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1,000 | 54,560 |
Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of Western New York
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1996/95-1065
|
95-1065
|
1996
|
Schenck
|
Pro-Choice Network of Western New York
|
<p>This action was filed by the Pro-Choice Network of Western New York (PCN), on behalf of health care providers, to enjoin Schenck and others from continuously staging blockades and other disruptive illegal activities in front of abortion clinics. After its restraining order proved ineffective, a District Court issued a preliminary injunction creating "fixed buffer zones" which prohibited demonstrations within fifteen feet of entrances to abortion clinics, parking lots, or driveways. The court also created "floating buffer zones" prohibiting demonstrators from coming within fifteen feet of people or vehicles seeking access to the clinics. Following the Appellate Court's decision to uphold the District Court's ruling that the "buffer zones" were constitutional, the Supreme Court granted Schenck certiorari.</p>
| 822 | 6 | 3 | false |
majority opinion
|
reversed in-part/remanded
|
Privacy
|
1,001 | 54,563 |
Hughes Aircraft Company v. United States ex rel. Schumer
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1996/95-1340
|
95-1340
|
1996
|
Hughes Aircraft Company
|
United States ex rel. Schumer
|
<p>In 1989, William J. Schumer filed an action against Hughes Aircraft Co. under the False Claims Act (FCA), specifically under the qui tam provision which allows suits by private parties on behalf of the United States against anyone submitting a false claim to the government. Schumer alleged that Hughes had submitted false claims related to two Air Force radar projects between 1982 and 1984. Hughes moved to dismiss the case claiming that the 1986 amendment to the FCA that Schumer had filed under was not retroactive and that the alleged conduct precluded the suit because the government already had the information on which the suit was based. The motion was dismissed; however, the District Court ruled in favor of Hughes based on the merits of the case. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals rejected Hughes, finding that the FCA should be applied retroactively to suits pre-1986. The appellate court also found that, because no public disclosure of information possessed by the Government had been made, the action was not barred under the 1986 version of the Act.</p>
| 1,073 | 9 | 0 | true |
majority opinion
|
vacated/remanded
|
Economic Activity
|
1,002 | 54,562 |
Lambrix v. Singletary
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1996/96-5658
|
96-5658
|
1996
|
Lambrix
|
Singletary
|
<p>In the sentencing phase of the trial at which Cary Michael Lambrix was convicted on two counts of first degree murder, the Florida state court jury rendered an advisory verdict recommending death sentences on both counts. Finding numerous aggravating circumstances in connection with both murders, and no mitigating circumstances as to either, the trial court sentenced Lambrix to death on both counts. After his conviction and sentence were upheld by the Florida courts, Lambrix filed a habeas corpus petition in the Federal District Court, which rejected all of his claims. While Lambrix's appeal was pending before the Court of Appeals, The U.S. Supreme Court handed down a ruling that if the sentencing judge in a "weighing" State (i.e., a State such as Florida that requires specified aggravating circumstances to be weighed against any mitigating circumstances at a capital trial's sentencing phase) is required to give deference to a jury's advisory sentencing recommendation, then neither the jury nor the judge is constitutionally permitted to weigh invalid aggravating circumstances. Lambrix claimed that his sentencing jury was improperly instructed on the "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel" aggravator. The Court of Appeals held its proceedings in abeyance to permit Lambrix to present his claim to the Florida Supreme Court, which rejected the claim without considering its merits on the ground that the claim was procedurally barred. The Court of Appeals denied relief, ruling that the U.S. Supreme Court had announced a "new rule" which could not be applied retroactively on federal habeas corpus petitions.</p>
| 1,637 | 5 | 4 | false |
majority opinion
|
affirmed
|
Criminal Procedure
|
1,003 | 54,564 |
Edwards v. Balisok
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1996/95-1352
|
95-1352
|
1996
|
Edwards et al.
|
Balisok
|
<p>Jerry B. Balisok, a Washington state prison inmate, was found guilty of prison rules infractions resulting in the loss of thirty days of good time, credit he had previously earned toward his release. Balisok alleged that the procedures used in his disciplinary hearing violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. Balisok also alleged that the proceedings were deceitful and biased. Under federal law Balisok filed for a statement declaring the procedures unconstitutional, compensatory and punitive damages for their use, and an injunction to prevent future violations. The District Court held a state prisoner's claim for damages is not conceivable if a judgement for him would imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence. The Court of Appeals reversed and held that claims challenging only the procedures used in a disciplinary hearing are always cognizable.</p>
| 885 | 9 | 0 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed/remanded
|
Civil Rights
|
1,004 | 54,566 |
Mazurek v. Armstrong
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1996/96-1104
|
96-1104
|
1996
|
Joseph P. Mazurek, Attorney General
|
James H. Armstrong et al.
|
<p>In 1995, the Montana Legislature enacted a statute restricting the performance of abortions to licensed physicians. A group of licensed physicians and one physician-assistant brought suit, challenging that statute under the Constitution. The District Court denied the practitioners' motion for a preliminary injunction, finding that they had not established any likelihood of prevailing on their claim that the law imposed an undue burden concerning abortion rights. The Court of Appeals vacated the judgment, holding that the practitioners had shown a fair chance of success on the merits of their claim and thus had met the threshold requirement for preliminary injunctive. On remand, the District Court entered an injunction pending appeal and postponed a hearing on the preliminary injunction motion until the U.S. Supreme Court's disposition of the state attorney general's certiorari petition.</p>
| 907 | 6 | 3 | true |
per curiam
|
reversed/remanded
|
Privacy
|
1,005 | 54,565 |
Old Chief v. United States
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1996/95-6556
|
95-6556
|
1996
|
Old Chief
|
United States
|
<p>Johnny Lynn Old Chief was involved in a disturbance involving gunfire. Subsequently, Old Chief was charged with violating federal law, 18 U. S. C. Section(s) 922(g)(1), which prohibits possession of a firearm by anyone with a prior felony conviction. The earlier crime that was charged in the indictment against Old Chief was assault causing serious bodily injury. Old Chief moved for an order requiring the Government to refrain from revealing the name and nature of his prior assault conviction, which, he argued, would unfairly tax the jury's capacity to hold the Government to its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, in violation of Federal Rules of Evidence, on current charges of assault, possession, and violence with a firearm. Old Chief offered to stipulate, or concede, to the fact of the prior conviction without releasing its name or nature. The Government refused to join the stipulation. The Government argued it had the right to present its own evidence of the prior conviction. The District Court ruled in favor of the Government. In affirming the conviction, the Court of Appeals found that the Government was entitled to introduce probative evidence to prove the prior offense regardless of the stipulation offer.</p>
| 1,246 | 5 | 4 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed/remanded
|
Criminal Procedure
|
1,006 | 54,567 |
Lachance v. Erickson
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/96-1395
|
96-1395
|
1997
|
Lachance
|
Erickson
|
<p>Federal employees subject to adverse actions by their respective agencies, each made false statements to agency investigators with respect to the misconduct with which they were charged. In each case, the agency additionally charged the false statement as a ground for adverse action. Separately, each employee appealed the actions taken against him or her to the Merit Systems Protection Board (Board). The Board upheld the portion of each penalty that was based on the underlying charge. The Board overturned each false statement charge. The Board held that an employee's false statements could not be used for purposes of impeaching the employee's credibility, nor could they be considered in setting the appropriate punishment for the employee's underlying misconduct. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit agreed with the Board and held that no penalty could be based on a false denial of the underlying claim.</p>
| 942 | 9 | 0 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed
|
Due Process
|
1,007 | 54,570 |
Miller v. Albright
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/96-1060
|
96-1060
|
1997
|
Miller
|
Albright
|
<p>Lorelyn Miller was born in the Philippines, in 1970, to a Filipino national woman and an American soldier. Her parents were never married. In 1992, after the State Department rejected her first application for U.S. citizenship, Miller reapplied when a Texas court granted her father's petition for a paternity decree declaring him her father. When the State Department rejected her citizenship application again, claiming that 8 U.S.C. Section 1409(a) required foreign born illegitimate children of American fathers to be legitimated before age 18, Miller challenged the refusal. She claimed that since Section 1409(c) established at birth the citizenship of an illegitimate foreign-born child whose mother was an American citizen, the State Department's refusal to do the same under Section 1409(a), when the father is an American citizen, was unconstitutional. On appeal from an appellate court's decision to affirm the lower court's dismissal of the case, the Supreme Court granted Miller certiorari.</p>
| 1,011 | 6 | 3 | false |
plurality opinion
|
affirmed
|
Civil Rights
|
1,008 | 54,569 |
Quality King Distributors, Inc. v. L'Anzaresearch International, Inc.
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/96-1470
|
96-1470
|
1997
|
Quality King Distributors, Inc.
|
L'Anzaresearch International, Inc.
|
<p>L'anza Research International, Inc., a California based manufacturer and seller of hair care products, has copyrighted the labels that are affixed to its products. Compared to domestic markets, the price of L'anza products in foreign markets is substantially lower. L'anza's distributor in the United Kingdom arranged for the sale of L'anza products, affixed with copyrighted labels, to a distributor in Malta. The Malta distributor then sold the products to Quality King Distributors, Inc., who imported the products back to the U.S. and sold them at discounted prices to unauthorized retailers. In its suit, L'anza alleged that Quality King violated L'anza's exclusive rights under the Copyright Act of 1976 to reproduce and distribute the copyrighted material in the U.S. Rejecting Quality King's defense based on the "first sale" doctrine, the District Court ruled in favor of L'anza. The Court of Appeals affirmed.</p>
| 927 | 9 | 0 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed
|
Economic Activity
|
1,009 | 54,568 |
Oubre v. Entergy Operations Inc.
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/96-1291
|
96-1291
|
1997
|
Oubre
|
Entergy Operations Inc.
|
<p>In 1994, Dolores Oubre, a scheduler at a power plant run by Entergy Operations, Inc., was given the option of either improving her job performance or accepting a voluntary arrangement for her severance. Accepting a severance package, Oubre signed a release of all claims against Entergy. Entergy failed to comply with several requirements for a release under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), as set forth in the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act (OWBPA). After receiving all of her severance pay, Oubre filed a charge of age discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Oubre then sued Entergy, alleging constructive discharge on the basis of her age in violation of the ADEA and state law. Entergy argued that Oubre had ratified the defective release by failing to return the $6,258 in severance she had received. The District Court entered summary judgment for Entergy. The Court of Appeals affirmed.</p>
| 949 | 6 | 3 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed/remanded
|
Civil Rights
|
1,010 | 54,572 |
Crawford-El v. Britton
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/96-827
|
96-827
|
1997
|
Crawford-El
|
Britton
|
<p>Leonard Crawford-El, a prisoner in the District of Columbia's correctional system, was ultimately transferred to a federal prison in Florida. Crawford- El's belongings were transferred separately. A correctional officer had Crawford-El's brother-in-law pick his belongs rather than ship them. Crawford- El finally received his belongings months after reaching Florida. Crawford-El filed suit under 42 USC section 1983, which provides that "Every person who... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress...." Crawford-El alleged that the diversion of his property was motivated by an intent to retaliate against him for exercising his First Amendment rights. The District Court dismissed the complaint. In remanding, the en banc Court of Appeals conclude among other things, that in an unconstitutional-motive case, a plaintiff must establish motive by clear and convincing evidence.</p>
| 1,176 | 5 | 4 | true |
majority opinion
|
vacated/remanded
|
Civil Rights
|
1,011 | 54,574 |
South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/96-1581
|
96-1581
|
1997
|
South Dakota
|
Yankton Sioux Tribe
|
<p>An 1858 Treaty between the United States and the Yankton Tribe established the Yankton Sioux Reservation in South Dakota. The 1887 Dawes Act permitted the Government to allot tracts of tribal land to individual Indians and, with tribal consent, to open the remaining holdings to non-Indian settlement. In 1892, pursuant to the Dawes Act, an agreement between the Tribe and the Government, ratified in 1894, provided that nothing "shall be construed to abrogate the [1858] treaty." In 1992, the Southern Missouri Recycling and Waste Management District acquired land for a solid waste disposal facility that lies on unallotted, non-Indian fee land, but falls within the reservation's original 1858 boundaries. In 1994, the Tribe filed suit to enjoin construction. Ultimately, the District Court declined to enjoin construction of the landfill, but granted a declaratory judgment that the landfill lies within the Yankton Sioux Reservation, where federal environmental regulations apply. The Court of Appeals affirmed.</p>
| 1,024 | 9 | 0 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed/remanded
|
Civil Rights
|
1,012 | 54,571 |
Fidelity Financial Services, Inc. v. Fink
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/96-1370
|
96-1370
|
1997
|
Fidelity Financial Services, Inc.
|
Fink
|
<p>After purchasing a car, Diane Beasley gave Fidelity Financial Services, Inc. a promissory note for the purchase price. The car secured the note. 21 days later, Fidelity mailed Beasley the application to perfect its security interest under Missouri law. After Beasley filed for bankruptcy, Richard V. Fink, the trustee of Beasley's bankruptcy estate, moved to set aside Fidelity's security interest on the ground that the lien was a voidable preference under federal law. 11 USC section 547(c)(3)(B) prohibits the avoidance of a security interest for a loan used to acquire property if, among other things, the security interest is "perfected on or before 20 days after the debtor receives possession of such property." Fink argued that this "enabling loan" exception was inapposite because Fidelity had not perfected its interest within the 20-day period. Affirming the Bankruptcy Court and the District Court, the Court of Appeals held a transfer to be perfected when the transferee takes the last step required by state law to perfect its security interest.</p>
| 1,067 | 9 | 0 | false |
majority opinion
|
affirmed
|
Economic Activity
|
1,013 | 54,573 |
Rogers v. United States
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/96-1279
|
96-1279
|
1997
|
Rogers
|
United States
|
<p>After searching his truck, Florida police arrested and charged George Rogers with knowingly possessing an unregistered firearm and a silencer. Rogers admitted during his arrest and trial that he knew he was in possession of a silencer. Nonetheless, he requested the District Court to instruct the jury to define the Government's burden of establishing "knowing possession" as proof that he deliberately possessed an item that he not only knew to be a "firearm," but that he knew such possession was illegal. Following the court's refusal of his instruction request, Rogers was convicted. On appeal from the Eleventh Circuit's decision to affirm the lower court's ruling, the Supreme Court granted Rogers certiorari.</p>
| 723 | 6 | 3 | false |
plurality opinion
| null |
Judicial Power
|
1,014 | 54,577 |
Bay Area Laundry & Dry Cleaning Pension Trust Fund v. Ferbar Corporation of California, Inc.
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/96-370
|
96-370
|
1997
|
Bay Area Laundry & Dry Cleaning Pension Trust Fund
|
Ferbar Corporation of California, Inc.
|
<p>The Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980 (MPPAA) requires employers who withdraw from underfunded multiemployer pension plans to pay a "withdrawal liability," which is dischargeable with an arranged series of periodic payments. The Bay Area Laundry and Dry Cleaning Pension Trust Fund (Fund) is a multiemployer pension plan for laundry workers. The Ferbar Corporation contributed to the Fund, but ultimately ceased doing so. Subsequently, the Fund's trustees demanded payment of Ferbar's withdrawal liability. The trustees decided to allow Ferbar to satisfy its obligation by making monthly payments. However, Ferbar never made a payment. Ultimately, the District Court granted Ferbar summary judgment on statute of limitations grounds. The court noted that the trustees had filed suit eight days too late. This was the date Ferbar was to make its first payment. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that the six-year period began to run on the date Ferbar withdrew from the Fund, in March 1985. Under this view, the trustees commenced suit nearly two years too late.</p>
| 1,091 | 9 | 0 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed/remanded
|
Economic Activity
|
1,015 | 54,575 |
Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/97-42
|
97-42
|
1997
|
Eastern Enterprises
|
Apfel
|
<p>Currently unknown.</p>
| 26 | 5 | 4 | true |
plurality opinion
|
reversed/remanded
|
Due Process
|
1,016 | 54,576 |
California v. Deep Sea Research, Inc.
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/96-1400
|
96-1400
|
1997
|
California
|
Deep Sea Research, Inc.
|
<p>After several expeditions, Deep Sea Research, Inc. (DSR) located the wreck of the S.S. Brother Jonathan and its cargo which sank off the California coast in 1865. When DSR sought rights to the wreck and her cargo, under Article III, Section 2, federal admiralty jurisdiction, California challenged DSR claiming that it had title to the wreck under the Abandoned Shipwreck Act of 1987 (ASA). The ASA requires the federal government to transfer title over "abandoned shipwrecks" to the states in whose submerged lands the wrecks are found. California also noted that under Section 6313 of its own public code, title to all abandoned shipwrecks found off its coast vests in the state. In light of its claims to the Brother Jonathan, California claimed that DSR's federal title action violated its rights under the Eleventh Amendment, even though it lacked possession of the wreck.</p>
| 885 | 9 | 0 | false |
majority opinion
|
affirmed
|
Judicial Power
|
1,017 | 54,580 |
Cass County v. Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/97-174
|
97-174
|
1997
|
Cass County
|
Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians
|
<p>In 1993, Cass County, Minnesota began assessing ad valorem taxes on 21 parcels of reservation land that had been alienated from tribal control under the Nelson Act and later reacquired by the Leech Lake Band of Chippewa, a federally recognized Indian tribe. In 1995, the Band filed suit, seeking a declaratory judgment that Cass County could not tax the 21 parcels. The District Court held that all of the land that had been alienated from tribal ownership under the Nelson Act was taxable. Affirming in part, the Court of Appeals held that 13 parcels that had been allotted to individual Indians could be taxed so long as they had been patented after passage of the Burke Act proviso, because the explicit mention of "taxation" in the proviso expressed "unmistakably clear" intent. Reversing in part, the court held that the eight parcels sold as pine lands or homestead land could not be taxed because those sections did not incorporate the General Allotment Act or include any mention of an intent to tax lands distributed under them which might become reacquired by the Band.</p>
| 1,087 | 9 | 0 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed
|
Civil Rights
|
1,018 | 54,579 |
Pennsylvania Department of Corrections v. Yeskey
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/97-634
|
97-634
|
1997
|
Pennsylvania Department of Corrections
|
Yeskey
|
<p>After being sentenced to 18 to 36 months in prison, Ronald Yeskey was recommended as a candidate for a Motivational Boot Camp for first-time offenders. Successful completion of the Boot Camp could have resulted in Yeskey's early parole after just six months. When the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections discovered Yeskey's medical history of hypertension, he was denied admission to the Boot Camp. Yeskey challenged the refusal as discriminatory. On appeal from a reversal of a district court's dismissal of the claim, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.</p>
| 568 | 9 | 0 | false |
majority opinion
|
affirmed
|
Civil Rights
|
1,019 | 54,578 |
Gray v. Maryland
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/96-8653
|
96-8653
|
1997
|
Gray
|
Maryland
|
<p>In 1993, the State of Maryland tried Anthony Bell and Kevin Gray jointly for the murder of Stacy Williams. The State entered Bell's confession into evidence at trial. According to the trial judge's order, the police detective who read the confession said the word "deleted" or "deletion" whenever Gray's name appeared. Subsequently, the prosecutor asked the detective if Bell's confession led to Gray's arrest. The detective answered that it did. Ultimately, Gray testified and Bell did not. When instructing the jury, the trial judge specified that the confession was evidence only against Bell. The jury convicted both Bell and Gray. Setting aside Gray's conviction, Maryland's intermediate appellate court applied Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, in which the Court held that, despite a limiting instruction that the jury should consider the confession as evidence only against the confessing codefendant, the introduction of such a confession at a joint trial violates the nonconfessing defendant's Sixth Amendment right to cross-examine witnesses. Maryland's highest court reinstated the conviction.</p>
| 1,118 | 5 | 4 | true |
majority opinion
|
vacated/remanded
|
Criminal Procedure
|
1,020 | 54,581 |
Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole v. Scott
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/97-581
|
97-581
|
1997
|
Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole
|
Scott
|
<p>In granting Keith M. Scott parole, the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole (the "Board"), stipulated that he refrain from owning or possessing weapons. When officers learned that Scott may be in possession of weapons, they searched his home and found a bow and arrow and some firearms. Despite objecting at his parole violation hearing that the search was unconstitutional, the seized weapons were admitted as evidence and Scott was ultimately recommitted. On appeal, the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania affirmed Scott's challenge to the search and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court sustained the decision. The Supreme Court granted the Board certiorari.</p>
| 669 | 5 | 4 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed/remanded
|
Criminal Procedure
|
1,021 | 54,582 |
Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/97-569
|
97-569
|
1997
|
Burlington Industries, Inc.
|
Ellerth
|
<p>After working for Burlington Industries for 15 months, Kimberly B. Ellerth quit because she allegedly suffered sexual harassment by her supervisor - Ted Slowik. Despite her refusals of Slowik's advances Ellerth did not suffer any tangible retaliation and was, in fact, promoted once. Moreover, while she remained silent about Slowik's conduct despite her knowledge of Burlington's policy against sexual harassment, Ellerth challenged Burlington claiming that the company forced her constructive discharge.</p>
| 513 | 7 | 2 | false |
majority opinion
|
affirmed
|
Civil Rights
|
1,022 | 54,584 |
Allentown Mack Sales & Service, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/96-795
|
96-795
|
1997
|
Allentown Mack Sales & Service, Inc.
|
National Labor Relations Board
|
<p>In 1990, Mack Trucks, Inc., sold its Allentown, Pennsylvania, branch to Allentown Mack Sales, Inc. A number of Mack employees made statement to the new owners suggesting that Local Lodge 724 of the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, had lost the support of bargaining-unit members generally. Subsequently, Allentown refused Local 724's request for recognition and commencement of collective-bargaining negotiations. Allentown, under a National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) precedent, claimed a good-faith reasonable doubt as to the union's support in order to conduct an internal poll of employee support for the union. The employees voted 19 to 13 against the union. Local 724 then filed an unfair-labor-practice charge with the NLRB. Ultimately, an Administrative Law Judge held that Allentown's poll was conducted in compliance with procedural standards, but that Allentown did not have an "objective reasonable doubt" about the majority status of the union. The Court of Appeals enforced the NLRB's order for Allentown to recognize and bargain with Local 724.</p>
| 1,108 | 5 | 4 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed/remanded
|
Unions
|
1,023 | 54,583 |
Jefferson v. City of Tarrant
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/96-957
|
96-957
|
1997
|
Jefferson, Individually And As Administrator Of The Estate Of Jefferson, Deceased, et al.
|
City of Tarrant
|
<p>Alberta Jefferson, an African American woman, died as a result of a fire in her home in the city of Tarrant, Alabama. Her survivors filed multiple complaints against Tarrant City: two under state law and two under federal law. The state law complaints alleged wrongful death and the common-law tort of outrage, while the two federal claims brought under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 alleged that Ms. Jefferson's death was the direct result of indifference and racial discrimination in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. The City claimed that the complaints were governed by Alabama's Wrongful Death Act, which the Alabama Supreme Court had interpreted to provide only for punitive damages. The City then argued that it could not be sued under Section 1983 because the Supreme Court had ruled that Section 1983 plaintiffs are not entitled to sue a municipality for punitive damages.</p>
<p>The state court ruled in favor of Jefferson, but the Alabama Supreme Court reversed and sent the case back to the state court after determining that the state Act did in fact govern the claims. The Supreme Court agreed to consider the federal complaints. The City contended that the Court lacked jurisdiction over the Alabama Supreme Court's order because the case was not yet final.</p>
| 1,321 | 8 | 1 | false |
majority opinion
| null |
Judicial Power
|
1,024 | 54,585 |
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/97-282
|
97-282
|
1997
|
Faragher
|
City of Boca Raton
|
<p>After resigning as a lifeguard, Beth Ann Faragher brought an action against the City of Boca Raton and her immediate supervisors, alleging that the supervisors had created a sexually hostile atmosphere by touching, remarking, and commenting. Faragher asserted that this conduct constituted discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The District Court concluded that Faragher's supervisors' conduct was sufficiently serious to alter the conditions of her employment and constitute an abusive working environment. The court then held that the city could be held liable. In reversing, the en banc Court of Appeals held that Faragher's supervisors were not acting within the scope of their employment when they engaged in the harassing conduct, that knowledge of the harassment could not be imputed to the City, and that the City could not be held liable for negligence in failing to prevent it.</p>
| 931 | 7 | 2 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed/remanded
|
Civil Rights
|
1,025 | 54,586 |
United States v. United State Shoe Corporation
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/97-372
|
97-372
|
1997
|
United States
|
United State Shoe Corporation
|
<p>The Harbor Maintenance Tax (HMT) obligates exporters, importers, and domestic shippers to pay 0.125 percent of the value of the commercial cargo they ship through the Nation's ports. From April to June 1994, United States Shoe Corporation paid the HMT for articles it exported. U.S. Shoe then filed a protest with the Customs Service alleging that, to the extent the toll applies to exports, the HMT violates the Export Clause of the Constitution, which provides that "No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any State." The Customs Service refuted the accusation, stating that the HMT is a statutorily mandated user fee. U.S. Shoe then sued for a refund in the Court of International Trade (CIT). Granting U.S. Shoe summary judgment, the CIT held that the HMT qualifies as a tax, reasoning that the tax is assessed ad valorem directly upon the value of the cargo itself, not upon any services rendered for the cargo. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed.</p>
| 995 | 9 | 0 | false |
majority opinion
|
affirmed
|
Federal Taxation
|
1,026 | 54,587 |
Caterpillar, Inc. v. International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/96-1925
|
96-1925
|
1997
|
Caterpillar, Inc.
|
International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America
|
<p>United Auto Workers and Caterpillar, Inc. were involved in a working agreement that provided for employees of Caterpillar, Inc. to devote part of their time to processing employee grievances on behalf of the union, while still maintaining full-time employment status and benefits. This agreement was eventually expanded to allow employees to continue receiving benefits from Caterpillar while working full time for the union. In 1991, Caterpillar refused to continue paying benefits to workers who were not directly providing services for the company. The union filed with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) asserting that Caterpillar was engaging in unfair labor practices. Caterpillar claimed that the benefit payments violated section 302 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA). Both the NLRB and the District Court found that the payments did in fact violate Section 302 of the LMRA.</p>
<p>On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed and ruled for the union. The Third Circuit found that Congress had not intended the LMRA to ban the type of payments at issue. Then-Judge Samuel Alito dissented, arguing that the payments were illegal under the plain meaning of the legislation.</p>
| 1,228 | 9 | 0 | false |
per curiam
|
none
| null |
1,027 | 54,589 |
State Oil Company v. Khan
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/96-871
|
96-871
|
1997
|
State Oil Company
|
Khan et al.
|
<p>Barkat U. Khan and his corporation contracted with State Oil to lease and run a gas station. Under the agreement, State Oil set a maximum profit margin for gasoline and required Khan to return any excess profits to State Oil. Khan fell behind in lease payments and was evicted. Khan then sued State Oil claiming that State Oil had engaged in price fixing in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, which disallows restrictions on trade. State Oil claimed that in setting profit margins, they had not prevented Kahn from setting prices and therefore were not guilty of price fixing.</p>
<p>On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found in favor of Kahn based on the logic of <em>Albrecht v. Herald Co.</em> in which the Supreme Court ruled that some restrictions on trade, such as price-fixing, always have such negative effects coupled with such little competitive benefit that these restrictions are always unlawful.</p>
| 949 | 9 | 0 | true |
majority opinion
|
vacated/remanded
|
Economic Activity
|
1,028 | 54,590 |
Montana v. Crow Tribe of Indians
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/96-1829
|
96-1829
|
1997
|
Montana
|
Crow Tribe of Indians
|
<p>In 1904, the Crow Tribe ceded part of its Montana Reservation to the United States for settlement by non-Indians, with the U.S holding the rights to the minerals underlying the ceded strip in trust for the Tribe. In 1972, pursuant to the Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938 (IMLA), Westmoreland Resources, Inc., a non-Indian company, entered into a mining lease with the Tribe for coal underlying the ceded strip. In 1975, Montana imposed a severance tax and a gross proceeds tax on all coal produced in the State, including coal underlying the reservation and the ceded strip. In 1978, the Tribe brought a federal action for injunctive and declaratory relief against Montana and its counties, alleging that the State's severance and gross proceeds taxes were preempted by the IMLA and infringed on the Tribe's right to govern itself. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals concluded that both taxes were preempted by the IMLA and void for interfering with tribal governance. The U.S. Supreme Court summarily affirmed. Subsequently, the Tribe sough to recover certain taxes paid by Westmoreland. The District Court then concluded that the disgorgement remedy sought by the Tribe was not appropriate. The Court of Appeals reversed.</p>
| 1,231 | 9 | 0 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed/remanded
|
Civil Rights
|
1,029 | 54,592 |
Foster v. Love
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/96-670
|
96-670
|
1997
|
Foster
|
Love
|
<p>The Elections Clause of the Constitution provides that "the Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations." 2 USC sections 1 and 7 provide that the Tuesday after the first Monday in November in an even-numbered year is established as the date for federal congressional and presidential elections. In 1975, Louisiana adopted an "open primary," which occurs before the uniform federal election day and in which all candidates appear on the ballot and all voters may vote. If a candidate for a given office receives a majority at the open primary, that candidate is elected and no further act is done on federal election day to fill that office. Louisiana voters challenged the open primary is a violation of federal law. Reversing the District Court, the Court of Appeals held that Louisiana's system squarely "conflicts with the federal statutes that establish a uniform federal election day."</p>
| 1,067 | 9 | 0 | false |
majority opinion
|
affirmed
|
Civil Rights
|
1,030 | 54,591 |
Calderone v. Thompson
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/97-215
|
97-215
|
1997
|
Calderone
|
Thompson
|
<p>In 1983, Thomas M. Thompson was convicted of the rape and murder of Ginger Fleischli in California state court. The special circumstance found by the jury of murder during the commission of rape made Thompson eligible for the death penalty. In 1995, a federal District Court invalidated Thompson's death sentence by granted relief on his rape conviction and the rape special circumstance. In reversing, the Court of Appeals reinstated Thompson's death sentence, noting that the State presented strong evidence of rape at trial. The Court of Appeals then issued a mandate denying all habeas relief. Two days before Thompson's execution, the Court of Appeals recalled its mandate and granted Thompson relief. The appellate court found that Thompson was denied effective assistance of counsel at trial.</p>
| 807 | 5 | 4 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed/remanded
|
Criminal Procedure
|
1,031 | 54,594 |
American Telephone & Telegraph Company v. Central Office Telephone, Inc.
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/97-679
|
97-679
|
1997
|
American Telephone & Telegraph Company
|
Central Office Telephone, Inc.
|
<p>Under the Communications Act of 1934, AT&T must file "tariffs" containing all its charges for interstate services and all "classifications, practices and regulations affecting such charges" with the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). Under section 203(c) of the Act, a common carrier, such as AT&T, may not "extend to any person any privileges or facilities in such communication, or employ or enforce any classifications, regulations, or practices affecting such charges, except as specified in such [tariff]."In 1989, AT&T sold Central Office Telephone, Inc. its Software Defined Network, a long-distance service. Subsequently, Central Office experienced problems with the service and withdrew from the contract. Central Office sued AT&T in Federal District Court, asserting state-law claims for breach of contract and for tortious interference with contractual relations for failure to deliver various service, provisioning, and billing options in addition to those set forth in the tariff. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals affirmed a jury's damages award.</p>
| 1,089 | 7 | 1 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed
|
Federalism
|
1,032 | 54,593 |
Baker v. General Motors Corp.
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/96-653
|
96-653
|
1997
|
Baker
|
General Motors Corp.
|
<p>After working for General Motors Corporation (GM) for fifteen years as a vehicular fire analyst, Ronald Elwell sued GM for wrongful discharge. In an eventual settlement agreement reached in a Michigan county court, the parties agreed to a permanent injunction barring Elwell from testifying against GM without its consent, unless subpoenaed to do so by another court or tribunal. Thereafter, when Kenneth Lee Baker commenced a product liability action against GM in a Missouri county court, Elwell was subpoenaed to testify on Baker's behalf. When GM argued that Elwell was barred from testifying under the Michigan court injunction, the Missouri court disagreed and permitted his deposition and testimony. After suffering an adverse verdict in the Baker case, GM appealed on the basis that Elwell's testimony was illegally admitted. When a federal appeals court agreed with GM, Baker appealed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.</p>
| 943 | 9 | 0 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed/remanded
|
Interstate Relations
|
1,033 | 54,595 |
Muscarello v. United States
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/96-1654
|
96-1654
|
1997
|
Muscarello
|
United States
|
<p>18 USC section 924(c)(1) subjects a person who "uses or carries a firearm" "during and in relation to" a "drug trafficking crime" to a 5-year mandatory prison term. In 96-1654, police officers found a handgun locked in Frank J. Muscarello's truck's glove compartment. Muscarello was transporting marijuana for sale in his truck. Muscarello argued that his "carrying" of the gun in the glove compartment did not fall within the scope of the statutory word "carries." In 96-8837, federal agents found drugs and guns in Donald Cleveland and Enrique Gray-Santana's car at a drug-sale point. The Court of Appeals, in both cases, found that the defendants had violated section 924(c)(1).</p>
| 689 | 5 | 4 | false |
majority opinion
|
affirmed
|
Criminal Procedure
|
1,034 | 54,597 |
Lexecon, Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes and Lerach
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/96-1482
|
96-1482
|
1997
|
Lexecon, Inc.
|
Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes and Lerach
|
<p>Lexecon Inc. was a defendant in a class action lawsuit. Under 28 USC section 1407(a), the lawsuit was transferred for pretrial proceedings to the District of Arizona. Section 1407(a) authorizes the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation to transfer civil actions with common issues of fact "to any district for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings," but provides that the Panel "shall" remand any such action to the original district "at or before the conclusion of such pretrial proceedings." After claims against it were dismissed, Lexecon brought suit against Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach and others (Milberg) in the class action lawsuit in the Northern District of Illinois. Ultimately, the Panel, under section 1407(a), ordered the case transferred to the District of Arizona. Afterwards, Lexecon moved for the Arizona District Court to remand the case to Illinois. Milberg filed a countermotion requesting the Arizona District Court to invoke section 1404(a) to "transfer" the case to itself for trial.Ultimately, the court assigned the case to itself and the Court of Appeals affirmed its judgment.</p>
| 1,141 | 9 | 0 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed/remanded
|
Judicial Power
|
1,035 | 54,598 |
Monge v. California
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/97-6146
|
97-6146
|
1997
|
Monge
|
California
|
<p>Angel Jaime Monge was convicted on three counts of violating California's drug laws, all felonies. Under California's "three-strikes" law a convicted felon with one prior felony conviction will have his prison term doubled. The state sought to have Monge's sentence enhanced based on a previous assault conviction and the resulting prison term. Subsequently the California trial court doubled his sentence and added a one-year enhancement for the prior prison term. On appeal, the California Court of Appeal ruled that the evidence was insufficient to trigger the sentence enhancement because the prior conviction allegations were not proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, a retrial to substantiate the allegations would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The California Supreme Court reversed the double jeopardy ruling, holding that the Double Jeopardy Clause, though applicable in the capital sentencing context, does not extend to noncapital sentencing proceedings.</p>
| 1,009 | 5 | 4 | false |
majority opinion
|
affirmed
|
Criminal Procedure
|
1,036 | 54,596 |
County of Sacramento v. Lewis
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/96-1337
|
96-1337
|
1997
|
County of Sacramento
|
Lewis
|
<p>Philip Lewis was a passenger on a motorcycle that was involved in a high-speed police chase. The chase ended when the motorcycle's driver lost control and tipped the bike over, hurling both riders to the pavement. James Smith, one of two pursuing Sacramento county sheriff's deputies, was unable to stop his car in time and skidded into Philip, causing fatal injuries. Philip's parents, Teri and Thomas Lewis, accused Smith and the Sacramento county police department of deliberate and reckless conduct which ultimately deprived their son of his due process right to life and his protection against unconstitutional seizure. On appeal from an appellate court's reversal of a district court decision favoring Smith, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.</p>
| 760 | 9 | 0 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed
|
Economic Activity
|
1,037 | 54,600 |
Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Government
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/96-1577
|
96-1577
|
1997
|
Alaska
|
Native Village of Venetie Tribal Government
|
<p>In 1971, Congress enacted the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA), which completely extinguished all aboriginal claims to Alaska land. ANCSA revoked the Neets'aii Gwich'in Indians' reservation surrounding the Village of Venetie. Subsequently, two Native corporations established for the Neets'aii Gwich'in elected to use an ANCSA provision allowing them to take title to former reservation lands in return for forgoing the statute's monetary payments and transfers of nonreservation land. The title to the reservation was ultimately transferred to the Native Village of Venetie Tribal Government (Tribe). In 1986, Alaska entered into a joint venture with a private contractor to construct a public school in Venetie. Afterwards, the Tribe notified the contractor that it owed the Tribe approximately $161,000 in taxes for conducting business activities on its land. The Federal District Court held that, because the Tribe's ANCSA lands were not "Indian country," the Tribe lacked the power to impose a tax upon nonmembers. The Court of Appeals reversed.</p>
| 1,069 | 9 | 0 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed
|
Civil Rights
|
1,038 | 54,601 |
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/96-568
|
96-568
|
1997
|
Oncale
|
Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.
|
<p>Joseph Oncale, a male, filed a complaint against his employer, Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., alleging that he was sexually harassed by co-workers, in their workplace, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"). On appeal from a decision supporting a district court's ruling against Oncale, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.</p>
| 369 | 9 | 0 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed/remanded
|
Civil Rights
|
1,039 | 54,602 |
United States v. Ramirez
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/96-1469
|
96-1469
|
1997
|
United States
|
Ramirez
|
<p>While in route to testify, Alan Shelby, a dangerous prisoner serving concurrent state and federal sentences, escaped custody. An ATF Agent, based on an informant's information, observed a person resembling Shelby at Hernan Ramirez's home in Boring, Oregon. Subsequently, the Government obtained a "no-knock" warrant to enter and search the home. Executing the warrant, officers broke a single window in Ramirez's home. Awakened, Ramirez fired a pistol into the garage ceiling. After being arrested, because of a stash of weapons in his garage, Ramirez was indicted on federal charges of being a felon in possession of firearms. Shelby was not found. Granting Ramirez's motion to suppress evidence regarding his possession of the weapons, the District Court found that the officers had violated the Fourth Amendment because there were "insufficient exigent circumstances" to justify the police officer's destruction of property in their execution of the warrant. The Court of Appeals affirmed.</p>
| 1,000 | 9 | 0 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed/remanded
|
Criminal Procedure
|
1,040 | 54,603 |
Swidler & Berlin v. United States
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/97-1192
|
97-1192
|
1997
|
Swidler & Berlin
|
United States
|
<p>During the 1993 investigation of the White House Travel Office ("Travelgate"), Deputy White House Counsel Vincent W. Foster, Jr., met with an attorney from Swidler & Berlin's law firm named James Hamilton. Nine days later, Foster committed suicide. During a subsequent investigation into the legalities of Travelgate, Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr subpoenaed Hamilton's notes about his meeting with Foster. When Swidler & Berlin challenged Starr's subpoena as a violation of the attorney-client privilege, a district court agreed. On appeal from an appellate court reversal, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.</p>
| 632 | 6 | 3 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed
|
Criminal Procedure
|
1,041 | 54,599 |
Hohn v. United States
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/96-8986
|
96-8986
|
1997
|
Hohn
|
United States
|
<p>Arnold Hohn was convicted, among other things, of using or carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking offense. Two years after his conviction became final, the Supreme Court decided that the term "use" in 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c)(1) required active employment of the firearm. Hohn filed a pro se motion under 28 U.S.C. Section 2255 to vacate his Section 942(c)(1) conviction on the ground that the evidence presented at his trial was insufficient to prove use of a firearm. While his motion was pending before the district court, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), which requires a Section 2255 petitioner to obtain a certificate of appealability from a circuit justice or judge before he can appeal the denial of a Section 2255 petition. 28 U.S.C. Section 2253(c)(1). The district court denied Hohn's petition and he appealed. The court of appeals treated the notice of appeal as an application for a certificate of appealability, and a three-judge panel declined to issue a certificate. Hohn then petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari to review the denial of the certificate, seeking to invoke the Court's jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Section 1254(1).</p>
| 1,247 | 5 | 4 | true |
majority opinion
|
vacated/remanded
|
Criminal Procedure
|
1,042 | 54,606 |
Bragdon v. Abbott
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/97-156
|
97-156
|
1997
|
Bragdon
|
Abbott
|
<p>During a visit to her dentist's office, in order to fill a cavity, Sidney Abbott disclosed that although she did not manifest any obvious symptoms she carried the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV). When her dentist, Randon Bragdon, refused to treat her in his office, offering to conduct any necessary work at a hospital for no extra charge other than use of the facilities, Abbott challenged his policy as discriminatory. After both a federal trial and an appeals court ruled in Abbott's favor, Bragdon appealed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.</p>
| 563 | 5 | 4 | true |
majority opinion
|
vacated/remanded
|
Civil Rights
|
1,043 | 54,604 |
Bousley v. United States
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/96-8516
|
96-8516
|
1997
|
Bousley
|
United States
|
<p>In 1990, Kenneth Eugene Bousley pleaded guilty to "using" a firearm "during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime," in violation of 18 USC section 924(c)(1). Ultimately, Bousley sough habeas relief, claiming his guilty plea lacked a factual basis because a connection between the firearms, located in the bedroom, and the location where the drug trafficking occurred, in the garage, was not shown in either the evidence or the plea. Dismissing the petition, the District Court found that a factual basis for the plea existed because the guns were in close proximity to the drugs and were readily accessible. In affirming, the Court of Appeals rejected Bousley's argument, among others, that his guilty plea was not knowing and intelligent because he was misinformed about the elements of a section 924(c)(1) offense.</p>
| 830 | 7 | 2 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed/remanded
|
Criminal Procedure
|
1,044 | 54,605 |
United States v. Beggerly
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/97-731
|
97-731
|
1997
|
United States
|
Beggerly
|
<p>In 1979, the United States sued Chris W. Beggerly and the Beggerly family to quiet title to Horn Island, located within the state of Mississippi, for a federal park. The Government argued that Beggerly did not have clear title because the Government had never patented the disputed land after acquiring it as part of the Louisiana Purchase. In 1982, a settlement quieted title in the Government's favor. However, in 1994, with new evidence, Beggerly sued, seeking to set aside the settlement agreement and obtain damages. Ultimately, the District Court concluded that it had no jurisdiction to hear the case. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found jurisdiction under the Quiet Title Act and under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) as an "independent action." The appellate court then vacated the settlement agreement and instructed the District Court to quiet title in Beggerly's favor.</p>
| 900 | 9 | 0 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed/remanded
|
Judicial Power
|
1,045 | 54,610 |
Kalina v. Fletcher
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/96-792
|
96-792
|
1997
|
Kalina
|
Fletcher
|
<p>Lynne Kalina, a Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for King County, Washington, commenced criminal proceedings against Rodney Fletcher, in connection with a school robbery, by filing the appropriate documents. Included in those documents was a "Certification for Determination of Probable Cause." Based on the certification, the trial court found probable cause, and Fletcher was arrested. Kalina's certification contained two inaccurate factual statements: that Fletcher had "never been associated with the school in any manner and did not have permission to enter the school or to take any property," and that Fletcher had been identified asking for an appraisal of a computer stolen from the school. Subsequently, Fletcher sued Kalina for damages, alleging that she had violated his constitutional right to be free from unreasonable seizures. The Federal District Court denied her motion for summary judgment, holding that she was not entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity and that whether qualified immunity would apply was a question of fact. The Court of Appeals affirmed.</p>
| 1,085 | 9 | 0 | false |
majority opinion
|
affirmed
|
Civil Rights
|
1,046 | 54,611 |
Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/96-1578
|
96-1578
|
1997
|
Phillips
|
Washington Legal Foundation
|
<p>Under Texas' Interest on Lawyers Trust Account (IOLTA) program, lawyers must deposit their client's funds into a special interest-bearing "NOW" account upon determination that the funds could not earn the client interest or compensate for other financial and accounting fees. Interest federally funded interest accrued on IOLTA accounts is then paid to the Texas Equal Access to Justice Foundation (TEAJF) which supports legal services for low-income persons. Acting on behalf of others opposed to IOLTA, the Washington Legal Foundation (the "Foundation") challenged TEAJF's receipt and use of the IOLTA funds. On appeal from an appellate court's reversal of a favorable district court decision, the Supreme Court granted the Foundation certiorari.</p>
| 756 | 5 | 4 | false |
majority opinion
|
affirmed
|
Due Process
|
1,047 | 54,608 |
Textron Lycoming Reciprocating Engine Division, Avco Corp v.United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/97-463
|
97-463
|
1997
|
Textron Lycoming
|
United Automobile Workers
|
<p>Textron Lycoming Reciprocating Engine Division and the United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America and its Local 187 are parties to a collective-bargaining agreement that required Textron to notify the Union before entering into any agreement to "subcontract out" work that would otherwise be performed by Union members. In 1994, Textron announced plans to subcontract out work that would have caused approximately one-half of the Union members to lose their jobs. Subsequently, the Union filed suit, alleging that Textron had fraudulently induced the Union to sign the collective-bargaining agreement. The complaint invoked section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act, which confers federal subject matter jurisdiction over "suits for violation of contracts" between an employer and a labor organization. The District Court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, concluding that the cause of action alleged did not come within section 301(a). The Court of Appeals reversed.</p>
| 1,048 | 9 | 0 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed
|
Judicial Power
|
1,048 | 54,609 |
Arkansas Educational Television Commission v. Forbes
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/96-779
|
96-779
|
1997
|
Arkansas Educational Television Commission
|
Forbes
|
<p>During the 1992 race for Arkansas' Third Congressional District, the Arkansas Educational Television Commission (AETC) -- a state-owned public television broadcaster -- sponsored a debate between the major party candidates. Running as an independent candidate with little popular support, Ralph Forbes sought to participate in the debate but was denied permission. After unsuccessfully challenging AETC's refusal in district court, Forbes appealed and won a reversal. AETC then appealed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.</p>
| 536 | 6 | 3 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed
|
First Amendment
|
1,049 | 54,612 |
Steel Company v. Citizens for Better Environment
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/96-643
|
96-643
|
1997
|
Steel Company
|
Citizens for Better Environment
|
<p>In 1995, Citizens For A Better Environment, a environmental protection organization, filed an enforcement action for relief under the Emergency Planning And Community Right-To-Know Act of 1986's (EPCRA) Citizen-Suit Provision. Citizens alleged that the Chicago Steel And Pickling Company had violated the EPCRA by failing to file timely toxic-and hazardous-chemical storage and emission reports since 1988. Ultimately, Chicago Steel filed all of the overdue forms with the relevant agencies by the time the complaint was acted on. Arguing this fact and that the EPCRA does not allow suit for purely historical violations, Chicago Steel filed a motion to dismiss, contending that Citizens' allegation of untimeliness in filing was not a claim upon which relief could be granted. The District Court agreed. In reversing, the Court of Appeals concluded that the EPCRA authorizes citizen suits for purely past violations.</p>
| 925 | 9 | 0 | true |
majority opinion
|
vacated/remanded
|
Judicial Power
|
1,050 | 54,613 |
United States v. Scheffer
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/96-1133
|
96-1133
|
1997
|
United States
|
Scheffer
|
<p>While defending himself before a military court martial on, among other things, substance abuse charges, airman Edward G. Scheffer sought to introduce his polygraph examination results. The results indicated there was "no deception" in Scheffer's denial that he used drugs while enlisted. Relying on Military Rule of Evidence 707 ("Rule 707"), prohibiting the use of polygraph results in court-martial proceedings, the military judge refused Scheffer's request to admit his results into evidence. On successive appeals, following his conviction on all charges, the Air Force Court of Appeals affirmed but the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces reversed, finding the evidentiary exclusion to be unconstitutional. The United States appealed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.</p>
| 791 | 8 | 1 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed
|
Criminal Procedure
|
1,051 | 54,614 |
Bryan v. United States
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/96-8422
|
96-8422
|
1997
|
Bryan
|
United States
|
<p>18 USC section 924(a)(1)(D) prohibits anyone from "willfully" dealing in firearms without a federal license. The Government presented evidence at Sillasse Bryan's trial to show that he did not have a federal license to deal in firearms, that he was dealing in firearms, and that he knew his conduct was unlawful. No evidence was presented that Bryan was aware of the federal law that prohibits dealing in firearms without a federal license. The trial judge refused to instruct the jury that Bryan could be convicted only if he knew of the federal licensing requirement. The trial judge instructed that a person acts "willfully" if he acts with the bad purpose to disobey or disregard the law, but that he need not be aware of the specific law that his conduct may be violating. A jury found Bryan guilty. In affirming, the Court of Appeals concluded that the instruction was proper and that the Government had shown that Bryan had acted willfully.</p>
| 955 | 6 | 3 | false |
majority opinion
|
affirmed
|
Criminal Procedure
|
1,052 | 54,615 |
Bates v. United States
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/96-7185
|
96-7185
|
1997
|
Bates
|
United States
|
<p>In 1986, Garrit Bates was appointed to serve as the Acme Institute of Technology's treasurer. In 1987, James Jackson, as Acme's president, signed a program participation agreement with the Department of Education that authorized the school to receive student loan checks through the Title IV Guaranteed Student Loan (GSL) program. Under the GSL program, governing regulations required Acme to return a portion of a loan if the student withdrew from Acme before the term ended. In 1987, Jackson and Bates began a practice of not making GSL refunds. Ultimately, in 1994, Bates was indicted on of "knowingly and willfully misapplying" federally insured student loan funds, in violation of 20 USC section 1097(a). The District Court dismissed Bates's indictment because it lacked an allegation of his "intent to injure or defraud the United States." Reinstating the prosecution, the Court of Appeals concluded that section 1097(a) required the Government to prove only that Bates knowingly and willfully misapplied Title IV funds.</p>
| 1,034 | 9 | 0 | false |
majority opinion
|
affirmed
|
Criminal Procedure
|
1,053 | 54,616 |
Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Woodard
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/96-1769
|
96-1769
|
1997
|
Ohio Adult Parole Authority
|
Woodard
|
<p>After Eugene Woodard's death sentence was finalized, the Ohio Adult Parole Authority commenced a clemency investigation. The Authority informed Woodard of his voluntary interview and clemency hearing. Ultimately, Woodard filed suit, alleging that Ohio's clemency process violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process right and his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals held that Woodard had failed to establish a life or liberty interest protected by due process arising out of the clemency proceeding itself. The appellate court, however, also held that Woodard's pretrial life and liberty interests were protected because a minimal amount of due process attached to clemency due to its distance from trial. Subsequently, the Court of Appeals remanded the case for a determination as to what that process should be.</p>
| 859 | 9 | 0 | false |
majority opinion
|
reversed
|
Due Process
|
1,054 | 54,621 |
Newsweek, Inc. v. Florida Department of Revenue
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/97-663
|
97-663
|
1997
|
Newsweek, Inc.
|
Florida Department of Revenue
|
<p>In 1988, a Florida statutory provision exempted newspapers, but not magazines, from sales tax. In 1990, the Florida Supreme Court found the classification invalid under the First Amendment. Subsequently, Newsweek, a magazine, filed a claim for a refund of the sales tax that it had paid between 1988 and 1990. The Florida Department of Revenue denied the refund. Newsweek then filed suit alleging that Florida's failure to accord the magazine retroactive relief was a violation of due process. Ultimately, the District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District, concluded Newsweek was afforded due process because Florida law permits prepayment tax challenges by filing an action and paying the contested amount into the court registry, posting a bond, or obtaining a court order approving an alternative arrangement, without suffering onerous penalties.</p>
| 863 | 9 | 0 | true |
per curiam
|
vacated/remanded
|
Economic Activity
|
1,055 | 54,620 |
Spencer v. Kemna
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/96-7171
|
96-7171
|
1997
|
Spencer
|
Kemna
|
<p>In 1990, Randy G. Spencer began serving concurrent three-year sentences for convictions of felony stealing and burglary. In 1992, Spencer was released, but later that year his parole was revoked and he was returned to prison. Seeking to invalidate his parole revocation, Spencer filed unsuccessful habeas petitions in state court. Spencer then filed a federal habeas petition, alleging that he had not received due process in the parole revocation proceedings. In 1993, Spencer was re-released on parole before the District Court addressed the merits of his habeas petition. Subsequently, the court dismissed Spencer's petition as moot. The Court of Appeals affirmed.</p>
| 675 | 8 | 1 | false |
majority opinion
|
affirmed
|
Judicial Power
|
1,056 | 54,618 |
Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/97-300
|
97-300
|
1997
|
Stewart
|
Martinez-Villareal
|
<p>Ramon Martinez-Villareal was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death in Arizona. His first three federal habeas corpus petitions were denied because he had not exhausted his state remedies. Martinez-Villareal claimed in his fourth habeas petition that he was incompetent to be executed. The District Court dismissed that claim as premature, but granted the writ on other grounds. The Court of Appeals reversed the writ. Martinez-Villareal moved to reopen his petition despite the fact that review of his incompetency claim might be prevented by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). Under AEDPA, a prisoner must ask the Court of Appeals to direct the District Court to consider such a petition. By now Arizona had obtained a warrant for Martinez-Villareal's execution. Subsequently, he was found fit to be executed. The District Court denied another motion to reopen his incompetency claim, holding that it lacked jurisdiction under AEDPA. On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that the law did not apply to a petition that raises only a competency-to-be-executed claim and that Martinez-Villareal did not, therefore, need authorization to file his petition in the District Court.</p>
| 1,224 | 7 | 2 | false |
majority opinion
|
affirmed
|
Criminal Procedure
|
1,057 | 54,619 |
Ohio Forestry Association, Inc. v. Sierra Club
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/97-16
|
97-16
|
1997
|
Ohio Forestry Association, Inc.
|
Sierra Club
|
<p>Pursuant to the National Forest Management Act of 1976 (NFMA), the United States Forest Service developed a Land and Resource Management Plan for Ohio's Wayne National Forest. The Plan sets logging goals, selects the areas suited to timber production, and determines which probable methods of timber harvest are appropriate, but it does not itself authorize the cutting of any trees. Ultimately, the Sierra Club filed suit, alleging that erroneous analysis leads the Plan wrongly to favor logging and clearcutting. The District Court granted the Forest Service summary judgment, finding that the Forest Service had acted lawfully in making the various challenged determinations. In reversing, the Court of Appeals, finding both that the Sierra Club had standing to bring suit, and that since the suit was "ripe for review," there was no need to wait "until a site-specific action occurs," held that the Plan improperly favored clearcutting and therefore violated the NFMA.</p>
| 980 | 9 | 0 | true |
majority opinion
|
vacated/remanded
|
Judicial Power
|
1,058 | 54,623 |
Forney v. Apfel
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/97-5737
|
97-5737
|
1997
|
Forney
|
Apfel
|
<p>Sandra K. Forney applied for Social Security disability benefits. A Social Security Judge determined Forney was minimally disabled, but that she was not disabled enough to qualify for benefits. Consequently she was denied her disability claim. The Social Security Administration's Appeals Council denied Forney's request for review. Forney then sought judicial review in federal District Court. The District Court found that the final determination was inadequately supported by the evidence and remanded the case to the agency for further proceedings. Forney appealed the remand order to the Court of Appeals. She contended that the agency's denial of benefits should be reversed outright. The Court of Appeals did not hear her claim, however, for it decided that Forney did not have the legal right to appeal.</p>
| 819 | 9 | 0 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed/remanded
|
Judicial Power
|
1,059 | 54,622 |
Clinton v. City of New York
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/97-1374
|
97-1374
|
1997
|
Clinton
|
City of New York
|
<p>This case consolidates two separate challenges to the constitutionality of two cancellations, made by President William J. Clinton, under the Line Item Veto Act ("Act"). In the first, the City of New York, two hospital associations, a hospital, and two health care unions, challenged the President's cancellation of a provision in the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 which relinquished the Federal Government's ability to recoup nearly $2.6 billion in taxes levied against Medicaid providers by the State of New York. In the second, the Snake River farmer's cooperative and one of its individual members challenged the President's cancellation of a provision of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997. The provision permitted some food refiners and processors to defer recognition of their capital gains in exchange for selling their stock to eligible farmers' cooperatives. After a district court held the Act unconstitutional, the Supreme Court granted certiorari on expedited appeal.</p>
| 983 | 6 | 3 | false |
majority opinion
|
affirmed
|
Miscellaneous
|
1,060 | 54,624 |
Edwards v. United States
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/96-8732
|
96-8732
|
1997
|
Edwards
|
United States
|
<p>At Vincent Edwards, Reynolds A. Wintersmith, Horace Joiner, Karl V. Fort, and Joseph Tidwell's trial for "conspiring" to "possess with intent to...distribute [mixtures containing two] controlled substances," the jury was instructed that the Government must prove that the conspiracy involved measurable amounts of "cocaine or cocaine base (crack)." After the jury returned guilty verdicts, the District Judge imposed sentences based on his finding that each petitioners' illegal conduct involved both cocaine and crack. On appeal, the petitioners argued that their sentences were unlawful insofar as they were based upon crack, because the word "or" in the jury instruction meant that the judge must assume that the conspiracy involved only cocaine. The United States Sentencing Guidelines treats cocaine more leniently than crack. The Court of Appeals concluded that the Guidelines require the sentencing judge, not the jury, to determine both the kind and the amount of the drugs at issue in a drug conspiracy.</p>
| 1,020 | 9 | 0 | false |
majority opinion
|
affirmed
|
Criminal Procedure
|
1,061 | 54,625 |
Salinas v. United States
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/96-738
|
96-738
|
1997
|
Salinas
|
United States
|
<p>Hidalgo County agreed to take federal prisoners into its custody in return for federal money. During this agreement, Brigido Marmolejo, the Sheriff of Hidalgo County, Texas, and Mario Salinas, his deputy, accepted money and two watches and a truck respectively, from Homero Beltran-Aguirr, a federal prisoner housed in the county jail, in exchange for permitting his girlfriend to visit him. Ultimately, Salinas was charged with one count of violating the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 USC section 1962(c), one count of conspiracy to violate RICO, section 1962(d), and two counts of bribery, section 666(a)(1)(B). The jury convicted him on all but the substantive RICO count. The Court of Appeals affirmed.</p>
| 746 | 9 | 0 | false |
majority opinion
|
affirmed
|
Criminal Procedure
|
1,062 | 54,628 |
Rivet v. Regions Bank of Louisiana
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/96-1971
|
96-1971
|
1997
|
Rivet
|
Regions Bank of Louisiana
|
<p>In 1983, a partnership mortgaged its interest in the Louisiana equivalent of a leasehold estate on a parcel of real property in New Orleans to Regions Bank of Louisiana. The partnership then granted a second mortgage to Mary Anna Rivet, Minna Ree Winer, Edmond G. Miranne, and Edmond G. Miranne, Jr. Later, the partnership filed for bankruptcy. The Bankruptcy Court approved the sale of the estate to the Bank, which sold the property. Rivet filed suit in Louisiana state court, alleging that the transfer of the property without satisfying their rights under the second mortgage violated state law. The Bank removed the action to federal court, contending that federal-question jurisdiction existed because the prior Bankruptcy Court orders extinguished Rivet's rights. Denying Rivet's motion to remand, the District Court granted the Bank summary judgment. In affirming, the Court of Appeals concluded that removal is proper where a plaintiff's state cause of action is completely precluded by a prior federal judgment on a federal question.</p>
| 1,051 | 9 | 0 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed/remanded
|
Judicial Power
|
1,063 | 54,626 |
City of Monroe v. United States
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/97-122
|
97-122
|
1997
|
City of Monroe
|
United States
|
<p>Monroe, Georgia is covered by section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which requires the preclearance of certain voting changes. Prior to 1966, the Monroe city charter did not specify whether a majority vote or a plurality vote was needed to win a mayoral election. In practice, the city changed in 1966 from using a plurality-voting requirement to using a majority-voting requirement. The United States brought suit against the city, claiming that it had not sought preclearance of the change, as required by section 5 and sought to enjoin such majority voting and to require the city to return to plurality voting. The District Court, in granting summary judgment in favor of the United States, expressed the view that the change to majority voting had not been precleared in accordance with section 5.</p>
| 816 | 7 | 2 | true |
per curiam
|
reversed
|
Civil Rights
|
1,064 | 54,627 |
Federal Election Commission v. Akins
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/96-1590
|
96-1590
|
1997
|
Federal Election Commission
|
Akins
|
<p>The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA) imposes recordkeeping and disclosure requirements upon political committees which receive more than $1,000 in "contributions" or which make more than $1,000 in "expenditures" in a year "for the purpose of influencing any election for Federal office." Certain assistance does not count toward the expenditure cap if it takes the form of a "communication" by a "membership organization or corporation" "to its members" as long as the organization is not "organized primarily for the purpose of influencing [any individual's] nomination... or election." A complaint filed by a group of voters asked the Federal Election Commission (FEC) to order the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) to make public the information that FECA demands of political committees. Ultimately, the FEC found that AIPAC was not a political committee because its major purpose was not the nomination or election of candidates. The en banc Court of Appeals concluded that the FEC's major purpose test improperly interpreted FECA's definition of a political committee.</p>
| 1,109 | 6 | 3 | true |
majority opinion
|
vacated/remanded
|
Judicial Power
|
1,065 | 54,629 |
Caron v. United States
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/97-6270
|
97-6270
|
1997
|
Caron
|
United States
|
<p>18 USC section 922(g)(1) forbids a person convicted of a serious offense to possess any firearm. Section 924(e) requires that a three-time violent felon who violates section 922(g)(1) receive an enhanced sentence. Section 921(a)(20) provides that a previous conviction is not a predicate for the substantive offense or the enhanced sentence if the offender's civil rights have been restored, "unless such... restoration... expressly provides that the person may not... possess... firearms." In 1993, Gerald Caron was convicted of possessing six rifles and shotguns in violation of section 922(g). The District Court enhanced Caron's sentence based, in part, on three Massachusetts convictions. In vacating his sentence, the Court of Appeals concluded that a Massachusetts law that permitted Caron to possess rifles, but not handguns, had restored his civil rights. On remand, the District Court found that, because Massachusetts law allowed Caron to possess rifles, section 921(a)(20)'s "unless clause" was not activated. The Court of Appeals reversed.</p>
| 1,060 | 6 | 3 | false |
majority opinion
|
affirmed
|
Criminal Procedure
|
1,066 | 54,630 |
Ricci v. Arlington Heights
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/97-501
|
97-501
|
1997
|
Ricci
|
Arlington Heights
|
<p>Randall Ricci owns Rudeway Enterprises, a telemarketing business. After the Arlington Heights police department determined that Ricci lacked the required business license and that one of Ricci's employees had an outstanding warrant, officers went to Rudeway Enterprises to arrest the employee. While arresting the employee, the officers also searched Ricci's business papers without a warrant. Subsequently, Ricci was arrested for violating Section 9-201 of the Village of Arlington Heights Code of Ordinances, which makes it unlawful to operate a business without a license. Ultimately, Ricci filed a claim that the officers violated his civil rights by subjecting him to a full custodial arrest for committing a fine-only offense. The District Court dismissed the claim. Finding the arrest reasonable for Fourth Amendment purposes, the Court of Appeals rejected Ricci's argument that a full custodial arrest for violation of a fine-only ordinance is constitutionally permissible only if the violation involves a breach of the peace.</p>
| 1,042 | 9 | 0 | false |
per curiam
| null |
Judicial Power
|
1,067 | 54,631 |
Dooley v. Korean Airlines Company
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/97-704
|
97-704
|
1997
|
Dooley
|
Korean Airlines Company
|
<p>In 1983, Korean Air Lines (KAL) Flight KE007, en route from Alaska to South Korea entered the airspace of the former Soviet Union and was shot down. All 269 people on board were killed. Representatives of three of the passengers (petitioners) sued KAL for damages for their decedents' pre-death pain and suffering. While their suit was pending, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co. In Zicherman, the Court held that the Warsaw Convention permits compensation only for legally cognizable harm and that the Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA) supplies the applicable U.S. law where an airplane crashes on the high seas. DOHSA allows certain relatives of a decedent to sue for their own pecuniary losses, but does not authorize recovery for the decedent's pre-death pain and suffering. Subsequently, the District Court granted KAL's motion to dismiss petitioners' nonpecuniary damages claims on the ground that DOHSA does not permit recovery for such damages. In affirming, the Court of Appeals rejected the argument that general maritime law provides a survival action for pain and suffering damages.</p>
| 1,133 | 9 | 0 | false |
majority opinion
|
affirmed
|
Economic Activity
|
1,068 | 54,634 |
Breard v. Greene
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/97-8214
|
97-8214
|
1997
|
Breard
|
Greene
|
<p>In 1992, Angel Francisco Breard, a citizen of Paraguay, was convicted of the attempted rape and capital murder of Ruth Dickie. Breard was scheduled to be executed by the Commonwealth of Virginia in 1996. Ultimately, Breard filed a motion for habeas relief in Federal District Court, alleging that arresting authorities violated the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations when they failed to inform him that, as a foreign national, he had the right to contact the Paraguayan Consulate. The court concluded that Breard had procedurally default this claim by failing to raise it in state court. The Court of Appeals affirmed. In 1996, Paraguayan officials brought suit alleging that Virginia officials had violated their rights under the Vienna Convention by failing to inform Breard of his treaty rights and the Paraguayan consulate of Breard's situation. Ultimately, the District Court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals affirmed.</p>
| 963 | 6 | 3 | false |
per curiam
| null |
Criminal Procedure
|
1,069 | 54,632 |
City of Chicago v. International College of Surgeons
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/96-910
|
96-910
|
1997
|
City of Chicago
|
International College of Surgeons
|
<p>In 1989, following the Chicago Landmarks Commission's preliminary determination that two of the International College of Surgeons and the United States Section of the International College of Surgeons' (ICS) buildings qualified for protection under the city's Landmarks Ordinance, the city enacted a Designation Ordinance creating a landmark district that included the buildings. After ICS applied for and was denied a permit to demolish all but the facades of the buildings, it sought judicial review of the Commission's decisions, alleging the ordinances and the manner in which the Commission conducted its proceedings violated the Federal and State Constitutions. Chicago removed the case to federal district court on the basis of federal question jurisdiction. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals reversed the District Court's decision in favor of the city, ruling that a federal district court lacks jurisdiction of a case containing state law claims for on-the-record review of local administrative action.</p>
| 1,018 | 7 | 2 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed/remanded
|
Judicial Power
|
1,070 | 54,633 |
Beach v. Ocwen Federal Bank
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/97-5310
|
97-5310
|
1997
|
Beach
|
Ocwen Federal Bank
|
<p>David and Linda Beach refinanced their Florida house in 1986 with a loan from Great Western Bank. In 1991, they stopped making mortgage payments. In 1992, Great Western began foreclosure proceedings. While the Beach's acknowledged their default, they alleged that the bank's failure to make disclosures required by the Truth in Lending Act gave them the right under federal law to rescind the mortgage agreement. The Florida trial court rejected that defense, holding that any right to rescind had expired in 1989 under federal law which provides that the right of rescission shall expire three years after the loan closes. The state's intermediate appellate court affirmed, as did the Florida Supreme Court.</p>
| 716 | 9 | 0 | false |
majority opinion
|
affirmed
|
Economic Activity
|
1,071 | 54,637 |
Lewis v. United States
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/96-7151
|
96-7151
|
1997
|
Lewis
|
United States
|
<p>While living on the federal Army base Fort Polk, Debra Faye Lewis was charged with the murder of her four year-old daughter. Under the federal Assimilative Crimes Act (ACA), which provides that "whoever within... any [federal enclave], is guilty of any act or omission which, although not made punishable by any enactment of Congress, would be punishable... within the jurisdiction of the State... in which such place is situated, ...shall be guilty of a like offense and subject to like punishment," Lewis' indictment charged a violation of Louisiana's first-degree murder statute. Lewis was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment without parole by the District Court. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reasoned that the ACA did not apply because Congress made Lewis' acts punishable as federal second-degree murder. The appellate court, however, affirmed Lewis' conviction because the jury had necessarily found all of the requisite elements of federal second-degree murder.</p>
| 988 | 8 | 1 | true |
majority opinion
|
vacated/remanded
|
Criminal Procedure
|
1,072 | 54,635 |
Hopkins v. Reeves
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/96-1693
|
96-1693
|
1997
|
Hopkins
|
Reeves
|
<p>Randolph K. Reeves was charged with two counts of felony murder for the sexual assault and murder of Janet Mesner and Victoria Lamm, both of Lincoln, Nebraska. Under Nebraska law, felony murder is a form of first-degree murder committed in the perpetration of certain felonies, including sexual assault. A conviction for felony murder renders a defendant eligible for the death penalty; however the jury does not charge the defendant because capital sentencing is a judicial function. In his trial Reeves requested the jury be given other options rather than just felony murder. The trial court judge denied Reeves's motion and he was subsequently convicted on both counts. A three-judge panel sentenced Reeves to death. The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed his convictions and sentences. After exhausting his state remedies, Reeves filed a federal habeas corpus petition that the trial court's failure to give the requested instructions was unconstitutional. The District Court granted relief on an unrelated due process claim. The Court of Appeals rejected the lower court's decision, but held that a constitutional error had occurred.</p>
| 1,144 | 8 | 1 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed
|
Criminal Procedure
|
1,073 | 54,636 |
General Electric Company v. Joiner
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/96-188
|
96-188
|
1997
|
General Electric Company
|
Joiner
|
<p>In 1992, Robert Joiner, after being diagnosed with small-cell lung cancer, sued General Electric Co. in Georgia state court, alleging that his disease was promoted by workplace exposure to chemical "PCBs" and their derivatives, including polychlorinated dibenzofurans (furans) and polychlorinated dibenzodioxins (dioxins). Ultimately, Joiner provided the District Court with expert witnesses' depositions that testified that PCBs, furans, and dioxins can promote cancer and that this was the likely cause of his cancer. The court granted GE summary judgment, reasoning that there was no genuine issue as to whether Joiner had been exposed to furans and dioxins and that his experts' testimony had failed to show that there was a link between exposure to PCBs and small-cell lung cancer. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that the District Court erred in excluding the testimony of Joiner's expert witnesses. The appellate court applied a stringent standard of review to reach its conclusion.</p>
| 1,005 | 9 | 0 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed/remanded
|
Judicial Power
|
1,074 | 54,638 |
United States v. Cabrales
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/97-643
|
97-643
|
1997
|
United States
|
Cabrales
|
<p>An indictment returned in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Missouri charged Vickie S. Cabrales with various charges of money laundering. The incident alleged that Cabrales deposited $40,000 with the AmSouth Bank of Florida, of which she later withdrew $38,000. The money was traceable to illegal cocaine sales in Missouri. Cabrales moved to dismiss the indictment for improper venue. Because the money-laundering activity occurred entirely in Florida, the court dismissed two of the three counts against Cabrales. In affirming, the Court of Appeals noted that Article III, the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution, and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 18 required that a person be tried where the charged offense was committed. The court also noted that laundering alleged in the indictment occurred entirely in Florida and that the Government did not assert that Cabrales transported the money from Missouri to Florida.</p>
| 948 | 9 | 0 | false |
majority opinion
|
affirmed
|
Judicial Power
|
1,075 | 54,639 |
Wisconsin Department of Corrections v. Schacht
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/97-461
|
97-461
|
1997
|
Wisconsin Department of Corrections
|
Schacht
|
<p>In 1996, Keith Schacht filed a state-court suit against the Wisconsin Department of Corrections and several of its employees (defendants), in their "personal" and in their "official" capacity, alleging that his dismissal violated the Federal Constitution and federal civil rights laws. After removing the case to federal court, the defendants asserted that the Eleventh Amendment doctrine of sovereign immunity barred the claims against the Department and its employees in their official capacity. The District Court granted the individual defendants summary judgment on the "personal capacity" claims and dismissed the claims against the Department and the individual defendants in their "official capacity." On appeal, the Court of Appeals concluded that the removal had been improper because the presence of even one claim subject to an Eleventh Amendment bar deprives the federal courts of removal jurisdiction over the entire case.</p>
| 944 | 9 | 0 | true |
majority opinion
|
vacated/remanded
|
Judicial Power
|
1,076 | 54,640 |
Calderon v. Ashmus
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/97-391
|
97-391
|
1997
|
Calderon
|
Ashmus
|
<p>Chapter 154 of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) provides an expedited review process for federal habeas proceedings in capital cases in States that meet certain conditions. California officials stated that they believed they qualified for Chapter 154. Troy Ashmus, a state prisoner sentenced to death, filed a class action suit, which included all capital prisoners in California whose convictions were affirmed on direct appeal after June 6, 1989, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to resolve uncertainty over whether Chapter 154 applied. Holding that California did not qualify for Chapter 154, the District Court enjoined the State from invoking the Chapter in any proceedings involving class members. In affirming, the Court of Appeals concluded the Eleventh Amendment did not bar the suit and that the injunction did not violate the First Amendment.</p>
| 903 | 9 | 0 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed/remanded
|
Judicial Power
|
1,077 | 54,641 |
Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/96-1866
|
96-1866
|
1997
|
Gebser
|
Lago Vista Independent School District
|
<p>Alida Star Gebser, a high school student in the Lago Vista Independent School District ("Lago Vista"), had a secret sexual affair with one of her teachers. At the time, Lago Vista had no official procedure for reporting sexual harassment nor any formal anti-harassment policy, as required by federal law. One day, after the two were discovered having sex, the teacher was arrested and fired. Claiming she was harassed in violation of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (the "Amendments"), providing that no person "be subjected to discrimination" under any federally funded education program or activity, Gebser sought damages against Lago Vista. On appeal from a decision affirming a district court's ruling in favor of Lago Vista, the Supreme Court granted Gebser certiorari.</p>
| 795 | 5 | 4 | false |
majority opinion
|
affirmed
|
Civil Rights
|
1,078 | 54,644 |
Regions Hospital v. Shalala
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/96-1375
|
96-1375
|
1997
|
Regions Hospital
|
Shalala
|
<p>Under the Medicare Act a hospital may obtain a reimbursement for certain graduate medical education (GME) programs for interns and residents by preparing certain reports. The GME Amendment, section 9202(a), of the Medicare and Medicaid Budget Reconciliation Amendments of 1985 directs the Secretary of Health and Human Services to determine, for a hospital's cost reporting period starting during fiscal year 1984, the amount "recognized as reasonable" for GME costs. The Amendment then directs the Secretary to use the 1984 amount, adjusted for inflation, to calculate a hospital's GME reimbursement for subsequent years. The Secretary's "reaudit" regulation permits a second audit of the 1984 GME costs to ensure accurate reimbursements in future years. A reaudit of Regions Hospital significantly lowered the Hospital's allowable 1984 GME costs. Subsequently, the Hospital challenged the validity of the reaudit rule. Ultimately, the District Court granted the Secretary summary judgment, concluding that the rule reasonably interpreted Congress' prescription and that the reauditing did not impose an impermissible "retroactive rule." The Court of Appeals affirmed.</p>
| 1,177 | 6 | 3 | false |
majority opinion
|
affirmed
|
Judicial Power
|
1,079 | 54,643 |
Buchanan v. Angelone
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/96-8400
|
96-8400
|
1997
|
Buchanan
|
Angelone
|
<p>Following Douglas Buchanan's conviction for the capital murders of his father, stepmother, and two brothers, the prosecutor sought the death penalty based on Virginia's aggravating factor that the crime was vile. The trial court instructed the jury that if it found beyond a reasonable doubt that Buchanan's conduct was vile, "then you may fix the punishment...at death," but "if you believe from all the evidence that...death...is not justified, then you shall fix the punishment...at life imprisonment." Buchanan sought four additional instructions on particular mitigating factors and a general instruction on the concept of mitigating evidence. The court denied Buchanan, refusing to single out certain mitigating factors to the sentencing jury. The jury returned with a verdict for the death penalty.</p>
| 813 | 6 | 3 | false |
majority opinion
|
affirmed
|
Criminal Procedure
|
1,080 | 54,645 |
Trest v. Cain
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/96-7901
|
96-7901
|
1997
|
Trest
|
Cain
|
<p>Richard Trest sought a writ of habeas corpus that would cancel the sentence he was serving in Louisiana for armed robbery. The District Court rejected his claim. Trest appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, but before hearing the facts of the case, the Court of Appeals denied his appeal as a "procedural default." The Court of Appeals ruled that Trent had failed to meet the deadline for filing his federal claims in state court. Though Louisiana had not raised the issue, the Fifth Circuit felt compelled to dismiss the case on its own initiative. Trest appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the Fifth Circuit had incorrectly believed that it was required to decide the "procedural default" issue sua sponte - that is, without prompting from one of the parties.</p>
| 799 | 9 | 0 | true |
majority opinion
|
vacated/remanded
|
Criminal Procedure
|
1,081 | 54,646 |
Campbell v. Louisiana
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/96-1584
|
96-1584
|
1997
|
Campbell
|
Louisiana
|
<p>erry Campbell, a white man, was indicted for second-degree murder by a grand jury in Evangeline Parish, Louisiana. Campbell moved to quash the indictment by citing a long history of racial discrimination in the selection of grand jury forepersons in Evangeline Parish. No African-American had served as a foreperson for the past 16 years despite the fact twenty percent of the registered voters were black. Campbell claimed such practices violated his Fourteenth Amendment equal protection and due process rights. A Louisiana trial judge denied Campbell's challenge, holding that he lacked standing as a white man complaining about the exclusion of African-Americans from serving as forepersons. The Louisiana Court of Appeal overruled the trial judge and decided Campbell had standing. The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeal.</p>
| 852 | 7 | 2 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed/remanded
|
Civil Rights
|
1,082 | 54,650 |
New Mexico ex rel. Ortiz v. Reed
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/97-1217
|
97-1217
|
1997
|
New Mexico ex rel. Ortiz
|
Reed
|
<p>The Extradition Act implements the Constitution's extradition clause and provides for the extradition from one state of a fugitive from justice when a demand for the fugitive's extradition is made by another state. Manuel Ortiz, a parolee from the Ohio correctional system, fled to New Mexico after Ohio prison officials told him that they planned to revoke his parole status. The governor of New Mexico issued a warrant directing Ortiz's return upon Ohio's demand. Ortiz then sought habeas corpus relief in New Mexico. Ultimately, the Supreme Court of New Mexico affirmed a grant of habeas corpus relief. The court expressed the view that Ortiz was a refugee from injustice and that the New Mexico constitution, which guarantees the right of seeking and obtaining safety, prevailed over the state's duty under the extradition clause.</p>
| 842 | 9 | 0 | true |
per curiam
|
reversed/remanded
|
Criminal Procedure
|
1,083 | 54,648 |
Hudson v. United States
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/96-976
|
96-976
|
1997
|
Hudson et al.
|
United States
|
<p>John Hudson was chairman of the First National Bank of Tipton and the First National Bank of Hammon. Hudson used his position to regain bank stock he had used as collateral on defaulted loans through a series of bank loans to other parties. Upon investigation the Office of the Comptroller of Currency (OCC) found that the loans were made in violation of several banking statues and regulations. The OCC fined and debarred Hudson for the violations. Later, he faced criminal indictment in federal District Court for violations tied to those same events. Hudson objected, arguing that the indictment violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment.</p>
<p>The U. S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit eventually found for the Government in light of <em>United States v. Halper</em> on the grounds that the original proceedings were civil in nature and not so disproportional to the proven damages to the Government as to qualify as a form of criminal punishment.</p>
| 984 | 9 | 0 | false |
majority opinion
|
affirmed
|
Criminal Procedure
|
1,084 | 54,649 |
United States v. Balsys
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/97-873
|
97-873
|
1997
|
United States
|
Balsys
|
<p>Aloyzas Balsys was subpoenaed by the Justice Department's Office of Special Investigations (OSI) to testify about his wartime activities between 1940 and 1944 and his subsequent immigration to the United States. Fearing prosecution by a foreign nation, Balsys refused the subpoena by claiming his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. On appeal from an appellate court's reversal of a district court ruling granting OSI's subpoena enforcement petition, the Supreme Court granted the United States certiorari.</p>
| 532 | 7 | 2 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed/remanded
|
Criminal Procedure
|
1,085 | 54,651 |
Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc.
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/96-1037
|
96-1037
|
1997
|
Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma
|
Manufacturing Technologies, Inc.
|
<p>The U.S. holds in trust the Oklahoma land that the federally recognized Kiowa Tribe owns. In 1990, the then-Chairman of the Tribe's Business Committee signed a promissory note in the Tribe's name in order to purchase stock from Manufacturing Technologies, Inc. The note states that it was signed on tribal lands and provides that nothing in it subjects or limits the Tribe's sovereign rights. After the Tribe defaulted, Manufacturing Technologies sued the Tribe in state court, claiming that the note was executed and delivered beyond tribal lands. The Tribe moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Denying the motion, the trial court entered judgment for Manufacturing Technologies. In affirming, the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals held that Indian tribes are subject to suit in state court for breaches of contract involving off-reservation commercial conduct.</p>
| 874 | 6 | 3 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed
|
Civil Rights
|
1,086 | 54,652 |
Lunding v. New York Tax Appeals Tribunal
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/96-1462
|
96-1462
|
1997
|
Lunding
|
New York Tax Appeals Tribunal
|
<p>New York Tax Law section 631(b)(6) denies only nonresident taxpayers a state income tax deduction for alimony paid. In 1990, Christopher Lunding and his wife, residents of Connecticut, were required to pay higher taxes on their New York income when the State denied their attempted deduction of a pro rata portion of the alimony Lunding paid a previous spouse. Lunding commenced suit, asserting that section 631(b)(6) discriminates against New York nonresidents in violation of the Privileges and Immunities, Equal Protection, and Commerce Clauses of the Federal Constitution. Ultimately, the New York Court of Appeals held that section 631(b)(6) was adequately justified because New York residents who are subject to taxation on all of their income regardless of source should be entitled to the benefit of full deduction of expenses, while personal expenses of a nonresident taxpayer are more appropriately allocated to the State of residence.</p>
| 953 | 6 | 3 | false |
majority opinion
|
reversed/remanded
|
Economic Activity
|
1,087 | 54,654 |
Texas v. United States
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/97-29
|
97-29
|
1997
|
Texas
|
United States
|
<p>In 1995, the Texas Legislature enacted Chapter 39. Chapter 39 holds local school boards accountable to the State for student achievement in the public schools. The State Commissioner of Education may select from various sanctions, including the appointment of a master or a management team and the contracting out of services, when a school district falls short of Chapter 39's accreditation criteria. Under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, Texas submitted Chapter 39 to the United States Attorney General for a determination whether any of the sanctions effected voting and thus required preclearance. Ultimately, the Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights cautioned that such sanctions implementation might violate section 5. Subsequently, Texas sought a declaration District Court that section 5 did not apply to such sanctions. The court concluded that Texas's claim was not ripe.</p>
| 908 | 9 | 0 | false |
majority opinion
|
affirmed
|
Judicial Power
|
1,088 | 54,653 |
National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/97-371
|
97-371
|
1997
|
National Endowment for the Arts
|
Finley
|
<p>The National Foundation on the Arts and Humanities Act entrusts the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA) with discretion to award financial grants to the arts. The NEA's broad decision guidelines are: "artistic and cultural significance," with emphasis on "creativity and cultural diversity professional excellence," and the encouragement of "public education and appreciation of the arts." In 1990, Congress amended the criteria by requiring the NEA to consider "artistic excellence and artistic merit taking into consideration general standards of decency and respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the American public." After suffering a funding rejection, Karen Finely, along with three other performance artists and the National Association of Artists' Organizations, challenged the NEA's amended statutory review proceedings as unconstitutionally vague and discriminatory. After consecutive district and appellate court rulings in favor of Finley, the Supreme Court granted the NEA certiorari.</p>
| 1,015 | 8 | 1 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed/remanded
|
First Amendment
|
1,089 | 54,655 |
United States v. Estate of Romani
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/96-1613
|
96-1613
|
1997
|
United States
|
Estate of Romani
|
<p>Both a judgment lien and federal tax liens encumbered the real property of Francis Romani's Pennsylvania estate, worth $53,001, following his death. The estate's administrator sought a county court's permission to transfer the property to the judgment creditor. The Government objected to the conveyance, arguing that 31 USC section 3713(a), which provides that a Government claim "shall be paid first" when a decedent's estate cannot pay all of its debts, prioritized its payment. Nevertheless, the court authorized the conveyance. Ultimately, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed. The court concluded that Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966 modified the Government's preference and recognized the priority of many state claims over federal tax liens.</p>
| 757 | 9 | 0 | false |
majority opinion
|
affirmed
|
Federal Taxation
|
1,090 | 54,657 |
Kawaauhau v. Geiger
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/97-115
|
97-115
|
1997
|
Kawaauhau
|
Geiger
|
<p>In 1983, Margaret Kawaauhau sought treatment from Dr. Paul Geiger for a foot injury. Later, Geiger cancelled Kawaauhau's transfer, by other physicians, to an infectious disease specialist. Ultimately, Kawaauhau required that her right leg be amputated below the knee. In the subsequently malpractice suit, a jury awarded Kawaauhau approximately $355,000 in damages. Geiger, who carried no malpractice insurance, ultimately filed for bankruptcy. Kawaauhau requested the Bankruptcy Court to hold the malpractice judgment nondischargeable under 11 USC section 523(a)(6), which provides that a "discharge [in bankruptcy]... does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt... for willful and malicious injury... to another." The court held the debt nondischargeable. The District Court affirmed. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that section 523(a)(6)'s exemption from discharge is confined to debts for an intentional tort, so that a debt for malpractice remains dischargeable because it is based on negligent or reckless conduct.</p>
| 1,047 | 9 | 0 | false |
majority opinion
|
affirmed
|
Economic Activity
|
1,091 | 54,656 |
National Credit Union Administration v. First National Bank & Trust Company
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/96-843
|
96-843
|
1997
|
National Credit Union Administration
|
First National Bank & Trust Company
|
<p>Section 109 of the Federal Credit Union Act provides that that "federal credit union membership shall be limited to groups having a common bond of occupation or association, or to groups within a well-defined neighborhood, community, or rural district." The National Credit Union Administration (NCUA) interprets section 9 to permit federal credit unions to be composed of multiple, unrelated employer groups, each having its own distinct common bond of occupation. Under this interpretation, the NCUA approved a series of charter amendments adding several unrelated employer groups to the membership of AT&T Family Federal Credit Union, which now has approximately 110,000 members nationwide only 35% of whom are employees of AT&T and its affiliates. Subsequently, a number of private actors brought suit under the Administrative Procedure Act, asserting that the NCUA's decision was contrary to law because section 109 unambiguously requires that the same common bond of occupation unite each member of an occupationally defined federal credit union and members of the new groups did not share a common bond of occupation with AT&T Family Federal Credit Union's existing members. Ultimately, the District Court held that the private interests lack standing to challenge NCUA's decision and the Court of Appeals reversed.</p>
| 1,342 | 5 | 4 | false |
majority opinion
|
affirmed
|
Economic Activity
|
1,092 | 54,658 |
United States v. Bajakajian
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/96-1487
|
96-1487
|
1997
|
United States
|
Bajakajian
|
<p>During a routine check of departing international flight passengers, customs officers discovered $357,144 on the person of Hosep Bajakajian. In addition to charging him, under 31 U.S.C. Section 5316, of attempting to leave the United States with an unreported sum in excess of $10,000 cash, the government also sought forfeiture of the entire $357,144 under 18 U.S.C. Section 982 providing that the deliberate violation of Section 5316 shall result in the forfeiture of "any property involved in such an offense." After having its forfeiture claim rejected in both a district court and the Ninth Circuit, as excessively unconstitutional, the Supreme Court granted the government certiorari.</p>
| 698 | 5 | 4 | false |
majority opinion
|
affirmed
|
Criminal Procedure
|
1,093 | 54,660 |
Air Line Pilots Association v. Miller
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/97-428
|
97-428
|
1997
|
Air Line Pilots Association
|
Miller
|
<p>The Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA), a private-sector labor organization, represents pilots employed by Delta Air Lines. The collective-bargaining agreement between ALPA and Delta includes an "agency shop" clause that requires nonunion Delta pilots to pay ALPA a monthly service charge for representing them. 153 Delta pilots challenged in federal-court action the manner in which ALPA calculated agency fees. Under ALPA policy pilots who object to the fee calculation may request arbitration proceedings. When 174 Delta pilots filed objections to the agency-fee calculation, the ALPA treated the objections as requests for arbitration. The arbitrator sustained ALPA's calculation. The District Court concluded that the pilots seeking to challenge the fee calculation must exhaust arbitral remedies before proceeding in court. The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court. It found no legal basis for requiring objectors to arbitrate agency-fee challenges when they had not agreed to do so.</p>
| 1,005 | 7 | 2 | false |
majority opinion
|
affirmed
|
Unions
|
1,094 | 54,659 |
Cohen v. de la Cruz
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/96-1923
|
96-1923
|
1997
|
Cohen
|
de la Cruz
|
<p>After the local rent control administrator ordered Edward S. Cohen to refund $31,382.50 in excessive rents he had charged Hilda de la Cruz and other tenants, Cohen sought to discharge his debts under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. The tenants filed an adversary proceeding, arguing that the debt Cohen owed to them was nondischargeable under ?523(a)(2)(A) of the Code, which excepts from discharge "any debt ... for money, property, services, or an extension, renewal, or refinancing of credit, to the extent obtained by ... actual fraud." The tenants also sought treble damages, attorney's fees, and costs under the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act. The Bankruptcy Court ruled in their favor, finding that Cohen had committed "actual fraud" within the meaning of ?523(a)(2)(A) of the Code and that his conduct violated the New Jersey law. The court, therefore, awarded the tenants treble damages totaling $94,147.50, plus attorney's fees and costs. The District Court affirmed, as did the Court of Appeals, which held that debts resulting from fraud are nondischargeable under ?523(a)(2)(A) of the Code, and that the award of treble damages (plus attorney's fees and costs) in this case was therefore nondischargeable.</p>
| 1,227 | 9 | 0 | false |
majority opinion
|
affirmed
|
Economic Activity
|
1,095 | 54,661 |
New Jersey v. New York
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/120_orig
|
120-orig
|
1997
|
New Jersey
|
New York
|
<p>Under an 1834 compact between New York and New Jersey, Ellis Island was deemed part of New York. It was later determined, by the Supreme Court, that New Jersey would have sovereign rights over all submerged lands on its side of the Hudson River. During the time Ellis Island was used to receive immigrants, the Federal Government filled around the island adding some 24.5 acres to its original size over 42 years. When immigration was diverted from Ellis Island in 1954, New York and New Jersey asserted rival sovereignty claims over the Island's filled portions. New Jersey finally invoked the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to solve the matter once and for all time.</p>
| 683 | 6 | 3 | true |
majority opinion
| null | null |
1,096 | 54,663 |
Brogan v. United States
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/96-1579
|
96-1579
|
1997
|
Brogan
|
United States
|
<p>When questioned by federal agents as to the receipt of gifts or money from a company whose employees were members of the union in which he was an officer, James Brogan falsely answered "no." Brogan was subsequently indicted on federal bribery charges and the making of false statements within a federal agency's jurisdiction. Brogan challenged his conviction, arguing that false statements which merely deny wrongdoing, and do not impede federal functions, are protected under the Fifth Amendment. On appeal from an appeals court judgment upholding an adverse district court ruling, the Supreme Court granted Brogan certiorari.</p>
| 635 | 7 | 2 | false |
majority opinion
|
affirmed
|
Criminal Procedure
|
1,097 | 54,662 |
United States v. Bestfoods
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/97-454
|
97-454
|
1997
|
United States
|
Bestfoods
|
<p>The site of a chemical manufacturing plant was polluted over many years. During much of the time, the companies running the plant were wholly owned subsidiaries of, first, CPC International Inc. (CPC), and later Aerojet- General Corp (Aerojet). By 1981, the federal Environmental Protection Agency had undertaken to have the site cleaned up. To recover some of the money spent, the U.S. filed an action under Section 107 of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. Section 9607(a)(2). Section 107 allows the U.S. to seek reimbursement for cleanup costs from, among others, "any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or operated any facility." The first phase of the trial concerned only liability, and focused on whether CPC and Aerojet had "owned or operated" the facility.</p>
| 873 | 9 | 0 | true |
majority opinion
|
vacated/remanded
|
Economic Activity
|
1,098 | 54,664 |
Almendarez-Torres v. United States
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/96-6839
|
96-6839
|
1997
|
Almendarez-Torres
|
United States
|
<p>8 USC section 1326(a) makes it a crime, punishable by up to two years in prison, for a deported alien to return to the United States without special permission. In 1998, Congress added subsection (b)(2), which authorizes a maximum prison term of 20 years for "any alien described" in subsection (a), if the initial "deportation was subsequent to a conviction for commission of an aggravated felony." In 1995, Hugo Almendarez-Torres pleaded guilty to violating section 1326. Ultimately, the District Court sentenced Almendarez- Torres to 85 months' imprisonment. The court rejected his argument that, because his indictment failed to mention his aggravated felony convictions, the court could not sentence him to more than the maximum sentence authorized by section 1326(a). In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that subsection (b)(2) is a penalty provision which permits the imposition of a higher sentence when the unlawfully returning alien also has a record of prior convictions.</p>
| 993 | 5 | 4 | false |
majority opinion
|
affirmed
|
Criminal Procedure
|
1,099 | 54,666 |
Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc.
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/96-1768
|
96-1768
|
1997
|
Feltner
|
Columbia Pictures Television, Inc.
|
<p>In 1991, Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., terminated agreements licensing several television series, including "Who's the Boss," "Silver Spoons," "Hart to Hart," and "T. J. Hooker," to three television stations owned by C. Elvin Feltner after the stations' royalty payments became delinquent. Columbia sued Feltner after his stations continued to broadcast the programs for copyright infringement. After winning partial summary judgment as to liability on its copyright infringement claims, Columbia attempted to recover statutory damages under section 504(c) of the Copyright Act. The District Court denied Feltner's request for a jury trial and awarded Columbia statutory damages following a bench trial. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that neither section 504(c) nor the Seventh Amendment provides a right to a jury trial on statutory damages.</p>
| 866 | 9 | 0 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed/remanded
|
Economic Activity
|
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