buddhist-nlp/tatpa-cleaned · Datasets at Hugging Face

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athāpi syāt /	Then also it might be [objected]:
nāsamīkṣya yataḥ kāryaṃ śanako 'pi pravartate //	Since even a fisherman acts without deliberation, [the Spirit too might act similarly].
evaṃ hi kaivartādeḥ prākṛtapuruṣādapyatyantānabhijñatayā kathamasau prekṣāvatām avadheyavacanaḥ syāt /	For how could such a one [i.e. the Spirit], being even more ignorant than ordinary people like fishermen and others, be worthy of attention from intelligent people?
buddhimatteti / prekṣāvattā /	"Buddhimattā" means [having] intelligence.
śanakaḥ kaivartaḥ /	"Śanaka" [means] fisherman.
etenaiva puruṣadūṣaṇena ye vā śauriprabhṛtayaḥ parair jagato dhātāraḥ kalpitās te 'pi nirastā boddhavyā iti darśayati /	By this very refutation of [the notion of] Spirit, those who are postulated by others as creators of the world, [like] Śauri and others, should also be understood as rejected - this is what [the text] shows.
śauryātmajādaya ityādi / śauryātmajādayo ye 'pi dhātāraḥ parikalpitāḥ /	[The verse begins] "Śauri, the Self-born, and others" - those who are postulated as creators.
etenaiva prakāreṇa nirastāste 'pi vastutaḥ //	They too are in reality rejected by this very method.
tatra śaurir viṣṇuḥ /	Here, "Śauri" [means] Viṣṇu.
ātmajo brahmā /	"Self-born" [means] Brahmā.
ādiśabdena yo buddhimān kālaḥ parair iṣyate tasya grahaṇam /	By the word "ādi" (and others) is meant the inclusion of "Intelligent Time" which is accepted by others.
yathoktam // iti puruṣaparīkṣā //	As stated [before]; thus [ends] the examination of Person.
KAPITEL Ótmaparīkṣā	[Chapter on] the Examination of the Self
Naiyāyikavaiśeṣikaparikalpitātmaparīkṣā	Examination of the Self as Postulated by the Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas
anye punar ihātmānam icchādīnāṃ samāśrayam / svato 'cidrūpamicchanti nityaṃ sarvagataṃ tathā //	Others again postulate here [the existence of] a Self [which is] the substratum of desire and other [mental states], [and which is] by its own nature non-conscious, eternal, and likewise all-pervading.
śubhāśubhānāṃ kartāraṃ karmaṇāṃ tatphalasya ca /	[They postulate it as] the performer of good and bad actions and [the experiencer] of their fruits.
bhoktāraṃ cetanāyogāccetanaṃ na svarūpataḥ //	[They say it is] conscious through association with consciousness, [but] not by its own nature.
jñānayantrādisambandhaḥ kartṛtvaṃ tasya bhaṇyate /	Its connection with cognition, effort and other [qualities] is said to [constitute] its agency.
sukhaduḥkhādisaṃvittisamavāyas tu bhoktṛtā //	Its experiencership consists in the inherence of the awareness of pleasure, pain and other [feelings].
buddhibhir vedanābhiś ca janma tasyābhidhīyate //	Its birth is declared to be [its] connection with cognitions and sensations.
prāgāttābhirviyogas tu maraṇaṃ jīvanaṃ punaḥ /	Its death is [declared to be its] separation from these [cognitions and sensations] previously acquired, while life [is their continuation].
sadehasya manoyogo dharmādharmābhisatkṛtaḥ //	[Its] association with [a] body and mind [occurs] due to [its] merit and demerit.
śarīracakṣurādīnāṃ vadhāddhiṃsāsya kalpyate /	[The soul's] injury is inferred from the injury to [its] body, eyes and other [organs].
itthaṃ nitye 'pi puṃsyeṣā prakriyā vimalekṣyate //	Thus, even though the soul is eternal, this process is considered flawless.
sadādyaviśeṣaviṣayāviṣayobhayātmakajñeyapratyakṣānumānopamānaśabdasiddhadarśanaprātibhajñānārekaviparyayasvapnasvapnāntikāḥ prajñānaviśeṣā madīyaśarīrādivyatiriktasaṃvedakasaṃvedyāḥ svakāraṇāyattajanmavattvabodhātmakatvāśutaravināśitvasaṃskārādhāyakatvapratyayatvebhyaḥ puruṣāntarapratyayavat vaidharmyeṇa praśastamitā ghaṭādaya iti /	[All] specific cognitions—whether of objects falling under 'being' etc. or not falling [under it] or both, [whether] perceptual, inferential, analogical, verbal, astrological, intuitive, doubtful, erroneous, dreaming or dream-end—are apprehended by a cognizer distinct from my body etc., because they [1] depend on their own causes for origination, [2] are of the nature of consciousness, [3] are quickly destructible, [4] leave impressions, [and 5] are cognitions, just like the cognitions of other persons.
tatra sadādayaḥ ṣaḍaviśeṣāḥ pūrvaṃ vyākhyātāḥ /	Among these, the six categories beginning with 'being' have been explained earlier.
teṣāṃ sadādīnāṃ ṣaṇṇāṃ viṣayo dravyaguṇakarmāṇi /	Substance, quality and action are the objects of these six [categories] beginning with 'being'.
aviṣayaḥ sāmānyaviśeṣasamavāyāḥ /	Universals, particulars and inherence are not [their] objects.
tadetad ubhayātmakaṃ jñeyaṃ viṣayaḥ pratyakṣādīnāṃ jñānaviśeṣāṇāṃ te tathoktāḥ /	These both [types] constitute the knowable objects of specific cognitions like perception etc., [and] they are thus described.
pratyakṣānumānopamānetyādis tu dvandvanirdeśaḥ /	The terms "perception, inference, analogy, etc." form a dvandva compound.
siddhadarśanaṃ jyotiḥśāstrādyupanibaddham / taddhi siddhānāṃ darśanaṃ siddhaṃ vā darśanam iti kṛtvā siddhadarśanam ucyate /	Astrological knowledge is based on astronomy and other [sciences]. Indeed, it is called siddhadarśana because it is either the vision of accomplished ones or established knowledge.
tad dhi prāyeṇarṣiṇāṃ bhavatīti kṛtvārṣamucyate /	Since this generally belongs to the ṛṣis, it is called ārṣa [belonging to the ṛṣis].
ārekaḥ saṃśayaḥ /	[This is] a single doubt.
viparyayo viparyāsaḥ / prathamasvapnāvasthābhāvī pratyayaḥ svapnaḥ /	Error [means] misconception. Dream [means] a cognition occurring in the first state of sleep.
tad viṣayaṃ svapno 'pi yadaparaṃ jñānaṃ bhavati sa svapnāntikaḥ /	That cognition which occurs after a dream regarding that same object is [called] svapnāntika.
eta eva prajñānaviśeṣāḥ /	These indeed are the particular types of cognition.
śeṣaṃ subodham /	The rest is easily understood.
tadetat pramāṇyam arthato nirdiśann āha jñānāni cetyādi /	Indicating the validity of this through [its] meaning, he states "jñānāni ca" etc.
jñānāni ca madīyāni tatvādivyatirekiṇā /	"And my cognitions [are apprehended] by a cognizer distinct from [my] body and other [things]
saṃvedakena vedyāni pratyayatvāt tadanyavat //	[they are] apprehended by a cognizer because they are cognitions, like those other [cognitions]."
tatvādītyatrādiśabdena buddhīndriyavedanāḥ parigṛhyante /	Here in the compound "tatvādi" [body etc.], the word "ādi" includes intellect, sense-organs and feelings.
pratyayatvādityupalakṣaṇam / tadanye 'pi svakāraṇāyattajanmavattvādayo grāhyāḥ //	"Because they are cognitions" is [given as] an indication; the other [reasons] also should be understood, such as "having their origin dependent on their own causes" and so forth.
icchādayaś ca sarve 'pi kvacid ete samāśritāḥ /	"And all these [things] like desire etc. must have some substrate [in which they inhere];"
vastutve sati kāryatvād rūpavat sa ca naḥ pumān //	Because [they are] effects while being entities, like color, and this [something] is our soul.
vastutvagrahaṇādeṣa na nāśe vyabhicāravān /	Due to including the term "being entities," this [argument] is not fallacious with respect to destruction.
hetumattve 'pi nāśasya yasmānnaivāsti vastutā //	Because even though destruction has a cause, it does not have entity-hood.
yadyotakaras tu pramāṇayati devadattasya rūparasagandhasparśapratyayā ekānekanimittāḥ mayeti pratyayena pratisandhīyamānatvāt /	Yadyotakara proves [it thus]: "Devadatta's cognitions of color, taste, smell and touch have both single and multiple causes, because they are recalled through the notion of 'I'."
yac ca tadekaṃ nimittaṃ sa ātmeti /	And that which is their single cause is the Self.
tadetat pramāṇaṃ darśayann āha rūpādipratyayā iti /	Showing this proof, he states [the verse beginning with] "cognitions of color, etc."
rūpādipratyayāḥ sarve 'pyekānekanimittakāḥ / mayeti pratyayenaiṣāṃ pratisandhānabhāvataḥ //	All cognitions of color and other [qualities] have both single and multiple causes, because they are recalled through the notion of "I."
nartakībhrūlatābhaṅge bahūnāṃ pratyayā iva /	Like the cognitions of many [people] regarding the movement of a dancer's eyebrow.
anyathā pratisandhānaṃ na jāyetānibandhanam //	Otherwise, recollection would not arise, as it would lack a foundation.
subodham //	[This is] easily understood.
ayam aparastadīyaḥ prayogaḥ	This is another argument [by the same author]
ātmeti padaṃ śarīrendriyamanobuddhivedanāsaṃghātavyatiriktavacanaṃ prasiddhaparyāyavyatiriktatve satyekapadatvāt ghaṭādiśabdavat	The word "ātman" must denote something distinct from the aggregate of body, senses, mind, intellect and sensations, because while being different from [their] well-known synonyms, it is a single word, like the word "ghaṭa" etc.
tadāha buddhīndriyādītyādi	He states this in [the verse beginning with] "buddhīndriyādi"
buddhīndriyādisaṃghātavyatiriktābhidhāyakam ātmeti vacanaṃ yasmād idam ekapadaṃ matam	The word "ātman" denotes something distinct from the aggregate of intellect, senses and so forth, because this is accepted as a single word
yathānirdiṣṭadharmeṇa tadyuktaṃ paṭaśabdavat	[It is] endowed with the aforementioned property, like the word "paṭa" [cloth]
siddhaparyāyabhinnatva iti	[This refers to] being different from well-known synonyms
buddhīndriyādīnāṃ ye siddhāḥ paryāyā dhīprabhṛtayastebhyo bhinnatve satītyarthaḥ	The meaning is: while being different from the established synonyms of intellect and senses etc., such as "dhī" and others
yaccaivaṃ pariniścitam iti	Whatever is thus ascertained [to be such]
yathānirdiṣṭadharmeṇeti	[This refers to] having the aforementioned property
buddhyādivyatiriktārthābhidhāyitvena	[It means] by virtue of denoting something distinct from intellect etc.
punaḥ sa eva vyatirekiṇaṃ hetumātmasiddhaye prayuktavān	Again, he employed this distinguishing reason for establishing [the existence of] the Self
prāṇādibhir viyuktaś ca jīvaddeho bhavedayam	This living body would be [completely] devoid of breathing and other [vital] functions
nairātmyād ghaṭavat tasmān naivāstyasya nirātmatā	Because of [its hypothetical] soullessness, like a jar; therefore its soullessness cannot exist
asya nirātmateti	[This refers to] its soullessness
yadvā asyātmano nirātmatā niḥsvabhāvatā nāsti api tu sattvaṃ siddham ity arthaḥ	Or alternatively, this ātman's nirātmatā (lack of selfhood/non-existence) does not exist; rather, [its] existence is established
mātur udaraniṣkramaṇottarakālaṃ madīyādyaprajñānasaṃvedakasaṃvedyānyatatkālāni madīyāni prajñānāni madīyaprajñānatvāt ādyamadīyaprajñānavat	All my cognitions occurring after the time of emergence from [my] mother's womb are apprehended by the same cognizer who apprehended [my] first cognition, because they are my cognitions, like [that] first cognition of mine
evaṃ duḥkhādayo 'pi pakṣīkartavyāḥ	Similarly, pain and other [experiences] are also to be taken as the subject [of inference]
etac ca nityatve 'numānam	And this is the inference for [the Soul's] eternality
sarvamuttaravijñānaṃ majjñānatvāt tadādyavat	All subsequent cognitions [are known by the same cognizer] because they are my cognitions, like that first [cognition]
avanijalānilamanāṃsi vipratipattiviṣayabhāvāpannāni dūrataravartīni madīyenātmanā saha sambandhyante	Earth, water, air and mind, which are subjects of dispute [and] situated at great distances, are connected with my ātman
mūrtatvavegavattvaparatvamithaḥsaṃyogavibhāgavattvebhyo madīyaśarīrādivat	[This is] because of [their] corporeality, velocity, priority/posteriority, and mutual conjunction/disjunction, like my body and other [things]
evaṃ ca sattvanityatvavibhutvānāṃ viniścaye / ātmano na nirātmānaḥ sarvadharmā iti sthitam //	Thus, when the existence, eternality and omnipresence of the soul are definitely proved, [then] it is established that all dharmas are not without a soul.
tadatra prathame tāvat sādhane siddhasādhyatā /	With regard to the first argument here, there is the fallacy of proving what is [already] established.
sarvajñādiprabedyatvaṃ tvajjñānasyeṣyate yataḥ //	Because the apprehensibility of your cognition by the omniscient [being] and others is [already] admitted [by us].
prathame sādhana iti / jñānāni ca madīyānītyādau /	[This refers to] the first argument, [namely] the one beginning with "my cognitions" [in verse 177].
tatra siddhasādhyatā bhavadīyapratyayānāmasmābhir bhavaccharīrādivyatirekiṇā sarvavidā śrāvakapratyekabuddhais tadanyaiś ca parivittavedibhir vedanābhyupagamāt //	There is proving of what is [already] proved because we [already] admit that your cognitions are apprehended by the Omniscient One who is different from your body etc., as well as by Śrāvakas, Pratyekabuddhas, and other thought-readers.
yaścāpi puruṣāntarapratyayavad iti sādharmyadṛṣṭāntaḥ sa sādhyavikala iti darśayann āha prakāśakānapekṣaṃ cetyādi /	And showing that the example of similarity stated as "like the cognitions of other persons" lacks the probandum [the author] states beginning with "independent of illuminators."
anyavijñānamapyevaṃ sādhyaśūnyaṃ nidarśanam // yataḥ puruṣāntarīyakam api jñānaṃ prakāśakāntarānapekṣaṃ svasaṃvidrūpamevopajāyate /	The example is thus devoid of the probandum, because even the cognition belonging to another person arises in its own form as self-illuminating, independent of other illuminators.
athāpi syānnānyadīyaṃ cittamātram udāharaṇatvenābhipretaṃ kintu yasmin viṣaye vijñānamāgṛhītatadākāramupajāyate tadihodāharaṇam ity āha tadākāroparaktenetyādi /	Even if [it be argued that] what is intended as an example is not merely another's consciousness, but rather that cognition which arises having taken on the form of that object, [the author] states [the verse] beginning with "tinged by that form."
tadākāroparaktena yadanyena pravedyate /	[That which] is known by another [cognition] tinged with that form.
evam api yatsvasaṃvidrūpameva jñānaṃ jñānāntarasaṃvedanarahitam utpadyate tena saṃśayo bhavedanaikāntiko hetur iti yāvat / atha tadapi svavyatiriktasaṃvedakasaṃvedyamudayavyayadharmakatvaprameyatvasmaryamāṇapramāṇatvebhyo viṣayavad iti matam /	Even so, regarding that cognition which arises merely as self-illuminating without being cognized by another cognition, there would be doubt [about your argument], meaning the reason would be inconclusive. Even if it be maintained that this [cognition] too must be apprehended by a cognizer different from itself, because [1] it has the nature of arising and perishing, [2] it is cognizable, [3] it is remembered as a means of valid cognition - just like objects [of cognition].
tadatrāpi sādhyaviparyaye bādhakābhāvād vyatireko na niścitaḥ /	Here also, since there is no precluding [factor] in case of the contrary of what is to be proven, the negative concomitance is not certain.
uttarottarajñānānubhāve cānavasthā /	And [there would be] an infinite regress in [the series of] experiencing successive cognitions.
na hyavyaktavyaktiko viṣayaḥ siddhyet /	For an object whose manifestation has not become manifest cannot be established.
tataścaikaviṣayasiddhyarthaṃ jñānaparamparāmanusarataḥ sakalam eva puruṣāyuṣamupayujyeta /	And consequently, for establishing a single object, one following the series of cognitions would spend [one's] entire human lifespan.
athāpi kiñcijjñānamanavasthābhayāt saṃviditarūpam evotpadyata iti /	If [it is claimed that] from fear of infinite regress, some cognition arises as self-cognized,
tathā tenaivodayavyayadharmakatvādīnāṃ hetūnām anaikāntikatā /	then by that very [fact] the reasons such as "having the property of arising and perishing" become inconclusive.
tadvadevānyeṣām api jñānāṃ svasaṃvedanatvābhyupagame kaḥ pradveṣaḥ /	What objection [could there be] to accepting self-cognizability of other cognitions also, just like that [first cognition]?
atha tadasaṃviditarūpameveṣyate /	If it is maintained that this [cognition] has an uncognized form,
evam api tadasiddhau sarveṣāṃ pūrvajñānānām aprasiddhiranabhivyaktavyaktikatvāt /	even then, when that [cognition] is not established, all previous cognitions would be unproven due to their manifestation being unmanifested.
tataś ca viṣayo 'pi na prasiddhyet /	And consequently, the object too would not be established.
yeṣāṃ tu vijñānavādināṃ mataṃ sarvam eva jñānaṃ grāhyagrāhakavaidhuryāt svayam eva prakāśate na tu jñānāntareṇa vedyata iti tān prati sādhyavikalatā doṣo 'kampya eva /	But against those Vijñānavādins whose view is that every cognition, due to the absence of grasped and grasper, manifests by itself and is not known by another cognition - against them the fault of lacking what is to be proven remains completely unshaken.
evam anyeṣvapi kāraṇāyattajanmavattvādiṣu sādhaneṣu siddhasādhyatādidoṣā vācyāḥ /	Similarly, for other reasons like "having birth dependent on causes", the faults like proving what is [already] proven should be stated.
yaccāpi sadādītyādi dharmiviśeṣaṇaṃ kṛtaṃ tatpūrvavadanarthakaṃ nahyasya prastutasādhyasiddhāvaṅgabhāvo 'sti /	And the qualification of the subject [beginning with] "being, etc." that has been made is, as before, meaningless, for it has no role in establishing what is presently to be proven.
tathā hi etāvata kiṃ na gatam madīyāḥ pratyakṣādipratyayā madīyaśarīrādivyatiriktasaṃvedakasaṃvedyā iti /	For what indeed is not encompassed by this [statement] that "my perceptual and other cognitions are [all] cognized by a cognizer distinct from my body and other [physical elements]"?
pratyakṣānumānādipravibhāgenāpi dharmiprabhedo 'narthaka eva madīyāḥ pratyayā ityetāvataiva gatatvāt /	Even with a distinction based on [cognitions being] perception, inference and so forth, any distinction regarding the property-bearer is meaningless, since everything is already encompassed merely by [the term] "my cognitions."
na cāpi prativādino yathoktaviśeṣaṇaviśiṣṭo dharmī siddha ityāśrayāsiddhatā ca hetūnām /	And the property-bearer qualified by the aforementioned qualifications is not established for the opponent either, hence there is also [the fallacy of] āśrayāsiddhatā [lack of established basis] for the reasons.

athāpi syāt /

Then also it might be [objected]:

nāsamīkṣya yataḥ kāryaṃ śanako 'pi pravartate //

Since even a fisherman acts without deliberation, [the Spirit too might act similarly].

evaṃ hi kaivartādeḥ prākṛtapuruṣādapyatyantānabhijñatayā kathamasau prekṣāvatām avadheyavacanaḥ syāt /

For how could such a one [i.e. the Spirit], being even more ignorant than ordinary people like fishermen and others, be worthy of attention from intelligent people?

buddhimatteti / prekṣāvattā /

"Buddhimattā" means [having] intelligence.

śanakaḥ kaivartaḥ /

"Śanaka" [means] fisherman.

etenaiva puruṣadūṣaṇena ye vā śauriprabhṛtayaḥ parair jagato dhātāraḥ kalpitās te 'pi nirastā boddhavyā iti darśayati /

By this very refutation of [the notion of] Spirit, those who are postulated by others as creators of the world, [like] Śauri and others, should also be understood as rejected - this is what [the text] shows.

śauryātmajādaya ityādi / śauryātmajādayo ye 'pi dhātāraḥ parikalpitāḥ /

[The verse begins] "Śauri, the Self-born, and others" - those who are postulated as creators.

etenaiva prakāreṇa nirastāste 'pi vastutaḥ //

They too are in reality rejected by this very method.

tatra śaurir viṣṇuḥ /

Here, "Śauri" [means] Viṣṇu.

ātmajo brahmā /

"Self-born" [means] Brahmā.

ādiśabdena yo buddhimān kālaḥ parair iṣyate tasya grahaṇam /

By the word "ādi" (and others) is meant the inclusion of "Intelligent Time" which is accepted by others.

yathoktam // iti puruṣaparīkṣā //

As stated [before]; thus [ends] the examination of Person.

KAPITEL Ótmaparīkṣā

[Chapter on] the Examination of the Self

Naiyāyikavaiśeṣikaparikalpitātmaparīkṣā

Examination of the Self as Postulated by the Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas

anye punar ihātmānam icchādīnāṃ samāśrayam / svato 'cidrūpamicchanti nityaṃ sarvagataṃ tathā //

Others again postulate here [the existence of] a Self [which is] the substratum of desire and other [mental states], [and which is] by its own nature non-conscious, eternal, and likewise all-pervading.

śubhāśubhānāṃ kartāraṃ karmaṇāṃ tatphalasya ca /

[They postulate it as] the performer of good and bad actions and [the experiencer] of their fruits.

bhoktāraṃ cetanāyogāccetanaṃ na svarūpataḥ //

[They say it is] conscious through association with consciousness, [but] not by its own nature.

jñānayantrādisambandhaḥ kartṛtvaṃ tasya bhaṇyate /

Its connection with cognition, effort and other [qualities] is said to [constitute] its agency.

sukhaduḥkhādisaṃvittisamavāyas tu bhoktṛtā //

Its experiencership consists in the inherence of the awareness of pleasure, pain and other [feelings].

buddhibhir vedanābhiś ca janma tasyābhidhīyate //

Its birth is declared to be [its] connection with cognitions and sensations.

prāgāttābhirviyogas tu maraṇaṃ jīvanaṃ punaḥ /

Its death is [declared to be its] separation from these [cognitions and sensations] previously acquired, while life [is their continuation].

sadehasya manoyogo dharmādharmābhisatkṛtaḥ //

[Its] association with [a] body and mind [occurs] due to [its] merit and demerit.

śarīracakṣurādīnāṃ vadhāddhiṃsāsya kalpyate /

[The soul's] injury is inferred from the injury to [its] body, eyes and other [organs].

itthaṃ nitye 'pi puṃsyeṣā prakriyā vimalekṣyate //

Thus, even though the soul is eternal, this process is considered flawless.

sadādyaviśeṣaviṣayāviṣayobhayātmakajñeyapratyakṣānumānopamānaśabdasiddhadarśanaprātibhajñānārekaviparyayasvapnasvapnāntikāḥ prajñānaviśeṣā madīyaśarīrādivyatiriktasaṃvedakasaṃvedyāḥ svakāraṇāyattajanmavattvabodhātmakatvāśutaravināśitvasaṃskārādhāyakatvapratyayatvebhyaḥ puruṣāntarapratyayavat vaidharmyeṇa praśastamitā ghaṭādaya iti /

[All] specific cognitions—whether of objects falling under 'being' etc. or not falling [under it] or both, [whether] perceptual, inferential, analogical, verbal, astrological, intuitive, doubtful, erroneous, dreaming or dream-end—are apprehended by a cognizer distinct from my body etc., because they [1] depend on their own causes for origination, [2] are of the nature of consciousness, [3] are quickly destructible, [4] leave impressions, [and 5] are cognitions, just like the cognitions of other persons.

tatra sadādayaḥ ṣaḍaviśeṣāḥ pūrvaṃ vyākhyātāḥ /

Among these, the six categories beginning with 'being' have been explained earlier.

teṣāṃ sadādīnāṃ ṣaṇṇāṃ viṣayo dravyaguṇakarmāṇi /

Substance, quality and action are the objects of these six [categories] beginning with 'being'.

aviṣayaḥ sāmānyaviśeṣasamavāyāḥ /

Universals, particulars and inherence are not [their] objects.

tadetad ubhayātmakaṃ jñeyaṃ viṣayaḥ pratyakṣādīnāṃ jñānaviśeṣāṇāṃ te tathoktāḥ /

These both [types] constitute the knowable objects of specific cognitions like perception etc., [and] they are thus described.

pratyakṣānumānopamānetyādis tu dvandvanirdeśaḥ /

The terms "perception, inference, analogy, etc." form a dvandva compound.

siddhadarśanaṃ jyotiḥśāstrādyupanibaddham / taddhi siddhānāṃ darśanaṃ siddhaṃ vā darśanam iti kṛtvā siddhadarśanam ucyate /

Astrological knowledge is based on astronomy and other [sciences]. Indeed, it is called siddhadarśana because it is either the vision of accomplished ones or established knowledge.

tad dhi prāyeṇarṣiṇāṃ bhavatīti kṛtvārṣamucyate /

Since this generally belongs to the ṛṣis, it is called ārṣa [belonging to the ṛṣis].

ārekaḥ saṃśayaḥ /

[This is] a single doubt.

viparyayo viparyāsaḥ / prathamasvapnāvasthābhāvī pratyayaḥ svapnaḥ /

Error [means] misconception. Dream [means] a cognition occurring in the first state of sleep.

tad viṣayaṃ svapno 'pi yadaparaṃ jñānaṃ bhavati sa svapnāntikaḥ /

That cognition which occurs after a dream regarding that same object is [called] svapnāntika.

eta eva prajñānaviśeṣāḥ /

These indeed are the particular types of cognition.

śeṣaṃ subodham /

The rest is easily understood.

tadetat pramāṇyam arthato nirdiśann āha jñānāni cetyādi /

Indicating the validity of this through [its] meaning, he states "jñānāni ca" etc.

jñānāni ca madīyāni tatvādivyatirekiṇā /

"And my cognitions [are apprehended] by a cognizer distinct from [my] body and other [things]

saṃvedakena vedyāni pratyayatvāt tadanyavat //

[they are] apprehended by a cognizer because they are cognitions, like those other [cognitions]."

tatvādītyatrādiśabdena buddhīndriyavedanāḥ parigṛhyante /

Here in the compound "tatvādi" [body etc.], the word "ādi" includes intellect, sense-organs and feelings.

pratyayatvādityupalakṣaṇam / tadanye 'pi svakāraṇāyattajanmavattvādayo grāhyāḥ //

"Because they are cognitions" is [given as] an indication; the other [reasons] also should be understood, such as "having their origin dependent on their own causes" and so forth.

icchādayaś ca sarve 'pi kvacid ete samāśritāḥ /

"And all these [things] like desire etc. must have some substrate [in which they inhere];"

vastutve sati kāryatvād rūpavat sa ca naḥ pumān //

Because [they are] effects while being entities, like color, and this [something] is our soul.

vastutvagrahaṇādeṣa na nāśe vyabhicāravān /

Due to including the term "being entities," this [argument] is not fallacious with respect to destruction.

hetumattve 'pi nāśasya yasmānnaivāsti vastutā //

Because even though destruction has a cause, it does not have entity-hood.

yadyotakaras tu pramāṇayati devadattasya rūparasagandhasparśapratyayā ekānekanimittāḥ mayeti pratyayena pratisandhīyamānatvāt /

Yadyotakara proves [it thus]: "Devadatta's cognitions of color, taste, smell and touch have both single and multiple causes, because they are recalled through the notion of 'I'."

yac ca tadekaṃ nimittaṃ sa ātmeti /

And that which is their single cause is the Self.

tadetat pramāṇaṃ darśayann āha rūpādipratyayā iti /

Showing this proof, he states [the verse beginning with] "cognitions of color, etc."

rūpādipratyayāḥ sarve 'pyekānekanimittakāḥ / mayeti pratyayenaiṣāṃ pratisandhānabhāvataḥ //

All cognitions of color and other [qualities] have both single and multiple causes, because they are recalled through the notion of "I."

nartakībhrūlatābhaṅge bahūnāṃ pratyayā iva /

Like the cognitions of many [people] regarding the movement of a dancer's eyebrow.

anyathā pratisandhānaṃ na jāyetānibandhanam //

Otherwise, recollection would not arise, as it would lack a foundation.

subodham //

[This is] easily understood.

ayam aparastadīyaḥ prayogaḥ

This is another argument [by the same author]

ātmeti padaṃ śarīrendriyamanobuddhivedanāsaṃghātavyatiriktavacanaṃ prasiddhaparyāyavyatiriktatve satyekapadatvāt ghaṭādiśabdavat

The word "ātman" must denote something distinct from the aggregate of body, senses, mind, intellect and sensations, because while being different from [their] well-known synonyms, it is a single word, like the word "ghaṭa" etc.

tadāha buddhīndriyādītyādi

He states this in [the verse beginning with] "buddhīndriyādi"

buddhīndriyādisaṃghātavyatiriktābhidhāyakam ātmeti vacanaṃ yasmād idam ekapadaṃ matam

The word "ātman" denotes something distinct from the aggregate of intellect, senses and so forth, because this is accepted as a single word

yathānirdiṣṭadharmeṇa tadyuktaṃ paṭaśabdavat

[It is] endowed with the aforementioned property, like the word "paṭa" [cloth]

siddhaparyāyabhinnatva iti

[This refers to] being different from well-known synonyms

buddhīndriyādīnāṃ ye siddhāḥ paryāyā dhīprabhṛtayastebhyo bhinnatve satītyarthaḥ

The meaning is: while being different from the established synonyms of intellect and senses etc., such as "dhī" and others

yaccaivaṃ pariniścitam iti

Whatever is thus ascertained [to be such]

yathānirdiṣṭadharmeṇeti

[This refers to] having the aforementioned property

buddhyādivyatiriktārthābhidhāyitvena

[It means] by virtue of denoting something distinct from intellect etc.

punaḥ sa eva vyatirekiṇaṃ hetumātmasiddhaye prayuktavān

Again, he employed this distinguishing reason for establishing [the existence of] the Self

prāṇādibhir viyuktaś ca jīvaddeho bhavedayam

This living body would be [completely] devoid of breathing and other [vital] functions

nairātmyād ghaṭavat tasmān naivāstyasya nirātmatā

Because of [its hypothetical] soullessness, like a jar; therefore its soullessness cannot exist

asya nirātmateti

[This refers to] its soullessness

yadvā asyātmano nirātmatā niḥsvabhāvatā nāsti api tu sattvaṃ siddham ity arthaḥ

Or alternatively, this ātman's nirātmatā (lack of selfhood/non-existence) does not exist; rather, [its] existence is established

mātur udaraniṣkramaṇottarakālaṃ madīyādyaprajñānasaṃvedakasaṃvedyānyatatkālāni madīyāni prajñānāni madīyaprajñānatvāt ādyamadīyaprajñānavat

All my cognitions occurring after the time of emergence from [my] mother's womb are apprehended by the same cognizer who apprehended [my] first cognition, because they are my cognitions, like [that] first cognition of mine

evaṃ duḥkhādayo 'pi pakṣīkartavyāḥ

Similarly, pain and other [experiences] are also to be taken as the subject [of inference]

etac ca nityatve 'numānam

And this is the inference for [the Soul's] eternality

sarvamuttaravijñānaṃ majjñānatvāt tadādyavat

All subsequent cognitions [are known by the same cognizer] because they are my cognitions, like that first [cognition]

avanijalānilamanāṃsi vipratipattiviṣayabhāvāpannāni dūrataravartīni madīyenātmanā saha sambandhyante

Earth, water, air and mind, which are subjects of dispute [and] situated at great distances, are connected with my ātman

mūrtatvavegavattvaparatvamithaḥsaṃyogavibhāgavattvebhyo madīyaśarīrādivat

[This is] because of [their] corporeality, velocity, priority/posteriority, and mutual conjunction/disjunction, like my body and other [things]

evaṃ ca sattvanityatvavibhutvānāṃ viniścaye / ātmano na nirātmānaḥ sarvadharmā iti sthitam //

Thus, when the existence, eternality and omnipresence of the soul are definitely proved, [then] it is established that all dharmas are not without a soul.

tadatra prathame tāvat sādhane siddhasādhyatā /

With regard to the first argument here, there is the fallacy of proving what is [already] established.

sarvajñādiprabedyatvaṃ tvajjñānasyeṣyate yataḥ //

Because the apprehensibility of your cognition by the omniscient [being] and others is [already] admitted [by us].

prathame sādhana iti / jñānāni ca madīyānītyādau /

[This refers to] the first argument, [namely] the one beginning with "my cognitions" [in verse 177].

tatra siddhasādhyatā bhavadīyapratyayānāmasmābhir bhavaccharīrādivyatirekiṇā sarvavidā śrāvakapratyekabuddhais tadanyaiś ca parivittavedibhir vedanābhyupagamāt //

There is proving of what is [already] proved because we [already] admit that your cognitions are apprehended by the Omniscient One who is different from your body etc., as well as by Śrāvakas, Pratyekabuddhas, and other thought-readers.

yaścāpi puruṣāntarapratyayavad iti sādharmyadṛṣṭāntaḥ sa sādhyavikala iti darśayann āha prakāśakānapekṣaṃ cetyādi /

And showing that the example of similarity stated as "like the cognitions of other persons" lacks the probandum [the author] states beginning with "independent of illuminators."

anyavijñānamapyevaṃ sādhyaśūnyaṃ nidarśanam // yataḥ puruṣāntarīyakam api jñānaṃ prakāśakāntarānapekṣaṃ svasaṃvidrūpamevopajāyate /

The example is thus devoid of the probandum, because even the cognition belonging to another person arises in its own form as self-illuminating, independent of other illuminators.

athāpi syānnānyadīyaṃ cittamātram udāharaṇatvenābhipretaṃ kintu yasmin viṣaye vijñānamāgṛhītatadākāramupajāyate tadihodāharaṇam ity āha tadākāroparaktenetyādi /

Even if [it be argued that] what is intended as an example is not merely another's consciousness, but rather that cognition which arises having taken on the form of that object, [the author] states [the verse] beginning with "tinged by that form."

tadākāroparaktena yadanyena pravedyate /

[That which] is known by another [cognition] tinged with that form.

evam api yatsvasaṃvidrūpameva jñānaṃ jñānāntarasaṃvedanarahitam utpadyate tena saṃśayo bhavedanaikāntiko hetur iti yāvat / atha tadapi svavyatiriktasaṃvedakasaṃvedyamudayavyayadharmakatvaprameyatvasmaryamāṇapramāṇatvebhyo viṣayavad iti matam /

Even so, regarding that cognition which arises merely as self-illuminating without being cognized by another cognition, there would be doubt [about your argument], meaning the reason would be inconclusive. Even if it be maintained that this [cognition] too must be apprehended by a cognizer different from itself, because [1] it has the nature of arising and perishing, [2] it is cognizable, [3] it is remembered as a means of valid cognition - just like objects [of cognition].

tadatrāpi sādhyaviparyaye bādhakābhāvād vyatireko na niścitaḥ /

Here also, since there is no precluding [factor] in case of the contrary of what is to be proven, the negative concomitance is not certain.

uttarottarajñānānubhāve cānavasthā /

And [there would be] an infinite regress in [the series of] experiencing successive cognitions.

na hyavyaktavyaktiko viṣayaḥ siddhyet /

For an object whose manifestation has not become manifest cannot be established.

tataścaikaviṣayasiddhyarthaṃ jñānaparamparāmanusarataḥ sakalam eva puruṣāyuṣamupayujyeta /

And consequently, for establishing a single object, one following the series of cognitions would spend [one's] entire human lifespan.

athāpi kiñcijjñānamanavasthābhayāt saṃviditarūpam evotpadyata iti /

If [it is claimed that] from fear of infinite regress, some cognition arises as self-cognized,

tathā tenaivodayavyayadharmakatvādīnāṃ hetūnām anaikāntikatā /

then by that very [fact] the reasons such as "having the property of arising and perishing" become inconclusive.

tadvadevānyeṣām api jñānāṃ svasaṃvedanatvābhyupagame kaḥ pradveṣaḥ /

What objection [could there be] to accepting self-cognizability of other cognitions also, just like that [first cognition]?

atha tadasaṃviditarūpameveṣyate /

If it is maintained that this [cognition] has an uncognized form,

evam api tadasiddhau sarveṣāṃ pūrvajñānānām aprasiddhiranabhivyaktavyaktikatvāt /

even then, when that [cognition] is not established, all previous cognitions would be unproven due to their manifestation being unmanifested.

tataś ca viṣayo 'pi na prasiddhyet /

And consequently, the object too would not be established.

yeṣāṃ tu vijñānavādināṃ mataṃ sarvam eva jñānaṃ grāhyagrāhakavaidhuryāt svayam eva prakāśate na tu jñānāntareṇa vedyata iti tān prati sādhyavikalatā doṣo 'kampya eva /

But against those Vijñānavādins whose view is that every cognition, due to the absence of grasped and grasper, manifests by itself and is not known by another cognition - against them the fault of lacking what is to be proven remains completely unshaken.

evam anyeṣvapi kāraṇāyattajanmavattvādiṣu sādhaneṣu siddhasādhyatādidoṣā vācyāḥ /

Similarly, for other reasons like "having birth dependent on causes", the faults like proving what is [already] proven should be stated.

yaccāpi sadādītyādi dharmiviśeṣaṇaṃ kṛtaṃ tatpūrvavadanarthakaṃ nahyasya prastutasādhyasiddhāvaṅgabhāvo 'sti /

And the qualification of the subject [beginning with] "being, etc." that has been made is, as before, meaningless, for it has no role in establishing what is presently to be proven.

tathā hi etāvata kiṃ na gatam madīyāḥ pratyakṣādipratyayā madīyaśarīrādivyatiriktasaṃvedakasaṃvedyā iti /

For what indeed is not encompassed by this [statement] that "my perceptual and other cognitions are [all] cognized by a cognizer distinct from my body and other [physical elements]"?

pratyakṣānumānādipravibhāgenāpi dharmiprabhedo 'narthaka eva madīyāḥ pratyayā ityetāvataiva gatatvāt /

Even with a distinction based on [cognitions being] perception, inference and so forth, any distinction regarding the property-bearer is meaningless, since everything is already encompassed merely by [the term] "my cognitions."

na cāpi prativādino yathoktaviśeṣaṇaviśiṣṭo dharmī siddha ityāśrayāsiddhatā ca hetūnām /

And the property-bearer qualified by the aforementioned qualifications is not established for the opponent either, hence there is also [the fallacy of] āśrayāsiddhatā [lack of established basis] for the reasons.