ariondas/full_text_dataset · Datasets at Hugging Face

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that none of them could comprehend what we meant when we talked to them
of a man in the abstract as common to all men in particular (so that
though we spoke of him as a thing that we could point at with our
fingers, yet none of them could perceive him) and yet distinct from every
one, as if he were some monstrous Colossus or giant; yet, for all this
ignorance of these empty notions, they knew astronomy, and were perfectly
acquainted with the motions of the heavenly bodies; and have many
instruments, well contrived and divided, by which they very accurately
compute the course and positions of the sun, moon, and stars. But for
the cheat of divining by the stars, by their oppositions or conjunctions,
it has not so much as entered into their thoughts. They have a
particular sagacity, founded upon much observation, in judging of the
weather, by which they know when they may look for rain, wind, or other
alterations in the air; but as to the philosophy of these things, the
cause of the saltness of the sea, of its ebbing and flowing, and of the
original and nature both of the heavens and the earth, they dispute of
them partly as our ancient philosophers have done, and partly upon some
new hypothesis, in which, as they differ from them, so they do not in all
things agree among themselves.

"As to moral philosophy, they have the same disputes among them as we
have here. They examine what are properly good, both for the body and
the mind; and whether any outward thing can be called truly _good_, or if
that term belong only to the endowments of the soul. They inquire,
likewise, into the nature of virtue and pleasure. But their chief
dispute is concerning the happiness of a man, and wherein it
consists--whether in some one thing or in a great many. They seem,
indeed, more inclinable to that opinion that places, if not the whole,
yet the chief part, of a man's happiness in pleasure; and, what may seem
more strange, they make use of arguments even from religion,
notwithstanding its severity and roughness, for the support of that
opinion so indulgent to pleasure; for they never dispute concerning
happiness without fetching some arguments from the principles of religion
as well as from natural reason, since without the former they reckon that
all our inquiries after happiness must be but conjectural and defective.

"These are their religious principles:--That the soul of man is immortal,
and that God of His goodness has designed that it should be happy; and
that He has, therefore, appointed rewards for good and virtuous actions,
and punishments for vice, to be distributed after this life. Though
these principles of religion are conveyed down among them by tradition,
they think that even reason itself determines a man to believe and
acknowledge them; and freely confess that if these were taken away, no
man would be so insensible as not to seek after pleasure by all possible
means, lawful or unlawful, using only this caution--that a lesser
pleasure might not stand in the way of a greater, and that no pleasure
ought to be pursued that should draw a great deal of pain after it; for
they think it the maddest thing in the world to pursue virtue, that is a
sour and difficult thing, and not only to renounce the pleasures of life,
but willingly to undergo much pain and trouble, if a man has no prospect
of a reward. And what reward can there be for one that has passed his
whole life, not only without pleasure, but in pain, if there is nothing
to be expected after death? Yet they do not place happiness in all sorts
of pleasures, but only in those that in themselves are good and honest.
There is a party among them who place happiness in bare virtue; others
think that our natures are conducted by virtue to happiness, as that
which is the chief good of man. They define virtue thus--that it is a
living according to Nature, and think that we are made by God for that
end; they believe that a man then follows the dictates of Nature when he
pursues or avoids things according to the direction of reason. They say
that the first dictate of reason is the kindling in us a love and
reverence for the Divine Majesty, to whom we owe both all that we have
and, all that we can ever hope for. In the next place, reason directs us
to keep our minds as free from passion and as cheerful as we can, and
that we should consider ourselves as bound by the ties of good-nature and
humanity to use our utmost endeavours to help forward the happiness of
all other persons; for there never was any man such a morose and severe
pursuer of virtue, such an enemy to pleasure, that though he set hard
rules for men to undergo, much pain, many watchings, and other rigors,
yet did not at the same time advise them to do all they could in order to
relieve and ease the miserable, and who did not represent gentleness and
good-nature as amiable dispositions. And from thence they infer that if
a man ought to advance the welfare and comfort of the rest of mankind
(there being no virtue more proper and peculiar to our nature than to
ease the miseries of others, to free from trouble and anxiety, in
furnishing them with the comforts of life, in which pleasure consists)
Nature much more vigorously leads them to do all this for himself. A
life of pleasure is either a real evil, and in that case we ought not to
assist others in their pursuit of it, but, on the contrary, to keep them
from it all we can, as from that which is most hurtful and deadly; or if
it is a good thing, so that we not only may but ought to help others to
it, why, then, ought not a man to begin with himself? since no man can be
more bound to look after the good of another than after his own; for
Nature cannot direct us to be good and kind to others, and yet at the
same time to be unmerciful and cruel to ourselves. Thus as they define
virtue to be living according to Nature, so they imagine that Nature
prompts all people on to seek after pleasure as the end of all they do.
They also observe that in order to our supporting the pleasures of life,
Nature inclines us to enter into society; for there is no man so much
raised above the rest of mankind as to be the only favourite of Nature,
who, on the contrary, seems to have placed on a level all those that
belong to the same species. Upon this they infer that no man ought to
seek his own conveniences so eagerly as to prejudice others; and
therefore they think that not only all agreements between private persons
ought to be observed, but likewise that all those laws ought to be kept
which either a good prince has published in due form, or to which a
people that is neither oppressed with tyranny nor circumvented by fraud
has consented, for distributing those conveniences of life which afford
us all our pleasures.

that none of them could comprehend what we meant when we talked to them

of a man in the abstract as common to all men in particular (so that

though we spoke of him as a thing that we could point at with our

fingers, yet none of them could perceive him) and yet distinct from every

one, as if he were some monstrous Colossus or giant; yet, for all this

ignorance of these empty notions, they knew astronomy, and were perfectly

acquainted with the motions of the heavenly bodies; and have many

instruments, well contrived and divided, by which they very accurately

compute the course and positions of the sun, moon, and stars. But for

the cheat of divining by the stars, by their oppositions or conjunctions,

it has not so much as entered into their thoughts. They have a

particular sagacity, founded upon much observation, in judging of the

weather, by which they know when they may look for rain, wind, or other

alterations in the air; but as to the philosophy of these things, the

cause of the saltness of the sea, of its ebbing and flowing, and of the

original and nature both of the heavens and the earth, they dispute of

them partly as our ancient philosophers have done, and partly upon some

new hypothesis, in which, as they differ from them, so they do not in all

things agree among themselves.

"As to moral philosophy, they have the same disputes among them as we

have here. They examine what are properly good, both for the body and

the mind; and whether any outward thing can be called truly _good_, or if

that term belong only to the endowments of the soul. They inquire,

likewise, into the nature of virtue and pleasure. But their chief

dispute is concerning the happiness of a man, and wherein it

consists--whether in some one thing or in a great many. They seem,

indeed, more inclinable to that opinion that places, if not the whole,

yet the chief part, of a man's happiness in pleasure; and, what may seem

more strange, they make use of arguments even from religion,

notwithstanding its severity and roughness, for the support of that

opinion so indulgent to pleasure; for they never dispute concerning

happiness without fetching some arguments from the principles of religion

as well as from natural reason, since without the former they reckon that

all our inquiries after happiness must be but conjectural and defective.

"These are their religious principles:--That the soul of man is immortal,

and that God of His goodness has designed that it should be happy; and

that He has, therefore, appointed rewards for good and virtuous actions,

and punishments for vice, to be distributed after this life. Though

these principles of religion are conveyed down among them by tradition,

they think that even reason itself determines a man to believe and

acknowledge them; and freely confess that if these were taken away, no

man would be so insensible as not to seek after pleasure by all possible

means, lawful or unlawful, using only this caution--that a lesser

pleasure might not stand in the way of a greater, and that no pleasure

ought to be pursued that should draw a great deal of pain after it; for

they think it the maddest thing in the world to pursue virtue, that is a

sour and difficult thing, and not only to renounce the pleasures of life,

but willingly to undergo much pain and trouble, if a man has no prospect

of a reward. And what reward can there be for one that has passed his

whole life, not only without pleasure, but in pain, if there is nothing

to be expected after death? Yet they do not place happiness in all sorts

of pleasures, but only in those that in themselves are good and honest.

There is a party among them who place happiness in bare virtue; others

think that our natures are conducted by virtue to happiness, as that

which is the chief good of man. They define virtue thus--that it is a

living according to Nature, and think that we are made by God for that

end; they believe that a man then follows the dictates of Nature when he

pursues or avoids things according to the direction of reason. They say

that the first dictate of reason is the kindling in us a love and

reverence for the Divine Majesty, to whom we owe both all that we have

and, all that we can ever hope for. In the next place, reason directs us

to keep our minds as free from passion and as cheerful as we can, and

that we should consider ourselves as bound by the ties of good-nature and

humanity to use our utmost endeavours to help forward the happiness of

all other persons; for there never was any man such a morose and severe

pursuer of virtue, such an enemy to pleasure, that though he set hard

rules for men to undergo, much pain, many watchings, and other rigors,

yet did not at the same time advise them to do all they could in order to

relieve and ease the miserable, and who did not represent gentleness and

good-nature as amiable dispositions. And from thence they infer that if

a man ought to advance the welfare and comfort of the rest of mankind

(there being no virtue more proper and peculiar to our nature than to

ease the miseries of others, to free from trouble and anxiety, in

furnishing them with the comforts of life, in which pleasure consists)

Nature much more vigorously leads them to do all this for himself. A

life of pleasure is either a real evil, and in that case we ought not to

assist others in their pursuit of it, but, on the contrary, to keep them

from it all we can, as from that which is most hurtful and deadly; or if

it is a good thing, so that we not only may but ought to help others to

it, why, then, ought not a man to begin with himself? since no man can be

more bound to look after the good of another than after his own; for

Nature cannot direct us to be good and kind to others, and yet at the

same time to be unmerciful and cruel to ourselves. Thus as they define

virtue to be living according to Nature, so they imagine that Nature

prompts all people on to seek after pleasure as the end of all they do.

They also observe that in order to our supporting the pleasures of life,

Nature inclines us to enter into society; for there is no man so much

raised above the rest of mankind as to be the only favourite of Nature,

who, on the contrary, seems to have placed on a level all those that

belong to the same species. Upon this they infer that no man ought to

seek his own conveniences so eagerly as to prejudice others; and

therefore they think that not only all agreements between private persons

ought to be observed, but likewise that all those laws ought to be kept

which either a good prince has published in due form, or to which a

people that is neither oppressed with tyranny nor circumvented by fraud

has consented, for distributing those conveniences of life which afford

us all our pleasures.