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46480e23249c0aff55cee89bb56f9a9c
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186 007-1
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4.2.1 Date of the statement
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Date of the statement:
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46480e23249c0aff55cee89bb56f9a9c
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186 007-1
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4.2.2 Implementation Under Test (IUT) identification
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IUT name: IUT version:
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186 007-1
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4.2.3 System Under Test (SUT) identification
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SUT name: Hardware configuration: Operating system: ETSI ETSI TS 186 007-1 V1.1.1 (2006-10) 9
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46480e23249c0aff55cee89bb56f9a9c
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186 007-1
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4.2.4 Product supplier
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Name: Address: Telephone number: Facsimile number: Additional information:
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186 007-1
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4.2.5 Client
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Name: Address: Telephone number: Facsimile number: Additional information:
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46480e23249c0aff55cee89bb56f9a9c
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186 007-1
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4.2.6 PICS contact person
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Name: Telephone number: Facsimile number: Additional information:
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186 007-1
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4.3 PICS proforma tables
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46480e23249c0aff55cee89bb56f9a9c
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186 007-1
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4.3.1 Global statement of conformance
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(Yes/No) Are all mandatory capabilities implemented?
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46480e23249c0aff55cee89bb56f9a9c
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186 007-1
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4.3.2 Network capabilities
|
Table 1: Network capabilities Item Item description Reference Status Support 1 Does the network support the hold and resume of media streams in the early dialogue? RFC 3264 [9] o 2 Does the network support the hold and resume of media streams using the UPDATE method in the confirmed dialogue? 4.5.2.1/ [4] o 3 Does the AS of the invoking UE initiate the procedures for the provision of an announcement to the held user? 4.5.2.4/ [4] o ETSI ETSI TS 186 007-1 V1.1.1 (2006-10) 10 History Document history V1.1.1 October 2006 Publication
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de0f08a3c38814f6bb9a0f228626538d
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186 006-2
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1 Scope
|
The present document specifies the Test Suite Structure and Test Purposes (TSS&TP) for the Originating Identification Presentation (OIP) and Originating Identification Restriction (OIR) NGN Basic Service, TS 124 607 [1]. A further part of the present document specifies the Abstract Test Suite (ATS) and partial Protocol Implementation eXtra Information for Testing (PIXIT) proforma based on the present document. Within the TISPAN NGN Release 1 Next Generation Network (NGN) the stage 3 description is specified using the IP Multimedia Call Control Protocol based on Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) and Session Description Protocol (SDP). The OIP service provides the terminating party with the possibility to receive a trusted (network-provided) identity of the originating party, and is applicable to all session-based services of the NGN. The OIR service enables the originating party to prevent presentation of any network-provided identity to the terminating party, and is applicable to all session-based services of the NGN.
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186 006-2
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2 References
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References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the reference document (including any amendments) applies. Referenced documents which are not found to be publicly available in the expected location might be found at http://docbox.etsi.org/Reference. NOTE: While any hyperlinks included in this clause were valid at the time of publication, ETSI cannot guarantee their long term validity.
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186 006-2
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2.1 Normative references
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The following referenced documents are necessary for the application of the present document. [1] ETSI TS 124 607 (V8.4.0): "Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+); Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); LTE; Originating Identification Presentation (OIP) and Originating Identification Restriction (OIR) using IP Multimedia (IM) Core Network (CN) subsystem; Protocol specification (3GPP TS 24.607 version 8.4.0 Release 8)". [2] ETSI TS 186 006-1: "Telecommunications and Internet Converged Services and Protocols for Advanced Networking (TISPAN); Originating Identification Presentation (OIP) and Originating Identification Restriction (OIR) Part 1: Protocol Implementation Conformance Statement (PICS)". [3] IETF RFC 3323: "A Privacy Mechanism for the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)".
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186 006-2
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2.2 Informative references
|
The following referenced documents are not necessary for the application of the present document but they assist the user with regard to a particular subject area. [i.1] ISO/IEC 9646-1: "Information technology - Open Systems Interconnection - Conformance testing methodology and framework - Part 1: General concepts". ETSI ETSI TS 186 006-2 V3.1.1 (2011-07) 6
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de0f08a3c38814f6bb9a0f228626538d
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186 006-2
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3 Definitions and abbreviations
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de0f08a3c38814f6bb9a0f228626538d
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186 006-2
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3.1 Definitions
|
For the purposes of the present document, the terms and definitions given in TS 124 607 [1] and the following apply: Abstract Test Suite (ATS): Refer to ISO/IEC 9646-1 [i.1]. Implementation Under Test (IUT): Refer to ISO/IEC 9646-1 [i.1]. PICS proforma: Refer to ISO/IEC 9646-1 [i.1]. point of control and observation: Refer to ISO/IEC 9646-1 [i.1]. Protocol Implementation Conformance Statement (PICS): Refer to ISO/IEC 9646-1 [i.1]. System Under Test (SUT): Refer to ISO/IEC 9646-1 [i.1]. Test Purpose (TP): Refer to ISO/IEC 9646-1 [i.1].
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de0f08a3c38814f6bb9a0f228626538d
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186 006-2
|
3.2 Abbreviations
|
For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in TS 124 607 [1] and the following apply: NNI Network-Network Interface TSS Test Suite Structure
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de0f08a3c38814f6bb9a0f228626538d
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186 006-2
|
4 Test Suite Structure (TSS)
|
User CallingUser OIP_U01_xxx CalledUser OIP_U02_xxx Network AS_OrigUser OIP_N01_xxx AS_TermUser OIP_N02_xxx Figure 1: Test suite structure
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de0f08a3c38814f6bb9a0f228626538d
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186 006-2
|
4.1 Configuration
|
The scope of the current specification is to test the signalling and procedural aspects of the stage 3 requirements as described in TS 124 607 [1]. The stage 3 description describes the requirements for several network entities and also the requirements regarding for terminal devices. Therefore several interfaces (reference points) are addressed to satisfy the test of the different entities. Therefore to test the appropriate entities the configurations below are applicable:
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de0f08a3c38814f6bb9a0f228626538d
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186 006-2
|
4.1.1 Testing of the AS
|
The AS entity is responsible for performing and managing services. The ISC interface is the appropriate access point for testing. ETSI ETSI TS 186 006-2 V3.1.1 (2011-07) 7 Figure 2: Applicable interface to test AS functionalities If the ISC interface is not accessible it is also possible to perform the test of the AS using any NNI (Mw, Mg, Mx) interface (see figure 3). In case only the Gm interface is accessible this interface can be used instead for testing, but the verification of all requirements may not be possible. CSCF (and/or AS) Implementation under Test Test System Test System Mw, Mg, Mx Mw, Mg, Mx Figure 3: Applicable interfaces for tests using a (generic) NNI interface
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de0f08a3c38814f6bb9a0f228626538d
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186 006-2
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4.1.2 Testing of the UE
|
There are special clauses in the protocol standard describing the procedures that apply at the originating and terminating user equipment. Therefore the test configuration in figure 4 has been chosen. User Equipment Implementation under Test Test System Gm Figure 4: Applicable configuration to test UE functionalities ETSI ETSI TS 186 006-2 V3.1.1 (2011-07) 8
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de0f08a3c38814f6bb9a0f228626538d
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186 006-2
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5 Test Purposes (TP)
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de0f08a3c38814f6bb9a0f228626538d
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186 006-2
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5.1 Introduction
|
For each test requirement a TP is defined.
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de0f08a3c38814f6bb9a0f228626538d
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186 006-2
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5.1.1 TP naming convention
|
TPs are numbered, starting at 001, within each group. Groups are organized according to the TSS. Additional references are added to identify the actual test suite and whether it applies to the network or the user (see table 1). Table 1: TP identifier naming convention scheme Identifier: <ss>_<iut><group>_<nnn> <ss> = supplementary service: e.g. "OIP" <iut> = type of IUT: U User - equipment N Network <group> = group 2 digit field representing group reference according to TSS <nnn> = sequential number (001 to 999)
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de0f08a3c38814f6bb9a0f228626538d
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186 006-2
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5.1.2 Test strategy
|
As the base standard TS 124 607 [1] contains no explicit requirements for testing, the TPs were generated as a result of an analysis of the base standard and the PICS specification TS 186 006-1 [2]. The criteria applied include the following: • only the requirements from the point of view of the T or coincident S and T reference point are considered; • whether or not a test case can be built from the TP is not considered.
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de0f08a3c38814f6bb9a0f228626538d
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186 006-2
|
5.2 User TPs for OIP and OIR
|
All PICS items referred to in this clause are as specified in TS 186 006-1 [2] unless indicated otherwise by another numbered reference.
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de0f08a3c38814f6bb9a0f228626538d
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186 006-2
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5.2.1 Calling user
|
TSS User/Calling_User TP OIP_U01_001 OIP reference clause 4.5.2.1 Selection expression PICS 1/1 Test purpose: Originating user sends a P-Preferred Identity. Ensure that the IUT, in order to present a complete calling user identity with which is registered, sends an INVITE message containing a P-Preferred-Identity header with valid 'tel' or 'SIP' URI defined as USER_URI. Preconditions: The user registers the public user identity. Comments: User Equipment Test Equipment INVITE ETSI ETSI TS 186 006-2 V3.1.1 (2011-07) 9 TSS User/Calling_User TP OIP_U01_002 OIP reference clause 4.5.2.1 Selection expression PICS 1/1, 2/4 Test purpose: Originating user sends a P-Preferred Identity and wishes to override the default setting 'Presentation restricted'. Ensure that the IUT, in order to present a complete calling user identity with which is registered and to override the OIR default settings of 'presentation restricted', sends an INVITE message containing a P-Preferred-Identity header with valid 'tel' or 'SIP' URI defined as USER_URI and a Privacy header set to "none". Preconditions: The user registers the public user identity. The user has subscribed to OIR temporary mode, default value 'presentation restricted'. Comments: User Equipment Test Equipment INVITE INVITE User/Calling_User TP OIP_U01_003 OIP reference clause 4.5.2.1 Selection expression PICS 1/1, 2/3 Test purpose: Originating user sends an 'anonymous' From header and wishes to override the default setting 'Presentation not restricted'. Ensure that the IUT, in order to override the OIR default settings of 'presentation not restricted', sends an INVITE message not containing a P-Preferred-Identity header and containing a Privacy header set to "id" or "header" and containing an anonymous From header. The convention for configuring an anonymous From header is described in RFC 3323 [3] and should be followed; i.e. From: "Anonymous" <sip:[email protected]>;tag= xxxxxx. Preconditions: The user has subscribed to OIR temporary mode, default value 'presentation restricted'. Comments: User Equipment Tert Equipment INVITE INVITE Table 2 Values for test purposes OIP_U02_001 to OIP_U02_003 USER_URI VA_1 tel: local number VA_2 tel: global number VA_3 tel: local number ; phone-context= particular phone prefix. VA_4 tel: local number ; phone-context= domainname VA_5 tel: local number; isub= ISDN Subadress VA_6 SIP URI sip:user:password@host:port;uri-parameters VA_7 sip URI: local number @host:port;uri-parameters VA_8 sip URI: global number @host:port;uri-parameters VA_9 sip URI: local number ; phone-context= particular phone prefix @host:port;uri-parameters
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de0f08a3c38814f6bb9a0f228626538d
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186 006-2
|
5.2.2 Called user
|
TSS User/Called_User TP OIP_U02_001 OIP reference Selection expression PICS 1/2 Test purpose: Terminating user receives a P-Asserted identity header field. Ensure that the terminating UE, receiving a valid and compatible INVITE message containing one P-Asserted-Identity header indicating a public user identity defined as URI_USER, accepts the call following the basic call procedures. Comments: User Equipment Test Equipment INVITE INVITE ETSI ETSI TS 186 006-2 V3.1.1 (2011-07) 10 TSS User/Called_User TP OIP_U02_002 OIP reference Selection expression PICS 1/2 Test purpose: Terminating user receives a P-Asserted identity header field. Ensure that the terminating UE, receiving a valid and compatible INVITE message containing two P-Asserted-Identity headers indicating public user identities defined as URI_USER accepts the call following the basic call procedures. Comments: User Equipment SUT Test Equipment INVITE INVITE Table 3 Values for test purposes OIP_U02_001 and 002 USER_URI VA_1 tel: local number VA_2 tel: global number VA_3 tel: local number ; phone-context= particular phone prefix. VA_4 tel: local number ; phone-context= domainname VA_5 tel: local number; isub= ISDN Subadress VA_6 SIP URI sip:user:password@host:port;uri-parameters VA_7 sip URI: local number @host:port;uri-parameters VA_8 sip URI: global number @host:port;uri-parameters VA_9 Sip URI: local number ; phone-context= particular phone prefix @host:port;uri-parameters
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de0f08a3c38814f6bb9a0f228626538d
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186 006-2
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5.2.3 Requirements on the originating network side
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de0f08a3c38814f6bb9a0f228626538d
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186 006-2
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5.2.3.1 Actions at the AS serving the originating user
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TSS Network/AS_OrigUser TP OIP_N01_001 OIP reference clauses 4.5.2.4 Selection expression PICS 2/2 Test purpose: The AS includes a Privacy header field in permanent mode. Ensure that the IUT, on receipt of an INVITE without Privacy header, transmits an INVITE with a Privacy header set to "id". Preconditions: The originating user has subscribed to the OIR service in the permanent mode. The subscription option Restriction is set to 'restrict the asserted identity'. Comments: Test equipment AS Test equipment INVITE INVITE 100 Trying TSS Network /AS_OrigUser TP OIP_N01_002 OIP reference clauses 4.5.2.4 Selection expression PICS 2/2 Test purpose: The AS includes a Privacy header field in permanent mode. Ensure that the IUT, on receipt of an INVITE without Privacy header, transmits an INVITE with a Privacy header set to "header". Preconditions: The originating user has subscribed to the OIR service in the permanent mode. The subscription option Restriction is set to 'restrict all private information appearing in headers'. Comments: Test equipment AS Test equipment INVITE INVITE 100 Trying ETSI ETSI TS 186 006-2 V3.1.1 (2011-07) 11 TSS Network/AS_OrigUser TP OIP_N01_003 OIP reference clauses 4.5.2.4 Selection expression PICS 2/2 Test purpose: The AS removes Privacy header field "none" in permanent mode. Ensure that the IUT, on receipt of an INVITE with a Privacy header set to "none", transmits an INVITE with only one Privacy header set to "id". Preconditions: The originating user has subscribed to the OIR service in the permanent mode. The subscription option Restriction is set to 'restrict the asserted identity'. Comments: Test equipment AS Test equipment INVITE INVITE 100 Trying TSS Network/AS_OrigUser TP OIP_N01_004 OIP reference clauses 4.5.2.4 Selection expression PICS 2/2 Test purpose: The AS removes Privacy header field "none" in permanent mode. Ensure that the IUT, on receipt of an INVITE with a Privacy header set to "none", transmits an INVITE with only one Privacy header set to "header". Preconditions: The originating user has subscribed to the OIR service in the permanent mode. The subscription option Restriction is set to 'restrict all private information appearing in headers'. Comments: Test equipment AS Test equipment INVITE INVITE 100 Trying TSS Network/AS_OrigUser TP OIP_N01_005 OIP reference clauses 4.5.2.4 Selection expression PICS 1/5, 2/2 Test purpose: The AS anonymizes the identity in permanent mode. Ensure that the IUT, on receipt of an INVITE, transmits an INVITE with a Privacy header set to "user" or transmits an INVITE with the From header anonymized. Preconditions: The originating user has subscribed to the OIR service in the permanent mode. Comments: Test equipment AS Test equipment INVITE INVITE 100 Trying TSS Network/AS_OrigUser TP OIP_N01_006 OIP reference clauses 4.5.2.4 Selection expression PICS 2/4 Test purpose: The AS includes a Privacy header field in temporary mode, restricted. Ensure that the IUT, on receipt of an INVITE without Privacy header, transmits an INVITE with a Privacy header set to "id". Preconditions: The originating user has subscribed to the OIR service in the temporary mode with default presentation restricted. The subscription option Restriction is set to 'restrict the asserted identity'. Comments: Test equipment AS Test equipment INVITE INVITE 100 Trying ETSI ETSI TS 186 006-2 V3.1.1 (2011-07) 12 TSS Network/AS_OrigUser TP OIP_N01_007 OIP reference clauses 4.5.2.4 Selection expression PICS 2/4 Test purpose: The AS includes a Privacy header field in temporary mode, restricted. Ensure that the IUT, on receipt of an INVITE without Privacy header, transmits an INVITE with a Privacy header set to "header". Preconditions: The originating user has subscribed to the OIR service in the temporary mode with default presentation restricted. The subscription option Restriction is set to 'restrict all private information appearing in headers'. Comments: Test equipment AS Test equipment INVITE INVITE 100 Trying TSS Network/AS_OrigUser TP OIP_N01_008 OIP reference clauses 4.5.2.4 Selection expression PICS 2/4 Test purpose: The AS includes a Privacy header field in temporary mode, restricted. Ensure that the IUT, on receipt of an INVITE with a Privacy header present set to a value other than "none", transmits an INVITE with a Privacy header set to "id". Preconditions: The originating user has subscribed to the OIR service in the temporary mode with default presentation restricted. The subscription option Restriction is set to 'restrict the asserted identity'. Comments: Test equipment AS Test equipment INVITE INVITE 100 Trying TSS Network/AS_OrigUser TP OIP_N01_009 OIP reference clauses 4.5.2.4 Selection expression PICS 2/4 Test purpose: The AS includes a Privacy header field in temporary mode, restricted. Ensure that the IUT, on receipt of an INVITE with a Privacy header present set to a value other than "none", transmits an INVITE with a Privacy header set to "header". Preconditions: The originating user has subscribed to the OIR service in the temporary mode with default presentation restricted. The subscription option Restriction is set to 'restrict all private information appearing in headers'. Comments: Test equipment AS Test equipment INVITE INVITE 100 Trying TSS Network/AS_OrigUser TP OIP_N01_010 OIP reference clauses 4.5.2.4 Selection expression PICS 1/5, 2/4 Test purpose: The AS anonymizes the identity in permanent mode. Ensure that the IUT, on receipt of an INVITE, transmits an INVITE with a Privacy header set to "user" or transmits an INVITE with the From header anonymized. Preconditions: The originating user has subscribed to the OIR service in the permanent mode. Comments: Test equipment AS Test equipment INVITE INVITE 100 Trying ETSI ETSI TS 186 006-2 V3.1.1 (2011-07) 13 TSS Network/AS_OrigUser TP OIP_N01_011 OIP reference clauses 4.5.2.4 Selection expression PICS 1/5, 2/3, 2/6 Test purpose: The AS anonymizes the identity in temporary mode, not restricted. Ensure that the IUT, on receipt of an INVITE with a Privacy header set to "id", transmits an INVITE with the From header anonymized. Preconditions: The originating user has subscribed to the OIR service in the temporary mode with default not restricted. The originating user has subscribed to the "no screening" special arrangement. Comments: Test equipment AS Test equipment INVITE INVITE 100 Trying TSS Network/AS_OrigUser TP OIP_N01_012 OIP reference clauses 4.5.2.4 Selection expression PICS 1/5, 2/3, 2/6 Test purpose: The AS anonymizes the identity in temporary mode, not restricted. Ensure that the IUT, on receipt of an INVITE with a Privacy header set to "header", transmits an INVITE with the From header anonymized. Preconditions: The originating user has subscribed to the OIR service in the temporary mode with default not restricted. The originating user has subscribed to the "no screening" special arrangement. Comments: Test equipment AS Test equipment INVITE INVITE 100 Trying TSS Network/AS_OrigUser TP OIP_N01_013 OIP reference clauses 4.5.2.4 Selection expression PICS 1/7, 2/3, NOT 2/6 Test purpose: The AS replaces the identity in temporary mode, not restricted. Ensure that the IUT, on receipt of an INVITE with a Privacy header set to "id" and with the From header containing an identity which is not one of the originating user's registered public identities, transmits an INVITE with the From header containing the default public user identity of the originating user. Preconditions: The originating user has subscribed to the OIR service in the temporary mode with default not restricted. The originating user has not subscribed to the "no screening" special arrangement. Comments: Test equipment AS Test equipment INVITE INVITE 100 Trying TSS Network/AS_OrigUser TP OIP_N01_014 OIP reference clauses 4.5.2.4 Selection expression PICS 1/7, 2/3, NOT 2/6 Test purpose: The AS replaces the identity in temporary mode, not restricted. Ensure that the IUT, on receipt of an INVITE with a Privacy header set to "header" and with the From header containing an identity which is not one of the originating user's registered public identities, transmits an INVITE with the From header containing the default public user identity of the originating user. Preconditions: The originating user has subscribed to the OIR service in the temporary mode with default not restricted. The originating user has not subscribed to the "no screening" special arrangement. Comments: Test equipment AS Test equipment INVITE INVITE 100 Trying ETSI ETSI TS 186 006-2 V3.1.1 (2011-07) 14 TSS Network/AS_OrigUser TP OIP_N01_015 OIP reference clauses 4.5.2.4 Selection expression PICS NOT 1/5, 2/3, 2/6 Test purpose: The AS does not anonymize the identity in temporary mode, not restricted. Ensure that the IUT, on receipt of an INVITE with a Privacy header set to "id", transmits an INVITE with the From header not anonymized. Preconditions: The originating user has subscribed to the OIR service in the temporary mode with default not restricted. The originating user has subscribed to the "no screening" special arrangement. Comments: Test equipment AS Test equipment INVITE INVITE 100 Trying TSS Network/AS_OrigUser TP OIP_N01_016 OIP reference clauses 4.5.2.4 Selection expression PICS NOT 1/5, 2/3, 2/6 Test purpose: The AS does anonymize the identity in temporary mode, not restricted. Ensure that the IUT, on receipt of an INVITE with a Privacy header set to "header", transmits an INVITE with the From header not anonymized. Preconditions: The originating user has subscribed to the OIR service in the temporary mode with default not restricted. The originating user has subscribed to the "no screening" special arrangement. Comments: Test equipment AS Test equipment INVITE INVITE 100 Trying TSS Network/AS_OrigUser TP OIP_N01_017 OIP reference clauses 4.5.2.4 Selection expression PICS 2/3, 2/6 Test purpose: The AS leaves the identity unchanged in temporary mode, not restricted. Ensure that the IUT, on receipt of an INVITE without a Privacy header, transmits an INVITE with the From header unchanged. Preconditions: The originating user has subscribed to the OIR service in the temporary mode with default not restricted. The originating user has subscribed to the "no screening" special arrangement. Comments: Test equipment AS Test equipment INVITE INVITE 100 Trying
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de0f08a3c38814f6bb9a0f228626538d
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186 006-2
|
5.2.3.2 Actions at the AS serving the terminating UE
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TSS Network/AS_TermUser TP OIP_N02_001 OIP reference clause 4.5.2.9 Selection expression NOT PICS 2/1 Test purpose: The terminating user does not subscribe the OIP service. Ensure that the IUT, on receipt of an INVITE with a Privacy header and a P-Asserted-Identity header, transmits an INVITE without Privacy header and without P-Asserted-Identity header. Preconditions: Terminating user does not subscribe to OIP service Comments: Test Equipment AS Test Equipment INVITE INVITE 100 Trying ETSI ETSI TS 186 006-2 V3.1.1 (2011-07) 15 TSS Network/AS_TermUser TP OIP_N02_002 OIP reference clause 4.5.2.9 Selection expression NOT PICS 2/1 AND PICS 1/8 Test purpose: The terminating user does not subscribe the OIP service, the AS anonymizes the contents of the From header. Ensure that the IUT, on receipt of an INVITE with a Privacy header and a P-Asserted-Identity header, transmits an INVITE without Privacy header and without P-Asserted-Identity header and with the From header set to a default non significant value. Preconditions: Terminating user does not subscribe to OIP service. The IUT anonymize the contents of the From header. Comments: Test Equipment AS Test Equipment INVITE INVITE 100 Trying TSS Network/AS_TermUser TP OIP_N02_003 OIP reference clause 4.5.2.9 Selection expression PICS 2/1, 2/5 Test purpose: Terminating user has the override category. Ensure that the IUT, on receipt of an INVITE with a Privacy header and a P-Asserted-Identity header, transmits an INVITE without Privacy header and with the P-Asserted-Identity header. Preconditions: Terminating user does subscribe to OIP service. Terminating user has an override category. Comments: Test Equipment AS Test Equipment INVITE INVITE 100 Trying
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de0f08a3c38814f6bb9a0f228626538d
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186 006-2
|
5.2.3.3 Actions at the S-CSCF serving the terminating UE
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TSS Originating_Netw/ TermS-CSCF TP OIP_N06_001 OIP reference clause 4.3.3 Selection expression Test purpose: The terminating S-CSCF acts according the OIR service. Ensure that the IUT, on receipt of an INVITE with a Privacy header set to "id", transmits an INVITE without the P- Asserted-Identity header. Comments: Test Equipment S_CSCF Test Equipment INVITE INVITE 100 Trying
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de0f08a3c38814f6bb9a0f228626538d
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186 006-2
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6 Compliance
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An ATS which complies with this TSS&TP specification shall: • consist of a set of test cases corresponding to the set or to a subset of the TPs specified in clause 5; • use a TSS which is an appropriate subset of the whole of the TSS specified in clause 4; • use the same naming conventions for the test groups and test cases; • maintain the relationship specified in clause 5 between the test groups and TPs and the entries in the PICS proforma to be used for test case deselection. In the case of a) or b) above, a subset shall be used only where a particular Abstract Test Method (ATM) makes some TPs untestable. All testable TPs from clause 5 shall be included in a compliant ATS. ETSI ETSI TS 186 006-2 V3.1.1 (2011-07) 16 Annex A (informative): Bibliography IETF RFC 2806: "URLs for Telephone Calls". ETSI ETSI TS 186 006-2 V3.1.1 (2011-07) 17 History Document history V1.1.1 July 2006 Publication V3.1.1 July 2011 Publication
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3e0a30a5b2d8ee4758f9853ce70f973d
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186 006-1
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1 Scope
|
The present document specifies the Protocol implementation conformance statement (PICS) for the Originating Identification Presentation (OIP) and Originating Identification Restriction (OIR) NGN Basic Service, TS 183 007 [10]. A further part of the present document specifies the Abstract Test Suite (ATS) and partial Protocol Implementation eXtra Information for Testing (PIXIT) proforma based on the present document. Within the TISPAN NGN Release 1 Next Generation Network (NGN) the stage 3 description is specified using the IP Multimedia Call Control Protocol based on Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) and Session Description Protocol (SDP). The OIP service provides the terminating party with the possibility to receive a trusted (network-provided) identity of the originating party, and is applicable to all session-based services of the NGN. The OIR service enables the originating party to prevent presentation of any network-provided identity to the terminating party, and is applicable to all session-based services of the NGN.
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2 References
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The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document. • References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. • For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply. • For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. Referenced documents which are not found to be publicly available in the expected location might be found at http://docbox.etsi.org/Reference. NOTE: While any hyperlinks included in this clause were valid at the time of publication ETSI cannot guarantee their long term validity. [1] ETSI TS 181 002: "Telecommunications and Internet Converged, Services and Protocols for Advanced Networking (TISPAN); NGN Basic Supplementary Services; General aspects". [2] ETSI ES 283 003: "Endorsement of "IP Multimedia Call Control Protocol based on Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) and Session Description Protocol (SDP) Stage 3 (Release 6);TISPAN NGN Release 1". [3] ETSI EN 300 089: "Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN); Calling Line Identification Presentation (CLIP) supplementary service; Service description". [4] ETSI EN 300 090: "Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN); Calling Line Identification Restriction (CLIR) supplementary service; Service description". [5] IETF RFC 3323: "A Privacy Mechanism for the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)". [6] IETF RFC 3325: "Private Extensions to the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) for Asserted Identity within Trusted Networks". [7] IETF RFC 2396: "Uniform Resource Identifiers (URI): Generic Syntax". [8] IETF RFC 3966: "The tel URI for Telephone Numbers". [9] IETF RFC 3261: "SIP: Session Initiation Protocol". [10] ETSI TS 183 007: "Telecommunications and Internet converged Services and Protocols for Advanced Networking (TISPAN); PSTN/ISDN simulation services; Originating Identification Presentation (OIP) and Originating Identification Restriction (OIR); Protocol specification". ETSI ETSI TS 186 006-1 V1.1.1 (2006-10) 6 [11] ETSI ES 283 027: "Telecommunications and Internet converged Services and Protocols for Advanced Networking (TISPAN); Endorsement of the SIP-ISUP Interworking between the IP Multimedia (IM) Core Network (CN) subsystem and Circuit Switched (CS) networks [3GPP TS 29.163 (Release 7), modified]". [12] ISO/IEC 9646-1: "Information technology - Open Systems Interconnection - Conformance testing methodology and framework - Part 1: General concepts". [13] ISO/IEC 9646-3: "Information technology - Open Systems Interconnection - Conformance testing methodology and framework - Part 3: The Tree and Tabular Combined Notation (TTCN)". [14] ISO/IEC 9646-7: "Information technology - Open Systems Interconnection - Conformance testing methodology and framework - Part 7: Implementation Conformance Statements".
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3 Definitions and abbreviations
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3.1 Definitions
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For the purposes of the present document, the following terms and definitions apply: abstract test case: Refer to ISO/IEC 9646-1. Abstract Test Suite (ATS): Refer to ISO/IEC 9646-1. Implementation Under Test (IUT): Refer to ISO/IEC 9646-1. implicit send event: Refer to ISO/IEC 9646-3. lower tester: Refer to ISO/IEC 9646-1. Point of Control and Observation (PCO): Refer to ISO/IEC 9646-1. Protocol Implementation Conformance Statement (PICS): Refer to ISO/IEC 9646-1. PICS proforma: Refer to ISO/IEC 9646-1. Protocol Implementation eXtra Information for Testing (PIXIT): Refer to ISO/IEC 9646-1. PIXIT proforma: Refer to ISO/IEC 9646-1. system under test: Refer to ISO/IEC 9646-1. Test Purpose (TP): Refer to ISO/IEC 9646-1.
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3.2 Abbreviations
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For the purposes of the present document, the following abbreviations apply: AS Application Server CLIP Calling Line Identification Presentation CLIR Calling Line Identification Restriction CN Core Network CS Circuit Switched CSCF Call Session Control Function IP Internet Protocol ISDN Integrated Service Data Network n/a not applicable NGN Next Generation Network OIP Originating Identification Presentation OIR Originating Identification Restriction PSTN Public Switched Telephone Network ETSI ETSI TS 186 006-1 V1.1.1 (2006-10) 7 S-CSCF Serving CSCF SDP Session Description Protocol SIP Session Initiation Protocol URI Universal Resource Identifier ETSI ETSI TS 186 006-1 V1.1.1 (2006-10) 8 4 Protocol Implementation Conformance Statement (PICS) proforma Notwithstanding the provisions of the copyright clause related to the text of the present document, ETSI grants that users of the present document may freely reproduce the PICS proforma in this clause so that it can be used for its intended purposes and may further publish the completed PICS.
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4.1 Instructions for completing the PICS proforma
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4.1.1 More detailed instructions are given at the beginning of the different clauses of the PICS proforma The supplier of the implementation shall complete the PICS proforma in each of the spaces provided. If necessary, the supplier may provide additional comments separately in clause 5.
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4.1.1.1 Purposes and structure
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The purpose of this PICS proforma is to provide a mechanism whereby a supplier of an implementation of the requirements defined in reference specification [1] to [11] may provide information about the implementation in a standardized manner. The PICS proforma is subdivided into clauses for the following categories of information: • instructions for completing the PICS proforma; • identification of the implementation; • identification of the reference protocol specification; • PICS proforma tables (containing the global statement of conformance).
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4.1.2 Abbreviations and conventions
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The PICS proforma is composed of information in tabular form in accordance with the guidelines presented in ISO/IEC 9646-7. Item column: It contains a number that identifies the item in the table. Item description column: It describes each respective item (e.g. parameters, timers, etc.). Reference column: It gives reference to the OIP/OIR specification [10], except where explicitly stated otherwise. Status column: The following notations, defined in ISO/IEC 9646-7, are used for the status column: m mandatory - the capability is required to be supported. n/a not applicable - in the given context, it is impossible to use the capability. No answer in the support column is required. ETSI ETSI TS 186 006-1 V1.1.1 (2006-10) 9 o optional - the capability may be supported or not. o.i qualified optional - for mutually exclusive or selectable options from a set. "i" is an integer which identifies a unique group of related optional items and the logic of their selection which is defined immediately following the table. ci conditional - the requirement on the capability ("m", "o" or "n/a") depends on the support of other optional or conditional items. "i" is an integer identifying a unique conditional status expression that is defined immediately following the table. For nested conditional expressions, the syntax "IF ... THEN (IF ... THEN ... ELSE...) ELSE ..." shall be used to avoid ambiguities. If an ELSE clause is omitted, "ELSE n/a" shall be implied. NOTE: Support of a capability means that the capability is implemented in conformance to the specifications [1] to [11]. Support column: The support column shall be filled in by the supplier of the implementation. The following common notations, defined in ISO/IEC 9646-7, are used for the support column: Y or y supported by the implementation. N or n not supported by the implementation. N/A or n/a no answer required (allowed only if the status is N/A, directly or after evaluation of a conditional status).
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4.2 Identification of the implementation
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Identification of the Implementation Under Test (IUT) and the system in which it resides - the System Under Test (SUT) should be filled in so as to provide as much detail as possible regarding version numbers and configuration options. The product supplier information and client information should both be filled in if they are different. A person who can answer queries regarding information supplied in the ICS should be named as the contact person.
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4.2.1 Date of the statement
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Date of the statement::
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4.2.2 Implementation Under Test (IUT) identification
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IUT name: IUT version:
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4.2.3 System Under Test (SUT) identification
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SUT name: Hardware configuration: Operating system: ETSI ETSI TS 186 006-1 V1.1.1 (2006-10) 10
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4.2.4 Product supplier
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Name: Address: Telephone number: Facsimile number: Additional information:
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4.2.5 Client
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Name: Address: Telephone number: Facsimile number: Additional information:
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4.2.6 PICS contact person
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Name: Telephone number: Facsimile number: Additional information:
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4.3 PICS proforma tables
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4.3.1 Global statement of conformance
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(Yes/No) Are all mandatory capabilities implemented? ETSI ETSI TS 186 006-1 V1.1.1 (2006-10) 11
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4.3.2 Roles and network capabilities
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Table 1: Roles and network capabilities Item Item description Reference Status Support 1 Is the implementation an originating user equipment? 4.5.2.1/ [10] o 2 Is the terminating user a terminating user equipment? 4.5.2.12/ [10] o 3 Is the implementation connected with a trusted network? 4.5.2.7, 4.5.2.8/ [10] o 4 Is the implementation connected with an untrusted network? 4.5.2.7, 4.5.2.8/ [10] o 5 The Application Server anonymise the contents of the From header if any P-Asserted-Identity or Privacy header fields included in the request is removed? 4.5.2.9 o 6 Does the network insert the display-name in the P-Asserted-Identity? RFC 3325 [6] 7 The Application Server serving the originating user set the From header field to the default public user identities if the received From header field does not match with one of the registered public user identities? 4.5.2.4/ [10] c.1 8 The AS, serving the terminating user, anonymise the contents of the From header by setting it to a default non significant value? 4.5.2.9/ [10] o 9 Is the S-CSCF able to a add a second P-Asserted-Identity header containing an associated tel-URI for a SIP URI contained in the P-Asserted-Identity header received in the request? 4.5.2.3/ [10] o c.1 IF 2/6 THEN o ELSE n/a
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4.3.3 OIP/OIR user capabilities
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Table 2: OIP/OIR user capabilities Item Item description Reference Status Support 1 Does the terminating user subscribe the OIP service? 4.3.1.1/ [10] o 2 Does the originating user subscribe the OIR service in permanent mode? 4.3.1.2/ [10] o 3 Does the originating user subscribe the OIR service in temporary mode with default value "presentation not restricted"? 4.3.1.2/ [10] o 4 Does the originating user subscribe the OIR service in temporary mode with default value "presentation restricted"? 4.3.1.2/ [10] o 5 Does the terminating user subscribe the override category for the OIR service? 4.5.2.9/ [10] o 6 Does the originating user subscribe the "no screening" special arrangement? 4.3.2, 4.5.2.4/ [10] o ETSI ETSI TS 186 006-1 V1.1.1 (2006-10) 12 History Document history V1.1.1 October 2006 Publication
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1 Scope
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2 References
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3 Abbreviations
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4 3G Security Principles
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4.1 Second Generation Security Elements to be retained
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4.2 Weaknesses in Second Generation security
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4.3 New Security Features and the Security of New Service Features
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5 3G Security Objectives
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6 Priorities
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...................................................................................................................................................8 Annex A: Change history........................................................................................................................9 History..............................................................................................................................................................10 ETSI TS 133 120 V3.0.0 (2000-01) (3G TS 33.120 version 3.0.0 Release 1999) ETSI 3GPP 3G TS 33.120 V3.0.0 (1999-05) 4 3G TS 33.120 version 3.0.0 Foreword This Technical Specification has been produced by the 3GPP. The contents of the present document are subject to continuing work within the TSG and may change following formal TSG approval. Should the TSG modify the contents of this TS, it will be re-released by the TSG with an identifying change of release date and an increase in version number as follows: Version 3.y.z where: x the first digit: 1 presented to TSG for information; 2 presented to TSG for approval; 3 Indicates TSG approved document under change control. y the second digit is incremented for all changes of substance, i.e. technical enhancements, corrections, updates, etc. z the third digit is incremented when editorial only changes have been incorporated in the specification; ETSI TS 133 120 V3.0.0 (2000-01) (3G TS 33.120 version 3.0.0 Release 1999) ETSI 3GPP 3G TS 33.120 V3.0.0 (1999-05) 5 3G TS 33.120 version 3.0.0 1 Scope The present document gives the objectives and principles of 3GPP security. The principles state what is to be provided by 3G security as compared to the security of second generation systems. The principles will also ensure that 3G security can secure the new services and new service environments offered by 3G systems. The objectives give general, high level requirements for 3GPP security which will be expanded upon in 3G TS 21.133 [1]. The priorities for the implementation of 3GPP security are also given. 2 References The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document. • References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non-specific. • For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply. • For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. • A non-specific reference to an ETS shall also be taken to refer to later versions published as an EN with the same number. [1] 3G TS 21.133: "3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP); Technical Specification Group (TSG) SA; 3G Security; Security Threats and Requirements". [2] UMTS 33.21, V3.0.0: "Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); Security Requirements". [3] ARIB, Volume 1: "Requirements and Objectives for 3G Mobile Services and System (Ver.0.8)", Annex 8. [4] Tdoc S3-99014, 3GPP TSG SA, WG3 (Security), London, 2-4 February, 1999. 3 Abbreviations For the purposes of the present document, the following abbreviations apply: HE Home Environment IMEI International Mobile Equipment Identifier LI Lawful Interception MExE Mobile Execution Environment SAT SIM Application Toolkit SN Serving Network SIM Subscriber Identity Module ETSI TS 133 120 V3.0.0 (2000-01) (3G TS 33.120 version 3.0.0 Release 1999) ETSI 3GPP 3G TS 33.120 V3.0.0 (1999-05) 6 3G TS 33.120 version 3.0.0 4 3G Security Principles There are three key principles behind 3G security: 1) 3G security will build on the security of second generation systems. Security elements within GSM and other second generation systems that have proved to be needed and robust shall be adopted for 3G security. These elements are listed in subclause 4.1. 2) 3G security will improve on the security of second generation systems - 3G security will address and correct real and perceived weaknesses in second generation systems. The most important of these are given in subclause 4.2. 3) 3G security will offer new security features and will secure new services offered by 3G. 4.1 Second Generation Security Elements to be retained 3G security shall retain (and in some cases develop) the following security elements of second generation systems: a) authentication of subscribers for service access. Problems with inadequate algorithms will be addressed. Conditions regarding the optionality of authentication and its relationship to encryption shall be clarified and tightened; b) radio interface encryption. The strength of the encryption will be greater than that used in second generation systems (the strength is a combination of key length and algorithm design). This is to meet the threat posed by the increased computing power available to those attempting cryptanalysis of the radio interface encryption. Problems caused by multiple algorithms will be dealt with (note); NOTE: The method of negotiating which algorithm to be used is open to attack. c) subscriber identity confidentiality on the radio interface. However, a more secure mechanism will be provided; d) the SIM as: a removable, hardware security module that is: - manageable by network operators; - independent of the terminal as regards its security functionality. e) SIM application toolkit security features providing a secure application layer channel between the SIM and a home network server. Other application layer channels may also be provided; f) the operation of security features is independent of the user, i.e. the user does not have to do anything for the security features to be in operation. However, greater user visibility of the operation of security features will be provided to the user; g) HE trust in the SN for security functionality is minimised. 4.2 Weaknesses in Second Generation security The following weaknesses in the security of GSM (and other second generation systems) will be corrected in 3G security: 1) active attacks using a “false BTS” are possible; 2) cipher keys and authentication data are transmitted in clear between and within networks; ETSI TS 133 120 V3.0.0 (2000-01) (3G TS 33.120 version 3.0.0 Release 1999) ETSI 3GPP 3G TS 33.120 V3.0.0 (1999-05) 7 3G TS 33.120 version 3.0.0 3) encryption does not extend far enough towards the core network resulting in the cleartext transmission of user and signalling data across microwave links (in GSM, from the BTS to the BSC); 4) user authentication using a previously generated cipher key (where user authentication using RAND, SRES and A3/8 is not provided) and the provision of protection against channel hijack rely on the use of encryption, which provides implicit user authentication. However, encryption is not used in some networks, leaving opportunities for fraud; 5) data integrity is not provided. Data integrity defeats certain false BTS attacks and, in the absence of encryption, provides protection against channel hijack; 6) the IMEI is an unsecured identity and should be treated as such; 7) fraud and LI were not considered in the design phase of second generation systems but as afterthoughts to the main design work; 8) there is no HE knowledge or control of how an SN uses authentication parameters for HE subscribers roaming in that SN; 9) second generation systems do not have the flexibility to upgrade and improve security functionality over time. 4.3 New Security Features and the Security of New Service Features The new service features that will be secured cannot be listed at the time of writing. However, the environment in which these features are likely to be developed can be described. 3G security will secure this environment. The environment in which new services will be developed can be characterised by (but is not limited to) the following aspects: - there will be new and different providers of services. For example: content providers, data service providers, HLR only service providers; - 3G mobile systems will be positioned as the preferred means of communications for users. They will be preferable to fixed line systems; - there will be a variety of prepaid and pay-as-you-go services which may be the rule rather than the exception. A long-term subscription between the user and a network operator may not be the paradigm. (3G security will provide satisfactory security for such systems and will not be content with insecure systems such as GSM Advice of Charge); - there will be increased control for the user over their service profile (which they might manage over the Internet) and over the capabilities of their terminal (it will be possible to download new services and functions using systems such as MExE and SAT); - there will be active attacks on users. (In active attacks, equipment is used to impersonate parts of the network to actively cause lapses in security. In passive attacks, the attacker is outside the system and listens in, hoping security lapses will occur); - non-voice services will be as important as, or more important than, voice services; - the terminal will be used as a platform for e-commerce and other applications. Multi-application smartcards where the USIM is one application among many can be used with the terminal. The smartcard and terminal will support environments such as Java to allow this. The terminal may support personal authentication of the user using biometric methods. ETSI TS 133 120 V3.0.0 (2000-01) (3G TS 33.120 version 3.0.0 Release 1999) ETSI 3GPP 3G TS 33.120 V3.0.0 (1999-05) 8 3G TS 33.120 version 3.0.0 5 3G Security Objectives In addition to the above principles for 3G security, there are the high level objectives given below. These will be expanded upon in 3G TS 21.133 [1]: a) to ensure that information generated by or relating to a user is adequately protected against misuse or misappropriation; b) to ensure that the resources and services provided by serving networks and home environments are adequately protected against misuse or misappropriation; c) to ensure that the security features standardised are compatible with world-wide availability. (There shall be at least one ciphering algorithm that can be exported on a world-wide basis (in accordance with the Wassenaar agreement)); d) to ensure that the security features are adequately standardised to ensure world-wide interoperability and roaming between different serving networks; e) to ensure that the level of protection afforded to users and providers of services is better than that provided in contemporary fixed and mobile networks (including GSM); f) to ensure that the implementation of 3GPP security features and mechanisms can be extended and enhanced as required by new threats and services. As a priority, 3G security will provide the proven second generation security features described in subclause 4.1 and correct the weaknesses in second generation systems described in subclause 4.2. Security for new services and service environments will then be developed as required. ETSI TS 133 120 V3.0.0 (2000-01) (3G TS 33.120 version 3.0.0 Release 1999) ETSI 3GPP 3G TS 33.120 V3.0.0 (1999-05) 9 3G TS 33.120 version 3.0.0 Annex A: Change history Change history TSG SA# Spec Version CR <Phase> New Version Subject/Comment Jan 1999 S3_02 draft 0.0.0 Start Mar 1999 S3_02 0.0.0 0.0.2 Submitted for approval SA#2 SA#02 33.120 2.0.0 3.0.0 Approved at SA#2 ETSI TS 133 120 V3.0.0 (2000-01) (3G TS 33.120 version 3.0.0 Release 1999) ETSI 10 ETSI ETSI TS 133 120 V3.0.0 (2000-01) (3G TS 33.120 version 3.0.0 Release 1999) History Document history V3.0.0 January 2000 Publication
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1 Scope
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2 References
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3 Definitions and abbreviations
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3.1 Definitions
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3.3 Abbreviations
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4 Relationship to Regional Requirements
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5 Requirements
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5.1 Description of requirements
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5.1.1 General technical requirements
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5.1.2 General principles
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5.1.3 Applicability to telecommunication services
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5.2 Normal operation
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5.2.1 Intercept administration requirements
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5.2.1.1 Activation of LI
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5.2.1.2 Deactivation of LI
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5.2.1.3 Security of processes
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5.2.2 Intercept invocation
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5.2.2.1 Invocation events for lawful interception
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5.2.2.2 Invocation and removal of interception regarding services
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5.2.2.3 Correlation of information and product
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5.3 Exceptional procedures
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5.4 Interworking considerations
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5.5 Charging aspects
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5.6 Minimum service requirements
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6 Handover Interface Requirements
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...........................................................................................................9 Annex A (informative): Change history...............................................................................................10 ETSI TS 133 106 V3.1.0 (2000-01) (3G TS 33.106 version 3.1.0 Release 1999) ETSI 3GPP 3G TS 33.106 V3.1.0 (1999-12) 4 3G TS 33.106 version 3.1.0 Release 1999 Foreword This Technical Specification has been produced by the 3GPP. The contents of the present document are subject to continuing work within the TSG and may change following formal TSG approval. Should the TSG modify the contents of this TS, it will be re-released by the TSG with an identifying change of release date and an increase in version number as follows: Version 3.y.z where: 3 the first digit: 3 Indicates TSG approved document under change control. y the second digit is incremented for all changes of substance, i.e. technical enhancements, corrections, updates, etc. z the third digit is incremented when editorial only changes have been incorporated in the specification. Introduction This Technical Specification has been produced by the 3GPP TSG SA to allow for the standardisation in the area of lawful interception of telecommunications. This document describes in general the requirements for lawful interception. Laws of individual nations and regional institutions (e.g. European Union), and sometimes licensing and operating conditions define a need to intercept telecommunications traffic and related information in modern telecommunications systems. It has to be noted that lawful interception shall always be done in accordance with the applicable national or regional laws and technical regulations. ETSI TS 133 106 V3.1.0 (2000-01) (3G TS 33.106 version 3.1.0 Release 1999) ETSI 3GPP 3G TS 33.106 V3.1.0 (1999-12) 5 3G TS 33.106 version 3.1.0 Release 1999 1 Scope The present document provides basic interception requirements within a Third Generation Mobile Communication System (3GMS). The specification describes the service requirements from a Law Enforcement point of view only. The aim of this document is to define a 3GMS interception system that supports a number of regional interception regulations, but these regulations are not repeated here as they vary. Regional interception requirements shall rely on this specification to derive such information as they require. These interception requirements shall be used to derive specific network requirements. 2 References The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document. • References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non-specific. • For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply. • For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. [1] European Union Council Resolution on the Lawful Interception of Telecommunications (17. January 1995) [2] ETR 331: "Definition of User Requirements for Lawful Interception of Telecommunications; Requirements of the Law Enforcement Agencies". [3] ES 201 158: "Lawful Interception; Requirements for network functions". [4] ES 201 671: "Handover Interface for the lawful interception of telecommunications traffic". [5] GSM 01.33: "Lawful Interception requirements for GSM". [6] GSM 02.33:" Lawful Interception - stage 1". [7] GSM 03.33: "Lawful Interception - stage 2". [8] J-STD-25 Interim Standard, "Lawfully Authorised Electronic Surveillance". 3 Definitions and abbreviations 3.1 Definitions For the purposes of the present document, the following terms and definitions apply. Interception Area: is a subset of the Public Lands Mobile Network (PLMN) service area comprised of a set of cells which define a geographical zone. Location Dependent Interception: is interception within a PLMN service area that is restricted to one or several Interception Areas (IA). Network Based Interception: Interception that is invoked at a network access point regardless of Target Identity. Subject Based Interception: Interception that is invoked using a specific Target Identity Target Identity: A technical identity that uniquely identifies a target of interception. One target may have one or ETSI TS 133 106 V3.1.0 (2000-01) (3G TS 33.106 version 3.1.0 Release 1999) ETSI 3GPP 3G TS 33.106 V3.1.0 (1999-12) 6 3G TS 33.106 version 3.1.0 Release 1999 several identities. 3.3 Abbreviations For the purposes of the present document, the following abbreviations apply: CC Content of Communication IA Interception Area IP Internet Protocol IRI Intercept Related Information LDI Location Dependent Interception LEA Law Enforcement Agency LEMF Law Enforcement Monitoring Facility 3GMS Third Generation Mobile Communications System 4 Relationship to Regional Requirements Interception requirements are subject to national law and international treaties and should be interpreted in accordance with applicable national policies. Requirements universally called out in regional interception regulatory requirements are supported by the system defined in this document. Requirements unique to a specific region are not addressed (some examples are given in Section 2 as references). The intercept system defined here provides subject based interception. Network based interception is not included. 5 Requirements 5.1 Description of requirements This section gives the general description of lawful interception requirements. 5.1.1 General technical requirements Figure 1 shows the general system for interception. Technical interception is implemented within a 3GMS by special functionality on network elements shown in the figure. ETSI TS 133 106 V3.1.0 (2000-01) (3G TS 33.106 version 3.1.0 Release 1999) ETSI 3GPP 3G TS 33.106 V3.1.0 (1999-12) 7 3G TS 33.106 version 3.1.0 Release 1999 LEA 3 GMS node Administration Function IRI CC Delivery Function 3GMS IRI CC LEA NETWORK RELATED DATA TECHNICAL INTERCEPTION HANDOVER INTERFACE INTERCEPT REQUEST INTERCEPT REQUEST MOBILE TARGET Figure 1: General specification for interception 5.1.2 General principles 3GMS shall provide access to the intercepted Content of Communications (CC) and the Intercept Related Information (IRI) of the mobile target on behalf of Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs). A mobile target in a given 3GMS can be a subscriber of that 3GMS, or a user roaming from another 3GMS or from any other network capable of using that 3GMS (such as a GSM or mobile satellite). The intercepted CC and the IRI can only be delivered for activities on that given 3GMS. For interception, there needs to be a means of identifying the target, correspondent and initiator of the communication. Target Identities used for interception shall be MSISDN, IMEI and IMSIWhen network encryption is introduced, it shall be a national option as to whether the network provides the CC to the agency decrypted, or encrypted with a key available to the agency. Location Dependent Interception, (LDI) allows a 3GMS to service multiple interception jurisdictions within its service area. Multiple law agencies with their own interception areas can be served by the 3GMS. All the information or rules given for interception within a 3GMS apply to interception within an IA when Location Dependent Interception is invoked. A target may be marked in one or more different IAs within the same 3GMS. Interception is not required nor prohibited by this standard when Location Dependent Interception is active and the location of the target subscriber is not known or available. 5.1.3 Applicability to telecommunication services The requirement for lawful interception is that all telecommunications services for the 3GMS standards should be capable of meeting the requirements within this document 5.2 Normal operation This section gives the expected operation for lawful interception. ETSI TS 133 106 V3.1.0 (2000-01) (3G TS 33.106 version 3.1.0 Release 1999) ETSI 3GPP 3G TS 33.106 V3.1.0 (1999-12) 8 3G TS 33.106 version 3.1.0 Release 1999 5.2.1 Intercept administration requirements A secure means of administrating the service by the 3GMS operator and intercept requesting entity is necessary. This mechanism shall provide means to activate, deactivate, show, or list targets in the 3GMS as quickly as possible. The function shall be policed by appropriate authentication and audit procedures. The administration function shall allow specific IAs to be associated with target subscribers when Location Dependent Interception is being used. 5.2.1.1 Activation of LI As a result of the activation it shall be possible to request for the specified target, either the CC, the IRI or both, and designate the LEA destination addresses for the delivery of the CC and IRI if required. These shall be selectable on a 3GMS basis according to national options. 5.2.1.2 Deactivation of LI As a result of deactivation it shall be possible to stop all, or a part of, interception activities for the specified target. 5.2.1.3 Security of processes The intercept function shall only be accessible by authorised personnel. To be effective, interception must take place without the knowledge of either party to the communication. Therefore, decryption must also take place without either party being aware that it is happening. No indication shall be given to any person except authorised personnel that the intercept function has been activated on a target. Authentication, encryption, audits, log files and other mechanisms may be used to maintain security in the system. Audit procedures should be capable of keeping accurate logs of administration commands. 5.2.2 Intercept invocation 5.2.2.1 Invocation events for lawful interception In general, Lawful interception should be invoked when the transmission of information or an event takes place that involves the target. Examples of when Lawful interception could be invoked are when: - A circuit switched call is requested originated from, terminated to, or redirected by the target, - Location information related to the target facility is modified by the subscriber attaching or detaching from the network, or if there is a change in location, - An SMS transfer is requested - either originated from or terminated to the target, - A data packet is transmitted to or from a target. 5.2.2.2 Invocation and removal of interception regarding services The invocation of lawful interception shall not alter the operation of a target's services or provide indication to any party involved in communication with the target. Lawful interception shall not alter the standard function of 3GMS network elements. If lawful interception is activated during a circuit switched service, the currently active circuit switched service is not required to be intercepted. If lawful interception is deactivated during a circuit switched service, all ongoing intercepted activities may continue till they are completed. If lawful interception is activated when a packet data service is already in use, the next packets transmitted shall be intercepted. If lawful interception is deactivated during a packet data service, the next packets shall not be transmitted. 5.2.2.3 Correlation of information and product When both IRI and CC are invoked, an unambiguous correlation shall be established between the two. The IRI and CC shall be delivered in as near real time as possible. ETSI TS 133 106 V3.1.0 (2000-01) (3G TS 33.106 version 3.1.0 Release 1999) ETSI 3GPP 3G TS 33.106 V3.1.0 (1999-12) 9 3G TS 33.106 version 3.1.0 Release 1999 5.3 Exceptional procedures When a failure occurs while establishing the connection towards the LEA to transfer the CC this shall not result in any interruption of the ongoing telecommunications service. No further specific requirements apply for the CC in the 3GMS. A national option may be that when failure occurs while trying to provide the IRI it shall be temporarily stored in the 3GMS and some further attempts shall be made to deliver it if available. 5.4 Interworking considerations For 3GMS, the network, homed or visited, shall not be responsible to interpret the protocol used by the target, or to remove user level compression or encryption. 5.5 Charging aspects The 3GMS may require raising charges for lawful interception. However charging aspects are subject to national laws and regulations. Some charging mechanisms include the following: - Use of network resources, - Activation and deactivation of the target, - Every intercept invocation, - Flat rate. The 3GMS shall be capable of producing intercept-charging data. It shall be possible to produce this data in such a way that access by non-authorised personnel or the target is precluded. 5.6 Minimum service requirements Quality of service, capacity and reliability are the subject of bilateral agreement between the relevant authorities and the 3GMS operator. Handover interface requirements are defined by national or regional specifications. See references [4] and [8]. ETSI TS 133 106 V3.1.0 (2000-01) (3G TS 33.106 version 3.1.0 Release 1999) ETSI 3GPP 3G TS 33.106 V3.1.0 (1999-12) 10 3G TS 33.106 version 3.1.0 Release 1999 Annex A (informative): Change history Change history TSG SA # Version CR Tdoc SA New Version Subject/Comment SA#04 1.0.0 3.0.0 Approved at SA#4 and placed under TSG SA Change Control SA#06 3.0.0 001 3.1.0 ETSI TS 133 106 V3.1.0 (2000-01) (3G TS 33.106 version 3.1.0 Release 1999) ETSI 11 ETSI ETSI TS 133 106 V3.1.0 (2000-01) (3G TS 33.106 version 3.1.0 Release 1999) History Document history V3.1.0 January 2000 Publication
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1 Scope
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2 References
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3 Definitions and abbreviations
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3.1 Definitions
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3.2 Abbreviations
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4 Basic aspects
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4.6 Mapping
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5 GDMO definitions
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