CVE ID
stringlengths 13
43
⌀ | CVE Page
stringlengths 45
48
⌀ | CWE ID
stringclasses 90
values | codeLink
stringlengths 46
139
| commit_id
stringlengths 6
81
| commit_message
stringlengths 3
13.3k
⌀ | func_after
stringlengths 14
241k
| func_before
stringlengths 14
241k
| lang
stringclasses 3
values | project
stringclasses 309
values | vul
int8 0
1
|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
CVE-2018-6077
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6077/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/6ed26f014f76f10e76e80636027a2db9dcbe1664
|
6ed26f014f76f10e76e80636027a2db9dcbe1664
|
[PE] Distinguish between tainting due to canvas content and filter.
A filter on a canvas can itself lead to origin tainting, for reasons
other than that the canvas contents are tainted. This CL changes
to distinguish these two causes, so that we recompute filters
on content-tainting change.
Bug: 778506
Change-Id: I3cec8ef3b2772f2af78cdd4b290520113092cca6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/811767
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Söderquist <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Chris Harrelson <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#522274}
|
static bool ValidateRectForCanvas(double& x,
double& y,
double& width,
double& height) {
if (!std::isfinite(x) || !std::isfinite(y) || !std::isfinite(width) ||
!std::isfinite(height))
return false;
if (!width && !height)
return false;
if (width < 0) {
width = -width;
x -= width;
}
if (height < 0) {
height = -height;
y -= height;
}
return true;
}
|
static bool ValidateRectForCanvas(double& x,
double& y,
double& width,
double& height) {
if (!std::isfinite(x) || !std::isfinite(y) || !std::isfinite(width) ||
!std::isfinite(height))
return false;
if (!width && !height)
return false;
if (width < 0) {
width = -width;
x -= width;
}
if (height < 0) {
height = -height;
y -= height;
}
return true;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-9520
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-9520/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/radare/radare2/commit/f85bc674b2a2256a364fe796351bc1971e106005
|
f85bc674b2a2256a364fe796351bc1971e106005
|
Fix #7698 - UAF in r_config_set when loading a dex
|
R_API void r_config_list(RConfig *cfg, const char *str, int rad) {
RConfigNode *node;
RListIter *iter;
const char *sfx = "";
const char *pfx = "";
int len = 0;
bool verbose = false;
bool json = false;
bool isFirst = false;
if (!STRNULL (str)) {
str = r_str_chop_ro (str);
len = strlen (str);
if (len > 0 && str[0] == 'j') {
str++;
len--;
json = true;
rad = 'J';
}
if (len > 0 && str[0] == ' ') {
str++;
len--;
}
if (strlen (str) == 0) {
str = NULL;
len = 0;
}
}
switch (rad) {
case 1:
pfx = "\"e ";
sfx = "\"";
/* fallthrou */
case 0:
r_list_foreach (cfg->nodes, iter, node) {
if (!str || (str && (!strncmp (str, node->name, len)))) {
config_print_node (cfg, node, pfx, sfx, verbose, json);
}
}
break;
case 2:
r_list_foreach (cfg->nodes, iter, node) {
if (!str || (str && (!strncmp (str, node->name, len)))) {
if (!str || !strncmp (str, node->name, len)) {
cfg->cb_printf ("%20s: %s\n", node->name,
node->desc? node->desc: "");
}
}
}
break;
case 'v':
verbose = true;
r_list_foreach (cfg->nodes, iter, node) {
if (!str || (str && (!strncmp (str, node->name, len)))) {
config_print_node (cfg, node, pfx, sfx, verbose, json);
}
}
break;
case 'q':
r_list_foreach (cfg->nodes, iter, node) {
cfg->cb_printf ("%s\n", node->name);
}
break;
case 'J':
verbose = true;
/* fallthrou */
case 'j':
json = true;
isFirst = true;
if (verbose) {
cfg->cb_printf ("[");
} else {
cfg->cb_printf ("{");
}
r_list_foreach (cfg->nodes, iter, node) {
if (!str || (str && (!strncmp (str, node->name, len)))) {
if (!str || !strncmp (str, node->name, len)) {
if (isFirst) {
isFirst = false;
} else {
cfg->cb_printf (",");
}
config_print_node (cfg, node, pfx, sfx, verbose, json);
}
}
}
if (verbose) {
cfg->cb_printf ("]\n");
} else {
cfg->cb_printf ("}\n");
}
break;
}
}
|
R_API void r_config_list(RConfig *cfg, const char *str, int rad) {
RConfigNode *node;
RListIter *iter;
const char *sfx = "";
const char *pfx = "";
int len = 0;
bool verbose = false;
bool json = false;
bool isFirst = false;
if (!STRNULL (str)) {
str = r_str_chop_ro (str);
len = strlen (str);
if (len > 0 && str[0] == 'j') {
str++;
len--;
json = true;
rad = 'J';
}
if (len > 0 && str[0] == ' ') {
str++;
len--;
}
if (strlen (str) == 0) {
str = NULL;
len = 0;
}
}
switch (rad) {
case 1:
pfx = "\"e ";
sfx = "\"";
/* fallthrou */
case 0:
r_list_foreach (cfg->nodes, iter, node) {
if (!str || (str && (!strncmp (str, node->name, len)))) {
config_print_node (cfg, node, pfx, sfx, verbose, json);
}
}
break;
case 2:
r_list_foreach (cfg->nodes, iter, node) {
if (!str || (str && (!strncmp (str, node->name, len)))) {
if (!str || !strncmp (str, node->name, len)) {
cfg->cb_printf ("%20s: %s\n", node->name,
node->desc? node->desc: "");
}
}
}
break;
case 'v':
verbose = true;
r_list_foreach (cfg->nodes, iter, node) {
if (!str || (str && (!strncmp (str, node->name, len)))) {
config_print_node (cfg, node, pfx, sfx, verbose, json);
}
}
break;
case 'q':
r_list_foreach (cfg->nodes, iter, node) {
cfg->cb_printf ("%s\n", node->name);
}
break;
case 'J':
verbose = true;
/* fallthrou */
case 'j':
json = true;
isFirst = true;
if (verbose) {
cfg->cb_printf ("[");
} else {
cfg->cb_printf ("{");
}
r_list_foreach (cfg->nodes, iter, node) {
if (!str || (str && (!strncmp (str, node->name, len)))) {
if (!str || !strncmp (str, node->name, len)) {
if (isFirst) {
isFirst = false;
} else {
cfg->cb_printf (",");
}
config_print_node (cfg, node, pfx, sfx, verbose, json);
}
}
}
if (verbose) {
cfg->cb_printf ("]\n");
} else {
cfg->cb_printf ("}\n");
}
break;
}
}
|
C
|
radare2
| 0 |
CVE-2018-17468
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-17468/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/5fe74f831fddb92afa5ddfe46490bb49f083132b
|
5fe74f831fddb92afa5ddfe46490bb49f083132b
|
Do not forward resource timing to parent frame after back-forward navigation
LocalFrame has |should_send_resource_timing_info_to_parent_| flag not to
send timing info to parent except for the first navigation. This flag is
cleared when the first timing is sent to parent, however this does not happen
if iframe's first navigation was by back-forward navigation. For such
iframes, we shouldn't send timings to parent at all.
Bug: 876822
Change-Id: I128b51a82ef278c439548afc8283ae63abdef5c5
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1186215
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Kunihiko Sakamoto <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#585736}
|
void WebLocalFrameImpl::ExecuteScriptInIsolatedWorld(
int world_id,
const WebScriptSource& source_in) {
DCHECK(GetFrame());
CHECK_GT(world_id, 0);
CHECK_LT(world_id, DOMWrapperWorld::kEmbedderWorldIdLimit);
v8::HandleScope handle_scope(ToIsolate(GetFrame()));
GetFrame()->GetScriptController().ExecuteScriptInIsolatedWorld(world_id,
source_in);
}
|
void WebLocalFrameImpl::ExecuteScriptInIsolatedWorld(
int world_id,
const WebScriptSource& source_in) {
DCHECK(GetFrame());
CHECK_GT(world_id, 0);
CHECK_LT(world_id, DOMWrapperWorld::kEmbedderWorldIdLimit);
v8::HandleScope handle_scope(ToIsolate(GetFrame()));
GetFrame()->GetScriptController().ExecuteScriptInIsolatedWorld(world_id,
source_in);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-8746
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-8746/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/18e3b739fdc826481c6a1335ce0c5b19b3d415da
|
18e3b739fdc826481c6a1335ce0c5b19b3d415da
|
NFS: Fix a NULL pointer dereference of migration recovery ops for v4.2 client
---Steps to Reproduce--
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
<nfs-client>
# mount -t nfs nfs-server:/nfs/ /mnt/
# ll /mnt/*/
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt,refer=/nfs/old/@nfs-server)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
# service nfs restart
<nfs-client>
# ll /mnt/*/ --->>>>> oops here
[ 5123.102925] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null)
[ 5123.103363] IP: [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.103752] PGD 587b9067 PUD 3cbf5067 PMD 0
[ 5123.104131] Oops: 0000 [#1]
[ 5123.104529] Modules linked in: nfsv4(OE) nfs(OE) fscache(E) nfsd(OE) xfs libcrc32c iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi coretemp crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel ppdev vmw_balloon parport_pc parport i2c_piix4 shpchp auth_rpcgss nfs_acl vmw_vmci lockd grace sunrpc vmwgfx drm_kms_helper ttm drm mptspi serio_raw scsi_transport_spi e1000 mptscsih mptbase ata_generic pata_acpi [last unloaded: nfsd]
[ 5123.105887] CPU: 0 PID: 15853 Comm: ::1-manager Tainted: G OE 4.2.0-rc6+ #214
[ 5123.106358] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 05/20/2014
[ 5123.106860] task: ffff88007620f300 ti: ffff88005877c000 task.ti: ffff88005877c000
[ 5123.107363] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa03ed38b>] [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.107909] RSP: 0018:ffff88005877fdb8 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 5123.108435] RAX: ffff880053f3bc00 RBX: ffff88006ce6c908 RCX: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.108968] RDX: ffffea0000e6d940 RSI: ffff8800399a0000 RDI: ffff88006ce6c908
[ 5123.109503] RBP: ffff88005877fe28 R08: ffffffff81c708a0 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 5123.110045] R10: 00000000000001a2 R11: ffff88003ba7f5c8 R12: ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.110618] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff880053a0d240 R15: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.111169] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffffff81c27000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 5123.111726] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 5123.112286] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000054cac000 CR4: 00000000001406f0
[ 5123.112888] Stack:
[ 5123.113458] ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 00000000000167d0 0000000000000000
[ 5123.114049] 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000a7ec82c6
[ 5123.114662] ffff88005877fe18 ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.115264] Call Trace:
[ 5123.115868] [<ffffffffa03fb44b>] nfs4_try_migration+0xbb/0x220 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.116487] [<ffffffffa03fcb3b>] nfs4_run_state_manager+0x4ab/0x7b0 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117104] [<ffffffffa03fc690>] ? nfs4_do_reclaim+0x510/0x510 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117813] [<ffffffff810a4527>] kthread+0xd7/0xf0
[ 5123.118456] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.119108] [<ffffffff816d9cdf>] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70
[ 5123.119723] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.120329] Code: 4c 8b 6a 58 74 17 eb 52 48 8d 55 a8 89 c6 4c 89 e7 e8 4a b5 ff ff 8b 45 b0 85 c0 74 1c 4c 89 f9 48 8b 55 90 48 8b 75 98 48 89 df <41> ff 55 00 3d e8 d8 ff ff 41 89 c6 74 cf 48 8b 4d c8 65 48 33
[ 5123.121643] RIP [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.122308] RSP <ffff88005877fdb8>
[ 5123.122942] CR2: 0000000000000000
Fixes: ec011fe847 ("NFS: Introduce a vector of migration recovery ops")
Cc: [email protected] # v3.13+
Signed-off-by: Kinglong Mee <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
|
static int nfs4_proc_remove(struct inode *dir, struct qstr *name)
{
struct nfs4_exception exception = { };
int err;
do {
err = _nfs4_proc_remove(dir, name);
trace_nfs4_remove(dir, name, err);
err = nfs4_handle_exception(NFS_SERVER(dir), err,
&exception);
} while (exception.retry);
return err;
}
|
static int nfs4_proc_remove(struct inode *dir, struct qstr *name)
{
struct nfs4_exception exception = { };
int err;
do {
err = _nfs4_proc_remove(dir, name);
trace_nfs4_remove(dir, name, err);
err = nfs4_handle_exception(NFS_SERVER(dir), err,
&exception);
} while (exception.retry);
return err;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/3a353ebdb7753a3fbeb401c4c0e0f3358ccbb90b
|
3a353ebdb7753a3fbeb401c4c0e0f3358ccbb90b
|
Support pausing media when a context is frozen.
Media is resumed when the context is unpaused. This feature will be used
for bfcache and pausing iframes feature policy.
BUG=907125
Change-Id: Ic3925ea1a4544242b7bf0b9ad8c9cb9f63976bbd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1410126
Commit-Queue: Dave Tapuska <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mounir Lamouri <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#623319}
|
void HTMLMediaElement::FlingingStarted() {
if (GetWebMediaPlayer())
GetWebMediaPlayer()->FlingingStarted();
}
|
void HTMLMediaElement::FlingingStarted() {
if (GetWebMediaPlayer())
GetWebMediaPlayer()->FlingingStarted();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2019-5827
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-5827/
|
CWE-190
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/517ac71c9ee27f856f9becde8abea7d1604af9d4
|
517ac71c9ee27f856f9becde8abea7d1604af9d4
|
sqlite: backport bugfixes for dbfuzz2
Bug: 952406
Change-Id: Icbec429742048d6674828726c96d8e265c41b595
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1568152
Reviewed-by: Chris Mumford <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Darwin Huang <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#651030}
|
static int dbpageNext(sqlite3_vtab_cursor *pCursor){
int rc = SQLITE_OK;
DbpageCursor *pCsr = (DbpageCursor *)pCursor;
pCsr->pgno++;
return rc;
}
|
static int dbpageNext(sqlite3_vtab_cursor *pCursor){
int rc = SQLITE_OK;
DbpageCursor *pCsr = (DbpageCursor *)pCursor;
pCsr->pgno++;
return rc;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/0c5e07b0a63a5aea8ab0c2b50177b4c99e7c9538
|
0c5e07b0a63a5aea8ab0c2b50177b4c99e7c9538
|
Restore old title in WebViewPlugin only when loading the plugin.
BUG=72437
TEST=see bug for manual test
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6476006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@74428 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
bool WebViewPlugin::initialize(WebPluginContainer* container) {
container_ = container;
if (container_)
old_title_ = container_->element().getAttribute("title");
return true;
}
|
bool WebViewPlugin::initialize(WebPluginContainer* container) {
container_ = container;
if (container_)
old_title_ = container_->element().getAttribute("title");
return true;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a3e2afaedd8190398ae45ccef34fcdee00fb19aa
|
a3e2afaedd8190398ae45ccef34fcdee00fb19aa
|
Fixed crash related to cellular network payment plan retreival.
BUG=chromium-os:8864
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/4690002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@65405 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
virtual CellularNetwork* cellular_network() {
return cellular_;
}
|
virtual CellularNetwork* cellular_network() {
return cellular_;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-9294
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-9294/
|
CWE-476
|
http://git.ghostscript.com/?p=mujs.git;a=commit;h=5008105780c0b0182ea6eda83ad5598f225be3ee
|
5008105780c0b0182ea6eda83ad5598f225be3ee
| null |
static int isfun(enum js_AstType T)
{
return T == AST_FUNDEC || T == EXP_FUN || T == EXP_PROP_GET || T == EXP_PROP_SET;
}
|
static int isfun(enum js_AstType T)
{
return T == AST_FUNDEC || T == EXP_FUN || T == EXP_PROP_GET || T == EXP_PROP_SET;
}
|
C
|
ghostscript
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2861
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2861/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/8262245d384be025f13e2a5b3a03b7e5c98374ce
|
8262245d384be025f13e2a5b3a03b7e5c98374ce
|
DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void ChromeContentBrowserClient::PluginProcessHostCreated(
PluginProcessHost* host) {
host->AddFilter(new ChromePluginMessageFilter(host));
}
|
void ChromeContentBrowserClient::PluginProcessHostCreated(
PluginProcessHost* host) {
host->AddFilter(new ChromePluginMessageFilter(host));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-3552
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-3552/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f6d8bd051c391c1c0458a30b2a7abcd939329259
|
f6d8bd051c391c1c0458a30b2a7abcd939329259
|
inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Cc: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static void dccp_v6_err(struct sk_buff *skb, struct inet6_skb_parm *opt,
u8 type, u8 code, int offset, __be32 info)
{
const struct ipv6hdr *hdr = (const struct ipv6hdr *)skb->data;
const struct dccp_hdr *dh = (struct dccp_hdr *)(skb->data + offset);
struct dccp_sock *dp;
struct ipv6_pinfo *np;
struct sock *sk;
int err;
__u64 seq;
struct net *net = dev_net(skb->dev);
if (skb->len < offset + sizeof(*dh) ||
skb->len < offset + __dccp_basic_hdr_len(dh)) {
ICMP6_INC_STATS_BH(net, __in6_dev_get(skb->dev),
ICMP6_MIB_INERRORS);
return;
}
sk = inet6_lookup(net, &dccp_hashinfo,
&hdr->daddr, dh->dccph_dport,
&hdr->saddr, dh->dccph_sport, inet6_iif(skb));
if (sk == NULL) {
ICMP6_INC_STATS_BH(net, __in6_dev_get(skb->dev),
ICMP6_MIB_INERRORS);
return;
}
if (sk->sk_state == DCCP_TIME_WAIT) {
inet_twsk_put(inet_twsk(sk));
return;
}
bh_lock_sock(sk);
if (sock_owned_by_user(sk))
NET_INC_STATS_BH(net, LINUX_MIB_LOCKDROPPEDICMPS);
if (sk->sk_state == DCCP_CLOSED)
goto out;
dp = dccp_sk(sk);
seq = dccp_hdr_seq(dh);
if ((1 << sk->sk_state) & ~(DCCPF_REQUESTING | DCCPF_LISTEN) &&
!between48(seq, dp->dccps_awl, dp->dccps_awh)) {
NET_INC_STATS_BH(net, LINUX_MIB_OUTOFWINDOWICMPS);
goto out;
}
np = inet6_sk(sk);
if (type == ICMPV6_PKT_TOOBIG) {
struct dst_entry *dst = NULL;
if (sock_owned_by_user(sk))
goto out;
if ((1 << sk->sk_state) & (DCCPF_LISTEN | DCCPF_CLOSED))
goto out;
/* icmp should have updated the destination cache entry */
dst = __sk_dst_check(sk, np->dst_cookie);
if (dst == NULL) {
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
struct flowi6 fl6;
/* BUGGG_FUTURE: Again, it is not clear how
to handle rthdr case. Ignore this complexity
for now.
*/
memset(&fl6, 0, sizeof(fl6));
fl6.flowi6_proto = IPPROTO_DCCP;
ipv6_addr_copy(&fl6.daddr, &np->daddr);
ipv6_addr_copy(&fl6.saddr, &np->saddr);
fl6.flowi6_oif = sk->sk_bound_dev_if;
fl6.fl6_dport = inet->inet_dport;
fl6.fl6_sport = inet->inet_sport;
security_sk_classify_flow(sk, flowi6_to_flowi(&fl6));
dst = ip6_dst_lookup_flow(sk, &fl6, NULL, false);
if (IS_ERR(dst)) {
sk->sk_err_soft = -PTR_ERR(dst);
goto out;
}
} else
dst_hold(dst);
if (inet_csk(sk)->icsk_pmtu_cookie > dst_mtu(dst)) {
dccp_sync_mss(sk, dst_mtu(dst));
} /* else let the usual retransmit timer handle it */
dst_release(dst);
goto out;
}
icmpv6_err_convert(type, code, &err);
/* Might be for an request_sock */
switch (sk->sk_state) {
struct request_sock *req, **prev;
case DCCP_LISTEN:
if (sock_owned_by_user(sk))
goto out;
req = inet6_csk_search_req(sk, &prev, dh->dccph_dport,
&hdr->daddr, &hdr->saddr,
inet6_iif(skb));
if (req == NULL)
goto out;
/*
* ICMPs are not backlogged, hence we cannot get an established
* socket here.
*/
WARN_ON(req->sk != NULL);
if (seq != dccp_rsk(req)->dreq_iss) {
NET_INC_STATS_BH(net, LINUX_MIB_OUTOFWINDOWICMPS);
goto out;
}
inet_csk_reqsk_queue_drop(sk, req, prev);
goto out;
case DCCP_REQUESTING:
case DCCP_RESPOND: /* Cannot happen.
It can, it SYNs are crossed. --ANK */
if (!sock_owned_by_user(sk)) {
DCCP_INC_STATS_BH(DCCP_MIB_ATTEMPTFAILS);
sk->sk_err = err;
/*
* Wake people up to see the error
* (see connect in sock.c)
*/
sk->sk_error_report(sk);
dccp_done(sk);
} else
sk->sk_err_soft = err;
goto out;
}
if (!sock_owned_by_user(sk) && np->recverr) {
sk->sk_err = err;
sk->sk_error_report(sk);
} else
sk->sk_err_soft = err;
out:
bh_unlock_sock(sk);
sock_put(sk);
}
|
static void dccp_v6_err(struct sk_buff *skb, struct inet6_skb_parm *opt,
u8 type, u8 code, int offset, __be32 info)
{
const struct ipv6hdr *hdr = (const struct ipv6hdr *)skb->data;
const struct dccp_hdr *dh = (struct dccp_hdr *)(skb->data + offset);
struct dccp_sock *dp;
struct ipv6_pinfo *np;
struct sock *sk;
int err;
__u64 seq;
struct net *net = dev_net(skb->dev);
if (skb->len < offset + sizeof(*dh) ||
skb->len < offset + __dccp_basic_hdr_len(dh)) {
ICMP6_INC_STATS_BH(net, __in6_dev_get(skb->dev),
ICMP6_MIB_INERRORS);
return;
}
sk = inet6_lookup(net, &dccp_hashinfo,
&hdr->daddr, dh->dccph_dport,
&hdr->saddr, dh->dccph_sport, inet6_iif(skb));
if (sk == NULL) {
ICMP6_INC_STATS_BH(net, __in6_dev_get(skb->dev),
ICMP6_MIB_INERRORS);
return;
}
if (sk->sk_state == DCCP_TIME_WAIT) {
inet_twsk_put(inet_twsk(sk));
return;
}
bh_lock_sock(sk);
if (sock_owned_by_user(sk))
NET_INC_STATS_BH(net, LINUX_MIB_LOCKDROPPEDICMPS);
if (sk->sk_state == DCCP_CLOSED)
goto out;
dp = dccp_sk(sk);
seq = dccp_hdr_seq(dh);
if ((1 << sk->sk_state) & ~(DCCPF_REQUESTING | DCCPF_LISTEN) &&
!between48(seq, dp->dccps_awl, dp->dccps_awh)) {
NET_INC_STATS_BH(net, LINUX_MIB_OUTOFWINDOWICMPS);
goto out;
}
np = inet6_sk(sk);
if (type == ICMPV6_PKT_TOOBIG) {
struct dst_entry *dst = NULL;
if (sock_owned_by_user(sk))
goto out;
if ((1 << sk->sk_state) & (DCCPF_LISTEN | DCCPF_CLOSED))
goto out;
/* icmp should have updated the destination cache entry */
dst = __sk_dst_check(sk, np->dst_cookie);
if (dst == NULL) {
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
struct flowi6 fl6;
/* BUGGG_FUTURE: Again, it is not clear how
to handle rthdr case. Ignore this complexity
for now.
*/
memset(&fl6, 0, sizeof(fl6));
fl6.flowi6_proto = IPPROTO_DCCP;
ipv6_addr_copy(&fl6.daddr, &np->daddr);
ipv6_addr_copy(&fl6.saddr, &np->saddr);
fl6.flowi6_oif = sk->sk_bound_dev_if;
fl6.fl6_dport = inet->inet_dport;
fl6.fl6_sport = inet->inet_sport;
security_sk_classify_flow(sk, flowi6_to_flowi(&fl6));
dst = ip6_dst_lookup_flow(sk, &fl6, NULL, false);
if (IS_ERR(dst)) {
sk->sk_err_soft = -PTR_ERR(dst);
goto out;
}
} else
dst_hold(dst);
if (inet_csk(sk)->icsk_pmtu_cookie > dst_mtu(dst)) {
dccp_sync_mss(sk, dst_mtu(dst));
} /* else let the usual retransmit timer handle it */
dst_release(dst);
goto out;
}
icmpv6_err_convert(type, code, &err);
/* Might be for an request_sock */
switch (sk->sk_state) {
struct request_sock *req, **prev;
case DCCP_LISTEN:
if (sock_owned_by_user(sk))
goto out;
req = inet6_csk_search_req(sk, &prev, dh->dccph_dport,
&hdr->daddr, &hdr->saddr,
inet6_iif(skb));
if (req == NULL)
goto out;
/*
* ICMPs are not backlogged, hence we cannot get an established
* socket here.
*/
WARN_ON(req->sk != NULL);
if (seq != dccp_rsk(req)->dreq_iss) {
NET_INC_STATS_BH(net, LINUX_MIB_OUTOFWINDOWICMPS);
goto out;
}
inet_csk_reqsk_queue_drop(sk, req, prev);
goto out;
case DCCP_REQUESTING:
case DCCP_RESPOND: /* Cannot happen.
It can, it SYNs are crossed. --ANK */
if (!sock_owned_by_user(sk)) {
DCCP_INC_STATS_BH(DCCP_MIB_ATTEMPTFAILS);
sk->sk_err = err;
/*
* Wake people up to see the error
* (see connect in sock.c)
*/
sk->sk_error_report(sk);
dccp_done(sk);
} else
sk->sk_err_soft = err;
goto out;
}
if (!sock_owned_by_user(sk) && np->recverr) {
sk->sk_err = err;
sk->sk_error_report(sk);
} else
sk->sk_err_soft = err;
out:
bh_unlock_sock(sk);
sock_put(sk);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-20856
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-20856/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/54648cf1ec2d7f4b6a71767799c45676a138ca24
|
54648cf1ec2d7f4b6a71767799c45676a138ca24
|
block: blk_init_allocated_queue() set q->fq as NULL in the fail case
We find the memory use-after-free issue in __blk_drain_queue()
on the kernel 4.14. After read the latest kernel 4.18-rc6 we
think it has the same problem.
Memory is allocated for q->fq in the blk_init_allocated_queue().
If the elevator init function called with error return, it will
run into the fail case to free the q->fq.
Then the __blk_drain_queue() uses the same memory after the free
of the q->fq, it will lead to the unpredictable event.
The patch is to set q->fq as NULL in the fail case of
blk_init_allocated_queue().
Fixes: commit 7c94e1c157a2 ("block: introduce blk_flush_queue to drive flush machinery")
Cc: <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ming Lei <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: xiao jin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
|
static bool should_fail_request(struct hd_struct *part, unsigned int bytes)
{
return part->make_it_fail && should_fail(&fail_make_request, bytes);
}
|
static bool should_fail_request(struct hd_struct *part, unsigned int bytes)
{
return part->make_it_fail && should_fail(&fail_make_request, bytes);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2015-1265
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1265/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/04ff52bb66284467ccb43d90800013b89ee8db75
|
04ff52bb66284467ccb43d90800013b89ee8db75
|
Switching AudioOutputAuthorizationHandler from using AudioManager interface to AudioSystem one.
BUG=672468
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2692203003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#450939}
|
size_t RenderProcessHostImpl::GetWorkerRefCount() const {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
return service_worker_ref_count_ + shared_worker_ref_count_;
}
|
size_t RenderProcessHostImpl::GetWorkerRefCount() const {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
return service_worker_ref_count_ + shared_worker_ref_count_;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-0841
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-0841/
|
CWE-119
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/3097f364237fb552871f7639d37a7afa4563e252
|
3097f364237fb552871f7639d37a7afa4563e252
|
Get service by value instead of reference
to prevent a cleared service binder from being used.
Bug: 26040840
Change-Id: Ifb5483c55b172d3553deb80dbe27f2204b86ecdb
|
status_t MediaMetadataRetriever::setDataSource(int fd, int64_t offset, int64_t length)
{
ALOGV("setDataSource(%d, %" PRId64 ", %" PRId64 ")", fd, offset, length);
Mutex::Autolock _l(mLock);
if (mRetriever == 0) {
ALOGE("retriever is not initialized");
return INVALID_OPERATION;
}
if (fd < 0 || offset < 0 || length < 0) {
ALOGE("Invalid negative argument");
return UNKNOWN_ERROR;
}
return mRetriever->setDataSource(fd, offset, length);
}
|
status_t MediaMetadataRetriever::setDataSource(int fd, int64_t offset, int64_t length)
{
ALOGV("setDataSource(%d, %" PRId64 ", %" PRId64 ")", fd, offset, length);
Mutex::Autolock _l(mLock);
if (mRetriever == 0) {
ALOGE("retriever is not initialized");
return INVALID_OPERATION;
}
if (fd < 0 || offset < 0 || length < 0) {
ALOGE("Invalid negative argument");
return UNKNOWN_ERROR;
}
return mRetriever->setDataSource(fd, offset, length);
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2016-2464
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-2464/
|
CWE-20
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/libvpx/+/65c49d5b382de4085ee5668732bcb0f6ecaf7148
|
65c49d5b382de4085ee5668732bcb0f6ecaf7148
|
Fix ParseElementHeader to support 0 payload elements
Cherry-pick'ing Change 5c83bbec9a5f6f00a349674ddad85b753d2ea219
from upstream. This fixes regression in some edge cases for mkv
playback.
BUG=26499283
Change-Id: I88de03219a3d941b6b2f251d384e29c36bdd4d9b
|
long Chapters::Parse() {
IMkvReader* const pReader = m_pSegment->m_pReader;
long long pos = m_start; // payload start
const long long stop = pos + m_size; // payload stop
while (pos < stop) {
long long id, size;
long status = ParseElementHeader(pReader, pos, stop, id, size);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
if (size == 0) // weird
continue;
if (id == 0x05B9) { // EditionEntry ID
status = ParseEdition(pos, size);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
}
pos += size;
if (pos > stop)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
}
if (pos != stop)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
return 0;
}
|
long Chapters::Parse() {
IMkvReader* const pReader = m_pSegment->m_pReader;
long long pos = m_start; // payload start
const long long stop = pos + m_size; // payload stop
while (pos < stop) {
long long id, size;
long status = ParseElementHeader(pReader, pos, stop, id, size);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
if (size == 0) // weird
continue;
if (id == 0x05B9) { // EditionEntry ID
status = ParseEdition(pos, size);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
}
pos += size;
if (pos > stop)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
}
if (pos != stop)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
return 0;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5340
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5340/
|
CWE-190
|
https://github.com/php/php-src/commit/4cc0286f2f3780abc6084bcdae5dce595daa3c12
|
4cc0286f2f3780abc6084bcdae5dce595daa3c12
|
Fix #73832 - leave the table in a safe state if the size is too big.
|
ZEND_API void ZEND_FASTCALL zend_hash_del_bucket(HashTable *ht, Bucket *p)
{
IS_CONSISTENT(ht);
HT_ASSERT(GC_REFCOUNT(ht) == 1);
_zend_hash_del_el(ht, HT_IDX_TO_HASH(p - ht->arData), p);
}
|
ZEND_API void ZEND_FASTCALL zend_hash_del_bucket(HashTable *ht, Bucket *p)
{
IS_CONSISTENT(ht);
HT_ASSERT(GC_REFCOUNT(ht) == 1);
_zend_hash_del_el(ht, HT_IDX_TO_HASH(p - ht->arData), p);
}
|
C
|
php-src
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/511d0a0a31a54e0cc0f15cb1b977dc9f9b20f0d3
|
511d0a0a31a54e0cc0f15cb1b977dc9f9b20f0d3
|
Implement new websocket handshake based on draft-hixie-thewebsocketprotocol-76
BUG=none
TEST=net_unittests passes
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/1108002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@42736 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void TestProcessFrameData(WebSocket* websocket,
const char* expected_remaining_data,
int expected_remaining_len) {
websocket->ProcessFrameData();
const char* actual_remaining_data =
websocket->current_read_buf_->StartOfBuffer()
+ websocket->read_consumed_len_;
int actual_remaining_len =
websocket->current_read_buf_->offset() - websocket->read_consumed_len_;
EXPECT_EQ(expected_remaining_len, actual_remaining_len);
EXPECT_TRUE(!memcmp(expected_remaining_data, actual_remaining_data,
expected_remaining_len));
}
|
void TestProcessFrameData(WebSocket* websocket,
const char* expected_remaining_data,
int expected_remaining_len) {
websocket->ProcessFrameData();
const char* actual_remaining_data =
websocket->current_read_buf_->StartOfBuffer()
+ websocket->read_consumed_len_;
int actual_remaining_len =
websocket->current_read_buf_->offset() - websocket->read_consumed_len_;
EXPECT_EQ(expected_remaining_len, actual_remaining_len);
EXPECT_TRUE(!memcmp(expected_remaining_data, actual_remaining_data,
expected_remaining_len));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-11590
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-11590/
|
CWE-190
|
https://github.com/espruino/Espruino/commit/a0d7f432abee692402c00e8b615ff5982dde9780
|
a0d7f432abee692402c00e8b615ff5982dde9780
|
Fix stack size detection on Linux (fix #1427)
|
void ftoa_bounded(JsVarFloat val,char *str, size_t len) {
ftoa_bounded_extra(val, str, len, 10, -1);
}
|
void ftoa_bounded(JsVarFloat val,char *str, size_t len) {
ftoa_bounded_extra(val, str, len, 10, -1);
}
|
C
|
Espruino
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a5333583f14284a411abac2fef7caed889a8bba3
|
a5333583f14284a411abac2fef7caed889a8bba3
|
Wire InstallFinished and add some InstallEvent.waitUntil tests
BUG=285976
TEST=content_browsertests:ServiceWorkerVersionBrowserTest.Install*
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/chrome?view=rev&revision=250804
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/153553008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@250936 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void StopOnIOThread(const base::Closure& done,
ServiceWorkerStatusCode* result) {
ASSERT_TRUE(version_);
version_->StopWorker(CreateReceiver(BrowserThread::UI, done, result));
}
|
void StopOnIOThread(const base::Closure& done,
ServiceWorkerStatusCode* result) {
ASSERT_TRUE(version_);
version_->StopWorker(CreateReceiver(BrowserThread::UI, done, result));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6063
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6063/
|
CWE-787
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/673ce95d481ea9368c4d4d43ac756ba1d6d9e608
|
673ce95d481ea9368c4d4d43ac756ba1d6d9e608
|
Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
|
void RenderProcessHostImpl::DisableKeepAliveRefCount() {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
DCHECK(!is_keep_alive_ref_count_disabled_);
is_keep_alive_ref_count_disabled_ = true;
if (!keep_alive_ref_count_)
return;
keep_alive_ref_count_ = 0;
Cleanup();
}
|
void RenderProcessHostImpl::DisableKeepAliveRefCount() {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
DCHECK(!is_keep_alive_ref_count_disabled_);
is_keep_alive_ref_count_disabled_ = true;
if (!keep_alive_ref_count_)
return;
keep_alive_ref_count_ = 0;
Cleanup();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-16931
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-16931/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/GNOME/libxml2/commit/e26630548e7d138d2c560844c43820b6767251e3
|
e26630548e7d138d2c560844c43820b6767251e3
|
Fix handling of parameter-entity references
There were two bugs where parameter-entity references could lead to an
unexpected change of the input buffer in xmlParseNameComplex and
xmlDictLookup being called with an invalid pointer.
Percent sign in DTD Names
=========================
The NEXTL macro used to call xmlParserHandlePEReference. When parsing
"complex" names inside the DTD, this could result in entity expansion
which created a new input buffer. The fix is to simply remove the call
to xmlParserHandlePEReference from the NEXTL macro. This is safe because
no users of the macro require expansion of parameter entities.
- xmlParseNameComplex
- xmlParseNCNameComplex
- xmlParseNmtoken
The percent sign is not allowed in names, which are grammatical tokens.
- xmlParseEntityValue
Parameter-entity references in entity values are expanded but this
happens in a separate step in this function.
- xmlParseSystemLiteral
Parameter-entity references are ignored in the system literal.
- xmlParseAttValueComplex
- xmlParseCharDataComplex
- xmlParseCommentComplex
- xmlParsePI
- xmlParseCDSect
Parameter-entity references are ignored outside the DTD.
- xmlLoadEntityContent
This function is only called from xmlStringLenDecodeEntities and
entities are replaced in a separate step immediately after the function
call.
This bug could also be triggered with an internal subset and double
entity expansion.
This fixes bug 766956 initially reported by Wei Lei and independently by
Chromium's ClusterFuzz, Hanno Böck, and Marco Grassi. Thanks to everyone
involved.
xmlParseNameComplex with XML_PARSE_OLD10
========================================
When parsing Names inside an expanded parameter entity with the
XML_PARSE_OLD10 option, xmlParseNameComplex would call xmlGROW via the
GROW macro if the input buffer was exhausted. At the end of the
parameter entity's replacement text, this function would then call
xmlPopInput which invalidated the input buffer.
There should be no need to invoke GROW in this situation because the
buffer is grown periodically every XML_PARSER_CHUNK_SIZE characters and,
at least for UTF-8, in xmlCurrentChar. This also matches the code path
executed when XML_PARSE_OLD10 is not set.
This fixes bugs 781205 (CVE-2017-9049) and 781361 (CVE-2017-9050).
Thanks to Marcel Böhme and Thuan Pham for the report.
Additional hardening
====================
A separate check was added in xmlParseNameComplex to validate the
buffer size.
|
xptrDocTest(const char *filename,
const char *resul ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
const char *err ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
int options) {
char pattern[500];
char result[500];
glob_t globbuf;
size_t i;
int ret = 0, res;
xpathDocument = xmlReadFile(filename, NULL,
options | XML_PARSE_DTDATTR | XML_PARSE_NOENT);
if (xpathDocument == NULL) {
fprintf(stderr, "Failed to load %s\n", filename);
return(-1);
}
snprintf(pattern, 499, "./test/XPath/xptr/%s*", baseFilename(filename));
pattern[499] = 0;
globbuf.gl_offs = 0;
glob(pattern, GLOB_DOOFFS, NULL, &globbuf);
for (i = 0;i < globbuf.gl_pathc;i++) {
snprintf(result, 499, "result/XPath/xptr/%s",
baseFilename(globbuf.gl_pathv[i]));
res = xpathCommonTest(globbuf.gl_pathv[i], &result[0], 1, 0);
if (res != 0)
ret = res;
}
globfree(&globbuf);
xmlFreeDoc(xpathDocument);
return(ret);
}
|
xptrDocTest(const char *filename,
const char *resul ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
const char *err ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
int options) {
char pattern[500];
char result[500];
glob_t globbuf;
size_t i;
int ret = 0, res;
xpathDocument = xmlReadFile(filename, NULL,
options | XML_PARSE_DTDATTR | XML_PARSE_NOENT);
if (xpathDocument == NULL) {
fprintf(stderr, "Failed to load %s\n", filename);
return(-1);
}
snprintf(pattern, 499, "./test/XPath/xptr/%s*", baseFilename(filename));
pattern[499] = 0;
globbuf.gl_offs = 0;
glob(pattern, GLOB_DOOFFS, NULL, &globbuf);
for (i = 0;i < globbuf.gl_pathc;i++) {
snprintf(result, 499, "result/XPath/xptr/%s",
baseFilename(globbuf.gl_pathv[i]));
res = xpathCommonTest(globbuf.gl_pathv[i], &result[0], 1, 0);
if (res != 0)
ret = res;
}
globfree(&globbuf);
xmlFreeDoc(xpathDocument);
return(ret);
}
|
C
|
libxml2
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1647
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1647/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/e5787005a9004d7be289cc649c6ae4f3051996cd
|
e5787005a9004d7be289cc649c6ae4f3051996cd
|
Check that RWHI isn't deleted manually while owned by a scoped_ptr in RVHI
BUG=590284
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1747183002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#378844}
|
void RenderWidgetHostImpl::OnImeCompositionRangeChanged(
const gfx::Range& range,
const std::vector<gfx::Rect>& character_bounds) {
if (view_)
view_->ImeCompositionRangeChanged(range, character_bounds);
}
|
void RenderWidgetHostImpl::OnImeCompositionRangeChanged(
const gfx::Range& range,
const std::vector<gfx::Rect>& character_bounds) {
if (view_)
view_->ImeCompositionRangeChanged(range, character_bounds);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-9756
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-9756/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/erikd/libsndfile/commit/725c7dbb95bfaf8b4bb7b04820e3a00cceea9ce6
|
725c7dbb95bfaf8b4bb7b04820e3a00cceea9ce6
|
src/file_io.c : Prevent potential divide-by-zero.
Closes: https://github.com/erikd/libsndfile/issues/92
|
psf_fsync (SF_PRIVATE *psf)
{ FlushFileBuffers (psf->file.handle) ;
} /* psf_fsync */
|
psf_fsync (SF_PRIVATE *psf)
{ FlushFileBuffers (psf->file.handle) ;
} /* psf_fsync */
|
C
|
libsndfile
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/e93dc535728da259ec16d1c3cc393f80b25f64ae
|
e93dc535728da259ec16d1c3cc393f80b25f64ae
|
Add a unit test that filenames aren't unintentionally converted to URLs.
Also fixes two issues in OSExchangeDataProviderWin:
- It used a disjoint set of clipboard formats when handling
GetUrl(..., true /* filename conversion */) vs GetFilenames(...), so the
actual returned results would vary depending on which one was called.
- It incorrectly used ::DragFinish() instead of ::ReleaseStgMedium().
::DragFinish() is only meant to be used in conjunction with WM_DROPFILES.
BUG=346135
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/380553002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@283226 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
HRESULT DataObjectImpl::SetAsyncMode(BOOL do_op_async) {
in_async_mode_ = (do_op_async == TRUE);
return S_OK;
}
|
HRESULT DataObjectImpl::SetAsyncMode(BOOL do_op_async) {
in_async_mode_ = (do_op_async == TRUE);
return S_OK;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5170
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5170/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/c3957448cfc6e299165196a33cd954b790875fdb
|
c3957448cfc6e299165196a33cd954b790875fdb
|
Cleanup and remove dead code in SetFocusedElement
This early-out was added in:
https://crrev.com/ce8ea3446283965c7eabab592cbffe223b1cf2bc
Back then, we applied fragment focus in LayoutUpdated() which could
cause this issue. This got cleaned up in:
https://crrev.com/45236fd563e9df53dc45579be1f3d0b4784885a2
so that focus is no longer applied after layout.
+Cleanup: Goto considered harmful
Bug: 795381
Change-Id: Ifeb4d2e03e872fd48cca6720b1d4de36ad1ecbb7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1524417
Commit-Queue: David Bokan <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Zager <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#641101}
|
void Document::CancelAnimationFrame(int id) {
if (!scripted_animation_controller_)
return;
scripted_animation_controller_->CancelCallback(id);
}
|
void Document::CancelAnimationFrame(int id) {
if (!scripted_animation_controller_)
return;
scripted_animation_controller_->CancelCallback(id);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-0045
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-0045/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/c2226fc9e87ba3da060e47333657cd6616652b84
|
c2226fc9e87ba3da060e47333657cd6616652b84
|
KVM: x86: fix missing checks in syscall emulation
On hosts without this patch, 32bit guests will crash (and 64bit guests
may behave in a wrong way) for example by simply executing following
nasm-demo-application:
[bits 32]
global _start
SECTION .text
_start: syscall
(I tested it with winxp and linux - both always crashed)
Disassembly of section .text:
00000000 <_start>:
0: 0f 05 syscall
The reason seems a missing "invalid opcode"-trap (int6) for the
syscall opcode "0f05", which is not available on Intel CPUs
within non-longmodes, as also on some AMD CPUs within legacy-mode.
(depending on CPU vendor, MSR_EFER and cpuid)
Because previous mentioned OSs may not engage corresponding
syscall target-registers (STAR, LSTAR, CSTAR), they remain
NULL and (non trapping) syscalls are leading to multiple
faults and finally crashs.
Depending on the architecture (AMD or Intel) pretended by
guests, various checks according to vendor's documentation
are implemented to overcome the current issue and behave
like the CPUs physical counterparts.
[mtosatti: cleanup/beautify code]
Signed-off-by: Stephan Baerwolf <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <[email protected]>
|
static int em_xchg(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
{
/* Write back the register source. */
ctxt->src.val = ctxt->dst.val;
write_register_operand(&ctxt->src);
/* Write back the memory destination with implicit LOCK prefix. */
ctxt->dst.val = ctxt->src.orig_val;
ctxt->lock_prefix = 1;
return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
}
|
static int em_xchg(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
{
/* Write back the register source. */
ctxt->src.val = ctxt->dst.val;
write_register_operand(&ctxt->src);
/* Write back the memory destination with implicit LOCK prefix. */
ctxt->dst.val = ctxt->src.orig_val;
ctxt->lock_prefix = 1;
return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-11469
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-11469/
|
CWE-200
|
https://git.haproxy.org/?p=haproxy-1.8.git;a=commit;h=17514045e5d934dede62116216c1b016fe23dd06
|
17514045e5d934dede62116216c1b016fe23dd06
| null |
http_get_path_from_string(char *str)
{
char *ptr = str;
/* RFC2616, par. 5.1.2 :
* Request-URI = "*" | absuri | abspath | authority
*/
if (*ptr == '*')
return NULL;
if (isalpha((unsigned char)*ptr)) {
/* this is a scheme as described by RFC3986, par. 3.1 */
ptr++;
while (isalnum((unsigned char)*ptr) || *ptr == '+' || *ptr == '-' || *ptr == '.')
ptr++;
/* skip '://' */
if (*ptr == '\0' || *ptr++ != ':')
return NULL;
if (*ptr == '\0' || *ptr++ != '/')
return NULL;
if (*ptr == '\0' || *ptr++ != '/')
return NULL;
}
/* skip [user[:passwd]@]host[:[port]] */
while (*ptr != '\0' && *ptr != ' ' && *ptr != '/')
ptr++;
if (*ptr == '\0' || *ptr == ' ')
return NULL;
/* OK, we got the '/' ! */
return ptr;
}
|
http_get_path_from_string(char *str)
{
char *ptr = str;
/* RFC2616, par. 5.1.2 :
* Request-URI = "*" | absuri | abspath | authority
*/
if (*ptr == '*')
return NULL;
if (isalpha((unsigned char)*ptr)) {
/* this is a scheme as described by RFC3986, par. 3.1 */
ptr++;
while (isalnum((unsigned char)*ptr) || *ptr == '+' || *ptr == '-' || *ptr == '.')
ptr++;
/* skip '://' */
if (*ptr == '\0' || *ptr++ != ':')
return NULL;
if (*ptr == '\0' || *ptr++ != '/')
return NULL;
if (*ptr == '\0' || *ptr++ != '/')
return NULL;
}
/* skip [user[:passwd]@]host[:[port]] */
while (*ptr != '\0' && *ptr != ' ' && *ptr != '/')
ptr++;
if (*ptr == '\0' || *ptr == ' ')
return NULL;
/* OK, we got the '/' ! */
return ptr;
}
|
C
|
haproxy
| 0 |
CVE-2015-6769
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-6769/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/33c5e0a9db05dbd2f7793c23ac23b7aa6a556c05
|
33c5e0a9db05dbd2f7793c23ac23b7aa6a556c05
|
Fixing names of password_manager kEnableManualFallbacksFilling feature.
Fixing names of password_manager kEnableManualFallbacksFilling feature
as per the naming convention.
Bug: 785953
Change-Id: I4a4baa1649fe9f02c3783a5e4c40bc75e717cc03
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/900566
Reviewed-by: Vaclav Brozek <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: NIKHIL SAHNI <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#534923}
|
void SetHttpWarningEnabled() {
scoped_feature_list_.InitAndEnableFeature(
security_state::kHttpFormWarningFeature);
}
|
void SetHttpWarningEnabled() {
scoped_feature_list_.InitAndEnableFeature(
security_state::kHttpFormWarningFeature);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-10911
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-10911/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/089bc0143f489bd3a4578bdff5f4ca68fb26f341
|
089bc0143f489bd3a4578bdff5f4ca68fb26f341
|
xen-blkback: don't leak stack data via response ring
Rather than constructing a local structure instance on the stack, fill
the fields directly on the shared ring, just like other backends do.
Build on the fact that all response structure flavors are actually
identical (the old code did make this assumption too).
This is XSA-216.
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <[email protected]>
|
static int xen_blkbk_map_seg(struct pending_req *pending_req)
{
int rc;
rc = xen_blkbk_map(pending_req->ring, pending_req->segments,
pending_req->nr_segs,
(pending_req->operation != BLKIF_OP_READ));
return rc;
}
|
static int xen_blkbk_map_seg(struct pending_req *pending_req)
{
int rc;
rc = xen_blkbk_map(pending_req->ring, pending_req->segments,
pending_req->nr_segs,
(pending_req->operation != BLKIF_OP_READ));
return rc;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2010-2806
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2010-2806/
|
CWE-399
|
https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/freetype/freetype2.git/commit/?id=c06da1ad34663da7b6fc39b030dc3ae185b96557
|
c06da1ad34663da7b6fc39b030dc3ae185b96557
| null |
t42_parse_font_matrix( T42_Face face,
T42_Loader loader )
{
T42_Parser parser = &loader->parser;
FT_Matrix* matrix = &face->type1.font_matrix;
FT_Vector* offset = &face->type1.font_offset;
FT_Face root = (FT_Face)&face->root;
FT_Fixed temp[6];
FT_Fixed temp_scale;
(void)T1_ToFixedArray( parser, 6, temp, 3 );
temp_scale = FT_ABS( temp[3] );
/* Set Units per EM based on FontMatrix values. We set the value to */
/* 1000 / temp_scale, because temp_scale was already multiplied by */
/* 1000 (in t1_tofixed, from psobjs.c). */
root->units_per_EM = (FT_UShort)( FT_DivFix( 1000 * 0x10000L,
temp_scale ) >> 16 );
/* we need to scale the values by 1.0/temp_scale */
if ( temp_scale != 0x10000L )
{
temp[0] = FT_DivFix( temp[0], temp_scale );
temp[1] = FT_DivFix( temp[1], temp_scale );
temp[2] = FT_DivFix( temp[2], temp_scale );
temp[4] = FT_DivFix( temp[4], temp_scale );
temp[5] = FT_DivFix( temp[5], temp_scale );
temp[3] = 0x10000L;
}
matrix->xx = temp[0];
matrix->yx = temp[1];
matrix->xy = temp[2];
matrix->yy = temp[3];
/* note that the offsets must be expressed in integer font units */
offset->x = temp[4] >> 16;
offset->y = temp[5] >> 16;
}
|
t42_parse_font_matrix( T42_Face face,
T42_Loader loader )
{
T42_Parser parser = &loader->parser;
FT_Matrix* matrix = &face->type1.font_matrix;
FT_Vector* offset = &face->type1.font_offset;
FT_Face root = (FT_Face)&face->root;
FT_Fixed temp[6];
FT_Fixed temp_scale;
(void)T1_ToFixedArray( parser, 6, temp, 3 );
temp_scale = FT_ABS( temp[3] );
/* Set Units per EM based on FontMatrix values. We set the value to */
/* 1000 / temp_scale, because temp_scale was already multiplied by */
/* 1000 (in t1_tofixed, from psobjs.c). */
root->units_per_EM = (FT_UShort)( FT_DivFix( 1000 * 0x10000L,
temp_scale ) >> 16 );
/* we need to scale the values by 1.0/temp_scale */
if ( temp_scale != 0x10000L )
{
temp[0] = FT_DivFix( temp[0], temp_scale );
temp[1] = FT_DivFix( temp[1], temp_scale );
temp[2] = FT_DivFix( temp[2], temp_scale );
temp[4] = FT_DivFix( temp[4], temp_scale );
temp[5] = FT_DivFix( temp[5], temp_scale );
temp[3] = 0x10000L;
}
matrix->xx = temp[0];
matrix->yx = temp[1];
matrix->xy = temp[2];
matrix->yy = temp[3];
/* note that the offsets must be expressed in integer font units */
offset->x = temp[4] >> 16;
offset->y = temp[5] >> 16;
}
|
C
|
savannah
| 0 |
CVE-2015-6773
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-6773/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/33827275411b33371e7bb750cce20f11de85002d
|
33827275411b33371e7bb750cce20f11de85002d
|
Move SelectionTemplate::is_handle_visible_ to FrameSelection
This patch moves |is_handle_visible_| to |FrameSelection| from |SelectionTemplate|
since handle visibility is used only for setting |FrameSelection|, hence it is
a redundant member variable of |SelectionTemplate|.
Bug: 742093
Change-Id: I3add4da3844fb40be34dcb4d4b46b5fa6fed1d7e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/595389
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kent Tamura <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#491660}
|
void Editor::Redo() {
undo_stack_->Redo();
}
|
void Editor::Redo() {
undo_stack_->Redo();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-12893
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-12893/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/6f5ba2b651cd9d4b7fa8ee5c4f94460645877c45
|
6f5ba2b651cd9d4b7fa8ee5c4f94460645877c45
|
CVE-2017-12893/SMB/CIFS: Add a bounds check in name_len().
After we advance the pointer by the length value in the buffer, make
sure it points to something in the captured data.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Forcepoint's security
researchers Otto Airamo & Antti Levomäki.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
|
interpret_dos_date(uint32_t date, struct tm *tp)
{
uint32_t p0, p1, p2, p3;
p0 = date & 0xFF;
p1 = ((date & 0xFF00) >> 8) & 0xFF;
p2 = ((date & 0xFF0000) >> 16) & 0xFF;
p3 = ((date & 0xFF000000) >> 24) & 0xFF;
tp->tm_sec = 2 * (p0 & 0x1F);
tp->tm_min = ((p0 >> 5) & 0xFF) + ((p1 & 0x7) << 3);
tp->tm_hour = (p1 >> 3) & 0xFF;
tp->tm_mday = (p2 & 0x1F);
tp->tm_mon = ((p2 >> 5) & 0xFF) + ((p3 & 0x1) << 3) - 1;
tp->tm_year = ((p3 >> 1) & 0xFF) + 80;
}
|
interpret_dos_date(uint32_t date, struct tm *tp)
{
uint32_t p0, p1, p2, p3;
p0 = date & 0xFF;
p1 = ((date & 0xFF00) >> 8) & 0xFF;
p2 = ((date & 0xFF0000) >> 16) & 0xFF;
p3 = ((date & 0xFF000000) >> 24) & 0xFF;
tp->tm_sec = 2 * (p0 & 0x1F);
tp->tm_min = ((p0 >> 5) & 0xFF) + ((p1 & 0x7) << 3);
tp->tm_hour = (p1 >> 3) & 0xFF;
tp->tm_mday = (p2 & 0x1F);
tp->tm_mon = ((p2 >> 5) & 0xFF) + ((p3 & 0x1) << 3) - 1;
tp->tm_year = ((p3 >> 1) & 0xFF) + 80;
}
|
C
|
tcpdump
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5218
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5218/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/45d901b56f578a74b19ba0d10fa5c4c467f19303
|
45d901b56f578a74b19ba0d10fa5c4c467f19303
|
Paint tab groups with the group color.
* The background of TabGroupHeader now uses the group color.
* The backgrounds of tabs in the group are tinted with the group color.
This treatment, along with the colors chosen, are intended to be
a placeholder.
Bug: 905491
Change-Id: Ic808548f8eba23064606e7fb8c9bba281d0d117f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1610504
Commit-Queue: Bret Sepulveda <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Taylor Bergquist <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#660498}
|
void TabStrip::OnGestureEvent(ui::GestureEvent* event) {
SetResetToShrinkOnExit(false);
switch (event->type()) {
case ui::ET_GESTURE_SCROLL_END:
case ui::ET_SCROLL_FLING_START:
case ui::ET_GESTURE_END:
EndDrag(END_DRAG_COMPLETE);
if (adjust_layout_) {
SetStackedLayout(true);
controller_->StackedLayoutMaybeChanged();
}
break;
case ui::ET_GESTURE_LONG_PRESS:
drag_context_->SetMoveBehavior(TabDragController::REORDER);
break;
case ui::ET_GESTURE_LONG_TAP: {
EndDrag(END_DRAG_CANCEL);
gfx::Point local_point = event->location();
Tab* tab = touch_layout_ ? FindTabForEvent(local_point)
: FindTabHitByPoint(local_point);
if (tab) {
ConvertPointToScreen(this, &local_point);
ShowContextMenuForTab(tab, local_point, ui::MENU_SOURCE_TOUCH);
}
break;
}
case ui::ET_GESTURE_SCROLL_UPDATE:
ContinueDrag(this, *event);
break;
case ui::ET_GESTURE_TAP_DOWN:
EndDrag(END_DRAG_CANCEL);
break;
case ui::ET_GESTURE_TAP: {
const int active_index = controller_->GetActiveIndex();
DCHECK_NE(-1, active_index);
Tab* active_tab = tab_at(active_index);
TouchUMA::GestureActionType action = TouchUMA::kGestureTabNoSwitchTap;
if (active_tab->tab_activated_with_last_tap_down())
action = TouchUMA::kGestureTabSwitchTap;
TouchUMA::RecordGestureAction(action);
break;
}
default:
break;
}
event->SetHandled();
}
|
void TabStrip::OnGestureEvent(ui::GestureEvent* event) {
SetResetToShrinkOnExit(false);
switch (event->type()) {
case ui::ET_GESTURE_SCROLL_END:
case ui::ET_SCROLL_FLING_START:
case ui::ET_GESTURE_END:
EndDrag(END_DRAG_COMPLETE);
if (adjust_layout_) {
SetStackedLayout(true);
controller_->StackedLayoutMaybeChanged();
}
break;
case ui::ET_GESTURE_LONG_PRESS:
drag_context_->SetMoveBehavior(TabDragController::REORDER);
break;
case ui::ET_GESTURE_LONG_TAP: {
EndDrag(END_DRAG_CANCEL);
gfx::Point local_point = event->location();
Tab* tab = touch_layout_ ? FindTabForEvent(local_point)
: FindTabHitByPoint(local_point);
if (tab) {
ConvertPointToScreen(this, &local_point);
ShowContextMenuForTab(tab, local_point, ui::MENU_SOURCE_TOUCH);
}
break;
}
case ui::ET_GESTURE_SCROLL_UPDATE:
ContinueDrag(this, *event);
break;
case ui::ET_GESTURE_TAP_DOWN:
EndDrag(END_DRAG_CANCEL);
break;
case ui::ET_GESTURE_TAP: {
const int active_index = controller_->GetActiveIndex();
DCHECK_NE(-1, active_index);
Tab* active_tab = tab_at(active_index);
TouchUMA::GestureActionType action = TouchUMA::kGestureTabNoSwitchTap;
if (active_tab->tab_activated_with_last_tap_down())
action = TouchUMA::kGestureTabSwitchTap;
TouchUMA::RecordGestureAction(action);
break;
}
default:
break;
}
event->SetHandled();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a0af50481db56aa780942e8595a20c36b2c34f5c
|
a0af50481db56aa780942e8595a20c36b2c34f5c
|
Build fix following bug #30696.
Patch by Gavin Barraclough <[email protected]> on 2009-10-22
Reviewed by NOBODY (build fix).
* WebCoreSupport/FrameLoaderClientGtk.cpp:
(WebKit::FrameLoaderClient::windowObjectCleared):
* webkit/webkitwebframe.cpp:
(webkit_web_frame_get_global_context):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@49964 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
void FrameLoaderClient::dispatchDidFailLoading(WebCore::DocumentLoader* loader, unsigned long identifier, const ResourceError& error)
{
static_cast<WebKit::DocumentLoader*>(loader)->decreaseLoadCount(identifier);
notImplemented();
}
|
void FrameLoaderClient::dispatchDidFailLoading(WebCore::DocumentLoader* loader, unsigned long identifier, const ResourceError& error)
{
static_cast<WebKit::DocumentLoader*>(loader)->decreaseLoadCount(identifier);
notImplemented();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-14357
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-14357/
|
CWE-77
|
https://github.com/neomutt/neomutt/commit/e52393740334443ae0206cab2d7caef381646725
|
e52393740334443ae0206cab2d7caef381646725
|
quote imap strings more carefully
Co-authored-by: JerikoOne <[email protected]>
|
const char *imap_cmd_trailer(struct ImapData *idata)
{
static const char *notrailer = "";
const char *s = idata->buf;
if (!s)
{
mutt_debug(2, "not a tagged response\n");
return notrailer;
}
s = imap_next_word((char *) s);
if (!s || ((mutt_str_strncasecmp(s, "OK", 2) != 0) &&
(mutt_str_strncasecmp(s, "NO", 2) != 0) &&
(mutt_str_strncasecmp(s, "BAD", 3) != 0)))
{
mutt_debug(2, "not a command completion: %s\n", idata->buf);
return notrailer;
}
s = imap_next_word((char *) s);
if (!s)
return notrailer;
return s;
}
|
const char *imap_cmd_trailer(struct ImapData *idata)
{
static const char *notrailer = "";
const char *s = idata->buf;
if (!s)
{
mutt_debug(2, "not a tagged response\n");
return notrailer;
}
s = imap_next_word((char *) s);
if (!s || ((mutt_str_strncasecmp(s, "OK", 2) != 0) &&
(mutt_str_strncasecmp(s, "NO", 2) != 0) &&
(mutt_str_strncasecmp(s, "BAD", 3) != 0)))
{
mutt_debug(2, "not a command completion: %s\n", idata->buf);
return notrailer;
}
s = imap_next_word((char *) s);
if (!s)
return notrailer;
return s;
}
|
C
|
neomutt
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2900
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2900/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/9597042cad54926f50d58f5ada39205eb734d7be
|
9597042cad54926f50d58f5ada39205eb734d7be
|
Revert 137988 - VAVDA is the hardware video decode accelerator for Chrome on Linux and ChromeOS for Intel CPUs (Sandy Bridge and newer).
This CL enables VAVDA acceleration for ChromeOS, both for HTML5 video and Flash.
The feature is currently hidden behind a command line flag and can be enabled by adding the --enable-vaapi parameter to command line.
BUG=117062
TEST=Manual runs of test streams.
Change-Id: I386e16739e2ef2230f52a0a434971b33d8654699
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9814001
This is causing crbug.com/129103
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10411066
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@138208 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
bool GpuProcessHost::LaunchGpuProcess(const std::string& channel_id) {
if (!(gpu_enabled_ &&
GpuDataManagerImpl::GetInstance()->ShouldUseSoftwareRendering()) &&
!hardware_gpu_enabled_) {
SendOutstandingReplies();
return false;
}
const CommandLine& browser_command_line = *CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
CommandLine::StringType gpu_launcher =
browser_command_line.GetSwitchValueNative(switches::kGpuLauncher);
#if defined(OS_LINUX)
int child_flags = gpu_launcher.empty() ? ChildProcessHost::CHILD_ALLOW_SELF :
ChildProcessHost::CHILD_NORMAL;
#else
int child_flags = ChildProcessHost::CHILD_NORMAL;
#endif
FilePath exe_path = ChildProcessHost::GetChildPath(child_flags);
if (exe_path.empty())
return false;
CommandLine* cmd_line = new CommandLine(exe_path);
cmd_line->AppendSwitchASCII(switches::kProcessType, switches::kGpuProcess);
cmd_line->AppendSwitchASCII(switches::kProcessChannelID, channel_id);
if (kind_ == GPU_PROCESS_KIND_UNSANDBOXED)
cmd_line->AppendSwitch(switches::kDisableGpuSandbox);
static const char* const kSwitchNames[] = {
switches::kDisableBreakpad,
switches::kDisableGLMultisampling,
switches::kDisableGpuSandbox,
switches::kReduceGpuSandbox,
switches::kDisableSeccompFilterSandbox,
switches::kDisableGpuSwitching,
switches::kDisableGpuVsync,
switches::kDisableGpuWatchdog,
switches::kDisableImageTransportSurface,
switches::kDisableLogging,
switches::kEnableGPUServiceLogging,
switches::kEnableLogging,
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
switches::kEnableSandboxLogging,
#endif
switches::kGpuNoContextLost,
switches::kGpuStartupDialog,
switches::kLoggingLevel,
switches::kNoSandbox,
switches::kTestGLLib,
switches::kTraceStartup,
switches::kV,
switches::kVModule,
};
cmd_line->CopySwitchesFrom(browser_command_line, kSwitchNames,
arraysize(kSwitchNames));
cmd_line->CopySwitchesFrom(
browser_command_line, switches::kGpuSwitches, switches::kNumGpuSwitches);
content::GetContentClient()->browser()->AppendExtraCommandLineSwitches(
cmd_line, process_->GetData().id);
GpuDataManagerImpl::GetInstance()->AppendGpuCommandLine(cmd_line);
if (cmd_line->HasSwitch(switches::kUseGL))
software_rendering_ =
(cmd_line->GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kUseGL) == "swiftshader");
UMA_HISTOGRAM_BOOLEAN("GPU.GPUProcessSoftwareRendering", software_rendering_);
if (!gpu_launcher.empty())
cmd_line->PrependWrapper(gpu_launcher);
process_->Launch(
#if defined(OS_WIN)
FilePath(),
#elif defined(OS_POSIX)
false, // Never use the zygote (GPU plugin can't be sandboxed).
base::EnvironmentVector(),
#endif
cmd_line);
process_launched_ = true;
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("GPU.GPUProcessLifetimeEvents",
LAUNCHED, GPU_PROCESS_LIFETIME_EVENT_MAX);
return true;
}
|
bool GpuProcessHost::LaunchGpuProcess(const std::string& channel_id) {
if (!(gpu_enabled_ &&
GpuDataManagerImpl::GetInstance()->ShouldUseSoftwareRendering()) &&
!hardware_gpu_enabled_) {
SendOutstandingReplies();
return false;
}
const CommandLine& browser_command_line = *CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
CommandLine::StringType gpu_launcher =
browser_command_line.GetSwitchValueNative(switches::kGpuLauncher);
#if defined(OS_LINUX)
int child_flags = gpu_launcher.empty() ? ChildProcessHost::CHILD_ALLOW_SELF :
ChildProcessHost::CHILD_NORMAL;
#else
int child_flags = ChildProcessHost::CHILD_NORMAL;
#endif
FilePath exe_path = ChildProcessHost::GetChildPath(child_flags);
if (exe_path.empty())
return false;
CommandLine* cmd_line = new CommandLine(exe_path);
cmd_line->AppendSwitchASCII(switches::kProcessType, switches::kGpuProcess);
cmd_line->AppendSwitchASCII(switches::kProcessChannelID, channel_id);
if (kind_ == GPU_PROCESS_KIND_UNSANDBOXED)
cmd_line->AppendSwitch(switches::kDisableGpuSandbox);
static const char* const kSwitchNames[] = {
switches::kDisableBreakpad,
switches::kDisableGLMultisampling,
switches::kDisableGpuSandbox,
switches::kReduceGpuSandbox,
switches::kDisableSeccompFilterSandbox,
switches::kDisableGpuSwitching,
switches::kDisableGpuVsync,
switches::kDisableGpuWatchdog,
switches::kDisableImageTransportSurface,
switches::kDisableLogging,
switches::kEnableGPUServiceLogging,
switches::kEnableLogging,
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
switches::kEnableSandboxLogging,
#endif
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
switches::kEnableVaapi,
#endif
switches::kGpuNoContextLost,
switches::kGpuStartupDialog,
switches::kLoggingLevel,
switches::kNoSandbox,
switches::kTestGLLib,
switches::kTraceStartup,
switches::kV,
switches::kVModule,
};
cmd_line->CopySwitchesFrom(browser_command_line, kSwitchNames,
arraysize(kSwitchNames));
cmd_line->CopySwitchesFrom(
browser_command_line, switches::kGpuSwitches, switches::kNumGpuSwitches);
content::GetContentClient()->browser()->AppendExtraCommandLineSwitches(
cmd_line, process_->GetData().id);
GpuDataManagerImpl::GetInstance()->AppendGpuCommandLine(cmd_line);
if (cmd_line->HasSwitch(switches::kUseGL))
software_rendering_ =
(cmd_line->GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kUseGL) == "swiftshader");
UMA_HISTOGRAM_BOOLEAN("GPU.GPUProcessSoftwareRendering", software_rendering_);
if (!gpu_launcher.empty())
cmd_line->PrependWrapper(gpu_launcher);
process_->Launch(
#if defined(OS_WIN)
FilePath(),
#elif defined(OS_POSIX)
false, // Never use the zygote (GPU plugin can't be sandboxed).
base::EnvironmentVector(),
#endif
cmd_line);
process_launched_ = true;
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("GPU.GPUProcessLifetimeEvents",
LAUNCHED, GPU_PROCESS_LIFETIME_EVENT_MAX);
return true;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 1 |
CVE-2014-1713
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-1713/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f85a87ec670ad0fce9d98d90c9a705b72a288154
|
f85a87ec670ad0fce9d98d90c9a705b72a288154
|
document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
static void limitedToOnlyOneAttributeAttributeGetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::String>, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMGetter");
TestObjectV8Internal::limitedToOnlyOneAttributeAttributeGetter(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
|
static void limitedToOnlyOneAttributeAttributeGetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::String>, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMGetter");
TestObjectV8Internal::limitedToOnlyOneAttributeAttributeGetter(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5077
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5077/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/fec26ff33bf372476a70326f3669a35f34a9d474
|
fec26ff33bf372476a70326f3669a35f34a9d474
|
Origins should be represented as url::Origin (not as GURL).
As pointed out in //docs/security/origin-vs-url.md, origins should be
represented as url::Origin (not as GURL). This CL applies this
guideline to predictor-related code and changes the type of the
following fields from GURL to url::Origin:
- OriginRequestSummary::origin
- PreconnectedRequestStats::origin
- PreconnectRequest::origin
The old code did not depend on any non-origin parts of GURL
(like path and/or query). Therefore, this CL has no intended
behavior change.
Bug: 973885
Change-Id: Idd14590b4834cb9d50c74ed747b595fe1a4ba357
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1895167
Commit-Queue: Łukasz Anforowicz <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alex Ilin <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#716311}
|
void LoadingPredictor::CancelPageLoadHint(const GURL& url) {
if (shutdown_)
return;
CancelActiveHint(active_hints_.find(url));
}
|
void LoadingPredictor::CancelPageLoadHint(const GURL& url) {
if (shutdown_)
return;
CancelActiveHint(active_hints_.find(url));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6121
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6121/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/7614790c80996d32a28218f4d1605b0908e9ddf6
|
7614790c80996d32a28218f4d1605b0908e9ddf6
|
Apply ExtensionNavigationThrottle filesystem/blob checks to all frames.
BUG=836858
Change-Id: I34333a72501129fd40b5a9aa6378c9f35f1e7fc2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1028511
Reviewed-by: Devlin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Nick Carter <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#553867}
|
void RenderFrameHostImpl::OnUpdatePictureInPictureSurfaceId(
const viz::SurfaceId& surface_id,
const gfx::Size& natural_size) {
if (delegate_)
delegate_->UpdatePictureInPictureSurfaceId(surface_id, natural_size);
}
|
void RenderFrameHostImpl::OnUpdatePictureInPictureSurfaceId(
const viz::SurfaceId& surface_id,
const gfx::Size& natural_size) {
if (delegate_)
delegate_->UpdatePictureInPictureSurfaceId(surface_id, natural_size);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-2906
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2906/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/c4a4dfb26615b5ef5e9dcc730ef43f70ce9202e2
|
c4a4dfb26615b5ef5e9dcc730ef43f70ce9202e2
|
Suspend shared timers while blockingly closing databases
BUG=388771
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/409863002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@284785 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void RenderThreadImpl::RegisterSchemes() {
WebString swappedout_scheme(base::ASCIIToUTF16(kSwappedOutScheme));
WebSecurityPolicy::registerURLSchemeAsDisplayIsolated(swappedout_scheme);
WebSecurityPolicy::registerURLSchemeAsEmptyDocument(swappedout_scheme);
}
|
void RenderThreadImpl::RegisterSchemes() {
WebString swappedout_scheme(base::ASCIIToUTF16(kSwappedOutScheme));
WebSecurityPolicy::registerURLSchemeAsDisplayIsolated(swappedout_scheme);
WebSecurityPolicy::registerURLSchemeAsEmptyDocument(swappedout_scheme);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-16359
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-16359/
|
CWE-476
|
https://github.com/radare/radare2/commit/62e39f34b2705131a2d08aff0c2e542c6a52cf0e
|
62e39f34b2705131a2d08aff0c2e542c6a52cf0e
|
Fix #8764 - huge vd_aux caused pointer wraparound
|
static int is_in_vphdr (Elf_(Phdr) *p, ut64 addr) {
return addr >= p->p_vaddr && addr < p->p_vaddr + p->p_memsz;
}
|
static int is_in_vphdr (Elf_(Phdr) *p, ut64 addr) {
return addr >= p->p_vaddr && addr < p->p_vaddr + p->p_memsz;
}
|
C
|
radare2
| 0 |
CVE-2016-2451
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-2451/
|
CWE-264
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/f9ed2fe6d61259e779a37d4c2d7edb33a1c1f8ba
|
f9ed2fe6d61259e779a37d4c2d7edb33a1c1f8ba
|
Add VPX output buffer size check
and handle dead observers more gracefully
Bug: 27597103
Change-Id: Id7acb25d5ef69b197da15ec200a9e4f9e7b03518
|
status_t OMX::createPersistentInputSurface(
sp<IGraphicBufferProducer> *bufferProducer,
sp<IGraphicBufferConsumer> *bufferConsumer) {
return OMXNodeInstance::createPersistentInputSurface(
bufferProducer, bufferConsumer);
}
|
status_t OMX::createPersistentInputSurface(
sp<IGraphicBufferProducer> *bufferProducer,
sp<IGraphicBufferConsumer> *bufferConsumer) {
return OMXNodeInstance::createPersistentInputSurface(
bufferProducer, bufferConsumer);
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2013-1789
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-1789/
| null |
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/poppler/poppler/commit/?h=poppler-0.22&id=a9b8ab4657dec65b8b86c225d12c533ad7e984e2
|
a9b8ab4657dec65b8b86c225d12c533ad7e984e2
| null |
SplashError Splash::blitTransparent(SplashBitmap *src, int xSrc, int ySrc,
int xDest, int yDest, int w, int h) {
SplashColorPtr p, sp;
Guchar *q;
int x, y, mask, srcMask;
if (src->mode != bitmap->mode) {
return splashErrModeMismatch;
}
switch (bitmap->mode) {
case splashModeMono1:
for (y = 0; y < h; ++y) {
p = &bitmap->data[(yDest + y) * bitmap->rowSize + (xDest >> 3)];
mask = 0x80 >> (xDest & 7);
sp = &src->data[(ySrc + y) * src->rowSize + (xSrc >> 3)];
srcMask = 0x80 >> (xSrc & 7);
for (x = 0; x < w; ++x) {
if (*sp & srcMask) {
*p |= mask;
} else {
*p &= ~mask;
}
if (!(mask >>= 1)) {
mask = 0x80;
++p;
}
if (!(srcMask >>= 1)) {
srcMask = 0x80;
++sp;
}
}
}
break;
case splashModeMono8:
for (y = 0; y < h; ++y) {
p = &bitmap->data[(yDest + y) * bitmap->rowSize + xDest];
sp = &src->data[(ySrc + y) * bitmap->rowSize + xSrc];
for (x = 0; x < w; ++x) {
*p++ = *sp++;
}
}
break;
case splashModeRGB8:
case splashModeBGR8:
for (y = 0; y < h; ++y) {
p = &bitmap->data[(yDest + y) * bitmap->rowSize + 3 * xDest];
sp = &src->data[(ySrc + y) * src->rowSize + 3 * xSrc];
for (x = 0; x < w; ++x) {
*p++ = *sp++;
*p++ = *sp++;
*p++ = *sp++;
}
}
break;
case splashModeXBGR8:
for (y = 0; y < h; ++y) {
p = &bitmap->data[(yDest + y) * bitmap->rowSize + 4 * xDest];
sp = &src->data[(ySrc + y) * src->rowSize + 4 * xSrc];
for (x = 0; x < w; ++x) {
*p++ = *sp++;
*p++ = *sp++;
*p++ = *sp++;
*p++ = 255;
sp++;
}
}
break;
#if SPLASH_CMYK
case splashModeCMYK8:
for (y = 0; y < h; ++y) {
p = &bitmap->data[(yDest + y) * bitmap->rowSize + 4 * xDest];
sp = &src->data[(ySrc + y) * src->rowSize + 4 * xSrc];
for (x = 0; x < w; ++x) {
*p++ = *sp++;
*p++ = *sp++;
*p++ = *sp++;
*p++ = *sp++;
}
}
break;
case splashModeDeviceN8:
for (y = 0; y < h; ++y) {
p = &bitmap->data[(yDest + y) * bitmap->rowSize + (SPOT_NCOMPS+4) * xDest];
sp = &src->data[(ySrc + y) * src->rowSize + (SPOT_NCOMPS+4) * xSrc];
for (x = 0; x < w; ++x) {
for (int cp=0; cp < SPOT_NCOMPS+4; cp++)
*p++ = *sp++;
}
}
break;
#endif
}
if (bitmap->alpha) {
for (y = 0; y < h; ++y) {
q = &bitmap->alpha[(yDest + y) * bitmap->width + xDest];
memset(q, 0x00, w);
}
}
return splashOk;
}
|
SplashError Splash::blitTransparent(SplashBitmap *src, int xSrc, int ySrc,
int xDest, int yDest, int w, int h) {
SplashColorPtr p, sp;
Guchar *q;
int x, y, mask, srcMask;
if (src->mode != bitmap->mode) {
return splashErrModeMismatch;
}
switch (bitmap->mode) {
case splashModeMono1:
for (y = 0; y < h; ++y) {
p = &bitmap->data[(yDest + y) * bitmap->rowSize + (xDest >> 3)];
mask = 0x80 >> (xDest & 7);
sp = &src->data[(ySrc + y) * src->rowSize + (xSrc >> 3)];
srcMask = 0x80 >> (xSrc & 7);
for (x = 0; x < w; ++x) {
if (*sp & srcMask) {
*p |= mask;
} else {
*p &= ~mask;
}
if (!(mask >>= 1)) {
mask = 0x80;
++p;
}
if (!(srcMask >>= 1)) {
srcMask = 0x80;
++sp;
}
}
}
break;
case splashModeMono8:
for (y = 0; y < h; ++y) {
p = &bitmap->data[(yDest + y) * bitmap->rowSize + xDest];
sp = &src->data[(ySrc + y) * bitmap->rowSize + xSrc];
for (x = 0; x < w; ++x) {
*p++ = *sp++;
}
}
break;
case splashModeRGB8:
case splashModeBGR8:
for (y = 0; y < h; ++y) {
p = &bitmap->data[(yDest + y) * bitmap->rowSize + 3 * xDest];
sp = &src->data[(ySrc + y) * src->rowSize + 3 * xSrc];
for (x = 0; x < w; ++x) {
*p++ = *sp++;
*p++ = *sp++;
*p++ = *sp++;
}
}
break;
case splashModeXBGR8:
for (y = 0; y < h; ++y) {
p = &bitmap->data[(yDest + y) * bitmap->rowSize + 4 * xDest];
sp = &src->data[(ySrc + y) * src->rowSize + 4 * xSrc];
for (x = 0; x < w; ++x) {
*p++ = *sp++;
*p++ = *sp++;
*p++ = *sp++;
*p++ = 255;
sp++;
}
}
break;
#if SPLASH_CMYK
case splashModeCMYK8:
for (y = 0; y < h; ++y) {
p = &bitmap->data[(yDest + y) * bitmap->rowSize + 4 * xDest];
sp = &src->data[(ySrc + y) * src->rowSize + 4 * xSrc];
for (x = 0; x < w; ++x) {
*p++ = *sp++;
*p++ = *sp++;
*p++ = *sp++;
*p++ = *sp++;
}
}
break;
case splashModeDeviceN8:
for (y = 0; y < h; ++y) {
p = &bitmap->data[(yDest + y) * bitmap->rowSize + (SPOT_NCOMPS+4) * xDest];
sp = &src->data[(ySrc + y) * src->rowSize + (SPOT_NCOMPS+4) * xSrc];
for (x = 0; x < w; ++x) {
for (int cp=0; cp < SPOT_NCOMPS+4; cp++)
*p++ = *sp++;
}
}
break;
#endif
}
if (bitmap->alpha) {
for (y = 0; y < h; ++y) {
q = &bitmap->alpha[(yDest + y) * bitmap->width + xDest];
memset(q, 0x00, w);
}
}
return splashOk;
}
|
CPP
|
poppler
| 0 |
CVE-2016-4565
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-4565/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/e6bd18f57aad1a2d1ef40e646d03ed0f2515c9e3
|
e6bd18f57aad1a2d1ef40e646d03ed0f2515c9e3
|
IB/security: Restrict use of the write() interface
The drivers/infiniband stack uses write() as a replacement for
bi-directional ioctl(). This is not safe. There are ways to
trigger write calls that result in the return structure that
is normally written to user space being shunted off to user
specified kernel memory instead.
For the immediate repair, detect and deny suspicious accesses to
the write API.
For long term, update the user space libraries and the kernel API
to something that doesn't present the same security vulnerabilities
(likely a structured ioctl() interface).
The impacted uAPI interfaces are generally only available if
hardware from drivers/infiniband is installed in the system.
Reported-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]>
[ Expanded check to all known write() entry points ]
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <[email protected]>
|
static unsigned int hfi1_poll(struct file *fp, struct poll_table_struct *pt)
{
struct hfi1_ctxtdata *uctxt;
unsigned pollflag;
uctxt = ((struct hfi1_filedata *)fp->private_data)->uctxt;
if (!uctxt)
pollflag = POLLERR;
else if (uctxt->poll_type == HFI1_POLL_TYPE_URGENT)
pollflag = poll_urgent(fp, pt);
else if (uctxt->poll_type == HFI1_POLL_TYPE_ANYRCV)
pollflag = poll_next(fp, pt);
else /* invalid */
pollflag = POLLERR;
return pollflag;
}
|
static unsigned int hfi1_poll(struct file *fp, struct poll_table_struct *pt)
{
struct hfi1_ctxtdata *uctxt;
unsigned pollflag;
uctxt = ((struct hfi1_filedata *)fp->private_data)->uctxt;
if (!uctxt)
pollflag = POLLERR;
else if (uctxt->poll_type == HFI1_POLL_TYPE_URGENT)
pollflag = poll_urgent(fp, pt);
else if (uctxt->poll_type == HFI1_POLL_TYPE_ANYRCV)
pollflag = poll_next(fp, pt);
else /* invalid */
pollflag = POLLERR;
return pollflag;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5218
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5218/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/45d901b56f578a74b19ba0d10fa5c4c467f19303
|
45d901b56f578a74b19ba0d10fa5c4c467f19303
|
Paint tab groups with the group color.
* The background of TabGroupHeader now uses the group color.
* The backgrounds of tabs in the group are tinted with the group color.
This treatment, along with the colors chosen, are intended to be
a placeholder.
Bug: 905491
Change-Id: Ic808548f8eba23064606e7fb8c9bba281d0d117f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1610504
Commit-Queue: Bret Sepulveda <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Taylor Bergquist <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#660498}
|
bool GM2TabStyle::IsHoverActive() const {
if (!hover_controller_)
return false;
return hover_controller_->ShouldDraw();
}
|
bool GM2TabStyle::IsHoverActive() const {
if (!hover_controller_)
return false;
return hover_controller_->ShouldDraw();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-14734
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-14734/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/cb2595c1393b4a5211534e6f0a0fbad369e21ad8
|
cb2595c1393b4a5211534e6f0a0fbad369e21ad8
|
infiniband: fix a possible use-after-free bug
ucma_process_join() will free the new allocated "mc" struct,
if there is any error after that, especially the copy_to_user().
But in parallel, ucma_leave_multicast() could find this "mc"
through idr_find() before ucma_process_join() frees it, since it
is already published.
So "mc" could be used in ucma_leave_multicast() after it is been
allocated and freed in ucma_process_join(), since we don't refcnt
it.
Fix this by separating "publish" from ID allocation, so that we
can get an ID first and publish it later after copy_to_user().
Fixes: c8f6a362bf3e ("RDMA/cma: Add multicast communication support")
Reported-by: Noam Rathaus <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]>
|
static ssize_t ucma_write(struct file *filp, const char __user *buf,
size_t len, loff_t *pos)
{
struct ucma_file *file = filp->private_data;
struct rdma_ucm_cmd_hdr hdr;
ssize_t ret;
if (!ib_safe_file_access(filp)) {
pr_err_once("ucma_write: process %d (%s) changed security contexts after opening file descriptor, this is not allowed.\n",
task_tgid_vnr(current), current->comm);
return -EACCES;
}
if (len < sizeof(hdr))
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_from_user(&hdr, buf, sizeof(hdr)))
return -EFAULT;
if (hdr.cmd >= ARRAY_SIZE(ucma_cmd_table))
return -EINVAL;
if (hdr.in + sizeof(hdr) > len)
return -EINVAL;
if (!ucma_cmd_table[hdr.cmd])
return -ENOSYS;
ret = ucma_cmd_table[hdr.cmd](file, buf + sizeof(hdr), hdr.in, hdr.out);
if (!ret)
ret = len;
return ret;
}
|
static ssize_t ucma_write(struct file *filp, const char __user *buf,
size_t len, loff_t *pos)
{
struct ucma_file *file = filp->private_data;
struct rdma_ucm_cmd_hdr hdr;
ssize_t ret;
if (!ib_safe_file_access(filp)) {
pr_err_once("ucma_write: process %d (%s) changed security contexts after opening file descriptor, this is not allowed.\n",
task_tgid_vnr(current), current->comm);
return -EACCES;
}
if (len < sizeof(hdr))
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_from_user(&hdr, buf, sizeof(hdr)))
return -EFAULT;
if (hdr.cmd >= ARRAY_SIZE(ucma_cmd_table))
return -EINVAL;
if (hdr.in + sizeof(hdr) > len)
return -EINVAL;
if (!ucma_cmd_table[hdr.cmd])
return -ENOSYS;
ret = ucma_cmd_table[hdr.cmd](file, buf + sizeof(hdr), hdr.in, hdr.out);
if (!ret)
ret = len;
return ret;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2014-6269
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-6269/
|
CWE-189
|
https://git.haproxy.org/?p=haproxy-1.5.git;a=commitdiff;h=b4d05093bc89f71377230228007e69a1434c1a0c
|
b4d05093bc89f71377230228007e69a1434c1a0c
| null |
struct http_req_rule *parse_http_req_cond(const char **args, const char *file, int linenum, struct proxy *proxy)
{
struct http_req_rule *rule;
struct http_req_action_kw *custom = NULL;
int cur_arg;
char *error;
rule = (struct http_req_rule*)calloc(1, sizeof(struct http_req_rule));
if (!rule) {
Alert("parsing [%s:%d]: out of memory.\n", file, linenum);
goto out_err;
}
if (!strcmp(args[0], "allow")) {
rule->action = HTTP_REQ_ACT_ALLOW;
cur_arg = 1;
} else if (!strcmp(args[0], "deny") || !strcmp(args[0], "block")) {
rule->action = HTTP_REQ_ACT_DENY;
cur_arg = 1;
} else if (!strcmp(args[0], "tarpit")) {
rule->action = HTTP_REQ_ACT_TARPIT;
cur_arg = 1;
} else if (!strcmp(args[0], "auth")) {
rule->action = HTTP_REQ_ACT_AUTH;
cur_arg = 1;
while(*args[cur_arg]) {
if (!strcmp(args[cur_arg], "realm")) {
rule->arg.auth.realm = strdup(args[cur_arg + 1]);
cur_arg+=2;
continue;
} else
break;
}
} else if (!strcmp(args[0], "set-nice")) {
rule->action = HTTP_REQ_ACT_SET_NICE;
cur_arg = 1;
if (!*args[cur_arg] ||
(*args[cur_arg + 1] && strcmp(args[cur_arg + 1], "if") != 0 && strcmp(args[cur_arg + 1], "unless") != 0)) {
Alert("parsing [%s:%d]: 'http-request %s' expects exactly 1 argument (integer value).\n",
file, linenum, args[0]);
goto out_err;
}
rule->arg.nice = atoi(args[cur_arg]);
if (rule->arg.nice < -1024)
rule->arg.nice = -1024;
else if (rule->arg.nice > 1024)
rule->arg.nice = 1024;
cur_arg++;
} else if (!strcmp(args[0], "set-tos")) {
#ifdef IP_TOS
char *err;
rule->action = HTTP_REQ_ACT_SET_TOS;
cur_arg = 1;
if (!*args[cur_arg] ||
(*args[cur_arg + 1] && strcmp(args[cur_arg + 1], "if") != 0 && strcmp(args[cur_arg + 1], "unless") != 0)) {
Alert("parsing [%s:%d]: 'http-request %s' expects exactly 1 argument (integer/hex value).\n",
file, linenum, args[0]);
goto out_err;
}
rule->arg.tos = strtol(args[cur_arg], &err, 0);
if (err && *err != '\0') {
Alert("parsing [%s:%d]: invalid character starting at '%s' in 'http-request %s' (integer/hex value expected).\n",
file, linenum, err, args[0]);
goto out_err;
}
cur_arg++;
#else
Alert("parsing [%s:%d]: 'http-request %s' is not supported on this platform (IP_TOS undefined).\n", file, linenum, args[0]);
goto out_err;
#endif
} else if (!strcmp(args[0], "set-mark")) {
#ifdef SO_MARK
char *err;
rule->action = HTTP_REQ_ACT_SET_MARK;
cur_arg = 1;
if (!*args[cur_arg] ||
(*args[cur_arg + 1] && strcmp(args[cur_arg + 1], "if") != 0 && strcmp(args[cur_arg + 1], "unless") != 0)) {
Alert("parsing [%s:%d]: 'http-request %s' expects exactly 1 argument (integer/hex value).\n",
file, linenum, args[0]);
goto out_err;
}
rule->arg.mark = strtoul(args[cur_arg], &err, 0);
if (err && *err != '\0') {
Alert("parsing [%s:%d]: invalid character starting at '%s' in 'http-request %s' (integer/hex value expected).\n",
file, linenum, err, args[0]);
goto out_err;
}
cur_arg++;
global.last_checks |= LSTCHK_NETADM;
#else
Alert("parsing [%s:%d]: 'http-request %s' is not supported on this platform (SO_MARK undefined).\n", file, linenum, args[0]);
goto out_err;
#endif
} else if (!strcmp(args[0], "set-log-level")) {
rule->action = HTTP_REQ_ACT_SET_LOGL;
cur_arg = 1;
if (!*args[cur_arg] ||
(*args[cur_arg + 1] && strcmp(args[cur_arg + 1], "if") != 0 && strcmp(args[cur_arg + 1], "unless") != 0)) {
bad_log_level:
Alert("parsing [%s:%d]: 'http-request %s' expects exactly 1 argument (log level name or 'silent').\n",
file, linenum, args[0]);
goto out_err;
}
if (strcmp(args[cur_arg], "silent") == 0)
rule->arg.loglevel = -1;
else if ((rule->arg.loglevel = get_log_level(args[cur_arg]) + 1) == 0)
goto bad_log_level;
cur_arg++;
} else if (strcmp(args[0], "add-header") == 0 || strcmp(args[0], "set-header") == 0) {
rule->action = *args[0] == 'a' ? HTTP_REQ_ACT_ADD_HDR : HTTP_REQ_ACT_SET_HDR;
cur_arg = 1;
if (!*args[cur_arg] || !*args[cur_arg+1] ||
(*args[cur_arg+2] && strcmp(args[cur_arg+2], "if") != 0 && strcmp(args[cur_arg+2], "unless") != 0)) {
Alert("parsing [%s:%d]: 'http-request %s' expects exactly 2 arguments.\n",
file, linenum, args[0]);
goto out_err;
}
rule->arg.hdr_add.name = strdup(args[cur_arg]);
rule->arg.hdr_add.name_len = strlen(rule->arg.hdr_add.name);
LIST_INIT(&rule->arg.hdr_add.fmt);
proxy->conf.args.ctx = ARGC_HRQ;
parse_logformat_string(args[cur_arg + 1], proxy, &rule->arg.hdr_add.fmt, LOG_OPT_HTTP,
(proxy->cap & PR_CAP_FE) ? SMP_VAL_FE_HRQ_HDR : SMP_VAL_BE_HRQ_HDR,
file, linenum);
free(proxy->conf.lfs_file);
proxy->conf.lfs_file = strdup(proxy->conf.args.file);
proxy->conf.lfs_line = proxy->conf.args.line;
cur_arg += 2;
} else if (strcmp(args[0], "replace-header") == 0 || strcmp(args[0], "replace-value") == 0) {
rule->action = args[0][8] == 'h' ? HTTP_REQ_ACT_REPLACE_HDR : HTTP_REQ_ACT_REPLACE_VAL;
cur_arg = 1;
if (!*args[cur_arg] || !*args[cur_arg+1] || !*args[cur_arg+2] ||
(*args[cur_arg+3] && strcmp(args[cur_arg+3], "if") != 0 && strcmp(args[cur_arg+3], "unless") != 0)) {
Alert("parsing [%s:%d]: 'http-request %s' expects exactly 3 arguments.\n",
file, linenum, args[0]);
goto out_err;
}
rule->arg.hdr_add.name = strdup(args[cur_arg]);
rule->arg.hdr_add.name_len = strlen(rule->arg.hdr_add.name);
LIST_INIT(&rule->arg.hdr_add.fmt);
error = NULL;
if (!regex_comp(args[cur_arg + 1], &rule->arg.hdr_add.re, 1, 1, &error)) {
Alert("parsing [%s:%d] : '%s' : %s.\n", file, linenum,
args[cur_arg + 1], error);
free(error);
goto out_err;
}
proxy->conf.args.ctx = ARGC_HRQ;
parse_logformat_string(args[cur_arg + 2], proxy, &rule->arg.hdr_add.fmt, LOG_OPT_HTTP,
(proxy->cap & PR_CAP_FE) ? SMP_VAL_FE_HRQ_HDR : SMP_VAL_BE_HRQ_HDR,
file, linenum);
free(proxy->conf.lfs_file);
proxy->conf.lfs_file = strdup(proxy->conf.args.file);
proxy->conf.lfs_line = proxy->conf.args.line;
cur_arg += 3;
} else if (strcmp(args[0], "del-header") == 0) {
rule->action = HTTP_REQ_ACT_DEL_HDR;
cur_arg = 1;
if (!*args[cur_arg] ||
(*args[cur_arg+1] && strcmp(args[cur_arg+1], "if") != 0 && strcmp(args[cur_arg+1], "unless") != 0)) {
Alert("parsing [%s:%d]: 'http-request %s' expects exactly 1 argument.\n",
file, linenum, args[0]);
goto out_err;
}
rule->arg.hdr_add.name = strdup(args[cur_arg]);
rule->arg.hdr_add.name_len = strlen(rule->arg.hdr_add.name);
proxy->conf.args.ctx = ARGC_HRQ;
free(proxy->conf.lfs_file);
proxy->conf.lfs_file = strdup(proxy->conf.args.file);
proxy->conf.lfs_line = proxy->conf.args.line;
cur_arg += 1;
} else if (strcmp(args[0], "redirect") == 0) {
struct redirect_rule *redir;
char *errmsg = NULL;
if ((redir = http_parse_redirect_rule(file, linenum, proxy, (const char **)args + 1, &errmsg, 1)) == NULL) {
Alert("parsing [%s:%d] : error detected in %s '%s' while parsing 'http-request %s' rule : %s.\n",
file, linenum, proxy_type_str(proxy), proxy->id, args[0], errmsg);
goto out_err;
}
/* this redirect rule might already contain a parsed condition which
* we'll pass to the http-request rule.
*/
rule->action = HTTP_REQ_ACT_REDIR;
rule->arg.redir = redir;
rule->cond = redir->cond;
redir->cond = NULL;
cur_arg = 2;
return rule;
} else if (strncmp(args[0], "add-acl", 7) == 0) {
/* http-request add-acl(<reference (acl name)>) <key pattern> */
rule->action = HTTP_REQ_ACT_ADD_ACL;
/*
* '+ 8' for 'add-acl('
* '- 9' for 'add-acl(' + trailing ')'
*/
rule->arg.map.ref = my_strndup(args[0] + 8, strlen(args[0]) - 9);
cur_arg = 1;
if (!*args[cur_arg] ||
(*args[cur_arg+1] && strcmp(args[cur_arg+1], "if") != 0 && strcmp(args[cur_arg+1], "unless") != 0)) {
Alert("parsing [%s:%d]: 'http-request %s' expects exactly 1 argument.\n",
file, linenum, args[0]);
goto out_err;
}
LIST_INIT(&rule->arg.map.key);
proxy->conf.args.ctx = ARGC_HRQ;
parse_logformat_string(args[cur_arg], proxy, &rule->arg.map.key, LOG_OPT_HTTP,
(proxy->cap & PR_CAP_FE) ? SMP_VAL_FE_HRQ_HDR : SMP_VAL_BE_HRQ_HDR,
file, linenum);
free(proxy->conf.lfs_file);
proxy->conf.lfs_file = strdup(proxy->conf.args.file);
proxy->conf.lfs_line = proxy->conf.args.line;
cur_arg += 1;
} else if (strncmp(args[0], "del-acl", 7) == 0) {
/* http-request del-acl(<reference (acl name)>) <key pattern> */
rule->action = HTTP_REQ_ACT_DEL_ACL;
/*
* '+ 8' for 'del-acl('
* '- 9' for 'del-acl(' + trailing ')'
*/
rule->arg.map.ref = my_strndup(args[0] + 8, strlen(args[0]) - 9);
cur_arg = 1;
if (!*args[cur_arg] ||
(*args[cur_arg+1] && strcmp(args[cur_arg+1], "if") != 0 && strcmp(args[cur_arg+1], "unless") != 0)) {
Alert("parsing [%s:%d]: 'http-request %s' expects exactly 1 argument.\n",
file, linenum, args[0]);
goto out_err;
}
LIST_INIT(&rule->arg.map.key);
proxy->conf.args.ctx = ARGC_HRQ;
parse_logformat_string(args[cur_arg], proxy, &rule->arg.map.key, LOG_OPT_HTTP,
(proxy->cap & PR_CAP_FE) ? SMP_VAL_FE_HRQ_HDR : SMP_VAL_BE_HRQ_HDR,
file, linenum);
free(proxy->conf.lfs_file);
proxy->conf.lfs_file = strdup(proxy->conf.args.file);
proxy->conf.lfs_line = proxy->conf.args.line;
cur_arg += 1;
} else if (strncmp(args[0], "del-map", 7) == 0) {
/* http-request del-map(<reference (map name)>) <key pattern> */
rule->action = HTTP_REQ_ACT_DEL_MAP;
/*
* '+ 8' for 'del-map('
* '- 9' for 'del-map(' + trailing ')'
*/
rule->arg.map.ref = my_strndup(args[0] + 8, strlen(args[0]) - 9);
cur_arg = 1;
if (!*args[cur_arg] ||
(*args[cur_arg+1] && strcmp(args[cur_arg+1], "if") != 0 && strcmp(args[cur_arg+1], "unless") != 0)) {
Alert("parsing [%s:%d]: 'http-request %s' expects exactly 1 argument.\n",
file, linenum, args[0]);
goto out_err;
}
LIST_INIT(&rule->arg.map.key);
proxy->conf.args.ctx = ARGC_HRQ;
parse_logformat_string(args[cur_arg], proxy, &rule->arg.map.key, LOG_OPT_HTTP,
(proxy->cap & PR_CAP_FE) ? SMP_VAL_FE_HRQ_HDR : SMP_VAL_BE_HRQ_HDR,
file, linenum);
free(proxy->conf.lfs_file);
proxy->conf.lfs_file = strdup(proxy->conf.args.file);
proxy->conf.lfs_line = proxy->conf.args.line;
cur_arg += 1;
} else if (strncmp(args[0], "set-map", 7) == 0) {
/* http-request set-map(<reference (map name)>) <key pattern> <value pattern> */
rule->action = HTTP_REQ_ACT_SET_MAP;
/*
* '+ 8' for 'set-map('
* '- 9' for 'set-map(' + trailing ')'
*/
rule->arg.map.ref = my_strndup(args[0] + 8, strlen(args[0]) - 9);
cur_arg = 1;
if (!*args[cur_arg] || !*args[cur_arg+1] ||
(*args[cur_arg+2] && strcmp(args[cur_arg+2], "if") != 0 && strcmp(args[cur_arg+2], "unless") != 0)) {
Alert("parsing [%s:%d]: 'http-request %s' expects exactly 2 arguments.\n",
file, linenum, args[0]);
goto out_err;
}
LIST_INIT(&rule->arg.map.key);
LIST_INIT(&rule->arg.map.value);
proxy->conf.args.ctx = ARGC_HRQ;
/* key pattern */
parse_logformat_string(args[cur_arg], proxy, &rule->arg.map.key, LOG_OPT_HTTP,
(proxy->cap & PR_CAP_FE) ? SMP_VAL_FE_HRQ_HDR : SMP_VAL_BE_HRQ_HDR,
file, linenum);
/* value pattern */
parse_logformat_string(args[cur_arg + 1], proxy, &rule->arg.map.value, LOG_OPT_HTTP,
(proxy->cap & PR_CAP_FE) ? SMP_VAL_FE_HRQ_HDR : SMP_VAL_BE_HRQ_HDR,
file, linenum);
free(proxy->conf.lfs_file);
proxy->conf.lfs_file = strdup(proxy->conf.args.file);
proxy->conf.lfs_line = proxy->conf.args.line;
cur_arg += 2;
} else if (((custom = action_http_req_custom(args[0])) != NULL)) {
char *errmsg = NULL;
cur_arg = 1;
/* try in the module list */
if (custom->parse(args, &cur_arg, proxy, rule, &errmsg) < 0) {
Alert("parsing [%s:%d] : error detected in %s '%s' while parsing 'http-request %s' rule : %s.\n",
file, linenum, proxy_type_str(proxy), proxy->id, args[0], errmsg);
free(errmsg);
goto out_err;
}
} else {
Alert("parsing [%s:%d]: 'http-request' expects 'allow', 'deny', 'auth', 'redirect', 'tarpit', 'add-header', 'set-header', 'replace-header', 'replace-value', 'set-nice', 'set-tos', 'set-mark', 'set-log-level', 'add-acl', 'del-acl', 'del-map', 'set-map', but got '%s'%s.\n",
file, linenum, args[0], *args[0] ? "" : " (missing argument)");
goto out_err;
}
if (strcmp(args[cur_arg], "if") == 0 || strcmp(args[cur_arg], "unless") == 0) {
struct acl_cond *cond;
char *errmsg = NULL;
if ((cond = build_acl_cond(file, linenum, proxy, args+cur_arg, &errmsg)) == NULL) {
Alert("parsing [%s:%d] : error detected while parsing an 'http-request %s' condition : %s.\n",
file, linenum, args[0], errmsg);
free(errmsg);
goto out_err;
}
rule->cond = cond;
}
else if (*args[cur_arg]) {
Alert("parsing [%s:%d]: 'http-request %s' expects 'realm' for 'auth' or"
" either 'if' or 'unless' followed by a condition but found '%s'.\n",
file, linenum, args[0], args[cur_arg]);
goto out_err;
}
return rule;
out_err:
free(rule);
return NULL;
}
|
struct http_req_rule *parse_http_req_cond(const char **args, const char *file, int linenum, struct proxy *proxy)
{
struct http_req_rule *rule;
struct http_req_action_kw *custom = NULL;
int cur_arg;
char *error;
rule = (struct http_req_rule*)calloc(1, sizeof(struct http_req_rule));
if (!rule) {
Alert("parsing [%s:%d]: out of memory.\n", file, linenum);
goto out_err;
}
if (!strcmp(args[0], "allow")) {
rule->action = HTTP_REQ_ACT_ALLOW;
cur_arg = 1;
} else if (!strcmp(args[0], "deny") || !strcmp(args[0], "block")) {
rule->action = HTTP_REQ_ACT_DENY;
cur_arg = 1;
} else if (!strcmp(args[0], "tarpit")) {
rule->action = HTTP_REQ_ACT_TARPIT;
cur_arg = 1;
} else if (!strcmp(args[0], "auth")) {
rule->action = HTTP_REQ_ACT_AUTH;
cur_arg = 1;
while(*args[cur_arg]) {
if (!strcmp(args[cur_arg], "realm")) {
rule->arg.auth.realm = strdup(args[cur_arg + 1]);
cur_arg+=2;
continue;
} else
break;
}
} else if (!strcmp(args[0], "set-nice")) {
rule->action = HTTP_REQ_ACT_SET_NICE;
cur_arg = 1;
if (!*args[cur_arg] ||
(*args[cur_arg + 1] && strcmp(args[cur_arg + 1], "if") != 0 && strcmp(args[cur_arg + 1], "unless") != 0)) {
Alert("parsing [%s:%d]: 'http-request %s' expects exactly 1 argument (integer value).\n",
file, linenum, args[0]);
goto out_err;
}
rule->arg.nice = atoi(args[cur_arg]);
if (rule->arg.nice < -1024)
rule->arg.nice = -1024;
else if (rule->arg.nice > 1024)
rule->arg.nice = 1024;
cur_arg++;
} else if (!strcmp(args[0], "set-tos")) {
#ifdef IP_TOS
char *err;
rule->action = HTTP_REQ_ACT_SET_TOS;
cur_arg = 1;
if (!*args[cur_arg] ||
(*args[cur_arg + 1] && strcmp(args[cur_arg + 1], "if") != 0 && strcmp(args[cur_arg + 1], "unless") != 0)) {
Alert("parsing [%s:%d]: 'http-request %s' expects exactly 1 argument (integer/hex value).\n",
file, linenum, args[0]);
goto out_err;
}
rule->arg.tos = strtol(args[cur_arg], &err, 0);
if (err && *err != '\0') {
Alert("parsing [%s:%d]: invalid character starting at '%s' in 'http-request %s' (integer/hex value expected).\n",
file, linenum, err, args[0]);
goto out_err;
}
cur_arg++;
#else
Alert("parsing [%s:%d]: 'http-request %s' is not supported on this platform (IP_TOS undefined).\n", file, linenum, args[0]);
goto out_err;
#endif
} else if (!strcmp(args[0], "set-mark")) {
#ifdef SO_MARK
char *err;
rule->action = HTTP_REQ_ACT_SET_MARK;
cur_arg = 1;
if (!*args[cur_arg] ||
(*args[cur_arg + 1] && strcmp(args[cur_arg + 1], "if") != 0 && strcmp(args[cur_arg + 1], "unless") != 0)) {
Alert("parsing [%s:%d]: 'http-request %s' expects exactly 1 argument (integer/hex value).\n",
file, linenum, args[0]);
goto out_err;
}
rule->arg.mark = strtoul(args[cur_arg], &err, 0);
if (err && *err != '\0') {
Alert("parsing [%s:%d]: invalid character starting at '%s' in 'http-request %s' (integer/hex value expected).\n",
file, linenum, err, args[0]);
goto out_err;
}
cur_arg++;
global.last_checks |= LSTCHK_NETADM;
#else
Alert("parsing [%s:%d]: 'http-request %s' is not supported on this platform (SO_MARK undefined).\n", file, linenum, args[0]);
goto out_err;
#endif
} else if (!strcmp(args[0], "set-log-level")) {
rule->action = HTTP_REQ_ACT_SET_LOGL;
cur_arg = 1;
if (!*args[cur_arg] ||
(*args[cur_arg + 1] && strcmp(args[cur_arg + 1], "if") != 0 && strcmp(args[cur_arg + 1], "unless") != 0)) {
bad_log_level:
Alert("parsing [%s:%d]: 'http-request %s' expects exactly 1 argument (log level name or 'silent').\n",
file, linenum, args[0]);
goto out_err;
}
if (strcmp(args[cur_arg], "silent") == 0)
rule->arg.loglevel = -1;
else if ((rule->arg.loglevel = get_log_level(args[cur_arg]) + 1) == 0)
goto bad_log_level;
cur_arg++;
} else if (strcmp(args[0], "add-header") == 0 || strcmp(args[0], "set-header") == 0) {
rule->action = *args[0] == 'a' ? HTTP_REQ_ACT_ADD_HDR : HTTP_REQ_ACT_SET_HDR;
cur_arg = 1;
if (!*args[cur_arg] || !*args[cur_arg+1] ||
(*args[cur_arg+2] && strcmp(args[cur_arg+2], "if") != 0 && strcmp(args[cur_arg+2], "unless") != 0)) {
Alert("parsing [%s:%d]: 'http-request %s' expects exactly 2 arguments.\n",
file, linenum, args[0]);
goto out_err;
}
rule->arg.hdr_add.name = strdup(args[cur_arg]);
rule->arg.hdr_add.name_len = strlen(rule->arg.hdr_add.name);
LIST_INIT(&rule->arg.hdr_add.fmt);
proxy->conf.args.ctx = ARGC_HRQ;
parse_logformat_string(args[cur_arg + 1], proxy, &rule->arg.hdr_add.fmt, LOG_OPT_HTTP,
(proxy->cap & PR_CAP_FE) ? SMP_VAL_FE_HRQ_HDR : SMP_VAL_BE_HRQ_HDR,
file, linenum);
free(proxy->conf.lfs_file);
proxy->conf.lfs_file = strdup(proxy->conf.args.file);
proxy->conf.lfs_line = proxy->conf.args.line;
cur_arg += 2;
} else if (strcmp(args[0], "replace-header") == 0 || strcmp(args[0], "replace-value") == 0) {
rule->action = args[0][8] == 'h' ? HTTP_REQ_ACT_REPLACE_HDR : HTTP_REQ_ACT_REPLACE_VAL;
cur_arg = 1;
if (!*args[cur_arg] || !*args[cur_arg+1] || !*args[cur_arg+2] ||
(*args[cur_arg+3] && strcmp(args[cur_arg+3], "if") != 0 && strcmp(args[cur_arg+3], "unless") != 0)) {
Alert("parsing [%s:%d]: 'http-request %s' expects exactly 3 arguments.\n",
file, linenum, args[0]);
goto out_err;
}
rule->arg.hdr_add.name = strdup(args[cur_arg]);
rule->arg.hdr_add.name_len = strlen(rule->arg.hdr_add.name);
LIST_INIT(&rule->arg.hdr_add.fmt);
error = NULL;
if (!regex_comp(args[cur_arg + 1], &rule->arg.hdr_add.re, 1, 1, &error)) {
Alert("parsing [%s:%d] : '%s' : %s.\n", file, linenum,
args[cur_arg + 1], error);
free(error);
goto out_err;
}
proxy->conf.args.ctx = ARGC_HRQ;
parse_logformat_string(args[cur_arg + 2], proxy, &rule->arg.hdr_add.fmt, LOG_OPT_HTTP,
(proxy->cap & PR_CAP_FE) ? SMP_VAL_FE_HRQ_HDR : SMP_VAL_BE_HRQ_HDR,
file, linenum);
free(proxy->conf.lfs_file);
proxy->conf.lfs_file = strdup(proxy->conf.args.file);
proxy->conf.lfs_line = proxy->conf.args.line;
cur_arg += 3;
} else if (strcmp(args[0], "del-header") == 0) {
rule->action = HTTP_REQ_ACT_DEL_HDR;
cur_arg = 1;
if (!*args[cur_arg] ||
(*args[cur_arg+1] && strcmp(args[cur_arg+1], "if") != 0 && strcmp(args[cur_arg+1], "unless") != 0)) {
Alert("parsing [%s:%d]: 'http-request %s' expects exactly 1 argument.\n",
file, linenum, args[0]);
goto out_err;
}
rule->arg.hdr_add.name = strdup(args[cur_arg]);
rule->arg.hdr_add.name_len = strlen(rule->arg.hdr_add.name);
proxy->conf.args.ctx = ARGC_HRQ;
free(proxy->conf.lfs_file);
proxy->conf.lfs_file = strdup(proxy->conf.args.file);
proxy->conf.lfs_line = proxy->conf.args.line;
cur_arg += 1;
} else if (strcmp(args[0], "redirect") == 0) {
struct redirect_rule *redir;
char *errmsg = NULL;
if ((redir = http_parse_redirect_rule(file, linenum, proxy, (const char **)args + 1, &errmsg, 1)) == NULL) {
Alert("parsing [%s:%d] : error detected in %s '%s' while parsing 'http-request %s' rule : %s.\n",
file, linenum, proxy_type_str(proxy), proxy->id, args[0], errmsg);
goto out_err;
}
/* this redirect rule might already contain a parsed condition which
* we'll pass to the http-request rule.
*/
rule->action = HTTP_REQ_ACT_REDIR;
rule->arg.redir = redir;
rule->cond = redir->cond;
redir->cond = NULL;
cur_arg = 2;
return rule;
} else if (strncmp(args[0], "add-acl", 7) == 0) {
/* http-request add-acl(<reference (acl name)>) <key pattern> */
rule->action = HTTP_REQ_ACT_ADD_ACL;
/*
* '+ 8' for 'add-acl('
* '- 9' for 'add-acl(' + trailing ')'
*/
rule->arg.map.ref = my_strndup(args[0] + 8, strlen(args[0]) - 9);
cur_arg = 1;
if (!*args[cur_arg] ||
(*args[cur_arg+1] && strcmp(args[cur_arg+1], "if") != 0 && strcmp(args[cur_arg+1], "unless") != 0)) {
Alert("parsing [%s:%d]: 'http-request %s' expects exactly 1 argument.\n",
file, linenum, args[0]);
goto out_err;
}
LIST_INIT(&rule->arg.map.key);
proxy->conf.args.ctx = ARGC_HRQ;
parse_logformat_string(args[cur_arg], proxy, &rule->arg.map.key, LOG_OPT_HTTP,
(proxy->cap & PR_CAP_FE) ? SMP_VAL_FE_HRQ_HDR : SMP_VAL_BE_HRQ_HDR,
file, linenum);
free(proxy->conf.lfs_file);
proxy->conf.lfs_file = strdup(proxy->conf.args.file);
proxy->conf.lfs_line = proxy->conf.args.line;
cur_arg += 1;
} else if (strncmp(args[0], "del-acl", 7) == 0) {
/* http-request del-acl(<reference (acl name)>) <key pattern> */
rule->action = HTTP_REQ_ACT_DEL_ACL;
/*
* '+ 8' for 'del-acl('
* '- 9' for 'del-acl(' + trailing ')'
*/
rule->arg.map.ref = my_strndup(args[0] + 8, strlen(args[0]) - 9);
cur_arg = 1;
if (!*args[cur_arg] ||
(*args[cur_arg+1] && strcmp(args[cur_arg+1], "if") != 0 && strcmp(args[cur_arg+1], "unless") != 0)) {
Alert("parsing [%s:%d]: 'http-request %s' expects exactly 1 argument.\n",
file, linenum, args[0]);
goto out_err;
}
LIST_INIT(&rule->arg.map.key);
proxy->conf.args.ctx = ARGC_HRQ;
parse_logformat_string(args[cur_arg], proxy, &rule->arg.map.key, LOG_OPT_HTTP,
(proxy->cap & PR_CAP_FE) ? SMP_VAL_FE_HRQ_HDR : SMP_VAL_BE_HRQ_HDR,
file, linenum);
free(proxy->conf.lfs_file);
proxy->conf.lfs_file = strdup(proxy->conf.args.file);
proxy->conf.lfs_line = proxy->conf.args.line;
cur_arg += 1;
} else if (strncmp(args[0], "del-map", 7) == 0) {
/* http-request del-map(<reference (map name)>) <key pattern> */
rule->action = HTTP_REQ_ACT_DEL_MAP;
/*
* '+ 8' for 'del-map('
* '- 9' for 'del-map(' + trailing ')'
*/
rule->arg.map.ref = my_strndup(args[0] + 8, strlen(args[0]) - 9);
cur_arg = 1;
if (!*args[cur_arg] ||
(*args[cur_arg+1] && strcmp(args[cur_arg+1], "if") != 0 && strcmp(args[cur_arg+1], "unless") != 0)) {
Alert("parsing [%s:%d]: 'http-request %s' expects exactly 1 argument.\n",
file, linenum, args[0]);
goto out_err;
}
LIST_INIT(&rule->arg.map.key);
proxy->conf.args.ctx = ARGC_HRQ;
parse_logformat_string(args[cur_arg], proxy, &rule->arg.map.key, LOG_OPT_HTTP,
(proxy->cap & PR_CAP_FE) ? SMP_VAL_FE_HRQ_HDR : SMP_VAL_BE_HRQ_HDR,
file, linenum);
free(proxy->conf.lfs_file);
proxy->conf.lfs_file = strdup(proxy->conf.args.file);
proxy->conf.lfs_line = proxy->conf.args.line;
cur_arg += 1;
} else if (strncmp(args[0], "set-map", 7) == 0) {
/* http-request set-map(<reference (map name)>) <key pattern> <value pattern> */
rule->action = HTTP_REQ_ACT_SET_MAP;
/*
* '+ 8' for 'set-map('
* '- 9' for 'set-map(' + trailing ')'
*/
rule->arg.map.ref = my_strndup(args[0] + 8, strlen(args[0]) - 9);
cur_arg = 1;
if (!*args[cur_arg] || !*args[cur_arg+1] ||
(*args[cur_arg+2] && strcmp(args[cur_arg+2], "if") != 0 && strcmp(args[cur_arg+2], "unless") != 0)) {
Alert("parsing [%s:%d]: 'http-request %s' expects exactly 2 arguments.\n",
file, linenum, args[0]);
goto out_err;
}
LIST_INIT(&rule->arg.map.key);
LIST_INIT(&rule->arg.map.value);
proxy->conf.args.ctx = ARGC_HRQ;
/* key pattern */
parse_logformat_string(args[cur_arg], proxy, &rule->arg.map.key, LOG_OPT_HTTP,
(proxy->cap & PR_CAP_FE) ? SMP_VAL_FE_HRQ_HDR : SMP_VAL_BE_HRQ_HDR,
file, linenum);
/* value pattern */
parse_logformat_string(args[cur_arg + 1], proxy, &rule->arg.map.value, LOG_OPT_HTTP,
(proxy->cap & PR_CAP_FE) ? SMP_VAL_FE_HRQ_HDR : SMP_VAL_BE_HRQ_HDR,
file, linenum);
free(proxy->conf.lfs_file);
proxy->conf.lfs_file = strdup(proxy->conf.args.file);
proxy->conf.lfs_line = proxy->conf.args.line;
cur_arg += 2;
} else if (((custom = action_http_req_custom(args[0])) != NULL)) {
char *errmsg = NULL;
cur_arg = 1;
/* try in the module list */
if (custom->parse(args, &cur_arg, proxy, rule, &errmsg) < 0) {
Alert("parsing [%s:%d] : error detected in %s '%s' while parsing 'http-request %s' rule : %s.\n",
file, linenum, proxy_type_str(proxy), proxy->id, args[0], errmsg);
free(errmsg);
goto out_err;
}
} else {
Alert("parsing [%s:%d]: 'http-request' expects 'allow', 'deny', 'auth', 'redirect', 'tarpit', 'add-header', 'set-header', 'replace-header', 'replace-value', 'set-nice', 'set-tos', 'set-mark', 'set-log-level', 'add-acl', 'del-acl', 'del-map', 'set-map', but got '%s'%s.\n",
file, linenum, args[0], *args[0] ? "" : " (missing argument)");
goto out_err;
}
if (strcmp(args[cur_arg], "if") == 0 || strcmp(args[cur_arg], "unless") == 0) {
struct acl_cond *cond;
char *errmsg = NULL;
if ((cond = build_acl_cond(file, linenum, proxy, args+cur_arg, &errmsg)) == NULL) {
Alert("parsing [%s:%d] : error detected while parsing an 'http-request %s' condition : %s.\n",
file, linenum, args[0], errmsg);
free(errmsg);
goto out_err;
}
rule->cond = cond;
}
else if (*args[cur_arg]) {
Alert("parsing [%s:%d]: 'http-request %s' expects 'realm' for 'auth' or"
" either 'if' or 'unless' followed by a condition but found '%s'.\n",
file, linenum, args[0], args[cur_arg]);
goto out_err;
}
return rule;
out_err:
free(rule);
return NULL;
}
|
C
|
haproxy
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1641
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1641/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/75ca8ffd7bd7c58ace1144df05e1307d8d707662
|
75ca8ffd7bd7c58ace1144df05e1307d8d707662
|
Don't call WebContents::DownloadImage() callback if the WebContents were deleted
BUG=583718
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1685343004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#375700}
|
bool WebContentsImpl::IsTreeOnlyAccessibilityModeForTesting() const {
return accessibility_mode_ == AccessibilityModeTreeOnly;
}
|
bool WebContentsImpl::IsTreeOnlyAccessibilityModeForTesting() const {
return accessibility_mode_ == AccessibilityModeTreeOnly;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-13083
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-13083/
|
CWE-494
|
https://github.com/pbatard/rufus/commit/c3c39f7f8a11f612c4ebf7affce25ec6928eb1cb
|
c3c39f7f8a11f612c4ebf7affce25ec6928eb1cb
|
[pki] fix https://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/403768
* This commit effectively fixes https://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/403768 (CVE-2017-13083) as
it is described per its revision 11, which is the latest revision at the time of this commit,
by disabling Windows prompts, enacted during signature validation, that allow the user to
bypass the intended signature verification checks.
* It needs to be pointed out that the vulnerability ("allow(ing) the use of a self-signed
certificate"), which relies on the end-user actively ignoring a Windows prompt that tells
them that the update failed the signature validation whilst also advising against running it,
is being fully addressed, even as the update protocol remains HTTP.
* It also need to be pointed out that the extended delay (48 hours) between the time the
vulnerability was reported and the moment it is fixed in our codebase has to do with
the fact that the reporter chose to deviate from standard security practices by not
disclosing the details of the vulnerability with us, be it publicly or privately,
before creating the cert.org report. The only advance notification we received was a
generic note about the use of HTTP vs HTTPS, which, as have established, is not
immediately relevant to addressing the reported vulnerability.
* Closes #1009
* Note: The other vulnerability scenario described towards the end of #1009, which
doesn't have to do with the "lack of CA checking", will be addressed separately.
|
void CenterDialog(HWND hDlg)
{
HWND hParent;
RECT rc, rcDlg, rcParent;
if ((hParent = GetParent(hDlg)) == NULL) {
hParent = GetDesktopWindow();
}
GetWindowRect(hParent, &rcParent);
GetWindowRect(hDlg, &rcDlg);
CopyRect(&rc, &rcParent);
OffsetRect(&rcDlg, -rcDlg.left, -rcDlg.top);
OffsetRect(&rc, -rc.left, -rc.top);
OffsetRect(&rc, -rcDlg.right, -rcDlg.bottom);
SetWindowPos(hDlg, HWND_TOP, rcParent.left + (rc.right / 2), rcParent.top + (rc.bottom / 2) - 25, 0, 0, SWP_NOSIZE);
}
|
void CenterDialog(HWND hDlg)
{
HWND hParent;
RECT rc, rcDlg, rcParent;
if ((hParent = GetParent(hDlg)) == NULL) {
hParent = GetDesktopWindow();
}
GetWindowRect(hParent, &rcParent);
GetWindowRect(hDlg, &rcDlg);
CopyRect(&rc, &rcParent);
OffsetRect(&rcDlg, -rcDlg.left, -rcDlg.top);
OffsetRect(&rc, -rc.left, -rc.top);
OffsetRect(&rc, -rcDlg.right, -rcDlg.bottom);
SetWindowPos(hDlg, HWND_TOP, rcParent.left + (rc.right / 2), rcParent.top + (rc.bottom / 2) - 25, 0, 0, SWP_NOSIZE);
}
|
C
|
rufus
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6074
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6074/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/c59ad14fc61393a50b2ca3e89c7ecaba7028c4c4
|
c59ad14fc61393a50b2ca3e89c7ecaba7028c4c4
|
DevTools: allow styling the page number element when printing over the protocol.
Bug: none
Change-Id: I13e6afbd86a7c6bcdedbf0645183194b9de7cfb4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/809759
Commit-Queue: Pavel Feldman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tom Sepez <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jianzhou Feng <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#523966}
|
void PageHandler::SetRenderer(RenderProcessHost* process_host,
RenderFrameHostImpl* frame_host) {
if (host_ == frame_host)
return;
RenderWidgetHostImpl* widget_host =
host_ ? host_->GetRenderWidgetHost() : nullptr;
if (widget_host) {
registrar_.Remove(
this,
content::NOTIFICATION_RENDER_WIDGET_VISIBILITY_CHANGED,
content::Source<RenderWidgetHost>(widget_host));
}
host_ = frame_host;
widget_host = host_ ? host_->GetRenderWidgetHost() : nullptr;
if (widget_host) {
registrar_.Add(
this,
content::NOTIFICATION_RENDER_WIDGET_VISIBILITY_CHANGED,
content::Source<RenderWidgetHost>(widget_host));
}
}
|
void PageHandler::SetRenderer(RenderProcessHost* process_host,
RenderFrameHostImpl* frame_host) {
if (host_ == frame_host)
return;
RenderWidgetHostImpl* widget_host =
host_ ? host_->GetRenderWidgetHost() : nullptr;
if (widget_host) {
registrar_.Remove(
this,
content::NOTIFICATION_RENDER_WIDGET_VISIBILITY_CHANGED,
content::Source<RenderWidgetHost>(widget_host));
}
host_ = frame_host;
widget_host = host_ ? host_->GetRenderWidgetHost() : nullptr;
if (widget_host) {
registrar_.Add(
this,
content::NOTIFICATION_RENDER_WIDGET_VISIBILITY_CHANGED,
content::Source<RenderWidgetHost>(widget_host));
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2019-8906
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-8906/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/file/file/commit/2858eaf99f6cc5aae129bcbf1e24ad160240185f
|
2858eaf99f6cc5aae129bcbf1e24ad160240185f
|
Avoid OOB read (found by ASAN reported by F. Alonso)
|
get_string_on_virtaddr(struct magic_set *ms,
int swap, int clazz, int fd, off_t ph_off, int ph_num,
off_t fsize, uint64_t virtaddr, char *buf, ssize_t buflen)
{
char *bptr;
off_t offset;
if (buflen == 0)
return 0;
offset = get_offset_from_virtaddr(ms, swap, clazz, fd, ph_off, ph_num,
fsize, virtaddr);
if (offset < 0 ||
(buflen = pread(fd, buf, CAST(size_t, buflen), offset)) <= 0) {
file_badread(ms);
return 0;
}
buf[buflen - 1] = '\0';
/* We expect only printable characters, so return if buffer contains
* non-printable character before the '\0' or just '\0'. */
for (bptr = buf; *bptr && isprint((unsigned char)*bptr); bptr++)
continue;
if (*bptr != '\0')
return 0;
return bptr - buf;
}
|
get_string_on_virtaddr(struct magic_set *ms,
int swap, int clazz, int fd, off_t ph_off, int ph_num,
off_t fsize, uint64_t virtaddr, char *buf, ssize_t buflen)
{
char *bptr;
off_t offset;
if (buflen == 0)
return 0;
offset = get_offset_from_virtaddr(ms, swap, clazz, fd, ph_off, ph_num,
fsize, virtaddr);
if (offset < 0 ||
(buflen = pread(fd, buf, CAST(size_t, buflen), offset)) <= 0) {
file_badread(ms);
return 0;
}
buf[buflen - 1] = '\0';
/* We expect only printable characters, so return if buffer contains
* non-printable character before the '\0' or just '\0'. */
for (bptr = buf; *bptr && isprint((unsigned char)*bptr); bptr++)
continue;
if (*bptr != '\0')
return 0;
return bptr - buf;
}
|
C
|
file
| 0 |
CVE-2018-17407
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-17407/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/TeX-Live/texlive-source/commit/6ed0077520e2b0da1fd060c7f88db7b2e6068e4c
|
6ed0077520e2b0da1fd060c7f88db7b2e6068e4c
|
writet1 protection against buffer overflow
git-svn-id: svn://tug.org/texlive/trunk/Build/source@48697 c570f23f-e606-0410-a88d-b1316a301751
|
static void cs_store(boolean is_subr)
{
char *p;
cs_entry *ptr;
int subr;
for (p = t1_line_array, t1_buf_ptr = t1_buf_array; *p != ' ';
*t1_buf_ptr++ = *p++);
*t1_buf_ptr = 0;
if (is_subr) {
subr = (int) t1_scan_num(p + 1, 0);
check_subr(subr);
ptr = subr_tab + subr;
} else {
ptr = cs_ptr++;
if (cs_ptr - cs_tab > cs_size)
formatted_error("type 1","CharStrings dict: more entries than dict size '%i'", cs_size);
if (strcmp(t1_buf_array + 1, notdef) == 0) /* skip the slash */
ptr->name = (char *) notdef;
else
ptr->name = xstrdup(t1_buf_array + 1);
}
/*tex Copy |" RD " + cs data| to |t1_buf_array|. */
memcpy(t1_buf_array, t1_line_array + cs_start - 4, (unsigned) (t1_cslen + 4));
/*tex Copy the end of cs data to |t1_buf_array|. */
for (p = t1_line_array + cs_start + t1_cslen, t1_buf_ptr =
t1_buf_array + t1_cslen + 4; *p != 10; *t1_buf_ptr++ = *p++);
*t1_buf_ptr++ = 10;
if (is_subr && cs_token_pair == NULL)
cs_token_pair = check_cs_token_pair();
ptr->len = (unsigned short) (t1_buf_ptr - t1_buf_array);
ptr->cslen = t1_cslen;
xfree(ptr->data);
ptr->data = xtalloc(ptr->len, byte);
memcpy(ptr->data, t1_buf_array, ptr->len);
ptr->valid = true;
}
|
static void cs_store(boolean is_subr)
{
char *p;
cs_entry *ptr;
int subr;
for (p = t1_line_array, t1_buf_ptr = t1_buf_array; *p != ' ';
*t1_buf_ptr++ = *p++);
*t1_buf_ptr = 0;
if (is_subr) {
subr = (int) t1_scan_num(p + 1, 0);
check_subr(subr);
ptr = subr_tab + subr;
} else {
ptr = cs_ptr++;
if (cs_ptr - cs_tab > cs_size)
formatted_error("type 1","CharStrings dict: more entries than dict size '%i'", cs_size);
if (strcmp(t1_buf_array + 1, notdef) == 0) /* skip the slash */
ptr->name = (char *) notdef;
else
ptr->name = xstrdup(t1_buf_array + 1);
}
/*tex Copy |" RD " + cs data| to |t1_buf_array|. */
memcpy(t1_buf_array, t1_line_array + cs_start - 4, (unsigned) (t1_cslen + 4));
/*tex Copy the end of cs data to |t1_buf_array|. */
for (p = t1_line_array + cs_start + t1_cslen, t1_buf_ptr =
t1_buf_array + t1_cslen + 4; *p != 10; *t1_buf_ptr++ = *p++);
*t1_buf_ptr++ = 10;
if (is_subr && cs_token_pair == NULL)
cs_token_pair = check_cs_token_pair();
ptr->len = (unsigned short) (t1_buf_ptr - t1_buf_array);
ptr->cslen = t1_cslen;
xfree(ptr->data);
ptr->data = xtalloc(ptr->len, byte);
memcpy(ptr->data, t1_buf_array, ptr->len);
ptr->valid = true;
}
|
C
|
texlive-source
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5120
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5120/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/b7277af490d28ac7f802c015bb0ff31395768556
|
b7277af490d28ac7f802c015bb0ff31395768556
|
bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
|
static void Uint8ArrayMethodMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(info.Holder());
V8SetReturnValue(info, impl->uint8ArrayMethod());
}
|
static void Uint8ArrayMethodMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(info.Holder());
V8SetReturnValue(info, impl->uint8ArrayMethod());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/6c5d779aaf0dec9628da8a20751e95fd09554b14
|
6c5d779aaf0dec9628da8a20751e95fd09554b14
|
Move the cancellation of blocked requests code from ResourceDispatcherHost::~ResourceDispatcherHost() to ResourceDispatcherHost::OnShutdown().
This causes the requests to be cancelled on the IO thread rather than the UI thread, which is important since cancellation may delete the URLRequest (and URLRequests should not outlive the IO thread).
BUG=39243
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/1213004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@42575 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void ResourceDispatcherHost::OnCancelRequest(int request_id) {
CancelRequest(receiver_->id(), request_id, true, true);
}
|
void ResourceDispatcherHost::OnCancelRequest(int request_id) {
CancelRequest(receiver_->id(), request_id, true, true);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-15391
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-15391/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f1afce25b3f94d8bddec69b08ffbc29b989ad844
|
f1afce25b3f94d8bddec69b08ffbc29b989ad844
|
[Extensions] Update navigations across hypothetical extension extents
Update code to treat navigations across hypothetical extension extents
(e.g. for nonexistent extensions) the same as we do for navigations
crossing installed extension extents.
Bug: 598265
Change-Id: Ibdf2f563ce1fd108ead279077901020a24de732b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/617180
Commit-Queue: Devlin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#495779}
|
ChromeContentBrowserClientExtensionsPart::ShouldTryToUseExistingProcessHost(
Profile* profile, const GURL& url) {
ExtensionRegistry* registry =
profile ? ExtensionRegistry::Get(profile) : NULL;
if (!registry)
return false;
const Extension* extension =
registry->enabled_extensions().GetExtensionOrAppByURL(url);
if (!extension)
return false;
if (!BackgroundInfo::HasBackgroundPage(extension))
return false;
std::set<int> process_ids;
size_t max_process_count =
content::RenderProcessHost::GetMaxRendererProcessCount();
std::vector<Profile*> profiles = g_browser_process->profile_manager()->
GetLoadedProfiles();
for (size_t i = 0; i < profiles.size(); ++i) {
ProcessManager* epm = ProcessManager::Get(profiles[i]);
for (ExtensionHost* host : epm->background_hosts())
process_ids.insert(host->render_process_host()->GetID());
}
return (process_ids.size() >
(max_process_count * chrome::kMaxShareOfExtensionProcesses));
}
|
ChromeContentBrowserClientExtensionsPart::ShouldTryToUseExistingProcessHost(
Profile* profile, const GURL& url) {
ExtensionRegistry* registry =
profile ? ExtensionRegistry::Get(profile) : NULL;
if (!registry)
return false;
const Extension* extension =
registry->enabled_extensions().GetExtensionOrAppByURL(url);
if (!extension)
return false;
if (!BackgroundInfo::HasBackgroundPage(extension))
return false;
std::set<int> process_ids;
size_t max_process_count =
content::RenderProcessHost::GetMaxRendererProcessCount();
std::vector<Profile*> profiles = g_browser_process->profile_manager()->
GetLoadedProfiles();
for (size_t i = 0; i < profiles.size(); ++i) {
ProcessManager* epm = ProcessManager::Get(profiles[i]);
for (ExtensionHost* host : epm->background_hosts())
process_ids.insert(host->render_process_host()->GetID());
}
return (process_ids.size() >
(max_process_count * chrome::kMaxShareOfExtensionProcesses));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1621
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1621/
|
CWE-119
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/libvpx/+/5a9753fca56f0eeb9f61e342b2fccffc364f9426
|
5a9753fca56f0eeb9f61e342b2fccffc364f9426
|
Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
|
unsigned int ScaleForFrameNumber(unsigned int frame, unsigned int val) {
if (frame < 10)
return val;
if (frame < 20)
return val / 2;
if (frame < 30)
return val * 2 / 3;
if (frame < 40)
return val / 4;
if (frame < 50)
return val * 7 / 8;
return val;
}
|
unsigned int ScaleForFrameNumber(unsigned int frame, unsigned int val) {
if (frame < 10)
return val;
if (frame < 20)
return val / 2;
if (frame < 30)
return val * 2 / 3;
if (frame < 40)
return val / 4;
if (frame < 50)
return val * 7 / 8;
return val;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5189
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5189/
|
CWE-284
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/2440e872debd68ae7c2a8bf9ddb34df2cce378cd
|
2440e872debd68ae7c2a8bf9ddb34df2cce378cd
|
[GCPW] Disallow sign in of consumer accounts when mdm is enabled.
Unless the registry key "mdm_aca" is explicitly set to 1, always
fail sign in of consumer accounts when mdm enrollment is enabled.
Consumer accounts are defined as accounts with gmail.com or
googlemail.com domain.
Bug: 944049
Change-Id: Icb822f3737d90931de16a8d3317616dd2b159edd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1532903
Commit-Queue: Tien Mai <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Roger Tawa <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#646278}
|
HRESULT CGaiaCredentialBase::GetUserGlsCommandline(
base::CommandLine* command_line) {
return S_OK;
}
|
HRESULT CGaiaCredentialBase::GetUserGlsCommandline(
base::CommandLine* command_line) {
return S_OK;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-3171
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-3171/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/d10a8dac48d3a9467e81c62cb45208344f4542db
|
d10a8dac48d3a9467e81c62cb45208344f4542db
|
Replace further questionable HashMap::add usages in bindings
BUG=390928
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/411273002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@178823 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
v8::Handle<v8::Value> SerializedScriptValue::deserialize(v8::Isolate* isolate, MessagePortArray* messagePorts, const WebBlobInfoArray* blobInfo)
{
if (!m_data.impl())
return v8::Null(isolate);
COMPILE_ASSERT(sizeof(BufferValueType) == 2, BufferValueTypeIsTwoBytes);
m_data.ensure16Bit();
Reader reader(reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(m_data.impl()->characters16()), 2 * m_data.length(), blobInfo, m_blobDataHandles, ScriptState::current(isolate));
Deserializer deserializer(reader, messagePorts, m_arrayBufferContentsArray.get());
RefPtr<SerializedScriptValue> protect(this);
return deserializer.deserialize();
}
|
v8::Handle<v8::Value> SerializedScriptValue::deserialize(v8::Isolate* isolate, MessagePortArray* messagePorts, const WebBlobInfoArray* blobInfo)
{
if (!m_data.impl())
return v8::Null(isolate);
COMPILE_ASSERT(sizeof(BufferValueType) == 2, BufferValueTypeIsTwoBytes);
m_data.ensure16Bit();
Reader reader(reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(m_data.impl()->characters16()), 2 * m_data.length(), blobInfo, m_blobDataHandles, ScriptState::current(isolate));
Deserializer deserializer(reader, messagePorts, m_arrayBufferContentsArray.get());
RefPtr<SerializedScriptValue> protect(this);
return deserializer.deserialize();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3834
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3834/
|
CWE-200
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/1f24c730ab6ca5aff1e3137b340b8aeaeda4bdbc
|
1f24c730ab6ca5aff1e3137b340b8aeaeda4bdbc
|
DO NOT MERGE: Camera: Adjust pointers to ANW buffers to avoid infoleak
Subtract address of a random static object from pointers being routed
through app process.
Bug: 28466701
Change-Id: Idcbfe81e9507433769672f3dc6d67db5eeed4e04
|
status_t BnCameraRecordingProxy::onTransact(
uint32_t code, const Parcel& data, Parcel* reply, uint32_t flags)
{
switch(code) {
case START_RECORDING: {
ALOGV("START_RECORDING");
CHECK_INTERFACE(ICameraRecordingProxy, data, reply);
sp<ICameraRecordingProxyListener> listener =
interface_cast<ICameraRecordingProxyListener>(data.readStrongBinder());
reply->writeInt32(startRecording(listener));
return NO_ERROR;
} break;
case STOP_RECORDING: {
ALOGV("STOP_RECORDING");
CHECK_INTERFACE(ICameraRecordingProxy, data, reply);
stopRecording();
return NO_ERROR;
} break;
case RELEASE_RECORDING_FRAME: {
ALOGV("RELEASE_RECORDING_FRAME");
CHECK_INTERFACE(ICameraRecordingProxy, data, reply);
sp<IMemory> mem = interface_cast<IMemory>(data.readStrongBinder());
releaseRecordingFrame(mem);
return NO_ERROR;
} break;
default:
return BBinder::onTransact(code, data, reply, flags);
}
}
|
status_t BnCameraRecordingProxy::onTransact(
uint32_t code, const Parcel& data, Parcel* reply, uint32_t flags)
{
switch(code) {
case START_RECORDING: {
ALOGV("START_RECORDING");
CHECK_INTERFACE(ICameraRecordingProxy, data, reply);
sp<ICameraRecordingProxyListener> listener =
interface_cast<ICameraRecordingProxyListener>(data.readStrongBinder());
reply->writeInt32(startRecording(listener));
return NO_ERROR;
} break;
case STOP_RECORDING: {
ALOGV("STOP_RECORDING");
CHECK_INTERFACE(ICameraRecordingProxy, data, reply);
stopRecording();
return NO_ERROR;
} break;
case RELEASE_RECORDING_FRAME: {
ALOGV("RELEASE_RECORDING_FRAME");
CHECK_INTERFACE(ICameraRecordingProxy, data, reply);
sp<IMemory> mem = interface_cast<IMemory>(data.readStrongBinder());
releaseRecordingFrame(mem);
return NO_ERROR;
} break;
default:
return BBinder::onTransact(code, data, reply, flags);
}
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2016-9540
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-9540/
|
CWE-787
|
https://github.com/vadz/libtiff/commit/5ad9d8016fbb60109302d558f7edb2cb2a3bb8e3
|
5ad9d8016fbb60109302d558f7edb2cb2a3bb8e3
|
* tools/tiffcp.c: fix out-of-bounds write on tiled images with odd
tile width vs image width. Reported as MSVR 35103
by Axel Souchet and Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities &
Mitigations team.
|
DECLAREcpFunc(cpSeparateTiles2SeparateTiles)
{
return cpImage(in, out,
readSeparateTilesIntoBuffer,
writeBufferToSeparateTiles,
imagelength, imagewidth, spp);
}
|
DECLAREcpFunc(cpSeparateTiles2SeparateTiles)
{
return cpImage(in, out,
readSeparateTilesIntoBuffer,
writeBufferToSeparateTiles,
imagelength, imagewidth, spp);
}
|
C
|
libtiff
| 0 |
CVE-2011-4324
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-4324/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/dc0b027dfadfcb8a5504f7d8052754bf8d501ab9
|
dc0b027dfadfcb8a5504f7d8052754bf8d501ab9
|
NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
|
static void nfs_set_open_stateid_locked(struct nfs4_state *state, nfs4_stateid *stateid, int open_flags)
static void nfs_set_open_stateid_locked(struct nfs4_state *state, nfs4_stateid *stateid, fmode_t fmode)
{
if (test_bit(NFS_DELEGATED_STATE, &state->flags) == 0)
memcpy(state->stateid.data, stateid->data, sizeof(state->stateid.data));
memcpy(state->open_stateid.data, stateid->data, sizeof(state->open_stateid.data));
switch (fmode) {
case FMODE_READ:
set_bit(NFS_O_RDONLY_STATE, &state->flags);
break;
case FMODE_WRITE:
set_bit(NFS_O_WRONLY_STATE, &state->flags);
break;
case FMODE_READ|FMODE_WRITE:
set_bit(NFS_O_RDWR_STATE, &state->flags);
}
}
|
static void nfs_set_open_stateid_locked(struct nfs4_state *state, nfs4_stateid *stateid, int open_flags)
{
if (test_bit(NFS_DELEGATED_STATE, &state->flags) == 0)
memcpy(state->stateid.data, stateid->data, sizeof(state->stateid.data));
memcpy(state->open_stateid.data, stateid->data, sizeof(state->open_stateid.data));
switch (open_flags) {
case FMODE_READ:
set_bit(NFS_O_RDONLY_STATE, &state->flags);
break;
case FMODE_WRITE:
set_bit(NFS_O_WRONLY_STATE, &state->flags);
break;
case FMODE_READ|FMODE_WRITE:
set_bit(NFS_O_RDWR_STATE, &state->flags);
}
}
|
C
|
linux
| 1 |
CVE-2015-8746
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-8746/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/18e3b739fdc826481c6a1335ce0c5b19b3d415da
|
18e3b739fdc826481c6a1335ce0c5b19b3d415da
|
NFS: Fix a NULL pointer dereference of migration recovery ops for v4.2 client
---Steps to Reproduce--
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
<nfs-client>
# mount -t nfs nfs-server:/nfs/ /mnt/
# ll /mnt/*/
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt,refer=/nfs/old/@nfs-server)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
# service nfs restart
<nfs-client>
# ll /mnt/*/ --->>>>> oops here
[ 5123.102925] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null)
[ 5123.103363] IP: [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.103752] PGD 587b9067 PUD 3cbf5067 PMD 0
[ 5123.104131] Oops: 0000 [#1]
[ 5123.104529] Modules linked in: nfsv4(OE) nfs(OE) fscache(E) nfsd(OE) xfs libcrc32c iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi coretemp crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel ppdev vmw_balloon parport_pc parport i2c_piix4 shpchp auth_rpcgss nfs_acl vmw_vmci lockd grace sunrpc vmwgfx drm_kms_helper ttm drm mptspi serio_raw scsi_transport_spi e1000 mptscsih mptbase ata_generic pata_acpi [last unloaded: nfsd]
[ 5123.105887] CPU: 0 PID: 15853 Comm: ::1-manager Tainted: G OE 4.2.0-rc6+ #214
[ 5123.106358] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 05/20/2014
[ 5123.106860] task: ffff88007620f300 ti: ffff88005877c000 task.ti: ffff88005877c000
[ 5123.107363] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa03ed38b>] [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.107909] RSP: 0018:ffff88005877fdb8 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 5123.108435] RAX: ffff880053f3bc00 RBX: ffff88006ce6c908 RCX: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.108968] RDX: ffffea0000e6d940 RSI: ffff8800399a0000 RDI: ffff88006ce6c908
[ 5123.109503] RBP: ffff88005877fe28 R08: ffffffff81c708a0 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 5123.110045] R10: 00000000000001a2 R11: ffff88003ba7f5c8 R12: ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.110618] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff880053a0d240 R15: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.111169] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffffff81c27000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 5123.111726] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 5123.112286] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000054cac000 CR4: 00000000001406f0
[ 5123.112888] Stack:
[ 5123.113458] ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 00000000000167d0 0000000000000000
[ 5123.114049] 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000a7ec82c6
[ 5123.114662] ffff88005877fe18 ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.115264] Call Trace:
[ 5123.115868] [<ffffffffa03fb44b>] nfs4_try_migration+0xbb/0x220 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.116487] [<ffffffffa03fcb3b>] nfs4_run_state_manager+0x4ab/0x7b0 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117104] [<ffffffffa03fc690>] ? nfs4_do_reclaim+0x510/0x510 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117813] [<ffffffff810a4527>] kthread+0xd7/0xf0
[ 5123.118456] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.119108] [<ffffffff816d9cdf>] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70
[ 5123.119723] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.120329] Code: 4c 8b 6a 58 74 17 eb 52 48 8d 55 a8 89 c6 4c 89 e7 e8 4a b5 ff ff 8b 45 b0 85 c0 74 1c 4c 89 f9 48 8b 55 90 48 8b 75 98 48 89 df <41> ff 55 00 3d e8 d8 ff ff 41 89 c6 74 cf 48 8b 4d c8 65 48 33
[ 5123.121643] RIP [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.122308] RSP <ffff88005877fdb8>
[ 5123.122942] CR2: 0000000000000000
Fixes: ec011fe847 ("NFS: Introduce a vector of migration recovery ops")
Cc: [email protected] # v3.13+
Signed-off-by: Kinglong Mee <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
|
static int _nfs4_do_setlk(struct nfs4_state *state, int cmd, struct file_lock *fl, int recovery_type)
{
struct nfs4_lockdata *data;
struct rpc_task *task;
struct rpc_message msg = {
.rpc_proc = &nfs4_procedures[NFSPROC4_CLNT_LOCK],
.rpc_cred = state->owner->so_cred,
};
struct rpc_task_setup task_setup_data = {
.rpc_client = NFS_CLIENT(state->inode),
.rpc_message = &msg,
.callback_ops = &nfs4_lock_ops,
.workqueue = nfsiod_workqueue,
.flags = RPC_TASK_ASYNC,
};
int ret;
dprintk("%s: begin!\n", __func__);
data = nfs4_alloc_lockdata(fl, nfs_file_open_context(fl->fl_file),
fl->fl_u.nfs4_fl.owner,
recovery_type == NFS_LOCK_NEW ? GFP_KERNEL : GFP_NOFS);
if (data == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
if (IS_SETLKW(cmd))
data->arg.block = 1;
nfs4_init_sequence(&data->arg.seq_args, &data->res.seq_res, 1);
msg.rpc_argp = &data->arg;
msg.rpc_resp = &data->res;
task_setup_data.callback_data = data;
if (recovery_type > NFS_LOCK_NEW) {
if (recovery_type == NFS_LOCK_RECLAIM)
data->arg.reclaim = NFS_LOCK_RECLAIM;
nfs4_set_sequence_privileged(&data->arg.seq_args);
} else
data->arg.new_lock = 1;
task = rpc_run_task(&task_setup_data);
if (IS_ERR(task))
return PTR_ERR(task);
ret = nfs4_wait_for_completion_rpc_task(task);
if (ret == 0) {
ret = data->rpc_status;
if (ret)
nfs4_handle_setlk_error(data->server, data->lsp,
data->arg.new_lock_owner, ret);
} else
data->cancelled = 1;
rpc_put_task(task);
dprintk("%s: done, ret = %d!\n", __func__, ret);
return ret;
}
|
static int _nfs4_do_setlk(struct nfs4_state *state, int cmd, struct file_lock *fl, int recovery_type)
{
struct nfs4_lockdata *data;
struct rpc_task *task;
struct rpc_message msg = {
.rpc_proc = &nfs4_procedures[NFSPROC4_CLNT_LOCK],
.rpc_cred = state->owner->so_cred,
};
struct rpc_task_setup task_setup_data = {
.rpc_client = NFS_CLIENT(state->inode),
.rpc_message = &msg,
.callback_ops = &nfs4_lock_ops,
.workqueue = nfsiod_workqueue,
.flags = RPC_TASK_ASYNC,
};
int ret;
dprintk("%s: begin!\n", __func__);
data = nfs4_alloc_lockdata(fl, nfs_file_open_context(fl->fl_file),
fl->fl_u.nfs4_fl.owner,
recovery_type == NFS_LOCK_NEW ? GFP_KERNEL : GFP_NOFS);
if (data == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
if (IS_SETLKW(cmd))
data->arg.block = 1;
nfs4_init_sequence(&data->arg.seq_args, &data->res.seq_res, 1);
msg.rpc_argp = &data->arg;
msg.rpc_resp = &data->res;
task_setup_data.callback_data = data;
if (recovery_type > NFS_LOCK_NEW) {
if (recovery_type == NFS_LOCK_RECLAIM)
data->arg.reclaim = NFS_LOCK_RECLAIM;
nfs4_set_sequence_privileged(&data->arg.seq_args);
} else
data->arg.new_lock = 1;
task = rpc_run_task(&task_setup_data);
if (IS_ERR(task))
return PTR_ERR(task);
ret = nfs4_wait_for_completion_rpc_task(task);
if (ret == 0) {
ret = data->rpc_status;
if (ret)
nfs4_handle_setlk_error(data->server, data->lsp,
data->arg.new_lock_owner, ret);
} else
data->cancelled = 1;
rpc_put_task(task);
dprintk("%s: done, ret = %d!\n", __func__, ret);
return ret;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2015-6763
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-6763/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f1574f25e1402e748bf2bd7e28ce3dd96ceb1ca4
|
f1574f25e1402e748bf2bd7e28ce3dd96ceb1ca4
|
MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
|
bool InputType::CanBeSuccessfulSubmitButton() {
return false;
}
|
bool InputType::CanBeSuccessfulSubmitButton() {
return false;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2019-12110
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-12110/
|
CWE-476
|
https://github.com/miniupnp/miniupnp/commit/f321c2066b96d18afa5158dfa2d2873a2957ef38
|
f321c2066b96d18afa5158dfa2d2873a2957ef38
|
upnp_redirect(): accept NULL desc argument
|
upnp_delete_redirection(unsigned short eport, const char * protocol)
{
syslog(LOG_INFO, "removing redirect rule port %hu %s", eport, protocol);
return _upnp_delete_redir(eport, proto_atoi(protocol));
}
|
upnp_delete_redirection(unsigned short eport, const char * protocol)
{
syslog(LOG_INFO, "removing redirect rule port %hu %s", eport, protocol);
return _upnp_delete_redir(eport, proto_atoi(protocol));
}
|
C
|
miniupnp
| 0 |
CVE-2019-5760
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-5760/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/3514a77e7fa2e5b8bfe5d98af22964bbd69d680f
|
3514a77e7fa2e5b8bfe5d98af22964bbd69d680f
|
Check weak pointers in RTCPeerConnectionHandler::WebRtcSetDescriptionObserverImpl
Bug: 912074
Change-Id: I8ba86751f5d5bf12db51520f985ef0d3dae63ed8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1411916
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Henrik Boström <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#622945}
|
explicit CreateSessionDescriptionRequest(
const scoped_refptr<base::SingleThreadTaskRunner>& main_thread,
const blink::WebRTCSessionDescriptionRequest& request,
const base::WeakPtr<RTCPeerConnectionHandler>& handler,
const base::WeakPtr<PeerConnectionTracker>& tracker,
PeerConnectionTracker::Action action)
: main_thread_(main_thread),
webkit_request_(request),
handler_(handler),
tracker_(tracker),
action_(action) {}
|
explicit CreateSessionDescriptionRequest(
const scoped_refptr<base::SingleThreadTaskRunner>& main_thread,
const blink::WebRTCSessionDescriptionRequest& request,
const base::WeakPtr<RTCPeerConnectionHandler>& handler,
const base::WeakPtr<PeerConnectionTracker>& tracker,
PeerConnectionTracker::Action action)
: main_thread_(main_thread),
webkit_request_(request),
handler_(handler),
tracker_(tracker),
action_(action) {}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2839
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2839/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/c63f2b7fe4fe2977f858a8e36d5f48db17eff2e7
|
c63f2b7fe4fe2977f858a8e36d5f48db17eff2e7
|
Extend TTS extension API to support richer events returned from the engine
to the client. Previously we just had a completed event; this adds start,
word boundary, sentence boundary, and marker boundary. In addition,
interrupted and canceled, which were previously errors, now become events.
Mac and Windows implementations extended to support as many of these events
as possible.
BUG=67713
BUG=70198
BUG=75106
BUG=83404
TEST=Updates all TTS API tests to be event-based, and adds new tests.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6792014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void ExtensionTtsController::OnSpeechFinished(
|
void ExtensionTtsController::OnSpeechFinished(
int request_id, const std::string& error_message) {
if (!current_utterance_ || request_id != current_utterance_->id())
return;
current_utterance_->set_error(error_message);
FinishCurrentUtterance();
SpeakNextUtterance();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 1 |
CVE-2016-2505
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-2505/
|
CWE-119
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/4f236c532039a61f0cf681d2e3c6e022911bbb5c
|
4f236c532039a61f0cf681d2e3c6e022911bbb5c
|
Check section size when verifying CRC
Bug: 28333006
Change-Id: Ief7a2da848face78f0edde21e2f2009316076679
|
unsigned programMapPID() const {
return mProgramMapPID;
}
|
unsigned programMapPID() const {
return mProgramMapPID;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2018-17467
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-17467/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/7da6c3419fd172405bcece1ae4ec6ec8316cd345
|
7da6c3419fd172405bcece1ae4ec6ec8316cd345
|
Start rendering timer after first navigation
Currently the new content rendering timer in the browser process,
which clears an old page's contents 4 seconds after a navigation if the
new page doesn't draw in that time, is not set on the first navigation
for a top-level frame.
This is problematic because content can exist before the first
navigation, for instance if it was created by a javascript: URL.
This CL removes the code that skips the timer activation on the first
navigation.
Bug: 844881
Change-Id: I19b3ad1ff62c69ded3a5f7b1c0afde191aaf4584
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1188589
Reviewed-by: Fady Samuel <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: ccameron <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Ken Buchanan <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#586913}
|
void RenderWidgetHostImpl::SendScreenRects() {
if (!renderer_initialized_ || waiting_for_screen_rects_ack_)
return;
if (is_hidden_) {
return;
}
if (!view_)
return;
last_view_screen_rect_ = view_->GetViewBounds();
last_window_screen_rect_ = view_->GetBoundsInRootWindow();
view_->WillSendScreenRects();
Send(new ViewMsg_UpdateScreenRects(
GetRoutingID(), last_view_screen_rect_, last_window_screen_rect_));
waiting_for_screen_rects_ack_ = true;
}
|
void RenderWidgetHostImpl::SendScreenRects() {
if (!renderer_initialized_ || waiting_for_screen_rects_ack_)
return;
if (is_hidden_) {
return;
}
if (!view_)
return;
last_view_screen_rect_ = view_->GetViewBounds();
last_window_screen_rect_ = view_->GetBoundsInRootWindow();
view_->WillSendScreenRects();
Send(new ViewMsg_UpdateScreenRects(
GetRoutingID(), last_view_screen_rect_, last_window_screen_rect_));
waiting_for_screen_rects_ack_ = true;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-0701
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-0701/
|
CWE-200
|
https://git.openssl.org/?p=openssl.git;a=commit;h=c5b831f21d0d29d1e517d139d9d101763f60c9a2
|
c5b831f21d0d29d1e517d139d9d101763f60c9a2
| null |
const SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_get_cipher_by_char(const unsigned char *p)
{
SSL_CIPHER c;
const SSL_CIPHER *cp;
unsigned long id;
id = 0x03000000L | ((unsigned long)p[0] << 8L) | (unsigned long)p[1];
c.id = id;
cp = OBJ_bsearch_ssl_cipher_id(&c, ssl3_ciphers, SSL3_NUM_CIPHERS);
#ifdef DEBUG_PRINT_UNKNOWN_CIPHERSUITES
if (cp == NULL)
fprintf(stderr, "Unknown cipher ID %x\n", (p[0] << 8) | p[1]);
#endif
return cp;
}
|
const SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_get_cipher_by_char(const unsigned char *p)
{
SSL_CIPHER c;
const SSL_CIPHER *cp;
unsigned long id;
id = 0x03000000L | ((unsigned long)p[0] << 8L) | (unsigned long)p[1];
c.id = id;
cp = OBJ_bsearch_ssl_cipher_id(&c, ssl3_ciphers, SSL3_NUM_CIPHERS);
#ifdef DEBUG_PRINT_UNKNOWN_CIPHERSUITES
if (cp == NULL)
fprintf(stderr, "Unknown cipher ID %x\n", (p[0] << 8) | p[1]);
#endif
return cp;
}
|
C
|
openssl
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5219
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5219/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a4150b688a754d3d10d2ca385155b1c95d77d6ae
|
a4150b688a754d3d10d2ca385155b1c95d77d6ae
|
Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
|
bool GLES2DecoderImpl::GenVertexArraysOESHelper(
GLsizei n, const GLuint* client_ids) {
for (GLsizei ii = 0; ii < n; ++ii) {
if (GetVertexAttribManager(client_ids[ii])) {
return false;
}
}
if (!features().native_vertex_array_object) {
for (GLsizei ii = 0; ii < n; ++ii) {
CreateVertexAttribManager(client_ids[ii], 0, true);
}
} else {
std::unique_ptr<GLuint[]> service_ids(new GLuint[n]);
api()->glGenVertexArraysOESFn(n, service_ids.get());
for (GLsizei ii = 0; ii < n; ++ii) {
CreateVertexAttribManager(client_ids[ii], service_ids[ii], true);
}
}
return true;
}
|
bool GLES2DecoderImpl::GenVertexArraysOESHelper(
GLsizei n, const GLuint* client_ids) {
for (GLsizei ii = 0; ii < n; ++ii) {
if (GetVertexAttribManager(client_ids[ii])) {
return false;
}
}
if (!features().native_vertex_array_object) {
for (GLsizei ii = 0; ii < n; ++ii) {
CreateVertexAttribManager(client_ids[ii], 0, true);
}
} else {
std::unique_ptr<GLuint[]> service_ids(new GLuint[n]);
api()->glGenVertexArraysOESFn(n, service_ids.get());
for (GLsizei ii = 0; ii < n; ++ii) {
CreateVertexAttribManager(client_ids[ii], service_ids[ii], true);
}
}
return true;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6135
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6135/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/2ccbb407dccc976ae4bdbaa5ff2f777f4eb0723b
|
2ccbb407dccc976ae4bdbaa5ff2f777f4eb0723b
|
Force a flush of drawing to the widget when a dialog is shown.
BUG=823353
TEST=as in bug
Change-Id: I5da777068fc29c5638ef02d50e59d5d7b2729260
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/971661
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#544518}
|
void RenderWidgetHostImpl::ImeCommitText(
const base::string16& text,
const std::vector<ui::ImeTextSpan>& ime_text_spans,
const gfx::Range& replacement_range,
int relative_cursor_pos) {
GetWidgetInputHandler()->ImeCommitText(
text, ime_text_spans, replacement_range, relative_cursor_pos);
}
|
void RenderWidgetHostImpl::ImeCommitText(
const base::string16& text,
const std::vector<ui::ImeTextSpan>& ime_text_spans,
const gfx::Range& replacement_range,
int relative_cursor_pos) {
GetWidgetInputHandler()->ImeCommitText(
text, ime_text_spans, replacement_range, relative_cursor_pos);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2875
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2875/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/1266ba494530a267ec8a21442ea1b5cae94da4fb
|
1266ba494530a267ec8a21442ea1b5cae94da4fb
|
Introduce XGetImage() for GrabWindowSnapshot() in ChromeOS.
BUG=119492
TEST=manually done
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10386124
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137556 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
RootWindowHost* RootWindowHost::GetForAcceleratedWidget(
gfx::AcceleratedWidget accelerated_widget) {
return reinterpret_cast<RootWindowHost*>(
ui::ViewProp::GetValue(accelerated_widget, kRootWindowHostLinuxKey));
}
|
RootWindowHost* RootWindowHost::GetForAcceleratedWidget(
gfx::AcceleratedWidget accelerated_widget) {
return reinterpret_cast<RootWindowHost*>(
ui::ViewProp::GetValue(accelerated_widget, kRootWindowHostLinuxKey));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6063
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6063/
|
CWE-787
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/673ce95d481ea9368c4d4d43ac756ba1d6d9e608
|
673ce95d481ea9368c4d4d43ac756ba1d6d9e608
|
Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
|
VideoEncodeAcceleratorClient::VideoEncodeAcceleratorClient(
VideoEncodeAccelerator::Client* client,
mojom::VideoEncodeAcceleratorClientRequest request)
: client_(client), binding_(this, std::move(request)) {
DCHECK(client_);
}
|
VideoEncodeAcceleratorClient::VideoEncodeAcceleratorClient(
VideoEncodeAccelerator::Client* client,
mojom::VideoEncodeAcceleratorClientRequest request)
: client_(client), binding_(this, std::move(request)) {
DCHECK(client_);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-6773
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-6773/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/33827275411b33371e7bb750cce20f11de85002d
|
33827275411b33371e7bb750cce20f11de85002d
|
Move SelectionTemplate::is_handle_visible_ to FrameSelection
This patch moves |is_handle_visible_| to |FrameSelection| from |SelectionTemplate|
since handle visibility is used only for setting |FrameSelection|, hence it is
a redundant member variable of |SelectionTemplate|.
Bug: 742093
Change-Id: I3add4da3844fb40be34dcb4d4b46b5fa6fed1d7e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/595389
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kent Tamura <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#491660}
|
void Editor::ApplyStyle(StylePropertySet* style,
InputEvent::InputType input_type) {
const VisibleSelection& selection =
GetFrame().Selection().ComputeVisibleSelectionInDOMTreeDeprecated();
if (selection.IsNone())
return;
if (selection.IsCaret()) {
ComputeAndSetTypingStyle(style, input_type);
return;
}
DCHECK(selection.IsRange()) << selection;
if (!style)
return;
DCHECK(GetFrame().GetDocument());
ApplyStyleCommand::Create(*GetFrame().GetDocument(),
EditingStyle::Create(style), input_type)
->Apply();
}
|
void Editor::ApplyStyle(StylePropertySet* style,
InputEvent::InputType input_type) {
const VisibleSelection& selection =
GetFrame().Selection().ComputeVisibleSelectionInDOMTreeDeprecated();
if (selection.IsNone())
return;
if (selection.IsCaret()) {
ComputeAndSetTypingStyle(style, input_type);
return;
}
DCHECK(selection.IsRange()) << selection;
if (!style)
return;
DCHECK(GetFrame().GetDocument());
ApplyStyleCommand::Create(*GetFrame().GetDocument(),
EditingStyle::Create(style), input_type)
->Apply();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6080
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6080/
|
CWE-269
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/b44e68087804e6543a99c87076ab7648d11d9b07
|
b44e68087804e6543a99c87076ab7648d11d9b07
|
memory-infra: split up memory-infra coordinator service into two
This allows for heap profiler to use its own service with correct
capabilities and all other instances to use the existing coordinator
service.
Bug: 792028
Change-Id: I84e4ec71f5f1d00991c0516b1424ce7334bcd3cd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/836896
Commit-Queue: Lalit Maganti <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: oysteine <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Albert J. Wong <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Hector Dearman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#529059}
|
void MemoryInstrumentation::RequestGlobalDump(
const std::vector<std::string>& allocator_dump_names,
RequestGlobalDumpCallback callback) {
const auto& coordinator = GetCoordinatorBindingForCurrentThread();
coordinator->RequestGlobalMemoryDump(MemoryDumpType::SUMMARY_ONLY,
MemoryDumpLevelOfDetail::BACKGROUND,
allocator_dump_names, callback);
}
|
void MemoryInstrumentation::RequestGlobalDump(
const std::vector<std::string>& allocator_dump_names,
RequestGlobalDumpCallback callback) {
const auto& coordinator = GetCoordinatorBindingForCurrentThread();
coordinator->RequestGlobalMemoryDump(MemoryDumpType::SUMMARY_ONLY,
MemoryDumpLevelOfDetail::BACKGROUND,
allocator_dump_names, callback);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1696
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1696/
|
CWE-284
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/c0569cc04741cccf6548c2169fcc1609d958523f
|
c0569cc04741cccf6548c2169fcc1609d958523f
|
[Extensions] Expand bindings access checks
BUG=601149
BUG=601073
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1866103002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#387710}
|
void RuntimeCustomBindings::OpenChannelToNativeApp(
const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& args) {
Feature::Availability availability =
FeatureProvider::GetPermissionFeatures()
->GetFeature("nativeMessaging")
->IsAvailableToContext(context()->extension(),
context()->context_type(), context()->url());
if (!availability.is_available())
return;
content::RenderFrame* render_frame = context()->GetRenderFrame();
if (!render_frame)
return;
CHECK(args.Length() >= 2 && args[0]->IsString() && args[1]->IsString());
std::string extension_id = *v8::String::Utf8Value(args[0]);
std::string native_app_name = *v8::String::Utf8Value(args[1]);
int port_id = -1;
render_frame->Send(new ExtensionHostMsg_OpenChannelToNativeApp(
render_frame->GetRoutingID(), extension_id, native_app_name, &port_id));
args.GetReturnValue().Set(static_cast<int32_t>(port_id));
}
|
void RuntimeCustomBindings::OpenChannelToNativeApp(
const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& args) {
Feature::Availability availability =
FeatureProvider::GetPermissionFeatures()
->GetFeature("nativeMessaging")
->IsAvailableToContext(context()->extension(),
context()->context_type(), context()->url());
if (!availability.is_available())
return;
content::RenderFrame* render_frame = context()->GetRenderFrame();
if (!render_frame)
return;
CHECK(args.Length() >= 2 && args[0]->IsString() && args[1]->IsString());
std::string extension_id = *v8::String::Utf8Value(args[0]);
std::string native_app_name = *v8::String::Utf8Value(args[1]);
int port_id = -1;
render_frame->Send(new ExtensionHostMsg_OpenChannelToNativeApp(
render_frame->GetRoutingID(), extension_id, native_app_name, &port_id));
args.GetReturnValue().Set(static_cast<int32_t>(port_id));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1665
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1665/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/282f53ffdc3b1902da86f6a0791af736837efbf8
|
282f53ffdc3b1902da86f6a0791af736837efbf8
|
[signin] Add metrics to track the source for refresh token updated events
This CL add a source for update and revoke credentials operations. It then
surfaces the source in the chrome://signin-internals page.
This CL also records the following histograms that track refresh token events:
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToValidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToInvalidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenRevoked.Source
These histograms are needed to validate the assumptions of how often tokens
are revoked by the browser and the sources for the token revocations.
Bug: 896182
Change-Id: I2fcab80ee8e5699708e695bc3289fa6d34859a90
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1286464
Reviewed-by: Jochen Eisinger <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: David Roger <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Sherman <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Mihai Sardarescu <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606181}
|
void ExpectOneTokensLoadedNotification() {
EXPECT_EQ(0, token_available_count_);
EXPECT_EQ(0, token_revoked_count_);
EXPECT_EQ(1, tokens_loaded_count_);
ResetObserverCounts();
}
|
void ExpectOneTokensLoadedNotification() {
EXPECT_EQ(0, token_available_count_);
EXPECT_EQ(0, token_revoked_count_);
EXPECT_EQ(1, tokens_loaded_count_);
ResetObserverCounts();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2019-12981
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-12981/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/libming/libming/pull/179/commits/3dc0338e4a36a3092720ebaa5b908ba3dca467d9
|
3dc0338e4a36a3092720ebaa5b908ba3dca467d9
|
SWFShape_setLeftFillStyle: prevent fill overflow
|
static inline void growLineArray(SWFShape shape)
{
int size;
if ( shape->nLines % STYLE_INCREMENT != 0 )
return;
size = (shape->nLines+STYLE_INCREMENT) * sizeof(SWFLineStyle);
shape->lines = (SWFLineStyle*)realloc(shape->lines, size);
}
|
static inline void growLineArray(SWFShape shape)
{
int size;
if ( shape->nLines % STYLE_INCREMENT != 0 )
return;
size = (shape->nLines+STYLE_INCREMENT) * sizeof(SWFLineStyle);
shape->lines = (SWFLineStyle*)realloc(shape->lines, size);
}
|
C
|
libming
| 0 |
CVE-2012-5148
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-5148/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/e89cfcb9090e8c98129ae9160c513f504db74599
|
e89cfcb9090e8c98129ae9160c513f504db74599
|
Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void BrowserView::ShowBookmarkPrompt() {
GetLocationBarView()->ShowBookmarkPrompt();
}
|
void BrowserView::ShowBookmarkPrompt() {
GetLocationBarView()->ShowBookmarkPrompt();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-0723
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-0723/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/5c17c861a357e9458001f021a7afa7aab9937439
|
5c17c861a357e9458001f021a7afa7aab9937439
|
tty: Fix unsafe ldisc reference via ioctl(TIOCGETD)
ioctl(TIOCGETD) retrieves the line discipline id directly from the
ldisc because the line discipline id (c_line) in termios is untrustworthy;
userspace may have set termios via ioctl(TCSETS*) without actually
changing the line discipline via ioctl(TIOCSETD).
However, directly accessing the current ldisc via tty->ldisc is
unsafe; the ldisc ptr dereferenced may be stale if the line discipline
is changing via ioctl(TIOCSETD) or hangup.
Wait for the line discipline reference (just like read() or write())
to retrieve the "current" line discipline id.
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Peter Hurley <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
|
void __start_tty(struct tty_struct *tty)
{
if (!tty->stopped || tty->flow_stopped)
return;
tty->stopped = 0;
if (tty->ops->start)
tty->ops->start(tty);
tty_wakeup(tty);
}
|
void __start_tty(struct tty_struct *tty)
{
if (!tty->stopped || tty->flow_stopped)
return;
tty->stopped = 0;
if (tty->ops->start)
tty->ops->start(tty);
tty_wakeup(tty);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2840
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2840/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/2db5a2048dfcacfe5ad4311c2b1e435c4c67febc
|
2db5a2048dfcacfe5ad4311c2b1e435c4c67febc
|
chromeos: fix bug where "aw snap" page replaces first tab if it was a NTP when closing window with > 1 tab.
BUG=chromium-os:12088
TEST=verify bug per bug report.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6882058
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@83031 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
virtual void TabDetachedAt(TabContentsWrapper* contents, int index) {
states_.push_back(new State(contents, index, DETACH));
}
|
virtual void TabDetachedAt(TabContentsWrapper* contents, int index) {
states_.push_back(new State(contents, index, DETACH));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-1274
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1274/
|
CWE-254
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/d27468a832d5316884bd02f459cbf493697fd7e1
|
d27468a832d5316884bd02f459cbf493697fd7e1
|
Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
|
void AXObject::setSequentialFocusNavigationStartingPoint() {
if (parentObject())
parentObject()->setSequentialFocusNavigationStartingPoint();
}
|
void AXObject::setSequentialFocusNavigationStartingPoint() {
if (parentObject())
parentObject()->setSequentialFocusNavigationStartingPoint();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-10197
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-10197/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/libevent/libevent/commit/ec65c42052d95d2c23d1d837136d1cf1d9ecef9e
|
ec65c42052d95d2c23d1d837136d1cf1d9ecef9e
|
evdns: fix searching empty hostnames
From #332:
Here follows a bug report by **Guido Vranken** via the _Tor bug bounty program_. Please credit Guido accordingly.
## Bug report
The DNS code of Libevent contains this rather obvious OOB read:
```c
static char *
search_make_new(const struct search_state *const state, int n, const char *const base_name) {
const size_t base_len = strlen(base_name);
const char need_to_append_dot = base_name[base_len - 1] == '.' ? 0 : 1;
```
If the length of ```base_name``` is 0, then line 3125 reads 1 byte before the buffer. This will trigger a crash on ASAN-protected builds.
To reproduce:
Build libevent with ASAN:
```
$ CFLAGS='-fomit-frame-pointer -fsanitize=address' ./configure && make -j4
```
Put the attached ```resolv.conf``` and ```poc.c``` in the source directory and then do:
```
$ gcc -fsanitize=address -fomit-frame-pointer poc.c .libs/libevent.a
$ ./a.out
=================================================================
==22201== ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x60060000efdf at pc 0x4429da bp 0x7ffe1ed47300 sp 0x7ffe1ed472f8
READ of size 1 at 0x60060000efdf thread T0
```
P.S. we can add a check earlier, but since this is very uncommon, I didn't add it.
Fixes: #332
|
search_state_decref(struct search_state *const state) {
if (!state) return;
state->refcount--;
if (!state->refcount) {
struct search_domain *next, *dom;
for (dom = state->head; dom; dom = next) {
next = dom->next;
mm_free(dom);
}
mm_free(state);
}
}
|
search_state_decref(struct search_state *const state) {
if (!state) return;
state->refcount--;
if (!state->refcount) {
struct search_domain *next, *dom;
for (dom = state->head; dom; dom = next) {
next = dom->next;
mm_free(dom);
}
mm_free(state);
}
}
|
C
|
libevent
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5204
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5204/
|
CWE-79
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/e1e67d5d341d82c61cab2c41ff4163f17caf14ae
|
e1e67d5d341d82c61cab2c41ff4163f17caf14ae
|
Add boolean to UserIntiatedInfo noting if an input event led to navigation.
Also refactor UkmPageLoadMetricsObserver to use this new boolean to
report the user initiated metric in RecordPageLoadExtraInfoMetrics, so
that it works correctly in the case when the page load failed.
Bug: 925104
Change-Id: Ie08e7d3912cb1da484190d838005e95e57a209ff
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1450460
Commit-Queue: Annie Sullivan <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Bryan McQuade <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#630870}
|
void MetricsWebContentsObserver::BroadcastEventToObservers(
const void* const event_key) {
if (committed_load_)
committed_load_->BroadcastEventToObservers(event_key);
}
|
void MetricsWebContentsObserver::BroadcastEventToObservers(
const void* const event_key) {
if (committed_load_)
committed_load_->BroadcastEventToObservers(event_key);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6127
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6127/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/28044cb7ef4488e7278c2b80f0e3a2c3707d03b6
|
28044cb7ef4488e7278c2b80f0e3a2c3707d03b6
|
[IndexedDB] Fixing early destruction of connection during forceclose
Patch is as small as possible for merging.
Bug: 842990
Change-Id: I9968ffee1bf3279e61e1ec13e4d541f713caf12f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1062935
Commit-Queue: Daniel Murphy <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Victor Costan <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#559383}
|
void IndexedDBTransaction::ScheduleAbortTask(AbortOperation abort_task) {
DCHECK_NE(FINISHED, state_);
DCHECK(used_);
abort_task_stack_.push(std::move(abort_task));
}
|
void IndexedDBTransaction::ScheduleAbortTask(AbortOperation abort_task) {
DCHECK_NE(FINISHED, state_);
DCHECK(used_);
abort_task_stack_.push(std::move(abort_task));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-3179
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-3179/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/d800220da9f744779f1989e2092c88770adcd20a
|
d800220da9f744779f1989e2092c88770adcd20a
|
Remove blink::ReadableStream
This CL removes two stable runtime enabled flags
- ResponseConstructedWithReadableStream
- ResponseBodyWithV8ExtraStream
and related code including blink::ReadableStream.
BUG=613435
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2227403002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#411014}
|
bool ReadableStream::enqueuePostAction()
{
m_isPulling = false;
bool shouldApplyBackpressure = this->shouldApplyBackpressure();
if (m_state == Errored)
return false;
return !shouldApplyBackpressure;
}
|
bool ReadableStream::enqueuePostAction()
{
m_isPulling = false;
bool shouldApplyBackpressure = this->shouldApplyBackpressure();
if (m_state == Errored)
return false;
return !shouldApplyBackpressure;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-12248
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-12248/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/mruby/mruby/commit/778500563a9f7ceba996937dc886bd8cde29b42b
|
778500563a9f7ceba996937dc886bd8cde29b42b
|
Extend stack when pushing arguments that does not fit in; fix #4038
|
fiber_init(mrb_state *mrb, mrb_value self)
{
static const struct mrb_context mrb_context_zero = { 0 };
struct RFiber *f = fiber_ptr(self);
struct mrb_context *c;
struct RProc *p;
mrb_callinfo *ci;
mrb_value blk;
size_t slen;
mrb_get_args(mrb, "&", &blk);
if (f->cxt) {
mrb_raise(mrb, E_RUNTIME_ERROR, "cannot initialize twice");
}
if (mrb_nil_p(blk)) {
mrb_raise(mrb, E_ARGUMENT_ERROR, "tried to create Fiber object without a block");
}
p = mrb_proc_ptr(blk);
if (MRB_PROC_CFUNC_P(p)) {
mrb_raise(mrb, E_FIBER_ERROR, "tried to create Fiber from C defined method");
}
c = (struct mrb_context*)mrb_malloc(mrb, sizeof(struct mrb_context));
*c = mrb_context_zero;
f->cxt = c;
/* initialize VM stack */
slen = FIBER_STACK_INIT_SIZE;
if (p->body.irep->nregs > slen) {
slen += p->body.irep->nregs;
}
c->stbase = (mrb_value *)mrb_malloc(mrb, slen*sizeof(mrb_value));
c->stend = c->stbase + slen;
c->stack = c->stbase;
#ifdef MRB_NAN_BOXING
{
mrb_value *p = c->stbase;
mrb_value *pend = c->stend;
while (p < pend) {
SET_NIL_VALUE(*p);
p++;
}
}
#else
memset(c->stbase, 0, slen * sizeof(mrb_value));
#endif
/* copy receiver from a block */
c->stack[0] = mrb->c->stack[0];
/* initialize callinfo stack */
c->cibase = (mrb_callinfo *)mrb_calloc(mrb, FIBER_CI_INIT_SIZE, sizeof(mrb_callinfo));
c->ciend = c->cibase + FIBER_CI_INIT_SIZE;
c->ci = c->cibase;
c->ci->stackent = c->stack;
/* adjust return callinfo */
ci = c->ci;
ci->target_class = MRB_PROC_TARGET_CLASS(p);
ci->proc = p;
mrb_field_write_barrier(mrb, (struct RBasic*)mrb_obj_ptr(self), (struct RBasic*)p);
ci->pc = p->body.irep->iseq;
ci->nregs = p->body.irep->nregs;
ci[1] = ci[0];
c->ci++; /* push dummy callinfo */
c->fib = f;
c->status = MRB_FIBER_CREATED;
return self;
}
|
fiber_init(mrb_state *mrb, mrb_value self)
{
static const struct mrb_context mrb_context_zero = { 0 };
struct RFiber *f = fiber_ptr(self);
struct mrb_context *c;
struct RProc *p;
mrb_callinfo *ci;
mrb_value blk;
size_t slen;
mrb_get_args(mrb, "&", &blk);
if (f->cxt) {
mrb_raise(mrb, E_RUNTIME_ERROR, "cannot initialize twice");
}
if (mrb_nil_p(blk)) {
mrb_raise(mrb, E_ARGUMENT_ERROR, "tried to create Fiber object without a block");
}
p = mrb_proc_ptr(blk);
if (MRB_PROC_CFUNC_P(p)) {
mrb_raise(mrb, E_FIBER_ERROR, "tried to create Fiber from C defined method");
}
c = (struct mrb_context*)mrb_malloc(mrb, sizeof(struct mrb_context));
*c = mrb_context_zero;
f->cxt = c;
/* initialize VM stack */
slen = FIBER_STACK_INIT_SIZE;
if (p->body.irep->nregs > slen) {
slen += p->body.irep->nregs;
}
c->stbase = (mrb_value *)mrb_malloc(mrb, slen*sizeof(mrb_value));
c->stend = c->stbase + slen;
c->stack = c->stbase;
#ifdef MRB_NAN_BOXING
{
mrb_value *p = c->stbase;
mrb_value *pend = c->stend;
while (p < pend) {
SET_NIL_VALUE(*p);
p++;
}
}
#else
memset(c->stbase, 0, slen * sizeof(mrb_value));
#endif
/* copy receiver from a block */
c->stack[0] = mrb->c->stack[0];
/* initialize callinfo stack */
c->cibase = (mrb_callinfo *)mrb_calloc(mrb, FIBER_CI_INIT_SIZE, sizeof(mrb_callinfo));
c->ciend = c->cibase + FIBER_CI_INIT_SIZE;
c->ci = c->cibase;
c->ci->stackent = c->stack;
/* adjust return callinfo */
ci = c->ci;
ci->target_class = MRB_PROC_TARGET_CLASS(p);
ci->proc = p;
mrb_field_write_barrier(mrb, (struct RBasic*)mrb_obj_ptr(self), (struct RBasic*)p);
ci->pc = p->body.irep->iseq;
ci->nregs = p->body.irep->nregs;
ci[1] = ci[0];
c->ci++; /* push dummy callinfo */
c->fib = f;
c->status = MRB_FIBER_CREATED;
return self;
}
|
C
|
mruby
| 0 |
CVE-2015-3331
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-3331/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/ccfe8c3f7e52ae83155cb038753f4c75b774ca8a
|
ccfe8c3f7e52ae83155cb038753f4c75b774ca8a
|
crypto: aesni - fix memory usage in GCM decryption
The kernel crypto API logic requires the caller to provide the
length of (ciphertext || authentication tag) as cryptlen for the
AEAD decryption operation. Thus, the cipher implementation must
calculate the size of the plaintext output itself and cannot simply use
cryptlen.
The RFC4106 GCM decryption operation tries to overwrite cryptlen memory
in req->dst. As the destination buffer for decryption only needs to hold
the plaintext memory but cryptlen references the input buffer holding
(ciphertext || authentication tag), the assumption of the destination
buffer length in RFC4106 GCM operation leads to a too large size. This
patch simply uses the already calculated plaintext size.
In addition, this patch fixes the offset calculation of the AAD buffer
pointer: as mentioned before, cryptlen already includes the size of the
tag. Thus, the tag does not need to be added. With the addition, the AAD
will be written beyond the already allocated buffer.
Note, this fixes a kernel crash that can be triggered from user space
via AF_ALG(aead) -- simply use the libkcapi test application
from [1] and update it to use rfc4106-gcm-aes.
Using [1], the changes were tested using CAVS vectors to demonstrate
that the crypto operation still delivers the right results.
[1] http://www.chronox.de/libkcapi.html
CC: Tadeusz Struk <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
|
static int xts_aesni_setkey(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, const u8 *key,
unsigned int keylen)
{
struct aesni_xts_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
u32 *flags = &tfm->crt_flags;
int err;
/* key consists of keys of equal size concatenated, therefore
* the length must be even
*/
if (keylen % 2) {
*flags |= CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN;
return -EINVAL;
}
/* first half of xts-key is for crypt */
err = aes_set_key_common(tfm, ctx->raw_crypt_ctx, key, keylen / 2);
if (err)
return err;
/* second half of xts-key is for tweak */
return aes_set_key_common(tfm, ctx->raw_tweak_ctx, key + keylen / 2,
keylen / 2);
}
|
static int xts_aesni_setkey(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, const u8 *key,
unsigned int keylen)
{
struct aesni_xts_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
u32 *flags = &tfm->crt_flags;
int err;
/* key consists of keys of equal size concatenated, therefore
* the length must be even
*/
if (keylen % 2) {
*flags |= CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN;
return -EINVAL;
}
/* first half of xts-key is for crypt */
err = aes_set_key_common(tfm, ctx->raw_crypt_ctx, key, keylen / 2);
if (err)
return err;
/* second half of xts-key is for tweak */
return aes_set_key_common(tfm, ctx->raw_tweak_ctx, key + keylen / 2,
keylen / 2);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/1161a49d663dd395bd639549c2dfe7324f847938
|
1161a49d663dd395bd639549c2dfe7324f847938
|
Don't populate URL data in WebDropData when dragging files.
This is considered a potential security issue as well, since it leaks
filesystem paths.
BUG=332579
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/135633002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@244538 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
bool TabStrip::IsRectInWindowCaption(const gfx::Rect& rect) {
views::View* v = GetEventHandlerForRect(rect);
if (v == this)
return true;
gfx::RectF rect_in_newtab_coords_f(rect);
View::ConvertRectToTarget(this, newtab_button_, &rect_in_newtab_coords_f);
gfx::Rect rect_in_newtab_coords = gfx::ToEnclosingRect(
rect_in_newtab_coords_f);
if (newtab_button_->GetLocalBounds().Intersects(rect_in_newtab_coords) &&
!newtab_button_->HitTestRect(rect_in_newtab_coords))
return true;
return false;
}
|
bool TabStrip::IsRectInWindowCaption(const gfx::Rect& rect) {
views::View* v = GetEventHandlerForRect(rect);
if (v == this)
return true;
gfx::RectF rect_in_newtab_coords_f(rect);
View::ConvertRectToTarget(this, newtab_button_, &rect_in_newtab_coords_f);
gfx::Rect rect_in_newtab_coords = gfx::ToEnclosingRect(
rect_in_newtab_coords_f);
if (newtab_button_->GetLocalBounds().Intersects(rect_in_newtab_coords) &&
!newtab_button_->HitTestRect(rect_in_newtab_coords))
return true;
return false;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-4516
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-4516/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b33654b1e3b0c74d4a1fed041c9aae50b3c427
|
a8b33654b1e3b0c74d4a1fed041c9aae50b3c427
|
Staging: sb105x: info leak in mp_get_count()
The icount.reserved[] array isn't initialized so it leaks stack
information to userspace.
Reported-by: Nico Golde <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Fabian Yamaguchi <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
static void mp_throttle(struct tty_struct *tty)
{
struct sb_uart_state *state = tty->driver_data;
if (I_IXOFF(tty))
mp_send_xchar(tty, STOP_CHAR(tty));
if (tty->termios.c_cflag & CRTSCTS)
uart_clear_mctrl(state->port, TIOCM_RTS);
}
|
static void mp_throttle(struct tty_struct *tty)
{
struct sb_uart_state *state = tty->driver_data;
if (I_IXOFF(tty))
mp_send_xchar(tty, STOP_CHAR(tty));
if (tty->termios.c_cflag & CRTSCTS)
uart_clear_mctrl(state->port, TIOCM_RTS);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2015-8863
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-8863/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/stedolan/jq/commit/8eb1367ca44e772963e704a700ef72ae2e12babd
|
8eb1367ca44e772963e704a700ef72ae2e12babd
|
Heap buffer overflow in tokenadd() (fix #105)
This was an off-by one: the NUL terminator byte was not allocated on
resize. This was triggered by JSON-encoded numbers longer than 256
bytes.
|
static void parser_free(struct jv_parser* p) {
parser_reset(p);
jv_free(p->path);
jv_free(p->output);
jv_mem_free(p->stack);
jv_mem_free(p->tokenbuf);
jvp_dtoa_context_free(&p->dtoa);
}
|
static void parser_free(struct jv_parser* p) {
parser_reset(p);
jv_free(p->path);
jv_free(p->output);
jv_mem_free(p->stack);
jv_mem_free(p->tokenbuf);
jvp_dtoa_context_free(&p->dtoa);
}
|
C
|
jq
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5053
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5053/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/5c895ed26b096468eea6baa6584f2df65905b76b
|
5c895ed26b096468eea6baa6584f2df65905b76b
|
[Android][TouchToFill] Use FindPasswordInfoForElement for triggering
Use for TouchToFill the same triggering logic that is used for regular
suggestions.
Bug: 1010233
Change-Id: I111d4eac4ce94dd94b86097b6b6c98e08875e11a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1834230
Commit-Queue: Boris Sazonov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Vadym Doroshenko <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#702058}
|
void PasswordAutofillAgent::OnDynamicFormsSeen() {
SendPasswordForms(false /* only_visible */);
}
|
void PasswordAutofillAgent::OnDynamicFormsSeen() {
SendPasswordForms(false /* only_visible */);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1621
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1621/
|
CWE-119
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/libvpx/+/5a9753fca56f0eeb9f61e342b2fccffc364f9426
|
5a9753fca56f0eeb9f61e342b2fccffc364f9426
|
Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
|
void Encoder::EncodeFrameInternal(const VideoSource &video,
const unsigned long frame_flags) {
vpx_codec_err_t res;
const vpx_image_t *img = video.img();
if (cfg_.g_w != img->d_w || cfg_.g_h != img->d_h) {
cfg_.g_w = img->d_w;
cfg_.g_h = img->d_h;
res = vpx_codec_enc_config_set(&encoder_, &cfg_);
ASSERT_EQ(VPX_CODEC_OK, res) << EncoderError();
}
API_REGISTER_STATE_CHECK(
res = vpx_codec_encode(&encoder_, img, video.pts(), video.duration(),
frame_flags, deadline_));
ASSERT_EQ(VPX_CODEC_OK, res) << EncoderError();
}
|
void Encoder::EncodeFrameInternal(const VideoSource &video,
const unsigned long frame_flags) {
vpx_codec_err_t res;
const vpx_image_t *img = video.img();
if (!encoder_.priv) {
cfg_.g_w = img->d_w;
cfg_.g_h = img->d_h;
cfg_.g_timebase = video.timebase();
cfg_.rc_twopass_stats_in = stats_->buf();
res = vpx_codec_enc_init(&encoder_, CodecInterface(), &cfg_,
init_flags_);
ASSERT_EQ(VPX_CODEC_OK, res) << EncoderError();
}
if (cfg_.g_w != img->d_w || cfg_.g_h != img->d_h) {
cfg_.g_w = img->d_w;
cfg_.g_h = img->d_h;
res = vpx_codec_enc_config_set(&encoder_, &cfg_);
ASSERT_EQ(VPX_CODEC_OK, res) << EncoderError();
}
REGISTER_STATE_CHECK(
res = vpx_codec_encode(&encoder_,
video.img(), video.pts(), video.duration(),
frame_flags, deadline_));
ASSERT_EQ(VPX_CODEC_OK, res) << EncoderError();
}
|
C
|
Android
| 1 |
CVE-2012-5148
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-5148/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/e89cfcb9090e8c98129ae9160c513f504db74599
|
e89cfcb9090e8c98129ae9160c513f504db74599
|
Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
RunOnProcessLauncherThread() {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::PROCESS_LAUNCHER));
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::PROCESS_LAUNCHER, FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(
&WaitForProcessLauncherThreadToGoIdleObserver::
RunOnProcessLauncherThread2,
this));
}
|
RunOnProcessLauncherThread() {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::PROCESS_LAUNCHER));
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::PROCESS_LAUNCHER, FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(
&WaitForProcessLauncherThreadToGoIdleObserver::
RunOnProcessLauncherThread2,
this));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-6269
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-6269/
|
CWE-189
|
https://git.haproxy.org/?p=haproxy-1.5.git;a=commitdiff;h=b4d05093bc89f71377230228007e69a1434c1a0c
|
b4d05093bc89f71377230228007e69a1434c1a0c
| null |
int http_resync_states(struct session *s)
{
struct http_txn *txn = &s->txn;
int old_req_state = txn->req.msg_state;
int old_res_state = txn->rsp.msg_state;
http_sync_req_state(s);
while (1) {
if (!http_sync_res_state(s))
break;
if (!http_sync_req_state(s))
break;
}
/* OK, both state machines agree on a compatible state.
* There are a few cases we're interested in :
* - HTTP_MSG_TUNNEL on either means we have to disable both analysers
* - HTTP_MSG_CLOSED on both sides means we've reached the end in both
* directions, so let's simply disable both analysers.
* - HTTP_MSG_CLOSED on the response only means we must abort the
* request.
* - HTTP_MSG_CLOSED on the request and HTTP_MSG_DONE on the response
* with server-close mode means we've completed one request and we
* must re-initialize the server connection.
*/
if (txn->req.msg_state == HTTP_MSG_TUNNEL ||
txn->rsp.msg_state == HTTP_MSG_TUNNEL ||
(txn->req.msg_state == HTTP_MSG_CLOSED &&
txn->rsp.msg_state == HTTP_MSG_CLOSED)) {
s->req->analysers = 0;
channel_auto_close(s->req);
channel_auto_read(s->req);
s->rep->analysers = 0;
channel_auto_close(s->rep);
channel_auto_read(s->rep);
}
else if ((txn->req.msg_state >= HTTP_MSG_DONE &&
(txn->rsp.msg_state == HTTP_MSG_CLOSED || (s->rep->flags & CF_SHUTW))) ||
txn->rsp.msg_state == HTTP_MSG_ERROR ||
txn->req.msg_state == HTTP_MSG_ERROR) {
s->rep->analysers = 0;
channel_auto_close(s->rep);
channel_auto_read(s->rep);
s->req->analysers = 0;
channel_abort(s->req);
channel_auto_close(s->req);
channel_auto_read(s->req);
bi_erase(s->req);
}
else if ((txn->req.msg_state == HTTP_MSG_DONE ||
txn->req.msg_state == HTTP_MSG_CLOSED) &&
txn->rsp.msg_state == HTTP_MSG_DONE &&
((txn->flags & TX_CON_WANT_MSK) == TX_CON_WANT_SCL ||
(txn->flags & TX_CON_WANT_MSK) == TX_CON_WANT_KAL)) {
/* server-close/keep-alive: terminate this transaction,
* possibly killing the server connection and reinitialize
* a fresh-new transaction.
*/
http_end_txn_clean_session(s);
}
return txn->req.msg_state != old_req_state ||
txn->rsp.msg_state != old_res_state;
}
|
int http_resync_states(struct session *s)
{
struct http_txn *txn = &s->txn;
int old_req_state = txn->req.msg_state;
int old_res_state = txn->rsp.msg_state;
http_sync_req_state(s);
while (1) {
if (!http_sync_res_state(s))
break;
if (!http_sync_req_state(s))
break;
}
/* OK, both state machines agree on a compatible state.
* There are a few cases we're interested in :
* - HTTP_MSG_TUNNEL on either means we have to disable both analysers
* - HTTP_MSG_CLOSED on both sides means we've reached the end in both
* directions, so let's simply disable both analysers.
* - HTTP_MSG_CLOSED on the response only means we must abort the
* request.
* - HTTP_MSG_CLOSED on the request and HTTP_MSG_DONE on the response
* with server-close mode means we've completed one request and we
* must re-initialize the server connection.
*/
if (txn->req.msg_state == HTTP_MSG_TUNNEL ||
txn->rsp.msg_state == HTTP_MSG_TUNNEL ||
(txn->req.msg_state == HTTP_MSG_CLOSED &&
txn->rsp.msg_state == HTTP_MSG_CLOSED)) {
s->req->analysers = 0;
channel_auto_close(s->req);
channel_auto_read(s->req);
s->rep->analysers = 0;
channel_auto_close(s->rep);
channel_auto_read(s->rep);
}
else if ((txn->req.msg_state >= HTTP_MSG_DONE &&
(txn->rsp.msg_state == HTTP_MSG_CLOSED || (s->rep->flags & CF_SHUTW))) ||
txn->rsp.msg_state == HTTP_MSG_ERROR ||
txn->req.msg_state == HTTP_MSG_ERROR) {
s->rep->analysers = 0;
channel_auto_close(s->rep);
channel_auto_read(s->rep);
s->req->analysers = 0;
channel_abort(s->req);
channel_auto_close(s->req);
channel_auto_read(s->req);
bi_erase(s->req);
}
else if ((txn->req.msg_state == HTTP_MSG_DONE ||
txn->req.msg_state == HTTP_MSG_CLOSED) &&
txn->rsp.msg_state == HTTP_MSG_DONE &&
((txn->flags & TX_CON_WANT_MSK) == TX_CON_WANT_SCL ||
(txn->flags & TX_CON_WANT_MSK) == TX_CON_WANT_KAL)) {
/* server-close/keep-alive: terminate this transaction,
* possibly killing the server connection and reinitialize
* a fresh-new transaction.
*/
http_end_txn_clean_session(s);
}
return txn->req.msg_state != old_req_state ||
txn->rsp.msg_state != old_res_state;
}
|
C
|
haproxy
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/6834289784ed45b5524de0fb7ef43ae283b0d6d3
|
6834289784ed45b5524de0fb7ef43ae283b0d6d3
|
Output silence if the MediaElementAudioSourceNode has a different origin
See http://webaudio.github.io/web-audio-api/#security-with-mediaelementaudiosourcenode-and-cross-origin-resources
Two new tests added for the same origin and a cross origin source.
BUG=313939
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/520433002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@189527 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
AudioContext::AudioContext(Document* document, unsigned numberOfChannels, size_t numberOfFrames, float sampleRate)
: ActiveDOMObject(document)
, m_isStopScheduled(false)
, m_isCleared(false)
, m_isInitialized(false)
, m_destinationNode(nullptr)
, m_isResolvingResumePromises(false)
, m_automaticPullNodesNeedUpdating(false)
, m_connectionCount(0)
, m_didInitializeContextGraphMutex(false)
, m_audioThread(0)
, m_isOfflineContext(true)
, m_contextState(Suspended)
, m_cachedSampleFrame(0)
{
m_didInitializeContextGraphMutex = true;
m_renderTarget = AudioBuffer::create(numberOfChannels, numberOfFrames, sampleRate);
if (m_renderTarget.get())
m_destinationNode = OfflineAudioDestinationNode::create(this, m_renderTarget.get());
initialize();
}
|
AudioContext::AudioContext(Document* document, unsigned numberOfChannels, size_t numberOfFrames, float sampleRate)
: ActiveDOMObject(document)
, m_isStopScheduled(false)
, m_isCleared(false)
, m_isInitialized(false)
, m_destinationNode(nullptr)
, m_isResolvingResumePromises(false)
, m_automaticPullNodesNeedUpdating(false)
, m_connectionCount(0)
, m_didInitializeContextGraphMutex(false)
, m_audioThread(0)
, m_isOfflineContext(true)
, m_contextState(Suspended)
, m_cachedSampleFrame(0)
{
m_didInitializeContextGraphMutex = true;
m_renderTarget = AudioBuffer::create(numberOfChannels, numberOfFrames, sampleRate);
if (m_renderTarget.get())
m_destinationNode = OfflineAudioDestinationNode::create(this, m_renderTarget.get());
initialize();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5019
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5019/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f03ea5a5c2ff26e239dfd23e263b15da2d9cee93
|
f03ea5a5c2ff26e239dfd23e263b15da2d9cee93
|
Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
|
void RenderFrameImpl::ShowDeferredContextMenu(const ContextMenuParams& params) {
Send(new FrameHostMsg_ContextMenu(routing_id_, params));
}
|
void RenderFrameImpl::ShowDeferredContextMenu(const ContextMenuParams& params) {
Send(new FrameHostMsg_ContextMenu(routing_id_, params));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-5112
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-5112/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/d65b01ca819881a507b5e60c25a2f9caff58cd57
|
d65b01ca819881a507b5e60c25a2f9caff58cd57
|
Wipe out QuotaThreadTask.
This is a one of a series of refactoring patches for QuotaManager.
http://codereview.chromium.org/10872054/
http://codereview.chromium.org/10917060/
BUG=139270
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10919070
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@154987 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
GetUsageInfoTask(
QuotaManager* manager,
const GetUsageInfoCallback& callback)
: QuotaTask(manager),
callback_(callback),
weak_factory_(ALLOW_THIS_IN_INITIALIZER_LIST(this)) {
}
|
GetUsageInfoTask(
QuotaManager* manager,
const GetUsageInfoCallback& callback)
: QuotaTask(manager),
callback_(callback),
weak_factory_(ALLOW_THIS_IN_INITIALIZER_LIST(this)) {
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-9059
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-9059/
|
CWE-404
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/c70422f760c120480fee4de6c38804c72aa26bc1
|
c70422f760c120480fee4de6c38804c72aa26bc1
|
Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
|
nfsd4_reclaim_complete(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct nfsd4_compound_state *cstate, struct nfsd4_reclaim_complete *rc)
{
__be32 status = 0;
if (rc->rca_one_fs) {
if (!cstate->current_fh.fh_dentry)
return nfserr_nofilehandle;
/*
* We don't take advantage of the rca_one_fs case.
* That's OK, it's optional, we can safely ignore it.
*/
return nfs_ok;
}
status = nfserr_complete_already;
if (test_and_set_bit(NFSD4_CLIENT_RECLAIM_COMPLETE,
&cstate->session->se_client->cl_flags))
goto out;
status = nfserr_stale_clientid;
if (is_client_expired(cstate->session->se_client))
/*
* The following error isn't really legal.
* But we only get here if the client just explicitly
* destroyed the client. Surely it no longer cares what
* error it gets back on an operation for the dead
* client.
*/
goto out;
status = nfs_ok;
nfsd4_client_record_create(cstate->session->se_client);
out:
return status;
}
|
nfsd4_reclaim_complete(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct nfsd4_compound_state *cstate, struct nfsd4_reclaim_complete *rc)
{
__be32 status = 0;
if (rc->rca_one_fs) {
if (!cstate->current_fh.fh_dentry)
return nfserr_nofilehandle;
/*
* We don't take advantage of the rca_one_fs case.
* That's OK, it's optional, we can safely ignore it.
*/
return nfs_ok;
}
status = nfserr_complete_already;
if (test_and_set_bit(NFSD4_CLIENT_RECLAIM_COMPLETE,
&cstate->session->se_client->cl_flags))
goto out;
status = nfserr_stale_clientid;
if (is_client_expired(cstate->session->se_client))
/*
* The following error isn't really legal.
* But we only get here if the client just explicitly
* destroyed the client. Surely it no longer cares what
* error it gets back on an operation for the dead
* client.
*/
goto out;
status = nfs_ok;
nfsd4_client_record_create(cstate->session->se_client);
out:
return status;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2350
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2350/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/b944f670bb7a8a919daac497a4ea0536c954c201
|
b944f670bb7a8a919daac497a4ea0536c954c201
|
[JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
EncodedJSValue JSC_HOST_CALL jsTestInterfaceConstructorFunctionSupplementalMethod4(ExecState* exec)
{
TestSupplemental::supplementalMethod4();
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
}
|
EncodedJSValue JSC_HOST_CALL jsTestInterfaceConstructorFunctionSupplementalMethod4(ExecState* exec)
{
TestSupplemental::supplementalMethod4();
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
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