\n\nFirst, make the dogs:\n\nPlace a metal steaming basket inside a large pot. Add 2 to 3 inches water, ensuring the water is below the steaming basket. Cut four pieces of aluminum foil, about 7 inches wide.\n\nCombine the black beans, cilantro, olive oil, tomato paste, liquid smoke, and \u00be cup plus 2 tablespoons water in a blender or food processor. Puree until smooth.\n\nPlace the vital wheat gluten, onion powder, garlic powder, paprika, nutritional yeast, salt, and pepper in a large bowl and stir with a fork to combine. Pour the black bean mixture into the wheat gluten mixture, stirring with a fork as you go, then use clean hands to knead everything into a ball.\n\nBreak the ball into four pieces and form each piece into a sausage shape. Place each sausage in the middle of a piece of foil and then roll it up like a Tootsie Roll\u2014not too tightly, as the dogs expand as they cook.\n\nPlace the foil-wrapped hot dogs in the steamer basket, cover, and bring the water to a boil. Steam for 40 minutes. (If the water level gets too low, add more as needed.) Remove from the heat and let cool for at least 10 minutes before unwrapping each hot dog.\n\nWhile the dogs are cooking, make the salsa:\n\nCombine all the salsa ingredients in a medium bowl. Stir and set aside.\n\nAssemble and enjoy:\n\nSlice and toast the hot-dog buns.\n\nIn a large skillet, heat the canola oil over medium-high heat. Add the dogs and cook, turning every 2 to 3 minutes, until golden brown all over.\n\nPlace a dog in each toasted bun. Top with the salsa, avocado, sour cream, cilantro, microgreens, and jalape\u00f1o (if using). Enjoy immediately.\n\n**Serving Suggestion:** Serve with a side of Quick Country Coleslaw or Spicy Sweet Potato Fries.\n\n**Tips:** On a hot summer day, cook the dogs on the grill instead of in a skillet. Also, want a more traditional dog? Skip the toppings and instead enjoy with classic hot-dog condiments\u2014like ketchup, mustard, and relish.\n\n**Shopping Tip:** You can final vital wheat gluten in the flour aisle of most grocery stores!\n\n\"Reduce your red meat intake to help the environment.\"\n\n\u2014LEONARDO DICAPRIO\nMARDI GRAS GUMBEAUX\n\nGumbo is a hearty stew that originated during the 1700s in southern Louisiana\u2014the same region that's now sinking back into the Gulf of Mexico in large part due to climate change. Gumbo is thickened with a roux (in this case, made from flour and oil) and always includes what Bayou Staters call the \"Holy Trinity\" of vegetables: celery, peppers, and onions. It usually includes meat or fish, but for those of us who want to get all those Louisiana flavors without contributing to the region's watery fate, this version uses beans, mushrooms, veggie chicken, and vegetables instead. As they say in the Big Easy, _laissez les bons temps rouler_!\n\nSERVES 6 PREP AND COOKING TIME: 1 HOUR\n\nINGREDIENTS\n\n1 C brown rice\n\n1 (9-oz) package Beyond Meat grilled chicken strips\n\n1 (14-oz) can crushed tomatoes\n\n2 vegetable bouillon cubes\n\n\u00bd tsp fil\u00e9 powder (optional)\n\n\u00be tsp dried thyme\n\n\u00bd tsp cayenne pepper\n\n\u00bd tsp paprika\n\n3 bay leaves\n\n\u00bd tsp sea salt\n\n1\u00bd tsp vegan Worcestershire sauce\n\n1 green bell pepper, finely diced\n\n2\u00bd C sliced fresh okra\n\n1\u00bd celery stalks, finely diced\n\n4 garlic cloves, minced\n\n1 C canned red kidney beans, drained and rinsed\n\n1 C canned great northern beans, drained and rinsed\n\n\u00bc C coconut oil\n\n\u00bc C all-purpose flour\n\n1 large onion, finely diced\n\n2 C mushrooms (any kind), chopped\n\nCrystal hot sauce, for serving (optional)\n\nMETHOD\n\nCombine the rice and 2 cups water in a saucepan. Cover and bring to a boil over a high heat. Lower the heat to low and simmer until the water has been absorbed, about 20 minutes. Remove from the heat and set aside.\n\nWhile the rice is cooking, remove the chicken strips from the freezer and set aside to defrost slightly.\n\nIn a large bowl or pitcher, combine the crushed tomatoes, bouillon cubes, fil\u00e9, thyme, cayenne, paprika, bay leaves, salt, Worcestershire, and 3 cups water. Set the mixture aside.\n\nCombine the bell pepper, okra, celery, and garlic in a bowl and set aside. Combine the beans in a separate bowl and set aside as well.\n\nIn a large, wide pot with a lid (I use a 4-quart cast-iron braiser), melt the coconut oil over medium heat. Sprinkle the flour over the oil and stir or whisk continuously until the roux darkens to a caramel-brown color, about 10 minutes. To keep the roux from burning (which will ruin the dish), make sure to stir continuously and don't have the heat too high\u2014it takes a while, but is worth it.\n\nAdd the onion to the roux and stir continuously until soft, about 5 minutes. Add the vegetables and cook, stirring frequently, until all the vegetables are soft, about 10 minutes. (During this time, the sliminess of the okra will cook off.)\n\nAdd the crushed tomato mixture, mushrooms, and chicken strips and bring to a boil. Lower the heat to maintain a simmer, cover, and cook for about 15 minutes. After 15 minutes, remove the cover, add the beans, and return to a boil. Lower the heat to maintain a simmer and cook, uncovered, for 15 minutes more, until slightly thickened.\n\nServe the gumbo over brown rice and top with Louisiana's own Crystal hot sauce if you enjoy that extra kick.\n\n**Want to go the extra eco-mile?** Replace the Beyond Meat chicken strips with 1\u00bd cups extra beans to cut down on packaging.\n\n**Shopping Tip:** Fil\u00e9 powder is ground sassafras leaves and acts as a thickener and a seasoning for gumbo. Find it in the spice aisle.\nMASSAGED KALE CAESAR WITH PUMPERNICKEL CROUTONS\n\nMost anchovies are used in the unsustainable practice of turning wild-caught fish into food for farmed fish. That makes this nutty, creamy, anchovy-free Caesar both satisfying and ocean-friendly. Plus, because the recipe doesn't contain eggs, it has less of a water footprint. Vibrant kale, sweet and hearty pumpernickel croutons, creamy cashew dressing, and capers: this salad is an explosion of flavors.\n\nSERVES 2 AS A MAIN OR 4 AS A SIDE PREP AND COOKING TIME: 20 MINUTES\n\nINGREDIENTS\n\nFor the dressing:\n\n1 C cashews, soaked in water to cover for 4 hours\n\n2 Tbsp apple cider vinegar\n\n2 Tbsp olive oil\n\n\u00bd tsp garlic powder\n\n1 tsp Dijon mustard\n\n2 heaping Tbsp capers\n\n1 tsp vegan Worcestershire sauce\n\n2 Tbsp nutritional yeast\n\nGenerous pinch of salt\n\nFreshly ground black pepper\n\nFor the croutons:\n\n3 or 4 slices pumpernickel bread\n\n3 Tbsp olive oil\n\n\u00bd tsp garlic powder\n\n1 Tbsp nutritional yeast\n\n\u00bd tsp salt\n\nFor the salad:\n\n1 (16-oz) bag or bunch of kale\n\n1 tsp salt\n\n1 (14-oz) can chickpeas, drained and rinsed\n\nNutritional yeast\n\nMETHOD\n\nPreheat the oven to 400\u00b0F.\n\nMake the dressing:\n\nDrain the cashews and place all the dressing ingredients in a blender along with \u00bd cup water. Blend until smooth. Add 1 tablespoon more water at a time as needed until the desired consistency is reached. Store in the fridge until ready to use.\n\nMake the croutons:\n\nCut the bread into small, crouton-size pieces\u2014about \u00bc inch each\u2014and place in a container or bowl with the olive oil, garlic powder, nutritional yeast, and salt. Cover and shake so the bread is evenly coated. Spread the croutons out on a baking sheet and bake for 10 minutes or until totally crispy but not burnt. Set aside.\n\nMeanwhile, make the salad:\n\nRinse the kale in cool water. If not using pre-chopped kale, rip the leaves into bite-size pieces and place in a bowl, discarding the thicker, tougher parts of the stems. Sprinkle the salt over the leaves and massage them until they go limp and are taking up about half the amount of room they were taking up before.\n\nPour the dressing over the leaves and use clean hands to evenly coat the leaves with the creamy, salty goodness.\n\nTransfer to a serving bowl. Add the chickpeas. Top with the croutons and a generous sprinkle of nutritional yeast.\nREUBEN SANDWICH\n\nA Reuben sandwich is typically made with loads of unsustainable (and not the healthiest) ingredients\u2014like corned beef, cheese, and Russian dressing. This recipe uses tempeh instead of corned beef, egg-free Russian dressing, and plant-based cheese to make an eco-friendly Reuben that's meaty and filling and, of course, perfectly messy.\n\nSERVES 2 PREP AND COOKING TIME: 30 MINUTES\n\nINGREDIENTS\n\nFor the Russian dressing:\n\n\u00bd C vegan mayo\n\n\u00bc C ketchup\n\n2 tsp prepared horseradish\n\n\u00bd tsp vegan Worcestershire sauce\n\n2 Tbsp pickle relish\n\nFor the tempeh:\n\n2 Tbsp apple cider vinegar\n\n2 Tbsp pure maple syrup\n\n2 Tbsp soy sauce\n\n1 (8-oz) package tempeh, cut into \u00bd-inch-thick slices\n\nTo assemble:\n\n4 slices rye bread\n\n4 slices vegan cheese\n\n1 C sauerkraut, excess liquid squeezed out\n\n2 Tbsp margarine\n\nMETHOD\n\nMake the Russian dressing:\n\nCombine all the dressing ingredients in a small bowl. Set aside in the fridge.\n\nPrepare the tempeh:\n\nCombine the vinegar, maple syrup, soy sauce, and 1 tablespoon water in a small bowl.\n\nPut the tempeh in a large skillet in a single layer. Add the vinegar mixture and turn the tempeh so it's thoroughly coated in the marinade.\n\nCook over medium-high heat until the mixture starts to thicken and the tempeh is brown on both sides, 5 to 7 minutes. Remove from the heat and set aside.\n\nAssemble and enjoy:\n\nBuild the sandwiches by spreading the Russian dressing on the bread and topping with 2 slices of cheese, some tempeh, and sauerkraut.\n\nMelt the margarine in a clean pan over medium-high heat. Place the sandwiches in the pan and cook until golden on each side and the cheese has softened, about 3 minutes per side.\n\nRemove from the pan, cut in half, and serve immediately.\n\n**Serving Suggestion:** Serve with a pickle spear and potato chips or a side of Quick Country Coleslaw.\nROASTED COCONUT-BEET SOUP\n\nBeets have served people well for ages. We turn them into sugar. We've used them as a dye. In the Middle Ages, they were often used to treat digestive illnesses. In the nineteenth century, wine was sometimes colored with them. Earthy and sweet with a vibrant red color, they combine nicely with veggie stock, thyme, and coconut milk in this hearty soup.\n\nSERVES 4 PREP AND COOKING TIME: 1\u00bd HOURS\n\nINGREDIENTS\n\n6 to 8 medium beets\n\n\u00bc C olive oil\n\n2 yellow onions, finely chopped\n\n4 C vegetable stock\n\n\u00bd tsp freshly ground black pepper\n\n1 C canned coconut milk\n\n4 garlic cloves, finely chopped\n\nFresh thyme, for garnish\n\nMETHOD\n\nPreheat the oven to 400\u00b0F.\n\nTrim the greens and root ends off the beets. Place them, whole, in a roasting or cast-iron pan and roast for 1 hour.\n\nLet the beets cool a bit, then hold them under cold running water and rub off their skins. (If they're stubborn skins, you may need the help of a peeler.) Chop into \u00bd-inch cubes.\n\nIn a medium saucepan, heat the olive oil over medium-high heat. Add the onions and cook until browned, about 8 minutes. Add the beets and stir for 2 minutes, then add the stock, pepper, coconut milk, and garlic. Simmer for 5 minutes so that the garlic is cooked and all the flavors are combined.\n\nLet cool for 10 minutes and then transfer to a blender and blend until smooth. Pour into bowls and garnish with lots of fresh thyme.\n\n**Tips:** Roast the beets ahead of time and store in the fridge overnight.\n\n**Serving Suggestion:** Serve with toasted sourdough, Rosemary Cornbread Mini Muffins, or Sun-Dried Tomato and Basil Sausages.\n\n\"Most people are eating more vegetables at this point. It's a good way to live and it's a good way to have a healthy, long natural life.\"\n\n\u2014CHEF MARIO BATALI\nROASTED ROOT VEGETABLE AND QUINOA SALAD\n\nHere's a hearty, healthy salad straight from the earth. Carrots and sweet potatoes give the dish vibrant hues and a sweet taste, balanced out by the creamy parsnip, tahini, and cider vinegar. The whole thing is capped with a Middle Eastern flair thanks to the cumin, coriander, and pomegranate seeds.\n\nSERVES 4 PREP AND COOKING TIME: 50 MINUTES\n\nINGREDIENTS\n\nFor the salad:\n\n1 C quinoa\n\n2 C vegetable stock\n\n2 C \u00bd-inch cubes parsnip\n\n2 C \u00bd-inch cubes carrot\n\n2 C \u00bd-inch cubes sweet potato\n\n2 C \u00bd-inch cubes russet potato\n\n2 Tbsp olive oil\n\n1 tsp salt\n\n1 tsp ground coriander\n\n1 tsp ground cumin\n\n1 C raw almonds, chopped\n\n4 C arugula, washed and dried\n\nFor the dressing:\n\n\u00bd C tahini\n\n\u00bc C pure maple syrup\n\n\u00bc C apple cider vinegar\n\n2 tsp ground turmeric\n\nGenerous pinch of salt\n\nCracked black pepper\n\n\u00bd C pomegranate seeds, for garnish (optional)\n\nMETHOD\n\nPreheat the oven to 400\u00b0F.\n\nFirst, make the salad:\n\nPlace quinoa and stock in a medium saucepan. Bring to a boil over high heat. Lower the heat to maintain a simmer, cover, and cook until all the stock has been absorbed\u2014about 20 minutes. Remove from the heat, fluff with a fork, and set aside.\n\nPlace the parsnip, carrot, sweet potato, and russet potato cubes into a large bowl. Add the olive oil, salt, coriander, and cumin. Stir to coat thoroughly, then spread the cubed vegetables evenly over two baking sheets. Roast for 15 minutes.\n\nRemove the baking sheets, turn the vegetables with a spatula, add the chopped almonds, and return to the oven for another 10 minutes. Remove and let cool slightly.\n\nPlace the arugula in a large bowl. Top with half the quinoa, then half the vegetables, then the remaining quinoa and the remaining vegetables. Toss a couple of times to lightly combine.\n\nMake the dressing:\n\nCombine all the dressing ingredients in a small bowl and mix well.\n\nDrizzle the salad with as much of the dressing as you'd like (refrigerate any leftovers) and sprinkle pomegranate seeds over the top, if desired.\n\n**Tip:** Try this as a macro bowl, with the quinoa, vegetables, greens, and almonds served in \"clusters\" together in a bowl, rather than tossed as a salad.\n\n\"My diet had... a gradual trend toward less and less meat, even less and less fish, until now I rely so much on other sorts of protein, on many vegetables, most of them farm raised, and on fruits and pastas. My shift has been the result of many things\u2014books like Jonathan Safran Foer's _Eating Animals_ , films such as _Food, Inc._ , and my own observations of factory farms, feedlots, fish farms, and the condition of the meats and fish sold in many of our supermarkets.\"\n\n\u2014MARTHA STEWART\nSESAME SEAWEED SALAD\n\nSeaweed = super food. Wakame (edible seaweed) contains a compound that can help burn fatty tissue, as well as healthy omega-3 fatty acids. When you want that taste of the sea without all the problems associated with fish farming or trawling, this seaweed salad is poised to become your go-to.\n\nSERVES 4 PREP TIME: 5 MINUTES, PLUS 20 MINUTES FOR SOAKING\n\nINGREDIENTS\n\n1 oz (28g) dried seaweed (wakame or dulse)\n\n2 Tbsp sesame seeds\n\n1 Tbsp miso paste\n\n2 Tbsp soy sauce\n\n1 Tbsp toasted sesame oil\n\n2 Tbsp rice vinegar\n\n\u00bd tsp agave nectar\n\n\u00bd tsp grated fresh ginger\n\n1 red chile, finely sliced\n\nMETHOD\n\nPlace the seaweed in a bowl, add water to cover, and soak for 20 minutes to rehydrate. Drain and squeeze out excess water, then finely chop the seaweed.\n\nWhile the seaweed is rehydrating, toast the sesame seeds in a dry skillet over a medium heat. Stir continuously until they become fragrant and start to make a popping noise, 3 to 5 minutes. Transfer to a plate and let cool.\n\nPlace about three-quarters of the toasted sesame seeds in a mortar (setting the rest aside) and lightly grind with the pestle. (If you don't own a mortar and pestle, you can skip this step.)\n\nTransfer the ground seeds to a small bowl, add the remaining ingredients, and whisk to combine. Pour over the seaweed, tossing lightly with clean hands to distribute.\n\nCover and refrigerate for at least 10 minutes, or until ready to serve.\n\nSprinkle with the reserved toasted sesame seeds before serving.\n\n**Serving Suggestion: S** erve with Rainbow Veggie Sushi.\nSLAWPPY JOES\n\nI grew up eating the worst possible sloppy Joes\u2014courtesy of my grade school cafeteria. I revisited them as an adult and was surprised to learn that when done right, they're actually quite amazing. This grown-up version uses Beyond Meat ground beef\u2014made entirely from plants, and with more protein than beef\u2014and is topped with a big ol' pile of coleslaw to offer a healthy, eco-friendly version of that old cafeteria standby.\n\nSERVES 2 PREP AND COOKING TIME: 30 MINUTES\n\nINGREDIENTS\n\n1 Tbsp olive oil\n\n1 yellow onion, finely chopped\n\n1 (12-oz) bag Beyond Meat beef crumbles\n\n1 C tomato puree\n\n3 garlic cloves, minced\n\n3 Tbsp tomato paste\n\n1 Tbsp vegan Worcestershire sauce\n\n2 soft buns\n\nQuick Country Coleslaw, for serving\n\nMETHOD\n\nIn a heavy-bottomed skillet, heat the olive oil over medium-high heat. Add the onion and cook until translucent, about 2 minutes. Add the beef crumbles and cook until lightly browned all over, about 5 minutes.\n\nAdd the tomato puree, garlic, tomato paste, and Worcestershire. Simmer for 5 to 10 minutes more.\n\nOnce the meat is cooked, remove from the heat.\n\nToast the buns (or don't, if you prefer them soft). Build the sloppy Joes on the buns with a pile of coleslaw topped with the meat. Enjoy\u2014and don't be afraid to get messy!\n\n\"By eating meat, we share the responsibility of climate change.\"\n\n\u2014THICH NHAT HANH\nSOURDOUGH PANZANELLA\n\nOriginally from Tuscany, panzanella\u2014or panmolle\u2014is a light, airy salad made from bread and tomatoes. Plus, you can use stale (or going-stale) bread, which can help cut back on food waste and make the dish extra-eco-friendly.\n\nSERVES 2 AS A MAIN OR 4 AS A SIDE PREP AND COOKING TIME: 20 MINUTES\n\nINGREDIENTS\n\n3 to 5 big slices sourdough bread\n\n3 Tbsp olive oil\n\n2 Tbsp apple cider vinegar\n\n1 tsp whole-grain mustard\n\n\u00bd tsp sea salt\n\n1\u00bd lbs cherry tomatoes, halved\n\n1 small red onion, thinly sliced\n\n\u00bd C baby spinach\n\n2 Tbsp capers\n\n10 to 20 fresh basil leaves\n\nFreshly cracked black pepper\n\nMETHOD\n\nToast the bread (in a toaster or grill pan, or under the broiler) until lightly blackened. Let cool.\n\nCombine the olive oil, vinegar, mustard, and salt in a medium bowl. Add the tomatoes, along with the red onion. Stir until well coated in the dressing.\n\nPlace the baby spinach in a serving bowl. Tear the cooled sourdough into bite-size chunks and place on top of the spinach. Spoon the tomatoes and onion over the sourdough, then pour the dressing remaining in the bowl over the entire salad. Top with the capers and fresh basil and then season generously with freshly cracked black pepper.\n\nServe immediately.\nSPICY LENTIL BURGERS\n\nLentils and beef both pack protein, but one is resource-intensive, requiring copious amounts of land, feed, and water while emitting huge volumes of climate-changing gases like carbon and methane. (Can you guess which one that is?) Try tossing one of these lentil burgers into the mix every once in a while. It'll make your meal more environmentally friendly plus offer some varied taste and texture to spice up that tired old burger routine.\n\nSERVES 4 PREP AND COOKING TIME: 40 MINUTES\n\nINGREDIENTS\n\nFor the patties:\n\n1 (15-oz) can green or black lentils, drained and rinsed\n\n5 or 6 sun-dried tomatoes, chopped\n\n\u00bc C almonds, chopped\n\n\u00bc C fresh parsley, chopped\n\n\u00bd tsp garlic powder\n\n1 tsp onion powder\n\n\u00bd tsp paprika\n\n\u00bd tsp ground cumin\n\n\u00bc tsp freshly ground black pepper\n\n\u00be tsp salt\n\n\u00be C instant oats\n\n1 Tbsp almond butter\n\n1 Tbsp nutritional yeast\n\n1 Tbsp Sriracha (optional)\n\n2 Tbsp canola oil\n\nTo assemble:\n\n1 avocado, quartered, pitted, and peeled\n\n4 burger buns\n\nLettuce\n\n4 slices vegan cheese (optional)\n\nSliced fresh tomato\n\nSliced red onion\n\nMETHOD\n\nFirst, make the patties:\n\nCombine all the patty ingredients except the canola oil in a large bowl. Using moist, clean hands, form the mixture into four balls and then flatten them into patties roughly 1-inch thick.\n\nIn a large skillet, heat the canola oil over medium-high heat. Gently place the patties in the oil and cook until golden brown on the underside, about 3 minutes. Flip and cook for 3 minutes more.\n\nAssemble and enjoy:\n\nCut the avocado into quarters and spread each quarter over the bottom of a burger bun. Add lettuce, vegan cheese (if using), a burger patty, a slice of tomato, red onion, and any other condiments you'd like.\n\n**Want to go the extra eco-mile?** Cook the lentils from scratch in advance to cut down on packaging. You'll need 1\u00bd cup cooked lentils for 4 burgers.\n\n**Serving Suggestion:** Try the ranch dressing from the Spicy Sweet Potato Fries recipe on these.\n\n\"Beef, barbecue, and chicken wreak havoc on the air, water, soil, and on the health and well-being of communities.\"\n\n\u2014RACHEL CARSON COUNCIL\nVIETNAMESE B\u00c1NH M\u00cc WITH SRIRACHA CHICKEN\n\nB\u00e1hn m\u00ecs use a single-serving airy baguette that's light and airy on the inside and crunchy on the outside. Less heavy than other breads, this lets all the fillings inside shine. Note that you'll need to make the pickles ahead of time, so plan accordingly.\n\nSERVES 1 PREP AND COOKING TIME: 30 MINUTES\n\nINGREDIENTS\n\n4 Gardein Seven Grain Crispy Tenders\n\n1 baguette or French bread loaf, cut into roughly 6-inch pieces\n\nVegan mayo\n\n1 small handful of homemade pickles (recipe follows)\n\n2 sprigs cilantro, coarsely chopped\n\nFresh jalape\u00f1o slices\n\nSriracha\n\n1 wedge of lime\n\nCracked black pepper\n\nMETHOD\n\nCook the tenders according to the instructions on the package.\n\nHalve the baguette lengthwise and spread a good slathering of mayo on the cut side of each half.\n\nPlace the cooked tenders inside and top with pickles, cilantro, some jalape\u00f1o slices, and Sriracha. Squeeze some lime over everything, crack a little black pepper on top, and enjoy immediately.\n\n**Want to go the extra eco-mile?** Replace the Gardein with slabs of broiled tofu, cut into 1-inch-thick rectangles (see here for instructions) or the seitan \"meat\" from the Kebab recipe here, to cut down on packaging.\n\nPICKLES\n\nThis recipe makes enough pickles for 10 to 15 sandwiches.\n\nMAKES ABOUT 6 CUPS PREP TIME: 15 MINUTES, PLUS OVERNIGHT CHILLING\n\nINGREDIENTS\n\n\u00bd large daikon radish, peeled and julienned\n\n3 medium carrots, julienned\n\n1 large cucumber, peeled, seeded, and julienned\n\n2 C boiling water, plus more as needed\n\n2 Tbsp salt\n\n3 Tbsp sugar\n\n1 Tbsp Sriracha\n\n\u00bd C rice vinegar\n\nMETHOD\n\nDivide the daikon, carrots, and cucumber evenly between two clean 1-quart jars with lids.\n\nCombine the boiling water, salt, and sugar in a bowl and stir until the salt and sugar have dissolved. Add the Sriracha and vinegar and stir to combine. Pour into the jar and top with extra boiling water if needed, so that all the vegetables are covered.\n\nLoosely place the lid over the top and let cool to room temperature. Once cool, seal and refrigerate overnight before serving. The pickles will keep in the refrigerator for up to 2 weeks.\nWILD MUSHROOM CHILI\n\nI like to make this recipe when I know I'll be spending a cozy fall Sunday at home\u2014just so I can be immersed in its smell for as long as possible. The black beans offer a hearty protein that's far more eco-friendly than beef (who wants all the deforestation that goes along with industrial cattle ranching?), and the mushrooms add a nice earthy flavor with an additional meaty texture.\n\nSERVES: 2 TO 4 PREP AND COOKING TIME: 1\u00bd TO 3 HOURS, DEPENDING ON THE BEANS' AGE\n\nINGREDIENTS\n\n1 C dried black beans\n\n1 tsp salt\n\n18 oz assorted wild mushrooms, coarsely chopped\n\n2 medium yellow onions, finely chopped\n\n1 bunch cilantro, finely chopped\n\n4 garlic cloves, finely chopped\n\n1 (14-oz) can chopped tomatoes\n\n1 Tbsp soy sauce\n\n2 Tbsp tomato paste\n\n1 tsp crushed red pepper\n\n1 (10.75-oz) can condensed tomato soup\n\nVegan sour cream, for garnish (optional)\n\nMETHOD\n\nPlace the beans in a large pot with 5 cups water and the salt. Cover and bring to a boil, then lower the heat to maintain a simmer. Cook, half covered, until you can easily squish a few beans on the side of the pot and most but not all the water has been absorbed, 60 to 90 minutes, depending on the beans' age.\n\nOnce the beans are soft, add the mushrooms, onions, cilantro, garlic, chopped tomatoes, soy sauce, tomato paste, and crushed red pepper. Increase the heat a little and cook until the vegetables are soft, 15 to 30 minutes more. At the end, stir in the tomato soup and let warm through, 2 to 3 minutes.\n\nEnjoy immediately or remove from the heat and cover with a lid until ready to serve. Garnish with vegan sour cream, if desired.\n\n**Want to go the extra eco-mile?** Swap the sour cream for homemade cashew cream! Just combine \u00bc cup raw cashews, water to cover, a squeeze of lemon juice, and a pinch of salt in a high-speed blender and blend until very smooth.\n\n**Serving Suggestion:** Serve with a side of Rosemary Cornbread Mini Muffins.\nMAIN DISHES\n\nCashew Cream Mac 'n' Cheese\n\nChicken and Cabbage Wontons\n\nCoconut-Lemongrass Curry with Rice Noodles\n\nCreamy Basil-Chickpea Lettuce Cups\n\nGrilled Veggie Pizza with BBQ Sauce\n\nJerked Jackfruit Tacos with Grilled Pineapple\n\nMeat-Free Meat Loaf with Tomato-Maple Glaze\n\nMushroom and Kale Galette\n\nNo-Frills Cheese Pizza\n\nOyster Mushrooms \u00e0 la Marini\u00e8re\n\nPittsburgh Pierogis\n\nProtein-Packed Burrito Bowl\n\nRainbow Veggie Sushi\n\nSave-the-Bay Crab Cakes\n\nSmoky Seitan Kebabs with Peanut Sauce\n\nSpaghetti and Lentil Meatballs\n\nSteamed Buns with Tofu and Mushrooms\n\nSun-Dried Tomato and Basil Sausages\n\nWild Rice Risotto with Peas and Asparagus\nCASHEW CREAM MAC 'N' CHEESE\n\nWhy rely on boxed mac 'n' cheese when you can get a bit crafty with your mac 'n' cheese? This dish uses cashews for that rich, fatty flavor\u2014combined with nutritional yeast for a cheesy taste. It's quick, easy, healthy, and better for the planet than using cow's cheese: cashew trees are lighter on the land than cows, providing wildlife habitat and preventing erosion. So give two big, creamy thumbs up for planet-friendly pasta!\n\nSERVES 4 PREP AND COOKING TIME: 30 MINUTES, PLUS SOAKING TIME FOR CASHEWS\n\nINGREDIENTS\n\n1 C raw cashews, soaked in water to cover for 4 hours\n\n2 Tbsp lemon juice\n\n\u00bd tsp soy sauce\n\n\u00be tsp mustard\n\n2 tsp onion powder\n\n\u00bd tsp garlic powder\n\n1 tsp salt\n\n\u00bc C nutritional yeast\n\n2 Tbsp margarine\n\n1 (16-oz) box pasta (shells or macaroni)\n\nFreshly ground black pepper\n\nSmoked paprika, for garnish (optional)\n\nFresh basil, for garnish (optional)\n\nMETHOD\n\nRinse the soaked cashews. Put them in a blender. Add enough fresh water so that they are just covered, then blend until very smooth, about 1 minute. Add the lemon juice, soy sauce, mustard, onion powder, garlic powder, salt, nutritional yeast, and margarine. Blend until well combined. Add a little more water, 1 tablespoon at a time, until you have a smooth and creamy sauce.\n\nBring a large pot of water to a boil. Cook the pasta according to the package instructions. Drain in a colander and rinse thoroughly. Return the pasta to the pot and add the cashew cheese sauce.\n\nSpoon into bowls and garnish with pepper, paprika (if using), and basil (if using), or whatever other toppings you love (saut\u00e9ed onions, garlic, and cherry tomatoes work well!).\n\n**Tip:** Like baked mac? Put the mac 'n' cheese in a baking dish and bake for 10 to 15 minutes at 350\u00b0F, or until slightly browned.\n\n\"If you're driving a Prius or you're shopping green or looking for organic, you should probably be a semi-vegetarian.\"\n\n\u2014MARK BITTMAN\nCHICKEN AND CABBAGE WONTONS\n\nTravel to almost any corner of the world and you'll find a dumpling, or some variation of it: ravioli (Italy), pierogis (Poland), samosas (India), empanadas (Latin America), kibbeh (the Middle East), and of course wontons (China). These little fried wontons use meat-free chicken and fresh vegetables instead of meat to cut back on air pollution in an oh-so-delicious way.\n\nSERVES 2 PREP AND COOKING TIME: 30 TO 40 MINUTES\n\nINGREDIENTS\n\nFor the dipping sauce:\n\n1 Tbsp toasted sesame oil\n\n3 Tbsp soy sauce\n\n2 Tbsp rice vinegar\n\n\u00bd Tbsp sugar\n\n1 Tbsp Sriracha (optional)\n\nFor the wonton filling:\n\n2 C chopped Beyond Meat chicken strips\n\n1\u00bd C shredded cabbage\n\n\u00bd C chopped scallions\n\n1 garlic clove, chopped\n\n1 Tbsp chopped fresh cilantro\n\n1 Tbsp grated fresh ginger\n\n1 Tbsp toasted sesame oil\n\n1 Tbsp soy sauce\n\n1 Tbsp rice vinegar\n\n1 Tbsp sesame seeds\n\nTo assemble and garnish:\n\n30 wonton wrappers, defrosted if frozen\n\nSesame oil\n\nChili oil\n\nSesame seeds\n\nChopped, fresh cilantro\n\nMETHOD\n\nMake the dipping sauce:\n\nCombine all the dipping sauce ingredients, including the Sriracha (if using), in a small bowl. Set aside in the refrigerator.\n\nMake the filling:\n\nPlace all the filling ingredients in a food processor. Pulse until the chicken and cabbage are finely minced and everything is well combined.\n\nAssemble the wontons:\n\nFill a small bowl with water and set it to the side. You'll use this to wet the edges of the wrappers.\n\nLay out a few wrappers, keeping the rest covered with a damp paper towel so they don't dry out. Place roughly 1 to 2 teaspoons of the filling in the center of each wrapper. Make sure the filling is just in the middle (not on the edges) or it will prevent the ends from sticking together. Gently wet the edges of one wrapper with your fingertips and fold it in half, squeezing out the air and squeezing the edges together to ensure they stick together. Place the finished wonton on a plate or platter. Repeat until you have used up all the filling.\n\nPlace a heavy-bottomed skillet over a medium-high heat and lightly coat the bottom with sesame oil. Fill the pan with wontons, leaving room to flip them, and cook until the bottoms turn golden, about 3 minutes. Add about \u00bc cup water and then cover. (If you don't have a lid for your pan, you can use another pan, the lid from a large saucepan, a large plate, or aluminum foil as a cover.) Cook until all the water has evaporated, 2 to 3 minutes.\n\nRemove from the heat and garnish with chili oil, sesame seeds, and cilantro. Serve with the dipping sauce alongside.\n\n**Want to go the extra eco-mile?** Replace the meatless chicken with 1\u00bd cups crumbled pressed extra-firm tofu (see here for instructions on pressing tofu). Just add it to the other filling ingredients after you've processed them.\n\n**Equipment Alert:** This recipe requires a food processor.\nCOCONUT-LEMONGRASS CURRY WITH RICE NOODLES\n\nLemongrass is a tropical plant in the grass family. It's widely used as a culinary herb in Asian cooking and as a medicinal herb in India. Its oil is sometimes used as a \"lure\" to attract honeybees. And it's commonly used in teas, soups, and curries for its subtle, delicious, citrusy flavor. This dish combines lemongrass with meaty shiitake mushrooms, rich coconut milk, tofu, vermicelli rice noodles, and other deliciousness to create an aromatic, flavorful curry that'll leave you full and happy. Just watch out for bees!\n\nSERVES 2 PREP AND COOKING TIME: 30 MINUTES\n\nINGREDIENTS\n\n\u00bd (14-oz) package extra-firm tofu\n\n3 stalks lemongrass\n\n1 Tbsp coconut oil\n\n1 Tbsp red curry paste\n\n2 C canned coconut milk\n\n\u00bc tsp salt\n\n1 C vegetable stock\n\n1 C thinly sliced shiitake mushrooms\n\n1 C \u00bd-inch pieces carrot\n\n1 C \u00bd-inch pieces broccoli\n\nAbout 6 oz rice vermicelli noodles\n\nFresh lime wedges, for garnish\n\nChopped fresh cilantro, for garnish\n\nSliced scallions, for garnish\n\nMETHOD\n\nCut the tofu block in half crosswise. Cut into triangles and set aside.\n\nCut the lemongrass stalks down the middle, remove the outer layer, and set aside.\n\nIn a large saucepan, melt the coconut oil over medium-high heat. Add the curry paste and lemongrass. Stir until fragrant, about 2 minutes.\n\nAdd the coconut milk, salt, stock, mushrooms, and carrots. Increase the heat to high and bring to a boil, then lower the heat to maintain a simmer. Cook for about 7 minutes and then add the tofu and broccoli. Cook for 5 minutes more.\n\nDivide the vermicelli noodles in half and place into two large serving bowls\u2014the bowls you're going to serve or eat this dish from. Remove any large pieces of lemongrass from the curry and then pour the curry over the noodles. Cover by at least an inch, or more (depending on how soupy you want it at the end). Let sit for a few minutes so the noodles soften, and then gently stir to soften the noodles even more. (You don't need to cook the rice noodles first. By the time the curry is the right temperature to eat, they will be cooked.)\n\nTop with a squeeze of fresh lime, chopped cilantro, and scallions and enjoy immediately.\n\n**Want to go the extra eco-mile?** Save the broccoli stems and use them in the Quick Country Coleslaw to cut down on food waste.\nCREAMY BASIL-CHICKPEA LETTUCE CUPS\n\nThe chickpea is a rain-fed crop with a low water footprint. It also improves soil structure, enriching it by fixing nitrogen. This favors crop rotation, contributing to a more sustainable model of agriculture. So we celebrate the humble chickpea for its earth-saving properties in this creamy, nutty lettuce cup recipe.\n\nSERVES 2 PREP AND COOKING TIME: 15 MINUTES, PLUS SOAKING TIME FOR CASHEWS\n\nINGREDIENTS\n\n1 C raw cashews, soaked in water to cover for 4 hours, plus more (unsoaked) for serving\n\n\u00bc C fresh basil leaves, plus more for serving\n\n1 Tbsp rice vinegar or distilled white vinegar\n\n1 garlic clove\n\nJuice of \u00bd lemon\n\n\u00bd tsp salt\n\n1 (14-oz) can chickpeas, drained and rinsed\n\n1 Tbsp capers\n\n1 medium cucumber, cut into \u00bd-inch cubes\n\n2 celery stalks, chopped\n\n\u00bd C chopped red onion\n\n10 romaine lettuce leaves\n\n2 Tbsp hulled pumpkin seeds\n\n1 Tbsp black sesame seeds\n\nFreshly cracked black pepper\n\nRaisins, for garnish (optional)\n\nMETHOD\n\nRinse the soaked cashews. Place them in a blender with 1 cup water. Add the basil leaves, vinegar, garlic, lemon juice, and salt. Blend until totally smooth (about 1 minute in a Vitamix or other high-speed blender, or a bit longer in a normal blender).\n\nPlace the chickpeas and capers in a large bowl. With a potato masher or a large fork, mash them a little bit. Add the cucumber, celery, and red onion. Add the sauce and stir to combine.\n\nLay the lettuce leaves out like cups or taco shells. Spoon 2 heaping tablespoons of the creamy chickpea mix into each cup. Sprinkle with pumpkin seeds, black sesame seeds, a few additional cashews, and basil leaves, season with some freshly cracked black pepper, and garnish with a few raisins, if you like. Enjoy immediately.\n\n**Tip:** Try toasting the pumpkin seeds first in a hot, dry pan until lightly browned.\n\n**Want to go the extra eco-mile?** Save the aquafaba (chickpea juice; see here) for Chocolate Brownies (here) or Lemon Meringue Pie\u2014to cut down on waste.\n\n\"If more people had vegetarian or vegan diets, especially in the developed world, the environmental impact would be significant.\"\n\n\u2014MARK TERCEK, NATURE CONSERVANCY CEO\nGRILLED VEGGIE PIZZA WITH BBQ SAUCE\n\nHomemade pizza is one of my all-time favorite things to make. I recommend inviting people over and making multiple pizzas. (Who says adults can't have pizza parties?) This pizza uses grilled eggplant, zucchini, and mushrooms along with BBQ sauce and dollops of vegan cream cheese (I like the Tofutti and Kite Hill brands) to create a smoky, fiery pie that's sure to please.\n\nSERVES 2 PREP AND COOKING TIME: 2 HOURS\n\nINGREDIENTS\n\nFor the grilled vegetables:\n\n1 medium eggplant, cut into \u00bc-inch-thick rounds\n\n1 medium zucchini, cut into \u00bc-inch-thick rounds\n\n3 large button mushrooms, cut into \u00bc-inch pieces\n\n\u00bc C balsamic vinegar\n\n\u00bc C canola oil\n\n\u00bd tsp salt\n\n1\u00bd tsp liquid smoke\n\nFor the crust:\n\n1\u00bd C all-purpose flour, plus more for dusting\n\n1 tsp salt\n\n1 tsp active dry yeast\n\n\u00bd C plain almond milk\n\n2 Tbsp olive oil\n\nCornmeal, for dusting (optional)\n\nTo assemble:\n\n\u00bd C BBQ sauce\n\n\u00bd C plus \u0661 Tbsp vegan cream cheese\n\nFresh basil leaves\n\nMETHOD\n\nFirst, prep the vegetables:\n\nPut the eggplant, zucchini, and mushrooms in a large casserole dish or container.\n\nWhisk together the vinegar, canola oil, salt, and liquid smoke in a small bowl. Pour over the vegetables and turn to coat evenly. Let sit for at least 30 minutes.\n\nCook the vegetables in a hot grill pan for about 3 minutes per side. Alternatively, lay them flat on a baking sheet and place them under the broiler for 6 to 8 minutes on one side, then flip them and broil for 4 minutes on the other. Return them to the dish they were marinating in and let cool while you prepare the rest of the pizza.\n\nNext, make the crust:\n\nPlace the flour, salt, and yeast in a large bowl and stir to combine. Make a well in the center.\n\nWarm the almond milk by microwaving it in a microwave-safe mug for 40 seconds. Add 1 tablespoon of the olive oil and stir to combine. Slowly pour the almond milk mixture into the well in the dry ingredients, gently stirring as you go. It'll start out as a liquidy paste, and then get more solid. Once the mixture is solid enough to handle, use your hand to form the dough into a ball.\n\nPlace the dough on a lightly floured surface and knead for about 3 minutes, until you have a nice, silky-smooth ball of dough. Wipe out the bowl and place a little bit of olive oil in the bottom of it. Return the dough to the bowl, turning to coat it with oil. Cover with a clean dish towel and place it somewhere warm until the dough has doubled in size. This usually takes an hour but can take up to two depending on where you live.\n\nOnce the dough has doubled, punch it to deflate it, then return it to the floured counter. Roll it into a football shape, cover with the dish towel, and let sit for 20 minutes more.\n\nAt this point, preheat the oven to 400\u00b0F while the dough rests.\n\nAfter 20 minutes, press the dough football flat and then sprinkle the top with a little flour and roll it into a pizza crust roughly 12 x 20 inches. (I find it helps to sprinkle a little cornmeal on my rolling surface, too.) Carefully transfer the dough to a large baking sheet.\n\nFinish the pizza:\n\nSpoon the BBQ sauce over the pizza dough and spread it around with the back of a tablespoon, leaving a 1-inch border along the edges.\n\nPile the grilled veggies onto the pizza and bake for 20 minutes.\n\nRemove from the oven and add the cream cheese in roughly 1-tablespoon dollops. Return the pizza to the oven for a final 5 minutes.\n\nRemove from the oven and let cool for 3 to 5 minutes. Top with fresh basil leaves and cut into 6 to 8 slices. Enjoy alone or with a side salad.\nJERKED JACKFRUIT TACOS WITH GRILLED PINEAPPLE\n\nJerk is a style of Jamaican cooking that involves a super-hot spice mixture and (usually) meat. But what's a guy or gal to do if you want that same fiery flavor without the environmental problems that often accompany meat production? Well, bring on the jackfruits! This fruit, when marinated and shredded, mimics the taste and texture of pulled pork. So this recipe offers a real culinary mashup of ingredients\u2014tropical fruit with Caribbean meat spices in a Mexican tortilla. You'll never think of fruit the same way again!\n\nSERVES 2 PREP AND COOKING TIME: 30 MINUTES\n\nINGREDIENTS\n\n3 Tbsp agave nectar\n\n3 Tbsp apple cider vinegar\n\n2 Tbsp olive oil\n\n1\u00bd Tbsp ground cinnamon\n\n2 Tbsp freshly ground black pepper\n\n1 Tbsp dried thyme\n\n2 tsp ground allspice\n\n1\u00bd tsp cayenne pepper\n\n\u00bd tsp ground nutmeg\n\n\u00bd tsp garlic powder\n\n\u00bd tsp onion powder\n\n\u00bd tsp salt\n\n1 (20-oz) can jackfruit, drained\n\n3 pineapple rings, fresh or canned\n\n6 soft corn or flour tortillas\n\n1\u00bd C sliced red cabbage\n\n12 cherry tomatoes, quartered\n\nVegan sour cream, for serving\n\nChopped fresh cilantro, for serving\n\nFresh lime, for serving\n\nMETHOD\n\nIn a small bowl, combine the agave nectar, vinegar, olive oil and \u00bc cup water. Set aside.\n\nCombine the cinnamon, black pepper, thyme, allspice, cayenne, nutmeg, garlic powder, onion powder, and salt in a small bowl. Place a large, flat-bottomed skillet over a medium-high heat. Once hot, add the spice mixture and stir for about 2 minutes, or until fragrant. Pour the agave mixture into the skillet and heat for 30 seconds. Add the jackfruit and stir to break up the jackfruit as it softens. Heat through, about 3 minutes, and set aside.\n\nHeat a grill pan over high heat and grill the pineapple rings until lightly blackened, about 3 minutes per side. (If you don't have a grill pan, just use a regular heavy-bottomed skillet and sear them for a couple of minutes on each side.)\n\nWarm the tortillas on the stove or in the microwave. Build your tacos using the jackfruit, grilled pineapple, cabbage, cherry tomatoes, sour cream, and cilantro. Serve with wedges of lime.\nMEAT-FREE MEAT LOAF WITH TOMATO-MAPLE GLAZE\n\nMom's meat loaf was always one of my absolute favorites. But a single beef serving dishes out almost 30 kg of climate-change-causing CO2, so this recipe uses chickpeas instead. Coming in at less than 2 kg of CO2 per serving, they're a much eco-friendlier choice. And combined with carrots, celery, panko bread crumbs, and delicious flavorings, they cook up into a robust, hearty loaf that'll leave you wanting seconds.\n\nSERVES 4 PREP AND COOKING TIME: 1 HOUR 10 MINUTES\n\nINGREDIENTS\n\nFor the loaf:\n\n2 Tbsp olive oil, plus more for greasing\n\n2 (14-oz) cans chickpeas, drained and rinsed\n\n1 large yellow onion, diced\n\n2 celery stalks, finely diced\n\n2 carrots, finely diced\n\n2 garlic cloves, minced\n\n3 Tbsp chopped walnuts\n\n2 C panko bread crumbs\n\n\u00bd C plain almond milk\n\n2\u00bd Tbsp soy sauce\n\n3 Tbsp vegan Worcestershire sauce\n\n2 Tbsp nutritional yeast\n\n2 Tbsp flax meal\n\n2\u00bd Tbsp tomato paste\n\n1 tsp liquid smoke\n\n\u00bc tsp freshly ground black pepper\n\n\u00bd tsp ground sage\n\n\u00bd tsp dried thyme\n\nFor the glaze:\n\n\u00bc C tomato paste\n\n2 Tbsp pure maple syrup\n\n2 Tbsp apple cider vinegar\n\n1 Tbsp soy sauce\n\n1 tsp paprika (preferably smoked paprika)\n\n\u00bd tsp freshly ground black pepper\n\nDash of crushed red pepper\n\n2 Tbsp sesame seeds\n\nMETHOD\n\nFirst, make the loaf:\n\nPreheat the oven to 375\u00b0F. Lightly oil a 9 x 5-inch loaf pan.\n\nPlace all the meat loaf ingredients in a large bowl and mix together.\n\nIn \u00be-cup batches, place the loaf mixture into a food processor and process until most of the chickpeas are broken up (you want it smooth, but still a little chunky in the end). Place each batch into the oiled loaf pan as you go.\n\nPack the mixture into the pan and smooth out the top. Bake, uncovered, for 30 minutes.\n\nMeanwhile, make the glaze:\n\nWhisk together all the glaze ingredients, except the sesame seeds, in a bowl and set aside.\n\nAfter 30 minutes of baking, remove the loaf and top it with the glaze, smoothing it over. Sprinkle the sesame seeds on top and bake for 25 minutes more.\n\nRemove from the oven, let cool for at least 15 minutes, slice, and serve.\n\n**Equipment Alert:** This recipe requires a food processor.\n\n**Serving Suggestion:**  \nServe with a side of Massaged Kale Caesar salad.\n\n\"Reducing meat consumption is a growing trend, driven by health and environmental considerations... I feel healthier, more active, and by making my diet more varied, I never feel like I'm missing out on anything.\"\n\n\u2014SIR RICHARD BRANSON\nMUSHROOM AND KALE GALETTE\n\nIn French cooking, galette can refer to several types of round or free-form crusty cakes or pies. (In New Orleans, where I used to live, they eat a sweet version called galette des rois\u2014or King Cake\u2014around Mardi Gras each year.) This galette is savory, made with mushrooms, kale, eggplant, and capers, plus some soy yogurt for creaminess. It's perfect for dinner parties, when you want a pretty centerpiece meal that'll be sure to please.\n\nSERVES 4 PREP AND COOKING TIME: 1\u00bd HOURS\n\nINGREDIENTS\n\n2 Tbsp olive oil\n\n1 red onion, finely chopped\n\n1 small eggplant, cut into \u00bd-inch cubes\n\n6 baby bella or button mushrooms, sliced\n\n1\u00bd C chopped tomatoes\n\n6 kale leaves, stemmed and chopped\n\n2 Tbsp capers\n\n\u00bc C nondairy yogurt\n\n1 tsp dried oregano\n\n2 tsp sea salt\n\n2 C whole wheat flour, plus more for dusting\n\n\u00bd C instant oats\n\n\u00bc C chilled margarine\n\n\u00bc to \u00bd C cold water\n\nAlmond milk, for brushing\n\nPine nuts, for garnish\n\nMETHOD\n\nIn a large skillet, heat the olive oil over medium-high heat.\n\nAdd the onion and stir so that it is coated in the oil. Add the eggplant and cook for about 5 minutes. Add the mushrooms and tomatoes and cook for 2 minutes more. (If sticking, add a splash of water as you go.) Add the kale and stir until the leaves are limp, about 2 minutes. Add the capers, yogurt, oregano, and 1 teaspoon of the salt. Sprinkle 1 tablespoon of the flour on top, then stir to combine. Remove from the heat and let sit while you prepare the crust.\n\nPreheat the oven to 375\u00b0F.\n\nPlace the remaining flour, the oats, and the remaining 1 teaspoon salt in a large bowl. Stir to combine. Add the margarine and work it through with clean fingers until the mixture is crumbly. Add the water, 2 tablespoons at a time, kneading between additions, until the mixture forms a ball.\n\nLightly dust a clean work surface with flour. Knead the dough a few times until it forms a nice, compact ball. Flatten with the palm of your clean hands and then sprinkle with a little bit of flour and roll into a circle with a rolling pin. Roll back and forth a few times and then flip, sprinkle with some more flour, roll, flip, and repeat until you have a circle about 15 inches in diameter.\n\nTransfer the dough to a baking sheet and spoon the filling into the middle. Fold the edges up, pressing the dough together where the edges touch to encourage sticking. Brush the dough with almond milk and sprinkle the pine nuts over the exposed part of the filling.\n\nBake for 45 minutes. Remove and let cool for 5 minutes before cutting and serving.\n\n\"I'm eating a far more plant-based diet.\"\n\n\u2014OPRAH WINFREY\nNO-FRILLS CHEESE PIZZA\n\nWho doesn't love a classic cheese pie once in a while? But cow's-milk mozzarella comes with all kinds of devastation\u2014like runoff from factory farms into local waterways and using copious amounts of water to grow cattle feed. So once in a while, try your pie with Daiya mozzarella instead\u2014it uses a blend of tapioca flour (for meltability) and pea protein instead of cow's milk. _Molto delizioso_!\n\nSERVES 2 PREP AND COOKING TIME: 45 MINUTES\n\nINGREDIENTS\n\n2\u00bd C all-purpose flour, plus more for dusting\n\n2\u00bd tsp baking powder\n\n1 tsp salt\n\n3 Tbsp olive oil\n\n1 (6-oz) can tomato paste\n\n\u00bd tsp garlic powder\n\n1 tsp dried oregano\n\n1 (8-oz) packet Daiya mozzarella shreds\n\nMETHOD\n\nPreheat the oven to 400\u00b0F.\n\nPlace the flour, baking powder, and salt in a large bowl and stir to combine. Make a well in the center.\n\nCombine \u00be cup water and 1 tablespoon of the olive oil in a small dish. Slowly pour this into the well in the dry ingredients, stirring as you go. It'll start out as a liquidy paste. Once firm enough to handle, use clean hands to form the dough into a ball inside the bowl. If the dough isn't coming together, add up to another \u00bc cup water, a little at a time, until it forms a nice ball. (If it's too wet, add some more flour.)\n\nPlace the dough on a lightly floured work surface and knead for about 3 minutes. Divide it into two balls and roll each out into a 10-inch circle. Carefully transfer each dough round to its own baking sheet.\n\nPlace the tomato paste, remaining 2 tablespoons olive oil, the garlic powder, and the oregano in a small dish and stir to combine. Spoon the sauce onto the crusts and spread it evenly with the back of a tablespoon, leaving a 1-inch border along the edges. Top the pizzas evenly with the mozzarella.\n\nBake the pizzas until the crusts are crispy but not burnt, 10 to 12 minutes. (If your oven is too small to fit both, cook one and then the other.) Enjoy immediately.\n\n**Serving Suggestion:** Try dipping your pizza in the ranch dressing from the Spicy Sweet Potato Fries recipe.\n\n**Note:** Want some frills on your no-frills pizza? Plant-Based Parmesan, fresh basil leaves, olives, capers, sun-dried tomatoes, artichokes, mushrooms, and red onion all make tasty additions.\nA MESSAGE FROM\n\n## WHOLE FOODS MARKET FOUNDER AND CEO JOHN MACKEY\n\n**In my early twenties, I became vegetarian,** back before anyone had even heard of vegans. I thought it was just a healthier way to live and was aware it did less harm to animals. I moved into a vegetarian co-op and fell in with that lifestyle. My friends were vegetarian, and so I was a vegetarian. You might say it was the good kind of peer pressure. Then, much later in life, when I was already running Whole Foods, I was challenged by an animal protection advocate to learn more about factory farming and some of the products we were selling. That process led me to become vegan, and I haven't looked back since.\n\nIn my opinion, you can't be an environmentalist\u2014not a true environmentalist\u2014unless you're eating a plant-based diet. The environmental impact of eating so much animal-based food is terrible for our planet in so many ways. From animal-waste disposal and polluting ground waters to devastating the rain forests and increasing our carbon footprint\u2014there's no question that a plant-based diet is gentler and more environmentally sustainable.\n\nAnd yet there's so much confusion out there about what healthy, sustainable eating is. That's no accident. There are big, vested interests\u2014the egg industry, the dairy industry, the meat industry\u2014that put out a lot of dummy studies to purposely cause that confusion.\n\nBut there's a strong consensus in the legitimate science. The really _good_ science increasingly shows that there are certain things everyone agrees about. Whatever you're eating\u2014vegan or omnivore or paleo or whatever else\u2014everyone agrees we should eat more fresh fruits and veggies. And the science is clear that we should be eating, as Michael Pollan says, \"real food, mostly plants, not too much.\" The science is clear that eating too many animal-based foods correlates very closely with heart disease, obesity, cancer, diabetes, and environmental harm. Anyone who says anything to the contrary will have no legitimate studies to support their point of view.\n\nDo we all have to be vegan? I certainly am, but there's a place at the table for everyone when it comes to eating a healthier, more plant-forward, eco-friendlier diet.\n\n_John Mackey has led Whole Foods Market as it has grown from a single store, founded in 1978, to an $11 billion Fortune 300 company and a top U.S. supermarket. For fifteen consecutive years,_ Fortune _magazine has included Whole Foods Market on its \"100 Best Companies to Work For\" list. Mackey has been recognized for his work over the years by being named Ernst & Young's \"United States Entrepreneur of the Year,\"_ Institutional Investor's _\"Best CEO in America,\"_ Barron's _\"World's Best CEO,\" MarketWatch's \"CEO of the Year,\"_ Fortune's _\"Businessperson of the Year,\" and_ Esquire's _\"Most Inspiring CEO.\"_\nOYSTER MUSHROOMS \u00c1 LA MARINI\u00c8RE\n\n\u00c0 la marini\u00e8re is a French style of cooking mussels in butter and wine. This version is more sea- (and sea creature\u2013) friendly, using oyster mushrooms instead of mussels. The French lentils add protein, and the dish is served in a pool of broth with a chunk of rustic bread. It's perfect for a cool fall evening.\n\nSERVES 2 PREP AND COOKING TIME: 1 HOUR\n\nINGREDIENTS\n\n\u00bd C dried French lentils\n\n2 vegetable bouillon cubes\n\n2 Tbsp raw cashews, soaked in water to cover for at least 4 hours\n\n3 Tbsp olive oil\n\n2 garlic cloves, minced\n\n\u00be C chopped shallots\n\n\u00bc C fresh parsley, chopped\n\n6 dried bay leaves\n\n1\u00bd Tbsp fresh thyme\n\n1 tsp chopped fresh rosemary\n\n\u00bc tsp salt\n\n\u00bc tsp freshly ground black pepper\n\n2 C oyster mushrooms, chopped\n\n1 C Pinot Grigio or other dry white wine\n\nA baguette or other rustic bread, for serving\n\nMETHOD\n\nPlace the lentils in a pot with 1\u00bd cups water and the bouillon cubes. Cover and bring to a boil. Lower the heat to maintain a simmer and cook until soft, about 30 minutes.\n\nMeanwhile, drain and rinse the soaked cashews. Place them in a blender. Add enough water to just cover them and blend until smooth, about 1 minute. Pour the cashew cream into a small bowl and set it aside.\n\nAfter 30 minutes, remove the lentils from the heat. Drain, reserving \u00bd cup of the cooking liquid. Set aside.\n\nIn a skillet, heat the olive oil over medium-high heat. Add the garlic and shallots and cook, stirring, until soft, 3 to 4 minutes. Add the parsley, bay leaves, thyme, rosemary, salt, and pepper and cook for 1 minute more.\n\nAdd the oyster mushrooms. As they cook, they'll release liquid. Cook until that liquid has evaporated, 5 to 8 minutes. Add the wine and cook for 3 to 4 minutes to let some of the alcohol burn off. Remove and discard the bay leaves. Add the cashew cream you made earlier and the reserved \u00bd cup lentil cooking liquid. Stir to combine. Add the cooked lentils and cook for about 1 minute more.\n\nWhen finished, you'll have a hearty dish in a light broth. Spoon this onto a plate and top it off with some of the broth, so the broth pools on the plate. Serve with a chunk of baguette or other type of rustic bread.\n\n**Tips:** If oyster mushrooms are too pricey, any kind of mushrooms will work. Also, enjoy the leftover white wine with your dinner\u2014the best kind of zero-waste dining!\nPITTSBURGH PIEROGIS\n\nMy wife is from Pittsburgh, where pierogis are basically the city's official food (and a way of life). Every time the Steelers are in a big game, she makes a massive plate of these delicious Polish dumplings for our friends and family. Here's her recipe for straight-out-of-Pittsburgh vegan pierogis.\n\nMAKES 30 TO 40 SMALL PIEROGIS PREP AND COOKING TIME: 2 HOURS\n\nINGREDIENTS\n\nFor the dough:\n\n1\u00bc C all-purpose flour\n\n\u00bc tsp salt\n\n1 Tbsp olive oil\n\n\u00bc C lukewarm water\n\n\u00bc C vegan sour cream\n\n2 Tbsp margarine, at room temperature\n\nFor the filling:\n\n\u2153 tsp sea salt, plus more for the cooking water\n\n1\u00bc lb Yukon Gold potatoes, peeled and cut into \u00bd-inch pieces\n\n1 Tbsp margarine\n\n\u00bc C plain soy milk\n\n1 tsp onion powder\n\n\u00bd tsp garlic powder\n\n\u00bc tsp freshly ground black pepper\n\nFor frying and serving:\n\nAll-purpose flour, for dusting\n\nSalt\n\n1 Tbsp canola oil\n\n\u00bd C vegan sour cream\n\n\u00bd C sauerkraut, squeezed\n\nMETHOD\n\nFirst, make the dough:\n\nCombine the flour and salt in a large bowl.\n\nWhisk the olive oil into the water and then slowly pour that into the flour, mixing as you go. Add the sour cream and margarine.\n\nWith clean hands, work the dough until it loses most of its stickiness, about 5 minutes, kneading it into a loose ball. Wrap the dough ball in plastic wrap and refrigerate for 30 minutes or up to 2 days.\n\nMeanwhile, make the filling:\n\nBring a large pot of salted water to a boil. Add the potatoes and cook until soft, about 15 minutes.\n\nRemove from the heat and drain. Rinse with cold water to cool them slightly. Return them to the pot and add the rest of the ingredients for the filling. Mash with a potato masher until smooth. Set aside.\n\nForm and fry the pierogis:\n\nFlour a clean work surface. Unwrap the dough and transfer it to the work surface. Knead for about 5 minutes, adding more flour as you go, until the dough is smooth but not sticky.\n\nRoll the dough into a large, very thin rectangle. Using a cookie cutter or thin-rimmed drinking glass roughly 3 inches in diameter, cut as many circles as possible into the rectangle of dough.\n\nLift away the remaining dough, knead it into a ball, roll that out again, and cut more circles. Repeat these steps until all the dough has been used up. You should have 30 to 40 small dough circles at the end.\n\nTake the mashed potato filling and roll it into roughly 30 to 40 small balls (one for each dough circle).\n\nBring a very large pot of salted water to a low boil. Set up a workstation with the dough circles, potato balls, a lightly floured baking sheet, and a small bowl of cold water (to wet your fingers when forming the pierogis).\n\nPlace a potato ball in the center of a dough circle, and then flatten the filling slightly. Using your clean finger, wet the edges of the dough circle. Fold the dough together to make a half circle and pinch the edges shut. Place the pierogi on the floured baking sheet and use a fork to seal the edges. Repeat with the remaining dough and filling. Your first few might be a bit weird, but you'll quickly get the hang of it.\n\nPlace about 6 pierogis into the pot of boiling water. Once they float to the surface, about 3 minutes, scoop them out with a slotted spoon and place them on a plate. Repeat until all the pierogis are boiled.\n\nIn a large nonstick skillet, heat the canola oil over medium-high heat. Add a few pierogis and fry until browned, 1 to 2 minutes per side. Repeat to fry the entire batch.\n\nTransfer the cooked pierogis to a serving plate. Top with vegan sour cream and sauerkraut. Enjoy!\n\n\"I'm eating less meat these days myself, and I'm proud of it... Twenty-eight percent of greenhouse gases come from livestock farming, so cutting back on meat consumption even slightly can have a big, positive impact.\"\n\n\u2014ARNOLD SCHWARZENEGGER\nPROTEIN-PACKED BURRITO BOWL\n\nThis is one hearty bowl of deliciousness! Gardein's plant-based chicken tenders are meaty and have a much greener footprint than real-meat chicken fingers (just think of all those Delmarva Peninsula residents dealing with poultry farm air pollution). Add quinoa and black beans, and this bowl is a protein-packed meal.\n\nSERVES 2 PREP AND COOKING TIME: 40 MINUTES\n\nINGREDIENTS\n\nFor the vinaigrette:\n\n2 Tbsp fresh lime juice\n\n1 garlic clove, minced\n\n\u00bd tsp agave nectar\n\n\u00bd tsp sea salt\n\n\u215b tsp ground cumin\n\n2 Tbsp olive oil\n\n1 Tbsp chopped fresh cilantro\n\nFor the bowl:\n\n1 (9.5-oz) packet Gardein Chipotle Lime Chicken Fingers\n\n1 C quinoa\n\nSea salt\n\n2 ears corn, husked\n\n1 Tbsp coconut oil\n\n\u00bc head purple cabbage, thinly sliced\n\n1 (15-oz) can black beans, drained and rinsed\n\n1 ripe avocado, halved and pitted, then diced, if desired\n\n10 cherry tomatoes, halved\n\n\u00bd red onion, finely sliced\n\nFresh cilantro, for garnish\n\nLime wedges, for garnish\n\nSesame seeds, for garnish\n\nMETHOD\n\nPreheat the oven to 450\u00b0F.\n\nFirst, make the vinaigrette:\n\nMix the vinaigrette ingredients together in a small bowl. Set aside in the fridge.\n\nAssemble the bowl:\n\nBake the Gardein according to the package instructions. Set aside once done.\n\nPut the quinoa in a saucepan with \u0661\u00bd cups water and a pinch of salt. Cover, bring to a boil, and lower the heat to maintain a simmer. Cook until the liquid has been absorbed, 15 to 20 minutes. Remove from the heat and fluff with a fork. Set aside.\n\nHeat a skillet over medium-high heat. Brush the corn with coconut oil, sprinkle with salt, and place in the hot pan. Cook, turning every few minutes, until lightly charred and cooked all over. Set aside.\n\nCut the corncobs into thirds and slice the chicken fingers. Assemble each bowl with half the corn, chicken fingers, cabbage, black beans, avocado, tomatoes, and onion. Sprinkle garnishes on top, add the dressing, and enjoy!\n\n**Want to go the extra eco-mile?** Replace the Gardein with tofu. Just broil a few strips (see here).\n\n**Serving Suggestion:** This also pairs well with a side of Roasted Red Pepper Hummus.\nRAINBOW VEGGIE SUSHI\n\nYou know what they say: give a man a fish and he'll eat for a day; teach a man to fish and all the world's fish will be gone by 2050. This no-fish dish uses red pepper, yellow mango, purple cabbage, green cucumber and avocado, and orange carrot to create flavorful, colorful sushi that's easy on our oceans and their inhabitants.\n\nSERVES 2 PREP AND COOKING TIME: 1 HOUR\n\nINGREDIENTS\n\n2\u00bd C short-grain brown rice\n\n\u2153 C vegan mayo\n\n8 sheets roasted nori\n\n1 red bell pepper, thinly sliced\n\n1 carrot, julienned\n\n1 mango, pitted, peeled, and julienned\n\n1 cucumber, julienned\n\n1 avocado, pitted, peeled, and thinly sliced\n\n2 C thinly sliced cabbage\n\nSoy sauce, for dipping\n\nWasabi paste (optional)\n\nPickled ginger (optional)\n\nMETHOD\n\nPlace the rice and 5 cups water in a medium saucepan. Cover and bring to a boil over high heat. Turn the heat down to low and simmer for 30 minutes. Remove from the heat and let sit, covered, for 10 minutes. Remove the lid, fluff with a fork, and let cool. Once fully cool, stir in the mayo.\n\nWhile rice is cooking, if you've never made homemade sushi before, now would be a good time to watch a video of it online so you can see the rolling technique.\n\nOnce you're ready to roll (literally!), wet a sushi mat and place a nori sheet on top of it, shiny-side down. Place one-eighth of the cooked rice on the bottom two-thirds of the nori sheet and press it out into a flat, even layer.\n\nPlace one-eighth of each ingredient (or any combination thereof that you'd like!) along the middle of the rice. Roll the bottom end of the sushi mat over the ingredients to enclose them in the rice and then continue to roll, using quite firm pressure to ensure that everything holds together. Set aside and repeat with the remaining ingredients to make a total of 8 rolls.\n\nUse a slightly wet serrated knife to cut each roll crosswise into 8 equal-size pieces.\n\nEnjoy immediately with soy sauce for dipping and wasabi and pickled ginger alongside, if you like.\n\n**Tip:** Make the rice in the morning or even the night before so it's fully cooled by the time you use it. If you try to roll rice that's too warm, you'll end up with soggy sushi\u2014and no one likes soggy sushi.\n\n**Serving Suggestion:** Serve with Sesame Seaweed Salad.\nSAVE-THE-BAY CRAB CAKES\n\nI've spent much of my life near the Chesapeake Bay, where crab cakes are a local favorite. But rather than pulling crabs from the bay to make the dish, this recipe instead uses hearts of palm\u2014which are soft and hearty and pull apart like crabmeat does. It's an eco-friendlier twist on a regional favorite.\n\nSERVES 4 PREP AND COOKING TIME: 1 HOUR\n\nINGREDIENTS\n\nFor the tartar sauce:\n\n\u00bc C vegan mayo\n\n2 tsp sweet relish\n\n1 tsp yellow mustard\n\n\u00bd tsp fresh lemon juice\n\nDash of salt\n\nFreshly cracked black pepper\n\nFor the crab cakes:\n\n1 (14-oz) can hearts of palm, drained\n\n1 Tbsp olive oil\n\n\u00bd C minced onion\n\n2 tsp minced garlic\n\n\u00bc C minced bell pepper\n\n1\u00bc C fresh, frozen, or canned corn kernels\n\n1 C bread crumbs\n\n2\u00bd Tbsp finely chopped fresh parsley\n\n2 tsp yellow mustard\n\n1\u00bd Tbsp Old Bay seasoning\n\n\u00bc C vegan mayo\n\n\u00bc C vegetable oil\n\nMETHOD\n\nFirst, make the tartar sauce:\n\nMix all the sauce ingredients together in a small bowl and refrigerate.\n\nMake the crab cakes:\n\nDrain the hearts of palm and lay them out on a cutting board. Thinly slice them lengthwise and then chop them. Into a large bowl, squeeze the chopped pieces between clean fingers until they break apart. Set aside.\n\nIn a large skillet, heat the olive oil over medium-high heat. Add the onion, garlic, and bell pepper. Saut\u00e9 until tender, about 4 minutes. Add the corn and saut\u00e9 for 1 minute more. Remove from the heat.\n\nPlace the vegetable mixture into the bowl with the hearts of palm, setting the skillet aside for later. Mix well to combine. Add \u2153 cup of the bread crumbs, the parsley, mustard, 1 tablespoon of the Old Bay, and the mayo. Mix well.\n\nFill the bottom of a shallow bowl or pie plate with the remaining \u2154 cup bread crumbs. Add the remaining \u00bd tablespoon Old Bay and mix.\n\nTake about \u00bc cup of the vegetable mixture and drop it into the bread crumbs. Roll it around until it's well coated and form into a small patty with clean hands. Transfer to a large plate or baking sheet. Repeat until all the vegetable mixture has been used. (You should have about 7 large crab cakes; if you want them a bit smaller, you could form 8 to 10 smaller patties instead.)\n\nGently wipe out the skillet. Add the vegetable oil and heat over medium-high heat. Once the oil is hot (about 1 minute), place the patties in the skillet, carefully\u2014so as not to splatter the oil\u2014and cook until golden brown on each side, about 2 minutes per side. Transfer to a paper towel\u2013lined plate to drain excess oil. Repeat until all the crab cakes have been fried.\n\nTop with tartar sauce and enjoy immediately, either on their own or with a side of Quick Country Coleslaw.\n\n**Tip:** As you fry all the crab cakes, the bread crumbs left over in the oil may burn. If this happens, drain the oil between batches, wipe out the pan, and heat up fresh oil.\nSMOKY SEITAN KEBABS WITH PEANUT SAUCE\n\nKebab is a general term that can apply to various types of Middle Eastern grilled meats. In America, we're most familiar with shish kebab: small pieces of meat that are skewered and grilled. But beef and lamb come with a high eco-footprint (especially when the animals eat grass, resulting in higher methane emissions). This smoky kebab recipe uses easy homemade seitan instead, to cut down on emissions. Topped with peanut sauce and served with fresh lime and herbs, it's a deliciously smoky and more sustainable way to enjoy this tasty dish.\n\nSERVES 2 PREP AND COOKING TIME: 30 MINUTES\n\nINGREDIENTS\n\n2 Tbsp creamy peanut butter\n\n4 Tbsp soy sauce\n\n2 Tbsp pure maple syrup\n\n1 tsp Sriracha (optional)\n\n1 C vital wheat gluten\n\n1 tsp garlic powder\n\n1 tsp onion powder\n\n1 tsp smoked paprika\n\n1 tsp dried thyme\n\n2 Tbsp nutritional yeast\n\n\u00bd tsp liquid smoke\n\n1 tsp vegan Worcestershire sauce\n\n1 Tbsp olive oil\n\n1 Tbsp tomato paste\n\nFresh cilantro, for garnish\n\nLime wedges, for serving\n\nMETHOD\n\nPreheat the oven to 375\u00b0F. Line a baking sheet with parchment paper and set aside.\n\nCombine the peanut butter, 2 tablespoons of the soy sauce, maple syrup, and Sriracha, if using, in a small bowl. Stir until well combined. Set the peanut sauce aside until ready to serve.\n\nPlace the vital wheat gluten, garlic powder, onion powder, paprika, thyme, and nutritional yeast in a large bowl and stir to combine.\n\nIn another bowl, place the liquid smoke, Worcestershire, olive oil, tomato paste, remaining 2 tablespoons soy sauce, and \u00bd cup water. Stir to combine.\n\nPour the wet mixture into the dry mixture. Stir gently as you pour, until it vaguely resembles ground beef. Knead the dough in the bowl for 2 minutes. It shouldn't stick to your hands at all.\n\nOnce you have a loose ball, break it into 18 small chunks. Press 3 chunks together to form one larger piece, then flatten it out. That'll be one kebab. Repeat this until you have 6 kebabs.\n\nPlace the kebabs on the prepared baking sheet. Flatten them out and bake for 10 minutes. Remove and let cool slightly. Turn the oven to broil.\n\nWet your skewers with water, and skewer each kebab. Place them back on the baking sheet and return to the oven, broiling each side for 2 minutes. Remove and serve topped with fresh herbs, with the peanut sauce and lime wedges alongside.\n\n**Serving Suggestion:** These are also great as the meat inside a Vietnamese B\u00e1nh M\u00ec.\n\n\"Please eat less meat.\"\n\n\u2014DR. RAJENDRA PACHAURI, FORMER CHAIR OF THE UN INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE (IPCC)\nSPAGHETTI AND LENTIL MEATBALLS\n\nWhat could be more classic than spaghetti and meatballs? But alas, one serving of beef creates about 27 kg of CO2 emissions. A serving of lentils? Only 0.9 kg. That's a 96.6 percent reduction. With lentils, walnuts, oats, and\u2014yes\u2014even peanut butter (trust me), this dish will win over the hearts and stomachs of even the hungriest carnivore.\n\nSERVES 4 PREP AND COOKING TIME: 1 HOUR\n\nINGREDIENTS\n\nFor the meatballs:\n\n3 Tbsp olive oil\n\n\u00bd C minced onion\n\n4 garlic cloves, minced\n\n1 tsp peanut butter\n\n2 Tbsp rolled (not instant) oats\n\n5 sun-dried tomatoes\n\n\u00bd tsp dried oregano\n\n\u00bd tsp dried rosemary\n\n\u00bd tsp dried thyme\n\n\u00bc tsp crushed red pepper\n\n\u00bd tsp dried sage\n\n\u00bc tsp freshly ground black pepper\n\n\u00bd tsp sea salt\n\n\u00bc C fresh parsley\n\n1\u00bd Tbsp tomato paste\n\n1 Tbsp flax meal\n\n1 (15-oz) can green or black lentils, drained\n\n6 Tbsp Plant-Based Parmesan\n\n5 Tbsp bread crumbs\n\nFor the sauce:\n\n\u00bd tsp salt, plus more for the pasta water\n\n1 Tbsp olive oil\n\n1 yellow onion, finely chopped\n\n3 to 5 garlic cloves, finely chopped\n\n2 (14-oz) cans chopped tomatoes\n\n\u00bc C tomato paste\n\n\u00bd tsp freshly ground black pepper\n\n\u00bd tsp dried oregano\n\n\u00bd tsp dried thyme\n\n1 tsp agave nectar or sugar\n\nSmall handful of fresh basil leaves\n\nTo assemble:\n\n1 (16-oz) box spaghetti\n\nOlive oil\n\nFresh basil leaves, for garnish\n\nFresh parsley leaves, for garnish\n\nPlant-Based Parmesan\n\nMETHOD\n\nFirst, make the meatballs:\n\nPreheat the oven to 375\u00b0F. Line a baking sheet with parchment paper.\n\nHeat a large skillet (I use cast iron) over medium-high heat. Once hot, add 2 tablespoons of the olive oil, and all of the onion and the garlic. Cook for about 3 minutes, then remove from the heat.\n\nTransfer the garlic and onions to a food processor (set the skillet aside) and add the rest of the meatball ingredients and 2 tablespoons water. Pulse to combine well, but avoid pureeing entirely. (You're going to roll this into balls next, so if it's too wet, add more bread crumbs, a little at a time, and pulse to combine.)\n\nScrape the mixture into a large bowl and stir once more to combine.\n\nForm the meatball mixture into about 12 small balls, gently rolling them in the palm of your hand with your fingertips and arranging them on the prepared baking sheet as you go.\n\nSet the skillet over medium-high heat. Add the remaining 1 tablespoon olive oil and as many meatballs as you can fit, leaving room to turn them. Cook until browned on most sides, about 2 minutes per side, turning or rolling them as you go. (Don't worry\u2014you bake them next, so they don't need to be fully cooked yet.)\n\nRearrange all the cooked meatballs on the baking sheet and bake for 20 minutes. Remove from the heat and set aside.\n\nMeanwhile, make the sauce:\n\nIn a saucepan, heat the olive oil over medium heat. Add the onion and garlic and cook for about 4 minutes. Add the remaining sauce ingredients and mix well. (Be careful of splatter when you add the chopped tomatoes.) Bring to a boil, then lower the heat to maintain a simmer and cook, uncovered, for about 10 minutes while you make the pasta.\n\nAssemble and enjoy:\n\nBring a large pot of salted water to a boil. Cook the pasta in the boiling water according to the directions on the package. Drain and mix some olive oil through to keep the pasta from sticking.\n\nServe the pasta in deep bowls topped with meatballs, sauce, fresh basil and parsley, and Plant-Based Parmesan. Mangia!\n\n**Equipment Alert:** This recipe requires a food processor.\n\n**Serving Suggestion:** Serve with a side of Easy Cheesy Garlic Bread.\n\n**Want to go the extra eco-mile?** Cook the lentils from scratch to cut down on packaging. You'll want 1\u00bd cups cooked lentils, and may want to make them in advance to save time.\nA MESSAGE FROM\n\n## NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL PRESIDENT RHEA SUH\n\n**I grew up in Boulder, Colorado,** which is surrounded by the magnificent Rocky Mountains and spectacular landscapes. When I was a kid, I kind of assumed that everyone had a backyard like mine, overlooking the Rockies. I was privileged to regularly hike, and camp, and ski, and fish, and to relax in the great outdoors. This experience was a critical part of my early years, and really influenced my vision of myself and of the world around me. That environmentalism was sort of \"baked into\" me from childhood.\n\nToday, climate change is the central environmental challenge of our time. It threatens our people, our oceans, our forests, our lands. It has the potential to cause a catastrophic collapse of species worldwide. It is a threat to the natural systems that support all life.\n\nDirectly connected to that is the growing scarcity of fresh water. Glaciers are melting worldwide, and that is already causing water shortages in Andean countries, parts of China, and elsewhere. We're seeing tens of thousands of Rocky Mountain whitefish dying in the Yellowstone River, for heaven's sake, because a microscopic parasite is thriving and fish are being stressed in water levels that are lower and temperatures that are higher than they should be.\n\nAnd finally, there is environmental injustice, with low-income communities and people of color bearing a disproportionate burden of dirty air, polluted water, and other environmental ills. We have a lot of work to do to get this right.\n\nAnd food touches on all of this\u2014air, water, wildlife, lands\u2014and impacts everything we're working to change\u2014energy, transportation, conservation. It's all wrapped up in how we produce, process, distribute, and consume our food. We won't get the equation right unless we get the food piece right.\n\nWe can eat more plants, for starters. Pound for pound, plants have a vastly smaller carbon and environmental \"food-print\" compared to animal products. Beef is the SUV of food, resulting in more than thirty times more climate-changing emissions, pound for pound, than lentils, for example.\n\nGoing vegetarian or vegan is great, but even changing your diet a little bit can make a big difference. But reducing the amount of red meat we eat\u2014even by a small amount\u2014can improve our health, save us money, and reduce our contribution to the planet's environmental burden. And don't forget that eating is an act of pleasure. Make some healthy, environmentally friendly changes to your diet that you truly enjoy, and chances are you'll want to repeat them and share with friends and family. That's making a difference.\n\n_Rhea Suh is president of the Natural Resources Defense Council, leading nearly five hundred scientists, attorneys, and policy experts at one of the country's most effective environmental-action organizations. Before joining NRDC, Suh was nominated by President Barack Obama and served as the Assistant Secretary for Policy, Management, and Budget at the U.S. Department of the Interior._\nSTEAMED BUNS WITH TOFU AND MUSHROOMS\n\nLegend says that thousands of years ago, Chinese military leader Zhuge Liang encountered a river his troops couldn't cross. He was told to sacrifice his men and toss their heads into the river, to appease the gods for safe crossing. Instead, he ordered that head-shaped buns stuffed with meat be thrown into the river. Thus was born the steamed bun. This version takes Liang's compassion further: rather than being meat-filled, they're filled with hearty tofu, mushrooms, and vegetables. You can toss them into a river, though I recommend eating them.\n\nSERVES 2 (MAKES 6 SMALL BUNS) PREP AND COOKING TIME: 1 HOUR, PLUS 1 HOUR RISING TIME\n\nINGREDIENTS\n\n1 heaping Tbsp sugar\n\n1 C lukewarm water\n\n2 tsp instant yeast\n\n2\u00bc C all-purpose flour\n\nTiny pinch of salt\n\n2 Tbsp soy sauce\n\n2 Tbsp rice vinegar\n\n1 Tbsp toasted sesame oil\n\n1 Tbsp agave nectar\n\n1 tsp Sriracha\n\n\u00bd (16-ounce) block extra-firm tofu, cut into 12 slices\n\nVegetable oil, for brushing\n\n1 tsp black sesame seeds\n\n2 large brown mushrooms, thinly sliced\n\n\u00bc large cucumber, thinly sliced\n\nChopped scallions\n\nChopped fresh cilantro\n\nMETHOD\n\nIn a measuring cup or small bowl, dissolve the sugar in the warm water. Add the yeast. Stir and let sit until it gets foamy, about 5 minutes.\n\nPlace the flour and salt in a large bowl. Once the yeast mixture has some bubbles, add it to the flour. Stir gently and knead until it's smooth and soft.\n\nReturn the dough to the bowl, cover with a dish towel, and leave in a warm place until the dough has doubled in size, about 1 hour. (If you live in a cold climate, place the bowl in a 95\u00b0F oven to rise.)\n\nWhile the dough is rising, combine the soy sauce, vinegar, sesame oil, agave, and Sriracha in a small dish. Add the tofu and turn to coat in the marinade.\n\nWhen the dough has doubled in size, punch the air out and split the dough into 6 pieces. Roll them into balls and lightly brush the bottoms with vegetable oil. Sprinkle with the sesame seeds and let sit for 10 minutes.\n\nWhile the buns are sitting, arrange bamboo steaming baskets so they are sitting in a wok or saucepan with just enough water in the bottom of the pan to not get the baskets wet.\n\nPlace the buns in the steamer baskets with enough room for them to expand a little. Bring to a boil, cover, and steam for 20 minutes. Remove from the heat and let sit for 5 minutes. Remove the lids, being careful not to drip water onto the buns.\n\nSet a skillet over medium heat. Add the mushrooms, 1 tablespoon water, and 2 tablespoons of the tofu marinade (reserving the rest). Cook until brown, about 5 minutes.\n\nMove the mushrooms to one side of the pan and add the tofu to the other side. Cook for 2 minutes per side to heat the tofu through.\n\nRemove the buns from their baskets and carefully split them down the middle. Fill with the tofu, mushrooms, cucumber slices, scallions, and cilantro. Pour the remaining marinade into a small dish to spoon over the buns as you eat them.\nSUN-DRIED TOMATO AND BASIL SAUSAGES\n\nSausage's environmental footprint can be high. Think about that mega pig farm the people of Arrow Rock, Missouri, fought against\u2014or all the pollution caused by pig factories in North Carolina. These sausages use vital wheat gluten: all protein, no pork. Mixed with white beans, sun-dried tomatoes, and basil for Italian flair, they're perfect for any occasion.\n\nSERVES 2 TO 4 PREP AND COOKING TIME: 1 HOUR\n\nINGREDIENTS\n\n4 sun-dried tomatoes, chopped\n\n2 garlic cloves, minced\n\n\u00bd C canned white beans, drained and rinsed\n\n10 fresh basil leaves\n\n2 Tbsp olive oil\n\n1 Tbsp apple cider vinegar\n\n1 tsp seeded mustard\n\n1\u00bd C vital wheat gluten\n\n1 tsp onion powder\n\n\u00be tsp sea salt\n\n\u00bd tsp freshly ground black pepper\n\n2 Tbsp nutritional yeast\n\nMETHOD\n\nPlace a metal steaming basket inside a large pot. Add 2 to 3 inches of water, ensuring the water is below the basket. Cut eight pieces of aluminum foil about 7 inches wide.\n\nPlace the sun-dried tomatoes, garlic, and white beans in a blender or food processor. Add the basil leaves, olive oil, vinegar, mustard, and 1 cup water. Puree until smooth.\n\nPlace the vital wheat gluten, onion powder, salt, pepper, and nutritional yeast in a large bowl and stir with a fork to combine. Pour the puree into the dry ingredients, stirring with a fork as you go, then use clean hands to knead everything into a ball.\n\nBreak the ball into 8 pieces and form each into a sausage shape. Roll each sausage in a piece of foil and twist at either end (like a Tootsie Roll)\u2014not too tight, as the sausages will expand as they cook.\n\nPlace the sausages in the steamer basket. Cover and bring to a boil. Steam for 40 minutes. (If the water gets too low, add more.) Once done, remove from the heat and let cool for at least 10 minutes before unwrapping each sausage.\n\nYou now have sausages that you can use as you please\u2014fry them in a pan, serve with mashed potatoes, take them to a BBQ and grill them, put them in a sandwich. The sky's the limit! Use immediately or store in an airtight container in the fridge for up to 3 days.\n\n**Serving Suggestion:** Serve with a side of grilled veggies drizzled with balsamic vinegar, or a simple salad.\n\n**Shopping Tip:** You can find vital wheat gluten in the flour aisle of most grocery stores.\nWILD RICE RISOTTO WITH PEAS AND ASPARAGUS\n\nRisotto is a northern Italian rice dish slowly cooked in stock. The stock is added a little at a time and continually topped off as the rice cooks and absorbs it. This releases starches from the rice that give the final product a creamy finish. The stock can be derived from meat, but for this version, we use veggie stock. The addition of wild rice\u2014which grows in water\u2014gives a nice earthy feel, and the peas help pack a little extra protein into the dish.\n\nSERVES 4 TO 6 PREP AND COOKING TIME: 1 HOUR\n\nINGREDIENTS\n\n10 C vegetable stock (see Note)\n\n2 Tbsp olive oil\n\n3 shallots, finely chopped\n\n3 garlic cloves, minced\n\n2 C Arborio rice\n\n1 C wild rice\n\n\u00bd C dry white wine\n\n2 C frozen peas\n\n1 (16-oz) bunch asparagus, cut into 1-inch pieces\n\nSalt and freshly ground black pepper\n\n\u00bd C fresh mint leaves, chopped, plus more for serving\n\n\u00bd C fresh basil leaves, chopped, plus more for serving\n\n\u00bd C pine nuts\n\nFresh lemon wedges, for serving\n\nMETHOD\n\nBring the stock to a boil in a large saucepan, then lower the heat to maintain a simmer or very low boil.\n\nMeanwhile, in a large saucepan, heat the olive oil over medium heat. Add the shallots and garlic and cook for about 3 minutes. Add the rices and stir until coated in oil and slightly translucent. Add the wine.\n\nYou now want to add just enough hot stock to cover the rice by about 1 inch. Bring it to a boil, then lower the heat to maintain a simmer and cook until the liquid has been mostly absorbed by the rice.\n\nOnce the first round of liquid has absorbed by the rice, add more hot stock\u2014about \u00bd cup\u2014and repeat until that liquid has been absorbed, too. Repeat as many times as you need to until the rice is fully cooked and very soft. (The amount of stock you need and the number of times you'll need to do this depends on how dry the rice is, how hot your kitchen is, etc. Generally, it takes about 30 minutes.)\n\nOnce the rice is cooked, stir in the frozen peas and cook for 3 minutes.\n\nAdd the asparagus to the pot and cook for 2 minutes more.\n\nRemove the risotto from the heat, cover, and let sit for 5 minutes. Season with salt and pepper. Stir the mint and basil leaves into the risotto.\n\nServe immediately, garnished with pine nuts, additional mint and basil, and a squeeze of lemon juice.\n\n**Note:** If you don't have stock, bring 10 cups water to a boil and add 5 cubes of vegetarian bouillon.\nSIDES AND EXTRAS\n\nBlackened Brussels Sprouts with Capers and Raisins\n\nCreamy Herbed Mashed Potatoes\n\nCrispy Rice Paper Bacon\n\nEasy Cheesy Garlic Bread\n\nGreen Bean Casserole\n\nLonestar BBQ Beans\n\nMint and Tofu Summer Rolls\n\nMinted Green Pea Guacamole\n\nPistachio and Sunflower Seed Dukkah\n\nPlant-Based Parmesan\n\nQuick Country Coleslaw\n\nRoasted Red Pepper Hummus\n\nRosemary Cornbread Mini Muffins\n\nSpicy Sweet Potato Fries with Ranch\n\nSweet-and-Salty Curried Popcorn\nBLACKENED BRUSSELS SPROUTS WITH CAPERS AND RAISINS\n\nThis recipe combines Brussels sprouts with vinegar and agave for a sweet-and-sour taste. Add walnuts, capers, raisins, garlic, and more, and you've got a flavorful, aromatic dish that's crave-worthy on its own, as a snack, or as a side dish.\n\nSERVES 4 TO 6 PREP AND COOKING TIME: 1 HOUR\n\nINGREDIENTS\n\n2 lb Brussels sprouts\n\n\u00bc tsp sea salt\n\n\u00bd C olive oil\n\n\u00bc C red wine vinegar\n\n1\u00bd Tbsp agave nectar\n\n\u00be C walnuts, chopped\n\n\u2153 C capers\n\n3 Tbsp golden raisins\n\n2 garlic cloves, minced\n\n\u00bc tsp ground cumin\n\n1 shallot, minced\n\nPinch of freshly ground black pepper\n\nMETHOD\n\nPreheat the oven to 425\u00b0F.\n\nPeel any bad leaves from the outsides of the sprouts and cut any larger sprouts in half. Place them in a large bowl as you go. Add the salt and \u00bc cup of the olive oil. Stir to coat well.\n\nPour the coated sprouts into a large cast-iron skillet and roast for 20 minutes, turning several times so the sprouts cook evenly.\n\nWhile the sprouts are in the oven, put the remaining \u00bc cup olive oil, the vinegar, and the agave in a blender and blend until emulsified, about 20 seconds. (You can also whisk this instead of blending, but you need to whisk well to emulsify the oil.) Pour into a small bowl and add the walnuts, capers, raisins, garlic, cumin, shallot, and pepper.\n\nRemove the sprouts from the oven and evenly pour the dressing over them. Mix to coat and bake for 15 minutes more.\n\nTurn the oven to broil and let the tops of the sprouts blacken, 3 to 10 minutes, depending on your oven and how blackened you want them.\n\nRemove from the oven (carefully, as the skillet will be hot!) and enjoy immediately on their own or as a side dish.\n\n**Serving Suggestion:** Serve alongside Meat-Free Meat Loaf.\nCREAMY HERBED MASHED POTATOES\n\nIt's hard to go wrong with a big, piping hot plate of mashed potatoes. This vegan version uses almond milk instead of cow's milk, margarine instead of butter, nutritional yeast for a little cheesy flavor, and chopped chives for... well, just so we can say there's something green in there!\n\nSERVES 4 PREP AND COOKING TIME: 30 MINUTES\n\nINGREDIENTS\n\n2 lb Yukon Gold potatoes, peeled and cubed\n\n1\u00bd tsp salt\n\n1 C plain almond milk\n\n2 Tbsp margarine\n\n2 Tbsp nutritional yeast\n\n\u00bc tsp freshly ground black pepper, plus more to taste\n\n1 tsp dried rosemary\n\n\u00bd tsp dried thyme\n\n2 Tbsp chopped fresh chives\n\nMETHOD\n\nPut the potatoes and 1 teaspoon of the salt in a large pot with enough cold water to cover them by 3 to 4 inches. Bring to a boil over high heat. Lower the heat to maintain a simmer and cook for 15 to 20 minutes, or until soft.\n\nDrain the water from the cooked potatoes and return them to the pot. Add the almond milk, margarine, nutritional yeast, remaining \u00bd teaspoon salt, the pepper, rosemary, and thyme. Mash until smooth using a potato masher. Serve, topped with chives and additional pepper.\n\n**Tip:** You can use any unsweetened, unflavored, creamy plant-based milk, such as soy, hemp, or coconut, in place of the almond milk.\n\n\"Eliminating or reducing meat consumption in our diets is one important way to reduce our contribution to climate change... So enjoy Meatless Mondays, Tofu Tuesdays, Salad Sundays and everything in between. Because a locally sourced plant-heavy diet is not only good for you, but good for our planet too.\"\n\n\u2014THE SIERRA CLUB\nCRISPY RICE PAPER BACON\n\nCrispy, salty, smoky\u2014this bacon hits the spot, without all the eco-woes that accompany industrial pig farming. It crisps and bubbles, and is marbled with shades of brown and red and white.\n\nSERVES 4 PREP AND COOKING TIME: 30 MINUTES\n\nINGREDIENTS\n\n2 Tbsp olive oil\n\n3 Tbsp soy sauce\n\n\u00bd tsp pure maple syrup\n\n\u00bd tsp liquid smoke\n\n2 Tbsp nutritional yeast\n\n1 tsp smoked paprika\n\n\u00bd tsp garlic powder\n\n\u00bc tsp onion powder\n\nPinch of freshly ground black pepper\n\n10 sheets rice paper\n\nMETHOD\n\nPreheat the oven to 400\u00b0F.\n\nIn a small bowl, combine all the ingredients except the rice paper and whisk together.\n\nNow you're going to cut the rice paper sheets into strips. It's tricky. Lay out one sheet of rice paper and, using a sharp knife, cut it into roughly 1-inch-wide strips. It'll crack apart (especially if your knife isn't sharp). Set the intact strips aside and repeat for all 10 sheets. At the end, you should have a nice pile of cut strips. (And it doesn't matter if they aren't perfect-looking!)\n\nNext, set up a large workspace with a parchment-covered baking sheet, a wide bowl or pie dish of water, and a dish of the marinade.\n\nTake two strips of roughly the same shape and hold them together. Dip them in the water. They'll stick together. Squeegee some of the water off with your fingers.\n\nDip the doubled strip in the marinade, gently, to coat both sides. Place on the parchment-lined baking sheet. Repeat until all the strips have been dipped and you have a bunch of double-thick bacon strips.\n\nBake until crispy, about 8 minutes. Careful: They'll go from crispy to burnt quickly.\n\nEnjoy immediately, or transfer to a wire rack and let cool before transferring to an airtight container and storing in the fridge. They're great on sandwiches, as a breakfast side, and more!\n\n**Tip:** Like your bacon a little chewier? Just bake it for a minute less.\n\n**Serving Suggestion:** Serve alongside the Tofu Scramble or any other breakfast dish.\n\n\"Like most people, I don't think I can be easily fooled. But that's just what happened when I was asked to taste a chicken taco and tell whether the meat inside was real or fake. The meat certainly had the look and the smell of chicken. I took a bite and it had the taste and texture of real chicken, too. But I was surprised to learn that there wasn't an ounce of real chicken it. The 'meat' was made entirely of plants. And yet, I couldn't tell the difference. What I was experiencing was more than a clever meat substitute. It was a taste of the future of food.\"\n\n\u2014BILL GATES\nEASY CHEESY GARLIC BREAD\n\nWhen I was young, I worked in a pizzeria. I became obsessed with the cheesy garlic bread that was one of their specialties. This is my reinvention of that recipe using plant-based, planet-friendly ingredients.\n\nSERVES 2 TO 4 PREP AND COOKING TIME: 10 MINUTES\n\nINGREDIENTS\n\n2 soft sub rolls\n\n1 Tbsp margarine\n\n\u00bd tsp salt\n\n1\u00bd tsp garlic powder\n\n1 Tbsp nutritional yeast\n\n1 tsp dried oregano\n\n\u00bd tsp freshly ground black pepper\n\nDaiya mozzarella shreds\n\nMETHOD\n\nPreheat the oven to 400\u00b0F.\n\nSlice each sub roll in half lengthwise. Lay them sliced-side up on a baking sheet.\n\nOn each half, spread about half the margarine. (If it's too cold to spread, warm it in the microwave for a few seconds to soften.)\n\nIn a small bowl, mix together the salt, garlic powder, nutritional yeast, oregano, and pepper. Sprinkle this across all four roll halves equally and use a butter knife to push it into the margarine a little bit.\n\nSprinkle each half with as much or as little mozzarella as you'd like.\n\nBake until toasted and the cheese has melted, 5 to 7 minutes.\n\n**Want to go the extra eco-mile?** Cut down on packaging by replacing the vegan mozzarella shreds with an extra 1 tablespoon nutritional yeast.\n\n**Serving Suggestion:** Enjoy with Spaghetti and Lentil Meatballs or Massaged Kale Caesar salad.\nGREEN BEAN CASSEROLE\n\nThis was always a Thanksgiving must-have in the Prescott household. And a Christmas must-have. And a Hanukkah must-have. Creamy mushroom soup, fresh green beans, and indulgent French-fried onions: You can't go wrong. This recipe is a new take on our family's classic, using shiitakes instead of button mushrooms and almond milk instead of cow's milk. Perfect any time of year\u2014especially holidays.\n\nSERVES 4 TO 6 PREP AND COOKING TIME: 30 MINUTES, PLUS SOAKING TIME FOR THE MUSHROOMS\n\nINGREDIENTS\n\n\u00be C dried shiitakes\n\n1 C boiling water\n\n4 C halved green beans\n\n\u00bc tsp salt, plus a pinch\n\n1 C almond milk\n\n1 vegetable bouillon cube, crushed into powder\n\n2 Tbsp nutritional yeast\n\n\u00bc tsp freshly ground black pepper\n\n\u00bc tsp dried sage\n\n1\u00bd C French-fried onions\n\nMETHOD\n\nPlace the dried mushrooms in a heatproof bowl. Add the boiling water and let sit for 1 hour.\n\nPreheat the oven to 375\u00b0F.\n\nMeanwhile, place the beans in a pot of cold water with a pinch of salt. Cover and bring to a boil. Cook for 3 to 4 minutes. Remove from the heat, drain immediately, and rinse under cold water.\n\nPour the liquid from the mushrooms into a medium bowl. Add the almond milk, crushed bouillon cube, nutritional yeast, \u00bc teaspoon salt, pepper, and sage. Whisk to combine. Finely chop the rehydrated mushrooms and add these to the liquid, along with half the French-fried onions.\n\nPlace the beans in a casserole dish, pour the liquid over, and then toss a couple of times to make sure the onions and mushrooms are nicely distributed throughout the beans and not sitting on top. Sprinkle the remaining onions over the top of the beans and bake for 15 minutes.\n\nRemove from the heat and let sit for 5 minutes before serving.\n\n**Serving Suggestion:** Serve with Meat-Free Meat Loaf and Creamy Herbed Mashed Potatoes.\n\n**Want to go the extra eco-mile?** Make this recipe when green beans are in season (see here).\nA MESSAGE FROM\n\n## THE CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY'S STEPHANIE FELDSTEIN\n\nIf you're looking for an easy and enjoyable way to conserve water; protect our oceans, lakes, and rivers; and save an amazing array of wild animal species, it's simple: eat less meat.\n\nThere are more than 7.4 billion people on the planet. It took about two hundred thousand years for the human population to reach 1 billion, then only two hundred years for that to increase sevenfold. There's never been another large, vertebrate animal that's grown as much, as quickly, or with such devastating consequences. In the past fifty years alone, our population has doubled, while wildlife populations\u2014including animals living in our oceans\u2014have plummeted by about half.\n\nAnd it's not just our sheer numbers that are crowding out other species\u2014it's our reckless overconsumption, relying on polluting, destructive industries. And at the top of that list is factory farming, the planet's single most environmentally destructive industry.\n\nThirty-five thousand miles of U.S. rivers, which provide habitat to countless fish, amphibians, and birds, are polluted by factory farms. Orange clownfish (like the star of _Finding Nemo_ ) and many other unique, beautiful species are losing their coral reef habitat to ocean acidification caused by greenhouse gas pollution\u2014caused in large part by the meat industry.\n\nEvery time we eat, we can make a wildlife-friendly choice. Fortunately, there are abundant plant-forward foods out there to help us do this. We can choose veggie sushi over fish sushi, bean burgers over hamburgers. Almond milk is easier on the planet than cow's milk. There's a whole rainbow of produce available at local grocers nationwide that offers delicious and vibrant ways to help save the planet. It's one of the best\u2014and tastiest\u2014ways to protect the environment.\n\n_Stephanie Feldstein is Population and Sustainability Director for the Center for Biological Diversity\u2014a national nonprofit conservation organization dedicated to the protection of endangered species and wild places. Using science, law, and creative media, the Center works to secure a future for all species great and small, with a focus on protecting the lands, waters, and climate that species need to survive._\nLONESTAR BBQ BEANS\n\nI make these beans whenever I've got visitors\u2014when I want an easy and filling meal with some Welcome-to-Texas flair. And because beans have remarkably low carbon and water footprints, my visitors and I can rest easy (and full) knowing we're eating something that's healthy, great tasting, and sustainable.\n\nSERVES 4 TO 6 PREP AND COOKING TIME: 1\u00bd TO 2 HOURS\n\nINGREDIENTS\n\n2 C dried pinto beans\n\n1 vegetable bouillon cube\n\n\u00bd tsp paprika\n\n\u00bd tsp liquid smoke\n\n1 Tbsp vegan Worcestershire sauce (optional)\n\n1 Tbsp agave nectar or molasses\n\n\u00bc C ketchup\n\n1 tsp mustard\n\n\u00bc tsp cayenne pepper\n\n2 Tbsp olive oil\n\n\u00bd C chopped onion\n\n\u00bd C finely chopped celery\n\n\u00bc C finely chopped carrots\n\n2 garlic cloves, minced\n\nMETHOD\n\nPlace the beans, 4 cups water, and the bouillon cube in a medium saucepan. Cover and bring to a boil. Lower the heat to maintain somewhere between a simmer and a very low boil and cook until the beans are soft, 60 to 90 minutes.\n\nWhile the beans cook, in a small bowl, whisk together the paprika, liquid smoke, Worcestershire (if using), agave, ketchup, mustard, cayenne, and 1 tablespoon water. Set aside.\n\nOnce the beans are done, remove them from the heat and set aside\u2014but don't drain them. Also, you want the water level to be just below the beans when they're done; if it's too high, remove the cover and boil for 2 minutes or so to let some of the excess water evaporate before removing from the heat.\n\nIn a large, deep skillet, heat the olive oil over medium-high heat for 2 to 3 minutes. Add the onion, celery, carrots, and garlic. Cook, stirring occasionally, until the vegetables soften, 5 to 8 minutes.\n\nPour the beans\u2014plus their cooking liquid\u2014into the skillet. Be careful! The water hitting the hot skillet will cause splatter. The beans will kind of pile up in the center of the skillet and the water will push to the sides. Go with that (no need to stir). Cook over medium heat until most of the liquid has evaporated, about 10 minutes. Add the BBQ sauce, stir to combine, and cook to heat through, about another 1 minute. Enjoy!\n\n**Serving Suggestions:** Top with vegan sour cream and serve over rice, or alongside the Jerked Jackfruit Tacos or Sun-Dried Tomato and Basil Sausages.\nMINT AND TOFU SUMMER ROLLS\n\nUnlike their spring counterparts, summer rolls aren't fried, but rather eaten cold and fresh. These Vietnamese rolls often contain pork and shrimp. But if you want a meat-free version that avoids all the troubles wrought by industrial pig and shrimp farming (air pollution, mangrove forest destruction, and so on), try using fresh vegetables and tofu instead. It's lighter on the planet and makes this already-fresh dish even fresher tasting.\n\nSERVES 2 PREP AND COOKING TIME: 30 MINUTES\n\nINGREDIENTS\n\n\u00bd (8.8-oz) package rice vermicelli noodles\n\n2 Tbsp creamy peanut butter\n\n2 Tbsp soy sauce\n\n2 Tbsp pure maple syrup\n\n2 tsp Sriracha\n\n1 tsp rice vinegar\n\n1 tsp ground ginger\n\n1 medium cucumber, seeded and julienned\n\n\u00bd (16-oz) block extra-firm tofu, cut into matchsticks\n\n\u00bd head iceberg lettuce, chopped\n\n\u00bd green bell pepper, sliced (optional)\n\n\u00bd C enoki mushrooms (optional)\n\nAbout 24 fresh mint leaves\n\nAbout 24 fresh Thai basil leaves\n\n8 (10-inch) sheets rice paper\n\n2 tsp sesame seeds\n\nMETHOD\n\nCook the rice noodles according to the directions on the package. Rinse in cold water, drain, and set side.\n\nCombine the peanut butter, soy sauce, maple syrup, Sriracha, vinegar, and ginger in a small bowl. Stir to combine. Thin with water if too thick. Set the peanut sauce aside in the fridge.\n\nSet the cucumber, tofu, lettuce, bell pepper (if using), mushrooms (if using), mint leaves, and basil leaves in individual piles.\n\nFill a large bowl or saucepan\u2014something a little bigger than 10 inches in diameter\u2014with lukewarm water. Set up a station with a plate to make the summer rolls on, a plate to put finished rolls on, and all the ingredients within arm's reach.\n\nImmerse a rice paper sheet in the water for about 10 seconds and then place on the rolling plate. It will still be a little hard. This is okay\u2014it will soften on the plate and be perfect for rolling once all the ingredients are on it. Leaving it in the water until completely soft makes it incredibly difficult to work with.\n\nSprinkle some of the sesame seeds onto the rice paper sheet, near one of the edges. Add a few pieces of cucumber, mint leaves, basil leaves, a piece of tofu, a smidge of the noodles, and a piece of lettuce. Add bell pepper and enoki mushrooms, if using. (For your first few, go light on the fillings, as it'll be easier to get the technique down.) Fold the sides over the fillings and then fold the bottom flap up and over the fillings, tuck, and roll like you're rolling a burrito. Repeat until all the rolls are done and enjoy immediately, with the dipping sauce.\n\n**Want to go the extra eco-mile?** To avoid food waste, if you have leftover fillings, make them into a small salad and top with the peanut sauce or even just a splash of rice vinegar.\n\n**Tip:** Never made summer rolls before? Watch a video online of the technique first!\nMINTED GREEN PEA GUACAMOLE\n\nLiving in Texas, my guac bar is set pretty high. I'm not gonna lie, when traveling outside the Lone Star state, I find most guacamole is simply not up to snuff. But as good as the classic avocado-tomato-onion recipe is, sometimes I just want a little somethin' extra in my guac. Enter: minted green pea guacamole. It's like your classic guac, but with mint for a little added freshness and green peas for a little added protein.\n\nSERVES 4 TO 6 PREP AND COOKING TIME: 25 MINUTES\n\nINGREDIENTS\n\n1 Tbsp pine nuts\n\nHandful of fresh cilantro, chopped\n\nHandful of fresh mint leaves, chopped\n\n1 garlic clove, minced\n\n1 C frozen peas\n\n\u2153 C finely chopped red onion\n\n2 large ripe avocados\n\nJuice of 1 lime\n\n\u00bd tsp salt\n\nFreshly ground black pepper\n\nTortilla chips or crudit\u00e9s, for serving\n\nMETHOD\n\nIn a dry pan, toast the pine nuts over medium heat until browned but not burnt.\n\nPlace the toasted pine nuts in a mortar and add the cilantro, mint, and garlic. Mash together with the pestle to make a pesto, then transfer to a large bowl.\n\nPlace the peas in a small bowl and microwave for 60 seconds. Add them to the pesto.\n\nAdd the onion to the bowl, along with the avocado flesh, lime juice, and salt. Mash until somewhere between smooth and chunky, according to your preference.\n\nSeason with the pepper and stir to combine.\n\nGarnish with additional fresh mint and serve immediately, with tortilla chips or crudit\u00e9s.\n\n**Note:** No mortar and pestle? Just mix all the pesto ingredients together, finely chopping the cilantro, mint, and garlic first\u2014or process in a food processor.\nPISTACHIO AND SUNFLOWER SEED DUKKAH\n\nDukkah is an Egyptian condiment made using nuts, seeds, herbs, and spices. Blended into a crumbly powder, dukkah is used for dipping bread into, or for sprinkling atop vegetables. This version uses toasted pistachios and sunflower seeds, along with sesame seeds and spices,to create an aromatic, delicious blend that's great for parties, or just to keep on hand as a tasty addition to any meal.\n\nSERVES 6 TO 8 PREP AND COOKING TIME: 20 MINUTES\n\nINGREDIENTS\n\n\u00bd C shelled pistachios\n\n\u00bd C shelled sunflower seeds\n\n\u00bd C sesame seeds\n\n1 Tbsp coriander seeds\n\n1 Tbsp cumin seeds\n\n1 tsp sea salt\n\n1 tsp black peppercorns\n\nMETHOD\n\nPlace all the ingredients in a dry skillet over medium heat and toast, turning continuously with a spatula until fragrant and the seeds start to make a popping sound, about 5 minutes.\n\nRemove from the heat and let cool for 10 minutes.\n\nTransfer to a food processor or blender. Process in 3- to 5-second intervals, until you have a chunky powder. (Stop and check every few seconds to ensure you don't accidentally turn it into nut butter by overprocessing!)\n\nServe with bread and olive oil (dip the bread in the oil, then the dukkah), or sprinkle on roasted vegetables, salads, pizza, and more. Store leftovers in an airtight container at room temperature.\n\n**Serving Suggestion:** Along with bread and oil, Roasted Red Pepper Hummus makes a great addition.\nPLANT-BASED PARMESAN\n\nNo pasta would be complete without parm. I'm a fiend for the stuff, and like to really heap on big piles of it. Fortunately, you can use nuts and nutritional yeast to replace the fatty, tangy flavors that parmesan lends to Italian cuisine. I dare you not to eat it out of the jar by the spoonful.\n\nMAKES 1\u00bc CUPS PREP AND COOKING TIME: 15 MINUTES\n\nINGREDIENTS\n\n\u00bd C pine nuts\n\n\u00bc C chopped Brazil nuts\n\n\u00bc C shelled sunflower seeds\n\n\u00bc C nutritional yeast\n\n\u00bd tsp garlic powder\n\n1 tsp salt\n\nMETHOD\n\nPlace the pine nuts, Brazil nuts, and sunflower seeds in a dry skillet over medium heat and stir until lightly toasted. Keep an eye on them, as pine nuts can burn quickly. Once golden brown, remove from the heat and let cool.\n\nPlace all the ingredients in a food processor or blender and pulse until the mixture resembles bread crumbs. Spoon into an airtight jar and store in the fridge until ready to use (up to 2 weeks).\n\n**Tip:** Don't have Brazil nuts? Just double the sunflower seeds.\n\n**Equipment Alert:** This recipe requires a food processor or blender.\n\n**Serving Suggestion:** This shines atop pizza (see here and here), the Spaghetti and Lentil Meatballs, the Massaged Kale Caesar salad, and so many other foods.\n\n\"A plant-based diet can and will change your life.\"\n\n\u2014RYAN SEACREST\nQUICK COUNTRY COLESLAW\n\nThis slaw is perfect for any BBQ, picnic, or potluck! The tangy cider vinegar with creamy mayo and sweet agave combine for a balanced slaw just like Mama used to make. And because it uses nondairy milk and egg-free mayo, it's easier on the earth\u2014conserving water and land, and emitting fewer greenhouse gases.\n\nSERVES 8 TO 10 PREP AND COOKING TIME: 15 MINUTES\n\nINGREDIENTS\n\n1\u00bc C vegan mayo\n\n3 Tbsp apple cider vinegar\n\n2 Tbsp plain almond milk\n\n1 tsp sea salt\n\n1 Tbsp sugar\n\n1 tsp celery seed\n\n\u00bd tsp freshly ground black pepper\n\n\u00bc tsp garlic powder\n\n\u00bc tsp onion powder\n\n2 medium carrots\n\n\u00bd head green cabbage\n\n\u00bd head red cabbage\n\nMETHOD\n\nIn a small bowl, whisk or stir together the mayo, vinegar, almond milk, salt, sugar, celery seed, pepper, garlic powder, and onion powder. Set aside.\n\nShred the carrots and cabbages using a grater. Place in a large bowl and mix with clean hands.\n\nPour the dressing on top and mix well to combine.\n\nCover and refrigerate. Enjoy chilled as a side, especially with a Spicy Lentil Burger or any other sandwich.\n\n**Note:** Check out the Slawppy Joe recipe for another tasty way to enjoy this dish!\n\n**Want to go the extra eco-mile?** Next time you make broccoli, save the stems. Shred them in a food processor and then replace the cabbage with them (or add them to the cabbage). It'll cut down on food waste and is delicious!\n\n\"I am a firm believer in eating a full plant-based, whole-food diet.\"\n\n\u2014ARIANA GRANDE\nROASTED RED PEPPER HUMMUS\n\nHummus has become so popular that some farmers in the South have begun switching from tobacco to chickpeas in order to accommodate the demand. In this recipe, roasted red peppers offer a fiery addition, making it ideal as a dip, a spread, or added to any salad.\n\nSERVES 2 TO 4 PREP TIME: 10 MINUTES\n\nINGREDIENTS\n\n1 (14-oz) can chickpeas, drained and rinsed\n\n\u00bd C roasted red peppers\n\n2 garlic cloves, minced\n\n2 Tbsp tahini\n\nJuice of \u00bd lemon\n\n1 Tbsp olive oil, plus more for garnish\n\n\u00bd tsp ground cumin\n\n\u00bd tsp salt\n\nSesame seeds, for garnish\n\n1 Tbsp chopped fresh parsley, for serving\n\nMETHOD\n\nCombine the chickpeas, roasted peppers, garlic, tahini, lemon juice, olive oil, cumin, salt, and a splash of water in a blender or food processor and blend until well combined. Continue blending, adding water a little at a time until the desired consistency is achieved (water is what will make your hummus creamy).\n\nGarnish with sesame seeds, some more olive oil, and the parsley. Store in an airtight container in the fridge for up to 5 days.\n\n**Tip:** If you like your hummus tangier, double the lemon juice.\n\n**Want to go the extra eco-mile?** Save the aquafaba (chickpea juice) for the Chocolate Brownies or the Lemon Meringue Pie\u2014to cut down on food waste.\nROSEMARY CORNBREAD MINI MUFFINS\n\nThese go wonderfully with the Wild Mushroom Chili. Moist and filling, with aromatic rosemary, they'll make the whole house smell great. Bet you can't eat just one!\n\nMAKES 12 MUFFINS PREP AND COOKING TIME: 45 MINUTES\n\nINGREDIENTS\n\n1 C canned coconut milk\n\n1 tsp apple cider vinegar\n\n1 C cornmeal\n\n\u00bd C all-purpose flour\n\n\u00bd tsp baking powder\n\n\u00bd tsp baking soda\n\n\u00bc tsp salt\n\n\u00bd C plus 1 Tbsp olive oil\n\n1 small yellow onion, finely chopped\n\n2 red bell peppers, finely chopped\n\n6 cherry tomatoes, halved\n\nFresh rosemary, for garnish\n\nMETHOD\n\nPreheat the oven to 350\u00b0F. Lightly grease a 12-cup muffin pan with vegetable oil or cooking spray.\n\nIn a small bowl, combine the coconut milk and vinegar and set aside.\n\nCombine the cornmeal, flour, baking powder, baking soda, and salt in a large bowl and set aside.\n\nIn a heavy-bottomed skillet, heat 1 tablespoon of the olive oil over medium heat. Add the onion. Cook for 2 minutes and then add the bell peppers and cook until soft, about 5 minutes more. Remove from the heat and set aside.\n\nAdd the remaining \u00bd cup olive oil to the coconut milk\u2013vinegar mixture. Whisk the wet ingredients into the bowl of dry ingredients. Add the cooked onion\u2013bell pepper mixture, and then stir slightly, to combine.\n\nSpoon into muffin cups. Gently press half a cherry tomato into each top and top with fresh rosemary. Bake for 15 minutes or until a toothpick inserted into the center comes out clean. Let cool for 10 minutes and then enjoy, preferably smothered with margarine.\nSPICY SWEET POTATO FRIES WITH RANCH\n\nSweet potatoes offer all kinds of health benefits over their more common cousins. For this recipe, we take a usually-not-so-healthy favorite and offer a new spin to pack in some extra flavor (and spice) along with better health. So break out the ketchup and eat up.\n\nSERVES 2 PREP AND COOKING TIME: 45 MINUTES\n\nINGREDIENTS\n\n2 medium sweet potatoes\n\n2 Tbsp olive oil\n\n1 tsp salt\n\n\u00bd tsp crushed red pepper\n\n\u00bd C vegan mayo\n\n\u00bc tsp onion powder\n\n\u00bc tsp garlic powder\n\nPinch of freshly ground black pepper\n\n\u00bc C plain almond milk\n\n1 Tbsp nutritional yeast\n\n3 tsp dried parsley\n\nMETHOD\n\nPreheat the oven to 400\u00b0F.\n\nScrub the sweet potatoes. With a sharp knife, cut them into \u00bc-inch-thick fries. Place in a large bowl and coat well with olive oil, salt, and crushed red pepper.\n\nSpread the fries onto a rimless baking sheet. The trick to getting crispy fries is to place them far enough apart, on a baking sheet with no edges so that as they cook all the steam they are releasing can evaporate, rather than being absorbed by surrounding fries. You may need to use two baking sheets, depending on the size of your oven. Bake the fries for 15 minutes.\n\nMeanwhile, combine the mayo, onion powder, garlic powder, black pepper, almond milk, nutritional yeast, and 1\u00bd teaspoons of the dried parsley in a bowl. Stir to combine well and set aside in the fridge.\n\nOnce the fries have baked for 15 minutes, turn them all with a spatula. Return to the oven for another 15 to 20 minutes, depending on how well done you want them.\n\nSprinkle with the remaining 1\u00bd teaspoons dried parsley and serve with the ranch dressing for dipping. Enjoy alone as a snack, or with the Buffalo Cauliflower Wrap or any other sandwich or burger.\n\n**Want to go the extra eco-mile?** Make this when sweet potatoes are in season (see here).\nSWEET-AND-SALTY CURRIED POPCORN\n\nThere's nothing quite like plopping down on the couch with a movie (or three) and a huge bowl of homemade popcorn. This is one of our favorites\u2014salty, sweet, and aromatic, it's perfect for a cozy night in.\n\nSERVES 2 TO 4 PREP AND COOKING TIME: 10 MINUTES\n\nINGREDIENTS\n\n6 Tbsp coconut oil\n\n1 Tbsp curry powder\n\n3\u00bd Tbsp pure maple syrup\n\n1 tsp salt\n\n1 C popcorn kernels\n\nMETHOD\n\nMelt 4 tablespoons of the coconut oil in a small saucepan. Add the curry powder and stir for 1 minute, or until fragrant. Remove from the heat, stir in the maple syrup and salt, and set aside.\n\nIn a large pot with a lid, melt the remaining 2 tablespoons coconut oil over medium-high heat. Add 3 kernels of popcorn and cover. Once those three kernels pop, add all the unpopped kernels and cover. Shake vigorously, using a dish towel to hold the lid in place with your thumbs as you hold the pot by its handles. Place the pot back on the heat and wait for the popping to begin. It will start out slowly and get more and more intense, then slowly die down again. Once you haven't heard a pop for a few seconds, remove from the heat and carefully remove the lid to let the steam escape.\n\nIf you're nervous or unsure about the heat on your stove, you can hold the pot just above the burner, shaking it intermittently, to give it a break from being on the heat. It will take a little longer for all the kernels to pop, but is a good way to prevent burning.\n\nPour the topping over the popcorn, cover, and shake vigorously (or mix in a very large bowl) to combine. Enjoy!\n\n**Alternative Topping:** Not a sweet curry fan? No worries. Instead of curry powder and maple syrup, use 1 tablespoon Old Bay seasoning and 2 tablespoons nutritional yeast in the first stage instead, and use that as your topping.\nDESSERTS\n\nAll-the-Nut-Butters Cups\n\nApple-Pecan Crisp\n\nAvocado Chocolate Mousse with Vanilla Bean Whip\n\nChocolate Brownies with Puffed Quinoa\n\nClassic Pumpkin Pie\n\nCoconut Basbousa\n\nLemon-Ginger Blueberry Cake with Cream Cheese Frosting\n\nLemon Meringue Pie\n\nMinted Lemon-Cucumber Sorbet\n\nMom's Noodle Kugel\n\nPeanut Butter Chocolate Chip Cookie Ice Cream Sandwiches\n\nPeanut Butter Trail Mix Cookies\n\nRaw Chocolate-Hazelnut Truffles\n\nRaw Lemon Vanilla Raspberry Slab\n\nSmoky Maple-Pecan Cheesecake\n\nSpicy Chocolate Milk Shake with Whipped Coconut Cream\nALL-THE-NUT-BUTTERS CUPS\n\nWhy stick with plain peanut butter cups when you could use other nut butters? Almond, cashew, hazelnut\u2014even sunflower butter! And why use milk chocolate when you could make your own super-easy dark chocolate? Mix 'em, match 'em\u2014you can't go wrong!\n\nMAKES TEN 1-INCH CUPS PREP AND COOKING TIME: 30 MINUTES\n\nINGREDIENTS\n\n3 oz cocoa butter\n\n\u00bc C pure maple syrup\n\n\u00be C unsweetened cocoa powder\n\nPinch of salt\n\n2 Tbsp confectioners' sugar, plus more if needed\n\n3\u00bd Tbsp nut butter (hazelnut, almond, or peanut)\n\nMETHOD\n\nPlace ten small paper muffin cup liners or chocolate molds on a dinner plate.\n\nMake a DIY double boiler: bring 1 cup water to a boil in a small saucepan. Place a small metal bowl on top (making sure the bottom of the bowl does not touch the water).\n\nPut the cocoa butter in the hot bowl and stir with a silicone spatula; it will melt quickly. Add the maple syrup and stir to combine. Add the cocoa powder and salt and stir until smooth and well combined. Turn the heat off.\n\nSpoon 1 tablespoon of the mixture into each muffin cup or mold. (You'll have leftover chocolate; save it for later to top the cups.) Place the entire plate of muffin cups in the freezer until the chocolate is firm, about 15 minutes.\n\nWhile that's firming up in the freezer, sift the confectioners' sugar into a bowl. Add the nut butter. Roll the mixture into 10 small balls. If they're too wet to roll, add more sugar.\n\nRemove the plate from the freezer and place a nut butter ball in the center of each mold, on top of the chocolate. Press down ever so slightly, being careful not to push it all the way to the edges.\n\nSpoon 1 tablespoon of the remaining chocolate mixture on top of each, and then place back in the freezer until firm, about 15 minutes more. Once set, transfer to an airtight container and store in the fridge until ready to eat (up to 1 week).\nAPPLE-PECAN CRISP\n\nNothing says fall like spending the day picking apples and then enjoying the fruits of your labor with a warm bowl of comforting crisp. And because trees, including fruit trees, soak up CO2 and produce oxygen, they can help offset climate-changing emissions. In fact, even a single-acre apple orchard will extract about fifteen tons of CO2 from the air each year. You know what they say: an apple a day keeps global warming away!\n\nSERVES 4 PREP AND COOKING TIME: 1 HOUR\n\nINGREDIENTS\n\n4 heaping Tbsp margarine, chilled, plus more for the baking dish\n\n10 medium apples (about 3 lb)\n\n2 heaping tsp ground cinnamon\n\n7 heaping Tbsp sugar\n\n1 C all-purpose flour\n\n1 C rolled oats\n\n\u00bd C pecans, coarsely chopped\n\n\u00bd tsp vanilla extract\n\n\u00bd tsp baking powder\n\nPinch of salt\n\nMETHOD\n\nPreheat the oven to 350\u00b0F. Lightly coat a 9 x 13-inch casserole dish with a tiny bit of margarine.\n\nPeel, core, and slice each apple, placing them in a large bowl as you go.\n\nSprinkle the cinnamon and 3 tablespoons of the sugar over the apples. Add 1 tablespoon of the flour and mix well to combine. Pour the apple mixture into the prepared casserole dish.\n\nIn the same bowl, combine the remaining 4 tablespoons sugar, remaining flour, the oats, pecans, vanilla, baking powder, and salt. Stir to combine. Add the chilled margarine. Using clean hands, work the margarine into the mixture until it's evenly distributed. Sprinkle the topping over the apples and bake, uncovered, until the apples are soft, 45 to 55 minutes.\n\nRemove from the oven and let cool for 5 minutes before serving.\n\n**Serving Suggestion:** Top with the Whipped Coconut Cream\n\n**Want to go the extra eco-mile?** Make this when apples are in season\u2014and even try hand picking them yourself at an orchard!\nAVOCADO CHOCOLATE MOUSSE WITH VANILLA BEAN WHIP\n\nAvocado makes a creamy, decadent replacement for heavy cream and eggs in this dish. Combined with maple syrup, vanilla, and cocoa powder, you can't taste the avocado at all\u2014and the texture is spot-on. Plus, it's more sustainable! Pound for pound, eggs take almost four hundred gallons of water to produce and cow's milk takes more than eight hundred gallons\u2014while avocados take only about 140 gallons per pound to grow. That's a huge reduction in water use from just one simple swap. How sweet is that?\n\nSERVES 4 PREP TIME: 15 MINUTES, PLUS TIME TO CHILL\n\nINGREDIENTS\n\n2 ripe avocados\n\n\u00bc C pure maple syrup\n\n3 Tbsp unsweetened cocoa powder, plus more for dusting\n\n\u00bd tsp pure vanilla extract\n\nPinch of salt\n\n1 (5.4-oz) can coconut cream, chilled\n\n2 Tbsp confectioners' sugar\n\n1 whole vanilla bean\n\nFresh raspberries, for garnish (optional)\n\nMETHOD\n\nScoop the flesh out of the avocado and place it in a blender. Add the maple syrup, cocoa powder, vanilla extract, and salt. Puree until thick and smooth. It should be sweet and rich and not taste at all like avocado. If it's too avocado-tasting for you, try adding a little more maple syrup and cocoa.\n\nTransfer to an airtight container and refrigerate for several hours, until cold.\n\nMeanwhile, place the coconut cream in a bowl. Add the confectioners' sugar. Cut the vanilla bean down the middle lengthwise and scrape the seeds into the bowl. Using a handheld mixer, whip until thick.\n\nSpoon the mousse into bowls. Top with whip and garnish with fresh raspberries (if using) and a dusting of cocoa.\n\n**Equipment Alert:** This recipe requires a handheld mixer.\nA MESSAGE FROM\n\n## PRO RACE CAR DRIVER AND ECO-CHAMPION LEILANI M\u00a8UNTER\n\nI became vegetarian (and then vegan) because I love animals and didn't want to see them harmed. It turns out that was also one of the most eco-friendly moves I could have made.\n\nWe know, for example, that communities across the country are suffering through the air pollution caused by mega factory farms. We also know that air pollution is causing global warming. Most people associate their eco-footprint with the kind of car they drive or fuel they burn; when they think of our planet's air and the problems it faces, they may just think of industrial smokestacks and smog.\n\nAt home, I drive a 100-percent electric car that I power from the solar panels on the roof of my house. But it is likely that I am making a more positive impact on our planet and air through eating plant-based foods.\n\nAnd no matter where you fall on the spectrum\u2014vegan, vegetarian, or something else entirely\u2014it's easier than ever to make sustainable choices! Look around at the grocery store and you'll see all kinds of amazing veg-forward foods. Check out menus at your local restaurants and I bet you'll see some great veggie options you'd never even noticed.\n\nAs someone who's gone through the life- (and planet-) transforming decision to focus my diet on plants rather than animals, I promise you'll be better for it! Whether you go all in on plant-based eating or just make an effort to eat plant-based foods more often, you'll discover a great variety of new foods that are satisfying, delicious, easy to prepare, and eco-friendly! That's something that you, the animals, and the planet can all feel good about.\n\n_Leilani M\u00fcnter\u2014a professional race car driver and environmental activist\u2014has been named Discovery Planet's Green number one eco-athlete in the world and was awarded an_ ELLE _magazine Genius Award. She's an outspoken advocate for solar power, electric cars, plant-based diets, and animal protection. An active lobbyist on these issues, Leilani has been a guest at the White House and the United Nations in Geneva. She also uses her race car to get environmental messages in front of America's 75 million race fans: her cars have carried messages about renewable energy, clean energy legislation, and animal protection._\nCHOCOLATE BROWNIES WITH PUFFED QUINOA\n\nPeanut butter and chocolate is my favorite flavor combo. And because this rich brownie recipe uses aquafaba instead of eggs, it's more eco-friendly than your typical brownie. (Aquafaba, after all, is a zero-waste product!) The puffed quinoa on top gives the brownie an extra airy crunch and a little zap of protein.\n\nSERVES 8 PREP AND COOKING TIME: 1 HOUR PLUS COOLING TIME\n\nINGREDIENTS\n\n7 oz dark bittersweet chocolate\n\n2 Tbsp coconut oil\n\n\u00bd tsp pure vanilla extract\n\n3 Tbsp creamy peanut butter\n\n\u00bd C plus 2 Tbsp aquafaba (chickpea juice)\n\n1 C sugar\n\n1 C all-purpose flour\n\n2 Tbsp unsweetened cocoa powder\n\n1 tsp baking powder\n\n\u00bd tsp salt\n\n2 Tbsp puffed quinoa (optional)\n\nMETHOD\n\nPreheat the oven to 350\u00b0F.\n\nMake a DIY double boiler: Bring 1 cup water to a boil in a small saucepan. Place a small metal bowl on top (be sure the bottom of the bowl does not touch the water).\n\nBreak the chocolate into smaller pieces and put them in the bowl, along with the coconut oil, vanilla, and peanut butter. Stir until everything is melted and well combined.\n\nIn the bowl of a stand mixer fitted with the whisk attachment or in a large bowl using a handheld mixer, beat the aquafaba and sugar until thick and creamy and doubled in size, about 5 minutes.\n\nAdd the melted chocolate mixture to the bowl, scraping all the goodness out with a silicone spatula. Beat until just combined, about 30 seconds. Sift the flour, cocoa powder, baking powder, and salt into the bowl. Use a sieve, as cocoa can be very lumpy. Beat again until it's nicely combined, about 30 seconds.\n\nLine a 7 x 11-inch baking pan with parchment paper. Pour the brownie batter in. It will be quite thick. Use a silicone spatula to scrape everything from the bowl into the pan and then smooth it out.\n\nSprinkle the puffed quinoa over the brownies and bake for 30 minutes. Remove and let cool before cutting into 8 squares.\n\n**Tip:** If you don't have puffed quinoa, you can sprinkle some chopped pistachios (or other kind of nuts) on top.\n\n**Equipment Alert:** This recipe requires a stand mixer or handheld mixer.\nCLASSIC PUMPKIN PIE\n\nWith no big slice of pumpkin pie to end the feast, my first Thanksgiving as a vegan was a bit rough. Whether you're fully vegan and want to make sure to end your holidays right or you're simply looking for a healthier, eco-friendlier version of this classic dessert to try out, this recipe is sure to please.\n\nSERVES 6 TO 8 PREP AND COOKING TIME: 2 HOURS PLUS OVERNIGHT COOLING TIME\n\nINGREDIENTS\n\n2 C all-purpose flour, plus more for dusting\n\n2 Tbsp sugar, plus more for sprinkling\n\n\u00bd tsp salt\n\n\u00bc cup very cold margarine\n\n\u00bd C very cold water\n\n1 (15-oz) can pure pumpkin puree\n\n1 C coconut cream\n\n\u00bd C pure maple syrup\n\n3 Tbsp arrowroot powder\n\n2 heaping tsp ground cinnamon\n\n2 heaping tsp ground ginger\n\n\u00bd tsp ground nutmeg\n\n1 tsp pure vanilla extract\n\nMETHOD\n\nPlace the flour, sugar, and \u00bc tsp of the salt in a large bowl. Stir to combine. Add the cold margarine and work it through with clean fingers until the dough resembles bread crumbs. Add the water, 1 tablespoon at a time, kneading after each addition, until the mixture forms into a ball.\n\nLightly dust a clean work surface with flour. Press the dough into a flat, round disk. Cover with an inverted bowl and let sit for 10 minutes.\n\nUncover the dough, sprinkle the top with a little flour, and then roll over it with a rolling pin about four times. Flip it over, sprinkle with more flour, and roll over it again. Repeat until the dough is roughly 12 inches in diameter\u2014large enough to cover the bottom and up the sides of a pie dish.\n\nCarefully transfer the rolled-out dough to a pie dish and press it up the sides. Any overhang can be folded down and any broken bits can be easily pressed back together with your fingers. Prick holes in the bottom with a fork and set aside.\n\nOnce the dough is made, preheat the oven to 375\u00b0F.\n\nPlace the remaining \u00bc teaspoon salt, the pumpkin, coconut cream, maple syrup, arrowroot powder, cinnamon, ginger, nutmeg, and vanilla in a blender or food processor and blend until smooth. Pour into the pie dish and smooth the top. Sprinkle a little sugar on top.\n\nBake for 1 hour.\n\nRemove from the oven and let cool fully on the counter. Cover and refrigerate overnight before slicing and serving.\n\n**Equipment Alert:** This recipe requires a blender or food processor.\nCOCONUT BASBOUSA\n\nBasbousa is a super-sweet Middle Eastern cake made from semolina or farina and soaked in simple syrup. It's so moist, you almost need to eat it with a spoon. Semolina is a by-product of wheat milling, making this sweet treat both tasty and more sustainable. And because this particular recipe uses nondairy ingredients, it cuts down on the cake's water and climate footprints too.\n\nSERVES 8 TO 10 PREP AND COOKING TIME: 1 HOUR\n\nINGREDIENTS\n\n1 C vanilla nondairy yogurt\n\n\u00bd C almond milk\n\n2 C coarse semolina or farina\n\n1 tsp baking powder\n\n2\u00bd C sugar\n\n\u00bd C margarine, melted\n\n\u2153 C shredded coconut, plus more for garnish\n\n1 tsp ground cinnamon\n\nMETHOD\n\nPreheat the oven to 350\u00b0F. Lightly grease a baking dish (9 x 13 inches works well) with margarine.\n\nIn a large bowl, mix together the yogurt, almond milk, semolina, baking powder, and 1 cup of the sugar. Melt the margarine in the microwave in a mug or small bowl and add it to the mixture, stirring to combine. Let sit for 1 minute. Add the coconut and stir until well mixed.\n\nPour the mixture into the prepared baking dish, spreading it evenly. Bake for 30 to 45 minutes. (Check at 30 minutes\u2014it should be yellowish with golden brown edges when done.)\n\nWhile the cake is baking, combine 1\u00bd cup water, the cinnamon, and the remaining 1\u00bd cups sugar in a saucepan. Bring to a boil, stirring until the sugar has dissolved. Once boiling, turn down the heat and simmer until the syrup thickens slightly, 1 to 2 minutes. Set aside to cool.\n\nWhen the cake is done, remove it from the oven and cut it into pieces (leaving it in the dish). Pour the cooled syrup over the top, making sure to cover all parts. Let the syrup-coated cake rest for 20 minutes, allowing the cake to fully absorb the syrup.\n\nTo serve, scoop out the pieces, roughly, with a spatula and stack on a plate, sprinkling with extra coconut as you go. It'll crumble and the pieces will not be uniform (since it's sooooo moist)\u2014don't worry, it's supposed to be like that. Finish it off with some more coconut and eat immediately or chilled.\nLEMON-GINGER BLUEBERRY CAKE WITH CREAM CHEESE FROSTING\n\nThe tartness of fresh lemons, the zing of ginger, and the sweetness of blueberries all shine in this cake. The vegan cream cheese frosting adds a nice creaminess to the cake, without the planetary pitfalls associated with dairy production. It all comes together to form a more sustainable\u2014and highly delectable\u2014dessert.\n\nSERVES 6 TO 8 PREP AND COOKING TIME: 1 HOUR, PLUS COOLING TIME\n\nINGREDIENTS\n\n1 C almond milk\n\n8 Tbsp fresh lemon juice\n\n6\u00bd Tbsp coconut oil, melted\n\n1 C sugar\n\n2\u00bd C all-purpose flour\n\n1 tsp baking powder\n\n1 tsp baking soda\n\n1 tsp ground ginger\n\n1 tsp ground cinnamon\n\n\u00bd tsp salt\n\n1 C fresh or frozen blueberries\n\n1 (8-oz) package vegan cream cheese\n\n\u2153 C margarine, at room temperature\n\n3\u00bd C confectioners' sugar\n\n1 tsp lemon zest\n\n\u00bd tsp pure vanilla extract\n\n\u00bc tsp pure almond extract (optional)\n\nAdditional blueberries, lemon zest, and\/or edible flowers, for garnish (optional)\n\nMETHOD\n\nPreheat the oven to 350\u00b0F. Line a round 12-inch cake pan with parchment paper.\n\nCombine the almond milk and 7 tablespoons of the lemon juice in a medium bowl and set aside for 5 minutes. After 5 minutes, add the melted coconut oil and stir to combine.\n\nIn a large bowl, combine the sugar, flour, baking powder, baking soda, ginger, cinnamon, and salt. Stir to combine. Add the wet mixture, whisking or beating with a handheld mixer as you go. Add the blueberries and fold them into the cake batter with a spatula.\n\nPour the cake batter into the prepared pan. Bake until the top is lightly golden, 45 to 55 minutes. The cake is done when you can stick a toothpick or skewer into the center and it comes out clean. Remove from the oven and let cool.\n\nWhile the cake is baking, place the cream cheese and margarine in a bowl and beat with a handheld mixer until thick and smooth. Add the remaining 1 tablespoon lemon juice, the confectioners' sugar, lemon zest, vanilla, and almond extract (if using). Beat on high until you have a thick and creamy frosting, 3 to 5 minutes. Set aside.\n\nOnce cake is entirely cool, top it with the frosting and additional blueberries, lemon zest, and\/or edible flowers.\n\nIf not eating within a few hours, store in the fridge and bring to room temperature before serving.\nLEMON MERINGUE PIE\n\nThis pie brims with fresh lemon taste. Sweet and tart, it's just like Grandma used to make\u2014almost. Instead of using egg whites, it uses aquafaba\u2014the \"juice\" from canned chickpeas. In 2014, French chef Jo\u00ebl Roessel discovered that this can be whipped into foams that are functionally equivalent to egg whites but healthier. It's also more sustainable: in addition to being a zero-waste food that would otherwise end up down the drain, aquafaba helps us avoid eggs, which means avoiding all the air pollution associated with chicken farming and the climate-changing greenhouse gas emissions associated with feed production. So just like Grandma used to make? Maybe not. Better than Grandma used to make? Definitely. (Sorry, Grandma.)\n\nSERVES 6 TO 8 PREP AND COOKING TIME: 1\u00bd HOURS, PLUS COOLING TIME\n\nINGREDIENTS\n\nFor the crust:\n\n2 C all-purpose flour, plus more for dusting\n\n2 Tbsp sugar\n\n\u215b tsp salt\n\n\u00bd C very cold margarine\n\n\u00bd C ice-cold water\n\nFor the filling:\n\n\u00bd C sugar\n\nZest of 1 lemon\n\n\u2154 C fresh lemon juice\n\n\u2153 C coconut cream\n\n1 Tbsp agar-agar (powder, not flakes)\n\n2 Tbsp arrowroot powder\n\n1 (14-oz) packet silken tofu\n\n\u00bd tsp ground turmeric\n\nFor the meringue topping:\n\n\u00be C aquafaba (chickpea canning liquid)\n\n\u00bd tsp cream of tartar\n\n\u00bd tsp pure vanilla extract\n\n1 C sugar\n\nMETHOD\n\nFirst, make the crust:\n\nPreheat the oven to 350\u00b0F.\n\nPlace the flour, sugar, and salt in a large bowl and stir to combine. Add the cold margarine and work it through with clean fingers until the dough resembles bread crumbs. Add the water, 1 tablespoon at a time, kneading after each addition, until the mixture forms into a ball.\n\nLightly dust a clean work surface with flour. Place the ball of dough on top and press it into a flat, round disk. Cover with an inverted bowl and let sit for 10 minutes.\n\nUncover the dough, sprinkle the top of the disk with a little flour, and then roll it with a rolling pin about four times. Flip the dough over, sprinkle with more flour, and roll over it again. Repeat until the dough is roughly 12 inches in diameter\u2014large enough to cover the bottom of a pie dish and go up the sides.\n\nCarefully transfer to a pie dish and press it up the sides. Remove or fold down any overhang. Prick holes in the bottom with a fork. If you have dried beans or pie weights on hand, line the dough with aluminum foil and fill with a layer of beans or weights about \u00bd inch thick, to prevent it from rising while it bakes. (If you don't have this, no problem.) Bake for 30 minutes. Remove from the oven and let cool.\n\n**Timesaver:** Make the crust and filling the night before and refrigerate, covered, overnight. Then, the next day, make the meringue, bake, cool, and eat.\n\nMeanwhile, make the lemon curd filling:\n\nPlace all the filling ingredients in a food processor or blender and puree until totally smooth. Transfer to a saucepan, place over medium-high heat, and whisk continuously until the mixture has thickened, about 5 minutes. Once thick, pour the filling into the cooled piecrust and let set, at least 15 minutes.\n\nMake the meringue:\n\nIf you've made meringue using eggs, then this is much the same\u2014except you're using aquafaba (the juice from a can of beans) instead of the whites of a chicken egg. Chick _pea_ protein instead of chick _en_ protein.\n\nPour the aquafaba into a large bowl or the bowl of a stand mixer fitted with the whisk attachment. Add the cream of tartar and vanilla and beat on medium-high speed until the mixture holds soft peaks, 5 to 10 minutes. Add the sugar, a little at a time, and beat until the mixture holds stiff peaks. It will take another 10 to 20 minutes of beating, but the end result is well worth your time. If you think you have stiff enough peaks but you aren't sure, hold the bowl upside down; if the meringue stays put, it's ready.\n\nAnd for the grand finale:\n\nSpoon the meringue on top of the pie. Make it about 2 inches thick and ensure it touches all the edges. Make little peaks as you go. You can also pipe the meringue on instead, if you want something fancier.\n\nBake for 5 minutes. Remove and let fully cool, at least 2 hours. Enjoy!\n\n**Tip:** Want the peaks of your meringue a little darker? Increase the oven temperature to 400\u00b0F and place the pie under the broiler for the final minute. Or you can (safely!) blast it with a kitchen blowtorch.\n\n**Equipment Alert:** This recipe requires a stand mixer.\nMINTED LEMON-CUCUMBER SORBET\n\nI scream, you scream, we all scream for... sorbet! In this recipe, fresh mint, tart lemon juice, and that oh-so-subtle cucumber flavor join forces to create a dairy-free dessert that's refreshing and eco-friendly. Add a dash of liquor before freezing for an adult-friendly summer treat.\n\nSERVES 2 PREP TIME: 10 MINUTES, PLUS FREEZING TIME\n\nINGREDIENTS\n\n\u00bd C sugar\n\n1\u00bd Tbsp fresh lemon juice\n\n10 fresh mint leaves\n\n1 small cucumber, peeled and cut into \u00bc-inch chunks\n\nZest of \u00bd lemon\n\n1 tsp white rum or vodka (optional)\n\nMETHOD\n\nPut the sugar and lemon juice in a small saucepan and place over high heat. Cook until the lemon juice is bubbling, then remove from the heat and stir until the sugar has dissolved to create syrup. Add the mint leaves. Stir, then set aside to fully cool.\n\nPlace the cucumber, cooled syrup, lemon zest, and rum (if using) in a food processor or high-speed blender. Pulse until smooth and then pour into a freezer-safe container.\n\nFreeze for at least 4 hours or overnight, stirring once after 2 hours. When it's ready, the sorbet will easily hold its form while being scooped but will never freeze rock-hard, due to the sugar. You can therefore enjoy it as soon as it is ready, or leave it in the freezer for up to 2 weeks.\n\nServe alone, or garnished with slices of cucumber and lemon.\n\n**Want to go the extra eco-mile?** Try growing mint on your windowsill or in your yard to cut down on food miles and packaging.\n\n\"I changed my diet to a vegan diet, really just to experiment to see what it was like. And I felt better, so... I'm likely to continue it for the rest of my life.\"\n\n\u2014AL GORE\nMOM'S NOODLE KUGEL\n\nGrowing up in a mildly Jewish household, we only ate traditional Jewish foods around Passover or Hanukkah. Noodle kugel was always a must-have. Sweet, filling, and creamy, this dessert is one of my favorites. But normally, kugel is made with a laundry list of planet-unfriendly ingredients\u2014like eggs, butter, and cheese. These ingredients require large amounts of water and land, and emit huge quantities of greenhouse gases. (Just the cheese alone emits about 13.5 kg of CO2 per serving!) So this recipe uses tofu instead\u2014a much gentler choice, emitting only 2 kg of CO2 per serving\u2014along with plant-based sour cream and margarine. The first time I tried it out on my mother, you can imagine I was nervous. But she loved it, our guests loved it, and the whole dish was gobbled up. Not one person was able to pass over this tasty, eco-friendly kugel.\n\nSERVES 8 TO 10 PREP AND COOKING TIME: 1 HOUR\n\nINGREDIENTS\n\n8 oz pasta (rotini or spelt ribbons)\n\n1 apple or pear\n\n\u00bd (16-oz) package soft tofu\n\n\u00bc C pure maple syrup\n\n2 tsp pure vanilla extract\n\n1 C vegan sour cream\n\n\u00bc C margarine, melted\n\n\u00bd C sugar\n\n1 tsp ground cinnamon\n\nPinch of ground nutmeg\n\n\u00bc tsp salt\n\n1 C raisins\n\nInstructions\n\nPreheat the oven to 350\u00baF. Lightly grease an 11 x 8-inch casserole dish with margarine.\n\nBring a large pot of salted water to a boil. Cook the pasta in the boiling water according to the directions on the package. Drain, rinse, and set aside.\n\nThinly slice the apple or pear and put it in a large bowl. Finely crumble the tofu into the bowl. Stir in all the remaining ingredients, in the order listed, and mix. The tofu should be mashed and fine by the end. Add the cooked pasta and mix thoroughly to combine.\n\nTransfer the mixture to the prepared baking dish. Bake until the kugel is firm on the inside and the top turns golden brown and begins to crisp, 40 to 45 minutes.\n\nRemove from the oven, let sit for at least 10 minutes, and serve.\n\n**Serving Suggestion:** Kugel is great served cold or at room temperature!\nPEANUT BUTTER CHOCOLATE CHIP COOKIE ICE CREAM SANDWICHES\n\nWhen I first became vegan in the late '90s, these peanut butter chocolate chip cookies were one of the first desserts I learned how to bake. They're rich and creamy, soft and sweet, and total people-pleasers. This recipe combines them with delicious nondairy ice cream for a decadent dessert.\n\nSERVES 3 PREP AND COOKING TIME: 35 MINUTES, PLUS 5 HOURS FREEZING TIME\n\nINGREDIENTS\n\n1\u00bd C all-purpose flour\n\n\u00bd C granulated sugar\n\n\u00bd C brown sugar\n\n\u00be tsp baking soda\n\n1 tsp arrowroot powder\n\n\u00bc tsp salt\n\n1 C peanut butter\n\n\u00bd tsp pure vanilla extract\n\n\u00bc C margarine, room temperature\n\n\u00bd C almond milk\n\n\u00bd (12-oz) bag dark chocolate chips\n\nNondairy ice cream (any flavor you'd like)\n\nMETHOD\n\nOnce you're ready, preheat the oven to 350\u00b0F.\n\nIn a large bowl, mix the flour, granulated sugar, brown sugar, baking soda, arrowroot powder, and salt. Add the peanut butter, vanilla, and margarine. Using clean hands, mix thoroughly. It's worth the mess (using your hands gives it the right consistency). Add the almond milk, a little at a time, until it's not too wet but not too dry. Continue with your hands. Add the chocolate chips and mix some more.\n\nRoll the dough into 1-inch balls and place on a baking sheet with enough space between them so they can spread to be about 3-inch cookies. Flatten them slightly, first with the palm of your hand and then with your fingers.\n\nBake for 15 minutes, being careful to not let the bottoms burn. Remove from the oven and let cool. (They'll still be soft when removed\u2014they'll harden as they cool.)\n\nSandwich as much ice cream between two cookies as you'd like and enjoy immediately.\nA MESSAGE FROM\n\n## GOOD FOOD INSTITUTE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR BRUCE FRIEDRICH\n\nHumans have the unique ability to improve our world and lives through blending imagination with design. Smartphones allow farmers and textile workers in the developing world to start small businesses and move out of desperate poverty. Modern air travel and the Internet have made travel and information more accessible than before.\n\nToday, each of us can bring that same spirit of innovation and improvement to our dinner plates. And we should. After all, what we choose to eat affects everything\u2014the earth, our water and air, our climate, animals. Just as modern automobiles replaced the horse and buggy, better alternatives can now replace industrial animal agriculture.\n\nWe now have plant-based meats and milks that have the taste and texture of their animal-based counterparts but that are more environmentally sustainable. These products can help us avoid antibiotics, growth hormones, and Salmonella. They can reduce our land and water costs and slash greenhouse gas emissions. They're healthier for us. They're safer. And most important, they taste fantastic.\n\nAdd these types of innovative foods to an abundance of whole grains and legumes, produce, and simple plant-based proteins like tofu and tempeh and the opportunities for better, more sustainable eating are virtually endless. In a world where we all need to eat\u2014and where we all want _what we eat_ to be good\u2014the more we capitalize on those opportunities, the better off we and our planet will be.\n\n_Bruce Friedrich is Executive Director of the Good Food Insti\u00adtute, and has been a leading food and agriculture reformer for over two decades. He holds degrees from Grinnell College, Johns Hopkins University, and the London School of Econom\u00adics._\nPEANUT BUTTER TRAIL MIX COOKIES\n\nThese cookies have all the things. Rolled oats, sunflower seeds, raisins, and peanut butter make for a filling and fun cookie. They are missing one thing, though: eggs. That means they're better for the earth (and, of course, the animals) and have zero cholesterol. Talk about a win-win!\n\nMAKES 10 COOKIES PREP AND COOKING TIME: 30 MINUTES\n\nINGREDIENTS\n\n2 C rolled oats\n\n\u00bd C all-purpose flour, plus more if needed\n\n1 tsp baking powder\n\n1 tsp ground cinnamon\n\n\u2154 C raisins\n\n\u00bc C shelled sunflower seeds\n\nPinch of salt\n\n2 Tbsp coconut oil\n\n5 heaping Tbsp peanut butter\n\n\u00bd C sugar\n\n1 tsp pure vanilla extract\n\n\u00bd C almond milk, plus more if needed\n\nMETHOD\n\nPreheat the oven to 350\u00b0F. Lightly grease a baking sheet with margarine.\n\nCombine oats, flour, baking powder, cinnamon, raisins, sunflower seeds, and salt in a large bowl and mix thoroughly.\n\nPlace the coconut oil, peanut butter, sugar, and vanilla in a medium saucepan and and set over medium heat. Stir until all the ingredients are combined and the sugar has completely dissolved.\n\nPour the warm peanut butter mixture into the bowl of dry ingredients and stir until well combined. Add the almond milk and mix thoroughly. You want it somewhere between wet and dry, and it should hold together. Add about \u00bc cup more almond milk if not wet enough, or more flour if too wet.\n\nUsing wet hands, roll 10 golf ball\u2013size balls of cookie dough, placing them on the prepared baking sheet as you go. Once you have rolled all the cookie dough into balls, press them flat, first with the palm of your hand and then with a fork, so they're about \u00bd inch thick.\n\nBake for 15 minutes. Remove from the oven and let cool completely on the baking sheet.\n\nEnjoy immediately or store in an airtight container.\n\n**Tip:** Chocolate lovers can substitute chocolate chips for half the raisins. Just be sure the mixture has cooled before adding the chocolate, and add them last (after the almond milk).\nRAW CHOCOLATE-HAZELNUT TRUFFLES\n\nEasy, decadent, and the perfect quick chocolate fix\u2014these raw truffles make a great snack.\n\nMAKES 10 TO 20 PREP TIME: 20 MINUTES\n\nINGREDIENTS\n\n10 Medjool dates, pitted\n\n\u00be C hazelnut meal, plus more for rolling\n\n\u2153 C hazelnut butter\n\n\u00bc C unsweetened cocoa powder, plus more for rolling\n\n\u00bd tsp pure vanilla extract\n\nPinch of sea salt\n\nCoconut meal\n\nMETHOD\n\nPlace the dates, hazelnut meal, hazelnut butter, cocoa powder, vanilla, salt, and 1 tablespoon water in a food processor and pulse until the dates are broken down. Process until everything is sticky and you can easily form a ball from the mixture. If your dates were a little dry and things aren't coming together so easily, add an extra tablespoon of water and process some more.\n\nUsing wet hands, roll the mixture into balls. You can go as big or as small as you like, but I find that 12 balls of about 1 ounce each are the perfect size. Roll the truffles in coconut meal, cocoa powder, or hazelnut meal (or mix and match). Store in an airtight container in the fridge until ready to enjoy (up to 1 week).\n\n**Tips:** Bob's Red Mill hazelnut meal is sold in the baking section of many grocery stores. Can't find hazelnut butter or meal? Almond butter and almond meal work well as replacements.\nRAW LEMON VANILLA RASPBERRY SLAB\n\nThis delicious dessert is made by layering flavorful cashew cream and berries on top of an almond-date base. It uses coconut milk and nuts instead of cow's milk for a lighter eco-footprint, and lemon zest and juice for a little tartness. It's creamy and sweet, tart and tasty.\n\nSERVES 8 PREP TIME: 20 MINUTES, PLUS TIME TO SET\n\nINGREDIENTS\n\n15 Medjool dates, pitted\n\n1 C raw almonds\n\n1 C shredded coconut\n\nZest of 1 lemon\n\n2 pinches of salt\n\n4 C fresh raspberries\n\n3 C raw cashews, soaked in water to cover for 4 hours\n\n1 C canned coconut milk\n\n\u00bd C agave nectar\n\n\u00bc C fresh lemon juice\n\n1\u00bd tsp pure vanilla extract\n\n\u00bd C coconut flakes, for garnish\n\nMETHOD\n\nLine an 8-inch square baking pan with parchment paper. (This will make it easier to remove the slab later.) The best way is to cut the paper to 10 inches wide, so it goes up and over two sides of the pan and you can use the excess parchment hanging over to lift the slab out once it's set.\n\nPlace the dates, almonds, shredded coconut, lemon zest, and a pinch of salt in a food processor. Pulse until the almonds are finely ground and the mixture holds together. Press the mixture into the bottom of the prepared pan and smooth the top. Place 1\u00bd cups of the raspberries on top of the base.\n\nDrain and rinse the cashews and place them in a food processor or blender, along with the coconut milk, agave, lemon juice, vanilla, and remaining pinch of salt. Process until smooth, 2 to 4 minutes.\n\nPour half the vanilla-cashew filling on top of the raspberries in the baking pan. Add 1\u00bd cups of the berries to the remaining filling in the food processor and process until well combined. Pour this over the vanilla layer. Top with the remaining berries and the coconut flakes. Freeze until set, at least 4 hours, though overnight is preferable.\n\nRemove from the freezer 10 minutes before serving. To remove from the dish, run a warm, wet knife along the sides that are in direct contact with the dish and then lift it out using the paper overhang on the other edges.\n\nHeat up a sharp knife by running hot water over it and cut the slab into 8 pieces. Enjoy immediately and keep leftovers refrigerated.\n\n**Equipment Alert:** This recipe requires a food processor.\nSMOKY MAPLE-PECAN CHEESECAKE\n\nThis sultry pecan cheesecake recipe combines the richness of coconut milk and the sweetness of maple syrup along with smoked pecans to deliver a creamy, unique, lip-smacking dessert. Because it uses tofu (instead of eggs), it's lighter on our waistlines and the planet.\n\nSERVES 6 TO 8 PREP AND COOKING TIME: 1\u00bd HOURS\n\nINGREDIENTS\n\n1 C plus 1 Tbsp pure maple syrup\n\n1 (13.5-oz) can coconut milk\n\n\u00be box of graham crackers (about 18 cracker sheets)\n\n\u00bc C sugar\n\n\u00be C margarine, melted\n\n1 (14-oz) package silken tofu\n\n\u2153 C all-purpose flour\n\n1 tsp pure vanilla extract\n\nPinch of salt\n\n2 C chopped pecans\n\n\u00bc tsp liquid smoke\n\nMETHOD\n\nPreheat the oven to 425\u00b0F.\n\nPlace 1 cup of the maple syrup and the coconut milk in a saucepan. Bring to a boil, lower the heat to maintain a simmer, and cook, whisking occasionally, for 15 minutes. Remove from the heat and place in the fridge to cool a bit.\n\nUsing a food processor, turn the graham crackers into fine crumbs. Place them in a bowl. Add the sugar and melted margarine. Stir until the ingredients are well combined and the cracker crumbs are soaked. Press into a 9-inch round cake pan or glass pie dish, working the mixture up the sides. Set aside in the fridge.\n\nRinse the food processor. Place the slightly cooled coconut milk\u2013maple syrup mixture into it. Add the tofu, flour, vanilla, and salt. Blend until smooth and well combined. Add 1 cup of the pecans and pulse to combine.\n\nPour that mixture into the chilled piecrust and bake for 10 minutes.\n\nRemove the cheesecake after 10 minutes and lower the oven temperature to 350\u00b0F.\n\nPlace the remaining 1 cup pecans in a bowl. Add the remaining 1 tablespoon maple syrup and the liquid smoke. Stir to coat, then sprinkle over the cheesecake. Bake for 40 minutes more.\n\nRemove from the oven and let cool. Cover and refrigerate for a few hours or up to overnight before serving.\n\n**Note:** Don't want this smoky? Just leave the liquid smoke out of the recipe.\nSPICY CHOCOLATE MILK SHAKE WITH WHIPPED COCONUT CREAM\n\nSpice up your chocolate with a little kick of cayenne. This spicy milk shake with whipped coconut cream is a decadent dessert that bites back. And since the recipe uses almond milk and nondairy ice cream for the shake, and coconut cream instead of dairy cream for the whipped topping, it has less of a water and climate footprint than a standard milk shake. Moo-ve over dairy, there's a new shake in town!\n\nSERVES 2 PREP TIME: 10 MINUTES\n\nINGREDIENTS\n\nFor the whipped cream:\n\n1 (5.4-oz) can coconut cream, chilled\n\n\u00bc C confectioners' sugar\n\n\u00bc tsp pure vanilla extract\n\nFor the milk shake:\n\n\u00be C almond milk\n\n2 C vegan chocolate ice cream\n\n2 Tbsp unsweetened cocoa powder\n\n\u215c tsp ground nutmeg\n\nTiny pinch of salt\n\nPinch of cayenne pepper (optional)\n\nPinch of ground cinnamon, for garnish (optional)\n\nMETHOD\n\nFirst, make the whipped cream:\n\nScoop the chilled coconut cream into a bowl, discarding the little bit of liquid left in the can. Add the confectioners' sugar and vanilla. Using a handheld mixer, whip until thick. Set aside in the fridge.\n\nNow for the shake:\n\nPlace all the milk shake ingredients in a blender and blend until smooth.\n\nPour the milk shake into glasses and top with the whipped cream and a pinch of cinnamon (if using). Enjoy!\n\n\"We should all be... focusing on enjoying more plant-based delights.\"\n\n\u2014JAMIE OLIVER\nA MESSAGE FROM\n\n## CHEF JOS\u00c9 ANDR\u00c9S\n\nOn January 12, 2010, a massive 7.0-magnitude earthquake hit Haiti, just sixteen miles west of the country's capital city of Port-au-Prince. Over the next two weeks, fifty-two major aftershocks had been recorded, with an estimated three million people affected by the quake.\n\nShortly after, I traveled to Haiti to assist in relief efforts. I was struck to see that the grinding poverty Haitians live with day-to-day had been exacerbated by dirty cooking conditions in overcrowded and unsafe tent cities. And I was also struck to learn that the problem extends far beyond Haiti.\n\nEvery day, all across the world, nearly three billion people eat food prepared using crude cookstoves or open fires in homes with poor or no ventilation. Exposure to this smoke can cause illnesses including pneumonia, lung disease, and cancer\u2014killing an estimated two million people annually. This problem has been categorized by the World Health Organization as the fifth biggest health risk in developing countries.\n\nThe fact is that how we cook and eat food can have major social implications\u2014on our own health, the health of our communities, and the health of the planet. Whether it's illness caused by unsafe cooking methods, or heart disease and climate change caused by diets that focus too little on plant-based foods, we owe it to ourselves to make sure that everyone the world over has access to healthy, safely prepared, sustainably produced food\u2014along with a knowledge about how their food choices impact the world.\n\nIn 2013, I was honored to join The United Nations Foundation's Global Alliance for Clean Cookstoves as Culinary Ambassador, helping to raise awareness about the death, sickness, and injury caused by toxic smoke from cooking stoves in developing countries. I formed World Central Kitchen to provide innovative solutions to alleviate hunger throughout the developing world, including the deployment of clean and innovative cooking solutions, because for too many women and children in Haiti and elsewhere, the danger and difficulty of cooking has reached a crisis point. And I've partnered with former U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Global Ambassador Julia Roberts, and many others to ensure that this issue is on the agenda of advocates, chefs, business owners, and policymakers worldwide.\n\nI've also worked to ensure that my restaurants serve an array of healthy, sustainable, plant-based dishes that everyone can enjoy. My Washington, D.C., restaurant Beefsteak, for example, serves mostly plant-based dishes\u2014putting meat as a side-of-the-plate extra rather than the centerpiece.\n\nWhenever we eat, we make choices. Those choices are wrapped up in family and tradition; they're wrapped up in taste and mood. And whether we think about it or not, they're also wrapped up in what kind of global citizen we want to be. Across the world, millions of people have little or no real choice about how they eat\u2014about how much food they have, how they prepare it, how it's produced. Those of us who do have a choice share in the responsibility to make the right choices. Fortunately, countless people are doing just that, by choosing healthier, safer, more sustainably produced meals\u2014creating a better, cleaner world with every bite.\n\n_Named one of TIME 's \"100 Most Influential People\" and awarded \"Outstanding Chef\" by the James Beard Foundation, Jos\u00e9 Andr\u00e9s is an internationally recognized culinary innovator, author, educator, television personality, humanitarian, and chef\/owner of ThinkFoodGroup. He is the only chef globally who has both a two-star Michelin restaurant and four Bib Gourmands. Andr\u00e9s is also a committed advocate for food and hunger issues and is known for championing the role of chefs in the national debate on food policy. His awards and distinctions include the 2017 Lifetime Achievement Award from International Association of Culinary Professionals, the 2015 National Humanities Medal, and the Congressional Hispanic Caucus Institute's Chair's Medallion Award._\nSHOPPING FOR A BETTER WORLD\n\nAdjusting to (and sticking with) any diet can be tough if you don't have the right foods handy. By keeping a well-stocked pantry (and fridge) full of protein-packed, plant-based staples, you can ensure success in your effort to easily enjoy eco-friendlier fare.\n\nIf you're vegetarian or vegan, these plan(e)t-based pantry items will probably be your everyday staples. If you're a meat, dairy, and egg reducer, at least keep some of these items on deck to help mix up your normal culinary repertoire and ensure success in your efforts to help the planet with every plate. Happy shopping!\n\nPROTEIN 101\n\nWe all want well-balanced meals that are as filling as they are healthy. While Americans, on average, _over_ consume protein, there's no doubt that combined with a healthy helping of fiber, it helps us feel satisfied after any meal. If you want to mix things up from meat, try packing a protein punch with any of these whole, natural foods.\n\n**Tofu:** Tofu is made essentially the same way cheese is\u2014except from soybeans instead of milk. Reports suggest that Benjamin Franklin introduced it to America in the eighteenth century, after sending it home from one of his many trips abroad. Here's a hint, though: don't eat it raw! Just as you wouldn't like the taste of raw, unflavored chicken, many people dislike the taste of raw tofu. Cut it up and pop it in any stir-fry, though, and it's great. Broil it on a baking sheet and it puffs up and turns golden brown. Scramble it, mash it, slather it in BBQ sauce and grill it\u2014there are so many delicious ways to prepare tofu!\n\n**Tempeh:** Tempeh is similar to tofu in that it's typically made from soybeans as well\u2014though instead of being cultured and pressed, like cheese, they're fermented and formed into blocks. It's got a meaty, dense texture and cooks well in almost any format. Try marinating it before cooking it. Tempeh's got a potent taste, and a nice marinade will help it soak up your favorite flavors.\n\n**Seitan:** This is a magically meaty product made from vital wheat gluten, wheat's primary protein. You can buy it in a plastic tub (like tofu) or vacuum-packed in the refrigerated section of some stores, or make it at home with relative ease. And it cooks up just like meat, too, offering a hearty texture and taking on whatever flavors it's cooked with.\n\n**Beans and Legumes:** Enough can't be said about beans and legumes. Black beans, pinto beans, garbanzos (chickpeas), kidney beans, white beans, lentils of all colors and types, and more\u2014these are some of the most protein-rich and diverse foods on the planet. You can certainly buy any kind of bean or legume in a can. Want to try your hand at home preparation, though? Buy 'em dried and cook them yourself. Some (like lentils) cook as quickly and as easily as rice. Dried beans, on the other hand, take longer (overnight soaking plus a few hours of cooking)\u2014but preparing dried beans at home really brings out their taste in a big way, and gives you more control over their texture.\n\nTOFU 101\n\nIt's versatile, delicious, and protein-rich. But let's face it: to the uninitiated, tofu can be a little scary. In the same way you wouldn't eat an entirely unseasoned chicken breast, you probably won't want to eat raw tofu. And just in the same way raw chicken needs to soak up flavors to taste good, so does tofu. Same principle, different protein. Don't worry! Here are some tips to help ensure a positive tofu experience:\n\n**Press it!** Pressing your tofu before using it helps it firm up and also improves its ability to take on whatever flavors you're cooking it in. To press tofu, open the packet and pour the water down the drain. Wrap the block of tofu in a clean dish towel or some paper towels. Next, place it on a large plate or tray. Place something flat and heavy on top of it\u2014like a cutting board, heavy skillet, or another plate. (If what you put on top of it isn't that heavy, put something heavy\u2014like a jar of beans or jug of water\u2014on top of that.) Leave it there for at least 10 minutes, or even up to a few hours. If you are working with a 16-oz block of tofu, cut it in half crosswise through the middle first.\n\n**Freeze it!** Freezing your tofu before using it gives it a whole new texture: it makes it firmer and meatier. To freeze your tofu, just take the whole package and stick it in the freezer. Before you use it, thaw the tofu on your counter for several hours. Then once thawed, press a little of the excess water out with clean hands, slice, cook, and enjoy.\n\n**Broil it!** Broiling tofu before you use it makes it puff out and become nice and golden brown, almost like it's deep-fried (but not). To broil your tofu, cut the block into squares (however big or small you want). Place them on a baking sheet and broil in the oven for 15 minutes or until golden brown. Remove from the oven, let cool, then scrape the tofu off the baking sheet with a spatula. From here, you can put the tofu in salads as-is, pop it in some sauce for a stir fry, put it on a sandwich, and so much more. It's like a much healthier (and so much easier) version of deep-frying.\n\nPLANT-BASED \"MEATS\"\n\nMany people trying to eat more eco-friendly foods start by simply reducing meat and replacing it with the plant-based versions of their favorite items. It used to be that a veggie burger was one of your only options; today, we find a huge range of plant-based meats at grocery stores in virtually every town and city. Of course, like all packaged foods, they have a higher eco-footprint than do whole foods; but from an environmental standpoint, compared to their meaty counterparts, they're the clear winner. So if you want some ready-made options on hand for busy weeknight meals, these are a solid choice.\n\n**Chicken:** Gardein offers perhaps the best \"chicken\" tenders on the market (plus all kinds of other bird-free poultry). Try Beyond Meat's chicken strips (and other products)\u2014they have more protein than chicken, and are prepared exactly the same way. Morningstar Farms, Boca, store brand products by Target and Whole Foods, and Trader Joe's offer nuggets and strips as well as seasoned, marinated chicken-free bites. The list of plant-based poultry goes on and on.\n\nA MEAL FOR ALL SEASONS\n\nIn addition to eating more whole, plant-based meals, we can lessen our environmental _food_ -print by enjoying more seasonal produce, too. Eating seasonally helps cut down on food miles, as produce likely travels a shorter distance to reach your local market when it's in season. Of course, what's in season will change depending on where you live, but as you peruse the recipes, use this as a general guide to help you get started.\n\n**Burgers:** Beyond Meat's pre-made burgers and pre-formed patties (which look, taste, and cook just like ground beef) are best sellers. Gardein's beefless burgers are hard to beat, too. And then there are classics like Boca's Vegan Original, as well as burgers packed with whole grains and vegetables, like Sunshine Burgers and Dr. Praeger's. Find the brand(s) you like best!\n\n**Faux fish:** Okay, so there's not a ton of fish-free seafood out there. But Gardein makes a stellar frozen, breaded fish fillet that keeps forever in the freezer and tastes incredible. Top it with some lemon juice or a plant-based tartar sauce and you won't know the difference!\n\n**Pork without the pig:** Tofu Pups and Smart Dogs are two veggie dog brands I like. Field Roast and Tofurky both make an incredible variety of sausages made entirely from plant-based ingredients\u2014creole-flavored, apple sage, spicy chipotle, you name it! Gardein makes Sweet and Sour Porkless Bites and BBQ pulled pork from plant-based ingredients. These items are usually found in the produce sections of grocery stores (by the tofu) and in the freezer section.\n\n**Breakfast meats:** Sweet Earth makes a vegan bacon that will blow any carnivore's mind, and Lightlife Smart Bacon is another popular brand. Field Roast makes breakfast links as well that are sweet and filled with umami flavor. There are all kinds of other plant-based breakfast meats out there\u2014give them a try and see which ones you like best.\n\n**Deli meats:** Where tofu is sold, you'll often find a huge array of plant-based deli meats: bologna, ham, turkey slices of all flavors and brands, pepperoni, and much, much more. Want a sandwich in a cinch? Keep a couple of these in your fridge.\n\nFAT = FLAVOR\n\nAnimal-based fats tend to be harder on the earth than their plant-based counterparts, because of the inefficiencies associated with factory farming. On the other hand, there are loads of healthy, plant-based fats that are easier on our bodies and gentler on the earth. Try reducing your use of animal-filled fats like butter and lard by swapping for these eco-friendlier fats.\n\n**Avocado:** Avocado is a fantastic source of healthy fat. You can blend it into sauces and dressings, and even incorporate it into desserts! It's also excellent as a cheese replacement when you want something fatty, tasty, and creamy that isn't dairy on a sandwich or burger.\n\n**Oils:** Olive oil: We know it. We love it. It's a classic. You can cook virtually anything with it, and it adds a richness and flavor that's fatty and decadent and delicious. But have you tried coconut oil? It's more eco-friendly than animal fat and has a nice, soft taste; it also cooks incredibly well. Try it in place of butter or vegetable oil when cooking. It's solid when cold and liquid when warm, so keep that in mind for storing. Oh, and what about toasted sesame oil? Adds characteristic flavor to any Asian dish\u2014either as a dressing or cooking oil!\n\n**Margarine:** Try Earth Balance margarine in place of butter once in a while. It's not (by any means) the only plant-based butter on the market, but is likely the most popular. Spreads well, melts perfectly.\n\nWHAT'S THE DEAL WITH PALM OIL?\n\nPalm oil is a significant cause of deforestation, especially in Malaysia and Indonesia, where huge tracts of forests and carbon-rich swamps are being destroyed for palm plantations. This emits massive amounts of greenhouse gases and threatens biodiversity\u2014with orangutans, tigers, rhinoceros, and elephants being killed or displaced by the process.\n\n**Mayo:** Just Mayo by Hampton Creek has become one of the most popular brands of plant-based mayo\u2014and one of the most affordable. Even the world's largest food-service company, serving millions of meals a day (at universities, ballparks, and more), now uses Just Mayo for 100 percent of its mayonnaise needs nationwide! Plus, it's available everywhere\u2014even the Dollar Tree! Vegenaise is another widely available brand. Even the ubiquitous Hellmann's and Best Foods brands make plant-based mayo, branded as \"Carefully Crafted.\"\n\nMOO-FREE MILKS\n\nCountless people are now drinking nondairy milks. Try a variety of them and see which you like best. You'll find they vary in taste and consistency\u2014that you prefer one brand over another, or one type for baking and another in your coffee (just like you wouldn't bake with half-and-half or drink heavy cream). Here's a short list to get you started:\n\n**Soy creamer:** Gone are the days of putting regular ol' soy milk into coffee. Now those trying to make their morning joe healthier and more environmentally friendly have all kinds of brands (and flavors!) of soy-based creamers to choose from.\n\n**Soy milk:** Vanilla, chocolate, plain, unsweetened, sweetened\u2014there are so many types available now. Find the kind you like best. For baking, unsweetened soy milk is best; for drinking or putting on cereal, try vanilla.\n\n**Nut milk:** Nut milks are gaining in popularity in a huge way. In fact, almond milk is one of the fastest-growing beverages in the marketplace. You can even get almond milk in any espresso drink at Dunkin' Donuts nationwide, and most coffee shops now offer it, too. It's a reliable option, and far more planet-friendly than cow's milk!\n\nCOW-FREE CHEESE\n\nAside from vegans, countless people who continue eating cheese in moderation are now mixing things up with the amazing new plant-based cheeses\u2014cheeses made from almonds and cashews and coconut and tapioca and all kinds of other delicious products that are creamy and fatty and spread well and melt well... all while being more eco-friendly to produce. They're available nationwide, and there are always more coming out in the market. By the time you read this, I bet a new plant-based cheese will have hit the shelves!\n\n**Miyoko's:** Miyoko's Creamery makes higher-end vegan cheeses. Country-style herbes de Provence, aged English sharp farmhouse, high Sierra rustic alpine, and more. They're nutty and incredible.\n\n**Field Roast Chao:** Field Roast, known for their plant-based meats, dove into the cheese world with a major splash, taking coconut oil and other ingredients and turning them into slices under the Chao brand name. From tomato cayenne to creamy original, these cheese slices are sure to please.\n\n**Follow Your Heart:** For years, Follow Your Heart was known as the maker of Vegenaise. More recently, it's begun making plant-based cheese products that will knock your socks off. Want a block of cheddar without the eco-harm that comes with industrial dairy production? Follow Your Heart's got your back. Provolone slices, mozzarella shreds, and much more, these dairy-free delights are not to be missed.\n\n**Kite Hill:** Renowned plant-based chef Tal Ronnen, of Crossroads Kitchen fame, helped create Kite Hill, bringing what some call the most incredible vegan cheeses in history to the market. They make artisanal delicacies like almond milk ricotta and soft, fresh truffle dill and chive cheese, as well as a variety of schmears, like herbed cream cheese.\n\n**Daiya:** Daiya's cheese uses an innovative ingredient\u2014tapioca\u2014to help it melt and stretch just like dairy cheese. Their cheddar, pepperjack, and mozzarella shreds are especially good on pizzas and for mac 'n' cheese.\n\n**Nutritional yeast:** Okay, this is not a cheese\u2014technically. It comes as a powder or as flakes. But it has a really cheesy, nutty flavor that can't be beat. And it's a whole food, so its eco-footprint is low. You can sprinkle it on popcorn or pasta like Parmesan, or make decadent plant-based mac 'n' cheese with it. It has a million and one uses.\n\nESCHEWING EGGS\n\nWant to try egg-free baking? How about a breakfast scramble? Producing eggs is extremely resource-intensive when it comes to protein production, so keep some of these items on deck to use (at least) once in a while if you want to lower your ecological footprint.\n\n**The Vegan Egg:** From Follow Your Heart, the Vegan Egg comes as a powder that, when mixed with water, scrambles well for breakfast and can be used in any baked good. A quick note, though: if scrambling, try adding some additional flavor\u2014like pepper, sage, or rosemary\u2014to really make it pop.\n\n**Egg replacer:** Ener-G and Bob's Red Mill brand egg replacers are classic pantry items to replace eggs. Just mix with water to a certain ratio, and you can whip up cookies, cakes and other baked goods that taste and feel just like they have eggs, but are eco-friendlier and healthier.\n\n**Applesauce:** If you're looking for a whole-foods substitute for eggs in baked goods, applesauce is your best friend. Try substituting \u00bc cup of it for each egg called for in a recipe for sweet, baked desserts. Whodathunkit?!\n\n**Flaxseeds:** Full of omega-3 fatty acids, flaxseeds are a total power food. When ground up into a powder and mixed with water, they make a great egg replacer.\n\n**Aquafaba:** Aquafaba is a relatively new discovery that's taking the culinary world by storm. You basically take the liquid from a can of chickpeas and whip it for a long time to turn it into a poufy, fluffy, white substance that mimics whipped egg whites perfectly. You can even bake it into meringue! It sounds weird, but Google it and watch some videos\u2014you'll be amazed. Plus, because it's made from an ingredient that would otherwise go down the drain, it's extra eco-friendly!\n\n**Chickpea flour:** Also called garbanzo flour, gram flour, or _besan_ , chickpea flour is full of protein and can be used to mimic eggs in many recipes (like the Rise 'n' Shine Breakfast Sandwiches).\n\nGO NUTS\n\nEver tried nuts blended into a creamy sauce? Well, actually, you probably have\u2014if you've had peanut sauce at a Thai restaurant. Other nuts can also be blended into creamy deliciousness. Cashews and almonds work especially well for soup bases and dressings (soak them overnight or for a few hours and blend them up with water). Pine nuts make a rich addition to any pasta dish or salad. Then there are peanuts and macadamia nuts and pistachios and pecans and walnuts and all kinds of others. Keep a bunch in your pantry and, well, go nuts with them!\n\nGRAINS GALORE AND SEEDS-A-PLENTY\n\nWhite rice is certainly fine, but want something more nutritious and flavorful that'll pack even more protein, flavor, and other goodness into your meat-free meals? Try quinoa. It's a tiny seed that's huge on protein, full of flavor, and cooks in a jiff. Millet, barley, couscous, amaranth, brown rice, wild rice, farina, kamut\u2014these will leave you satisfied and full as you embark on eco-friendlier eating.\n\n# ACKNOWLEDGMENTS\n\nThank you to Josh Balk, Paul Shapiro, and Kristie Middleton. Thank you also to Alex Hodgkins, with whom I started my plant-based journey so many years ago. And to Michelle Geiss, my dear friend and focus group guru, as well as Caitlin Hayes, whose early edits on this book were invaluable. Thank you also, of course, to my father, Parker.\n\nThank you to Sally Ekus, and everyone else at The Lisa Ekus Group. And to Whitney Frick, Kara Rota, and the team at Flatiron Books. Without them, this book wouldn't exist.\n\nThank you to my culinary captain and photographer, Jessica Prescott. Her vision for the food and book helped make this what it is. And thanks to Amy Sly, for her on-point design.\n\nThank you to Staub, Vitamix, and Mauviel for the equipment and to Nouri Zarrugh for the delicious basbousa recipe.\n\nThanks to all those who contributed essays, blurbs, and photographs.\n\nThank you to my team of recipe testers: Ali Crumpacker, Amy Webster, Andy Cook, Ann Herbert, Ben Peterson, Bruce Mallory, Eddie Garza, Gabe Wigtil, Hillary Prescott (hey, sis!), Janet Prescott (hi, Mom!), Jim Reilly, Josie Morris, Joyana Hunt (also for the edits!), Justin Leonard, Kamber Sherrod, Karla Dumas, Karla Goodson, Karla Waples, Katie Scott, Lauren Pitts, Marsha Filion, Nicole Nuss, Paul Petersan, PJ Smith, Regan Karlson, Sam Hagio, Terry Hagio, Veronica Martin, and Wanda White.\n\nAnd finally, thank you to those who helped in other ways: Bernie Unti, Chad Sarno, Cody Carlson, Deb Olin Unferth, Erik Olson, Geoff Orme Evans, Janet Friesen, Jill Soffer, Joe Meloy, Jonathan Kaplan, Karen Bouris, Kat Clark, Lisa Inzerillo, Rachel Querry, Suzanne Barnard, Terri Depaolo, and anyone else I've forgotten here.\n\n# CITATIONS\n\n*Please note some of the links referenced through this work may no longer be active.\n\n.Lapp\u00e9, Frances Moore. _Diet for a Small Planet: 20th Anniversary Edition_. New York: Random House, 1991. Print. Page 8.\n\n.Fryar, Cheryl, Carroll, Margaret, and Ogden, Cynthia. _Prevalence of Overweight, Obesity, and Extreme Obesity Among Adults: United States, 1960\u20131962 Through 2011\u20132012_. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 19 Sept. 2014, https:\/\/www.cdc.gov\/nchs\/data\/hestat\/obesity_adult_11_12\/obesity_adult_11_12.htm. Accessed 30 June 2017.\n\n.\"Childhood Obesity Facts.\" _The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention_ , 10 April 2017, <https:\/\/www.cdc.gov\/obesity\/data\/childhood.html>, Accessed 30 June 2017.\n\n.Cawley, John, Meyerhoefer, Chad. \"The medical care costs of obesity: An instrumental variables approach.\" _Journal of Health Economics_ , 2012; 31 (1): 219.\n\n.United States. USDA and U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. _Scientific Report of the 2015 Dietary Guidelines Advisory Committee: Advisory Report to the Secretary of Health and Human Service and the Secretary of Agriculture_. February 2015. Web. Accessed 6 May 2016. Available at <http:\/\/health.gov\/dietaryguidelines\/2015-scientific-report\/PDFs\/Scientific-Report-of-the-2015-Dietary-Guidelines-Advisory-Committee.pdf>. Accessed 30 June 2017.\n\n.\"Gazpacho.\" The Humane Society of the United States, n.d. Available at <http:\/\/www.humanesociety.org\/issues\/eating\/recipes\/soups\/gazpacho_aha.html?credit=web>. Accessed 30 June 2017.\n\n.\"AICR, The China Study, and Forks Over Knives.\" The American Institute for Cancer Research. n.d. Available at <https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20130716220718\/http:\/www.aicr.org\/about\/advocacy\/the-china-study.html>.\n\n.\"The Hidden Epidemic: Heart Disease in America.\" _PBS_. 2007.\n\n.\"Fast Facts: Data and Statistics about Diabetes.\" _American Diabetes Association_ , Dec 2015. <http:\/\/professional.diabetes.org\/sites\/professional.diabetes.org\/files\/media\/fast_facts_12-2015a.pdf>. Accessed 30 June 2017.\n\n.Ibid.\n\n.Anderson, J. W. & Ward, K.: \"High carbohydrate, high-fiber diets for insulin-treated men with diabetes mellitus.\" _American Journal of Clinical Nutrition_ , 32: 2312, 1979.\n\n.Based on calculations from <http:\/\/www.fao.org\/faostat\/en\/#data>.\n\n.\"Farm Animal Statistics: Slaughter Totals.\" The Humane Society of the United States. 25 June 2015. Web. Accessed 6 May 2016. Available at www.humanesociety.org\/news\/resources\/research\/stats_slaughter_totals.html.\n\n.Dimitri, C., Effland, A., Conklin, N. _The 20th Century Transformation of U.S. Agriculture and Farm Policy_. United States Department of Agriculture Economic Research Service. Economic Information Bulletin Number 3. Page 5, Figure 3. June 2005.\n\n.Sauven, John. \"Why meat eaters should think much more about soil.\" _The Guardian._ 16 May 2017. Available at <https:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/commentisfree\/2017\/may\/16\/meat-eaters-soil-degradation-over-grazing>. Accessed 30 June 2017.\n\n.\"Fish Count Estimates.\" _FishCount.org.uk_ , 2014, <http:\/\/fishcount.org.uk\/fish-count-estimates>. Accessed 30 June 2017.\n\n.\"Pet Industry Market Size and Ownership Statistics.\" _American Pet Products Association_ , <http:\/\/www.americanpetproducts.org\/press_industrytrends.asp>. Accessed 30 June 2017.\n\n.\"Directory of Charities and Nonprofit Organizations.\" _GuideStar_ , <https:\/\/www.guidestar.org\/nonprofit-directory\/environment-animals\/animal-protection-welfare-services\/1.aspx>. Accessed 30 June 2017.\n\n.\"U.S. Grocery Shopper Trends 2015 Executive Summary.\" _The Food Marketing Institute_ , 2015. Available at <https:\/\/www.fmi.org\/docs\/default-source\/document-share\/fmitrends15-exec-summ-06-02-15.pdf>. Accessed 30 June 2015.\n\n.Norwood, F. B., J. L. Lusk, and R. W. Prickett. 2007. Consumer preferences for farm animal welfare: Results of a nationwide telephone survey. Working paper. Department of Agricultural Economics, Oklahoma State University, Stillwater, OK. Available at <http:\/\/cratefreefuture.com\/pdf\/American%20Farm%20Bureau-Funded%20Poll.pdf>. Accessed 30 June 2017.\n\n. _Journal of Interpersonal Violence_. 2009 Jun; 24(6):1036-56. doi: 10.1177\/0886260508319362. Epub 2008 Jun 10. Available at <https:\/\/www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov\/pubmed\/18544751>.\n\n.\"How Many Species are we Losing?\" World Wildlife Fund for Nature. Available at http:\/\/wwf.panda.org\/about_our_earth\/biodiversity\/biodiversity. Accessed 30 June 2017.\n\n.The United States Environmental Protection Agency. (26 March 2013). _EPA Survey Finds More Than Half of the Nation's River and Stream Miles in Poor Condition_ [Press release]. Available at <https:\/\/yosemite.epa.gov\/opa\/admpress.nsf\/0\/26A31559BB37A7D285257B3A00589DDF>. Accessed 30 June 2017\n\n.The Gates Notes. \"The Science Behind Plant-Based Protein.\" Online video. _YouTube_ , 19 March 2013. Accessed 6 May 2016. Available at <https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/watch?v=jjlVq5GiHbo>.\n\n.Weise, Elizabeth. \"Eating can be energy-efficient, too.\" _USA Today_. 21 April 2009. Available at <http:\/\/usatoday30.usatoday.com\/news\/nation\/environment\/2009-04-21-carbon-diet_N.htm>.\n\n.Searchinger, T., Hanson, C., Ranganathan, J., Lipinski, B., Waite, R., Winterbottom, R., Dinshaw, A., and Heimlich, R. 2013. Creating a Sustainable Food Future: Interim Findings. Page 4. Available at <https:\/\/www.wri.org\/sites\/default\/files\/wri13_report_4c_wrr_online.pdf>.\n\n.2013. Gerber, P.J., Steinfeld, H., Henderson, B., Mottet, A., Opio, C., Dijkman, J., Falcucci, A. & Tempio, G. Tackling climate change through livestock \u2013 A global assessment of emissions and mitigation opportunities. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), Rome. Available from http:\/\/www.fao.org\/docrep\/018\/ie\/ie.pdf.\n\n.Own calculations: (1) based on U.S. total average water footprint per product from Mekonnen, M.M. and Hoekstra, A.Y. 2012. A global assessment of the water footprint of farm animal products. Ecosystems 15:401-15; and (2) whole milk and egg weights from United States Department of Agriculture Economic Research Service in cooperation with the Agricultural Marketing Service, the Agricultural Research Service, and the National Agriculture Statistics Service. 1992. Weights, measures, and conversion factors for agricultural commodities and their products, p. 28 Table 19 and p. 34 Table 21. Agricultural Handbook No. 697. www.ers.usda.gov\/media\/935958\/ah697_002.pdf. Accessed May 6, 2016.\n\n.NRDC (nrdcfood). \"Eating plant-forward dishes can go a long way in reducing diet-related carbon emissions.\" <http:\/\/bit.ly\/2q6WFl9> via @mindbodygreen. 27 April 2017, 10:00 AM. Tweet. Available at <https:\/\/twitter.com\/NRDCFood\/status\/857595205679173632>.\n\n.Lia Marie Johnson. \"Obama and I have a serious conversation...\" Online video. _YouTube_ , 7 Nov 2016. Accessed 6 February 2017. Available at <https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/watch?v=Dl1stHbyJAw>.\n\n.Grossman-Cohen, Ben. \"'Meatless Monday' Too Hot a Potato for USDA.\" _CNN_. 2 August 2012. Available at www.cnn.com\/2012\/08\/02\/opinion\/grossman-cohen-meatless-monday.\n\n.Barclay, Eliza. \"Even carnivores are putting more fake meat on their plates.\" _National Public Radio_. 15 August 2013. Available at www.npr.org\/sections\/thesalt\/2013\/08\/14\/212024490\/even-carnivores-are-putting-more-fake-meat-on-their-plates.\n\n.Scipioni, Jade and Libasi, Matthew. \"Tyson Foods CEO: The Future of Food May be Meatless.\" _FOX Business_. 7 March 2017. Available at <http:\/\/www.foxbusiness.com\/features\/2017\/03\/07\/tyson-foods-ceo-future-food-might-be-meatless.html>.\n\n.Black, Jane. \"Meat on the Side: Modern Menus Shift the Focus to Vegetables.\" _The Wall Street Journal_. 31 Oct 2014. Available at <https:\/\/www.wsj.com\/articles\/meat-on-the-side-modern-menus-shift-the-focus-to-vegetables-1414784266>. Accessed 30 June 2017.\n\n.Timothy V. \"Jamie Oliver Interview\u2014Veganism, McDonald's, Bill Gates.\" Online video. _YouTube_ , 4 Feb 2015. Accessed 21 October 2016. Available at www.youtube.com\/watch?v=gAEgSLeepOw.\n\n.Kennedy, Wally. \"Effort to keep CAFO from Arrow Rock mirrors fight to protect parks.\" _Joplin Globe_. 17 November 2007. Available at www.joplinglobe.com\/archives\/effort-to-keep-cafo-from-arrow-rock-mirrors-fight-to\/article_fe9f629a-3a98-5f27-a49d-ce47c711b6a4.html.\n\n.\"American FactFinder.\" United States Census Bureau. Accessed 5 May 2016.\n\n.Kennedy, Wally. \"Effort to keep CAFO from Arrow Rock mirrors fight to protect parks.\" _Joplin Globe_. 17 November 2007. Available at www.joplinglobe.com\/archives\/effort-to-keep-cafo-from-arrow-rock-mirrors-fight-to\/article_fe9f629a-3a98-5f27-a49d-ce47c711b6a4.html.\n\n.Ibid.\n\n.Sandy, Jennifer. \"Factory Farms: A Bad Choice for Rural America.\" _Forum Journal_. Vol. 23, No. 2. Winter 2009. Available at: www.preservationnation.org\/forum\/library\/public-articles\/factory-farms.html.\n\n.Gates, Bill. \"The Future of Food.\" _The Gates Notes_. 18 March 2013. Available at www.gatesnotes.com\/About-Bill-Gates\/Future-of-Food.\n\n.Kennedy, Wally. \"Effort to keep CAFO from Arrow Rock mirrors fight to protect parks.\" _Joplin Globe_. 17 November 2007. Available at www.joplinglobe.com\/archives\/effort-to-keep-cafo-from-arrow-rock-mirrors-fight-to\/article_fe9f629a-3a98-5f27-a49d-ce47c711b6a4.html.\n\n.Borgman, Kathy. Phone interview by Matthew Prescott. 11 October 2016.\n\n.Steinfeld, H., Gerber, P., Wassenaar, T., Castel, V., Rosales, M., and De Haan, C. 2006. \"Livestock's long shadow: environmental issues and options\" (Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations). Available at <ftp:\/\/ftp.fao.org\/docrep\/fao\/010\/a0701e\/a0701e.pdf>.\n\n.Marks, Robbin. \"Cesspools of Shame.\" July 2001. NRDC. Available at: www.nrdc.org\/sites\/default\/files\/cesspools.pdf.\n\n.Steinfeld, H., Gerber, P., Wassenaar, T., Castel, V., Rosales, M., and De Haan, C. 2006. \"Livestock's long shadow: environmental issues and options\" (Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations). Available at <ftp:\/\/ftp.fao.org\/docrep\/fao\/010\/a0701e\/a0701e.pdf>.\n\n.Walker, R., Browder, J., Arima, E., Simmons, C., Pereira, R., Caldas, M., Shirota, R., Zen, S.d., 2009. \"Ranching and the new global range: Amaz\u00f4nia in the 21st century.\" _Geoforum_ 40, 732\u2013745.\n\n.Bianchi, C., Haig, S., 2013. Deforestation trends of tropical dry forests in central Brazil. Biotropica 45, 395-400.\n\n.Morales-Hidalgo, D., 2006. Tree cover assessment: with special focus on the relative position issue. Case Studies in Open Areas in Costa Rica. Cuvillier Verlag.\n\n.Rulli, M.C., Saviori, A., D'Odorico, P., 2013. \"Global land and water grabbing.\" _Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci._ 110, 892\u2013897.\n\n.Devendra, C., Thomas, D., 2002a. \"Crop\u2013animal systems in Asia: importance of livestock and characterisation of agro-ecological zones.\" _Agric. Syst._ 71, 5\u201315.\n\n.B. Machovina et al. \"Science of the Total Environment\" 536 (2015). Pages 419\u2013431. Available at <http:\/\/dx.doi.org\/10.1016\/j.scitotenv.2015.07.022>.\n\n.Ibid.\n\n.Own calculation using: (1) 2014. Eshel, Gidon et al. Land, irrigation water, greenhouse gas, and reactive nitrogen burdens of meat, eggs, and dairy production in the United States. _PNAS_. 19 August 2014. Vol. 111, No. 33. Available at www.pnas.org\/cgi\/doi\/10.1073\/pnas.1402183111; with (2) square meters converted to square feet; and for the square footage of an NFL football field (3) Smith, Greg. \"A controversial end to an instant classic.\" 13 Jan. 2010. National Football League. Accessed 6 May 2016. Available at www.nfl.com\/news\/story\/09000d5d815b45a6\/printable\/a-controversial-end-to-an-instant-classic.\n\n.Borgman, Kathy. Phone interview by Matthew Prescott. 11 October 2016.\n\n.Roosevelt, Franklin. _Letter to all State Governors on a Uniform Soil Conservation Law_. 26 Feb 1937. Available at: www.presidency.ucsb.edu\/ws\/?pid=15373.\n\n.Ranganthan, J., Vennard, D., Waite, R., Dumas, P., Lipinksi, B., Searchinger, T., and Globagri-WRR Model Authors (2016). Shifting Diets for a Sustainable Future. Page 37. Available at www.wri.org\/sites\/default\/files\/Shifting_Diets_for_a_Sustainable_Food_Future_0.pdf.\n\n.Vaughan, Adam. \"Paul McCartney Backs Meat-Free Monday to Curb Carbon Emissions.\" _The Guardian_. 15 June 2009. Available at: www.theguardian.com\/environment\/2009\/jun\/15\/paul-mccartney-meat-free-monday.\n\n.\"Climate Actions to Change our World.\" United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization. 16 October 2016. Available at: www.fao.org\/world-food-day\/2016\/climate-actions\/en.\n\n.Carlson, Cody. Phone interview by Matthew Prescott. 12 May 2016.\n\n.Lerner, Rebecca. \"Toxic Fumes, Blisters & Brain Damage: The Cost of Doing Business?\" _The Ithaca Times_. 2 April 2008. Available at: www.organicconsumers.org\/news\/toxic-fumes-blisters-brain-damage-cost-doing-business. Note: Subsequently, Karen Strecker's father and other residents unsuccessfully sued the dairy for Clean Water Act violations.\n\n.Ross, Brian and Schecter, Anna. \"Got Milk? Got Ethics? Animal Rights v. U.S. Dairy Industry.\" _ABC News_. 26 January 2010. <http:\/\/abcnews.go.com\/Blotter\/animal-rights-us-dairy-industry\/story?id=9658866>.\n\n.(1) Lerner, Rebecca. \"Toxic Fumes, Blisters & Brain Damage: The Cost of Doing Business?\" _The Ithaca Times_. 2 April 2008. Available at: www.organicconsumers.org\/news\/toxic-fumes-blisters-brain-damage-cost-doing-business; with (2) 157,000 tons converted to pounds.\n\n.Based on curb weight of a 2015 Ford F-150 4x2. Ford Motor Company. \"F-150 Specifications.\" n.d. Available at: www.ford.com\/trucks\/f150\/specifications.\n\n.Lerner, Rebecca. \"Toxic Fumes, Blisters & Brain Damage: The Cost of Doing Business?\" _The Ithaca Times_. 2 April 2008. Available at: www.organicconsumers.org\/news\/toxic-fumes-blisters-brain-damage-cost-doing-business.\n\n.Ibid.\n\n.Hauter, Wenonah. _Foodopoly: The Battle over the Future of Food and Farming in America_. New York: The New Press, 2014. Print.\n\n.Kilborn, Peter. \"Hurricane Reveals Flaws in Farm Law.\" _The New York Times_. 22 September 1999. Available at: www.nytimes.com\/library\/national\/101799floyd-environment.html.\n\n.\"Corporate Hogs at the Public Trough.\" _Sierra Club_. San Francisco, California. 1999.\n\n.Merritt Frey, et al. \"Spills and Kills: Manure Pollution and America's Livestock Feedlots.\" _Clean Water Network_. Izaak Walton League of America and Natural Resources Defense Council. August 2000.\n\n.\"Corporate Hogs at the Public Trough.\" _Sierra Club_. San Francisco, California. 1999.\n\n.Merritt Frey, et al. \"Spills and Kills: Manure Pollution and America's Livestock Feedlots.\" _Clean Water Network_. Izaak Walton League of America and Natural Resources Defense Council. August 2000.\n\n.Hopkins, Elaine. \"Dairy Farm Ordered to Clean Up\u2014Inwood Dairy Must Cut Herd Size, Clean Ravine of 2 Million Gallons of Waste.\" _Peoria Journal Star_. 22 February 2001.\n\n.Ibid.\n\n.\"Corporate Hogs at the Public Trough.\" _Sierra Club_. San Francisco, California. 1999.\n\n.Gordon, Stuart and Lindsay, Alvie. \"Polluting Dairyman Gets Jail.\" _The Modesto Bee_. 14 March 1998.\n\n.Prince Charles, Prince of Wales. _A speech by HRH The Prince of Wales to the Future for Food Conference, Georgetown University, Washington DC_. 4 May 2011. Available at www.princeofwales.gov.uk\/media\/speeches\/speech-hrh-the-prince-of-wales-the-future-food-conference-georgetown-university.\n\n.Environmental Science, Enger and Smith, 6th ed. Fishery management: Page 201-Page 203. Available at: www.mhhe.com\/biosci\/pae\/es_map\/articles\/article_53.mhtml.\n\n.United States. EPA. _PA California Dairy Farmer Sentenced for Clean Water Violations_. Press Release. 20 March 1998. Available at <https:\/\/yosemite.epa.gov\/opa\/admpress.nsf\/0\/34ADD4BDC5B8707A852565CD005FD499>.\n\n.Environmental Defense Fund. \"Overfishing: Worse than You Might Think.\" n.d. Accessed 11 May 2016. Available at: www.edf.org\/oceans\/overfishing-worse-you-might-think.\n\n.\"Fish Count Estimates.\" <http:\/\/fishcount.org.uk\/fish-count-estimates>.\n\n.Worm, Boris, Barbier, Edward B., Beaumont, Nicola, Duffy, J. Emmett, Folke, Carl, Halpern, Benjamin S., Jackson, Jeremy B. C., Lotze, Heike K., Micheli, Fiorenza, Palumbi, Stephen R., Sala, Enric, Selkoe, Kimberley A., Stachowicz, John J., and Watson, Reg. \"Impact of Biodiversity Loss on Ocean Ecosystem Services.\" _Science_. Vol. 314, Issue 5800, pp. 787-790. 3 November 2006. Available at: <http:\/\/science.sciencemag.org\/content\/314\/5800\/787.abstract>.\n\n.Brown, Culum. \"Animal minds: Not just a pretty face.\" _New Scientist_. 12 June 2004. Available at: www.newscientist.com\/article\/mg18224515.200-animal-minds-not-just-a-pretty-face.\n\n.Oceana. \"Responsible fishing: Stopping overfishing.\" n.d. Accessed 11 May 2016. Available at http:\/\/oceana.org\/en\/our-work\/promote-responsible-fishing\/bottom-trawling\/learn-act\/more-on-bottom-trawling-gear.\n\n.Ibid.\n\n.Harris, Richard. \"Whales, Dolphins Are Collateral Damage In Our Taste For Seafood.\" NPR. 8 January 2014. Available at www.npr.org\/blogs\/thesalt\/2014\/01\/07\/260555381\/thousands-of-whales-dolphins-killed-to-satisfy-our-seafood-appetite.\n\n.Smith, Z., Gilroy, M., Eisenson, M., Schnettler, E., Stefanski, S. Natural Resources Defense Council. \"Net Loss: The Killing of Marine Mammals in Foreign Fisheries.\" January 2014. Available at www.nrdc.org\/sites\/default\/files\/mammals-foreign-fisheries-report.pdf.\n\n.\"Aquaculture.\" World Wildlife Fund for Nature. Available at <http:\/\/wwf.panda.org\/what_we_do\/footprint\/agriculture\/aquaculture.cfm>. Accessed 30 June 2017.\n\n.(1) United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization. \"Global aquaculture production statistics updated to 2013: Summary information.\" Table 1. March 2015. Available at: www.fao.org\/3\/a-i4899e.pdf; with (2) total metric tons converted to pounds.\n\n.Based on reported weight of 450,000 pounds. The Statue of Liberty \u2013 Ellis Island Foundation. \"Statue Facts.\" n.d. Available at: www.libertyellisfoundation.org\/statue-facts.\n\n.Balcombe, Jonathan. Phone interview by Matthew Prescott. 15 May 2016.\n\n.\"Salmon Fishing Problems.\" Coastal Alliance for Aquaculture Reform. _Farmed and Dangerous_. n.d. Available at: www.farmedanddangerous.org\/salmon-farming-problems.\n\n.Ibid.\n\n.Crawford, Elizabeth. \"Almond milk sales continue to surge, while dairy milk contracts, Nielsen data shows.\" _Food Navigator_. 15 April 2016. Available at: www.foodnavigator-usa.com\/Manufacturers\/Almond-milk-sales-continue-to-surge-as-dairy-milk-contracts-Nielsen.\n\n.Midkiff, Ken. _The Meat You Eat: How Corporate Farming Has Endangered America's Food Supply_. New York: St. Martin's Press, 2004. Print. Back cover.\n\n.Inzerillo, Lisa. Personal interview by Matthew Prescott. 18 February 2017.\n\n.Montgomery, Jess. \"Delaware's broiler chicken output grows.\" _The News Journal_. 29 April 2014. Available at: www.delawareonline.com\/story\/money\/business\/2014\/04\/29\/delawares-broiler-chicken-output-grows\/8475187.\n\n.Schuessler, Ryan. \"Maryland residents fight poultry industry expansion.\" _Al Jazeera America_. 23 Nov. 2015. Available at: <http:\/\/america.aljazeera.com\/articles\/2015\/11\/23\/maryland-residents-fight-poultry-industry-expansion.html>.\n\n.Kobell, Rona. \"Poultry mega-houses forcing Shore residents to flee from stench, traffic.\" _The Bay Journal_. 22 July 2015. Available at: <http:\/\/marylandreporter.com\/2015\/07\/22\/poultry-mega-houses-forcing-shore-residents-to-flee-stench-traffic>.\n\n.\"Poisoned Waters.\" _Frontline_. PBS. 21 April 2009. Web. Accessed 10 May 2016. Relevant segment available at: www.pbslearningmedia.org\/resource\/envh10.sci.life.eco.chickenwaste\/chicken-waste-and-water-pollution.\n\n.Ibid.\n\n. _Poult Sci._ 2013 Jan; 92(1):64\u201383. doi: 10.3382\/ps.2012-02745.\n\n.\"The Facts.\" _Cowspiracy_. Web. Accessed 10 May 2016. Available at: www.cowspiracy.com\/facts.\n\n.\"Poisoned Waters.\" _Frontline_. PBS. 21 April 2009. Web. Accessed 10 May 2016. Relevant segment available at: www.pbslearningmedia.org\/resource\/envh10.sci.life.eco.chickenwaste\/chicken-waste-and-water-pollution.\n\n.Parker, Suzi. \"How poultry producers are ravaging the rural south.\" _Grist_. 22 February 2006. Available at: http:\/\/grist.org\/article\/parker1.\n\n.Ibid.\n\n.Mirabelli, Maria C., Wing, Steve, Marshall, Stephen W., and Wilcosky, Timothy C., \"Race, Poverty, and Potential Exposure of Middle-School Students to Air Emissions from Confined Swine Feeding Operations.\" Available at http:\/\/www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov\/pmc\/articles\/PMC1440786.\n\n.Pope Francis. _Encyclical Letter of the Holy Father on Care for our Common Home_. 24 May 2015. Available at: <http:\/\/w2.vatican.va\/content\/francesco\/en\/encyclicals\/documents\/papa-francesco_20150524_enciclica-laudato-si.html>.\n\n.Parker, Suzi. \"How poultry producers are ravaging the rural south.\" _Grist_. 22 February 2006. Available at: http:\/\/grist.org\/article\/parker1.\n\n.Doujaiji, B. and Al-Tawfiq, J. \"Hydrogen sulfide exposure in an adult male.\" _Annals of Saudi Medicine_. 30(1): 76\u201380. April 1010. Available at: www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov\/pmc\/articles\/PMC2850187.\n\n.Good, Kate. \"How Factory Farming Creates Air Pollution.\" _One Green Planet_. 10 March 2015. Available at: http:\/\/www.onegreenplanet.org\/environment\/how-factory-farming-creates-air-pollution.\n\n.The Pew Charitable Trusts. (29 April 2008). _Pew Commission Says Industrial Scale Farm Animal Production Poses \"Unacceptable\" Risks to Public Health, Environment_ [Press release]. Available at <http:\/\/www.pewtrusts.org\/en\/about\/news-room\/press-releases\/2008\/04\/29\/pew-commission-says-industrial-scale-farm-animal-production-poses-unacceptable-risks-to-public-health-environment>. Accessed 30 June 2017.\n\n.\"Air Pollution.\" Sustainable Table. n.d. Available at: <http:\/\/gracelinks.org\/media\/pdf\/air_pollution_tp_20090826.pdf>.\n\n.Curtis Stofferahn, \"Industrialized Farming and Its Relationship to Community Well-Being: an Update of the 2000 Report by Linda Labao,\" Special report prepared for the state of North Dakota, Office of Attorney General, www.und.edu\/org\/ndrural\/Lobao%20&%20Stofferahn.pdf.\n\n.Marks, Robbin. \"Cesspools of Shame.\" July 2001. NRDC. Available at: www.nrdc.org\/sites\/default\/files\/cesspools.pdf.\n\n.Pacelle, Wayne. \"HSUS 2016 annual report: Transformational progress for orcas and elephants, farm and lab animals, and others.\" Web blog post. _A Humane Nation_. The Humane Society of the United States, 15 March 2017. Web. Available at <http:\/\/blog.humanesociety.org\/wayne\/2017\/03\/hsus-annual-report-2016-transformational-progress.html>. Accessed 30 June 2017.\n\n.\"Per Capita Consumption of Poultry and Livestock, 1965 to Estimated 2016, in Pounds.\" _National Chicken Council_. 13 April 2016. Accessed 10 May 2016. Available at: www.nationalchickencouncil.org\/about-the-industry\/statistics\/per-capita-consumption-of-poultry-and-livestock-1965-to-estimated-2012-in-pounds.\n\n.\"Chart of U.S. Population: 1790 \u2013 2000.\" Census-Charts.com. n.d. Available at: www.census-charts.com\/Population\/pop-us-1790-2000.html.\n\n.United States. U.S. Census Bureau. U.S. and World Population Clock. Available at: www.census.gov\/popclock.\n\n.\"Sales and Trends.\" _Soyfoods Association of America_. Available at: www.soyfoods.org\/soy-products\/sales-and-trends.\n\n.Tropical Smoothie Caf\u00e9 menu. n.d. Available at: <https:\/\/s3.amazonaws.com\/tscws\/downloads\/TSC_Food_Smoothies_Menu.pdf>.\n\n.Beyond Meat. Lightly Seasoned Strips. n.d. Available at: <http:\/\/beyondmeat.com\/products>.\n\n.United States. USDA and U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. _Scientific Report of the 2015 Dietary Guidelines Advisory Committee: Advisory Report to the Secretary of Health and Human Service and the Secretary of Agriculture_. February 2015. Web. Accessed 10 May 2016. Available at <http:\/\/health.gov\/dietaryguidelines\/2015-scientific-report\/PDFs\/Scientific-Report-of-the-2015-Dietary-Guidelines-Advisory-Committee.pdf>.\n\n.United States. Office of the White House Press Secretary. _Remarks by the President at the GLACIER Conference\u2014Anchorage, AK_. 31 August 2015. Web. Accessed 17 October 2016. Available at www.whitehouse.gov\/the-press-office\/2015\/09\/01\/remarks-president-glacier-conference-anchorage-ak.\n\n.America's Climate Choices: Panel on Advancing the Science of Climate Change; National Research Council (2010). _Advancing the Science of Climate Change_. Washington, D.C.: The National Academies Press. ISBN 0-309-14588-0. Available at: www.nap.edu\/catalog.php?record_id=12782.\n\n.Davenport, Coral and Robertson, Campbell. \"Resettling the First American 'Climate Refugees.'\" _The New York Times_. 3 May 2016. Available at: www.nytimes.com\/2016\/05\/03\/us\/resettling-the-first-american-climate-refugees.html.\n\n.Ibid.\n\n.Allen, Leslie. \"Will Tuvalu Disappear Beneath the Sea?\" _Smithsonian Magazine_. August 2004. Available at: www.smithsonianmag.com\/travel\/will-tuvalu-disappear-beneath-the-sea-180940704\/?all.\n\n.Ibid.\n\n.\"Tuvalu: Joining forces to tackle climate change.\" International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. n.d. Available at: www.ifrc.org\/Global\/Case%20studies\/Disasters\/cs-tuvalu-en.pdf.\n\n.Steinfeld, H., Gerber, P., Wassenaar, T., Castel, V., Rosales, M., and De Haan, C. 2006. \"Livestock's long shadow: environmental issues and options\" (Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations). Available at <ftp:\/\/ftp.fao.org\/docrep\/fao\/010\/a0701e\/a0701e.pdf>.\n\n.United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization. \"Key Facts and Findings.\" n.d. Available at: www.fao.org\/news\/story\/en\/item\/197623\/icode.\n\n.\"Fighting Global Warming with Food.\" Environmental Defense Fund. 27 August 2007. Available at <https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20080604070742\/edf.org\/article.cfm?contentID=6604>.\n\n.\"Limit Your Meat Consumption.\" _Earth Day Network_ , n.d. Available at <http:\/\/www.earthday.org\/limit-meat-consumption>. Accessed 30 June 2017.\n\n.Isomaki, Risto. _Meat, Milk and Climate: Why it is Absolutely Necessary to Reduce the Consumption of Animal Products_. Helsinki: Into Publishing, 2016. Page 1. Print.\n\n.Kandy, Daniel. \"The World Mangrove Atlas: Hope Amid Despair.\" _The World Watch Institute_. 20 August 2010. Available at: http:\/\/blogs.worldwatch.org\/nourishingtheplanet\/the-world-mangrove-atlas-hope-amid-despair.\n\n.Steinfeld, H., Gerber, P., Wassenaar, T., Castel, V., Rosales, M., and De Haan, C. 2006. \"Livestock's long shadow: environmental issues and options\" (Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. Pp. 272). Available at <ftp:\/\/ftp.fao.org\/docrep\/fao\/010\/a0701e\/a0701e.pdf>.\n\n.2003. Pimentel, David and Marcia Pimentel. \"Sustainability of meat-based and plant-based diets and the environment.\" _American Journal of Clinical Nutrition_.78 (suppl): 660S\u20133S. Available from http:\/\/ajcn.nutrition.org\/content\/78\/3\/660S.full.\n\n.Eshel, Gidon. \"Grass-fed beef packs a punch to environment.\" _Reuters_. 8 April 2010. Available at: http:\/\/blogs.reuters.com\/environment\/2010\/04\/08\/grass-fed-beef-packs-a-punch-to-environment.\n\n.Steinfeld, H., Gerber, P., Wassenaar, T., Castel, V., Rosales, M., and de Haan, C. 2006. \"Livestock's long shadow: environmental issues and options.\" Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, p. 112.\n\n.Ramanathan, V. and Xu, Y. 2010. \"The Copenhagen Accord for limiting global warming: criteria, constraints, and available avenues.\" Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 107 (18).\n\n.Eshel, Gidon. \"Grass-fed beef packs a punch to environment.\" _Reuters_. 8 April 2010. Available at: <http:\/\/blogs.reuters.com\/environment\/2010\/04\/08\/grass-fed-beef-packs-a-punch-to-environment>.\n\n.\"Fighting Global Warming with Food.\" The Environmental Defense Fund website. 24 July 2007. Archived copy available at: web.archive.org\/web\/20080923070051\/http:\/www.edf.org\/article.cfm?contentid=6604.\n\n.Pine, Joselyn. _Wit and Wisdom of America's First Ladies_. 2014. Mineola: Dover Publications. Print.\n\n.Scarborough, P., Appleby, N., Mizdrak, A., Briggs, A.D.M., Travis, R., Bradbury, K., and Key, T. \"Dietary greenhouse gas emissions of meat-eaters, fish-eaters, vegetarians and vegans in the UK.\" _Climate Change_. July 2014. Vol. 125, Issue 2, pp. 179\u2013192. Available at: <http:\/\/link.springer.com\/article\/10.1007\/s10584-014-1169-1>.\n\n.Ibid.\n\n.2014. Bailey, Rob, Froggatt, Antony, and Wellesley, Laura. _Livestock \u2013 Climate Change's Forgotten Sector_. The Royal Institute of International Affairs. Available from www.chathamhouse.org\/sites\/files\/chathamhouse\/field\/field_document\/20141203LivestockClimateChangeBaileyFroggattWellesley.pdf.\n\n.2015. Wellesley, L., Happer, C., and Froggatt, A. _Changing Climate, Changing Diets: Pathways to Lower Meat Consumption_. The Royal Institute of International Affairs. Available from www.chathamhouse.org\/publication\/changing-climate-changing-diets%20.\n\n.TED. \"The Case for Optimism on Climate Change.\" Online video. _YouTube_ , 14 March 2016. Accessed 30 June 2017. Available at <https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/watch?v=gVfgkFaswn4>.\n\n.Pollan, Michael. \"Unhappy Meals.\" _The New York Times_. 28 January 2007. Available at <http:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/2007\/01\/28\/magazine\/28nutritionism.t.html>. Accessed 5 October 2017.\n\n.Katzen, Mollie. _The Heart of the Plate: Vegetarian Recipes for a New Generation_. New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt. 2013. Print.\n\n.Goodall, Jane. _Harvest for Hope: A Guide to Mindful Eating_. New York: Time Warner Book Group, 2005. Print. Page 111.\n\n.Huget, Jennifer Larue. \"Bobby Flay's Recipe for Eating Healthfully.\" _The Washington Post_. 20 September 2011. Available at <https:\/\/www.washingtonpost.com\/lifestyle\/wellness\/bobby-flays-recipe-for-eating-healthfully\/2011\/09\/16\/gIQA2I8uhK_story.html>.\n\n.Thomas-Wachsberger, Beatrice. \"Natalie Portman: a rare bloom.\" _New Zealand Herald_. 5 May 2011.\n\n.The White House. (13 Sept 2010). _Remarks by the First Lady in Address to the National Restaurant Association Meeting_ [Press release]. Available at <https:\/\/obamawhitehouse.archives.gov\/the-press-office\/2010\/09\/13\/remarks-first-lady-address-national-restaurant-association-meeting>. Accessed 30 June 2017.\n\n.Nazarali, Roselina. \"Shania Twain is vegetarian.\" _Foodista_. 3 December 2012. Available at www.foodista.com\/blog\/2012\/12\/03\/shania-twain-is-vegetarian.\n\n.Armstrong, Laura and Brankin, Emma. \"Leo's Big Misteak.\" _The Sun_. 19 November 2016. Available at: www.thesun.co.uk\/tvandshowbiz\/2221787\/leonardo-dicaprio-preaches-about-meat-at-a-veggie-talk-but-is-later-caught-tucking-into-lamb-tagine-at-a-steakhouse.\n\n.\"Mario Batali Talks Meatless Monday.\" _Meatless Monday_ , 25 Jan 2016. Available at <http:\/\/www.meatlessmonday.com\/articles\/mario-batali-talks-meatless-monday-tuesday-and-wednesday-on-the-chew>. Accessed 30 June 2017.\n\n.Stewart, Martha. _Meatless: More than 200 of the Very Best Vegetarian Recipes_. New York: Random House, 2013. Print.\n\n.Jenkins, Willis, Tucker, Mary Evelyn, and Grim, John. _Routledge Handbook of Religion and Ecology_. New York: Routledge, 2016.\n\n.\"Sustainable Food.\" Rachel Carson Council, n.d. Available at http:\/\/rachelcarsoncouncil.org\/our-work\/sustainable-food. Accessed 30 June 2017.\n\n.TED. \"What's Wrong with what we Eat \u2013 Mark Bittman.\" Online video. _YouTube_ , 21 May 2008. Accessed 30 June 2017. Available at <https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/watch?v=5YkNkscBEp0>.\n\n.Bessette, Chanelle. \"Mark Tercek on Small Changes that Make a Big Difference.\" _Fortune_. 5 Nov 2013. Available at www.fortune.com\/2013\/11\/05\/mark-tercek-on-small-changes-that-make-a-big-difference.\n\n.Branson, Richard. \"Why I've Given up Eating Beef.\" _Virgin_. 9 July 2014. Available at www.virgin.com\/richard-branson\/why-ive-given-up-eating-beef.\n\n.Winfrey, Oprah. \"Conscious Eating: What I Learned on the 21-Day Cleanse.\" _O, The Oprah Magazine_. October 2008. Available at: oprah.com\/omagazine\/What-I-Know-for-Sure-Oprahs-Vegan-Cleanse.\n\n.Schwarzenegger, Arnold. \"Arnold's Opinion on Vegetarianism: The Oak's Thoughts on Going Meatless.\" _Flex_. N.d. Available at www.flexonline.com\/nutrition\/arnolds-opinion-vegetarianism.\n\n.Agence France-Presse. \"Lifestyle changes can curb climate change: IPCC chief.\" 15 January 2008. Available at www.abc.net.au\/news\/2008-01-16\/lifestyle-changes-can-curb-climate-change-ipcc\/1013982.\n\n.Lantry, Lauren. \"My Plate, My Planet.\" _Sierra Club_. Available at: www.sierraclub.org\/compass\/2015\/05\/my-plate-my-planet.\n\n.Gates, Bill. \"The Future of Food.\" _The Gates Notes_. 18 March 2013. Available at www.gatesnotes.com\/About-Bill-Gates\/Future-of-Food.\n\n.Borges, Marco. _The 22-Day Revolution Cookbook_. New York. Penguin Random House, 2016.\n\n.\"Celebrity vegans and the veganism facts you need.\" MSN. 13 June 2016. Available at: www.msn.com\/en-gb\/health\/nutrition\/celebrity-vegans-and-the-veganism-facts-you-need\/ss-BBmuG5R#image=5.\n\n.D'estries, Michael. \"Al Gore Says He'll Stay Vegan 'For Life.'\" _Mother Nature Network_. 13 March 2014. Available at: www.mnn.com\/health\/fitness-well-being\/blogs\/al-gore-says-hell-likely-stay-vegan-for-life.\n\n.Buckley, Jemma. \"I'm going vegetarian 3 times a week says Jamie Oliver.\" _Daily Mail_. 12 May 2015. Available at: dailymail.co.uk\/tvshowbiz\/article-3079084\/I-m-going-vegetarian-3-times-week-says-Jamie-Oliver-s-got-veggie-cook-book-coming-out.html.\n\n# INDEX\n\nThe index that appeared in the print version of this title does not match the pages in your eBook. Please use the search function on your eReading device to search for terms of interest. For your reference, the terms that appear in the print index are listed below.\n\n**A**\n\nAFOs (animal feeding operations)\n\n_see also_ factory farms\n\nair\n\nalmond milk\n\nClassic French Toast\n\nCreamy Herbed Mashed Potatoes\n\nGreen Bean Casserole\n\nLemon-Ginger Blueberry Cake with Cream Cheese Frosting\n\nOatmeal with Chai-Poached Pears\n\nPB&J Power Smoothies\n\nSpicy Chocolate Milk Shake with Whipped Coconut Cream\n\nalmonds:\n\nRaw Lemon Vanilla Raspberry Slab\n\nRoasted Root Vegetable and Quinoa Salad\n\nAmazon rain forest\n\nAmerican Farm Bureau Federation\n\nAmerican Heart Association\n\nAmerican Institute for Cancer Research\n\n_American Journal of Clinical Nutrition_\n\nAndr\u00e9s, Jos\u00e9\n\nanimal cruelty\n\n_see also_ factory farms\n\nAppendino, Chiara\n\napples:\n\nApple-Cinnamon Pancakes\n\nApple-Pecan Crisp\n\nMom's Noodle Kugel\n\napplesauce\n\naquaculture (fish factory farms)\n\naquafaba\n\nArrow Rock, Mo.\n\nAsparagus, Wild Rice Risotto with Peas and\n\navocados\n\nAvocado Chocolate Mousse with Vanilla Bean Whip\n\nBlack Bean Breakfast Burritos\n\nBLT Bagel Sandwich\n\nLoaded Black Bean Dogs\n\nMinted Green Pea Guacamole\n\nProtein-Packed Burrito Bowl\n\nRainbow Veggie Sushi\n\nSpicy Lentil Burgers\n\n**B**\n\nbacon, veggie\n\nBLT Bagel Sandwich\n\nCrispy Rice Paper Bacon\n\nBagel BLT Sandwich\n\nBalcombe, Jonathan\n\nbananas:\n\nBreakfast Banana Split\n\nPB&J Power Smoothies\n\nB\u00e1nh M\u00ec with Sriracha Chicken, Vietnamese\n\nBasbousa, Coconut\n\nbasil:\n\nCreamy Basil Chickpea Lettuce Cups\n\nGrilled Veggie Pizza with BBQ Sauce\n\nSourdough Panzanella\n\nSun-Dried Tomato and Basil Sausages\n\nBatali, Mario\n\nbeans\n\nBlack Bean Breakfast Burritos\n\nGreen Bean Casserole\n\nLoaded Black Bean Dogs\n\nLonestar BBQ Beans\n\nMardi Gras Gumbeaux\n\nProtein-Packed Burrito Bowl\n\nSun-Dried Tomato and Basil Sausages\n\nWild Mushroom Chili\n\n_see also_ chickpeas\n\nbeets:\n\nBloody Beet Burgers\n\nRoasted Coconut-Beet Soup\n\nBingham, George Caleb\n\nBiscuits and Gravy\n\nBittman, Mark\n\nBLT Bagel Sandwich\n\nblueberries:\n\nBlueberry Buckwheat Waffles\n\nLemon-Ginger Blueberry Cake with Cream Cheese Frosting\n\nPB&J Power Smoothies\n\nBorgman, Kathy\n\nBoston University\n\nBourg, Joann\n\nBranson, Richard\n\nBrazil\n\nbread:\n\nBiscuits and Gravy\n\nBlueberry Buckwheat Waffles\n\nCherry Chia Puff Pastry Breakfast Tarts\n\nClassic French Toast\n\nEasy Cheesy Garlic Bread\n\nRosemary Cornbread Mini Muffins\n\nSourdough Panzanella\n\nSteamed Buns with Tofu and Mushrooms\n\nbreakfast:\n\nApple-Cinnamon Pancakes\n\nBiscuits and Gravy\n\nBlack Bean Breakfast Burritos\n\nBlueberry Buckwheat Waffles\n\nBreakfast Banana Split\n\nCherry Chia Puff Pastry Breakfast Tarts\n\nClassic French Toast\n\nMix 'n' Match Superfood Smoothies\n\nOatmeal with Chai-Poached Pears\n\nPB&J Power Smoothies\n\nPea and Potato Frittata\n\nRice Pudding with Coconut and Cranberries\n\nRise 'n' Breakfast Sandwich\n\nSweet Potato and Parsnip Hash\n\nTofu Scramble 101\n\nbreakfast meats, vegan\n\nbroccoli, in Coconut-Lemongrass Curry with Rice Noodles\n\nBrown, Culum\n\nBrown, Nancy\n\nBrownies, Chocolate, with Puffed Quinoa\n\nBrussels Sprouts, Blackened, with Capers and Raisins\n\nBuckwheat Blueberry Waffles\n\nBuns, Steamed, with Tofu and Mushrooms\n\nburgers\n\nBloody Beet Burgers\n\nSpicy Lentil Burgers\n\nBurrito Bowl, Protein-Packed\n\nBurritos, Black Bean Breakfast\n\n**C**\n\ncabbage:\n\nChicken and Cabbage Wontons\n\nQuick Country Coleslaw\n\nRainbow Veggie Sushi\n\n_CAFO: The Tragedy of Industrial Animal Factories_\n\nCAFOs (confined animal feeding operations)\n\n_see also_ factory farms\n\nCake, Lemon-Ginger Blueberry, with Cream Cheese Frosting\n\nCameron, James\n\nCameron, Suzy Amis\n\ncancer\n\nCape Fear\n\nCapers, Blackened Brussels Sprouts with Raisins and\n\ncarbon dioxide\n\ncarbon sequestration\n\nCarlson, Cody\n\ncarrots:\n\nCoconut-Lemongrass Curry with Rice Noodles\n\nGinger-Sesame Soba Noodle Salad\n\nPickles\n\nQuick Country Coleslaw\n\nRainbow Veggie Sushi\n\nRoasted Root Vegetable and Quinoa Salad\n\ncashews:\n\nCashew Cream Mac 'n' Cheese\n\nRaw Lemon Vanilla Raspberry Slab\n\nCasserole, Green Bean\n\nCastelli, William\n\nCauliflower Wraps, Buffalo, with Blue Cheese\n\nCenter for Biological Diversity\n\nCenters for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)\n\n_Cesspools of Shame_\n\nChai-Poached Pears, Oatmeal with\n\nCharles, Prince\n\nChatham House\n\ncheese, plant-based\n\nBuffalo Cauliflower Wraps with Blue Cheese\n\nCashew Cream Mac 'n' Cheese\n\nEasy Cheesy Garlic Bread\n\nLemon-Ginger Blueberry Cake with Cream Cheese Frosting\n\nNo-Frills Cheese Pizza\n\nPlant-Based Parmesan\n\nReuben Sandwich\n\nCheesecake, Smoky Maple-Pecan\n\nCherry Chia Puff Pastry Breakfast Tarts\n\nchicken, plant-based\n\nChicken and Cabbage Wontons\n\nMardi Gras Gumbeaux\n\nProtein-Packed Burrito Bowl\n\nVietnamese B\u00e1nh M\u00ec with Sriracha Chicken\n\nchickens\n\nchickpea flour\n\nchickpeas:\n\naquafaba\n\nCreamy Basil Chickpea Lettuce Cups\n\nMassaged Kale Caesar with Pumpernickel Croutons\n\nMeat-Free Meat Loaf with Tomato-Maple Glaze\n\nRoasted Red Pepper Hummus\n\nChili, Wild Mushroom\n\nChincoteague National Wildlife Refuge\n\nchocolate:\n\nAll-the-Nut-Butters Cups\n\nAvocado Chocolate Mousse with Vanilla Bean Whip\n\nChocolate Brownies with Puffed Quinoa\n\nPeanut Butter Chocolate Chip Cookie Ice Cream Sandwiches\n\nRaw Chocolate-Hazelnut Truffles\n\nSpicy Chocolate Milk Shake with Whipped Coconut Cream\n\ncholesterol\n\nChristen, Rolf\n\ncilantro:\n\nMinted Green Pea Guacamole\n\nWild Mushroom Chili\n\ncinnamon:\n\nApple-Cinnamon Pancakes\n\nApple-Pecan Crisp\n\nBlueberry Buckwheat Waffles\n\nClassic Pumpkin Pie\n\nMom's Noodle Kugel\n\nPeanut Butter Trail Mix Cookies\n\nRice Pudding with Coconut and Cranberries\n\nclimate change\n\n_Climate Change_\n\nCoastal Alliance for Aquaculture Reform\n\ncoconut:\n\nCoconut Basbousa\n\nCoconut-Lemongrass Curry with Rice Noodles\n\nRaw Lemon Vanilla Raspberry Slab\n\nRice Pudding with Coconut and Cranberries\n\nRoasted Coconut-Beet Soup\n\nSpicy Chocolate Milk Shake with Whipped Coconut Cream\n\nColeslaw, Quick Country\n\nSlawppy Joes\n\ncompassion\n\nCook, Ken\n\ncookies:\n\nPeanut Butter Chocolate Chip Cookie Ice Cream Sandwiches\n\nPeanut Butter Trail Mix Cookies\n\ncorn\n\nBlack Bean Breakfast Burritos\n\nProtein-Packed Burrito Bowl\n\nSave-the-Bay Crab Cakes\n\nCornbread Mini Muffins, Rosemary\n\nCosta Rica\n\ncows\n\n_Cowspiracy_\n\nCrab Cakes, Save-the-Bay\n\nCranberries, Rice Pudding with Coconut and\n\ncucumber:\n\nGinger-Sesame Soba Noodle Salad\n\nMint and Tofu Summer Rolls\n\nMinted Lemon-Cucumber Sorbet\n\nPickles\n\nRainbow Veggie Sushi\n\ncurry:\n\nCoconut-Lemongrass Curry with Rice Noodles\n\nSweet-and-Salty Curried Popcorn\n\n**D**\n\ndairy complexes\n\nWillet Dairy\n\ndairy products\n\nmilk\n\nDaiya\n\ndates:\n\nRaw Chocolate-Hazelnut Truffles\n\nRaw Lemon Vanilla Raspberry Slab\n\ndead zones\n\nDelmarva Peninsula\n\ndesserts:\n\nAll-the-Nut-Butters Cups\n\nApple-Pecan Crisp\n\nAvocado Chocolate Mousse with Vanilla Bean Whip\n\nCherry Chia Puff Pastry Breakfast Tarts\n\nChocolate Brownies with Puffed Quinoa\n\nClassic Pumpkin Pie\n\nCoconut Basbousa\n\nLemon-Ginger Blueberry Cake with Cream Cheese Frosting\n\nLemon Meringue Pie\n\nMinted Lemon-Cucumber Sorbet\n\nMom's Noodle Kugel\n\nPeanut Butter Chocolate Chip Cookie Ice Cream Sandwiches\n\nPeanut Butter Trail Mix Cookies\n\nRaw Chocolate-Hazelnut Truffles\n\nRaw Lemon Vanilla Raspberry Slab\n\nRice Pudding with Coconut and Cranberries\n\nSmoky Maple-Pecan Cheesecake\n\nSpicy Chocolate Milk Shake with Whipped Coconut Cream\n\nDew, Aloma\n\ndiabetes\n\nDiCaprio, Leonardo\n\n_Diet for a Small Planet_ (Lapp\u00e9)\n\ndogs, veggie\n\nLoaded Black Bean Dogs\n\nDukkah, Pistachio and Sunflower Seed\n\n**E**\n\nEarth\n\nEarth Day Network\n\n_Eating Animals_ (Foer)\n\nEcuador\n\nEdwards, Bernadine\n\neggplant:\n\nGrilled Veggie Pizza with BBQ Sauce\n\nMushroom and Kale Galette\n\neggs\n\nreplacements for\n\nEisenberg, Jesse\n\nempathy\n\nEnvironmental Defense Fund\n\nEnvironmental Protection Agency (EPA)\n\nEnvironmental Working Group (EWG)\n\nEshel, Gidon\n\n**F**\n\nfactory farms\n\nAFOs\n\nCAFOs\n\nchicken\n\ndefinitions of\n\nfish\n\ninvestigators of\n\nlagoons of\n\nsoil and\n\nTacosa Feedyard\n\nfats\n\nsaturated\n\nFeldstein, Stephanie\n\nField Roast\n\nfire\n\nfish\n\nfactory farms\n\nfish, faux\n\nflaxseeds\n\nFlay, Bobby\n\nflexitarian approach\n\nFoer, Jonathan Safran\n\nFollow Your Heart\n\nFood Marketing Institute (FMI)\n\n_Food Navigator_\n\n_Forks Over Knives_\n\nFramingham Heart Study (FHS)\n\nFrancis, Pope\n\nFrench Toast, Classic\n\nFriedrich, Bruce\n\nFries, Spicy Sweet Potato, with Ranch\n\nFrittata, Pea and Potato\n\n**G**\n\nGalette, Mushroom and Kale\n\nGarlic Bread, Easy Cheesy\n\nGates, Bill\n\nGessling, Dennis\n\ngestation crates\n\nginger:\n\nGinger-Sesame Soba Noodle Salad\n\nLemon-Ginger Blueberry Cake with Cream Cheese Frosting\n\nGoodall, Jane\n\nGood Food Institute\n\nGore, Al\n\ngrains\n\nGrande, Ariana\n\nGravy, Biscuits and\n\nGreen Bean Casserole\n\ngreenhouse gas emissions\n\nGreenpeace UK\n\nGreenpeace USA\n\nGreger, Michael\n\nGrossman-Cohen, Ben\n\nGuacamole, Minted Green Pea\n\nGumbeaux, Mardi Gras\n\n**H**\n\nHamilton, Bruce\n\nhazelnut butter:\n\nAll-the-Nut-Butters Cups\n\nRaw Chocolate-Hazelnut Truffles\n\nhealth and disease\n\nheart disease\n\nhearts of palm, in Save-the-Bay Crab Cakes\n\nHorton, Tom\n\nhot dogs, veggie\n\nLoaded Black Bean Dogs\n\nHumane Society of the United States\n\nHummus, Roasted Red Pepper\n\nHurricane Floyd\n\n**I**\n\nice cream:\n\nPeanut Butter Chocolate Chip Cookie Ice Cream Sandwiches\n\nSpicy Chocolate Milk Shake with Whipped Coconut Cream\n\nICESCAPE\u2014Impacts of Climate Change on the Eco-Systems and Chemistry of the Arctic Pacific Environment\n\nImhoff, Daniel\n\nInternational Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies\n\nInzerillo, Joe\n\nInzerillo, Lisa\n\nIsom\u00e4ki, Risto\n\n**J**\n\nJackfruit Tacos with Grilled Pineapple, Jerked\n\nJohn Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health\n\nJohnson, Lady Bird\n\n_Journal of Health Economics_\n\n**K**\n\nkale:\n\nMassaged Kale Caesar with Pumpernickel Croutons\n\nMushroom and Kale Galette\n\nKebabs, Smoky Seitan, with Peanut Sauce\n\nKennedy, Robert F., Jr.\n\nKerchner, Sherri\n\nKerchner, Thomas\n\nKerr, Day and Whitney\n\nKite Hill\n\nKugel, Mom's Noodle\n\n**L**\n\nlagoons\n\nLapp\u00e9, Frances Moore\n\nlegumes\n\n_see also_ beans; chickpeas\n\nlemon:\n\nLemon-Ginger Blueberry Cake with Cream Cheese Frosting\n\nLemon Meringue Pie\n\nMinted Lemon-Cucumber Sorbet\n\nRaw Lemon Vanilla Raspberry Slab\n\nLemongrass-Coconut Curry with Rice Noodles\n\nlentils\n\nBloody Beet Burgers\n\nOyster Mushrooms \u00e0 la Marini\u00e8re\n\nSpaghetti and Lentil Meatballs\n\nSpicy Lentil Burgers\n\nLeonard, Annie\n\nLettuce Cups, Creamy Basil Chickpea\n\nlivestock\n\ncows\n\nfeed for\n\nland and\n\npigs\n\n_Livestock's Long Shadow_\n\nLouisiana\n\n**M**\n\nMackey, John\n\nMac 'n' Cheese, Cashew Cream\n\nmain dishes:\n\nCashew Cream Mac 'n' Cheese\n\nChicken and Cabbage Wontons\n\nCoconut-Lemongrass Curry with Rice Noodles\n\nCreamy Basil Chickpea Lettuce Cups\n\nGrilled Veggie Pizza with BBQ Sauce\n\nJerked Jackfruit Tacos with Grilled Pineapple\n\nMeat-Free Meat Loaf with Tomato-Maple Glaze\n\nMushroom and Kale Galette\n\nNo-Frills Cheese Pizza\n\nOyster Mushrooms \u00e0 la Marini\u00e8re\n\nPittsburgh Pierogis\n\nProtein-Packed Burrito Bowl\n\nRainbow Veggie Sushi\n\nSave-the-Bay Crab Cakes\n\nSmoky Seitan Kebabs with Peanut Sauce\n\nSpaghetti and Lentil Meatballs\n\nSteamed Buns with Tofu and Mushrooms\n\nSun-Dried Tomato and Basil Sausages\n\nWild Rice Risotto with Peas and Asparagus\n\nmangrove swamps\n\nmanure\n\nmaple:\n\nMeat-Free Meat Loaf with Tomato-Maple Glaze\n\nSmoky Maple-Pecan Cheesecake\n\nmargarine\n\nmayonnaise\n\nMcCartney, Paul\n\nmeat\n\ngrass-fed\n\nland impact of\n\n_Meat, Milk and Climate: Why It Is Absolutely Necessary to Reduce the Consumption of Animal Products_ (Isom\u00e4ki)\n\nMeatballs, Lentil, Spaghetti and\n\n_Meatingplace_\n\nMeatless Mondays\n\nMeat Loaf, Meat-Free, with Tomato-Maple Glaze\n\nmeats, plant-based\n\nsee also chicken, plant-based\n\nMehdi, Ahmad\n\nMercy For Animals (MFA)\n\nmethane\n\nmilk\n\nmilks, nondairy\n\nMilk Shake, Spicy Chocolate, with Whipped Coconut Cream\n\nmint:\n\nMint and Tofu Summer Rolls\n\nMinted Green Pea Guacamole\n\nMinted Lemon-Cucumber Sorbet\n\nMiyoko's Creamery\n\nMousse, Avocado Chocolate, with Vanilla Bean Whip\n\nMuffins, Rosemary Cornbread Mini\n\nM\u00fcnter, Leilani\n\nmushrooms:\n\nCoconut-Lemongrass Curry with Rice Noodles\n\nGreen Bean Casserole\n\nGrilled Veggie Pizza with BBQ Sauce\n\nMushroom and Kale Galette\n\nOyster Mushrooms \u00e0 la Marini\u00e8re\n\nSteamed Buns with Tofu and Mushrooms\n\nWild Mushroom Chili\n\n**N**\n\nNapo River\n\nNaquin, Albert\n\nNational Heart, Lung and Blood Institute\n\nNational Trust for History Preservation\n\nNatural Resources Defense Council (NRDC)\n\n_New York Times_\n\nNhat Hanh, Thich\n\nnoodles:\n\nCoconut-Lemongrass Curry with Rice Noodles\n\nGinger-Sesame Soba Noodle Salad\n\nMint and Tofu Summer Rolls\n\nMom's Noodle Kugel\n\n_see also_ pasta\n\nNorth Carolina\n\nNPR\n\nnut butters:\n\nAll-the-Nut-Butters Cups\n\n_see also_ peanut butter\n\nnut milks\n\n_see also_ almond milk\n\nnuts\n\nnutritional yeast\n\n**O**\n\noats:\n\nApple-Pecan Crisp\n\nOatmeal with Chai-Poached Pears\n\nPeanut Butter Trail Mix Cookies\n\nObama, Barack\n\nObama, Michelle\n\noils\n\nOliver, Jamie\n\nomega-3 fatty acids\n\noverweight and obesity\n\nOxfam America\n\n**P**\n\nPacelle, Wayne\n\nPachauri, Rajendra\n\npalm oil\n\nPancakes, Apple-Cinnamon\n\nPanzanella, Sourdough\n\nParmesan, Plant-Based\n\nparsnips:\n\nRoasted Root Vegetable and Quinoa Salad\n\nSweet Potato and Parsnip Hash\n\npasta:\n\nCashew Cream Mac 'n' Cheese\n\nSpaghetti and Lentil Meatballs\n\n_see also_ noodles\n\npeanut butter:\n\nAll-the-Nut-Butters Cups\n\nPB&J Power Smoothies\n\nPeanut Butter Chocolate Chip Cookie Ice Cream Sandwiches\n\nPeanut Butter Trail Mix Cookies\n\nSmoky Seitan Kebabs with Peanut Sauce\n\npears:\n\nMom's Noodle Kugel\n\nOatmeal with Chai-Poached Pears\n\npeas:\n\nMinted Green Pea Guacamole\n\nPea and Potato Frittata\n\nWild Rice Risotto with Peas and Asparagus\n\npecans:\n\nApple-Pecan Crisp\n\nSmoky Maple-Pecan Cheesecake\n\npepper, bell:\n\nGinger-Sesame Soba Noodle Salad\n\nRainbow Veggie Sushi\n\nRoasted Red Pepper Hummus\n\nPew Charitable Trusts\n\nPew Commission on Industrial Farm Animal Production\n\nPhilippines\n\nPickles\n\nPierogis, Pittsburgh\n\npies:\n\nClassic Pumpkin Pie\n\nLemon Meringue Pie\n\nSmoky Maple-Pecan Cheesecake\n\npigs\n\nPineapple, Grilled, Jerked Jackfruit Tacos with\n\nPistachio and Sunflower Seed Dukkah\n\npizza:\n\nGrilled Veggie Pizza with BBQ Sauce\n\nNo-Frills Cheese Pizza\n\nPollan, Michael\n\nPopcorn, Sweet-and-Salty Curried\n\nPortman, Natalie\n\npotatoes:\n\nCreamy Herbed Mashed Potatoes\n\nPea and Potato Frittata\n\nPittsburgh Pierogis\n\nRoasted Root Vegetable and Quinoa Salad\n\npoultry\n\nPritikin, Nathan\n\nprotein\n\nPudding, Rice, with Coconut and Cranberries\n\nPumpernickel Croutons, Massaged Kale Caesar with\n\nPumpkin Pie, Classic\n\n**Q**\n\nquinoa\n\nChocolate Brownies with Puffed Quinoa\n\nProtein-Packed Burrito Bowl\n\nRoasted Root Vegetable and Quinoa Salad\n\n**R**\n\nRachel Carson Council\n\nraisins:\n\nBlackened Brussels Sprouts with Capers and Raisins\n\nMom's Noodle Kugel\n\nPeanut Butter Trail Mix Cookies\n\nRanch, Spicy Sweet Potato Fries with\n\nRaspberry Slab, Raw Lemon Vanilla\n\nReduce, Replace, Refine\n\nrice:\n\nMardi Gras Gumbeaux\n\nRainbow Veggie Sushi\n\nRice Pudding with Coconut and Cranberries\n\nWild Rice Risotto with Peas and Asparagus\n\nrice paper:\n\nBLT Bagel Sandwich\n\nCrispy Rice Paper Bacon\n\nMint and Tofu Summer Rolls\n\nRio Branco\n\nRisotto, Wild Rice, with Peas and Asparagus\n\nRocky Mountains\n\nRoosevelt, Franklin D.\n\nrosemary:\n\nCreamy Herbed Mashed Potatoes\n\nOyster Mushrooms \u00e0 la Marini\u00e8re\n\nRosemary Cornbread Mini Muffins\n\nRoyal Institute of International Affairs\n\n**S**\n\nsalads:\n\nGinger-Sesame Soba Noodle Salad\n\nMassaged Kale Caesar with Pumpernickel Croutons\n\nQuick Country Coleslaw\n\nRoasted Root Vegetable and Quinoa Salad\n\nSesame Seaweed Salad\n\nSourdough Panzanella\n\nsandwiches:\n\nBloody Beet Burgers\n\nBLT Bagel Sandwich\n\nBuffalo Cauliflower Wraps with Blue Cheese\n\nLoaded Black Bean Dogs\n\nReuben Sandwich\n\nRise 'n' Breakfast Sandwich\n\nSlawppy Joes\n\nSpicy Lentil Burgers\n\nVietnamese B\u00e1nh M\u00ec with Sriracha Chicken\n\nSandy, Jennifer\n\nSappington, John\n\nsausage, vegan\n\nRise 'n' Breakfast Sandwich\n\nSun-Dried Tomato and Basil Sausages\n\nSauven, John\n\nSchwarzenegger, Arnold\n\n_Science_\n\n_Science Behind Plant-Based Protein, The_\n\n_Science of the Total Environment_\n\nSeacrest, Ryan\n\nseasonal produce\n\nSeaweed Salad, Sesame\n\nseeds\n\nseitan\n\nSmoky Seitan Kebabs with Peanut Sauce\n\nsesame:\n\nGinger-Sesame Soba Noodle Salad\n\nSesame Seaweed Salad\n\n_Shifting Diets for a Sustainable Food Future_\n\nshopping\n\nshrimp\n\nsides and extras:\n\nBlackened Brussels Sprouts with Capers and Raisins\n\nCreamy Herbed Mashed Potatoes\n\nCrispy Rice Paper Bacon\n\nEasy Cheesy Garlic Bread\n\nGreen Bean Casserole\n\nLonestar BBQ Beans\n\nMint and Tofu Summer Rolls\n\nMinted Green Pea Guacamole\n\nPistachio and Sunflower Seed Dukkah\n\nPlant-Based Parmesan\n\nQuick Country Coleslaw\n\nRoasted Red Pepper Hummus\n\nRosemary Cornbread Mini Muffins\n\nSpicy Sweet Potato Fries with Ranch\n\nSweet-and-Salty Curried Popcorn\n\nSierra Club\n\nSilicon Valley\n\nSlawppy Joes\n\nsmoothies:\n\nMix 'n' Match Superfood Smoothies\n\nPB&J Power Smoothies\n\nSoba Noodle Salad, Ginger-Sesame\n\nsoil\n\nSorbet, Minted Lemon-Cucumber\n\nsoups:\n\nRoasted Coconut-Beet Soup\n\nWild Mushroom Chili\n\nSourdough Panzanella\n\nsoybeans\n\nsoy creamer\n\nsoy milk\n\nSpaghetti and Lentil Meatballs\n\nStewart, Martha\n\nstews:\n\nMardi Gras Gumbeaux\n\nWild Mushroom Chili\n\nStrecker, Karen\n\nSuh, Rhea\n\nSummer Rolls, Mint and Tofu\n\nsunflower seeds:\n\nPeanut Butter Trail Mix Cookies\n\nPistachio and Sunflower Seed Dukkah\n\nPlant-Based Parmesan\n\nSushi, Rainbow Veggie\n\nsweet potatoes:\n\nRoasted Root Vegetable and Quinoa Salad\n\nSpicy Sweet Potato Fries with Ranch\n\nSweet Potato and Parsnip Hash\n\n**T**\n\nTacos, Jerked Jackfruit, with Grilled Pineapple\n\nTacosa Feedyard\n\nTarts, Cherry Chia Puff Pastry Breakfast\n\ntempeh\n\nReuben Sandwich\n\nTercek, Mark\n\nThree Rs\n\ntofu\n\nBlack Bean Breakfast Burritos\n\nCoconut-Lemongrass Curry with Rice Noodles\n\nLemon Meringue Pie\n\nMint and Tofu Summer Rolls\n\nMom's Noodle Kugel\n\nPea and Potato Frittata\n\nSmoky Maple-Pecan Cheesecake\n\nSteamed Buns with Tofu and Mushrooms\n\ntips for preparing\n\nTofu Scramble 101\n\ntomatoes:\n\nBLT Bagel Sandwich\n\nJerked Jackfruit Tacos with Grilled Pineapple\n\nMardi Gras Gumbeaux\n\nMeat-Free Meat Loaf with Tomato-Maple Glaze\n\nMushroom and Kale Galette\n\nNo-Frills Cheese Pizza\n\nProtein-Packed Burrito Bowl\n\nRosemary Cornbread Mini Muffins\n\nSlawppy Joes\n\nSourdough Panzanella\n\nWild Mushroom Chili\n\ntomatoes, sun-dried:\n\nSpaghetti and Lentil Meatballs\n\nSun-Dried Tomato and Basil Sausages\n\ntortillas:\n\nBlack Bean Breakfast Burritos\n\nJerked Jackfruit Tacos with Grilled Pineapple\n\nTrail Mix Peanut Butter Cookies\n\nTruffles, Raw Chocolate-Hazelnut\n\nTuvalu\n\nTwain, Shania\n\nTyson Foods\n\n**U**\n\nUnited Nations (UN)\n\nFood and Agriculture Organization (FAO)\n\nIntergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)\n\nUniversity of North Carolina School of Public Health\n\nUSDA\n\nConservation Reserve Program (CRP)\n\nUS Department of Housing and Urban Development\n\nU.S. Dietary Guidelines Advisory Committee\n\n**V**\n\nvanilla:\n\nAvocado Chocolate Mousse with Vanilla Bean Whip\n\nRaw Lemon Vanilla Raspberry Slab\n\nVavae, Hilia\n\nVegan Egg\n\nvitamin B12\n\n**W**\n\nWaffles, Blueberry Buckwheat\n\n_Wall Street Journal_\n\nwater\n\n_What a Fish Knows: The Inner Lives of Our Underwater Cousins_ (Balcombe)\n\nwheat gluten:\n\nLoaded Black Bean Dogs\n\nSmoky Seitan Kebabs with Peanut Sauce\n\nSun-Dried Tomato and Basil Sausages\n\nWhole Foods Market\n\nWild Rice Risotto with Peas and Asparagus\n\nWillet Dairy\n\nWinfrey, Oprah\n\nWontons, Chicken and Cabbage\n\nWorld Bank\n\nWorld Resources Institute\n\nWorld Watch Institute\n\nWorld Wildlife Fund\n\nWraps, Buffalo Cauliflower, with Blue Cheese\n\n**Y**\n\nyeast, nutritional\n\nyogurt, nondairy:\n\nBlueberry Buckwheat Waffles\n\nCoconut Basbousa\n\n**Z**\n\nzucchini, in Grilled Veggie Pizza with BBQ Sauce\n\n# [PRAISE FOR  \nFOOD IS THE SOLUTION](toc.xhtml#praise)\n\n\"This book is an important call to action for anyone who eats.\"\n\n\u2014EMERIL LAGASSE\n\n\"As global citizens, we all share in the responsibility of creating a better future. With this book, Matthew Prescott shows us how our food choices can do just that.\"\n\n\u2014JOS\u00c9 ANDR\u00c9S\n\n\" _Food Is the Solution_ shares easy ways to look and feel great while also respecting the Earth. Talk about a win-win!\"\n\n\u2014ELLE MACPHERSON\n\n\"Individual action can lead to collective action, and collective action opens the door for system wide, positive change. So please do all you can, starting at home\u2014where Matthew Prescott's inspiring book can guide you to some healthy and delicious choices.\"\n\n\u2014FRED KRUPP, PRESIDENT OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND\n\n\" _Food Is the Solution_ will give you the tools you need to incorporate plant-based eating into your everyday life. Start now, and help the planet.\"\n\n\u2014MARK R. TERCEK, PRESIDENT AND CEO OF THE NATURE CONSERVANCY\n\n\"Devour this book. Eat it up. It might just save your life and the world.\"\n\n\u2014MICHAEL GREGER, MD, FACLM, BESTSELLING AUTHOR OF _HOW NOT TO DIE_\n\n\"Food plays a big part of our identity, and this book will help us align what we eat with who we are.\"\n\n\u2014KEEGAN-MICHAEL KEY\n\n\"There's nothing sexier than saving the Earth\u2014and this book shows you how you can do that through the power of your plate.\"\n\n\u2014PAMELA ANDERSON\n\n\"Eat more plants for a better planet: Easy peasy. Bon app\u00e9tit!\"\n\n\u2014PAUL \"PEE-WEE HERMAN\" REUBENS\n\n\"Food is power, and this book will help you use it.\"\n\n\u2014DAVID CHANG, FOUNDER OF MOMOFUKU\n\n\"Matthew Prescott proves that food can be delicious while also helping mend the social and ecological fabric of our world.\"\n\n\u2014MICHAEL SYMON, HOST OF ABC'S _THE CHEW_\n\n\"Though diet is but one of many things we need to change, we won't be able to save the world without dramatically changing our food and agriculture practices. Matthew Prescott has assembled a detailed and delicious road map to survival.\"\n\n\u2014MICHAEL BRUNE, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE SIERRA CLUB\n\n\" _Food Is the Solution_ is the guide I wish I had as a young mom. This is the blueprint for anyone who eats.\"\n\n\u2014LAURIE DAVID, ACADEMY AWARD\u2013WINNING PRODUCER OF _AN INCONVENIENT TRUTH_\n\n\"A superb and thought-provoking book about the long-term impact of what we eat on the environment and our health. We need to learn how to vote with our mouths and this is a great guide to help us do so.\"\n\n\u2014THEODORE ROOSEVELT IV, CHAIRMAN, CENTER FOR CLIMATE AND ENERGY SOLUTIONS\n\n\"Eating with the Earth in mind has never been easier, thanks to this important and eye-opening book.\"\n\n\u2014JOHN MACKEY, CEO OF WHOLE FOODS MARKET\n\n\"More people than ever are enjoying plant-based foods as a way to help themselves and the planet. Matthew Prescott's book makes it easy and accessible for anyone to lend a hand\u2014and fork.\"\n\n\u2014T\u00c9A LEONI\n\n\"The planet needs us, and this book can help.\"\n\n\u2014MOBY\n\n\"There's a place at the table for everyone when it comes to environmental eating, and this book can help you find yours.\"\n\n\u2014BOB PERCIASEPE, FORMER DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR OF THE U.S. EPA\n\n\"The fact is, the more plant-based we eat, the better we feel, the better we are. No more alternative facts.\"\n\n\u2014ROSIE O'DONNELL\n\n\"Each one of us can help protect the planet when we choose what to eat. It's simpler than you may think! This book will give you all the tools you need.\"\n\n\u2014VANI HARI, BESTSELLING AUTHOR OF _THE FOOD BABE WAY_\n\n\"Want to save the world while enjoying great food? This marvelous book shows you how.\"\n\n\u2014JOHN ROBBINS, BESTSELLING AUTHOR OF _DIET FOR A NEW AMERICA_\n\n\"This book is the best thing since sliced bread.\"\n\n\u2014BRUCE FRIEDRICH, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE GOOD FOOD INSTITUTE\n\n\"Matthew Prescott has cut through all the confusing information on the food supply to bring us great recipes that are good for us and the planet. A must-read!\"\n\n\u2014KRISTIN DAVIS\n\n\" _Food Is the Solution_ offers moving stories and helpful tips so we can all live more sustainably.\"\n\n\u2014KEN COOK, PRESIDENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL WORKING GROUP\n\n\"The message for the future is really very simple: Get as close to a whole-food, plant-based diet as possible.\"\n\n\u2014DR. T. COLIN CAMPBELL, AUTHOR OF _THE CHINA STUDY_\n\n\"Great cause, great recipes, great read!\"\n\n\u2014EVAN SHARP, CO-FOUNDER OF PINTEREST\n\n\"This book will help you celebrate Earth Day every day!\"\n\n\u2014KATHLEEN ROGERS, PRESIDENT OF EARTH DAY NETWORK\n\n\"Matthew Prescott provides a compelling case that most foods that are good for you are also good for the world. Whether you're a carnivore or vegan, you'll benefit from reading this book.\"\n\n\u2014LAWRENCE WILLIAMS, CEO OF THE U.S. HEALTHFUL FOODS COUNCIL\n\n\"We impact the world at each meal, and this book can help us use our plates as a force for good.\"\n\n\u2014RICHARD LINKLATER\n\n\"There's a crisis in our oceans and on our planet. This book offers concrete, easy, and delicious ways to help.\"\n\n\u2014LOUIE PSIHOYOS, ACADEMY AWARD\u2013WINNING DIRECTOR OF _THE COVE AND RACING EXTINCTION_\n\n\"We can heal our bodies through the right types of food, and by consuming and producing the right ingredients, food also becomes a medicine for our planet.\"\n\n\u2014PETRA N\u011aMCOV\u00c1\n\n\"Great book, great food, better world\u2014what more could we ask for?\"\n\n\u2014TAL RONNEN, CROSSROADS KITCHEN\n\n\"The world\u2014literally, planet Earth\u2014needs this book!\"\n\n\u2014KATHY FRESTON, BESTSELLING AUTHOR OF _QUANTUM WELLNESS_\n\n\"For those of us already enthralled by Matthew Prescott's perspective and insight into how what we eat affects who we are and the fate of the world, this book comes at exactly the right time.\"\n\n\u2014MAYIM BIALIK\n\n\"This is one of the most crucial books of our time. It offers amazing, healthy food while being environmentally conscious and informative. A must-read!\"\n\n\u2014HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS KHALED BIN ALWALEED, PRINCE OF SAUDI ARABIA\n\n\"Use this book as an important tool to help you turn your diet into a force for good.\"\n\n\u2014KIER\u00c1N SUCKLING, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY\n\n\"Protecting our environment takes all hands\u2014and mouths\u2014on deck. _Food Is the Solution_ shows how simple it can be to adopt a more Earth-friendly lifestyle, which is a critical first step to changing our habits as a society.\"\n\n\u2014MARGIE ALT, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF ENVIRONMENT AMERICA\n\n\"Thought-provoking resources and recipes to help you kick-start a more environmentally friendly diet.\"\n\n\u2014IAN ANDERSON, FRONT MAN FOR JETHRO TULL\n\n\" _Food Is the Solution_ will help you save the Earth and live more compassionately.\"\n\n\u2014GENE BAUR, FOUNDER OF FARM SANCTUARY\n\n\"Today's chefs are spending more time than ever before on plant-forward foods. As this book proves, culinarians can activate positive change to help us all eat better and diversify our food choices, while also preserving our planet and its precious resources.\"\n\n\u2014SCOTT GIAMBASTIANI, GLOBAL PROGRAM CHEF AT GOOGLE\n\n\"This provocative and valuable book reminds us that a smart diet is good for our health, our soul, and our planet.\"\n\n\u2014GENE KARPINSKI, PRESIDENT OF THE LEAGUE OF CONSERVATION VOTERS\n\n\"When it comes to food and its impact on the environment, animal welfare, and public health, we've reached a fork in the road\u2014and Matthew Prescott's book will help you use yours to choose the right way.\"\n\n\u2014WAYNE PACELLE, PRESIDENT AND CEO OF THE HUMANE SOCIETY OF THE UNITED STATES\n\n\"Matthew Prescott has created an outstanding resource to support global change.\"\n\n\u2014JULIANAA SATIE, FOUNDER OF THE SCHOOL OF NATURAL COOKERY\n\n\"Matthew Prescott has offered a significant tool for anyone who wants to take action for the planet every time they eat.\"\n\n\u2014LINDSEY ALLEN, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF RAINFOREST ACTION NETWORK\n\n\"A menu of ideas to help us eat in a more environmentally responsible and healthy way.\"\n\n\u2014JANET RANGANATHAN, WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE\n\n\"For your health, the environment, and animals\u2014this book has everything you need to make a difference!\"\n\n\u2014DORON PETERSAN, FARE WELL AND STICKY FINGERS BAKERY\n\n\"We can use our plates to help the planet. This book is a giant lightbulb switched on to help us.\"\n\n\u2014JOHN SCHLIMM, AUTHOR OF _FIVE YEARS IN HEAVEN_\n\n\"A timely resource to help us all eat better and tread lighter on the planet.\"\n\n\u2014JAMIE RAPPAPORT CLARK, PRESIDENT AND CEO OF DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE\n\n\"For anyone wondering what they can do for the climate, this important book proves our everyday choices can have powerful consequences\u2014not to mention, some seriously delicious results.\"\n\n\u2014KEN BERLIN, PRESIDENT AND CEO OF THE CLIMATE REALITY PROJECT\n\n\"As this book shows, even slight changes in diet can help improve water quality.\"\n\n\u2014WILLIAM C. BAKER, PRESIDENT OF CHESAPEAKE BAY FOUNDATION\n\n\"We can fight for the planet and public health in the courts or when we eat. Matthew Prescott shows us how to make a difference with every meal.\"\n\n\u2014TRIP VAN NOPPEN, PRESIDENT OF EARTHJUSTICE\n\n\"We can stand up for the planet when we sit down to eat, and Matthew Prescott has given us straightforward, easy ways to do exactly that.\"\n\n\u2014TERRY TAMMINEN, CEO OF THE LEONARDO DICAPRIO FOUNDATION AND FORMER SECRETARY OF THE CALIFORNIA ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY\n\n\"I get asked all the time how to do more to help animals, the planet, and people. I always say to start with what you do every day\u2014and we all eat! This book will help you feel better while helping others in an easy, great tasting way.\"\n\n\u2014KRISTIN BAUER VAN STRATEN\n\n\"Food tastes so much better when you know it is giving back to the world. This book highlights how and why.\"\n\n\u2014CHAD SARNO, COAUTHOR OF _CRAZY SEXY KITCHEN_\n\n\" _Food Is the Solution_ can help you invest in your health and the health of the Earth at every meal.\"\n\n\u2014LESLIE SAMUELRICH, PRESIDENT OF GREEN CENTURY CAPITAL MANAGEMENT\n\n\"This book is a great guide to a simpler, healthier, and more compassionate way to live.\"\n\n\u2014WENDIE MALICK\n\n# ABOUT THE AUTHOR\n\nMatthew Prescott is a leading figure in the global movement to reform how we farm and eat. He's Senior Food Policy Director for the Humane Society of the United States and advisor to the Good Food Institute. A sought-after speaker and thought leader, Prescott has spent over a decade and a half sharing his ideas with Ivy League universities, Fortune 500 companies, consumers, and more. His efforts have directly led to sweeping changes in the supply chains of hundreds of major food companies, impacted countless individuals' diets, and have been covered extensively by the media: his work has been featured by CNN, in the pages of the _New York Times_ , the _Wall Street Journal_ , the _Boston Globe_ , and countless more; his writings have appeared in _USA Today_ , the _Washington Post_ , _Barron's_ , and others; his photographs have been featured in _Rolling Stone_ and _Food & Wine_; he's been a guest on national television news programs; and he was even once a guest on NPR's _Wait Wait... Don't Tell Me_. He lives in Austin, Texas, with his wife, the writer Lara Prescott. You can sign up for author updates here.\n\n**Thank you for buying this**\n\n**Flatiron Books ebook.**\n\nTo receive special offers, bonus content,\n\nand info on new releases and other great reads,\n\nsign up for our newsletters.\n\nOr visit us online at\n\nus.macmillan.com\/newslettersignup\n\nFor email updates on the author, click here.\n\n# CONTENTS\n\nTitle Page\n\nCopyright Notice\n\nDedication\n\nFOREWORD\n\nby James Cameron\n\nINTRODUCTION\n\nFood Is the Solution\n\n[PART ONE:  \nOUR PLANET](part01.xhtml)\n\n**Earth**\n\n**Water**\n\n**Air**\n\n**Fire**\n\n[PART TWO:  \nOUR PLATES](part02.xhtml)\n\n**Breakfast**\n\n**Soups, Stews, Salads, and Sandwiches**\n\n**Main Dishes**\n\n**Sides and Extras**\n\n**Desserts**\n\nShopping for a Better World\n\nAcknowledgments\n\nCitations\n\nIndex\n\nPraise for Food is the Solution\n\nAbout the Author\n\nCopyright\nFOOD IS THE SOLUTION. Copyright \u00a9 2018 by Matthew Prescott. Foreword copyright \u00a9 2018 by James Cameron. All rights reserved. For information, address Flatiron Books, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010.\n\nwww.flatironbooks.com\n\n\"Thanks, Giving\" by Jesse Eisenberg. Copyright \u00a9 2018 Jesse Eisenberg.\n\nCover designed by Amy Sly\n\nFood and cover photographs by Jessica Prescott\n\nOur eBooks may be purchased in bulk for promotional, educational, or business use. Please contact the Macmillan Corporate and Premium Sales Department at 1-800-221-7945, extension. 5442, or by e-mail at MacmillanSpecialMarkets@macmillan.com.\n\nThe Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available upon request.\n\neISBN 978-1-250-14446-1\n\nFirst Edition: March 2018\n\n# Contents\n\n  1. Cover\n  2. Title Page\n  3. Copyright Notice\n  4. Dedication\n  5. Foreword\n  6. Introduction\n    1. Food is the Solution\n  7. Part One: Our Planet\n    1. Earth\n    2. Water\n    3. Air\n    4. Fire\n  8. Part Two: Our Plates\n    1. Breakfast\n    2. Soups, Stews, Salads, and Sandwiches\n    3. Main Dishes\n    4. Sides and Extras\n    5. Desserts\n  9. Shopping for a Better World\n  10. Acknowledgments\n  11. Citations\n  12. Index\n  13. Praise for Food is the Solution\n  14. About the Author\n  15. Newsletter Sign-up\n  16. Contents\n  17. Copyright\n\n## Guide\n\n  1. Start Reading\n  2. Cover\n  3. Copyright\n  4. Table of Contents\n\n","meta":{"redpajama_set_name":"RedPajamaBook"}}
+{"text":" \nEAT WELL ON $4\/DAY\n\nGOOD\n\nAND\n\nCHEAP\n\nLEANNE BROWN\n\nWorkman Publishing \u2022 New York\nContents\n\nIntroduction\n\nBreakfast\n\nTomato Scrambled Eggs\n\nOmelet\n\nEgg Sandwiches with Mushroom Hash\n\nPeanut Butter and Jelly Granola Bars\n\nOatmeal\n\nBreakfast Quinoa\n\nBanana Pancakes\n\nWhole-Wheat Jalape\u00f1o Cheddar Scones\n\nChocolate Zucchini Muffins\n\nBroiled Grapefruit\n\nSoup and Salad\n\nDal\n\nCorn Soup\n\nFrench Onion Soup\n\nLightly Curried Butternut Squash Soup\n\nTomato Soup and Grilled Cheese\n\nSweet or Savory Pineapple Salad\n\nKale Caesar Salad\n\nBroiled Eggplant Salad\n\nBeet and Chickpea Salad\n\nEver-Popular Potato Salad\n\nSpicy Panzanella\n\nCold (and Spicy?) Asian Noodles\n\nTaco Salad\n\nCharred Summer Salad\n\nWilted Cabbage Salad\n\nBroccoli Apple Salad\n\nSnacks, Sides, and Small Bites\n\nBrussels Sprout Hash and Eggs\n\nMexican Street Corn\n\nMy Dad's Baked Beans\n\nSmoky and Spicy Roasted Cauliflower\n\nCrispy Chickpeas and Pumpkin Seeds\n\nSpicy Green Beans\n\nPopcorn!\n\nMashed Beets\n\nMashed Cauliflower\n\nWinter Squash Puree\n\nMashed Celery Root\n\nBubble and Squeak\n\nJacket Sweet Potatoes\n\nRoasted Potatoes with Chiles\n\nPoutine\n\nThings on Toast\n\nCornmeal-Crusted Veggies\n\nGreen Chile and Cheddar Quesadillas\n\nDinner\n\nFilipino Chicken Adobo\n\nRoast Chicken\n\nPeanut Chicken and Broccoli with Coconut Rice\n\nBeef Stroganoff\n\nSpicy Broiled Tilapia with Lime\n\nCreamy Zucchini Fettuccine\n\nPasta with Eggplant and Tomato\n\nTomato and Tuna Spaghetti\n\nCauliflower Cheese\n\nSavory Summer Cobbler\n\nBarley Risotto with Peas\n\nVegetable Jambalaya\n\nSpicy, Crunchy, Creamy Polenta\n\nTofu Hot Pot\n\nDeconstructed Cabbage Rolls\n\nRoasted Vegetables\n\nChana Masala\n\nBlack-Eyed Peas and Collards\n\nVegetable Quiche, Hold the Crust\n\nBroccoli, Egg, and Cheddar Empanadas\n\nPotato and Kale Rolls with Raita\n\nStuff on Hot Dogs\n\nPotato Leek Pizzas\n\nBroccoli Rabe and Mozzarella Calzones\n\nHalf-Veggie Burgers\n\nBig Batch\n\nBest Tomato Sauce\n\nChorizo and White Bean Rag\u00f9\n\nDark and Spicy Chili\n\nSpicy Pulled Pork\n\nHummus\n\nDeviled Eggs\n\nPierogi\n\nDumplings\n\nPantry\n\nPeanut Sauce\n\nSalsa\n\nTzatziki\n\nRaita\n\nFlavor\n\nSpice Oil\n\nRoti\n\nFlour Tortillas\n\nPizza Dough\n\nCroutons or Breadcrumbs\n\nFresh Pasta\n\nRicotta\n\nRainbow Rice\n\nHow to Cook Dried Beans\n\nPickle Primer\n\nDrinks and Desserts\n\nAgua Fresca\n\nSmoothies\n\nAvocado Milkshake\n\nFast Melon Sorbet\n\nRice Pudding\n\nCoconut and Lime Brown Rice Pudding\n\nCaramelized Bananas\n\nCoconut Chocolate Cookies\n\nPeach Coffee Cake\n\nConversion Tables\n\nAcknowledgments\n\nAbout the Author\nIntroduction\n\nEating is one of life's greatest pleasures. In a perfect world, healthy and delicious food would be all around us. It would be easy to choose and easy to enjoy.\n\nBut of course, it's not a perfect world. There are thousands of barriers that can keep us from eating in a way that nourishes our bodies and satisfies our tastes. Money just shouldn't be one of them.\n\n**Kitchen skill, not budget, is the key to great food.** This cookbook is a celebration of the many delicious meals available to those on even the strictest of budgets.\n\nEating on a limited budget is not easy, and there are times when a tough week can turn mealtime into a chore. As one woman told me, \"I'm weary of the 'what's for dinner?' game.\" I hope the recipes and techniques in this book can help make those times rare and the tough choices a little more bearable.\n\nAt the same time, this book is not a meal plan\u2014those are much too individual to share on a wide scale. Every person and every family has specific needs and unique tastes. We live in different regions, different neighborhoods, and with varying means. One book cannot account for all of that, but I hope it can be a spark, a general strategy, a flexible set of approachable and cheap recipes. The rest is up to you.\n\nI think you'll find (or perhaps have already found) that learning to cook has a powerfully positive effect. **If you can become a more skilled, more conscious cook, then you'll be able to conjure deliciousness in any kitchen, anytime.** Good cooking alone can't solve hunger in America, but it can make life happier\u2014and that is worth every effort.\n\nJust as a good meal is best shared with others, so is a good recipe. I may not be able to share a meal with you, but I'd love to offer a few ideas. **What's for dinner? Here's my answer.**\n\nAbout This Book I created an earlier version of this book as the capstone project for my master's degree in food studies at New York University. After I posted a free PDF on my website (leannebrown.com), it went viral on Reddit, Tumblr, and elsewhere, racking up almost 100,000 downloads in the first few weeks. That support gave me the courage to launch a Kickstarter campaign to get printed copies of _Good and Cheap_ into the hands of people who don't have computers or who wouldn't otherwise see it. Thousands of generous supporters contributed to the campaign, donating more than 9,000 free copies of the printed book and sponsoring twenty new recipes. That first printed edition of the book was self-published, and sold out within a few months. The PDF was downloaded about 500,000 times within six months after it was first posted. What you hold in your hands is a second edition, including 30 new recipes. The experience changed my life. I hope this book changes yours.\n\nMy Philosophy The best health advice is simple: Eat fruits and vegetables. Many American cookbooks rely on meat as the central feature of a meal. **My recipes celebrate the vegetables rather than the meat.** My intent was to create satisfying food that doesn't require you to supplement your meals with cheap carbohydrates to stave off hunger. **I strove to create recipes that use money carefully, without being purely slavish to the bottom line.** For example, many recipes use butter rather than oil. Butter is not cheap, but it creates flavor, crunch, and richness in a way that cheap oils never can.\n\nI'm not a dietitian, and this isn't a diet book. I'm just a home cook, like you. If you have dietary restrictions, some recipes won't work for you as written, but that's fine\u2014you can adapt them to your needs, or just turn the page and keep looking for inspiration.\n\n**More than a book of recipes, this is a book of ideas.** I want you to tailor things to your taste. Improvisation is the soul of great cooking! If it doesn't work out every time, I hope you'll forgive me. More important, forgive yourself, and try again.\n\nA Note on $4\/Day\n\nI designed these recipes to fit the budgets of people living on SNAP, the US federal program that used to be called food stamps. If you're on SNAP, you already know that the benefit formulas are complicated, but the rule of thumb is that you end up with $4 per person, per day, to spend on food.\n\nT his book isn't challenging you to live on so little\u2014it's a resource in case that's your reality. In May 2014, there were 46 million Americans on food stamps. Untold millions more\u2014in particular, retirees and students\u2014live under similar constraints.\n\nIf you're in Canada, or anywhere else outside the United States, it might seem like this book won't apply to you. While the specifics may differ, learning to cook and take joy in simple, real food is great for anyone, anywhere.\n\nT he costs for each recipe are based on two sources. For the list of grocery ideas on page xiii, I collected prices from four grocery stores in a diverse neighborhood in New York. For specific spices and a wider variety of fruits and vegetables, I looked at online grocery stores or nationwide averages collected by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The prices for fruits and vegetables assume that they're roughly in season, when you can get the best deals. This means, unfortunately, that you'll pay a lot more if you want to make peach coffee cake in February. I talk more about shopping in season on the following pages.\n\nThe estimates are, by necessity, a snapshot of place and time. Costs will vary in other cities, other neighborhoods, even just other stores. Please think of the numbers as a guideline, not a guarantee.\n\nMore than in most cookbooks, my recipes are flexible and encourage substitution based on availability, price, and personal tastes. A strict budget requires flexibility and a willingness to say, \"That's a good deal this week, so it's what I'll be cooking!\" Don't worry, you'll pick up the tricks quickly.\n\nA few recipes call for fancy kitchen equipment, but in my work with low-income families in New York, I've found that items like blenders, food processors, and electric mixers are fairly common. I did not, however, attempt to tackle the very real situation of people who have no kitchen, no equipment, and no space to prepare food. I simply cannot hope to do those issues justice within the bounds of one cookbook. Let's all agree that we need to keep striving to address all the issues that make it difficult for so many people to eat well.\n\nTips for Eating and Shopping Well\n\n1 buy foods that can be used in multiple meals\n\nVersatile ingredients save meals. If you buy flour, you can make Tortillas, Roti, Scones, and Pancakes. If you buy canned tomatoes, you can make soup, sauce, even chili. Need I even mention the versatility of garlic or lemons? If you always keep them around, you can make anything else taste fantastic.\n\n2 buy in bulk\n\nBuying larger amounts of one item can usually bring down the price per unit. When you're working within a tight budget, you won't always be able to afford to shop for the future, but you should do it when you can. And, of course, keep storage in mind: If the item will go bad before you can finish it, get the smaller size. Only buy what you can eat. If you buy versatile ingredients in slightly larger amounts, then you'll be able to use them quickly but still make diverse meals.\n\n3 start building a pantry\n\nIf possible\u2014and admittedly this can be difficult for people living on their own\u2014reserve part of your budget to buy one or two semi-expensive pantry items each week or month. Things like olive oil, soy sauce, and spices are pricey at first, but if you use just a little with each recipe, they go a long way. With turmeric, coriander, cumin, and chili powder, you'll suddenly have a world of flavor on your shelf. For specific advice.\n\n4 think weekly\n\nEach week, mix things up by buying different varieties of staple foods like grains and beans. This week, you might have omelet every morning with Dark and Spicy Chili later in the day, but next week you'll have yogurt for breakfast and Hummus or Chana Masala for lunch and dinner. If you have time to shop frequently, pick up smaller amounts of produce every couple of days to ensure everything is fresh. It's a lot more inspiring to pull crisp greens out of the fridge than to unstick a wilted mess from the bottom of the veggie drawer. If you can't shop as often, consider getting canned or frozen versions of the vegetables you won't use immediately.\n\n5 think seasonally\n\nDuring their local growing season, fruits and vegetables are generally cheaper and definitely tastier than outside of season. You'll notice that orange prices shoot up during the summer, yet what's available is drab and flavorless. But oranges are abundant in December and January, the peak of their season, and that's reflected in the price. At the end of summer, you can get bags of zucchini for next to nothing. Brussels sprouts are also very seasonal, coming on sale around Thanksgiving. Enjoy as much of the summer and fall produce as possible, because you'll be more limited in the winter. Then again, simmering and roasting winter vegetables is a fine way to warm up your house, and tough winter roots are easy to store. In addition, winter is a great time to search for deals on canned and frozen produce. Seasons for fruits and vegetables vary depending on where you live, so consult a local guide to growing seasons (or the chart) and use it to shop for the best deals.\n\n6 more vegetables = more flavor\n\nNothing livens up a bowl of rice like summer squash and corn! Vegetables make the best sauces: They're earthy, bright, tart, sweet, bitter, and savory. Give them a treasured spot at the top of your grocery list and you'll never be bored.\n\n7 always buy eggs\n\nWith these babies in your fridge, you're only minutes away from a satisfying meal. Scramble an egg with leftovers or drop an egg on top of a salad or a plate of stir-fried vegetables, and deliciousness is guaranteed.\n\n8 buy expensive eggs if you can\n\nFree-range or organic eggs are usually worth the money\u2014they taste so much better than regular eggs. Even at $4 a dozen, you're still only paying 33 cents per egg. Really fresh eggs, like those from a farmers' market, make a big difference in flavor.\n\n9 be careful with undercooked eggs\n\nVery rarely, raw eggs can be infected with salmonella. Many classic recipes, from mayonnaise to eggnog to Caesar dressing, are prepared with raw egg yolk, but technically only a fully cooked egg is guaranteed to be free of salmonella. Consequently, raw or runny eggs are not recommended for infants, the elderly, pregnant women, or anyone with a weakened immune system.\n\n10 buy fresh bread\n\nTry to buy fresh loaves of interesting bread from an independent bakery or the bakery in your grocery store. Although fresh loaves don't last as long as sliced bread, they're much more enjoyable, and you can use the old stuff to make Panzanella, or Croutons or Breadcrumbs to top other dishes. Later in the day, many independent bakeries offer deep discounts on bread they would otherwise have to throw out.\n\n11 don't buy drinks\n\nAll the body needs drink-wise is water. Except for milk, most packaged drinks are overpriced and deliver a lot of sugar without filling you up the way a piece of fruit or a bowl of yogurt would. If you want a special drink, make Agua Fresca, a smoothie, or tea.\n\n12 get creative with wilted vegetables\n\nSometimes you forget a pepper or bunch of spinach in the back of the fridge. Although wilted veggies might not remain fit for a salad, they'll still be wonderful in any dish that calls for saut\u00e9ed, grated, or baked vegetables. Just cut off any actual rot. You can also use them in broth.\n\n13 make your own broth\n\nIn almost any savory recipe that calls for water, homemade broth would be better. To make broth, start by saving any vegetable bits that you chop off and would normally throw away, like onion tops, the seedy parts of peppers, and the ends of carrots. Store them in the freezer until you have a few cups, then cover them with water, bring to a boil, and simmer over low heat for a few hours. Add salt to taste, and you have broth! To make a heartier broth, do the same with leftover bones or scraps of meat (preferably all the same kind of meat). Because you're using stuff you'd otherwise throw away, broth is effectively free.\n\n14 treat your freezer with respect\n\nA freezer can be a great friend for saving time by letting you prepare large batches of food at once. For instance, cooking dried beans takes a while, so make more than you need, then freeze the rest. Another great trick I learned from a reader is to dice a whole package of bacon, fry it, and then freeze it in small parcels. This makes it easy to add a small amount of bacon to a dish without the temptation of using the whole package or the fear of rancid meat.\n\n15 turn chicken skin into schmaltz\n\nSchmaltz is rendered chicken fat that you can use like butter. Buy chicken that still has its skin, then trim the skins and lay them in a pan over low heat. Add a cup or so of water and simmer until the fat releases from the skin and the water cooks off. Let the fat cool, then throw away the skins and pour the fat into a glass jar. Store in the fridge.\n\n16 buy a pepper grinder\n\nSeriously, banish pre-ground pepper from your life\u2014it loses all flavor when it sits around. Fresh pepper creates pops of intensity on the tongue and lights up bland dishes. One of the most popular dishes in Rome is just pasta with butter and pepper: Give it a try!\n\n17 buy yogurt in bulk\n\nThere are so many types of yogurt in the grocery store: some low in fat and high in sugar, some with cute animal pictures. Some are Greek. Some have chocolate shavings and candy. Some have names like \"Key lime pie.\" Now forget about all of that. The buckets of plain yogurt are the best value for your money. If you start with plain yogurt, you can make your favorite flavors in your own kitchen, where you know exactly what's going into it. The fat content is your choice.\n\nIf you have kids, ask them what flavors they can imagine and go make them! It's a lot more fun than letting the supermarket choose for you. Try something new and smash it in! If you want to make thicker Greek-style yogurt, all you have to do is strain the standard variety through cheesecloth to remove the extra water.\n\nYogurt's versatility makes it a great staple to keep in the fridge. And when you consider that there are savory options\u2014like Tzatziki or Raita\u2014the possibilities expand even more.\n\n1 Bananas\n\n2 Peanut butter\n\n3 Frozen or dried fruit\n\n4 Yogurt\n\n5 Lime\n\n6 Honey\n\n7 Coconut\n\n8 More yogurt!\n\n9 Fresh berries\n\n10 Kiwi fruit\n\n11 Red and green grapes\n\n12 Jam or jelly\n\nsupermarket strategies\n\n**With these commonly available items in your pantry, you can have a wide variety of meals on the table within minutes.** Keeping a well-stocked pantry is the key to easy, fast cooking at home. When you're living on a budget, building up supplies does take time, but just keep adding each week and you'll get there.\n\n1 protein\n\nMeat isn't the only protein! Items like dried beans, nuts, and eggs are cheap, store easily, and have multiple uses. Be aware that most fish at the grocery store has previously been frozen and was merely thawed for display. There's no harm in buying it frozen and thawing it yourself.\n\n2 dairy\n\nButter is just as good to cook with as it is on toast. The cheeses listed opposite are the ones I like best, but buy what your taste, budget, and local availability allow.\n\n3 vegetables\n\nVegetables can (and should!) be the base of most meals. Other than greens, which should be used quickly, they can be stored for a few days to a few weeks. Try to snag each vegetable as it hits peak season.\n\n4 fruits\n\nCitrus fruits are cooking essentials and they keep well. The zest and juice can liven up just about any dish, and they always make a great dressing. Bananas, apples, and melons are great quick snacks, but try every fruit you can afford! Remember, almost all fruits and vegetables have a season, so savor them at their freshest and cheapest.\n\n5 grains\n\nFlour is so inexpensive, and once you have a few basics at hand, most baked goods are a cinch to make. There's great variety in whole grains. Substitute them for rice, toss them in a salad, or add them to soup.\n\n6 canned vegetables\n\nPlenty of vegetables are good when canned, so remember to compare prices between fresh, frozen, and canned. The canned versions are fantastic in sauces. Just be aware that canned foods are often very salty, so you might want to rinse them, except for canned tomatoes.\n\n7 frozen fruits and vegetables\n\nFresh berries can be expensive, but the frozen ones often go on sale and are great for smoothies. Frozen veggies are quick to add to soups and rice dishes. Compare prices to see whether frozen is the best value.\n\n8 flavor\n\nYou can explore an extraordinary number of cuisines with these items. They add depth and excitement to the simplest dishes.\n\n9 treats that go a long way\n\nAlthough specialty items can be expensive, a little goes a long way. When you can, pick up an item or two and enjoy the results.\n\n10 spices\n\nSpices are expensive to buy and can often be a sticking point: no caloric value and they often have a high price tag. But because you use such small amounts, they end up costing pennies per recipe. If you're able to shop around, look for inexpensive spices in bulk at ethnic markets. I've suggested (below) the spices you should start with. I use these a lot in these recipes and at home. If you want to branch out further, take a look at page  to be inspired by flavor combinations.\n\nGroceries you won't regret buying\n\nprotein\n\neggs\n\ndried beans\n\nlentils\n\ntofu\n\nnuts\n\npeanut butter\n\ndairy\n\nbutter\n\nmilk\n\nyogurt\n\nqueso fresco\n\nRomano or Parmesan cheese\n\nsharp Cheddar cheese\n\nmozzarella\n\nvegetables\n\ngarlic\n\nonions\n\ncarrots\n\ncelery\n\npeppers\n\nbroccoli\n\ntomatoes\n\nhot peppers\n\nhardy greens\n\nsalad greens\n\npotatoes\n\nsweet potatoes\n\ncauliflower\n\nwinter squash\n\nfruits\n\napples\n\nmelons\n\noranges\n\nlimes\n\nlemons\n\nbananas\n\ngrains\n\nbread\n\ntortillas\n\npasta\n\nall-purpose flour\n\nwhole-wheat flour\n\noats\n\npopcorn\n\nshort-grain rice\n\nlong-grain rice\n\nbrown rice\n\ncornmeal\n\nother dried whole grains\n\ncanned vegetables\n\nwhole tomatoes\n\ntomato paste\n\ncorn\n\nfrozen fruits and vegetables\n\nberries\n\npeas\n\ngreen beans\n\ncorn\n\nflavor\n\nolive oil or vegetable oil\n\nwine vinegar\n\nanchovies\n\nsardines\n\nolives\n\nfish sauce\n\ncoconut milk\n\nmiso paste\n\nmustard\n\nsoy sauce\n\nchili sauce\n\nbrown sugar\n\nfresh herbs\n\ntreats that go a long way\n\ndried fruits\n\ndried mushrooms\n\nfrozen shrimp\n\nmaple syrup\n\nbacon\n\nvanilla extract\n\ncocoa powder\n\nspices\n\nchile flakes\n\ncinnamon\n\ncumin or cumin seeds\n\npaprika and smoked paprika\n\ncurry powder\n\noregano\n\nthyme\n\nLeftovers\n\n**Leftovers may be convenient,** but they can seem unappealing, limp, and cold after sitting in the fridge for a couple of days. That's why the sandwich, the wrap, and the taco are your friends. Here are just a few ideas for how to give leftovers a makeover very quickly to invent a whole new meal!\n\n1 chana masala wrap\n\nSounds strange, but trust me: Spread herbed mayo on the wrap and pile in the Chana Masala.\n\n2 black-eyed peas and collards wrap\n\nFold the Black-Eyed Peas and Collards into a wrap with a little hot sauce or some Tzatziki.\n\n3 tomato scrambled eggs wrap\n\nThrow the Tomato Scrambled Eggs into a wrap and add some roasted potatoes or rice for bulk.\n\n4 vegetable jambalaya burrito\n\nAdd some salsa or any leftover beans to the Vegetable Jambalaya and wrap in a flour tortilla.\n\n5 cauliflower cheese sandwich\n\nStart with cauliflower cheese, and add crunchy greens, toast, and mustard. Yum!\n\n6 Roasted Vegetables sandwich\n\nAdd some extra spices or sauces to liven up the vegetables and grill the bread for some crunch.\n\n7 Roasted Potatoes and chile taco\n\nThis dish is great in a taco: Just add a little salsa and grated cheese. I like green salsa here.\n\n8 tilapia taco\n\nFor a makeshift fish taco, add the Tilapia, Wilted Cabbage, and cilantro to a tortilla and enjoy.\n\n9 cauliflower tacos\n\nCombine Smoky and Smoky and Spicy Roasted Cauliflower with salsa and grated Cheddar or cotija cheese in a warm tortilla.\n\n10 fancied-up poutine\n\nPretend you're at a super-modern poutinery and make up some crazy toppings for your baked French fries. Black-Eyed Peas and Collards would be great, as would chili, Baked Beans, or Filipino Chicken Adobo.\n\n11 jacket sweet potatoes spread\n\nMash up leftover baked Jacket Sweet Potatoes, then spread them in a bacon sandwich for a sweet counterpoint.\n\n12 rethink toast toppings\n\nAny of the recipes that can top toast would also be great over rice or any other grain, wrapped in a tortilla, tossed with pasta, or even on a pizza. Or, take a pack of ramen noodles, skip the flavor packet, and throw in one of the toast toppings instead.\n\n13 chili three ways\n\nTake some chili, stuff into Jacket Sweet Potatoes, serve over roasted vegetables, or top hot dogs.\n\n14 reinvigorate veggies\n\nGot some veggies that look past their prime? Try them in any of the soups (pages 21\u201329) or Dark and Spicy Chili, Bubble and Squeak, in scrambled eggs, or cooked into a tomato sauce. The Broiled Eggplant Salad is lovely tossed with noodles.\n\nMashed winter vegetables make a great pierogi filling, can be added to scrambled eggs, or used as a sandwich filling.\n\nseasonal chart\n\n**Here's a chart** of some common fruits and vegetables with shading that represents the months when it's best to buy them. Generally, in-season produce is likely to be less expensive. Of course, where you live also makes a difference in cost, so make sure to check the specials when you go to the grocery store.\n\nThe print edition of this book includes a chart. Please download a PDF of this chart here: workman.com\/ebookdownloads\n\nKitchen Equipment\n\n**It might seem like** a daunting task to stock your kitchen with equipment, but it doesn't need to be scary\u2014or expensive. The tools below will help you make any recipe in this book.\n\n1 good knives\n\n\u2022 A good chef's knife is the most important tool in your kitchen. Make sure it's big and sharp.\n\n\u2022 You'll need a paring knife for smaller tasks, like peeling and coring an apple.\n\n\u2022 Get a serrated knife to cut bread and tomatoes easily.\n\n2 box grater\n\n_Use it to:_\n\n\u2022 Grate cheese\n\n\u2022 Shred potatoes\n\n\u2022 Make quick work of tough vegetables\n\n3 measuring cups and spoons\n\n4 essential pots and pans\n\n\u2022 Large cast-iron or nonstick pan\n\n\u2022 Medium-size saucepan\n\n\u2022 Large soup pot\n\n5 stirring utensils\n\n\u2022 You can stir anything with a long-handled wooden spoon.\n\n\u2022 A ladle is essential for soups, stews, and sauces.\n\n\u2022 While you can often use a fork instead, get a whisk if you're serious about sauces or desserts.\n\n6 roasting\n\n\u2022 Use oven-safe dishes and baking pans\u2014glass, ceramic, etc.\u2014for broiling, baking, and roasting.\n\n\u2022 Casserole dishes are handy for storing leftovers.\n\n7 sieve\n\n_Use it to:_\n\n\u2022 Drain pasta or boiled veggies\n\n\u2022 Sift flour\n\n\u2022 Strain extra whey from yogurt\n\n8 microplane\n\n_Use it to:_\n\n\u2022 Zest lemons and limes\n\n\u2022 Grate hard cheeses and garlic\n\n\u2022 Shred soft vegetables into a sauce\n\n9 specialty baking\n\n\u2022 Muffin tins can be used for baking in small portions (not just muffins!).\n\n\u2022 It's hard to make a cake without a cake pan.\n\n\u2022 Rimmed baking sheets can also be used to roast veggies or broil fish.\n\n10 immersion blender\n\n\u2022 Use it to puree soups and smoothies.\n\n\u2022 It's more versatile and quicker to clean than traditional blenders.\n\n\u2022 If you need power, consider investing in a food processor or full-size blender.\n\n11 flipping and shuffling utensils\n\n\u2022 Flat spatulas are for flipping pancakes.\n\n\u2022 Rounded spatulas are good to scrape bowls.\n\n\u2022 Use tongs for salads, or moving hot foods without hurting yourself.\n\n12 cutting board\n\n\u2022 Wood is longest lasting and, contrary to what you might think, the most sanitary surface for preparing raw meat. There's a reason it's called butcher block!\n\n\u2022 Cheap plastic boards are fine and easy to wash.\n\n\u2022 Don't get glass. Just don't.\n\nHow to Use This Book\n\n_Good and Cheap_ is a strategy guide, not a typical cookbook. Sure, we have _breakfast, dinner,_ and _snacks and sides._ But there is also _big batch_ for feeding a crowd or planning ahead. There is the _pantry_ section filled with the staples we eat every day and the sauces that make those basics sing. The _drinks and desserts_ are delicious and worth the effort, while making use of everyday ingredients you'll buy for other meals. The _ideas_ pages show just how much variety there is in simple things like oatmeal or popcorn. And the _methods_ are meant to teach you a process that you can use over and over again.\n\nOnce you embrace cooking, you learn that there are no rules for the best oatmeal, there's just _your_ best oatmeal. More practically, you realize that many ingredients are used in similar ways and can be easily substituted. If there is a sale on red lentils or a neighbor gives you a bag of zucchini, I want you to be armed with the skills to take advantage of that, not shackled to an inflexible recipe. The recipes in this book are a starting point. My hope is that with _Good and Cheap_ as a foundation, you'll learn to cook without recipes and be empowered to cook for your own pleasure.\nBREAKFAST\n\nTomato Scrambled Eggs\n\n$1.80 \/ serving\n\n$3.60 total\n\nThis pile of fluffy, creamy eggs holds together a mass of tangy, juicy, sweet tomatoes. This dish is best enjoyed when tomatoes are in season. Serve the eggs on, in, or alongside some toast or a tortilla, if you have any on hand. serves 2\n\n\u00bd tablespoon butter\n\n4 small or 2 large, chopped fresh tomatoes, or 2 cups chopped canned tomatoes\n\n4 eggs\n\nsalt and pepper, to taste\n\nadditions\n\nsprinkling of chopped fresh basil or other herbs\n\n1 Melt the butter in a small or medium nonstick pan over medium heat, swirling it around to coat the pan. Add the tomatoes and cook until they release their juice and most of it evaporates, 5 to 7 minutes.\n\n2 Meanwhile, crack the eggs into a bowl and add a generous sprinkling of salt and pepper. Beat the eggs lightly with a fork.\n\n3 Turn the heat down to low and add the eggs to the pan. Using a spatula, gently mix the eggs with the tomatoes and stir carefully and continuously, to keep the eggs from forming chunks. Turn the heat down as low as possible; the slower your eggs cook, the creamier they'll be.\n\n4 Once the eggs are cooked to your desired consistency, turn off the heat and add any chopped herbs. Basil is the best with tomatoes. I like my scrambled eggs loose and juicy with the eggs forming very soft curds. You can let them cook a little longer if you prefer your eggs drier.\n\nOmelet\n\n$0.80 \/ serving\n\n$1.60 total\n\nI make this omelet at least once a week. It's insanely delicious, whether laden with veggies or kept simple. I love it with dill, but it's good with almost any herb, or with scallions. I tend to use Cheddar and Romano, since they go well with most vegetables. But other great combos are goat cheese with zucchini, and cauliflower with sausage and chile flakes.\n\nIf I'm serving two people, I usually cut one large omelet in half rather than making two. However, if you feel like being fancy, make a pair of two-egg omelets simply by using half the ingredients for each. For a French style omelet, roll it up in Step 4 instead of folding it. The result will be quite thin and tender. serves 2\n\n4 eggs\n\n2 tablespoons finely chopped fresh dill\n\nsalt and pepper, to taste\n\nbutter, for the pan\n\n1 shallot or \u00bd small red onion, finely diced\n\n\u00bc cup grated cheese\n\n1 Place the eggs, dill, salt, and pepper in a bowl, and beat with a fork.\n\n2 Melt a small pat of butter in a big frying pan over medium-high heat. Once it's sizzling, add the shallot and saut\u00e9 for about 2 minutes, until it's translucent and smells great.\n\n3 Add the egg to the hot pan and swirl it to coat the surface evenly. If the center of the omelet cooks more quickly than the edge, use a spatula to pull any raw egg into the middle. Then stop touching it.\n\n4 After about 30 seconds, toss the cheese on top of the egg, along with any other raw or cooked vegetable you feel like adding. Once none of the egg remains translucent, 30 seconds to 2 minutes, fold the omelet in half with your spatula and lift it out of the pan. You don't want any brown on your eggs.\n\nEgg Sandwiches with Mushroom Hash\n\n$1.80 \/ sandwich\n\n$3.60 total\n\nEgg sandwiches are a mainstay of every corner deli in New York City, and for good reason: They're cheap and easy, fast, and delicious. I knew I had to include one when Charlene, one of my early supporters, asked for a recipe with eggs and mushrooms. (I'm thankful she did! I don't really like mushrooms, so they're scarce in this book, even though plenty of people love them.) Like most sandwiches, this recipe is really flexible. In particular, you can change the hash to use whatever you have around. Sad leftovers take on new life when turned into a hash and matched with the rich fattiness of a runny egg. serves 2\n\n2 teaspoons butter\n\n1 small potato, diced\n\nsalt and pepper, to taste\n\n8 ounces mushrooms, sliced\n\n2 cloves garlic, finely chopped\n\n2 rolls or English muffins, split, or 4 slices of bread\n\n2 eggs\n\nadditions\n\nsliced tomato\n\npitted, peeled, and sliced avocado\n\ncheese\n\nvariations\n\npotato and onion\n\npotato and pea\n\ncollards and bacon\n\nzucchini\n\nchorizo and green chile\n\n1 Melt 1 teaspoon of the butter in a pan over medium heat. Throw in the potato pieces and cook, stirring minimally, until they just start to brown and soften, about 5 minutes. Season them with salt and pepper.\n\n2 Add the mushrooms and garlic and cook, stirring, until the mushrooms are brown and have shrunk down, another 5 minutes. If the potato pieces are getting stuck to the pan, add a splash of water. Pierce one piece of potato with a fork to test it. If it goes through easily, you're done. If not, cook for a few more minutes. (The smaller the potatoes are chopped, the quicker they'll cook.) Taste and adjust the seasoning to your preferences.\n\n3 Place the rolls or bread in the toaster. Meanwhile, melt the other teaspoon of butter in a medium, nonstick skillet over medium heat. Crack the eggs in and dust with salt and pepper.\n\n4 _If you like your eggs sunny-side up_ , place a lid over the pan to ensure that the whites will cook through without making the yolks hard. Once the whites are no longer translucent, turn off the heat and remove the eggs from the pan.\n\n_If you like eggs over easy (my favorite)_ , wait until the yolks are cooked but still look runny, then flip each egg with a spatula and let the other side cook for about 15 seconds. That'll get your whites fully cooked, but keep the yolks runny\u2014the best. If you prefer hard yolks (please, no!), then cook for another 30 seconds.\n\n5 Moving quickly so everything stays nice and hot, assemble the ingredients into a sandwich, layering the veggies first, topping with the egg, and using any condiments you like. Way better than what you'll find at the corner deli!\n\nPeanut Butter and Jelly Granola Bars\n\n$0.30 \/ bar\n\n$3.60 total\n\nTired of endless PB+J sandwiches? Give these bars a try instead! I designed them for my friend Alex, the best long-distance runner I know. They are a little more crumbly than a store-bought granola bar, so be careful when eating these on the go\u2014you'll probably leave a trail of crumbs on the sidewalk and down your shirt. As a bonus, you can find the ingredients in any corner store or food pantry. Any kind of jam or jelly will do\u2014I used blueberry, but grape, strawberry, or any flavor would be tasty. You can use quick-cooking oats if they're all you have, but I prefer the bite and chew of rolled oats. For a little more crunch along with your chew, you can also substitute a cup of Rice Krispies for a cup of the oats. makes 12 bars\n\nbutter or vegetable oil, for the pan\n\n3 cups rolled oats, or 2 cups rolled oats and 1 cup Rice Krispies\n\n\u00bd cup peanut butter\n\n\u00bd cup jelly or jam\n\n\u00bc cup hot water\n\n\u00bc teaspoon salt\n\nadditions\n\n\u00bd cup chopped nuts\n\n\u00bd cup shredded coconut\n\n\u00bd cup chopped dried fruit\n\n\u00bd cup honey (instead of the jelly)\n\n1 Preheat the oven to 350\u00b0F.\n\n2 Grease an 8- by 11-inch baking pan. If you have a different size pan, that's fine\u2014it'll just change how thick the bars are, so you'll want to adjust the cooking time a little. A larger pan may take less time to cook through and get crunchy, while a smaller pan will take a few more minutes\u2014just keep an eye on it in the oven.\n\n3 Pour the oats into a large bowl.\n\n4 Place a small saucepan over low heat and add the peanut butter, half of the jelly, the water, the salt, and any other additions. Stir until smooth, about 2 minutes.\n\n5 Pour the peanut butter and jelly concoction into the oats and mix until all the oats are coated and you have a sticky mass. Dump the mixture into the buttered baking pan and press it into an even layer. Spread the remaining jelly over the top.\n\n6 Pop the baking dish into the oven for 25 minutes. The bars are done when the edges are toasty and brown. Mmm. Crunchy.\n\n7 Leave the bars in the pan until they cool completely, about an hour, then slice them into 12 bars.\n\nideas\n\nOatmeal\n\n$0.15 \/ serving\n\n$0.30 total\n\n**Oatmeal is a hot and comforting breakfast** that will give you energy for a great morning. It's also extremely inexpensive, so it will allow you to spend a bit more on lunch and dinner. Basic oatmeal has a reputation for being dull, but this recipe can be dressed up in so many ways, you'll never get bored.\n\nThink of basic oatmeal as a foundation. Make it your own with the ideas on the next pages. Whether it's milky and sweet or savory and salty, I'm sure you can find a favorite way to enjoy a hot bowl of oats in the morning!\n\nBasic Oatmeal\n\nserves 2\n\n1 cup rolled oats\n\n2 cups water\n\n\u00bc teaspoon salt\n\n1 Add the oats, water, and salt to a small pot and bring to a boil over medium heat. Immediately turn the heat to low and place a lid on the pot.\n\n2 Cook for 5 minutes, until the oats are soft and tender and most of the water has evaporated. You can add more water if you like your oatmeal smooth and thin, or use slightly less to make it thick and creamy.\n\n1 Pumpkin\n\n$0.75 serving \/ $1.50 total\n\n\u00bd cup canned pumpkin\n\n\u00be cup milk (or almond milk or soy milk)\n\n2 tablespoons brown sugar, plus more to taste\n\n1 teaspoon ground cinnamon\n\nadditions\n\n\u00bc teaspoon ground ginger\n\n\u00bc teaspoon ground cloves\n\ndrizzling of maple syrup\n\nWhisk the pumpkin, milk, and 1\u00bc cups water (not the full 2 cups in the basic recipe) in a pot. Add the oats, salt, brown sugar, and spices. Cook over medium-low heat until the mixture just comes to a boil, 2 to 5 minutes. Turn to low for 5 more minutes. Add maple syrup or more sugar to taste.\n\n2 Savory\n\n$0.75 serving \/ $1.50 total\n\n2 or 3 scallions, white and green parts, finely chopped\n\n\u00bc cup grated sharp Cheddar cheese\n\n1 teaspoon butter\n\n2 eggs\n\nCook the oatmeal as directed in basic oatmeal (left), adding the scallions in Step 1. Just before it's done, stir in the cheese. While the oatmeal cooks, melt the butter in a pan over medium heat. Crack in the eggs, then cover the pan and fry until the yolks are runny but the whites are cooked, 2 to 3 minutes. Top each bowl of oats with one fried egg!\n\n3 Coconut and Lime\n\n$0.75 serving \/ $1.50 total\n\n\u00bc cup unsweetened coconut flakes\n\n2 tablespoons sugar\n\njuice of \u00bd lime\n\nAdd the coconut and sugar to the oatmeal, and cook as directed in Basic Oatmeal. Turn off the heat and squeeze the lime juice over the top.\n\n4 Fruity\n\n$0.55 serving \/ $1.10 total\n\n\u00bd cup berries, or chopped fruit, fresh or frozen\n\n1 tablespoon sugar\n\nCook the oatmeal as directed in Basic Oatmeal, but 2 minutes before it's ready, add the berries and sugar and stir to combine. It's surprising how many variations you can come up with just by trying a new fruit or combining several varieties.\n\n5 Apple Cinnamon\n\n$1 serving \/ $2 total\n\n2 cups apple juice or cider\n\n1 teaspoon ground cinnamon\n\n1 apple, cored and chopped\n\nCook the oats as directed in Basic Oatmeal, using the apple juice instead of the water and adding the cinnamon. Top with the apple. If you want the apple to be soft and warm, cook it along with the oats.\n\n6 Baklava\n\n$0.75 serving \/ $1.50 total\n\n1 teaspoon ground cinnamon\n\n1 tablespoon finely grated orange zest\n\n4 tablespoons honey\n\n2 tablespoons chopped almonds or pistachios\n\nAdd the cinnamon, orange zest, and 2 tablespoons of the honey before cooking the oatmeal as directed in Basic Oatmeal). Once it's done, top each bowl with another tablespoon of honey and a tablespoon of nuts.\n\n7 Chocolate\n\n$0.50 serving \/ $1 total\n\n1 cup milk\n\n1 tablespoon cocoa\n\n1 tablespoon sugar\n\nA brilliant suggestion from a wonderful reader, Karen Lofstrom. Who needs Cocoa Puffs when you can have cocoa oatmeal?\n\nReplace one of the two cups of water with 1 cup of milk. Stir the cocoa and sugar into the milk and water before you add it to the pan\u2014this will keep the lumps away! Then proceed as usual with the oatmeal.\n\nBreakfast Quinoa\n\n$1.25 \/ serving\n\n$2.50 total\n\nQuinoa makes a great alternative to oatmeal from time to time. It contains more naturally occurring protein than oats do, so it keeps you full longer. Unfortunately, it also comes with a higher price tag, but if you buy in bulk, it can still be affordable. serves 2\n\n1 cup white quinoa\n\n2 cups water\n\n\u00bc teaspoon salt\n\n1 tablespoon sugar\n\n1 cup berries or chopped fruit, fresh or frozen\n\n1 Add the quinoa, water, and salt to a small pot and bring to a boil over medium heat. Turn the heat down to low. Place a lid on the pot, slightly askew, to let steam escape.\n\n2 After about 10 minutes, add the sugar and half the fruit, stirring to combine. The quinoa should take about 20 minutes total, but keep an eye on it and add more water if it becomes too dry. It's ready when the grains are translucent, have doubled in size, and you can see an opaque ring around each grain.\n\n3 Fluff up the quinoa with a fork and scoop it into bowls. Top with the rest of the fruit.\n\nBanana Pancakes\n\n$0.75 \/ Serving\n\n$3 total\n\nWith the creamy texture and delicious flavor of bananas, these pancakes are stunningly good. You will be seriously popular if you feed these to your family or friends. Another plus: This is a great way to get rid of mushy bananas that doesn't involve making banana bread. serves 4, makes 10 to 15 pancakes\n\n2 cups all-purpose flour\n\n\u00bc cup brown sugar\n\n2 teaspoons baking powder\n\n1 teaspoon baking soda\n\n1 teaspoon salt\n\n4 bananas\n\n2 eggs\n\n1\u00bd cups milk\n\n1 teaspoon vanilla extract\n\nbutter, for cooking and serving\n\nsyrup, for serving\n\n1 Preheat the oven on its lowest setting.\n\n2 Combine the flour, brown sugar, baking powder, baking soda, and salt in a medium-size bowl. Mix thoroughly with a spoon.\n\n3 In another medium bowl, mash 2 of the bananas with a fork. Add the eggs, milk, and vanilla, and mix well to combine.\n\n4 Add the dry mixture to the bananas, stirring with a spoon until everything just comes together. Tender pancakes come from not overmixing the batter. If there are still a few pockets of flour, don't worry about it.\n\n5 Let the mixture sit for 10 to 15 minutes. Meanwhile, slice the 2 remaining bananas.\n\n6 Place a nonstick or cast-iron skillet or griddle over medium heat. Once it's hot, melt a small amount of butter, about \u00bd teaspoon, in the skillet and ladle some pancake batter into the center of the pan. A normal amount of batter is \u00bc to \u2153 cup, but you can make your pancakes as large or small as you like. If it's your first time making pancakes, make them smaller: They'll be easier to flip.\n\n7 As soon as the batter is in the pan, place 3 to 4 banana slices atop the uncooked side of the pancake. Once the edges of the pancake start to dry up and you can see the middle start to bubble, flip the pancake over. Cook until it is browned on both sides, about 30 seconds to 1 minute per side.\n\n8 Stack the finished pancake on a plate in the warm oven and repeat Steps 6 and 7 until you run out of batter. Serve hot, with butter and syrup.\n\nIf you're in a hurry, use a larger skillet or griddle and cook a few pancakes at a time. Making batches of three or four is much faster than one pancake at a time!\n\nWhole-Wheat Jalape\u00f1o Cheddar Scones\n\n$0.75 \/ scone\n\n$4.50 total\n\nSpicy, cheesy, flaky\u2014these scones are at their best straight out of the oven. They're delicious for breakfast, or with a plate of beans or a pile of vegetables, or crumbled into stew or chili. Cutting the cheese into cubes rather than grating it means you'll have pockets of gooey cheese that contrast nicely with the crumb of the scone. If you want the heat of the jalape\u00f1o, leave the seeds and membrane; if you like it milder, remove them and chop up only the pepper itself. makes 6 scones\n\n\u00bd cup (1 stick) butter (see box)\n\n2\u00bd cups whole-wheat flour, plus more for the work surface\n\n1 tablespoon baking powder\n\n1 teaspoon salt\n\n1 jalape\u00f1o pepper, finely chopped (see headnote)\n\n4 ounces sharp Cheddar cheese, diced to about \u00bc inch\n\n2 eggs, lightly beaten\n\n\u00bd cup milk\n\negg wash (optional)\n\n1 egg\n\nsalt and pepper, to taste\n\nuse the wrapper from the stick of butter to grease the baking sheet.\n\n1 Place the butter in the freezer for 30 minutes.\n\n2 Preheat the oven to 400\u00b0F. Line a baking sheet with parchment paper or lightly grease it with butter.\n\n3 Combine the flour, baking powder, and salt in a large bowl.\n\n4 Remove the butter from the freezer and grate it directly into the flour mixture. (Use a cheese grater\u2014it's the best way to break up butter without melting it.) Using your hands, gently squish the butter into the flour until everything is incorporated but not smooth. The chunks of butter will create flaky scones.\n\n5 Add the jalape\u00f1o, cheese, beaten eggs, and milk to the bowl, then use your hands to mix everything gently until it just comes together. The dough will probably be a little shaggy, but that's fine.\n\n6 Sprinkle flour on a clean countertop and dump the dough onto it. Gently shape the dough into a disk about 1\u00bd inches thick. Cut the disk into 6 triangular wedges, like a pizza, and move them to the baking sheet.\n\n7 If you want to make the egg wash (recommended!), lightly beat the egg and brush it over the scones (you'll have more egg wash than you need to use). Sprinkle salt and pepper over each scone. Bake for 25 minutes or until golden brown.\n\nChocolate Zucchini Muffins\n\n$0.20 \/ muffin\n\n$4.80 total\n\nWhen my friend Michael challenged me to create a recipe that used dark chocolate, I got a little worried: Dark chocolate is expensive! But then I remembered that cocoa powder is deeply, darkly chocolaty, without the expense. I thought of the chocolate zucchini cake my mother made when I was growing up and knew I had something.\n\nThis is a great breakfast treat that uses staples you should generally have on hand, such as flour, oats, and yogurt. The yogurt and zucchini make these muffins super moist and yummy, but still a reasonably nutritious (if slightly sugary) choice for breakfast. Make them in midsummer, during the height of zucchini season, when larger zucchini are really cheap. Big zucchini are generally a bit woodier, but they're great for baking. makes 24 small muffins\n\nbutter or vegetable oil, for the muffin tin\n\n2 cups grated zucchini (start with 1 large or 2 small zucchinis)\n\n1\u00bd cups all-purpose flour\n\n1\u00bd cups rolled oats\n\n1\u00bd cups sugar\n\n\u00bd cup cocoa powder\n\n2 teaspoons baking soda\n\n1 teaspoon salt\n\n4 eggs\n\n1 cup plain yogurt\n\nadditions\n\n1 tablespoon ground cinnamon\n\n\u00bd cup dark chocolate chips\n\n1 Preheat the oven to 350\u00b0F.\n\n2 Grease 24 muffin cups with butter, or, if you have paper liners on hand, line the muffin cups.\n\n3 Cut off the round end of the zucchini (which is a little tough), keeping the stem to use as a handhold. Shred the zucchini with a box grater into a large bowl, stopping before you get to the stem.\n\n4 Dump the flour, oats, sugar, cocoa powder, baking soda, salt, and cinnamon and chocolate chips, if using, into a medium bowl.\n\n5 Mix the eggs and yogurt with the grated zucchini. Add the dry ingredients, mixing until just combined.\n\n6 With a spoon, dollop the batter into the muffin tins until each cup is about three-quarters full. Transfer to the oven and bake for 20 minutes.\n\n7 Pull the muffins out and poke them in the middle with a toothpick or knife. If it comes out wet, bake the muffins for 5 more minutes. If it comes out clean, they're done.\n\n8 Let the muffins cool in their tins for 20 to 30 minutes, then eat warm!\n\nBroiled Grapefruit\n\n$1 \/ serving\n\n$2 total\n\nIf your oven has a broiler, this is a fast and fun way to liven up a standard, healthy breakfast of grapefruit, turning it into a hot and sticky treat. It might just make a grapefruit lover out of you! If you have maple syrup on hand, use it instead of sugar for even more flavor. serves 2\n\n2 grapefruits\n\n2 tablespoons light or dark brown sugar\n\nsalt\n\n1 Turn your oven's broiler up to high.\n\n2 Cut each grapefruit in half at the equator and place the halves, cut sides up, on a rimmed baking sheet or another ovenproof pan. Sprinkle the halves evenly with brown sugar and top with just a tiny bit of salt to bring out the flavor.\n\n3 Place the grapefruit halves under the broiler until they turn bubbly and a little brown (or even black) around the edges. This usually takes me about 3 minutes, but every broiler is different, so monitor it\u2014yours may take up to 8 minutes. Don't get distracted! Black on the edges is okay; black sticky mess in the center is not. Overbroiling ruins a good meal fast.\n\n4 Let the grapefruit cool down for a minute or two before serving.\nSOUP AND SALAD\n\nDal\n\n$0.60 \/ serving\n\n$2.40 total\n\nThis thick lentil soup is a flavor-packed staple of the Indian table. There are a ton of ways to prepare dal, but the core\u2014beyond the lentils themselves\u2014is usually fresh ginger, garlic, and chile, along with some dry spices. You can use any type of lentil you like. If you're using larger lentils (like chana dal, French lentils, or split mung beans), soak them for 30 minutes. If you're using the small orange lentils, then don't bother soaking them\u2014they cook very quickly. serves 4\n\n1 tablespoon butter\n\n1 medium onion, finely chopped\n\n1 teaspoon cumin seeds\n\n1 teaspoon black mustard seeds\n\n1 teaspoon turmeric\n\n2 cloves garlic, finely chopped\n\n1 jalape\u00f1o or serrano pepper, finely chopped (see box)\n\n\u00bd-inch piece of ginger, grated\n\n2 cups lentils\n\nsalt and pepper, to taste\n\nadditions\n\nheavy cream\n\nsprinkling of chopped fresh cilantro\n\nsprinkling of chopped scallions\n\n1 Melt the butter in a medium-size pot over medium heat. Add the onion and cook for 1 minute, then add the cumin seeds and mustard seeds and stir them until they sizzle. Toss in the turmeric, garlic, and jalape\u00f1o and cook until the vegetables soften, 3 to 4 more minutes. Add the ginger and stir-fry for about 30 seconds.\n\n2 Add the lentils along with enough water to cover them, then cook, covered, until the lentils are tender, about 20 minutes for split red lentils, 30 for green or brown, or 45 for other whole varieties. Plan according to what lentil you are using (package directions can be helpful).\n\n3 Sample the dal and add salt and pepper to taste. You'll probably need a fair bit of salt to bring out all the flavors\u2014a teaspoon or so.\n\n4 Top the dish with a splash of cream, some chopped fresh cilantro or scallions, and serve.\n\nIf you prefer mild dishes, use a quarter of the jalape\u00f1o to start and add more if you decide you like it. Serrano peppers are hotter than jalape\u00f1os, so only use those if you like your food very spicy. Like salt, the amount of chile pepper should be to your taste. And you can always seed and devein your peppers to reduce their heat.\n\nCorn Soup\n\n$1.25 \/ serving\n\n$5 total\n\nThis thick, sweet, satisfying soup is a favorite of kids and adults. It's wonderful to make in late summer to early autumn when corn on the cob is at its peak, but canned or frozen corn can also serve as a warm reminder of summer in the depths of winter. If you're making this soup with corn on the cob, the first step is to make corn broth out of the cobs once you've removed the kernels. If you're using canned or frozen corn, you'll need to substitute chicken or vegetable broth instead. Pair it with a slice of garlic bread or add a hard-boiled egg for extra protein. serves 4 to 6\n\n1 tablespoon butter\n\n1 onion, finely chopped\n\n2 stalks of celery, finely chopped\n\n1 green or red bell pepper, stemmed, seeded, and finely chopped\n\n1 small potato, diced\n\n4 cloves garlic, finely chopped\n\n1 chile pepper, finely chopped (optional)\n\n4 cups corn, fresh (from 4 to 8 ears), canned, or frozen\n\n1 tablespoon cornmeal or all-purpose flour\n\n5 cups corn broth (recipe below), vegetable broth, or chicken broth\n\nsalt and pepper, to taste\n\n1 Melt the butter in a large pot with a lid over medium heat. Add the onion, celery, bell pepper, and potato and stir. Cover the pot and let everything cook until the onion is translucent, about 5 minutes.\n\n2 Remove the lid and add the garlic and the chile pepper, if using. Stir the vegetables, adding a splash of water or broth to free any that get stuck to the bottom of the pot.\n\n3 Let the vegetables cook, stirring occasionally, until they are lightly browned and soft, 5 minutes more. The potatoes should not yet be fully cooked.\n\n4 Add the corn and cornmeal to the pot and stir. Pour in the broth and bring to a boil, then turn the heat down to low and simmer until the broth thickens and becomes opaque, about 30 minutes.\n\n5 Add salt and pepper. If you made your own corn broth, you'll probably need at least a teaspoon of salt; if you used store-bought broth, you'll need less.\n\nCorn Cob Broth\n\nMakes 5 cups\n\n4 to 8 corn cobs, kernels reserved for the soup (see box)\n\n2 bay leaves (optional)\n\nsalt and pepper, to taste\n\nPlace the corn cobs and the bay leaves, if using, in a large stockpot and cover with water. Bring to a boil over high heat, then turn the heat down to medium and let boil for about 30 minutes. Taste the broth and add salt and pepper until it has a nice corn flavor. Measure out 5 cups of broth for the soup and store the rest. If you don't want to have leftovers, boil the broth longer, until it is reduced to 5 cups. This will make the flavor of the broth stronger. The broth will keep for several months in the freezer, or for a few weeks in the refrigerator.\n\nFrench Onion Soup\n\n$1.50 \/ serving\n\n$9 total\n\nBest if you accept it now: You are going to cry making this recipe, because the first step is to chop a mountain of onions. But crying is good for us from time to time. Soon you will be on to the magical part, watching a colossal pile of onions shrink and caramelize to make a sweet, flavorful, wonderful soup. Save this recipe for the winter, when other vegetables are out of season and you want to fill your home with rich aromas. As my friend Marilyn, who suggested this recipe, says, \"The smell in your kitchen is absolute heaven.\" serves 6\n\n4 pounds onions, any type\n\n4 cloves garlic\n\n2 tablespoons butter\n\n2 bay leaves\n\n3 teaspoons salt, plus more to taste\n\n2 teaspoons pepper, plus more to taste\n\n6 slices bread\n\n1\u00bd cups grated Gruy\u00e8re or Cheddar cheese\n\nadditions\n\nbeef broth or chicken broth instead of water in Step 4\n\n\u00bd cup red wine, or 1 tablespoon vinegar, any type\n\n1 teaspoon chile flakes\n\nsprinkling of fresh thyme leaves\n\n1 Chop each onion in half from tip to tail, peel them, then slice them into approximately \u00bc-inch-thick (or smaller) half-moon slices. Big slices are fine since you're cooking the onions for so long. Slice the garlic as well.\n\n2 Melt the butter in a large pot over medium heat. Add the onions, garlic, and bay leaves. Cover the pot with a lid and leave it until the onions release a lot of moisture, about 10 minutes. Give them a stir.\n\n3 Cook for 1 to 1\u00bd hours, stirring every 20 minutes. When the onions at the bottom start to stick and turn dark, add a splash of water to unstick them. Don't worry, they aren't burning, just caramelizing. The water helps lift off the sticky, delicious, sweet part!\n\n4 Once the onions are very dark and about a quarter the volume they once were, add 8 cups of water, the salt, and the pepper. Bring to a boil and cover the pot again, turn the heat down to low, and let it simmer for another hour.\n\n5 Taste and adjust with salt and pepper as needed, then ladle the soup into bowls. Discard the bay leaves.\n\n6 Now it's time to make cheese toast! If you want classic French onion soup\u2014with the toast directly in the soup, which makes it a bit soggy\u2014place a piece of bread on top of each (ovenproof!) bowl of soup, sprinkle with cheese, then heat the bowls under the broiler until the cheese is bubbly, 2 to 5 minutes. If you don't like soggy toast, just broil the cheese toast on its own and serve it on the side to dunk.\n\nIf you're using any of the additions, add them with the water (or broth) in Step 4. The beef broth is traditional and will make the soup richer. The vinegar adds a nice hit of acidity, which provides some depth. The chile flakes or thyme add another dimension to the soup.\n\nLightly Curried Butternut Squash Soup\n\n$1.50 \/ serving\n\n$6 total\n\nSquash is a wonderful vegetable for soup: It's flavorful and has a divinely smooth texture when cooked and pureed. Serve this soup to people who think they don't like squash or curry, and you'll change some minds. You can substitute any winter squash for the butternut\u2014I just like butternut because it's faster to peel and chop than its many cousins. serves 4\n\n1 butternut squash or equivalent amount of other winter squash (about 2 pounds)\n\n1 tablespoon butter\n\n1 medium onion, chopped\n\n1 green bell pepper, stemmed, seeded, and chopped\n\n3 cloves garlic, finely chopped\n\n1 teaspoon ground cumin\n\n1 teaspoon ground coriander\n\n1 teaspoon ground turmeric\n\n1 teaspoon cayenne pepper\n\n1 can coconut milk, 2 tablespoons reserved for garnish\n\nsalt and pepper, to taste\n\nadditions\n\nsour cream\n\nchopped scallions\n\nchopped fresh cilantro\n\n1 To prepare the squash, peel off the tough skin with a potato peeler. Cut the squash in half lengthwise with a sharp chef's knife, then scoop out the seeds and goop. (You can save the seeds for a tasty snack later, if you like\u2014see page .)\n\n2 Next, slice off the stem and the very bottom of the squash and throw them away. Place each half of the squash flat side down on a cutting board. Chop each half into \u00bd-inch slices, then cut each slice into cubes.\n\n3 Melt the butter in a large pot over medium heat. Add the onion, bell pepper, and garlic and saut\u00e9 until translucent, about 2 minutes.\n\n4 Add the cubed squash, cumin, coriander, turmeric, and cayenne, and stir it all together. Put a lid on the pot and cook for 2 minutes more. Add the coconut milk and 3 cups of water and stir.\n\n5 Bring the soup to a boil, then turn down the heat to low and let it cook until the squash is tender, about 30 minutes. Taste the soup and add salt and pepper as needed. Soup usually needs a fair bit of salt to bring out the flavors, so be generous.\n\n6 If you have an immersion blender, you can puree the soup in the pot. If you have a stand blender, wait until the soup has cooled before transferring it to the blender. Puree until smooth, then taste again and add any more salt and pepper if needed. You can enjoy the soup as is or serve it with a drizzle of the reserved coconut milk or a dollop of sour cream, plus some chopped scallions or cilantro.\n\nTomato Soup and Grilled Cheese\n\n$2.40 \/ serving\n\n$12 total\n\nIf I get to choose, this will be my last meal on earth. Some of the first \"cooking\" I did for myself, at age ten or so, was plopping out a can of tomato soup. I felt very adult. Now that I know how easy it is to make from scratch, I never bother with the canned stuff. And if your family is anything like mine, making a grilled cheese sandwich will get you more glory and appreciation than a four-course dinner you slaved over for hours. To me, everything that is good and honest, delicious and comforting, is contained in velvety tomato soup and a crusty grilled cheese sandwich.\n\nThe sandwich recipe makes five sandwiches, so adjust according to your needs. Use any good melting cheese, or a blend of cheeses. If you have just the ends of a few cheeses left over from other meals, this is a great way to use them. For the bread, I like rye, but anything will do. serves 5\n\nThe Soup\n\n1 tablespoon butter\n\n2 medium onions, chopped\n\n4 cloves garlic, finely chopped\n\n2 cans (28 ounces each) pureed tomatoes (see box)\n\n6 cups vegetable broth (homemade is great, but a bouillon cube dissolved in water works just fine)\n\nsalt and pepper, to taste\n\nadditions\n\n\u00bd cup heavy cream, to make cream of tomato soup\n\nleaves from 2 sprigs fresh thyme\n\n2 tablespoons chopped fresh basil\n\nzest of 1 lemon\n\n1 Melt the butter in a large pot over medium heat. Add the onions, stir them to coat, then place a lid on the pot and leave it for 5 minutes. Take the lid off and stir the onions. Add the garlic and cover again until the onions are soft and just starting to brown, another 2 minutes.\n\n2 Add the pureed tomatoes and vegetable broth to the pot and stir, being sure to scrape any sticky onions off the bottom to keep them from burning. Bring the soup to a boil, then turn it down to low to simmer for about 10 minutes.\n\n3 Taste and add salt and pepper as needed. Add the cream, herbs, or lemon zest, if using. For smooth soup, use an immersion blender to quickly puree the onions into the tomato mixture. If you're using a standard blender, wait for the soup to cool before you blend it.\n\nI prefer to puree canned whole tomatoes in a blender or food processor\u2014the quality is better than the ones already pureed in the can.\n\nThe Sandwiches\n\nsoftened butter, for the bread\n\n10 slices bread\n\nDijon mustard (optional)\n\n2\u00bd cups grated cheese (see headnote)\n\n1 Spread the butter on one side of each slice of bread, all the way to the edges.\n\n2 Flip over 5 slices, buttered side down, and top each with mustard, if using, and then with approximately \u00bd cup of the cheese. Top each of your cheesified slices with another piece of bread, buttered side up.\n\n3 Place a pan over medium heat for about a minute (see box). Stuff as many sandwiches into the pan as you can fit. I usually don't do more than 3 at a time so there's room to flip them.\n\n4 Fry the sandwiches until they turn golden brown, about 2 minutes. Press down gently on the top of each sandwich for even browning. Flip the sandwiches over with a spatula and repeat on the other side. Press down again to make sure that the cheese in the middle is melting. If either side is not as golden brown as you would like, flip that side down and cook it some more.\n\n5 Once the sandwich is golden and the cheese is melted in the middle, serve it up with the soup. Dunking is optional.\n\nIf your pan is too hot on the bottom, it will burn the sandwich before the cheese melts, so start with medium heat and lower the temperature as necessary. Placing a lid over your pan will trap some steam and melt the cheese faster.\n\nSweet or Savory Pineapple Salad\n\n$1.40 \/ serving\n\n$2.80 total\n\nPineapple is so sweet, juicy, and crunchy that its citric acid punch can sneak up on you\u2014suddenly, you realize you can't feel your lips or the tip of your tongue anymore! Canned pineapple is rarely as strongly flavored and acidic as its fresh cousin, but it sure is convenient and affordable\u2014plus, you get juice. Here are two quick and simple ways to add flavor to a good old can of pineapple. The sweet version makes a great dessert, snack, or even a topping for yogurt. The savory version is lovely on its own, almost like a pineapple salsa. Enjoy it on seafood or pork, or with beans in a taco. serves 2 as a side\n\nSweet\n\n1 can pineapple, in juice\n\n1 tablespoon sugar\n\nzest of \u00bd lime\n\nsalt, a wee pinch\n\nSavory\n\n1 can pineapple, in juice\n\n1 tablespoon finely chopped red chile\n\n2 tablespoons chopped fresh cilantro\n\nsalt, to taste\n\n1 Open the can of pineapple. Drain the juice into a glass and drink it!\n\n2 If the pineapple is cut into chunks, simply scoop them into a bowl. If you have rings, chop them into bite-size pieces first.\n\n3 Add the remaining ingredients for the sweet or savory salad. Stir and taste. For the sweet, don't forget the salt\u2014it brings out the sweetness in the acidic pineapple. Adjust to taste, and serve.\n\nKale Caesar Salad\n\n$2.25 \/ serving\n\n$4.50 total\n\nThis kale is treated like romaine lettuce in a classic Caesar salad, not the creamy modern version. The bitterness of the greens is delicious alongside the rich, fatty dressing. You could also use Swiss chard. If you're worried about the raw egg yolk in the dressing, simply omit it. And make the croutons first\u2014they'll take longest. serves 2, or 4 as a side\n\n1 raw egg yolk, from a high-quality fresh egg\n\n2 teaspoons lemon juice\n\n2 teaspoons Dijon mustard\n\n3 tablespoons olive oil\n\nsalt and pepper, to taste\n\n1 large bunch kale\n\nCroutons, about 2 cups\n\nfreshly grated Romano cheese\n\nadditions\n\n1 clove garlic, grated\n\n1 anchovy fillet, chopped\n\n1 Drop the egg yolk into a large mixing bowl. Add the lemon juice, mustard, and garlic and anchovy, if using. Whisk briskly until the dressing is light and frothy. Slowly add the olive oil, whisking the whole time. Once everything is incorporated, add the salt and pepper, then adjust to your taste. I like it very lemony.\n\n2 Remove the large stem from the center of the kale leaves. (Lacinato kale, sometimes called Tuscan or dinosaur kale, has the easiest stems to remove.) Chop the leaves in half lengthwise, then cut into thin ribbons. This method disguises the kale's tough texture.\n\n3 Toss the kale in the bowl to coat it with dressing. Set it aside for 10 minutes or leave it in the fridge for up to 4 hours. The kale will become tender as it marinates.\n\n4 Before serving, toss in the croutons and a sprinkling (or more!) of Romano cheese, according to your taste.\n\nBroiled Eggplant Salad\n\n$2.25 \/ serving\n\n$4.50 total\n\nEggplant haters often cite mushy texture as their biggest complaint. Well, this salad has you covered. Broiled eggplant has a crunchy and meaty texture, and the tahini dressing makes the salad rich and creamy. To turn it from a side into a lunchtime salad, throw in some roasted potatoes or chickpeas. serves 2 as a side\n\n1 medium eggplant, sliced into circles\n\n1 tablespoon tahini\n\n1 tablespoon lemon juice\n\nsalt and pepper, to taste\n\nchopped scallions\n\nadditions\n\nsprinkling of chile flakes\n\nfinely chopped fresh dill\n\nroasted potatoes\n\nchickpeas\n\n1 Turn your oven's broiler to high. Arrange the slices of eggplant on a baking sheet, then place them under the broiler for 3 to 8 minutes, depending on the power of your broiler. (If you want the eggplant to get some char, position it as close to the broiler as possible.) Watch carefully. Once the eggplant begins to blacken, remove it from the oven and flip the slices over.\n\n2 Repeat the process on the other side. Once your eggplant is nicely charred, chop it into bite-size pieces.\n\n3 In a medium-size bowl, mix the tahini, lemon juice, and chile flakes, if using, and toss in plenty of salt and pepper. Add the eggplant and stir. Add more salt or lemon juice according to your taste. Top it with scallions, or dill, if available, and serve!\n\nBeet and Chickpea Salad\n\n$1.75 \/ serving\n\n$3.50 total\n\nThis dish is spicy, crunchy, and almost certainly the pinkest salad you'll ever eat! Don't be scared. serves 2 as a side\n\n2 or 3 beets\n\n1 cup chickpeas, cooked or canned, drained\n\n3 tablespoons peanuts\n\ndressing\n\n1 tablespoon fresh lime juice\n\n1 teaspoon chili sauce\n\n1 tablespoon olive oil\n\nsalt and pepper, to taste\n\n1 Peel the raw beets, removing the stems if necessary, then shred them with a box grater. Place the shredded beets in a medium-size bowl along with the chickpeas and peanuts.\n\n2 Stir the lime juice, chili sauce, olive oil, and salt and pepper together in a small bowl to make the dressing. Taste and adjust the salt and pepper to your liking.\n\n3 Add the dressing to the bowl with the beets and mix to combine. Let everything sit about 5 minutes so that the flavors can soak into the vegetables and the beet juices can mingle with the dressing.\n\nEver-Popular Potato Salad\n\n$0.75 \/ serving\n\n$3 total\n\nI developed this recipe because I'm not a big fan of mayonnaise-based potato salads. It's really the simplest thing: just potatoes in a regular vinaigrette. Smaller potatoes are best, but whatever you have will be fine! You can add all kinds of extras to make it more festive, but people always rave about the salad as is. The secret is that potatoes actually have really nice flavor\u2014all you have to do is season them properly. Let potatoes be potatoes, no need to disguise 'em!\n\nIf you have leftover roasted potatoes or other root vegetables, the same idea works well. Just skip the cooking part and go straight to the dressing. serves 4 as a side\n\n2 pounds potatoes\n\n2 tablespoons olive oil\n\n2 tablespoons lemon juice, lime juice, or vinegar\n\n2 teaspoons Dijon mustard\n\nsalt and pepper, to taste\n\n3 or 4 scallions\n\nadditions\n\nchopped fresh dill\n\nchopped fresh parsley\n\npaprika\n\nfinely chopped fresh chiles\n\nfinely chopped pickles\n\n1 If you're using very large potatoes, chop them into halves or quarters to speed up the cooking\u2014or dice them into bite-size pieces if you're really in a hurry. Otherwise, keep the potatoes whole.\n\n2 Put the potatoes in a large pot with a lid and cover with water. Bring to a boil over medium-high heat, then turn the heat down to medium and set the lid askew so that steam can escape.\n\n3 After boiling about 25 minutes, stab the largest potato with a fork. If the fork pierces the potato easily, it's fully cooked. If not, boil for 5 more minutes. It's fine if they're a little overcooked, but undercooked potatoes are awful.\n\n4 Drain the potatoes. Once they're cool enough to handle safely (but still warm), roughly chop them into bite-size pieces (unless you did that in Step 1).\n\n5 While the potatoes are cooling, mix the olive oil, lemon juice, mustard, salt, and pepper in a large bowl. Whisk it briskly until the liquid is blended. If you don't have a whisk, use a fork.\n\n6 Throw the potatoes into the bowl and toss them in the dressing to coat. Add a generous amount of salt as you stir. Potatoes are very bland without salt! Let them marinate for 10 minutes.\n\n7 Meanwhile, remove the outer layer and any wilty top bits from the scallions, chop them, and sprinkle them over the top. Toss the salad once more (along with any additions you are using), then taste and adjust the salt, pepper, and citrus juice or vinegar as you see fit. This keeps very well, covered, in the fridge for up to a week, and it travels nicely to a picnic or potluck. Have fun!\n\nSpicy Panzanella\n\n$1.30 \/ serving\n\n$5.20 total\n\nA former classmate of mine, George, likes salads with a little kick. (As you can maybe tell, I do, too!) For inspiration, I turned to panzanella, a classic Italian bread-and-tomato salad. The Italians are true masters of making leftovers delicious. Here, old hard bread soaks up tomato juice and dressing for a super-flavorful and filling salad. You can toss in any vegetable or fruit as long as it's juicy. Bell peppers or carrots won't work so well, but peaches, grapes, and zucchini all do. If you don't like spicy salads as much as George and I do, feel free to seed and stem the jalape\u00f1o to remove its fierce heat, or replace it entirely with garlic or shallot. serves 4 as a side\n\n2 small field cucumbers or 1 English cucumber\n\n2 medium tomatoes, chopped\n\nsalt and pepper, to taste\n\n4 slices day-old bread\n\ndressing\n\n2 tablespoons olive oil, plus a few drops for the pan\n\n1 jalape\u00f1o, finely chopped\n\n2 tablespoons chopped tomato\n\nsalt and pepper, to taste\n\njuice of 1 lime\n\nadditions\n\nchopped fresh herbs\n\nchopped peaches, nectarines, or plums\n\nfinely chopped red onion\n\nchopped zucchini or summer squash\n\npitted olives\n\ngrapes\n\n1 If you're using field cucumbers\u2014usually cheaper than English\u2014peel them to remove the tough skin. (A little leftover peel is not a problem.) For English cucumbers, there's no need to peel.\n\n2 Reserve about 2 tablespoons of the chopped tomatoes to use in the dressing, but throw the rest of the tomatoes and all of the cucumbers into a large bowl. Sprinkle generously with salt and pepper; the salt helps draw out the juices. Toss the vegetables and set aside.\n\n3 Place a small saucepan over medium heat and add a few drops of olive oil. Add the jalape\u00f1o and saut\u00e9 until it sizzles and smells good, about a minute, then add the rest of the chopped tomato and a tablespoon of water. Cook until the tomato juices release, another 2 minutes. Sprinkle liberally with salt and pepper.\n\n4 Once the water has evaporated, turn off the heat and dump the jalape\u00f1o-tomato mixture on your cutting board. Chop it up very finely, then throw it back into the pan\u2014with the heat off\u2014with the lime juice and 2 tablespoons of olive oil. Stir to combine, taste, and add salt and pepper as needed. You've got dressing!\n\n5 Chop or tear the bread into bite-size pieces, then toast it in a skillet over medium heat, tossing occasionally, until the bread chunks are toasty on all sides. Alternatively, just toast full slices of bread in a toaster and tear them up afterward, or skip the toasting if the bread is already super-hard.\n\n6 Add the bread and dressing to the vegetables and stir to combine. Taste and adjust the salt and pepper once more. Let the salad sit for a few minutes so that the bread can soak up the juices, then serve!\n\nCold (and Spicy?) Asian Noodles\n\n$2.50 \/ serving\n\n$5 total\n\nNo question\u2014cold but spicy food is refreshing and delicious on a hot summer day. Here's a recipe that you can really make your own. Use whatever sauce or dressing you like and whatever vegetables you have around, or just a few scallions. If you have some Spice Oil on hand, be sure to add it. It's amazing in this. serves 2, or 4 as a side\n\n12 ounces dried spaghetti, soba, or any Asian noodles\n\n2 tablespoons soy sauce\n\n1 bunch scallions, chopped\n\n1 cucumber, finely chopped\n\nsalt and pepper, to taste\n\nadditions\n\nSpice Oil\n\nPeanut Sauce\n\ngrated carrot\n\nchopped hard-boiled egg\n\n1 Prepare the noodles according to the package instructions. Rinse them under cold water and drain in a colander.\n\n2 Put the noodles in a bowl and add the soy sauce, Spice Oil if you have it, scallions, and cucumber (and any other additions), and mix with a fork or tongs. Taste it and add salt and pepper or more Spice Oil as needed.\n\n3 Let the noodles sit in the fridge for about an hour if you can. The flavors will mingle and become more intense. The finished dish should keep for up to 3 days, covered, in the fridge. A great make-ahead lunch.\n\nTaco Salad\n\n$2.60 \/ serving\n\n$5.20 total\n\nThis salad is a great use for leftover beans or pulled pork\u2014crunchy, fresh, yet satisfying enough to be a whole meal. I like to make taco salad for a weekday lunch in the summertime. serves 2, or 4 as a side\n\n4 cups chopped lettuce\n\n1 cup cooked beans, pulled pork, or ground beef\n\n2 small tomatoes, chopped\n\n\u00bd cup corn kernels, canned or fresh\n\n2 or 3 scallions, finely chopped\n\n1 cup tortilla chips, roughly crushed\n\n\u00bc cup shredded sharp Cheddar cheese or queso fresco\n\ndressing\n\n\u00bc cup sour cream or yogurt\n\njuice of 1 lime\n\nsalt and pepper, to taste\n\nadditions\n\nchopped cucumber\n\nchopped jalape\u00f1o (remove seeds for less heat)\n\nbell peppers, stemmed, seeded, and chopped\n\ngrated carrots\n\nSalsa\n\n1 Mix the lettuce, beans, tomatoes, corn, scallions, tortilla chips, cheese, and any additions in a large bowl.\n\n2 In a small bowl, stir together the sour cream, lime juice, salt, and pepper. Taste it and adjust the salt, pepper, and lime to your liking.\n\n3 Just before serving, pour the dressing over the salad and toss to coat. Eat immediately, maybe with a few extra chips on the side.\n\nCharred Summer Salad\n\n2.75 \/ serving\n\n$5.50 total\n\nOne of the early supporters of this book, Gina, can't eat gluten and wanted more Mexican-inspired options. I designed this spicy summer salad for her, topped with popcorn for the kind of crunch that croutons would provide. Use smaller zucchini, and save the big ones for Chocolate Zucchini Muffins. If you own a grill, use it instead of the broiler! serves 2, or 4 as a side\n\n3 small or 2 medium zucchini\n\n2 ears corn\n\n1 tablespoon olive oil or vegetable oil\n\nsalt and pepper, to taste\n\n2 ounces crumbled cotija or feta cheese\n\n1 cup popped Popcorn\n\ndressing\n\njuice of 1 lime\n\n1 tablespoon olive oil\n\n\u00bd teaspoon chili powder, plus more for dusting\n\nsalt and pepper, to taste\n\n1 Turn your oven's broiler to high.\n\n2 Chop off both ends of the zucchini, then slice each into four long sticks. Shuck the corn. Lay the zucchini and corn on a baking sheet, then rub them with the oil, making sure they're well coated. Sprinkle with salt and pepper.\n\n3 Broil the zucchini and corn for 2 to 5 minutes, depending on how powerful your broiler is. The zucchini should start to blacken in some spots. This is good! Turn the corn over as needed (but not the zucchini!) to make sure it cooks evenly. Broil until the vegetables are lightly charred, another 2 to 5 minutes. Let them cool.\n\n4 To make the dressing, mix the lime juice, olive oil, chili powder, salt, and pepper in a large bowl. Taste it and adjust the seasoning, if necessary.\n\n5 Chop the zucchini into bite-size pieces and slice the corn kernels from the cobs (see box).\n\n6 Transfer the vegetables into the bowl with the dressing. Add the crumbled cotija or feta and mix well. Sprinkle the popcorn over the top, then dust with a little extra chili powder, salt, and pepper.\n\nto cut the kernels off a cob of corn, hold the cob by the stem, vertically, inside a large bowl. Rest the other end of the corn on the bottom of the bowl. Using a sharp knife, slice the kernels off the cob as far down as you can go until your wrist hits the lip of the bowl. Slice all the way around the cob. Flip the cob over vertically and slice off the kernels that you missed closer to the pointy end.\n\nWilted Cabbage Salad\n\n$1.05 \/ serving\n\n$4.20 total\n\nThe idea for this recipe came from a wonderful reader, Karen. Wilted cabbage keeps its crunch and freshness for several days, whereas a regular lettuce salad turns gross soon after being dressed. (Kale behaves similarly to cabbage\u2014it's one of the reasons I love the kale salad!) This salad is best if left to marinate in the tart dressing overnight. Just be sure to add the peanuts shortly before serving to prevent sogginess. serves 4 as a side\n\n1 medium-size cabbage, finely chopped\n\n1 tablespoon salt\n\n\u00bd cup raw peanuts\n\n\u00bd bunch scallions, finely chopped\n\ndressing\n\n2 tablespoons olive oil\n\n2 tablespoons rice vinegar or lemon juice\n\nsalt and pepper, to taste\n\nadditions\n\ngrated carrot\n\nfinely chopped apple\n\nsesame seeds\n\na few drops of sesame oil\n\n1 Toss the cabbage and salt in a large bowl. Place something heavy, like a pot (any size that fits in the bowl), on top of the cabbage. The weight, along with the salt, will encourage the cabbage to expel its moisture. Leave it for 2 hours. This method will take away some bitterness, leaving the crunchy texture of raw cabbage.\n\n2 Roast the peanuts in a single layer in a skillet over medium heat, occasionally tossing them and moving them, until they are lightly brown all over, about 5 minutes. Alternatively, spread the peanuts on a baking sheet and broil them about 2 minutes. Keep an eye on them so they don't burn. You want them nice and golden. Sprinkle a bit of salt on the roasted peanuts and set them aside.\n\n3 Combine the olive oil, rice vinegar, salt, and pepper in a small bowl. Mix it up and taste. Adjust the salt and pepper as you like. Remember that the cabbage is already salted, so you won't need too much salt in the dressing.\n\n4 Once the 2 hours have passed, toss the cabbage again with your hands. Cabbage treated in this way will last for several days. Before serving, add the scallions, peanuts, and dressing. Toss, taste, and adjust the seasoning as you see fit.\n\nBroccoli Apple Salad\n\n$0.80 \/ serving\n\n$3.20 total\n\nThe bitterness of broccoli is delicious paired with the sweet tartness of apples. Plenty of crunch, too! For a slightly richer and creamier dish, try the yogurt dressing. serves 4 as a side\n\n1 large crown and stem of broccoli\n\n2 apples\n\ndressing\n\njuice of 1 lemon\n\n1 tablespoon olive oil\n\nsalt and pepper, to taste\n\nalternative yogurt dressing\n\n1 tablespoon yogurt\n\n1 teaspoon olive oil\n\n1 teaspoon lemon juice\n\n1 teaspoon chopped fresh dill\n\nsalt and pepper, to taste\n\n1 Slice the stem of the broccoli into \u215b-inch disks. If you can't get them that thin, don't worry, but if you have the patience, thinner is better! Once you reach the crown of the broccoli, cut the florets off and slice them as thin as you can. Set the broccoli in a bowl.\n\n2 Halve and core the apples, then place the apples flat side down on your cutting board to make them easier to slice. Slice the apples into \u215b-inch pieces, and dump them into the bowl with the broccoli.\n\n3 Mix the lemon juice, olive oil, salt, and pepper in a small bowl. Taste it and season with more salt and pepper as you see fit.\n\n4 Pour the dressing over the broccoli and apples and mix it all together.\n\nIf you put your plates in the fridge for 10 minutes before serving, the salad will stay crisp slightly longer. For the best presentation, pile the salad as high and tight as you can manage.\nSnacks, Sides, and Small Bites\n\nBrussels Sprout Hash and Eggs\n\n$1.75 \/ serving\n\n$3.50 total\n\nThis simple concoction is a great dish for brunch, a light lunch, or a side. The Brussels sprouts get salty and tangy from the olives and lemon, then they crisp and caramelize on the bottom. Mix in the little bit of fat from the egg yolk, and wow is this delicious. serves 2, or 4 as a side\n\n1 pound Brussels sprouts\n\nsalt and pepper, to taste\n\n1 tablespoon butter\n\n3 cloves garlic, finely chopped\n\n6 olives, finely chopped\n\n2 eggs\n\nlemon juice, to taste\n\n1 Chop off the ends of the sprouts. Slice them in half, then finely chop each half. Place the shreds in a bowl\u2014you should end up with about 4 cups\u2014and sprinkle with salt and pepper.\n\n2 Melt the butter in a medium-size nonstick pan with a lid over medium-high heat, swirling to coat the pan. Add the Brussels sprouts and the garlic, then let them cook until just a little wilted, about 1 minute. Toss the mixture. Add the olives and toss again.\n\n3 Crack the eggs into the pan so they aren't touching. Sprinkle with salt and pepper. Pour in 2 tablespoons water and cover with the lid. Let the eggs steam, undisturbed, until the whites are cooked through but the yolks are still runny, about 2 minutes.\n\n4 Turn off the heat and squeeze lemon juice over everything. Serve immediately.\n\nMexican Street Corn\n\n$1 \/ serving\n\n$4 total\n\nThis recipe takes fresh, sweet summer corn\u2014already amazing\u2014and adds salt, tang, and spice to the experience. If you have an outdoor grill, prepare the corn that way, but for those without, a broiler is a great shortcut! Use any chile powder you like, such as ground ancho powder or cayenne pepper. serves 4 as a side\n\n4 ears corn\n\n4 tablespoons mayonnaise\n\n\u00bd cup grated cotija, queso blanco, feta, Romano, or Parmesan cheese\n\ndusting of chile powder\n\n1 lime, sliced into wedges\n\n1 Turn your oven's broiler to high.\n\n2 Peel off the corn husks and clean off all the silk. Leave the green ends attached for a convenient handhold.\n\n3 Place the corn on a baking sheet and stick them under the broiler for 2 to 3 minutes. Rotate and repeat until they're brown and toasty all the way around\u2014no more than 10 minutes total.\n\n4 Working quickly, spread a tablespoon of mayonnaise over each ear of corn, lightly coating every kernel. Next, sprinkle the cheese over the corn. It should stick fairly easily to the mayonnaise, but you'll probably get a little messy.\n\n5 Sprinkle chile powder on top, but not too heavily, or it'll be gritty.\n\n6 Last, squeeze lime juice all over the corn, and serve hot!\n\nMy Dad's Baked Beans\n\n$1.50 \/ serving\n\n$3 total\n\nMy dad loves beans in basically any form. This is his formula for the quickest, easiest way to get beans on his plate without missing out on great flavor. Dad's beans rely on a can of baked beans as the base, while my version uses dried beans you might have left over from another meal. Mine requires a little more cooking and chopping to create the sauce, but it ends up less expensive because of the dried beans. Both versions taste great, so go with what works best for you: super quick and cheap, or quick and cheaper. serves 2, or 4 as a side\n\n2 teaspoons chipotle chiles in adobo with a bit of their sauce, or any chile sauce\n\n2 cans (13.5 ounces each) baked beans\n\n2 tablespoons mustard\n\n2 tablespoons molasses or brown sugar\n\nvariations\n\nspicy mustard instead of plain\n\nomit the chipotle\n\ntoppings\n\nsalsa\n\nscallions\n\nfresh cilantro\n\navocado\n\ntomato\n\ncrumbled bacon\n\nchunks of ham\n\n1 If you're using the chipotle in adobo, chop it finely to be sure the spice will be evenly distributed.\n\n2 Mix the chiles, beans, mustard, and molasses in a pot and place over medium heat. Cook until the beans are warmed through, 2 to 5 minutes. Give it a stir and serve. Or do it all in the microwave\u2014that works just as well!\n\n3 For a side dish, serve as is. To make a full meal, serve with leftover rice, over toast, in a burrito, scrambled with eggs, or stir-fried with onions and bell peppers.\n\nAnd Mine\n\n2 teaspoons chipotle chiles in adobo with a bit of their sauce, or any chile sauce\n\n3 cups cooked pinto, red, or black beans\n\n\u00bd cup pureed or chopped canned tomatoes, with juice\n\n\u00bc onion, finely chopped\n\n2 tablespoons mustard\n\n2 tablespoons molasses or brown sugar\n\nCook everything in a pot over medium heat until the juices thicken, about 5 minutes. That's it!\n\nSmoky and Spicy Roasted Cauliflower\n\n$0.85 \/ serving\n\n$3.40 total\n\nRoasted veggies are always delicious, but something magical happens to cauliflower in the oven. It gets so crispy and nutty, and that flavor is brought out even more with the spices here. I'm happy to just eat a bowl of this for dinner, maybe with an egg on top. serves 4 as a side\n\n1 head cauliflower, stem and florets, cut into small pieces\n\n2 cloves garlic, unpeeled\n\n1 tablespoon butter, melted\n\n1 teaspoon smoked paprika\n\n\u00bd teaspoon cayenne pepper\n\nsalt and pepper, to taste\n\n1 Preheat the oven to 400\u00b0F.\n\n2 Arrange the cauliflower and the garlic in a large roasting pan. Drizzle the butter over the cauliflower and sprinkle the paprika, cayenne, and generous amounts of salt and pepper over the top. Use your hands to coat the cauliflower with the butter and spices.\n\n3 Bake until the cauliflower can be easily pierced with a fork and the florets begin to brown, 45 minutes to 1 hour. If you like things extra crispy and dark brown, bake for the full hour. To serve, squeeze the roasted garlic among the florets and trash the skins.\n\nCrispy Chickpeas and Pumpkin Seeds\n\n$0.50 \/ serving\n\n$1 total\n\nSave the seeds from your winter squash or pumpkins: Just remove them from the juicy bits inside the squash and rinse them off. Spread them out to dry on a clean surface or in an oven on its lowest setting for 15 minutes. Once dry, you can store them for several weeks. After you've built up a good supply, toast them up and enjoy! Just like with popcorn, these are great with different spice combinations. My favorite is a half teaspoon each of ground coriander, turmeric, cumin, and cayenne pepper. serves 2 as a snack\n\n1\u00bd cups cooked chickpeas, drained\n\n\u00bd cup pumpkin or winter squash seeds\n\n1 teaspoon butter, melted\n\n1 teaspoon salt\n\n2 teaspoons any combination of ground spices (see headnote)\n\n1 Preheat the oven to 400\u00b0F.\n\n2 Put the chickpeas, pumpkin seeds, butter, salt, and spices in a bowl. Mix to coat every chickpea and seed with the spices.\n\n3 Spread the chickpeas and pumpkin seeds on a baking sheet in a single layer.\n\n4 Bake for 20 minutes.\n\n5 Remove the baking sheet from the oven and turn the chickpeas and seeds with a spatula, making sure they aren't sticking too much. Put the baking sheet back in the oven until everything is crusty and golden, 10 more minutes.\n\n6 Let the chickpeas and seeds cool for 10 minutes. Scoop into a bowl and serve.\n\nSpicy Green Beans\n\n$0.65 \/ serving\n\n$1.30 total\n\nWhenever I make these green beans, I think, \"Why don't I eat this every day?\" Throw a fried egg on top, serve with rice, and you have a delicious meal. Try to find the chile paste called sambal oelek; it's commonly available and you'll love having it in your flavor arsenal. It's my favorite Asian chile paste for this dish. It has a lovely, pure flavor, and (usually) no added vinegar or garlic. serves 2 as a side\n\n1 teaspoon vegetable oil\n\n8 ounces green beans, ends trimmed and chopped into bite-size pieces\n\n2 cloves garlic, finely chopped\n\n1 teaspoon soy sauce\n\n1 teaspoon sambal oelek\n\nadditions\n\n1 teaspoon grated ginger\n\n1 teaspoon lemon juice\n\n1 Place a frying pan over medium heat and add the vegetable oil. Once it's hot, add the green beans. Let them cook undisturbed for about 1 minute.\n\n2 Mix the garlic, soy sauce, sambal oelek, and any additions in a small bowl. This is your sauce!\n\n3 After 1 minute, the beans should have turned bright green. Add about \u00bc cup of water to the pan. Cook for another 2 minutes, until the water is mostly gone.\n\n4 Pour the sauce into the pan and toss gently to coat. Cook until everything is fragrant and most of the liquid is gone, another 2 minutes. Poke the beans with a fork: If it goes through easily, they're done.\n\n5 Add more chile sauce or soy sauce to taste if you want the beans hotter or saltier.\n\nideas\n\nPopcorn!\n\n$0.25 \/ serving\n\n$1 total\n\n**Popcorn is such a great snack.** It's easy to forget how simple and cheap it is to prepare at home when there are so many prepackaged varieties available at ten times the price.\n\nIt's also fun to get kids involved since the transformation is so dramatic and explosive. Science! Make the popcorn your own by adding your favorite flavors to it. My family went for Parmesan and black pepper on Sunday nights when I was growing up.\n\nBe sure to experiment and figure out what suits you best. I've suggested a few toppings on the opposite page. This recipe makes 10 to 12 cups of popped popcorn\u2014enough for four people. Eat it while it's hot!\n\nBasic Popcorn\n\nserves 4 as a snack\n\n2 tablespoons vegetable oil\n\n\u2153 cup unpopped popcorn kernels\n\n2 tablespoons butter, melted\n\nsalt, to taste\n\n1 Place a large pot with a tight-fitting lid on the stove. Pour in the vegetable oil, then the popcorn kernels. Put the lid on and turn the heat to medium.\n\n2 Using oven mitts, gently shake the pot from side to side to make sure the kernels are evenly distributed in the oil. Once the popcorn begins to pop, turn the heat down to medium low and shake again.\n\n3 Once the popping slows to 5 to 10 seconds between pops, turn off the heat. Wait until you're sure the popping has stopped, and remove the lid.\n\n4 Dump the popcorn into a large bowl, pour the butter over the top, and sprinkle with salt and any other toppings. Gently toss to coat.\n\n1 Minced scallion and cilantro\n\n2 Turmeric and coriander\n\n3 Spice Oil\n\n4 Parmesan and black pepper\n\n5 Cayenne pepper and smoked paprika\n\n6 Brown sugar and orange zest\n\n7 Chili powder and lime\n\n8 Parmesan and dried oregano\n\nMashed Beets\n\n$0.75 \/ serving\n\n$3 total\n\nMaking a mash or puree out of beets is a little different than making a mash out of another kind of root. Beets are much less starchy, so they don't naturally fluff up as much as other winter vegetables. For the smoothest results, use a food processor. The puree is electric magenta and delicious (although it's just as good when chunky). serves 4 as a side\n\nsalt, to taste\n\n4 medium-size beets\n\n1 tablespoon butter\n\n3 cloves garlic, finely chopped\n\n\u00bc cup chicken or vegetable broth\n\npepper, to taste\n\nadditions\n\norange juice instead of broth\n\ndill\n\nyogurt or sour cream\n\nvinegar\n\n1 Bring a pot of salted water to a boil. Add the beets, in their skins, and cook until a knife can pierce them easily, about 40 minutes.\n\n2 Drain the water and let the beets cool for 5 minutes.\n\n3 Meanwhile, melt the butter in a pan over medium heat. Saut\u00e9 the garlic until it smells great and turns translucent, but not brown, about 2 minutes. Remove from the heat and set aside.\n\n4 Once the beets are cool, chop off the tough stems and peel off the skin. It should be quite easy, because the cooking will have softened the exterior.\n\n5 Dice the beets and add them to a bowl or a food processor, along with the saut\u00e9ed garlic, the broth, and any additions. Process or mash until the mixture is very smooth. Taste and add salt and pepper as needed.\n\nMashed Cauliflower\n\n$1 \/ serving\n\n$4 total\n\nMashed cauliflower has a very light, nutty taste that soaks up the flavors you add to it, much like potatoes. Unlike potatoes, it's lighter in your belly and more interesting in texture. serves 4 as a side\n\nsalt, to taste\n\n1 head cauliflower, chopped\n\n1 tablespoon butter\n\n3 cloves garlic, finely chopped\n\npepper, to taste\n\nadditions\n\nspices\n\ngrated cheese\n\nyogurt or sour cream\n\nchiles, finely chopped\n\nginger, finely grated\n\nscallions, chopped\n\n1 Bring a large pot of salted water to a boil. Add the cauliflower and cook until tender, 5 to 7 minutes.\n\n2 Drain the water and remove the cauliflower.\n\n3 Place the pot back over medium heat and add the butter. Let it melt, add the garlic, and saut\u00e9 for about 2 minutes. Put the cauliflower back into the pot. Stir to coat, and cook until it is just heated through, or for a little longer to let it get golden and crispy. Your choice!\n\n4 Turn off the heat and let the mixture cool for 5 minutes. Use a potato masher to smash the cauliflower roughly. Add salt, pepper, and any other additions, and mash and mix some more. Taste and adjust as desired.\n\nWinter Squash Puree\n\n$0.60 \/ serving\n\n$2.40 total\n\nThe easiest way to cook winter squash is to roast it whole. The inside becomes soft and smooth and you can scoop it out of the skin with ease. serves 4 as a side\n\n1 tablespoon butter, plus more for the pan\n\n1 butternut, kabocha, acorn, delicata, or other winter squash (except spaghetti squash)\n\n3 cloves garlic\n\nsalt and pepper, to taste\n\nadditions\n\nyogurt or sour cream\n\nbrown sugar and cinnamon\n\nfinely chopped chiles\n\ncurry powder\n\nraisins\n\nsage\n\n1 Preheat the oven to 400\u00b0F. Butter a baking sheet.\n\n2 Slice the squash in half using a big, sharp knife. Scoop out the innards. Set the halves facedown on the sheet.\n\n3 Bake in the oven until a knife poked into the squash goes through easily, 30 to 40 minutes.\n\n4 Melt the butter in a pan over medium heat. Add the garlic and saut\u00e9 about 2 minutes. Remove from the heat.\n\n5 Scoop the squash into a large bowl with the garlic, the butter from the pan, and any other additions. Stir until smooth. Taste and add salt and pepper as needed.\n\nMashed Celery Root\n\n$0.75 \/ serving\n\n$3 total\n\nCelery root is just what it sounds like. It's the root from which the stalks of celery grow, and yes, you can eat it! Knobbly and ugly as it may appear, it tastes as if a potato and celery had a baby. serves 4 as a side\n\nsalt, to taste\n\n1 medium-size celery root, peeled and diced\n\n1 tablespoon butter\n\n3 cloves garlic\n\n\u00bd cup broth or water, warm\n\npepper, to taste\n\nadditions\n\nchopped fresh cilantro\n\ngrated ginger\n\nyogurt or sour cream\n\nchile flakes\n\n1 Bring a pot of salted water to a boil.\n\n2 Add the celery root to the pot and let the water return to a boil. Reduce the heat to a simmer and cook until the celery root is easy to pierce with a fork, 20 minutes. Drain the water and put the celery root in a bowl.\n\n3 Place the pot back over medium heat and add the butter. Let it melt, add the garlic, and saut\u00e9 until fragrant, about 2 minutes. Put the celery root back in the pot. Stir to coat, and cook until the celery root begins to get a bit mushy, about 5 minutes.\n\n4 Turn off the heat and add the broth along with any other additions. Use a potato masher, food processor, or electric mixer to smash the celery root until smooth. (Get it smooth enough and you'll almost think it's a potato.) Season with salt and pepper to taste.\n\nmethod\n\nBubble and Squeak\n\n**Bubble and Squeak is a traditional British weekend breakfast food** meant to use up the leftovers from the night before. Because it's British, of course the recipe includes mashed potatoes! It's basically a big potato pancake with stuff mixed into it. Chop up any other stray vegetables you have lying around. Find a carrot? Grate it or finely chop it and add it to the bowl. Cabbage, peas, corn, broccoli, Brussels sprouts\u2014all these things are great. You won't want to add really watery vegetables like tomato, zucchini, or cucumber, though, so stick to precooked or tougher ones.\n\nThe adorable name comes from the sound this dish makes in the pan, the squeak coming from the cabbage, which is the most common mix-in for the potato. The method I'm giving you is for one big pancake, but you could make smaller pancakes for a neater presentation. You can also forget the pancakes entirely and make a hash out of the mixture. This method is more of a technique than a traditional recipe, so just try to embrace the concept: Crispy and hot, you can't go wrong!\n\n2 cups mashed potatoes\n\n1 cup mashed root vegetables or roasted vegetables\n\nsalt and pepper, to taste\n\n1 tablespoon butter\n\nadditions\n\n\u00bd cup peas\n\n\u00bd cup cabbage\n\n2 to 3 scallions, finely chopped\n\n1 **Combine the mashed potatoes and mashed root vegetables or roasted vegetables in a large bowl**. The above measurements are a general guideline, but you can tweak the ratios so long as you have enough potato to hold it all together. (If it's falling apart, add more potato!)\n\n2 **Sprinkle with salt and pepper and mix everything together into a big thick kind of dough.** Taste it and see if it needs more salt and pepper. Since you are using leftovers that are already seasoned, you probably won't need to add much salt. This may seem haphazard, but it's a very forgiving recipe and as long as the mixture is at least half mashed potato it should work out just fine.\n\n3 Melt the butter in a cast-iron or nonstick skillet over medium heat. **Add the mixture to the pan and press it into a flat pancake** that fills the pan all the way to the edge. Let it cook for 5 to 7 minutes without touching it.\n\n4 Use a spatula to check the underside of the pancake. **When it's golden, it's time to flip it**. (If it's not, wait another minute or two.) Now comes a decision. You can try to flip the pancake all in one go\u2014something I usually fail at\u2014or you can simply flip it bit by bit. No need to worry if you break it up. After you flip the pancake, squish it back together again with the spatula.Brown the other side of the pancake for another 10 minutes. Once you have a nice golden crust around the whole pancake, turn off the heat. Let cool in the pan for 10 minutes.\n\n5 **Slice into wedges to serve.**\n\nJacket Sweet Potatoes\n\n$1.20 \/ serving\n\n$4.80 total\n\nI like to serve these with all kinds of toppings, usually leftovers from other meals. Try filling them with roasted chicken, beans and cheese, corn and tomatoes\u2014whatever you have around (but avoid veggies that can't stand up to residual heat, like lettuce or cucumbers). serves 4\n\n4 large sweet potatoes\n\nsalt and pepper, to taste\n\n\u00bc cup sour cream\n\n\u00bd bunch scallions, finely chopped\n\n1 Preheat the oven to 400\u00b0F.\n\n2 Scrub the sweet potatoes and stab them with a fork a few times. Lay them on a baking sheet.\n\n3 Bake for 60 to 75 minutes. Because sweet potatoes vary greatly in size, stick them with a long knife after an hour to check them. If it goes through easily, they're ready. If not, bake longer.\n\n4 Let the potatoes cool for 15 minutes. Make a long cut along the top of each potato and open them gently. Beat the soft, orange middle with a fork to fluff it up.\n\n5 Sprinkle with salt and pepper. Let each person add sour cream and scallions (or more salt and pepper) to their taste.\n\nRoasted Potatoes with Chiles\n\n$0.75 \/ serving\n\n$3 total\n\nIt doesn't get much simpler or more satisfying than roasted potatoes. You can use any pepper you like\u2014from large, dark poblanos to Hungarian wax chiles to bell peppers. When you chop the peppers, be sure to get rid of the seeds and white ribs inside. In addition to being a great side dish, this makes a delicious taco filling. Alternatively, try it alongside some black beans and rice or piled high on a plate with an egg on top. serves 4 as a side\n\n4 medium-size potatoes, chopped into bite-size pieces\n\n4 medium-size chile peppers or 2 bell peppers, chopped into bite-size pieces\n\n2 cloves garlic, unpeeled\n\n1 tablespoon butter, melted\n\nsalt and pepper, to taste\n\n1 Preheat the oven to 400\u00b0F.\n\n2 Tumble the potatoes, peppers, and garlic together in a large roasting pan.\n\n3 Pour the butter over the top and sprinkle liberally with salt and pepper. Potatoes need quite a bit of salt! Use your hands to mix everything up.\n\n4 Roast until you can spear the potatoes easily with a fork and everything is a little crispy, about 1 hour. Squish the garlic cloves, spread the roasted garlic throughout, and discard the skins.\n\nPoutine\n\n$1.75 \/ serving\n\n$7 total\n\nPoutine, a French-Canadian dish of French fries, gravy, and cheese curds, isn't an everyday meal, but it's a favorite. Since I don't like deep-frying at home, I bake the fries\u2014they still get crispy without the fuss. Montreal-style poutine is made with vegetable gravy, as in this recipe, but you can also use beef or turkey gravy. Of course, proper poutine uses cheese curds, and if you can find them do use them, but fresh mozzarella works almost as well. It has the same spongy quality, just maybe with a little less squeak. However, using fresh mozzarella makes this recipe come out a little more on the expensive side than you would think. If you use less or skip the cheese entirely, you can cut the price in half. serves 4 as a side\n\n2 tablespoons vegetable oil\n\n2 to 3 medium russet potatoes, cut into sticks\n\nsalt and pepper, to taste\n\n6 ounces fresh mozzarella cheese, diced\n\n1 to 2 scallions, chopped\n\ngravy\n\n2 tablespoons butter\n\n1 shallot or 3 scallions, finely chopped\n\n3 cloves garlic, finely chopped\n\n6 leaves fresh sage, finely chopped (optional)\n\n2 tablespoons all-purpose flour\n\n1\u00bd cups vegetable broth\n\n1 teaspoon soy sauce\n\n\u00bd teaspoon cayenne pepper\n\nsalt and pepper, to taste\n\n1 Preheat the oven to 400\u00b0F.\n\n2 Spread 1 tablespoon of the vegetable oil on a baking sheet, then add the potato. Drizzle the remaining tablespoon of oil over the potatoes and sprinkle them generously with salt and pepper. Toss the potatoes with your hands and evenly space them across the baking sheet. Bake for 20 minutes.\n\n3 Meanwhile, melt the butter in a small saucepan over medium heat. Swirl it around to coat the pan. Add the shallot, garlic, and sage, if using, and cook until the shallots are translucent but not brown, about 2 minutes. Quickly stir in the flour. Add a little vegetable broth if the mixture gets too lumpy.\n\n4 Let the mixture cook until it turns light brown. Add the vegetable broth, soy sauce, and cayenne pepper. Bring the gravy to a boil, then turn down the heat and let it cook until it thickens to a gravy-ish consistency, about 5 minutes, stirring occasionally. Taste it, adding salt and pepper as needed. Turn down the heat to its lowest setting, just enough to keep the gravy warm.\n\n5 After the fries have baked for 20 minutes, remove them from the oven. Shuffle them with a spatula and test with a fork. If it goes through easily, the fries are ready. If you want them a little crispier, flip them over and put them back in the oven for a bit.\n\n6 Once they're done, pile one layer of fries onto a plate. Top with the diced mozzarella and the gravy. Repeat with a second layer and sprinkle with scallions and more freshly ground black pepper.\n\nideas\n\nThings on Toast\n\n$0.75 \/ serving\n\n$1.50 total\n\n**I love bread, and toast in particular is my comfort food.** Here, I suggest that you take some toast and put something tasty on it. That's it!\n\nI like these recipes for times when I'm on my own and want a quick meal or snack. They're a great way to use leftovers or turn a side dish into a full meal. What makes this more like a special dinner than a quick snack is the way you treat the bread\u2014toasting it in the pan like a nice piece of fish.\n\nA pile of saut\u00e9ed or raw veggies over buttered, crusty toast is the perfect meal for one or two and a great way to try a new vegetable. I've suggested a few topping variations on the following pages, but you can use pretty much any veggie dish from this book or invent your own. Go with raw vegetable salads or, as I most often do, saut\u00e9 veggies or cooked beans in oil with flavors like garlic and chiles, olives and dill, ginger and turmeric, or any other classic combination (page ). It only takes a few minutes, and the result is an aromatic, attractive, satisfying meal.\n\nBasic Toast\n\nserves 2\n\n4 slices bread\n\n2 tablespoons butter\n\nsalt and pepper, to taste\n\n2 fried eggs (optional)\n\n1 Melt \u00bd tablespoon of the butter in a pan over medium heat. Place 2 slices of bread in the pan, let them cook for about 2 minutes, then lift them with a spatula to see if they're golden brown underneath. When they are, flip 'em over.\n\n2 Add another \u00bd tablespoon of the butter to the pan to make sure the second side of the toast becomes just as golden as the first. Sprinkle the toast with salt and pepper. Once the second side is golden, set the bread on a plate to await its topping. Repeat with the remaining bread and butter.\n\n3 Pile on some toppings (see the following pages for inspiration) and finish each with a fried egg, if you have it.\n\n1 Peas and Lemon\n\n$1 serving \/ $2 total\n\nA less salty, more rustic version of the British classic mushy peas.\n\n1 teaspoon olive oil\n\n2 cloves garlic, finely chopped\n\n1 cup peas, fresh or frozen\n\n1 teaspoon lemon juice\n\nfreshly grated Romano or Parmesan cheese\n\nsalt and pepper, to taste\n\nPlace a pan on the stove over medium heat and add the olive oil. Drop in the garlic and peas along with 2 tablespoons water so that the peas can steam a bit. Leave them until they turn bright green. Sprinkle with the lemon juice, cheese, salt, and pepper, then remove the peas from the heat and mash with the back of a fork, either in the pan or in a bowl. Pile onto warm toast and enjoy!\n\n2 Asian Greens Gra Prow\n\n$2.50 serving \/ $5 total\n\nTry any Asian green you can get your hands on, from bok choy to tatsoi to gai lan. _Gra prow_ means stir-fried with Thai basil.\n\n1 teaspoon vegetable oil\n\n2 cloves garlic, chopped\n\n1 teaspoon grated ginger\n\n2 teaspoons soy sauce\n\n1 bunch Asian greens, stems and leaves chopped separately\n\n1 handful Thai basil\n\nsalt and pepper, to taste\n\nHeat the oil in a pan over medium heat. Saut\u00e9 the garlic until fragrant, 2 minutes, then add the ginger, soy sauce, and the chopped stems of the greens. Cook until almost tender, 4 to 5 minutes. Add the rest of the greens and cook for 2 more minutes. Turn off the heat and mix in the Thai basil, salt, and pepper.\n\n3 Caramelized Onions and Cheddar\n\n$1 serving \/ $2 total\n\nCaramelizing onions isn't quick, but if you make a large batch it's worth it. Sweet onion and salty Cheddar are a drool-inducing pair!\n\n1 tablespoon butter\n\n1 red onion, thinly sliced\n\nsharp Cheddar cheese, thinly sliced\n\nsalt and pepper, to taste\n\nMelt the butter in a pan over low heat. Add the onion and cook slowly, about 20 minutes. As the onions darken, stir occasionally, adding water to loosen the sticky bits. When the onions are sweet and caramelized, spread them over toast, and top with Cheddar, salt, and pepper. Put the toast back in the pan and cook, covered, until the cheese is bubbly.\n\n4 Roasted Vegetables\n\n$1 serving \/ $2 total\n\nOne of my favorite ways to eat leftover roasted vegetables.\n\nRoasted Vegetables\n\nfreshly grated Romano or Parmesan cheese\n\npepper, to taste\n\nSimply create a ridiculously tall pile of vegetables like the winter squash and leeks pictured here, then sprinkle with grated Romano and fresh pepper. You can also add any sauce you have on hand, or sprinkle crushed nuts on top.\n\n5 Salty Broccoli\n\n$1.50 serving \/ $3 total\n\nMost broccoli that enters my home meets its fate as this dish.\n\n1 teaspoon olive oil\n\n3 cloves garlic, chopped\n\n1 teaspoon chile flakes\n\n1 anchovy fillet, chopped\n\n1 crown and stem of broccoli, chopped\n\nfreshly grated Romano or Parmesan cheese\n\nsalt and pepper, to taste\n\nWarm the oil in a pan over medium heat. Add the garlic and chile flakes and cook 2 minutes. Add the anchovy and cook for another minute. Add the broccoli and \u00bc cup water. Cover the pan, steam for 3 minutes, then toss and cook for 2 minutes, until the broccoli is tender and the water is gone. Spoon onto warm toast. Top with cheese, salt, and pepper.\n\n6 Broiled Eggplant Salad\n\n$1.75 serving \/ $3.50 total\n\nYet another use for leftovers\u2014or just a way to make a great salad more substantial.\n\nBroiled Eggplant Salad\n\nchopped fresh herbs or greens\n\nany cheese, crumbled or grated\n\nSimply dollop the Broiled Eggplant Salad onto toast, then add some herbs or greens to the top for a fresh counterpoint, along with a bit of cheese.\n\n7 Peas and Collards\n\n$1 serving \/ $2 total\n\nOh man, is there anything more comforting than beans (or these bean-like peas) on toast? Everyone will be delighted even if you're just using up leftovers. To make the meal a little more fancy, use scones instead of toast.\n\nBlack-Eyed Peas and Collards\n\nWhole-Wheat Jalape\u00f1o Cheddar Scones\n\nHeat up the peas and collards in a pan on the stovetop or simply in the microwave. Spoon over warm toast and enjoy. If you're using the scones, slice them in half and toast them in a toaster oven or under your broiler before dolloping each half with the pea mixture.\n\n8 Spinach and Chickpea\n\n$4.50 serving \/ $2.25 total\n\nA popular tapas dish in Spain. This recipe makes a little more topping than you need for four pieces of toast\u2014but hey, leftovers are tasty.\n\n1 teaspoon butter\n\n2 cloves garlic, chopped\n\n1 cup cooked chickpeas\n\n1 bunch spinach, washed, thicker stems removed\n\nsalt and pepper, to taste\n\nsmoked paprika (optional)\n\nMelt the butter in a pan on medium heat. Add the garlic and cook for 2 minutes. Add the chickpeas and spinach, then cook for 2 to 5 minutes, until the spinach cooks down but is still bright green. Taste and add salt and pepper, then spoon over warm toast. If you have it, sprinkle with smoked paprika.\n\n9 Avocado\n\n$0.90 serving \/ $1.80 total\n\nYears ago, my partner and I arrived in Sydney, Australia, after cycling hundreds of miles. Our hosts gave us a mountain of toast with avocado. I may have eaten an entire loaf of bread and maybe three avocados. It is one of the most memorable meals of my life.\n\n1 avocado\n\nsalt and pepper, to taste\n\nchile flakes (optional)\n\nlemon or lime wedge (optional)\n\nSlice the avocado and remove the pit\u2014it should pop out easily. Scoop the avocado flesh out of each side, and slice in half again so you have 4 equal portions. Mash the avocado with a fork and spread onto the toast. Top with salt and pepper, a few chile flakes, and a squeeze of lemon or lime juice, if using.\n\n10 Apple Cheddar\n\n$1.40 serving \/ $2.80 total\n\nHave you ever seen anyone eat apple pie with a little Cheddar on it? This is the same, but even better! Try using an aged white Cheddar if you can get it, but your favorite standard Cheddar will do just as well. Crisp apple plus luscious, salty, crumbly Cheddar equals one of my favorite late-night snacks (even minus the toast).\n\n2 ounces Cheddar cheese\n\n1 apple\n\nsalt and pepper, to taste\n\nThinly slice the Cheddar and slice the apple. I prefer to layer the apples and then slide small slices of Cheddar in between them, but do it in whatever way makes sense to you.\n\n11 Saut\u00e9ed Mushrooms\n\n$1.75 serving \/ $3.50 total\n\nRich and earthy, the smell of mushrooms and garlic will have neighbors knocking on your door. These are also an incredible hamburger topping, so consider making enough for leftovers.\n\n1 tablespoon butter\n\n1 pound mushrooms, sliced\n\n4 cloves garlic, chopped\n\nsalt and pepper, to taste\n\nMelt the butter in a pan over medium heat. Add the mushrooms and saut\u00e9 until they have shrunk and expelled some of their liquid, about 2 minutes. Mix in the garlic and cook until the mushrooms are light brown all over, about 5 more minutes. Add salt and pepper to taste. Spoon onto warm toast.\n\n12 Korean-Style Spinach\n\n$1.75 serving \/ $3.50 total\n\nThis spinach, saut\u00e9ed with sesame and garlic, is one of my favorites.\n\n1 teaspoon olive oil\n\n4 cloves garlic, chopped\n\n1 bunch spinach, washed, thicker stems removed\n\n1 teaspoon soy sauce\n\n\u00bd teaspoon toasted sesame oil\n\nsalt, to taste\n\n1 teaspoon sesame seeds\n\nHeat the olive oil in a pan over medium heat. Add the garlic and cook, 2 minutes. Add the spinach and soy sauce and cook for 2 minutes, until the spinach has wilted and shrunk. Turn off the heat and add the sesame oil and salt. Mix and taste. Remove the spinach from the pan and squeeze out any excess moisture. Serve over hot slices of toast. Sprinkle sesame seeds on top.\n\nmethod\n\nCornmeal-Crusted Veggies\n\n**These are kind of like veggie French fries.** The cornmeal makes them super crunchy, and they're great with a dipping sauce. Might I suggest Peanut Sauce? Almost any vegetable works well with this method\u2014some of my favorites are zucchini wedges, bell pepper strips, and wedges of cooked winter squash. (Pictured are bell peppers and green beans.) It's sort of like fried green tomatoes or okra, but this baked version skips the expense and mess of the oil while keeping the crunch.\n\noil or butter, for the baking sheet\n\n\u00bd cup all-purpose flour\n\n2 eggs\n\n\u00bc cup milk\n\n1 cup cornmeal\n\n1 teaspoon salt\n\n1 teaspoon black pepper\n\n1 teaspoon paprika\n\n\u00bd teaspoon garlic powder\n\n8 ounces green beans, stemmed\n\nvariations\n\nzucchini wedges\n\nbell pepper strips\n\ncooked winter squash wedges\n\ncauliflower florets\n\nbroccoli florets\n\nwhole okra\n\ncarrot or parsnip sticks\n\nasparagus, whole if very thin\n\n1 **Preheat the oven to 450\u00b0F.**\n\n2 **Grease a baking sheet** with a small amount of oil or butter.\n\n3 **Set up your breading station!** Spread the flour on a plate. Crack both eggs into a bowl, add the milk, and beat lightly with a fork. On another plate, spread the cornmeal, salt, black pepper, paprika, and garlic powder, and mix them up with your fingers.\n\n4 A few at a time, **dredge the green beans in the flour and transfer them to the egg mixture.** Coat the beans lightly with the egg, being careful to shake off any excess. Then **transfer to the cornmeal mixture** and coat them evenly.\n\n5 **Spread the veggies on the baking sheet.** Repeat until you've done them all. If you run out of any of the three mixtures, just mix up a bit more.\n\n6 **Bake for 10 to 15 minutes,** until golden and crispy. Enjoy hot with your favorite dipping sauce!\n\nGreen Chile and Cheddar Quesadillas\n\n$1.75 \/ serving\n\n$3.50 total\n\nThese are a great snack or a quick meal, and you can add pretty much anything to them! To make 'em cheaper, use fresh tortillas made from scratch. serves 2\n\n4 Tortillas\n\n\u00bd cup chopped green chiles, canned or fresh\n\n\u00bd cup grated sharp Cheddar cheese\n\n1 tablespoon chopped fresh cilantro\n\nto serve\n\nSalsa, for serving\n\nsour cream, for serving\n\n1 Place 1 tortilla on a cutting board and spread half of the green chiles evenly over the top. Sprinkle half of the cheese over the chiles, then top with half the cilantro. Place another tortilla on top of each prepared tortilla to form a quesadilla. Repeat!\n\n2 Place a large, nonstick pan over medium heat. Once it's hot, add a quesadilla and toast until the tortilla browns, about 1 minute. Flip it over and brown the second side, then do the same for the other quesadilla. Slice into triangles and enjoy with some fresh salsa and sour cream. \nDinner\n\nFilipino Chicken Adobo\n\n$1.30 \/ serving\n\n$10.40 total\n\nThis ultra-adaptable recipe comes to us courtesy of Tony Pangilinan, who grew up on food stamps after his family immigrated from the Philippines \"with nothing but four suitcases and a lot of dreams.\" After several decades of struggle, Tony achieved those dreams and can now help family members who remain in poverty in the Philippines. He says that, despite their hard circumstances, his family still feels blessed.\n\nFilipino adobo\u2014very different from Spanish adobo\u2014is basically anything cooked in vinegar, soy sauce, and garlic. Although this version is made with chicken, you can use any meat or vegetables you like. Because it's vinegar-based, it keeps well in the fridge! serves 8\n\n8 chicken thighs\n\n\u00be cup rice vinegar or distilled white vinegar\n\n\u00bc cup soy sauce\n\n2 cloves garlic, minced\n\n\u00bd teaspoon black pepper\n\n2 bay leaves\n\n2 tablespoons vegetable oil\n\n2 medium-size potatoes, chopped\n\n4 medium-size carrots, sliced\n\n2 cups white rice\n\n2 pinches of salt\n\n2 teaspoons cornstarch mixed with 1 tablespoon water\n\nadditions\n\n4 jalape\u00f1o peppers, sliced (remove seeds for less heat)\n\nginger, grated\n\nvariations\n\n1\u00bd pounds pork shoulder or butt\n\nsubstitute 1 can (13.5 ounces) coconut milk for the water\n\n1 Cut off the chicken fat. Don't get rid of every last bit, just trim what seems excessive.\n\n2 Stir together the vinegar, soy sauce, garlic, pepper, and bay leaves in a large, non-aluminum pan. Add the chicken, coating each piece. Cover and marinate for 30 minutes (overnight is great).\n\n3 Remove the chicken from the marinade and pat each piece dry with paper towels. (Don't throw out the marinade! You'll use it later.)\n\n4 Pour the oil into a large pot over medium heat. Once it's hot, add enough chicken to cover the bottom. Cook until one side of the chicken is browned, just a few minutes, then flip it over and repeat. When the first batch of chicken is done, remove it from the pot and repeat.\n\n5 After all the chicken is browned, put it back in the pot along with the marinade, potatoes, carrots, and \u00be cup of water. Turn the heat up, bring the liquid to a boil, then decrease the heat to low. Simmer until the meat is cooked through and the carrots and potatoes are soft, about 45 minutes. Cut into the meat. If it's no longer pink, it's done.\n\n6 When the dish is almost ready, pour the rice into a medium-size pot with 4 cups of water and the salt. Bring to a boil over medium heat. Turn the heat down and cover with a lid placed slightly askew. Cook until the water is gone, about 20 minutes.\n\n7 Remove the bay leaves from the adobo and stir in the cornstarch and water mixture. Let it thicken until the chicken and vegetables are well glazed. Serve over the rice.\n\nRoast Chicken\n\n$1.50 to $2.75 \/ serving\n\n$8 to $15 total\n\nAlthough chicken ranges widely in prices, a whole chicken is usually less expensive than buying single pieces like breasts or thighs\u2014plus you can make broth later from the bones and any meat too difficult to get off. The leftovers can be used in sandwiches, in tacos, over a salad, or tossed with sauce and mixed into pasta. This is a base recipe: Add spices to the butter or sprinkle them over the surface of the chicken to change up the flavor in any way you like. serves 6\n\n1 whole chicken, about 4 pounds\n\n1 tablespoon butter, melted\n\nsalt and pepper, to taste\n\n2 cloves garlic\n\n1 lemon\n\n1 Preheat the oven to 400\u00b0F.\n\n2 Remove the giblets from the inside of the chicken and chop off the neck. Keep them for broth later. You can either freeze them or just leave them in the fridge if you plan to make broth in the next couple of days. Rub the entire bird with the melted butter, then sprinkle it with salt and pepper.\n\n3 Smash the garlic cloves with the side of a knife blade, remove the peel, and slice the lemon in half. Stuff the garlic and lemon into the body cavity.\n\n4 Place the chicken in a roasting pan or an ovenproof skillet. Transfer to the oven and cook for 1 hour. If you have a meat thermometer, check to make sure the chicken is at 165\u00b0F, the temperature at which chicken is completely safe to eat, but an hour in a 400\u00b0F oven should be long enough to cook it fully.\n\n5 Let the chicken rest for at least 10 minutes before you carve it to make sure you don't lose any of the tasty juices. Remove the garlic and lemon before carving.\n\nAfter you carve away all the meat, make chicken broth from the carcass, giblets, and neck. Simmer them for several hours in a pot full of water along with vegetable scraps like the ends of onions and carrots, plus a generous helping of salt.\n\nPeanut Chicken and Broccoli with Coconut Rice\n\n$1.50 \/ serving\n\n$9 total\n\nThis recipe uses peanut sauce to elevate a pretty plain chicken and broccoli stir-fry to something you'll want to serve to your favorite guests. Make a full batch of the Peanut Sauce and use some for this and the rest for dipping veggies, dressing salads, or smothering your favorite protein. serves 6\n\n1\u00bd cups long-grain rice\n\n1 can (13.5 ounces) coconut milk\n\n\u00bd teaspoon salt, plus more to taste\n\n1\u00bd pounds chicken (any part), chopped into bite-size pieces\n\npepper, to taste\n\n2 teaspoons vegetable oil\n\n6 cups chopped broccoli, stems and florets separated (about 1 large bunch)\n\n\u00bd cup Peanut Sauce\n\nchopped fresh cilantro\n\nvariation\n\n10 ounces tofu, cut into cubes and marinated in \u00bc cup soy sauce, instead of chicken\n\n1 Rinse the rice. Add it, along with the coconut milk, salt, and 1\u00bd cups water, to a pot over medium heat. Bring to a boil, then turn the heat to low. Let the rice simmer, covered, with the lid askew, until the liquid is gone, about 20 minutes. If the rice is done before the stir-fry, remove it from the heat, fluff it a bit with a fork so it doesn't stick to the pot, and cover to keep it warm.\n\n2 While the rice cooks, sprinkle the chicken with salt and pepper and set aside.\n\n3 Place a large pan or wok over medium-high heat and add 1 teaspoon of the vegetable oil. Let it get hot and add the broccoli stems. Cook, stirring occasionally, to soften the stems, about 3 minutes. Add the tops of the broccoli and \u00bc cup of water and cover the pan. It will steam and sizzle a lot, so watch out! Let the broccoli cook until the water evaporates, about 3 more minutes. Test a piece of broccoli with a fork. It should be just barely tender, but not soft. Turn off the heat and remove the broccoli from the pan.\n\n4 Add the remaining teaspoon of oil to the pan and put it back over medium heat. Add the chicken and cook, stirring occasionally, until it's no longer pink, about 5 minutes. Add another \u00bc cup water and stir occasionally until the chicken is cooked all the way through, another 2 minutes.\n\n5 Add the peanut sauce and stir to coat the chicken. Don't worry if the sauce seems too thick at first. It will blend with the water to become a glaze.\n\n6 Once the chicken is coated with sauce, put the broccoli back into the pan and stir it all together. Taste and add salt as needed.\n\n7 Scoop the coconut rice onto plates and top with the broccoli, chicken, and cilantro.\n\nBeef Stroganoff\n\n$2.75 \/ serving\n\n$16.50 total\n\nBeef stroganoff is one of my husband's favorites, so I make it as a treat for him\u2014and one of my early readers, Dave, says his mother made it for him growing up. It's a classic winter meal from Eastern Europe that warms up a cold house and fills the air with rich aromas. You can use any cut of beef, but adjust the cooking time based on the toughness. If you aren't sure about which cuts of beef to use here, ask your butcher. serves 6\n\n1 pound beef chuck or other cut\n\nsalt and pepper, to taste\n\n2 tablespoons butter\n\n2 onions, chopped\n\n2 large carrots, chopped\n\n1 tablespoon flour\n\n2 teaspoons paprika\n\n1 pound egg noodles or any pasta\n\n3 cloves garlic, finely chopped\n\n1 pound mushrooms, chopped\n\n\u00bd cup sour cream\n\n3 tablespoons mustard\n\nadditions\n\n\u00bd cup red wine (add with the water in Step 3)\n\npotatoes and 1 bell pepper, chopped (add with the carrots and onions in Step 3)\n\nfresh dill (for garnish)\n\n1 Chop the raw beef into bite-size pieces and season them generously with salt and pepper.\n\n2 Melt 1 tablespoon of the butter in a large saucepan over medium heat. Toss in enough beef to cover the bottom of the pan. You may need to cook the meat in two batches, depending on the size of your pan. Brown the meat on all sides, then set it aside on a plate.\n\n3 Add the onions and carrots to the pan and cook until the onions become translucent. Sprinkle the flour and paprika over the top, then cover everything with 4 cups of water. Put the meat back into the pot. Place a lid slightly askew on the pot so steam can escape. Let cook over medium-low heat until the beef is tender and the water has turned into broth, about 2 hours.\n\n4 Bring a large pot of salted water to a boil. Cook the noodles according to the package instructions. Try to time it to coincide with finishing the stew.\n\n5 Meanwhile, melt the remaining tablespoon of butter in another pan over medium heat. Add the garlic and cook until fragrant, about a minute. Add the mushrooms, toss them to coat, sprinkle with salt and pepper, and cook, stirring occasionally, until they shrink and turn brown, about 5 minutes. Turn off the heat, taste, and add salt and pepper as needed.\n\n6 Check on the beef. If the water has reduced to about a cup of thick, flavorful liquid and the beef is tender, it's done! If not, let it cook a little longer and keep checking on it. Once it's ready, turn down the heat and stir in the mushrooms, sour cream, and mustard. Taste and add more salt, pepper, and paprika if needed.\n\n7 Serve the stew over the noodles and sprinkle with more paprika.\n\nIf you're using a pricier, more tender cut of beef, like round steak or sirloin tip, you don't need to cook it nearly as long. Simply brown the meat, substitute 1 cup of beef broth for the water, and cook for 20 to 30 minutes.\n\nSpicy Broiled Tilapia with Lime\n\n$4.50 \/ serving\n\n$9 total\n\nThis meal comes together so quickly it's astonishing. Broiled fish is crispy on the outside and flaky and moist on the inside. Serve with rice, a vegetable mash, or a favorite side dish like Spicy Green Beans. If you saut\u00e9 some vegetables while the fish cooks, dinner will be on the table in minutes. serves 2\n\n1 teaspoon vegetable oil\n\n1 teaspoon salt\n\n\u00bd teaspoon black pepper\n\n1 teaspoon cayenne pepper\n\n1 teaspoon ground cumin\n\n\u00bd teaspoon garlic powder\n\n\u00bd teaspoon dried oregano\n\n2 fillets tilapia or other white fish\n\n\u00bd lime\n\n1 Turn your oven's broiler to high. Line a baking sheet with aluminum foil and coat it evenly with the vegetable oil to keep the fish from sticking.\n\n2 In a small bowl, mix together the salt, pepper, cayenne, cumin, garlic powder, and oregano. Sprinkle them over both sides of the fish and massage gently with your fingers until the fish is covered thoroughly.\n\n3 Place the fish on the prepared baking pan. If you are using a fillet that still has its skin, make sure it is skin-side up so it will get crispy.\n\n4 Broil the fillets for 4 to 7 minutes. The fish will cook very quickly, so check after 4 minutes by gently inserting a butter knife into the thickest part. If it goes through easily and the fish flakes apart, then it's done. If the knife meets resistance and the fish stays together, put the fillets back under the broiler for another few minutes. Once you've made this recipe once or twice, you'll be able to tell at a glance when your fish is done.\n\n5 When the fish is done, squeeze lime juice over it.\n\nSome broilers are not strong enough to get the skin crispy\u2014if that's the case for you, pull it off just before serving. Or leave it. Crispy or not, fish skin is delicious.\n\nCreamy Zucchini Fettuccine\n\n$1.80 \/ serving\n\n$3.60 total\n\nZucchini and summer squash are so abundant in the summer months. This simple pasta is like a lighter, brighter fettuccine alfredo. It also comes together in no time\u2014the veggies will be ready by the time your pasta is cooked. You'll love it, I promise. serves 3, or 2 very hungry people\n\nsalt, to taste\n\n8 ounces fettuccine\n\n4 tablespoons butter\n\n4 cloves garlic, finely chopped\n\n\u00bd teaspoon chile flakes\n\n2 small zucchini, finely diced\n\nzest of 1 lemon\n\n\u00bc cup heavy cream\n\n\u00bd cup grated Romano or Parmesan cheese\n\npepper, to taste\n\nsprinkling of finely chopped fresh basil (optional)\n\n1 Bring a pot of water to a boil over high heat. Salt the water liberally. This is how pasta gets its flavor, so don't be shy! Most of the salt won't end up in the pasta.\n\n2 Cook the pasta according to the package directions. I drain the pasta just before it's finished so it doesn't get mushy when I add it to the vegetable pan and it gets cooked a little more.\n\n3 Meanwhile, melt 1 tablespoon of the butter in a pan over medium heat. Add the garlic and chile flakes. Let them sizzle for 30 seconds to a minute, then add the zucchini. Stir the vegetables to coat. Cook, stirring occasionally, until some of the water has cooked off and the veggies are tender, 5 to 7 minutes. Young summer zucchini doesn't need much cooking. Add the lemon zest. Stir!\n\n4 Drain the fettuccine and add it to the pan along with the remaining 3 tablespoons of butter, the cream, and most of the cheese. Toss the fettuccine around the pan, and add salt and lots of freshly ground pepper to taste. Top with a bit more cheese and a sprinkling of basil, if using, and serve immediately.\n\nPasta with Eggplant and Tomato\n\n$2.50 \/ serving\n\n$5 total\n\nThis dish is similar to a traditional pasta alla norma, but without anchovies and ricotta salata. It's a perfect weeknight dinner in the summertime. I like to use a tubular pasta for this dish, but you can use anything, even spaghetti. The eggplant and tomatoes come together into a sauce that is thick, jammy, and savory. serves 3, or 2 very hungry people\n\nsalt\n\n8 ounces rigatoni\n\n2 tablespoons olive oil\n\n1 large eggplant, cubed\n\n4 cloves garlic, finely chopped\n\n\u00bd teaspoon chile flakes\n\n2 cups finely diced canned tomatoes\n\n\u00bc cup freshly grated Romano or Parmesan cheese\n\nsprinkling of finely chopped fresh basil (optional)\n\npepper, to taste\n\n1 Put a pot of water over high heat and add a good shake of salt. Bring it to a boil and cook the pasta according to the package instructions.\n\n2 Meanwhile, set a wide pan over medium-high heat and splash in the olive oil. Let it get hot, then add the eggplant cubes, sprinkle with salt, and cook until the cubes start to brown, about 5 minutes. If the eggplant starts to look too dry, add a bit of water.\n\n3 Once the cubes are a little brown on all sides, add the garlic and chile flakes and stir. Add the tomatoes and cook, stirring occasionally, about 15 minutes. Again, if it looks too dry, add a bit of water. Everything will shrink up and become a sort of loose, thick sauce.\n\n4 Add half the cheese and half the basil, if using, and stir to combine.\n\n5 Once the pasta is cooked, drain it and add it to the saucepan. Toss everything together, then turn off the heat. Add salt and pepper to taste, and serve in bowls sprinkled with the remaining Romano and basil.\n\nTomato and Tuna Spaghetti\n\n$2.25 \/ serving\n\n$4.50 total\n\nWe already know that a can of tuna can be great in a salad or sandwich for a quick, satisfying lunch, but those uses are just scratching the surface. Canned tuna has a light flavor and a lovely, flaky texture that goes well in all kinds of dishes where you'd like more protein. This traditional Italian pasta dish brings together common pantry items for a beautiful and quick weeknight dinner. serves 3, or 2 very hungry people\n\nsalt, to taste\n\n8 ounces spaghetti\n\n1 tablespoon olive oil\n\n4 cloves garlic, finely chopped\n\n1 cup pureed or chopped canned tomatoes (see box)\n\n1 can (5 ounces) tuna (see box)\n\n\u00bd cup grated Romano cheese\n\npepper, to taste\n\nadditions\n\n2 anchovy fillets, finely chopped\n\n2 tablespoons chopped olives\n\n\u00bc cup Breadcrumbs\n\n1 tablespoon capers\n\nYou can use either oil- or water-packed tuna here. The oil-packed tuna will slip and slide over the noodles a little more easily, but the water-packed can work just fine if you add another tablespoon of olive oil along with it.\n\n1 Boil a large pot of heavily salted water and cook the spaghetti according to the package instructions.\n\n2 Meanwhile, make your sauce. Place a pan over medium heat and add the olive oil. Let it get warm, then add the garlic and saut\u00e9 until it smells great, about 1 minute.\n\n3 Add the pureed tomatoes to the garlic and swirl around the pan. Let the sauce warm up for 2 minutes before adding the tuna. Use a wooden spoon to break up the tuna, and cook until it's heated through, about 3 more minutes.\n\n4 Add \u00bc cup of the grated Romano, reserving the rest to sprinkle on top. Taste and add salt and pepper as needed. Turn down the heat as low as possible and place a lid over the pan to keep it warm while you finish boiling the spaghetti.\n\n5 Once the spaghetti is ready, drain most of the water from the pot, reserving a small amount. Dump the spaghetti into the pan with the sauce and toss everything together. If the sauce isn't moving nicely and coating the noodles, add a little bit of the reserved pasta water and toss it some more.\n\n6 Once the spaghetti is coated, serve it topped with the remaining Romano.\n\nIf you want to create a more complex dish, include one or more of the additions. The anchovies, olives, and capers can be added to the sauce at the beginning, but use the breadcrumbs at the end with the reserved Romano for a little crunch.\n\nCauliflower Cheese\n\n$1.65 \/ serving\n\n$6.60 total\n\nThis is a classic side dish in Great Britain: creamy, cheesy sauce over cauliflower, baked in the oven until the edges get crunchy and bubbly. It's like a healthier and more flavorful version of macaroni and cheese. Try substituting broccoli or cooked winter squash for the cauliflower\u2014everyone will love it. With broccoli, this dish becomes an interpretation of the classic sleazy broccoli with cheese sauce\u2014but a little less sleazy. You can also add some breadcrumbs to the top of the dish before baking if you like extra crunch. Enjoy with a green salad. serves 4\n\n2 teaspoons salt, plus more to taste\n\n1 head cauliflower, cut into bite-size pieces\n\n1 tablespoon butter, plus more for the baking dish\n\n3 cloves garlic, finely chopped\n\n\u00bd teaspoon chile flakes\n\n1 bay leaf\n\n1 tablespoon all-purpose flour\n\n1\u00bd cups milk\n\n6 ounces sharp Cheddar cheese, grated\n\npepper, to taste\n\nadditions\n\n1 tablespoon Dijon mustard\n\n4 scallions, finely chopped\n\nzest of 1 lemon\n\n1 teaspoon smoked paprika\n\n\u00bd teaspoon dried thyme\n\nBreadcrumbs\n\nsprinkling of finely chopped fresh basil\n\n1 Preheat the oven to 400\u00b0F.\n\n2 Bring a large pot of water to a boil over high heat. Add the salt and the cauliflower, then leave it for 4 minutes.\n\n3 Meanwhile, butter a baking dish large enough to comfortably accommodate all the cauliflower. I usually use a pie dish. Drain the cauliflower and add it to the dish.\n\n4 Melt the butter in a medium-size saucepan over medium heat. Add the garlic, chile flakes, and bay leaf and cook for about 1 minute. Add the flour and stir quickly. The flour-butter mixture is called a roux. You want the roux to get just a little brown\u2014this will probably take another minute. Slowly add the milk to the pot, stirring all the while to incorporate the roux and make a creamy sauce.\n\n5 Continue cooking the sauce, stirring occasionally, until it just comes to a boil, about 5 to 7 minutes. Once a couple of bubbles appear, turn off the heat and stir the cheese into the sauce. Include any additions at this point (except breadcrumbs). Taste the sauce and add salt and pepper as needed. Remove the bay leaf. The sauce should be creamy, smooth, and savory.\n\n6 Pour the sauce over the cauliflower, sprinkling with breadcrumbs if desired. Place the dish in the oven and bake until the top is brown and bubbly, about 40 minutes.\n\nSavory Summer Cobbler\n\n$2 \/ serving\n\n$8 total\n\nCelebrate summer's most ubiquitous vegetables\u2014tomatoes and zucchini\u2014with a crunchy, peppery, Southern biscuit topping. For a variation, swap the zucchini for eggplant. Chop the eggplant into bite-size pieces, salt them, and set them aside for 30 minutes before using them in Step 2 as you would with the zucchini. serves 4\n\n1 tablespoon olive oil, plus more for the pan\n\n3 or 4 medium-size zucchini or summer squash, chopped into bite-size pieces\n\n3 or 4 large tomatoes, canned or fresh, chopped into bite-size pieces (see box)\n\n3 cloves garlic, finely chopped\n\n4 scallions, finely chopped\n\nzest of 1 lemon\n\n\u00bc cup fresh basil (optional)\n\nsalt and pepper, to taste\n\ntopping\n\n\u00bd cup (1 stick) unsalted butter\n\n1\u00bd cups all-purpose or whole-wheat flour\n\n\u00bd cup cornmeal\n\n1 tablespoon baking powder\n\n\u00bd teaspoon salt\n\n1 teaspoon black pepper\n\n1 teaspoon smoked paprika\n\n\u00bd cup grated sharp Cheddar cheese, plus more for sprinkling\n\n1 cup milk\n\nsprinkling of fresh chopped herbs or scallions\n\n1 Put the butter for the topping in the freezer for 30 minutes. Preheat the oven to 425\u00b0F.\n\n2 Lightly oil an 8- by 10-inch baking dish (or any baking dish that will accommodate the vegetables) and pile in the zucchini, tomatoes, garlic, scallions, lemon zest, and basil, if using. Pour the olive oil over the top, scatter a generous amount of salt and pepper over everything, and mix it up with your hands. Bake the vegetables for 25 minutes while you prepare the biscuit topping.\n\n3 Combine the flour, cornmeal, baking powder, salt, pepper, paprika, and cheese in a bowl.\n\n4 Once the butter is frozen, use a box grater to flake it into the flour mixture. Gently massage the butter into the flour with your fingers until the mixture is crumbly but still clumpy. Add the milk and quickly bring the dough together. Don't knead it: Lumpiness is fine and results in a flaky topping. Put it in the fridge until the vegetables come out of the oven.\n\n5 Once the vegetable mixture has cooked for 25 minutes, remove it from the oven and quickly top it with small clumps of biscuit dough. The vegetables should still be visible in some areas.\n\n6 Bake until the vegetables are bubbly and the topping is lightly browned, 20 to 25 minutes. Top with some more Cheddar and some chopped herbs or scallions.\n\nIf you have very large and juicy tomatoes, you might want to remove some of the seeds and juice so that the final dish is less watery. If a little juice doesn't bother you, just leave them as is.\n\nBarley Risotto with Peas\n\n$2 \/ serving\n\n$6 total\n\nBarley is sadly underused\u2014other than in the odd soup, it rarely makes an appearance. What a shame! It has such a chewy, satisfying texture and nutty flavor. In this play on risotto, barley takes the place of Arborio rice for a dish that is less creamy, but more hearty and requires much less stirring. The pops of chewy barley and peas go well together, but as with regular risotto, you can use any vegetable\u2014just adjust the cooking time depending on what you choose. For a more traditional risotto flavor, substitute Romano cheese for the ricotta. serves 3\n\n1 cup pearl barley\n\n5 cups broth (see box)\n\n1 tablespoon butter\n\n1 onion, chopped\n\n3 cloves garlic, finely chopped\n\nzest and juice of 1 lemon\n\n2 cups frozen peas\n\n\u00bd cup Ricotta\n\nsalt and pepper, to taste\n\n2 slices bacon, chopped (optional\u2014see box)\n\nUse homemade broth if possible. I like vegetable, but chicken is fine. Beef or fish might be overwhelming, but could work if you use different vegetables. Even a bouillon cube dissolved in water is fine. Just don't buy boxed broth\u2014it's a total rip-off.\n\n1 Preheat the oven to 350\u00b0F.\n\n2 Pour the barley onto a rimmed baking sheet, spreading it into an even layer. Place it in the oven and bake until the barley is golden brown, 10 minutes. If you're short on time, skip this step, but you'll lose out on the toasty flavor.\n\n3 Place a small pot over low heat and add the broth. It just needs to heat up and stay warm.\n\n4 Melt the butter in a large, heavy-bottomed pan over medium heat. Add the onion and cook until it becomes translucent, about 3 minutes. Add the garlic and cook for another minute.\n\n5 Add the toasted barley and lemon zest, then stir to coat with the butter and onion. Add a ladleful (about \u00bd cup) of broth and stir. Cook for about 30 minutes, stirring occasionally and adding another ladleful of broth whenever the barley looks like it needs it. Reduce the heat if you notice the broth disappearing quickly.\n\n6 At the 20-minute mark you should have used up about 4 cups of broth. Add the frozen peas and another \u00bd cup broth. Stir until the broth is absorbed. Try a piece of barley to see whether it is fully cooked. There should be no hard center and the barley should be soft, but still chewy and whole. If the barley is not quite cooked, add the remaining \u00bd cup broth, stir, and keep cooking. Once it's ready, add the lemon juice and ricotta and stir. Taste and add salt and pepper as needed. You should be generous with the pepper, but the salt will depend on the saltiness of your broth, so be mindful.\n\nIf you want to use bacon, add it in Step 4 instead of the butter. Let the bacon get crispy and release its fat. Continue with Step 4.\n\nVegetable Jambalaya\n\n$0.65 \/ serving\n\n$3.90 total\n\nI don't make jambalaya exactly the way they do down South, but this vegetable-heavy version is faster and just as good\u2014a great, throw-everything-in-the-pot kind of meal. It's spicy, savory, and deeply satisfying. The leftovers are great for burritos or warmed up with a fried egg on top. serves 6\n\n2 tablespoons vegetable oil or butter\n\n1 medium-size onion, chopped\n\n1 green bell pepper, stemmed, seeded, and chopped\n\n3 stalks of celery, chopped\n\n3 cloves garlic, finely chopped\n\n\u00bd small green chile, finely chopped\n\n2 large tomatoes, chopped\n\n2 bay leaves\n\n1 teaspoon paprika\n\n1 teaspoon garlic powder\n\n1 teaspoon cayenne pepper\n\n\u00bd teaspoon dried thyme\n\n\u00bd teaspoon dried oregano\n\n1 teaspoon Worcestershire sauce or soy sauce\n\n\u00be cup long-grain rice\n\n3 cups vegetable or chicken broth\n\nsalt and pepper, to taste\n\nadditions\n\nslices of fried sausage\n\nshrimp\n\nleftover meat, tofu, or beans\n\n1 Place a large, heavy-bottomed pot over medium-high heat and add the oil. After it gets hot, add the onion, bell pepper, and celery and cook for about 5 minutes, until they become translucent but not brown.\n\n2 Add the garlic, chile, tomatoes, bay leaves, paprika, garlic powder, cayenne, thyme, oregano, salt, pepper, and Worcestershire sauce. Let everything cook until some of the tomato juice releases, about 1 minute.\n\n3 Add the rice and slowly pour in the broth. Lower the heat to medium and let the dish cook until the rice absorbs all the liquid, 20 to 25 minutes. If you're using any of the additions, throw them in to cook with the rice after 15 minutes have passed.\n\n4 Taste and adjust the salt, pepper, and any other spices.\n\nSpicy, Crunchy, Creamy Polenta\n\n$1.75 \/ serving\n\n$3.50 total\n\nPolenta + vegetable + egg = satisfying and delicious. You can also add a can of corn to the polenta for bursts of flavor. Or add frozen peas, scallions, olives, or (my favorite) green chiles to do something a little different. Or skip the Romano cheese and add \u00bc cup of grated Cheddar for maximum cheese factor. serves 2\n\n\u00bd teaspoon salt, plus more to taste\n\n\u00bd cup polenta or cornmeal\n\n4 cups fresh spinach or 1 cup thawed frozen spinach\n\n3 cloves garlic\n\n1 anchovy (optional)\n\n1 tablespoon olive oil or butter\n\n\u00bd teaspoon chile flakes or 1 chopped fresh chile\n\n2 eggs\n\nsprinkling of freshly grated Romano or Parmesan cheese\n\npepper, to taste\n\n1 Add 2 cups of water to a medium-size pot and bring it to a boil over medium-high heat. Add the salt, then turn the heat down to low and slowly pour in the polenta, stirring briskly with a wooden spoon. Stirring while pouring is crucial to make creamy, lump-free polenta. Once it's smooth and thick, leave the spoon in the pot and place a lid on it, slightly askew, so that steam can escape.\n\n2 Let the polenta cook while you prepare the rest of the meal, checking in occasionally to give it a stir. The total cooking time should be 25 to 30 minutes, but if you're in a rush, you can eat it after 15.\n\n3 Meanwhile, roughly chop the spinach. Finely chop the garlic and anchovy, if using, and set aside.\n\n4 Place a pan over medium heat and add half the olive oil. Let the pan heat up until it sizzles when you flick it with water. Add the garlic, anchovy, and chile flakes. Let them cook until you can smell them, about 1 minute. Add the spinach and toss it around with tongs, or just swirl the pan to coat the spinach with the garlic mixture. Let everything cook until the spinach is wilted, 3 to 5 minutes. Turn off the heat and transfer the mixture to a bowl to wait for the polenta and eggs.\n\n5 When the polenta is about 2 minutes from being done, start the eggs. Carefully wipe off the pan you just used, and put it back over medium heat. Add the remaining olive oil. When the oil is hot, crack the eggs into the pan and cover with a lid to steam them, 1 to 2 minutes. You'll have sunny-side-up eggs with fully cooked whites.\n\n6 Scoop the polenta into two bowls. Add some Romano and lots of salt and pepper. Layer the spinach mixture over the polenta.\n\n7 Once the whites have cooked, remove the eggs from the pan with a spatula and lay them over the spinach. Top with another sprinkling of cheese and a little more salt and pepper.\n\nTofu Hot Pot\n\n$1.80 \/ serving\n\n$7.20 total\n\nI got really excited when my friend Iva asked for a recipe that featured the Chinese flavors she grew up with. After all, Chinese cooking depends on the same general principles as Good and Cheap: Build bright flavors from key ingredients, and use lots of veggies with just a little meat or fish. The ginger-garlic broth in this hot pot is spectacular! The effect of a small amount of toasted sesame oil is remarkable\u2014an investment, but a transformative flavor. Use whatever vegetables you have around, but mushrooms help create an earthy broth. serves 4\n\n1 tablespoon finely grated ginger (see box)\n\n4 cloves garlic, finely grated\n\n\u00bd pound mushrooms, chopped\n\n1 teaspoon chile paste\n\n2 tablespoons soy sauce\n\n2 teaspoons toasted sesame oil\n\n1 pound firm tofu\n\n4 medium-size carrots, chopped\n\n4 scallions, white and green parts, separated and chopped\n\n8 ounces dried spaghetti, soba, or any Asian noodles\n\nhandful of bean sprouts (optional)\n\nadditions\n\n1 pound chicken, pork, or beef instead of tofu\n\nhandful of peanuts, chopped\n\ncabbage\n\nchile peppers, finely chopped\n\nsprinkling of chopped fresh cilantro\n\nkimchi, for topping\n\n1 daikon radish, sliced, for topping\n\n1 Place the grated ginger and garlic in a pot over medium heat. A few seconds later, once you start to smell the garlic, pour in 8 cups of water. Bring to a boil, then decrease the heat to low. Add the mushrooms, chile paste, soy sauce, and toasted sesame oil. Place a lid on the pot and let simmer for 20 minutes.\n\n2 Cut the tofu into 4 slices, then cut each slice into 8 squares. (Or just chop it up however you like.)\n\n3 Add the tofu, carrots, and the white parts of the scallions to the broth. Cook until the carrots are tender, about 10 minutes more.\n\n4 Add the noodles and boil until they soften, usually just a few minutes, although it depends on the type of noodle. Check the package directions for specific cooking times.\n\n5 Taste the broth. If it isn't salty enough, splash in more soy sauce. Adjust the sesame oil and chile paste to your taste as well.\n\n6 Ladle the soup into bowls. For a little crunch, top with the bean sprouts, if using, and the green parts of the scallions.\n\nWhen you buy ginger, just store it in the freezer. It's much easier to grate when frozen! You don't need to peel it\u2014just grate and the skin will flake off. (It'll last for a couple of months.)\n\nIf you have leftovers, you'll find you like this soup even more the next day. Overnight, the flavors will infuse into the tofu, as well as combining with each other. You might want to store the noodles separately, though, because otherwise they'll get mushy.\n\nDeconstructed Cabbage Rolls\n\n$1.50 \/ serving\n\n$9.00 total\n\nCasseroles are a great way to stretch your cooking-without-a-recipe muscles. As one reader, Carolie, reminded me, they require little prep time, yield many meals, and the leftovers will keep nicely in the fridge or freezer. So here's my adaptation of one of Carolie's favorite casseroles, itself a play on cabbage rolls, a traditional Eastern European dish that is delicious but labor-intensive. This version is a good way to use up leftover rice or grains and lentils, including leftover Rainbow Rice. For the sausage, I use fresh chorizo because it's easy to find in my neighborhood and I love the spicy, smoky flavor, but you should use whatever you like. serves 6\n\n1 tablespoon butter\n\n1 fresh sausage, about 4 ounces\n\n1 onion, chopped\n\n4 cloves garlic, finely chopped\n\n1 small or \u00bd large cabbage, cored and chopped\n\nsalt and pepper, to taste\n\n3 cups cooked rice\n\n4 cups cooked lentils\n\n3\u00bd cups pureed canned tomatoes or Best Tomato Sauce\n\nadditions\n\nBreadcrumbs, for topping\n\nolives\n\npeas or corn\n\ncheese\n\nany spice combination\n\nvariations\n\nground beef, turkey, or pork instead of lentils and sausage\n\nSwiss chard or collards instead of cabbage\n\n1 Preheat the oven to 350\u00b0F. Lightly oil a large casserole dish.\n\n2 Melt the butter in a large pan over medium heat. Slide the casing off the sausage and crumble the raw meat into the pan. Saut\u00e9 the meat until it's no longer pink, about 5 minutes, then transfer to a large bowl.\n\n3 Add the onion and garlic to the pan with the sausage drippings and saut\u00e9. Once the onion turns translucent, about 3 minutes, add the cabbage and saut\u00e9 until it's tender enough to jab easily with a fork, 5 to 7 minutes. Season generously with salt and pepper.\n\n4 While the cabbage cooks, mix the rice and lentils with the sausage in the bowl. Add salt, pepper, and any other spices or additions you'd like. Make sure you taste the mixture as you season it. If both parts of the casserole are tasty, you'll end up with a delicious meal. If they aren't seasoned well, it'll be bland.\n\n5 Spread half of the lentil-rice-sausage mixture in an even layer in the casserole dish. Next, spread half of the cabbage mixture on top. Then, as evenly as possible, pour half of the pureed tomatoes over everything. Repeat the layers and sprinkle with salt and pepper. If adding breadcrumbs, sprinkle over the top.\n\n6 Bake until the casserole is hot and bubbly, about 30 minutes.\n\nmethod\n\nRoasted Vegetables\n\n**When the weather turns cool, I want to eat warm, flavorful food.** Roasting is easy, it warms up the kitchen, and it makes the house smell like the holidays. If you're uncertain how to prepare a new vegetable, you usually can't go wrong with roasting\u2014most things end up sweeter, with nice crunchy bits. If you roast a bunch of vegetables at the beginning of the week, you can eat them throughout the week in various ways: with eggs at breakfast, folded into an omelet, as a side dish, in a taco or sandwich, on toast, or with any grain.\n\nolive oil or butter\n\nsalt and pepper, to taste\n\nroots\n\npotatoes, sweet potatoes, beets, turnips, onions, parsnips, carrots, sunchokes, kohlrabi, fennel bulbs\n\nnon-roots\n\nbell peppers, winter squash, broccoli, Brussels sprouts, cauliflower, asparagus, eggplant\n\nadditions\n\nwhole, unpeeled garlic cloves\n\nlemon slices or lemon zest\n\nanything you would pair with roast chicken\n\ntough herbs like sage, oregano, thyme, or bay leaves\n\nany spice combination\n\nfavorite sauce, a soft cheese, or mayonnaise, for serving\n\n1 **Preheat the oven to 400\u00b0F.**\n\n2 **Clean your vegetables.** Generally, I prefer to leave the skin on. Skin tastes nice and gets crispy, there's a lot of nutrition in the skin, and peeling is fussy! Just be sure to wash the vegetables thoroughly.\n\n3 **Chop them up.** Many vegetables are nice roasted whole, like new potatoes or little sunchokes or turnips\u2014they will be crispy and salty on the outside and bursting with fluffy, starchy goodness inside. However, the general rule is that the smaller you chop things, the faster they cook, so try to keep everything about the same size.\n\n4 **Dump your vegetables into a roasting pan**. Drizzle everything with olive oil or melted butter\u2014about 2 tablespoons per standard-size roasting pan. Season generously with salt and pepper and add any other additions from the list. Use your hands to coat the vegetables thoroughly with the oil and spices.\n\n5 **Pop the pan in the oven.** Root vegetables generally need to bake for at least 1 hour or longer, but check on them after 30 minutes. Non-roots need only 25 to 30 minutes, so check on those earlier. Poke them with a knife to test their doneness. If the knife meets no resistance, they're finished; if not, let them cook longer (you don't want undercooked root vegetables in particular\u2014they're awful). Don't worry about leaving them in too long. Unlike vegetables overcooked through boiling or steaming, overcooked roasted vegetables may dry out a bit, but they still retain their shape and flavor.\n\n6 After you pull the vegetables out of the oven, **push them around with a spatula to free them from the pan.** Remove any garlic cloves and smash them into a fine paste (remove the skins at this point), then put the garlic back in the pan and mix together. Squeeze the juice out of any lemons and discard the woody bits of any cooked herbs.\n\n7 **Add a little more butter, a bit of a favorite sauce, or a little soft cheese or mayonnaise, and serve.**\n\nChana Masala\n\n$1.50 \/ serving\n\n$3 total\n\nThis Indian chickpea dish is a beloved staple in my home. If you don't have cooked chickpeas, you can use canned, but it will cost about $1 more. For a full meal, serve the chana masala over rice or with Roti. serves 2\n\n1 tablespoon ground coriander\n\n1 teaspoon ground turmeric\n\n\u00bc teaspoon cayenne powder\n\n\u00bd teaspoon garam masala\n\n1 teaspoon smoked paprika (optional)\n\n\u00bd teaspoon salt, plus more to taste\n\n\u00bd tablespoon ghee (see box) or \u00bd tablespoon butter plus a splash of olive oil\n\n1 teaspoon cumin seeds\n\n1 small onion, chopped\n\n3 cloves garlic, finely chopped\n\n1 teaspoon grated ginger\n\n\u00bd jalape\u00f1o pepper, finely chopped (remove seeds for less heat)\n\n1 cup pureed canned tomatoes (see box)\n\n2\u00bd cups cooked chickpeas, drained\n\ngarnishes\n\nchopped fresh cilantro\n\nRaita or yogurt\n\n1 Combine the coriander, turmeric, cayenne, garam masala, smoked paprika, if using, and salt in a small bowl.\n\n2 Melt the ghee in a small saucepan over medium-low heat. Once it begins to sizzle, add the cumin seeds and stir for about 5 seconds until you can smell them. Add the onion and saut\u00e9 until it's a little soft, 2 to 3 minutes. Add the garlic and cook for 2 minutes. Add the ginger and jalape\u00f1o and cook for 1 minute longer. Add the spice mixture you made in Step 1, then the pureed tomatoes. Mix, then put a lid on the pan and let everything cook down, 5 to 10 minutes.\n\n3 Once the tomato has reduced and the ghee starts to separate from the sauce, add the chickpeas and \u00bd cup of water. Stir, bring it to a boil, and then decrease the heat to a simmer. Cook for 10 minutes, and then squish a few chickpeas with the back of a spoon to thicken the sauce before serving. Garnish with cilantro and Raita.\n\nGHEE, a traditional staple in Indian cooking, is just butter with the milk solids removed. It can withstand higher temperatures than butter without burning. You can make it at home by melting butter and letting the white milk solids rise to the top. Scoop them out and discard them. The leftover golden liquid is ghee. Store it in the fridge.\n\nBlack-Eyed Peas and Collards\n\n$1.25 \/ serving\n\n$5 total\n\nThis is similar to the Southern classic Hoppin' John, but streamlined into a one-pot meal, where you cook the collards with the beans instead of on their own. If you have them, you can add more vegetables to the base along with the onion\u2014celery, carrot, bell pepper, and some canned tomatoes would all be great in this. If you want to skip the bacon, just add smoked paprika to replace the smoky flavor. This dish pairs well with rice, any other grain, or with some toast or flatbread. serves 4\n\n1 cup dried black-eyed peas\n\n1 tablespoon butter\n\n1 large onion, finely chopped\n\n3 cloves garlic, finely chopped\n\n3 strips bacon, cut into small pieces\n\n1 bay leaf\n\n1 large bunch collard greens\n\n1 teaspoon salt, plus more to taste\n\npepper, to taste\n\n1 Place the black-eyed peas and 4 cups of water in a bowl and soak overnight.\n\n2 Melt the butter in a large saucepan over medium heat. Add the onion, garlic, bacon, and bay leaf. Cover the pan with a lid and leave it for 2 minutes. Stir occasionally and cook until the onion is translucent and the bacon is starting to crisp, about 5 minutes.\n\n3 Drain the black-eyed peas and pour them into the saucepan. Cover them with water and turn the heat down to medium-low. Cook for 30 minutes to 2 hours. The cooking time will depend on how old the peas are, which is difficult to predict. The peas are done when you can easily squish them on the countertop with the back of a spoon. Check on them every half hour or so, and if water boils off, add more water (hot, preferably) to cover them.\n\n4 While the peas cook, line up several leaves of collard greens on a cutting board and slice the tough central stem away from the leaves. Discard the stems. Thoroughly wash the collards and chop them into bite-size pieces. Alternatively, use your hands to tear the collards into small pieces.\n\n5 Once the peas are cooked, add the collards to the pot and put the lid back on. Add the salt and some freshly ground pepper, then stir. Taste the liquid and peas and add more salt as needed. Cover the pan with a lid and leave until the collards are tender, 10 to 15 minutes. Remove from the heat and serve.\n\nVegetable Quiche, Hold the Crust\n\n$1.50 \/ serving\n\n$6 total\n\nAs much as I love this quiche hot, I like it even better cold out of the fridge the next day. It makes a great fast breakfast or lunch (paired with a side salad). The quiche in the picture uses broccoli, but you can make it with pretty much any kind of vegetable. Some of my favorites are roasted green chiles and Cheddar, winter squash with goat cheese, zucchini and tomato, or spinach and olive. Spreading out onions on the bottom of the quiche adds a crust-like layer and a bit of crunch. serves 4\n\n1 tablespoon butter\n\n1 large onion, sliced into half-moons\n\n1 teaspoon salt, plus more to taste\n\n\u00bd teaspoon pepper, plus more to taste\n\n3 to 4 cups chopped vegetables (see box)\n\n8 eggs\n\n1 cup milk\n\n1 cup grated Cheddar or other cheese\n\n1 Preheat the oven to 400\u00b0F.\n\n2 Melt the butter in a cast-iron or ovenproof skillet over medium heat. (If your skillet isn't ovenproof, transfer everything to a pie plate in Step 3 to bake it.) Add the onion slices and sprinkle a bit of salt and pepper over them. Cook the onions until they are golden brown and starting to caramelize, about 10 minutes.\n\n3 Remove the pan from the heat and spread the onions evenly across the bottom. Spread the vegetables evenly over the onions. The dish or pan should look fairly full.\n\n4 In a bowl, use a fork to beat the eggs lightly with the milk, cheese, 1 teaspoon of salt, and \u00bd teaspoon of pepper, just enough to break up the yolks and whites. This is a savory custard mixture. Pour the custard over the vegetables and onions and enjoy watching it fill in all the open spaces.\n\n5 Transfer the quiche to the oven and bake for 1 hour. Once the surface is lightly brown all the way across, it's fully cooked.\n\n6 Let the quiche cool for about 20 minutes, then slice into wedges.\n\nFor hardier vegetables like broccoli, cauliflower, or winter squash, I suggest steaming or cooking them before adding them to the quiche to ensure they'll be fully cooked. For tomatoes, zucchini, spinach, or any other quick-cooking vegetable, just use them fresh.\n\nBroccoli, Egg, and Cheddar Empanadas\n\n$0.60 \/ empanada\n\n$7.20 total\n\nEvery culture has some version of dough stuffed with tasty filling\u2014it's a perfect combination. So empanadas, dumplings, pierogi, and calzones in one book isn't that crazy\u2014right? My friend Barb felt the same way, so I created this recipe for her. The cornmeal isn't traditional in empanadas\u2014I just like the extra crunch it gives. You can substitute more flour for the cornmeal if you like. makes 12 empanadas\n\noil or butter, for the baking sheet\n\ndough\n\n\u00bc cup (\u00bd stick) butter\n\n2 cups all-purpose or whole-wheat flour, plus more for rolling the dough\n\n\u00bd cup cornmeal\n\n\u00bd teaspoon salt\n\n1 egg\n\n\u00bd cup cold water\n\nfilling\n\n4 cups chopped broccoli, florets and stems\n\n8 eggs\n\n2 cloves garlic, finely chopped\n\n\u00bd teaspoon chile flakes\n\nsalt and pepper, to taste\n\n1 cup grated sharp Cheddar cheese\n\nIf you own a pastry brush, an egg wash will make the empanadas shinier. Since it only affects appearance, this step is optional. To make the egg wash, beat an egg with a fork in a small bowl, then brush the tops of the empanadas.\n\n1 Preheat the oven to 400\u00b0F. Lightly oil or butter 2 baking sheets.\n\n2 Make the dough: Place the \u00bc cup butter in the freezer for 10 minutes. Meanwhile, mix the flour, cornmeal, and salt in a large bowl. Grate the cold butter directly into the flour mixture. Use clean hands to squish the butter gently into the flour until it looks like breadcrumbs.\n\n3 Make a crater in the flour mixture. Crack 1 egg into it and pour in the cold water. Mix with your hands until the dough comes together into a smooth ball. If you're using whole-wheat flour and the dough seems dry, add another tablespoon of water. Wrap the ball of dough in plastic or cover it with a moist towel.\n\n4 Make the filling: Place a large pan over medium heat and add the broccoli and 1 cup water. Cover it with a lid and cook until the water is gone and the broccoli is tender, 5 to 7 minutes.\n\n5 Meanwhile, crack the 8 eggs into a bowl. Add the garlic, chile flakes, salt, and pepper, and beat lightly to combine.\n\n6 Once the broccoli is tender, pour the eggs into the pan with the broccoli and stir until the eggs are just scrambled, about 2 minutes. Turn off the heat, add the cheese, and stir again.\n\n7 Dust a clean countertop lightly with flour. Unwrap the dough and divide it into 12 equal pieces. Roll each piece into a ball with your hands, then use a rolling pin to flatten each ball into a thin circle, a little bigger than a coaster. Place some filling\u2014about a heaping \u2153 cup\u2014on one side of the circle, then fold over the other side to form a half-moon. Pinch the edges together and place the empanada on the prepared baking sheet. Repeat!\n\n8 Bake until the empanadas turn golden brown, about 20 minutes. Cool for 10 minutes before serving.\n\nPotato and Kale Rolls with Raita\n\n$0.70 \/ roll\n\n$5.60 total\n\nThese are a great meal to make when you have leftover Roti and Raita. The possibilities for fillings are endless\u2014this quick version with potatoes and greens is tasty and satisfying. serves 4\n\n1 tablespoon ghee or butter (see box)\n\n1 teaspoon cumin seeds\n\n1 small onion, finely chopped\n\n3 cloves garlic, finely chopped\n\n1 tablespoon finely grated ginger\n\n1 teaspoon ground turmeric\n\n1 teaspoon ground coriander\n\n1 teaspoon cayenne pepper\n\n1 teaspoon salt, plus more to taste\n\n2 large or 4 medium-size potatoes, chopped\n\n1 bunch kale or spinach, stems removed, chopped\n\n8 Roti\n\nsprinkling of chopped fresh cilantro\n\nRaita\n\n1 Place a skillet over medium heat and add the ghee. Once it is hot, add the cumin seeds and let them sizzle for 5 seconds before adding the onion. Let the onion cook for 2 minutes, stirring occasionally.\n\n2 In a small bowl, combine the garlic, ginger, turmeric, coriander, cayenne pepper, salt, and 1 tablespoon water.\n\n3 Add the spices to the onion mixture and cook, stirring, for another 2 minutes. It will smell strongly aromatic. This step is important because the spices will toast and release their flavor.\n\n4 Next, add the potatoes and stir them with the onion and spice mixture to coat. Add about a cup of water and cover the pan with a lid. Let the potatoes cook until tender, about 10 minutes, stirring occasionally. Add more water as needed. The water helps everything cook evenly, but you want the final mixture to be dry potatoes with just enough moisture to keep them from sticking. When you add water, be sure to let it cook off.\n\n5 Test the potatoes with a fork: If you can easily pierce them, they're ready. Once they are, add the kale and stir until the kale is wilted, 1 to 2 minutes. Taste and add more salt if needed.\n\n6 To assemble the rolls, scoop \u215b of the mixture into the center of a roti, distributing it in an even line. Roll it up.\n\n7 Serve 2 roti per person with cilantro and a generous dollop of raita, either inside the wrap or on the side.\n\nideas\n\nStuff on Hot Dogs\n\n**Although you might eat hot dogs** with great delight on a sunny day, they don't feel so exciting when they're all you have in the fridge, or all a picky child will eat. But don't get stuck thinking hot dogs are boring. Whether pork, beef, kosher, or veggie, hot dogs are livelier with a generous vegetable topping. Here are some ideas to get you going.\n\n1 Quick Teriyaki Carrots\n\n$0.75 total\n\nThis quick teriyaki sauce is great on all kinds of vegetables. Try it with carrots and then experiment from there.\n\n2 tablespoons soy sauce\n\n1 teaspoon brown sugar\n\n1 clove garlic, grated\n\n2 to 3 carrots, grated\n\n1 Add the soy sauce, brown sugar, and garlic to a hot pan over medium heat. Let it sizzle.\n\n2 Once the sugar is dissolved, toss the carrots in and cook until they absorb the sauce, about 2 minutes.\n\n2 Salt and Vinegar Cucumbers with Dill\n\n$1.20 total\n\nThese tangy cucumbers are like a quick form of pickles. Add a tablespoon of dill or mustard seeds for a more pickley flavor. Store leftovers in a sealed container in the fridge and they'll keep about a week.\n\n1 field cucumber\n\n2 tablespoons vinegar\n\n1 teaspoon salt\n\n1 Thinly slice the cucumber.\n\n2 Scoop the cucumber into a bowl with the vinegar and salt and toss. Marinate for 20 minutes.\n\n3 Mexican Street Corn\n\nSimply cut the corn off the cob and mix the mayo, chili powder, cheese, and lime into the kernels.\n\n4 Wilted Cabbage Salad\n\nChop the cabbage finely so that it can be distributed evenly over your hot dog.\n\n5 Salsa\n\nTry to drain a little bit of the juice so it doesn't make your bun too soggy. Crumble tortilla chips on top for some crunch.\n\n6 Sweet or Savory Pineapple Salad\n\nThis is a classic combo, especially with pork! Chop the pineapple finely so it won't fall off.\n\nPotato Leek Pizzas\n\n$2.25 \/ pizza\n\n$9 total\n\nObviously you should just make all kinds of pizza. Seriously, do it. Make it a Thursday-night tradition and an excuse to use up leftovers. This pizza is a fun variation that confounds expectations\u2014proof that, indeed, anything is good on pizza! makes 4 personal pizzas\n\n2 tablespoons olive oil\n\n1 large russet potato or 3 small potatoes, sliced into thin circles\n\nsalt and pepper, to taste\n\n3 leeks, trimmed, washed, and sliced into circles\n\nall-purpose flour, for shaping the dough\n\n1 recipe Pizza Dough\n\n1 pound fresh mozzarella cheese, shredded\n\n1 Preheat the oven to 500\u00b0F.\n\n2 Place a large pan over medium heat and add 1 tablespoon of the olive oil. Once the oil is hot, add as many potato slices as will fit in the pan, spacing them out to make sure each slice is touching the bottom. (If you slice them thinly enough, they'll turn out almost like little chips.)\n\n3 Let the potatoes cook until they start to crinkle around the edges and turn brown, about 2 minutes. Flip them over and brown the other side, another minute or so, then move them to a bowl. Continue in batches, as needed. Sprinkle with salt and pepper, then (after they cool down!) toss with your hands to make sure they're evenly coated.\n\n4 Heat the remaining tablespoon of oil in the same pan, then throw in the leeks, stirring occasionally until they're soft, about 5 minutes. Toss them in the bowl with the potato slices, add a bit more salt and pepper, and stir.\n\n5 Sprinkle flour on a clean countertop. Divide the pizza dough into 4 equal pieces and place one piece on the countertop. Using your hands or a rolling pin, stretch the dough into crust. I like to make mine really thin and big, but it's up to you how thick to make it.\n\n6 Once the crust is the desired shape and thickness, dust the back of a baking sheet with flour to keep the crust from sticking, then place the crust on the sheet.\n\n7 Layer a quarter of the potato and leek mixture on top of the crust and sprinkle with a quarter of the shredded mozzarella. Bake for 5 to 8 minutes. If it's your first time, simply keep an eye on the oven to see when the pizza's done. The crust should be light brown and the cheese melted. Repeat the process until you've baked all your pizzas. If your oven is big enough, you can, of course, do more than one pizza at a time.\n\nBroccoli Rabe and Mozzarella Calzones\n\n$1.50 \/ calzone\n\n$6 total\n\nCalzones are pizza in a slightly different form\u2014a form that lets you stuff in more filling without weighing down the crust. Broccoli rabe is great, but you can use any bitter green, or even broccoli or cauliflower. You'll love these crusty pockets full of oozy goodness! makes 4 calzones\n\nall-purpose flour or cornmeal, for shaping the dough\n\n1 tablespoon olive oil\n\n1 large bunch broccoli rabe, chopped\n\n4 cloves garlic, finely chopped\n\n1 teaspoon chile flakes\n\n2 anchovy fillets, finely chopped (optional)\n\nsalt and pepper, to taste\n\n1 recipe Pizza Dough\n\n2 cups grated mozzarella cheese\n\nIf you have Italian sausage in your fridge, crumble it into the pan with the broccoli rabe in Step 2. Sausage and broccoli rabe are a classic combination.\n\n1 Preheat the oven to 500\u00b0F (or as hot as your oven gets). Sprinkle a small amount of flour over a baking sheet and set it aside.\n\n2 Place a large pan over medium heat and add the olive oil. Once the oil is hot, add the tough stem ends of the broccoli rabe and cook for 2 minutes. Next, add the rest of the broccoli rabe, including the leafy parts, along with the garlic, chile flakes, and the anchovies, if using. Cook, stirring occasionally, until the stems are tender, about 5 minutes. Add salt and pepper, and set the filling aside.\n\n3 Sprinkle flour on a clean countertop. Divide the pizza dough into 4 equal pieces and place one piece on the countertop. Using your hands or a rolling pin, roll out the dough as you would for pizza, until it is quite thin.\n\n4 Pile a quarter of the broccoli rabe mixture and \u00bd cup of the mozzarella onto one side of the circle, leaving a lip around the edge.\n\n5 Gather up the half of the dough that isn't weighed down with filling and fold it over to create a half-moon shape. Pinch the edges of the dough together. Place the calzone carefully on the prepared baking sheet and repeat Steps 3 to 5 until you have 4 calzones.\n\n6 Bake until the calzones are golden brown on the outside, 6 to 8 minutes. Be careful when you bite into them\u2014they'll be hot!\n\nHalf-Veggie Burgers\n\n$0.90 \/ serving\n\n$7.20 total\n\nWhen a reader named Quinn suggested a recipe that used both lentils and meat, I started thinking about how veggie burgers and beef burgers each have their own strengths. Why not combine the two ideas to create a burger with meaty flavor but the lean protein and low cost of lentils? And so I offer you the half-veggie burger. May it rest a little lighter in your belly.\n\nYou can use almost any vegetable to make these burger patties, except for lettuce and other greens, or super-watery vegetables like tomato or cucumber. Make sure the vegetables are either small to begin with (like corn or peas) or finely chopped so that they cook evenly. I went for a bell pepper this time. Vegetables like potato, squash, or eggplant, which are inedible raw, should be fully cooked before you add them to the patty. serves 8\n\n3 cups cooked lentils or beans\n\n1 cup finely chopped bell pepper or other vegetable\n\n1 pound ground beef or other ground meat\n\n1 egg (optional)\n\nsalt and pepper, to taste\n\n8 buns\n\n1 Roughly mash the lentils with the back of a large spoon.\n\n2 Mix the lentils, bell pepper, and ground beef with your hands in a large bowl. If you're grilling, add an egg to keep the patties from crumbling. Season with salt and pepper and form into 8 patties.\n\n3 Place a large skillet over medium-high heat (or fire up the grill, if you have one), and add the patties. Sear them until they're dark brown on one side, about 5 minutes, then flip 'em and do the same on the other side. If you want cheeseburgers, lay cheese on the patties after flipping them once.\n\n4 Serve on toasted buns with your favorite condiments and fresh vegetables. Burgers are a great place to be adventurous!\n\nIf you won't eat all of the burgers at once, wrap any leftover raw patties in plastic. They will keep in the refrigerator for a few days or in the freezer for up to 2 weeks.\nBig Batch\n\nBest Tomato Sauce\n\n$1 \/ cup\n\n$7 total\n\nThere are many ways to make tomato sauce. I don't find that the more complex recipes taste any better\u2014this one is boldly tomatoey and works on just about anything. It also takes 5 minutes to make. Can't beat that. MAKES 7 CUPS\n\n2 tablespoons olive oil\n\n6 cloves garlic, finely chopped\n\n1 teaspoon chile flakes\n\n2 cans (28 ounces each) tomatoes, crushed or diced\n\nzest of 1 lemon (optional)\n\nsalt and pepper, to taste\n\n1 Add the olive oil to a saucepan over medium heat.\n\n2 Saut\u00e9 the garlic until it smells great and becomes translucent, 1 minute. Add the chile flakes and cook for 30 seconds.\n\n3 Add the cans of tomatoes, mix, and cook until warmed through.\n\n4 Add the lemon zest, if using, then salt and pepper to taste. Because canned tomatoes are often already salted, you may not need to add any.\n\nIf you want a thicker sauce that will stick to pasta better, cook it a little longer to evaporate more of the liquid, 10 to 20 minutes. Use immediately, keep in a jar in the fridge for up to a week, or portion it out into containers and store in the freezer for a month.\n\nChorizo and White Bean Rag\u00f9\n\n$1.25 \/ cup\n\n$7.50 total\n\nAfter my friend Chris told me he loves a good rag\u00f9, I developed a version that is as hearty as a meaty tomato sauce without the cost and heaviness of a traditional rag\u00f9. A batch of this is probably enough for eight people, served with grated Romano or Parmesan cheese over pasta, polenta, or grits. MAKES 6 CUPS\n\n2 tablespoons butter or vegetable oil\n\n2 onions, chopped\n\n6 cloves garlic, finely chopped\n\n2 tablespoons finely chopped jalape\u00f1o (optional)\n\n1 pound fresh chorizo, casing removed (or other fresh sausage)\n\n3 cups canned or fresh tomatoes, pureed\n\n3 cups cooked cannellini, navy, or butter beans\n\nsalt and pepper, to taste\n\n1 Melt the butter in a pan over medium heat, swirling it to coat the pan. Add the chopped onions and cook until they turn translucent, 3 to 4 minutes.\n\n2 Toss in the garlic, jalape\u00f1o (if using), and fresh chorizo, then saut\u00e9 for about a minute. Add the tomatoes and beans, then simmer until the sauce is thick and the sausage is cooked, about 5 minutes. Taste and add salt and pepper as needed.\n\nFreeze this sauce if you don't intend to eat it within a few days. It won't keep very long in the fridge.\n\nDark and Spicy Chili\n\n$1.65 \/ serving\n\n$19.80 total\n\nChili is such a crowd-pleaser. If you don't already have your own award-winning recipe, give this one a try. To stretch this recipe even further, serve it with rice. SERVES 12\n\n2 tablespoons ground cumin\n\n2 tablespoons dried oregano\n\n2 tablespoons ground coriander\n\n1 tablespoon ground cinnamon\n\n2 tablespoons cocoa powder\n\n1 to 4 canned chipotle chiles in adobo, finely chopped\n\n1 pound ground beef or turkey\n\n1 pound Mexican chorizo (fresh, casings removed), or 1 pound more ground beef or turkey\n\n2 medium-size onions, chopped\n\n6 cloves garlic, finely chopped\n\n2 bell peppers, stemmed, seeded, and chopped\n\n2 carrots, chopped\n\n6 cups cooked black beans\n\n2 cans (28 ounces each) diced or crushed tomatoes\n\n1 tablespoon salt, plus more to taste\n\nto serve\n\nchopped scallions\n\nchopped fresh cilantro\n\nsour cream\n\ncheddar cheese\n\n1 In a small bowl, combine the cumin, oregano, coriander, cinnamon, cocoa powder, and chiles, and stir well. If it's your first time making this chili, use one or two chipotles. You can always add more, but you can't take away!\n\n2 Place a large pot over medium heat and add the ground beef and chorizo. Cook the meat, breaking it up and stirring, until it is no longer pink. The fat from the meat should be enough to keep everything from sticking to the pot.\n\n3 Add the spice mixture to the meat and stir until you can smell the spices, about 20 seconds. Add the onions, garlic, peppers, and carrots, and stir. Place a lid on the pot and cook, stirring occasionally, until the onion is translucent, about 10 minutes.\n\n4 Add the black beans, tomatoes, and 4 cups of water, then stir. Bring the mixture to a boil, then turn the heat to low and simmer for 1\u00bd hours with the lid askew to allow steam to escape. Taste and season with salt and pepper.\n\n5 Serve in big bowls topped with scallions and cilantro, if using, or freeze in small portions for later.\n\nTo make vegetarian chili, use a bit of oil to brown the onions and substitute more beans and veggies for the meat. Most of the flavor comes from the spices and vegetables, so you won't miss much.\n\nYou can use \u00bd cup chili powder instead of the cumin, oregano, coriander, and chipotles in the spice mixture\u2014just add the cinnamon and cocoa for a hint of sweetness.\n\nTo make in a slow cooker, follow the instructions up to Step 3, then transfer the mixture to the slow cooker, and add the rest of the ingredients. Cook on low for 8 to 10 hours.\n\nSpicy Pulled Pork\n\n$1.40 \/ serving\n\n$14 total\n\nPulled pork is incredibly flavorful, rich, spicy, and remarkably versatile. Although it seems expensive, it's quite a bargain when you look at the price per serving. As with many special meals, this one takes quite a long time to prepare. Most of the time, however, is just spent waiting for it to cook \"low and slow.\"\n\nMy favorite way to serve pulled pork is over squishy hamburger buns or in tacos with crunchy vegetables. Pulled pork sandwiches are great with cabbage slaw, so try using the Wilted Cabbage Salad. Serve with a simple green salad, corn on the cob, steamed green beans, or any other summery vegetables. SERVES 10\n\n\u2153 cup brown sugar\n\n2 tablespoons ground coffee\n\n2 tablespoons kosher salt\n\n4 teaspoons smoked paprika\n\n3 teaspoons sweet paprika\n\n2 teaspoons ground cumin\n\n1 teaspoon ground coriander\n\n1 teaspoon ground cloves\n\n1 teaspoon garlic powder\n\n1 teaspoon black pepper\n\n1 pork shoulder (about 5 pounds)\n\n1 Make a dry rub by mixing all of the ingredients except the pork in a small bowl.\n\n2 Apply the rub liberally to the pork shoulder, pressing it gently into the meat until you've covered every side. Set any leftover rub aside for later.\n\n3 Place the pork shoulder in a large pot with a tight-fitting lid. Leave it in the fridge for 2 hours or overnight to let the flavors seep in.\n\n4 Preheat the oven to 200\u00b0F.\n\n5 Pour enough water into the pot to cover the bottom. Put the lid on and place the pot in the oven for 10 to 12 hours. The rule of thumb is 1\u00bd to 2 hours per pound of pork, but I find it usually takes a little longer than that. You want the internal temperature to reach 200\u00b0F.\n\nIf you don't have a meat thermometer, figuring out the internal temperature is trickier, but you can test it by feel. Poke the meat with a finger: When it's so soft that it falls apart on its own, take it out of the oven. It's hard to overcook it at such a low temperature, so don't be too concerned about that.\n\n6 Remove the meat from the juices and gently tear the pork apart with two forks or your hands. Discard any larger bits of fat. If any section is hard to tear apart, the meat hasn't cooked enough. If you have the time to spare, put it back in the oven for another couple of hours.\n\n7 Once you've pulled all of the pork, mix in any remaining rub and transfer it to a casserole dish or a large plate. If you aren't eating the meat right away, stash it in the fridge, covered, for 3 to 4 days.\n\nto make a sauce from the pot full of drippings, bring them to a gentle boil in a pot over medium-high heat and let the juices thicken for 20 to 30 minutes. The fat will rise to the top: It's the clear, thick layer, not the thin, red liquid below. Skim off as much of the fat as possible. Mix a few spoonfuls of the pan drippings with the pork before serving.\n\nideas\n\nHummus\n\n$0.40 \/ serving\n\n$1.60 total\n\n**Hummus is my go-to snack when hunger hits midafternoon.** I often double or triple this recipe and freeze it. A food processor makes things easier, but without one all is not lost. After all, hummus was invented long before food processors.\n\nIf you have dried chickpeas, cook them using the instructions. Canned chickpeas will increase the cost of the recipes. (I also think the flavor of dried beans is better.)\n\nUnless you are extremely thorough and patient with your handmade hummus, you will have a chunkier texture than the super-smooth and creamy store-bought hummus. It will still taste great, though!\n\nBasic Hummus\n\nserves 4\n\n2 cups cooked chickpeas (see box)\n\n1 tablespoon tahini\n\n1 tablespoon lemon juice\n\n1 clove garlic, finely chopped\n\n1 tablespoon olive oil, plus more for serving\n\nsalt and pepper, to taste\n\n1 _If you are making the hummus by hand_ , warm the chickpeas for about 30 seconds in the microwave.\n\n2 Mash the tahini, lemon juice, garlic, olive oil, salt, and pepper in a bowl.\n\n3 Slowly add \u00bc cup water a bit at a time, mashing as you add it, until the mixture is smooth, creamy, and light, about 5 minutes. Taste it and adjust the seasoning. Add more oil and tahini if you want it richer.\n\n1 _If you are using a food processor_ , add all the ingredients to the processor along with \u215b cup water.\n\n2 Once the mixture is a smooth paste, taste it to check the consistency. For a smoother and lighter hummus, add a bit more water. Taste it and adjust the seasoning. Add more oil and tahini if you want it richer.\n\n1 Roasted Garlic\n\n$0.50 serving \/ $2 total\n\n1 Preheat the oven to 350\u00b0F.\n\n2 Slice the top off of a head of garlic so that you can see the cloves (leave the peel). Drizzle the cloves with olive oil. Wrap in tinfoil and place on a tray in the oven. Roast for 1 hour.\n\n3 Remove the garlic from the oven. When it is cool enough to touch, gently squeeze all but 3 of the garlic cloves into the hummus and mix according to the basic recipe.\n\n4 Finely chop the leftover garlic cloves and sprinkle on top of the hummus with extra olive oil.\n\n2 Lemon\n\n$0.45 serving \/ $1.80 total\n\nReplace the \u00bc cup water with 3 tablespoons lemon juice and 1 tablespoon water. Add the zest of 1 lemon.\n\n3 Chipotle\n\n$0.45 serving \/ $1.80 total\n\nAdd 1 or 2 chipotles in adobo to the hummus. If you're not using a food processor, make sure the chipotle is finely chopped. Mix a bit of adobo sauce with olive oil and drizzle over the top.\n\nideas\n\nDeviled Eggs\n\n$0.15 \/ half egg\n\n$3.60 total\n\n**Deviled eggs are my favorite party food and the perfect recipe to dedicate to my friend Camilla.** At parties, I often eat too much random junk food and end up feeling gross. These eggs are a great antidote: festive and delicious without the empty calories. Although they're a little fussy, they aren't actually difficult to make. Here's the formula: Make a basic deviled egg and add one of the 8 flavors (or create your own!).\n\n12 eggs\n\nsalt and pepper, to taste\n\n2 scallions, finely chopped (optional)\n\ndash of paprika (optional)\n\nHard-boiled eggs are easier to peel if the eggs you boil aren't quite fresh, so try making these with eggs that have been sitting in the fridge a week or two.\n\nBasic Deviled Eggs\n\nMakes 24 half eggs\n\n1 Place a layer of eggs at the bottom of a pot that is large enough to fit them all with a bit of wiggle room. If you can't fit all your eggs, don't stack them\u2014they might crack. Hard-boil them in batches instead.\n\n2 Cover the eggs with cold water. Place the pot over medium heat and bring to a boil. As soon as the water is boiling, turn off the heat and cover the pot with a tight-fitting lid. Set a timer for 10 minutes.\n\n3 When the timer goes off, carefully pour out the hot water and cover the eggs with very cold water. The cold water stops the cooking process so that you don't end up with that slightly icky blue-green skin around your yolk.\n\n4 Peel the eggs. Everyone has his or her own technique, but I like to gently roll each egg across the counter to crack the shell. Roll the egg around until it looks like a cracked desert landscape, then peel it starting from the bottom (where the air pocket is). Once peeled, rinse the egg and set it aside. Repeat until you have peeled all the eggs.\n\n5 Slice each egg in half lengthwise. Pop the yolks out and put them in a medium-size bowl. Don't worry if you leave a little yolk behind. Set the whites aside on a plate.\n\n6 Sprinkle the yolks with salt and pepper, then add the other ingredients of your choice to the bowl. Mash with a fork until you have a relatively smooth paste.\n\n7 Spoon the yolk mixture back into each egg. Pile the filling high! Alternatively, scoop the filling into a plastic sandwich bag. Cut off the corner of the sandwich bag and squeeze the yolk mixture into the whites.\n\n8 Sprinkle with the scallions and some paprika for color, if you have it.\n\n1 Classic\n\n2 tablespoons mustard\n\n2 tablespoons mayonnaise\n\n2 tablespoons water, pickle brine, or lemon juice\n\n2 Chile and Lime\n\n2 tablespoons mayonnaise\n\n2 tablespoons lime juice\n\n1 jalape\u00f1o pepper, finely chopped (remove seeds for less heat)\n\n3 Ramen-Inspired\n\n2 tablespoons mayonnaise\n\n2 tablespoons soy sauce\n\n1 tablespoon rice vinegar\n\nchili sauce, to taste\n\n4 Curried\n\n2 tablespoons mayonnaise\n\n2 tablespoons water\n\n4 teaspoons curry powder, or 1 teaspoon each of turmeric, cayenne, coriander, and cumin\n\n5 Tomato\n\n2 tablespoons mayonnaise\n\n\u00bc cup finely chopped fresh or canned tomatoes or Best Tomato Sauce\n\n6 Chile and Cheese\n\n2 tablespoons mayonnaise\n\n2 tablespoons chopped green chiles\n\n2 tablespoons grated cheese\n\n7 Chorizo\n\n2 tablespoons mayonnaise\n\n2 tablespoons cooked, minced fresh chorizo\n\n1 teaspoon paprika\n\n8 Feta and Dill\n\n2 tablespoons mayonnaise\n\n2 tablespoons crumbled feta\n\n1 tablespoon chopped dill\n\nPierogi\n\n$0.20 \/ pierogi\n\n$14 total\n\nThis recipe is huge and will feed you for days. It takes time and effort, but the results are worth it. The best approach is to invite a couple of friends over for a pierogi-making party. Everyone takes home a bag or two for the freezer, and it's a great time! For the filling, you should play around with some of your favorite things\u2014there aren't many flavors that don't work in potatoes. I usually use several additions and a strong, aged cheddar. MAKES 60 TO 72 PIEROGI\n\ndough\n\n4\u00bd cups all-purpose flour, plus more for shaping the dough\n\n2 teaspoons salt\n\n2 cups yogurt or sour cream\n\n2 eggs\n\nfilling\n\n5 russet potatoes, roughly cubed\n\nsalt and pepper, to taste\n\n1\u00bd cups shredded sharp Cheddar cheese\n\nadditions\n\n2 scallions, chopped\n\n4 cloves roasted garlic\n\n2 tablespoons Dijon mustard\n\n1 teaspoon cayenne pepper\n\n1 teaspoon paprika\n\nto serve\n\n1 tablespoon butter\n\nscallions, chopped\n\nsour cream\n\n1 In a large bowl, mix the flour and salt. Pour in the yogurt, eggs, and 1 tablespoon of water. Mix everything slowly and carefully with clean hands until it comes together into a smooth dough. The dough will be quite sticky. Cover it with a towel or plastic wrap while you make the filling.\n\n2 Put the chopped potatoes in a pot. Cover with water, then add a bit of salt. Cover with a lid and bring to a boil over medium-high heat. Remove the lid and cook the potatoes until tender, about 20 minutes. Test them with a fork. If it goes through easily, they're done.\n\n3 Drain the potatoes and add the shredded cheese, salt, pepper, and any additions you might enjoy.\n\n4 Mash the potatoes with an electric mixer or two forks. Once the filling is ready, gather some friends\u00ad\u00ad\u2014shaping takes time.\n\n5 Flour your countertop liberally. Split the dough in half. Keep one half covered, but place the other half on the floured surface. Use a rolling pin to flatten the dough about \u215b-inch thick. Punch out as many 3-inch dough circles as possible, using a round cookie cutter or a small glass. Squish the scraps into the remaining covered half of the dough.\n\n6 Place about a tablespoon of filling in the center of one circle of dough. Fold the dough over the filling and press the edges to create a dumpling. The stickiness should ensure a tight seal. Lay the pierogi on a floured surface and use a fork to squish the edges together. Keep going until you run out of circles, then repeat with the remaining dough and filling.\n\n7 Once you've formed all your pierogi, bring a pot of water to a boil over high heat. Add 12 pierogi to the water and let them cook until they rise to the surface, about 1 minute. Pull out the boiled pierogi with a spoon, bring the water back to a boil, and repeat with batches of the remaining pierogi.\n\n8 If you're planning to freeze some of the pierogi, let them cool down and then put them in freezer bags with the air squeezed out. I usually do 12 to a bag, but you can portion them out in whatever way suits you. They will keep for at least 6 months.\n\n9 You can eat the pierogi just boiled, but I prefer them fried afterward. Melt the butter in a pan over medium heat, then fry up as many pierogi as you want. (Six per person is plenty.) Flip them every few minutes until they're browned on all sides. Serve with scallions and a dollop of sour cream.\n\nDumplings\n\n$0.12 \/ dumpling\n\n$7.20 total\n\nMy friend Raffaella comes from a huge family and fondly recalls making dumplings with her sisters growing up. (Her brothers only helped eat them.) Dumplings are a great way to use up veggies that aren't fresh anymore. Minced and stuffed inside a dumpling, they come back to life! MAKES 60 DUMPLINGS\n\ndough\n\n4 cups all-purpose flour, plus more for shaping the dough\n\n1 teaspoon salt\n\n2 eggs\n\nveggie filling\n\n3 cups finely chopped broccoli\n\n2 cups grated carrot\n\n8 ounces firm tofu, crumbled\n\n2 tablespoons soy sauce\n\n1 teaspoon toasted sesame oil\n\n2 scallions, chopped\n\n2 eggs\n\npork filling\n\n1 pound ground pork or sausage, cooked or raw\n\n3 cups finely chopped collards, chard, spinach, or scallions\n\n2 tablespoons soy sauce\n\n1 teaspoon toasted sesame oil\n\n2 scallions, chopped\n\n2 eggs\n\n1 Mix the flour and salt in a large bowl. Make a crater in the middle, crack in the eggs, and add 1 cup of water. Use one hand like a shovel to mix the dough into a shaggy mass. If it seems too dry, add a few drops of water. Knead the dough for a minute, then cover it with plastic wrap or a damp towel and let it rest for 30 minutes to 2 hours.\n\n2 In a large bowl, mix your desired filling ingredients.\n\n3 Once the dough has rested, split it into 4 chunks. Dust your countertop with flour, then roll the first piece of dough into a log. Cover the other pieces so they don't dry out.\n\n4 Cut the log into 15 equal slices, then form one of the slices into a flat disk with your hands. With a rolling pin, flatten the disk into an almost paper-thin circle about the size of a drink coaster.\n\n5 Place a heaping tablespoon of filling in the center of the dough. Lift all the edges to meet in the middle, then pinch it closed like a little parcel. If the dough won't stick to itself, wet your fingertips and dab the edges.\n\n6 Repeat until you run out of either filling or dough. Ask for help from family or friends\u2014one person can roll while the others fill and cook.\n\n7 Now, a tough decision: Steam, fry, or boil?\n\n_To steam them_ , spread a small amount of oil in a large pan. Fill the pan with dumplings\u2014as many as you can fit without them sticking to each other. Turn the heat to medium and let them sizzle for a minute. Once the dough has absorbed most of the oil, add about \u00bd cup of water, then quickly cover with a lid. The water will splatter and sizzle. Leave the lid on for about a minute to steam the dumplings, then turn the heat to low and remove the lid. Cook until the water evaporates, then turn off the heat. Your dumplings should be steamed on top with crispy, brown bottoms.\n\n_To pan-fry them_ , follow the technique above, but use more oil. Skip the water and the lid entirely. Just keep frying! Once the dumplings are golden on one side, flip them to fry on the other side. This method is awkward with parcel-style dumplings but works well for other shapes (such as a pierogi shape), so plan accordingly.\n\n_To boil them,_ drop the dumplings into a pot of boiling water. When they rise to the top, they're ready to eat, usually in 1 or 2 minutes.\nPantry\n\nPeanut Sauce\n\n$3 \/ cup\n\n$3 total\n\nThis is my go-to dipping sauce for everything from veggies (especially the cornmeal-crusted) to flatbread, to shrimp. But it's versatile enough to make a great marinade or coating for chicken or fish. My fridge is rarely without it. Try it, you'll see. makes 1 cup\n\n1 jalape\u00f1o pepper or other chile (remove seeds for less heat), or 2 tablespoons chile paste\n\n3 cloves garlic\n\n1 shallot or small onion\n\n1 teaspoon vegetable oil\n\n\u00bd to 1 cup coconut milk\n\n\u00bd cup sugar-free peanut butter\n\n1 tablespoon soy sauce\n\nadditions\n\n1 teaspoon ground turmeric\n\n1 tablespoon brown sugar\n\n\u00bd teaspoon sesame oil\n\n1 Finely chop the jalape\u00f1o, garlic, and shallot, or use a food processor to make them into a paste. (If you're using chile paste instead of a fresh pepper, add it in Step 2.)\n\n2 Add the oil to a saucepan over medium heat. Once it's warm, saut\u00e9 the pepper and garlic until fragrant, about 2 to 3 minutes. Add the \u00bd cup of coconut milk, turmeric, and chile paste, if using.\n\n3 Let everything come to a boil, then turn the heat down to low. Stir in the peanut butter, soy sauce, and brown sugar and sesame oil, if using. If the sauce is too thick, add more coconut milk to thin it out. Once the mixture is well combined, taste it and add whatever you think it needs, concentrating on the salt and spices in particular.\n\nSalsa\n\n$0.75 \/ cup\n\n$2.25 total\n\nSummertime salsas combine a load of fresh tomatoes with smaller amounts of choice vegetables and fruit. Apart from its usual use on tortilla chips and tacos, this salsa is a wonderful topping for fish or chicken, as a sauce for cold noodles, or as a finishing touch on a savory breakfast. If you aren't a fan of cilantro, substitute another herb; mint, savory, or lemon balm work well. makes 3 cups\n\n\u00bd medium onion, finely chopped\n\n2 cups chopped tomatoes\n\n1 jalape\u00f1o pepper, finely chopped (remove seeds for less heat)\n\njuice of 1 lime\n\n\u00bc cup finely chopped fresh cilantro\n\nsalt and pepper, to taste\n\nadditions\n\nchopped mango, peach, plum, or pineapple\n\nbeans\n\ncorn\n\nfinely chopped garlic\n\nchipotle chiles in adobo instead of the jalape\u00f1o\n\n1 If you like raw onion, skip ahead to Step 2. Otherwise, take the edge off by saut\u00e9ing the onion with a bit of water in a pan over medium heat. The onion is ready once the water has boiled off.\n\n2 Mix the onion, tomato, pepper, lime juice, cilantro, salt, and pepper in a bowl. Be sure to add enough salt and pepper!\n\n3 Taste the salsa. You're looking for a balance of spicy from the jalape\u00f1o pepper, sweet from the tomatoes, and bright and fresh from the herbs and lime juice. If something's out of balance, add more of the appropriate ingredient to bring it back into balance.\n\n4 Store in an airtight container in the fridge. Fresh salsa won't last as long as store-bought salsa because it doesn't have any preservatives, but it's so tasty that I'm sure you'll finish it fast!\n\nFor a winter version, use canned tomatoes and heat everything but the lime juice on the stovetop for 5 minutes to marry the flavors. Finish with the lime juice and store.\n\nTzatziki\n\n$1.75 \/ cup\n\n$3.50 total\n\nThis classic yogurt sauce uses cucumbers in a way you might not have thought of before. Straining the yogurt and cucumber intensifies the flavor but, if you're in a hurry, skip the straining steps and just mix the ingredients together. makes 2 cups\n\n1 large cucumber\n\n1 teaspoon salt\n\n2 cups yogurt\n\n2 tablespoons chopped fresh dill\n\n2 scallions, finely chopped\n\n1 clove garlic, finely chopped (optional)\n\nsalt and pepper\n\n1 Grate the cucumber and place it in a sieve over a large bowl. Add the salt and mix it around. Leave it for 30 minutes to 2 hours, occasionally pressing the cucumber gently into the sieve to get the liquid out. The salt will help leach the water out of the cucumber.\n\n2 Line another sieve (or the same one, cleaned) with a paper towel or cheesecloth. Place it over a large bowl and pour the yogurt into it. You can leave it for as little as 1 hour on the counter or overnight in the fridge. The longer you leave it, the thicker it will get. This is how Greek yogurt is made!\n\n3 Mix the yogurt with the strained cucumber, dill, scallions, and garlic, if using, and taste. Season with salt and pepper and add more dill or scallions to taste.\n\n4 Enjoy on sandwiches, as a dip, with pita or chips, or over meatballs, kebabs, or anything spicy.\n\nRaita\n\n$1.25 \/ cup\n\n$2.50 total\n\nThis traditional Indian yogurt sauce is simple and surprisingly tasty. Spoon it onto Chana Masala, Potato and Kale Rolls with Raita, or anything spicy to cool things down. This recipe is extremely loose\u2014just stir some of your favorite chopped vegetables into yogurt and add salt and pepper. Use this as a stepping-stone to develop your signature raita. makes 2 cups\n\n1 cup yogurt\n\n1 cup chopped cucumber\n\n\u00bd cup chopped tomato\n\n\u00bc cup chopped red onion\n\n1 teaspoon ground cumin\n\n\u00bd teaspoon cayenne pepper\n\n2 tablespoons chopped fresh cilantro\n\nsalt and pepper\n\nadditions\n\n1 tablespoon grated ginger\n\n2 tablespoons mint\n\n\u00bc cup chickpeas\n\ncooked spinach\n\n1 Stir all the ingredients together in a medium-size bowl. Add salt and pepper to taste.\n\n2 Store the raita in a covered container in the fridge until you're ready to use it. It will keep for up to 3 days.\n\nideas\n\nFlavor\n\n**Many of the recipes in this collection can be easily modified to your taste.** Learning to cook with different spices, herbs, and aromatics will instantly elevate your cooking and open up new and interesting possibilities. Although spices last a reasonably long time, they do grow stale and lose their intensity after a couple of months. When you experiment, buy small amounts of new spices in the bulk aisle and go for larger quantities of the spices you use most often.\n\nTry the flavor combinations below on bland basics like rice, roasted chicken, vegetables, and potatoes. Starchy potatoes are almost the perfect flavor sponge.\n\nMix spices into butter, add them to popcorn, or sprinkle them on toast. In short, experiment!\n\ngarlic\n\nGarlic! You should always have this around. Cheap and flavorful, it goes well with almost everything. Try saut\u00e9ing vegetables, especially bitter green ones like broccoli and Brussels sprouts, with the following flavors, or pack the flavors into a creamy dressing over arugula or mustard greens. Any would make a great base for a pasta sauce, or bring a spark to plain rice or barley. Oh, and shellfish\u2014did I mention shellfish?\n\n\u2022 garlic and lemon zest\n\n\u2022 garlic and fresh basil, fresh parsley, or rosemary\n\n\u2022 garlic, onion, and ginger (heat with olive oil as the base for a stir-fry)\n\n\u2022 garlic, anchovy, and chile flakes\n\ncitrus\n\nThe strongest lemon flavor comes not from the juice, but from the essential oils trapped in the bright, top layer of skin. Ditto for limes and oranges. If you want something to really taste like citrus, try adding just a touch of finely grated zest. It's very strong, though, so be careful with it. I add lemon zest to my tomato sauce, lime zest to pork tacos, and orange zest to dressing. Citrus brings out other flavors almost as well as salt.\n\n\u2022 orange, lemon, and lime zests\n\n\u2022 lime zest, coconut, and chile flakes\n\n\u2022 orange zest, scallions, and fresh cilantro\n\n\u2022 lime zest and chipotle powder\n\n\u2022 lemon zest and fresh mint (amazing with cucumbers or watermelon)\n\nherbal\n\nTry sprinkling these classic combinations on roasted root vegetables or rub them all over a chicken before you roast it.\n\n\u2022 sage, rosemary, and thyme\n\n\u2022 sage and garlic (incredible with winter squash)\n\n\u2022 paprika and fresh dill\n\n\u2022 fennel seeds and fresh parsley\n\nFennel seeds\u2014sweet and a little licorice-y\u2014will be a familiar flavor to Italian sausage lovers, but it's not especially common in North America. Try them in a salad or in a blend with other spices. They bring out the flavors around them.\n\nearthy\n\nYou want to get serious about spices? Try these South Asian combinations and don't be shy with them!\n\n\u2022 ginger, cinnamon, and black pepper\n\nExcept for the pepper, the flavors above might seem like sweet spices, but they are wonderful in rice pilaf and with winter root vegetables. Add these to tea along with some cardamom for a traditional masala chai.\n\n\u2022 cardamom, coriander, and bay leaf\n\n\u2022 cumin seeds, coriander seeds, and mustard seeds\n\nFor one of the best stir-fries you'll ever have, heat a teaspoon each of the above in a dry skillet until you smell them, then add vegetables.\n\nsweet\n\nIf you're a baker, get yourself some of these lovely sweet spices to enliven all your standard favorite breads, cakes, and cookies. You can even add them to tea if you get adventurous. Try to get whole nutmeg rather than pre-ground. You'll be amazed at the difference that just a tiny grating of the fresh stuff will add to your food.\n\n\u2022 cinnamon, ginger powder, nutmeg, and clove\n\n\u2022 lemon zest and thyme (savory flavors that are incredible in a simple shortbread cookie)\n\n\u2022 orange zest and cocoa powder\n\n\u2022 lime and coconut\n\n\u2022 green cardamom and vanilla\n\nTry to get whole cardamom pods, smash the green pods and remove the black seeds in the center. Their aroma is much stronger when fresh rather than pre-ground. However, pre-ground cardamom is still fine in baked goods\u2014you may just need to use a little more of it to get the full flavor. The whole pods are lovely in rice and tea as well, so track some down if you're a cardamom fan.\n\nmake your own spice blends\n\nSome common spice blends can be made easily at home. For instance, instead of buying pre-made chili powder, make your own blend of cumin, cayenne pepper, garlic powder, oregano, and paprika. The spices included in the ingredients for Dark and Spicy Chili (with the exception of cocoa powder) make a chili powder that can be substituted for the pre-made stuff.\n\nCurry powder is a bunch of South Asian spices blended together, and there are many, many varieties of curry blends\u2014usually, some combination of turmeric, coriander, cumin, and chile powder.\n\nGaram masala, another spice blend that is essential to Indian cooking, is most often made with similar spices, but rarely includes chile powder. Try pre-made curry and garam masala blends to start, and work your way up to making your own.\n\nDon't buy pumpkin pie spice. It's usually stale and bland. Just hit your pumpkin pie or cookies with a mix of cinnamon, nutmeg, ground ginger, and a little clove.\n\navoid some dried herbs\n\nDried oregano, dried thyme, and dried rosemary add a lot of flavor to chili, soups, and roasted vegetables. However, don't bother with dried basil, dried cilantro, dried dill, and definitely not dried mint, unless you particularly like them and can't afford to get them fresh. They lose almost all their magic when dried.\n\nsalt\n\nSalt is essential to bringing out the natural flavor in any food and should be used alongside any other flavors you choose. If something doesn't taste quite right, the answer most of the time is to add a bit more salt. Granted, those with health conditions where sodium levels can cause harm should watch their intake! If you can't use much salt in your diet, try replacing it with spice, a squeeze of citrus juice, or a sprinkling of citrus zest.\n\nIt's easy to make a basic salad dressing, so you should never have to buy it pre-made. Simply follow the instructions for the basic vinaigrette on page , and add any of the flavor combinations suggested here to experiment. The ones under citrus are the best place to start.\n\nSpice Oil\n\n$3.50 \/ cup\n\n$3.50 total\n\nUse this spice oil on salads, in cold noodle dishes, or on roasted or saut\u00e9ed vegetables. You can get all of the spices at most Asian grocery stores. makes 1 cup\n\n1 clove garlic\n\n1 cup olive or vegetable oil\n\n2 tablespoons chile flakes or chopped dried red chiles\n\n1 teaspoon Sichuan or regular peppercorns\n\n1 star anise\n\n\u00bd teaspoon cumin seeds\n\n\u00bc teaspoon salt\n\n1 Use the side of a knife to crush the garlic clove, and peel it when it cracks open.\n\n2 Place the crushed garlic in a small pot and add the olive oil, chile flakes, peppercorns, star anise, cumin seeds, and salt. Warm the mixture over low heat, until it starts to bubble gently and you can hear a bit of a sizzle, about 10 minutes. Turn off the heat. You don't want it to be so hot that the spices start to cook or fry.\n\n3 Put the covered pot in the fridge for 4 to 8 hours.\n\n4 Taste the oil. If it isn't strongly spicy, let it infuse for a few more hours. Once it's ready, strain the oil through a sieve to remove the spices. Store in a jar in the fridge for up to a week.\n\nIf you don't have a sieve, place a lid over the pot and carefully pour the oil out sideways to strain it. Allow a small opening between the lid and the pot so the oil can escape while the spices are left behind.\n\nRoti\n\n$0.03 \/ roti\n\n$0.50 total\n\nThese flatbreads are a staple in many parts of India. They're quick to make and very tasty when fresh. Enjoy them with a curried filling, dip them into soups or stews, or wrap them around eggs at breakfast. makes 16 roti\n\n2 cups whole-wheat flour (see box)\n\n1 teaspoon salt\n\n1 cup water\n\nvegetable oil, for coating your hands\n\n1 Mix the flour, salt, and water in a small bowl using one clean hand. It should form a fairly moist dough. Knead until smooth\u2014anywhere from 2 to 5 minutes\u2014and form into a ball. Cover with a damp towel or paper towel and set aside for 10 minutes to an hour.\n\n2 Rub a small amount of oil onto your hands to make it easier to handle the dough. Divide the dough into 16 small balls.\n\n3 Sprinkle a countertop with flour and place one piece of dough in the middle. Cover the ball with flour so it doesn't stick to the surface, then gently roll it out with a rolling pin (or a bottle if you're in a pinch) until it's thin and flat, about \u215b inch thick. As you roll the dough, unstick it from your counter and flip it over. To make it round, roll straight in front of you, then turn the dough 90 degrees and roll out again.\n\n4 Place a nonstick skillet over medium heat (cast-iron is best). Once the pan is hot, add the roti and cook until the dough lifts away from the pan around the edges and small bubbles form, 1 to 2 minutes. Flip the bread over and cook the other side. You want to see light brown bubbles all over the dough. Don't let it get too dark, though, as this will make the roti too crunchy to use for rolls. Repeat until you run out of dough.\n\n5 Keep the roti under a towel on the counter or in a warm oven until ready to serve.\n\nWhole-wheat durum flour, sometimes called _roti_ or _chapati_ flour, can be found in Indian grocery stores and is the best flour to use for this recipe. You can use regular whole-wheat flour as well, but if you want to make this recipe often, consider a special trip to get roti flour!\n\nFlour Tortillas\n\n$0.07 \/ tortilla\n\n$1.70 total\n\nHomemade tortillas are a bit of work, but they're totally worth it. With practice, you'll get quicker and enjoy the process as much as the results. makes 24 small tortillas\n\n1\u00bc cups all-purpose flour, plus more for shaping the dough\n\n1\u00bc cups whole-wheat flour\n\n2\u00bd teaspoons baking powder\n\n1 teaspoon salt\n\n\u2153 cup clarified butter or lard, at room temperature (see box)\n\n1 cup hot water\n\nLard is more traditional, but I prefer clarified butter (which is just butter with the milk solids removed). Even regular butter will work. You can also buy ghee from an Indian grocer and use that.\n\n1 Whisk together the flours, baking powder, and salt in a large bowl. Add the clarified butter. Using your fingers, work the butter into the flour until the mixture looks like moist crumbs. Add the hot water\u2014not boiling, just hot\u2014and form the dough with your hands. Leave it in the bowl for an hour, covered by plastic wrap or a moist towel.\n\n2 Roll the dough into 24 small balls, then cover them again.\n\n3 Lightly flour your countertop. Gently flatten one dough ball with your palm, then roll it out with a rolling pin. Flip it over to make sure it doesn't stick to the counter; add more flour if it does stick. Once the dough is a nice, thin, 5- to 6-inch circle, set it aside under a moist towel.\n\n4 Once you've rolled out one or two tortillas, put a nonstick or cast-iron pan over medium-high heat. Let it get nice and hot. Place a tortilla in the pan. Once it starts to dry up around the edges, flip it over with a spatula, then gently press it down to give it some color underneath.\n\n5 Once the tortilla has brown spots on both sides, remove it from the pan and continue with the next. Work quickly! As you wait for each tortilla to cook, roll out more. You'll get better at this part with practice.\n\n6 If you're serving the tortillas soon, place them in a warm oven to keep them pliable. If they're for later in the day, pile them under a cloth while you finish making them. Once you're done, wrap them in aluminum foil and put them in the fridge. Heat them in the oven before serving.\n\nPizza Dough\n\n$0.20 \/ crust\n\n$0.80 total\n\nThere are two ways to make pizza dough: the fast way and the slow way. They're the same amount of work, just with different wait times. The slow method is convenient for a weekday with a little preparation\u2014make it the night before you plan to make pizza, pop it in the fridge, and then pull it out to rise a few hours before dinner. If you're organized enough to make the slow dough, I recommend taking the extra time: It tastes best, and is much softer and easier to stretch. makes 4 individual pizzas\n\n3 cups all-purpose flour or bread flour, plus more for shaping the dough\n\n1\u00bd teaspoons salt\n\n\u00bd to 1 teaspoon instant yeast\n\n1 tablespoon olive oil, plus more for coating the bowl\n\n1\u00bc cups water, at room temperature\n\nFast Method\n\n1 Measure out the flour, salt, and 1 teaspoon of yeast into a big bowl. Mix in the oil with your hands, crumbling until the texture is a bit sandy, then add the water. Keep mixing until the dough comes together.\n\n2 Lightly flour your countertop. Gently stretch and fold the dough to knead it, pushing against the countertop over and over. Massage the dough until it becomes smooth and elastic, about 5 to 7 minutes. The dough will be smooth but quite wet.\n\n3 Add a small amount of oil to a bowl. Place your dough ball in the bowl and cover with plastic wrap. Let it rise for 1\u00bd to 3 hours, depending on the warmth of your kitchen. It's done rising when it has doubled in size. Now you're ready to make pizza! For rolling instructions, see page .\n\nSlow Method\n\n1 Follow Steps 1 and 2 of the fast method, but add only \u00bd teaspoon of yeast to the flour mixture. Use very cold water instead of room temperature.\n\n2 Add a small amount of oil to a bowl. Place your dough ball in the bowl and cover with plastic wrap. Put it into the fridge overnight. Letting the yeast work overnight creates a better flavor; it also makes the dough more elastic and easy to work with.\n\n3 The next day, 2 to 3 hours before you want to bake your pizzas, remove the dough from the fridge to return to room temperature. Now you're ready to make pizza! See page  for how to roll it out.\n\nmethod\n\nCroutons or Breadcrumbs\n\n**I am constantly haunted by crusts of hard, several-days-old bread that I have neglected.** Luckily, there are plenty of delicious solutions that help those crusts avoid the trash can. Croutons and breadcrumbs will keep for ages in a sealed container on the counter, and when you have them around, you'll find yourself using them everywhere\u2014and perhaps even finding excuses to make a salad. You can make this with any amount of bread.\n\nbread\n\nbutter or vegetable oil, as needed\n\nsalt and pepper, to taste\n\n1 **Prepare the bread.** For croutons, cut the bread into cubes. For breadcrumbs, mince the loaf with a knife, tear it apart, or throw small chunks of bread into a food processor. If the bread is too hard to cut, wrap it in a kitchen towel, sprinkle some water on the towel, and microwave for 20 to 30 seconds. This will restore just enough moisture to let you cut the bread easily.\n\n2 **Place a large pan on the stove over medium heat.** Add enough butter\u2014usually at least a tablespoon\u2014to coat the bottom of the pan. **Melt the butter.**\n\n3 **Working in batches, add the bread and toss it gently until it's coated in butter.** Let the bread sit for 2 minutes, then flip the pieces over. Keep tossing and turning, leaving it for a minute or so at a time, until the bread is brown all over. Add more butter as needed. The bread cubes may get kind of dry, and a little more fat will help them brown more evenly. Sprinkle with salt and pepper. It is basically impossible, unless you are very patient (which I am not), to get every side of the cubes browned, so just get them generally looking good and toasty and then take them off the heat. Taste one and add more salt and pepper, if you need to.\n\n4 **Use the breadcrumbs or croutons immediately, or store them in a sealed container after letting them cool off.**\n\nFor breadcrumbs, if you like, you can go oil free: just toast whole slices of bread and then crush or process them into small pieces.\n\nFresh Pasta\n\n$0.35 \/ serving\n\n$0.35 total\n\nWhen a reader, Jeanne, asked for a good pasta dish, I decided to show her how to create it from scratch. Sure, making pasta by hand requires elbow grease and a good rolling pin, but you'll be surprised at how simple, cheap, and tasty it is. If an Italian grandmother can do it, so can you! Because fresh pasta is so wonderful, the sauce you pair it with doesn't need to be complicated. Try it with Best Tomato Sauce or Chorizo and White Bean Rag\u00f9 and a little cheese. serves 1 very hungry person\n\nMultiply this recipe by the number of people you are serving. The stated quantities are a useful ratio, but they produce big portions.\n\n\u00be cup all-purpose or bread flour, plus more for shaping the dough\n\n1 egg\n\nolive or vegetable oil\n\nsalt\n\n1 Put the flour in a bowl. Make a crater in the center of the flour and crack the egg into it. Mix with your hands. The egg takes a while to release all its moisture, so don't panic if things are dry at first. If, after mixing for about a minute, the dough still seems excessively dry, add a teaspoon of water. Keep mixing until you develop a stiff dough that is quite dry. The dryness makes it easier to roll out and keeps the noodles from sticking together when you cook them.\n\n2 Add a small amount of oil to a bowl. Place the dough in the bowl, cover with a moist towel or plastic wrap, and let rest for 1 to 2 hours.\n\n3 Once an hour (or more) has passed, you should notice a marked change in the dough. The egg will have released its moisture to form a pale yellow, smooth, pliable dough. Knead it again to create a smooth ball.\n\n4 Tear or slice the dough into manageable pieces\u2014usually as many as the number of people you're feeding. Dust your countertop heavily with flour, then use a rolling pin to make the dough as thin as you can. Rolling it out will take a while because it's tough and stretchy. Try to get it thin enough to see light through it. The thinner the dough, the quicker it will cook, but don't make the dough so thin that it tears.\n\n5 By the time the pasta is rolled out, it should be dry enough to avoid sticking to itself. If it's still moist, let it sit for a few minutes.\n\n6 Boil a pot of heavily salted water.\n\n7 Slice the dough into whatever size noodles you like. If you fold the dough over itself a few times, it's easy to make the noodles a consistent size. Shake the cut noodles on a tray with a bit of flour to keep them from sticking.\n\n8 When the pot of water has come to a boil, add the pasta. Fresh pasta takes as little as 30 seconds to cook, if the noodles are thin. It's ready when it changes color and starts to float. Taste a noodle after they start to float to see if it's cooked. If not, let it cook a little longer.\n\n9 Drain and serve immediately. Uncooked pasta will keep, wrapped in plastic or spread out on a covered baking sheet, for up to 2 days in the fridge. Dust it with enough flour to keep it from sticking to itself.\n\nRicotta\n\n$4 \/ Cup\n\n$6 total\n\nTo transform regular milk into something truly special, make your own ricotta. It's a neat recipe to do with kids because it's simple, yet the transformation of the milk is dramatic. Try this in lasagna or anywhere else you would usually use ricotta, but be sure to enjoy a little of it on its own to appreciate its full deliciousness. I love it best on toast (shocking!) with a sprinkling of pesto or chopped herbs on top to cut the richness of the cheese. Save the whey to use in soups instead of broth. makes 1\u00bd cups\n\n\u00bd gallon whole milk\n\n1 cup heavy cream\n\n1 teaspoon salt\n\n3 tablespoons distilled white vinegar or lemon juice\n\nadditions\n\nfresh herbs\n\ndried herbs\n\nany spice\n\n1 Place the milk, cream, and salt in a large, heavy-bottomed pot and bring just to a boil. When just one bubble comes up to the top, add the vinegar, give it a stir, and turn off the heat. The vinegar will create a disturbance and the whey and cream will begin to separate.\n\n2 Meanwhile, line a sieve with cheesecloth or two layers of paper towels and place over a large bowl.\n\n3 Leave the mixture in the pot for 5 minutes, then stir to separate the cheese and the whey completely. They should be two distinct parts of the mixture. If some of it is still milky, add another tablespoon of vinegar, stir, and let it sit for a few more minutes.\n\n4 Pour your ricotta mixture into the cheesecloth-lined sieve with the bowl underneath to catch the whey. Leave for 30 minutes to drain.\n\n5 The cheesecloth will be full of a crumbly white cheese. That's your ricotta! Taste it and add more salt if it needs it, or add herbs or spices.\n\n6 Eat immediately, or pack into an airtight container and store in the fridge. The ricotta will keep for about 3 days.\n\nideas\n\nRainbow Rice\n\n$0.20 \/ serving\n\n$0.40 total\n\n**Here are three quick ways to make plain rice a little more exciting.** An early reader, Charles, said he loves rice with vegetables, but these treatments work for grains other than rice as well\u2014everything from quinoa to barley to farro. Vegetables are a great way to liven up the usual rice and beans.\n\nPlain Rice\n\nserves 2\n\n2 cups water\n\n1 cup rice\n\n2 pinches of salt\n\nTo make plain rice, pour the water into a pot and add the uncooked rice and salt. That'll be enough for two generous portions, or three or four smaller servings. With the lid off, bring to a low boil over medium heat. Turn down the heat to low and put the lid on slightly askew, so that the steam can escape. Cook for about 20 minutes, until the water is all gone and the rice is fluffy.\n\n1 Green Rice\n\n$1 serving \/ $2 total\n\n1 cup frozen spinach, beet greens, chard, or fresh parsley\n\nChop the spinach as much as you like. The more finely chopped, the more it will disperse into the rice. Cook as directed for plain rice, but after cooking for 15 minutes, mix the spinach into the rice. Cook with the lid off for the last 5 minutes. Adding the spinach at the end keeps it lush and bright, rather than sad and overcooked.\n\n2 Orange Rice\n\n$1 serving \/ $2 total\n\n1 cup canned winter squash, pumpkin, or sweet potato puree\n\nStir the squash with 1\u00bd cups of water in a bowl, then pour it into a pot with the rice and salt. (You can also use frozen, boiled, or saut\u00e9ed squash.) Cook as directed for plain rice.\n\n3 Red Rice\n\n$1 serving \/ $2 total\n\n1 cup canned tomatoes, pureed\n\nStir the tomatoes with 1\u00bd cups of water, then pour into a pot with the rice and salt. Cook as directed for plain rice.\n\nmethod\n\nHow to Cook Dried Beans\n\n**This method works for cooking any kind of beans in any amount.** Make a large batch on a Sunday and use them in meals throughout the week. The only thing to keep in mind is that the older and bigger they are, the longer they take to cook. Some may take as long as 4 hours. If you eat a lot of beans, consider investing in a pressure cooker, which will cut down on the boiling time.\n\nadditions\n\nbay leaf\n\nbouquet garni of favorite tough herbs\n\ndried herbs and spices\n\nonion\n\ngarlic\n\nchiles\n\nginger, sliced\n\n1 The best way to prepare dried beans is to **soak them in water overnight**. The next day, drain and rinse the beans thoroughly before cooking them in fresh water. If you don't have the opportunity to soak the beans ahead of time, you can make up for it: Cover the beans with water, then bring them to a boil in a large pot. After 10 minutes, take them off the heat and drain them.\n\n2 **Place the drained beans in a large pot and cover with fresh water.** Include any additions you desire.\n\n3 **Bring to a boil over medium heat, then turn down the heat so that the beans simmer gently.** Put a lid on the pot, but leave it askew so the water doesn't boil over.\n\n4 **Check on the beans every half hour or so,** being sure to keep them covered with water if it boils away.\n\n5 **Beans take vastly different lengths of time to become tender.** The older and bigger they are, the longer they take to cook. Very old, very large beans can take as long as 4 hours. If you are making refried beans or beans for a soup or stew, don't worry about overcooking them\u2014it's fine if they're mushy. If you want to maintain their shape and integrity, however, monitor them closely once they're nearly done, after a couple of hours.\n\n6 **Once the beans are tender, you can drain them or leave them in their cooking water,** depending on what you're using them for. Remove and discard the additions, if necessary, and add salt to taste\u2014they will need a fair bit!\n\nmethod\n\nPickle Primer\n\n**Pickles made from cucumbers are undeniably America's favorite kind of pickle.** But pickled carrots, beets, asparagus, onions, and cauliflower are delicious as well. Pickled vegetables are not only incredibly delicious\u2014they are also a great way to preserve vegetables when you have an unexpected bounty that you don't want to go to waste. A friend left five pounds of zucchini on your doorstep? Pickle it! You might also want to consider pickles for holiday gifts. I get requests for them every year!\n\nThe form of pickling I'm describing isn't proper, long-term preserving or canning. That process is worth learning, but it requires specialized equipment. Here we're learning the quick method to create tangy, flavorful, quick pickles that blow any store-bought pickles away.\n\nessentials\n\nvegetables (cucumbers, zucchini, cauliflower, carrots, beets, asparagus, onions, peppers, or string beans)\n\n1-quart mason jars (see box)\n\nadditions to the jar\n\nsprigs of dill\n\ngarlic cloves, quartered\n\nbrine\n\n1 cup distilled white vinegar\n\n1 cup water\n\n1 tablespoon salt\n\n1 teaspoon mustard seeds\n\n1 teaspoon dill seeds\n\n1 bay leaf\n\nadditions to the brine\n\n1 or 2 dried chiles, crushed\n\ncinnamon stick\n\n2 whole cloves\n\n\u00bd teaspoon coriander seeds\n\n\u00bd teaspoon allspice berries\n\n\u00bd teaspoon fennel seeds\n\n\u00bd teaspoon celery seeds\n\n1 tablespoon sugar\n\nMultiply this recipe by the number of quarts of brine you want to end up with. The quantities below are a ratio\u2014they will make roughly enough brine to fill a 1 quart mason jar (depending on how tightly packed it is with vegetables). You can adjust the ratio according to how many vegetables you have and how many jars you want to fill. I suggest making at least 6 quarts at once if you have the space in the fridge. It's more efficient to make a large batch and, trust me, they will be popular.\n\n1 **Cut up the vegetables however you like.** Smaller pieces will pickle faster because the brine takes less time to penetrate them. I generally go with bite-size pieces, or long strips if making cucumber pickles. You can also add any other vegetables or herbs for flavor.\n\n2 **Fill the jars with the vegetables.**\n\n3 **Make the brine:** Pour the vinegar, water, and salt into a pot. Put in any other additions. If you don't maintain a spice collection, you can buy pickling mix in the spice aisle of most grocery stores. Instead of the seeds and bay leaf, add 1 tablespoon of pickling mix to the water, vinegar, and salt. And for sweet pickles, add about 1 tablespoon of sugar.\n\n4 Bring the brine to a boil and turn the heat down to low. **Simmer for10 minutes.**\n\n5 **Pour the hot liquid over the vegetables in the jars.** If you don't have enough, don't panic. Simply make more using the ratio in the brine ingredients list. If you've run out of spices, just skip them.\n\n6 **Place the lids over the jars.** Don't screw them on tightly until the jars have come to room temperature. Once the jars have cooled completely, screw on the lids and put the jars in the fridge.\n\n7 **Leave the pickles for 2 weeks to let the brine do its work.** After 2 weeks, eat them!\n\nIdeally, you'll have glass jars with tight-fitting screw-top lids. You can usually find jars for canning at hardware stores or many grocery stores, but another kind of glass jar or an old pickle jar will do in a pinch. Mason jars can be used over and over and I use them to house things like dried beans and grains, so they are very useful and inexpensive storage.\nDrinks and Desserts\n\nmethod\n\nAgua Fresca\n\n**Refreshing, hydrating, and beautiful, these drinks are great at a party,** and they can help you use up fruit before it goes bad. Use this as a starting point for developing your own favorite.\n\n2 cups chopped fruit\n\n4 cups water\n\nadditions\n\n1 teaspoon vanilla extract\n\nsqueeze of citrus juice\n\nsugar\n\nmint leaves\n\nleaves of other herbs\n\nvariations\n\nblueberry and lemon\n\ncucumber and lemon\n\nmango and lime\n\nmelon\n\norange\n\npapaya and pineapple\n\npeach and vanilla\n\nstrawberry and mint\n\n1 **For a very lightly flavored agua fresca, just mix the fruit and water together.** Done! Obviously, if you want more fruit flavor, then use less water; for a more subtle flavor, use more water.\n\n2 **Serve over ice.** Try some of the variations I've suggested or whatever fruits you like! If you store this in the fridge, it'll keep for about 3 days or up to a week, depending on the fruit.\n\nI usually run my agua fresca through the blender. If you want the drink to be clear, strain the pulpy leftovers of the fruit after blending. If you're using blueberries or oranges or other fruit with a skin, you'll almost certainly want to strain it. For some fruits, you can also choose to leave the pulp: in the case of melons, the pulp purees so smoothly that you barely notice it.\n\nideas\n\nSmoothies\n\n**I have four types of smoothies** here, but, of course, once you get the hang of it, there are many more flavor combinations to be made. Frozen fruit is perfect for smoothies. Or, use overripe fruit that you wouldn't eat otherwise. Add a teaspoon of vanilla extract to any of these and they will seem incredibly professional. The frozen melon drinks, in particular, are a refreshing slushy-like treat on a hot summer day. Two\u2014watermelon and honeydew\u2014are pictured at right. (The mango lassi is not pictured.) serves 2\n\n1 Drinkable Yogurt\n\n$0.50 serving \/ $1 total\n\n\u00bd cup yogurt, not Greek\n\n\u00bd cup fruit juice\n\nIf you like the grocery store's yogurt drinks, try making these at home for less! You don't even need to blend them\u2014just add the yogurt and juice to a jar, then shake.\n\n2 Berry Smoothie\n\n$1 serving \/ $2 total\n\n\u00bd cup yogurt, not Greek\n\n1 cup frozen berries\n\nmilk or juice to thin as needed\n\n1 teaspoon vanilla extract\n\nBlend the yogurt, berries, a bit of milk, and vanilla until smooth, then adjust with more berries or milk to your taste.\n\n3 Melon Smoothie\n\n$0.50 serving \/ $1 total\n\n1 cup chopped frozen melon\n\n\u00bd cup water or juice\n\n1 teaspoon vanilla extract\n\nWhen you buy a melon, dice and freeze whatever you don't eat. Pull it out a cup at a time and blend it with a bit of water or juice and vanilla to thin it out. It's like a slushy, but better!\n\n4 Mango Lassi\n\n$1 serving \/ $2 total\n\n1 mango, peeled, pitted, and diced\n\n1 cup yogurt, not Greek\n\nmilk to thin as needed\n\nBlend the mango and yogurt together. If it's too thick to drink with a straw, add some milk to thin it out. A ripe and juicy mango combined with yogurt is often all you need. Be warned: If you make this for children, they will request it over and over.\n\nAvocado Milkshake\n\n$1.15 \/ serving\n\n$2.30 total\n\nJohn, the reader who introduced me to the silky magic of this milkshake, lives in California, where avocados are often less than a dollar. If you can find a similar deal, whip up a batch of these! serves 2\n\n1 avocado, peeled and pitted\n\n2 cups milk, coconut milk beverage, almond milk, or rice milk\n\n1 teaspoon vanilla extract\n\n1 tablespoon lime juice\n\npinch of salt\n\n2 tablespoons sugar\n\nToss the avocado, milk, vanilla, lime juice, salt, and sugar into a blender and whiz them up! Let it go for a while so that the avocado breaks down and blends with the milk. Once the liquid is Kermit the Frog green, it's ready. Taste it and add more sugar or lime juice as needed.\n\nIf your avocado isn't quite ripe, a bit more lime juice will bring out its flavor.\n\nFast Melon Sorbet\n\n$0.60 \/ serving\n\n$2.40 total\n\nWhen you see lovely watermelons, honeydews, and cantaloupes on sale, buy them up. Eat half, then cube and freeze the other half. When you want a quick dessert or smoothie, pull out a bag of frozen melon and whip this up. serves 4\n\n2 cups chopped frozen melon\n\n\u00bd cup plain yogurt\n\n\u00bc cup sugar\n\n1 teaspoon vanilla extract or lime juice (optional)\n\nAdd the melon, yogurt, sugar, and vanilla, if using, to a food processor or blender. Process or blend until just smooth. Don't blend too much, or the sorbet will become overly soft. Serve immediately or store in the freezer to enjoy later.\n\nideas\n\nRice Pudding\n\n$0.35 \/ serving\n\n$1.40 total\n\n**Rice pudding is so simple to make\u2014it's almost as easy as cooking plain rice.** It's a wonderful make-ahead dessert if you have guests, and it can easily be dressed up with berries, nuts, or Caramelized Bananas. I've included a few variations, but please do experiment: Milk, rice, and sugar are a great canvas. Try switching out the sugar for honey, or stirring in a spoonful of cocoa powder, peanut butter, or coconut flakes. serves 4\n\nBasic (Vanilla) Pudding\n\nserves 4\n\n\u00bd cup long-grain rice\n\n2 cups milk\n\n\u00bd cup sugar\n\n\u215b teaspoon salt\n\n2 teaspoons vanilla extract or \u00bd vanilla bean, seeds scraped\n\n1 Place a pot over medium heat and add the rice, milk, sugar, and salt. Stir until the sugar is dissolved and then bring to a boil. Once the milk is just boiling, turn the heat down to low and simmer for 20 minutes. Place a lid slightly askew on the pot so the steam can escape.\n\n2 Remove a grain of rice and taste it to see whether it's cooked. If it is soft and chewy all the way through, then it's done. If not, let it cook for a few more minutes. Once the rice is cooked, add the vanilla, and stir.\n\n3 Remove the pudding from the heat and let it cool to room temperature. Let it chill in the fridge for 2 hours before serving. You can also eat it hot, but if you wait, the pudding will thicken in the fridge and have a more pleasing texture.\n\n1 Indian-Style\n\n$0.65 serving \/ $2.60 total\n\n\u00bd cup basmati rice\n\n2 cups milk\n\n\u00bd cup sugar\n\n\u215b teaspoon salt\n\n1 teaspoon cardamom\n\n\u00bc cup chopped almonds or pistachios\n\nFollow the instructions for vanilla rice pudding, but use basmati rice and add cardamom in place of the vanilla in Step 2. Top with chopped nuts.\n\n2 Pumpkin Pie\n\n$0.60 serving \/ $2.40 total\n\n\u00bd cup long-grain rice\n\n\u00be cup canned or fresh pumpkin puree\n\n2 cups milk\n\n\u00bd cup brown sugar\n\n\u215b teaspoon salt\n\n1 teaspoon ground cinnamon\n\n\u00bd teaspoon ground cloves\n\n\u00bd teaspoon ground ginger\n\nFollow the instructions for vanilla rice pudding, but substitute brown sugar and add pumpkin, cinnamon, cloves, and ginger, and stir together before adding to the pot. Simmer for 25 minutes (instead of 20), stirring occasionally.\n\nCoconut and Lime Brown Rice Pudding\n\n$0.60 \/ serving\n\n$2.40 total\n\nTangy, rich, creamy, and just a little chewy, this dessert may be a healthier alternative to the rice puddings on page 175, but it sure doesn't feel like a compromise. serves 2\n\n\u00bd cup short-grain brown rice\n\n2 cups water\n\n\u215b teaspoon salt\n\n1 can (13.5 ounces) full-fat coconut milk\n\n\u00bd cup sugar\n\nzest of 1 lime or orange\n\n4 slices ginger, added with the coconut milk then removed before serving (optional)\n\n1 Place a pot over medium heat. Add the rice, water, and salt. Bring to a boil, turn the heat down to low, and cook the rice for 35 minutes. Place a lid slightly askew on the pot so the steam can escape.\n\n2 Dump the rice into a sieve to drain. It should be almost cooked, but not quite.\n\n3 Add the coconut milk and sugar to the now-empty pot over medium heat. Stir and let cook until the sugar is dissolved.\n\n4 Put the brown rice back in the pot and bring it to a boil over medium heat. Turn the heat down to low and simmer with the lid on for 15 more minutes. Test to make sure the rice is tender\u2014if it's not, let it simmer for a few more minutes. Add the lime or orange zest and stir.\n\n5 Remove the pudding from the heat and let it cool to room temperature. You can also eat it hot, but if you chill it for 2 hours before serving, it will thicken and have a more pleasing texture.\n\nCaramelized Bananas\n\n$0.35 \/ serving\n\n$0.70 total\n\nThese bananas\u2014cooked in just a bit of caramel\u2014are crispy and gooey on the outside and almost like a soft pudding inside. Sweet, messy, and irresistible. serves 2\n\n1 tablespoon butter\n\n2 tablespoons brown sugar\n\n2 bananas, peeled and split in half lengthwise\n\n1 Melt the butter in a nonstick or cast-iron pan over medium-high heat. Add the sugar and let it melt into the butter for about 2 minutes. Stir once to create a smooth mixture.\n\n2 Place the bananas flat-side down in the butter-sugar mixture, then cook until they become brown and sticky, about 2 minutes. Carefully flip them over and do the same on the other side.\n\n3 Serve them as is or cut them into quarters. Drizzle any caramel left in the pan over the bananas. Serve with ice cream or on their own.\n\nCoconut Chocolate Cookies\n\n$0.25 \/ cookie\n\n$10 total\n\nThis is a just-chewy-enough, just-crispy-enough, just-gooey-enough cookie that's perfect for a special treat. makes approximately 40 cookies\n\n\u2154 cup shaved unsweetened coconut\n\n1 cup (2 sticks) unsalted butter\n\n2 cups all-purpose flour\n\n1 teaspoon salt, plus extra for sprinkling\n\n1 teaspoon baking soda\n\n1\u00bd cups firmly packed dark brown sugar\n\n2 eggs\n\n2 teaspoons vanilla extract\n\n1\u00bd cups chocolate chips\n\n1 Preheat the oven to 350\u00b0F.\n\n2 Spread the coconut in a thin, even layer on a baking sheet. Place it in the oven and bake until it's light brown, toasty, and aromatic, 5 to 8 minutes.\n\n3 Melt the butter in a heavy-bottomed saucepan over low heat. Allow the melted butter to cool in the pan for a few minutes.\n\n4 Stir together the flour, salt, and baking soda in a medium-size bowl.\n\n5 Beat the brown sugar and melted butter together in a large bowl until smooth, about 2 minutes. Add the eggs and vanilla and beat until the mixture lightens in color, about 5 minutes. Add the flour mixture to the brown sugar mixture, a third at a time, until it forms a dark brown, homogeneous mass. Add the chocolate chips and toasted coconut and stir until just combined.\n\n6 Place the dough in the fridge for 20 minutes. You can skip this step if you're in a hurry, but resting the dough in the fridge will help your cookies bake more evenly.\n\n7 Lightly butter a baking sheet and scoop heaping tablespoons of dough onto it, leaving large spaces between each cookie so they have room to spread out. I usually do about 6 cookies per sheet. Just before putting the cookies into the oven, sprinkle them with salt.\n\n8 Let the cookies bake until they're golden, 8 to 10 minutes. After you take them out of the oven, leave them on the baking sheet to set for 2 minutes, then move them to a wire rack to cool further. The cookies are very soft when they first come out of the oven, but they'll firm up quickly, so if you leave them on the sheet for 2 minutes, they'll transfer more easily. Don't stack the cookies until they're fully cooled.\n\n9 Repeat Steps 7 and 8 until all the dough is used. Store the finished cookies in an airtight container for up to a week.\n\nPeach Coffee Cake\n\n$0.75 \/ serving\n\n$9 total\n\nAdapted from the apple cake often served during Rosh Hashanah, this coffee cake is simple and wonderful for dessert, with tea, or as a sweet breakfast. The juicy peaches add a ton of flavor. If you buy peaches in season, the cost can be quite reasonable. serves 12\n\n1 cup (2 sticks) unsalted butter, at room temperature\n\n6 peaches, pitted and cut into 8 slices each\n\njuice of \u00bd lemon\n\n1 teaspoon ground cinnamon\n\n2 cups all-purpose flour\n\n2 teaspoons baking powder\n\n1\u2153 cups plus 1 tablespoon firmly packed brown sugar\n\n\u215b teaspoon salt\n\n1 teaspoon vanilla extract\n\n2 large eggs\n\nThis cake is a great base for all kinds of fruit, from other stone fruit like plums, to apples, to berries. Anything but citrus or melons will work. Try frozen fruit if what you want is not in season.\n\n1 Preheat the oven to 350\u00b0F.\n\n2 Use the paper wrapping from the butter to lightly grease an 8- by 11-inch glass baking dish or 9-inch springform pan. Any shape will do as long as it is large enough. This cake doubles in size when it bakes.\n\n3 Mix the peach slices, lemon juice, and cinnamon with your hands in a large bowl, making sure the peaches are well coated in cinnamon.\n\n4 Stir together the flour and baking powder in a medium-size bowl, getting rid of any lumps.\n\n5 Beat the butter, 1\u2153 cups brown sugar, and salt in another large bowl, either with a wooden spoon or an electric mixer. Stop when the mixture is fluffy and has slightly lightened in color, about 5 minutes. Add the vanilla, then the eggs one at a time, fully mixing in the first before adding the second.\n\n6 Add the flour mixture to the butter mixture, gently incorporating until it's smooth. (If you're using an electric mixer, switch to a wooden spoon.) The batter will be quite thick.\n\n7 Spread half the batter over the bottom of the buttered pan. Evenly distribute 24 of the peach slices over the top. (There should be 48 in total.) Spread the other half of the batter over the peaches, then top with the rest of the peaches. Sprinkle with the remaining 1 tablespoon brown sugar and place the cake in the oven.\n\n8 Bake until a knife inserted into the center comes out clean, about 1 hour. \nConversion Tables\n\n**Please note that all conversions are approximate but close enough to be useful when converting from one system to another.**\n\nOven Temperatures\n\n---\n\nFahrenheit | Gas Mark | Celsius\n\n250 | \u00bd | 120\n\n275 | 1  | 140\n\n300 | 2  | 150\n\n325 | 3 | 160\n\n350 | 4 | 180\n\n375 | 5 | 190\n\n400 | 6 | 200\n\n425 | 7 | 220\n\n450 | 8 | 230\n\n475 | 9 | 240\n\n500 | 10 | 260\n\nNOTE: Reduce the temperature by 20\u00b0C (68\u00b0F) for fan-assisted ovens.\n\nApproximate Equivalents\n\n1 stick butter = 8 tbsp = 4 oz = \u00bd cup = 115 g\n\n1 cup all-purpose presifted flour = 4.7 oz\n\n1 cup granulated sugar = 8 oz = 220 g\n\n1 cup firmly packed brown sugar = 6 oz = 220 g to 230 g\n\n1 cup honey or syrup = 12 oz\n\n1 cup grated cheese = 4 oz\n\n1 cup dried beans = 6 oz\n\n1 large egg = about 2 oz or about 3 tbsp\n\n1 egg yolk = about 1 tbsp\n\n1 egg white = about 2 tbsp\n\nLiquid Conversions\n\n---\n\nUS  | Imperial | Metric\n\n2 tbsp | 1 fl oz | 30 ml\n\n3 tbsp | 1\u00bc fl oz | 45 ml\n\n\u00bc cup | 2 fl oz | 60 ml\n\n\u2154 cup | 2\u00bd fl oz | 75 ml\n\n\u2153 cup + 1 tbsp | 3 fl oz | 90 ml\n\n\u2153 cup + 2 tbsp | 3\u00bd fl oz | 100 ml\n\n\u00bd cup | 4 fl oz | 125 ml\n\n\u2154 cup | 5 fl oz | 150 ml\n\n\u00be cup | 6 fl oz | 175 ml\n\n\u00be cup + 2 tbsp | 7 fl oz | 200 ml\n\n1 cup | 8 fl oz | 250 ml\n\n1 cup + 2 tbsp | 9 fl oz | 275 ml\n\n1\u00bc cups | 10 fl oz | 300 ml\n\n1\u2153 cups | 11 fl oz | 325 ml\n\n1\u00bd cups | 12 fl oz | 350 ml\n\n1\u2154 cups | 13 fl oz | 375 ml\n\n1\u00be cups | 14 fl oz | 400 ml\n\n1\u00be cups + 2 tbsp | 15 fl oz | 450 ml\n\n2 cups (1 pint) | 16 fl oz | 500 ml\n\n2\u00bd cups | 20 fl oz (1 pint) | 600 ml\n\n3\u00be cups | 1\u00bd pints | 900 ml\n\n4 cups | 1\u00be pints | 1 liter\n\nWeight Conversions\n\n---\n\nUS\/UK  | Metric\n\n\u00bd oz | 15 g\n\n1 oz | 30 g\n\n1\u00bd oz | 45 g\n\n2 oz | 60 g\n\n2\u00bd oz | 75 g\n\n3 oz | 90 g\n\n3\u00bd oz | 100 g\n\n4 oz | 125 g\n\n5 oz | 150 g\n\n6 oz | 175 g\n\n7 oz | 200 g\n\n8 oz | 250 g\n\n9 oz | 275 g\n\n10 oz | 300 g\n\n11 oz | 325 g\n\n12 oz | 350 g\n\n13 oz | 375 g\n\n14 oz | 400 g\n\n15 oz | 450 g\n\n1 lb | 500 g\nAcknowledgments\n\nFirst, special thanks to my husband, Dan. Your support and expertise were critical. But thank you most of all for never letting me give up or give in, even when I really wanted to. You make me a better person and without you, _Good and Cheap_ would be just a shadow of what it is.\n\nThank you to Mum, Dad, Emily, Hannah, and Papa for your unconditional love and support. Thank you to my incredible friends who believed in this idea before anyone else. Your excitement was infectious! Your advice and support kept me sane. Thanks particularly to Jhen for jumping in, Claire for making me look good, and Sarah and Matt for making me feel powerful.\n\nThanks to my exceptionally patient and understanding editor, Liz, a great advocate and friend. And to Selina, John, Suzie, Jenny, Emily, Janet, Gordon, Orlando, and Amanda, who have given and continue to give so much to make this project a success, I cannot thank you enough. To everyone at Workman: Thank you for taking a chance with me. I'm positive that no other first-time author has ever benefitted from so much devotion from her publisher.\n\nAnd thanks to all of you who shared your food stories: joyful, painful, incredible. You remind me every day why this work is important. The outpouring of love and support I've received is enough for several lifetimes, and I couldn't be more grateful. To those who told me this book has given them hope, inspired them, or otherwise brought them pleasure: I don't deserve so much gratitude for so little, but doing work that matters is all I have ever wanted. \nAbout the Author\n\nAuthor photo by Jordan Matter Photography. \u00a9 Workman Publishing.\n\n**Leanne Brown** is a very silly person who lives in New York City with her husband, Dan Lazin. She grew up in Edmonton, Canada, where her awesome family and many of her favorite people still reside. Before she moved to NYC, she liked to ride her bicycle everywhere. Now she rides sometimes, but takes the subway or walks other times. She likes to run in the park until she is really tired, eat pastries on the street, and go to bed late. She loves fairness, sci-fi and fantasy, tasty food, and laughing. She has been delighted by cooking and baking ever since she realized that they are the closest things we have to magic.\nSPECIAL DISCOUNTS for NON-PROFITS\n\nA special edition of Good and Cheap is available for non-profit organizations wishing to give books away to those with limited incomes. Deep discounts are available on bulk purchases of 10 or more copies. Please email goodandcheap@workman.com for more information.\n\nCopyright \u00a9 2015 by Leanne Brown\n\nPhotographs copyright \u00a9 by Leanne Brown and Dan Lazin\n\nAll rights reserved. A portion of this book was previously published by the author under a Creative Commons license. Terms of the Creative Commons license relate to portions of the book from that edition only. No portion of this book may be reproduced\u2014mechanically, electronically, or by any other means, including photocopying\u2014without written permission of the publisher. Published simultaneously in Canada by Thomas Allen & Son Limited.\n\nAn earlier version of this book was distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercialShareAlike 4.0 license. For more information, visit creativecommons.org\/licenses\/by-nc-sa\/4.0.\n\nLibrary of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available.\n\nISBN 978-0-7611-8499-7\n\nCover photo by Leanne Brown Additional Photo Credits: page 16 (from top to bottom): pixelrobot\/fotolia, lester120\/fotolia, arinahabich\/fotolia, komodoempire\/fotolia, simmittorok\/fotolia, taiftin\/fotolia; page 17 (from top to bottom): Tarzhanova\/fotolia, Workman Publishing, Viktor\/fotolia, photos777\/fotolia, pioneer\/fotolia, Andy Lidstone\/fotolia.\n\nWorkman books are available at special discounts when purchased in bulk for premiums and sales promotions as well as for fund-raising or educational use. Special editions or book excerpts also can be created to specification. For details, contact the Special Sales Director at the address below, or send an email to specialmarkets@workman.com.\n\nWorkman Publishing Co., Inc.  \n225 Varick Street  \nNew York, NY 10014-4381  \nworkman.com\n\nWORKMAN is a registered trademark of Workman Publishing Co., Inc.\n","meta":{"redpajama_set_name":"RedPajamaBook"}}