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188 005-1
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5.2.2 NASS
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The following entities are defined in ES 282 004 [5]. a4 Service control subsystems and applications TE CNG a3 a1 a2 e1 e2 e4 e3 Resource and Admission Control Subsystem CLF NACF CPECF AMF PDBF UAAF ARF e1 e2 e5 CNGCF UE Figure 8: TISPAN NAS As a result of analysis, the following entities are required to be modelled in the NRM. TISPAN Entity Remark Network Access Configuration Function (NACF) see note Access Management Function (AMF) see note Connectivity Session Location and Repository Function (CLF) see note User Access Authorization Function (UAAF) see note Profile Data Base Function (PDBF) see note CNG Configuration Function (CNGCF) see note NOTE: This entity meets Requirement 2 of clause 4.2.2 because it is well defined and should be able to generate alarms. ETSI ETSI TS 188 005-1 V2.1.1 (2009-02) 15
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188 005-1
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5.2.3 RACS
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The following entities are defined in ES 282 003 [6]. Di Transport Layer Rq Di A-RACF Ia e4 Re Gq’ Ra NASS AF SPDF Core Border Node BGF Ip Edge RCEF L2T Point Access Node RACS UE Ds Di Transport Layer Rq Di A-RACF Ia e4 Re Gq’ Ra NASS AF SPDF Core Border Node BGF Ip Edge RCEF L2T Point Access Node RACS UE Ds Figure 9: TISPAN RACS As a result of analysis, the following entities are required to be modelled in the NRM. TISPAN Entity Remarks SPDF see note A-RACF see note NOTE: There is a requirement for this well defined NGN Functional Entity to generate alarms. ETSI ETSI TS 188 005-1 V2.1.1 (2009-02) 16
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188 005-1
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5.3 List of NGN Managed Entities
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188 005-1
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5.3.1 Required NGN Managed Entities
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Based on the analysis of clauses 5.1 and 5.2, the NGN entities to be managed are: TISPAN Entity AMF (Access Management Function) A-MGF (Access) A-RACF ARF ASF Type 1 (Application Server Function (ASF) Type 1) ASF Type 2 (Application Server Function (ASF) Type 2) BGCF C-BGF CLF (Connectivity Session Location and Repository Function) CNGCF (Customer Network Gateway Configuration Function) IBCF (Interconnection Border Control Function) I-BGF I-CSCF IWF (Interworking Function) MGCF MRFC MRFP NACF (Network Access Configuration Function) PDBF Profile Data Base Function) P-CSCF RCEF SGF SLF (Subscription Locator Function) SPDF S-CSCF T-MGF (Trunking) UAAF (User Access Authorization Function) UPSF (User profile service Function)
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188 005-1
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5.3.2 Candidate NGN Managed Entities identified for further study
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TISPAN Entity Charging and data Collection Function Trunk Routing Customer Location AGF (Access Gateway Function) R-MGF (Residential Media Gateway Function) Media Gateway Function BGF L2TF ETSI ETSI TS 188 005-1 V2.1.1 (2009-02) 17 Annex A (normative): Agreed Use Cases This clause captures agreed use cases. Table A.1: Configure new SPDF Use Case Stage Evolution / Specification <<Uses>> Related use case Goal Configure new SPDF Required performance: Not real time. This Use Case identifies the mandatory steps and information that are necessary for a new SPDF to become 'Configured'. Refer to ES 282 003 [6], clause 5.2.3.1. Actor and Roles SPDF Manager. Assumptions The SPDF relies on local configuration (ES 282 003 [6], clause 5.2.3.1.10) to discover the contact points for the A-RACFs and the BGFs. Pre conditions SPDF not configured. Begins when SPDF Manager brings SPDF into service. Step1 Set list of IP Addresses/Ports or FQDNs towards interested Functional Entities it is allowed to communicate with: - set IP Addresses/Ports or FQDNs towards AF; - set IP Addresses/Ports or FQDNs towards A-RACF; - set IP Addresses/Ports or FQDNs towards BGF. There is no preferred order for the execution of the above tasks. Step 2 Set Charging information to be provided. They can be any combination of: - Charging correlation information. - Requestor Info. - Subscriber Info. - Service Priority. - Media Description. - Commit ID. - Time Stamp. - Reason. Step 3 Set operator-defined local policy. This use case is indicated as generic, because no further details are given in stage 2 specs. Step 4 Set, for each BGF, the BGF services to be requested. They can be any combination of: - Open/close gates. - Packet marking. - Resource allocation (per flow). - NAT. - Hosted NAT Traversal. - Policing of down/uplink traffic. - Usage metering. Step 7 Set Status to Active. Ends when SPDF Status = Active. Exceptions Failure of set IP Address/Port or FQDN towards AF. Failure of set IP Address/Port or FQDN towards A-RACF. Failure of set IP Address/Port or FQDN towards BGF. Post Conditions SPDF Status = Active. Traceability To be defined. NOTE: It is for further study if the Charging information related to this use case is to be included within the NRM. It is expected that additional specific use cases covering areas such as fault management, configuration management, etc. will be specified in future versions of the present document. ETSI ETSI TS 188 005-1 V2.1.1 (2009-02) 18 Annex B (informative): Candidate Use Cases <for further study> ETSI ETSI TS 188 005-1 V2.1.1 (2009-02) 19 Annex C (informative): Bibliography ETSI TS 132 631: "Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); Telecommunication Management; Configuration Management (CM); Core network resources Integration Reference Point (IRP): Requirements (3GPP TS 32 631 version 6.0.0 Release 6)". ETSI ETSI TS 188 005-1 V2.1.1 (2009-02) 20 Annex D (informative): Change history Date WG Doc. CR Rev CAT Title / Comment Current Version New Version 05-11-08 19WTD063r1 1 - F Correction to update R-MGF 2.0.0 2.0.1 Publication 2.0.1 2.1.1 ETSI ETSI TS 188 005-1 V2.1.1 (2009-02) 21 History Document history V2.0.0 February 2007 Publication V2.1.1 February 2009 Publication
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187 001
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1 Scope
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The present document defines the security requirements pertaining to TISPAN NGN Release 1. The present document holds requirements for the various NGN subsystems defined at a stage 1 level. The present document covers security requirements for both the NGN core network, and the NGN access network(s). The main scope of the security requirements for the different subsystems are to identify requirement in the following main areas: • Security Policies. • Authentication, Authorization, Access Control and Accountability. • Identity and Secure Registration. • Communications and Data Security Requirements (including confidentiality, integrity aspects). • Privacy. • Key Management. • NAT/Firewall Interworking. • Availability and DoS protection. • Assurance. • Strength of Security Mechanisms.
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2 References
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The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document. • References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. • For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply. • For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. Referenced documents which are not found to be publicly available in the expected location might be found at http://docbox.etsi.org/Reference. [1] ETSI TS 187 003: "Telecommunications and Internet converged Services and Protocols for Advanced Networking (TISPAN); NGN Security; Security Architecture". [2] ETSI TS 133 203: "Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+); Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); 3G security; Access security for IP-based services (3GPP TS 33.203)". [3] ETSI TS 133 210: "Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+); Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); 3G security; Network Domain Security (NDS); IP network layer security (3GPP TS 33.210)". [4] ETSI EG 202 238: "Telecommunications and Internet Protocol Harmonization Over Networks (TIPHON); Evaluation criteria for cryptographic algorithms". ETSI ETSI TS 187 001 V1.1.1 (2006-03) 6
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3 Definitions and abbreviations
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3.1 Definitions
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For the purposes of the present document, the following terms and definitions apply: anonymous communication: anonymous communication session is given when a user receiving a communication session cannot identify the originating user
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3.2 Abbreviations
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For the purposes of the present document, the following abbreviations apply: 3G 3rd Generation 3GPP 3rd Generation Partnership Project AA Authentication & Authorization ACR Anonymous Communications Rejection AF Application Function ALG Application Layer Gateway AP Authentication Proxy AS Application Server CNG Customer Network Gateway CPE Customer Premises Equipment CPN Customer Premises Network CSCF Call Session Control Function DoS Denial-of-Service HSS Home Subscriber Server ID IDentity IKE Internet Key Exchange IMPU IMS PUblic user ID IMS IP Multimedia Subsystem IP Internet Protocol ISIM IMS Subscriber Identity Module NAF operator controlled Network Application Function NAPT Network Address and Port Translation NASS Network Access SubSystem NAT Network Address Translation NDS Network Domain Security NGN Next Generation Network P-CSCF Proxy - Call Session Control Function PES PSTN/ISDN Emulation Subsystem RACS Resource Admission Control Subsystem S-CSCF Serving - Call Session Control Function SEGF SEcurity Gateway Functions SIP Session Initiation Protocol TE Terminal Equipment TISPAN Telecommunication and Internet converged Services and Protocols for Advanced Networking TS Technical Specification UE User Equipment UICC Universal Integrated Circuit Card UMTS Universal Mobile Telecommunication System ETSI ETSI TS 187 001 V1.1.1 (2006-03) 7
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4 Security Requirements
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Security requirements described in clause 4 are identified by a symbolic security requirement identifier (e.g. R-SP-n) for quick reference and along with some textual description. The security requirements are listed without any implied preference or priority. It is pointed out that not all security requirements are mutually exclusive, but there is indeed some unavoidable overlap among them. High level Objectives The NGN shall support a secure and trustworthy environment for customers, network operators and service providers to meet a set of comprehensive and fundamental security requirements. Given the service requirements, the security objectives are to prevent masquerade, DoS, manipulation of data, fraud and misuse of the network, abuse of one type of network through interconnection from a less secure environment. The ISIM over UICC is the preferred solution for achieving the security requirements to access the NGN IMS features. This does not preclude existing solutions such as e.g. Digest Authentication to allow early legacy implementations. The ISIM may reside on a UICC within the device itself, or be accessed remotely, via a local interface to the "device holding the UICC". Security requirements for users, service providers (access, application) may vary. The NGN security architecture shall not be limited to a single security policy. Each of the security services (authentication, data integrity, replay detection, confidentiality, etc.) must have the capability to be used independently of the others, as far as possible. The selection of services should be based on policy. Security mechanisms needs to provide capabilities to allow for extensibility for new security mechanism and protocols. Security mechanisms should not introduce new DoS attacks. Some security mechanisms and algorithms require substantial processing or storage, in which case the security protocols should protect themselves as much as possible against flooding attacks that overwhelm an endpoint with such processing or storage. Satisfying the requirement for high availability implies being able to mitigate denial-of-service attacks.
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4.1 Security Policy Requirements
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A security policy defines the legitimate users of a system and what they are allowed to do. It states what information must be protected from which threats. In environments with heterogeneous user communities, multiple vendors' equipment, differing threat models, and uneven deployment of security functionality, assurance that security is functioning correctly is extremely difficult without enforceable policies. (R-SP- 1): The TISPAN NGN network shall be logically and physically divided into security domains allowing for separation of application (e.g. IMS) and transport (e.g. ADSL or UMTS). Also different operators of similar networks (e.g. IMS) shall be able to operate their own security policies. (R-SP- 2): Security mechanisms and other parameters beyond default security mechanisms shall be configurable. This shall be static for NNI interface and may be negotiated for UNI interfaces. The security mechanism negotiation shall have a certain minimum level to be defined by the security domain; e.g. avoid bidding-down attacks. Users shall be able to reject communications that do not conform to their minimum security policy. (R-SP- 3): The security mechanisms shall be partitioned such that the functions of authentication, data integrity, replay detection, and confidentiality may be implemented and selected independently of each other, insofar as this makes sense. (R-SP- 4): The UE shall always offer encryption algorithms for P-CSCF to be used for the session and the P-CSCF policy shall define whether to use encryption or not. (R-SP- 5): The UE and the P CSCF shall negotiate the integrity algorithm that shall be used for the session. (R-SP- 6): The policy of the HN shall be used to decide if an authentication shall take place for the registration of different IMPUs e.g. belonging to same or different service profiles. ETSI ETSI TS 187 001 V1.1.1 (2006-03) 8 (R-SP- 7): The security gateway functions (SEGF) shall be responsible for enforcing security policies for the interworking between networks. NOTE: The actual inter-security domain policy is not standardized and is left to the discretion of the roaming agreements of the operators. (R-SP- 8): SEGFs are responsible for security sensitive operations and shall offer capabilities for secure storage of long-term keys used for IKE authentication. 4.2 Authentication, Authorization, Access Control and Accountability Requirements General Access authentication (R-AA- 1): Access to NGN networks, services, and applications shall be provided for authorized users only. (R-AA- 2): NGN R1 IMS authentication shall support early deployment scenarios (with support for legacy equipments). (R-AA- 3): In non-early deployment scenarios, IMS authentication shall be independent from access authentication. (R-AA- 4): An ISIM shall be used to access any IMS service, however, exceptions may be allowed for emergency calls and early deployment scenarios. (R-AA- 5): ISIM based Authentication between the IMS-subscriber and the network shall comply to the authentication part of Access Security for IP-based services TS 133 203 [2]. (R-AA- 6): ISIM based Re-authentication of an IMS-subscriber shall comply to the authentication part of Access Security for IP-based services TS 133 203 [2]. (R-AA- 7): It shall be possible to prevent the use of a particular ISIM to access NGN networks and services and it should be possible to revoke a specific ISIM. (R-AA- 8): NGN relevant ISIM specific information shall be protected against unauthorized access or alteration. (R-AA- 9): User authentication may either be hardware-based (for 3GPP UE: ISIM; i.e. proof by possession of a physical token) or be software-based (i.e. proof by knowledge of some secret information). Early Deployments (R-AA- 10): User Authentication to the NGN IMS using SIP Digest mechanisms shall be supported as a early deployment scenario. (R-AA- 11): Where both Digest and ISIM solutions are deployed by an NGN IMS operator, that operator shall determine the authentication mechanism (SIP Digest or ISIM-based) on a per-user basis. The authentication mechanism shall be enforced according to both the subscription information in the user's service profile and the specific policies of the NGN IMS operator. (R-AA- 12): Transmitted passwords shall be sufficiently protected; e.g. by encryption or other techniques. ETSI ETSI TS 187 001 V1.1.1 (2006-03) 9 (R-AA- 13): For the special early deployment scenarios (see note 1), where IMS authentication is linked to access authentication, it shall be possible to gain access to IMS services after an authentication procedure. This authentication provides simultaneous access to the access network and IMS services. NOTE 1: The two special early deployment scenarios are (also referred to as NASS Bundled authentication): (A). IMS authentication is linked to access line authentication (no nomadicity) (B). IMS authentication is linked to access authentication for IP Connectivity (limited nomadicity can be provided) NOTE 2: Access authentication may result in IMS services being tied to the access point (line) or to the current IP Connectivity (device). In the latter case limited nomadicity may be available. No IMS specific authentication is therefore required from the CPE/Terminal to gain access to IMS services. (R-AA- 14): The NGN subsystems shall be able to be able to define and enforce policy with respect to validity of user authorization. Ut Interface (R-AA- 15): Mutual authentication shall be supported between the UE and the AS before providing authorization. (R-AA- 16): It SHOULD also be possible to support an Authentication Proxy based architecture. NOTE 1: The purpose of the AP is to separate the authentication procedure and the AS specific application logic to different logical entities. (R-AA- 17): Mutual authentication shall be supported between the UE and the AP. (R-AA- 18): The AP shall decide whether a particular subscriber (i.e. the UE), is authorized to access a particular AS. (R-AA- 19): If an AP is used, the AS shall only authorize the access request to the requested resource. NOTE 2: The AS does not need to explicitly authenticate the user. NASS (R-AA- 20): Mutual authentication should be supported between the CPE and the NASS during access network level registration. (R-AA- 21): The access network shall be able to authenticate and authorize the access subscriber. (R-AA- 22): Authentication and authorization to the Access Network is controlled by the operator of the Access Network. (R-AA- 23): The attributes required for authentication of a user by the access network maybe provided by the network operator to whom the user has a NGN IMS subscription. (R-AA- 24): NASS shall support both the use explicit (e.g. PPP or IEEE 802.1x) and/or implicit line authentication (e.g. MAC address authentication or line authentication) of the users/subscribers. In the case of the implicit access authentication, it shall rely only on an implicit authentication through physical or logic identity on the layer 2 (L2) transport layer. (R-AA- 25): In case the CNG is a routing modem and the Customer Premises Network (CPN) is a private IP realm, authentication shall be initiated from the CNG. (R-AA- 26): In case the CNG is a bridge, each UE shall authenticate with the NASS as the IP realm in the CPN is known to the Access Network. ETSI ETSI TS 187 001 V1.1.1 (2006-03) 10 RACS (R-AA- 27): As the interface between the Application Function (AF) and RACS can be inter-operator, the RACS shall authenticate and authorize the Application Function (AF). Other Specific Requirements (R-AA- 28): A media gateway controller must be able to handle authentication of multiple media gateways, i.e. to maintain multiple security associations with different media gateways. (R-AA- 29): Authentication of NGN users and authentication of NGN terminals shall be separate. (R-AA- 30): Caller id and location information shall be stored according to the Common European regulatory framework by the EMTEL Service Provider. Caller ID and location information shall be validated by the EMTEL Service Provider.
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4.3 Identity and Secure Registration Requirements
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The following requirements aims to mitigate against masquerading, spoofing, and impersonation of NGN terminals, devices/systems (HW/SW) and users. The requirements aim to provide measures against identity theft, misuse/authorized use of NGN services/applications. (R-IR- 1): It shall be possible to implicitly register IMPU(s). The implicitly registered IMPU(s) all belong to the same Service Profile. All the IMPU(s) being implicitly registered shall be delivered by the HSS to the S-CSCF and subsequently to the P-CSCF. The S-CSCF shall regard all implicitly registered IMPU(s) as registered IMPU(s). (R-IR- 2): An access identity shall be used for access authentication. This identity may or may not be used for other purposes. (R-IR- 3): The line ID shall be possible to use for line authentication.
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4.4 Communications and Data Security Requirements
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Clause 4.4 contains such requirements that address communications and data security. Data, in this context, can mean either user data (e.g. voice, video, text stream) or management data.
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4.4.1 General Communications and Data Security Requirements
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General (R-CD- 1): Confidentiality and integrity of IMS signalling shall be applied in a hop-to-hop fashion. (UE-to-P-CSCF and among other NEs). NDS (R-CD- 2): Network Domain Security (NDS) shall be provided at the network layer and comply to TS 133 210 [3]. (R-CD- 3): All NDS/IP traffic shall pass through a SEGF (Security Gateway Function) before entering or leaving the security domain. IMS operators shall operate NDS/IP Za interface between SEGFs according to TS 133 210 [3]. (R-CD- 4): Security shall be provided within the network domain for the Cx interface. ETSI ETSI TS 187 001 V1.1.1 (2006-03) 11 Access Security (R-CD- 5): An ISIM based solution for IMS access security (authentication, confidentiality and integrity protection) of signalling to and from the user, shall be supported. (R-CD- 6): Secure link shall be provided between UE and the P-CSCF for protection of the Gm reference point. (R-CD- 7): In case access authentication is independent from IMS authentication. • Solutions for access to the NGN core shall provide for secure transfer of signalling to the NGN core independent of the access technology. • Solutions for access to the NGN core shall provide for secure transfer of signalling to the NGN core independent of the presence of intermediate IP networks connecting the NGN access with the NGN core. • Solutions for access to the NGN core shall allow for mutual authentication of end user and NGN core. It shall be possible for the terminal to authenticate the user. (R-CD- 8): In the case where IMS authentication is linked to access line authentication the underlying access technology shall provide protection of NGN signalling and user data. (R-CD- 9): ISIM specific information shall be updated in a secure manner. Ut (R-CD- 10): It shall be possible to protect sensitive data (such as Presence information and notifications) from attacks (e.g. eavesdropping, tampering, and replay attacks). RACS (R-CD- 11): The Rq and Gq' reference points shall provide mechanism to assure security of the information exchanged. Other Specific Requirements (R-CD- 12): All data related to configuring the UE through the e3 if shall be protected against loss of confidentiality and against loss of integrity.
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4.4.2 Integrity and Replay Protection Requirements
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General (R-CD- 13): Integrity protection of signalling, control communications and of stored data shall be provided. (R-CD- 14): It shall be possible to ensure the origin, integrity and freshness of authentication data, particularly of the cipher key. Access Security (R-CD- 15): Integrity protection shall be applied between the UE and the P-CSCF for protecting the SIP signalling. NDS (R-CD- 16): Integrity protection between Network Elements (e.g. between CSCFs, and between CSCFs and the HSS) shall rely on mechanisms specified by Network Domain Security in TS 133 210 [3]. Ut (R-CD- 17): Data integrity shall be supported between the UE and the Application Server. ETSI ETSI TS 187 001 V1.1.1 (2006-03) 12
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4.4.3 Confidentiality Requirements
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General (R-CD- 18): Confidentiality of communications should be achieved by cryptographic encryption. Confidentiality of stored data shall be achieved by cryptographic encryption or by access controls. (R-CD- 19): Confidentiality of signalling and control messages shall be enforced if required by the application or in environments where the security policy demands confidentiality. The mechanism should allow a choice in the algorithm to be used. Access Security (R-CD- 20): IMS specific confidentiality protection shall be provided for the SIP signalling between UE and P-CSCF. NDS (R-CD- 21): Confidentiality protection between Network Functions (e.g. between CSCFs, or between CSCFs and the HSS) shall rely on mechanisms specified by Network Domain Security in TS 133 210 [3]. Other Specific Requirements (R-CD- 22): It shall be possible to protect the confidentiality of user-related data which is stored or processed by a provider.
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4.5 Privacy Requirements
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(R-P- 1): It shall be possible to protect the network topology from exposure toward other domains. It shall also be possible for a security domains to define and implement protection against traffic analysis for signalling and management protocols. (R-P- 2): User location and usage patterns shall be kept from unwanted disclosure. (R-P- 3): It shall be possible to protect the confidentiality of user identity data. (R-P- 4): Anonymous communication sessions shall be supported in NGN either in a permanent mode or in a temporary mode communication by call. In this case the originating party identity shall not be presented to the destination party. The network to which the destination party is connected to is responsible to handle this service. (R-P- 5): NGN shall support the specific case where the destination party has an override right (e.g. emergency communication sessions), and the originating party identity is provided to the destination party independent whether or not this communication session is anonymous. (R-P- 6): The Anonymous Communications Rejection (ACR) simulation service shall allow the served user to reject incoming communication from users or subscribers who have restricted the presentation of their originating identity according to the OIR simulation service. (R-P- 7): The NGN shall support mechanisms for the network operator to guarantee the authenticity of a user identity presented for an incoming call to a user where the call is wholly within that operator's network (i.e. originating and terminating parties are subscribers to, and resident in, a single NGN). (R-P- 8): The NGN shall provide mechanisms that allow to present the identity of the session originator, if this is not restricted by the session originator. (R-P- 9): The privacy aspect of presence information and the need for authorization before providing presence information shall be configurable by the user (i.e. presentity). ETSI ETSI TS 187 001 V1.1.1 (2006-03) 13 (R-P- 10): A principal of a presentity shall, at any time, be able to control to whom, for how long and what (all or part of) presence information of the presentity is provided, and a principal of a watcher shall, at any time, be able to control to whom, for how long and what (all or part of) watcher information of the watcher is provided (R-P- 11): Any services using the presence information shall ensure privacy agreement before releasing presence information. The presence service does not address deployment specific issues (e.g. where agreements are stored or how they are negotiated). It only gives requirements for privacy management. (R-P- 12): It shall be possible for the sender of the message to request to hide its public ID from the recipient (R-P- 13): Users may select the Identity presented when starting a session or sending a message. It shall be possible to verify this identity and to initiate a session or message in reply.
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4.6 Key Management Requirements
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(R-KM- 1): Key management and key distribution between SEGFs shall comply to the Network Domain Security TS 133 210 [3]. (R-KM- 2): The UE and the AS shall be able to resume a previously established secure session. (R-KM- 3): The key management mechanism must be able to traverse a NAT/NATP device.
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4.7 Secure Management Requirements
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Security Management requirements are for further study.
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4.8 NAT/Firewall Interworking Requirements
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Firewall is here understood in a generic sense. A firewall could be an application-level gateway (ALG), a proxy, a packet-filter, a NAT/NATP device or a combination of all of those. A Security Gateway Function is an entity on the border of the IP security domain and is used to secure native IP based protocols over the Za interfaces. (R-NF- 1): NGN security protocols shall work with commonly-used firewalls and shall work in environments with NAT/NATP. (R-NF- 2): Filters to screen the IP packets to restrict/grant access to specific bearer streams shall be supported. (R-NF- 3): The SEGFs may include filtering policies and firewall functionality not required in TS 133 210 [3].
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4.9 Non-Repudiation Requirements
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Non-repudiation requirements are for further study.
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4.10 Availability and DoS protection Requirements
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(R-AD- 1): Mechanisms shall be provided to mitigate denial-of-service attacks. (R-AD- 2): Provide access control mechanisms to ensure that authorized users only can access the service. (R-AD- 3): It shall be possible to prevent intruders from restricting the availability of services by logical means. (R-AD- 4): Availability of and accuracy of location information shall be provided for the EMTEL services. (R-AD- 5): Availability of EMTEL PSAPs shall not be decreased by DoS attacks. EMTEL PSAPs shall be able to reconnect. ETSI ETSI TS 187 001 V1.1.1 (2006-03) 14
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4.11 Assurance Requirements
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(R-AS- 1): The TISPAN NGN shall provide guidance for evaluating and certifying NGN equipment and systems. (R-AS- 2): Security implications of potential misuse of protocols used in NGN shall be documented through a TVRA. This enables users to assess the security they need before deploying the given protocol.
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4.12 Requirements on Strength of Security Mechanisms
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The guidelines defined in EG 202 238 [4] shall be followed when defining or selecting cryptographic algorithms in TISPAN.
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5 NGN Security Release 1 Requirements Mapping
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Clause 5 maps the security requirements identified in clause 4 to the different subsystems as well as the interfaces they applies to. Clause 5 is intended as an informational clause to make it easier to trace requirements per interface and subsystem. Other networks Other subsystems Core IMS PSTN/ISDN Emulation subsystem User Equipment Service Layer Transport Layer Transfer Functions Resource and Admission Control Subsystem Network Attachment Subsystem Applications User profiles Figure 1: TISPAN NGN overall architecture
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f70fb7e2e21534cac81ae96c16587368
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187 001
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5.1 Network Access SubSystem (NASS)
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Requirements related to NASS Security Requirements (R-AA- 24): NASS shall support both the use explicit (e.g. PPP or IEEE 802.1x) and/or implicit line authentication (e.g. MAC address authentication or line authentication) of the users/subscribers. In the case of the implicit access authentication, it shall rely only on an implicit authentication through physical or logic identity on the layer 2 (L2) transport layer. (R-AA- 25): In case the CNG is a routing modem and the Customer Premises Network (CPN) is a private IP realm, authentication shall be initiated from the CNG. (R-AA- 26): In case the CNG is a bridge, each UE shall authenticate with the NASS as the IP realm in the CPN is known to the Access Network. (R-AA- 3): In non-early deployment scenarios, IMS authentication shall be independent from access authentication. ETSI ETSI TS 187 001 V1.1.1 (2006-03) 15 Security Requirements (R-AA- 7): It shall be possible to prevent the use of a particular ISIM to access NGN networks and services and it should be possible to revoke a specific ISIM. (R-AA- 11): Where both Digest and ISIM solutions are deployed by an NGN IMS operator, that operator shall determine the authentication mechanism (SIP Digest or ISIM-based) on a per-user basis. The authentication mechanism shall be enforced according to both the subscription information in the user's service profile and the specific policies of the NGN IMS operator. (R-AA- 12): Transmitted passwords shall be sufficiently protected; e.g. by encryption or other techniques. (R-AA- 13): For the special early deployment scenarios (see note 1), where IMS authentication is linked to access authentication, it shall be possible to gain access to IMS services after an authentication procedure. This authentication provides simultaneous access to the access network and IMS services. NOTE 1: The two special early deployment scenarios are (also referred to as NASS Bundled authentication): (A). IMS authentication is linked to access line authentication (no nomadicity) (B). IMS authentication is linked to access authentication for IP Connectivity (limited nomadicity can be provided) NOTE 2: Access authentication may result in IMS services being tied to the access point (line) or to the current IP Connectivity (device). In the latter case limited nomadicity may be available. No IMS specific authentication is therefore required from the CPE/Terminal to gain access to IMS services. (R-AA- 14): The NGN subsystems shall be able to be able to define and enforce policy with respect to validity of user authorization. (R-AA- 20): Mutual authentication should be supported between the CPE and the NASS during access network level registration. (R-AA- 21): The access network shall be able to authenticate and authorize the access subscriber. (R-AA- 22): Authentication and authorization to the Access Network is controlled by the operator of the Access Network. (R-AA- 23): The attributes required for authentication of a user by the access network maybe provided by the network operator to whom the user has a NGN IMS subscription. (R-AA- 30): Caller id and location information shall be stored according to the Common European regulatory framework by the EMTEL Service Provider. Caller ID and location information shall be validated by the EMTEL Service Provider. (R-SP- 1): The TISPAN NGN network shall be logically and physically divided into security domains allowing for separation of application (e.g. IMS) and transport (e.g. ADSL or UMTS). Also different operators of similar networks (e.g. IMS) shall be able to operate their own security policies. (R-SP- 3): The security mechanisms shall be partitioned such that the functions of authentication, data integrity, replay detection, and confidentiality may be implemented and selected independently of each other, insofar as this makes sense. (R-IR- 2): An access identity shall be used for access authentication. This identity may or may not be used for other purposes. (R-IR- 3): The line ID shall be possible to use for line authentication. (R-CD- 2): Network Domain Security (NDS) shall be provided at the network layer and comply to TS 133 210 [3]. (R-CD- 3): All NDS/IP traffic shall pass through a SEGF (Security Gateway Function) before entering or leaving the security domain. IMS operators shall operate NDS/IP Za interface between SEGFs according to TS 133 210 [3]. (R-CD- 7): In case access authentication is independent from IMS authentication (R-CD- 8): In the case where IMS authentication is linked to access line authentication the underlying access technology shall provide protection of NGN signalling and user data. (R-CD- 12): All data related to configuring the UE through the e3 if shall be protected against loss of confidentiality and against loss of integrity. (R-CD- 13): Integrity protection of signalling, control communications and of stored data shall be provided. (R-CD- 18): Confidentiality of communications should be achieved by cryptographic encryption. Confidentiality of stored data shall be achieved by cryptographic encryption or by access controls. (R-CD- 19): Confidentiality of signalling and control messages shall be enforced if required by the application or in environments where the security policy demands confidentiality. The mechanism should allow a choice in the algorithm to be used. (R-CD- 22): It shall be possible to protect the confidentiality of user-related data which is stored or processed by a provider. (R-P- 1): It shall be possible to protect the network topology from exposure toward other domains. It shall also be possible for a security domains to define and implement protection against traffic analysis for signalling and management protocols. (R-P- 2): User location and usage patterns shall be kept from unwanted disclosure. (R-P- 3): It shall be possible to protect the confidentiality of user identity data. (R-P- 5): NGN shall support the specific case where the destination party has an override right (e.g. emergency communication sessions), and the originating party identity is provided to the destination party independent whether or not this communication session is anonymous. (R-P- 7): The NGN shall support mechanisms for the network operator to guarantee the authenticity of a user identity presented for an incoming call to a user where the call is wholly within that operator's network (i.e. originating and terminating parties are subscribers to, and resident in, a single NGN). ETSI ETSI TS 187 001 V1.1.1 (2006-03) 16 Security Requirements (R-P- 8): The NGN shall provide mechanisms that allow to present the identity of the session originator, if this is not restricted by the session originator. (R-KM- 3): The key management mechanism must be able to traverse a NAT/NATP device. (R-NF- 1): NGN security protocols shall work with commonly-used firewalls and shall work in environments with NAT/NATP. (R-NF- 2): Filters to screen the IP packets to restrict/grant access to specific bearer streams shall be supported. (R-AD- 1): Mechanisms shall be provided to mitigate denial-of-service attacks. (R-AD- 2): Provide access control mechanisms to ensure that authorized users only can access the service. (R-AD- 3): It shall be possible to prevent intruders from restricting the availability of services by logical means. (R-AD- 4): Availability of and accuracy of location information shall be provided for the EMTEL services. (R-AD- 5): Availability of EMTEL PSAPs shall not be decreased by DoS attacks. EMTEL PSAPs shall be able to reconnect. (R-AS- 1): The TISPAN NGN shall provide guidance for evaluating and certifying NGN equipment and systems. (R-AS- 2): Security implications of potential misuse of protocols used in NGN shall be documented through a TVRA. This enables users to assess the security they need before deploying the given protocol.
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f70fb7e2e21534cac81ae96c16587368
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187 001
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5.2 Resource and Admission Control Subsystem (RACS)
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Requirements related to RACS Security Requirements (R-AA- 27): As the interface between the Application Function (AF) and RACS can be inter-operator, the RACS shall authenticate and authorize the Application Function (AF). (R-SP- 1): The TISPAN NGN network shall be logically and physically divided into security domains allowing for separation of application (e.g. IMS) and transport (e.g. ADSL or UMTS). Also different operators of similar networks (e.g. IMS) shall be able to operate their own security policies. (R-CD- 2): Network Domain Security (NDS) shall be provided at the network layer and comply to TS 133 210 [3]. (R-CD- 3): All NDS/IP traffic shall pass through a SEGF (Security Gateway Function) before entering or leaving the security domain. IMS operators shall operate NDS/IP Za interface between SEGFs according to TS 133 210 [3]. (R-CD- 11): The Rq and Gq' reference points shall provide mechanism to assure security of the information exchanged. (R-CD- 13): Integrity protection of signalling, control communications and of stored data shall be provided. (R-CD- 18): Confidentiality of communications should be achieved by cryptographic encryption. Confidentiality of stored data shall be achieved by cryptographic encryption or by access controls. (R-CD- 19): Confidentiality of signalling and control messages shall be enforced if required by the application or in environments where the security policy demands confidentiality. The mechanism should allow a choice in the algorithm to be used. (R-CD- 22): It shall be possible to protect the confidentiality of user-related data which is stored or processed by a provider. (R-P- 1): It shall be possible to protect the network topology from exposure toward other domains. It shall also be possible for a security domains to define and implement protection against traffic analysis for signalling and management protocols. (R-P- 2): User location and usage patterns shall be kept from unwanted disclosure. (R-P- 3): It shall be possible to protect the confidentiality of user identity data. (R-P- 5): NGN shall support the specific case where the destination party has an override right (e.g. emergency communication sessions), and the originating party identity is provided to the destination party independent whether or not this communication session is anonymous. (R-AS- 1): The TISPAN NGN shall provide guidance for evaluating and certifying NGN equipment and systems. (R-AS- 2): Security implications of potential misuse of protocols used in NGN shall be documented through a TVRA. This enables users to assess the security they need before deploying the given protocol. ETSI ETSI TS 187 001 V1.1.1 (2006-03) 17
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f70fb7e2e21534cac81ae96c16587368
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187 001
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5.3 The Core IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS)
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Requirements related to Core IMS Security Requirements (R-AA- 1): Access to NGN networks, services, and applications shall be provided for authorized users only. (R-AA- 3): In non-early deployment scenarios, IMS authentication shall be independent from access authentication. (R-AA- 4): An ISIM shall be used to access any IMS service, however, exceptions may be allowed for emergency calls and early deployment scenarios. (R-AA- 5): ISIM based Authentication between the IMS-subscriber and the network shall comply to the authentication part of Access Security for IP-based services TS 133 203 [2]. (R-AA- 6): ISIM based Re-authentication of an IMS-subscriber shall comply to the authentication part of Access Security for IP-based services TS 133 203 [2]. (R-AA- 7): It shall be possible to prevent the use of a particular ISIM to access NGN networks and services and it should be possible to revoke a specific ISIM. (R-AA- 8): NGN relevant ISIM specific information shall be protected against unauthorized access or alteration. (R-AA- 9): User authentication may either be hardware-based (for 3GPP UE: ISIM; i.e. proof by possession of a physical token) or be software-based (i.e. proof by knowledge of some secret information). (R-AA- 10): User Authentication to the NGN IMS using SIP Digest mechanisms shall be supported as a early deployment scenario. (R-AA- 11): Where both Digest and ISIM solutions are deployed by an NGN IMS operator, that operator shall determine the authentication mechanism (SIP Digest or ISIM-based) on a per-user basis. The authentication mechanism shall be enforced according to both the subscription information in the user's service profile and the specific policies of the NGN IMS operator. (R-AA- 12): Transmitted passwords shall be sufficiently protected; e.g. by encryption or other techniques. (R-AA- 13): For the special early deployment scenarios (see note 1), where IMS authentication is linked to access authentication, it shall be possible to gain access to IMS services after an authentication procedure. This authentication provides simultaneous access to the access network and IMS services. NOTE 1: The two special early deployment scenarios are (also referred to as NASS Bundled authentication): (A). IMS authentication is linked to access line authentication (no nomadicity) (B). IMS authentication is linked to access authentication for IP Connectivity (limited nomadicity can be provided) NOTE 2: Access authentication may result in IMS services being tied to the access point (line) or to the current IP Connectivity (device). In the latter case limited nomadicity may be available. No IMS specific authentication is therefore required from the CPE/Terminal to gain access to IMS services. (R-AA- 14): The NGN subsystems shall be able to be able to define and enforce policy with respect to validity of user authorization. (R-AA- 23): The attributes required for authentication of a user by the access network maybe provided by the network operator to whom the user has a NGN IMS subscription. (R-AA- 25): In case the CNG is a routing modem and the Customer Premises Network (CPN) is a private IP realm, authentication shall be initiated from the CNG. (R-AA- 29): Authentication of NGN users and authentication of NGN terminals shall be separate. (R-AA- 30): Caller id and location information shall be stored according to the Common European regulatory framework by the EMTEL Service Provider. Caller ID and location information shall be validated by the EMTEL Service Provider. (R-SP- 1): The TISPAN NGN network shall be logically and physically divided into security domains allowing for separation of application (e.g. IMS) and transport (e.g. ADSL or UMTS). Also different operators of similar networks (e.g. IMS) shall be able to operate their own security policies. (R-SP- 2): Security mechanisms and other parameters beyond default security mechanisms shall be configurable. This shall be static for NNI interface and may be negotiated for UNI interfaces. The security mechanism negotiation shall have a certain minimum level to be defined by the security domain; e.g. avoid bidding-down attacks. Users shall be able to reject communications that do not conform to their minimum security policy. (R-SP- 3): The security mechanisms shall be partitioned such that the functions of authentication, data integrity, replay detection, and confidentiality may be implemented and selected independently of each other, insofar as this makes sense. (R-SP- 4): The UE shall always offer encryption algorithms for P-CSCF to be used for the session and the P-CSCF policy shall define whether to use encryption or not. (R-SP- 5): The UE and the P CSCF shall negotiate the integrity algorithm that shall be used for the session. (R-SP- 6): The policy of the HN shall be used to decide if an authentication shall take place for the registration of different IMPUs e.g. belonging to same or different service profiles. (R-SP- 7): The security gateway functions (SEGF) shall be responsible for enforcing security policies for the interworking between networks. (R-SP- 8): SEGFs are responsible for security sensitive operations and shall offer capabilities for secure storage of long-term keys used for IKE authentication. ETSI ETSI TS 187 001 V1.1.1 (2006-03) 18 Security Requirements (R-IR- 1): It shall be possible to implicitly register IMPU(s). The implicitly registered IMPU(s) all belong to the same Service Profile. All the IMPU(s) being implicitly registered shall be delivered by the HSS to the S-CSCF and subsequently to the P-CSCF. The S-CSCF shall regard all implicitly registered IMPU(s) as registered IMPU(s). (R-IR- 2): An access identity shall be used for access authentication. This identity may or may not be used for other purposes. (R-CD- 1): Confidentiality and integrity of IMS signalling shall be applied in a hop-to-hop fashion. (UE-to-P-CSCF and among other NEs). (R-CD- 2): Network Domain Security (NDS) shall be provided at the network layer and comply to TS 133 210 [3]. (R-CD- 3): All NDS/IP traffic shall pass through a SEGF (Security Gateway Function) before entering or leaving the security domain. IMS operators shall operate NDS/IP Za interface between SEGFs according to TS 133 210 [3]. (R-CD- 4): Security shall be provided within the network domain for the Cx interface. (R-CD- 5): An ISIM based solution for IMS access security (authentication, confidentiality and integrity protection) of signalling to and from the user, shall be supported. (R-CD- 6): Secure link shall be provided between UE and the P-CSCF for protection of the Gm reference point. (R-CD- 7): In case access authentication is independent from IMS authentication. (R-CD- 8): In the case where IMS authentication is linked to access line authentication the underlying access technology shall provide protection of NGN signalling and user data. (R-CD- 9): ISIM specific information shall be updated in a secure manner. (R-CD- 13): Integrity protection of signalling, control communications and of stored data shall be provided. (R-CD- 14): It shall be possible to ensure the origin, integrity and freshness of authentication data, particularly of the cipher key. (R-CD- 15): Integrity protection shall be applied between the UE and the P-CSCF for protecting the SIP signalling. (R-CD- 16): Integrity protection between Network Elements (e.g. between CSCFs, and between CSCFs and the HSS) shall rely on mechanisms specified by Network Domain Security in TS 133 210 [3]. (R-CD- 18): Confidentiality of communications should be achieved by cryptographic encryption. Confidentiality of stored data shall be achieved by cryptographic encryption or by access controls. (R-CD- 19): Confidentiality of signalling and control messages shall be enforced if required by the application or in environments where the security policy demands confidentiality. The mechanism should allow a choice in the algorithm to be used. (R-CD- 20): IMS specific confidentiality protection shall be provided for the SIP signalling between UE and P-CSCF. (R-CD- 21): Confidentiality protection between Network Functions (e.g. between CSCFs, or between CSCFs and the HSS) shall rely on mechanisms specified by Network Domain Security in TS 133 210 [3]. (R-CD- 22): It shall be possible to protect the confidentiality of user-related data which is stored or processed by a provider. (R-P- 1): It shall be possible to protect the network topology from exposure toward other domains. It shall also be possible for a security domains to define and implement protection against traffic analysis for signalling and management protocols. (R-P- 2): User location and usage patterns shall be kept from unwanted disclosure. (R-P- 3): It shall be possible to protect the confidentiality of user identity data. (R-P- 4): Anonymous communication sessions shall be supported in NGN either in a permanent mode or in a temporary mode communication by call. In this case the originating party identity shall not be presented to the destination party. The network to which the destination party is connected to is responsible to handle this service. (R-P- 5): NGN shall support the specific case where the destination party has an override right (e.g. emergency communication sessions), and the originating party identity is provided to the destination party independent whether or not this communication session is anonymous. (R-P- 6): The Anonymous Communications Rejection (ACR) simulation service shall allow the served user to reject incoming communication from users or subscribers who have restricted the presentation of their originating identity according to the OIR simulation service. (R-P- 7): The NGN shall support mechanisms for the network operator to guarantee the authenticity of a user identity presented for an incoming call to a user where the call is wholly within that operator's network (i.e. originating and terminating parties are subscribers to, and resident in, a single NGN). (R-P- 8): The NGN shall provide mechanisms that allow to present the identity of the session originator, if this is not restricted by the session originator. (R-P- 9): The privacy aspect of presence information and the need for authorization before providing presence information shall be configurable by the user (i.e. presentity). (R-P- 10): A principal of a presentity shall, at any time, be able to control to whom, for how long and what (all or part of) presence information of the presentity is provided, and a principal of a watcher shall, at any time, be able to control to whom, for how long and what (all or part of) watcher information of the watcher is provided (R-P- 11): Any services using the presence information shall ensure privacy agreement before releasing presence information. The presence service does not address deployment specific issues (e.g. where agreements are stored or how they are negotiated). It only gives requirements for privacy management. (R-P- 12): It shall be possible for the sender of the message to request to hide its public ID from the recipient. ETSI ETSI TS 187 001 V1.1.1 (2006-03) 19 Security Requirements (R-P- 13): Users may select the Identity presented when starting a session or sending a message. It shall be possible to verify this identity and to initiate a session or message in reply. (R-KM- 1): Key management and key distribution between SEGFs shall comply to the Network Domain Security TS 133 210 [3]. (R-KM- 2): The UE and the AS shall be able to resume a previously established secure session. (R-KM- 3): The key management mechanism must be able to traverse a NAT/NATP device. (R-NF- 1): NGN security protocols shall work with commonly-used firewalls and shall work in environments with NAT/NATP. (R-NF- 2): Filters to screen the IP packets to restrict/grant access to specific bearer streams shall be supported. (R-NF- 3): The SEGFs may include filtering policies and firewall functionality not required in TS 133 210 [3]. (R-AD- 1): Mechanisms shall be provided to mitigate denial-of-service attacks. (R-AD- 2): Provide access control mechanisms to ensure that authorized users only can access the service. (R-AD- 3): It shall be possible to prevent intruders from restricting the availability of services by logical means. (R-AD- 4): Availability of and accuracy of location information shall be provided for the EMTEL services. (R-AD- 5): Availability of EMTEL PSAPs shall not be decreased by DoS attacks. EMTEL PSAPs shall be able to reconnect. (R-AS- 1): The TISPAN NGN shall provide guidance for evaluating and certifying NGN equipment and systems. (R-AS- 2): Security implications of potential misuse of protocols used in NGN shall be documented through a TVRA. This enables users to assess the security they need before deploying the given protocol.
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f70fb7e2e21534cac81ae96c16587368
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187 001
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5.4 The PSTN/ISDN Emulation subsystem (PES)
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Requirements related to PES Security Requirements (R-AA- 28): A media gateway controller must be able to handle authentication of multiple media gateways, i.e. to maintain multiple security associations with different media gateways. (R-SP- 1): The TISPAN NGN network shall be logically and physically divided into security domains allowing for separation of application (e.g. IMS) and transport (e.g. ADSL or UMTS). Also different operators of similar networks (e.g. IMS) shall be able to operate their own security policies. (R-CD- 2): Network Domain Security (NDS) shall be provided at the network layer and comply to TS 133 210 [3]. (R-CD- 3): All NDS/IP traffic shall pass through a SEGF (Security Gateway Function) before entering or leaving the security domain. IMS operators shall operate NDS/IP Za interface between SEGFs according to TS 133 210 [3]. (R-CD- 8): In the case where IMS authentication is linked to access line authentication the underlying access technology shall provide protection of NGN signalling and user data. (R-CD- 13): Integrity protection of signalling, control communications and of stored data shall be provided. (R-CD- 16): Integrity protection between Network Elements (e.g. between CSCFs, and between CSCFs and the HSS) shall rely on mechanisms specified by Network Domain Security in TS 133 210 [3]. (R-CD- 18): Confidentiality of communications should be achieved by cryptographic encryption. Confidentiality of stored data shall be achieved by cryptographic encryption or by access controls. (R-CD- 19): Confidentiality of signalling and control messages shall be enforced if required by the application or in environments where the security policy demands confidentiality. The mechanism should allow a choice in the algorithm to be used. (R-CD- 21): Confidentiality protection between Network Functions (e.g. between CSCFs, or between CSCFs and the HSS) shall rely on mechanisms specified by Network Domain Security in TS 133 210 [3]. (R-CD- 22): It shall be possible to protect the confidentiality of user-related data which is stored or processed by a provider. (R-P- 1): It shall be possible to protect the network topology from exposure toward other domains. It shall also be possible for a security domains to define and implement protection against traffic analysis for signalling and management protocols. (R-P- 2): User location and usage patterns shall be kept from unwanted disclosure. (R-P- 3): It shall be possible to protect the confidentiality of user identity data. (R-P- 4): Anonymous communication sessions shall be supported in NGN either in a permanent mode or in a temporary mode communication by call. In this case the originating party identity shall not be presented to the destination party. The network to which the destination party is connected to is responsible to handle this service. (R-P- 5): NGN shall support the specific case where the destination party has an override right (e.g. emergency communication sessions), and the originating party identity is provided to the destination party independent whether or not this communication session is anonymous. (R-P- 7): The NGN shall support mechanisms for the network operator to guarantee the authenticity of a user identity presented for an incoming call to a user where the call is wholly within that operator's network (i.e. originating and terminating parties are subscribers to, and resident in, a single NGN). (R-P- 8): The NGN shall provide mechanisms that allow to present the identity of the session originator, if this is not restricted by the session originator. ETSI ETSI TS 187 001 V1.1.1 (2006-03) 20 Security Requirements (R-AD- 2): Provide access control mechanisms to ensure that authorized users only can access the service. (R-AD- 4): Availability of and accuracy of location information shall be provided for the EMTEL services. (R-AS- 1): The TISPAN NGN shall provide guidance for evaluating and certifying NGN equipment and systems. (R-AS- 2): Security implications of potential misuse of protocols used in NGN shall be documented through a TVRA. This enables users to assess the security they need before deploying the given protocol.
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f70fb7e2e21534cac81ae96c16587368
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187 001
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5.5 Application Server (AS)
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Clause 5.5 lists the security requirements related to the Application Systems. NOTE: This is not a separate subsystem, but has been included to make it easier to track AS related requirements. Security Requirements (R-AA- 1): Access to NGN networks, services, and applications shall be provided for authorized users only. (R-AA- 4): An ISIM shall be used to access any IMS service, however, exceptions may be allowed for emergency calls and early deployment scenarios. (R-AA- 8): NGN relevant ISIM specific information shall be protected against unauthorized access or alteration. (R-AA- 12): Transmitted passwords shall be sufficiently protected; e.g. by encryption or other techniques. (R-AA- 15): Mutual authentication shall be supported between the UE and the AS before providing authorization. (R-AA- 16): It SHOULD also be possible to support an Authentication Proxy based architecture. NOTE 1: The purpose of the AP is to separate the authentication procedure and the AS specific application logic to different logical entities. (R-AA- 17): Mutual authentication shall be supported between the UE and the AP. (R-AA- 18): The AP shall decide whether a particular subscriber (i.e. the UE), is authorized to access a particular AS. (R-AA- 19): If an AP is used, the AS shall only authorize the access request to the requested resource. NOTE 2: The AS does not need to explicitly authenticate the user. (R-SP- 1): The TISPAN NGN network shall be logically and physically divided into security domains allowing for separation of application (e.g. IMS) and transport (e.g. ADSL or UMTS). Also different operators of similar networks (e.g. IMS) shall be able to operate their own security policies. (R-CD- 10): It shall be possible to protect sensitive data (such as Presence information and notifications) from attacks (e.g. eavesdropping, tampering, and replay attacks). (R-CD- 13): Integrity protection of signalling, control communications and of stored data shall be provided. (R-CD- 17): Data integrity shall be supported between the UE and the Application Server. (R-CD- 18): Confidentiality of communications should be achieved by cryptographic encryption. Confidentiality of stored data shall be achieved by cryptographic encryption or by access controls. (R-CD- 19): Confidentiality of signalling and control messages shall be enforced if required by the application or in environments where the security policy demands confidentiality. The mechanism should allow a choice in the algorithm to be used. (R-CD- 22): It shall be possible to protect the confidentiality of user-related data which is stored or processed by a provider. (R-P- 2): User location and usage patterns shall be kept from unwanted disclosure. (R-P- 3): It shall be possible to protect the confidentiality of user identity data. (R-P- 7): The NGN shall support mechanisms for the network operator to guarantee the authenticity of a user identity presented for an incoming call to a user where the call is wholly within that operator's network (i.e. originating and terminating parties are subscribers to, and resident in, a single NGN). (R-P- 8): The NGN shall provide mechanisms that allow to present the identity of the session originator, if this is not restricted by the session originator. (R-P- 9): The privacy aspect of presence information and the need for authorization before providing presence information shall be configurable by the user (i.e. presentity). (R-P- 10): A principal of a presentity shall, at any time, be able to control to whom, for how long and what (all or part of) presence information of the presentity is provided, and a principal of a watcher shall, at any time, be able to control to whom, for how long and what (all or part of) watcher information of the watcher is provided (R-P- 11): Any services using the presence information shall ensure privacy agreement before releasing presence information. The presence service does not address deployment specific issues (e.g. where agreements are stored or how they are negotiated). It only gives requirements for privacy management. (R-KM- 2): The UE and the AS shall be able to resume a previously established secure session. (R-NF- 1): NGN security protocols shall work with commonly-used firewalls and shall work in environments with NAT/NATP. (R-AD- 2): Provide access control mechanisms to ensure that authorized users only can access the service. (R-AS- 1): The TISPAN NGN shall provide guidance for evaluating and certifying NGN equipment and systems. (R-AS- 2): Security implications of potential misuse of protocols used in NGN shall be documented through a TVRA. This enables users to assess the security they need before deploying the given protocol. ETSI ETSI TS 187 001 V1.1.1 (2006-03) 21 Annex A (informative): Bibliography • ETSI TS 133 141: "Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); Presence service; Security (3GPP TS 33.141)". ETSI ETSI TS 187 001 V1.1.1 (2006-03) 22 History Document history V1.1.1 March 2006 Publication
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e79f48614b821558e326131aea55b05e
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186 012-1
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1 Scope
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The present document specifies the protocol implementation conformance statement of the Subaddressing (SUB) service, based on IP Multimedia Call Control Protocol based on Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) and Session Description Protocol (SDP) Stage 3. Within the Next Generation Network (NGN) the stage 3 description is specified using the IP Multimedia Communication Control Protocol based on Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) and Session Description Protocol (SDP).
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e79f48614b821558e326131aea55b05e
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186 012-1
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2 References
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References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. • For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply. • Non-specific reference may be made only to a complete document or a part thereof and only in the following cases: - if it is accepted that it will be possible to use all future changes of the referenced document for the purposes of the referring document; - for informative references. Referenced documents which are not found to be publicly available in the expected location might be found at http://docbox.etsi.org/Reference. For online referenced documents, information sufficient to identify and locate the source shall be provided. Preferably, the primary source of the referenced document should be cited, in order to ensure traceability. Furthermore, the reference should, as far as possible, remain valid for the expected life of the document. The reference shall include the method of access to the referenced document and the full network address, with the same punctuation and use of upper case and lower case letters. NOTE: While any hyperlinks included in this clause were valid at the time of publication ETSI cannot guarantee their long term validity.
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e79f48614b821558e326131aea55b05e
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186 012-1
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2.1 Normative references
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The following referenced documents are indispensable for the application of the present document. For dated references, only the edition cited applies. For non-specific references, the latest edition of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. [1] ETSI ES 283 003: "Telecommunications and Internet converged Services and Protocols for Advanced Networking (TISPAN); IP Multimedia Call Control Protocol based on Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) and Session Description Protocol (SDP) Stage 3 [3GPP TS 24.229 (Release 7), modified]". [2] ETSI TS 181 002: "Telecommunications and Internet converged Services and Protocols for Advanced Networking (TISPAN); Multimedia Telephony with PSTN/ISDN simulation services". [3] IETF RFC 3261: "SIP: Session Initiation Protocol". [4] ISO/IEC 9646-7: "Information technology - Open Systems Interconnection - Conformance testing methodology and framework - Part 7: Implementation Conformance Statements". [5] IETF RFC 3966 (2004): "The tel URI for Telephone Numbers". [6] ETSI ES 283 027: "Telecommunications and Internet converged Services and Protocols for Advanced Networking (TISPAN); Endorsement of the SIP-ISUP Interworking between the IP Multimedia (IM) Core Network (CN) subsystem and Circuit Switched (CS) networks [3GPP TS 29.163 (Release 7), modified]". ETSI ETSI TS 186 012-1 V1.0.0 (2008-06) 6
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2.2 Informative references
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The following referenced documents are not essential to the use of the present document but they assist the user with regard to a particular subject area. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. Not applicable.
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186 012-1
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3 Definitions and abbreviations
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3.1 Definitions
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For the purposes of the present document, the terms and definitions given in TS 181 002 [2] and RFC 3261 [3] apply.
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3.2 Abbreviations
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For the purposes of the present document, the following abbreviations apply: HOLD communication HOLD IMS IP Multimedia Subsystem IP Internet Protocol ISDN Integrated Service Data Network NGN Next Generation Network OCB Outgoing Communication Barring PSTN Public Switched Telephone Network SDP Session Description Protocol SIP Session Initiation Protocol SUB Subaddressing UE User Equipment URI Universal Resource Identifier ETSI ETSI TS 186 012-1 V1.0.0 (2008-06) 7 4 Protocol Implementation Conformance Statement proforma Notwithstanding the provisions of the copyright clause related to the text of the present document, ETSI grants that users of the present document may freely reproduce the PICS proforma in this clause so that it can be used for its intended purposes and may further publish the completed PICS.
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4.1 Instructions for completing the PICS proforma
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4.1.1 More detailed instructions are given at the beginning of the different clauses of the PICS proforma The supplier of the implementation shall complete the PICS proforma in each of the spaces provided. If necessary, the supplier may provide additional comments separately in clause 5.
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4.1.1.1 Purposes and structure
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The purpose of this PICS proforma is to provide a mechanism whereby a supplier of an implementation of the requirements defined in reference specification [1] to [6] may provide information about the implementation in a standardized manner. The PICS proforma is subdivided into clauses for the following categories of information: • instructions for completing the PICS proforma; • identification of the implementation; • identification of the reference protocol specification; • PICS proforma tables (containing the global statement of conformance).
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4.1.2 Abbreviations and conventions
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The PICS proforma is composed of an information in tabular form in accordance with the guidelines presented in ISO/IEC 9646-7 [4]. Item column It contains a number that identifies the item in the table. Item description column It describes each respective item (e.g. parameters, timers, etc.). Reference column It gives reference to the SUB specification [5], except where explicitly stated otherwise. Status column The following notations, defined in ISO/IEC 9646-7 [4], are used for the status column: m mandatory - the capability is required to be supported. n/a not applicable - in the given context, it is impossible to use the capability. No answer in the support column is required. o optional - the capability may be supported or not. ETSI ETSI TS 186 012-1 V1.0.0 (2008-06) 8 o.i qualified optional - for mutually exclusive or selectable options from a set. "i" is an integer which identifies a unique group of related optional items and the logic of their selection which is defined immediately following the table. ci conditional - the requirement on the capability ("m", "o" or "n/a") depends on the support of other optional or conditional items. "i" is an integer identifying a unique conditional status expression that is defined immediately following the table. For nested conditional expressions, the syntax "IF ... THEN (IF ... THEN ... ELSE...) ELSE ..." shall be used to avoid ambiguities. If an ELSE clause is omitted, "ELSE n/a" shall be implied. NOTE: Support of a capability means that the capability is implemented in conformance to the specification(s) [1] to [6]. Support column The support column shall be filled in by the supplier of the implementation. The following common notations, defined in ISO/IEC 9646-7 [4], are used for the support column: Y or y supported by the implementation. N or n not supported by the implementation. N/A or n/a - no answer required (allowed only if the status is N/A, directly or after evaluation of a conditional status).
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4.2 Identification of the implementation
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Identification of the Implementation Under Test (IUT) and the system in which it resides - the System Under Test (SUT) should be filled in so as to provide as much detail as possible regarding version numbers and configuration options. The product supplier information and client information should both be filled in if they are different. A person who can answer queries regarding information supplied in the PICS should be named as the contact person.
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4.2.1 Date of the statement
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Date of the statement:
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4.2.2 Implementation Under Test (IUT) identification
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IUT name: IUT version:
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4.2.3 System Under Test (SUT) identification
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SUT name: Hardware configuration: Operating system: ETSI ETSI TS 186 012-1 V1.0.0 (2008-06) 9
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4.2.4 Product supplier
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Name: Address: Telephone number: Facsimile number: Additional information:
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186 012-1
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4.2.5 Client
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Name: Address: Telephone number: Facsimile number: Additional information:
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186 012-1
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4.2.6 PICS contact person
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Name: Telephone number: Facsimile number: Additional information:
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4.3 PICS proforma tables
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4.3.1 Global statement of conformance
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(Yes/No) Are all mandatory capabilities implemented? ETSI ETSI TS 186 012-1 V1.0.0 (2008-06) 10
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4.3.2 Roles and network capabilities
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Table 1: Roles and network capabilities Item Item description Reference Status Support 1 [UE] Is the Subaddressing service provided? 3 o 2 Is the Subaddressing service provided? 3 o 3 [MGCF] Is the interworking of isub parameter in the user part of an URI and the Subaddress contained in an ATP parameter in an ISUP message provided? 7.4.5/[6] o
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5 Additional information for PICS
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ETSI ETSI TS 186 012-1 V1.0.0 (2008-06) 11 History Document history V1.0.0 June 2008 Publication
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1 Scope
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The present document is for an initial release of a PSTN/ISDN Emulation Sub-system (PES) performance benchmark. The same tests can be used also for legacy PSTN/ISDN networks or for inter-working tests between PSTN/ISDN emulation subsystem and legacy PSTN and ISDN. The metrics measured and reported are for performance of this subsystem under a communications application load. The present document is the fourth part of the multi-part deliverable which consists four parts. TS 186 025-1 [i.1] contains the overall benchmark descriptions, architectures, processes, and information models that are common to all specific benchmarking scenarios. TS 186 025-2 [i.2] contains the specific benchmarking use-cases and scenarios, along with scenario specific metrics and design objectives. It also defines the SUT configuration parameters. This part also contains any required extensions to the overall descriptions present in the present document, if necessary for the specific scenario. TS 186 025-3 [i.3] defines an initial benchmark test through the specification of a traffic set, traffic-time profile and benchmark test procedure. TS 186 025-4 [i.4] defines Reference Load network quality parameters for the use cases defined in TS 186 025-2 [i.2].
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2 References
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References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the reference document (including any amendments) applies. Referenced documents which are not found to be publicly available in the expected location might be found at http://docbox.etsi.org/Reference. NOTE: While any hyperlinks included in this clause were valid at the time of publication, ETSI cannot guarantee their long term validity.
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2.1 Normative references
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The following referenced documents are necessary for the application of the present document. [1] ETSI TS 101 563: "Speech and multimedia Transmission Quality (STQ); IMS/PES exchange performance requirements". [2] Recommendation ITU-T Q.543: "Digital exchange performance design objectives". [3] ETSI TS 183 036: "Telecommunications and Internet converged Services and Protocols for Advanced Networking (TISPAN); ISDN/SIP interworking; Protocol specification". [4] ETSI TS 124 229: "Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+); Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); LTE; IP multimedia call control protocol based on Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) and Session Description Protocol (SDP); Stage 3 (3GPP TS 24.229)". [5] ETSI TS 183 043: "Telecommunications and Internet converged Services and Protocols for Advanced Networking (TISPAN); IMS-based PSTN/ISDN Emulation; Stage 3 specification".
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2.2 Informative references
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The following referenced documents are not necessary for the application of the present document but they assist the user with regard to a particular subject area. [i.1] ETSI TS 186 025-1: "Telecommunications and Internet converged Services and Protocols for Advanced Networking (TISPAN); IMS/PES Performance Benchmark; Part 1: Core Concepts". ETSI ETSI TS 186 025-4 V2.2.1 (2013-06) 6 [i.2] ETSI TS 186 025-2: "Telecommunications and Internet converged Services and Protocols for Advanced Networking (TISPAN); IMS/PES Performance Benchmark; Part 2: Subsystem Configurations and Benchmarks". [i.3] ETSI TS 186 025-3: "IMS Network Testing (INT); IMS/PES Performance Benchmark; Part 3: Traffic Sets and Traffic Profiles". [i.4] ETSI TS 186 025-4: "Telecommunications and Internet Converged Services and Protocols for Advanced Networking (TISPAN); IMS/PES Performance Benchmark; Part 4: Reference Load network quality parameters". [i.5] Recommendation ITU-T Q.541: "Digital exchange design objectives - General". [i.6] Recommendation ITU-T G.812: "Timing requirements of slave clocks suitable for use as node clocks in synchronization networks". [i.7] Recommendation ITU-T G.823: "The control of jitter and wander within digital networks which are based on the 2048 kbit/s hierarchy".
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3 Definitions and abbreviations
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3.1 Definitions
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For the purposes of the present document, the following terms and definitions apply: background load: workload applied to an SUT during a benchmark test, for the purpose of consuming SUT resources during a benchmark test and changing the traffic intensity at which the capacity of the SUT is reached benchmark report: documented generated at the conclusion of a test procedure containing the metrics measured during the execution of the test and/or computed from the data collected in the benchmark log benchmark test: procedure by which a test system interacts with a System Under Test to measure its behaviour and produce a benchmark report configuration: specification of a subset of IMS/PES architectural elements and metrics for which collection of benchmark tests can be defined design objective: probabilistic model of delay and failure requirements for an SUT, associated with a use-case, specified by threshold values and probabilities for delay and scenario failure idle load: load that is not dependent on the traffic or other external activities maximum capacity: smallest scenario arrival rate at which the successful scenario rate cannot be increased metric: performance measurement of an SUT reported in a benchmark report parameter: attribute of a SUT, test system, system load, or traffic set whose value is set externally and prior to a benchmark test, and whose value affects the behaviour of the benchmark test processor load: part of time the processor executes work, normally expressed in percent. The processor load consists of Idle load, Traffic load and Usage load Reference Call (RC): is defined as a basic ISUP to ISUP call connected through two MGW in the same MGC domain test parameters: parameters whose values determine the behaviour of a benchmark test test procedure: specification of the steps to be performed by a benchmark test test scenario: specific path through a use-case, whose implementation by a test system creates a system load test system: collection of hardware and software which presents a system load to a system under test and collects data on the system under test's performance, from which metrics can be computed ETSI ETSI TS 186 025-4 V2.2.1 (2013-06) 7 traffic load: load that results from handling traffic events that are directly related to calls; this load varies with the traffic intensity traffic-time profile: evolution of the average scenario over a time interval traffic set: mixture of traffic scenarios usage load: load that is reserved for the administrations operation and maintenance activities during busy hour workload: expressed as reference calls per second (RC/s) is calculated by multiplying calls per second by its corresponding WLF workload factor: traffic load for different types of calls in relation to the traffic load of the reference call (ISUP call)
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3.2 Abbreviations
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For the purposes of the present document, the following abbreviations apply: AGCF Access Gateway Control Function DLE Destination Local Exchange IBCF Interconnection Border Control Function IMS IP Multimedia Subsystem ISDN Media GateWay Controler ISUP ISDN User Part MGC Media GateWay Controler MGW Media Gateway NGN Next Generation Networks OLE Originating Local Exchange PES PSTN/ISDN Emulation Sub-system PSTN Public Switched Telecommunications Network RC Reference Call RTP Real Time Protocol SUT System Under Test TIE Time Interval Error VGW Voice Gateway WLF WorkLoad Factor
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4 Metrics and design objectives
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4.1 Delay probability - non-ISDN or mixed (ISDN - non-ISDN) environment This clause defines delay parameters related to non-ISDN environment and mixed (ISDN - non-ISDN) environment. The values are based on the values in Recommendation ITU-T Q.543 [2] and TS 101 563 [1]. ETSI ETSI TS 186 025-4 V2.2.1 (2013-06) 8 Table 1 Meaning of timers Parameter Q.543 [2] IMS, PES equivalent Reference Load A Reference Load B Detailed description Mean Value 95 % probability of not exceeding Mean Value 95 % probability of not exceeding Local exchange call request delay - originating outgoing and internal traffic connections ANALOGUE SUBSCRIBER LINES Local exchange call request delay - originating outgoing and internal traffic connections. clause 2.3.2.1 [2] For ANALOGUE SUBSCRIBER LINES, call request delay is defined as the interval from the instant when the off- hook condition is recognizable at the subscriber line interface of the exchange until the exchange begins to apply dial tone to the line. The call request delay interval is assumed to correspond to the period at the beginning of a call attempt during which the exchange is unable to receive any call address information from the subscriber. PES [5] For ANALOGUE SUBSCRIBER LINES connected to the AGCF/MSAN . Call request delay is defined as the interval from the instant when the off-hook condition is recognizable at the subscriber line interface of the AGCF/MSAN until the AGCF/MSAN begins to apply dial tone to the line. ≤ 400 ms ≤ 600 ms ≤ 800 ms ≤ 1 000 ms ANALOGUE SUBSCRIBER with IAD (VGW) Local exchange call request delay - originating outgoing and internal traffic connections. PES [5] For ANALOGUE SUBSCRIBER LINES connected to the VGW. Call request delay is defined as the interval from the instant when the off-hook condition is recognizable at the subscriber line interface of the VGW until the VGW begins to apply dial tone to the line. ≤ 400 ms ≤ 600 ms ≤ 800 ms ≤ 1 000 ms ETSI ETSI TS 186 025-4 V2.2.1 (2013-06) 9 Figure 1: Local exchange analogue subscriber call request delay: overlap sending Table 2 Meaning of timers Parameter Q.543 [2] IMS, PES equivalent Reference Load A Reference Load B Detailed description Mean Value 95 % probability of not exceeding Mean Value 95 % probability of not exceeding Local exchange ISDN subscriber call request delay: overlap sending ISDN SUBSCRIBER LINES Local exchange call request delay - Overlap sending. clause 2.3.2.2 [2] Local exchange call request delay. Call request delay is defined as the interval from the instant at which the SETUP message has been received from the subscriber signalling system until the SETUP ACKNOWLEDGE message is passed back to the subscriber signalling system. ISDN [3] Call request delay is defined as the interval from the instant at which the SETUP message has been received from the subscriber signalling system until the SETUP ACKNOWLEDGE message is passed back to the subscriber signalling system. ≤ 250 ms ≤ 400 ms ≤ 500 ms ≤ 600 ms IMS SUBSCRIBER Local exchange call request delay. IMS [4] Call request delay is defined as the interval from the instant at which the INVITE message has been received from the SIP subscriber until the 100 Trying from the SBC/P-CSCF is passed back to the subscriber. ≤ 15 ms ≤ 20 ms ≤ 30 ms ≤ 40 ms ETSI ETSI TS 186 025-4 V2.2.1 (2013-06) 10 OLE AGCF/VGW ISDN line ISDN line SETUP SETUP ACK SETUP SETUP ACK SBC/P-CSCF SIP line INVITE 100 Trying Q.543 IMS Figure 2: Local exchange ISDN subscriber call request delay: overlap sending ETSI ETSI TS 186 025-4 V2.2.1 (2013-06) 11 Table 3 Meaning of timers Parameter Q.543 IMS, PES equivalent Reference Load A Reference Load B Detailed description Mean Value 95 % probability of not exceeding Mean Value 95 % probability of not exceeding Local exchange ISDN subscriber call request delay: en Block sending ISDN SUBSCRIBER LINES Local exchange call request delay en - block sending. clause 2.3.2.3 [2] For DIGITAL SUBSCRIBER LINES using en-bloc sending, call request delay is defined as the interval from the instant at which the SETUP message is received from the subscriber signalling system until the call proceeding message is passed back to the subscriber signalling system. ISDN [3] For ISDN using en-bloc sending, call request delay is defined as the interval from the instant at which the SETUP message is received from the subscriber signalling system until the CALL PROCCEDING message is passed back to the subscriber signalling system. ≤ 300 ms ≤ 450 ms ≤ 600 ms ≤ 750 ms Figure 3: Local exchange ISDN subscriber call request delay: en Block sending ETSI ETSI TS 186 025-4 V2.2.1 (2013-06) 12 Table 4 Meaning of timers Parameter Q.543 [2] IMS, PES equivalent Reference Load A Reference Load B Detailed description Mean Value 95 % probability of not exceeding Mean Value 95 % probability of not exceeding Alerting sending delay for terminating traffic (the users are in different locations, controlled by different S-CSCF/P-CSCF) ANALOGUE SUBSCRIBER LINES Alerting sending Delay for terminating traffic. clause 2.3.6.1.1 [2] For calls terminating on ANALOGUE SUBSCRIBER LINES, alerting sending delay is defined as the interval from the instant when the last digit is available for processing in the exchange until the ringing tone is sent backwards toward the calling user. PES [5] For calls terminating on ANALOGUE SUBSCRIBER LINES, alerting sending delay is defined as the interval from the instant when the last digit is available for processing in the AGCF/MSAN until the ringing tone is sent toward the calling user. ≤ 300 ms ≤ 450 ms ≤ 600 ms ≤ 750 ms ISDN SUBSCRIBER LINES Alerting sending Delay for terminating traffic. clause 2.3.6.1.2 [2] For calls terminating on DIGITAL SUBSCRIBER LINES, the alerting sending delay is defined as the interval from the instant that an ALERTING message is received from the digital subscriber line signalling system to the instant at which an ADDRESS COMPLETE message is passed to the interexchange signalling system or ringing tone is sent backward toward the calling user. ISDN [3] For calls terminating on ISDN, the alerting sending delay is defined as the interval from the instant that an ALERTING message is received from the digital subscriber line signalling to the instant at which an AGCF/MSAN sends the 180 Ringing backward toward the calling user. ≤ 300 ms ≤ 450 ms ≤ 600 ms ≤ 750 ms ETSI ETSI TS 186 025-4 V2.2.1 (2013-06) 13 Latest address digit Ringing tone DLE Analogue line Q.543 IMS DLE ISDN line ALERTING ACM AGCF/VGW ISDN line ALERTING 180 Ringing Latest address digit AGCF/VGW Analogue line Ringing tone SBC/P-CSCF SIP line 180 Ringing 180 Ringing Figure 4: Local exchange Alerting sending delay for terminating traffic (in different locations) ETSI ETSI TS 186 025-4 V2.2.1 (2013-06) 14 Table 5 Meaning of timers Parameter Q.543 [2] IMS, PES equivalent Reference Load A Reference Load B Detailed description Mean Value 95 % probability of not exceeding Mean Value 95 % probability of not exceeding Alerting sending delay for internal traffic (the user are in same locations, controlled by same AGCF/VGW or P-CSCF) ANALOGUE SUBSCRIBER LINES Alerting sending Delay for internal traffic. clause 2.3.6.2.1 [2] For calls terminating on ANALOGUE SUBSCRIBER LINES, alerting sending delay is defined as the interval from the instant that the signalling information is available for processing in the exchange until ringing tone is applied to an ANALOGUE calling subscriber. PES [5] For calls terminating on ANALOGUE SUBSCRIBER LINES, alerting sending delay is defined as the interval from the instant that the signalling information is available for processing in the AGCF/MSAN until Ringing tone is sent towards the calling subscriber. ≤ 300 ms ≤ 450 ms ≤ 600 ms ≤ 750 ms ANALOGUE SUBSCRIBER LINES VGW Alerting sending Delay for internal traffic. PES [5] For calls terminating on ANALOGUE SUBSCRIBER LINES, alerting sending delay is defined as the interval from the instant that the signalling information is available for processing in the VGW until Ringing tone is sent towards the calling subscriber. ≤ 550 ms (see note) ≤ 800 ms ≤ 1 100 ms ≤ 1 350 ms ISDN SUBSCRIBER LINES Alerting sending Delay for Internal traffic. clause 2.3.6.2.2 [2] For internal calls terminating on DIGITAL SUBSCRIBER LINES originating from DIGITAL SUBSCRIBER LINES, alerting sending delay is defined as the interval from the instant that an ALERTING message is received from the signalling system of the called subscriber's line until the ALERTING message is applied to the calling subscriber line. ISDN [3] For calls terminating on ISDN, alerting sending delay is defined as the interval from the instant that an ALERTING message is received and ALERTING is sent towards the calling subscriber. ≤ 300 ms VGW ≤ 350 ms ≤ 450 ms VGW ≤ 550 ms ≤ 600 ms VGW ≤ 700 ms ≤ 750 ms VGW ≤ 850 ms IMS SUBSCRIBER LINES 180 sending Delay for Internal traffic. IMS [4] For calls terminating sending delay is defined as the interval from the instant that an 180 message at the Gm interface has received and 180 is sent on the Gm towards the calling subscriber. ≤ 150 ms ≤ 200 ms ≤ 300 ms ≤ 350 ms ETSI ETSI TS 186 025-4 V2.2.1 (2013-06) 15 Meaning of timers Parameter Q.543 [2] IMS, PES equivalent Reference Load A Reference Load B Detailed description Mean Value 95 % probability of not exceeding Mean Value 95 % probability of not exceeding NOTE: Setup: CPE with two POTS, Setup connection between two POTS via IMS. Time T1: T1+ T3 Time T2: Time between SIP-INVITE and 180 Ringing Time T3: CPE-internal process-time T3 ETSI ETSI TS 186 025-4 V2.2.1 (2013-06) 16 Figure 5: Alerting sending delay for internal traffic (the user are in same locations, controlled by same AGCF/VGW or P-CSCF) ETSI ETSI TS 186 025-4 V2.2.1 (2013-06) 17 Table 6 Meaning of timers Parameter Q.543 [2] IMS, PES equivalent Reference Load A Reference Load B Detailed description Mean Value 95 % probability of not exceeding Mean Value 95 % probability of not exceeding Call set up delay ISDN SUBSCRIBER LINES Call set up delay using overlap signalling. clause 2.4.3.1 [2] Call set-up delay is defined as the interval from the instant when the signalling information required for routing is received from the incoming signalling system until the instant when the corresponding signalling information is passed to the outgoing signalling system. Exchange call setup delay for originating outgoing traffic connections, digital subscriber lines. The time interval starts when the INFORMATION message received contains a "sending complete indication" or when the address information necessary for call set-up is complete and ends when the corresponding signalling information is passed to the outgoing signalling system. ISDN [3] Sending, the time interval starts when the INFORMATION message received contains a "sending complete indication" and ends when the INVITE message on the Ic interface has been sent. ≤ 450 ms ≤ 650 ms ≤ 800 ms ≤ 950 ms ISDN [3] Sending, the time interval starts when the INFORMATION message received contains a "sending complete indication" and ends when the INVITE message on terminating Gm interface has been sent. ≤ 350 ms VGW ≤ 400 ms ≤ 550 ms VGW ≤ 600 ms ≤ 700 ms VGW ≤ 800 ms ≤ 850 ms VGW ≤ 1 000 ms IMS [4] Session initiation delay is defined as the interval from the instant when the INVITE signalling information is received from the calling user on the originating Gm interface until the instant when the corresponding INVITE signalling information is passed on the terminating Gm interface to the called user. ≤ 300 ms ≤ 450 ms ≤ 600 ms ≤ 750 ms IMS [4] Session initiation delay is defined as the interval from the instant when the INVITE signalling information is received from the calling user on the originating Gm interface until the instant when the corresponding INVITE signalling information is passed on the terminating Ic interface to the called user.(without preconditions) ≤ 350 ms ≤ 550 ms ≤ 700 ms ≤ 850 ms ETSI ETSI TS 186 025-4 V2.2.1 (2013-06) 18 Figure 6: Call set up delay: Overlap sending is used ETSI ETSI TS 186 025-4 V2.2.1 (2013-06) 19 Table 7 Meaning of timers Parameter Q.543 [2] IMS, PES equivalent Reference Load A Reference Load B Detailed description Mean Value 95 % probability of not exceeding Mean Value 95 % probability of not exceeding Call set up delay: en Block sending is used ISDN SUBSCRIBER LINES Call set up delay using en-block signalling. clause 2.4.3.1 [2] Exchange call setup delay for originating outgoing traffic connections. For call attempts using en-bloc sending Call set-up delay is defined as the interval from the instant when the signalling information required for routing is received from the incoming signalling system until the instant when the corresponding signalling information is passed to the outgoing signalling system. The time interval starts when the SETUP message received contains a "sending complete indication" or when the address information necessary for call set-up is complete and ends when the call setup is sent on the outgoing signalling system. ISDN [3] Call set-up delay is defined as the interval from the instant when the signalling information including Sending Complete (#) is received from the incoming signalling system until the instant when the corresponding INVITE signalling information is passed to the Ic interface. ≤ 450 ms ≤ 650 ms ≤ 800 ms ≤ 950 ms ISDN [3] Call set-up delay is defined as the interval from the instant when the signalling information including Sending Complete (#) is received from the incoming signalling system until the instant when the corresponding INVITE signalling information is passed to the terminating Gm interface. ≤ 350 ms VGW ≤ 400 ms ≤ 550 ms VGW ≤ 600 ms ≤ 700 ms VGW ≤ 800 ms ≤ 850 ms VGW ≤ 1 000 ms ISDN [3] Call set-up delay for Internal traffic is defined as the interval from the instant when the SETUP including Sending Complete (#) is received from the incoming signalling system until the instant when the corresponding SETUP signalling information is passed to the called line signalling system (see note). ≤ 350 ms VGW ≤ 500 ms ≤ 550 ms VGW ≤ 750 ms ≤ 700 ms VGW ≤ 1 000 ms ≤ 850 ms VGW ≤ 1 200 ms IMS SUBSCRIBER Call set up delay using for Internal traffic. IMS [4] Session initiation delay is defined as the interval from the instant when the INVITE signalling information is received from the calling user on the originating Gm interface until the instant when the corresponding INVITE signalling information is passed on the terminating Gm interface to the called user. ≤ 300 ms ≤ 450 ms ≤ 600 ms ≤ 750 ms ETSI ETSI TS 186 025-4 V2.2.1 (2013-06) 20 Meaning of timers Parameter Q.543 [2] IMS, PES equivalent Reference Load A Reference Load B Detailed description Mean Value 95 % probability of not exceeding Mean Value 95 % probability of not exceeding Call set up delay: en Block sending is used IMS [4] Session initiation delay is defined as the interval from the instant when the INVITE signalling information is received from the calling user on the originating Gm interface until the instant when the corresponding INVITE signalling information is passed on the terminating Ic interface to the called user (without preconditions). ≤ 350 ms ≤ 550 ms ≤ 700 ms ≤ 850 ms NOTE: If SC (#) is not included the setup delay may increase up to the digit collection timer (15 s). ETSI ETSI TS 186 025-4 V2.2.1 (2013-06) 21 Figure 7: Call set up delay: en Block sending is used ETSI ETSI TS 186 025-4 V2.2.1 (2013-06) 22 Table 8 Meaning of timers Parameter Q.543 [2] IMS, PES equivalent Reference Load A Reference Load B Detailed description Mean Value 95 % probability of not exceeding Mean Value 95 % probability of not exceeding Through-connection delay ISDN SUBSCRIBER LINES Through-connection delay. clause 2.4.4.2 [2] Through-connection delay. The through connection delay is defined as the interval from the instant that the CONNECT message is received from the called line signalling system until the through connection is established and available for carrying traffic and the ANSWER and CONNECT ACKNOWLEDGEMENT messages have been passed to the appropriate signalling systems. ISDN [3] The through connection delay is defined as the interval from the instant that the CONNECT message is received from the called line signalling system until the through connection is established and available for carrying traffic and the CONNECT message has been sent to the calling user signalling system (see note). ≤ 350 ms ≤ 550 ms ≤ 700 ms ≤ 850 ms IMS Through-connection delay Delay for Internal traffic. IMS [4] The through connection delay is defined as the interval from the instant that the 200 OK message is received from the called user at the terminating Gm interface until the through connection is established and available for carrying traffic and the 200 OK message has been sent to the calling user on the originating Gm interface. ≤ 150 ms ≤ 200 ms ≤ 300 ms ≤ 350 ms NOTE: The through connection of RTP is not considered. ETSI ETSI TS 186 025-4 V2.2.1 (2013-06) 23 Q.543 IMS DLE ISDN line ANM orig AGCF/VGW ISDN line Connect term AGCF/VGW ISDN line orig Gm interface SIP line 200 OK INVITE term Gm interface SIP line 200 OK INVITE Connect Connect Connect ACK Figure 8: Through-connection delay ETSI ETSI TS 186 025-4 V2.2.1 (2013-06) 24 Table 9 Meaning of timers Parameter Q.543 [2] IMS, PES equivalent Reference Load A Reference Load B Detailed description Mean Value 95 % probability of not exceeding Mean Value 95 % probability of not exceeding Connection release delay: ISDN SUBSCRIBER LINES Connection call release delay. clause 2.4.6 [2] Connection release delay is defined as the interval from the instant when DISCONNECT or RELEASE message is received from a signalling system until the instant when the connection is no longer available for use on the call (and is available for use on another call) and a corresponding RELEASE or DISCONNECT message is passed to the other signalling system involved in the connection. ISDN [3] Connection release delay is defined as the interval from the instant when DISCONNECT or RELEASE message is received from a signalling system until the instant when RELEASE COMPLETE is sent and a corresponding RELEASE or DISCONNECT message is sent, or vice versa. ≤ 350 ms ≤ 550 ms ≤ 700 ms ≤ 850 ms IMS SUBSCRIBER Connection call release delay Delay for Internal traffic. IMS [4] Connection release delay is defined as the interval from the instant when a BYE message is received at the originating or terminating Gm interface until the instant when 200OK is sent and a corresponding BYE message is sent at the terminating or originating Gm interface respectively. ≤ 150 ms ≤ 200 ms ≤ 300 ms ≤ 350 ms ETSI ETSI TS 186 025-4 V2.2.1 (2013-06) 25 Figure 9: Connection call release delay ETSI ETSI TS 186 025-4 V2.2.1 (2013-06) 26
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4.2 Call processing performance objectives
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4.2.1 Premature release
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The probability that an exchange malfunction will result in the premature release of an established connection in any one minute interval should be: P ≤ 2 x 10-5
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4.2.2 Release failure
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The probability that an exchange malfunction will prevent the required release of a connection should be: P ≤ 2 x 10-5
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4.2.3 Incorrect charging or accounting
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The probability of a call attempt receiving incorrect charging or accounting treatment due to an exchange malfunction should be: P ≤ 10-4
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4.2.4 Misrouting
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The probability of a call attempt misrouted following receipt by the exchange of a valid address should be: P ≤ 10-4
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4.2.5 No tone
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The probability of a call attempt encountering no tone following receipt of a valid address by the exchange should be: P ≤ 10-4
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4.2.6 Other failures
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The probability of the exchange causing a call failure for any other reason not identified specifically above should be: P ≤ 10-4
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4.3 Transmission performance
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4.3.1 64 kbit/s switched connections
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The probability of a connection being established with an unacceptable transmission quality across the exchange should be: P ≤ 10-5 The transmission quality across the exchange is said to be unacceptable when the bit error ratio is above the alarm condition. ETSI ETSI TS 186 025-4 V2.2.1 (2013-06) 27
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4.4 Slip rate
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4.4.1 Normal conditions
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The slip rate under normal conditions is covered in Recommendation ITU-T Q.541 [i.5].
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4.4.2 Temporary loss of timing control
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The case of temporary loss of timing control corresponds to the "holdover operation" defined and recommended in Recommendation ITU-T G.812 [i.6]. The allowable slip rate will correspond to the maximum relative TIE also recommended therein.
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4.4.3 Abnormal conditions at the exchange input
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The slip rate in case of abnormal conditions (wide phase deviations, etc.) at the exchange input is the subject of further study taking into account the requirements of Recommendation ITU-T G.823 [i.7]. ETSI ETSI TS 186 025-4 V2.2.1 (2013-06) 28 History Document history V2.1.1 July 2011 Publication V2.2.1 June 2013 Publication
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1 Scope
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The present document describes the Abstract Test Suite (ATS) to test interoperability at IMS NNI for IP multimedia call control protocol based on TS 124 229 [1]. The ATS has been specified on the basis of the Test Descriptions for IMS NNI interoperability testing presented in TS 186 011-2 [3]. It defines a TTCN-3 framework as well as codec and adapter requirements for analysing interoperability test execution traces generated from the manual or automatic execution of IMS interoperability tests. The scope of this ATS is not to cover all requirements specified in TS 124 229 [1]. It only assesses requirements that are observable at the NNI between two IMS core network implementations specified in TS 186 011-1 [2].
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2 References
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References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the reference document (including any amendments) applies. Referenced documents which are not found to be publicly available in the expected location might be found at http://docbox.etsi.org/Reference. NOTE: While any hyperlinks included in this clause were valid at the time of publication ETSI cannot guarantee their long term validity.
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2.1 Normative references
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The following referenced documents are necessary for the application of the present document. [1] ETSI TS 124 229 (V8.10.0): "Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+); Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); LTE; Internet Protocol (IP) multimedia call control protocol based on Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) and Session Description Protocol (SDP); Stage 3 (3GPP TS 24.229 version 8.10.0 Release 8)". [2] ETSI TS 186 011-1 (V4.1.2): "IMS Network Testing (INT); IMS NNI Interoperability Test Specifications; Part 1: Test Purposes for IMS NNI Interoperability". [3] ETSI TS 186 011-2 (V4.1.2): "IMS Network Testing (INT); IMS NNI Interoperability Test Specifications; Part 2: Test Description for IMS NNI Interoperability". [4] ETSI ES 201 873-5: "Methods for Testing and Specification (MTS); The Testing and Test Control Notation version 3; Part 5: TTCN-3 Runtime Interface (TRI)". [5] ETSI ES 201 873-6: "Methods for Testing and Specification (MTS); The Testing and Test Control Notation version 3; Part 6: TTCN-3 Control Interface (TCI)". [6] ETSI ES 201 873-10: "Methods for Testing and Specification (MTS); The Testing and Test Control Notation version 3; Part 10: TTCN-3 Documentation Comment Specification". [7] ETSI ES 201 873-1: "Methods for Testing and Specification (MTS); The Testing and Test Control Notation version 3; Part 1: TTCN-3 Core Language".
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2.2 Informative references
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The following referenced documents are not necessary for the application of the present document but they assist the user with regard to a particular subject area. [i.1] ETSI EG 202 568: "Methods for Testing and Specification (MTS); Internet Protocol Testing (IPT); Testing: Methodology and Framework". [i.2] IETF RFC 3261: "SIP: Session Initiation Protocol". ETSI ETSI TS 186 011-3 V4.1.3 (2012-05) 6 [i.3] IETF RFC 3262: "Reliability of Provisional Responses in the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)". [i.4] IETF RFC 3265: "Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)-Specific Event Notification". [i.5] IETF RFC 3313: "Private Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Extensions for Media Authorization". [i.6] IETF RFC 3323: "A Privacy Mechanism for the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)". [i.7] IETF RFC 3325: "Private Extensions to the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) for Asserted Identity within Trusted Networks". [i.8] IETF RFC 3326: "The Reason Header Field for the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)". [i.9] IETF RFC 3327: "Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Extension Header Field for Registering Non- Adjacent Contacts". [i.10] IETF RFC 3329: "Security Mechanism Agreement for the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)". [i.11] IETF RFC 3455: "Private Header (P-Header) Extensions to the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) for the 3rd-Generation Partnership Project (3GPP)". [i.12] IETF RFC 3515: "The Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Refer Method". [i.13] IETF RFC 3608: "Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Extension Header Field for Service Route Discovery During Registration". [i.14] IETF RFC 3841: "Caller Preferences for the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)". [i.15] IETF RFC 3891: "The Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) "Replaces" Header". [i.16] IETF RFC 3892: "The Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Referred-By Mechanism". [i.17] IETF RFC 4028: "Session Timers in the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)". [i.18] IETF RFC 4244: "An Extension to the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) for Request History Information". [i.19] IETF RFC 5009: "Private Header (P-Header) Extension to the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) for Authorization of Early Media". [i.20] IETF RFC 2616: "Hypertext Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1". [i.21] IETF RFC 4566: "SDP: Session Description Protocol". [i.22] IETF RFC 1035: "Domain names - implementation and specification". [i.23] IETF RFC 2915: "The Naming Authority Pointer (NAPTR) DNS Resource Record". [i.24] IETF RFC 2617: "HTTP Authentication: Basic and Digest Access Authentication". [i.25] ETSI EG 202 810: "Methods for Testing and Specification (MTS); Automated Interoperability Testing; Methodology and Framework".
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3 Abbreviations
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For the purposes of the present document, the following abbreviations apply: AS (IMS) Application Server AT Hayes commands ATS Abstract Test Suite CN Core Network CSCF Call Session Control Function DNS Directory Name Server EG ETSI Guide ES ETSI Standard ETSI ETSI TS 186 011-3 V4.1.3 (2012-05) 7 EUT Equipment Under test IBCF Interconnection Border Control Gateway I-CSCF Interrogating CSCF IMS IP Multimedia Subsystem IOT Interoperability Testing IP Internet Protocol ISC IMS service control interface MTC Main Test Component NNI Network to Network Interface PCAP Packet CAPture PCO Point of Control and Observation P-CSCF Proxy CSCF PO Point of Observation PTC Parallel Test Component SA SUT Adapter S-CSCF Serving CSCF SDP Session Description Protocol SIP Session Initiation Protocol SUT System Under Test TC Test Cases TCI TTCN-3 Control Interface TD Test Description TE test Execution TP Test Purpose TRI TTCN-3 Runtime Interface TSI Test System Interface TTCN-3 Testing and Test Control Notation 3 UE User Equipment URI Uniform Resource Identifier UTF UCS transformation format
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4 Overview
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4.1 Network architecture
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The ATS is defined to observe the SIP communication at the Gm, Mx, Ici and ISC interface of two IMS core networks for interoperability testing. Figure 1 shows a general architecture of two IMS core networks including the related interfaces. ETSI ETSI TS 186 011-3 V4.1.3 (2012-05) 8 Figure 1: Network Architecture
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4.1.1 Core IMS Nodes
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The P-CSCF, S-CSCF, I-CSCF and the IBCF are considered to be within a "black box" for testing purposes, i.e. the System Under Test (SUT). Interfaces within the IMS are considered internal and not observable for testing purposes except the Mx interface. The Mx and the Ici interface between two IMS core networks is used as point of observation (PO) for NNI interoperability tests.
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4.1.2 External IMS Nodes
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4.1.2.1 UE
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The UE is considered to act as stimulus node in this test specification. The Gm interface between the P-CSCF and the UE is used as a Point of Control and Observation (PCO) for NNI interoperability tests.
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4.1.2.2 AS
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The Application Server (AS) is considered to act as a stimulus node in this test specification. The ISC interface between the S-CSCF and the AS is used as Point of Control and Observation (PCO) for NNI interoperability tests.
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5 Test configuration
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The test configuration is described in detail in TS 186 011-2 [3]. Test configurations have been defined in [3] by applying an interface based design approach. Here, each monitored IMS interface is paired with one dedicated Parallel Test Component (PTC) which receives all relevant message information from the TTCN-3 SUT Adapter (SA) via the abstract test system interface and checks its correctness according to the conformance criteria listed for a particular IMS test. An example test configuration is shown in figure 2. For detailed discussion of the abstract test system interface, the reader is referred to clause 6.2. IMS CN UE IMS CN AS AS IBCF IBCF U E G G Mx Mx Ici ISC ISC SIP protocol Core Network A Core Network B ETSI ETSI TS 186 011-3 V4.1.3 (2012-05) 9 Figure 2: Example IMS NNI interoperability test system configuration The test system configuration is based on the general TTCN-3 test system architecture specified in ES 201 873-5 [4] and ES 201 873-6 [5] as well as on the concepts stated in EG 202 810 [i.25]. Note that the figure 2 does not illustrate roaming and IMS/PSTN interworking aspects in a test configuration. In addition, it does not show the DNS server as an application support node for each IMS core network as well as its associated interface monitor component, which are only required in a few tests. Note that TTCN-3 test components which are shown with dashed lines in figure 2 are only started for the execution of the test suite in live mode. The different types of TTCN-3 components used in this ATS are: • Test Coordinator is a component type is dedicated to coordinate the behaviour of all other test components, which work on tasks independently of each other. It is in charge of controlling the overall execution, management of testing phases, conformance verdict and end-to-end interoperability verdict management, and synchronization. • Equipment User is a component type is dedicated to handle equipment operation, e.g. configure an IMS CN, make basic call or messaging from a UE, check for an incoming call notification on a UE, barring a user in a IMS CN, de-register a user forcefully from the IMS CN during a call. • Interface Monitor is a component type that is dedicated to monitor one specific logical interface either between two EUTs or a EUT and an Application Support Node, e.g. IMS CN and a DNS server. UE UE AS AS EUT_A IMS Gm Ici Gm ISC ISC EUT_B IMS Interface Monitor Monitor Gm Interface Monitor ISC Interface Monitor ISC Interface Monitor Gm Interface Monitor Ici Equipment User User_ Test Coordinat MT Equipment User User_ Controlling connection Equipment operation interface Monitored interface SIP interface Equipment User IMS_ Equipment User IMS_ EUT_A IBCF EUT_A IBCF Interface Monitor Mx Interface Monitor Mx Mx Mx SU ETSI ETSI TS 186 011-3 V4.1.3 (2012-05) 10
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6 Test design
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This clause defines guidelines and design patterns used in the Abstract Test Suite (ATS). The ATS is specified using TTCN-3 [7]. The benefits of TTCN-3 are: • well defined syntax; • well defined static and operational semantics; • rich type system which includes concepts like a verdict & native list types, subtyping, type compatibility, etc; • powerful built-in matching mechanism and matching expressions; • snapshot semantics; - ensures and preserves order of external event arrival; - allows checking of each external event against a number of alternative constraints; • allows definition of concurrent tests, i.e. tests with multiple test components; • support for asynchronous as well as synchronous communication paradigms; • support for dynamic test configurations, i.e. that test components can be (re)mapped, (re)connected or (re)created on the fly during a test; • allows specification of execution parameters at run time via module parameters to ease adaptation of test suite to different testing environments; • support for timers; • enables completely automated test execution. 6.1 TTCN-3 naming convention TTCN-3 can be considered a programming language. Therefore, the usage of naming conventions supports or increases code readability, consistency, and maintainability of the code. It also helps to achieve earlier detection of semantic errors and the distribution of test suite development work across several developers. The naming convention used by this test suite is based on the ETSI generic naming conventions and follows the underlying principles: • when constructing meaningful identifiers, the general guidelines specified for naming in clause 8 of EG 202 568 [i.1] should be followed; • the names of TTCN-3 objects being associated with standardized data types (e.g. in the base protocols) should reflect the names of these data types as close as possible (of course not conflicting with syntactical requirements or other conventions being explicitly stated); • the subfield names of TTCN-3 objects being associated with standardized data type should also be similar to corresponding element names in the base standards (be recognizable in the local context); • in most other cases, identifiers should be prefixed with a short alphabetic string (specified in table 4) indicating the type of TTCN-3 element it represents; • prefixes should be separated from the body of the identifier with an underscore ("_"); • only test case names, module names, data type names and module parameters should begin with an upper-case letter. All other names (i.e. the part of the identifier following the prefix) should begin with a lower-case letter. Table 1 specifies the naming guidelines for each construct of the TTCN-3 language indicating the recommended prefix and capitalization. ETSI ETSI TS 186 011-3 V4.1.3 (2012-05) 11 Table 1: Naming Conventions Language element Naming convention Prefix Example Notes Module Upper-case initial letter none LibSip_TypesAndValues Group Lower-case initial letter none messageGroup Data type Upper-case initial letter none SetupContents Message template Lower-case initial letter m_ m_response Note 1 Message template with wildcard or matching expression Lower-case initial letter mw_ mw_response Note 2 Modifying message template Lower-case initial letter md_ md_response Note 1 Modifying message template with wildcard or matching expression Lower-case initial letter mdw_ mdw_reponse Note 2 Port instance Lower-case initial letter none configPort Test component reference Lower-case initial letter none userTerminal Constant Lower-case initial letter c_ c_maxRetransmission Constant (defined within component type) Lower-case initial letter cc_ cc_maxRetransmission External constant Lower-case initial letter cx_ cx_macId Function Lower-case initial letter f_ f_authentication() External function Lower-case initial letter fx_ fx_calculateLength() Altstep (incl. Default) Lower-case initial letter a_ a_receiveSetup() Test case All upper-case letters TC_ TC_IMS_MESS_0001 Variable (defined locally) Lower-case initial letter v_ v_macId Note 3 Variable (defined within component type) Lower-case initial letter vc_ vc_systemName Timer (defined locally) Lower-case initial letter t_ t_wait Timer (defined within component type) Lower-case initial letter tc_ tc_authMin Module parameter All upper-case letters none PX_MAC_ID Parameterization Lower-case initial letter p_ p_macId Enumerated Value Lower-case initial letter e_ e_syncOk NOTE 1: This prefix should be used for all template definitions which do not assign or refer to templates with wildcards or matching expressions, e.g. templates specifying a constant value, parameterized templates without matching expressions, etc. NOTE 2: This prefix should be used in identifiers for templates which either assign a wildcard or matching expression (e.g. ?, *, value list, ifpresent, pattern, etc.) or reference another template which assigns a wildcard or matching expression. NOTE 3: In this case it is acceptable to use underscore within an identifier. NOTE: Naming conventions have been enforced only in the TTCN-3 code written within this project for this ATS. There may be some minor deviations from these conventions in code that has been reused from other ETSI projects. In addition to the above naming conventions, TTCN-3 functions which specify behaviour that is to execute on the main test component should use a "f_mtc_" prefix to distinguish it from functions which can run on PTCs which have no prefix extension. For further information on function design the reader is referred to clause 7.5. 6.2 TTCN-3 language version This test suite has been developed based on the concepts available in version 4.4.1 of the TTCN-3 core language defined in ES 201 873-1 [7]. In order to simplify codec and test implementation, this test suite avoids and should avoid in future versions the use of nested TTCN-3 type definitions as well as features deprecated in this version of the language, e.g. the use of the all keyword in TTCN-3 port type definitions, or port types of type mixed. ETSI ETSI TS 186 011-3 V4.1.3 (2012-05) 12 6.3 Modularization The ATS has been specified by using a library approach for TTCN-3 modules. Here, reusable definitions have been isolated from ATS specific definitions in so called "TTCN-3 Libraries". TTCN-3 libraries are specified as source code since the TTCN-3 standards do not define the integration of pre-compiled libraries. ATS and library specific modules are distinguished in their prefix which is either "Ats" or "Lib". The following prefixes are used in module names to identify ATS specific and library TTCN-3 modules: • LibCommon: A collection of generally useful TTCN-3 definitions for any test suite implementation, e.g. basic types definitions, verdict handling, timing, test component synchronization. • LibUpperTester: A collection of reusable TTCN-3 definitions related to upper tester specification for conformance and/or interoperability testing including an abstract equipment operation protocol. • LibSip: A collection of reusable TTCN-3 definitions related to SIP standards including type definitions for SIP base RFC as well as other RFCs, dummy, base and specific SIP templates. • LibIms: A collection of reusable TTCN-3 definitions related to IMS specific definitions including test component state information. • LibIot: A collection of reusable TTCN-3 definition for any IOT test suite implementation aligned with the ETSI methodology for automated interoperability testing of distributed systems. • AtsImsIot: IMS NNI IOT specific TTCN-3 definitions, e.g. test configuration management, test case statements, and test purpose checking functions. In general, TTCN-3 libraries contain either following types of modules or types of groups within a module: • TypesAndValues: collects library specific TTCN-3 type and constant definitions. • PIXIT: collects module parameter declarations used by library definitions. • TestInterface: contains component and port type definitions reflecting the interface(s) handled by the library. • Templates: collects library specific TTCN-3 template definitions, e.g. its Behavior module(s). • Functions: collects generic TTCN-3 and external functions. • Behavior: collects generic TTCN-3 functions expressing elementary message exchanges. For more information regarding the specific TTCN-3 libraries used by this ATS the reader is referred to clause 7.9. The ATS specific part of the test suite contains the following types of modules: • PICS: collects test case selection module parameters associated with the ATS. • PIXIT: collects module parameter declarations used by ATS definitions. • TypesAndValues: collects ATS specific TTCN-3 type and value definitions except component and port types. • TestSystem: specifies TTCN-3 component type definitions used by to create MTC and PTCs in the test cases as well as the abstract test system component type, i.e. the system component type. This module either specifies component types based on port types (respecting component type compatibility) or by extending component types defined in one or more TTCN-3 library interface modules. Component types may also add ATS specific variables or ports. • Templates: collects ATS specific TTCN-3 template definitions, e.g. used by its behaviour module(s). • TestConfiguration: contains functions which realize the configuration of the test system, i.e. the mapping of test components for the establishment and tear down of different test configurations as well as the configuration of the SUT Adapter. • Functions: collects ATS specific TTCN-3 functions. ETSI ETSI TS 186 011-3 V4.1.3 (2012-05) 13 • Behavior: collects ATS specific TTCN-3 functions for checking conformance related to test purposes associated with test descriptions. • TestControl: contains the control part definition which performs test case selection. • TestCases: collects TTCN-3 test case definitions which should be split across multiple modules of this type, e.g. for grouping test case according to functionalities.
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6.4 SIP message template design
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IMS SIP templates are defined in the IMS and SIP libraries using a three step approach. In the first step, for every message type and direction (sending or receiving) a dummy template is defined, e.g. m_ACK_Dummy and mw_ACK_Dummy. All optional fields of the dummy template are either set to 'omit' or '*' depending on the direction. Mandatory fields are set to dummy values or '?'. Please note that dummy templates should never be used directly for sending or receiving! In the second step, base templates are derived from the dummy templates. These base templates set all main SIP headers to specific (parameterized) values which are in accordance to the SIP standard. The template identifiers of these modifications include the keyword "base", e.g. md_ACK_Request_Base or mdw_ACK_Request_Base. In the third step, any other templates, e.g. templates for setting IMS specific headers are derived from the base templates by modifying the fields that need to be restricted for specific purposes, e.g. md_ACK_Request_route etc. These specific templates should be mainly used for sending and receiving. This design approach allows the extension of SIP message types with additional headers with a minimal change in templates, i.e. the dummy templates. All other templates do not require updates. The adoption of this design approach in new template additions to the ATS will help to improve the maintainability and continue the readability of the test suite. 6.5 Function design The approach selected for the design of functions maximizes reuse as well as clearly separates and isolates behaviour specific to the ATS, IOT, SIP or IMS to their respective libraries. Test case statements are defined in the ATS by following the naming of IMS NNI test descriptions as closely as possible, i.e. it invokes a configuration function named after the IMS NNI test configuration, then a preamble function representing the initial conditions of the TD, followed by equipment operation functions resembling the test sequence interleaved with test purpose checking functions. All of the functions called from the test case statement are functions which run on the main test component (MTC). Test configuration functions are defined in AtsImsIot and create all required test components, mappings and connections, as well as configuration. For example, these functions encapsulate the setting of filters in the adapter for interface monitor components. However, test sequence functions are named after the task they perform on a parallel test component (PTC). Therefore, the additional prefix "mtc_" has been introduced to clarify that even these functions run on the MTC. The main purpose of these functions is to start the behaviour specified in the function identifier on a specified PTC. Equipment operation functions which execute on PTCs are defined in LibIms behavioural modules. These customize the generic equipment operation function defined in LibUpperTester with the commands defined in the LibIms. The functions set the PTC E2E verdict by calling the verdict handling mechanism offered by LibIot. Test purpose checking functions are defined in AtsImsIot. These functions are split into two separate functions since each test purpose requires checks on two separate logical interfaces. Test purpose functions are implemented based on a generic function f_imsIot_receive()which is parameterized, e.g. with the templates performing part of the checks specified in a specific TP. In addition, this function allows passing received messages automatically to the MTC where it can be checked if specific content is equal to the one in other messages. f_imsIot_receive() is specified based on the generic f_gen_receive()function implemented in LibIot. The PTC conformance verdict is set by calling the verdict handling mechanism offered by LibIot from both the IMS IOT specific and the general receive function. ETSI ETSI TS 186 011-3 V4.1.3 (2012-05) 14 6.6 Handling of proprietary interfaces Equipment user test components (see figure 2) have the purpose to configure or trigger IMS equipment to perform particular tasks like barring a user from an IMS CN, to register to services from an UE or to initiate a call from a UE. The actual user interface of IMS equipment and its operation are however not standardized and highly implementation dependent. However, some manufacturers provide special automatable interfaces for the purposes of testing, e.g. AT based command set for IMS UEs. The TTCN-3 ATS should be implemented agnostic of proprietary interfaces. It uses an abstract concept for equipment operations which are based on a command request and response. Commands are abstract descriptions of actions to be taken, e.g. enter contact or initiate a VoIP call. Abstract primitives may have abstract parameters, e.g. the terminating user identifier. It is assumed that a part or component of the TTCN-3 SUT Adapter (not shown in figure 2) provides a mapping or translation of the abstract TTCN-3 equipment operation requests sent by equipment user test components to actual IMS equipment, specific operations or a terminal like output device that instructs test equipment operators in their interaction with the IMS equipment. Responses or observations of IMS equipment responses have to be mapped in the SUT Adapter to abstract responses prior to being sent to the respective equipment user test component. This mapping from abstract to concrete operations for the equipment participating in a test is beyond the scope of the TTCN-3 ATS and needs to be addressed as part of the TTCN-3 SUT adapter implementation. Note that one test component should be implemented for each IMS-equipment that is planned to be used during testing. EXAMPLE: For example, the equipment user test component User_A may initiate a call from UE A by sending an InitiateVoIPCallReq(DestUserInfo) command via the TSI to the SUT adapter. This command can be translated into a UE operation instruction which is displayed to the operator of UE A via a terminal window. 6.7 Message skipping Analysing the messages exchanged between two or more EUTs by an interface monitor test component can be complex when the messages to be checked are part of a longer message exchange on the monitored interface. In addition, IOT traffic captures may contain messages sent as part of the preamble or other unanticipated traffic that offsets the message observation from its anticipated occurrence in the test description call flow. For such cases, it is first necessary to locate the beginning of the sequence to be analysed, i.e. to skip all the preceding messages. This issue is unique to interoperability testing and not trivial to solve. In the case of IMS NNI testing, a test may assume that the all the UEs are already registered at the beginning of the test. However, in the test execution the UEs may not be registered at the beginning of the test, they first have to initiate a SIP register request before any other actions. Similarly, a test execution trace gained with manual triggering of EUTs may include unsuccessful attempts to run the same test due to configuration problems like mistyping of a SIP URI. It has been decided to address such message skipping by providing a time stamp to the test adapter from which it shall start parsing for relevant messages. Another issue that has been addressed is the need to skip messages that appear in the call flow but which do not have to be checked from the test description point of view. This has been implemented as a part of the AtsImsIot f_imsIot_receive() function for interface monitor components and allows skipping of a number of any messages (of that protocol) or skipping a number of specific type of messages, e.g. SIP INVITE messages. ETSI ETSI TS 186 011-3 V4.1.3 (2012-05) 15
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6.8 Documentation
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In order to allow browsing of the ATS without a TTCN-3 editor, the test suite has been documented using standardized TTCN-3 documentation tags [6]. These tags can be extracted and turned into HTML based documentation. The main documentation tags used in the documentation of this ATS are summarized in table 2. Table 2: Used TTCN-3 Documentation Tags Tag Description @author Specifies the names of the authors or an authoring organization which either has created or is maintaining a particular piece of TTCN-3 code. @desc Describes the purpose of a particular piece of TTCN-3 code. The description should be concise yet informative and describe the function and use of the construct. @remark Adds extra information, such as the highlighting of a particular feature or aspect not covered in the description. @see Refers to other TTCN-3 definitions in the same or another module. @url Associates references to external files or web pages with a particular piece of TTCN-3 code, e.g. a protocol specification or standard. @return Provides additional information on the value returned by a given function. @member Documents a member of structured TTCN-3 definitions. @param Documents a parameter of parameterized TTCN-3 definitions. @version States the version of a particular piece of TTCN-3 code. The following provides some basic guidelines on the usage of tags for specific TTCN-3 definitions: • each TTCN-3 module should use the @author, @version and @desc tags; • the @desc tag should be used with all TTCN-3 definitions. However, this should not be taken to the extreme. For example, it is probably not useful to tag literally every single constant or template declaration. It is left to the discretion of the writer to find the right level of use. At least all major constructs such as test cases and functions should have a comprehensive description: - when a TTCN-3 definition uses module parameters, it is also recommended to mention this explicitly in the description; - descriptions for behavioural constructs should mention if they set the test component verdict and also all known limitations of the construct; - descriptions for type definitions, e.g. component types, should mention if the type has been designed to be type compatible to another type or vice versa to be used as a basis for other type definitions. • the @see tag should be used to make dependencies between TTCN-3 definitions which are described by a @desc tag more explicit in the documentation, e.g. if some TTCN-3 definition uses a module parameter then its TTCN-3 definition should be referenced to using a @see tag; • where applicable, parameterized constructions such as functions, altsteps and templates should use the @param and @return tags. The @param tags should first list the parameter name and then a brief description of how this parameter is used by the construct; • the @url tag should be used to refer to the specification from which the TTCN-3 definition was derived from, e.g. a type definition could refer to a particular RFC IETF page. In some cases it may be necessary to use the @desc tag instead for this purpose as documents often are hard to access internally, i.e. it may only be possible to specify a reference to a complete document but impossible to point to a very specific clause in this document; • the @url tag may be used to link to relevant documentation such as Test Purposes or original requirements or even drawings of test configurations. Generally, the corresponding Test Purpose (in the TSS&TP) and to the corresponding Requirement (in the Requirements Catalogue) should be linked from the relevant TTCN-3 test case definition; ETSI ETSI TS 186 011-3 V4.1.3 (2012-05) 16 • the @remark tag may be used with any TTCN-3 definition. It should be used sparingly, e.g. possibly to indicate how a TTCN-3 definition should not be used.
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6.9 Mapping of test descriptions to test cases
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The ATS define one test case (TC) per IMS NNI test description (TD). The following naming convention is used by the ATS for test cases: Test case name = <TC_PREFIX>_<TD_ID> <TC_PREFIX> = the test cases prefix as specified e.g. "TC_" in the TTCN-3 naming conventions <TD_ID> = the test description Id e.g. "IMS_MESS_0001"
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186 011-3
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7 Test system
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186 011-3
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7.1 Test system architecture
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Figure 3: Abstract Test System Architecture Figure 3 shows the abstract test system architecture. It shows a test system (TS) that is compliant to [4] and [5] supporting two interfaces: the TTCN-3 Control Interface (TCI) handling the interaction between the TTCN-3 Executable (TE) and the Test Management (Test Control and Test Logging), and the TTCN-3 Runtime Interface (TRI) which handle the communication between the TE and System/Platform Adapter. For further descriptions, the reader is referred to [4] and [5].
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186 011-3
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7.1.1 SUT adapter requirements
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Figure 4 illustrates the port association between the TTCN-3 executable (TE) and system adapter (SA). The SA includes the lower and the upper tester. The lower tester implements the monitoring of the real interface and the upper tester translates the abstract equipment operation request into a concrete one or interacts via instructions with the user of that equipment. Test Control (TC) Test Logging (TL) System Adapter (SA) Platform Adapter (PA) Control Behavior Components Types, Data Ports Timer Component Handling Codec TCI TRI Test System User System Under Test (SUT) ETSI ETSI TS 186 011-3 V4.1.3 (2012-05) 17 Figure 4: Abstract Port Associations TTCN-3 components, i.e. the TTCN-3 TE, uses the Test System Interface (TSI) adapter configuration port acPort to perform general configuration as well as set filters in the lower tester component which is responsible for sending monitored messages to the TE. The port is also used to start and stop traffic capture. Note that every TTCN-3 component that would like to receive traffic has to request a filter setting from the adapter. The TSI data port dPort is used by the SA to send to TTCN-3 component which have been captured during the monitoring of EUT communication and filtered. The equipment access port eaPort is used by TTCN-3 components to request operation of equipment from at the System Adapter, e.g. to trigger for example the registration of a UE.
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186 011-3
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7.1.2 Adapter Configuration Primitives
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Table 3 provides and over view all adapter configuration primitives expected to be supported by the ATS, their parameters and usage information. For more information the reader is referred to the TTCN-3 module LibIot_TypesAndValues. Table 3: Adapter Configuration Primitives Primitive Parameters Usage GeneralConfigurationRequest GeneralConfigurationResponse IP address and port of capture process, live vs. offline test execution, physical interfaces, recording vs. no recording, capture file offset, capture file or files to be merged First message send to the adapter by ATS SetFilterRequest SetFilterResponse Protocol to be filtered IP address and port information related to interface Can be sent by any component but not during capture StartCaptureRequest StartCaptureResponse None Either sent after the general configuration or one or more filter requests StopCaptureRequest StopCaptureResponse None Sent after start capture request
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186 011-3
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7.1.3 Upper Tester Primitives
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Table 4 provides an overview of all equipment primitives expected to be supported by the ATS, their parameters and usage information. For more information the reader is referred to the TTCN-3 module LibUpperTester. dPort eaPort acPort TTCN-3 Executable EUT Trigger Interface Monitor System Adapter Interface Monitor Equipment User Lower Tester Upper Tester Test Coordinator SUT ETSI ETSI TS 186 011-3 V4.1.3 (2012-05) 18 Table 4: Upper Tester Primitives Primitive Parameters Usage EquipmentOperationRequest EquipmentOperationResponse command, parameter list
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7.1.4 TRI message encoding
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All messages are exchanged via the TRI in encoded format including adapter configuration and equipment operation primitives. In order to be able to mix and match components from different vendors in a test system the following encoding rules have been defined for encoding adapter configuration and equipment operation messages: • The message type is encoded in the first octet except for capturing messages which are pure raw data (see below table for details) • Each information element of a message is encoded with < length><value> where < length> is always encoded on 2 octets • Text string values are kept as they are • Integer values are always encoded on 8 octets, using network byte order • Enumerated values are encoded in their integer representation using 1 octet • Lists of information elements are encoded using <number of parameters><{< length><value>}+ >, where <number of parameters> shall use 2 octets and <length> <value> are encoded as described above • Sequences of information elements simply encoded as a concatenation of encoded information elements; note that the position of list information elements is assumed to be known, i.e. hardcoded • Union elements are encoded using <alternative index> in a single octet; the index starts at zero and the alternative definition order is assumed to be the same as in the TTCN-3 types defined in section X • Omitted information elements or values of length zero simply are encoded using <length> (or a <number of parameters> for the lists of information elements) set to '0000'H Table 5: Message type encoding Message type Octet Value Encoding GeneralConfigurationReq 0x00 GeneralConfigurationRsp 0x01 SetFilterReq 0x02 SetFilterRsp 0x03 StartTrafficCaptureReq 0x04 StartTrafficCaptureRsp 0x05 StopTrafficCaptureReq 0x06 StopTrafficCaptureRsp 0x07 EquipmentOperationReq 0x08 EquipmentOperationRsp 0x09
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320381f60d052d2b1060ecc4577deb9a
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186 011-3
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7.2 Platform Adapter requirements
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The ATS has no special requirements regarding timing. It assumes an implementation of timers using real time. There are no external functions defined as part of this test suite. ETSI ETSI TS 186 011-3 V4.1.3 (2012-05) 19
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7.3 Codec requirements
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This test suite requires a TTCN-3 Coding/Decoding entity that supports encoding SIP and SDP TTCN-3 values into SIP text messages and SDP payloads, as well as vice versa. In addition, it requires similar support for DNS messages. This test suite also expects an adapter configuration and equipment operation request encoder as well as a response decoder. This CoDec shall be implemented in conformance with the standard TTCN-3 Control Interface (TCI) [5].
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186 011-3
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7.3.1 Relevant RFCs
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The CoDec part should support all RFCs supported by the TTCN-3 SIP and DNS library type structure: • RFC 3261: "SIP: Session Initiation Protocol". • RFC 3262: "Reliability of Provisional Responses in the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)". • RFC 3265: "Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)-Specific Event Notification". • RFC 3313: "Private Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Extensions for Media Authorization". • RFC 3323: "A Privacy Mechanism for the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)". • RFC 3325: "Private Extensions to the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) for Asserted Identity within Trusted Networks". • RFC 3326: "The Reason Header Field for the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)". • RFC 3327: "Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Extension Header Field for Registering Non-Adjacent Contacts". • RFC 3329: "Security Mechanism Agreement for the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)". • RFC 3455: "Private Header (P-Header) Extensions to the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) for the 3rd- Generation Partnership Project (3GPP)". • RFC 3515: "The Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Refer Method". • RFC 3608: "Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Extension Header Field for Service Route Discovery During Registration". • RFC 3841: "Caller Preferences for the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)". • RFC 3891: "The Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) "Replaces" Header". • RFC 3892: "The Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Referred-By Mechanism". • RFC 4028: "Session Timers in the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)". • RFC 4244: "An Extension to the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) for Request History Information". • RFC 5009: "Private Header (P-Header) Extension to the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) for Authorization of Early Media". Some SIP message constructs reuse some headers defined in the HTTP protocol. Thus the following RFCs should be partially supported: • RFC 2616: "Hypertext Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1". • RFC 2617: "HTTP Authentication: Basic and Digest Access Authentication". Regarding the payload of the SIP messages, the CoDec should support encoding and decoding of message bodies in the SDP format. • RFC 4566: "SDP: Session Description Protocol". For DNS the following RFCs are relevant. ETSI ETSI TS 186 011-3 V4.1.3 (2012-05) 20 • RFC 1035: "Domain names - implementation and specification". • RFC 2915: "The Naming Authority Pointer (NAPTR) DNS Resource Record".
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186 011-3
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7.3.2 SIP and SDP codec requirements
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7.3.2.1 Omission of the delimiters The TTCN-3 types in SIP library provide an abstract representation of the SIP messages which also maps the transfer syntax of the SIP messages. This mapping is meant to ease the semantic analysis of the messages and all the elements in the messages that do not carry any information on a semantic point of view (thus that are present only for syntactic purpose) are not represented. This includes: • white space and new lines between the header fields • delimiters used for separating the fields (eg. : ; , ? & = @ or " in case of quoted strings) On the decoding side, the CoDec shall match these symbols to identify the fields delimited, then store the content of the fields into a TTCN-3 data structure and discard these delimiters. On the encoding side, the CoDec shall add all the necessary whitespaces and punctuations between the fields so as to produce a syntactically correct SIP message. EXAMPLE: The code below shows an example of the representation of a Via message header in the raw format and its corresponding value using the TTCN-3 types in the SIP library. Raw format: Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.0.2.1;branch=z9hG4Bk Corresponding TTCN-3 value: { fieldName := VIA_E viaBody := {{ sentProtocol := { protocolName := "SIP", protocolVersion := "2.0", transport := "UDP", sentBy := { host := "192.0.2.1", portField := { viaParams := {{ id := "branch", paramValue := "z9hG4bK" }}}}}}}} 7.3.2.2 Normalisation Some constructs in the SIP message format allow several representations of the same message that are semantically equivalent but that have a different syntax: • The most common headers names can be replaced with a one-letter alias to shorten the messages. For example, the header name "From:" can simply be represented as "f:" • The characters in a quoted string enclosed with double quotes (") may be escaped by a preceding backslash character (\) • Most field values that are not enclosed within a quoted string may contain escaping sequences starting with a percent character (%) and followed by two hexadecimal digits coding the binary value of the character. In order to ease the analysis of the messages received in the abstract test suite, these constructs should be normalised. Thus two messages that are syntactically different but semantically equivalent will produce exactly the same TTCN-3 value. Following this approach: • the two possible variants for a header name will map to the same enumeration value (e.g. the "From:" and "f:" header names will both map to the "FROM_E" header value) ETSI ETSI TS 186 011-3 V4.1.3 (2012-05) 21 • all the escaping characters (\) in quoted strings will be removed. Note that this does not raise any operational issue since the enclosing quotes (") were removed and are no longer needed for delimiting the string • all the escape sequences (%xx) outside quoted strings will be replaced with the corresponding character if the character is a displayable character (in the 7-bit ASCII set) Additionally the SIP message format is encoded using the Unicode UTF-8 character set. This encoding is identical to standard ASCII encoding for the ASCII character set but different for any characters which go beyond the ASCII range. Since SIP type definitions in LibSip map to the TTCN-3 charstring type and not the universal charstring, the type system cannot handle advanced UTF-8 encoded strings. 7.3.2.3 Other requirements According to the conventions used for structuring the messages in the SIP message, the following considerations shall be taken into account. • Optional fields that may contain multiple values are represented in TTCN-3 with an "optional" field containing a "record of" or a "set of" structured type. In the case no options are present, the field shall be omitted (instead of being present and containing an empty list). • The SIP messages contain an additional field named "payload" (which is distinct from the "messageBody" field). This field is meant to contain the whole raw SIP message represented in the value. Its purpose is only for debugging purpose to provide a textual representation of the message in the TTCN-3 environment. Its content is always ignored in the abstract test suite. The CoDec shall handle this field as follows: - when encoding a message, the payload field shall be ignored by the CoDec - when decoding a message, the CoDec shall fill the payload field with the whole SIP message in the textual format (as received from the System Adapter). Note this field is a 7-bit charstring, therefore the non-displayable characters shall be replaced or escaped to avoid that the TTCN-3 environment report any error. • The message headers in the SIP messages are syntactically represented as a list of headers. However since the position of headers is not significant (apart from headers that may appear multiple times) and since most of the headers can occur only once in a SIP messages, it was decided to represent the message headers as a single TTCN-3 set containing one field per header type. The filed type of the headers that can appear multiple times contain a "record of" for storing the successive occurrences of the header. This structure does not reflect accurately the message structure, however it easy considerably the semantic analysis of the message (a given header can be accessed directly as a field in the set instead of having to find it inside a list of headers). The CoDec is required to accommodate this representation.
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186 011-3
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8 Test execution
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