CVE ID
stringlengths 13
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⌀ | CVE Page
stringlengths 45
48
⌀ | CWE ID
stringclasses 90
values | codeLink
stringlengths 46
139
| commit_id
stringlengths 6
81
| commit_message
stringlengths 3
13.3k
⌀ | func_after
stringlengths 14
241k
| func_before
stringlengths 14
241k
| lang
stringclasses 3
values | project
stringclasses 309
values | vul
int8 0
1
|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
CVE-2018-16425
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-16425/
|
CWE-415
|
https://github.com/OpenSC/OpenSC/commit/360e95d45ac4123255a4c796db96337f332160ad#diff-d643a0fa169471dbf2912f4866dc49c5
|
360e95d45ac4123255a4c796db96337f332160ad#diff-d643a0fa169471dbf2912f4866dc49c5
|
fixed out of bounds writes
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting the problems.
|
void sc_mem_clear(void *ptr, size_t len)
{
if (len > 0) {
#ifdef ENABLE_OPENSSL
OPENSSL_cleanse(ptr, len);
#else
memset(ptr, 0, len);
#endif
}
}
|
void sc_mem_clear(void *ptr, size_t len)
{
if (len > 0) {
#ifdef ENABLE_OPENSSL
OPENSSL_cleanse(ptr, len);
#else
memset(ptr, 0, len);
#endif
}
}
|
C
|
OpenSC
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2918
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2918/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233
|
a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233
|
perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael Cree <[email protected]>
Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <[email protected]>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric B Munson <[email protected]>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul Mundt <[email protected]>
Cc: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Cc: Jason Wessel <[email protected]>
Cc: Don Zickus <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
|
static int __perf_event_enable(void *info)
{
struct perf_event *event = info;
struct perf_event_context *ctx = event->ctx;
struct perf_event *leader = event->group_leader;
struct perf_cpu_context *cpuctx = __get_cpu_context(ctx);
int err;
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!ctx->is_active))
return -EINVAL;
raw_spin_lock(&ctx->lock);
update_context_time(ctx);
if (event->state >= PERF_EVENT_STATE_INACTIVE)
goto unlock;
/*
* set current task's cgroup time reference point
*/
perf_cgroup_set_timestamp(current, ctx);
__perf_event_mark_enabled(event, ctx);
if (!event_filter_match(event)) {
if (is_cgroup_event(event))
perf_cgroup_defer_enabled(event);
goto unlock;
}
/*
* If the event is in a group and isn't the group leader,
* then don't put it on unless the group is on.
*/
if (leader != event && leader->state != PERF_EVENT_STATE_ACTIVE)
goto unlock;
if (!group_can_go_on(event, cpuctx, 1)) {
err = -EEXIST;
} else {
if (event == leader)
err = group_sched_in(event, cpuctx, ctx);
else
err = event_sched_in(event, cpuctx, ctx);
}
if (err) {
/*
* If this event can't go on and it's part of a
* group, then the whole group has to come off.
*/
if (leader != event)
group_sched_out(leader, cpuctx, ctx);
if (leader->attr.pinned) {
update_group_times(leader);
leader->state = PERF_EVENT_STATE_ERROR;
}
}
unlock:
raw_spin_unlock(&ctx->lock);
return 0;
}
|
static int __perf_event_enable(void *info)
{
struct perf_event *event = info;
struct perf_event_context *ctx = event->ctx;
struct perf_event *leader = event->group_leader;
struct perf_cpu_context *cpuctx = __get_cpu_context(ctx);
int err;
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!ctx->is_active))
return -EINVAL;
raw_spin_lock(&ctx->lock);
update_context_time(ctx);
if (event->state >= PERF_EVENT_STATE_INACTIVE)
goto unlock;
/*
* set current task's cgroup time reference point
*/
perf_cgroup_set_timestamp(current, ctx);
__perf_event_mark_enabled(event, ctx);
if (!event_filter_match(event)) {
if (is_cgroup_event(event))
perf_cgroup_defer_enabled(event);
goto unlock;
}
/*
* If the event is in a group and isn't the group leader,
* then don't put it on unless the group is on.
*/
if (leader != event && leader->state != PERF_EVENT_STATE_ACTIVE)
goto unlock;
if (!group_can_go_on(event, cpuctx, 1)) {
err = -EEXIST;
} else {
if (event == leader)
err = group_sched_in(event, cpuctx, ctx);
else
err = event_sched_in(event, cpuctx, ctx);
}
if (err) {
/*
* If this event can't go on and it's part of a
* group, then the whole group has to come off.
*/
if (leader != event)
group_sched_out(leader, cpuctx, ctx);
if (leader->attr.pinned) {
update_group_times(leader);
leader->state = PERF_EVENT_STATE_ERROR;
}
}
unlock:
raw_spin_unlock(&ctx->lock);
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2012-6647
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-6647/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/6f7b0a2a5c0fb03be7c25bd1745baa50582348ef
|
6f7b0a2a5c0fb03be7c25bd1745baa50582348ef
|
futex: Forbid uaddr == uaddr2 in futex_wait_requeue_pi()
If uaddr == uaddr2, then we have broken the rule of only requeueing
from a non-pi futex to a pi futex with this call. If we attempt this,
as the trinity test suite manages to do, we miss early wakeups as
q.key is equal to key2 (because they are the same uaddr). We will then
attempt to dereference the pi_mutex (which would exist had the futex_q
been properly requeued to a pi futex) and trigger a NULL pointer
dereference.
Signed-off-by: Darren Hart <[email protected]>
Cc: Dave Jones <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/ad82bfe7f7d130247fbe2b5b4275654807774227.1342809673.git.dvhart@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
|
int handle_early_requeue_pi_wakeup(struct futex_hash_bucket *hb,
struct futex_q *q, union futex_key *key2,
struct hrtimer_sleeper *timeout)
{
int ret = 0;
/*
* With the hb lock held, we avoid races while we process the wakeup.
* We only need to hold hb (and not hb2) to ensure atomicity as the
* wakeup code can't change q.key from uaddr to uaddr2 if we hold hb.
* It can't be requeued from uaddr2 to something else since we don't
* support a PI aware source futex for requeue.
*/
if (!match_futex(&q->key, key2)) {
WARN_ON(q->lock_ptr && (&hb->lock != q->lock_ptr));
/*
* We were woken prior to requeue by a timeout or a signal.
* Unqueue the futex_q and determine which it was.
*/
plist_del(&q->list, &hb->chain);
/* Handle spurious wakeups gracefully */
ret = -EWOULDBLOCK;
if (timeout && !timeout->task)
ret = -ETIMEDOUT;
else if (signal_pending(current))
ret = -ERESTARTNOINTR;
}
return ret;
}
|
int handle_early_requeue_pi_wakeup(struct futex_hash_bucket *hb,
struct futex_q *q, union futex_key *key2,
struct hrtimer_sleeper *timeout)
{
int ret = 0;
/*
* With the hb lock held, we avoid races while we process the wakeup.
* We only need to hold hb (and not hb2) to ensure atomicity as the
* wakeup code can't change q.key from uaddr to uaddr2 if we hold hb.
* It can't be requeued from uaddr2 to something else since we don't
* support a PI aware source futex for requeue.
*/
if (!match_futex(&q->key, key2)) {
WARN_ON(q->lock_ptr && (&hb->lock != q->lock_ptr));
/*
* We were woken prior to requeue by a timeout or a signal.
* Unqueue the futex_q and determine which it was.
*/
plist_del(&q->list, &hb->chain);
/* Handle spurious wakeups gracefully */
ret = -EWOULDBLOCK;
if (timeout && !timeout->task)
ret = -ETIMEDOUT;
else if (signal_pending(current))
ret = -ERESTARTNOINTR;
}
return ret;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2012-5154
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-5154/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/935cb0dee7696d70880f96a71bf5687411bb8cb9
|
935cb0dee7696d70880f96a71bf5687411bb8cb9
|
Fix integer overflow in Windows shared memory handling.
BUG=164490
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11450016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171369 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void SharedMemory::Unlock() {
DCHECK(lock_ != NULL);
ReleaseMutex(lock_);
}
|
void SharedMemory::Unlock() {
DCHECK(lock_ != NULL);
ReleaseMutex(lock_);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-3836
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-3836/
|
CWE-189
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/sonivox/+/e999f077f6ef59d20282f1e04786816a31fb8be6
|
e999f077f6ef59d20282f1e04786816a31fb8be6
|
DLS parser: fix wave pool size check.
Bug: 21132860.
Change-Id: I8ae872ea2cc2e8fec5fa0b7815f0b6b31ce744ff
(cherry picked from commit 2d7f8e1be2241e48458f5d3cab5e90be2b07c699)
|
static EAS_RESULT Parse_wsmp (SDLS_SYNTHESIZER_DATA *pDLSData, EAS_I32 pos, S_WSMP_DATA *p)
{
EAS_RESULT result;
EAS_U16 wtemp;
EAS_U32 ltemp;
EAS_U32 cbSize;
/* seek to start of chunk */
if ((result = EAS_HWFileSeek(pDLSData->hwInstData, pDLSData->fileHandle, pos)) != EAS_SUCCESS)
return result;
/* get structure size */
if ((result = EAS_HWGetDWord(pDLSData->hwInstData, pDLSData->fileHandle, &cbSize, EAS_FALSE)) != EAS_SUCCESS)
return result;
/* get unity note */
if ((result = EAS_HWGetWord(pDLSData->hwInstData, pDLSData->fileHandle, &wtemp, EAS_FALSE)) != EAS_SUCCESS)
return result;
if (wtemp <= 127)
p->unityNote = (EAS_U8) wtemp;
else
{
p->unityNote = 60;
{ /* dpp: EAS_ReportEx(_EAS_SEVERITY_WARNING, "Invalid unity note [%u] in DLS wsmp ignored, set to 60\n", wtemp); */ }
}
/* get fine tune */
if ((result = EAS_HWGetWord(pDLSData->hwInstData, pDLSData->fileHandle, &p->fineTune, EAS_FALSE)) != EAS_SUCCESS)
return result;
/* get gain */
if ((result = EAS_HWGetDWord(pDLSData->hwInstData, pDLSData->fileHandle, &p->gain, EAS_FALSE)) != EAS_SUCCESS)
return result;
if (p->gain > 0)
{
{ /* dpp: EAS_ReportEx(_EAS_SEVERITY_WARNING, "Positive gain [%ld] in DLS wsmp ignored, set to 0dB\n", p->gain); */ }
p->gain = 0;
}
/* option flags */
if ((result = EAS_HWGetDWord(pDLSData->hwInstData, pDLSData->fileHandle, <emp, EAS_FALSE)) != EAS_SUCCESS)
return result;
/* sample loops */
if ((result = EAS_HWGetDWord(pDLSData->hwInstData, pDLSData->fileHandle, <emp, EAS_FALSE)) != EAS_SUCCESS)
return result;
/* if looped sample, get loop data */
if (ltemp)
{
if (ltemp > 1)
{ /* dpp: EAS_ReportEx(_EAS_SEVERITY_WARNING, "DLS sample with %lu loops, ignoring extra loops\n", ltemp); */ }
/* skip ahead to loop data */
if ((result = EAS_HWFileSeek(pDLSData->hwInstData, pDLSData->fileHandle, pos + (EAS_I32) cbSize)) != EAS_SUCCESS)
return result;
/* get structure size */
if ((result = EAS_HWGetDWord(pDLSData->hwInstData, pDLSData->fileHandle, <emp, EAS_FALSE)) != EAS_SUCCESS)
return result;
/* get loop type */
if ((result = EAS_HWGetDWord(pDLSData->hwInstData, pDLSData->fileHandle, <emp, EAS_FALSE)) != EAS_SUCCESS)
return result;
/* get loop start */
if ((result = EAS_HWGetDWord(pDLSData->hwInstData, pDLSData->fileHandle, &p->loopStart, EAS_FALSE)) != EAS_SUCCESS)
return result;
/* get loop length */
if ((result = EAS_HWGetDWord(pDLSData->hwInstData, pDLSData->fileHandle, &p->loopLength, EAS_FALSE)) != EAS_SUCCESS)
return result;
}
return EAS_SUCCESS;
}
|
static EAS_RESULT Parse_wsmp (SDLS_SYNTHESIZER_DATA *pDLSData, EAS_I32 pos, S_WSMP_DATA *p)
{
EAS_RESULT result;
EAS_U16 wtemp;
EAS_U32 ltemp;
EAS_U32 cbSize;
/* seek to start of chunk */
if ((result = EAS_HWFileSeek(pDLSData->hwInstData, pDLSData->fileHandle, pos)) != EAS_SUCCESS)
return result;
/* get structure size */
if ((result = EAS_HWGetDWord(pDLSData->hwInstData, pDLSData->fileHandle, &cbSize, EAS_FALSE)) != EAS_SUCCESS)
return result;
/* get unity note */
if ((result = EAS_HWGetWord(pDLSData->hwInstData, pDLSData->fileHandle, &wtemp, EAS_FALSE)) != EAS_SUCCESS)
return result;
if (wtemp <= 127)
p->unityNote = (EAS_U8) wtemp;
else
{
p->unityNote = 60;
{ /* dpp: EAS_ReportEx(_EAS_SEVERITY_WARNING, "Invalid unity note [%u] in DLS wsmp ignored, set to 60\n", wtemp); */ }
}
/* get fine tune */
if ((result = EAS_HWGetWord(pDLSData->hwInstData, pDLSData->fileHandle, &p->fineTune, EAS_FALSE)) != EAS_SUCCESS)
return result;
/* get gain */
if ((result = EAS_HWGetDWord(pDLSData->hwInstData, pDLSData->fileHandle, &p->gain, EAS_FALSE)) != EAS_SUCCESS)
return result;
if (p->gain > 0)
{
{ /* dpp: EAS_ReportEx(_EAS_SEVERITY_WARNING, "Positive gain [%ld] in DLS wsmp ignored, set to 0dB\n", p->gain); */ }
p->gain = 0;
}
/* option flags */
if ((result = EAS_HWGetDWord(pDLSData->hwInstData, pDLSData->fileHandle, <emp, EAS_FALSE)) != EAS_SUCCESS)
return result;
/* sample loops */
if ((result = EAS_HWGetDWord(pDLSData->hwInstData, pDLSData->fileHandle, <emp, EAS_FALSE)) != EAS_SUCCESS)
return result;
/* if looped sample, get loop data */
if (ltemp)
{
if (ltemp > 1)
{ /* dpp: EAS_ReportEx(_EAS_SEVERITY_WARNING, "DLS sample with %lu loops, ignoring extra loops\n", ltemp); */ }
/* skip ahead to loop data */
if ((result = EAS_HWFileSeek(pDLSData->hwInstData, pDLSData->fileHandle, pos + (EAS_I32) cbSize)) != EAS_SUCCESS)
return result;
/* get structure size */
if ((result = EAS_HWGetDWord(pDLSData->hwInstData, pDLSData->fileHandle, <emp, EAS_FALSE)) != EAS_SUCCESS)
return result;
/* get loop type */
if ((result = EAS_HWGetDWord(pDLSData->hwInstData, pDLSData->fileHandle, <emp, EAS_FALSE)) != EAS_SUCCESS)
return result;
/* get loop start */
if ((result = EAS_HWGetDWord(pDLSData->hwInstData, pDLSData->fileHandle, &p->loopStart, EAS_FALSE)) != EAS_SUCCESS)
return result;
/* get loop length */
if ((result = EAS_HWGetDWord(pDLSData->hwInstData, pDLSData->fileHandle, &p->loopLength, EAS_FALSE)) != EAS_SUCCESS)
return result;
}
return EAS_SUCCESS;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3839
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3839/
|
CWE-284
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/system/bt/+/472271b153c5dc53c28beac55480a8d8434b2d5c
|
472271b153c5dc53c28beac55480a8d8434b2d5c
|
DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
|
bt_status_t btif_shutdown_bluetooth(void)
{
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __FUNCTION__);
btif_transfer_context(btif_jni_disassociate, 0, NULL, 0, NULL);
btif_queue_release();
thread_free(bt_jni_workqueue_thread);
bt_jni_workqueue_thread = NULL;
bte_main_shutdown();
btif_dut_mode = 0;
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("%s done", __FUNCTION__);
return BT_STATUS_SUCCESS;
}
|
bt_status_t btif_shutdown_bluetooth(void)
{
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __FUNCTION__);
btif_transfer_context(btif_jni_disassociate, 0, NULL, 0, NULL);
btif_queue_release();
thread_free(bt_jni_workqueue_thread);
bt_jni_workqueue_thread = NULL;
bte_main_shutdown();
btif_dut_mode = 0;
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("%s done", __FUNCTION__);
return BT_STATUS_SUCCESS;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5107
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5107/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/c25b198675380f713a56649c857b4367601d4a3d
|
c25b198675380f713a56649c857b4367601d4a3d
|
[Lock Screen Media Controls] Tweak UI based on new mocks
This CL rearranges the different components of the CrOS lock screen
media controls based on the newest mocks. This involves resizing most
of the child views and their spacings. The artwork was also resized
and re-positioned. Additionally, the close button was moved from the
main view to the header row child view.
Artist and title data about the current session will eventually be
placed to the right of the artwork, but right now this space is empty.
See the bug for before and after pictures.
Bug: 991647
Change-Id: I7b97f31982ccf2912bd2564d5241bfd849d21d92
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1746554
Reviewed-by: Xiyuan Xia <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Becca Hughes <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Mia Bergeron <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#686253}
|
void LockScreenMediaControlsView::OnMouseEntered(const ui::MouseEvent& event) {
if (is_in_drag_ || contents_view_->layer()->GetAnimator()->is_animating())
return;
header_row_->SetCloseButtonVisibility(true);
}
|
void LockScreenMediaControlsView::OnMouseEntered(const ui::MouseEvent& event) {
if (is_in_drag_ || contents_view_->layer()->GetAnimator()->is_animating())
return;
close_button_->SetVisible(true);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 1 |
CVE-2015-8767
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-8767/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/635682a14427d241bab7bbdeebb48a7d7b91638e
|
635682a14427d241bab7bbdeebb48a7d7b91638e
|
sctp: Prevent soft lockup when sctp_accept() is called during a timeout event
A case can occur when sctp_accept() is called by the user during
a heartbeat timeout event after the 4-way handshake. Since
sctp_assoc_migrate() changes both assoc->base.sk and assoc->ep, the
bh_sock_lock in sctp_generate_heartbeat_event() will be taken with
the listening socket but released with the new association socket.
The result is a deadlock on any future attempts to take the listening
socket lock.
Note that this race can occur with other SCTP timeouts that take
the bh_lock_sock() in the event sctp_accept() is called.
BUG: soft lockup - CPU#9 stuck for 67s! [swapper:0]
...
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8152d48e>] [<ffffffff8152d48e>] _spin_lock+0x1e/0x30
RSP: 0018:ffff880028323b20 EFLAGS: 00000206
RAX: 0000000000000002 RBX: ffff880028323b20 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff880028323be0 RDI: ffff8804632c4b48
RBP: ffffffff8100bb93 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffff880610662280 R11: 0000000000000100 R12: ffff880028323aa0
R13: ffff8804383c3880 R14: ffff880028323a90 R15: ffffffff81534225
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff880028320000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0018 ES: 0018 CR0: 000000008005003b
CR2: 00000000006df528 CR3: 0000000001a85000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Process swapper (pid: 0, threadinfo ffff880616b70000, task ffff880616b6cab0)
Stack:
ffff880028323c40 ffffffffa01c2582 ffff880614cfb020 0000000000000000
<d> 0100000000000000 00000014383a6c44 ffff8804383c3880 ffff880614e93c00
<d> ffff880614e93c00 0000000000000000 ffff8804632c4b00 ffff8804383c38b8
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
[<ffffffffa01c2582>] ? sctp_rcv+0x492/0xa10 [sctp]
[<ffffffff8148c559>] ? nf_iterate+0x69/0xb0
[<ffffffff814974a0>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0
[<ffffffff8148c716>] ? nf_hook_slow+0x76/0x120
[<ffffffff814974a0>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0
[<ffffffff8149757d>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0xdd/0x2d0
[<ffffffff81497808>] ? ip_local_deliver+0x98/0xa0
[<ffffffff81496ccd>] ? ip_rcv_finish+0x12d/0x440
[<ffffffff81497255>] ? ip_rcv+0x275/0x350
[<ffffffff8145cfeb>] ? __netif_receive_skb+0x4ab/0x750
...
With lockdep debugging:
=====================================
[ BUG: bad unlock balance detected! ]
-------------------------------------
CslRx/12087 is trying to release lock (slock-AF_INET) at:
[<ffffffffa01bcae0>] sctp_generate_timeout_event+0x40/0xe0 [sctp]
but there are no more locks to release!
other info that might help us debug this:
2 locks held by CslRx/12087:
#0: (&asoc->timers[i]){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff8108ce1f>] run_timer_softirq+0x16f/0x3e0
#1: (slock-AF_INET){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffffa01bcac3>] sctp_generate_timeout_event+0x23/0xe0 [sctp]
Ensure the socket taken is also the same one that is released by
saving a copy of the socket before entering the timeout event
critical section.
Signed-off-by: Karl Heiss <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static void sctp_cmd_send_asconf(struct sctp_association *asoc)
{
struct net *net = sock_net(asoc->base.sk);
/* Send the next asconf chunk from the addip chunk
* queue.
*/
if (!list_empty(&asoc->addip_chunk_list)) {
struct list_head *entry = asoc->addip_chunk_list.next;
struct sctp_chunk *asconf = list_entry(entry,
struct sctp_chunk, list);
list_del_init(entry);
/* Hold the chunk until an ASCONF_ACK is received. */
sctp_chunk_hold(asconf);
if (sctp_primitive_ASCONF(net, asoc, asconf))
sctp_chunk_free(asconf);
else
asoc->addip_last_asconf = asconf;
}
}
|
static void sctp_cmd_send_asconf(struct sctp_association *asoc)
{
struct net *net = sock_net(asoc->base.sk);
/* Send the next asconf chunk from the addip chunk
* queue.
*/
if (!list_empty(&asoc->addip_chunk_list)) {
struct list_head *entry = asoc->addip_chunk_list.next;
struct sctp_chunk *asconf = list_entry(entry,
struct sctp_chunk, list);
list_del_init(entry);
/* Hold the chunk until an ASCONF_ACK is received. */
sctp_chunk_hold(asconf);
if (sctp_primitive_ASCONF(net, asoc, asconf))
sctp_chunk_free(asconf);
else
asoc->addip_last_asconf = asconf;
}
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2012-4508
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-4508/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/dee1f973ca341c266229faa5a1a5bb268bed3531
|
dee1f973ca341c266229faa5a1a5bb268bed3531
|
ext4: race-condition protection for ext4_convert_unwritten_extents_endio
We assumed that at the time we call ext4_convert_unwritten_extents_endio()
extent in question is fully inside [map.m_lblk, map->m_len] because
it was already split during submission. But this may not be true due to
a race between writeback vs fallocate.
If extent in question is larger than requested we will split it again.
Special precautions should being done if zeroout required because
[map.m_lblk, map->m_len] already contains valid data.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Monakhov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
|
ext4_ext_binsearch_idx(struct inode *inode,
struct ext4_ext_path *path, ext4_lblk_t block)
{
struct ext4_extent_header *eh = path->p_hdr;
struct ext4_extent_idx *r, *l, *m;
ext_debug("binsearch for %u(idx): ", block);
l = EXT_FIRST_INDEX(eh) + 1;
r = EXT_LAST_INDEX(eh);
while (l <= r) {
m = l + (r - l) / 2;
if (block < le32_to_cpu(m->ei_block))
r = m - 1;
else
l = m + 1;
ext_debug("%p(%u):%p(%u):%p(%u) ", l, le32_to_cpu(l->ei_block),
m, le32_to_cpu(m->ei_block),
r, le32_to_cpu(r->ei_block));
}
path->p_idx = l - 1;
ext_debug(" -> %u->%lld ", le32_to_cpu(path->p_idx->ei_block),
ext4_idx_pblock(path->p_idx));
#ifdef CHECK_BINSEARCH
{
struct ext4_extent_idx *chix, *ix;
int k;
chix = ix = EXT_FIRST_INDEX(eh);
for (k = 0; k < le16_to_cpu(eh->eh_entries); k++, ix++) {
if (k != 0 &&
le32_to_cpu(ix->ei_block) <= le32_to_cpu(ix[-1].ei_block)) {
printk(KERN_DEBUG "k=%d, ix=0x%p, "
"first=0x%p\n", k,
ix, EXT_FIRST_INDEX(eh));
printk(KERN_DEBUG "%u <= %u\n",
le32_to_cpu(ix->ei_block),
le32_to_cpu(ix[-1].ei_block));
}
BUG_ON(k && le32_to_cpu(ix->ei_block)
<= le32_to_cpu(ix[-1].ei_block));
if (block < le32_to_cpu(ix->ei_block))
break;
chix = ix;
}
BUG_ON(chix != path->p_idx);
}
#endif
}
|
ext4_ext_binsearch_idx(struct inode *inode,
struct ext4_ext_path *path, ext4_lblk_t block)
{
struct ext4_extent_header *eh = path->p_hdr;
struct ext4_extent_idx *r, *l, *m;
ext_debug("binsearch for %u(idx): ", block);
l = EXT_FIRST_INDEX(eh) + 1;
r = EXT_LAST_INDEX(eh);
while (l <= r) {
m = l + (r - l) / 2;
if (block < le32_to_cpu(m->ei_block))
r = m - 1;
else
l = m + 1;
ext_debug("%p(%u):%p(%u):%p(%u) ", l, le32_to_cpu(l->ei_block),
m, le32_to_cpu(m->ei_block),
r, le32_to_cpu(r->ei_block));
}
path->p_idx = l - 1;
ext_debug(" -> %u->%lld ", le32_to_cpu(path->p_idx->ei_block),
ext4_idx_pblock(path->p_idx));
#ifdef CHECK_BINSEARCH
{
struct ext4_extent_idx *chix, *ix;
int k;
chix = ix = EXT_FIRST_INDEX(eh);
for (k = 0; k < le16_to_cpu(eh->eh_entries); k++, ix++) {
if (k != 0 &&
le32_to_cpu(ix->ei_block) <= le32_to_cpu(ix[-1].ei_block)) {
printk(KERN_DEBUG "k=%d, ix=0x%p, "
"first=0x%p\n", k,
ix, EXT_FIRST_INDEX(eh));
printk(KERN_DEBUG "%u <= %u\n",
le32_to_cpu(ix->ei_block),
le32_to_cpu(ix[-1].ei_block));
}
BUG_ON(k && le32_to_cpu(ix->ei_block)
<= le32_to_cpu(ix[-1].ei_block));
if (block < le32_to_cpu(ix->ei_block))
break;
chix = ix;
}
BUG_ON(chix != path->p_idx);
}
#endif
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-6310
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-6310/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/verdammelt/tnef/commit/8dccf79857ceeb7a6d3e42c1e762e7b865d5344d
|
8dccf79857ceeb7a6d3e42c1e762e7b865d5344d
|
Check types to avoid invalid reads/writes.
|
get_html_data (MAPI_Attr *a)
{
VarLenData **body = XCALLOC(VarLenData*, a->num_values + 1);
int j;
for (j = 0; j < a->num_values; j++)
{
if (a->type == szMAPI_BINARY) {
body[j] = XMALLOC(VarLenData, 1);
body[j]->len = a->values[j].len;
body[j]->data = CHECKED_XCALLOC(unsigned char, a->values[j].len);
memmove (body[j]->data, a->values[j].data.buf, body[j]->len);
}
}
return body;
}
|
get_html_data (MAPI_Attr *a)
{
VarLenData **body = XCALLOC(VarLenData*, a->num_values + 1);
int j;
for (j = 0; j < a->num_values; j++)
{
body[j] = XMALLOC(VarLenData, 1);
body[j]->len = a->values[j].len;
body[j]->data = CHECKED_XCALLOC(unsigned char, a->values[j].len);
memmove (body[j]->data, a->values[j].data.buf, body[j]->len);
}
return body;
}
|
C
|
tnef
| 1 |
CVE-2015-8126
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-8126/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/7f3d85b096f66870a15b37c2f40b219b2e292693
|
7f3d85b096f66870a15b37c2f40b219b2e292693
|
third_party/libpng: update to 1.2.54
[email protected]
BUG=560291
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1467263003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#362298}
|
png_set_expand_gray_1_2_4_to_8(png_structp png_ptr)
{
png_debug(1, "in png_set_expand_gray_1_2_4_to_8");
if (png_ptr == NULL)
return;
png_ptr->transformations |= PNG_EXPAND;
png_ptr->flags &= ~PNG_FLAG_ROW_INIT;
}
|
png_set_expand_gray_1_2_4_to_8(png_structp png_ptr)
{
png_debug(1, "in png_set_expand_gray_1_2_4_to_8");
if (png_ptr == NULL)
return;
png_ptr->transformations |= PNG_EXPAND;
png_ptr->flags &= ~PNG_FLAG_ROW_INIT;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5170
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5170/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/c3957448cfc6e299165196a33cd954b790875fdb
|
c3957448cfc6e299165196a33cd954b790875fdb
|
Cleanup and remove dead code in SetFocusedElement
This early-out was added in:
https://crrev.com/ce8ea3446283965c7eabab592cbffe223b1cf2bc
Back then, we applied fragment focus in LayoutUpdated() which could
cause this issue. This got cleaned up in:
https://crrev.com/45236fd563e9df53dc45579be1f3d0b4784885a2
so that focus is no longer applied after layout.
+Cleanup: Goto considered harmful
Bug: 795381
Change-Id: Ifeb4d2e03e872fd48cca6720b1d4de36ad1ecbb7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1524417
Commit-Queue: David Bokan <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Zager <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#641101}
|
EventTarget* Document::ErrorEventTarget() {
return domWindow();
}
|
EventTarget* Document::ErrorEventTarget() {
return domWindow();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-3084
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-3084/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/744c2a2d90c3c9a33c818e1ea4b7ccb5010663a0
|
744c2a2d90c3c9a33c818e1ea4b7ccb5010663a0
|
Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void MockRenderThread::AddRoute(int32 routing_id,
IPC::Channel::Listener* listener) {
// We may hear this for views created from OnMsgCreateWindow as well,
// in which case we don't want to track the new widget.
if (routing_id_ == routing_id)
widget_ = listener;
}
|
void MockRenderThread::AddRoute(int32 routing_id,
IPC::Channel::Listener* listener) {
EXPECT_EQ(routing_id_, routing_id);
widget_ = listener;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 1 |
CVE-2017-7962
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-7962/
|
CWE-369
|
https://github.com/jsummers/imageworsener/commit/ca3356eb49fee03e2eaf6b6aff826988c1122d93
|
ca3356eb49fee03e2eaf6b6aff826988c1122d93
|
Fixed a GIF decoding bug (divide by zero)
Fixes issue #15
|
static void lzw_clear(struct lzwdeccontext *d)
{
d->ct_used = d->num_root_codes+2;
d->current_codesize = d->root_codesize+1;
d->ncodes_since_clear=0;
d->oldcode=0;
}
|
static void lzw_clear(struct lzwdeccontext *d)
{
d->ct_used = d->num_root_codes+2;
d->current_codesize = d->root_codesize+1;
d->ncodes_since_clear=0;
d->oldcode=0;
}
|
C
|
imageworsener
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/fc790462b4f248712bbc8c3734664dd6b05f80f2
|
fc790462b4f248712bbc8c3734664dd6b05f80f2
|
Set the job name for the print job on the Mac.
BUG=http://crbug.com/29188
TEST=as in bug
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/1997016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@47056 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void PrintJobWorker::Cancel() {
printing_context_.Cancel();
}
|
void PrintJobWorker::Cancel() {
printing_context_.Cancel();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-3173
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-3173/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/ee7579229ff7e9e5ae28bf53aea069251499d7da
|
ee7579229ff7e9e5ae28bf53aea069251499d7da
|
Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
[email protected],[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
TextureAttachment(
TextureRef* texture_ref, GLenum target, GLint level, GLsizei samples)
: texture_ref_(texture_ref),
target_(target),
level_(level),
samples_(samples) {
}
|
TextureAttachment(
TextureRef* texture_ref, GLenum target, GLint level, GLsizei samples)
: texture_ref_(texture_ref),
target_(target),
level_(level),
samples_(samples) {
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2918
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2918/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233
|
a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233
|
perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael Cree <[email protected]>
Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <[email protected]>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric B Munson <[email protected]>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul Mundt <[email protected]>
Cc: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Cc: Jason Wessel <[email protected]>
Cc: Don Zickus <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
|
static void cpu_clock_event_read(struct perf_event *event)
{
cpu_clock_event_update(event);
}
|
static void cpu_clock_event_read(struct perf_event *event)
{
cpu_clock_event_update(event);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-10218
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-10218/
|
CWE-476
|
http://git.ghostscript.com/?p=ghostpdl.git;a=commit;h=d621292fb2c8157d9899dcd83fd04dd250e30fe4
|
d621292fb2c8157d9899dcd83fd04dd250e30fe4
| null |
pdf14_discard_trans_layer(gx_device *dev, gs_gstate * pgs)
{
pdf14_device *pdev = (pdf14_device *)dev;
/* The things that need to be cleaned up */
pdf14_ctx *ctx = pdev->ctx;
pdf14_smaskcolor_t *smaskcolor = pdev->smaskcolor;
pdf14_parent_color_t *group_procs = pdev->trans_group_parent_cmap_procs;
/* Free up the smask color */
if (smaskcolor != NULL) {
smaskcolor->ref_count = 1;
pdf14_decrement_smask_color(pgs, dev);
pdev->smaskcolor = NULL;
}
/* Free up the nested color procs and decrement the profiles */
if (group_procs != NULL) {
while (group_procs->previous != NULL)
pdf14_pop_parent_color(dev, pgs);
gs_free_object(dev->memory, group_procs, "pdf14_discard_trans_layer");
pdev->trans_group_parent_cmap_procs = NULL;
}
/* Start the contex clean up */
if (ctx != NULL) {
pdf14_buf *buf, *next;
pdf14_parent_color_t *procs, *prev_procs;
if (ctx->mask_stack != NULL) {
pdf14_free_mask_stack(ctx, ctx->memory);
}
/* Now the stack of buffers */
for (buf = ctx->stack; buf != NULL; buf = next) {
next = buf->saved;
gs_free_object(ctx->memory, buf->transfer_fn, "pdf14_discard_trans_layer");
gs_free_object(ctx->memory, buf->matte, "pdf14_discard_trans_layer");
gs_free_object(ctx->memory, buf->data, "pdf14_discard_trans_layer");
gs_free_object(ctx->memory, buf->backdrop, "pdf14_discard_trans_layer");
/* During the soft mask push, the mask_stack was copied (not moved) from
the ctx to the tos mask_stack. We are done with this now so it is safe
to free this one object */
gs_free_object(ctx->memory, buf->mask_stack, "pdf14_discard_trans_layer");
for (procs = buf->parent_color_info_procs; procs != NULL; procs = prev_procs) {
prev_procs = procs->previous;
gs_free_object(ctx->memory, procs, "pdf14_discard_trans_layer");
}
gs_free_object(ctx->memory, buf, "pdf14_discard_trans_layer");
}
/* Finally the context itself */
gs_free_object (ctx->memory, ctx, "pdf14_discard_trans_layer");
pdev->ctx = NULL;
}
return 0;
}
|
pdf14_discard_trans_layer(gx_device *dev, gs_gstate * pgs)
{
pdf14_device *pdev = (pdf14_device *)dev;
/* The things that need to be cleaned up */
pdf14_ctx *ctx = pdev->ctx;
pdf14_smaskcolor_t *smaskcolor = pdev->smaskcolor;
pdf14_parent_color_t *group_procs = pdev->trans_group_parent_cmap_procs;
/* Free up the smask color */
if (smaskcolor != NULL) {
smaskcolor->ref_count = 1;
pdf14_decrement_smask_color(pgs, dev);
pdev->smaskcolor = NULL;
}
/* Free up the nested color procs and decrement the profiles */
if (group_procs != NULL) {
while (group_procs->previous != NULL)
pdf14_pop_parent_color(dev, pgs);
gs_free_object(dev->memory, group_procs, "pdf14_discard_trans_layer");
pdev->trans_group_parent_cmap_procs = NULL;
}
/* Start the contex clean up */
if (ctx != NULL) {
pdf14_buf *buf, *next;
pdf14_parent_color_t *procs, *prev_procs;
if (ctx->mask_stack != NULL) {
pdf14_free_mask_stack(ctx, ctx->memory);
}
/* Now the stack of buffers */
for (buf = ctx->stack; buf != NULL; buf = next) {
next = buf->saved;
gs_free_object(ctx->memory, buf->transfer_fn, "pdf14_discard_trans_layer");
gs_free_object(ctx->memory, buf->matte, "pdf14_discard_trans_layer");
gs_free_object(ctx->memory, buf->data, "pdf14_discard_trans_layer");
gs_free_object(ctx->memory, buf->backdrop, "pdf14_discard_trans_layer");
/* During the soft mask push, the mask_stack was copied (not moved) from
the ctx to the tos mask_stack. We are done with this now so it is safe
to free this one object */
gs_free_object(ctx->memory, buf->mask_stack, "pdf14_discard_trans_layer");
for (procs = buf->parent_color_info_procs; procs != NULL; procs = prev_procs) {
prev_procs = procs->previous;
gs_free_object(ctx->memory, procs, "pdf14_discard_trans_layer");
}
gs_free_object(ctx->memory, buf, "pdf14_discard_trans_layer");
}
/* Finally the context itself */
gs_free_object (ctx->memory, ctx, "pdf14_discard_trans_layer");
pdev->ctx = NULL;
}
return 0;
}
|
C
|
ghostscript
| 0 |
CVE-2014-1715
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-1715/
|
CWE-22
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/ce70785c73a2b7cf2b34de0d8439ca31929b4743
|
ce70785c73a2b7cf2b34de0d8439ca31929b4743
|
Consistently check if a block can handle pagination strut propagation.
https://codereview.chromium.org/1360753002 got it right for inline child
layout, but did nothing for block child layout.
BUG=329421
[email protected],[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1387553002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#352429}
|
void LayoutBlockFlow::clipOutFloatingObjects(const LayoutBlock* rootBlock, ClipScope& clipScope,
const LayoutPoint& rootBlockPhysicalPosition, const LayoutSize& offsetFromRootBlock) const
{
if (!m_floatingObjects)
return;
const FloatingObjectSet& floatingObjectSet = m_floatingObjects->set();
FloatingObjectSetIterator end = floatingObjectSet.end();
for (FloatingObjectSetIterator it = floatingObjectSet.begin(); it != end; ++it) {
const FloatingObject& floatingObject = *it->get();
LayoutRect floatBox(LayoutPoint(offsetFromRootBlock), floatingObject.layoutObject()->size());
floatBox.move(positionForFloatIncludingMargin(floatingObject));
rootBlock->flipForWritingMode(floatBox);
floatBox.move(rootBlockPhysicalPosition.x(), rootBlockPhysicalPosition.y());
clipScope.clip(floatBox, SkRegion::kDifference_Op);
}
}
|
void LayoutBlockFlow::clipOutFloatingObjects(const LayoutBlock* rootBlock, ClipScope& clipScope,
const LayoutPoint& rootBlockPhysicalPosition, const LayoutSize& offsetFromRootBlock) const
{
if (!m_floatingObjects)
return;
const FloatingObjectSet& floatingObjectSet = m_floatingObjects->set();
FloatingObjectSetIterator end = floatingObjectSet.end();
for (FloatingObjectSetIterator it = floatingObjectSet.begin(); it != end; ++it) {
const FloatingObject& floatingObject = *it->get();
LayoutRect floatBox(LayoutPoint(offsetFromRootBlock), floatingObject.layoutObject()->size());
floatBox.move(positionForFloatIncludingMargin(floatingObject));
rootBlock->flipForWritingMode(floatBox);
floatBox.move(rootBlockPhysicalPosition.x(), rootBlockPhysicalPosition.y());
clipScope.clip(floatBox, SkRegion::kDifference_Op);
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5147
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5147/
|
CWE-79
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/5472db1c7eca35822219d03be5c817d9a9258c11
|
5472db1c7eca35822219d03be5c817d9a9258c11
|
Always call UpdateCompositedScrollOffset, not just for the root layer
Bug: 927560
Change-Id: I1d5522aae4f11dd3f5b8947bb089bac1bf19bdb4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1452701
Reviewed-by: Chris Harrelson <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Mason Freed <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#628942}
|
void PaintLayerScrollableArea::ScrollbarManager::Trace(
blink::Visitor* visitor) {
visitor->Trace(scrollable_area_);
visitor->Trace(h_bar_);
visitor->Trace(v_bar_);
}
|
void PaintLayerScrollableArea::ScrollbarManager::Trace(
blink::Visitor* visitor) {
visitor->Trace(scrollable_area_);
visitor->Trace(h_bar_);
visitor->Trace(v_bar_);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2861
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2861/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/8262245d384be025f13e2a5b3a03b7e5c98374ce
|
8262245d384be025f13e2a5b3a03b7e5c98374ce
|
DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
WebKit::WebGeolocationClient* RenderView::geolocationClient() {
if (!geolocation_dispatcher_)
geolocation_dispatcher_ = new GeolocationDispatcher(this);
return geolocation_dispatcher_;
}
|
WebKit::WebGeolocationClient* RenderView::geolocationClient() {
if (!geolocation_dispatcher_)
geolocation_dispatcher_ = new GeolocationDispatcher(this);
return geolocation_dispatcher_;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/e49d943e9f5f90411313e64d0ae6b646edc85043
|
e49d943e9f5f90411313e64d0ae6b646edc85043
|
Use document referrer policy when preloading
Previously, preload requests used the referrer policy from meta tags
encountered during scanning, but not from headers delivered with the
page. This CL uses the document's current referrer policy when the
preload scan starts.
BUG=605451
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/1913983002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#390264}
|
void TokenPreloadScanner::scanCommon(const Token& token, const SegmentedString& source, PreloadRequestStream& requests, ViewportDescriptionWrapper* viewport, bool* likelyDocumentWriteScript)
{
if (!m_documentParameters->doHtmlPreloadScanning)
return;
if (m_isAppCacheEnabled)
return;
if (m_isCSPEnabled)
return;
switch (token.type()) {
case HTMLToken::Character: {
if (m_inStyle) {
m_cssScanner.scan(token.data(), source, requests, m_predictedBaseElementURL);
} else if (m_inScript && likelyDocumentWriteScript && !m_didRewind) {
*likelyDocumentWriteScript = shouldEvaluateForDocumentWrite(token.data());
}
return;
}
case HTMLToken::EndTag: {
const StringImpl* tagImpl = tagImplFor(token.data());
if (match(tagImpl, templateTag)) {
if (m_templateCount)
--m_templateCount;
return;
}
if (match(tagImpl, styleTag)) {
if (m_inStyle)
m_cssScanner.reset();
m_inStyle = false;
return;
}
if (match(tagImpl, scriptTag)) {
m_inScript = false;
return;
}
if (match(tagImpl, pictureTag))
m_inPicture = false;
return;
}
case HTMLToken::StartTag: {
if (m_templateCount)
return;
const StringImpl* tagImpl = tagImplFor(token.data());
if (match(tagImpl, templateTag)) {
++m_templateCount;
return;
}
if (match(tagImpl, styleTag)) {
m_inStyle = true;
return;
}
if (match(tagImpl, scriptTag)) {
m_inScript = true;
}
if (match(tagImpl, baseTag)) {
if (!m_predictedBaseElementURL.isEmpty())
return;
updatePredictedBaseURL(token);
return;
}
if (match(tagImpl, htmlTag) && token.getAttributeItem(manifestAttr)) {
m_isAppCacheEnabled = true;
return;
}
if (match(tagImpl, metaTag)) {
const typename Token::Attribute* equivAttribute = token.getAttributeItem(http_equivAttr);
if (equivAttribute) {
String equivAttributeValue(equivAttribute->value());
if (equalIgnoringCase(equivAttributeValue, "content-security-policy")) {
m_isCSPEnabled = true;
} else if (equalIgnoringCase(equivAttributeValue, "accept-ch")) {
const typename Token::Attribute* contentAttribute = token.getAttributeItem(contentAttr);
if (contentAttribute)
m_clientHintsPreferences.updateFromAcceptClientHintsHeader(contentAttribute->value(), nullptr);
}
return;
}
handleMetaNameAttribute(token, m_documentParameters.get(), m_mediaValues.get(), &m_cssScanner, viewport);
}
if (match(tagImpl, pictureTag)) {
m_inPicture = true;
m_pictureData = PictureData();
return;
}
StartTagScanner scanner(tagImpl, m_mediaValues);
scanner.processAttributes(token.attributes());
if (m_inPicture)
scanner.handlePictureSourceURL(m_pictureData);
OwnPtr<PreloadRequest> request = scanner.createPreloadRequest(m_predictedBaseElementURL, source, m_clientHintsPreferences, m_pictureData, m_documentParameters->referrerPolicy);
if (request)
requests.append(request.release());
return;
}
default: {
return;
}
}
}
|
void TokenPreloadScanner::scanCommon(const Token& token, const SegmentedString& source, PreloadRequestStream& requests, ViewportDescriptionWrapper* viewport, bool* likelyDocumentWriteScript)
{
if (!m_documentParameters->doHtmlPreloadScanning)
return;
if (m_isAppCacheEnabled)
return;
if (m_isCSPEnabled)
return;
switch (token.type()) {
case HTMLToken::Character: {
if (m_inStyle) {
m_cssScanner.scan(token.data(), source, requests, m_predictedBaseElementURL);
} else if (m_inScript && likelyDocumentWriteScript && !m_didRewind) {
*likelyDocumentWriteScript = shouldEvaluateForDocumentWrite(token.data());
}
return;
}
case HTMLToken::EndTag: {
const StringImpl* tagImpl = tagImplFor(token.data());
if (match(tagImpl, templateTag)) {
if (m_templateCount)
--m_templateCount;
return;
}
if (match(tagImpl, styleTag)) {
if (m_inStyle)
m_cssScanner.reset();
m_inStyle = false;
return;
}
if (match(tagImpl, scriptTag)) {
m_inScript = false;
return;
}
if (match(tagImpl, pictureTag))
m_inPicture = false;
return;
}
case HTMLToken::StartTag: {
if (m_templateCount)
return;
const StringImpl* tagImpl = tagImplFor(token.data());
if (match(tagImpl, templateTag)) {
++m_templateCount;
return;
}
if (match(tagImpl, styleTag)) {
m_inStyle = true;
return;
}
if (match(tagImpl, scriptTag)) {
m_inScript = true;
}
if (match(tagImpl, baseTag)) {
if (!m_predictedBaseElementURL.isEmpty())
return;
updatePredictedBaseURL(token);
return;
}
if (match(tagImpl, htmlTag) && token.getAttributeItem(manifestAttr)) {
m_isAppCacheEnabled = true;
return;
}
if (match(tagImpl, metaTag)) {
const typename Token::Attribute* equivAttribute = token.getAttributeItem(http_equivAttr);
if (equivAttribute) {
String equivAttributeValue(equivAttribute->value());
if (equalIgnoringCase(equivAttributeValue, "content-security-policy")) {
m_isCSPEnabled = true;
} else if (equalIgnoringCase(equivAttributeValue, "accept-ch")) {
const typename Token::Attribute* contentAttribute = token.getAttributeItem(contentAttr);
if (contentAttribute)
m_clientHintsPreferences.updateFromAcceptClientHintsHeader(contentAttribute->value(), nullptr);
}
return;
}
handleMetaNameAttribute(token, m_documentParameters.get(), m_mediaValues.get(), &m_cssScanner, viewport);
}
if (match(tagImpl, pictureTag)) {
m_inPicture = true;
m_pictureData = PictureData();
return;
}
StartTagScanner scanner(tagImpl, m_mediaValues);
scanner.processAttributes(token.attributes());
if (m_inPicture)
scanner.handlePictureSourceURL(m_pictureData);
OwnPtr<PreloadRequest> request = scanner.createPreloadRequest(m_predictedBaseElementURL, source, m_clientHintsPreferences, m_pictureData, m_documentParameters->referrerPolicy);
if (request)
requests.append(request.release());
return;
}
default: {
return;
}
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-2440
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-2440/
|
CWE-264
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/native/+/a59b827869a2ea04022dd225007f29af8d61837a
|
a59b827869a2ea04022dd225007f29af8d61837a
|
Fix issue #27252896: Security Vulnerability -- weak binder
Sending transaction to freed BBinder through weak handle
can cause use of a (mostly) freed object. We need to try to
safely promote to a strong reference first.
Change-Id: Ic9c6940fa824980472e94ed2dfeca52a6b0fd342
(cherry picked from commit c11146106f94e07016e8e26e4f8628f9a0c73199)
|
void IPCThreadState::shutdown()
{
gShutdown = true;
if (gHaveTLS) {
IPCThreadState* st = (IPCThreadState*)pthread_getspecific(gTLS);
if (st) {
delete st;
pthread_setspecific(gTLS, NULL);
}
gHaveTLS = false;
}
}
|
void IPCThreadState::shutdown()
{
gShutdown = true;
if (gHaveTLS) {
IPCThreadState* st = (IPCThreadState*)pthread_getspecific(gTLS);
if (st) {
delete st;
pthread_setspecific(gTLS, NULL);
}
gHaveTLS = false;
}
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2011-3099
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-3099/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/3bbc818ed1a7b63b8290bbde9ae975956748cb8a
|
3bbc818ed1a7b63b8290bbde9ae975956748cb8a
|
[GTK] Inspector should set a default attached height before being attached
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=90767
Reviewed by Xan Lopez.
We are currently using the minimum attached height in
WebKitWebViewBase as the default height for the inspector when
attached. It would be easier for WebKitWebViewBase and embedders
implementing attach() if the inspector already had an attached
height set when it's being attached.
* UIProcess/API/gtk/WebKitWebViewBase.cpp:
(webkitWebViewBaseContainerAdd): Don't initialize
inspectorViewHeight.
(webkitWebViewBaseSetInspectorViewHeight): Allow to set the
inspector view height before having an inpector view, but only
queue a resize when the view already has an inspector view.
* UIProcess/API/gtk/tests/TestInspector.cpp:
(testInspectorDefault):
(testInspectorManualAttachDetach):
* UIProcess/gtk/WebInspectorProxyGtk.cpp:
(WebKit::WebInspectorProxy::platformAttach): Set the default
attached height before attach the inspector view.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@124479 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
static void toplevelWindowResizeGripVisibilityChanged(GObject* object, GParamSpec*, WebKitWebViewBase* webViewBase)
{
webkitWebViewBaseNotifyResizerSizeForWindow(webViewBase, GTK_WINDOW(object));
}
|
static void toplevelWindowResizeGripVisibilityChanged(GObject* object, GParamSpec*, WebKitWebViewBase* webViewBase)
{
webkitWebViewBaseNotifyResizerSizeForWindow(webViewBase, GTK_WINDOW(object));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-6787
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-6787/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f911e11e7f6b5c0d6f5ee694a9871de6619889f7
|
f911e11e7f6b5c0d6f5ee694a9871de6619889f7
|
Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <[email protected]>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> [email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
[email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930}
|
void BlockPainter::PaintChildrenOfFlexibleBox(
const LayoutFlexibleBox& layout_flexible_box,
const PaintInfo& paint_info,
const LayoutPoint& paint_offset) {
for (const LayoutBox* child = layout_flexible_box.GetOrderIterator().First();
child; child = layout_flexible_box.GetOrderIterator().Next())
BlockPainter(layout_flexible_box)
.PaintAllChildPhasesAtomically(*child, paint_info, paint_offset);
}
|
void BlockPainter::PaintChildrenOfFlexibleBox(
const LayoutFlexibleBox& layout_flexible_box,
const PaintInfo& paint_info,
const LayoutPoint& paint_offset) {
for (const LayoutBox* child = layout_flexible_box.GetOrderIterator().First();
child; child = layout_flexible_box.GetOrderIterator().Next())
BlockPainter(layout_flexible_box)
.PaintAllChildPhasesAtomically(*child, paint_info, paint_offset);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-0207
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-0207/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8c1f65c79cbbb2f7da782d4c9d15639a9b94b27
|
a8c1f65c79cbbb2f7da782d4c9d15639a9b94b27
|
igmp: Avoid zero delay when receiving odd mixture of IGMP queries
Commit 5b7c84066733c5dfb0e4016d939757b38de189e4 ('ipv4: correct IGMP
behavior on v3 query during v2-compatibility mode') added yet another
case for query parsing, which can result in max_delay = 0. Substitute
a value of 1, as in the usual v3 case.
Reported-by: Simon McVittie <[email protected]>
References: http://bugs.debian.org/654876
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static void igmpv3_add_delrec(struct in_device *in_dev, struct ip_mc_list *im)
{
struct ip_mc_list *pmc;
/* this is an "ip_mc_list" for convenience; only the fields below
* are actually used. In particular, the refcnt and users are not
* used for management of the delete list. Using the same structure
* for deleted items allows change reports to use common code with
* non-deleted or query-response MCA's.
*/
pmc = kzalloc(sizeof(*pmc), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!pmc)
return;
spin_lock_bh(&im->lock);
pmc->interface = im->interface;
in_dev_hold(in_dev);
pmc->multiaddr = im->multiaddr;
pmc->crcount = in_dev->mr_qrv ? in_dev->mr_qrv :
IGMP_Unsolicited_Report_Count;
pmc->sfmode = im->sfmode;
if (pmc->sfmode == MCAST_INCLUDE) {
struct ip_sf_list *psf;
pmc->tomb = im->tomb;
pmc->sources = im->sources;
im->tomb = im->sources = NULL;
for (psf=pmc->sources; psf; psf=psf->sf_next)
psf->sf_crcount = pmc->crcount;
}
spin_unlock_bh(&im->lock);
spin_lock_bh(&in_dev->mc_tomb_lock);
pmc->next = in_dev->mc_tomb;
in_dev->mc_tomb = pmc;
spin_unlock_bh(&in_dev->mc_tomb_lock);
}
|
static void igmpv3_add_delrec(struct in_device *in_dev, struct ip_mc_list *im)
{
struct ip_mc_list *pmc;
/* this is an "ip_mc_list" for convenience; only the fields below
* are actually used. In particular, the refcnt and users are not
* used for management of the delete list. Using the same structure
* for deleted items allows change reports to use common code with
* non-deleted or query-response MCA's.
*/
pmc = kzalloc(sizeof(*pmc), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!pmc)
return;
spin_lock_bh(&im->lock);
pmc->interface = im->interface;
in_dev_hold(in_dev);
pmc->multiaddr = im->multiaddr;
pmc->crcount = in_dev->mr_qrv ? in_dev->mr_qrv :
IGMP_Unsolicited_Report_Count;
pmc->sfmode = im->sfmode;
if (pmc->sfmode == MCAST_INCLUDE) {
struct ip_sf_list *psf;
pmc->tomb = im->tomb;
pmc->sources = im->sources;
im->tomb = im->sources = NULL;
for (psf=pmc->sources; psf; psf=psf->sf_next)
psf->sf_crcount = pmc->crcount;
}
spin_unlock_bh(&im->lock);
spin_lock_bh(&in_dev->mc_tomb_lock);
pmc->next = in_dev->mc_tomb;
in_dev->mc_tomb = pmc;
spin_unlock_bh(&in_dev->mc_tomb_lock);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2012-6638
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-6638/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/fdf5af0daf8019cec2396cdef8fb042d80fe71fa
|
fdf5af0daf8019cec2396cdef8fb042d80fe71fa
|
tcp: drop SYN+FIN messages
Denys Fedoryshchenko reported that SYN+FIN attacks were bringing his
linux machines to their limits.
Dont call conn_request() if the TCP flags includes SYN flag
Reported-by: Denys Fedoryshchenko <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
void tcp_enter_frto(struct sock *sk)
{
const struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk);
struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
struct sk_buff *skb;
if ((!tp->frto_counter && icsk->icsk_ca_state <= TCP_CA_Disorder) ||
tp->snd_una == tp->high_seq ||
((icsk->icsk_ca_state == TCP_CA_Loss || tp->frto_counter) &&
!icsk->icsk_retransmits)) {
tp->prior_ssthresh = tcp_current_ssthresh(sk);
/* Our state is too optimistic in ssthresh() call because cwnd
* is not reduced until tcp_enter_frto_loss() when previous F-RTO
* recovery has not yet completed. Pattern would be this: RTO,
* Cumulative ACK, RTO (2xRTO for the same segment does not end
* up here twice).
* RFC4138 should be more specific on what to do, even though
* RTO is quite unlikely to occur after the first Cumulative ACK
* due to back-off and complexity of triggering events ...
*/
if (tp->frto_counter) {
u32 stored_cwnd;
stored_cwnd = tp->snd_cwnd;
tp->snd_cwnd = 2;
tp->snd_ssthresh = icsk->icsk_ca_ops->ssthresh(sk);
tp->snd_cwnd = stored_cwnd;
} else {
tp->snd_ssthresh = icsk->icsk_ca_ops->ssthresh(sk);
}
/* ... in theory, cong.control module could do "any tricks" in
* ssthresh(), which means that ca_state, lost bits and lost_out
* counter would have to be faked before the call occurs. We
* consider that too expensive, unlikely and hacky, so modules
* using these in ssthresh() must deal these incompatibility
* issues if they receives CA_EVENT_FRTO and frto_counter != 0
*/
tcp_ca_event(sk, CA_EVENT_FRTO);
}
tp->undo_marker = tp->snd_una;
tp->undo_retrans = 0;
skb = tcp_write_queue_head(sk);
if (TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->sacked & TCPCB_RETRANS)
tp->undo_marker = 0;
if (TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->sacked & TCPCB_SACKED_RETRANS) {
TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->sacked &= ~TCPCB_SACKED_RETRANS;
tp->retrans_out -= tcp_skb_pcount(skb);
}
tcp_verify_left_out(tp);
/* Too bad if TCP was application limited */
tp->snd_cwnd = min(tp->snd_cwnd, tcp_packets_in_flight(tp) + 1);
/* Earlier loss recovery underway (see RFC4138; Appendix B).
* The last condition is necessary at least in tp->frto_counter case.
*/
if (tcp_is_sackfrto(tp) && (tp->frto_counter ||
((1 << icsk->icsk_ca_state) & (TCPF_CA_Recovery|TCPF_CA_Loss))) &&
after(tp->high_seq, tp->snd_una)) {
tp->frto_highmark = tp->high_seq;
} else {
tp->frto_highmark = tp->snd_nxt;
}
tcp_set_ca_state(sk, TCP_CA_Disorder);
tp->high_seq = tp->snd_nxt;
tp->frto_counter = 1;
}
|
void tcp_enter_frto(struct sock *sk)
{
const struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk);
struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
struct sk_buff *skb;
if ((!tp->frto_counter && icsk->icsk_ca_state <= TCP_CA_Disorder) ||
tp->snd_una == tp->high_seq ||
((icsk->icsk_ca_state == TCP_CA_Loss || tp->frto_counter) &&
!icsk->icsk_retransmits)) {
tp->prior_ssthresh = tcp_current_ssthresh(sk);
/* Our state is too optimistic in ssthresh() call because cwnd
* is not reduced until tcp_enter_frto_loss() when previous F-RTO
* recovery has not yet completed. Pattern would be this: RTO,
* Cumulative ACK, RTO (2xRTO for the same segment does not end
* up here twice).
* RFC4138 should be more specific on what to do, even though
* RTO is quite unlikely to occur after the first Cumulative ACK
* due to back-off and complexity of triggering events ...
*/
if (tp->frto_counter) {
u32 stored_cwnd;
stored_cwnd = tp->snd_cwnd;
tp->snd_cwnd = 2;
tp->snd_ssthresh = icsk->icsk_ca_ops->ssthresh(sk);
tp->snd_cwnd = stored_cwnd;
} else {
tp->snd_ssthresh = icsk->icsk_ca_ops->ssthresh(sk);
}
/* ... in theory, cong.control module could do "any tricks" in
* ssthresh(), which means that ca_state, lost bits and lost_out
* counter would have to be faked before the call occurs. We
* consider that too expensive, unlikely and hacky, so modules
* using these in ssthresh() must deal these incompatibility
* issues if they receives CA_EVENT_FRTO and frto_counter != 0
*/
tcp_ca_event(sk, CA_EVENT_FRTO);
}
tp->undo_marker = tp->snd_una;
tp->undo_retrans = 0;
skb = tcp_write_queue_head(sk);
if (TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->sacked & TCPCB_RETRANS)
tp->undo_marker = 0;
if (TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->sacked & TCPCB_SACKED_RETRANS) {
TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->sacked &= ~TCPCB_SACKED_RETRANS;
tp->retrans_out -= tcp_skb_pcount(skb);
}
tcp_verify_left_out(tp);
/* Too bad if TCP was application limited */
tp->snd_cwnd = min(tp->snd_cwnd, tcp_packets_in_flight(tp) + 1);
/* Earlier loss recovery underway (see RFC4138; Appendix B).
* The last condition is necessary at least in tp->frto_counter case.
*/
if (tcp_is_sackfrto(tp) && (tp->frto_counter ||
((1 << icsk->icsk_ca_state) & (TCPF_CA_Recovery|TCPF_CA_Loss))) &&
after(tp->high_seq, tp->snd_una)) {
tp->frto_highmark = tp->high_seq;
} else {
tp->frto_highmark = tp->snd_nxt;
}
tcp_set_ca_state(sk, TCP_CA_Disorder);
tp->high_seq = tp->snd_nxt;
tp->frto_counter = 1;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2015-3842
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-3842/
|
CWE-119
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/aeea52da00d210587fb3ed895de3d5f2e0264c88
|
aeea52da00d210587fb3ed895de3d5f2e0264c88
|
audio effects: fix heap overflow
Check consistency of effect command reply sizes before
copying to reply address.
Also add null pointer check on reply size.
Also remove unused parameter warning.
Bug: 21953516.
Change-Id: I4cf00c12eaed696af28f3b7613f7e36f47a160c4
(cherry picked from commit 0f714a464d2425afe00d6450535e763131b40844)
|
void NsEnable(preproc_effect_t *effect)
{
webrtc::NoiseSuppression *ns = static_cast<webrtc::NoiseSuppression *>(effect->engine);
ALOGV("NsEnable ns %p", ns);
ns->Enable(true);
}
|
void NsEnable(preproc_effect_t *effect)
{
webrtc::NoiseSuppression *ns = static_cast<webrtc::NoiseSuppression *>(effect->engine);
ALOGV("NsEnable ns %p", ns);
ns->Enable(true);
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2011-3091
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-3091/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/cc7cde43832b547cdab856fe1bedc9514ca38e13
|
cc7cde43832b547cdab856fe1bedc9514ca38e13
|
Add DCHECK to ensure IndexedDBDispatcher doesn't get re-created.
This could happen if there are IDB objects that survive the call to
didStopWorkerRunLoop.
BUG=121734
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9999035
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@131679 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void IndexedDBDispatcher::RequestIDBCursorContinue(
const IndexedDBKey& key,
WebIDBCallbacks* callbacks_ptr,
int32 idb_cursor_id,
WebExceptionCode* ec) {
ResetCursorPrefetchCaches(idb_cursor_id);
scoped_ptr<WebIDBCallbacks> callbacks(callbacks_ptr);
int32 response_id = pending_callbacks_.Add(callbacks.release());
Send(
new IndexedDBHostMsg_CursorContinue(idb_cursor_id, CurrentWorkerId(),
response_id, key, ec));
if (*ec)
pending_callbacks_.Remove(response_id);
}
|
void IndexedDBDispatcher::RequestIDBCursorContinue(
const IndexedDBKey& key,
WebIDBCallbacks* callbacks_ptr,
int32 idb_cursor_id,
WebExceptionCode* ec) {
ResetCursorPrefetchCaches(idb_cursor_id);
scoped_ptr<WebIDBCallbacks> callbacks(callbacks_ptr);
int32 response_id = pending_callbacks_.Add(callbacks.release());
Send(
new IndexedDBHostMsg_CursorContinue(idb_cursor_id, CurrentWorkerId(),
response_id, key, ec));
if (*ec)
pending_callbacks_.Remove(response_id);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-1280
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1280/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/bc1f34b9be509f1404f0bb1ba1947614d5f0bcd1
|
bc1f34b9be509f1404f0bb1ba1947614d5f0bcd1
|
media: Support hosting mojo CDM in a standalone service
Currently when mojo CDM is enabled it is hosted in the MediaService
running in the process specified by "mojo_media_host". However, on
some platforms we need to run mojo CDM and other mojo media services in
different processes. For example, on desktop platforms, we want to run
mojo video decoder in the GPU process, but run the mojo CDM in the
utility process.
This CL adds a new build flag "enable_standalone_cdm_service". When
enabled, the mojo CDM service will be hosted in a standalone "cdm"
service running in the utility process. All other mojo media services
will sill be hosted in the "media" servie running in the process
specified by "mojo_media_host".
BUG=664364
TEST=Encrypted media browser tests using mojo CDM is still working.
Change-Id: I95be6e05adc9ebcff966b26958ef1d7becdfb487
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/567172
Commit-Queue: Xiaohan Wang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dan Sanders <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486947}
|
ServiceManagerConnectionImpl::ServiceManagerConnectionImpl(
service_manager::mojom::ServiceRequest request,
scoped_refptr<base::SequencedTaskRunner> io_task_runner)
: weak_factory_(this) {
service_manager::mojom::ConnectorRequest connector_request;
connector_ = service_manager::Connector::Create(&connector_request);
std::unique_ptr<service_manager::Connector> io_thread_connector =
connector_->Clone();
context_ = new IOThreadContext(
std::move(request), io_task_runner, std::move(io_thread_connector),
std::move(connector_request));
}
|
ServiceManagerConnectionImpl::ServiceManagerConnectionImpl(
service_manager::mojom::ServiceRequest request,
scoped_refptr<base::SequencedTaskRunner> io_task_runner)
: weak_factory_(this) {
service_manager::mojom::ConnectorRequest connector_request;
connector_ = service_manager::Connector::Create(&connector_request);
std::unique_ptr<service_manager::Connector> io_thread_connector =
connector_->Clone();
context_ = new IOThreadContext(
std::move(request), io_task_runner, std::move(io_thread_connector),
std::move(connector_request));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a3e2afaedd8190398ae45ccef34fcdee00fb19aa
|
a3e2afaedd8190398ae45ccef34fcdee00fb19aa
|
Fixed crash related to cellular network payment plan retreival.
BUG=chromium-os:8864
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/4690002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@65405 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
WifiNetwork* GetWifiNetworkByName(const std::string& name) {
for (size_t i = 0; i < wifi_networks_.size(); ++i) {
if (wifi_networks_[i]->name().compare(name) == 0) {
return wifi_networks_[i];
}
}
return NULL;
}
|
WifiNetwork* GetWifiNetworkByName(const std::string& name) {
for (size_t i = 0; i < wifi_networks_.size(); ++i) {
if (wifi_networks_[i]->name().compare(name) == 0) {
return wifi_networks_[i];
}
}
return NULL;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/70cff275010b33dbab628f837d76364359065b79
|
70cff275010b33dbab628f837d76364359065b79
|
Disable compositor thread input handling on windows
BUG=160122
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11946019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@177369 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
bool RenderViewImpl::OnMessageReceived(const IPC::Message& message) {
WebFrame* main_frame = webview() ? webview()->mainFrame() : NULL;
if (main_frame)
GetContentClient()->SetActiveURL(main_frame->document().url());
ObserverListBase<RenderViewObserver>::Iterator it(observers_);
RenderViewObserver* observer;
while ((observer = it.GetNext()) != NULL)
if (observer->OnMessageReceived(message))
return true;
bool handled = true;
bool msg_is_ok = true;
IPC_BEGIN_MESSAGE_MAP_EX(RenderViewImpl, message, msg_is_ok)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_Navigate, OnNavigate)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_Stop, OnStop)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_ReloadFrame, OnReloadFrame)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_Undo, OnUndo)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_Redo, OnRedo)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_Cut, OnCut)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_Copy, OnCopy)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_Paste, OnPaste)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_PasteAndMatchStyle, OnPasteAndMatchStyle)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_Replace, OnReplace)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_Delete, OnDelete)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_SetName, OnSetName)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_SelectAll, OnSelectAll)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_Unselect, OnUnselect)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_SetEditableSelectionOffsets,
OnSetEditableSelectionOffsets)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_SetCompositionFromExistingText,
OnSetCompositionFromExistingText)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_ExtendSelectionAndDelete,
OnExtendSelectionAndDelete)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_SelectRange, OnSelectRange)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_MoveCaret, OnMoveCaret)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_CopyImageAt, OnCopyImageAt)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_ExecuteEditCommand, OnExecuteEditCommand)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_Find, OnFind)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_StopFinding, OnStopFinding)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_Zoom, OnZoom)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_SetZoomLevel, OnSetZoomLevel)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_ZoomFactor, OnZoomFactor)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_SetZoomLevelForLoadingURL,
OnSetZoomLevelForLoadingURL)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_SetPageEncoding, OnSetPageEncoding)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_ResetPageEncodingToDefault,
OnResetPageEncodingToDefault)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_ScriptEvalRequest, OnScriptEvalRequest)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_PostMessageEvent, OnPostMessageEvent)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_CSSInsertRequest, OnCSSInsertRequest)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(DragMsg_TargetDragEnter, OnDragTargetDragEnter)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(DragMsg_TargetDragOver, OnDragTargetDragOver)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(DragMsg_TargetDragLeave, OnDragTargetDragLeave)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(DragMsg_TargetDrop, OnDragTargetDrop)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(DragMsg_SourceEndedOrMoved, OnDragSourceEndedOrMoved)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(DragMsg_SourceSystemDragEnded,
OnDragSourceSystemDragEnded)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_AllowBindings, OnAllowBindings)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_SetInitialFocus, OnSetInitialFocus)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_ScrollFocusedEditableNodeIntoRect,
OnScrollFocusedEditableNodeIntoRect)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_UpdateTargetURL_ACK, OnUpdateTargetURLAck)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_UpdateWebPreferences, OnUpdateWebPreferences)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_TimezoneChange, OnUpdateTimezone)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_SetAltErrorPageURL, OnSetAltErrorPageURL)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_EnumerateDirectoryResponse,
OnEnumerateDirectoryResponse)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_RunFileChooserResponse, OnFileChooserResponse)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_ShouldClose, OnShouldClose)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_SwapOut, OnSwapOut)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_ClosePage, OnClosePage)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_ThemeChanged, OnThemeChanged)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_DisassociateFromPopupCount,
OnDisassociateFromPopupCount)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_MoveOrResizeStarted, OnMoveOrResizeStarted)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_ClearFocusedNode, OnClearFocusedNode)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_SetBackground, OnSetBackground)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_EnablePreferredSizeChangedMode,
OnEnablePreferredSizeChangedMode)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_EnableAutoResize, OnEnableAutoResize)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_DisableAutoResize, OnDisableAutoResize)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_DisableScrollbarsForSmallWindows,
OnDisableScrollbarsForSmallWindows)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_SetRendererPrefs, OnSetRendererPrefs)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_MediaPlayerActionAt, OnMediaPlayerActionAt)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_OrientationChangeEvent,
OnOrientationChangeEvent)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_PluginActionAt, OnPluginActionAt)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_SetActive, OnSetActive)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_SetNavigationStartTime,
OnSetNavigationStartTime)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_SetEditCommandsForNextKeyEvent,
OnSetEditCommandsForNextKeyEvent)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_CustomContextMenuAction,
OnCustomContextMenuAction)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_AsyncOpenFile_ACK, OnAsyncFileOpened)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_PpapiBrokerChannelCreated,
OnPpapiBrokerChannelCreated)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_PpapiBrokerPermissionResult,
OnPpapiBrokerPermissionResult)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_GetAllSavableResourceLinksForCurrentPage,
OnGetAllSavableResourceLinksForCurrentPage)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(
ViewMsg_GetSerializedHtmlDataForCurrentPageWithLocalLinks,
OnGetSerializedHtmlDataForCurrentPageWithLocalLinks)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_ContextMenuClosed, OnContextMenuClosed)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_SetHistoryLengthAndPrune,
OnSetHistoryLengthAndPrune)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_EnableViewSourceMode, OnEnableViewSourceMode)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(JavaBridgeMsg_Init, OnJavaBridgeInit)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_SetAccessibilityMode, OnSetAccessibilityMode)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_DisownOpener, OnDisownOpener)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_UpdateFrameTree, OnUpdatedFrameTree)
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_ActivateNearestFindResult,
OnActivateNearestFindResult)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_FindMatchRects, OnFindMatchRects)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_SelectPopupMenuItems, OnSelectPopupMenuItems)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER_DELAY_REPLY(ViewMsg_SynchronousFind, OnSynchronousFind)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_UndoScrollFocusedEditableNodeIntoView,
OnUndoScrollFocusedEditableNodeIntoRect)
#elif defined(OS_MACOSX)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_CopyToFindPboard, OnCopyToFindPboard)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_PluginImeCompositionCompleted,
OnPluginImeCompositionCompleted)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_SelectPopupMenuItem, OnSelectPopupMenuItem)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_SetInLiveResize, OnSetInLiveResize)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_SetWindowVisibility, OnSetWindowVisibility)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_WindowFrameChanged, OnWindowFrameChanged)
#endif
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_ReleaseDisambiguationPopupDIB,
OnReleaseDisambiguationPopupDIB)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_WindowSnapshotCompleted,
OnWindowSnapshotCompleted)
IPC_MESSAGE_UNHANDLED(handled = RenderWidget::OnMessageReceived(message))
IPC_END_MESSAGE_MAP()
if (!msg_is_ok) {
CHECK(false) << "Unable to deserialize message in RenderViewImpl.";
}
return handled;
}
|
bool RenderViewImpl::OnMessageReceived(const IPC::Message& message) {
WebFrame* main_frame = webview() ? webview()->mainFrame() : NULL;
if (main_frame)
GetContentClient()->SetActiveURL(main_frame->document().url());
ObserverListBase<RenderViewObserver>::Iterator it(observers_);
RenderViewObserver* observer;
while ((observer = it.GetNext()) != NULL)
if (observer->OnMessageReceived(message))
return true;
bool handled = true;
bool msg_is_ok = true;
IPC_BEGIN_MESSAGE_MAP_EX(RenderViewImpl, message, msg_is_ok)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_Navigate, OnNavigate)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_Stop, OnStop)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_ReloadFrame, OnReloadFrame)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_Undo, OnUndo)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_Redo, OnRedo)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_Cut, OnCut)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_Copy, OnCopy)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_Paste, OnPaste)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_PasteAndMatchStyle, OnPasteAndMatchStyle)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_Replace, OnReplace)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_Delete, OnDelete)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_SetName, OnSetName)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_SelectAll, OnSelectAll)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_Unselect, OnUnselect)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_SetEditableSelectionOffsets,
OnSetEditableSelectionOffsets)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_SetCompositionFromExistingText,
OnSetCompositionFromExistingText)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_ExtendSelectionAndDelete,
OnExtendSelectionAndDelete)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_SelectRange, OnSelectRange)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_MoveCaret, OnMoveCaret)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_CopyImageAt, OnCopyImageAt)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_ExecuteEditCommand, OnExecuteEditCommand)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_Find, OnFind)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_StopFinding, OnStopFinding)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_Zoom, OnZoom)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_SetZoomLevel, OnSetZoomLevel)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_ZoomFactor, OnZoomFactor)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_SetZoomLevelForLoadingURL,
OnSetZoomLevelForLoadingURL)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_SetPageEncoding, OnSetPageEncoding)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_ResetPageEncodingToDefault,
OnResetPageEncodingToDefault)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_ScriptEvalRequest, OnScriptEvalRequest)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_PostMessageEvent, OnPostMessageEvent)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_CSSInsertRequest, OnCSSInsertRequest)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(DragMsg_TargetDragEnter, OnDragTargetDragEnter)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(DragMsg_TargetDragOver, OnDragTargetDragOver)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(DragMsg_TargetDragLeave, OnDragTargetDragLeave)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(DragMsg_TargetDrop, OnDragTargetDrop)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(DragMsg_SourceEndedOrMoved, OnDragSourceEndedOrMoved)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(DragMsg_SourceSystemDragEnded,
OnDragSourceSystemDragEnded)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_AllowBindings, OnAllowBindings)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_SetInitialFocus, OnSetInitialFocus)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_ScrollFocusedEditableNodeIntoRect,
OnScrollFocusedEditableNodeIntoRect)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_UpdateTargetURL_ACK, OnUpdateTargetURLAck)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_UpdateWebPreferences, OnUpdateWebPreferences)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_TimezoneChange, OnUpdateTimezone)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_SetAltErrorPageURL, OnSetAltErrorPageURL)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_EnumerateDirectoryResponse,
OnEnumerateDirectoryResponse)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_RunFileChooserResponse, OnFileChooserResponse)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_ShouldClose, OnShouldClose)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_SwapOut, OnSwapOut)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_ClosePage, OnClosePage)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_ThemeChanged, OnThemeChanged)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_DisassociateFromPopupCount,
OnDisassociateFromPopupCount)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_MoveOrResizeStarted, OnMoveOrResizeStarted)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_ClearFocusedNode, OnClearFocusedNode)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_SetBackground, OnSetBackground)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_EnablePreferredSizeChangedMode,
OnEnablePreferredSizeChangedMode)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_EnableAutoResize, OnEnableAutoResize)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_DisableAutoResize, OnDisableAutoResize)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_DisableScrollbarsForSmallWindows,
OnDisableScrollbarsForSmallWindows)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_SetRendererPrefs, OnSetRendererPrefs)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_MediaPlayerActionAt, OnMediaPlayerActionAt)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_OrientationChangeEvent,
OnOrientationChangeEvent)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_PluginActionAt, OnPluginActionAt)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_SetActive, OnSetActive)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_SetNavigationStartTime,
OnSetNavigationStartTime)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_SetEditCommandsForNextKeyEvent,
OnSetEditCommandsForNextKeyEvent)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_CustomContextMenuAction,
OnCustomContextMenuAction)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_AsyncOpenFile_ACK, OnAsyncFileOpened)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_PpapiBrokerChannelCreated,
OnPpapiBrokerChannelCreated)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_PpapiBrokerPermissionResult,
OnPpapiBrokerPermissionResult)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_GetAllSavableResourceLinksForCurrentPage,
OnGetAllSavableResourceLinksForCurrentPage)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(
ViewMsg_GetSerializedHtmlDataForCurrentPageWithLocalLinks,
OnGetSerializedHtmlDataForCurrentPageWithLocalLinks)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_ContextMenuClosed, OnContextMenuClosed)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_SetHistoryLengthAndPrune,
OnSetHistoryLengthAndPrune)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_EnableViewSourceMode, OnEnableViewSourceMode)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(JavaBridgeMsg_Init, OnJavaBridgeInit)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_SetAccessibilityMode, OnSetAccessibilityMode)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_DisownOpener, OnDisownOpener)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_UpdateFrameTree, OnUpdatedFrameTree)
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_ActivateNearestFindResult,
OnActivateNearestFindResult)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_FindMatchRects, OnFindMatchRects)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_SelectPopupMenuItems, OnSelectPopupMenuItems)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER_DELAY_REPLY(ViewMsg_SynchronousFind, OnSynchronousFind)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_UndoScrollFocusedEditableNodeIntoView,
OnUndoScrollFocusedEditableNodeIntoRect)
#elif defined(OS_MACOSX)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_CopyToFindPboard, OnCopyToFindPboard)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_PluginImeCompositionCompleted,
OnPluginImeCompositionCompleted)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_SelectPopupMenuItem, OnSelectPopupMenuItem)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_SetInLiveResize, OnSetInLiveResize)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_SetWindowVisibility, OnSetWindowVisibility)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_WindowFrameChanged, OnWindowFrameChanged)
#endif
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_ReleaseDisambiguationPopupDIB,
OnReleaseDisambiguationPopupDIB)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_WindowSnapshotCompleted,
OnWindowSnapshotCompleted)
IPC_MESSAGE_UNHANDLED(handled = RenderWidget::OnMessageReceived(message))
IPC_END_MESSAGE_MAP()
if (!msg_is_ok) {
CHECK(false) << "Unable to deserialize message in RenderViewImpl.";
}
return handled;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2019-11487
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-11487/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/8fde12ca79aff9b5ba951fce1a2641901b8d8e64
|
8fde12ca79aff9b5ba951fce1a2641901b8d8e64
|
mm: prevent get_user_pages() from overflowing page refcount
If the page refcount wraps around past zero, it will be freed while
there are still four billion references to it. One of the possible
avenues for an attacker to try to make this happen is by doing direct IO
on a page multiple times. This patch makes get_user_pages() refuse to
take a new page reference if there are already more than two billion
references to the page.
Reported-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Matthew Wilcox <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
static inline gfp_t htlb_alloc_mask(struct hstate *h)
{
if (hugepage_migration_supported(h))
return GFP_HIGHUSER_MOVABLE;
else
return GFP_HIGHUSER;
}
|
static inline gfp_t htlb_alloc_mask(struct hstate *h)
{
if (hugepage_migration_supported(h))
return GFP_HIGHUSER_MOVABLE;
else
return GFP_HIGHUSER;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2802
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2802/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/4ab22cfc619ee8ff17a8c50e289ec3b30731ceba
|
4ab22cfc619ee8ff17a8c50e289ec3b30731ceba
|
In chromedriver, add /log url to get the contents of the chromedriver log
remotely. Also add a 'chrome.verbose' boolean startup option.
Remove usage of VLOG(1) in chromedriver. We do not need as complicated
logging as in Chrome.
BUG=85241
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7104085
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@88591 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
bool SetMongooseOptions(struct mg_context* ctx,
const std::string& port,
const std::string& root) {
if (!mg_set_option(ctx, "ports", port.c_str())) {
std::cout << "ChromeDriver cannot bind to port ("
<< port.c_str() << ")" << std::endl;
return false;
}
if (root.length())
mg_set_option(ctx, "root", root.c_str());
mg_set_option(ctx, "idle_time", "1");
return true;
}
|
bool SetMongooseOptions(struct mg_context* ctx,
const std::string& port,
const std::string& root) {
if (!mg_set_option(ctx, "ports", port.c_str())) {
std::cout << "ChromeDriver cannot bind to port ("
<< port.c_str() << ")" << std::endl;
return false;
}
if (root.length())
mg_set_option(ctx, "root", root.c_str());
mg_set_option(ctx, "idle_time", "1");
return true;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-14036
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-14036/
|
CWE-22
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/accountsservice/commit/?id=f9abd359f71a5bce421b9ae23432f539a067847a
|
f9abd359f71a5bce421b9ae23432f539a067847a
| null |
user_changed (User *user)
{
accounts_user_emit_changed (ACCOUNTS_USER (user));
}
|
user_changed (User *user)
{
accounts_user_emit_changed (ACCOUNTS_USER (user));
}
|
C
|
accountsservice
| 0 |
CVE-2014-6410
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-6410/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/c03aa9f6e1f938618e6db2e23afef0574efeeb65
|
c03aa9f6e1f938618e6db2e23afef0574efeeb65
|
udf: Avoid infinite loop when processing indirect ICBs
We did not implement any bound on number of indirect ICBs we follow when
loading inode. Thus corrupted medium could cause kernel to go into an
infinite loop, possibly causing a stack overflow.
Fix the possible stack overflow by removing recursion from
__udf_read_inode() and limit number of indirect ICBs we follow to avoid
infinite loops.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
|
struct buffer_head *udf_expand_dir_adinicb(struct inode *inode, int *block,
int *err)
{
int newblock;
struct buffer_head *dbh = NULL;
struct kernel_lb_addr eloc;
uint8_t alloctype;
struct extent_position epos;
struct udf_fileident_bh sfibh, dfibh;
loff_t f_pos = udf_ext0_offset(inode);
int size = udf_ext0_offset(inode) + inode->i_size;
struct fileIdentDesc cfi, *sfi, *dfi;
struct udf_inode_info *iinfo = UDF_I(inode);
if (UDF_QUERY_FLAG(inode->i_sb, UDF_FLAG_USE_SHORT_AD))
alloctype = ICBTAG_FLAG_AD_SHORT;
else
alloctype = ICBTAG_FLAG_AD_LONG;
if (!inode->i_size) {
iinfo->i_alloc_type = alloctype;
mark_inode_dirty(inode);
return NULL;
}
/* alloc block, and copy data to it */
*block = udf_new_block(inode->i_sb, inode,
iinfo->i_location.partitionReferenceNum,
iinfo->i_location.logicalBlockNum, err);
if (!(*block))
return NULL;
newblock = udf_get_pblock(inode->i_sb, *block,
iinfo->i_location.partitionReferenceNum,
0);
if (!newblock)
return NULL;
dbh = udf_tgetblk(inode->i_sb, newblock);
if (!dbh)
return NULL;
lock_buffer(dbh);
memset(dbh->b_data, 0x00, inode->i_sb->s_blocksize);
set_buffer_uptodate(dbh);
unlock_buffer(dbh);
mark_buffer_dirty_inode(dbh, inode);
sfibh.soffset = sfibh.eoffset =
f_pos & (inode->i_sb->s_blocksize - 1);
sfibh.sbh = sfibh.ebh = NULL;
dfibh.soffset = dfibh.eoffset = 0;
dfibh.sbh = dfibh.ebh = dbh;
while (f_pos < size) {
iinfo->i_alloc_type = ICBTAG_FLAG_AD_IN_ICB;
sfi = udf_fileident_read(inode, &f_pos, &sfibh, &cfi, NULL,
NULL, NULL, NULL);
if (!sfi) {
brelse(dbh);
return NULL;
}
iinfo->i_alloc_type = alloctype;
sfi->descTag.tagLocation = cpu_to_le32(*block);
dfibh.soffset = dfibh.eoffset;
dfibh.eoffset += (sfibh.eoffset - sfibh.soffset);
dfi = (struct fileIdentDesc *)(dbh->b_data + dfibh.soffset);
if (udf_write_fi(inode, sfi, dfi, &dfibh, sfi->impUse,
sfi->fileIdent +
le16_to_cpu(sfi->lengthOfImpUse))) {
iinfo->i_alloc_type = ICBTAG_FLAG_AD_IN_ICB;
brelse(dbh);
return NULL;
}
}
mark_buffer_dirty_inode(dbh, inode);
memset(iinfo->i_ext.i_data + iinfo->i_lenEAttr, 0,
iinfo->i_lenAlloc);
iinfo->i_lenAlloc = 0;
eloc.logicalBlockNum = *block;
eloc.partitionReferenceNum =
iinfo->i_location.partitionReferenceNum;
iinfo->i_lenExtents = inode->i_size;
epos.bh = NULL;
epos.block = iinfo->i_location;
epos.offset = udf_file_entry_alloc_offset(inode);
udf_add_aext(inode, &epos, &eloc, inode->i_size, 0);
/* UniqueID stuff */
brelse(epos.bh);
mark_inode_dirty(inode);
return dbh;
}
|
struct buffer_head *udf_expand_dir_adinicb(struct inode *inode, int *block,
int *err)
{
int newblock;
struct buffer_head *dbh = NULL;
struct kernel_lb_addr eloc;
uint8_t alloctype;
struct extent_position epos;
struct udf_fileident_bh sfibh, dfibh;
loff_t f_pos = udf_ext0_offset(inode);
int size = udf_ext0_offset(inode) + inode->i_size;
struct fileIdentDesc cfi, *sfi, *dfi;
struct udf_inode_info *iinfo = UDF_I(inode);
if (UDF_QUERY_FLAG(inode->i_sb, UDF_FLAG_USE_SHORT_AD))
alloctype = ICBTAG_FLAG_AD_SHORT;
else
alloctype = ICBTAG_FLAG_AD_LONG;
if (!inode->i_size) {
iinfo->i_alloc_type = alloctype;
mark_inode_dirty(inode);
return NULL;
}
/* alloc block, and copy data to it */
*block = udf_new_block(inode->i_sb, inode,
iinfo->i_location.partitionReferenceNum,
iinfo->i_location.logicalBlockNum, err);
if (!(*block))
return NULL;
newblock = udf_get_pblock(inode->i_sb, *block,
iinfo->i_location.partitionReferenceNum,
0);
if (!newblock)
return NULL;
dbh = udf_tgetblk(inode->i_sb, newblock);
if (!dbh)
return NULL;
lock_buffer(dbh);
memset(dbh->b_data, 0x00, inode->i_sb->s_blocksize);
set_buffer_uptodate(dbh);
unlock_buffer(dbh);
mark_buffer_dirty_inode(dbh, inode);
sfibh.soffset = sfibh.eoffset =
f_pos & (inode->i_sb->s_blocksize - 1);
sfibh.sbh = sfibh.ebh = NULL;
dfibh.soffset = dfibh.eoffset = 0;
dfibh.sbh = dfibh.ebh = dbh;
while (f_pos < size) {
iinfo->i_alloc_type = ICBTAG_FLAG_AD_IN_ICB;
sfi = udf_fileident_read(inode, &f_pos, &sfibh, &cfi, NULL,
NULL, NULL, NULL);
if (!sfi) {
brelse(dbh);
return NULL;
}
iinfo->i_alloc_type = alloctype;
sfi->descTag.tagLocation = cpu_to_le32(*block);
dfibh.soffset = dfibh.eoffset;
dfibh.eoffset += (sfibh.eoffset - sfibh.soffset);
dfi = (struct fileIdentDesc *)(dbh->b_data + dfibh.soffset);
if (udf_write_fi(inode, sfi, dfi, &dfibh, sfi->impUse,
sfi->fileIdent +
le16_to_cpu(sfi->lengthOfImpUse))) {
iinfo->i_alloc_type = ICBTAG_FLAG_AD_IN_ICB;
brelse(dbh);
return NULL;
}
}
mark_buffer_dirty_inode(dbh, inode);
memset(iinfo->i_ext.i_data + iinfo->i_lenEAttr, 0,
iinfo->i_lenAlloc);
iinfo->i_lenAlloc = 0;
eloc.logicalBlockNum = *block;
eloc.partitionReferenceNum =
iinfo->i_location.partitionReferenceNum;
iinfo->i_lenExtents = inode->i_size;
epos.bh = NULL;
epos.block = iinfo->i_location;
epos.offset = udf_file_entry_alloc_offset(inode);
udf_add_aext(inode, &epos, &eloc, inode->i_size, 0);
/* UniqueID stuff */
brelse(epos.bh);
mark_inode_dirty(inode);
return dbh;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2015-7513
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-7513/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/0185604c2d82c560dab2f2933a18f797e74ab5a8
|
0185604c2d82c560dab2f2933a18f797e74ab5a8
|
KVM: x86: Reload pit counters for all channels when restoring state
Currently if userspace restores the pit counters with a count of 0
on channels 1 or 2 and the guest attempts to read the count on those
channels, then KVM will perform a mod of 0 and crash. This will ensure
that 0 values are converted to 65536 as per the spec.
This is CVE-2015-7513.
Signed-off-by: Andy Honig <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
|
void kvm_vcpu_reload_apic_access_page(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct page *page = NULL;
if (!lapic_in_kernel(vcpu))
return;
if (!kvm_x86_ops->set_apic_access_page_addr)
return;
page = gfn_to_page(vcpu->kvm, APIC_DEFAULT_PHYS_BASE >> PAGE_SHIFT);
if (is_error_page(page))
return;
kvm_x86_ops->set_apic_access_page_addr(vcpu, page_to_phys(page));
/*
* Do not pin apic access page in memory, the MMU notifier
* will call us again if it is migrated or swapped out.
*/
put_page(page);
}
|
void kvm_vcpu_reload_apic_access_page(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct page *page = NULL;
if (!lapic_in_kernel(vcpu))
return;
if (!kvm_x86_ops->set_apic_access_page_addr)
return;
page = gfn_to_page(vcpu->kvm, APIC_DEFAULT_PHYS_BASE >> PAGE_SHIFT);
if (is_error_page(page))
return;
kvm_x86_ops->set_apic_access_page_addr(vcpu, page_to_phys(page));
/*
* Do not pin apic access page in memory, the MMU notifier
* will call us again if it is migrated or swapped out.
*/
put_page(page);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2014-1713
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-1713/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f85a87ec670ad0fce9d98d90c9a705b72a288154
|
f85a87ec670ad0fce9d98d90c9a705b72a288154
|
document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
static void anyCallbackFunctionOptionalAnyArgAttributeAttributeSetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::String>, v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMSetter");
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::anyCallbackFunctionOptionalAnyArgAttributeAttributeSetter(jsValue, info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
|
static void anyCallbackFunctionOptionalAnyArgAttributeAttributeSetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::String>, v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMSetter");
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::anyCallbackFunctionOptionalAnyArgAttributeAttributeSetter(jsValue, info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-4119
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-4119/
|
CWE-476
|
https://github.com/FreeRDP/FreeRDP/commit/0773bb9303d24473fe1185d85a424dfe159aff53
|
0773bb9303d24473fe1185d85a424dfe159aff53
|
nla: invalidate sec handle after creation
If sec pointer isn't invalidated after creation it is not possible
to check if the upper and lower pointers are valid.
This fixes a segfault in the server part if the client disconnects before
the authentication was finished.
|
void sspi_ContextBufferAllocTableFree()
{
ContextBufferAllocTable.cEntries = ContextBufferAllocTable.cMaxEntries = 0;
free(ContextBufferAllocTable.entries);
}
|
void sspi_ContextBufferAllocTableFree()
{
ContextBufferAllocTable.cEntries = ContextBufferAllocTable.cMaxEntries = 0;
free(ContextBufferAllocTable.entries);
}
|
C
|
FreeRDP
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2804
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2804/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/dc7b094a338c6c521f918f478e993f0f74bbea0d
|
dc7b094a338c6c521f918f478e993f0f74bbea0d
|
Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void Observe(NotificationType type,
const NotificationSource& source,
const NotificationDetails& details) {
if (type.value == NotificationType::APP_TERMINATING) {
notification_registrar_.RemoveAll();
StopInputMethodDaemon();
#if !defined(TOUCH_UI)
candidate_window_controller_.reset(NULL);
#endif
}
}
|
void Observe(NotificationType type,
const NotificationSource& source,
const NotificationDetails& details) {
if (type.value == NotificationType::APP_TERMINATING) {
notification_registrar_.RemoveAll();
StopInputMethodDaemon();
#if !defined(TOUCH_UI)
candidate_window_controller_.reset(NULL);
#endif
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5107
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5107/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/c25b198675380f713a56649c857b4367601d4a3d
|
c25b198675380f713a56649c857b4367601d4a3d
|
[Lock Screen Media Controls] Tweak UI based on new mocks
This CL rearranges the different components of the CrOS lock screen
media controls based on the newest mocks. This involves resizing most
of the child views and their spacings. The artwork was also resized
and re-positioned. Additionally, the close button was moved from the
main view to the header row child view.
Artist and title data about the current session will eventually be
placed to the right of the artwork, but right now this space is empty.
See the bug for before and after pictures.
Bug: 991647
Change-Id: I7b97f31982ccf2912bd2564d5241bfd849d21d92
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1746554
Reviewed-by: Xiyuan Xia <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Becca Hughes <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Mia Bergeron <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#686253}
|
MediaControlsHeaderView* header_row() const {
return media_controls_view_->header_row_;
}
|
MediaControlsHeaderView* header_row() const {
return media_controls_view_->header_row_;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5225
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5225/
|
CWE-19
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/4ac4aff49c4c539bce6d8a0d8800c01324bb6bc0
|
4ac4aff49c4c539bce6d8a0d8800c01324bb6bc0
|
Enforce form-action CSP even when form.target is present.
BUG=630332
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2464123004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#429922}
|
HTMLFormControlElement* HTMLFormElement::findDefaultButton() const {
for (const auto& element : associatedElements()) {
if (!element->isFormControlElement())
continue;
HTMLFormControlElement* control = toHTMLFormControlElement(element);
if (control->canBeSuccessfulSubmitButton())
return control;
}
return nullptr;
}
|
HTMLFormControlElement* HTMLFormElement::findDefaultButton() const {
for (const auto& element : associatedElements()) {
if (!element->isFormControlElement())
continue;
HTMLFormControlElement* control = toHTMLFormControlElement(element);
if (control->canBeSuccessfulSubmitButton())
return control;
}
return nullptr;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-12179
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-12179/
|
CWE-190
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/commit/?id=d088e3c1286b548a58e62afdc70bb40981cdb9e8
|
d088e3c1286b548a58e62afdc70bb40981cdb9e8
| null |
XIDestroyPointerBarrier(ClientPtr client,
xXFixesDestroyPointerBarrierReq * stuff)
{
int err;
void *barrier;
err = dixLookupResourceByType((void **) &barrier, stuff->barrier,
PointerBarrierType, client, DixDestroyAccess);
if (err != Success) {
client->errorValue = stuff->barrier;
return err;
}
if (CLIENT_ID(stuff->barrier) != client->index)
return BadAccess;
FreeResource(stuff->barrier, RT_NONE);
return Success;
}
|
XIDestroyPointerBarrier(ClientPtr client,
xXFixesDestroyPointerBarrierReq * stuff)
{
int err;
void *barrier;
err = dixLookupResourceByType((void **) &barrier, stuff->barrier,
PointerBarrierType, client, DixDestroyAccess);
if (err != Success) {
client->errorValue = stuff->barrier;
return err;
}
if (CLIENT_ID(stuff->barrier) != client->index)
return BadAccess;
FreeResource(stuff->barrier, RT_NONE);
return Success;
}
|
C
|
xserver
| 0 |
CVE-2015-1274
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1274/
|
CWE-254
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/d27468a832d5316884bd02f459cbf493697fd7e1
|
d27468a832d5316884bd02f459cbf493697fd7e1
|
Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
|
bool AXNodeObject::isMultiSelectable() const {
const AtomicString& ariaMultiSelectable =
getAttribute(aria_multiselectableAttr);
if (equalIgnoringASCIICase(ariaMultiSelectable, "true"))
return true;
if (equalIgnoringASCIICase(ariaMultiSelectable, "false"))
return false;
return isHTMLSelectElement(getNode()) &&
toHTMLSelectElement(*getNode()).isMultiple();
}
|
bool AXNodeObject::isMultiSelectable() const {
const AtomicString& ariaMultiSelectable =
getAttribute(aria_multiselectableAttr);
if (equalIgnoringCase(ariaMultiSelectable, "true"))
return true;
if (equalIgnoringCase(ariaMultiSelectable, "false"))
return false;
return isHTMLSelectElement(getNode()) &&
toHTMLSelectElement(*getNode()).isMultiple();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 1 |
CVE-2017-14991
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-14991/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/3e0097499839e0fe3af380410eababe5a47c4cf9
|
3e0097499839e0fe3af380410eababe5a47c4cf9
|
scsi: sg: fixup infoleak when using SG_GET_REQUEST_TABLE
When calling SG_GET_REQUEST_TABLE ioctl only a half-filled table is
returned; the remaining part will then contain stale kernel memory
information. This patch zeroes out the entire table to avoid this
issue.
Signed-off-by: Hannes Reinecke <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <[email protected]>
|
sg_get_rq_mark(Sg_fd * sfp, int pack_id)
{
Sg_request *resp;
unsigned long iflags;
write_lock_irqsave(&sfp->rq_list_lock, iflags);
list_for_each_entry(resp, &sfp->rq_list, entry) {
/* look for requests that are ready + not SG_IO owned */
if ((1 == resp->done) && (!resp->sg_io_owned) &&
((-1 == pack_id) || (resp->header.pack_id == pack_id))) {
resp->done = 2; /* guard against other readers */
write_unlock_irqrestore(&sfp->rq_list_lock, iflags);
return resp;
}
}
write_unlock_irqrestore(&sfp->rq_list_lock, iflags);
return NULL;
}
|
sg_get_rq_mark(Sg_fd * sfp, int pack_id)
{
Sg_request *resp;
unsigned long iflags;
write_lock_irqsave(&sfp->rq_list_lock, iflags);
list_for_each_entry(resp, &sfp->rq_list, entry) {
/* look for requests that are ready + not SG_IO owned */
if ((1 == resp->done) && (!resp->sg_io_owned) &&
((-1 == pack_id) || (resp->header.pack_id == pack_id))) {
resp->done = 2; /* guard against other readers */
write_unlock_irqrestore(&sfp->rq_list_lock, iflags);
return resp;
}
}
write_unlock_irqrestore(&sfp->rq_list_lock, iflags);
return NULL;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2011-1476
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-1476/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/b769f49463711205d57286e64cf535ed4daf59e9
|
b769f49463711205d57286e64cf535ed4daf59e9
|
sound/oss: remove offset from load_patch callbacks
Was: [PATCH] sound/oss/midi_synth: prevent underflow, use of
uninitialized value, and signedness issue
The offset passed to midi_synth_load_patch() can be essentially
arbitrary. If it's greater than the header length, this will result in
a copy_from_user(dst, src, negative_val). While this will just return
-EFAULT on x86, on other architectures this may cause memory corruption.
Additionally, the length field of the sysex_info structure may not be
initialized prior to its use. Finally, a signed comparison may result
in an unintentionally large loop.
On suggestion by Takashi Iwai, version two removes the offset argument
from the load_patch callbacks entirely, which also resolves similar
issues in opl3. Compile tested only.
v3 adjusts comments and hopefully gets copy offsets right.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
|
static void midi_outc(int dev, unsigned char data)
{
/*
* NOTE! Calls sleep(). Don't call this from interrupt.
*/
int n;
unsigned long flags;
/*
* This routine sends one byte to the Midi channel.
* If the output FIFO is full, it waits until there
* is space in the queue
*/
n = 3 * HZ; /* Timeout */
spin_lock_irqsave(&lock,flags);
while (n && !midi_devs[dev]->outputc(dev, data)) {
interruptible_sleep_on_timeout(&seq_sleeper, HZ/25);
n--;
}
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&lock,flags);
}
|
static void midi_outc(int dev, unsigned char data)
{
/*
* NOTE! Calls sleep(). Don't call this from interrupt.
*/
int n;
unsigned long flags;
/*
* This routine sends one byte to the Midi channel.
* If the output FIFO is full, it waits until there
* is space in the queue
*/
n = 3 * HZ; /* Timeout */
spin_lock_irqsave(&lock,flags);
while (n && !midi_devs[dev]->outputc(dev, data)) {
interruptible_sleep_on_timeout(&seq_sleeper, HZ/25);
n--;
}
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&lock,flags);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5120
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5120/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/b7277af490d28ac7f802c015bb0ff31395768556
|
b7277af490d28ac7f802c015bb0ff31395768556
|
bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
|
static void WindowAttributeAttributeGetter(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
v8::Local<v8::Object> holder = info.Holder();
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(holder);
V8SetReturnValueFast(info, WTF::GetPtr(impl->windowAttribute()), impl);
}
|
static void WindowAttributeAttributeGetter(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
v8::Local<v8::Object> holder = info.Holder();
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(holder);
V8SetReturnValueFast(info, WTF::GetPtr(impl->windowAttribute()), impl);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-18445
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-18445/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/b799207e1e1816b09e7a5920fbb2d5fcf6edd681
|
b799207e1e1816b09e7a5920fbb2d5fcf6edd681
|
bpf: 32-bit RSH verification must truncate input before the ALU op
When I wrote commit 468f6eafa6c4 ("bpf: fix 32-bit ALU op verification"), I
assumed that, in order to emulate 64-bit arithmetic with 32-bit logic, it
is sufficient to just truncate the output to 32 bits; and so I just moved
the register size coercion that used to be at the start of the function to
the end of the function.
That assumption is true for almost every op, but not for 32-bit right
shifts, because those can propagate information towards the least
significant bit. Fix it by always truncating inputs for 32-bit ops to 32
bits.
Also get rid of the coerce_reg_to_size() after the ALU op, since that has
no effect.
Fixes: 468f6eafa6c4 ("bpf: fix 32-bit ALU op verification")
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
|
static bool states_equal(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
struct bpf_verifier_state *old,
struct bpf_verifier_state *cur)
{
int i;
if (old->curframe != cur->curframe)
return false;
/* for states to be equal callsites have to be the same
* and all frame states need to be equivalent
*/
for (i = 0; i <= old->curframe; i++) {
if (old->frame[i]->callsite != cur->frame[i]->callsite)
return false;
if (!func_states_equal(old->frame[i], cur->frame[i]))
return false;
}
return true;
}
|
static bool states_equal(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
struct bpf_verifier_state *old,
struct bpf_verifier_state *cur)
{
int i;
if (old->curframe != cur->curframe)
return false;
/* for states to be equal callsites have to be the same
* and all frame states need to be equivalent
*/
for (i = 0; i <= old->curframe; i++) {
if (old->frame[i]->callsite != cur->frame[i]->callsite)
return false;
if (!func_states_equal(old->frame[i], cur->frame[i]))
return false;
}
return true;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/bfa69d49b17f33635c79f79819b90a8d2089c4b3
|
bfa69d49b17f33635c79f79819b90a8d2089c4b3
|
Change notification cmd line enabling to use the new RuntimeEnabledFeatures code.
BUG=25318
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/339093
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@30660 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void WebSettingsImpl::setCursiveFontFamily(const WebString& font)
{
m_settings->setCursiveFontFamily((String)font);
}
|
void WebSettingsImpl::setCursiveFontFamily(const WebString& font)
{
m_settings->setCursiveFontFamily((String)font);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-1428
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-1428/
|
CWE-20
|
https://git.savannah.gnu.org/gitweb/?p=weechat.git;a=commit;h=c265cad1c95b84abfd4e8d861f25926ef13b5d91
|
c265cad1c95b84abfd4e8d861f25926ef13b5d91
| null |
network_connect_gnutls_handshake_fd_cb (void *arg_hook_connect, int fd)
{
struct t_hook *hook_connect;
int rc, direction, flags;
/* make C compiler happy */
(void) fd;
hook_connect = (struct t_hook *)arg_hook_connect;
rc = gnutls_handshake (*HOOK_CONNECT(hook_connect, gnutls_sess));
if ((rc == GNUTLS_E_AGAIN) || (rc == GNUTLS_E_INTERRUPTED))
{
direction = gnutls_record_get_direction (*HOOK_CONNECT(hook_connect, gnutls_sess));
flags = HOOK_FD(HOOK_CONNECT(hook_connect, handshake_hook_fd), flags);
if ((((flags & HOOK_FD_FLAG_READ) == HOOK_FD_FLAG_READ)
&& (direction != 0))
|| (((flags & HOOK_FD_FLAG_WRITE) == HOOK_FD_FLAG_WRITE)
&& (direction != 1)))
{
HOOK_FD(HOOK_CONNECT(hook_connect, handshake_hook_fd), flags) =
(direction) ? HOOK_FD_FLAG_WRITE: HOOK_FD_FLAG_READ;
}
}
else if (rc != GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS)
{
(void) (HOOK_CONNECT(hook_connect, callback))
(hook_connect->callback_data,
WEECHAT_HOOK_CONNECT_GNUTLS_HANDSHAKE_ERROR,
rc,
gnutls_strerror (rc),
HOOK_CONNECT(hook_connect, handshake_ip_address));
unhook (hook_connect);
}
else
{
fcntl (HOOK_CONNECT(hook_connect, sock), F_SETFL,
HOOK_CONNECT(hook_connect, handshake_fd_flags));
unhook (HOOK_CONNECT(hook_connect, handshake_hook_fd));
(void) (HOOK_CONNECT(hook_connect, callback))
(hook_connect->callback_data, WEECHAT_HOOK_CONNECT_OK, 0, NULL,
HOOK_CONNECT(hook_connect, handshake_ip_address));
unhook (hook_connect);
}
return WEECHAT_RC_OK;
}
|
network_connect_gnutls_handshake_fd_cb (void *arg_hook_connect, int fd)
{
struct t_hook *hook_connect;
int rc, direction, flags;
/* make C compiler happy */
(void) fd;
hook_connect = (struct t_hook *)arg_hook_connect;
rc = gnutls_handshake (*HOOK_CONNECT(hook_connect, gnutls_sess));
if ((rc == GNUTLS_E_AGAIN) || (rc == GNUTLS_E_INTERRUPTED))
{
direction = gnutls_record_get_direction (*HOOK_CONNECT(hook_connect, gnutls_sess));
flags = HOOK_FD(HOOK_CONNECT(hook_connect, handshake_hook_fd), flags);
if ((((flags & HOOK_FD_FLAG_READ) == HOOK_FD_FLAG_READ)
&& (direction != 0))
|| (((flags & HOOK_FD_FLAG_WRITE) == HOOK_FD_FLAG_WRITE)
&& (direction != 1)))
{
HOOK_FD(HOOK_CONNECT(hook_connect, handshake_hook_fd), flags) =
(direction) ? HOOK_FD_FLAG_WRITE: HOOK_FD_FLAG_READ;
}
}
else if (rc != GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS)
{
(void) (HOOK_CONNECT(hook_connect, callback))
(hook_connect->callback_data,
WEECHAT_HOOK_CONNECT_GNUTLS_HANDSHAKE_ERROR,
rc,
gnutls_strerror (rc),
HOOK_CONNECT(hook_connect, handshake_ip_address));
unhook (hook_connect);
}
else
{
fcntl (HOOK_CONNECT(hook_connect, sock), F_SETFL,
HOOK_CONNECT(hook_connect, handshake_fd_flags));
unhook (HOOK_CONNECT(hook_connect, handshake_hook_fd));
(void) (HOOK_CONNECT(hook_connect, callback))
(hook_connect->callback_data, WEECHAT_HOOK_CONNECT_OK, 0, NULL,
HOOK_CONNECT(hook_connect, handshake_ip_address));
unhook (hook_connect);
}
return WEECHAT_RC_OK;
}
|
C
|
savannah
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/44a637b47793512bfb1d2589d43b8dc492a97629
|
44a637b47793512bfb1d2589d43b8dc492a97629
|
Desist libxml from continuing the parse after a SAX callback has stopped the
parse.
Attempt 2 -- now with less compile fail on Mac / Clang.
BUG=95465
TBR=cdn
TEST=covered by existing tests under ASAN
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7892003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@100953 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
xmlParseXMLDecl(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
xmlChar *version;
/*
* This value for standalone indicates that the document has an
* XML declaration but it does not have a standalone attribute.
* It will be overwritten later if a standalone attribute is found.
*/
ctxt->input->standalone = -2;
/*
* We know that '<?xml' is here.
*/
SKIP(5);
if (!IS_BLANK_CH(RAW)) {
xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_SPACE_REQUIRED,
"Blank needed after '<?xml'\n");
}
SKIP_BLANKS;
/*
* We must have the VersionInfo here.
*/
version = xmlParseVersionInfo(ctxt);
if (version == NULL) {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_VERSION_MISSING, NULL);
} else {
if (!xmlStrEqual(version, (const xmlChar *) XML_DEFAULT_VERSION)) {
/*
* Changed here for XML-1.0 5th edition
*/
if (ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_OLD10) {
xmlFatalErrMsgStr(ctxt, XML_ERR_UNKNOWN_VERSION,
"Unsupported version '%s'\n",
version);
} else {
if ((version[0] == '1') && ((version[1] == '.'))) {
xmlWarningMsg(ctxt, XML_WAR_UNKNOWN_VERSION,
"Unsupported version '%s'\n",
version, NULL);
} else {
xmlFatalErrMsgStr(ctxt, XML_ERR_UNKNOWN_VERSION,
"Unsupported version '%s'\n",
version);
}
}
}
if (ctxt->version != NULL)
xmlFree((void *) ctxt->version);
ctxt->version = version;
}
/*
* We may have the encoding declaration
*/
if (!IS_BLANK_CH(RAW)) {
if ((RAW == '?') && (NXT(1) == '>')) {
SKIP(2);
return;
}
xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_SPACE_REQUIRED, "Blank needed here\n");
}
xmlParseEncodingDecl(ctxt);
if (ctxt->errNo == XML_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_ENCODING) {
/*
* The XML REC instructs us to stop parsing right here
*/
return;
}
/*
* We may have the standalone status.
*/
if ((ctxt->input->encoding != NULL) && (!IS_BLANK_CH(RAW))) {
if ((RAW == '?') && (NXT(1) == '>')) {
SKIP(2);
return;
}
xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_SPACE_REQUIRED, "Blank needed here\n");
}
/*
* We can grow the input buffer freely at that point
*/
GROW;
SKIP_BLANKS;
ctxt->input->standalone = xmlParseSDDecl(ctxt);
SKIP_BLANKS;
if ((RAW == '?') && (NXT(1) == '>')) {
SKIP(2);
} else if (RAW == '>') {
/* Deprecated old WD ... */
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_XMLDECL_NOT_FINISHED, NULL);
NEXT;
} else {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_XMLDECL_NOT_FINISHED, NULL);
MOVETO_ENDTAG(CUR_PTR);
NEXT;
}
}
|
xmlParseXMLDecl(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
xmlChar *version;
/*
* This value for standalone indicates that the document has an
* XML declaration but it does not have a standalone attribute.
* It will be overwritten later if a standalone attribute is found.
*/
ctxt->input->standalone = -2;
/*
* We know that '<?xml' is here.
*/
SKIP(5);
if (!IS_BLANK_CH(RAW)) {
xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_SPACE_REQUIRED,
"Blank needed after '<?xml'\n");
}
SKIP_BLANKS;
/*
* We must have the VersionInfo here.
*/
version = xmlParseVersionInfo(ctxt);
if (version == NULL) {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_VERSION_MISSING, NULL);
} else {
if (!xmlStrEqual(version, (const xmlChar *) XML_DEFAULT_VERSION)) {
/*
* Changed here for XML-1.0 5th edition
*/
if (ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_OLD10) {
xmlFatalErrMsgStr(ctxt, XML_ERR_UNKNOWN_VERSION,
"Unsupported version '%s'\n",
version);
} else {
if ((version[0] == '1') && ((version[1] == '.'))) {
xmlWarningMsg(ctxt, XML_WAR_UNKNOWN_VERSION,
"Unsupported version '%s'\n",
version, NULL);
} else {
xmlFatalErrMsgStr(ctxt, XML_ERR_UNKNOWN_VERSION,
"Unsupported version '%s'\n",
version);
}
}
}
if (ctxt->version != NULL)
xmlFree((void *) ctxt->version);
ctxt->version = version;
}
/*
* We may have the encoding declaration
*/
if (!IS_BLANK_CH(RAW)) {
if ((RAW == '?') && (NXT(1) == '>')) {
SKIP(2);
return;
}
xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_SPACE_REQUIRED, "Blank needed here\n");
}
xmlParseEncodingDecl(ctxt);
if (ctxt->errNo == XML_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_ENCODING) {
/*
* The XML REC instructs us to stop parsing right here
*/
return;
}
/*
* We may have the standalone status.
*/
if ((ctxt->input->encoding != NULL) && (!IS_BLANK_CH(RAW))) {
if ((RAW == '?') && (NXT(1) == '>')) {
SKIP(2);
return;
}
xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_SPACE_REQUIRED, "Blank needed here\n");
}
/*
* We can grow the input buffer freely at that point
*/
GROW;
SKIP_BLANKS;
ctxt->input->standalone = xmlParseSDDecl(ctxt);
SKIP_BLANKS;
if ((RAW == '?') && (NXT(1) == '>')) {
SKIP(2);
} else if (RAW == '>') {
/* Deprecated old WD ... */
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_XMLDECL_NOT_FINISHED, NULL);
NEXT;
} else {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_XMLDECL_NOT_FINISHED, NULL);
MOVETO_ENDTAG(CUR_PTR);
NEXT;
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2918
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2918/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233
|
a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233
|
perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael Cree <[email protected]>
Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <[email protected]>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric B Munson <[email protected]>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul Mundt <[email protected]>
Cc: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Cc: Jason Wessel <[email protected]>
Cc: Don Zickus <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
|
static void perf_stop_nmi_watchdog(void *unused)
{
struct cpu_hw_events *cpuc = &__get_cpu_var(cpu_hw_events);
stop_nmi_watchdog(NULL);
cpuc->pcr = pcr_ops->read();
}
|
static void perf_stop_nmi_watchdog(void *unused)
{
struct cpu_hw_events *cpuc = &__get_cpu_var(cpu_hw_events);
stop_nmi_watchdog(NULL);
cpuc->pcr = pcr_ops->read();
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2011-4930
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-4930/
|
CWE-134
|
https://htcondor-git.cs.wisc.edu/?p=condor.git;a=commitdiff;h=5e5571d1a431eb3c61977b6dd6ec90186ef79867
|
5e5571d1a431eb3c61977b6dd6ec90186ef79867
| null |
ReadUserLogState::StatFile( StatStructType &statbuf ) const
{
return StatFile( CurPath(), statbuf );
}
|
ReadUserLogState::StatFile( StatStructType &statbuf ) const
{
return StatFile( CurPath(), statbuf );
}
|
CPP
|
htcondor
| 0 |
CVE-2011-3088
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-3088/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/1dab554a7e795dac34313e2f7dbe4325628d12d4
|
1dab554a7e795dac34313e2f7dbe4325628d12d4
|
Lands http://codereview.chromium.org/9316065/ for Marja. I reviewed
this, so I'm using TBR to land it.
Don't crash if multiple SessionRestoreImpl:s refer to the same
Profile.
It shouldn't ever happen but it seems to happen anyway.
BUG=111238
TEST=NONE
[email protected]
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9343005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@120648 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void TabLoader::OnOnlineStateChanged(bool online) {
if (online) {
if (!loading_) {
loading_ = true;
LoadNextTab();
}
} else {
loading_ = false;
}
}
|
void TabLoader::OnOnlineStateChanged(bool online) {
if (online) {
if (!loading_) {
loading_ = true;
LoadNextTab();
}
} else {
loading_ = false;
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-9994
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-9994/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/FFmpeg/FFmpeg/commit/6b5d3fb26fb4be48e4966e4b1d97c2165538d4ef
|
6b5d3fb26fb4be48e4966e4b1d97c2165538d4ef
|
avcodec/webp: Always set pix_fmt
Fixes: out of array access
Fixes: 1434/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-6314998085189632
Fixes: 1435/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-6483783723253760
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/targets/ffmpeg
Reviewed-by: "Ronald S. Bultje" <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]>
|
static int parse_transform_color(WebPContext *s)
{
int block_bits, blocks_w, blocks_h, ret;
PARSE_BLOCK_SIZE(s->width, s->height);
ret = decode_entropy_coded_image(s, IMAGE_ROLE_COLOR_TRANSFORM, blocks_w,
blocks_h);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
s->image[IMAGE_ROLE_COLOR_TRANSFORM].size_reduction = block_bits;
return 0;
}
|
static int parse_transform_color(WebPContext *s)
{
int block_bits, blocks_w, blocks_h, ret;
PARSE_BLOCK_SIZE(s->width, s->height);
ret = decode_entropy_coded_image(s, IMAGE_ROLE_COLOR_TRANSFORM, blocks_w,
blocks_h);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
s->image[IMAGE_ROLE_COLOR_TRANSFORM].size_reduction = block_bits;
return 0;
}
|
C
|
FFmpeg
| 0 |
CVE-2019-11487
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-11487/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/6b3a707736301c2128ca85ce85fb13f60b5e350a
|
6b3a707736301c2128ca85ce85fb13f60b5e350a
|
Merge branch 'page-refs' (page ref overflow)
Merge page ref overflow branch.
Jann Horn reported that he can overflow the page ref count with
sufficient memory (and a filesystem that is intentionally extremely
slow).
Admittedly it's not exactly easy. To have more than four billion
references to a page requires a minimum of 32GB of kernel memory just
for the pointers to the pages, much less any metadata to keep track of
those pointers. Jann needed a total of 140GB of memory and a specially
crafted filesystem that leaves all reads pending (in order to not ever
free the page references and just keep adding more).
Still, we have a fairly straightforward way to limit the two obvious
user-controllable sources of page references: direct-IO like page
references gotten through get_user_pages(), and the splice pipe page
duplication. So let's just do that.
* branch page-refs:
fs: prevent page refcount overflow in pipe_buf_get
mm: prevent get_user_pages() from overflowing page refcount
mm: add 'try_get_page()' helper function
mm: make page ref count overflow check tighter and more explicit
|
long get_user_pages_unlocked(unsigned long start, unsigned long nr_pages,
struct page **pages, unsigned int gup_flags)
{
struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
int locked = 1;
long ret;
down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
ret = __get_user_pages_locked(current, mm, start, nr_pages, pages, NULL,
&locked, gup_flags | FOLL_TOUCH);
if (locked)
up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
return ret;
}
|
long get_user_pages_unlocked(unsigned long start, unsigned long nr_pages,
struct page **pages, unsigned int gup_flags)
{
struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
int locked = 1;
long ret;
down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
ret = __get_user_pages_locked(current, mm, start, nr_pages, pages, NULL,
&locked, gup_flags | FOLL_TOUCH);
if (locked)
up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
return ret;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5580
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5580/
|
CWE-119
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/virglrenderer/commit/src/gallium/auxiliary/tgsi/tgsi_text.c?id=28894a30a17a84529be102b21118e55d6c9f23fa
|
28894a30a17a84529be102b21118e55d6c9f23fa
| null |
parse_fs_coord_origin( const char **pcur, uint *fs_coord_origin )
{
uint i;
for (i = 0; i < Elements(tgsi_fs_coord_origin_names); i++) {
const char *cur = *pcur;
if (str_match_nocase_whole( &cur, tgsi_fs_coord_origin_names[i])) {
*fs_coord_origin = i;
*pcur = cur;
return TRUE;
}
}
return FALSE;
}
|
parse_fs_coord_origin( const char **pcur, uint *fs_coord_origin )
{
uint i;
for (i = 0; i < Elements(tgsi_fs_coord_origin_names); i++) {
const char *cur = *pcur;
if (str_match_nocase_whole( &cur, tgsi_fs_coord_origin_names[i])) {
*fs_coord_origin = i;
*pcur = cur;
return TRUE;
}
}
return FALSE;
}
|
C
|
virglrenderer
| 0 |
CVE-2013-0904
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0904/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/b2b21468c1f7f08b30a7c1755316f6026c50eb2a
|
b2b21468c1f7f08b30a7c1755316f6026c50eb2a
|
Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
[email protected], [email protected], [email protected]
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
void RenderBox::setScrollLeft(int newLeft)
{
DisableCompositingQueryAsserts disabler;
if (hasOverflowClip())
layer()->scrollableArea()->scrollToXOffset(newLeft, ScrollOffsetClamped);
}
|
void RenderBox::setScrollLeft(int newLeft)
{
DisableCompositingQueryAsserts disabler;
if (hasOverflowClip())
layer()->scrollableArea()->scrollToXOffset(newLeft, ScrollOffsetClamped);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5850
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5850/
|
CWE-770
|
https://github.com/openbsd/src/commit/142cfc82b932bc211218fbd7bdda8c7ce83f19df
|
142cfc82b932bc211218fbd7bdda8c7ce83f19df
|
Reimplement httpd's support for byte ranges.
The previous implementation loaded all the output into a single output
buffer and used its size to determine the Content-Length of the body.
The new implementation calculates the body length first and writes the
individual ranges in an async way using the bufferevent mechanism.
This prevents httpd from using too much memory and applies the
watermark and throttling mechanisms to range requests.
Problem reported by Pierre Kim (pierre.kim.sec at gmail.com)
OK benno@ sunil@
|
server_httpmethod_cmp(const void *a, const void *b)
{
const struct http_method *ma = a;
const struct http_method *mb = b;
/*
* RFC 2616 section 5.1.1 says that the method is case
* sensitive so we don't do a strcasecmp here.
*/
return (strcmp(ma->method_name, mb->method_name));
}
|
server_httpmethod_cmp(const void *a, const void *b)
{
const struct http_method *ma = a;
const struct http_method *mb = b;
/*
* RFC 2616 section 5.1.1 says that the method is case
* sensitive so we don't do a strcasecmp here.
*/
return (strcmp(ma->method_name, mb->method_name));
}
|
C
|
src
| 0 |
CVE-2014-8172
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-8172/
|
CWE-17
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/eee5cc2702929fd41cce28058dc6d6717f723f87
|
eee5cc2702929fd41cce28058dc6d6717f723f87
|
get rid of s_files and files_lock
The only thing we need it for is alt-sysrq-r (emergency remount r/o)
and these days we can do just as well without going through the
list of files.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]>
|
struct dentry *mount_nodev(struct file_system_type *fs_type,
int flags, void *data,
int (*fill_super)(struct super_block *, void *, int))
{
int error;
struct super_block *s = sget(fs_type, NULL, set_anon_super, flags, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(s))
return ERR_CAST(s);
error = fill_super(s, data, flags & MS_SILENT ? 1 : 0);
if (error) {
deactivate_locked_super(s);
return ERR_PTR(error);
}
s->s_flags |= MS_ACTIVE;
return dget(s->s_root);
}
|
struct dentry *mount_nodev(struct file_system_type *fs_type,
int flags, void *data,
int (*fill_super)(struct super_block *, void *, int))
{
int error;
struct super_block *s = sget(fs_type, NULL, set_anon_super, flags, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(s))
return ERR_CAST(s);
error = fill_super(s, data, flags & MS_SILENT ? 1 : 0);
if (error) {
deactivate_locked_super(s);
return ERR_PTR(error);
}
s->s_flags |= MS_ACTIVE;
return dget(s->s_root);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-9203
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-9203/
|
CWE-787
|
https://github.com/jsummers/imageworsener/commit/a4f247707f08e322f0b41e82c3e06e224240a654
|
a4f247707f08e322f0b41e82c3e06e224240a654
|
Fixed a bug that could cause invalid memory to be accessed
The bug could happen when transparency is removed from an image.
Also fixed a semi-related BMP error handling logic bug.
Fixes issue #21
|
static size_t iwbmp_calc_bpr(int bpp, size_t width)
{
return ((bpp*width+31)/32)*4;
}
|
static size_t iwbmp_calc_bpr(int bpp, size_t width)
{
return ((bpp*width+31)/32)*4;
}
|
C
|
imageworsener
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5219
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5219/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a4150b688a754d3d10d2ca385155b1c95d77d6ae
|
a4150b688a754d3d10d2ca385155b1c95d77d6ae
|
Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
|
error::Error GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::DoUniformMatrix4x3fv(
GLint location,
GLsizei count,
GLboolean transpose,
const volatile GLfloat* value) {
api()->glUniformMatrix4x3fvFn(location, count, transpose,
const_cast<const GLfloat*>(value));
return error::kNoError;
}
|
error::Error GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::DoUniformMatrix4x3fv(
GLint location,
GLsizei count,
GLboolean transpose,
const volatile GLfloat* value) {
api()->glUniformMatrix4x3fvFn(location, count, transpose,
const_cast<const GLfloat*>(value));
return error::kNoError;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-0723
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-0723/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/5c17c861a357e9458001f021a7afa7aab9937439
|
5c17c861a357e9458001f021a7afa7aab9937439
|
tty: Fix unsafe ldisc reference via ioctl(TIOCGETD)
ioctl(TIOCGETD) retrieves the line discipline id directly from the
ldisc because the line discipline id (c_line) in termios is untrustworthy;
userspace may have set termios via ioctl(TCSETS*) without actually
changing the line discipline via ioctl(TIOCSETD).
However, directly accessing the current ldisc via tty->ldisc is
unsafe; the ldisc ptr dereferenced may be stale if the line discipline
is changing via ioctl(TIOCSETD) or hangup.
Wait for the line discipline reference (just like read() or write())
to retrieve the "current" line discipline id.
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Peter Hurley <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
|
int tty_init_termios(struct tty_struct *tty)
{
struct ktermios *tp;
int idx = tty->index;
if (tty->driver->flags & TTY_DRIVER_RESET_TERMIOS)
tty->termios = tty->driver->init_termios;
else {
/* Check for lazy saved data */
tp = tty->driver->termios[idx];
if (tp != NULL)
tty->termios = *tp;
else
tty->termios = tty->driver->init_termios;
}
/* Compatibility until drivers always set this */
tty->termios.c_ispeed = tty_termios_input_baud_rate(&tty->termios);
tty->termios.c_ospeed = tty_termios_baud_rate(&tty->termios);
return 0;
}
|
int tty_init_termios(struct tty_struct *tty)
{
struct ktermios *tp;
int idx = tty->index;
if (tty->driver->flags & TTY_DRIVER_RESET_TERMIOS)
tty->termios = tty->driver->init_termios;
else {
/* Check for lazy saved data */
tp = tty->driver->termios[idx];
if (tp != NULL)
tty->termios = *tp;
else
tty->termios = tty->driver->init_termios;
}
/* Compatibility until drivers always set this */
tty->termios.c_ispeed = tty_termios_input_baud_rate(&tty->termios);
tty->termios.c_ospeed = tty_termios_baud_rate(&tty->termios);
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2019-5774
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-5774/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/b32471d5abb3b3a4fe56e1dd79871400b51a0cca
|
b32471d5abb3b3a4fe56e1dd79871400b51a0cca
|
Add .desktop file to download_file_types.asciipb
.desktop files act as shortcuts on Linux, allowing arbitrary code
execution. We should send pings for these files.
Bug: 904182
Change-Id: Ibc26141fb180e843e1ffaf3f78717a9109d2fa9a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1344552
Reviewed-by: Varun Khaneja <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Daniel Rubery <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#611272}
|
getMimeTypeToDownloadContentMap() {
return {
{"application/octet-stream", DownloadContent::OCTET_STREAM},
{"binary/octet-stream", DownloadContent::OCTET_STREAM},
{"application/pdf", DownloadContent::PDF},
{"application/msword", DownloadContent::DOCUMENT},
{"application/"
"vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document",
DownloadContent::DOCUMENT},
{"application/rtf", DownloadContent::DOCUMENT},
{"application/vnd.oasis.opendocument.text", DownloadContent::DOCUMENT},
{"application/vnd.google-apps.document", DownloadContent::DOCUMENT},
{"application/vnd.ms-excel", DownloadContent::SPREADSHEET},
{"application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.spreadsheetml.sheet",
DownloadContent::SPREADSHEET},
{"application/vnd.oasis.opendocument.spreadsheet",
DownloadContent::SPREADSHEET},
{"application/vnd.google-apps.spreadsheet", DownloadContent::SPREADSHEET},
{"application/vns.ms-powerpoint", DownloadContent::PRESENTATION},
{"application/"
"vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.presentationml.presentation",
DownloadContent::PRESENTATION},
{"application/vnd.oasis.opendocument.presentation",
DownloadContent::PRESENTATION},
{"application/vnd.google-apps.presentation",
DownloadContent::PRESENTATION},
{"application/zip", DownloadContent::ARCHIVE},
{"application/x-gzip", DownloadContent::ARCHIVE},
{"application/x-rar-compressed", DownloadContent::ARCHIVE},
{"application/x-tar", DownloadContent::ARCHIVE},
{"application/x-bzip", DownloadContent::ARCHIVE},
{"application/x-bzip2", DownloadContent::ARCHIVE},
{"application/x-7z-compressed", DownloadContent::ARCHIVE},
{"application/x-exe", DownloadContent::EXECUTABLE},
{"application/java-archive", DownloadContent::EXECUTABLE},
{"application/vnd.apple.installer+xml", DownloadContent::EXECUTABLE},
{"application/x-csh", DownloadContent::EXECUTABLE},
{"application/x-sh", DownloadContent::EXECUTABLE},
{"application/x-apple-diskimage", DownloadContent::DMG},
{"application/x-chrome-extension", DownloadContent::CRX},
{"application/xhtml+xml", DownloadContent::WEB},
{"application/xml", DownloadContent::WEB},
{"application/javascript", DownloadContent::WEB},
{"application/json", DownloadContent::WEB},
{"application/typescript", DownloadContent::WEB},
{"application/vnd.mozilla.xul+xml", DownloadContent::WEB},
{"application/vnd.amazon.ebook", DownloadContent::EBOOK},
{"application/epub+zip", DownloadContent::EBOOK},
{"application/vnd.android.package-archive", DownloadContent::APK}};
}
|
getMimeTypeToDownloadContentMap() {
return {
{"application/octet-stream", DownloadContent::OCTET_STREAM},
{"binary/octet-stream", DownloadContent::OCTET_STREAM},
{"application/pdf", DownloadContent::PDF},
{"application/msword", DownloadContent::DOCUMENT},
{"application/"
"vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document",
DownloadContent::DOCUMENT},
{"application/rtf", DownloadContent::DOCUMENT},
{"application/vnd.oasis.opendocument.text", DownloadContent::DOCUMENT},
{"application/vnd.google-apps.document", DownloadContent::DOCUMENT},
{"application/vnd.ms-excel", DownloadContent::SPREADSHEET},
{"application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.spreadsheetml.sheet",
DownloadContent::SPREADSHEET},
{"application/vnd.oasis.opendocument.spreadsheet",
DownloadContent::SPREADSHEET},
{"application/vnd.google-apps.spreadsheet", DownloadContent::SPREADSHEET},
{"application/vns.ms-powerpoint", DownloadContent::PRESENTATION},
{"application/"
"vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.presentationml.presentation",
DownloadContent::PRESENTATION},
{"application/vnd.oasis.opendocument.presentation",
DownloadContent::PRESENTATION},
{"application/vnd.google-apps.presentation",
DownloadContent::PRESENTATION},
{"application/zip", DownloadContent::ARCHIVE},
{"application/x-gzip", DownloadContent::ARCHIVE},
{"application/x-rar-compressed", DownloadContent::ARCHIVE},
{"application/x-tar", DownloadContent::ARCHIVE},
{"application/x-bzip", DownloadContent::ARCHIVE},
{"application/x-bzip2", DownloadContent::ARCHIVE},
{"application/x-7z-compressed", DownloadContent::ARCHIVE},
{"application/x-exe", DownloadContent::EXECUTABLE},
{"application/java-archive", DownloadContent::EXECUTABLE},
{"application/vnd.apple.installer+xml", DownloadContent::EXECUTABLE},
{"application/x-csh", DownloadContent::EXECUTABLE},
{"application/x-sh", DownloadContent::EXECUTABLE},
{"application/x-apple-diskimage", DownloadContent::DMG},
{"application/x-chrome-extension", DownloadContent::CRX},
{"application/xhtml+xml", DownloadContent::WEB},
{"application/xml", DownloadContent::WEB},
{"application/javascript", DownloadContent::WEB},
{"application/json", DownloadContent::WEB},
{"application/typescript", DownloadContent::WEB},
{"application/vnd.mozilla.xul+xml", DownloadContent::WEB},
{"application/vnd.amazon.ebook", DownloadContent::EBOOK},
{"application/epub+zip", DownloadContent::EBOOK},
{"application/vnd.android.package-archive", DownloadContent::APK}};
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-8539
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-8539/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/096fe9eaea40a17e125569f9e657e34cdb6d73bd
|
096fe9eaea40a17e125569f9e657e34cdb6d73bd
|
KEYS: Fix handling of stored error in a negatively instantiated user key
If a user key gets negatively instantiated, an error code is cached in the
payload area. A negatively instantiated key may be then be positively
instantiated by updating it with valid data. However, the ->update key
type method must be aware that the error code may be there.
The following may be used to trigger the bug in the user key type:
keyctl request2 user user "" @u
keyctl add user user "a" @u
which manifests itself as:
BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 00000000ffffff8a
IP: [<ffffffff810a376f>] __call_rcu.constprop.76+0x1f/0x280 kernel/rcu/tree.c:3046
PGD 7cc30067 PUD 0
Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 3 PID: 2644 Comm: a.out Not tainted 4.3.0+ #49
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
task: ffff88003ddea700 ti: ffff88003dd88000 task.ti: ffff88003dd88000
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff810a376f>] [<ffffffff810a376f>] __call_rcu.constprop.76+0x1f/0x280
[<ffffffff810a376f>] __call_rcu.constprop.76+0x1f/0x280 kernel/rcu/tree.c:3046
RSP: 0018:ffff88003dd8bdb0 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 00000000ffffff82 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000001
RDX: ffffffff81e3fe40 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 00000000ffffff82
RBP: ffff88003dd8bde0 R08: ffff88007d2d2da0 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff88003e8073c0 R12: 00000000ffffff82
R13: ffff88003dd8be68 R14: ffff88007d027600 R15: ffff88003ddea700
FS: 0000000000b92880(0063) GS:ffff88007fd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
CR2: 00000000ffffff8a CR3: 000000007cc5f000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
Stack:
ffff88003dd8bdf0 ffffffff81160a8a 0000000000000000 00000000ffffff82
ffff88003dd8be68 ffff88007d027600 ffff88003dd8bdf0 ffffffff810a39e5
ffff88003dd8be20 ffffffff812a31ab ffff88007d027600 ffff88007d027620
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff810a39e5>] kfree_call_rcu+0x15/0x20 kernel/rcu/tree.c:3136
[<ffffffff812a31ab>] user_update+0x8b/0xb0 security/keys/user_defined.c:129
[< inline >] __key_update security/keys/key.c:730
[<ffffffff8129e5c1>] key_create_or_update+0x291/0x440 security/keys/key.c:908
[< inline >] SYSC_add_key security/keys/keyctl.c:125
[<ffffffff8129fc21>] SyS_add_key+0x101/0x1e0 security/keys/keyctl.c:60
[<ffffffff8185f617>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6a arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:185
Note the error code (-ENOKEY) in EDX.
A similar bug can be tripped by:
keyctl request2 trusted user "" @u
keyctl add trusted user "a" @u
This should also affect encrypted keys - but that has to be correctly
parameterised or it will fail with EINVAL before getting to the bit that
will crashes.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <[email protected]>
|
static int derived_key_encrypt(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload,
const u8 *derived_key,
unsigned int derived_keylen)
{
struct scatterlist sg_in[2];
struct scatterlist sg_out[1];
struct blkcipher_desc desc;
unsigned int encrypted_datalen;
unsigned int padlen;
char pad[16];
int ret;
encrypted_datalen = roundup(epayload->decrypted_datalen, blksize);
padlen = encrypted_datalen - epayload->decrypted_datalen;
ret = init_blkcipher_desc(&desc, derived_key, derived_keylen,
epayload->iv, ivsize);
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
dump_decrypted_data(epayload);
memset(pad, 0, sizeof pad);
sg_init_table(sg_in, 2);
sg_set_buf(&sg_in[0], epayload->decrypted_data,
epayload->decrypted_datalen);
sg_set_buf(&sg_in[1], pad, padlen);
sg_init_table(sg_out, 1);
sg_set_buf(sg_out, epayload->encrypted_data, encrypted_datalen);
ret = crypto_blkcipher_encrypt(&desc, sg_out, sg_in, encrypted_datalen);
crypto_free_blkcipher(desc.tfm);
if (ret < 0)
pr_err("encrypted_key: failed to encrypt (%d)\n", ret);
else
dump_encrypted_data(epayload, encrypted_datalen);
out:
return ret;
}
|
static int derived_key_encrypt(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload,
const u8 *derived_key,
unsigned int derived_keylen)
{
struct scatterlist sg_in[2];
struct scatterlist sg_out[1];
struct blkcipher_desc desc;
unsigned int encrypted_datalen;
unsigned int padlen;
char pad[16];
int ret;
encrypted_datalen = roundup(epayload->decrypted_datalen, blksize);
padlen = encrypted_datalen - epayload->decrypted_datalen;
ret = init_blkcipher_desc(&desc, derived_key, derived_keylen,
epayload->iv, ivsize);
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
dump_decrypted_data(epayload);
memset(pad, 0, sizeof pad);
sg_init_table(sg_in, 2);
sg_set_buf(&sg_in[0], epayload->decrypted_data,
epayload->decrypted_datalen);
sg_set_buf(&sg_in[1], pad, padlen);
sg_init_table(sg_out, 1);
sg_set_buf(sg_out, epayload->encrypted_data, encrypted_datalen);
ret = crypto_blkcipher_encrypt(&desc, sg_out, sg_in, encrypted_datalen);
crypto_free_blkcipher(desc.tfm);
if (ret < 0)
pr_err("encrypted_key: failed to encrypt (%d)\n", ret);
else
dump_encrypted_data(epayload, encrypted_datalen);
out:
return ret;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-14036
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-14036/
|
CWE-22
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/accountsservice/commit/?id=f9abd359f71a5bce421b9ae23432f539a067847a
|
f9abd359f71a5bce421b9ae23432f539a067847a
| null |
user_get_system_account (User *user)
{
return accounts_user_get_system_account (ACCOUNTS_USER (user));
}
|
user_get_system_account (User *user)
{
return accounts_user_get_system_account (ACCOUNTS_USER (user));
}
|
C
|
accountsservice
| 0 |
CVE-2019-15938
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-15938/
|
CWE-119
|
https://git.pengutronix.de/cgit/barebox/commit/fs/nfs.c?h=next&id=574ce994016107ad8ab0f845a785f28d7eaa5208
|
574ce994016107ad8ab0f845a785f28d7eaa5208
| null |
static int nfs_write(struct device_d *_dev, FILE *file, const void *inbuf,
size_t insize)
{
return -ENOSYS;
}
|
static int nfs_write(struct device_d *_dev, FILE *file, const void *inbuf,
size_t insize)
{
return -ENOSYS;
}
|
C
|
pengutronix
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1616
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1616/
|
CWE-254
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/297ae873b471a46929ea39697b121c0b411434ee
|
297ae873b471a46929ea39697b121c0b411434ee
|
Custom buttons should only handle accelerators when focused.
BUG=541415
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1437523005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#360130}
|
void CustomButton::OnEnabledChanged() {
if (enabled() ? (state_ != STATE_DISABLED) : (state_ == STATE_DISABLED))
return;
if (enabled())
SetState(ShouldEnterHoveredState() ? STATE_HOVERED : STATE_NORMAL);
else
SetState(STATE_DISABLED);
}
|
void CustomButton::OnEnabledChanged() {
if (enabled() ? (state_ != STATE_DISABLED) : (state_ == STATE_DISABLED))
return;
if (enabled())
SetState(ShouldEnterHoveredState() ? STATE_HOVERED : STATE_NORMAL);
else
SetState(STATE_DISABLED);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2891
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2891/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/116d0963cadfbf55ef2ec3d13781987c4d80517a
|
116d0963cadfbf55ef2ec3d13781987c4d80517a
|
Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void PrintWebViewHelper::OnInitiatePrintPreview() {
DCHECK(is_preview_enabled_);
WebFrame* frame;
if (GetPrintFrame(&frame)) {
print_preview_context_.InitWithFrame(frame);
RequestPrintPreview(PRINT_PREVIEW_USER_INITIATED_ENTIRE_FRAME);
} else {
CHECK(false);
}
}
|
void PrintWebViewHelper::OnInitiatePrintPreview() {
DCHECK(is_preview_enabled_);
WebFrame* frame;
if (GetPrintFrame(&frame)) {
print_preview_context_.InitWithFrame(frame);
RequestPrintPreview(PRINT_PREVIEW_USER_INITIATED_ENTIRE_FRAME);
} else {
CHECK(false);
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-12989
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-12989/
|
CWE-835
|
https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/db24063b01cba8e9d4d88b7d8ac70c9000c104e4
|
db24063b01cba8e9d4d88b7d8ac70c9000c104e4
|
CVE-2017-12989/RESP: Make sure resp_get_length() advances the pointer for invalid lengths.
Make sure that it always sends *endp before returning and that, for
invalid lengths where we don't like a character in the length string,
what it sets *endp to is past the character in question, so we don't
run the risk of infinitely looping (or doing something else random) if a
character in the length is invalid.
This fixes an infinite loop discovered by Forcepoint's security
researchers Otto Airamo & Antti Levomäki.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
|
resp_get_length(netdissect_options *ndo, register const u_char *bp, int len, const u_char **endp)
{
int result;
u_char c;
int saw_digit;
int neg;
int too_large;
if (len == 0)
goto trunc;
ND_TCHECK(*bp);
too_large = 0;
neg = 0;
if (*bp == '-') {
neg = 1;
bp++;
len--;
}
result = 0;
saw_digit = 0;
for (;;) {
if (len == 0)
goto trunc;
ND_TCHECK(*bp);
c = *bp;
if (!(c >= '0' && c <= '9')) {
if (!saw_digit) {
bp++;
goto invalid;
}
break;
}
c -= '0';
if (result > (INT_MAX / 10)) {
/* This will overflow an int when we multiply it by 10. */
too_large = 1;
} else {
result *= 10;
if (result == INT_MAX && c > (INT_MAX % 10)) {
/* This will overflow an int when we add c */
too_large = 1;
} else
result += c;
}
bp++;
len--;
saw_digit = 1;
}
if (!saw_digit)
goto invalid;
/*
* OK, the next thing should be \r\n.
*/
if (len == 0)
goto trunc;
ND_TCHECK(*bp);
if (*bp != '\r') {
bp++;
goto invalid;
}
bp++;
len--;
if (len == 0)
goto trunc;
ND_TCHECK(*bp);
if (*bp != '\n') {
bp++;
goto invalid;
}
bp++;
len--;
*endp = bp;
if (neg) {
/* -1 means "null", anything else is invalid */
if (too_large || result != 1)
return (-4);
result = -1;
}
return (too_large ? -3 : result);
trunc:
*endp = bp;
return (-2);
invalid:
*endp = bp;
return (-5);
}
|
resp_get_length(netdissect_options *ndo, register const u_char *bp, int len, const u_char **endp)
{
int result;
u_char c;
int saw_digit;
int neg;
int too_large;
if (len == 0)
goto trunc;
ND_TCHECK(*bp);
too_large = 0;
neg = 0;
if (*bp == '-') {
neg = 1;
bp++;
len--;
}
result = 0;
saw_digit = 0;
for (;;) {
if (len == 0)
goto trunc;
ND_TCHECK(*bp);
c = *bp;
if (!(c >= '0' && c <= '9')) {
if (!saw_digit)
goto invalid;
break;
}
c -= '0';
if (result > (INT_MAX / 10)) {
/* This will overflow an int when we multiply it by 10. */
too_large = 1;
} else {
result *= 10;
if (result == INT_MAX && c > (INT_MAX % 10)) {
/* This will overflow an int when we add c */
too_large = 1;
} else
result += c;
}
bp++;
len--;
saw_digit = 1;
}
if (!saw_digit)
goto invalid;
/*
* OK, the next thing should be \r\n.
*/
if (len == 0)
goto trunc;
ND_TCHECK(*bp);
if (*bp != '\r')
goto invalid;
bp++;
len--;
if (len == 0)
goto trunc;
ND_TCHECK(*bp);
if (*bp != '\n')
goto invalid;
bp++;
len--;
*endp = bp;
if (neg) {
/* -1 means "null", anything else is invalid */
if (too_large || result != 1)
return (-4);
result = -1;
}
return (too_large ? -3 : result);
trunc:
return (-2);
invalid:
return (-5);
}
|
C
|
tcpdump
| 1 |
CVE-2012-0045
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-0045/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/c2226fc9e87ba3da060e47333657cd6616652b84
|
c2226fc9e87ba3da060e47333657cd6616652b84
|
KVM: x86: fix missing checks in syscall emulation
On hosts without this patch, 32bit guests will crash (and 64bit guests
may behave in a wrong way) for example by simply executing following
nasm-demo-application:
[bits 32]
global _start
SECTION .text
_start: syscall
(I tested it with winxp and linux - both always crashed)
Disassembly of section .text:
00000000 <_start>:
0: 0f 05 syscall
The reason seems a missing "invalid opcode"-trap (int6) for the
syscall opcode "0f05", which is not available on Intel CPUs
within non-longmodes, as also on some AMD CPUs within legacy-mode.
(depending on CPU vendor, MSR_EFER and cpuid)
Because previous mentioned OSs may not engage corresponding
syscall target-registers (STAR, LSTAR, CSTAR), they remain
NULL and (non trapping) syscalls are leading to multiple
faults and finally crashs.
Depending on the architecture (AMD or Intel) pretended by
guests, various checks according to vendor's documentation
are implemented to overcome the current issue and behave
like the CPUs physical counterparts.
[mtosatti: cleanup/beautify code]
Signed-off-by: Stephan Baerwolf <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <[email protected]>
|
static int emulate_gp(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, int err)
{
return emulate_exception(ctxt, GP_VECTOR, err, true);
}
|
static int emulate_gp(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, int err)
{
return emulate_exception(ctxt, GP_VECTOR, err, true);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-14043
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-14043/
|
CWE-732
|
https://github.com/Monetra/mstdlib/commit/db124b8f607dd0a40a9aef2d4d468fad433522a7
|
db124b8f607dd0a40a9aef2d4d468fad433522a7
|
fs: Don't try to delete the file when copying. It could cause a security issue if the file exists and doesn't allow other's to read/write. delete could allow someone to create the file and have access to the data.
|
char *M_fs_path_join(const char *p1, const char *p2, M_fs_system_t sys_type)
{
M_buf_t *buf;
char sep;
sys_type = M_fs_path_get_system_type(sys_type);
/* If p2 is an absolute path we can't properly join it to another path... */
if (M_fs_path_isabs(p2, sys_type))
return M_strdup(p2);
buf = M_buf_create();
sep = M_fs_path_get_system_sep(sys_type);
/* Don't add nothing if we have nothing. */
if (p1 != NULL && *p1 != '\0')
M_buf_add_str(buf, p1);
/* Only put a sep if we have two parts and we really need the sep (p1 doesn't end with a sep). */
if (p1 != NULL && *p1 != '\0' && p2 != NULL && *p2 != '\0' && p1[M_str_len(p1)-1] != sep)
M_buf_add_byte(buf, (unsigned char)sep);
/* Don't add nothing if we have nothing. */
if (p2 != NULL && *p2 != '\0')
M_buf_add_str(buf, p2);
return M_buf_finish_str(buf, NULL);
}
|
char *M_fs_path_join(const char *p1, const char *p2, M_fs_system_t sys_type)
{
M_buf_t *buf;
char sep;
sys_type = M_fs_path_get_system_type(sys_type);
/* If p2 is an absolute path we can't properly join it to another path... */
if (M_fs_path_isabs(p2, sys_type))
return M_strdup(p2);
buf = M_buf_create();
sep = M_fs_path_get_system_sep(sys_type);
/* Don't add nothing if we have nothing. */
if (p1 != NULL && *p1 != '\0')
M_buf_add_str(buf, p1);
/* Only put a sep if we have two parts and we really need the sep (p1 doesn't end with a sep). */
if (p1 != NULL && *p1 != '\0' && p2 != NULL && *p2 != '\0' && p1[M_str_len(p1)-1] != sep)
M_buf_add_byte(buf, (unsigned char)sep);
/* Don't add nothing if we have nothing. */
if (p2 != NULL && *p2 != '\0')
M_buf_add_str(buf, p2);
return M_buf_finish_str(buf, NULL);
}
|
C
|
mstdlib
| 0 |
CVE-2009-3605
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2009-3605/
|
CWE-189
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/poppler/poppler/commit/?id=7b2d314a61fd0e12f47c62996cb49ec0d1ba747a
|
7b2d314a61fd0e12f47c62996cb49ec0d1ba747a
| null |
void CairoImage::setImage (cairo_surface_t *image) {
if (this->image)
cairo_surface_destroy (this->image);
this->image = cairo_surface_reference (image);
}
|
void CairoImage::setImage (cairo_surface_t *image) {
if (this->image)
cairo_surface_destroy (this->image);
this->image = cairo_surface_reference (image);
}
|
CPP
|
poppler
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2375
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2375/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/20e0fa98b751facf9a1101edaefbc19c82616a68
|
20e0fa98b751facf9a1101edaefbc19c82616a68
|
Fix length of buffer copied in __nfs4_get_acl_uncached
_copy_from_pages() used to copy data from the temporary buffer to the
user passed buffer is passed the wrong size parameter when copying
data. res.acl_len contains both the bitmap and acl lenghts while
acl_len contains the acl length after adjusting for the bitmap size.
Signed-off-by: Sachin Prabhu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
|
nfs4_layoutget_prepare(struct rpc_task *task, void *calldata)
{
struct nfs4_layoutget *lgp = calldata;
struct nfs_server *server = NFS_SERVER(lgp->args.inode);
dprintk("--> %s\n", __func__);
/* Note the is a race here, where a CB_LAYOUTRECALL can come in
* right now covering the LAYOUTGET we are about to send.
* However, that is not so catastrophic, and there seems
* to be no way to prevent it completely.
*/
if (nfs4_setup_sequence(server, &lgp->args.seq_args,
&lgp->res.seq_res, task))
return;
if (pnfs_choose_layoutget_stateid(&lgp->args.stateid,
NFS_I(lgp->args.inode)->layout,
lgp->args.ctx->state)) {
rpc_exit(task, NFS4_OK);
return;
}
rpc_call_start(task);
}
|
nfs4_layoutget_prepare(struct rpc_task *task, void *calldata)
{
struct nfs4_layoutget *lgp = calldata;
struct nfs_server *server = NFS_SERVER(lgp->args.inode);
dprintk("--> %s\n", __func__);
/* Note the is a race here, where a CB_LAYOUTRECALL can come in
* right now covering the LAYOUTGET we are about to send.
* However, that is not so catastrophic, and there seems
* to be no way to prevent it completely.
*/
if (nfs4_setup_sequence(server, &lgp->args.seq_args,
&lgp->res.seq_res, task))
return;
if (pnfs_choose_layoutget_stateid(&lgp->args.stateid,
NFS_I(lgp->args.inode)->layout,
lgp->args.ctx->state)) {
rpc_exit(task, NFS4_OK);
return;
}
rpc_call_start(task);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-4350
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-4350/
|
CWE-310
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/95ee62083cb6453e056562d91f597552021e6ae7
|
95ee62083cb6453e056562d91f597552021e6ae7
|
net: sctp: fix ipv6 ipsec encryption bug in sctp_v6_xmit
Alan Chester reported an issue with IPv6 on SCTP that IPsec traffic is not
being encrypted, whereas on IPv4 it is. Setting up an AH + ESP transport
does not seem to have the desired effect:
SCTP + IPv4:
22:14:20.809645 IP (tos 0x2,ECT(0), ttl 64, id 0, offset 0, flags [DF], proto AH (51), length 116)
192.168.0.2 > 192.168.0.5: AH(spi=0x00000042,sumlen=16,seq=0x1): ESP(spi=0x00000044,seq=0x1), length 72
22:14:20.813270 IP (tos 0x2,ECT(0), ttl 64, id 0, offset 0, flags [DF], proto AH (51), length 340)
192.168.0.5 > 192.168.0.2: AH(spi=0x00000043,sumlen=16,seq=0x1):
SCTP + IPv6:
22:31:19.215029 IP6 (class 0x02, hlim 64, next-header SCTP (132) payload length: 364)
fe80::222:15ff:fe87:7fc.3333 > fe80::92e6:baff:fe0d:5a54.36767: sctp
1) [INIT ACK] [init tag: 747759530] [rwnd: 62464] [OS: 10] [MIS: 10]
Moreover, Alan says:
This problem was seen with both Racoon and Racoon2. Other people have seen
this with OpenSwan. When IPsec is configured to encrypt all upper layer
protocols the SCTP connection does not initialize. After using Wireshark to
follow packets, this is because the SCTP packet leaves Box A unencrypted and
Box B believes all upper layer protocols are to be encrypted so it drops
this packet, causing the SCTP connection to fail to initialize. When IPsec
is configured to encrypt just SCTP, the SCTP packets are observed unencrypted.
In fact, using `socat sctp6-listen:3333 -` on one end and transferring "plaintext"
string on the other end, results in cleartext on the wire where SCTP eventually
does not report any errors, thus in the latter case that Alan reports, the
non-paranoid user might think he's communicating over an encrypted transport on
SCTP although he's not (tcpdump ... -X):
...
0x0030: 5d70 8e1a 0003 001a 177d eb6c 0000 0000 ]p.......}.l....
0x0040: 0000 0000 706c 6169 6e74 6578 740a 0000 ....plaintext...
Only in /proc/net/xfrm_stat we can see XfrmInTmplMismatch increasing on the
receiver side. Initial follow-up analysis from Alan's bug report was done by
Alexey Dobriyan. Also thanks to Vlad Yasevich for feedback on this.
SCTP has its own implementation of sctp_v6_xmit() not calling inet6_csk_xmit().
This has the implication that it probably never really got updated along with
changes in inet6_csk_xmit() and therefore does not seem to invoke xfrm handlers.
SCTP's IPv4 xmit however, properly calls ip_queue_xmit() to do the work. Since
a call to inet6_csk_xmit() would solve this problem, but result in unecessary
route lookups, let us just use the cached flowi6 instead that we got through
sctp_v6_get_dst(). Since all SCTP packets are being sent through sctp_packet_transmit(),
we do the route lookup / flow caching in sctp_transport_route(), hold it in
tp->dst and skb_dst_set() right after that. If we would alter fl6->daddr in
sctp_v6_xmit() to np->opt->srcrt, we possibly could run into the same effect
of not having xfrm layer pick it up, hence, use fl6_update_dst() in sctp_v6_get_dst()
instead to get the correct source routed dst entry, which we assign to the skb.
Also source address routing example from 625034113 ("sctp: fix sctp to work with
ipv6 source address routing") still works with this patch! Nevertheless, in RFC5095
it is actually 'recommended' to not use that anyway due to traffic amplification [1].
So it seems we're not supposed to do that anyway in sctp_v6_xmit(). Moreover, if
we overwrite the flow destination here, the lower IPv6 layer will be unable to
put the correct destination address into IP header, as routing header is added in
ipv6_push_nfrag_opts() but then probably with wrong final destination. Things aside,
result of this patch is that we do not have any XfrmInTmplMismatch increase plus on
the wire with this patch it now looks like:
SCTP + IPv6:
08:17:47.074080 IP6 2620:52:0:102f:7a2b:cbff:fe27:1b0a > 2620:52:0:102f:213:72ff:fe32:7eba:
AH(spi=0x00005fb4,seq=0x1): ESP(spi=0x00005fb5,seq=0x1), length 72
08:17:47.074264 IP6 2620:52:0:102f:213:72ff:fe32:7eba > 2620:52:0:102f:7a2b:cbff:fe27:1b0a:
AH(spi=0x00003d54,seq=0x1): ESP(spi=0x00003d55,seq=0x1), length 296
This fixes Kernel Bugzilla 24412. This security issue seems to be present since
2.6.18 kernels. Lets just hope some big passive adversary in the wild didn't have
its fun with that. lksctp-tools IPv6 regression test suite passes as well with
this patch.
[1] http://www.secdev.org/conf/IPv6_RH_security-csw07.pdf
Reported-by: Alan Chester <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Alexey Dobriyan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <[email protected]>
Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static int sctp_v6_to_addr_param(const union sctp_addr *addr,
union sctp_addr_param *param)
{
int length = sizeof(sctp_ipv6addr_param_t);
param->v6.param_hdr.type = SCTP_PARAM_IPV6_ADDRESS;
param->v6.param_hdr.length = htons(length);
param->v6.addr = addr->v6.sin6_addr;
return length;
}
|
static int sctp_v6_to_addr_param(const union sctp_addr *addr,
union sctp_addr_param *param)
{
int length = sizeof(sctp_ipv6addr_param_t);
param->v6.param_hdr.type = SCTP_PARAM_IPV6_ADDRESS;
param->v6.param_hdr.length = htons(length);
param->v6.addr = addr->v6.sin6_addr;
return length;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-7277
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-7277/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/8605330aac5a5785630aec8f64378a54891937cc
|
8605330aac5a5785630aec8f64378a54891937cc
|
tcp: fix SCM_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS for normal skbs
__sock_recv_timestamp can be called for both normal skbs (for
receive timestamps) and for skbs on the error queue (for transmit
timestamps).
Commit 1c885808e456
(tcp: SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS option for SO_TIMESTAMPING)
assumes any skb passed to __sock_recv_timestamp are from
the error queue, containing OPT_STATS in the content of the skb.
This results in accessing invalid memory or generating junk
data.
To fix this, set skb->pkt_type to PACKET_OUTGOING for packets
on the error queue. This is safe because on the receive path
on local sockets skb->pkt_type is never set to PACKET_OUTGOING.
With that, copy OPT_STATS from a packet, only if its pkt_type
is PACKET_OUTGOING.
Fixes: 1c885808e456 ("tcp: SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS option for SO_TIMESTAMPING")
Reported-by: JongHwan Kim <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static void __skb_complete_tx_timestamp(struct sk_buff *skb,
struct sock *sk,
int tstype)
{
struct sock_exterr_skb *serr;
int err;
serr = SKB_EXT_ERR(skb);
memset(serr, 0, sizeof(*serr));
serr->ee.ee_errno = ENOMSG;
serr->ee.ee_origin = SO_EE_ORIGIN_TIMESTAMPING;
serr->ee.ee_info = tstype;
if (sk->sk_tsflags & SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_ID) {
serr->ee.ee_data = skb_shinfo(skb)->tskey;
if (sk->sk_protocol == IPPROTO_TCP &&
sk->sk_type == SOCK_STREAM)
serr->ee.ee_data -= sk->sk_tskey;
}
err = sock_queue_err_skb(sk, skb);
if (err)
kfree_skb(skb);
}
|
static void __skb_complete_tx_timestamp(struct sk_buff *skb,
struct sock *sk,
int tstype)
{
struct sock_exterr_skb *serr;
int err;
serr = SKB_EXT_ERR(skb);
memset(serr, 0, sizeof(*serr));
serr->ee.ee_errno = ENOMSG;
serr->ee.ee_origin = SO_EE_ORIGIN_TIMESTAMPING;
serr->ee.ee_info = tstype;
if (sk->sk_tsflags & SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_ID) {
serr->ee.ee_data = skb_shinfo(skb)->tskey;
if (sk->sk_protocol == IPPROTO_TCP &&
sk->sk_type == SOCK_STREAM)
serr->ee.ee_data -= sk->sk_tskey;
}
err = sock_queue_err_skb(sk, skb);
if (err)
kfree_skb(skb);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2918
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2918/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233
|
a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233
|
perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael Cree <[email protected]>
Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <[email protected]>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric B Munson <[email protected]>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul Mundt <[email protected]>
Cc: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Cc: Jason Wessel <[email protected]>
Cc: Don Zickus <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
|
asmlinkage void do_fpu_error(unsigned long r4, unsigned long r5,
unsigned long r6, unsigned long r7,
struct pt_regs regs)
{
struct task_struct *tsk = current;
siginfo_t info;
if (ieee_fpe_handler (®s))
return;
regs.pc += 2;
info.si_signo = SIGFPE;
info.si_errno = 0;
info.si_code = FPE_FLTINV;
info.si_addr = (void __user *)regs.pc;
force_sig_info(SIGFPE, &info, tsk);
}
|
asmlinkage void do_fpu_error(unsigned long r4, unsigned long r5,
unsigned long r6, unsigned long r7,
struct pt_regs regs)
{
struct task_struct *tsk = current;
siginfo_t info;
if (ieee_fpe_handler (®s))
return;
regs.pc += 2;
info.si_signo = SIGFPE;
info.si_errno = 0;
info.si_code = FPE_FLTINV;
info.si_addr = (void __user *)regs.pc;
force_sig_info(SIGFPE, &info, tsk);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-19198
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-19198/
|
CWE-787
|
https://github.com/uriparser/uriparser/commit/864f5d4c127def386dd5cc926ad96934b297f04e
|
864f5d4c127def386dd5cc926ad96934b297f04e
|
UriQuery.c: Fix out-of-bounds-write in ComposeQuery and ...Ex
Reported by Google Autofuzz team
|
void testUriUserInfoHostPort23_Bug3510198_3() {
UriParserStateA stateA;
UriUriA uriA;
stateA.uri = &uriA;
int res;
res = uriParseUriA(&stateA, "http" "://" "user:!$&'()*+,;=" "@" "host" "/");
TEST_ASSERT(URI_SUCCESS == res);
TEST_ASSERT(!memcmp(uriA.userInfo.first, "user:!$&'()*+,;=", 16 * sizeof(char)));
TEST_ASSERT(uriA.userInfo.afterLast - uriA.userInfo.first == 16);
TEST_ASSERT(!memcmp(uriA.hostText.first, "host", 4 * sizeof(char)));
TEST_ASSERT(uriA.hostText.afterLast - uriA.hostText.first == 4);
TEST_ASSERT(uriA.portText.first == NULL);
TEST_ASSERT(uriA.portText.afterLast == NULL);
uriFreeUriMembersA(&uriA);
}
|
void testUriUserInfoHostPort23_Bug3510198_3() {
UriParserStateA stateA;
UriUriA uriA;
stateA.uri = &uriA;
int res;
res = uriParseUriA(&stateA, "http" "://" "user:!$&'()*+,;=" "@" "host" "/");
TEST_ASSERT(URI_SUCCESS == res);
TEST_ASSERT(!memcmp(uriA.userInfo.first, "user:!$&'()*+,;=", 16 * sizeof(char)));
TEST_ASSERT(uriA.userInfo.afterLast - uriA.userInfo.first == 16);
TEST_ASSERT(!memcmp(uriA.hostText.first, "host", 4 * sizeof(char)));
TEST_ASSERT(uriA.hostText.afterLast - uriA.hostText.first == 4);
TEST_ASSERT(uriA.portText.first == NULL);
TEST_ASSERT(uriA.portText.afterLast == NULL);
uriFreeUriMembersA(&uriA);
}
|
C
|
uriparser
| 0 |
CVE-2011-3896
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-3896/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/5925dff83699508b5e2735afb0297dfb310e159d
|
5925dff83699508b5e2735afb0297dfb310e159d
|
Implement a bubble that appears at the top of the screen when a tab enters
fullscreen mode via webkitRequestFullScreen(), telling the user how to exit
fullscreen.
This is implemented as an NSView rather than an NSWindow because the floating
chrome that appears in presentation mode should overlap the bubble.
Content-initiated fullscreen mode makes use of 'presentation mode' on the Mac:
the mode in which the UI is hidden, accessible by moving the cursor to the top
of the screen. On Snow Leopard, this mode is synonymous with fullscreen mode.
On Lion, however, fullscreen mode does not imply presentation mode: in
non-presentation fullscreen mode, the chrome is permanently shown. It is
possible to switch between presentation mode and fullscreen mode using the
presentation mode UI control.
When a tab initiates fullscreen mode on Lion, we enter presentation mode if not
in presentation mode already. When the user exits fullscreen mode using Chrome
UI (i.e. keyboard shortcuts, menu items, buttons, switching tabs, etc.) we
return the user to the mode they were in before the tab entered fullscreen.
BUG=14471
TEST=Enter fullscreen mode using webkitRequestFullScreen. You should see a bubble pop down from the top of the screen.
Need to test the Lion logic somehow, with no Lion trybots.
BUG=96883
Original review http://codereview.chromium.org/7890056/
TBR=thakis
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7920024
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@101624 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void Browser::CloseFrameAfterDragSession() {
#if !defined(OS_MACOSX)
MessageLoop::current()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE, method_factory_.NewRunnableMethod(&Browser::CloseFrame));
#endif
}
|
void Browser::CloseFrameAfterDragSession() {
#if !defined(OS_MACOSX)
MessageLoop::current()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE, method_factory_.NewRunnableMethod(&Browser::CloseFrame));
#endif
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-4299
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-4299/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/e9c6a182649f4259db704ae15a91ac820e63b0ca
|
e9c6a182649f4259db704ae15a91ac820e63b0ca
|
dm snapshot: fix data corruption
This patch fixes a particular type of data corruption that has been
encountered when loading a snapshot's metadata from disk.
When we allocate a new chunk in persistent_prepare, we increment
ps->next_free and we make sure that it doesn't point to a metadata area
by further incrementing it if necessary.
When we load metadata from disk on device activation, ps->next_free is
positioned after the last used data chunk. However, if this last used
data chunk is followed by a metadata area, ps->next_free is positioned
erroneously to the metadata area. A newly-allocated chunk is placed at
the same location as the metadata area, resulting in data or metadata
corruption.
This patch changes the code so that ps->next_free skips the metadata
area when metadata are loaded in function read_exceptions.
The patch also moves a piece of code from persistent_prepare_exception
to a separate function skip_metadata to avoid code duplication.
CVE-2013-4299
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: Mike Snitzer <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Alasdair G Kergon <[email protected]>
|
static void persistent_drop_snapshot(struct dm_exception_store *store)
{
struct pstore *ps = get_info(store);
ps->valid = 0;
if (write_header(ps))
DMWARN("write header failed");
}
|
static void persistent_drop_snapshot(struct dm_exception_store *store)
{
struct pstore *ps = get_info(store);
ps->valid = 0;
if (write_header(ps))
DMWARN("write header failed");
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-16535
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-16535/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/1c0edc3633b56000e18d82fc241e3995ca18a69e
|
1c0edc3633b56000e18d82fc241e3995ca18a69e
|
USB: core: fix out-of-bounds access bug in usb_get_bos_descriptor()
Andrey used the syzkaller fuzzer to find an out-of-bounds memory
access in usb_get_bos_descriptor(). The code wasn't checking that the
next usb_dev_cap_header structure could fit into the remaining buffer
space.
This patch fixes the error and also reduces the bNumDeviceCaps field
in the header to match the actual number of capabilities found, in
cases where there are fewer than expected.
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
CC: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
|
static int usb_parse_interface(struct device *ddev, int cfgno,
struct usb_host_config *config, unsigned char *buffer, int size,
u8 inums[], u8 nalts[])
{
unsigned char *buffer0 = buffer;
struct usb_interface_descriptor *d;
int inum, asnum;
struct usb_interface_cache *intfc;
struct usb_host_interface *alt;
int i, n;
int len, retval;
int num_ep, num_ep_orig;
d = (struct usb_interface_descriptor *) buffer;
buffer += d->bLength;
size -= d->bLength;
if (d->bLength < USB_DT_INTERFACE_SIZE)
goto skip_to_next_interface_descriptor;
/* Which interface entry is this? */
intfc = NULL;
inum = d->bInterfaceNumber;
for (i = 0; i < config->desc.bNumInterfaces; ++i) {
if (inums[i] == inum) {
intfc = config->intf_cache[i];
break;
}
}
if (!intfc || intfc->num_altsetting >= nalts[i])
goto skip_to_next_interface_descriptor;
/* Check for duplicate altsetting entries */
asnum = d->bAlternateSetting;
for ((i = 0, alt = &intfc->altsetting[0]);
i < intfc->num_altsetting;
(++i, ++alt)) {
if (alt->desc.bAlternateSetting == asnum) {
dev_warn(ddev, "Duplicate descriptor for config %d "
"interface %d altsetting %d, skipping\n",
cfgno, inum, asnum);
goto skip_to_next_interface_descriptor;
}
}
++intfc->num_altsetting;
memcpy(&alt->desc, d, USB_DT_INTERFACE_SIZE);
/* Skip over any Class Specific or Vendor Specific descriptors;
* find the first endpoint or interface descriptor */
alt->extra = buffer;
i = find_next_descriptor(buffer, size, USB_DT_ENDPOINT,
USB_DT_INTERFACE, &n);
alt->extralen = i;
if (n > 0)
dev_dbg(ddev, "skipped %d descriptor%s after %s\n",
n, plural(n), "interface");
buffer += i;
size -= i;
/* Allocate space for the right(?) number of endpoints */
num_ep = num_ep_orig = alt->desc.bNumEndpoints;
alt->desc.bNumEndpoints = 0; /* Use as a counter */
if (num_ep > USB_MAXENDPOINTS) {
dev_warn(ddev, "too many endpoints for config %d interface %d "
"altsetting %d: %d, using maximum allowed: %d\n",
cfgno, inum, asnum, num_ep, USB_MAXENDPOINTS);
num_ep = USB_MAXENDPOINTS;
}
if (num_ep > 0) {
/* Can't allocate 0 bytes */
len = sizeof(struct usb_host_endpoint) * num_ep;
alt->endpoint = kzalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!alt->endpoint)
return -ENOMEM;
}
/* Parse all the endpoint descriptors */
n = 0;
while (size > 0) {
if (((struct usb_descriptor_header *) buffer)->bDescriptorType
== USB_DT_INTERFACE)
break;
retval = usb_parse_endpoint(ddev, cfgno, inum, asnum, alt,
num_ep, buffer, size);
if (retval < 0)
return retval;
++n;
buffer += retval;
size -= retval;
}
if (n != num_ep_orig)
dev_warn(ddev, "config %d interface %d altsetting %d has %d "
"endpoint descriptor%s, different from the interface "
"descriptor's value: %d\n",
cfgno, inum, asnum, n, plural(n), num_ep_orig);
return buffer - buffer0;
skip_to_next_interface_descriptor:
i = find_next_descriptor(buffer, size, USB_DT_INTERFACE,
USB_DT_INTERFACE, NULL);
return buffer - buffer0 + i;
}
|
static int usb_parse_interface(struct device *ddev, int cfgno,
struct usb_host_config *config, unsigned char *buffer, int size,
u8 inums[], u8 nalts[])
{
unsigned char *buffer0 = buffer;
struct usb_interface_descriptor *d;
int inum, asnum;
struct usb_interface_cache *intfc;
struct usb_host_interface *alt;
int i, n;
int len, retval;
int num_ep, num_ep_orig;
d = (struct usb_interface_descriptor *) buffer;
buffer += d->bLength;
size -= d->bLength;
if (d->bLength < USB_DT_INTERFACE_SIZE)
goto skip_to_next_interface_descriptor;
/* Which interface entry is this? */
intfc = NULL;
inum = d->bInterfaceNumber;
for (i = 0; i < config->desc.bNumInterfaces; ++i) {
if (inums[i] == inum) {
intfc = config->intf_cache[i];
break;
}
}
if (!intfc || intfc->num_altsetting >= nalts[i])
goto skip_to_next_interface_descriptor;
/* Check for duplicate altsetting entries */
asnum = d->bAlternateSetting;
for ((i = 0, alt = &intfc->altsetting[0]);
i < intfc->num_altsetting;
(++i, ++alt)) {
if (alt->desc.bAlternateSetting == asnum) {
dev_warn(ddev, "Duplicate descriptor for config %d "
"interface %d altsetting %d, skipping\n",
cfgno, inum, asnum);
goto skip_to_next_interface_descriptor;
}
}
++intfc->num_altsetting;
memcpy(&alt->desc, d, USB_DT_INTERFACE_SIZE);
/* Skip over any Class Specific or Vendor Specific descriptors;
* find the first endpoint or interface descriptor */
alt->extra = buffer;
i = find_next_descriptor(buffer, size, USB_DT_ENDPOINT,
USB_DT_INTERFACE, &n);
alt->extralen = i;
if (n > 0)
dev_dbg(ddev, "skipped %d descriptor%s after %s\n",
n, plural(n), "interface");
buffer += i;
size -= i;
/* Allocate space for the right(?) number of endpoints */
num_ep = num_ep_orig = alt->desc.bNumEndpoints;
alt->desc.bNumEndpoints = 0; /* Use as a counter */
if (num_ep > USB_MAXENDPOINTS) {
dev_warn(ddev, "too many endpoints for config %d interface %d "
"altsetting %d: %d, using maximum allowed: %d\n",
cfgno, inum, asnum, num_ep, USB_MAXENDPOINTS);
num_ep = USB_MAXENDPOINTS;
}
if (num_ep > 0) {
/* Can't allocate 0 bytes */
len = sizeof(struct usb_host_endpoint) * num_ep;
alt->endpoint = kzalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!alt->endpoint)
return -ENOMEM;
}
/* Parse all the endpoint descriptors */
n = 0;
while (size > 0) {
if (((struct usb_descriptor_header *) buffer)->bDescriptorType
== USB_DT_INTERFACE)
break;
retval = usb_parse_endpoint(ddev, cfgno, inum, asnum, alt,
num_ep, buffer, size);
if (retval < 0)
return retval;
++n;
buffer += retval;
size -= retval;
}
if (n != num_ep_orig)
dev_warn(ddev, "config %d interface %d altsetting %d has %d "
"endpoint descriptor%s, different from the interface "
"descriptor's value: %d\n",
cfgno, inum, asnum, n, plural(n), num_ep_orig);
return buffer - buffer0;
skip_to_next_interface_descriptor:
i = find_next_descriptor(buffer, size, USB_DT_INTERFACE,
USB_DT_INTERFACE, NULL);
return buffer - buffer0 + i;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-7533
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-7533/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/49d31c2f389acfe83417083e1208422b4091cd9e
|
49d31c2f389acfe83417083e1208422b4091cd9e
|
dentry name snapshots
take_dentry_name_snapshot() takes a safe snapshot of dentry name;
if the name is a short one, it gets copied into caller-supplied
structure, otherwise an extra reference to external name is grabbed
(those are never modified). In either case the pointer to stable
string is stored into the same structure.
dentry must be held by the caller of take_dentry_name_snapshot(),
but may be freely dropped afterwards - the snapshot will stay
until destroyed by release_dentry_name_snapshot().
Intended use:
struct name_snapshot s;
take_dentry_name_snapshot(&s, dentry);
...
access s.name
...
release_dentry_name_snapshot(&s);
Replaces fsnotify_oldname_...(), gets used in fsnotify to obtain the name
to pass down with event.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]>
|
void d_move(struct dentry *dentry, struct dentry *target)
{
write_seqlock(&rename_lock);
__d_move(dentry, target, false);
write_sequnlock(&rename_lock);
}
|
void d_move(struct dentry *dentry, struct dentry *target)
{
write_seqlock(&rename_lock);
__d_move(dentry, target, false);
write_sequnlock(&rename_lock);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2015-3412
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-3412/
|
CWE-254
|
https://git.php.net/?p=php-src.git;a=commit;h=4435b9142ff9813845d5c97ab29a5d637bedb257
|
4435b9142ff9813845d5c97ab29a5d637bedb257
| null |
int dom_document_format_output_write(dom_object *obj, zval *newval TSRMLS_DC)
{
zval value_copy;
dom_doc_propsptr doc_prop;
if(Z_REFCOUNT_P(newval) > 1) {
value_copy = *newval;
zval_copy_ctor(&value_copy);
newval = &value_copy;
}
convert_to_boolean(newval);
if (obj->document) {
doc_prop = dom_get_doc_props(obj->document);
doc_prop->formatoutput = Z_LVAL_P(newval);
}
if (newval == &value_copy) {
zval_dtor(newval);
}
return SUCCESS;
}
|
int dom_document_format_output_write(dom_object *obj, zval *newval TSRMLS_DC)
{
zval value_copy;
dom_doc_propsptr doc_prop;
if(Z_REFCOUNT_P(newval) > 1) {
value_copy = *newval;
zval_copy_ctor(&value_copy);
newval = &value_copy;
}
convert_to_boolean(newval);
if (obj->document) {
doc_prop = dom_get_doc_props(obj->document);
doc_prop->formatoutput = Z_LVAL_P(newval);
}
if (newval == &value_copy) {
zval_dtor(newval);
}
return SUCCESS;
}
|
C
|
php
| 0 |
CVE-2012-6711
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-6711/
|
CWE-119
|
https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/bash.git/commit/?h=devel&id=863d31ae775d56b785dc5b0105b6d251515d81d5
|
863d31ae775d56b785dc5b0105b6d251515d81d5
| null |
pop_context ()
{
pop_dollar_vars ();
variable_context--;
pop_var_context ();
sv_ifs ("IFS"); /* XXX here for now */
}
|
pop_context ()
{
pop_dollar_vars ();
variable_context--;
pop_var_context ();
sv_ifs ("IFS"); /* XXX here for now */
}
|
C
|
savannah
| 0 |
CVE-2010-2805
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2010-2805/
|
CWE-20
|
https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/freetype/freetype2.git/commit/?id=45a3c76b547511fa9d97aca34b150a0663257375
|
45a3c76b547511fa9d97aca34b150a0663257375
| null |
FT_Stream_ReadOffset( FT_Stream stream,
FT_Error* error )
{
FT_Byte reads[3];
FT_Byte* p = 0;
FT_Long result = 0;
FT_ASSERT( stream );
*error = FT_Err_Ok;
if ( stream->pos + 2 < stream->size )
{
if ( stream->read )
{
if (stream->read( stream, stream->pos, reads, 3L ) != 3L )
goto Fail;
p = reads;
}
else
{
p = stream->base + stream->pos;
}
if ( p )
result = FT_NEXT_OFF3( p );
}
else
goto Fail;
stream->pos += 3;
return result;
Fail:
*error = FT_Err_Invalid_Stream_Operation;
FT_ERROR(( "FT_Stream_ReadOffset:"
" invalid i/o; pos = 0x%lx, size = 0x%lx\n",
stream->pos, stream->size ));
return 0;
}
|
FT_Stream_ReadOffset( FT_Stream stream,
FT_Error* error )
{
FT_Byte reads[3];
FT_Byte* p = 0;
FT_Long result = 0;
FT_ASSERT( stream );
*error = FT_Err_Ok;
if ( stream->pos + 2 < stream->size )
{
if ( stream->read )
{
if (stream->read( stream, stream->pos, reads, 3L ) != 3L )
goto Fail;
p = reads;
}
else
{
p = stream->base + stream->pos;
}
if ( p )
result = FT_NEXT_OFF3( p );
}
else
goto Fail;
stream->pos += 3;
return result;
Fail:
*error = FT_Err_Invalid_Stream_Operation;
FT_ERROR(( "FT_Stream_ReadOffset:"
" invalid i/o; pos = 0x%lx, size = 0x%lx\n",
stream->pos, stream->size ));
return 0;
}
|
C
|
savannah
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2491
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2491/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/0b760113a3a155269a3fba93a409c640031dd68f
|
0b760113a3a155269a3fba93a409c640031dd68f
|
NLM: Don't hang forever on NLM unlock requests
If the NLM daemon is killed on the NFS server, we can currently end up
hanging forever on an 'unlock' request, instead of aborting. Basically,
if the rpcbind request fails, or the server keeps returning garbage, we
really want to quit instead of retrying.
Tested-by: Vasily Averin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
|
void rpc_wake_up_queued_task(struct rpc_wait_queue *queue, struct rpc_task *task)
{
spin_lock_bh(&queue->lock);
rpc_wake_up_task_queue_locked(queue, task);
spin_unlock_bh(&queue->lock);
}
|
void rpc_wake_up_queued_task(struct rpc_wait_queue *queue, struct rpc_task *task)
{
spin_lock_bh(&queue->lock);
rpc_wake_up_task_queue_locked(queue, task);
spin_unlock_bh(&queue->lock);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5218
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5218/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/45d901b56f578a74b19ba0d10fa5c4c467f19303
|
45d901b56f578a74b19ba0d10fa5c4c467f19303
|
Paint tab groups with the group color.
* The background of TabGroupHeader now uses the group color.
* The backgrounds of tabs in the group are tinted with the group color.
This treatment, along with the colors chosen, are intended to be
a placeholder.
Bug: 905491
Change-Id: Ic808548f8eba23064606e7fb8c9bba281d0d117f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1610504
Commit-Queue: Bret Sepulveda <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Taylor Bergquist <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#660498}
|
bool showing_icon(Tab* tab) const { return tab->showing_icon_; }
|
bool showing_icon(Tab* tab) const { return tab->showing_icon_; }
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2019-15903
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-15903/
|
CWE-611
|
https://github.com/libexpat/libexpat/commit/c20b758c332d9a13afbbb276d30db1d183a85d43
|
c20b758c332d9a13afbbb276d30db1d183a85d43
|
xmlparse.c: Deny internal entities closing the doctype
|
processXmlDecl(XML_Parser parser, int isGeneralTextEntity, const char *s,
const char *next) {
const char *encodingName = NULL;
const XML_Char *storedEncName = NULL;
const ENCODING *newEncoding = NULL;
const char *version = NULL;
const char *versionend;
const XML_Char *storedversion = NULL;
int standalone = -1;
if (! (parser->m_ns ? XmlParseXmlDeclNS : XmlParseXmlDecl)(
isGeneralTextEntity, parser->m_encoding, s, next, &parser->m_eventPtr,
&version, &versionend, &encodingName, &newEncoding, &standalone)) {
if (isGeneralTextEntity)
return XML_ERROR_TEXT_DECL;
else
return XML_ERROR_XML_DECL;
}
if (! isGeneralTextEntity && standalone == 1) {
parser->m_dtd->standalone = XML_TRUE;
#ifdef XML_DTD
if (parser->m_paramEntityParsing
== XML_PARAM_ENTITY_PARSING_UNLESS_STANDALONE)
parser->m_paramEntityParsing = XML_PARAM_ENTITY_PARSING_NEVER;
#endif /* XML_DTD */
}
if (parser->m_xmlDeclHandler) {
if (encodingName != NULL) {
storedEncName = poolStoreString(
&parser->m_temp2Pool, parser->m_encoding, encodingName,
encodingName + XmlNameLength(parser->m_encoding, encodingName));
if (! storedEncName)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
poolFinish(&parser->m_temp2Pool);
}
if (version) {
storedversion
= poolStoreString(&parser->m_temp2Pool, parser->m_encoding, version,
versionend - parser->m_encoding->minBytesPerChar);
if (! storedversion)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
}
parser->m_xmlDeclHandler(parser->m_handlerArg, storedversion, storedEncName,
standalone);
} else if (parser->m_defaultHandler)
reportDefault(parser, parser->m_encoding, s, next);
if (parser->m_protocolEncodingName == NULL) {
if (newEncoding) {
/* Check that the specified encoding does not conflict with what
* the parser has already deduced. Do we have the same number
* of bytes in the smallest representation of a character? If
* this is UTF-16, is it the same endianness?
*/
if (newEncoding->minBytesPerChar != parser->m_encoding->minBytesPerChar
|| (newEncoding->minBytesPerChar == 2
&& newEncoding != parser->m_encoding)) {
parser->m_eventPtr = encodingName;
return XML_ERROR_INCORRECT_ENCODING;
}
parser->m_encoding = newEncoding;
} else if (encodingName) {
enum XML_Error result;
if (! storedEncName) {
storedEncName = poolStoreString(
&parser->m_temp2Pool, parser->m_encoding, encodingName,
encodingName + XmlNameLength(parser->m_encoding, encodingName));
if (! storedEncName)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
}
result = handleUnknownEncoding(parser, storedEncName);
poolClear(&parser->m_temp2Pool);
if (result == XML_ERROR_UNKNOWN_ENCODING)
parser->m_eventPtr = encodingName;
return result;
}
}
if (storedEncName || storedversion)
poolClear(&parser->m_temp2Pool);
return XML_ERROR_NONE;
}
|
processXmlDecl(XML_Parser parser, int isGeneralTextEntity, const char *s,
const char *next) {
const char *encodingName = NULL;
const XML_Char *storedEncName = NULL;
const ENCODING *newEncoding = NULL;
const char *version = NULL;
const char *versionend;
const XML_Char *storedversion = NULL;
int standalone = -1;
if (! (parser->m_ns ? XmlParseXmlDeclNS : XmlParseXmlDecl)(
isGeneralTextEntity, parser->m_encoding, s, next, &parser->m_eventPtr,
&version, &versionend, &encodingName, &newEncoding, &standalone)) {
if (isGeneralTextEntity)
return XML_ERROR_TEXT_DECL;
else
return XML_ERROR_XML_DECL;
}
if (! isGeneralTextEntity && standalone == 1) {
parser->m_dtd->standalone = XML_TRUE;
#ifdef XML_DTD
if (parser->m_paramEntityParsing
== XML_PARAM_ENTITY_PARSING_UNLESS_STANDALONE)
parser->m_paramEntityParsing = XML_PARAM_ENTITY_PARSING_NEVER;
#endif /* XML_DTD */
}
if (parser->m_xmlDeclHandler) {
if (encodingName != NULL) {
storedEncName = poolStoreString(
&parser->m_temp2Pool, parser->m_encoding, encodingName,
encodingName + XmlNameLength(parser->m_encoding, encodingName));
if (! storedEncName)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
poolFinish(&parser->m_temp2Pool);
}
if (version) {
storedversion
= poolStoreString(&parser->m_temp2Pool, parser->m_encoding, version,
versionend - parser->m_encoding->minBytesPerChar);
if (! storedversion)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
}
parser->m_xmlDeclHandler(parser->m_handlerArg, storedversion, storedEncName,
standalone);
} else if (parser->m_defaultHandler)
reportDefault(parser, parser->m_encoding, s, next);
if (parser->m_protocolEncodingName == NULL) {
if (newEncoding) {
/* Check that the specified encoding does not conflict with what
* the parser has already deduced. Do we have the same number
* of bytes in the smallest representation of a character? If
* this is UTF-16, is it the same endianness?
*/
if (newEncoding->minBytesPerChar != parser->m_encoding->minBytesPerChar
|| (newEncoding->minBytesPerChar == 2
&& newEncoding != parser->m_encoding)) {
parser->m_eventPtr = encodingName;
return XML_ERROR_INCORRECT_ENCODING;
}
parser->m_encoding = newEncoding;
} else if (encodingName) {
enum XML_Error result;
if (! storedEncName) {
storedEncName = poolStoreString(
&parser->m_temp2Pool, parser->m_encoding, encodingName,
encodingName + XmlNameLength(parser->m_encoding, encodingName));
if (! storedEncName)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
}
result = handleUnknownEncoding(parser, storedEncName);
poolClear(&parser->m_temp2Pool);
if (result == XML_ERROR_UNKNOWN_ENCODING)
parser->m_eventPtr = encodingName;
return result;
}
}
if (storedEncName || storedversion)
poolClear(&parser->m_temp2Pool);
return XML_ERROR_NONE;
}
|
C
|
libexpat
| 0 |
CVE-2017-7865
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-7865/
|
CWE-787
|
https://github.com/FFmpeg/FFmpeg/commit/2080bc33717955a0e4268e738acf8c1eeddbf8cb
|
2080bc33717955a0e4268e738acf8c1eeddbf8cb
|
avcodec/utils: correct align value for interplay
Fixes out of array access
Fixes: 452/fuzz-1-ffmpeg_VIDEO_AV_CODEC_ID_INTERPLAY_VIDEO_fuzzer
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/targets/ffmpeg
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]>
|
static int apply_param_change(AVCodecContext *avctx, AVPacket *avpkt)
{
int size = 0, ret;
const uint8_t *data;
uint32_t flags;
int64_t val;
data = av_packet_get_side_data(avpkt, AV_PKT_DATA_PARAM_CHANGE, &size);
if (!data)
return 0;
if (!(avctx->codec->capabilities & AV_CODEC_CAP_PARAM_CHANGE)) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "This decoder does not support parameter "
"changes, but PARAM_CHANGE side data was sent to it.\n");
ret = AVERROR(EINVAL);
goto fail2;
}
if (size < 4)
goto fail;
flags = bytestream_get_le32(&data);
size -= 4;
if (flags & AV_SIDE_DATA_PARAM_CHANGE_CHANNEL_COUNT) {
if (size < 4)
goto fail;
val = bytestream_get_le32(&data);
if (val <= 0 || val > INT_MAX) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Invalid channel count");
ret = AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
goto fail2;
}
avctx->channels = val;
size -= 4;
}
if (flags & AV_SIDE_DATA_PARAM_CHANGE_CHANNEL_LAYOUT) {
if (size < 8)
goto fail;
avctx->channel_layout = bytestream_get_le64(&data);
size -= 8;
}
if (flags & AV_SIDE_DATA_PARAM_CHANGE_SAMPLE_RATE) {
if (size < 4)
goto fail;
val = bytestream_get_le32(&data);
if (val <= 0 || val > INT_MAX) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Invalid sample rate");
ret = AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
goto fail2;
}
avctx->sample_rate = val;
size -= 4;
}
if (flags & AV_SIDE_DATA_PARAM_CHANGE_DIMENSIONS) {
if (size < 8)
goto fail;
avctx->width = bytestream_get_le32(&data);
avctx->height = bytestream_get_le32(&data);
size -= 8;
ret = ff_set_dimensions(avctx, avctx->width, avctx->height);
if (ret < 0)
goto fail2;
}
return 0;
fail:
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "PARAM_CHANGE side data too small.\n");
ret = AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
fail2:
if (ret < 0) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Error applying parameter changes.\n");
if (avctx->err_recognition & AV_EF_EXPLODE)
return ret;
}
return 0;
}
|
static int apply_param_change(AVCodecContext *avctx, AVPacket *avpkt)
{
int size = 0, ret;
const uint8_t *data;
uint32_t flags;
int64_t val;
data = av_packet_get_side_data(avpkt, AV_PKT_DATA_PARAM_CHANGE, &size);
if (!data)
return 0;
if (!(avctx->codec->capabilities & AV_CODEC_CAP_PARAM_CHANGE)) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "This decoder does not support parameter "
"changes, but PARAM_CHANGE side data was sent to it.\n");
ret = AVERROR(EINVAL);
goto fail2;
}
if (size < 4)
goto fail;
flags = bytestream_get_le32(&data);
size -= 4;
if (flags & AV_SIDE_DATA_PARAM_CHANGE_CHANNEL_COUNT) {
if (size < 4)
goto fail;
val = bytestream_get_le32(&data);
if (val <= 0 || val > INT_MAX) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Invalid channel count");
ret = AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
goto fail2;
}
avctx->channels = val;
size -= 4;
}
if (flags & AV_SIDE_DATA_PARAM_CHANGE_CHANNEL_LAYOUT) {
if (size < 8)
goto fail;
avctx->channel_layout = bytestream_get_le64(&data);
size -= 8;
}
if (flags & AV_SIDE_DATA_PARAM_CHANGE_SAMPLE_RATE) {
if (size < 4)
goto fail;
val = bytestream_get_le32(&data);
if (val <= 0 || val > INT_MAX) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Invalid sample rate");
ret = AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
goto fail2;
}
avctx->sample_rate = val;
size -= 4;
}
if (flags & AV_SIDE_DATA_PARAM_CHANGE_DIMENSIONS) {
if (size < 8)
goto fail;
avctx->width = bytestream_get_le32(&data);
avctx->height = bytestream_get_le32(&data);
size -= 8;
ret = ff_set_dimensions(avctx, avctx->width, avctx->height);
if (ret < 0)
goto fail2;
}
return 0;
fail:
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "PARAM_CHANGE side data too small.\n");
ret = AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
fail2:
if (ret < 0) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Error applying parameter changes.\n");
if (avctx->err_recognition & AV_EF_EXPLODE)
return ret;
}
return 0;
}
|
C
|
FFmpeg
| 0 |
CVE-2012-3552
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-3552/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f6d8bd051c391c1c0458a30b2a7abcd939329259
|
f6d8bd051c391c1c0458a30b2a7abcd939329259
|
inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Cc: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
int inet_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
size_t size, int flags)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
int addr_len = 0;
int err;
sock_rps_record_flow(sk);
err = sk->sk_prot->recvmsg(iocb, sk, msg, size, flags & MSG_DONTWAIT,
flags & ~MSG_DONTWAIT, &addr_len);
if (err >= 0)
msg->msg_namelen = addr_len;
return err;
}
|
int inet_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
size_t size, int flags)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
int addr_len = 0;
int err;
sock_rps_record_flow(sk);
err = sk->sk_prot->recvmsg(iocb, sk, msg, size, flags & MSG_DONTWAIT,
flags & ~MSG_DONTWAIT, &addr_len);
if (err >= 0)
msg->msg_namelen = addr_len;
return err;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2859
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2859/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/454434f6100cb6a529652a25b5fc181caa7c7f32
|
454434f6100cb6a529652a25b5fc181caa7c7f32
|
Limit extent of webstore app to just chrome.google.com/webstore.
BUG=93497
TEST=Try installing extensions and apps from the webstore, starting both being
initially logged in, and not.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7719003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@97986 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void ExtensionService::Observe(int type,
const NotificationSource& source,
const NotificationDetails& details) {
switch (type) {
case chrome::NOTIFICATION_EXTENSION_PROCESS_TERMINATED: {
if (profile_ != Source<Profile>(source).ptr()->GetOriginalProfile())
break;
ExtensionHost* host = Details<ExtensionHost>(details).ptr();
MessageLoop::current()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE,
method_factory_.NewRunnableMethod(
&ExtensionService::TrackTerminatedExtension,
host->extension()));
break;
}
case content::NOTIFICATION_RENDERER_PROCESS_CREATED: {
RenderProcessHost* process = Source<RenderProcessHost>(source).ptr();
Profile* host_profile =
Profile::FromBrowserContext(process->browser_context());
if (!profile_->IsSameProfile(host_profile->GetOriginalProfile()))
break;
std::vector<std::string> function_names;
ExtensionFunctionDispatcher::GetAllFunctionNames(&function_names);
process->Send(new ExtensionMsg_SetFunctionNames(function_names));
process->Send(new ExtensionMsg_SetScriptingWhitelist(
*Extension::GetScriptingWhitelist()));
for (size_t i = 0; i < extensions_.size(); ++i) {
process->Send(new ExtensionMsg_Loaded(
ExtensionMsg_Loaded_Params(extensions_[i])));
}
break;
}
case content::NOTIFICATION_RENDERER_PROCESS_TERMINATED: {
RenderProcessHost* process = Source<RenderProcessHost>(source).ptr();
Profile* host_profile =
Profile::FromBrowserContext(process->browser_context());
if (!profile_->IsSameProfile(host_profile->GetOriginalProfile()))
break;
installed_app_hosts_.erase(process->id());
break;
}
case chrome::NOTIFICATION_PREF_CHANGED: {
std::string* pref_name = Details<std::string>(details).ptr();
if (*pref_name == prefs::kExtensionInstallAllowList ||
*pref_name == prefs::kExtensionInstallDenyList) {
CheckAdminBlacklist();
} else {
NOTREACHED() << "Unexpected preference name.";
}
break;
}
default:
NOTREACHED() << "Unexpected notification type.";
}
}
|
void ExtensionService::Observe(int type,
const NotificationSource& source,
const NotificationDetails& details) {
switch (type) {
case chrome::NOTIFICATION_EXTENSION_PROCESS_TERMINATED: {
if (profile_ != Source<Profile>(source).ptr()->GetOriginalProfile())
break;
ExtensionHost* host = Details<ExtensionHost>(details).ptr();
MessageLoop::current()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE,
method_factory_.NewRunnableMethod(
&ExtensionService::TrackTerminatedExtension,
host->extension()));
break;
}
case content::NOTIFICATION_RENDERER_PROCESS_CREATED: {
RenderProcessHost* process = Source<RenderProcessHost>(source).ptr();
Profile* host_profile =
Profile::FromBrowserContext(process->browser_context());
if (!profile_->IsSameProfile(host_profile->GetOriginalProfile()))
break;
std::vector<std::string> function_names;
ExtensionFunctionDispatcher::GetAllFunctionNames(&function_names);
process->Send(new ExtensionMsg_SetFunctionNames(function_names));
process->Send(new ExtensionMsg_SetScriptingWhitelist(
*Extension::GetScriptingWhitelist()));
for (size_t i = 0; i < extensions_.size(); ++i) {
process->Send(new ExtensionMsg_Loaded(
ExtensionMsg_Loaded_Params(extensions_[i])));
}
break;
}
case content::NOTIFICATION_RENDERER_PROCESS_TERMINATED: {
RenderProcessHost* process = Source<RenderProcessHost>(source).ptr();
Profile* host_profile =
Profile::FromBrowserContext(process->browser_context());
if (!profile_->IsSameProfile(host_profile->GetOriginalProfile()))
break;
installed_app_hosts_.erase(process->id());
break;
}
case chrome::NOTIFICATION_PREF_CHANGED: {
std::string* pref_name = Details<std::string>(details).ptr();
if (*pref_name == prefs::kExtensionInstallAllowList ||
*pref_name == prefs::kExtensionInstallDenyList) {
CheckAdminBlacklist();
} else {
NOTREACHED() << "Unexpected preference name.";
}
break;
}
default:
NOTREACHED() << "Unexpected notification type.";
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-6368
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-6368/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/fda4e2e85589191b123d31cdc21fd33ee70f50fd
|
fda4e2e85589191b123d31cdc21fd33ee70f50fd
|
KVM: x86: Convert vapic synchronization to _cached functions (CVE-2013-6368)
In kvm_lapic_sync_from_vapic and kvm_lapic_sync_to_vapic there is the
potential to corrupt kernel memory if userspace provides an address that
is at the end of a page. This patches concerts those functions to use
kvm_write_guest_cached and kvm_read_guest_cached. It also checks the
vapic_address specified by userspace during ioctl processing and returns
an error to userspace if the address is not a valid GPA.
This is generally not guest triggerable, because the required write is
done by firmware that runs before the guest. Also, it only affects AMD
processors and oldish Intel that do not have the FlexPriority feature
(unless you disable FlexPriority, of course; then newer processors are
also affected).
Fixes: b93463aa59d6 ('KVM: Accelerated apic support')
Reported-by: Andrew Honig <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
|
static int do_monotonic(struct timespec *ts, cycle_t *cycle_now)
{
unsigned long seq;
u64 ns;
int mode;
struct pvclock_gtod_data *gtod = &pvclock_gtod_data;
ts->tv_nsec = 0;
do {
seq = read_seqcount_begin(>od->seq);
mode = gtod->clock.vclock_mode;
ts->tv_sec = gtod->monotonic_time_sec;
ns = gtod->monotonic_time_snsec;
ns += vgettsc(cycle_now);
ns >>= gtod->clock.shift;
} while (unlikely(read_seqcount_retry(>od->seq, seq)));
timespec_add_ns(ts, ns);
return mode;
}
|
static int do_monotonic(struct timespec *ts, cycle_t *cycle_now)
{
unsigned long seq;
u64 ns;
int mode;
struct pvclock_gtod_data *gtod = &pvclock_gtod_data;
ts->tv_nsec = 0;
do {
seq = read_seqcount_begin(>od->seq);
mode = gtod->clock.vclock_mode;
ts->tv_sec = gtod->monotonic_time_sec;
ns = gtod->monotonic_time_snsec;
ns += vgettsc(cycle_now);
ns >>= gtod->clock.shift;
} while (unlikely(read_seqcount_retry(>od->seq, seq)));
timespec_add_ns(ts, ns);
return mode;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-18120
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-18120/
|
CWE-415
|
https://github.com/kohler/gifsicle/commit/118a46090c50829dc543179019e6140e1235f909
|
118a46090c50829dc543179019e6140e1235f909
|
gif_read: Set last_name = NULL unconditionally.
With a non-malicious GIF, last_name is set to NULL when a name
extension is followed by an image. Reported in #117, via
Debian, via a KAIST fuzzing program.
|
read_compressed_image(Gif_Image *gfi, Gif_Reader *grr, int read_flags)
{
if (grr->is_record) {
const uint32_t image_pos = grr->pos;
/* scan over image */
++grr->pos; /* skip min code size */
while (grr->pos < grr->length) {
int amt = grr->v[grr->pos];
grr->pos += amt + 1;
if (amt == 0)
break;
}
if (grr->pos > grr->length)
grr->pos = grr->length;
gfi->compressed_len = grr->pos - image_pos;
gfi->compressed_errors = 0;
if (read_flags & GIF_READ_CONST_RECORD) {
gfi->compressed = (uint8_t*) &grr->v[image_pos];
gfi->free_compressed = 0;
} else {
gfi->compressed = Gif_NewArray(uint8_t, gfi->compressed_len);
gfi->free_compressed = Gif_Free;
if (!gfi->compressed) return 0;
memcpy(gfi->compressed, &grr->v[image_pos], gfi->compressed_len);
}
} else {
/* non-record; have to read it block by block. */
uint32_t comp_cap = 1024;
uint32_t comp_len;
uint8_t *comp = Gif_NewArray(uint8_t, comp_cap);
int i;
if (!comp) return 0;
/* min code size */
i = gifgetbyte(grr);
comp[0] = i;
comp_len = 1;
i = gifgetbyte(grr);
while (i > 0) {
/* add 2 before check so we don't have to check after loop when appending
0 block */
if (comp_len + i + 2 > comp_cap) {
comp_cap *= 2;
Gif_ReArray(comp, uint8_t, comp_cap);
if (!comp) return 0;
}
comp[comp_len] = i;
gifgetblock(comp + comp_len + 1, i, grr);
comp_len += i + 1;
i = gifgetbyte(grr);
}
comp[comp_len++] = 0;
gfi->compressed_len = comp_len;
gfi->compressed_errors = 0;
gfi->compressed = comp;
gfi->free_compressed = Gif_Free;
}
return 1;
}
|
read_compressed_image(Gif_Image *gfi, Gif_Reader *grr, int read_flags)
{
if (grr->is_record) {
const uint32_t image_pos = grr->pos;
/* scan over image */
++grr->pos; /* skip min code size */
while (grr->pos < grr->length) {
int amt = grr->v[grr->pos];
grr->pos += amt + 1;
if (amt == 0)
break;
}
if (grr->pos > grr->length)
grr->pos = grr->length;
gfi->compressed_len = grr->pos - image_pos;
gfi->compressed_errors = 0;
if (read_flags & GIF_READ_CONST_RECORD) {
gfi->compressed = (uint8_t*) &grr->v[image_pos];
gfi->free_compressed = 0;
} else {
gfi->compressed = Gif_NewArray(uint8_t, gfi->compressed_len);
gfi->free_compressed = Gif_Free;
if (!gfi->compressed) return 0;
memcpy(gfi->compressed, &grr->v[image_pos], gfi->compressed_len);
}
} else {
/* non-record; have to read it block by block. */
uint32_t comp_cap = 1024;
uint32_t comp_len;
uint8_t *comp = Gif_NewArray(uint8_t, comp_cap);
int i;
if (!comp) return 0;
/* min code size */
i = gifgetbyte(grr);
comp[0] = i;
comp_len = 1;
i = gifgetbyte(grr);
while (i > 0) {
/* add 2 before check so we don't have to check after loop when appending
0 block */
if (comp_len + i + 2 > comp_cap) {
comp_cap *= 2;
Gif_ReArray(comp, uint8_t, comp_cap);
if (!comp) return 0;
}
comp[comp_len] = i;
gifgetblock(comp + comp_len + 1, i, grr);
comp_len += i + 1;
i = gifgetbyte(grr);
}
comp[comp_len++] = 0;
gfi->compressed_len = comp_len;
gfi->compressed_errors = 0;
gfi->compressed = comp;
gfi->free_compressed = Gif_Free;
}
return 1;
}
|
C
|
gifsicle
| 0 |
CVE-2016-10048
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-10048/
|
CWE-22
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/fc6080f1321fd21e86ef916195cc110b05d9effb
|
fc6080f1321fd21e86ef916195cc110b05d9effb
|
Coder path traversal is not authorized, bug report provided by Masaaki Chida
|
static void TagToFilterModuleName(const char *tag,char *name)
{
assert(tag != (char *) NULL);
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",tag);
assert(name != (char *) NULL);
#if !defined(MAGICKCORE_LTDL_DELEGATE)
(void) FormatLocaleString(name,MaxTextExtent,"%s.dll",tag);
#else
(void) FormatLocaleString(name,MaxTextExtent,"%s.la",tag);
#endif
}
|
static void TagToFilterModuleName(const char *tag,char *name)
{
assert(tag != (char *) NULL);
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",tag);
assert(name != (char *) NULL);
#if !defined(MAGICKCORE_LTDL_DELEGATE)
(void) FormatLocaleString(name,MaxTextExtent,"%s.dll",tag);
#else
(void) FormatLocaleString(name,MaxTextExtent,"%s.la",tag);
#endif
}
|
C
|
ImageMagick
| 0 |
CVE-2013-0892
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0892/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/da5e5f78f02bc0af5ddc5694090defbef7853af1
|
da5e5f78f02bc0af5ddc5694090defbef7853af1
|
DevTools: remove references to modules/device_orientation from core
BUG=340221
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/150913003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@166493 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
InspectorAgent::InspectorAgent(const String& name)
: m_name(name)
{
}
|
InspectorAgent::InspectorAgent(const String& name)
: m_name(name)
{
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-2487
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-2487/
|
CWE-20
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/918eeaa29d99d257282fafec931b4bda0e3bae12
|
918eeaa29d99d257282fafec931b4bda0e3bae12
|
codecs: check OMX buffer size before use in (avc|hevc|mpeg2)dec
Bug: 27833616
Change-Id: Ic4045a3f56f53b08d0b1264b2a91b8f43e91b738
(cherry picked from commit 87fdee0bc9e3ac4d2a88ef0a8e150cfdf08c161d)
|
void SoftHEVC::onReset() {
ALOGV("onReset called");
SoftVideoDecoderOMXComponent::onReset();
mSignalledError = false;
resetDecoder();
resetPlugin();
}
|
void SoftHEVC::onReset() {
ALOGV("onReset called");
SoftVideoDecoderOMXComponent::onReset();
mSignalledError = false;
resetDecoder();
resetPlugin();
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2014-0205
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-0205/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/7ada876a8703f23befbb20a7465a702ee39b1704
|
7ada876a8703f23befbb20a7465a702ee39b1704
|
futex: Fix errors in nested key ref-counting
futex_wait() is leaking key references due to futex_wait_setup()
acquiring an additional reference via the queue_lock() routine. The
nested key ref-counting has been masking bugs and complicating code
analysis. queue_lock() is only called with a previously ref-counted
key, so remove the additional ref-counting from the queue_(un)lock()
functions.
Also futex_wait_requeue_pi() drops one key reference too many in
unqueue_me_pi(). Remove the key reference handling from
unqueue_me_pi(). This was paired with a queue_lock() in
futex_lock_pi(), so the count remains unchanged.
Document remaining nested key ref-counting sites.
Signed-off-by: Darren Hart <[email protected]>
Reported-and-tested-by: Matthieu Fertré<[email protected]>
Reported-by: Louis Rilling<[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Cc: John Kacur <[email protected]>
Cc: Rusty Russell <[email protected]>
LKML-Reference: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
|
static u32 cmpxchg_futex_value_locked(u32 __user *uaddr, u32 uval, u32 newval)
{
u32 curval;
pagefault_disable();
curval = futex_atomic_cmpxchg_inatomic(uaddr, uval, newval);
pagefault_enable();
return curval;
}
|
static u32 cmpxchg_futex_value_locked(u32 __user *uaddr, u32 uval, u32 newval)
{
u32 curval;
pagefault_disable();
curval = futex_atomic_cmpxchg_inatomic(uaddr, uval, newval);
pagefault_enable();
return curval;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3751
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3751/
| null |
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/libpng/+/9d4853418ab2f754c2b63e091c29c5529b8b86ca
|
9d4853418ab2f754c2b63e091c29c5529b8b86ca
|
DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
|
compare_two_images(Image *a, Image *b, int via_linear,
png_const_colorp background)
{
ptrdiff_t stridea = a->stride;
ptrdiff_t strideb = b->stride;
png_const_bytep rowa = a->buffer+16;
png_const_bytep rowb = b->buffer+16;
const png_uint_32 width = a->image.width;
const png_uint_32 height = a->image.height;
const png_uint_32 formata = a->image.format;
const png_uint_32 formatb = b->image.format;
const unsigned int a_sample = PNG_IMAGE_SAMPLE_SIZE(formata);
const unsigned int b_sample = PNG_IMAGE_SAMPLE_SIZE(formatb);
int alpha_added, alpha_removed;
int bchannels;
int btoa[4];
png_uint_32 y;
Transform tr;
/* This should never happen: */
if (width != b->image.width || height != b->image.height)
return logerror(a, a->file_name, ": width x height changed: ",
b->file_name);
/* Set up the background and the transform */
transform_from_formats(&tr, a, b, background, via_linear);
/* Find the first row and inter-row space. */
if (!(formata & PNG_FORMAT_FLAG_COLORMAP) &&
(formata & PNG_FORMAT_FLAG_LINEAR))
stridea *= 2;
if (!(formatb & PNG_FORMAT_FLAG_COLORMAP) &&
(formatb & PNG_FORMAT_FLAG_LINEAR))
strideb *= 2;
if (stridea < 0) rowa += (height-1) * (-stridea);
if (strideb < 0) rowb += (height-1) * (-strideb);
/* First shortcut the two colormap case by comparing the image data; if it
* matches then we expect the colormaps to match, although this is not
* absolutely necessary for an image match. If the colormaps fail to match
* then there is a problem in libpng.
*/
if (formata & formatb & PNG_FORMAT_FLAG_COLORMAP)
{
/* Only check colormap entries that actually exist; */
png_const_bytep ppa, ppb;
int match;
png_byte in_use[256], amax = 0, bmax = 0;
memset(in_use, 0, sizeof in_use);
ppa = rowa;
ppb = rowb;
/* Do this the slow way to accumulate the 'in_use' flags, don't break out
* of the loop until the end; this validates the color-mapped data to
* ensure all pixels are valid color-map indexes.
*/
for (y=0, match=1; y<height && match; ++y, ppa += stridea, ppb += strideb)
{
png_uint_32 x;
for (x=0; x<width; ++x)
{
png_byte bval = ppb[x];
png_byte aval = ppa[x];
if (bval > bmax)
bmax = bval;
if (bval != aval)
match = 0;
in_use[aval] = 1;
if (aval > amax)
amax = aval;
}
}
/* If the buffers match then the colormaps must too. */
if (match)
{
/* Do the color-maps match, entry by entry? Only check the 'in_use'
* entries. An error here should be logged as a color-map error.
*/
png_const_bytep a_cmap = (png_const_bytep)a->colormap;
png_const_bytep b_cmap = (png_const_bytep)b->colormap;
int result = 1; /* match by default */
/* This is used in logpixel to get the error message correct. */
tr.is_palette = 1;
for (y=0; y<256; ++y, a_cmap += a_sample, b_cmap += b_sample)
if (in_use[y])
{
/* The colormap entries should be valid, but because libpng doesn't
* do any checking at present the original image may contain invalid
* pixel values. These cause an error here (at present) unless
* accumulating errors in which case the program just ignores them.
*/
if (y >= a->image.colormap_entries)
{
if ((a->opts & ACCUMULATE) == 0)
{
char pindex[9];
sprintf(pindex, "%lu[%lu]", (unsigned long)y,
(unsigned long)a->image.colormap_entries);
logerror(a, a->file_name, ": bad pixel index: ", pindex);
}
result = 0;
}
else if (y >= b->image.colormap_entries)
{
if ((b->opts & ACCUMULATE) == 0)
{
char pindex[9];
sprintf(pindex, "%lu[%lu]", (unsigned long)y,
(unsigned long)b->image.colormap_entries);
logerror(b, b->file_name, ": bad pixel index: ", pindex);
}
result = 0;
}
/* All the mismatches are logged here; there can only be 256! */
else if (!cmppixel(&tr, a_cmap, b_cmap, 0, y))
result = 0;
}
/* If reqested copy the error values back from the Transform. */
if (a->opts & ACCUMULATE)
{
tr.error_ptr[0] = tr.error[0];
tr.error_ptr[1] = tr.error[1];
tr.error_ptr[2] = tr.error[2];
tr.error_ptr[3] = tr.error[3];
result = 1; /* force a continue */
}
return result;
}
/* else the image buffers don't match pixel-wise so compare sample values
* instead, but first validate that the pixel indexes are in range (but
* only if not accumulating, when the error is ignored.)
*/
else if ((a->opts & ACCUMULATE) == 0)
{
/* Check the original image first,
* TODO: deal with input images with bad pixel values?
*/
if (amax >= a->image.colormap_entries)
{
char pindex[9];
sprintf(pindex, "%d[%lu]", amax,
(unsigned long)a->image.colormap_entries);
return logerror(a, a->file_name, ": bad pixel index: ", pindex);
}
else if (bmax >= b->image.colormap_entries)
{
char pindex[9];
sprintf(pindex, "%d[%lu]", bmax,
(unsigned long)b->image.colormap_entries);
return logerror(b, b->file_name, ": bad pixel index: ", pindex);
}
}
}
/* We can directly compare pixel values without the need to use the read
* or transform support (i.e. a memory compare) if:
*
* 1) The bit depth has not changed.
* 2) RGB to grayscale has not been done (the reverse is ok; we just compare
* the three RGB values to the original grayscale.)
* 3) An alpha channel has not been removed from an 8-bit format, or the
* 8-bit alpha value of the pixel was 255 (opaque).
*
* If an alpha channel has been *added* then it must have the relevant opaque
* value (255 or 65535).
*
* The fist two the tests (in the order given above) (using the boolean
* equivalence !a && !b == !(a || b))
*/
if (!(((formata ^ formatb) & PNG_FORMAT_FLAG_LINEAR) |
(formata & (formatb ^ PNG_FORMAT_FLAG_COLOR) & PNG_FORMAT_FLAG_COLOR)))
{
/* Was an alpha channel changed? */
const png_uint_32 alpha_changed = (formata ^ formatb) &
PNG_FORMAT_FLAG_ALPHA;
/* Was an alpha channel removed? (The third test.) If so the direct
* comparison is only possible if the input alpha is opaque.
*/
alpha_removed = (formata & alpha_changed) != 0;
/* Was an alpha channel added? */
alpha_added = (formatb & alpha_changed) != 0;
/* The channels may have been moved between input and output, this finds
* out how, recording the result in the btoa array, which says where in
* 'a' to find each channel of 'b'. If alpha was added then btoa[alpha]
* ends up as 4 (and is not used.)
*/
{
int i;
png_byte aloc[4];
png_byte bloc[4];
/* The following are used only if the formats match, except that
* 'bchannels' is a flag for matching formats. btoa[x] says, for each
* channel in b, where to find the corresponding value in a, for the
* bchannels. achannels may be different for a gray to rgb transform
* (a will be 1 or 2, b will be 3 or 4 channels.)
*/
(void)component_loc(aloc, formata);
bchannels = component_loc(bloc, formatb);
/* Hence the btoa array. */
for (i=0; i<4; ++i) if (bloc[i] < 4)
btoa[bloc[i]] = aloc[i]; /* may be '4' for alpha */
if (alpha_added)
alpha_added = bloc[0]; /* location of alpha channel in image b */
else
alpha_added = 4; /* Won't match an image b channel */
if (alpha_removed)
alpha_removed = aloc[0]; /* location of alpha channel in image a */
else
alpha_removed = 4;
}
}
else
{
/* Direct compare is not possible, cancel out all the corresponding local
* variables.
*/
bchannels = 0;
alpha_removed = alpha_added = 4;
btoa[3] = btoa[2] = btoa[1] = btoa[0] = 4; /* 4 == not present */
}
for (y=0; y<height; ++y, rowa += stridea, rowb += strideb)
{
png_const_bytep ppa, ppb;
png_uint_32 x;
for (x=0, ppa=rowa, ppb=rowb; x<width; ++x)
{
png_const_bytep psa, psb;
if (formata & PNG_FORMAT_FLAG_COLORMAP)
psa = (png_const_bytep)a->colormap + a_sample * *ppa++;
else
psa = ppa, ppa += a_sample;
if (formatb & PNG_FORMAT_FLAG_COLORMAP)
psb = (png_const_bytep)b->colormap + b_sample * *ppb++;
else
psb = ppb, ppb += b_sample;
/* Do the fast test if possible. */
if (bchannels)
{
/* Check each 'b' channel against either the corresponding 'a'
* channel or the opaque alpha value, as appropriate. If
* alpha_removed value is set (not 4) then also do this only if the
* 'a' alpha channel (alpha_removed) is opaque; only relevant for
* the 8-bit case.
*/
if (formatb & PNG_FORMAT_FLAG_LINEAR) /* 16-bit checks */
{
png_const_uint_16p pua = aligncastconst(png_const_uint_16p, psa);
png_const_uint_16p pub = aligncastconst(png_const_uint_16p, psb);
switch (bchannels)
{
case 4:
if (pua[btoa[3]] != pub[3]) break;
case 3:
if (pua[btoa[2]] != pub[2]) break;
case 2:
if (pua[btoa[1]] != pub[1]) break;
case 1:
if (pua[btoa[0]] != pub[0]) break;
if (alpha_added != 4 && pub[alpha_added] != 65535) break;
continue; /* x loop */
default:
break; /* impossible */
}
}
else if (alpha_removed == 4 || psa[alpha_removed] == 255)
{
switch (bchannels)
{
case 4:
if (psa[btoa[3]] != psb[3]) break;
case 3:
if (psa[btoa[2]] != psb[2]) break;
case 2:
if (psa[btoa[1]] != psb[1]) break;
case 1:
if (psa[btoa[0]] != psb[0]) break;
if (alpha_added != 4 && psb[alpha_added] != 255) break;
continue; /* x loop */
default:
break; /* impossible */
}
}
}
/* If we get to here the fast match failed; do the slow match for this
* pixel.
*/
if (!cmppixel(&tr, psa, psb, x, y) && (a->opts & KEEP_GOING) == 0)
return 0; /* error case */
}
}
/* If reqested copy the error values back from the Transform. */
if (a->opts & ACCUMULATE)
{
tr.error_ptr[0] = tr.error[0];
tr.error_ptr[1] = tr.error[1];
tr.error_ptr[2] = tr.error[2];
tr.error_ptr[3] = tr.error[3];
}
return 1;
}
|
compare_two_images(Image *a, Image *b, int via_linear,
png_const_colorp background)
{
ptrdiff_t stridea = a->stride;
ptrdiff_t strideb = b->stride;
png_const_bytep rowa = a->buffer+16;
png_const_bytep rowb = b->buffer+16;
const png_uint_32 width = a->image.width;
const png_uint_32 height = a->image.height;
const png_uint_32 formata = a->image.format;
const png_uint_32 formatb = b->image.format;
const unsigned int a_sample = PNG_IMAGE_SAMPLE_SIZE(formata);
const unsigned int b_sample = PNG_IMAGE_SAMPLE_SIZE(formatb);
int alpha_added, alpha_removed;
int bchannels;
int btoa[4];
png_uint_32 y;
Transform tr;
/* This should never happen: */
if (width != b->image.width || height != b->image.height)
return logerror(a, a->file_name, ": width x height changed: ",
b->file_name);
/* Set up the background and the transform */
transform_from_formats(&tr, a, b, background, via_linear);
/* Find the first row and inter-row space. */
if (!(formata & PNG_FORMAT_FLAG_COLORMAP) &&
(formata & PNG_FORMAT_FLAG_LINEAR))
stridea *= 2;
if (!(formatb & PNG_FORMAT_FLAG_COLORMAP) &&
(formatb & PNG_FORMAT_FLAG_LINEAR))
strideb *= 2;
if (stridea < 0) rowa += (height-1) * (-stridea);
if (strideb < 0) rowb += (height-1) * (-strideb);
/* First shortcut the two colormap case by comparing the image data; if it
* matches then we expect the colormaps to match, although this is not
* absolutely necessary for an image match. If the colormaps fail to match
* then there is a problem in libpng.
*/
if (formata & formatb & PNG_FORMAT_FLAG_COLORMAP)
{
/* Only check colormap entries that actually exist; */
png_const_bytep ppa, ppb;
int match;
png_byte in_use[256], amax = 0, bmax = 0;
memset(in_use, 0, sizeof in_use);
ppa = rowa;
ppb = rowb;
/* Do this the slow way to accumulate the 'in_use' flags, don't break out
* of the loop until the end; this validates the color-mapped data to
* ensure all pixels are valid color-map indexes.
*/
for (y=0, match=1; y<height && match; ++y, ppa += stridea, ppb += strideb)
{
png_uint_32 x;
for (x=0; x<width; ++x)
{
png_byte bval = ppb[x];
png_byte aval = ppa[x];
if (bval > bmax)
bmax = bval;
if (bval != aval)
match = 0;
in_use[aval] = 1;
if (aval > amax)
amax = aval;
}
}
/* If the buffers match then the colormaps must too. */
if (match)
{
/* Do the color-maps match, entry by entry? Only check the 'in_use'
* entries. An error here should be logged as a color-map error.
*/
png_const_bytep a_cmap = (png_const_bytep)a->colormap;
png_const_bytep b_cmap = (png_const_bytep)b->colormap;
int result = 1; /* match by default */
/* This is used in logpixel to get the error message correct. */
tr.is_palette = 1;
for (y=0; y<256; ++y, a_cmap += a_sample, b_cmap += b_sample)
if (in_use[y])
{
/* The colormap entries should be valid, but because libpng doesn't
* do any checking at present the original image may contain invalid
* pixel values. These cause an error here (at present) unless
* accumulating errors in which case the program just ignores them.
*/
if (y >= a->image.colormap_entries)
{
if ((a->opts & ACCUMULATE) == 0)
{
char pindex[9];
sprintf(pindex, "%lu[%lu]", (unsigned long)y,
(unsigned long)a->image.colormap_entries);
logerror(a, a->file_name, ": bad pixel index: ", pindex);
}
result = 0;
}
else if (y >= b->image.colormap_entries)
{
if ((a->opts & ACCUMULATE) == 0)
{
char pindex[9];
sprintf(pindex, "%lu[%lu]", (unsigned long)y,
(unsigned long)b->image.colormap_entries);
logerror(b, b->file_name, ": bad pixel index: ", pindex);
}
result = 0;
}
/* All the mismatches are logged here; there can only be 256! */
else if (!cmppixel(&tr, a_cmap, b_cmap, 0, y))
result = 0;
}
/* If reqested copy the error values back from the Transform. */
if (a->opts & ACCUMULATE)
{
tr.error_ptr[0] = tr.error[0];
tr.error_ptr[1] = tr.error[1];
tr.error_ptr[2] = tr.error[2];
tr.error_ptr[3] = tr.error[3];
result = 1; /* force a continue */
}
return result;
}
/* else the image buffers don't match pixel-wise so compare sample values
* instead, but first validate that the pixel indexes are in range (but
* only if not accumulating, when the error is ignored.)
*/
else if ((a->opts & ACCUMULATE) == 0)
{
/* Check the original image first,
* TODO: deal with input images with bad pixel values?
*/
if (amax >= a->image.colormap_entries)
{
char pindex[9];
sprintf(pindex, "%d[%lu]", amax,
(unsigned long)a->image.colormap_entries);
return logerror(a, a->file_name, ": bad pixel index: ", pindex);
}
else if (bmax >= b->image.colormap_entries)
{
char pindex[9];
sprintf(pindex, "%d[%lu]", bmax,
(unsigned long)b->image.colormap_entries);
return logerror(b, b->file_name, ": bad pixel index: ", pindex);
}
}
}
/* We can directly compare pixel values without the need to use the read
* or transform support (i.e. a memory compare) if:
*
* 1) The bit depth has not changed.
* 2) RGB to grayscale has not been done (the reverse is ok; we just compare
* the three RGB values to the original grayscale.)
* 3) An alpha channel has not been removed from an 8-bit format, or the
* 8-bit alpha value of the pixel was 255 (opaque).
*
* If an alpha channel has been *added* then it must have the relevant opaque
* value (255 or 65535).
*
* The fist two the tests (in the order given above) (using the boolean
* equivalence !a && !b == !(a || b))
*/
if (!(((formata ^ formatb) & PNG_FORMAT_FLAG_LINEAR) |
(formata & (formatb ^ PNG_FORMAT_FLAG_COLOR) & PNG_FORMAT_FLAG_COLOR)))
{
/* Was an alpha channel changed? */
const png_uint_32 alpha_changed = (formata ^ formatb) &
PNG_FORMAT_FLAG_ALPHA;
/* Was an alpha channel removed? (The third test.) If so the direct
* comparison is only possible if the input alpha is opaque.
*/
alpha_removed = (formata & alpha_changed) != 0;
/* Was an alpha channel added? */
alpha_added = (formatb & alpha_changed) != 0;
/* The channels may have been moved between input and output, this finds
* out how, recording the result in the btoa array, which says where in
* 'a' to find each channel of 'b'. If alpha was added then btoa[alpha]
* ends up as 4 (and is not used.)
*/
{
int i;
png_byte aloc[4];
png_byte bloc[4];
/* The following are used only if the formats match, except that
* 'bchannels' is a flag for matching formats. btoa[x] says, for each
* channel in b, where to find the corresponding value in a, for the
* bchannels. achannels may be different for a gray to rgb transform
* (a will be 1 or 2, b will be 3 or 4 channels.)
*/
(void)component_loc(aloc, formata);
bchannels = component_loc(bloc, formatb);
/* Hence the btoa array. */
for (i=0; i<4; ++i) if (bloc[i] < 4)
btoa[bloc[i]] = aloc[i]; /* may be '4' for alpha */
if (alpha_added)
alpha_added = bloc[0]; /* location of alpha channel in image b */
else
alpha_added = 4; /* Won't match an image b channel */
if (alpha_removed)
alpha_removed = aloc[0]; /* location of alpha channel in image a */
else
alpha_removed = 4;
}
}
else
{
/* Direct compare is not possible, cancel out all the corresponding local
* variables.
*/
bchannels = 0;
alpha_removed = alpha_added = 4;
btoa[3] = btoa[2] = btoa[1] = btoa[0] = 4; /* 4 == not present */
}
for (y=0; y<height; ++y, rowa += stridea, rowb += strideb)
{
png_const_bytep ppa, ppb;
png_uint_32 x;
for (x=0, ppa=rowa, ppb=rowb; x<width; ++x)
{
png_const_bytep psa, psb;
if (formata & PNG_FORMAT_FLAG_COLORMAP)
psa = (png_const_bytep)a->colormap + a_sample * *ppa++;
else
psa = ppa, ppa += a_sample;
if (formatb & PNG_FORMAT_FLAG_COLORMAP)
psb = (png_const_bytep)b->colormap + b_sample * *ppb++;
else
psb = ppb, ppb += b_sample;
/* Do the fast test if possible. */
if (bchannels)
{
/* Check each 'b' channel against either the corresponding 'a'
* channel or the opaque alpha value, as appropriate. If
* alpha_removed value is set (not 4) then also do this only if the
* 'a' alpha channel (alpha_removed) is opaque; only relevant for
* the 8-bit case.
*/
if (formatb & PNG_FORMAT_FLAG_LINEAR) /* 16-bit checks */
{
png_const_uint_16p pua = aligncastconst(png_const_uint_16p, psa);
png_const_uint_16p pub = aligncastconst(png_const_uint_16p, psb);
switch (bchannels)
{
case 4:
if (pua[btoa[3]] != pub[3]) break;
case 3:
if (pua[btoa[2]] != pub[2]) break;
case 2:
if (pua[btoa[1]] != pub[1]) break;
case 1:
if (pua[btoa[0]] != pub[0]) break;
if (alpha_added != 4 && pub[alpha_added] != 65535) break;
continue; /* x loop */
default:
break; /* impossible */
}
}
else if (alpha_removed == 4 || psa[alpha_removed] == 255)
{
switch (bchannels)
{
case 4:
if (psa[btoa[3]] != psb[3]) break;
case 3:
if (psa[btoa[2]] != psb[2]) break;
case 2:
if (psa[btoa[1]] != psb[1]) break;
case 1:
if (psa[btoa[0]] != psb[0]) break;
if (alpha_added != 4 && psb[alpha_added] != 255) break;
continue; /* x loop */
default:
break; /* impossible */
}
}
}
/* If we get to here the fast match failed; do the slow match for this
* pixel.
*/
if (!cmppixel(&tr, psa, psb, x, y) && (a->opts & KEEP_GOING) == 0)
return 0; /* error case */
}
}
/* If reqested copy the error values back from the Transform. */
if (a->opts & ACCUMULATE)
{
tr.error_ptr[0] = tr.error[0];
tr.error_ptr[1] = tr.error[1];
tr.error_ptr[2] = tr.error[2];
tr.error_ptr[3] = tr.error[3];
}
return 1;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 1 |
CVE-2013-1790
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-1790/
|
CWE-119
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/poppler/poppler/commit/?h=poppler-0.22&id=b1026b5978c385328f2a15a2185c599a563edf91
|
b1026b5978c385328f2a15a2185c599a563edf91
| null |
ImageStream::~ImageStream() {
if (imgLine != (Guchar *)inputLine) {
gfree(imgLine);
}
gfree(inputLine);
}
|
ImageStream::~ImageStream() {
if (imgLine != (Guchar *)inputLine) {
gfree(imgLine);
}
gfree(inputLine);
}
|
CPP
|
poppler
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3699
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3699/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/mjg59/linux/commit/a4a5ed2835e8ea042868b7401dced3f517cafa76
|
a4a5ed2835e8ea042868b7401dced3f517cafa76
|
acpi: Disable ACPI table override if securelevel is set
From the kernel documentation (initrd_table_override.txt):
If the ACPI_INITRD_TABLE_OVERRIDE compile option is true, it is possible
to override nearly any ACPI table provided by the BIOS with an
instrumented, modified one.
When securelevel is set, the kernel should disallow any unauthenticated
changes to kernel space. ACPI tables contain code invoked by the kernel, so
do not allow ACPI tables to be overridden if securelevel is set.
Signed-off-by: Linn Crosetto <[email protected]>
|
acpi_status acpi_os_execute(acpi_execute_type type,
acpi_osd_exec_callback function, void *context)
{
acpi_status status = AE_OK;
struct acpi_os_dpc *dpc;
struct workqueue_struct *queue;
int ret;
ACPI_DEBUG_PRINT((ACPI_DB_EXEC,
"Scheduling function [%p(%p)] for deferred execution.\n",
function, context));
if (type == OSL_DEBUGGER_MAIN_THREAD) {
ret = acpi_debugger_create_thread(function, context);
if (ret) {
pr_err("Call to kthread_create() failed.\n");
status = AE_ERROR;
}
goto out_thread;
}
/*
* Allocate/initialize DPC structure. Note that this memory will be
* freed by the callee. The kernel handles the work_struct list in a
* way that allows us to also free its memory inside the callee.
* Because we may want to schedule several tasks with different
* parameters we can't use the approach some kernel code uses of
* having a static work_struct.
*/
dpc = kzalloc(sizeof(struct acpi_os_dpc), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!dpc)
return AE_NO_MEMORY;
dpc->function = function;
dpc->context = context;
/*
* To prevent lockdep from complaining unnecessarily, make sure that
* there is a different static lockdep key for each workqueue by using
* INIT_WORK() for each of them separately.
*/
if (type == OSL_NOTIFY_HANDLER) {
queue = kacpi_notify_wq;
INIT_WORK(&dpc->work, acpi_os_execute_deferred);
} else if (type == OSL_GPE_HANDLER) {
queue = kacpid_wq;
INIT_WORK(&dpc->work, acpi_os_execute_deferred);
} else {
pr_err("Unsupported os_execute type %d.\n", type);
status = AE_ERROR;
}
if (ACPI_FAILURE(status))
goto err_workqueue;
/*
* On some machines, a software-initiated SMI causes corruption unless
* the SMI runs on CPU 0. An SMI can be initiated by any AML, but
* typically it's done in GPE-related methods that are run via
* workqueues, so we can avoid the known corruption cases by always
* queueing on CPU 0.
*/
ret = queue_work_on(0, queue, &dpc->work);
if (!ret) {
printk(KERN_ERR PREFIX
"Call to queue_work() failed.\n");
status = AE_ERROR;
}
err_workqueue:
if (ACPI_FAILURE(status))
kfree(dpc);
out_thread:
return status;
}
|
acpi_status acpi_os_execute(acpi_execute_type type,
acpi_osd_exec_callback function, void *context)
{
acpi_status status = AE_OK;
struct acpi_os_dpc *dpc;
struct workqueue_struct *queue;
int ret;
ACPI_DEBUG_PRINT((ACPI_DB_EXEC,
"Scheduling function [%p(%p)] for deferred execution.\n",
function, context));
if (type == OSL_DEBUGGER_MAIN_THREAD) {
ret = acpi_debugger_create_thread(function, context);
if (ret) {
pr_err("Call to kthread_create() failed.\n");
status = AE_ERROR;
}
goto out_thread;
}
/*
* Allocate/initialize DPC structure. Note that this memory will be
* freed by the callee. The kernel handles the work_struct list in a
* way that allows us to also free its memory inside the callee.
* Because we may want to schedule several tasks with different
* parameters we can't use the approach some kernel code uses of
* having a static work_struct.
*/
dpc = kzalloc(sizeof(struct acpi_os_dpc), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!dpc)
return AE_NO_MEMORY;
dpc->function = function;
dpc->context = context;
/*
* To prevent lockdep from complaining unnecessarily, make sure that
* there is a different static lockdep key for each workqueue by using
* INIT_WORK() for each of them separately.
*/
if (type == OSL_NOTIFY_HANDLER) {
queue = kacpi_notify_wq;
INIT_WORK(&dpc->work, acpi_os_execute_deferred);
} else if (type == OSL_GPE_HANDLER) {
queue = kacpid_wq;
INIT_WORK(&dpc->work, acpi_os_execute_deferred);
} else {
pr_err("Unsupported os_execute type %d.\n", type);
status = AE_ERROR;
}
if (ACPI_FAILURE(status))
goto err_workqueue;
/*
* On some machines, a software-initiated SMI causes corruption unless
* the SMI runs on CPU 0. An SMI can be initiated by any AML, but
* typically it's done in GPE-related methods that are run via
* workqueues, so we can avoid the known corruption cases by always
* queueing on CPU 0.
*/
ret = queue_work_on(0, queue, &dpc->work);
if (!ret) {
printk(KERN_ERR PREFIX
"Call to queue_work() failed.\n");
status = AE_ERROR;
}
err_workqueue:
if (ACPI_FAILURE(status))
kfree(dpc);
out_thread:
return status;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
Subsets and Splits
CWE-119 Function Changes
This query retrieves specific examples (before and after code changes) of vulnerabilities with CWE-119, providing basic filtering but limited insight.
Vulnerable Code with CWE IDs
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This query filters and shows raw data for vulnerable functions, which provides basic insight into specific vulnerabilities but lacks broader analytical value.
Top 100 Vulnerable Functions
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