CVE ID
stringlengths 13
43
⌀ | CVE Page
stringlengths 45
48
⌀ | CWE ID
stringclasses 90
values | codeLink
stringlengths 46
139
| commit_id
stringlengths 6
81
| commit_message
stringlengths 3
13.3k
⌀ | func_after
stringlengths 14
241k
| func_before
stringlengths 14
241k
| lang
stringclasses 3
values | project
stringclasses 309
values | vul
int8 0
1
|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
CVE-2017-9059
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-9059/
|
CWE-404
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/c70422f760c120480fee4de6c38804c72aa26bc1
|
c70422f760c120480fee4de6c38804c72aa26bc1
|
Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
|
static __be32 nfsd4_encode_path(struct xdr_stream *xdr,
const struct path *root,
const struct path *path)
{
struct path cur = *path;
__be32 *p;
struct dentry **components = NULL;
unsigned int ncomponents = 0;
__be32 err = nfserr_jukebox;
dprintk("nfsd4_encode_components(");
path_get(&cur);
/* First walk the path up to the nfsd root, and store the
* dentries/path components in an array.
*/
for (;;) {
if (path_equal(&cur, root))
break;
if (cur.dentry == cur.mnt->mnt_root) {
if (follow_up(&cur))
continue;
goto out_free;
}
if ((ncomponents & 15) == 0) {
struct dentry **new;
new = krealloc(components,
sizeof(*new) * (ncomponents + 16),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!new)
goto out_free;
components = new;
}
components[ncomponents++] = cur.dentry;
cur.dentry = dget_parent(cur.dentry);
}
err = nfserr_resource;
p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, 4);
if (!p)
goto out_free;
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(ncomponents);
while (ncomponents) {
struct dentry *dentry = components[ncomponents - 1];
unsigned int len;
spin_lock(&dentry->d_lock);
len = dentry->d_name.len;
p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, len + 4);
if (!p) {
spin_unlock(&dentry->d_lock);
goto out_free;
}
p = xdr_encode_opaque(p, dentry->d_name.name, len);
dprintk("/%pd", dentry);
spin_unlock(&dentry->d_lock);
dput(dentry);
ncomponents--;
}
err = 0;
out_free:
dprintk(")\n");
while (ncomponents)
dput(components[--ncomponents]);
kfree(components);
path_put(&cur);
return err;
}
|
static __be32 nfsd4_encode_path(struct xdr_stream *xdr,
const struct path *root,
const struct path *path)
{
struct path cur = *path;
__be32 *p;
struct dentry **components = NULL;
unsigned int ncomponents = 0;
__be32 err = nfserr_jukebox;
dprintk("nfsd4_encode_components(");
path_get(&cur);
/* First walk the path up to the nfsd root, and store the
* dentries/path components in an array.
*/
for (;;) {
if (path_equal(&cur, root))
break;
if (cur.dentry == cur.mnt->mnt_root) {
if (follow_up(&cur))
continue;
goto out_free;
}
if ((ncomponents & 15) == 0) {
struct dentry **new;
new = krealloc(components,
sizeof(*new) * (ncomponents + 16),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!new)
goto out_free;
components = new;
}
components[ncomponents++] = cur.dentry;
cur.dentry = dget_parent(cur.dentry);
}
err = nfserr_resource;
p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, 4);
if (!p)
goto out_free;
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(ncomponents);
while (ncomponents) {
struct dentry *dentry = components[ncomponents - 1];
unsigned int len;
spin_lock(&dentry->d_lock);
len = dentry->d_name.len;
p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, len + 4);
if (!p) {
spin_unlock(&dentry->d_lock);
goto out_free;
}
p = xdr_encode_opaque(p, dentry->d_name.name, len);
dprintk("/%pd", dentry);
spin_unlock(&dentry->d_lock);
dput(dentry);
ncomponents--;
}
err = 0;
out_free:
dprintk(")\n");
while (ncomponents)
dput(components[--ncomponents]);
kfree(components);
path_put(&cur);
return err;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2486
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2486/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/davidben/nspluginwrapper/commit/7e4ab8e1189846041f955e6c83f72bc1624e7a98
|
7e4ab8e1189846041f955e6c83f72bc1624e7a98
|
Support all the new variables added
|
static gboolean xt_event_dispatch(GSource *source, GSourceFunc callback, gpointer user_data)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < XT_MAX_DISPATCH_EVENTS; i++) {
int mask = XtAppPending(x_app_context);
if (mask == 0)
break;
XtAppProcessEvent(x_app_context, XtIMAll);
}
return TRUE;
}
|
static gboolean xt_event_dispatch(GSource *source, GSourceFunc callback, gpointer user_data)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < XT_MAX_DISPATCH_EVENTS; i++) {
int mask = XtAppPending(x_app_context);
if (mask == 0)
break;
XtAppProcessEvent(x_app_context, XtIMAll);
}
return TRUE;
}
|
C
|
nspluginwrapper
| 0 |
CVE-2018-15862
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-15862/
|
CWE-476
|
https://github.com/xkbcommon/libxkbcommon/commit/4e2ee9c3f6050d773f8bbe05bc0edb17f1ff8371
|
4e2ee9c3f6050d773f8bbe05bc0edb17f1ff8371
|
xkbcomp: Don't explode on invalid virtual modifiers
testcase: 'virtualModifiers=LevelThreC'
Signed-off-by: Daniel Stone <[email protected]>
|
ExprResolveGroup(struct xkb_context *ctx, const ExprDef *expr,
xkb_layout_index_t *group_rtrn)
{
bool ok;
int result;
ok = ExprResolveIntegerLookup(ctx, expr, &result, SimpleLookup,
groupNames);
if (!ok)
return false;
if (result <= 0 || result > XKB_MAX_GROUPS) {
log_err(ctx, "Group index %u is out of range (1..%d)\n",
result, XKB_MAX_GROUPS);
return false;
}
*group_rtrn = (xkb_layout_index_t) result;
return true;
}
|
ExprResolveGroup(struct xkb_context *ctx, const ExprDef *expr,
xkb_layout_index_t *group_rtrn)
{
bool ok;
int result;
ok = ExprResolveIntegerLookup(ctx, expr, &result, SimpleLookup,
groupNames);
if (!ok)
return false;
if (result <= 0 || result > XKB_MAX_GROUPS) {
log_err(ctx, "Group index %u is out of range (1..%d)\n",
result, XKB_MAX_GROUPS);
return false;
}
*group_rtrn = (xkb_layout_index_t) result;
return true;
}
|
C
|
libxkbcommon
| 0 |
CVE-2017-7865
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-7865/
|
CWE-787
|
https://github.com/FFmpeg/FFmpeg/commit/2080bc33717955a0e4268e738acf8c1eeddbf8cb
|
2080bc33717955a0e4268e738acf8c1eeddbf8cb
|
avcodec/utils: correct align value for interplay
Fixes out of array access
Fixes: 452/fuzz-1-ffmpeg_VIDEO_AV_CODEC_ID_INTERPLAY_VIDEO_fuzzer
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/targets/ffmpeg
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]>
|
unsigned int avpriv_toupper4(unsigned int x)
{
return av_toupper(x & 0xFF) +
(av_toupper((x >> 8) & 0xFF) << 8) +
(av_toupper((x >> 16) & 0xFF) << 16) +
((unsigned)av_toupper((x >> 24) & 0xFF) << 24);
}
|
unsigned int avpriv_toupper4(unsigned int x)
{
return av_toupper(x & 0xFF) +
(av_toupper((x >> 8) & 0xFF) << 8) +
(av_toupper((x >> 16) & 0xFF) << 16) +
((unsigned)av_toupper((x >> 24) & 0xFF) << 24);
}
|
C
|
FFmpeg
| 0 |
CVE-2014-2672
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-2672/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/21f8aaee0c62708654988ce092838aa7df4d25d8
|
21f8aaee0c62708654988ce092838aa7df4d25d8
|
ath9k: protect tid->sched check
We check tid->sched without a lock taken on ath_tx_aggr_sleep(). That
is race condition which can result of doing list_del(&tid->list) twice
(second time with poisoned list node) and cause crash like shown below:
[424271.637220] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 00100104
[424271.637328] IP: [<f90fc072>] ath_tx_aggr_sleep+0x62/0xe0 [ath9k]
...
[424271.639953] Call Trace:
[424271.639998] [<f90f6900>] ? ath9k_get_survey+0x110/0x110 [ath9k]
[424271.640083] [<f90f6942>] ath9k_sta_notify+0x42/0x50 [ath9k]
[424271.640177] [<f809cfef>] sta_ps_start+0x8f/0x1c0 [mac80211]
[424271.640258] [<c10f730e>] ? free_compound_page+0x2e/0x40
[424271.640346] [<f809e915>] ieee80211_rx_handlers+0x9d5/0x2340 [mac80211]
[424271.640437] [<c112f048>] ? kmem_cache_free+0x1d8/0x1f0
[424271.640510] [<c1345a84>] ? kfree_skbmem+0x34/0x90
[424271.640578] [<c10fc23c>] ? put_page+0x2c/0x40
[424271.640640] [<c1345a84>] ? kfree_skbmem+0x34/0x90
[424271.640706] [<c1345a84>] ? kfree_skbmem+0x34/0x90
[424271.640787] [<f809dde3>] ? ieee80211_rx_handlers_result+0x73/0x1d0 [mac80211]
[424271.640897] [<f80a07a0>] ieee80211_prepare_and_rx_handle+0x520/0xad0 [mac80211]
[424271.641009] [<f809e22d>] ? ieee80211_rx_handlers+0x2ed/0x2340 [mac80211]
[424271.641104] [<c13846ce>] ? ip_output+0x7e/0xd0
[424271.641182] [<f80a1057>] ieee80211_rx+0x307/0x7c0 [mac80211]
[424271.641266] [<f90fa6ee>] ath_rx_tasklet+0x88e/0xf70 [ath9k]
[424271.641358] [<f80a0f2c>] ? ieee80211_rx+0x1dc/0x7c0 [mac80211]
[424271.641445] [<f90f82db>] ath9k_tasklet+0xcb/0x130 [ath9k]
Bug report:
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=70551
Reported-and-tested-by: Max Sydorenko <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Stanislaw Gruszka <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <[email protected]>
|
static void ath_tx_fill_desc(struct ath_softc *sc, struct ath_buf *bf,
struct ath_txq *txq, int len)
{
struct ath_hw *ah = sc->sc_ah;
struct ath_buf *bf_first = NULL;
struct ath_tx_info info;
u32 rts_thresh = sc->hw->wiphy->rts_threshold;
bool rts = false;
memset(&info, 0, sizeof(info));
info.is_first = true;
info.is_last = true;
info.txpower = MAX_RATE_POWER;
info.qcu = txq->axq_qnum;
while (bf) {
struct sk_buff *skb = bf->bf_mpdu;
struct ieee80211_tx_info *tx_info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
struct ath_frame_info *fi = get_frame_info(skb);
bool aggr = !!(bf->bf_state.bf_type & BUF_AGGR);
info.type = get_hw_packet_type(skb);
if (bf->bf_next)
info.link = bf->bf_next->bf_daddr;
else
info.link = (sc->tx99_state) ? bf->bf_daddr : 0;
if (!bf_first) {
bf_first = bf;
if (!sc->tx99_state)
info.flags = ATH9K_TXDESC_INTREQ;
if ((tx_info->flags & IEEE80211_TX_CTL_CLEAR_PS_FILT) ||
txq == sc->tx.uapsdq)
info.flags |= ATH9K_TXDESC_CLRDMASK;
if (tx_info->flags & IEEE80211_TX_CTL_NO_ACK)
info.flags |= ATH9K_TXDESC_NOACK;
if (tx_info->flags & IEEE80211_TX_CTL_LDPC)
info.flags |= ATH9K_TXDESC_LDPC;
if (bf->bf_state.bfs_paprd)
info.flags |= (u32) bf->bf_state.bfs_paprd <<
ATH9K_TXDESC_PAPRD_S;
/*
* mac80211 doesn't handle RTS threshold for HT because
* the decision has to be taken based on AMPDU length
* and aggregation is done entirely inside ath9k.
* Set the RTS/CTS flag for the first subframe based
* on the threshold.
*/
if (aggr && (bf == bf_first) &&
unlikely(rts_thresh != (u32) -1)) {
/*
* "len" is the size of the entire AMPDU.
*/
if (!rts_thresh || (len > rts_thresh))
rts = true;
}
if (!aggr)
len = fi->framelen;
ath_buf_set_rate(sc, bf, &info, len, rts);
}
info.buf_addr[0] = bf->bf_buf_addr;
info.buf_len[0] = skb->len;
info.pkt_len = fi->framelen;
info.keyix = fi->keyix;
info.keytype = fi->keytype;
if (aggr) {
if (bf == bf_first)
info.aggr = AGGR_BUF_FIRST;
else if (bf == bf_first->bf_lastbf)
info.aggr = AGGR_BUF_LAST;
else
info.aggr = AGGR_BUF_MIDDLE;
info.ndelim = bf->bf_state.ndelim;
info.aggr_len = len;
}
if (bf == bf_first->bf_lastbf)
bf_first = NULL;
ath9k_hw_set_txdesc(ah, bf->bf_desc, &info);
bf = bf->bf_next;
}
}
|
static void ath_tx_fill_desc(struct ath_softc *sc, struct ath_buf *bf,
struct ath_txq *txq, int len)
{
struct ath_hw *ah = sc->sc_ah;
struct ath_buf *bf_first = NULL;
struct ath_tx_info info;
u32 rts_thresh = sc->hw->wiphy->rts_threshold;
bool rts = false;
memset(&info, 0, sizeof(info));
info.is_first = true;
info.is_last = true;
info.txpower = MAX_RATE_POWER;
info.qcu = txq->axq_qnum;
while (bf) {
struct sk_buff *skb = bf->bf_mpdu;
struct ieee80211_tx_info *tx_info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
struct ath_frame_info *fi = get_frame_info(skb);
bool aggr = !!(bf->bf_state.bf_type & BUF_AGGR);
info.type = get_hw_packet_type(skb);
if (bf->bf_next)
info.link = bf->bf_next->bf_daddr;
else
info.link = (sc->tx99_state) ? bf->bf_daddr : 0;
if (!bf_first) {
bf_first = bf;
if (!sc->tx99_state)
info.flags = ATH9K_TXDESC_INTREQ;
if ((tx_info->flags & IEEE80211_TX_CTL_CLEAR_PS_FILT) ||
txq == sc->tx.uapsdq)
info.flags |= ATH9K_TXDESC_CLRDMASK;
if (tx_info->flags & IEEE80211_TX_CTL_NO_ACK)
info.flags |= ATH9K_TXDESC_NOACK;
if (tx_info->flags & IEEE80211_TX_CTL_LDPC)
info.flags |= ATH9K_TXDESC_LDPC;
if (bf->bf_state.bfs_paprd)
info.flags |= (u32) bf->bf_state.bfs_paprd <<
ATH9K_TXDESC_PAPRD_S;
/*
* mac80211 doesn't handle RTS threshold for HT because
* the decision has to be taken based on AMPDU length
* and aggregation is done entirely inside ath9k.
* Set the RTS/CTS flag for the first subframe based
* on the threshold.
*/
if (aggr && (bf == bf_first) &&
unlikely(rts_thresh != (u32) -1)) {
/*
* "len" is the size of the entire AMPDU.
*/
if (!rts_thresh || (len > rts_thresh))
rts = true;
}
if (!aggr)
len = fi->framelen;
ath_buf_set_rate(sc, bf, &info, len, rts);
}
info.buf_addr[0] = bf->bf_buf_addr;
info.buf_len[0] = skb->len;
info.pkt_len = fi->framelen;
info.keyix = fi->keyix;
info.keytype = fi->keytype;
if (aggr) {
if (bf == bf_first)
info.aggr = AGGR_BUF_FIRST;
else if (bf == bf_first->bf_lastbf)
info.aggr = AGGR_BUF_LAST;
else
info.aggr = AGGR_BUF_MIDDLE;
info.ndelim = bf->bf_state.ndelim;
info.aggr_len = len;
}
if (bf == bf_first->bf_lastbf)
bf_first = NULL;
ath9k_hw_set_txdesc(ah, bf->bf_desc, &info);
bf = bf->bf_next;
}
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6048
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6048/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/931711135c90568f677cf42d94f2591a7eeced2e
|
931711135c90568f677cf42d94f2591a7eeced2e
|
Inherit referrer and policy when creating a nested browsing context
BUG=763194
[email protected]
Change-Id: Ide3950269adf26ba221f573dfa088e95291ab676
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/732652
Reviewed-by: Emily Stark <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Jochen Eisinger <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#511211}
|
void Document::CheckCompleted() {
if (!ShouldComplete())
return;
if (frame_) {
frame_->Client()->RunScriptsAtDocumentIdle();
if (!frame_)
return;
if (!ShouldComplete())
return;
}
SetReadyState(kComplete);
if (LoadEventStillNeeded())
ImplicitClose();
if (!frame_ || !frame_->IsAttached())
return;
if (frame_->GetSettings()->GetSavePreviousDocumentResources() ==
SavePreviousDocumentResources::kUntilOnLoad) {
fetcher_->ClearResourcesFromPreviousFetcher();
}
frame_->GetNavigationScheduler().StartTimer();
View()->HandleLoadCompleted();
if (!AllDescendantsAreComplete(frame_))
return;
if (!Loader()->SentDidFinishLoad()) {
if (frame_->IsMainFrame())
ViewportDescription().ReportMobilePageStats(frame_);
Loader()->SetSentDidFinishLoad();
frame_->Client()->DispatchDidFinishLoad();
if (!frame_)
return;
}
frame_->Loader().DidFinishNavigation();
}
|
void Document::CheckCompleted() {
if (!ShouldComplete())
return;
if (frame_) {
frame_->Client()->RunScriptsAtDocumentIdle();
if (!frame_)
return;
if (!ShouldComplete())
return;
}
SetReadyState(kComplete);
if (LoadEventStillNeeded())
ImplicitClose();
if (!frame_ || !frame_->IsAttached())
return;
if (frame_->GetSettings()->GetSavePreviousDocumentResources() ==
SavePreviousDocumentResources::kUntilOnLoad) {
fetcher_->ClearResourcesFromPreviousFetcher();
}
frame_->GetNavigationScheduler().StartTimer();
View()->HandleLoadCompleted();
if (!AllDescendantsAreComplete(frame_))
return;
if (!Loader()->SentDidFinishLoad()) {
if (frame_->IsMainFrame())
ViewportDescription().ReportMobilePageStats(frame_);
Loader()->SetSentDidFinishLoad();
frame_->Client()->DispatchDidFinishLoad();
if (!frame_)
return;
}
frame_->Loader().DidFinishNavigation();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-15386
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-15386/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/ba3b1b344017bbf36283464b51014fad15c2f3f4
|
ba3b1b344017bbf36283464b51014fad15c2f3f4
|
If a page shows a popup, end fullscreen.
This was implemented in Blink r159834, but it is susceptible
to a popup/fullscreen race. This CL reverts that implementation
and re-implements it in WebContents.
BUG=752003
TEST=WebContentsImplBrowserTest.PopupsFromJavaScriptEndFullscreen
Change-Id: Ia345cdeda273693c3231ad8f486bebfc3d83927f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/606987
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498171}
|
void ChromeClientImpl::Focus() {
if (web_view_->Client())
web_view_->Client()->DidFocus();
}
|
void ChromeClientImpl::Focus() {
if (web_view_->Client())
web_view_->Client()->DidFocus();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1616
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1616/
|
CWE-254
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/297ae873b471a46929ea39697b121c0b411434ee
|
297ae873b471a46929ea39697b121c0b411434ee
|
Custom buttons should only handle accelerators when focused.
BUG=541415
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1437523005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#360130}
|
void CustomButton::AnimationProgressed(const gfx::Animation* animation) {
SchedulePaint();
}
|
void CustomButton::AnimationProgressed(const gfx::Animation* animation) {
SchedulePaint();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-10191
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-10191/
|
CWE-190
|
https://github.com/mruby/mruby/commit/1905091634a6a2925c911484434448e568330626
|
1905091634a6a2925c911484434448e568330626
|
Check length of env stack before accessing upvar; fix #3995
|
mrb_run(mrb_state *mrb, struct RProc *proc, mrb_value self)
{
if (mrb->c->ci->argc < 0) {
return mrb_vm_run(mrb, proc, self, 3); /* receiver, args and block) */
}
else {
return mrb_vm_run(mrb, proc, self, mrb->c->ci->argc + 2); /* argc + 2 (receiver and block) */
}
}
|
mrb_run(mrb_state *mrb, struct RProc *proc, mrb_value self)
{
if (mrb->c->ci->argc < 0) {
return mrb_vm_run(mrb, proc, self, 3); /* receiver, args and block) */
}
else {
return mrb_vm_run(mrb, proc, self, mrb->c->ci->argc + 2); /* argc + 2 (receiver and block) */
}
}
|
C
|
mruby
| 0 |
CVE-2014-9903
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-9903/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/4efbc454ba68def5ef285b26ebfcfdb605b52755
|
4efbc454ba68def5ef285b26ebfcfdb605b52755
|
sched: Fix information leak in sys_sched_getattr()
We're copying the on-stack structure to userspace, but forgot to give
the right number of bytes to copy. This allows the calling process to
obtain up to PAGE_SIZE bytes from the stack (and possibly adjacent
kernel memory).
This fix copies only as much as we actually have on the stack
(attr->size defaults to the size of the struct) and leaves the rest of
the userspace-provided buffer untouched.
Found using kmemcheck + trinity.
Fixes: d50dde5a10f30 ("sched: Add new scheduler syscalls to support an extended scheduling parameters ABI")
Cc: Dario Faggioli <[email protected]>
Cc: Juri Lelli <[email protected]>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
|
static int __sched_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p,
const struct sched_attr *attr,
bool user)
{
int retval, oldprio, oldpolicy = -1, on_rq, running;
int policy = attr->sched_policy;
unsigned long flags;
const struct sched_class *prev_class;
struct rq *rq;
int reset_on_fork;
/* may grab non-irq protected spin_locks */
BUG_ON(in_interrupt());
recheck:
/* double check policy once rq lock held */
if (policy < 0) {
reset_on_fork = p->sched_reset_on_fork;
policy = oldpolicy = p->policy;
} else {
reset_on_fork = !!(attr->sched_flags & SCHED_FLAG_RESET_ON_FORK);
if (policy != SCHED_DEADLINE &&
policy != SCHED_FIFO && policy != SCHED_RR &&
policy != SCHED_NORMAL && policy != SCHED_BATCH &&
policy != SCHED_IDLE)
return -EINVAL;
}
if (attr->sched_flags & ~(SCHED_FLAG_RESET_ON_FORK))
return -EINVAL;
/*
* Valid priorities for SCHED_FIFO and SCHED_RR are
* 1..MAX_USER_RT_PRIO-1, valid priority for SCHED_NORMAL,
* SCHED_BATCH and SCHED_IDLE is 0.
*/
if ((p->mm && attr->sched_priority > MAX_USER_RT_PRIO-1) ||
(!p->mm && attr->sched_priority > MAX_RT_PRIO-1))
return -EINVAL;
if ((dl_policy(policy) && !__checkparam_dl(attr)) ||
(rt_policy(policy) != (attr->sched_priority != 0)))
return -EINVAL;
/*
* Allow unprivileged RT tasks to decrease priority:
*/
if (user && !capable(CAP_SYS_NICE)) {
if (fair_policy(policy)) {
if (attr->sched_nice < TASK_NICE(p) &&
!can_nice(p, attr->sched_nice))
return -EPERM;
}
if (rt_policy(policy)) {
unsigned long rlim_rtprio =
task_rlimit(p, RLIMIT_RTPRIO);
/* can't set/change the rt policy */
if (policy != p->policy && !rlim_rtprio)
return -EPERM;
/* can't increase priority */
if (attr->sched_priority > p->rt_priority &&
attr->sched_priority > rlim_rtprio)
return -EPERM;
}
/*
* Treat SCHED_IDLE as nice 20. Only allow a switch to
* SCHED_NORMAL if the RLIMIT_NICE would normally permit it.
*/
if (p->policy == SCHED_IDLE && policy != SCHED_IDLE) {
if (!can_nice(p, TASK_NICE(p)))
return -EPERM;
}
/* can't change other user's priorities */
if (!check_same_owner(p))
return -EPERM;
/* Normal users shall not reset the sched_reset_on_fork flag */
if (p->sched_reset_on_fork && !reset_on_fork)
return -EPERM;
}
if (user) {
retval = security_task_setscheduler(p);
if (retval)
return retval;
}
/*
* make sure no PI-waiters arrive (or leave) while we are
* changing the priority of the task:
*
* To be able to change p->policy safely, the appropriate
* runqueue lock must be held.
*/
rq = task_rq_lock(p, &flags);
/*
* Changing the policy of the stop threads its a very bad idea
*/
if (p == rq->stop) {
task_rq_unlock(rq, p, &flags);
return -EINVAL;
}
/*
* If not changing anything there's no need to proceed further:
*/
if (unlikely(policy == p->policy)) {
if (fair_policy(policy) && attr->sched_nice != TASK_NICE(p))
goto change;
if (rt_policy(policy) && attr->sched_priority != p->rt_priority)
goto change;
if (dl_policy(policy))
goto change;
task_rq_unlock(rq, p, &flags);
return 0;
}
change:
if (user) {
#ifdef CONFIG_RT_GROUP_SCHED
/*
* Do not allow realtime tasks into groups that have no runtime
* assigned.
*/
if (rt_bandwidth_enabled() && rt_policy(policy) &&
task_group(p)->rt_bandwidth.rt_runtime == 0 &&
!task_group_is_autogroup(task_group(p))) {
task_rq_unlock(rq, p, &flags);
return -EPERM;
}
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
if (dl_bandwidth_enabled() && dl_policy(policy)) {
cpumask_t *span = rq->rd->span;
/*
* Don't allow tasks with an affinity mask smaller than
* the entire root_domain to become SCHED_DEADLINE. We
* will also fail if there's no bandwidth available.
*/
if (!cpumask_subset(span, &p->cpus_allowed) ||
rq->rd->dl_bw.bw == 0) {
task_rq_unlock(rq, p, &flags);
return -EPERM;
}
}
#endif
}
/* recheck policy now with rq lock held */
if (unlikely(oldpolicy != -1 && oldpolicy != p->policy)) {
policy = oldpolicy = -1;
task_rq_unlock(rq, p, &flags);
goto recheck;
}
/*
* If setscheduling to SCHED_DEADLINE (or changing the parameters
* of a SCHED_DEADLINE task) we need to check if enough bandwidth
* is available.
*/
if ((dl_policy(policy) || dl_task(p)) && dl_overflow(p, policy, attr)) {
task_rq_unlock(rq, p, &flags);
return -EBUSY;
}
on_rq = p->on_rq;
running = task_current(rq, p);
if (on_rq)
dequeue_task(rq, p, 0);
if (running)
p->sched_class->put_prev_task(rq, p);
p->sched_reset_on_fork = reset_on_fork;
oldprio = p->prio;
prev_class = p->sched_class;
__setscheduler(rq, p, attr);
if (running)
p->sched_class->set_curr_task(rq);
if (on_rq)
enqueue_task(rq, p, 0);
check_class_changed(rq, p, prev_class, oldprio);
task_rq_unlock(rq, p, &flags);
rt_mutex_adjust_pi(p);
return 0;
}
|
static int __sched_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p,
const struct sched_attr *attr,
bool user)
{
int retval, oldprio, oldpolicy = -1, on_rq, running;
int policy = attr->sched_policy;
unsigned long flags;
const struct sched_class *prev_class;
struct rq *rq;
int reset_on_fork;
/* may grab non-irq protected spin_locks */
BUG_ON(in_interrupt());
recheck:
/* double check policy once rq lock held */
if (policy < 0) {
reset_on_fork = p->sched_reset_on_fork;
policy = oldpolicy = p->policy;
} else {
reset_on_fork = !!(attr->sched_flags & SCHED_FLAG_RESET_ON_FORK);
if (policy != SCHED_DEADLINE &&
policy != SCHED_FIFO && policy != SCHED_RR &&
policy != SCHED_NORMAL && policy != SCHED_BATCH &&
policy != SCHED_IDLE)
return -EINVAL;
}
if (attr->sched_flags & ~(SCHED_FLAG_RESET_ON_FORK))
return -EINVAL;
/*
* Valid priorities for SCHED_FIFO and SCHED_RR are
* 1..MAX_USER_RT_PRIO-1, valid priority for SCHED_NORMAL,
* SCHED_BATCH and SCHED_IDLE is 0.
*/
if ((p->mm && attr->sched_priority > MAX_USER_RT_PRIO-1) ||
(!p->mm && attr->sched_priority > MAX_RT_PRIO-1))
return -EINVAL;
if ((dl_policy(policy) && !__checkparam_dl(attr)) ||
(rt_policy(policy) != (attr->sched_priority != 0)))
return -EINVAL;
/*
* Allow unprivileged RT tasks to decrease priority:
*/
if (user && !capable(CAP_SYS_NICE)) {
if (fair_policy(policy)) {
if (attr->sched_nice < TASK_NICE(p) &&
!can_nice(p, attr->sched_nice))
return -EPERM;
}
if (rt_policy(policy)) {
unsigned long rlim_rtprio =
task_rlimit(p, RLIMIT_RTPRIO);
/* can't set/change the rt policy */
if (policy != p->policy && !rlim_rtprio)
return -EPERM;
/* can't increase priority */
if (attr->sched_priority > p->rt_priority &&
attr->sched_priority > rlim_rtprio)
return -EPERM;
}
/*
* Treat SCHED_IDLE as nice 20. Only allow a switch to
* SCHED_NORMAL if the RLIMIT_NICE would normally permit it.
*/
if (p->policy == SCHED_IDLE && policy != SCHED_IDLE) {
if (!can_nice(p, TASK_NICE(p)))
return -EPERM;
}
/* can't change other user's priorities */
if (!check_same_owner(p))
return -EPERM;
/* Normal users shall not reset the sched_reset_on_fork flag */
if (p->sched_reset_on_fork && !reset_on_fork)
return -EPERM;
}
if (user) {
retval = security_task_setscheduler(p);
if (retval)
return retval;
}
/*
* make sure no PI-waiters arrive (or leave) while we are
* changing the priority of the task:
*
* To be able to change p->policy safely, the appropriate
* runqueue lock must be held.
*/
rq = task_rq_lock(p, &flags);
/*
* Changing the policy of the stop threads its a very bad idea
*/
if (p == rq->stop) {
task_rq_unlock(rq, p, &flags);
return -EINVAL;
}
/*
* If not changing anything there's no need to proceed further:
*/
if (unlikely(policy == p->policy)) {
if (fair_policy(policy) && attr->sched_nice != TASK_NICE(p))
goto change;
if (rt_policy(policy) && attr->sched_priority != p->rt_priority)
goto change;
if (dl_policy(policy))
goto change;
task_rq_unlock(rq, p, &flags);
return 0;
}
change:
if (user) {
#ifdef CONFIG_RT_GROUP_SCHED
/*
* Do not allow realtime tasks into groups that have no runtime
* assigned.
*/
if (rt_bandwidth_enabled() && rt_policy(policy) &&
task_group(p)->rt_bandwidth.rt_runtime == 0 &&
!task_group_is_autogroup(task_group(p))) {
task_rq_unlock(rq, p, &flags);
return -EPERM;
}
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
if (dl_bandwidth_enabled() && dl_policy(policy)) {
cpumask_t *span = rq->rd->span;
/*
* Don't allow tasks with an affinity mask smaller than
* the entire root_domain to become SCHED_DEADLINE. We
* will also fail if there's no bandwidth available.
*/
if (!cpumask_subset(span, &p->cpus_allowed) ||
rq->rd->dl_bw.bw == 0) {
task_rq_unlock(rq, p, &flags);
return -EPERM;
}
}
#endif
}
/* recheck policy now with rq lock held */
if (unlikely(oldpolicy != -1 && oldpolicy != p->policy)) {
policy = oldpolicy = -1;
task_rq_unlock(rq, p, &flags);
goto recheck;
}
/*
* If setscheduling to SCHED_DEADLINE (or changing the parameters
* of a SCHED_DEADLINE task) we need to check if enough bandwidth
* is available.
*/
if ((dl_policy(policy) || dl_task(p)) && dl_overflow(p, policy, attr)) {
task_rq_unlock(rq, p, &flags);
return -EBUSY;
}
on_rq = p->on_rq;
running = task_current(rq, p);
if (on_rq)
dequeue_task(rq, p, 0);
if (running)
p->sched_class->put_prev_task(rq, p);
p->sched_reset_on_fork = reset_on_fork;
oldprio = p->prio;
prev_class = p->sched_class;
__setscheduler(rq, p, attr);
if (running)
p->sched_class->set_curr_task(rq);
if (on_rq)
enqueue_task(rq, p, 0);
check_class_changed(rq, p, prev_class, oldprio);
task_rq_unlock(rq, p, &flags);
rt_mutex_adjust_pi(p);
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/9ad7483d8e7c20e9f1a5a08d00150fb51899f14c
|
9ad7483d8e7c20e9f1a5a08d00150fb51899f14c
|
Shutdown Timebomb - In canary, get a callstack if it takes longer than
10 minutes. In Dev, get callstack if it takes longer than 20 minutes.
In Beta (50 minutes) and Stable (100 minutes) it is same as before.
BUG=519321
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1409333005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#355586}
|
void WatchDogThread::CleanUp() {
base::AutoLock lock(g_watchdog_lock.Get());
g_watchdog_thread = nullptr;
}
|
void WatchDogThread::CleanUp() {
base::AutoLock lock(g_watchdog_lock.Get());
g_watchdog_thread = nullptr;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-4116
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-4116/
| null |
https://git.php.net/?p=php-src.git;a=commit;h=1cbd25ca15383394ffa9ee8601c5de4c0f2f90e1
|
1cbd25ca15383394ffa9ee8601c5de4c0f2f90e1
| null |
static HashTable* spl_heap_object_get_debug_info_helper(zend_class_entry *ce, zval *obj, int *is_temp TSRMLS_DC) { /* {{{ */
spl_heap_object *intern = (spl_heap_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(obj TSRMLS_CC);
zval *tmp, zrv, *heap_array;
char *pnstr;
int pnlen;
int i;
*is_temp = 0;
if (!intern->std.properties) {
rebuild_object_properties(&intern->std);
}
if (intern->debug_info == NULL) {
ALLOC_HASHTABLE(intern->debug_info);
ZEND_INIT_SYMTABLE_EX(intern->debug_info, zend_hash_num_elements(intern->std.properties) + 1, 0);
}
if (intern->debug_info->nApplyCount == 0) {
INIT_PZVAL(&zrv);
Z_ARRVAL(zrv) = intern->debug_info;
zend_hash_copy(intern->debug_info, intern->std.properties, (copy_ctor_func_t) zval_add_ref, (void *) &tmp, sizeof(zval *));
pnstr = spl_gen_private_prop_name(ce, "flags", sizeof("flags")-1, &pnlen TSRMLS_CC);
add_assoc_long_ex(&zrv, pnstr, pnlen+1, intern->flags);
efree(pnstr);
pnstr = spl_gen_private_prop_name(ce, "isCorrupted", sizeof("isCorrupted")-1, &pnlen TSRMLS_CC);
add_assoc_bool_ex(&zrv, pnstr, pnlen+1, intern->heap->flags&SPL_HEAP_CORRUPTED);
efree(pnstr);
ALLOC_INIT_ZVAL(heap_array);
array_init(heap_array);
for (i = 0; i < intern->heap->count; ++i) {
add_index_zval(heap_array, i, (zval *)intern->heap->elements[i]);
Z_ADDREF_P(intern->heap->elements[i]);
}
pnstr = spl_gen_private_prop_name(ce, "heap", sizeof("heap")-1, &pnlen TSRMLS_CC);
add_assoc_zval_ex(&zrv, pnstr, pnlen+1, heap_array);
efree(pnstr);
}
return intern->debug_info;
}
/* }}} */
|
static HashTable* spl_heap_object_get_debug_info_helper(zend_class_entry *ce, zval *obj, int *is_temp TSRMLS_DC) { /* {{{ */
spl_heap_object *intern = (spl_heap_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(obj TSRMLS_CC);
zval *tmp, zrv, *heap_array;
char *pnstr;
int pnlen;
int i;
*is_temp = 0;
if (!intern->std.properties) {
rebuild_object_properties(&intern->std);
}
if (intern->debug_info == NULL) {
ALLOC_HASHTABLE(intern->debug_info);
ZEND_INIT_SYMTABLE_EX(intern->debug_info, zend_hash_num_elements(intern->std.properties) + 1, 0);
}
if (intern->debug_info->nApplyCount == 0) {
INIT_PZVAL(&zrv);
Z_ARRVAL(zrv) = intern->debug_info;
zend_hash_copy(intern->debug_info, intern->std.properties, (copy_ctor_func_t) zval_add_ref, (void *) &tmp, sizeof(zval *));
pnstr = spl_gen_private_prop_name(ce, "flags", sizeof("flags")-1, &pnlen TSRMLS_CC);
add_assoc_long_ex(&zrv, pnstr, pnlen+1, intern->flags);
efree(pnstr);
pnstr = spl_gen_private_prop_name(ce, "isCorrupted", sizeof("isCorrupted")-1, &pnlen TSRMLS_CC);
add_assoc_bool_ex(&zrv, pnstr, pnlen+1, intern->heap->flags&SPL_HEAP_CORRUPTED);
efree(pnstr);
ALLOC_INIT_ZVAL(heap_array);
array_init(heap_array);
for (i = 0; i < intern->heap->count; ++i) {
add_index_zval(heap_array, i, (zval *)intern->heap->elements[i]);
Z_ADDREF_P(intern->heap->elements[i]);
}
pnstr = spl_gen_private_prop_name(ce, "heap", sizeof("heap")-1, &pnlen TSRMLS_CC);
add_assoc_zval_ex(&zrv, pnstr, pnlen+1, heap_array);
efree(pnstr);
}
return intern->debug_info;
}
/* }}} */
|
C
|
php
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a3987c8b93d3abbba6ea4e438493bf996fff66b7
|
a3987c8b93d3abbba6ea4e438493bf996fff66b7
|
Make Surface creation lazy for OffscreenCanvasFrameReceiverImpl
This CL shifts the SurfaceFactory pointer and SurfaceFactoryClient implementation
from OffscreenCanvasSurfaceImpl to OffscreenCanvasFrameReceiverImpl to
facilitate resource handling after compositor frame is submitted. As a result,
surface on browser is lazily created (only happened on the first commit()).
BUG=563852
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2333133003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#418402}
|
MockCanvasSurfaceLayerBridgeClient::~MockCanvasSurfaceLayerBridgeClient()
{
}
|
MockCanvasSurfaceLayerBridgeClient::~MockCanvasSurfaceLayerBridgeClient()
{
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-5135
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-5135/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/b755ebba29dd405d6f1e4cf70f5bc81ffd33b0f6
|
b755ebba29dd405d6f1e4cf70f5bc81ffd33b0f6
|
Guard against the same PrintWebViewHelper being re-entered.
BUG=159165
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11367076
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@165821 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void PrintWebViewHelper::OnPrintForSystemDialog() {
WebKit::WebFrame* frame = print_preview_context_.frame();
if (!frame) {
NOTREACHED();
return;
}
Print(frame, print_preview_context_.node());
}
|
void PrintWebViewHelper::OnPrintForSystemDialog() {
WebKit::WebFrame* frame = print_preview_context_.frame();
if (!frame) {
NOTREACHED();
return;
}
Print(frame, print_preview_context_.node());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5061
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5061/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/5d78b84d39bd34bc9fce9d01c0dcd5a22a330d34
|
5d78b84d39bd34bc9fce9d01c0dcd5a22a330d34
|
(Reland) Discard compositor frames from unloaded web content
This is a reland of https://codereview.chromium.org/2707243005/ with a
small change to fix an uninitialized memory error that fails on MSAN
bots.
BUG=672847
[email protected], [email protected]
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2731283003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#454954}
|
LayerTreeHostTestReadyToActivateEmpty()
: did_notify_ready_to_activate_(false),
all_tiles_required_for_activation_are_ready_to_draw_(false),
required_for_activation_count_(0) {}
|
LayerTreeHostTestReadyToActivateEmpty()
: did_notify_ready_to_activate_(false),
all_tiles_required_for_activation_are_ready_to_draw_(false),
required_for_activation_count_(0) {}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-13006
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-13006/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/gpac/gpac/commit/bceb03fd2be95097a7b409ea59914f332fb6bc86
|
bceb03fd2be95097a7b409ea59914f332fb6bc86
|
fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
|
GF_Err trik_Write(GF_Box *s, GF_BitStream *bs)
{
GF_Err e;
u32 i;
GF_TrickPlayBox *ptr = (GF_TrickPlayBox *) s;
e = gf_isom_full_box_write(s, bs);
if (e) return e;
for (i=0; i < ptr->entry_count; i++ ) {
gf_bs_write_int(bs, ptr->entries[i].pic_type, 2);
gf_bs_write_int(bs, ptr->entries[i].dependency_level, 6);
}
return GF_OK;
}
|
GF_Err trik_Write(GF_Box *s, GF_BitStream *bs)
{
GF_Err e;
u32 i;
GF_TrickPlayBox *ptr = (GF_TrickPlayBox *) s;
e = gf_isom_full_box_write(s, bs);
if (e) return e;
for (i=0; i < ptr->entry_count; i++ ) {
gf_bs_write_int(bs, ptr->entries[i].pic_type, 2);
gf_bs_write_int(bs, ptr->entries[i].dependency_level, 6);
}
return GF_OK;
}
|
C
|
gpac
| 0 |
CVE-2017-6903
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-6903/
|
CWE-269
|
https://github.com/ioquake/ioq3/commit/376267d534476a875d8b9228149c4ee18b74a4fd
|
376267d534476a875d8b9228149c4ee18b74a4fd
|
Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s.
|
void CL_CheckUserinfo( void ) {
if(clc.state < CA_CONNECTED)
return;
if(CL_CheckPaused())
return;
if(cvar_modifiedFlags & CVAR_USERINFO)
{
cvar_modifiedFlags &= ~CVAR_USERINFO;
CL_AddReliableCommand(va("userinfo \"%s\"", Cvar_InfoString( CVAR_USERINFO ) ), qfalse);
}
}
|
void CL_CheckUserinfo( void ) {
if(clc.state < CA_CONNECTED)
return;
if(CL_CheckPaused())
return;
if(cvar_modifiedFlags & CVAR_USERINFO)
{
cvar_modifiedFlags &= ~CVAR_USERINFO;
CL_AddReliableCommand(va("userinfo \"%s\"", Cvar_InfoString( CVAR_USERINFO ) ), qfalse);
}
}
|
C
|
OpenJK
| 0 |
CVE-2018-1000127
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-1000127/
|
CWE-190
|
https://github.com/memcached/memcached/commit/a8c4a82787b8b6c256d61bd5c42fb7f92d1bae00
|
a8c4a82787b8b6c256d61bd5c42fb7f92d1bae00
|
Don't overflow item refcount on get
Counts as a miss if the refcount is too high. ASCII multigets are the only
time refcounts can be held for so long.
doing a dirty read of refcount. is aligned.
trying to avoid adding an extra refcount branch for all calls of item_get due
to performance. might be able to move it in there after logging refactoring
simplifies some of the branches.
|
static void conn_to_str(const conn *c, char *buf) {
char addr_text[MAXPATHLEN];
if (!c) {
strcpy(buf, "<null>");
} else if (c->state == conn_closed) {
strcpy(buf, "<closed>");
} else {
const char *protoname = "?";
struct sockaddr_in6 local_addr;
struct sockaddr *addr = (void *)&c->request_addr;
int af;
unsigned short port = 0;
/* For listen ports and idle UDP ports, show listen address */
if (c->state == conn_listening ||
(IS_UDP(c->transport) &&
c->state == conn_read)) {
socklen_t local_addr_len = sizeof(local_addr);
if (getsockname(c->sfd,
(struct sockaddr *)&local_addr,
&local_addr_len) == 0) {
addr = (struct sockaddr *)&local_addr;
}
}
af = addr->sa_family;
addr_text[0] = '\0';
switch (af) {
case AF_INET:
(void) inet_ntop(af,
&((struct sockaddr_in *)addr)->sin_addr,
addr_text,
sizeof(addr_text) - 1);
port = ntohs(((struct sockaddr_in *)addr)->sin_port);
protoname = IS_UDP(c->transport) ? "udp" : "tcp";
break;
case AF_INET6:
addr_text[0] = '[';
addr_text[1] = '\0';
if (inet_ntop(af,
&((struct sockaddr_in6 *)addr)->sin6_addr,
addr_text + 1,
sizeof(addr_text) - 2)) {
strcat(addr_text, "]");
}
port = ntohs(((struct sockaddr_in6 *)addr)->sin6_port);
protoname = IS_UDP(c->transport) ? "udp6" : "tcp6";
break;
case AF_UNIX:
strncpy(addr_text,
((struct sockaddr_un *)addr)->sun_path,
sizeof(addr_text) - 1);
addr_text[sizeof(addr_text)-1] = '\0';
protoname = "unix";
break;
}
if (strlen(addr_text) < 2) {
/* Most likely this is a connected UNIX-domain client which
* has no peer socket address, but there's no portable way
* to tell for sure.
*/
sprintf(addr_text, "<AF %d>", af);
}
if (port) {
sprintf(buf, "%s:%s:%u", protoname, addr_text, port);
} else {
sprintf(buf, "%s:%s", protoname, addr_text);
}
}
}
|
static void conn_to_str(const conn *c, char *buf) {
char addr_text[MAXPATHLEN];
if (!c) {
strcpy(buf, "<null>");
} else if (c->state == conn_closed) {
strcpy(buf, "<closed>");
} else {
const char *protoname = "?";
struct sockaddr_in6 local_addr;
struct sockaddr *addr = (void *)&c->request_addr;
int af;
unsigned short port = 0;
/* For listen ports and idle UDP ports, show listen address */
if (c->state == conn_listening ||
(IS_UDP(c->transport) &&
c->state == conn_read)) {
socklen_t local_addr_len = sizeof(local_addr);
if (getsockname(c->sfd,
(struct sockaddr *)&local_addr,
&local_addr_len) == 0) {
addr = (struct sockaddr *)&local_addr;
}
}
af = addr->sa_family;
addr_text[0] = '\0';
switch (af) {
case AF_INET:
(void) inet_ntop(af,
&((struct sockaddr_in *)addr)->sin_addr,
addr_text,
sizeof(addr_text) - 1);
port = ntohs(((struct sockaddr_in *)addr)->sin_port);
protoname = IS_UDP(c->transport) ? "udp" : "tcp";
break;
case AF_INET6:
addr_text[0] = '[';
addr_text[1] = '\0';
if (inet_ntop(af,
&((struct sockaddr_in6 *)addr)->sin6_addr,
addr_text + 1,
sizeof(addr_text) - 2)) {
strcat(addr_text, "]");
}
port = ntohs(((struct sockaddr_in6 *)addr)->sin6_port);
protoname = IS_UDP(c->transport) ? "udp6" : "tcp6";
break;
case AF_UNIX:
strncpy(addr_text,
((struct sockaddr_un *)addr)->sun_path,
sizeof(addr_text) - 1);
addr_text[sizeof(addr_text)-1] = '\0';
protoname = "unix";
break;
}
if (strlen(addr_text) < 2) {
/* Most likely this is a connected UNIX-domain client which
* has no peer socket address, but there's no portable way
* to tell for sure.
*/
sprintf(addr_text, "<AF %d>", af);
}
if (port) {
sprintf(buf, "%s:%s:%u", protoname, addr_text, port);
} else {
sprintf(buf, "%s:%s", protoname, addr_text);
}
}
}
|
C
|
memcached
| 0 |
CVE-2018-9336
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-9336/
|
CWE-415
|
https://github.com/OpenVPN/openvpn/commit/1394192b210cb3c6624a7419bcf3ff966742e79b
|
1394192b210cb3c6624a7419bcf3ff966742e79b
|
Fix potential double-free() in Interactive Service (CVE-2018-9336)
Malformed input data on the service pipe towards the OpenVPN interactive
service (normally used by the OpenVPN GUI to request openvpn instances
from the service) can result in a double free() in the error handling code.
This usually only leads to a process crash (DoS by an unprivileged local
account) but since it could possibly lead to memory corruption if
happening while multiple other threads are active at the same time,
CVE-2018-9336 has been assigned to acknowledge this risk.
Fix by ensuring that sud->directory is set to NULL in GetStartUpData()
for all error cases (thus not being free()ed in FreeStartupData()).
Rewrite control flow to use explicit error label for error exit.
Discovered and reported by Jacob Baines <[email protected]>.
CVE: 2018-9336
Signed-off-by: Gert Doering <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Selva Nair <[email protected]>
Message-Id: <[email protected]>
URL: https://www.mail-archive.com/search?l=mid&[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Gert Doering <[email protected]>
|
ExecCommand(const WCHAR *argv0, const WCHAR *cmdline, DWORD timeout)
{
DWORD exit_code;
STARTUPINFOW si;
PROCESS_INFORMATION pi;
DWORD proc_flags = CREATE_NO_WINDOW|CREATE_UNICODE_ENVIRONMENT;
WCHAR *cmdline_dup = NULL;
ZeroMemory(&si, sizeof(si));
ZeroMemory(&pi, sizeof(pi));
si.cb = sizeof(si);
/* CreateProcess needs a modifiable cmdline: make a copy */
cmdline_dup = wcsdup(cmdline);
if (cmdline_dup && CreateProcessW(argv0, cmdline_dup, NULL, NULL, FALSE,
proc_flags, NULL, NULL, &si, &pi) )
{
WaitForSingleObject(pi.hProcess, timeout ? timeout : INFINITE);
if (!GetExitCodeProcess(pi.hProcess, &exit_code))
{
MsgToEventLog(M_SYSERR, TEXT("ExecCommand: Error getting exit_code:"));
exit_code = GetLastError();
}
else if (exit_code == STILL_ACTIVE)
{
exit_code = WAIT_TIMEOUT; /* Windows error code 0x102 */
/* kill without impunity */
TerminateProcess(pi.hProcess, exit_code);
MsgToEventLog(M_ERR, TEXT("ExecCommand: \"%s %s\" killed after timeout"),
argv0, cmdline);
}
else if (exit_code)
{
MsgToEventLog(M_ERR, TEXT("ExecCommand: \"%s %s\" exited with status = %lu"),
argv0, cmdline, exit_code);
}
else
{
MsgToEventLog(M_INFO, TEXT("ExecCommand: \"%s %s\" completed"), argv0, cmdline);
}
CloseHandle(pi.hProcess);
CloseHandle(pi.hThread);
}
else
{
exit_code = GetLastError();
MsgToEventLog(M_SYSERR, TEXT("ExecCommand: could not run \"%s %s\" :"),
argv0, cmdline);
}
free(cmdline_dup);
return exit_code;
}
|
ExecCommand(const WCHAR *argv0, const WCHAR *cmdline, DWORD timeout)
{
DWORD exit_code;
STARTUPINFOW si;
PROCESS_INFORMATION pi;
DWORD proc_flags = CREATE_NO_WINDOW|CREATE_UNICODE_ENVIRONMENT;
WCHAR *cmdline_dup = NULL;
ZeroMemory(&si, sizeof(si));
ZeroMemory(&pi, sizeof(pi));
si.cb = sizeof(si);
/* CreateProcess needs a modifiable cmdline: make a copy */
cmdline_dup = wcsdup(cmdline);
if (cmdline_dup && CreateProcessW(argv0, cmdline_dup, NULL, NULL, FALSE,
proc_flags, NULL, NULL, &si, &pi) )
{
WaitForSingleObject(pi.hProcess, timeout ? timeout : INFINITE);
if (!GetExitCodeProcess(pi.hProcess, &exit_code))
{
MsgToEventLog(M_SYSERR, TEXT("ExecCommand: Error getting exit_code:"));
exit_code = GetLastError();
}
else if (exit_code == STILL_ACTIVE)
{
exit_code = WAIT_TIMEOUT; /* Windows error code 0x102 */
/* kill without impunity */
TerminateProcess(pi.hProcess, exit_code);
MsgToEventLog(M_ERR, TEXT("ExecCommand: \"%s %s\" killed after timeout"),
argv0, cmdline);
}
else if (exit_code)
{
MsgToEventLog(M_ERR, TEXT("ExecCommand: \"%s %s\" exited with status = %lu"),
argv0, cmdline, exit_code);
}
else
{
MsgToEventLog(M_INFO, TEXT("ExecCommand: \"%s %s\" completed"), argv0, cmdline);
}
CloseHandle(pi.hProcess);
CloseHandle(pi.hThread);
}
else
{
exit_code = GetLastError();
MsgToEventLog(M_SYSERR, TEXT("ExecCommand: could not run \"%s %s\" :"),
argv0, cmdline);
}
free(cmdline_dup);
return exit_code;
}
|
C
|
openvpn
| 0 |
CVE-2012-3430
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-3430/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/06b6a1cf6e776426766298d055bb3991957d90a7
|
06b6a1cf6e776426766298d055bb3991957d90a7
|
rds: set correct msg_namelen
Jay Fenlason ([email protected]) found a bug,
that recvfrom() on an RDS socket can return the contents of random kernel
memory to userspace if it was called with a address length larger than
sizeof(struct sockaddr_in).
rds_recvmsg() also fails to set the addr_len paramater properly before
returning, but that's just a bug.
There are also a number of cases wher recvfrom() can return an entirely bogus
address. Anything in rds_recvmsg() that returns a non-negative value but does
not go through the "sin = (struct sockaddr_in *)msg->msg_name;" code path
at the end of the while(1) loop will return up to 128 bytes of kernel memory
to userspace.
And I write two test programs to reproduce this bug, you will see that in
rds_server, fromAddr will be overwritten and the following sock_fd will be
destroyed.
Yes, it is the programmer's fault to set msg_namelen incorrectly, but it is
better to make the kernel copy the real length of address to user space in
such case.
How to run the test programs ?
I test them on 32bit x86 system, 3.5.0-rc7.
1 compile
gcc -o rds_client rds_client.c
gcc -o rds_server rds_server.c
2 run ./rds_server on one console
3 run ./rds_client on another console
4 you will see something like:
server is waiting to receive data...
old socket fd=3
server received data from client:data from client
msg.msg_namelen=32
new socket fd=-1067277685
sendmsg()
: Bad file descriptor
/***************** rds_client.c ********************/
int main(void)
{
int sock_fd;
struct sockaddr_in serverAddr;
struct sockaddr_in toAddr;
char recvBuffer[128] = "data from client";
struct msghdr msg;
struct iovec iov;
sock_fd = socket(AF_RDS, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0);
if (sock_fd < 0) {
perror("create socket error\n");
exit(1);
}
memset(&serverAddr, 0, sizeof(serverAddr));
serverAddr.sin_family = AF_INET;
serverAddr.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr("127.0.0.1");
serverAddr.sin_port = htons(4001);
if (bind(sock_fd, (struct sockaddr*)&serverAddr, sizeof(serverAddr)) < 0) {
perror("bind() error\n");
close(sock_fd);
exit(1);
}
memset(&toAddr, 0, sizeof(toAddr));
toAddr.sin_family = AF_INET;
toAddr.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr("127.0.0.1");
toAddr.sin_port = htons(4000);
msg.msg_name = &toAddr;
msg.msg_namelen = sizeof(toAddr);
msg.msg_iov = &iov;
msg.msg_iovlen = 1;
msg.msg_iov->iov_base = recvBuffer;
msg.msg_iov->iov_len = strlen(recvBuffer) + 1;
msg.msg_control = 0;
msg.msg_controllen = 0;
msg.msg_flags = 0;
if (sendmsg(sock_fd, &msg, 0) == -1) {
perror("sendto() error\n");
close(sock_fd);
exit(1);
}
printf("client send data:%s\n", recvBuffer);
memset(recvBuffer, '\0', 128);
msg.msg_name = &toAddr;
msg.msg_namelen = sizeof(toAddr);
msg.msg_iov = &iov;
msg.msg_iovlen = 1;
msg.msg_iov->iov_base = recvBuffer;
msg.msg_iov->iov_len = 128;
msg.msg_control = 0;
msg.msg_controllen = 0;
msg.msg_flags = 0;
if (recvmsg(sock_fd, &msg, 0) == -1) {
perror("recvmsg() error\n");
close(sock_fd);
exit(1);
}
printf("receive data from server:%s\n", recvBuffer);
close(sock_fd);
return 0;
}
/***************** rds_server.c ********************/
int main(void)
{
struct sockaddr_in fromAddr;
int sock_fd;
struct sockaddr_in serverAddr;
unsigned int addrLen;
char recvBuffer[128];
struct msghdr msg;
struct iovec iov;
sock_fd = socket(AF_RDS, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0);
if(sock_fd < 0) {
perror("create socket error\n");
exit(0);
}
memset(&serverAddr, 0, sizeof(serverAddr));
serverAddr.sin_family = AF_INET;
serverAddr.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr("127.0.0.1");
serverAddr.sin_port = htons(4000);
if (bind(sock_fd, (struct sockaddr*)&serverAddr, sizeof(serverAddr)) < 0) {
perror("bind error\n");
close(sock_fd);
exit(1);
}
printf("server is waiting to receive data...\n");
msg.msg_name = &fromAddr;
/*
* I add 16 to sizeof(fromAddr), ie 32,
* and pay attention to the definition of fromAddr,
* recvmsg() will overwrite sock_fd,
* since kernel will copy 32 bytes to userspace.
*
* If you just use sizeof(fromAddr), it works fine.
* */
msg.msg_namelen = sizeof(fromAddr) + 16;
/* msg.msg_namelen = sizeof(fromAddr); */
msg.msg_iov = &iov;
msg.msg_iovlen = 1;
msg.msg_iov->iov_base = recvBuffer;
msg.msg_iov->iov_len = 128;
msg.msg_control = 0;
msg.msg_controllen = 0;
msg.msg_flags = 0;
while (1) {
printf("old socket fd=%d\n", sock_fd);
if (recvmsg(sock_fd, &msg, 0) == -1) {
perror("recvmsg() error\n");
close(sock_fd);
exit(1);
}
printf("server received data from client:%s\n", recvBuffer);
printf("msg.msg_namelen=%d\n", msg.msg_namelen);
printf("new socket fd=%d\n", sock_fd);
strcat(recvBuffer, "--data from server");
if (sendmsg(sock_fd, &msg, 0) == -1) {
perror("sendmsg()\n");
close(sock_fd);
exit(1);
}
}
close(sock_fd);
return 0;
}
Signed-off-by: Weiping Pan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
int rds_notify_queue_get(struct rds_sock *rs, struct msghdr *msghdr)
{
struct rds_notifier *notifier;
struct rds_rdma_notify cmsg = { 0 }; /* fill holes with zero */
unsigned int count = 0, max_messages = ~0U;
unsigned long flags;
LIST_HEAD(copy);
int err = 0;
/* put_cmsg copies to user space and thus may sleep. We can't do this
* with rs_lock held, so first grab as many notifications as we can stuff
* in the user provided cmsg buffer. We don't try to copy more, to avoid
* losing notifications - except when the buffer is so small that it wouldn't
* even hold a single notification. Then we give him as much of this single
* msg as we can squeeze in, and set MSG_CTRUNC.
*/
if (msghdr) {
max_messages = msghdr->msg_controllen / CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(cmsg));
if (!max_messages)
max_messages = 1;
}
spin_lock_irqsave(&rs->rs_lock, flags);
while (!list_empty(&rs->rs_notify_queue) && count < max_messages) {
notifier = list_entry(rs->rs_notify_queue.next,
struct rds_notifier, n_list);
list_move(¬ifier->n_list, ©);
count++;
}
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&rs->rs_lock, flags);
if (!count)
return 0;
while (!list_empty(©)) {
notifier = list_entry(copy.next, struct rds_notifier, n_list);
if (msghdr) {
cmsg.user_token = notifier->n_user_token;
cmsg.status = notifier->n_status;
err = put_cmsg(msghdr, SOL_RDS, RDS_CMSG_RDMA_STATUS,
sizeof(cmsg), &cmsg);
if (err)
break;
}
list_del_init(¬ifier->n_list);
kfree(notifier);
}
/* If we bailed out because of an error in put_cmsg,
* we may be left with one or more notifications that we
* didn't process. Return them to the head of the list. */
if (!list_empty(©)) {
spin_lock_irqsave(&rs->rs_lock, flags);
list_splice(©, &rs->rs_notify_queue);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&rs->rs_lock, flags);
}
return err;
}
|
int rds_notify_queue_get(struct rds_sock *rs, struct msghdr *msghdr)
{
struct rds_notifier *notifier;
struct rds_rdma_notify cmsg = { 0 }; /* fill holes with zero */
unsigned int count = 0, max_messages = ~0U;
unsigned long flags;
LIST_HEAD(copy);
int err = 0;
/* put_cmsg copies to user space and thus may sleep. We can't do this
* with rs_lock held, so first grab as many notifications as we can stuff
* in the user provided cmsg buffer. We don't try to copy more, to avoid
* losing notifications - except when the buffer is so small that it wouldn't
* even hold a single notification. Then we give him as much of this single
* msg as we can squeeze in, and set MSG_CTRUNC.
*/
if (msghdr) {
max_messages = msghdr->msg_controllen / CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(cmsg));
if (!max_messages)
max_messages = 1;
}
spin_lock_irqsave(&rs->rs_lock, flags);
while (!list_empty(&rs->rs_notify_queue) && count < max_messages) {
notifier = list_entry(rs->rs_notify_queue.next,
struct rds_notifier, n_list);
list_move(¬ifier->n_list, ©);
count++;
}
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&rs->rs_lock, flags);
if (!count)
return 0;
while (!list_empty(©)) {
notifier = list_entry(copy.next, struct rds_notifier, n_list);
if (msghdr) {
cmsg.user_token = notifier->n_user_token;
cmsg.status = notifier->n_status;
err = put_cmsg(msghdr, SOL_RDS, RDS_CMSG_RDMA_STATUS,
sizeof(cmsg), &cmsg);
if (err)
break;
}
list_del_init(¬ifier->n_list);
kfree(notifier);
}
/* If we bailed out because of an error in put_cmsg,
* we may be left with one or more notifications that we
* didn't process. Return them to the head of the list. */
if (!list_empty(©)) {
spin_lock_irqsave(&rs->rs_lock, flags);
list_splice(©, &rs->rs_notify_queue);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&rs->rs_lock, flags);
}
return err;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/fc3c351a3d995f73ead5c92354396a7ec2b14e3f
|
fc3c351a3d995f73ead5c92354396a7ec2b14e3f
|
Split infobars.{cc,h} into separate pieces for the different classes defined within, so that each piece is shorter and clearer.
BUG=none
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6250057
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@73235 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
LinkInfoBar::LinkInfoBar(LinkInfoBarDelegate* delegate)
: InfoBar(delegate),
icon_(new views::ImageView),
label_1_(new views::Label),
label_2_(new views::Label),
link_(new views::Link) {
if (delegate->GetIcon())
icon_->SetImage(delegate->GetIcon());
AddChildView(icon_);
size_t offset;
string16 message_text = delegate->GetMessageTextWithOffset(&offset);
if (offset != string16::npos) {
label_1_->SetText(UTF16ToWideHack(message_text.substr(0, offset)));
label_2_->SetText(UTF16ToWideHack(message_text.substr(offset)));
} else {
label_1_->SetText(UTF16ToWideHack(message_text));
}
ResourceBundle& rb = ResourceBundle::GetSharedInstance();
label_1_->SetFont(rb.GetFont(ResourceBundle::MediumFont));
label_2_->SetFont(rb.GetFont(ResourceBundle::MediumFont));
label_1_->SetColor(SK_ColorBLACK);
label_2_->SetColor(SK_ColorBLACK);
label_1_->SetHorizontalAlignment(views::Label::ALIGN_LEFT);
label_2_->SetHorizontalAlignment(views::Label::ALIGN_LEFT);
AddChildView(label_1_);
AddChildView(label_2_);
link_->SetText(UTF16ToWideHack(delegate->GetLinkText()));
link_->SetFont(rb.GetFont(ResourceBundle::MediumFont));
link_->SetHorizontalAlignment(views::Label::ALIGN_LEFT);
link_->SetController(this);
link_->MakeReadableOverBackgroundColor(background()->get_color());
AddChildView(link_);
}
|
LinkInfoBar::LinkInfoBar(LinkInfoBarDelegate* delegate)
: InfoBar(delegate),
icon_(new views::ImageView),
label_1_(new views::Label),
label_2_(new views::Label),
link_(new views::Link) {
if (delegate->GetIcon())
icon_->SetImage(delegate->GetIcon());
AddChildView(icon_);
size_t offset;
string16 message_text = delegate->GetMessageTextWithOffset(&offset);
if (offset != string16::npos) {
label_1_->SetText(UTF16ToWideHack(message_text.substr(0, offset)));
label_2_->SetText(UTF16ToWideHack(message_text.substr(offset)));
} else {
label_1_->SetText(UTF16ToWideHack(message_text));
}
ResourceBundle& rb = ResourceBundle::GetSharedInstance();
label_1_->SetFont(rb.GetFont(ResourceBundle::MediumFont));
label_2_->SetFont(rb.GetFont(ResourceBundle::MediumFont));
label_1_->SetColor(SK_ColorBLACK);
label_2_->SetColor(SK_ColorBLACK);
label_1_->SetHorizontalAlignment(views::Label::ALIGN_LEFT);
label_2_->SetHorizontalAlignment(views::Label::ALIGN_LEFT);
AddChildView(label_1_);
AddChildView(label_2_);
link_->SetText(UTF16ToWideHack(delegate->GetLinkText()));
link_->SetFont(rb.GetFont(ResourceBundle::MediumFont));
link_->SetHorizontalAlignment(views::Label::ALIGN_LEFT);
link_->SetController(this);
link_->MakeReadableOverBackgroundColor(background()->get_color());
AddChildView(link_);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-3084
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-3084/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/744c2a2d90c3c9a33c818e1ea4b7ccb5010663a0
|
744c2a2d90c3c9a33c818e1ea4b7ccb5010663a0
|
Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
gfx::Rect RenderViewTest::GetElementBounds(const std::string& element_id) {
std::vector<std::string> params;
params.push_back(element_id);
std::string script =
ReplaceStringPlaceholders(kGetCoordinatesScript, params, NULL);
v8::HandleScope handle_scope;
v8::Handle<v8::Value> value = GetMainFrame()->executeScriptAndReturnValue(
WebScriptSource(WebString::fromUTF8(script)));
if (value.IsEmpty() || !value->IsArray())
return gfx::Rect();
v8::Handle<v8::Array> array = value.As<v8::Array>();
if (array->Length() != 4)
return gfx::Rect();
std::vector<int> coords;
for (int i = 0; i < 4; ++i) {
v8::Handle<v8::Number> index = v8::Number::New(i);
v8::Local<v8::Value> value = array->Get(index);
if (value.IsEmpty() || !value->IsInt32())
return gfx::Rect();
coords.push_back(value->Int32Value());
}
return gfx::Rect(coords[0], coords[1], coords[2], coords[3]);
}
|
gfx::Rect RenderViewTest::GetElementBounds(const std::string& element_id) {
std::vector<std::string> params;
params.push_back(element_id);
std::string script =
ReplaceStringPlaceholders(kGetCoordinatesScript, params, NULL);
v8::HandleScope handle_scope;
v8::Handle<v8::Value> value = GetMainFrame()->executeScriptAndReturnValue(
WebScriptSource(WebString::fromUTF8(script)));
if (value.IsEmpty() || !value->IsArray())
return gfx::Rect();
v8::Handle<v8::Array> array = value.As<v8::Array>();
if (array->Length() != 4)
return gfx::Rect();
std::vector<int> coords;
for (int i = 0; i < 4; ++i) {
v8::Handle<v8::Number> index = v8::Number::New(i);
v8::Local<v8::Value> value = array->Get(index);
if (value.IsEmpty() || !value->IsInt32())
return gfx::Rect();
coords.push_back(value->Int32Value());
}
return gfx::Rect(coords[0], coords[1], coords[2], coords[3]);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-3181
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-3181/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/c54def7bd64d7c0b6993336abcffb8444795bf38
|
c54def7bd64d7c0b6993336abcffb8444795bf38
|
HID: magicmouse: sanity check report size in raw_event() callback
The report passed to us from transport driver could potentially be
arbitrarily large, therefore we better sanity-check it so that
magicmouse_emit_touch() gets only valid values of raw_id.
Cc: [email protected]
Reported-by: Steven Vittitoe <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <[email protected]>
|
static int magicmouse_probe(struct hid_device *hdev,
const struct hid_device_id *id)
{
__u8 feature[] = { 0xd7, 0x01 };
struct magicmouse_sc *msc;
struct hid_report *report;
int ret;
msc = devm_kzalloc(&hdev->dev, sizeof(*msc), GFP_KERNEL);
if (msc == NULL) {
hid_err(hdev, "can't alloc magicmouse descriptor\n");
return -ENOMEM;
}
msc->scroll_accel = SCROLL_ACCEL_DEFAULT;
msc->quirks = id->driver_data;
hid_set_drvdata(hdev, msc);
ret = hid_parse(hdev);
if (ret) {
hid_err(hdev, "magicmouse hid parse failed\n");
return ret;
}
ret = hid_hw_start(hdev, HID_CONNECT_DEFAULT);
if (ret) {
hid_err(hdev, "magicmouse hw start failed\n");
return ret;
}
if (!msc->input) {
hid_err(hdev, "magicmouse input not registered\n");
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto err_stop_hw;
}
if (id->product == USB_DEVICE_ID_APPLE_MAGICMOUSE)
report = hid_register_report(hdev, HID_INPUT_REPORT,
MOUSE_REPORT_ID);
else { /* USB_DEVICE_ID_APPLE_MAGICTRACKPAD */
report = hid_register_report(hdev, HID_INPUT_REPORT,
TRACKPAD_REPORT_ID);
report = hid_register_report(hdev, HID_INPUT_REPORT,
DOUBLE_REPORT_ID);
}
if (!report) {
hid_err(hdev, "unable to register touch report\n");
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto err_stop_hw;
}
report->size = 6;
/*
* Some devices repond with 'invalid report id' when feature
* report switching it into multitouch mode is sent to it.
*
* This results in -EIO from the _raw low-level transport callback,
* but there seems to be no other way of switching the mode.
* Thus the super-ugly hacky success check below.
*/
ret = hid_hw_raw_request(hdev, feature[0], feature, sizeof(feature),
HID_FEATURE_REPORT, HID_REQ_SET_REPORT);
if (ret != -EIO && ret != sizeof(feature)) {
hid_err(hdev, "unable to request touch data (%d)\n", ret);
goto err_stop_hw;
}
return 0;
err_stop_hw:
hid_hw_stop(hdev);
return ret;
}
|
static int magicmouse_probe(struct hid_device *hdev,
const struct hid_device_id *id)
{
__u8 feature[] = { 0xd7, 0x01 };
struct magicmouse_sc *msc;
struct hid_report *report;
int ret;
msc = devm_kzalloc(&hdev->dev, sizeof(*msc), GFP_KERNEL);
if (msc == NULL) {
hid_err(hdev, "can't alloc magicmouse descriptor\n");
return -ENOMEM;
}
msc->scroll_accel = SCROLL_ACCEL_DEFAULT;
msc->quirks = id->driver_data;
hid_set_drvdata(hdev, msc);
ret = hid_parse(hdev);
if (ret) {
hid_err(hdev, "magicmouse hid parse failed\n");
return ret;
}
ret = hid_hw_start(hdev, HID_CONNECT_DEFAULT);
if (ret) {
hid_err(hdev, "magicmouse hw start failed\n");
return ret;
}
if (!msc->input) {
hid_err(hdev, "magicmouse input not registered\n");
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto err_stop_hw;
}
if (id->product == USB_DEVICE_ID_APPLE_MAGICMOUSE)
report = hid_register_report(hdev, HID_INPUT_REPORT,
MOUSE_REPORT_ID);
else { /* USB_DEVICE_ID_APPLE_MAGICTRACKPAD */
report = hid_register_report(hdev, HID_INPUT_REPORT,
TRACKPAD_REPORT_ID);
report = hid_register_report(hdev, HID_INPUT_REPORT,
DOUBLE_REPORT_ID);
}
if (!report) {
hid_err(hdev, "unable to register touch report\n");
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto err_stop_hw;
}
report->size = 6;
/*
* Some devices repond with 'invalid report id' when feature
* report switching it into multitouch mode is sent to it.
*
* This results in -EIO from the _raw low-level transport callback,
* but there seems to be no other way of switching the mode.
* Thus the super-ugly hacky success check below.
*/
ret = hid_hw_raw_request(hdev, feature[0], feature, sizeof(feature),
HID_FEATURE_REPORT, HID_REQ_SET_REPORT);
if (ret != -EIO && ret != sizeof(feature)) {
hid_err(hdev, "unable to request touch data (%d)\n", ret);
goto err_stop_hw;
}
return 0;
err_stop_hw:
hid_hw_stop(hdev);
return ret;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-15386
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-15386/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/ba3b1b344017bbf36283464b51014fad15c2f3f4
|
ba3b1b344017bbf36283464b51014fad15c2f3f4
|
If a page shows a popup, end fullscreen.
This was implemented in Blink r159834, but it is susceptible
to a popup/fullscreen race. This CL reverts that implementation
and re-implements it in WebContents.
BUG=752003
TEST=WebContentsImplBrowserTest.PopupsFromJavaScriptEndFullscreen
Change-Id: Ia345cdeda273693c3231ad8f486bebfc3d83927f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/606987
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498171}
|
void Run(bool dialog_was_suppressed,
bool success,
const base::string16& user_input) {
if (already_fired_)
return;
already_fired_ = true;
callback_.Run(dialog_was_suppressed, success, user_input);
}
|
void Run(bool dialog_was_suppressed,
bool success,
const base::string16& user_input) {
if (already_fired_)
return;
already_fired_ = true;
callback_.Run(dialog_was_suppressed, success, user_input);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5120
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5120/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/b7277af490d28ac7f802c015bb0ff31395768556
|
b7277af490d28ac7f802c015bb0ff31395768556
|
bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
|
void V8TestObject::OverloadedMethodBMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_overloadedMethodB");
test_object_v8_internal::OverloadedMethodBMethod(info);
}
|
void V8TestObject::OverloadedMethodBMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_overloadedMethodB");
test_object_v8_internal::OverloadedMethodBMethod(info);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3746
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3746/
| null |
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/hardware/qcom/media/+/5b82f4f90c3d531313714df4b936f92fb0ff15cf
|
5b82f4f90c3d531313714df4b936f92fb0ff15cf
|
DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: vdec: Avoid processing ETBs/FTBs in invalid states
(per the spec) ETB/FTB should not be handled in states other than
Executing, Paused and Idle. This avoids accessing invalid buffers.
Also add a lock to protect the private-buffers from being deleted
while accessing from another thread.
Bug: 27890802
Security Vulnerability - Heap Use-After-Free and Possible LPE in
MediaServer (libOmxVdec problem #6)
CRs-Fixed: 1008882
Change-Id: Iaac2e383cd53cf9cf8042c9ed93ddc76dba3907e
|
OMX_ERRORTYPE omx_vdec::push_input_hevc(OMX_HANDLETYPE hComp)
{
OMX_U32 partial_frame = 1;
unsigned long address,p2,id;
OMX_BOOL isNewFrame = OMX_FALSE;
OMX_BOOL generate_ebd = OMX_TRUE;
OMX_ERRORTYPE rc = OMX_ErrorNone;
if (h264_scratch.pBuffer == NULL) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR:Hevc Scratch Buffer not allocated");
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("h264_scratch.nFilledLen %u has look_ahead_nal %d \
pdest_frame nFilledLen %u nTimeStamp %lld",
(unsigned int)h264_scratch.nFilledLen, look_ahead_nal, (unsigned int)pdest_frame->nFilledLen, pdest_frame->nTimeStamp);
if (h264_scratch.nFilledLen && look_ahead_nal) {
look_ahead_nal = false;
rc = copy_buffer(pdest_frame, &h264_scratch);
if (rc != OMX_ErrorNone) {
return rc;
}
}
if (nal_length == 0) {
if (m_frame_parser.parse_sc_frame(psource_frame,
&h264_scratch,&partial_frame) == -1) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Error In Parsing Return Error");
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Non-zero NAL length clip, hence parse with NAL size %d",nal_length);
if (m_frame_parser.parse_h264_nallength(psource_frame,
&h264_scratch,&partial_frame) == -1) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Error In Parsing NAL size, Return Error");
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
}
if (partial_frame == 0) {
if (nal_count == 0 && h264_scratch.nFilledLen == 0) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("First NAL with Zero Length, hence Skip");
nal_count++;
h264_scratch.nTimeStamp = psource_frame->nTimeStamp;
h264_scratch.nFlags = psource_frame->nFlags;
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Parsed New NAL Length = %u", (unsigned int)h264_scratch.nFilledLen);
if (h264_scratch.nFilledLen) {
m_hevc_utils.isNewFrame(&h264_scratch, 0, isNewFrame);
nal_count++;
}
if (!isNewFrame) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Not a new frame, copy h264_scratch nFilledLen %u \
nTimestamp %lld, pdest_frame nFilledLen %u nTimestamp %lld",
(unsigned int)h264_scratch.nFilledLen, h264_scratch.nTimeStamp,
(unsigned int)pdest_frame->nFilledLen, pdest_frame->nTimeStamp);
rc = copy_buffer(pdest_frame, &h264_scratch);
if (rc != OMX_ErrorNone) {
return rc;
}
} else {
look_ahead_nal = true;
if (pdest_frame->nFilledLen == 0) {
look_ahead_nal = false;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("dest nation buffer empty, copy scratch buffer");
rc = copy_buffer(pdest_frame, &h264_scratch);
if (rc != OMX_ErrorNone) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
} else {
if (psource_frame->nFilledLen || h264_scratch.nFilledLen) {
pdest_frame->nFlags &= ~OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS;
}
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("FrameDetected # %d pdest_frame nFilledLen %u \
nTimeStamp %lld, look_ahead_nal in h264_scratch \
nFilledLen %u nTimeStamp %lld",
frame_count++, (unsigned int)pdest_frame->nFilledLen,
pdest_frame->nTimeStamp, (unsigned int)h264_scratch.nFilledLen,
h264_scratch.nTimeStamp);
if (empty_this_buffer_proxy(hComp, pdest_frame) != OMX_ErrorNone) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
pdest_frame = NULL;
if (m_input_free_q.m_size) {
m_input_free_q.pop_entry(&address, &p2, &id);
pdest_frame = (OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *) address;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("pop the next pdest_buffer %p", pdest_frame);
pdest_frame->nFilledLen = 0;
pdest_frame->nFlags = 0;
pdest_frame->nTimeStamp = LLONG_MAX;
}
}
}
}
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("psource_frame is partial nFilledLen %u nTimeStamp %lld, \
pdest_frame nFilledLen %u nTimeStamp %lld, h264_scratch \
nFilledLen %u nTimeStamp %lld",
(unsigned int)psource_frame->nFilledLen, psource_frame->nTimeStamp,
(unsigned int)pdest_frame->nFilledLen, pdest_frame->nTimeStamp,
(unsigned int)h264_scratch.nFilledLen, h264_scratch.nTimeStamp);
if (h264_scratch.nAllocLen ==
h264_scratch.nFilledLen + h264_scratch.nOffset) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Frame Not found though Destination Filled");
return OMX_ErrorStreamCorrupt;
}
}
if (!psource_frame->nFilledLen) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Buffer Consumed return source %p back to client", psource_frame);
if (psource_frame->nFlags & OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS) {
if (pdest_frame) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("EOS Reached Pass Last Buffer");
rc = copy_buffer(pdest_frame, &h264_scratch);
if ( rc != OMX_ErrorNone ) {
return rc;
}
pdest_frame->nTimeStamp = h264_scratch.nTimeStamp;
pdest_frame->nFlags = h264_scratch.nFlags | psource_frame->nFlags;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Push EOS frame number:%d nFilledLen =%u TimeStamp = %lld",
frame_count, (unsigned int)pdest_frame->nFilledLen, pdest_frame->nTimeStamp);
if (empty_this_buffer_proxy(hComp, pdest_frame) != OMX_ErrorNone) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
frame_count++;
pdest_frame = NULL;
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Last frame in else dest addr %p size %u",
pdest_frame, (unsigned int)h264_scratch.nFilledLen);
generate_ebd = OMX_FALSE;
}
}
}
if (generate_ebd && !psource_frame->nFilledLen) {
m_cb.EmptyBufferDone (hComp, m_app_data, psource_frame);
psource_frame = NULL;
if (m_input_pending_q.m_size) {
m_input_pending_q.pop_entry(&address, &p2, &id);
psource_frame = (OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *)address;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Next source Buffer flag %u nFilledLen %u, nTimeStamp %lld",
(unsigned int)psource_frame->nFlags, (unsigned int)psource_frame->nFilledLen, psource_frame->nTimeStamp);
}
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
|
OMX_ERRORTYPE omx_vdec::push_input_hevc(OMX_HANDLETYPE hComp)
{
OMX_U32 partial_frame = 1;
unsigned long address,p2,id;
OMX_BOOL isNewFrame = OMX_FALSE;
OMX_BOOL generate_ebd = OMX_TRUE;
OMX_ERRORTYPE rc = OMX_ErrorNone;
if (h264_scratch.pBuffer == NULL) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR:Hevc Scratch Buffer not allocated");
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("h264_scratch.nFilledLen %u has look_ahead_nal %d \
pdest_frame nFilledLen %u nTimeStamp %lld",
(unsigned int)h264_scratch.nFilledLen, look_ahead_nal, (unsigned int)pdest_frame->nFilledLen, pdest_frame->nTimeStamp);
if (h264_scratch.nFilledLen && look_ahead_nal) {
look_ahead_nal = false;
rc = copy_buffer(pdest_frame, &h264_scratch);
if (rc != OMX_ErrorNone) {
return rc;
}
}
if (nal_length == 0) {
if (m_frame_parser.parse_sc_frame(psource_frame,
&h264_scratch,&partial_frame) == -1) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Error In Parsing Return Error");
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Non-zero NAL length clip, hence parse with NAL size %d",nal_length);
if (m_frame_parser.parse_h264_nallength(psource_frame,
&h264_scratch,&partial_frame) == -1) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Error In Parsing NAL size, Return Error");
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
}
if (partial_frame == 0) {
if (nal_count == 0 && h264_scratch.nFilledLen == 0) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("First NAL with Zero Length, hence Skip");
nal_count++;
h264_scratch.nTimeStamp = psource_frame->nTimeStamp;
h264_scratch.nFlags = psource_frame->nFlags;
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Parsed New NAL Length = %u", (unsigned int)h264_scratch.nFilledLen);
if (h264_scratch.nFilledLen) {
m_hevc_utils.isNewFrame(&h264_scratch, 0, isNewFrame);
nal_count++;
}
if (!isNewFrame) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Not a new frame, copy h264_scratch nFilledLen %u \
nTimestamp %lld, pdest_frame nFilledLen %u nTimestamp %lld",
(unsigned int)h264_scratch.nFilledLen, h264_scratch.nTimeStamp,
(unsigned int)pdest_frame->nFilledLen, pdest_frame->nTimeStamp);
rc = copy_buffer(pdest_frame, &h264_scratch);
if (rc != OMX_ErrorNone) {
return rc;
}
} else {
look_ahead_nal = true;
if (pdest_frame->nFilledLen == 0) {
look_ahead_nal = false;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("dest nation buffer empty, copy scratch buffer");
rc = copy_buffer(pdest_frame, &h264_scratch);
if (rc != OMX_ErrorNone) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
} else {
if (psource_frame->nFilledLen || h264_scratch.nFilledLen) {
pdest_frame->nFlags &= ~OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS;
}
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("FrameDetected # %d pdest_frame nFilledLen %u \
nTimeStamp %lld, look_ahead_nal in h264_scratch \
nFilledLen %u nTimeStamp %lld",
frame_count++, (unsigned int)pdest_frame->nFilledLen,
pdest_frame->nTimeStamp, (unsigned int)h264_scratch.nFilledLen,
h264_scratch.nTimeStamp);
if (empty_this_buffer_proxy(hComp, pdest_frame) != OMX_ErrorNone) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
pdest_frame = NULL;
if (m_input_free_q.m_size) {
m_input_free_q.pop_entry(&address, &p2, &id);
pdest_frame = (OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *) address;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("pop the next pdest_buffer %p", pdest_frame);
pdest_frame->nFilledLen = 0;
pdest_frame->nFlags = 0;
pdest_frame->nTimeStamp = LLONG_MAX;
}
}
}
}
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("psource_frame is partial nFilledLen %u nTimeStamp %lld, \
pdest_frame nFilledLen %u nTimeStamp %lld, h264_scratch \
nFilledLen %u nTimeStamp %lld",
(unsigned int)psource_frame->nFilledLen, psource_frame->nTimeStamp,
(unsigned int)pdest_frame->nFilledLen, pdest_frame->nTimeStamp,
(unsigned int)h264_scratch.nFilledLen, h264_scratch.nTimeStamp);
if (h264_scratch.nAllocLen ==
h264_scratch.nFilledLen + h264_scratch.nOffset) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Frame Not found though Destination Filled");
return OMX_ErrorStreamCorrupt;
}
}
if (!psource_frame->nFilledLen) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Buffer Consumed return source %p back to client", psource_frame);
if (psource_frame->nFlags & OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS) {
if (pdest_frame) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("EOS Reached Pass Last Buffer");
rc = copy_buffer(pdest_frame, &h264_scratch);
if ( rc != OMX_ErrorNone ) {
return rc;
}
pdest_frame->nTimeStamp = h264_scratch.nTimeStamp;
pdest_frame->nFlags = h264_scratch.nFlags | psource_frame->nFlags;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Push EOS frame number:%d nFilledLen =%u TimeStamp = %lld",
frame_count, (unsigned int)pdest_frame->nFilledLen, pdest_frame->nTimeStamp);
if (empty_this_buffer_proxy(hComp, pdest_frame) != OMX_ErrorNone) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
frame_count++;
pdest_frame = NULL;
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Last frame in else dest addr %p size %u",
pdest_frame, (unsigned int)h264_scratch.nFilledLen);
generate_ebd = OMX_FALSE;
}
}
}
if (generate_ebd && !psource_frame->nFilledLen) {
m_cb.EmptyBufferDone (hComp, m_app_data, psource_frame);
psource_frame = NULL;
if (m_input_pending_q.m_size) {
m_input_pending_q.pop_entry(&address, &p2, &id);
psource_frame = (OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *)address;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Next source Buffer flag %u nFilledLen %u, nTimeStamp %lld",
(unsigned int)psource_frame->nFlags, (unsigned int)psource_frame->nFilledLen, psource_frame->nTimeStamp);
}
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2017-9202
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-9202/
|
CWE-369
|
https://github.com/jsummers/imageworsener/commit/dc49c807926b96e503bd7c0dec35119eecd6c6fe
|
dc49c807926b96e503bd7c0dec35119eecd6c6fe
|
Double-check that the input image's density is valid
Fixes a bug that could result in division by zero, at least for a JPEG
source image.
Fixes issues #19, #20
|
static void iw_warning_internal(struct iw_context *ctx, const char *s)
{
if(!ctx->warning_fn) return;
(*ctx->warning_fn)(ctx,s);
}
|
static void iw_warning_internal(struct iw_context *ctx, const char *s)
{
if(!ctx->warning_fn) return;
(*ctx->warning_fn)(ctx,s);
}
|
C
|
imageworsener
| 0 |
CVE-2018-19044
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-19044/
|
CWE-59
|
https://github.com/acassen/keepalived/commit/04f2d32871bb3b11d7dc024039952f2fe2750306
|
04f2d32871bb3b11d7dc024039952f2fe2750306
|
When opening files for write, ensure they aren't symbolic links
Issue #1048 identified that if, for example, a non privileged user
created a symbolic link from /etc/keepalvied.data to /etc/passwd,
writing to /etc/keepalived.data (which could be invoked via DBus)
would cause /etc/passwd to be overwritten.
This commit stops keepalived writing to pathnames where the ultimate
component is a symbolic link, by setting O_NOFOLLOW whenever opening
a file for writing.
This might break some setups, where, for example, /etc/keepalived.data
was a symbolic link to /home/fred/keepalived.data. If this was the case,
instead create a symbolic link from /home/fred/keepalived.data to
/tmp/keepalived.data, so that the file is still accessible via
/home/fred/keepalived.data.
There doesn't appear to be a way around this backward incompatibility,
since even checking if the pathname is a symbolic link prior to opening
for writing would create a race condition.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <[email protected]>
|
set_script_params_array(vector_t *strvec, notify_script_t *script, unsigned extra_params)
{
unsigned num_words = 0;
size_t len = 0;
char **word_ptrs;
char *words;
vector_t *strvec_qe = NULL;
unsigned i;
/* Count the number of words, and total string length */
if (vector_size(strvec) >= 2)
strvec_qe = alloc_strvec_quoted_escaped(strvec_slot(strvec, 1));
if (!strvec_qe)
return;
num_words = vector_size(strvec_qe);
for (i = 0; i < num_words; i++)
len += strlen(strvec_slot(strvec_qe, i)) + 1;
/* Allocate memory for pointers to words and words themselves */
script->args = word_ptrs = MALLOC((num_words + extra_params + 1) * sizeof(char *) + len);
words = (char *)word_ptrs + (num_words + extra_params + 1) * sizeof(char *);
/* Set up pointers to words, and copy the words */
for (i = 0; i < num_words; i++) {
strcpy(words, strvec_slot(strvec_qe, i));
*(word_ptrs++) = words;
words += strlen(words) + 1;
}
*word_ptrs = NULL;
script->num_args = num_words;
free_strvec(strvec_qe);
}
|
set_script_params_array(vector_t *strvec, notify_script_t *script, unsigned extra_params)
{
unsigned num_words = 0;
size_t len = 0;
char **word_ptrs;
char *words;
vector_t *strvec_qe = NULL;
unsigned i;
/* Count the number of words, and total string length */
if (vector_size(strvec) >= 2)
strvec_qe = alloc_strvec_quoted_escaped(strvec_slot(strvec, 1));
if (!strvec_qe)
return;
num_words = vector_size(strvec_qe);
for (i = 0; i < num_words; i++)
len += strlen(strvec_slot(strvec_qe, i)) + 1;
/* Allocate memory for pointers to words and words themselves */
script->args = word_ptrs = MALLOC((num_words + extra_params + 1) * sizeof(char *) + len);
words = (char *)word_ptrs + (num_words + extra_params + 1) * sizeof(char *);
/* Set up pointers to words, and copy the words */
for (i = 0; i < num_words; i++) {
strcpy(words, strvec_slot(strvec_qe, i));
*(word_ptrs++) = words;
words += strlen(words) + 1;
}
*word_ptrs = NULL;
script->num_args = num_words;
free_strvec(strvec_qe);
}
|
C
|
keepalived
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2880
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2880/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/244c78b3f737f2cacab2d212801b0524cbcc3a7b
|
244c78b3f737f2cacab2d212801b0524cbcc3a7b
|
Reset the device policy machinery upon retrying enrollment.
BUG=chromium-os:18208
TEST=See bug description
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7676005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@97615 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void CloudPolicySubsystem::CreateCloudPolicyController() {
DCHECK(!cloud_policy_controller_.get());
cloud_policy_controller_.reset(
new CloudPolicyController(device_management_service_.get(),
cloud_policy_cache_.get(),
device_token_fetcher_.get(),
data_store_,
notifier_.get()));
}
|
void CloudPolicySubsystem::CreateCloudPolicyController() {
DCHECK(!cloud_policy_controller_.get());
cloud_policy_controller_.reset(
new CloudPolicyController(device_management_service_.get(),
cloud_policy_cache_.get(),
device_token_fetcher_.get(),
data_store_,
notifier_.get()));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-0842
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0842/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/10cbaf017570ba6454174c55b844647aa6a9b3b4
|
10cbaf017570ba6454174c55b844647aa6a9b3b4
|
Validate that paths don't contain embedded NULLs at deserialization.
BUG=166867
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11743009
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@174935 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void ParamTraits<std::vector<unsigned char> >::Write(Message* m,
const param_type& p) {
if (p.empty()) {
m->WriteData(NULL, 0);
} else {
m->WriteData(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(&p.front()),
static_cast<int>(p.size()));
}
}
|
void ParamTraits<std::vector<unsigned char> >::Write(Message* m,
const param_type& p) {
if (p.empty()) {
m->WriteData(NULL, 0);
} else {
m->WriteData(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(&p.front()),
static_cast<int>(p.size()));
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-1000524
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-1000524/
|
CWE-190
|
https://github.com/fatcerberus/minisphere/commit/252c1ca184cb38e1acb917aa0e451c5f08519996
|
252c1ca184cb38e1acb917aa0e451c5f08519996
|
Fix integer overflow in layer_resize in map_engine.c (#268)
* Fix integer overflow in layer_resize in map_engine.c
There's a buffer overflow bug in the function layer_resize. It allocates
a buffer `tilemap` with size `x_size * y_size * sizeof(struct map_tile)`.
But it didn't check for integer overflow, so if x_size and y_size are
very large, it's possible that the buffer size is smaller than needed,
causing a buffer overflow later.
PoC: `SetLayerSize(0, 0x7FFFFFFF, 0x7FFFFFFF);`
* move malloc to a separate line
|
map_pathname(void)
{
return s_map ? s_map_filename : NULL;
}
|
map_pathname(void)
{
return s_map ? s_map_filename : NULL;
}
|
C
|
minisphere
| 0 |
CVE-2017-16527
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-16527/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/124751d5e63c823092060074bd0abaae61aaa9c4
|
124751d5e63c823092060074bd0abaae61aaa9c4
|
ALSA: usb-audio: Kill stray URB at exiting
USB-audio driver may leave a stray URB for the mixer interrupt when it
exits by some error during probe. This leads to a use-after-free
error as spotted by syzkaller like:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in snd_usb_mixer_interrupt+0x604/0x6f0
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:16
dump_stack+0x292/0x395 lib/dump_stack.c:52
print_address_description+0x78/0x280 mm/kasan/report.c:252
kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:351
kasan_report+0x23d/0x350 mm/kasan/report.c:409
__asan_report_load8_noabort+0x19/0x20 mm/kasan/report.c:430
snd_usb_mixer_interrupt+0x604/0x6f0 sound/usb/mixer.c:2490
__usb_hcd_giveback_urb+0x2e0/0x650 drivers/usb/core/hcd.c:1779
....
Allocated by task 1484:
save_stack_trace+0x1b/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c:59
save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:447
set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:459
kasan_kmalloc+0xad/0xe0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:551
kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x11e/0x2d0 mm/slub.c:2772
kmalloc ./include/linux/slab.h:493
kzalloc ./include/linux/slab.h:666
snd_usb_create_mixer+0x145/0x1010 sound/usb/mixer.c:2540
create_standard_mixer_quirk+0x58/0x80 sound/usb/quirks.c:516
snd_usb_create_quirk+0x92/0x100 sound/usb/quirks.c:560
create_composite_quirk+0x1c4/0x3e0 sound/usb/quirks.c:59
snd_usb_create_quirk+0x92/0x100 sound/usb/quirks.c:560
usb_audio_probe+0x1040/0x2c10 sound/usb/card.c:618
....
Freed by task 1484:
save_stack_trace+0x1b/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c:59
save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:447
set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:459
kasan_slab_free+0x72/0xc0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:524
slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1390
slab_free_freelist_hook mm/slub.c:1412
slab_free mm/slub.c:2988
kfree+0xf6/0x2f0 mm/slub.c:3919
snd_usb_mixer_free+0x11a/0x160 sound/usb/mixer.c:2244
snd_usb_mixer_dev_free+0x36/0x50 sound/usb/mixer.c:2250
__snd_device_free+0x1ff/0x380 sound/core/device.c:91
snd_device_free_all+0x8f/0xe0 sound/core/device.c:244
snd_card_do_free sound/core/init.c:461
release_card_device+0x47/0x170 sound/core/init.c:181
device_release+0x13f/0x210 drivers/base/core.c:814
....
Actually such a URB is killed properly at disconnection when the
device gets probed successfully, and what we need is to apply it for
the error-path, too.
In this patch, we apply snd_usb_mixer_disconnect() at releasing.
Also introduce a new flag, disconnected, to struct usb_mixer_interface
for not performing the disconnection procedure twice.
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
|
void snd_usb_mixer_disconnect(struct usb_mixer_interface *mixer)
{
if (mixer->disconnected)
return;
if (mixer->urb)
usb_kill_urb(mixer->urb);
if (mixer->rc_urb)
usb_kill_urb(mixer->rc_urb);
mixer->disconnected = true;
}
|
void snd_usb_mixer_disconnect(struct usb_mixer_interface *mixer)
{
usb_kill_urb(mixer->urb);
usb_kill_urb(mixer->rc_urb);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 1 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/d1a59e4e845a01d7d7b80ef184b672752a9eae4d
|
d1a59e4e845a01d7d7b80ef184b672752a9eae4d
|
Fixing cross-process postMessage replies on more than two iterations.
When two frames are replying to each other using event.source across processes,
after the first two replies, things break down. The root cause is that in
RenderViewImpl::GetFrameByMappedID, the lookup was incorrect. It is now
properly searching for the remote frame id and returning the local one.
BUG=153445
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11040015
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@159924 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void RenderViewImpl::didFinishResourceLoad(
WebFrame* frame, unsigned identifier) {
DocumentState* document_state =
DocumentState::FromDataSource(frame->dataSource());
if (!document_state->use_error_page())
return;
if (devtools_agent_->IsAttached())
return;
int http_status_code = document_state->http_status_code();
if (http_status_code == 404) {
const GURL& document_url = frame->document().url();
const GURL& error_page_url =
GetAlternateErrorPageURL(document_url, HTTP_404);
if (error_page_url.is_valid()) {
WebURLError original_error;
original_error.domain = "http";
original_error.reason = 404;
original_error.unreachableURL = document_url;
document_state->set_alt_error_page_fetcher(
new AltErrorPageResourceFetcher(
error_page_url, frame, original_error,
base::Bind(&RenderViewImpl::AltErrorPageFinished,
base::Unretained(this))));
return;
}
}
std::string error_domain;
if (content::GetContentClient()->renderer()->HasErrorPage(
http_status_code, &error_domain)) {
WebURLError error;
error.unreachableURL = frame->document().url();
error.domain = WebString::fromUTF8(error_domain);
error.reason = http_status_code;
LoadNavigationErrorPage(
frame, frame->dataSource()->request(), error, std::string(), true);
}
}
|
void RenderViewImpl::didFinishResourceLoad(
WebFrame* frame, unsigned identifier) {
DocumentState* document_state =
DocumentState::FromDataSource(frame->dataSource());
if (!document_state->use_error_page())
return;
if (devtools_agent_->IsAttached())
return;
int http_status_code = document_state->http_status_code();
if (http_status_code == 404) {
const GURL& document_url = frame->document().url();
const GURL& error_page_url =
GetAlternateErrorPageURL(document_url, HTTP_404);
if (error_page_url.is_valid()) {
WebURLError original_error;
original_error.domain = "http";
original_error.reason = 404;
original_error.unreachableURL = document_url;
document_state->set_alt_error_page_fetcher(
new AltErrorPageResourceFetcher(
error_page_url, frame, original_error,
base::Bind(&RenderViewImpl::AltErrorPageFinished,
base::Unretained(this))));
return;
}
}
std::string error_domain;
if (content::GetContentClient()->renderer()->HasErrorPage(
http_status_code, &error_domain)) {
WebURLError error;
error.unreachableURL = frame->document().url();
error.domain = WebString::fromUTF8(error_domain);
error.reason = http_status_code;
LoadNavigationErrorPage(
frame, frame->dataSource()->request(), error, std::string(), true);
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-1265
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1265/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/04ff52bb66284467ccb43d90800013b89ee8db75
|
04ff52bb66284467ccb43d90800013b89ee8db75
|
Switching AudioOutputAuthorizationHandler from using AudioManager interface to AudioSystem one.
BUG=672468
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2692203003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#450939}
|
bool RenderProcessHostImpl::IsProcessBackgrounded() const {
return is_process_backgrounded_;
}
|
bool RenderProcessHostImpl::IsProcessBackgrounded() const {
return is_process_backgrounded_;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-3610
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-3610/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/854e8bb1aa06c578c2c9145fa6bfe3680ef63b23
|
854e8bb1aa06c578c2c9145fa6bfe3680ef63b23
|
KVM: x86: Check non-canonical addresses upon WRMSR
Upon WRMSR, the CPU should inject #GP if a non-canonical value (address) is
written to certain MSRs. The behavior is "almost" identical for AMD and Intel
(ignoring MSRs that are not implemented in either architecture since they would
anyhow #GP). However, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP cause #GP if
non-canonical address is written on Intel but not on AMD (which ignores the top
32-bits).
Accordingly, this patch injects a #GP on the MSRs which behave identically on
Intel and AMD. To eliminate the differences between the architecutres, the
value which is written to IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP is turned to
canonical value before writing instead of injecting a #GP.
Some references from Intel and AMD manuals:
According to Intel SDM description of WRMSR instruction #GP is expected on
WRMSR "If the source register contains a non-canonical address and ECX
specifies one of the following MSRs: IA32_DS_AREA, IA32_FS_BASE, IA32_GS_BASE,
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE, IA32_LSTAR, IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP."
According to AMD manual instruction manual:
LSTAR/CSTAR (SYSCALL): "The WRMSR instruction loads the target RIP into the
LSTAR and CSTAR registers. If an RIP written by WRMSR is not in canonical
form, a general-protection exception (#GP) occurs."
IA32_GS_BASE and IA32_FS_BASE (WRFSBASE/WRGSBASE): "The address written to the
base field must be in canonical form or a #GP fault will occur."
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE (SWAPGS): "The address stored in the KernelGSbase MSR must
be in canonical form."
This patch fixes CVE-2014-3610.
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
|
static bool svm_has_wbinvd_exit(void)
{
return true;
}
|
static bool svm_has_wbinvd_exit(void)
{
return true;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5042
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5042/
|
CWE-311
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/7cde8513c12a6e8ec5d1d1eb1cfd078d9adad3ef
|
7cde8513c12a6e8ec5d1d1eb1cfd078d9adad3ef
|
Revert "PageInfo: decouple safe browsing and TLS statii."
This reverts commit ee95bc44021230127c7e6e9a8cf9d3820760f77c.
Reason for revert: suspect causing unit_tests failure on Linux MSAN Tests:
https://ci.chromium.org/p/chromium/builders/ci/Linux%20MSan%20Tests/17649
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.ChangingFlashSettingForSiteIsRemembered
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.EnsureCloseCallback
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.NotificationPermissionRevokeUkm
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.OpenPageInfoBubbleAfterNavigationStart
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfo
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoForUsbGuard
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoWithPolicyUsbDevices
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoWithUsbDevice
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoWithUserAndPolicyUsbDevices
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.UpdatingSiteDataRetainsLayout
https://logs.chromium.org/logs/chromium/buildbucket/cr-buildbucket.appspot.com/8909718923797040064/+/steps/unit_tests/0/logs/Deterministic_failure:_PageInfoBubbleViewTest.ChangingFlashSettingForSiteIsRemembered__status_CRASH_/0
[ RUN ] PageInfoBubbleViewTest.ChangingFlashSettingForSiteIsRemembered
==9056==WARNING: MemorySanitizer: use-of-uninitialized-value
#0 0x561baaab15ec in PageInfoUI::GetSecurityDescription(PageInfoUI::IdentityInfo const&) const ./../../chrome/browser/ui/page_info/page_info_ui.cc:250:3
#1 0x561bab6a1548 in PageInfoBubbleView::SetIdentityInfo(PageInfoUI::IdentityInfo const&) ./../../chrome/browser/ui/views/page_info/page_info_bubble_view.cc:802:7
#2 0x561baaaab3bb in PageInfo::PresentSiteIdentity() ./../../chrome/browser/ui/page_info/page_info.cc:969:8
#3 0x561baaaa0a21 in PageInfo::PageInfo(PageInfoUI*, Profile*, TabSpecificContentSettings*, content::WebContents*, GURL const&, security_state::SecurityLevel, security_state::VisibleSecurityState const&) ./../../chrome/browser/ui/page_info/page_info.cc:344:3
#4 0x561bab69b6dd in PageInfoBubbleView::PageInfoBubbleView(views::View*, gfx::Rect const&, aura::Window*, Profile*, content::WebContents*, GURL const&, security_state::SecurityLevel, security_state::VisibleSecurityState const&, base::OnceCallback<void (views::Widget::ClosedReason, bool)>) ./../../chrome/browser/ui/views/page_info/page_info_bubble_view.cc:576:24
...
Original change's description:
> PageInfo: decouple safe browsing and TLS statii.
>
> Previously, the Page Info bubble maintained a single variable to
> identify all reasons that a page might have a non-standard status. This
> lead to the display logic making assumptions about, for instance, the
> validity of a certificate when the page was flagged by Safe Browsing.
>
> This CL separates out the Safe Browsing status from the site identity
> status so that the page info bubble can inform the user that the site's
> certificate is invalid, even if it's also flagged by Safe Browsing.
>
> Bug: 869925
> Change-Id: I34107225b4206c8f32771ccd75e9367668d0a72b
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1662537
> Reviewed-by: Mustafa Emre Acer <[email protected]>
> Reviewed-by: Bret Sepulveda <[email protected]>
> Auto-Submit: Joe DeBlasio <[email protected]>
> Commit-Queue: Joe DeBlasio <[email protected]>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#671847}
[email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
Change-Id: I8be652952e7276bcc9266124693352e467159cc4
No-Presubmit: true
No-Tree-Checks: true
No-Try: true
Bug: 869925
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1673985
Reviewed-by: Takashi Sakamoto <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Takashi Sakamoto <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#671932}
|
ChooserContextBase* GetSerialChooserContext(Profile* profile) {
return SerialChooserContextFactory::GetForProfile(profile);
}
|
ChooserContextBase* GetSerialChooserContext(Profile* profile) {
return SerialChooserContextFactory::GetForProfile(profile);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6111
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6111/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/3c8e4852477d5b1e2da877808c998dc57db9460f
|
3c8e4852477d5b1e2da877808c998dc57db9460f
|
DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
|
void RenderFrameDevToolsAgentHost::WasHidden() {
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
GetWakeLock()->CancelWakeLock();
#endif
}
|
void RenderFrameDevToolsAgentHost::WasHidden() {
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
GetWakeLock()->CancelWakeLock();
#endif
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-3301
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-3301/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/6a76f8c0ab19f215af2a3442870eeb5f0e81998d
|
6a76f8c0ab19f215af2a3442870eeb5f0e81998d
|
tracing: Fix possible NULL pointer dereferences
Currently set_ftrace_pid and set_graph_function files use seq_lseek
for their fops. However seq_open() is called only for FMODE_READ in
the fops->open() so that if an user tries to seek one of those file
when she open it for writing, it sees NULL seq_file and then panic.
It can be easily reproduced with following command:
$ cd /sys/kernel/debug/tracing
$ echo 1234 | sudo tee -a set_ftrace_pid
In this example, GNU coreutils' tee opens the file with fopen(, "a")
and then the fopen() internally calls lseek().
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <[email protected]>
|
static int ops_traces_mod(struct ftrace_ops *ops)
{
struct ftrace_hash *hash;
hash = ops->filter_hash;
return ftrace_hash_empty(hash);
}
|
static int ops_traces_mod(struct ftrace_ops *ops)
{
struct ftrace_hash *hash;
hash = ops->filter_hash;
return ftrace_hash_empty(hash);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-7865
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-7865/
|
CWE-787
|
https://github.com/FFmpeg/FFmpeg/commit/2080bc33717955a0e4268e738acf8c1eeddbf8cb
|
2080bc33717955a0e4268e738acf8c1eeddbf8cb
|
avcodec/utils: correct align value for interplay
Fixes out of array access
Fixes: 452/fuzz-1-ffmpeg_VIDEO_AV_CODEC_ID_INTERPLAY_VIDEO_fuzzer
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/targets/ffmpeg
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]>
|
int ff_alloc_packet(AVPacket *avpkt, int size)
{
return ff_alloc_packet2(NULL, avpkt, size, 0);
}
|
int ff_alloc_packet(AVPacket *avpkt, int size)
{
return ff_alloc_packet2(NULL, avpkt, size, 0);
}
|
C
|
FFmpeg
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6111
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6111/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/3c8e4852477d5b1e2da877808c998dc57db9460f
|
3c8e4852477d5b1e2da877808c998dc57db9460f
|
DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
|
String resourcePriority(net::RequestPriority priority) {
switch (priority) {
case net::MINIMUM_PRIORITY:
case net::IDLE:
return Network::ResourcePriorityEnum::VeryLow;
case net::LOWEST:
return Network::ResourcePriorityEnum::Low;
case net::LOW:
return Network::ResourcePriorityEnum::Medium;
case net::MEDIUM:
return Network::ResourcePriorityEnum::High;
case net::HIGHEST:
return Network::ResourcePriorityEnum::VeryHigh;
}
NOTREACHED();
return Network::ResourcePriorityEnum::Medium;
}
|
String resourcePriority(net::RequestPriority priority) {
switch (priority) {
case net::MINIMUM_PRIORITY:
case net::IDLE:
return Network::ResourcePriorityEnum::VeryLow;
case net::LOWEST:
return Network::ResourcePriorityEnum::Low;
case net::LOW:
return Network::ResourcePriorityEnum::Medium;
case net::MEDIUM:
return Network::ResourcePriorityEnum::High;
case net::HIGHEST:
return Network::ResourcePriorityEnum::VeryHigh;
}
NOTREACHED();
return Network::ResourcePriorityEnum::Medium;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2019-15924
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-15924/
|
CWE-476
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/01ca667133d019edc9f0a1f70a272447c84ec41f
|
01ca667133d019edc9f0a1f70a272447c84ec41f
|
fm10k: Fix a potential NULL pointer dereference
Syzkaller report this:
kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access
general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
CPU: 0 PID: 4378 Comm: syz-executor.0 Tainted: G C 5.0.0+ #5
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:__lock_acquire+0x95b/0x3200 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3573
Code: 00 0f 85 28 1e 00 00 48 81 c4 08 01 00 00 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f c3 4c 89 ea 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 cc 24 00 00 49 81 7d 00 e0 de 03 a6 41 bc 00 00
RSP: 0018:ffff8881e3c07a40 EFLAGS: 00010002
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000080
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffff8881e3c07d98 R11: ffff8881c7f21f80 R12: 0000000000000001
R13: 0000000000000080 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000001
FS: 00007fce2252e700(0000) GS:ffff8881f2400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fffc7eb0228 CR3: 00000001e5bea002 CR4: 00000000007606f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
lock_acquire+0xff/0x2c0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4211
__mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:925 [inline]
__mutex_lock+0xdf/0x1050 kernel/locking/mutex.c:1072
drain_workqueue+0x24/0x3f0 kernel/workqueue.c:2934
destroy_workqueue+0x23/0x630 kernel/workqueue.c:4319
__do_sys_delete_module kernel/module.c:1018 [inline]
__se_sys_delete_module kernel/module.c:961 [inline]
__x64_sys_delete_module+0x30c/0x480 kernel/module.c:961
do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x450 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x462e99
Code: f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007fce2252dc58 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000b0
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000073bf00 RCX: 0000000000462e99
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000020000140
RBP: 0000000000000002 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fce2252e6bc
R13: 00000000004bcca9 R14: 00000000006f6b48 R15: 00000000ffffffff
If alloc_workqueue fails, it should return -ENOMEM, otherwise may
trigger this NULL pointer dereference while unloading drivers.
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <[email protected]>
Fixes: 0a38c17a21a0 ("fm10k: Remove create_workqueue")
Signed-off-by: Yue Haibing <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Andrew Bowers <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Kirsher <[email protected]>
|
static int fm10k_alloc_q_vectors(struct fm10k_intfc *interface)
{
unsigned int q_vectors = interface->num_q_vectors;
unsigned int rxr_remaining = interface->num_rx_queues;
unsigned int txr_remaining = interface->num_tx_queues;
unsigned int rxr_idx = 0, txr_idx = 0, v_idx = 0;
int err;
if (q_vectors >= (rxr_remaining + txr_remaining)) {
for (; rxr_remaining; v_idx++) {
err = fm10k_alloc_q_vector(interface, q_vectors, v_idx,
0, 0, 1, rxr_idx);
if (err)
goto err_out;
/* update counts and index */
rxr_remaining--;
rxr_idx++;
}
}
for (; v_idx < q_vectors; v_idx++) {
int rqpv = DIV_ROUND_UP(rxr_remaining, q_vectors - v_idx);
int tqpv = DIV_ROUND_UP(txr_remaining, q_vectors - v_idx);
err = fm10k_alloc_q_vector(interface, q_vectors, v_idx,
tqpv, txr_idx,
rqpv, rxr_idx);
if (err)
goto err_out;
/* update counts and index */
rxr_remaining -= rqpv;
txr_remaining -= tqpv;
rxr_idx++;
txr_idx++;
}
return 0;
err_out:
fm10k_reset_num_queues(interface);
while (v_idx--)
fm10k_free_q_vector(interface, v_idx);
return -ENOMEM;
}
|
static int fm10k_alloc_q_vectors(struct fm10k_intfc *interface)
{
unsigned int q_vectors = interface->num_q_vectors;
unsigned int rxr_remaining = interface->num_rx_queues;
unsigned int txr_remaining = interface->num_tx_queues;
unsigned int rxr_idx = 0, txr_idx = 0, v_idx = 0;
int err;
if (q_vectors >= (rxr_remaining + txr_remaining)) {
for (; rxr_remaining; v_idx++) {
err = fm10k_alloc_q_vector(interface, q_vectors, v_idx,
0, 0, 1, rxr_idx);
if (err)
goto err_out;
/* update counts and index */
rxr_remaining--;
rxr_idx++;
}
}
for (; v_idx < q_vectors; v_idx++) {
int rqpv = DIV_ROUND_UP(rxr_remaining, q_vectors - v_idx);
int tqpv = DIV_ROUND_UP(txr_remaining, q_vectors - v_idx);
err = fm10k_alloc_q_vector(interface, q_vectors, v_idx,
tqpv, txr_idx,
rqpv, rxr_idx);
if (err)
goto err_out;
/* update counts and index */
rxr_remaining -= rqpv;
txr_remaining -= tqpv;
rxr_idx++;
txr_idx++;
}
return 0;
err_out:
fm10k_reset_num_queues(interface);
while (v_idx--)
fm10k_free_q_vector(interface, v_idx);
return -ENOMEM;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-6903
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-6903/
|
CWE-269
|
https://github.com/iortcw/iortcw/commit/b6ff2bcb1e4e6976d61e316175c6d7c99860fe20
|
b6ff2bcb1e4e6976d61e316175c6d7c99860fe20
|
All: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s
|
qboolean FS_FilenameCompare( const char *s1, const char *s2 ) {
int c1, c2;
do {
c1 = *s1++;
c2 = *s2++;
if ( Q_islower( c1 ) ) {
c1 -= ( 'a' - 'A' );
}
if ( Q_islower( c2 ) ) {
c2 -= ( 'a' - 'A' );
}
if ( c1 == '\\' || c1 == ':' ) {
c1 = '/';
}
if ( c2 == '\\' || c2 == ':' ) {
c2 = '/';
}
if ( c1 != c2 ) {
return qtrue; // strings not equal
}
} while ( c1 );
return qfalse; // strings are equal
}
|
qboolean FS_FilenameCompare( const char *s1, const char *s2 ) {
int c1, c2;
do {
c1 = *s1++;
c2 = *s2++;
if ( Q_islower( c1 ) ) {
c1 -= ( 'a' - 'A' );
}
if ( Q_islower( c2 ) ) {
c2 -= ( 'a' - 'A' );
}
if ( c1 == '\\' || c1 == ':' ) {
c1 = '/';
}
if ( c2 == '\\' || c2 == ':' ) {
c2 = '/';
}
if ( c1 != c2 ) {
return qtrue; // strings not equal
}
} while ( c1 );
return qfalse; // strings are equal
}
|
C
|
OpenJK
| 0 |
CVE-2014-3191
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-3191/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/11a4cc4a6d6e665d9a118fada4b7c658d6f70d95
|
11a4cc4a6d6e665d9a118fada4b7c658d6f70d95
|
Defer call to updateWidgetPositions() outside of RenderLayerScrollableArea.
updateWidgetPositions() can destroy the render tree, so it should never
be called from inside RenderLayerScrollableArea. Leaving it there allows
for the potential of use-after-free bugs.
BUG=402407
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/490473003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180681 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
void FrameView::addScrollableArea(ScrollableArea* scrollableArea)
{
ASSERT(scrollableArea);
if (!m_scrollableAreas)
m_scrollableAreas = adoptPtr(new ScrollableAreaSet);
m_scrollableAreas->add(scrollableArea);
}
|
void FrameView::addScrollableArea(ScrollableArea* scrollableArea)
{
ASSERT(scrollableArea);
if (!m_scrollableAreas)
m_scrollableAreas = adoptPtr(new ScrollableAreaSet);
m_scrollableAreas->add(scrollableArea);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-8068
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-8068/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/5593523f968bc86d42a035c6df47d5e0979b5ace
|
5593523f968bc86d42a035c6df47d5e0979b5ace
|
pegasus: Use heap buffers for all register access
Allocating USB buffers on the stack is not portable, and no longer
works on x86_64 (with VMAP_STACK enabled as per default).
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
References: https://bugs.debian.org/852556
Reported-by: Lisandro Damián Nicanor Pérez Meyer <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Lisandro Damián Nicanor Pérez Meyer <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static __u8 mii_phy_probe(pegasus_t *pegasus)
{
int i;
__u16 tmp;
for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) {
read_mii_word(pegasus, i, MII_BMSR, &tmp);
if (tmp == 0 || tmp == 0xffff || (tmp & BMSR_MEDIA) == 0)
continue;
else
return i;
}
return 0xff;
}
|
static __u8 mii_phy_probe(pegasus_t *pegasus)
{
int i;
__u16 tmp;
for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) {
read_mii_word(pegasus, i, MII_BMSR, &tmp);
if (tmp == 0 || tmp == 0xffff || (tmp & BMSR_MEDIA) == 0)
continue;
else
return i;
}
return 0xff;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-8740
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-8740/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/apache/httpd/commit/29c63b786ae028d82405421585e91283c8fa0da3
|
29c63b786ae028d82405421585e91283c8fa0da3
|
SECURITY: CVE-2016-8740
mod_http2: properly crafted, endless HTTP/2 CONTINUATION frames could be used to exhaust all server's memory.
Reported by: Naveen Tiwari <[email protected]> and CDF/SEFCOM at Arizona State University
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1772576 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
|
apr_status_t h2_stream_submit_pushes(h2_stream *stream, h2_headers *response)
{
apr_status_t status = APR_SUCCESS;
apr_array_header_t *pushes;
int i;
pushes = h2_push_collect_update(stream, stream->request, response);
if (pushes && !apr_is_empty_array(pushes)) {
ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_TRACE1, 0, stream->session->c,
"h2_stream(%ld-%d): found %d push candidates",
stream->session->id, stream->id, pushes->nelts);
for (i = 0; i < pushes->nelts; ++i) {
h2_push *push = APR_ARRAY_IDX(pushes, i, h2_push*);
h2_stream *s = h2_session_push(stream->session, stream, push);
if (!s) {
status = APR_ECONNRESET;
break;
}
}
}
return status;
}
|
apr_status_t h2_stream_submit_pushes(h2_stream *stream, h2_headers *response)
{
apr_status_t status = APR_SUCCESS;
apr_array_header_t *pushes;
int i;
pushes = h2_push_collect_update(stream, stream->request, response);
if (pushes && !apr_is_empty_array(pushes)) {
ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_TRACE1, 0, stream->session->c,
"h2_stream(%ld-%d): found %d push candidates",
stream->session->id, stream->id, pushes->nelts);
for (i = 0; i < pushes->nelts; ++i) {
h2_push *push = APR_ARRAY_IDX(pushes, i, h2_push*);
h2_stream *s = h2_session_push(stream->session, stream, push);
if (!s) {
status = APR_ECONNRESET;
break;
}
}
}
return status;
}
|
C
|
httpd
| 0 |
CVE-2016-6720
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-6720/
|
CWE-200
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/7c88b498fda1c2b608a9dd73960a2fd4d7b7e3f7
|
7c88b498fda1c2b608a9dd73960a2fd4d7b7e3f7
|
IOMX: allow configuration after going to loaded state
This was disallowed recently but we still use it as MediaCodcec.stop
only goes to loaded state, and does not free component.
Bug: 31450460
Change-Id: I72e092e4e55c9f23b1baee3e950d76e84a5ef28d
(cherry picked from commit e03b22839d78c841ce0a1a0a1ee1960932188b0b)
|
BufferMeta(size_t size, OMX_U32 portIndex)
: mSize(size),
mCopyFromOmx(false),
mCopyToOmx(false),
mPortIndex(portIndex),
mBackup(NULL) {
}
|
BufferMeta(size_t size, OMX_U32 portIndex)
: mSize(size),
mCopyFromOmx(false),
mCopyToOmx(false),
mPortIndex(portIndex),
mBackup(NULL) {
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2015-8104
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-8104/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/cbdb967af3d54993f5814f1cee0ed311a055377d
|
cbdb967af3d54993f5814f1cee0ed311a055377d
|
KVM: svm: unconditionally intercept #DB
This is needed to avoid the possibility that the guest triggers
an infinite stream of #DB exceptions (CVE-2015-8104).
VMX is not affected: because it does not save DR6 in the VMCS,
it already intercepts #DB unconditionally.
Reported-by: Jan Beulich <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
|
static int ac_interception(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
{
kvm_queue_exception_e(&svm->vcpu, AC_VECTOR, 0);
return 1;
}
|
static int ac_interception(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
{
kvm_queue_exception_e(&svm->vcpu, AC_VECTOR, 0);
return 1;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-11143
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-11143/
|
CWE-502
|
https://git.php.net/?p=php-src.git;a=commit;h=2aae60461c2ff7b7fbcdd194c789ac841d0747d7
|
2aae60461c2ff7b7fbcdd194c789ac841d0747d7
| null |
static int wddx_stack_destroy(wddx_stack *stack)
{
register int i;
if (stack->elements) {
for (i = 0; i < stack->top; i++) {
if (((st_entry *)stack->elements[i])->data
&& ((st_entry *)stack->elements[i])->type != ST_FIELD) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&((st_entry *)stack->elements[i])->data);
}
if (((st_entry *)stack->elements[i])->varname) {
efree(((st_entry *)stack->elements[i])->varname);
}
efree(stack->elements[i]);
}
efree(stack->elements);
}
return SUCCESS;
}
|
static int wddx_stack_destroy(wddx_stack *stack)
{
register int i;
if (stack->elements) {
for (i = 0; i < stack->top; i++) {
if (((st_entry *)stack->elements[i])->data
&& ((st_entry *)stack->elements[i])->type != ST_FIELD) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&((st_entry *)stack->elements[i])->data);
}
if (((st_entry *)stack->elements[i])->varname) {
efree(((st_entry *)stack->elements[i])->varname);
}
efree(stack->elements[i]);
}
efree(stack->elements);
}
return SUCCESS;
}
|
C
|
php
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3751
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3751/
| null |
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/libpng/+/9d4853418ab2f754c2b63e091c29c5529b8b86ca
|
9d4853418ab2f754c2b63e091c29c5529b8b86ca
|
DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
|
BOOL pnm2png (FILE *pnm_file, FILE *png_file, FILE *alpha_file, BOOL interlace, BOOL alpha)
BOOL pnm2png (FILE *pnm_file, FILE *png_file, FILE *alpha_file, BOOL interlace,
BOOL alpha)
{
png_struct *png_ptr = NULL;
png_info *info_ptr = NULL;
png_byte *png_pixels = NULL;
png_byte **row_pointers = NULL;
png_byte *pix_ptr = NULL;
volatile png_uint_32 row_bytes;
char type_token[16];
char width_token[16];
char height_token[16];
char maxval_token[16];
volatile int color_type=1;
unsigned long ul_width=0, ul_alpha_width=0;
unsigned long ul_height=0, ul_alpha_height=0;
unsigned long ul_maxval=0;
volatile png_uint_32 width=0, height=0;
volatile png_uint_32 alpha_width=0, alpha_height=0;
png_uint_32 maxval;
volatile int bit_depth = 0;
int channels=0;
int alpha_depth = 0;
int alpha_present=0;
int row, col;
BOOL raw, alpha_raw = FALSE;
#if defined(PNG_WRITE_INVERT_SUPPORTED) || defined(PNG_WRITE_PACK_SUPPORTED)
BOOL packed_bitmap = FALSE;
#endif
png_uint_32 tmp16;
int i;
/* read header of PNM file */
get_token(pnm_file, type_token);
if (type_token[0] != 'P')
{
return FALSE;
}
else if ((type_token[1] == '1') || (type_token[1] == '4'))
{
#if defined(PNG_WRITE_INVERT_SUPPORTED) || defined(PNG_WRITE_PACK_SUPPORTED)
raw = (type_token[1] == '4');
color_type = PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY;
get_token(pnm_file, width_token);
sscanf (width_token, "%lu", &ul_width);
width = (png_uint_32) ul_width;
get_token(pnm_file, height_token);
sscanf (height_token, "%lu", &ul_height);
height = (png_uint_32) ul_height;
bit_depth = 1;
packed_bitmap = TRUE;
#else
fprintf (stderr, "PNM2PNG built without PNG_WRITE_INVERT_SUPPORTED and \n");
fprintf (stderr, "PNG_WRITE_PACK_SUPPORTED can't read PBM (P1,P4) files\n");
#endif
}
else if ((type_token[1] == '2') || (type_token[1] == '5'))
{
raw = (type_token[1] == '5');
color_type = PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY;
get_token(pnm_file, width_token);
sscanf (width_token, "%lu", &ul_width);
width = (png_uint_32) ul_width;
get_token(pnm_file, height_token);
sscanf (height_token, "%lu", &ul_height);
height = (png_uint_32) ul_height;
get_token(pnm_file, maxval_token);
sscanf (maxval_token, "%lu", &ul_maxval);
maxval = (png_uint_32) ul_maxval;
if (maxval <= 1)
bit_depth = 1;
else if (maxval <= 3)
bit_depth = 2;
else if (maxval <= 15)
bit_depth = 4;
else if (maxval <= 255)
bit_depth = 8;
else /* if (maxval <= 65535) */
bit_depth = 16;
}
else if ((type_token[1] == '3') || (type_token[1] == '6'))
{
raw = (type_token[1] == '6');
color_type = PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB;
get_token(pnm_file, width_token);
sscanf (width_token, "%lu", &ul_width);
width = (png_uint_32) ul_width;
get_token(pnm_file, height_token);
sscanf (height_token, "%lu", &ul_height);
height = (png_uint_32) ul_height;
get_token(pnm_file, maxval_token);
sscanf (maxval_token, "%lu", &ul_maxval);
maxval = (png_uint_32) ul_maxval;
if (maxval <= 1)
bit_depth = 1;
else if (maxval <= 3)
bit_depth = 2;
else if (maxval <= 15)
bit_depth = 4;
else if (maxval <= 255)
bit_depth = 8;
else /* if (maxval <= 65535) */
bit_depth = 16;
}
else
{
return FALSE;
}
/* read header of PGM file with alpha channel */
if (alpha)
{
if (color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY)
color_type = PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY_ALPHA;
if (color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB)
color_type = PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB_ALPHA;
get_token(alpha_file, type_token);
if (type_token[0] != 'P')
{
return FALSE;
}
else if ((type_token[1] == '2') || (type_token[1] == '5'))
{
alpha_raw = (type_token[1] == '5');
get_token(alpha_file, width_token);
sscanf (width_token, "%lu", &ul_alpha_width);
alpha_width=(png_uint_32) ul_alpha_width;
if (alpha_width != width)
return FALSE;
get_token(alpha_file, height_token);
sscanf (height_token, "%lu", &ul_alpha_height);
alpha_height = (png_uint_32) ul_alpha_height;
if (alpha_height != height)
return FALSE;
get_token(alpha_file, maxval_token);
sscanf (maxval_token, "%lu", &ul_maxval);
maxval = (png_uint_32) ul_maxval;
if (maxval <= 1)
alpha_depth = 1;
else if (maxval <= 3)
alpha_depth = 2;
else if (maxval <= 15)
alpha_depth = 4;
else if (maxval <= 255)
alpha_depth = 8;
else /* if (maxval <= 65535) */
alpha_depth = 16;
if (alpha_depth != bit_depth)
return FALSE;
}
else
{
return FALSE;
}
} /* end if alpha */
/* calculate the number of channels and store alpha-presence */
if (color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY)
channels = 1;
else if (color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY_ALPHA)
channels = 2;
else if (color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB)
channels = 3;
else if (color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB_ALPHA)
channels = 4;
#if 0
else
channels = 0; /* cannot happen */
#endif
alpha_present = (channels - 1) % 2;
#if defined(PNG_WRITE_INVERT_SUPPORTED) || defined(PNG_WRITE_PACK_SUPPORTED)
if (packed_bitmap)
/* row data is as many bytes as can fit width x channels x bit_depth */
row_bytes = (width * channels * bit_depth + 7) / 8;
else
#endif
/* row_bytes is the width x number of channels x (bit-depth / 8) */
row_bytes = width * channels * ((bit_depth <= 8) ? 1 : 2);
if ((png_pixels = (png_byte *)
malloc (row_bytes * height * sizeof (png_byte))) == NULL)
return FALSE;
/* read data from PNM file */
pix_ptr = png_pixels;
for (row = 0; row < (int) height; row++)
{
#if defined(PNG_WRITE_INVERT_SUPPORTED) || defined(PNG_WRITE_PACK_SUPPORTED)
if (packed_bitmap) {
for (i = 0; i < (int) row_bytes; i++)
/* png supports this format natively so no conversion is needed */
*pix_ptr++ = get_data (pnm_file, 8);
} else
#endif
{
for (col = 0; col < (int) width; col++)
{
for (i = 0; i < (channels - alpha_present); i++)
{
if (raw)
*pix_ptr++ = get_data (pnm_file, bit_depth);
else
if (bit_depth <= 8)
*pix_ptr++ = get_value (pnm_file, bit_depth);
else
{
tmp16 = get_value (pnm_file, bit_depth);
*pix_ptr = (png_byte) ((tmp16 >> 8) & 0xFF);
pix_ptr++;
*pix_ptr = (png_byte) (tmp16 & 0xFF);
pix_ptr++;
}
}
if (alpha) /* read alpha-channel from pgm file */
{
if (alpha_raw)
*pix_ptr++ = get_data (alpha_file, alpha_depth);
else
if (alpha_depth <= 8)
*pix_ptr++ = get_value (alpha_file, bit_depth);
else
{
tmp16 = get_value (alpha_file, bit_depth);
*pix_ptr++ = (png_byte) ((tmp16 >> 8) & 0xFF);
*pix_ptr++ = (png_byte) (tmp16 & 0xFF);
}
} /* if alpha */
} /* if packed_bitmap */
} /* end for col */
} /* end for row */
/* prepare the standard PNG structures */
png_ptr = png_create_write_struct (png_get_libpng_ver(NULL), NULL, NULL,
NULL);
if (!png_ptr)
{
free (png_pixels);
png_pixels = NULL;
return FALSE;
}
info_ptr = png_create_info_struct (png_ptr);
if (!info_ptr)
{
png_destroy_write_struct (&png_ptr, (png_infopp) NULL);
free (png_pixels);
png_pixels = NULL;
return FALSE;
}
#if defined(PNG_WRITE_INVERT_SUPPORTED) || defined(PNG_WRITE_PACK_SUPPORTED)
if (packed_bitmap == TRUE)
{
png_set_packing (png_ptr);
png_set_invert_mono (png_ptr);
}
#endif
/* setjmp() must be called in every function that calls a PNG-reading libpng function */
if (setjmp (png_jmpbuf(png_ptr)))
{
png_destroy_write_struct (&png_ptr, &info_ptr);
free (png_pixels);
png_pixels = NULL;
return FALSE;
}
/* initialize the png structure */
png_init_io (png_ptr, png_file);
/* we're going to write more or less the same PNG as the input file */
png_set_IHDR (png_ptr, info_ptr, width, height, bit_depth, color_type,
(!interlace) ? PNG_INTERLACE_NONE : PNG_INTERLACE_ADAM7,
PNG_COMPRESSION_TYPE_BASE, PNG_FILTER_TYPE_BASE);
/* write the file header information */
png_write_info (png_ptr, info_ptr);
/* if needed we will allocate memory for an new array of row-pointers */
if (row_pointers == (unsigned char**) NULL)
{
if ((row_pointers = (png_byte **)
malloc (height * sizeof (png_bytep))) == NULL)
{
png_destroy_write_struct (&png_ptr, &info_ptr);
free (png_pixels);
png_pixels = NULL;
return FALSE;
}
}
/* set the individual row_pointers to point at the correct offsets */
for (i = 0; i < (int) height; i++)
row_pointers[i] = png_pixels + i * row_bytes;
/* write out the entire image data in one call */
png_write_image (png_ptr, row_pointers);
/* write the additional chunks to the PNG file (not really needed) */
png_write_end (png_ptr, info_ptr);
/* clean up after the write, and free any memory allocated */
png_destroy_write_struct (&png_ptr, &info_ptr);
if (row_pointers != (unsigned char**) NULL)
free (row_pointers);
if (png_pixels != (unsigned char*) NULL)
free (png_pixels);
return TRUE;
} /* end of pnm2png */
|
BOOL pnm2png (FILE *pnm_file, FILE *png_file, FILE *alpha_file, BOOL interlace, BOOL alpha)
{
png_struct *png_ptr = NULL;
png_info *info_ptr = NULL;
png_byte *png_pixels = NULL;
png_byte **row_pointers = NULL;
png_byte *pix_ptr = NULL;
png_uint_32 row_bytes;
char type_token[16];
char width_token[16];
char height_token[16];
char maxval_token[16];
int color_type;
unsigned long ul_width=0, ul_alpha_width=0;
unsigned long ul_height=0, ul_alpha_height=0;
unsigned long ul_maxval=0;
png_uint_32 width, alpha_width;
png_uint_32 height, alpha_height;
png_uint_32 maxval;
int bit_depth = 0;
int channels;
int alpha_depth = 0;
int alpha_present;
int row, col;
BOOL raw, alpha_raw = FALSE;
#if defined(PNG_WRITE_INVERT_SUPPORTED) || defined(PNG_WRITE_PACK_SUPPORTED)
BOOL packed_bitmap = FALSE;
#endif
png_uint_32 tmp16;
int i;
/* read header of PNM file */
get_token(pnm_file, type_token);
if (type_token[0] != 'P')
{
return FALSE;
}
else if ((type_token[1] == '1') || (type_token[1] == '4'))
{
#if defined(PNG_WRITE_INVERT_SUPPORTED) || defined(PNG_WRITE_PACK_SUPPORTED)
raw = (type_token[1] == '4');
color_type = PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY;
get_token(pnm_file, width_token);
sscanf (width_token, "%lu", &ul_width);
width = (png_uint_32) ul_width;
get_token(pnm_file, height_token);
sscanf (height_token, "%lu", &ul_height);
height = (png_uint_32) ul_height;
bit_depth = 1;
packed_bitmap = TRUE;
#else
fprintf (stderr, "PNM2PNG built without PNG_WRITE_INVERT_SUPPORTED and \n");
fprintf (stderr, "PNG_WRITE_PACK_SUPPORTED can't read PBM (P1,P4) files\n");
#endif
}
else if ((type_token[1] == '2') || (type_token[1] == '5'))
{
raw = (type_token[1] == '5');
color_type = PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY;
get_token(pnm_file, width_token);
sscanf (width_token, "%lu", &ul_width);
width = (png_uint_32) ul_width;
get_token(pnm_file, height_token);
sscanf (height_token, "%lu", &ul_height);
height = (png_uint_32) ul_height;
get_token(pnm_file, maxval_token);
sscanf (maxval_token, "%lu", &ul_maxval);
maxval = (png_uint_32) ul_maxval;
if (maxval <= 1)
bit_depth = 1;
else if (maxval <= 3)
bit_depth = 2;
else if (maxval <= 15)
bit_depth = 4;
else if (maxval <= 255)
bit_depth = 8;
else /* if (maxval <= 65535) */
bit_depth = 16;
}
else if ((type_token[1] == '3') || (type_token[1] == '6'))
{
raw = (type_token[1] == '6');
color_type = PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB;
get_token(pnm_file, width_token);
sscanf (width_token, "%lu", &ul_width);
width = (png_uint_32) ul_width;
get_token(pnm_file, height_token);
sscanf (height_token, "%lu", &ul_height);
height = (png_uint_32) ul_height;
get_token(pnm_file, maxval_token);
sscanf (maxval_token, "%lu", &ul_maxval);
maxval = (png_uint_32) ul_maxval;
if (maxval <= 1)
bit_depth = 1;
else if (maxval <= 3)
bit_depth = 2;
else if (maxval <= 15)
bit_depth = 4;
else if (maxval <= 255)
bit_depth = 8;
else /* if (maxval <= 65535) */
bit_depth = 16;
}
else
{
return FALSE;
}
/* read header of PGM file with alpha channel */
if (alpha)
{
if (color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY)
color_type = PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY_ALPHA;
if (color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB)
color_type = PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB_ALPHA;
get_token(alpha_file, type_token);
if (type_token[0] != 'P')
{
return FALSE;
}
else if ((type_token[1] == '2') || (type_token[1] == '5'))
{
alpha_raw = (type_token[1] == '5');
get_token(alpha_file, width_token);
sscanf (width_token, "%lu", &ul_alpha_width);
alpha_width=(png_uint_32) ul_alpha_width;
if (alpha_width != width)
return FALSE;
get_token(alpha_file, height_token);
sscanf (height_token, "%lu", &ul_alpha_height);
alpha_height = (png_uint_32) ul_alpha_height;
if (alpha_height != height)
return FALSE;
get_token(alpha_file, maxval_token);
sscanf (maxval_token, "%lu", &ul_maxval);
maxval = (png_uint_32) ul_maxval;
if (maxval <= 1)
alpha_depth = 1;
else if (maxval <= 3)
alpha_depth = 2;
else if (maxval <= 15)
alpha_depth = 4;
else if (maxval <= 255)
alpha_depth = 8;
else /* if (maxval <= 65535) */
alpha_depth = 16;
if (alpha_depth != bit_depth)
return FALSE;
}
else
{
return FALSE;
}
} /* end if alpha */
/* calculate the number of channels and store alpha-presence */
if (color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY)
channels = 1;
else if (color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY_ALPHA)
channels = 2;
else if (color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB)
channels = 3;
else if (color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB_ALPHA)
channels = 4;
else
channels = 0; /* should not happen */
alpha_present = (channels - 1) % 2;
#if defined(PNG_WRITE_INVERT_SUPPORTED) || defined(PNG_WRITE_PACK_SUPPORTED)
if (packed_bitmap)
/* row data is as many bytes as can fit width x channels x bit_depth */
row_bytes = (width * channels * bit_depth + 7) / 8;
else
#endif
/* row_bytes is the width x number of channels x (bit-depth / 8) */
row_bytes = width * channels * ((bit_depth <= 8) ? 1 : 2);
if ((png_pixels = (png_byte *) malloc (row_bytes * height * sizeof (png_byte))) == NULL)
return FALSE;
/* read data from PNM file */
pix_ptr = png_pixels;
for (row = 0; row < height; row++)
{
#if defined(PNG_WRITE_INVERT_SUPPORTED) || defined(PNG_WRITE_PACK_SUPPORTED)
if (packed_bitmap) {
for (i = 0; i < row_bytes; i++)
/* png supports this format natively so no conversion is needed */
*pix_ptr++ = get_data (pnm_file, 8);
} else
#endif
{
for (col = 0; col < width; col++)
{
for (i = 0; i < (channels - alpha_present); i++)
{
if (raw)
*pix_ptr++ = get_data (pnm_file, bit_depth);
else
if (bit_depth <= 8)
*pix_ptr++ = get_value (pnm_file, bit_depth);
else
{
tmp16 = get_value (pnm_file, bit_depth);
*pix_ptr = (png_byte) ((tmp16 >> 8) & 0xFF);
pix_ptr++;
*pix_ptr = (png_byte) (tmp16 & 0xFF);
pix_ptr++;
}
}
if (alpha) /* read alpha-channel from pgm file */
{
if (alpha_raw)
*pix_ptr++ = get_data (alpha_file, alpha_depth);
else
if (alpha_depth <= 8)
*pix_ptr++ = get_value (alpha_file, bit_depth);
else
{
tmp16 = get_value (alpha_file, bit_depth);
*pix_ptr++ = (png_byte) ((tmp16 >> 8) & 0xFF);
*pix_ptr++ = (png_byte) (tmp16 & 0xFF);
}
} /* if alpha */
} /* if packed_bitmap */
} /* end for col */
} /* end for row */
/* prepare the standard PNG structures */
png_ptr = png_create_write_struct (PNG_LIBPNG_VER_STRING, NULL, NULL, NULL);
if (!png_ptr)
{
return FALSE;
}
info_ptr = png_create_info_struct (png_ptr);
if (!info_ptr)
{
png_destroy_write_struct (&png_ptr, (png_infopp) NULL);
return FALSE;
}
#if defined(PNG_WRITE_INVERT_SUPPORTED) || defined(PNG_WRITE_PACK_SUPPORTED)
if (packed_bitmap == TRUE)
{
png_set_packing (png_ptr);
png_set_invert_mono (png_ptr);
}
#endif
/* setjmp() must be called in every function that calls a PNG-reading libpng function */
if (setjmp (png_jmpbuf(png_ptr)))
{
png_destroy_write_struct (&png_ptr, (png_infopp) NULL);
return FALSE;
}
/* initialize the png structure */
png_init_io (png_ptr, png_file);
/* we're going to write more or less the same PNG as the input file */
png_set_IHDR (png_ptr, info_ptr, width, height, bit_depth, color_type,
(!interlace) ? PNG_INTERLACE_NONE : PNG_INTERLACE_ADAM7,
PNG_COMPRESSION_TYPE_BASE, PNG_FILTER_TYPE_BASE);
/* write the file header information */
png_write_info (png_ptr, info_ptr);
/* if needed we will allocate memory for an new array of row-pointers */
if (row_pointers == (unsigned char**) NULL)
{
if ((row_pointers = (png_byte **) malloc (height * sizeof (png_bytep))) == NULL)
{
png_destroy_write_struct (&png_ptr, (png_infopp) NULL);
return FALSE;
}
}
/* set the individual row_pointers to point at the correct offsets */
for (i = 0; i < (height); i++)
row_pointers[i] = png_pixels + i * row_bytes;
/* write out the entire image data in one call */
png_write_image (png_ptr, row_pointers);
/* write the additional chuncks to the PNG file (not really needed) */
png_write_end (png_ptr, info_ptr);
/* clean up after the write, and free any memory allocated */
png_destroy_write_struct (&png_ptr, (png_infopp) NULL);
if (row_pointers != (unsigned char**) NULL)
free (row_pointers);
if (png_pixels != (unsigned char*) NULL)
free (png_pixels);
return TRUE;
} /* end of pnm2png */
|
C
|
Android
| 1 |
CVE-2013-0904
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0904/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/b2b21468c1f7f08b30a7c1755316f6026c50eb2a
|
b2b21468c1f7f08b30a7c1755316f6026c50eb2a
|
Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
[email protected], [email protected], [email protected]
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
bool RenderBox::nodeAtPoint(const HitTestRequest& request, HitTestResult& result, const HitTestLocation& locationInContainer, const LayoutPoint& accumulatedOffset, HitTestAction action)
{
LayoutPoint adjustedLocation = accumulatedOffset + location();
for (RenderObject* child = lastChild(); child; child = child->previousSibling()) {
if (!child->hasLayer() && child->nodeAtPoint(request, result, locationInContainer, adjustedLocation, action)) {
updateHitTestResult(result, locationInContainer.point() - toLayoutSize(adjustedLocation));
return true;
}
}
LayoutRect boundsRect = borderBoxRect();
boundsRect.moveBy(adjustedLocation);
if (visibleToHitTestRequest(request) && action == HitTestForeground && locationInContainer.intersects(boundsRect)) {
updateHitTestResult(result, locationInContainer.point() - toLayoutSize(adjustedLocation));
if (!result.addNodeToRectBasedTestResult(node(), request, locationInContainer, boundsRect))
return true;
}
return false;
}
|
bool RenderBox::nodeAtPoint(const HitTestRequest& request, HitTestResult& result, const HitTestLocation& locationInContainer, const LayoutPoint& accumulatedOffset, HitTestAction action)
{
LayoutPoint adjustedLocation = accumulatedOffset + location();
for (RenderObject* child = lastChild(); child; child = child->previousSibling()) {
if (!child->hasLayer() && child->nodeAtPoint(request, result, locationInContainer, adjustedLocation, action)) {
updateHitTestResult(result, locationInContainer.point() - toLayoutSize(adjustedLocation));
return true;
}
}
LayoutRect boundsRect = borderBoxRect();
boundsRect.moveBy(adjustedLocation);
if (visibleToHitTestRequest(request) && action == HitTestForeground && locationInContainer.intersects(boundsRect)) {
updateHitTestResult(result, locationInContainer.point() - toLayoutSize(adjustedLocation));
if (!result.addNodeToRectBasedTestResult(node(), request, locationInContainer, boundsRect))
return true;
}
return false;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-4930
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-4930/
|
CWE-134
|
https://htcondor-git.cs.wisc.edu/?p=condor.git;a=commitdiff;h=5e5571d1a431eb3c61977b6dd6ec90186ef79867
|
5e5571d1a431eb3c61977b6dd6ec90186ef79867
| null |
GahpClient::gt4_generate_submit_id (char ** submit_id)
{
static const char * command = "GT4_GENERATE_SUBMIT_ID";
if ( submit_id ) {
*submit_id = NULL;
}
if (server->m_commands_supported->contains_anycase(command)==FALSE) {
return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED;
}
if ( !is_pending( command, NULL ) ) {
if ( m_mode == results_only ) {
return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_NOT_SUBMITTED;
}
now_pending( command, NULL, normal_proxy );
}
Gahp_Args* result = get_pending_result( command, NULL );
if ( result ) {
if (result->argc != 2) {
EXCEPT( "Bad %s Result", command );
}
if ( strcasecmp(result->argv[1], NULLSTRING) ) {
*submit_id = strdup( result->argv[1] );
} else {
*submit_id = NULL;
}
delete result;
return 0;
}
if ( check_pending_timeout( command, NULL ) ) {
sprintf( error_string, "%s timed out", command );
return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_TIMED_OUT;
}
return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_PENDING;
}
|
GahpClient::gt4_generate_submit_id (char ** submit_id)
{
static const char * command = "GT4_GENERATE_SUBMIT_ID";
if ( submit_id ) {
*submit_id = NULL;
}
if (server->m_commands_supported->contains_anycase(command)==FALSE) {
return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED;
}
if ( !is_pending( command, NULL ) ) {
if ( m_mode == results_only ) {
return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_NOT_SUBMITTED;
}
now_pending( command, NULL, normal_proxy );
}
Gahp_Args* result = get_pending_result( command, NULL );
if ( result ) {
if (result->argc != 2) {
EXCEPT( "Bad %s Result", command );
}
if ( strcasecmp(result->argv[1], NULLSTRING) ) {
*submit_id = strdup( result->argv[1] );
} else {
*submit_id = NULL;
}
delete result;
return 0;
}
if ( check_pending_timeout( command, NULL ) ) {
sprintf( error_string, "%s timed out", command );
return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_TIMED_OUT;
}
return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_PENDING;
}
|
CPP
|
htcondor
| 0 |
CVE-2016-2324
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-2324/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/git/git/commit/de1e67d0703894cb6ea782e36abb63976ab07e60
|
de1e67d0703894cb6ea782e36abb63976ab07e60
|
list-objects: pass full pathname to callbacks
When we find a blob at "a/b/c", we currently pass this to
our show_object_fn callbacks as two components: "a/b/" and
"c". Callbacks which want the full value then call
path_name(), which concatenates the two. But this is an
inefficient interface; the path is a strbuf, and we could
simply append "c" to it temporarily, then roll back the
length, without creating a new copy.
So we could improve this by teaching the callsites of
path_name() this trick (and there are only 3). But we can
also notice that no callback actually cares about the
broken-down representation, and simply pass each callback
the full path "a/b/c" as a string. The callback code becomes
even simpler, then, as we do not have to worry about freeing
an allocated buffer, nor rolling back our modification to
the strbuf.
This is theoretically less efficient, as some callbacks
would not bother to format the final path component. But in
practice this is not measurable. Since we use the same
strbuf over and over, our work to grow it is amortized, and
we really only pay to memcpy a few bytes.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <[email protected]>
|
void put_revision_mark(const struct rev_info *revs, const struct commit *commit)
{
char *mark = get_revision_mark(revs, commit);
if (!strlen(mark))
return;
fputs(mark, stdout);
putchar(' ');
}
|
void put_revision_mark(const struct rev_info *revs, const struct commit *commit)
{
char *mark = get_revision_mark(revs, commit);
if (!strlen(mark))
return;
fputs(mark, stdout);
putchar(' ');
}
|
C
|
git
| 0 |
CVE-2012-5148
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-5148/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/e89cfcb9090e8c98129ae9160c513f504db74599
|
e89cfcb9090e8c98129ae9160c513f504db74599
|
Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
bool BrowserView::GetSavedWindowPlacement(
gfx::Rect* bounds,
ui::WindowShowState* show_state) const {
if (!ShouldSaveOrRestoreWindowPos())
return false;
chrome::GetSavedWindowBoundsAndShowState(browser_.get(), bounds, show_state);
#if defined(USE_ASH)
if (browser_->is_type_popup() || browser_->is_type_panel()) {
if (bounds->x() == 0 && bounds->y() == 0) {
*bounds = ChromeShellDelegate::instance()->window_positioner()->
GetPopupPosition(*bounds);
}
}
#endif
if ((browser_->is_type_popup() &&
!browser_->is_devtools() && !browser_->is_app()) ||
(browser_->is_type_panel())) {
if (IsToolbarVisible()) {
bounds->set_height(
bounds->height() + toolbar_->GetPreferredSize().height());
}
gfx::Rect window_rect = frame_->non_client_view()->
GetWindowBoundsForClientBounds(*bounds);
window_rect.set_origin(bounds->origin());
if (window_rect.x() == 0 && window_rect.y() == 0) {
gfx::Size size = window_rect.size();
window_rect.set_origin(
WindowSizer::GetDefaultPopupOrigin(size,
browser_->host_desktop_type()));
}
*bounds = window_rect;
*show_state = ui::SHOW_STATE_NORMAL;
}
return true;
}
|
bool BrowserView::GetSavedWindowPlacement(
gfx::Rect* bounds,
ui::WindowShowState* show_state) const {
if (!ShouldSaveOrRestoreWindowPos())
return false;
chrome::GetSavedWindowBoundsAndShowState(browser_.get(), bounds, show_state);
#if defined(USE_ASH)
if (browser_->is_type_popup() || browser_->is_type_panel()) {
if (bounds->x() == 0 && bounds->y() == 0) {
*bounds = ChromeShellDelegate::instance()->window_positioner()->
GetPopupPosition(*bounds);
}
}
#endif
if ((browser_->is_type_popup() &&
!browser_->is_devtools() && !browser_->is_app()) ||
(browser_->is_type_panel())) {
if (IsToolbarVisible()) {
bounds->set_height(
bounds->height() + toolbar_->GetPreferredSize().height());
}
gfx::Rect window_rect = frame_->non_client_view()->
GetWindowBoundsForClientBounds(*bounds);
window_rect.set_origin(bounds->origin());
if (window_rect.x() == 0 && window_rect.y() == 0) {
gfx::Size size = window_rect.size();
window_rect.set_origin(
WindowSizer::GetDefaultPopupOrigin(size,
browser_->host_desktop_type()));
}
*bounds = window_rect;
*show_state = ui::SHOW_STATE_NORMAL;
}
return true;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2019-1010295
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-1010295/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/commit/d5c5b0b77b2b589666024d219a8007b3f5b6faeb
|
d5c5b0b77b2b589666024d219a8007b3f5b6faeb
|
core: svc: always check ta parameters
Always check TA parameters from a user TA. This prevents a user TA from
passing invalid pointers to a pseudo TA.
Fixes: OP-TEE-2018-0007: "Buffer checks missing when calling pseudo
TAs".
Signed-off-by: Jens Wiklander <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Joakim Bech <[email protected]> (QEMU v7, v8)
Reviewed-by: Joakim Bech <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Riscure <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Alyssa Milburn <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Etienne Carriere <[email protected]>
|
static void utee_param_to_param(struct tee_ta_param *p, struct utee_params *up)
static TEE_Result utee_param_to_param(struct user_ta_ctx *utc,
struct tee_ta_param *p,
struct utee_params *up)
{
size_t n;
uint32_t types = up->types;
p->types = types;
for (n = 0; n < TEE_NUM_PARAMS; n++) {
uintptr_t a = up->vals[n * 2];
size_t b = up->vals[n * 2 + 1];
uint32_t flags = TEE_MEMORY_ACCESS_READ |
TEE_MEMORY_ACCESS_ANY_OWNER;
switch (TEE_PARAM_TYPE_GET(types, n)) {
case TEE_PARAM_TYPE_MEMREF_OUTPUT:
case TEE_PARAM_TYPE_MEMREF_INOUT:
flags |= TEE_MEMORY_ACCESS_WRITE;
/*FALLTHROUGH*/
case TEE_PARAM_TYPE_MEMREF_INPUT:
p->u[n].mem.mobj = &mobj_virt;
p->u[n].mem.offs = a;
p->u[n].mem.size = b;
if (tee_mmu_check_access_rights(utc, flags, a, b))
return TEE_ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED;
break;
case TEE_PARAM_TYPE_VALUE_INPUT:
case TEE_PARAM_TYPE_VALUE_INOUT:
p->u[n].val.a = a;
p->u[n].val.b = b;
break;
default:
memset(&p->u[n], 0, sizeof(p->u[n]));
break;
}
}
return TEE_SUCCESS;
}
|
static void utee_param_to_param(struct tee_ta_param *p, struct utee_params *up)
{
size_t n;
uint32_t types = up->types;
p->types = types;
for (n = 0; n < TEE_NUM_PARAMS; n++) {
uintptr_t a = up->vals[n * 2];
size_t b = up->vals[n * 2 + 1];
switch (TEE_PARAM_TYPE_GET(types, n)) {
case TEE_PARAM_TYPE_MEMREF_INPUT:
case TEE_PARAM_TYPE_MEMREF_OUTPUT:
case TEE_PARAM_TYPE_MEMREF_INOUT:
p->u[n].mem.mobj = &mobj_virt;
p->u[n].mem.offs = a;
p->u[n].mem.size = b;
break;
case TEE_PARAM_TYPE_VALUE_INPUT:
case TEE_PARAM_TYPE_VALUE_INOUT:
p->u[n].val.a = a;
p->u[n].val.b = b;
break;
default:
memset(&p->u[n], 0, sizeof(p->u[n]));
break;
}
}
}
|
C
|
optee_os
| 1 |
CVE-2016-4579
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-4579/
|
CWE-20
|
https://git.gnupg.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?p=libksba.git;a=commit;h=a7eed17a0b2a1c09ef986f3b4b323cd31cea2b64
|
a7eed17a0b2a1c09ef986f3b4b323cd31cea2b64
| null |
ksba_ocsp_get_extension (ksba_ocsp_t ocsp, ksba_cert_t cert, int idx,
char const **r_oid, int *r_crit,
unsigned char const **r_der, size_t *r_derlen)
{
struct ocsp_extension_s *ex;
if (!ocsp)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE);
if (!ocsp->requestlist)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_MISSING_ACTION);
if (idx < 0)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_INDEX);
if (cert)
{
/* Return extensions for the certificate (singleExtensions). */
struct ocsp_reqitem_s *ri;
for (ri=ocsp->requestlist; ri; ri = ri->next)
if (ri->cert == cert)
break;
if (!ri)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND);
for (ex=ri->single_extensions; ex && idx; ex = ex->next, idx--)
;
if (!ex)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_EOF); /* No more extensions. */
}
else
{
/* Return extensions for the response (responseExtensions). */
for (ex=ocsp->response_extensions; ex && idx; ex = ex->next, idx--)
;
if (!ex)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_EOF); /* No more extensions. */
}
if (r_oid)
*r_oid = ex->data;
if (r_crit)
*r_crit = ex->crit;
if (r_der)
*r_der = ex->data + ex->off;
if (r_derlen)
*r_derlen = ex->len;
return 0;
}
|
ksba_ocsp_get_extension (ksba_ocsp_t ocsp, ksba_cert_t cert, int idx,
char const **r_oid, int *r_crit,
unsigned char const **r_der, size_t *r_derlen)
{
struct ocsp_extension_s *ex;
if (!ocsp)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE);
if (!ocsp->requestlist)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_MISSING_ACTION);
if (idx < 0)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_INDEX);
if (cert)
{
/* Return extensions for the certificate (singleExtensions). */
struct ocsp_reqitem_s *ri;
for (ri=ocsp->requestlist; ri; ri = ri->next)
if (ri->cert == cert)
break;
if (!ri)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND);
for (ex=ri->single_extensions; ex && idx; ex = ex->next, idx--)
;
if (!ex)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_EOF); /* No more extensions. */
}
else
{
/* Return extensions for the response (responseExtensions). */
for (ex=ocsp->response_extensions; ex && idx; ex = ex->next, idx--)
;
if (!ex)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_EOF); /* No more extensions. */
}
if (r_oid)
*r_oid = ex->data;
if (r_crit)
*r_crit = ex->crit;
if (r_der)
*r_der = ex->data + ex->off;
if (r_derlen)
*r_derlen = ex->len;
return 0;
}
|
C
|
gnupg
| 0 |
CVE-2017-6903
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-6903/
|
CWE-269
|
https://github.com/iortcw/iortcw/commit/11a83410153756ae350a82ed41b08d128ff7f998
|
11a83410153756ae350a82ed41b08d128ff7f998
|
All: Merge some file writing extension checks
|
void Con_Linefeed( qboolean skipnotify ) {
int i;
if ( con.current >= 0 ) {
if ( skipnotify ) {
con.times[con.current % NUM_CON_TIMES] = 0;
} else {
con.times[con.current % NUM_CON_TIMES] = cls.realtime;
}
}
con.x = 0;
if ( con.display == con.current ) {
con.display++;
}
con.current++;
for ( i = 0; i < con.linewidth; i++ )
con.text[( con.current % con.totallines ) * con.linewidth + i] = ( ColorIndex( COLNSOLE_COLOR ) << 8 ) | ' ';
}
|
void Con_Linefeed( qboolean skipnotify ) {
int i;
if ( con.current >= 0 ) {
if ( skipnotify ) {
con.times[con.current % NUM_CON_TIMES] = 0;
} else {
con.times[con.current % NUM_CON_TIMES] = cls.realtime;
}
}
con.x = 0;
if ( con.display == con.current ) {
con.display++;
}
con.current++;
for ( i = 0; i < con.linewidth; i++ )
con.text[( con.current % con.totallines ) * con.linewidth + i] = ( ColorIndex( COLNSOLE_COLOR ) << 8 ) | ' ';
}
|
C
|
OpenJK
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/d4cd2b2c0953ad7e9fa988c234eb9361be80fe81
|
d4cd2b2c0953ad7e9fa988c234eb9361be80fe81
|
DevTools: 'Overrides' UI overlay obstructs page and element inspector
BUG=302862
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/40233006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@160559 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
static Vector<KURL> allResourcesURLsForFrame(Frame* frame)
{
Vector<KURL> result;
result.append(urlWithoutFragment(frame->loader().documentLoader()->url()));
Vector<Resource*> allResources = cachedResourcesForFrame(frame);
for (Vector<Resource*>::const_iterator it = allResources.begin(); it != allResources.end(); ++it)
result.append(urlWithoutFragment((*it)->url()));
return result;
}
|
static Vector<KURL> allResourcesURLsForFrame(Frame* frame)
{
Vector<KURL> result;
result.append(urlWithoutFragment(frame->loader().documentLoader()->url()));
Vector<Resource*> allResources = cachedResourcesForFrame(frame);
for (Vector<Resource*>::const_iterator it = allResources.begin(); it != allResources.end(); ++it)
result.append(urlWithoutFragment((*it)->url()));
return result;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2019-5826
| null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/eaf2e8bce3855d362e53034bd83f0e3aff8714e4
|
eaf2e8bce3855d362e53034bd83f0e3aff8714e4
|
[IndexedDB] Fixed force close during pending connection open
During a force close of the database, the connections to that database
are iterated and force closed. The iteration method was not safe to
modification, and if there was a pending connection waiting to open,
that request would execute once all the other connections were
destroyed and create a new connection.
This change changes the iteration method to account for new connections
that are added during the iteration.
[email protected]
Bug: 941746
Change-Id: If1b3137237dc2920ad369d6ac99c963ed9c57d0c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1522330
Commit-Queue: Daniel Murphy <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Chase Phillips <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#640604}
|
void IndexedDBDatabase::RegisterAndScheduleTransaction(
IndexedDBTransaction* transaction) {
IDB_TRACE1("IndexedDBDatabase::RegisterAndScheduleTransaction", "txn.id",
transaction->id());
std::vector<ScopesLockManager::ScopeLockRequest> lock_requests;
lock_requests.reserve(1 + transaction->scope().size());
lock_requests.emplace_back(
kDatabaseRangeLockLevel, GetDatabaseLockRange(id()),
transaction->mode() == blink::mojom::IDBTransactionMode::VersionChange
? ScopesLockManager::LockType::kExclusive
: ScopesLockManager::LockType::kShared);
ScopesLockManager::LockType lock_type =
transaction->mode() == blink::mojom::IDBTransactionMode::ReadOnly
? ScopesLockManager::LockType::kShared
: ScopesLockManager::LockType::kExclusive;
for (int64_t object_store : transaction->scope()) {
lock_requests.emplace_back(kObjectStoreRangeLockLevel,
GetObjectStoreLockRange(id(), object_store),
lock_type);
}
lock_manager_->AcquireLocks(
std::move(lock_requests),
base::BindOnce(&IndexedDBTransaction::Start, transaction->AsWeakPtr()));
}
|
void IndexedDBDatabase::RegisterAndScheduleTransaction(
IndexedDBTransaction* transaction) {
IDB_TRACE1("IndexedDBDatabase::RegisterAndScheduleTransaction", "txn.id",
transaction->id());
std::vector<ScopesLockManager::ScopeLockRequest> lock_requests;
lock_requests.reserve(1 + transaction->scope().size());
lock_requests.emplace_back(
kDatabaseRangeLockLevel, GetDatabaseLockRange(id()),
transaction->mode() == blink::mojom::IDBTransactionMode::VersionChange
? ScopesLockManager::LockType::kExclusive
: ScopesLockManager::LockType::kShared);
ScopesLockManager::LockType lock_type =
transaction->mode() == blink::mojom::IDBTransactionMode::ReadOnly
? ScopesLockManager::LockType::kShared
: ScopesLockManager::LockType::kExclusive;
for (int64_t object_store : transaction->scope()) {
lock_requests.emplace_back(kObjectStoreRangeLockLevel,
GetObjectStoreLockRange(id(), object_store),
lock_type);
}
lock_manager_->AcquireLocks(
std::move(lock_requests),
base::BindOnce(&IndexedDBTransaction::Start, transaction->AsWeakPtr()));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1698
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1698/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/5fb2548448bd1b76a59d941b729d7a7f90d53bc8
|
5fb2548448bd1b76a59d941b729d7a7f90d53bc8
|
[Extensions] Finish freezing schema
BUG=604901
BUG=603725
BUG=591164
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1906593002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#388945}
|
void GetSchema(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& args) {
args.GetReturnValue().Set(
registry_->GetSchema(*v8::String::Utf8Value(args[0])));
}
|
void GetSchema(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& args) {
args.GetReturnValue().Set(
registry_->GetSchema(*v8::String::Utf8Value(args[0])));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/6834289784ed45b5524de0fb7ef43ae283b0d6d3
|
6834289784ed45b5524de0fb7ef43ae283b0d6d3
|
Output silence if the MediaElementAudioSourceNode has a different origin
See http://webaudio.github.io/web-audio-api/#security-with-mediaelementaudiosourcenode-and-cross-origin-resources
Two new tests added for the same origin and a cross origin source.
BUG=313939
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/520433002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@189527 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
AudioContext::AudioSummingJunctionDisposer::~AudioSummingJunctionDisposer()
{
ASSERT(isMainThread());
m_junction.dispose();
}
|
AudioContext::AudioSummingJunctionDisposer::~AudioSummingJunctionDisposer()
{
ASSERT(isMainThread());
m_junction.dispose();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2019-13106
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-13106/
|
CWE-787
|
https://github.com/u-boot/u-boot/commits/master
|
master
|
Merge branch '2020-01-22-master-imports'
- Re-add U8500 platform support
- Add bcm968360bg support
- Assorted Keymile fixes
- Other assorted bugfixes
|
int board_early_init_f(void)
{
ccsr_gur_t *gur = (void *)(CONFIG_SYS_MPC85xx_GUTS_ADDR);
bool cpuwd_flag = false;
/* configure mode for uP reset request */
qrio_uprstreq(UPREQ_CORE_RST);
/* board only uses the DDR_MCK0, so disable the DDR_MCK1/2/3 */
setbits_be32(&gur->ddrclkdr, 0x001f000f);
/* set reset reason according CPU register */
if ((gur->rstrqsr1 & (RSTRQSR1_WDT_RR | RSTRQSR1_SW_RR)) ==
RSTRQSR1_WDT_RR)
cpuwd_flag = true;
qrio_cpuwd_flag(cpuwd_flag);
/* clear CPU bits by writing 1 */
setbits_be32(&gur->rstrqsr1, RSTRQSR1_WDT_RR | RSTRQSR1_SW_RR);
/* set the BFTIC's prstcfg to reset at power-up and unit reset only */
qrio_prstcfg(BFTIC4_RST, PRSTCFG_POWUP_UNIT_RST);
/* and enable WD on it */
qrio_wdmask(BFTIC4_RST, true);
/* set the ZL30138's prstcfg to reset at power-up only */
qrio_prstcfg(ZL30158_RST, PRSTCFG_POWUP_RST);
/* and take it out of reset as soon as possible (needed for Hooper) */
qrio_prst(ZL30158_RST, false, false);
return 0;
}
|
int board_early_init_f(void)
{
ccsr_gur_t *gur = (void *)(CONFIG_SYS_MPC85xx_GUTS_ADDR);
bool cpuwd_flag = false;
/* configure mode for uP reset request */
qrio_uprstreq(UPREQ_CORE_RST);
/* board only uses the DDR_MCK0, so disable the DDR_MCK1/2/3 */
setbits_be32(&gur->ddrclkdr, 0x001f000f);
/* set reset reason according CPU register */
if ((gur->rstrqsr1 & (RSTRQSR1_WDT_RR | RSTRQSR1_SW_RR)) ==
RSTRQSR1_WDT_RR)
cpuwd_flag = true;
qrio_cpuwd_flag(cpuwd_flag);
/* clear CPU bits by writing 1 */
setbits_be32(&gur->rstrqsr1, RSTRQSR1_WDT_RR | RSTRQSR1_SW_RR);
/* set the BFTIC's prstcfg to reset at power-up and unit reset only */
qrio_prstcfg(BFTIC4_RST, PRSTCFG_POWUP_UNIT_RST);
/* and enable WD on it */
qrio_wdmask(BFTIC4_RST, true);
/* set the ZL30138's prstcfg to reset at power-up only */
qrio_prstcfg(ZL30158_RST, PRSTCFG_POWUP_RST);
/* and take it out of reset as soon as possible (needed for Hooper) */
qrio_prst(ZL30158_RST, false, false);
return 0;
}
|
C
|
u-boot
| 0 |
CVE-2018-15855
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-15855/
|
CWE-476
|
https://github.com/xkbcommon/libxkbcommon/commit/917636b1d0d70205a13f89062b95e3a0fc31d4ff
|
917636b1d0d70205a13f89062b95e3a0fc31d4ff
|
xkbcomp: fix crash when parsing an xkb_geometry section
xkb_geometry sections are ignored; previously the had done so by
returning NULL for the section's XkbFile, however some sections of the
code do not expect this. Instead, create an XkbFile for it, it will
never be processes and discarded later.
Caught with the afl fuzzer.
Signed-off-by: Ran Benita <[email protected]>
|
UpdateActionMods(struct xkb_keymap *keymap, union xkb_action *act,
xkb_mod_mask_t modmap)
{
switch (act->type) {
case ACTION_TYPE_MOD_SET:
case ACTION_TYPE_MOD_LATCH:
case ACTION_TYPE_MOD_LOCK:
if (act->mods.flags & ACTION_MODS_LOOKUP_MODMAP)
act->mods.mods.mods = modmap;
ComputeEffectiveMask(keymap, &act->mods.mods);
break;
default:
break;
}
}
|
UpdateActionMods(struct xkb_keymap *keymap, union xkb_action *act,
xkb_mod_mask_t modmap)
{
switch (act->type) {
case ACTION_TYPE_MOD_SET:
case ACTION_TYPE_MOD_LATCH:
case ACTION_TYPE_MOD_LOCK:
if (act->mods.flags & ACTION_MODS_LOOKUP_MODMAP)
act->mods.mods.mods = modmap;
ComputeEffectiveMask(keymap, &act->mods.mods);
break;
default:
break;
}
}
|
C
|
libxkbcommon
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5773
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5773/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/php/php-src/commit/f6aef68089221c5ea047d4a74224ee3deead99a6?w=1
|
f6aef68089221c5ea047d4a74224ee3deead99a6?w=1
|
Fix bug #72434: ZipArchive class Use After Free Vulnerability in PHP's GC algorithm and unserialize
|
static PHP_NAMED_FUNCTION(zif_zip_entry_compressionmethod)
{
php_zip_entry_get_info(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAM_PASSTHRU, 3);
}
|
static PHP_NAMED_FUNCTION(zif_zip_entry_compressionmethod)
{
php_zip_entry_get_info(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAM_PASSTHRU, 3);
}
|
C
|
php-src
| 0 |
CVE-2016-10061
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-10061/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/4e914bbe371433f0590cefdf3bd5f3a5710069f9
|
4e914bbe371433f0590cefdf3bd5f3a5710069f9
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/196
|
ModuleExport size_t RegisterTIFFImage(void)
{
#define TIFFDescription "Tagged Image File Format"
char
version[MagickPathExtent];
MagickInfo
*entry;
if (tiff_semaphore == (SemaphoreInfo *) NULL)
ActivateSemaphoreInfo(&tiff_semaphore);
LockSemaphoreInfo(tiff_semaphore);
if (instantiate_key == MagickFalse)
{
if (CreateMagickThreadKey(&tiff_exception,NULL) == MagickFalse)
ThrowFatalException(ResourceLimitFatalError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
error_handler=TIFFSetErrorHandler(TIFFErrors);
warning_handler=TIFFSetWarningHandler(TIFFWarnings);
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_HAVE_TIFFMERGEFIELDINFO) && defined(MAGICKCORE_HAVE_TIFFSETTAGEXTENDER)
if (tag_extender == (TIFFExtendProc) NULL)
tag_extender=TIFFSetTagExtender(TIFFTagExtender);
#endif
instantiate_key=MagickTrue;
}
UnlockSemaphoreInfo(tiff_semaphore);
*version='\0';
#if defined(TIFF_VERSION)
(void) FormatLocaleString(version,MagickPathExtent,"%d",TIFF_VERSION);
#endif
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_TIFF_DELEGATE)
{
const char
*p;
register ssize_t
i;
p=TIFFGetVersion();
for (i=0; (i < (MagickPathExtent-1)) && (*p != 0) && (*p != '\n'); i++)
version[i]=(*p++);
version[i]='\0';
}
#endif
entry=AcquireMagickInfo("TIFF","GROUP4","Raw CCITT Group4");
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_TIFF_DELEGATE)
entry->decoder=(DecodeImageHandler *) ReadGROUP4Image;
entry->encoder=(EncodeImageHandler *) WriteGROUP4Image;
#endif
entry->flags|=CoderRawSupportFlag;
entry->flags|=CoderEndianSupportFlag;
entry->flags|=CoderSeekableStreamFlag;
entry->flags^=CoderAdjoinFlag;
entry->flags^=CoderUseExtensionFlag;
entry->format_type=ImplicitFormatType;
entry->mime_type=ConstantString("image/tiff");
(void) RegisterMagickInfo(entry);
entry=AcquireMagickInfo("TIFF","PTIF","Pyramid encoded TIFF");
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_TIFF_DELEGATE)
entry->decoder=(DecodeImageHandler *) ReadTIFFImage;
entry->encoder=(EncodeImageHandler *) WritePTIFImage;
#endif
entry->flags|=CoderEndianSupportFlag;
entry->flags|=CoderSeekableStreamFlag;
entry->flags^=CoderUseExtensionFlag;
entry->mime_type=ConstantString("image/tiff");
(void) RegisterMagickInfo(entry);
entry=AcquireMagickInfo("TIFF","TIF",TIFFDescription);
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_TIFF_DELEGATE)
entry->decoder=(DecodeImageHandler *) ReadTIFFImage;
entry->encoder=(EncodeImageHandler *) WriteTIFFImage;
#endif
entry->flags|=CoderEndianSupportFlag;
entry->flags|=CoderSeekableStreamFlag;
entry->flags|=CoderStealthFlag;
entry->flags^=CoderUseExtensionFlag;
if (*version != '\0')
entry->version=ConstantString(version);
entry->mime_type=ConstantString("image/tiff");
(void) RegisterMagickInfo(entry);
entry=AcquireMagickInfo("TIFF","TIFF",TIFFDescription);
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_TIFF_DELEGATE)
entry->decoder=(DecodeImageHandler *) ReadTIFFImage;
entry->encoder=(EncodeImageHandler *) WriteTIFFImage;
#endif
entry->magick=(IsImageFormatHandler *) IsTIFF;
entry->flags|=CoderEndianSupportFlag;
entry->flags|=CoderSeekableStreamFlag;
entry->flags^=CoderUseExtensionFlag;
if (*version != '\0')
entry->version=ConstantString(version);
entry->mime_type=ConstantString("image/tiff");
(void) RegisterMagickInfo(entry);
entry=AcquireMagickInfo("TIFF","TIFF64","Tagged Image File Format (64-bit)");
#if defined(TIFF_VERSION_BIG)
entry->decoder=(DecodeImageHandler *) ReadTIFFImage;
entry->encoder=(EncodeImageHandler *) WriteTIFFImage;
#endif
entry->flags|=CoderEndianSupportFlag;
entry->flags|=CoderSeekableStreamFlag;
entry->flags^=CoderAdjoinFlag;
entry->flags^=CoderUseExtensionFlag;
if (*version != '\0')
entry->version=ConstantString(version);
entry->mime_type=ConstantString("image/tiff");
(void) RegisterMagickInfo(entry);
return(MagickImageCoderSignature);
}
|
ModuleExport size_t RegisterTIFFImage(void)
{
#define TIFFDescription "Tagged Image File Format"
char
version[MagickPathExtent];
MagickInfo
*entry;
if (tiff_semaphore == (SemaphoreInfo *) NULL)
ActivateSemaphoreInfo(&tiff_semaphore);
LockSemaphoreInfo(tiff_semaphore);
if (instantiate_key == MagickFalse)
{
if (CreateMagickThreadKey(&tiff_exception,NULL) == MagickFalse)
ThrowFatalException(ResourceLimitFatalError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
error_handler=TIFFSetErrorHandler(TIFFErrors);
warning_handler=TIFFSetWarningHandler(TIFFWarnings);
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_HAVE_TIFFMERGEFIELDINFO) && defined(MAGICKCORE_HAVE_TIFFSETTAGEXTENDER)
if (tag_extender == (TIFFExtendProc) NULL)
tag_extender=TIFFSetTagExtender(TIFFTagExtender);
#endif
instantiate_key=MagickTrue;
}
UnlockSemaphoreInfo(tiff_semaphore);
*version='\0';
#if defined(TIFF_VERSION)
(void) FormatLocaleString(version,MagickPathExtent,"%d",TIFF_VERSION);
#endif
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_TIFF_DELEGATE)
{
const char
*p;
register ssize_t
i;
p=TIFFGetVersion();
for (i=0; (i < (MagickPathExtent-1)) && (*p != 0) && (*p != '\n'); i++)
version[i]=(*p++);
version[i]='\0';
}
#endif
entry=AcquireMagickInfo("TIFF","GROUP4","Raw CCITT Group4");
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_TIFF_DELEGATE)
entry->decoder=(DecodeImageHandler *) ReadGROUP4Image;
entry->encoder=(EncodeImageHandler *) WriteGROUP4Image;
#endif
entry->flags|=CoderRawSupportFlag;
entry->flags|=CoderEndianSupportFlag;
entry->flags|=CoderSeekableStreamFlag;
entry->flags^=CoderAdjoinFlag;
entry->flags^=CoderUseExtensionFlag;
entry->format_type=ImplicitFormatType;
entry->mime_type=ConstantString("image/tiff");
(void) RegisterMagickInfo(entry);
entry=AcquireMagickInfo("TIFF","PTIF","Pyramid encoded TIFF");
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_TIFF_DELEGATE)
entry->decoder=(DecodeImageHandler *) ReadTIFFImage;
entry->encoder=(EncodeImageHandler *) WritePTIFImage;
#endif
entry->flags|=CoderEndianSupportFlag;
entry->flags|=CoderSeekableStreamFlag;
entry->flags^=CoderUseExtensionFlag;
entry->mime_type=ConstantString("image/tiff");
(void) RegisterMagickInfo(entry);
entry=AcquireMagickInfo("TIFF","TIF",TIFFDescription);
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_TIFF_DELEGATE)
entry->decoder=(DecodeImageHandler *) ReadTIFFImage;
entry->encoder=(EncodeImageHandler *) WriteTIFFImage;
#endif
entry->flags|=CoderEndianSupportFlag;
entry->flags|=CoderSeekableStreamFlag;
entry->flags|=CoderStealthFlag;
entry->flags^=CoderUseExtensionFlag;
if (*version != '\0')
entry->version=ConstantString(version);
entry->mime_type=ConstantString("image/tiff");
(void) RegisterMagickInfo(entry);
entry=AcquireMagickInfo("TIFF","TIFF",TIFFDescription);
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_TIFF_DELEGATE)
entry->decoder=(DecodeImageHandler *) ReadTIFFImage;
entry->encoder=(EncodeImageHandler *) WriteTIFFImage;
#endif
entry->magick=(IsImageFormatHandler *) IsTIFF;
entry->flags|=CoderEndianSupportFlag;
entry->flags|=CoderSeekableStreamFlag;
entry->flags^=CoderUseExtensionFlag;
if (*version != '\0')
entry->version=ConstantString(version);
entry->mime_type=ConstantString("image/tiff");
(void) RegisterMagickInfo(entry);
entry=AcquireMagickInfo("TIFF","TIFF64","Tagged Image File Format (64-bit)");
#if defined(TIFF_VERSION_BIG)
entry->decoder=(DecodeImageHandler *) ReadTIFFImage;
entry->encoder=(EncodeImageHandler *) WriteTIFFImage;
#endif
entry->flags|=CoderEndianSupportFlag;
entry->flags|=CoderSeekableStreamFlag;
entry->flags^=CoderAdjoinFlag;
entry->flags^=CoderUseExtensionFlag;
if (*version != '\0')
entry->version=ConstantString(version);
entry->mime_type=ConstantString("image/tiff");
(void) RegisterMagickInfo(entry);
return(MagickImageCoderSignature);
}
|
C
|
ImageMagick
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5094
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5094/
|
CWE-704
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/41f5b55ab27da6890af96f2f8f0f6dd5bc6cc93c
|
41f5b55ab27da6890af96f2f8f0f6dd5bc6cc93c
|
SkiaRenderer: Support changing color space
SkiaOutputSurfaceImpl did not handle the color space changing after it
was created previously. The SkSurfaceCharacterization color space was
only set during the first time Reshape() ran when the charactization is
returned from the GPU thread. If the color space was changed later the
SkSurface and SkDDL color spaces no longer matched and draw failed.
Bug: 1009452
Change-Id: Ib6d2083efc7e7eb6f94782342e92a809b69d6fdc
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1841811
Reviewed-by: Peng Huang <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: kylechar <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#702946}
|
void SkiaOutputSurfaceImpl::AddContextLostObserver(
ContextLostObserver* observer) {
observers_.AddObserver(observer);
}
|
void SkiaOutputSurfaceImpl::AddContextLostObserver(
ContextLostObserver* observer) {
observers_.AddObserver(observer);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-6763
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-6763/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f1574f25e1402e748bf2bd7e28ce3dd96ceb1ca4
|
f1574f25e1402e748bf2bd7e28ce3dd96ceb1ca4
|
MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
|
void LocalDOMWindow::RemovePostMessageTimer(PostMessageTimer* timer) {
post_message_timers_.erase(timer);
}
|
void LocalDOMWindow::RemovePostMessageTimer(PostMessageTimer* timer) {
post_message_timers_.erase(timer);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-1743
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-1743/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/6d9425ec7badda912555d46ea7abcfab81fdd9b9
|
6d9425ec7badda912555d46ea7abcfab81fdd9b9
|
sync compositor: pass simple gfx types by const ref
See bug for reasoning
BUG=159273
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1417893006
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#356653}
|
void BrowserViewRenderer::ForceFakeCompositeSW() {
DCHECK(compositor_);
SkBitmap bitmap;
bitmap.allocN32Pixels(1, 1);
bitmap.eraseColor(0);
SkCanvas canvas(bitmap);
CompositeSW(&canvas);
}
|
void BrowserViewRenderer::ForceFakeCompositeSW() {
DCHECK(compositor_);
SkBitmap bitmap;
bitmap.allocN32Pixels(1, 1);
bitmap.eraseColor(0);
SkCanvas canvas(bitmap);
CompositeSW(&canvas);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-2429
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-2429/
|
CWE-119
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/flac/+/b499389da21d89d32deff500376c5ee4f8f0b04c
|
b499389da21d89d32deff500376c5ee4f8f0b04c
|
Avoid free-before-initialize vulnerability in heap
Bug: 27211885
Change-Id: Ib9c93bd9ffdde2a5f8d31a86f06e267dc9c152db
|
FLAC__bool read_subframe_verbatim_(FLAC__StreamDecoder *decoder, unsigned channel, unsigned bps, FLAC__bool do_full_decode)
{
FLAC__Subframe_Verbatim *subframe = &decoder->private_->frame.subframes[channel].data.verbatim;
FLAC__int32 x, *residual = decoder->private_->residual[channel];
unsigned i;
decoder->private_->frame.subframes[channel].type = FLAC__SUBFRAME_TYPE_VERBATIM;
subframe->data = residual;
for(i = 0; i < decoder->private_->frame.header.blocksize; i++) {
if(!FLAC__bitreader_read_raw_int32(decoder->private_->input, &x, bps))
return false; /* read_callback_ sets the state for us */
residual[i] = x;
}
/* decode the subframe */
if(do_full_decode)
memcpy(decoder->private_->output[channel], subframe->data, sizeof(FLAC__int32) * decoder->private_->frame.header.blocksize);
return true;
}
|
FLAC__bool read_subframe_verbatim_(FLAC__StreamDecoder *decoder, unsigned channel, unsigned bps, FLAC__bool do_full_decode)
{
FLAC__Subframe_Verbatim *subframe = &decoder->private_->frame.subframes[channel].data.verbatim;
FLAC__int32 x, *residual = decoder->private_->residual[channel];
unsigned i;
decoder->private_->frame.subframes[channel].type = FLAC__SUBFRAME_TYPE_VERBATIM;
subframe->data = residual;
for(i = 0; i < decoder->private_->frame.header.blocksize; i++) {
if(!FLAC__bitreader_read_raw_int32(decoder->private_->input, &x, bps))
return false; /* read_callback_ sets the state for us */
residual[i] = x;
}
/* decode the subframe */
if(do_full_decode)
memcpy(decoder->private_->output[channel], subframe->data, sizeof(FLAC__int32) * decoder->private_->frame.header.blocksize);
return true;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2019-15148
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-15148/
|
CWE-787
|
https://github.com/gopro/gpmf-parser/commit/341f12cd5b97ab419e53853ca00176457c9f1681
|
341f12cd5b97ab419e53853ca00176457c9f1681
|
fixed many security issues with the too crude mp4 reader
|
size_t OpenMP4SourceUDTA(char *filename)
{
mp4object *mp4 = (mp4object *)malloc(sizeof(mp4object));
if (mp4 == NULL) return 0;
memset(mp4, 0, sizeof(mp4object));
#ifdef _WINDOWS
fopen_s(&mp4->mediafp, filename, "rb");
#else
mp4->mediafp = fopen(filename, "rb");
#endif
if (mp4->mediafp)
{
uint32_t qttag, qtsize32;
size_t len;
int32_t nest = 0;
uint64_t nestsize[MAX_NEST_LEVEL] = { 0 };
uint64_t lastsize = 0, qtsize;
do
{
len = fread(&qtsize32, 1, 4, mp4->mediafp);
len += fread(&qttag, 1, 4, mp4->mediafp);
if (len == 8)
{
if (!GPMF_VALID_FOURCC(qttag))
{
LongSeek(mp4, lastsize - 8 - 8);
NESTSIZE(lastsize - 8);
continue;
}
qtsize32 = BYTESWAP32(qtsize32);
if (qtsize32 == 1) // 64-bit Atom
{
fread(&qtsize, 1, 8, mp4->mediafp);
qtsize = BYTESWAP64(qtsize) - 8;
}
else
qtsize = qtsize32;
nest++;
if (qtsize < 8) break;
if (nest >= MAX_NEST_LEVEL) break;
nestsize[nest] = qtsize;
lastsize = qtsize;
if (qttag == MAKEID('m', 'd', 'a', 't') ||
qttag == MAKEID('f', 't', 'y', 'p'))
{
LongSeek(mp4, qtsize - 8);
NESTSIZE(qtsize);
continue;
}
if (qttag == MAKEID('G', 'P', 'M', 'F'))
{
mp4->videolength += 1.0;
mp4->metadatalength += 1.0;
mp4->indexcount = (int)mp4->metadatalength;
mp4->metasizes = (uint32_t *)malloc(mp4->indexcount * 4 + 4); memset(mp4->metasizes, 0, mp4->indexcount * 4 + 4);
mp4->metaoffsets = (uint64_t *)malloc(mp4->indexcount * 8 + 8); memset(mp4->metaoffsets, 0, mp4->indexcount * 8 + 8);
mp4->metasizes[0] = (int)qtsize - 8;
mp4->metaoffsets[0] = ftell(mp4->mediafp);
mp4->metasize_count = 1;
return (size_t)mp4; // not an MP4, RAW GPMF which has not inherent timing, assigning a during of 1second.
}
if (qttag != MAKEID('m', 'o', 'o', 'v') && //skip over all but these atoms
qttag != MAKEID('u', 'd', 't', 'a'))
{
LongSeek(mp4, qtsize - 8);
NESTSIZE(qtsize);
continue;
}
else
{
NESTSIZE(8);
}
}
} while (len > 0);
}
return (size_t)mp4;
}
|
size_t OpenMP4SourceUDTA(char *filename)
{
mp4object *mp4 = (mp4object *)malloc(sizeof(mp4object));
if (mp4 == NULL) return 0;
memset(mp4, 0, sizeof(mp4object));
#ifdef _WINDOWS
fopen_s(&mp4->mediafp, filename, "rb");
#else
mp4->mediafp = fopen(filename, "rb");
#endif
if (mp4->mediafp)
{
uint32_t qttag, qtsize32, len;
int32_t nest = 0;
uint64_t nestsize[MAX_NEST_LEVEL] = { 0 };
uint64_t lastsize = 0, qtsize;
do
{
len = fread(&qtsize32, 1, 4, mp4->mediafp);
len += fread(&qttag, 1, 4, mp4->mediafp);
if (len == 8)
{
if (!GPMF_VALID_FOURCC(qttag))
{
LONGSEEK(mp4->mediafp, lastsize - 8 - 8, SEEK_CUR);
NESTSIZE(lastsize - 8);
continue;
}
qtsize32 = BYTESWAP32(qtsize32);
if (qtsize32 == 1) // 64-bit Atom
{
fread(&qtsize, 1, 8, mp4->mediafp);
qtsize = BYTESWAP64(qtsize) - 8;
}
else
qtsize = qtsize32;
nest++;
if (qtsize < 8) break;
if (nest >= MAX_NEST_LEVEL) break;
nestsize[nest] = qtsize;
lastsize = qtsize;
if (qttag == MAKEID('m', 'd', 'a', 't') ||
qttag == MAKEID('f', 't', 'y', 'p'))
{
LONGSEEK(mp4->mediafp, qtsize - 8, SEEK_CUR);
NESTSIZE(qtsize);
continue;
}
if (qttag == MAKEID('G', 'P', 'M', 'F'))
{
mp4->videolength += 1.0;
mp4->metadatalength += 1.0;
mp4->indexcount = (int)mp4->metadatalength;
mp4->metasizes = (uint32_t *)malloc(mp4->indexcount * 4 + 4); memset(mp4->metasizes, 0, mp4->indexcount * 4 + 4);
mp4->metaoffsets = (uint64_t *)malloc(mp4->indexcount * 8 + 8); memset(mp4->metaoffsets, 0, mp4->indexcount * 8 + 8);
mp4->metasizes[0] = (int)qtsize - 8;
mp4->metaoffsets[0] = ftell(mp4->mediafp);
mp4->metasize_count = 1;
return (size_t)mp4; // not an MP4, RAW GPMF which has not inherent timing, assigning a during of 1second.
}
if (qttag != MAKEID('m', 'o', 'o', 'v') && //skip over all but these atoms
qttag != MAKEID('u', 'd', 't', 'a'))
{
LONGSEEK(mp4->mediafp, qtsize - 8, SEEK_CUR);
NESTSIZE(qtsize);
continue;
}
else
{
NESTSIZE(8);
}
}
} while (len > 0);
}
return (size_t)mp4;
}
|
C
|
gpmf-parser
| 1 |
CVE-2011-0716
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-0716/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/6b0d6a9b4296fa16a28d10d416db7a770fc03287
|
6b0d6a9b4296fa16a28d10d416db7a770fc03287
|
bridge: Fix mglist corruption that leads to memory corruption
The list mp->mglist is used to indicate whether a multicast group
is active on the bridge interface itself as opposed to one of the
constituent interfaces in the bridge.
Unfortunately the operation that adds the mp->mglist node to the
list neglected to check whether it has already been added. This
leads to list corruption in the form of nodes pointing to itself.
Normally this would be quite obvious as it would cause an infinite
loop when walking the list. However, as this list is never actually
walked (which means that we don't really need it, I'll get rid of
it in a subsequent patch), this instead is hidden until we perform
a delete operation on the affected nodes.
As the same node may now be pointed to by more than one node, the
delete operations can then cause modification of freed memory.
This was observed in practice to cause corruption in 512-byte slabs,
most commonly leading to crashes in jbd2.
Thanks to Josef Bacik for pointing me in the right direction.
Reported-by: Ian Page Hands <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
int br_multicast_toggle(struct net_bridge *br, unsigned long val)
{
struct net_bridge_port *port;
int err = 0;
struct net_bridge_mdb_htable *mdb;
spin_lock(&br->multicast_lock);
if (br->multicast_disabled == !val)
goto unlock;
br->multicast_disabled = !val;
if (br->multicast_disabled)
goto unlock;
if (!netif_running(br->dev))
goto unlock;
mdb = mlock_dereference(br->mdb, br);
if (mdb) {
if (mdb->old) {
err = -EEXIST;
rollback:
br->multicast_disabled = !!val;
goto unlock;
}
err = br_mdb_rehash(&br->mdb, mdb->max,
br->hash_elasticity);
if (err)
goto rollback;
}
br_multicast_open(br);
list_for_each_entry(port, &br->port_list, list) {
if (port->state == BR_STATE_DISABLED ||
port->state == BR_STATE_BLOCKING)
continue;
__br_multicast_enable_port(port);
}
unlock:
spin_unlock(&br->multicast_lock);
return err;
}
|
int br_multicast_toggle(struct net_bridge *br, unsigned long val)
{
struct net_bridge_port *port;
int err = 0;
struct net_bridge_mdb_htable *mdb;
spin_lock(&br->multicast_lock);
if (br->multicast_disabled == !val)
goto unlock;
br->multicast_disabled = !val;
if (br->multicast_disabled)
goto unlock;
if (!netif_running(br->dev))
goto unlock;
mdb = mlock_dereference(br->mdb, br);
if (mdb) {
if (mdb->old) {
err = -EEXIST;
rollback:
br->multicast_disabled = !!val;
goto unlock;
}
err = br_mdb_rehash(&br->mdb, mdb->max,
br->hash_elasticity);
if (err)
goto rollback;
}
br_multicast_open(br);
list_for_each_entry(port, &br->port_list, list) {
if (port->state == BR_STATE_DISABLED ||
port->state == BR_STATE_BLOCKING)
continue;
__br_multicast_enable_port(port);
}
unlock:
spin_unlock(&br->multicast_lock);
return err;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-9390
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-9390/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/mdadams/jasper/commit/ba2b9d000660313af7b692542afbd374c5685865
|
ba2b9d000660313af7b692542afbd374c5685865
|
Ensure that not all tiles lie outside the image area.
|
static int jpc_dec_process_siz(jpc_dec_t *dec, jpc_ms_t *ms)
{
jpc_siz_t *siz = &ms->parms.siz;
int compno;
int tileno;
jpc_dec_tile_t *tile;
jpc_dec_tcomp_t *tcomp;
int htileno;
int vtileno;
jpc_dec_cmpt_t *cmpt;
size_t size;
dec->xstart = siz->xoff;
dec->ystart = siz->yoff;
dec->xend = siz->width;
dec->yend = siz->height;
dec->tilewidth = siz->tilewidth;
dec->tileheight = siz->tileheight;
dec->tilexoff = siz->tilexoff;
dec->tileyoff = siz->tileyoff;
dec->numcomps = siz->numcomps;
if (!(dec->cp = jpc_dec_cp_create(dec->numcomps))) {
return -1;
}
if (!(dec->cmpts = jas_alloc2(dec->numcomps, sizeof(jpc_dec_cmpt_t)))) {
return -1;
}
for (compno = 0, cmpt = dec->cmpts; compno < dec->numcomps; ++compno,
++cmpt) {
cmpt->prec = siz->comps[compno].prec;
cmpt->sgnd = siz->comps[compno].sgnd;
cmpt->hstep = siz->comps[compno].hsamp;
cmpt->vstep = siz->comps[compno].vsamp;
cmpt->width = JPC_CEILDIV(dec->xend, cmpt->hstep) -
JPC_CEILDIV(dec->xstart, cmpt->hstep);
cmpt->height = JPC_CEILDIV(dec->yend, cmpt->vstep) -
JPC_CEILDIV(dec->ystart, cmpt->vstep);
cmpt->hsubstep = 0;
cmpt->vsubstep = 0;
}
dec->image = 0;
dec->numhtiles = JPC_CEILDIV(dec->xend - dec->tilexoff, dec->tilewidth);
dec->numvtiles = JPC_CEILDIV(dec->yend - dec->tileyoff, dec->tileheight);
if (!jas_safe_size_mul(dec->numhtiles, dec->numvtiles, &size)) {
return -1;
}
dec->numtiles = size;
JAS_DBGLOG(10, ("numtiles = %d; numhtiles = %d; numvtiles = %d;\n",
dec->numtiles, dec->numhtiles, dec->numvtiles));
if (!(dec->tiles = jas_alloc2(dec->numtiles, sizeof(jpc_dec_tile_t)))) {
return -1;
}
for (tileno = 0, tile = dec->tiles; tileno < dec->numtiles; ++tileno,
++tile) {
htileno = tileno % dec->numhtiles;
vtileno = tileno / dec->numhtiles;
tile->realmode = 0;
tile->state = JPC_TILE_INIT;
tile->xstart = JAS_MAX(dec->tilexoff + htileno * dec->tilewidth,
dec->xstart);
tile->ystart = JAS_MAX(dec->tileyoff + vtileno * dec->tileheight,
dec->ystart);
tile->xend = JAS_MIN(dec->tilexoff + (htileno + 1) *
dec->tilewidth, dec->xend);
tile->yend = JAS_MIN(dec->tileyoff + (vtileno + 1) *
dec->tileheight, dec->yend);
tile->numparts = 0;
tile->partno = 0;
tile->pkthdrstream = 0;
tile->pkthdrstreampos = 0;
tile->pptstab = 0;
tile->cp = 0;
tile->pi = 0;
if (!(tile->tcomps = jas_alloc2(dec->numcomps,
sizeof(jpc_dec_tcomp_t)))) {
return -1;
}
for (compno = 0, cmpt = dec->cmpts, tcomp = tile->tcomps;
compno < dec->numcomps; ++compno, ++cmpt, ++tcomp) {
tcomp->rlvls = 0;
tcomp->numrlvls = 0;
tcomp->data = 0;
tcomp->xstart = JPC_CEILDIV(tile->xstart, cmpt->hstep);
tcomp->ystart = JPC_CEILDIV(tile->ystart, cmpt->vstep);
tcomp->xend = JPC_CEILDIV(tile->xend, cmpt->hstep);
tcomp->yend = JPC_CEILDIV(tile->yend, cmpt->vstep);
tcomp->tsfb = 0;
}
}
dec->pkthdrstreams = 0;
/* We should expect to encounter other main header marker segments
or an SOT marker segment next. */
dec->state = JPC_MH;
return 0;
}
|
static int jpc_dec_process_siz(jpc_dec_t *dec, jpc_ms_t *ms)
{
jpc_siz_t *siz = &ms->parms.siz;
int compno;
int tileno;
jpc_dec_tile_t *tile;
jpc_dec_tcomp_t *tcomp;
int htileno;
int vtileno;
jpc_dec_cmpt_t *cmpt;
size_t size;
dec->xstart = siz->xoff;
dec->ystart = siz->yoff;
dec->xend = siz->width;
dec->yend = siz->height;
dec->tilewidth = siz->tilewidth;
dec->tileheight = siz->tileheight;
dec->tilexoff = siz->tilexoff;
dec->tileyoff = siz->tileyoff;
dec->numcomps = siz->numcomps;
if (!(dec->cp = jpc_dec_cp_create(dec->numcomps))) {
return -1;
}
if (!(dec->cmpts = jas_alloc2(dec->numcomps, sizeof(jpc_dec_cmpt_t)))) {
return -1;
}
for (compno = 0, cmpt = dec->cmpts; compno < dec->numcomps; ++compno,
++cmpt) {
cmpt->prec = siz->comps[compno].prec;
cmpt->sgnd = siz->comps[compno].sgnd;
cmpt->hstep = siz->comps[compno].hsamp;
cmpt->vstep = siz->comps[compno].vsamp;
cmpt->width = JPC_CEILDIV(dec->xend, cmpt->hstep) -
JPC_CEILDIV(dec->xstart, cmpt->hstep);
cmpt->height = JPC_CEILDIV(dec->yend, cmpt->vstep) -
JPC_CEILDIV(dec->ystart, cmpt->vstep);
cmpt->hsubstep = 0;
cmpt->vsubstep = 0;
}
dec->image = 0;
dec->numhtiles = JPC_CEILDIV(dec->xend - dec->tilexoff, dec->tilewidth);
dec->numvtiles = JPC_CEILDIV(dec->yend - dec->tileyoff, dec->tileheight);
if (!jas_safe_size_mul(dec->numhtiles, dec->numvtiles, &size)) {
return -1;
}
dec->numtiles = size;
JAS_DBGLOG(10, ("numtiles = %d; numhtiles = %d; numvtiles = %d;\n",
dec->numtiles, dec->numhtiles, dec->numvtiles));
if (!(dec->tiles = jas_alloc2(dec->numtiles, sizeof(jpc_dec_tile_t)))) {
return -1;
}
for (tileno = 0, tile = dec->tiles; tileno < dec->numtiles; ++tileno,
++tile) {
htileno = tileno % dec->numhtiles;
vtileno = tileno / dec->numhtiles;
tile->realmode = 0;
tile->state = JPC_TILE_INIT;
tile->xstart = JAS_MAX(dec->tilexoff + htileno * dec->tilewidth,
dec->xstart);
tile->ystart = JAS_MAX(dec->tileyoff + vtileno * dec->tileheight,
dec->ystart);
tile->xend = JAS_MIN(dec->tilexoff + (htileno + 1) *
dec->tilewidth, dec->xend);
tile->yend = JAS_MIN(dec->tileyoff + (vtileno + 1) *
dec->tileheight, dec->yend);
tile->numparts = 0;
tile->partno = 0;
tile->pkthdrstream = 0;
tile->pkthdrstreampos = 0;
tile->pptstab = 0;
tile->cp = 0;
tile->pi = 0;
if (!(tile->tcomps = jas_alloc2(dec->numcomps,
sizeof(jpc_dec_tcomp_t)))) {
return -1;
}
for (compno = 0, cmpt = dec->cmpts, tcomp = tile->tcomps;
compno < dec->numcomps; ++compno, ++cmpt, ++tcomp) {
tcomp->rlvls = 0;
tcomp->numrlvls = 0;
tcomp->data = 0;
tcomp->xstart = JPC_CEILDIV(tile->xstart, cmpt->hstep);
tcomp->ystart = JPC_CEILDIV(tile->ystart, cmpt->vstep);
tcomp->xend = JPC_CEILDIV(tile->xend, cmpt->hstep);
tcomp->yend = JPC_CEILDIV(tile->yend, cmpt->vstep);
tcomp->tsfb = 0;
}
}
dec->pkthdrstreams = 0;
/* We should expect to encounter other main header marker segments
or an SOT marker segment next. */
dec->state = JPC_MH;
return 0;
}
|
C
|
jasper
| 1 |
CVE-2012-2875
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2875/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/0e9e87823285d504a210dcce2eabdc847f230f09
|
0e9e87823285d504a210dcce2eabdc847f230f09
|
Adds per-provider information to omnibox UMA logs.
Adds a fairly general structure to omnibox logs that can be used to pass information (that's not per-result information) from providers to the UMA logs. Right now it's only used to pass whether the asynchronous pass of a provider has finished, but it will probably be used for other things in the future.
BUG=
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10380007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137288 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
AutocompleteEditController::~AutocompleteEditController() {
}
|
AutocompleteEditController::~AutocompleteEditController() {
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-7375
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-7375/
|
CWE-611
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/libxml2/+/308396a55280f69ad4112d4f9892f4cbeff042aa
|
308396a55280f69ad4112d4f9892f4cbeff042aa
|
DO NOT MERGE: Add validation for eternal enities
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=780691
Bug: 36556310
Change-Id: I9450743e167c3c73af5e4071f3fc85e81d061648
(cherry picked from commit bef9af3d89d241bcb518c20cba6da2a2fd9ba049)
|
xmlParsePubidLiteral(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
xmlChar *buf = NULL;
int len = 0;
int size = XML_PARSER_BUFFER_SIZE;
xmlChar cur;
xmlChar stop;
int count = 0;
xmlParserInputState oldstate = ctxt->instate;
SHRINK;
if (RAW == '"') {
NEXT;
stop = '"';
} else if (RAW == '\'') {
NEXT;
stop = '\'';
} else {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_LITERAL_NOT_STARTED, NULL);
return(NULL);
}
buf = (xmlChar *) xmlMallocAtomic(size * sizeof(xmlChar));
if (buf == NULL) {
xmlErrMemory(ctxt, NULL);
return(NULL);
}
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_PUBLIC_LITERAL;
cur = CUR;
while ((IS_PUBIDCHAR_CH(cur)) && (cur != stop)) { /* checked */
if (len + 1 >= size) {
xmlChar *tmp;
if ((size > XML_MAX_NAME_LENGTH) &&
((ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_HUGE) == 0)) {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_NAME_TOO_LONG, "Public ID");
xmlFree(buf);
return(NULL);
}
size *= 2;
tmp = (xmlChar *) xmlRealloc(buf, size * sizeof(xmlChar));
if (tmp == NULL) {
xmlErrMemory(ctxt, NULL);
xmlFree(buf);
return(NULL);
}
buf = tmp;
}
buf[len++] = cur;
count++;
if (count > 50) {
GROW;
count = 0;
if (ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_EOF) {
xmlFree(buf);
return(NULL);
}
}
NEXT;
cur = CUR;
if (cur == 0) {
GROW;
SHRINK;
cur = CUR;
}
}
buf[len] = 0;
if (cur != stop) {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_LITERAL_NOT_FINISHED, NULL);
} else {
NEXT;
}
ctxt->instate = oldstate;
return(buf);
}
|
xmlParsePubidLiteral(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
xmlChar *buf = NULL;
int len = 0;
int size = XML_PARSER_BUFFER_SIZE;
xmlChar cur;
xmlChar stop;
int count = 0;
xmlParserInputState oldstate = ctxt->instate;
SHRINK;
if (RAW == '"') {
NEXT;
stop = '"';
} else if (RAW == '\'') {
NEXT;
stop = '\'';
} else {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_LITERAL_NOT_STARTED, NULL);
return(NULL);
}
buf = (xmlChar *) xmlMallocAtomic(size * sizeof(xmlChar));
if (buf == NULL) {
xmlErrMemory(ctxt, NULL);
return(NULL);
}
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_PUBLIC_LITERAL;
cur = CUR;
while ((IS_PUBIDCHAR_CH(cur)) && (cur != stop)) { /* checked */
if (len + 1 >= size) {
xmlChar *tmp;
if ((size > XML_MAX_NAME_LENGTH) &&
((ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_HUGE) == 0)) {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_NAME_TOO_LONG, "Public ID");
xmlFree(buf);
return(NULL);
}
size *= 2;
tmp = (xmlChar *) xmlRealloc(buf, size * sizeof(xmlChar));
if (tmp == NULL) {
xmlErrMemory(ctxt, NULL);
xmlFree(buf);
return(NULL);
}
buf = tmp;
}
buf[len++] = cur;
count++;
if (count > 50) {
GROW;
count = 0;
if (ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_EOF) {
xmlFree(buf);
return(NULL);
}
}
NEXT;
cur = CUR;
if (cur == 0) {
GROW;
SHRINK;
cur = CUR;
}
}
buf[len] = 0;
if (cur != stop) {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_LITERAL_NOT_FINISHED, NULL);
} else {
NEXT;
}
ctxt->instate = oldstate;
return(buf);
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2013-6381
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-6381/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/6fb392b1a63ae36c31f62bc3fc8630b49d602b62
|
6fb392b1a63ae36c31f62bc3fc8630b49d602b62
|
qeth: avoid buffer overflow in snmp ioctl
Check user-defined length in snmp ioctl request and allow request
only if it fits into a qeth command buffer.
Signed-off-by: Ursula Braun <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Frank Blaschka <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Nico Golde <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Fabian Yamaguchi <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static int qeth_get_problem(struct ccw_device *cdev, struct irb *irb)
{
int dstat, cstat;
char *sense;
struct qeth_card *card;
sense = (char *) irb->ecw;
cstat = irb->scsw.cmd.cstat;
dstat = irb->scsw.cmd.dstat;
card = CARD_FROM_CDEV(cdev);
if (cstat & (SCHN_STAT_CHN_CTRL_CHK | SCHN_STAT_INTF_CTRL_CHK |
SCHN_STAT_CHN_DATA_CHK | SCHN_STAT_CHAIN_CHECK |
SCHN_STAT_PROT_CHECK | SCHN_STAT_PROG_CHECK)) {
QETH_CARD_TEXT(card, 2, "CGENCHK");
dev_warn(&cdev->dev, "The qeth device driver "
"failed to recover an error on the device\n");
QETH_DBF_MESSAGE(2, "%s check on device dstat=x%x, cstat=x%x\n",
dev_name(&cdev->dev), dstat, cstat);
print_hex_dump(KERN_WARNING, "qeth: irb ", DUMP_PREFIX_OFFSET,
16, 1, irb, 64, 1);
return 1;
}
if (dstat & DEV_STAT_UNIT_CHECK) {
if (sense[SENSE_RESETTING_EVENT_BYTE] &
SENSE_RESETTING_EVENT_FLAG) {
QETH_CARD_TEXT(card, 2, "REVIND");
return 1;
}
if (sense[SENSE_COMMAND_REJECT_BYTE] &
SENSE_COMMAND_REJECT_FLAG) {
QETH_CARD_TEXT(card, 2, "CMDREJi");
return 1;
}
if ((sense[2] == 0xaf) && (sense[3] == 0xfe)) {
QETH_CARD_TEXT(card, 2, "AFFE");
return 1;
}
if ((!sense[0]) && (!sense[1]) && (!sense[2]) && (!sense[3])) {
QETH_CARD_TEXT(card, 2, "ZEROSEN");
return 0;
}
QETH_CARD_TEXT(card, 2, "DGENCHK");
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
|
static int qeth_get_problem(struct ccw_device *cdev, struct irb *irb)
{
int dstat, cstat;
char *sense;
struct qeth_card *card;
sense = (char *) irb->ecw;
cstat = irb->scsw.cmd.cstat;
dstat = irb->scsw.cmd.dstat;
card = CARD_FROM_CDEV(cdev);
if (cstat & (SCHN_STAT_CHN_CTRL_CHK | SCHN_STAT_INTF_CTRL_CHK |
SCHN_STAT_CHN_DATA_CHK | SCHN_STAT_CHAIN_CHECK |
SCHN_STAT_PROT_CHECK | SCHN_STAT_PROG_CHECK)) {
QETH_CARD_TEXT(card, 2, "CGENCHK");
dev_warn(&cdev->dev, "The qeth device driver "
"failed to recover an error on the device\n");
QETH_DBF_MESSAGE(2, "%s check on device dstat=x%x, cstat=x%x\n",
dev_name(&cdev->dev), dstat, cstat);
print_hex_dump(KERN_WARNING, "qeth: irb ", DUMP_PREFIX_OFFSET,
16, 1, irb, 64, 1);
return 1;
}
if (dstat & DEV_STAT_UNIT_CHECK) {
if (sense[SENSE_RESETTING_EVENT_BYTE] &
SENSE_RESETTING_EVENT_FLAG) {
QETH_CARD_TEXT(card, 2, "REVIND");
return 1;
}
if (sense[SENSE_COMMAND_REJECT_BYTE] &
SENSE_COMMAND_REJECT_FLAG) {
QETH_CARD_TEXT(card, 2, "CMDREJi");
return 1;
}
if ((sense[2] == 0xaf) && (sense[3] == 0xfe)) {
QETH_CARD_TEXT(card, 2, "AFFE");
return 1;
}
if ((!sense[0]) && (!sense[1]) && (!sense[2]) && (!sense[3])) {
QETH_CARD_TEXT(card, 2, "ZEROSEN");
return 0;
}
QETH_CARD_TEXT(card, 2, "DGENCHK");
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2011-3055
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-3055/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/e9372a1bfd3588a80fcf49aa07321f0971dd6091
|
e9372a1bfd3588a80fcf49aa07321f0971dd6091
|
[V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
static v8::Handle<v8::Value> portsAttrGetter(v8::Local<v8::String> name, const v8::AccessorInfo& info)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.ports._get");
TestSerializedScriptValueInterface* imp = V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::toNative(info.Holder());
MessagePortArray* ports = imp->ports();
if (!ports)
return v8::Array::New(0);
MessagePortArray portsCopy(*ports);
v8::Local<v8::Array> portArray = v8::Array::New(portsCopy.size());
for (size_t i = 0; i < portsCopy.size(); ++i)
portArray->Set(v8::Integer::New(i), toV8(portsCopy[i].get(), info.GetIsolate()));
return portArray;
}
|
static v8::Handle<v8::Value> portsAttrGetter(v8::Local<v8::String> name, const v8::AccessorInfo& info)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.ports._get");
TestSerializedScriptValueInterface* imp = V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::toNative(info.Holder());
MessagePortArray* ports = imp->ports();
if (!ports)
return v8::Array::New(0);
MessagePortArray portsCopy(*ports);
v8::Local<v8::Array> portArray = v8::Array::New(portsCopy.size());
for (size_t i = 0; i < portsCopy.size(); ++i)
portArray->Set(v8::Integer::New(i), toV8(portsCopy[i].get(), info.GetIsolate()));
return portArray;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-3412
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-3412/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/68cb695ccecf949d48949e72f8ce591fdaaa325c
|
68cb695ccecf949d48949e72f8ce591fdaaa325c
|
sfc: Fix maximum number of TSO segments and minimum TX queue size
[ Upstream commit 7e6d06f0de3f74ca929441add094518ae332257c ]
Currently an skb requiring TSO may not fit within a minimum-size TX
queue. The TX queue selected for the skb may stall and trigger the TX
watchdog repeatedly (since the problem skb will be retried after the
TX reset). This issue is designated as CVE-2012-3412.
Set the maximum number of TSO segments for our devices to 100. This
should make no difference to behaviour unless the actual MSS is less
than about 700. Increase the minimum TX queue size accordingly to
allow for 2 worst-case skbs, so that there will definitely be space
to add an skb after we wake a queue.
To avoid invalidating existing configurations, change
efx_ethtool_set_ringparam() to fix up values that are too small rather
than returning -EINVAL.
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
|
static void efx_reset_work(struct work_struct *data)
{
struct efx_nic *efx = container_of(data, struct efx_nic, reset_work);
unsigned long pending = ACCESS_ONCE(efx->reset_pending);
if (!pending)
return;
/* If we're not RUNNING then don't reset. Leave the reset_pending
* flags set so that efx_pci_probe_main will be retried */
if (efx->state != STATE_RUNNING) {
netif_info(efx, drv, efx->net_dev,
"scheduled reset quenched. NIC not RUNNING\n");
return;
}
rtnl_lock();
(void)efx_reset(efx, fls(pending) - 1);
rtnl_unlock();
}
|
static void efx_reset_work(struct work_struct *data)
{
struct efx_nic *efx = container_of(data, struct efx_nic, reset_work);
unsigned long pending = ACCESS_ONCE(efx->reset_pending);
if (!pending)
return;
/* If we're not RUNNING then don't reset. Leave the reset_pending
* flags set so that efx_pci_probe_main will be retried */
if (efx->state != STATE_RUNNING) {
netif_info(efx, drv, efx->net_dev,
"scheduled reset quenched. NIC not RUNNING\n");
return;
}
rtnl_lock();
(void)efx_reset(efx, fls(pending) - 1);
rtnl_unlock();
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-10671
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-10671/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/blueness/sthttpd/commit/c0dc63a49d8605649f1d8e4a96c9b468b0bff660
|
c0dc63a49d8605649f1d8e4a96c9b468b0bff660
|
Fix heap buffer overflow in de_dotdot
|
auth_check2( httpd_conn* hc, char* dirname )
{
static char* authpath;
static size_t maxauthpath = 0;
struct stat sb;
char authinfo[500];
char* authpass;
char* colon;
int l;
FILE* fp;
char line[500];
char* cryp;
static char* prevauthpath;
static size_t maxprevauthpath = 0;
static time_t prevmtime;
static char* prevuser;
static size_t maxprevuser = 0;
static char* prevcryp;
static size_t maxprevcryp = 0;
char *crypt_result;
/* Construct auth filename. */
httpd_realloc_str(
&authpath, &maxauthpath, strlen( dirname ) + 1 + sizeof(AUTH_FILE) );
(void) my_snprintf( authpath, maxauthpath, "%s/%s", dirname, AUTH_FILE );
/* Does this directory have an auth file? */
if ( stat( authpath, &sb ) < 0 )
/* Nope, let the request go through. */
return 0;
/* Does this request contain basic authorization info? */
if ( hc->authorization[0] == '\0' ||
strncmp( hc->authorization, "Basic ", 6 ) != 0 )
{
/* Nope, return a 401 Unauthorized. */
send_authenticate( hc, dirname );
return -1;
}
/* Decode it. */
l = b64_decode(
&(hc->authorization[6]), (unsigned char*) authinfo,
sizeof(authinfo) - 1 );
authinfo[l] = '\0';
/* Split into user and password. */
authpass = strchr( authinfo, ':' );
if ( authpass == (char*) 0 )
{
/* No colon? Bogus auth info. */
send_authenticate( hc, dirname );
return -1;
}
*authpass++ = '\0';
/* If there are more fields, cut them off. */
colon = strchr( authpass, ':' );
if ( colon != (char*) 0 )
*colon = '\0';
/* See if we have a cached entry and can use it. */
if ( maxprevauthpath != 0 &&
strcmp( authpath, prevauthpath ) == 0 &&
sb.st_mtime == prevmtime &&
strcmp( authinfo, prevuser ) == 0 )
{
/* Yes. Check against the cached encrypted password. */
crypt_result = crypt( authpass, prevcryp );
if ( ! crypt_result )
return -1;
if ( strcmp( crypt_result, prevcryp ) == 0 )
{
/* Ok! */
httpd_realloc_str(
&hc->remoteuser, &hc->maxremoteuser, strlen( authinfo ) );
(void) strcpy( hc->remoteuser, authinfo );
return 1;
}
else
{
/* No. */
send_authenticate( hc, dirname );
return -1;
}
}
/* Open the password file. */
fp = fopen( authpath, "r" );
if ( fp == (FILE*) 0 )
{
/* The file exists but we can't open it? Disallow access. */
syslog(
LOG_ERR, "%.80s auth file %.80s could not be opened - %m",
httpd_ntoa( &hc->client_addr ), authpath );
httpd_send_err(
hc, 403, err403title, "",
ERROR_FORM( err403form, "The requested URL '%.80s' is protected by an authentication file, but the authentication file cannot be opened.\n" ),
hc->encodedurl );
return -1;
}
/* Read it. */
while ( fgets( line, sizeof(line), fp ) != (char*) 0 )
{
/* Nuke newline. */
l = strlen( line );
if ( line[l - 1] == '\n' )
line[l - 1] = '\0';
/* Split into user and encrypted password. */
cryp = strchr( line, ':' );
if ( cryp == (char*) 0 )
continue;
*cryp++ = '\0';
/* Is this the right user? */
if ( strcmp( line, authinfo ) == 0 )
{
/* Yes. */
(void) fclose( fp );
/* So is the password right? */
crypt_result = crypt( authpass, cryp );
if ( ! crypt_result )
return -1;
if ( strcmp( crypt_result, cryp ) == 0 )
{
/* Ok! */
httpd_realloc_str(
&hc->remoteuser, &hc->maxremoteuser, strlen( line ) );
(void) strcpy( hc->remoteuser, line );
/* And cache this user's info for next time. */
httpd_realloc_str(
&prevauthpath, &maxprevauthpath, strlen( authpath ) );
(void) strcpy( prevauthpath, authpath );
prevmtime = sb.st_mtime;
httpd_realloc_str(
&prevuser, &maxprevuser, strlen( authinfo ) );
(void) strcpy( prevuser, authinfo );
httpd_realloc_str( &prevcryp, &maxprevcryp, strlen( cryp ) );
(void) strcpy( prevcryp, cryp );
return 1;
}
else
{
/* No. */
send_authenticate( hc, dirname );
return -1;
}
}
}
/* Didn't find that user. Access denied. */
(void) fclose( fp );
send_authenticate( hc, dirname );
return -1;
}
|
auth_check2( httpd_conn* hc, char* dirname )
{
static char* authpath;
static size_t maxauthpath = 0;
struct stat sb;
char authinfo[500];
char* authpass;
char* colon;
int l;
FILE* fp;
char line[500];
char* cryp;
static char* prevauthpath;
static size_t maxprevauthpath = 0;
static time_t prevmtime;
static char* prevuser;
static size_t maxprevuser = 0;
static char* prevcryp;
static size_t maxprevcryp = 0;
char *crypt_result;
/* Construct auth filename. */
httpd_realloc_str(
&authpath, &maxauthpath, strlen( dirname ) + 1 + sizeof(AUTH_FILE) );
(void) my_snprintf( authpath, maxauthpath, "%s/%s", dirname, AUTH_FILE );
/* Does this directory have an auth file? */
if ( stat( authpath, &sb ) < 0 )
/* Nope, let the request go through. */
return 0;
/* Does this request contain basic authorization info? */
if ( hc->authorization[0] == '\0' ||
strncmp( hc->authorization, "Basic ", 6 ) != 0 )
{
/* Nope, return a 401 Unauthorized. */
send_authenticate( hc, dirname );
return -1;
}
/* Decode it. */
l = b64_decode(
&(hc->authorization[6]), (unsigned char*) authinfo,
sizeof(authinfo) - 1 );
authinfo[l] = '\0';
/* Split into user and password. */
authpass = strchr( authinfo, ':' );
if ( authpass == (char*) 0 )
{
/* No colon? Bogus auth info. */
send_authenticate( hc, dirname );
return -1;
}
*authpass++ = '\0';
/* If there are more fields, cut them off. */
colon = strchr( authpass, ':' );
if ( colon != (char*) 0 )
*colon = '\0';
/* See if we have a cached entry and can use it. */
if ( maxprevauthpath != 0 &&
strcmp( authpath, prevauthpath ) == 0 &&
sb.st_mtime == prevmtime &&
strcmp( authinfo, prevuser ) == 0 )
{
/* Yes. Check against the cached encrypted password. */
crypt_result = crypt( authpass, prevcryp );
if ( ! crypt_result )
return -1;
if ( strcmp( crypt_result, prevcryp ) == 0 )
{
/* Ok! */
httpd_realloc_str(
&hc->remoteuser, &hc->maxremoteuser, strlen( authinfo ) );
(void) strcpy( hc->remoteuser, authinfo );
return 1;
}
else
{
/* No. */
send_authenticate( hc, dirname );
return -1;
}
}
/* Open the password file. */
fp = fopen( authpath, "r" );
if ( fp == (FILE*) 0 )
{
/* The file exists but we can't open it? Disallow access. */
syslog(
LOG_ERR, "%.80s auth file %.80s could not be opened - %m",
httpd_ntoa( &hc->client_addr ), authpath );
httpd_send_err(
hc, 403, err403title, "",
ERROR_FORM( err403form, "The requested URL '%.80s' is protected by an authentication file, but the authentication file cannot be opened.\n" ),
hc->encodedurl );
return -1;
}
/* Read it. */
while ( fgets( line, sizeof(line), fp ) != (char*) 0 )
{
/* Nuke newline. */
l = strlen( line );
if ( line[l - 1] == '\n' )
line[l - 1] = '\0';
/* Split into user and encrypted password. */
cryp = strchr( line, ':' );
if ( cryp == (char*) 0 )
continue;
*cryp++ = '\0';
/* Is this the right user? */
if ( strcmp( line, authinfo ) == 0 )
{
/* Yes. */
(void) fclose( fp );
/* So is the password right? */
crypt_result = crypt( authpass, cryp );
if ( ! crypt_result )
return -1;
if ( strcmp( crypt_result, cryp ) == 0 )
{
/* Ok! */
httpd_realloc_str(
&hc->remoteuser, &hc->maxremoteuser, strlen( line ) );
(void) strcpy( hc->remoteuser, line );
/* And cache this user's info for next time. */
httpd_realloc_str(
&prevauthpath, &maxprevauthpath, strlen( authpath ) );
(void) strcpy( prevauthpath, authpath );
prevmtime = sb.st_mtime;
httpd_realloc_str(
&prevuser, &maxprevuser, strlen( authinfo ) );
(void) strcpy( prevuser, authinfo );
httpd_realloc_str( &prevcryp, &maxprevcryp, strlen( cryp ) );
(void) strcpy( prevcryp, cryp );
return 1;
}
else
{
/* No. */
send_authenticate( hc, dirname );
return -1;
}
}
}
/* Didn't find that user. Access denied. */
(void) fclose( fp );
send_authenticate( hc, dirname );
return -1;
}
|
C
|
sthttpd
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6031
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6031/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/01c9a7e71ca435651723e8cbcab0b3ad4c5351e2
|
01c9a7e71ca435651723e8cbcab0b3ad4c5351e2
|
[pdf] Use a temporary list when unloading pages
When traversing the |deferred_page_unloads_| list and handling the
unloads it's possible for new pages to get added to the list which will
invalidate the iterator.
This CL swaps the list with an empty list and does the iteration on the
list copy. New items that are unloaded while handling the defers will be
unloaded at a later point.
Bug: 780450
Change-Id: Ic7ced1c82227109784fb536ce19a4dd51b9119ac
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/758916
Commit-Queue: dsinclair <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#515056}
|
PDFiumEngine::~PDFiumEngine() {
for (auto& page : pages_)
page->Unload();
if (doc_) {
FORM_DoDocumentAAction(form_, FPDFDOC_AACTION_WC);
FPDFDOC_ExitFormFillEnvironment(form_);
FPDF_CloseDocument(doc_);
}
FPDFAvail_Destroy(fpdf_availability_);
}
|
PDFiumEngine::~PDFiumEngine() {
for (auto& page : pages_)
page->Unload();
if (doc_) {
FORM_DoDocumentAAction(form_, FPDFDOC_AACTION_WC);
FPDFDOC_ExitFormFillEnvironment(form_);
FPDF_CloseDocument(doc_);
}
FPDFAvail_Destroy(fpdf_availability_);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-9683
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-9683/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/942080643bce061c3dd9d5718d3b745dcb39a8bc
|
942080643bce061c3dd9d5718d3b745dcb39a8bc
|
eCryptfs: Remove buggy and unnecessary write in file name decode routine
Dmitry Chernenkov used KASAN to discover that eCryptfs writes past the
end of the allocated buffer during encrypted filename decoding. This
fix corrects the issue by getting rid of the unnecessary 0 write when
the current bit offset is 2.
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Dmitry Chernenkov <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected] # v2.6.29+: 51ca58d eCryptfs: Filename Encryption: Encoding and encryption functions
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <[email protected]>
|
int ecryptfs_decrypt_page(struct page *page)
{
struct inode *ecryptfs_inode;
struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat;
char *page_virt;
unsigned long extent_offset;
loff_t lower_offset;
int rc = 0;
ecryptfs_inode = page->mapping->host;
crypt_stat =
&(ecryptfs_inode_to_private(ecryptfs_inode)->crypt_stat);
BUG_ON(!(crypt_stat->flags & ECRYPTFS_ENCRYPTED));
lower_offset = lower_offset_for_page(crypt_stat, page);
page_virt = kmap(page);
rc = ecryptfs_read_lower(page_virt, lower_offset, PAGE_CACHE_SIZE,
ecryptfs_inode);
kunmap(page);
if (rc < 0) {
ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR,
"Error attempting to read lower page; rc = [%d]\n",
rc);
goto out;
}
for (extent_offset = 0;
extent_offset < (PAGE_CACHE_SIZE / crypt_stat->extent_size);
extent_offset++) {
rc = crypt_extent(crypt_stat, page, page,
extent_offset, DECRYPT);
if (rc) {
printk(KERN_ERR "%s: Error encrypting extent; "
"rc = [%d]\n", __func__, rc);
goto out;
}
}
out:
return rc;
}
|
int ecryptfs_decrypt_page(struct page *page)
{
struct inode *ecryptfs_inode;
struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat;
char *page_virt;
unsigned long extent_offset;
loff_t lower_offset;
int rc = 0;
ecryptfs_inode = page->mapping->host;
crypt_stat =
&(ecryptfs_inode_to_private(ecryptfs_inode)->crypt_stat);
BUG_ON(!(crypt_stat->flags & ECRYPTFS_ENCRYPTED));
lower_offset = lower_offset_for_page(crypt_stat, page);
page_virt = kmap(page);
rc = ecryptfs_read_lower(page_virt, lower_offset, PAGE_CACHE_SIZE,
ecryptfs_inode);
kunmap(page);
if (rc < 0) {
ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR,
"Error attempting to read lower page; rc = [%d]\n",
rc);
goto out;
}
for (extent_offset = 0;
extent_offset < (PAGE_CACHE_SIZE / crypt_stat->extent_size);
extent_offset++) {
rc = crypt_extent(crypt_stat, page, page,
extent_offset, DECRYPT);
if (rc) {
printk(KERN_ERR "%s: Error encrypting extent; "
"rc = [%d]\n", __func__, rc);
goto out;
}
}
out:
return rc;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2011-1800
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-1800/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/1777aa6484af15014b8691082a8c3075418786f5
|
1777aa6484af15014b8691082a8c3075418786f5
|
[Qt][WK2] Allow transparent WebViews
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=80608
Reviewed by Tor Arne Vestbø.
Added support for transparentBackground in QQuickWebViewExperimental.
This uses the existing drawsTransparentBackground property in WebKit2.
Also, changed LayerTreeHostQt to set the contentsOpaque flag when the root layer changes,
otherwise the change doesn't take effect.
A new API test was added.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview.cpp:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::setTransparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::transparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewExperimental::transparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewExperimental::setTransparentBackground):
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p.h:
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p_p.h:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate):
* UIProcess/API/qt/tests/qquickwebview/tst_qquickwebview.cpp:
(tst_QQuickWebView):
(tst_QQuickWebView::transparentWebViews):
* WebProcess/WebPage/qt/LayerTreeHostQt.cpp:
(WebKit::LayerTreeHostQt::LayerTreeHostQt):
(WebKit::LayerTreeHostQt::setRootCompositingLayer):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@110254 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
void LayerTreeHostQt::releaseImageBackingStore(int64_t key)
{
if (!key)
return;
HashMap<int64_t, int>::iterator it = m_directlyCompositedImageRefCounts.find(key);
if (it == m_directlyCompositedImageRefCounts.end())
return;
it->second--;
if (it->second)
return;
m_directlyCompositedImageRefCounts.remove(it);
m_webPage->send(Messages::LayerTreeHostProxy::DestroyDirectlyCompositedImage(key));
}
|
void LayerTreeHostQt::releaseImageBackingStore(int64_t key)
{
if (!key)
return;
HashMap<int64_t, int>::iterator it = m_directlyCompositedImageRefCounts.find(key);
if (it == m_directlyCompositedImageRefCounts.end())
return;
it->second--;
if (it->second)
return;
m_directlyCompositedImageRefCounts.remove(it);
m_webPage->send(Messages::LayerTreeHostProxy::DestroyDirectlyCompositedImage(key));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5218
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5218/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/45d901b56f578a74b19ba0d10fa5c4c467f19303
|
45d901b56f578a74b19ba0d10fa5c4c467f19303
|
Paint tab groups with the group color.
* The background of TabGroupHeader now uses the group color.
* The backgrounds of tabs in the group are tinted with the group color.
This treatment, along with the colors chosen, are intended to be
a placeholder.
Bug: 905491
Change-Id: Ic808548f8eba23064606e7fb8c9bba281d0d117f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1610504
Commit-Queue: Bret Sepulveda <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Taylor Bergquist <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#660498}
|
TabStrip::TabStrip(std::unique_ptr<TabStripController> controller)
: controller_(std::move(controller)),
layout_helper_(std::make_unique<TabStripLayoutHelper>()),
drag_context_(std::make_unique<TabDragContextImpl>(this)) {
Init();
SetEventTargeter(std::make_unique<views::ViewTargeter>(this));
md_observer_.Add(MD::GetInstance());
}
|
TabStrip::TabStrip(std::unique_ptr<TabStripController> controller)
: controller_(std::move(controller)),
layout_helper_(std::make_unique<TabStripLayoutHelper>()),
drag_context_(std::make_unique<TabDragContextImpl>(this)) {
Init();
SetEventTargeter(std::make_unique<views::ViewTargeter>(this));
md_observer_.Add(MD::GetInstance());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-12714
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-12714/
|
CWE-787
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/81f9c4e4177d31ced6f52a89bb70e93bfb77ca03
|
81f9c4e4177d31ced6f52a89bb70e93bfb77ca03
|
Merge tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace
Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:
"This contains a few fixes and a clean up.
- a bad merge caused an "endif" to go in the wrong place in
scripts/Makefile.build
- softirq tracing fix for tracing that corrupts lockdep and causes a
false splat
- histogram documentation typo fixes
- fix a bad memory reference when passing in no filter to the filter
code
- simplify code by using the swap macro instead of open coding the
swap"
* tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
tracing: Fix SKIP_STACK_VALIDATION=1 build due to bad merge with -mrecord-mcount
tracing: Fix some errors in histogram documentation
tracing: Use swap macro in update_max_tr
softirq: Reorder trace_softirqs_on to prevent lockdep splat
tracing: Check for no filter when processing event filters
|
static filter_pred_fn_t select_comparison_fn(enum filter_op_ids op,
int field_size, int field_is_signed)
{
filter_pred_fn_t fn = NULL;
int pred_func_index = -1;
switch (op) {
case OP_EQ:
case OP_NE:
break;
default:
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(op < PRED_FUNC_START))
return NULL;
pred_func_index = op - PRED_FUNC_START;
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(pred_func_index > PRED_FUNC_MAX))
return NULL;
}
switch (field_size) {
case 8:
if (pred_func_index < 0)
fn = filter_pred_64;
else if (field_is_signed)
fn = pred_funcs_s64[pred_func_index];
else
fn = pred_funcs_u64[pred_func_index];
break;
case 4:
if (pred_func_index < 0)
fn = filter_pred_32;
else if (field_is_signed)
fn = pred_funcs_s32[pred_func_index];
else
fn = pred_funcs_u32[pred_func_index];
break;
case 2:
if (pred_func_index < 0)
fn = filter_pred_16;
else if (field_is_signed)
fn = pred_funcs_s16[pred_func_index];
else
fn = pred_funcs_u16[pred_func_index];
break;
case 1:
if (pred_func_index < 0)
fn = filter_pred_8;
else if (field_is_signed)
fn = pred_funcs_s8[pred_func_index];
else
fn = pred_funcs_u8[pred_func_index];
break;
}
return fn;
}
|
static filter_pred_fn_t select_comparison_fn(enum filter_op_ids op,
int field_size, int field_is_signed)
{
filter_pred_fn_t fn = NULL;
int pred_func_index = -1;
switch (op) {
case OP_EQ:
case OP_NE:
break;
default:
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(op < PRED_FUNC_START))
return NULL;
pred_func_index = op - PRED_FUNC_START;
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(pred_func_index > PRED_FUNC_MAX))
return NULL;
}
switch (field_size) {
case 8:
if (pred_func_index < 0)
fn = filter_pred_64;
else if (field_is_signed)
fn = pred_funcs_s64[pred_func_index];
else
fn = pred_funcs_u64[pred_func_index];
break;
case 4:
if (pred_func_index < 0)
fn = filter_pred_32;
else if (field_is_signed)
fn = pred_funcs_s32[pred_func_index];
else
fn = pred_funcs_u32[pred_func_index];
break;
case 2:
if (pred_func_index < 0)
fn = filter_pred_16;
else if (field_is_signed)
fn = pred_funcs_s16[pred_func_index];
else
fn = pred_funcs_u16[pred_func_index];
break;
case 1:
if (pred_func_index < 0)
fn = filter_pred_8;
else if (field_is_signed)
fn = pred_funcs_s8[pred_func_index];
else
fn = pred_funcs_u8[pred_func_index];
break;
}
return fn;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2019-7396
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-7396/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/748a03651e5b138bcaf160d15133de2f4b1b89ce
|
748a03651e5b138bcaf160d15133de2f4b1b89ce
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1452
|
static MagickBooleanType IsSIXEL(const unsigned char *magick,
const size_t length)
{
const unsigned char
*end = magick + length;
if (length < 3)
return(MagickFalse);
if (*magick == 0x90 || (*magick == 0x1b && *++magick == 'P')) {
while (++magick != end) {
if (*magick == 'q')
return(MagickTrue);
if (!(*magick >= '0' && *magick <= '9') && *magick != ';')
return(MagickFalse);
}
}
return(MagickFalse);
}
|
static MagickBooleanType IsSIXEL(const unsigned char *magick,
const size_t length)
{
const unsigned char
*end = magick + length;
if (length < 3)
return(MagickFalse);
if (*magick == 0x90 || (*magick == 0x1b && *++magick == 'P')) {
while (++magick != end) {
if (*magick == 'q')
return(MagickTrue);
if (!(*magick >= '0' && *magick <= '9') && *magick != ';')
return(MagickFalse);
}
}
return(MagickFalse);
}
|
C
|
ImageMagick
| 0 |
CVE-2019-5797
| null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/ba169c14aa9cc2efd708a878ae21ff34f3898fe0
|
ba169c14aa9cc2efd708a878ae21ff34f3898fe0
|
Fixing BadMessageCallback usage by SessionStorage
TBR: [email protected]
Bug: 916523
Change-Id: I027cc818cfba917906844ad2ec0edd7fa4761bd1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1401604
Commit-Queue: Daniel Murphy <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Marijn Kruisselbrink <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ken Rockot <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#621772}
|
DOMStorageContextWrapper::~DOMStorageContextWrapper() {
DCHECK(!mojo_state_) << "Shutdown should be called before destruction";
DCHECK(!mojo_session_state_)
<< "Shutdown should be called before destruction";
}
|
DOMStorageContextWrapper::~DOMStorageContextWrapper() {
DCHECK(!mojo_state_) << "Shutdown should be called before destruction";
DCHECK(!mojo_session_state_)
<< "Shutdown should be called before destruction";
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/fc790462b4f248712bbc8c3734664dd6b05f80f2
|
fc790462b4f248712bbc8c3734664dd6b05f80f2
|
Set the job name for the print job on the Mac.
BUG=http://crbug.com/29188
TEST=as in bug
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/1997016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@47056 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void ResourceMessageFilter::OnPlatformCheckSpelling(const string16& word,
int tag,
bool* correct) {
*correct = SpellCheckerPlatform::CheckSpelling(word, tag);
}
|
void ResourceMessageFilter::OnPlatformCheckSpelling(const string16& word,
int tag,
bool* correct) {
*correct = SpellCheckerPlatform::CheckSpelling(word, tag);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1665
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1665/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/282f53ffdc3b1902da86f6a0791af736837efbf8
|
282f53ffdc3b1902da86f6a0791af736837efbf8
|
[signin] Add metrics to track the source for refresh token updated events
This CL add a source for update and revoke credentials operations. It then
surfaces the source in the chrome://signin-internals page.
This CL also records the following histograms that track refresh token events:
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToValidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToInvalidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenRevoked.Source
These histograms are needed to validate the assumptions of how often tokens
are revoked by the browser and the sources for the token revocations.
Bug: 896182
Change-Id: I2fcab80ee8e5699708e695bc3289fa6d34859a90
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1286464
Reviewed-by: Jochen Eisinger <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: David Roger <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Sherman <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Mihai Sardarescu <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606181}
|
void PeopleHandler::HandleAttemptUserExit(const base::ListValue* args) {
DVLOG(1) << "Signing out the user to fix a sync error.";
chrome::AttemptUserExit();
}
|
void PeopleHandler::HandleAttemptUserExit(const base::ListValue* args) {
DVLOG(1) << "Signing out the user to fix a sync error.";
chrome::AttemptUserExit();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-0826
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-0826/
|
CWE-264
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/c9ab2b0bb05a7e19fb057e79b36e232809d70122
|
c9ab2b0bb05a7e19fb057e79b36e232809d70122
|
Camera: Disallow dumping clients directly
Camera service dumps should only be initiated through
ICameraService::dump.
Bug: 26265403
Change-Id: If3ca4718ed74bf33ad8a416192689203029e2803
|
void CameraService::onFirstRef()
{
LOG1("CameraService::onFirstRef");
BnCameraService::onFirstRef();
if (hw_get_module(CAMERA_HARDWARE_MODULE_ID,
(const hw_module_t **)&mModule) < 0) {
ALOGE("Could not load camera HAL module");
mNumberOfCameras = 0;
}
else {
ALOGI("Loaded \"%s\" camera module", mModule->common.name);
mNumberOfCameras = mModule->get_number_of_cameras();
if (mNumberOfCameras > MAX_CAMERAS) {
ALOGE("Number of cameras(%d) > MAX_CAMERAS(%d).",
mNumberOfCameras, MAX_CAMERAS);
mNumberOfCameras = MAX_CAMERAS;
}
for (int i = 0; i < mNumberOfCameras; i++) {
setCameraFree(i);
}
if (mModule->common.module_api_version >=
CAMERA_MODULE_API_VERSION_2_1) {
mModule->set_callbacks(this);
}
CameraDeviceFactory::registerService(this);
}
}
|
void CameraService::onFirstRef()
{
LOG1("CameraService::onFirstRef");
BnCameraService::onFirstRef();
if (hw_get_module(CAMERA_HARDWARE_MODULE_ID,
(const hw_module_t **)&mModule) < 0) {
ALOGE("Could not load camera HAL module");
mNumberOfCameras = 0;
}
else {
ALOGI("Loaded \"%s\" camera module", mModule->common.name);
mNumberOfCameras = mModule->get_number_of_cameras();
if (mNumberOfCameras > MAX_CAMERAS) {
ALOGE("Number of cameras(%d) > MAX_CAMERAS(%d).",
mNumberOfCameras, MAX_CAMERAS);
mNumberOfCameras = MAX_CAMERAS;
}
for (int i = 0; i < mNumberOfCameras; i++) {
setCameraFree(i);
}
if (mModule->common.module_api_version >=
CAMERA_MODULE_API_VERSION_2_1) {
mModule->set_callbacks(this);
}
CameraDeviceFactory::registerService(this);
}
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2013-4588
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-4588/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/04bcef2a83f40c6db24222b27a52892cba39dffb
|
04bcef2a83f40c6db24222b27a52892cba39dffb
|
ipvs: Add boundary check on ioctl arguments
The ipvs code has a nifty system for doing the size of ioctl command
copies; it defines an array with values into which it indexes the cmd
to find the right length.
Unfortunately, the ipvs code forgot to check if the cmd was in the
range that the array provides, allowing for an index outside of the
array, which then gives a "garbage" result into the length, which
then gets used for copying into a stack buffer.
Fix this by adding sanity checks on these as well as the copy size.
[ [email protected]: adjusted limit to IP_VS_SO_GET_MAX ]
Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Julian Anastasov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Simon Horman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <[email protected]>
|
static int ip_vs_genl_fill_service(struct sk_buff *skb,
struct ip_vs_service *svc)
{
struct nlattr *nl_service;
struct ip_vs_flags flags = { .flags = svc->flags,
.mask = ~0 };
nl_service = nla_nest_start(skb, IPVS_CMD_ATTR_SERVICE);
if (!nl_service)
return -EMSGSIZE;
NLA_PUT_U16(skb, IPVS_SVC_ATTR_AF, svc->af);
if (svc->fwmark) {
NLA_PUT_U32(skb, IPVS_SVC_ATTR_FWMARK, svc->fwmark);
} else {
NLA_PUT_U16(skb, IPVS_SVC_ATTR_PROTOCOL, svc->protocol);
NLA_PUT(skb, IPVS_SVC_ATTR_ADDR, sizeof(svc->addr), &svc->addr);
NLA_PUT_U16(skb, IPVS_SVC_ATTR_PORT, svc->port);
}
NLA_PUT_STRING(skb, IPVS_SVC_ATTR_SCHED_NAME, svc->scheduler->name);
NLA_PUT(skb, IPVS_SVC_ATTR_FLAGS, sizeof(flags), &flags);
NLA_PUT_U32(skb, IPVS_SVC_ATTR_TIMEOUT, svc->timeout / HZ);
NLA_PUT_U32(skb, IPVS_SVC_ATTR_NETMASK, svc->netmask);
if (ip_vs_genl_fill_stats(skb, IPVS_SVC_ATTR_STATS, &svc->stats))
goto nla_put_failure;
nla_nest_end(skb, nl_service);
return 0;
nla_put_failure:
nla_nest_cancel(skb, nl_service);
return -EMSGSIZE;
}
|
static int ip_vs_genl_fill_service(struct sk_buff *skb,
struct ip_vs_service *svc)
{
struct nlattr *nl_service;
struct ip_vs_flags flags = { .flags = svc->flags,
.mask = ~0 };
nl_service = nla_nest_start(skb, IPVS_CMD_ATTR_SERVICE);
if (!nl_service)
return -EMSGSIZE;
NLA_PUT_U16(skb, IPVS_SVC_ATTR_AF, svc->af);
if (svc->fwmark) {
NLA_PUT_U32(skb, IPVS_SVC_ATTR_FWMARK, svc->fwmark);
} else {
NLA_PUT_U16(skb, IPVS_SVC_ATTR_PROTOCOL, svc->protocol);
NLA_PUT(skb, IPVS_SVC_ATTR_ADDR, sizeof(svc->addr), &svc->addr);
NLA_PUT_U16(skb, IPVS_SVC_ATTR_PORT, svc->port);
}
NLA_PUT_STRING(skb, IPVS_SVC_ATTR_SCHED_NAME, svc->scheduler->name);
NLA_PUT(skb, IPVS_SVC_ATTR_FLAGS, sizeof(flags), &flags);
NLA_PUT_U32(skb, IPVS_SVC_ATTR_TIMEOUT, svc->timeout / HZ);
NLA_PUT_U32(skb, IPVS_SVC_ATTR_NETMASK, svc->netmask);
if (ip_vs_genl_fill_stats(skb, IPVS_SVC_ATTR_STATS, &svc->stats))
goto nla_put_failure;
nla_nest_end(skb, nl_service);
return 0;
nla_put_failure:
nla_nest_cancel(skb, nl_service);
return -EMSGSIZE;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2896
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2896/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/3aad1a37affb1ab70d1897f2b03eb8c077264984
|
3aad1a37affb1ab70d1897f2b03eb8c077264984
|
Fix SafeAdd and SafeMultiply
BUG=145648,145544
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10916165
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@155478 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoVertexAttrib4f(
GLuint index, GLfloat v0, GLfloat v1, GLfloat v2, GLfloat v3) {
VertexAttribManager::VertexAttribInfo* info =
vertex_attrib_manager_->GetVertexAttribInfo(index);
if (!info) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "glVertexAttrib4f", "index out of range");
return;
}
VertexAttribManager::VertexAttribInfo::Vec4 value;
value.v[0] = v0;
value.v[1] = v1;
value.v[2] = v2;
value.v[3] = v3;
info->set_value(value);
glVertexAttrib4f(index, v0, v1, v2, v3);
}
|
void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoVertexAttrib4f(
GLuint index, GLfloat v0, GLfloat v1, GLfloat v2, GLfloat v3) {
VertexAttribManager::VertexAttribInfo* info =
vertex_attrib_manager_->GetVertexAttribInfo(index);
if (!info) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "glVertexAttrib4f", "index out of range");
return;
}
VertexAttribManager::VertexAttribInfo::Vec4 value;
value.v[0] = v0;
value.v[1] = v1;
value.v[2] = v2;
value.v[3] = v3;
info->set_value(value);
glVertexAttrib4f(index, v0, v1, v2, v3);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-12187
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-12187/
|
CWE-20
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/commit/?id=cad5a1050b7184d828aef9c1dd151c3ab649d37e
|
cad5a1050b7184d828aef9c1dd151c3ab649d37e
| null |
ProcRenderFillRectangles(ClientPtr client)
{
PicturePtr pDst;
int things;
REQUEST(xRenderFillRectanglesReq);
REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xRenderFillRectanglesReq);
if (!PictOpValid(stuff->op)) {
client->errorValue = stuff->op;
return BadValue;
}
VERIFY_PICTURE(pDst, stuff->dst, client, DixWriteAccess);
if (!pDst->pDrawable)
return BadDrawable;
things = (client->req_len << 2) - sizeof(xRenderFillRectanglesReq);
if (things & 4)
return BadLength;
things >>= 3;
CompositeRects(stuff->op,
pDst, &stuff->color, things, (xRectangle *) &stuff[1]);
return Success;
}
|
ProcRenderFillRectangles(ClientPtr client)
{
PicturePtr pDst;
int things;
REQUEST(xRenderFillRectanglesReq);
REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xRenderFillRectanglesReq);
if (!PictOpValid(stuff->op)) {
client->errorValue = stuff->op;
return BadValue;
}
VERIFY_PICTURE(pDst, stuff->dst, client, DixWriteAccess);
if (!pDst->pDrawable)
return BadDrawable;
things = (client->req_len << 2) - sizeof(xRenderFillRectanglesReq);
if (things & 4)
return BadLength;
things >>= 3;
CompositeRects(stuff->op,
pDst, &stuff->color, things, (xRectangle *) &stuff[1]);
return Success;
}
|
C
|
xserver
| 0 |
CVE-2017-11144
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-11144/
|
CWE-754
|
https://git.php.net/?p=php-src.git;a=commit;h=73cabfedf519298e1a11192699f44d53c529315e
|
73cabfedf519298e1a11192699f44d53c529315e
| null |
PHP_FUNCTION(openssl_pkcs7_encrypt)
{
zval * zrecipcerts, * zheaders = NULL;
STACK_OF(X509) * recipcerts = NULL;
BIO * infile = NULL, * outfile = NULL;
zend_long flags = 0;
PKCS7 * p7 = NULL;
zval * zcertval;
X509 * cert;
const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = NULL;
zend_long cipherid = PHP_OPENSSL_CIPHER_DEFAULT;
zend_string * strindex;
char * infilename = NULL;
size_t infilename_len;
char * outfilename = NULL;
size_t outfilename_len;
RETVAL_FALSE;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "ppza!|ll", &infilename, &infilename_len,
&outfilename, &outfilename_len, &zrecipcerts, &zheaders, &flags, &cipherid) == FAILURE)
return;
if (php_openssl_open_base_dir_chk(infilename) || php_openssl_open_base_dir_chk(outfilename)) {
return;
}
infile = BIO_new_file(infilename, "r");
if (infile == NULL) {
goto clean_exit;
}
outfile = BIO_new_file(outfilename, "w");
if (outfile == NULL) {
goto clean_exit;
}
recipcerts = sk_X509_new_null();
/* get certs */
if (Z_TYPE_P(zrecipcerts) == IS_ARRAY) {
ZEND_HASH_FOREACH_VAL(Z_ARRVAL_P(zrecipcerts), zcertval) {
zend_resource *certresource;
cert = php_openssl_x509_from_zval(zcertval, 0, &certresource);
if (cert == NULL) {
goto clean_exit;
}
if (certresource != NULL) {
/* we shouldn't free this particular cert, as it is a resource.
make a copy and push that on the stack instead */
cert = X509_dup(cert);
if (cert == NULL) {
goto clean_exit;
}
}
sk_X509_push(recipcerts, cert);
} ZEND_HASH_FOREACH_END();
} else {
/* a single certificate */
zend_resource *certresource;
cert = php_openssl_x509_from_zval(zrecipcerts, 0, &certresource);
if (cert == NULL) {
goto clean_exit;
}
if (certresource != NULL) {
/* we shouldn't free this particular cert, as it is a resource.
make a copy and push that on the stack instead */
cert = X509_dup(cert);
if (cert == NULL) {
goto clean_exit;
}
}
sk_X509_push(recipcerts, cert);
}
/* sanity check the cipher */
cipher = php_openssl_get_evp_cipher_from_algo(cipherid);
if (cipher == NULL) {
/* shouldn't happen */
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "Failed to get cipher");
goto clean_exit;
}
p7 = PKCS7_encrypt(recipcerts, infile, (EVP_CIPHER*)cipher, (int)flags);
if (p7 == NULL) {
goto clean_exit;
}
/* tack on extra headers */
if (zheaders) {
ZEND_HASH_FOREACH_STR_KEY_VAL(Z_ARRVAL_P(zheaders), strindex, zcertval) {
convert_to_string_ex(zcertval);
if (strindex) {
BIO_printf(outfile, "%s: %s\n", ZSTR_VAL(strindex), Z_STRVAL_P(zcertval));
} else {
BIO_printf(outfile, "%s\n", Z_STRVAL_P(zcertval));
}
} ZEND_HASH_FOREACH_END();
}
(void)BIO_reset(infile);
/* write the encrypted data */
SMIME_write_PKCS7(outfile, p7, infile, (int)flags);
RETVAL_TRUE;
clean_exit:
PKCS7_free(p7);
BIO_free(infile);
BIO_free(outfile);
if (recipcerts) {
sk_X509_pop_free(recipcerts, X509_free);
}
}
|
PHP_FUNCTION(openssl_pkcs7_encrypt)
{
zval * zrecipcerts, * zheaders = NULL;
STACK_OF(X509) * recipcerts = NULL;
BIO * infile = NULL, * outfile = NULL;
zend_long flags = 0;
PKCS7 * p7 = NULL;
zval * zcertval;
X509 * cert;
const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = NULL;
zend_long cipherid = PHP_OPENSSL_CIPHER_DEFAULT;
zend_string * strindex;
char * infilename = NULL;
size_t infilename_len;
char * outfilename = NULL;
size_t outfilename_len;
RETVAL_FALSE;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "ppza!|ll", &infilename, &infilename_len,
&outfilename, &outfilename_len, &zrecipcerts, &zheaders, &flags, &cipherid) == FAILURE)
return;
if (php_openssl_open_base_dir_chk(infilename) || php_openssl_open_base_dir_chk(outfilename)) {
return;
}
infile = BIO_new_file(infilename, "r");
if (infile == NULL) {
goto clean_exit;
}
outfile = BIO_new_file(outfilename, "w");
if (outfile == NULL) {
goto clean_exit;
}
recipcerts = sk_X509_new_null();
/* get certs */
if (Z_TYPE_P(zrecipcerts) == IS_ARRAY) {
ZEND_HASH_FOREACH_VAL(Z_ARRVAL_P(zrecipcerts), zcertval) {
zend_resource *certresource;
cert = php_openssl_x509_from_zval(zcertval, 0, &certresource);
if (cert == NULL) {
goto clean_exit;
}
if (certresource != NULL) {
/* we shouldn't free this particular cert, as it is a resource.
make a copy and push that on the stack instead */
cert = X509_dup(cert);
if (cert == NULL) {
goto clean_exit;
}
}
sk_X509_push(recipcerts, cert);
} ZEND_HASH_FOREACH_END();
} else {
/* a single certificate */
zend_resource *certresource;
cert = php_openssl_x509_from_zval(zrecipcerts, 0, &certresource);
if (cert == NULL) {
goto clean_exit;
}
if (certresource != NULL) {
/* we shouldn't free this particular cert, as it is a resource.
make a copy and push that on the stack instead */
cert = X509_dup(cert);
if (cert == NULL) {
goto clean_exit;
}
}
sk_X509_push(recipcerts, cert);
}
/* sanity check the cipher */
cipher = php_openssl_get_evp_cipher_from_algo(cipherid);
if (cipher == NULL) {
/* shouldn't happen */
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "Failed to get cipher");
goto clean_exit;
}
p7 = PKCS7_encrypt(recipcerts, infile, (EVP_CIPHER*)cipher, (int)flags);
if (p7 == NULL) {
goto clean_exit;
}
/* tack on extra headers */
if (zheaders) {
ZEND_HASH_FOREACH_STR_KEY_VAL(Z_ARRVAL_P(zheaders), strindex, zcertval) {
convert_to_string_ex(zcertval);
if (strindex) {
BIO_printf(outfile, "%s: %s\n", ZSTR_VAL(strindex), Z_STRVAL_P(zcertval));
} else {
BIO_printf(outfile, "%s\n", Z_STRVAL_P(zcertval));
}
} ZEND_HASH_FOREACH_END();
}
(void)BIO_reset(infile);
/* write the encrypted data */
SMIME_write_PKCS7(outfile, p7, infile, (int)flags);
RETVAL_TRUE;
clean_exit:
PKCS7_free(p7);
BIO_free(infile);
BIO_free(outfile);
if (recipcerts) {
sk_X509_pop_free(recipcerts, X509_free);
}
}
|
C
|
php
| 0 |
CVE-2014-9940
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-9940/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/60a2362f769cf549dc466134efe71c8bf9fbaaba
|
60a2362f769cf549dc466134efe71c8bf9fbaaba
|
regulator: core: Fix regualtor_ena_gpio_free not to access pin after freeing
After freeing pin from regulator_ena_gpio_free, loop can access
the pin. So this patch fixes not to access pin after freeing.
Signed-off-by: Seung-Woo Kim <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <[email protected]>
|
static bool have_full_constraints(void)
{
return has_full_constraints || of_have_populated_dt();
}
|
static bool have_full_constraints(void)
{
return has_full_constraints || of_have_populated_dt();
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-16427
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-16427/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/OpenSC/OpenSC/pull/1447/commits/8fe377e93b4b56060e5bbfb6f3142ceaeca744fa
|
8fe377e93b4b56060e5bbfb6f3142ceaeca744fa
|
fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
|
auth_update_component(struct sc_card *card, struct auth_update_component_info *args)
{
struct sc_apdu apdu;
unsigned char sbuf[SC_MAX_APDU_BUFFER_SIZE + 0x10];
unsigned char ins, p1, p2;
int rv, len;
LOG_FUNC_CALLED(card->ctx);
if (args->len > sizeof(sbuf) || args->len > 0x100)
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENTS);
sc_log(card->ctx, "nn %i; len %i", args->component, args->len);
ins = 0xD8;
p1 = args->component;
p2 = 0x04;
len = 0;
sbuf[len++] = args->type;
sbuf[len++] = args->len;
memcpy(sbuf + len, args->data, args->len);
len += args->len;
if (args->type == SC_CARDCTL_OBERTHUR_KEY_DES) {
int outl;
const unsigned char in[8] = {0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0};
unsigned char out[8];
EVP_CIPHER_CTX * ctx = NULL;
if (args->len!=8 && args->len!=24)
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENTS);
ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL)
SC_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL,SC_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY);
p2 = 0;
if (args->len == 24)
EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_des_ede(), NULL, args->data, NULL);
else
EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_des_ecb(), NULL, args->data, NULL);
rv = EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, out, &outl, in, 8);
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
if (rv == 0) {
sc_log(card->ctx, "OpenSSL encryption error.");
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_ERROR_INTERNAL);
}
sbuf[len++] = 0x03;
memcpy(sbuf + len, out, 3);
len += 3;
}
else {
sbuf[len++] = 0;
}
sc_format_apdu(card, &apdu, SC_APDU_CASE_3_SHORT, ins, p1, p2);
apdu.cla |= 0x80;
apdu.data = sbuf;
apdu.datalen = len;
apdu.lc = len;
if (args->len == 0x100) {
sbuf[0] = args->type;
sbuf[1] = 0x20;
memcpy(sbuf + 2, args->data, 0x20);
sbuf[0x22] = 0;
apdu.cla |= 0x10;
apdu.data = sbuf;
apdu.datalen = 0x23;
apdu.lc = 0x23;
rv = sc_transmit_apdu(card, &apdu);
apdu.cla &= ~0x10;
LOG_TEST_RET(card->ctx, rv, "APDU transmit failed");
sbuf[0] = args->type;
sbuf[1] = 0xE0;
memcpy(sbuf + 2, args->data + 0x20, 0xE0);
sbuf[0xE2] = 0;
apdu.data = sbuf;
apdu.datalen = 0xE3;
apdu.lc = 0xE3;
}
rv = sc_transmit_apdu(card, &apdu);
sc_mem_clear(sbuf, sizeof(sbuf));
LOG_TEST_RET(card->ctx, rv, "APDU transmit failed");
rv = sc_check_sw(card, apdu.sw1, apdu.sw2);
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, rv);
}
|
auth_update_component(struct sc_card *card, struct auth_update_component_info *args)
{
struct sc_apdu apdu;
unsigned char sbuf[SC_MAX_APDU_BUFFER_SIZE + 0x10];
unsigned char ins, p1, p2;
int rv, len;
LOG_FUNC_CALLED(card->ctx);
if (args->len > sizeof(sbuf) || args->len > 0x100)
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENTS);
sc_log(card->ctx, "nn %i; len %i", args->component, args->len);
ins = 0xD8;
p1 = args->component;
p2 = 0x04;
len = 0;
sbuf[len++] = args->type;
sbuf[len++] = args->len;
memcpy(sbuf + len, args->data, args->len);
len += args->len;
if (args->type == SC_CARDCTL_OBERTHUR_KEY_DES) {
int outl;
const unsigned char in[8] = {0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0};
unsigned char out[8];
EVP_CIPHER_CTX * ctx = NULL;
if (args->len!=8 && args->len!=24)
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENTS);
ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL)
SC_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL,SC_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY);
p2 = 0;
if (args->len == 24)
EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_des_ede(), NULL, args->data, NULL);
else
EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_des_ecb(), NULL, args->data, NULL);
rv = EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, out, &outl, in, 8);
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
if (rv == 0) {
sc_log(card->ctx, "OpenSSL encryption error.");
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_ERROR_INTERNAL);
}
sbuf[len++] = 0x03;
memcpy(sbuf + len, out, 3);
len += 3;
}
else {
sbuf[len++] = 0;
}
sc_format_apdu(card, &apdu, SC_APDU_CASE_3_SHORT, ins, p1, p2);
apdu.cla |= 0x80;
apdu.data = sbuf;
apdu.datalen = len;
apdu.lc = len;
if (args->len == 0x100) {
sbuf[0] = args->type;
sbuf[1] = 0x20;
memcpy(sbuf + 2, args->data, 0x20);
sbuf[0x22] = 0;
apdu.cla |= 0x10;
apdu.data = sbuf;
apdu.datalen = 0x23;
apdu.lc = 0x23;
rv = sc_transmit_apdu(card, &apdu);
apdu.cla &= ~0x10;
LOG_TEST_RET(card->ctx, rv, "APDU transmit failed");
sbuf[0] = args->type;
sbuf[1] = 0xE0;
memcpy(sbuf + 2, args->data + 0x20, 0xE0);
sbuf[0xE2] = 0;
apdu.data = sbuf;
apdu.datalen = 0xE3;
apdu.lc = 0xE3;
}
rv = sc_transmit_apdu(card, &apdu);
sc_mem_clear(sbuf, sizeof(sbuf));
LOG_TEST_RET(card->ctx, rv, "APDU transmit failed");
rv = sc_check_sw(card, apdu.sw1, apdu.sw2);
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, rv);
}
|
C
|
OpenSC
| 0 |
CVE-2014-3173
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-3173/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/ee7579229ff7e9e5ae28bf53aea069251499d7da
|
ee7579229ff7e9e5ae28bf53aea069251499d7da
|
Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
[email protected],[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
bool GLES2DecoderImpl::ValidateCompressedTexDimensions(
const char* function_name,
GLint level, GLsizei width, GLsizei height, GLenum format) {
switch (format) {
case GL_COMPRESSED_RGB_S3TC_DXT1_EXT:
case GL_COMPRESSED_RGBA_S3TC_DXT1_EXT:
case GL_COMPRESSED_RGBA_S3TC_DXT3_EXT:
case GL_COMPRESSED_RGBA_S3TC_DXT5_EXT: {
if (!IsValidDXTSize(level, width) || !IsValidDXTSize(level, height)) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(
GL_INVALID_OPERATION, function_name,
"width or height invalid for level");
return false;
}
return true;
}
case GL_ATC_RGB_AMD:
case GL_ATC_RGBA_EXPLICIT_ALPHA_AMD:
case GL_ATC_RGBA_INTERPOLATED_ALPHA_AMD:
case GL_ETC1_RGB8_OES: {
if (width <= 0 || height <= 0) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(
GL_INVALID_OPERATION, function_name,
"width or height invalid for level");
return false;
}
return true;
}
case GL_COMPRESSED_RGB_PVRTC_4BPPV1_IMG:
case GL_COMPRESSED_RGB_PVRTC_2BPPV1_IMG:
case GL_COMPRESSED_RGBA_PVRTC_4BPPV1_IMG:
case GL_COMPRESSED_RGBA_PVRTC_2BPPV1_IMG: {
if (!IsValidPVRTCSize(level, width) ||
!IsValidPVRTCSize(level, height)) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(
GL_INVALID_OPERATION, function_name,
"width or height invalid for level");
return false;
}
return true;
}
default:
return false;
}
}
|
bool GLES2DecoderImpl::ValidateCompressedTexDimensions(
const char* function_name,
GLint level, GLsizei width, GLsizei height, GLenum format) {
switch (format) {
case GL_COMPRESSED_RGB_S3TC_DXT1_EXT:
case GL_COMPRESSED_RGBA_S3TC_DXT1_EXT:
case GL_COMPRESSED_RGBA_S3TC_DXT3_EXT:
case GL_COMPRESSED_RGBA_S3TC_DXT5_EXT: {
if (!IsValidDXTSize(level, width) || !IsValidDXTSize(level, height)) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(
GL_INVALID_OPERATION, function_name,
"width or height invalid for level");
return false;
}
return true;
}
case GL_ATC_RGB_AMD:
case GL_ATC_RGBA_EXPLICIT_ALPHA_AMD:
case GL_ATC_RGBA_INTERPOLATED_ALPHA_AMD:
case GL_ETC1_RGB8_OES: {
if (width <= 0 || height <= 0) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(
GL_INVALID_OPERATION, function_name,
"width or height invalid for level");
return false;
}
return true;
}
case GL_COMPRESSED_RGB_PVRTC_4BPPV1_IMG:
case GL_COMPRESSED_RGB_PVRTC_2BPPV1_IMG:
case GL_COMPRESSED_RGBA_PVRTC_4BPPV1_IMG:
case GL_COMPRESSED_RGBA_PVRTC_2BPPV1_IMG: {
if (!IsValidPVRTCSize(level, width) ||
!IsValidPVRTCSize(level, height)) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(
GL_INVALID_OPERATION, function_name,
"width or height invalid for level");
return false;
}
return true;
}
default:
return false;
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5118
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5118/
|
CWE-732
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/0ab2412a104d2f235d7b9fe19d30ef605a410832
|
0ab2412a104d2f235d7b9fe19d30ef605a410832
|
Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
|
void Document::UpdateViewportDescription() {
if (GetFrame() && GetFrame()->IsMainFrame()) {
GetPage()->GetChromeClient().DispatchViewportPropertiesDidChange(
GetViewportDescription());
}
}
|
void Document::UpdateViewportDescription() {
if (GetFrame() && GetFrame()->IsMainFrame()) {
GetPage()->GetChromeClient().DispatchViewportPropertiesDidChange(
GetViewportDescription());
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5219
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5219/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a4150b688a754d3d10d2ca385155b1c95d77d6ae
|
a4150b688a754d3d10d2ca385155b1c95d77d6ae
|
Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
|
void GLES2Implementation::GenVertexArraysOESHelper(GLsizei n,
const GLuint* arrays) {
vertex_array_object_manager_->GenVertexArrays(n, arrays);
}
|
void GLES2Implementation::GenVertexArraysOESHelper(GLsizei n,
const GLuint* arrays) {
vertex_array_object_manager_->GenVertexArrays(n, arrays);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-3171
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-3171/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/d10a8dac48d3a9467e81c62cb45208344f4542db
|
d10a8dac48d3a9467e81c62cb45208344f4542db
|
Replace further questionable HashMap::add usages in bindings
BUG=390928
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/411273002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@178823 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
PassRefPtr<SerializedScriptValue> SerializedScriptValue::createFromWire(const String& data)
{
return adoptRef(new SerializedScriptValue(data));
}
|
PassRefPtr<SerializedScriptValue> SerializedScriptValue::createFromWire(const String& data)
{
return adoptRef(new SerializedScriptValue(data));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-19409
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-19409/
| null |
https://git.ghostscript.com/?p=ghostpdl.git;a=commit;h=661e8d8fb8248c38d67958beda32f3a5876d0c3f
|
661e8d8fb8248c38d67958beda32f3a5876d0c3f
| null |
zdoneshowpage(i_ctx_t *i_ctx_p)
{
gx_device *dev = gs_currentdevice(igs);
gx_device *tdev = (*dev_proc(dev, get_page_device)) (dev);
if (tdev != 0)
tdev->ShowpageCount++;
return 0;
}
|
zdoneshowpage(i_ctx_t *i_ctx_p)
{
gx_device *dev = gs_currentdevice(igs);
gx_device *tdev = (*dev_proc(dev, get_page_device)) (dev);
if (tdev != 0)
tdev->ShowpageCount++;
return 0;
}
|
C
|
ghostscript
| 0 |
CVE-2015-1213
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1213/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/faaa2fd0a05f1622d9a8806da118d4f3b602e707
|
faaa2fd0a05f1622d9a8806da118d4f3b602e707
|
[Blink>Media] Allow autoplay muted on Android by default
There was a mistake causing autoplay muted is shipped on Android
but it will be disabled if the chromium embedder doesn't specify
content setting for "AllowAutoplay" preference. This CL makes the
AllowAutoplay preference true by default so that it is allowed by
embedders (including AndroidWebView) unless they explicitly
disable it.
Intent to ship:
https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msg/blink-dev/Q1cnzNI2GpI/AL_eyUNABgAJ
BUG=689018
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2677173002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#448423}
|
void HTMLMediaElement::didRecalcStyle() {
if (layoutObject())
layoutObject()->updateFromElement();
}
|
void HTMLMediaElement::didRecalcStyle() {
if (layoutObject())
layoutObject()->updateFromElement();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-5148
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-5148/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/e89cfcb9090e8c98129ae9160c513f504db74599
|
e89cfcb9090e8c98129ae9160c513f504db74599
|
Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
bool TabStripGtk::IsCursorInTabStripZone() const {
gfx::Point tabstrip_topleft;
gtk_util::ConvertWidgetPointToScreen(tabstrip_.get(), &tabstrip_topleft);
gfx::Rect bds = bounds();
bds.set_origin(tabstrip_topleft);
bds.set_height(bds.height() + kTabStripAnimationVSlop);
GdkScreen* screen = gdk_screen_get_default();
GdkDisplay* display = gdk_screen_get_display(screen);
gint x, y;
gdk_display_get_pointer(display, NULL, &x, &y, NULL);
gfx::Point cursor_point(x, y);
return bds.Contains(cursor_point);
}
|
bool TabStripGtk::IsCursorInTabStripZone() const {
gfx::Point tabstrip_topleft;
gtk_util::ConvertWidgetPointToScreen(tabstrip_.get(), &tabstrip_topleft);
gfx::Rect bds = bounds();
bds.set_origin(tabstrip_topleft);
bds.set_height(bds.height() + kTabStripAnimationVSlop);
GdkScreen* screen = gdk_screen_get_default();
GdkDisplay* display = gdk_screen_get_display(screen);
gint x, y;
gdk_display_get_pointer(display, NULL, &x, &y, NULL);
gfx::Point cursor_point(x, y);
return bds.Contains(cursor_point);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
Subsets and Splits
CWE-119 Function Changes
This query retrieves specific examples (before and after code changes) of vulnerabilities with CWE-119, providing basic filtering but limited insight.
Vulnerable Code with CWE IDs
The query filters and combines records from multiple datasets to list specific vulnerability details, providing a basic overview of vulnerable functions but lacking deeper insights.
Vulnerable Functions in BigVul
Retrieves details of vulnerable functions from both validation and test datasets where vulnerabilities are present, providing a basic set of data points for further analysis.
Vulnerable Code Functions
This query filters and shows raw data for vulnerable functions, which provides basic insight into specific vulnerabilities but lacks broader analytical value.
Top 100 Vulnerable Functions
Retrieves 100 samples of vulnerabilities from the training dataset, showing the CVE ID, CWE ID, and code changes before and after the vulnerability, which is a basic filtering of vulnerability data.