labels
class label
2 classes
premise
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hypothesis
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task
stringlengths
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43
2contradiction
rt watch : " it may not be too late " " abortion pill reversal is possible : #ru486 "
This example is explicit_hate.
implicit-hate-stg1
2contradiction
Anne is heavy. Anne is strong. Anne is high. Erin is thin. Erin is short. Alan is kind. Alan is wealthy. Alan is smart. Harry is poor. Harry is dull. Harry is bad. Heavy people are kind. If someone is thin and short then they are little. If someone is poor and dull then they are rough. If someone is kind and wealthy then they are clever. If someone is little then they are tiny. If someone is tiny then they are small. If someone is small then they are bad. All bad people are dull. If someone is kind then they are wealthy. If someone is wealthy then they are smart. If someone is smart then they are huge. All huge people are big. If someone is clever then they are nice. If someone is nice then they are quiet. If someone is quiet then they are strong. All strong people are high. If someone is rough then they are imperfect. If someone is imperfect then they are sad. All sad people are short. All short people are thin. Alan is high.
This example is False.
PARARULE-Plus
0entailment
I wanted to try out for the soccer team. I was too shy to try out for the soccer team.
This example is False.
ambient
0entailment
Before you get annoyed, you can get irritated.
This example is True.
I2D2
0entailment
I don't think so should troops be deployed in isis
This example is CON.
args_me
0entailment
fast food is bad for adults and children and causes obesity and the risk of diabetes in many cases. We should ban fast food
This example is in favor of.
Touche23-ValueEval
0entailment
ICC and rule of law help deter war crimes and genocide International Criminal Court
This example is PRO.
starcon
2contradiction
How long does it take for money to transfer?
This example is topping_up_by_card.
banking77
0entailment
Frank was upset with Tom because the toaster he had sold him didn't work. The he is more likely to refer to Tom than Frank because The pronoun probably refers to Tom because he sold a toaster that was not working. And that made Frank upset In "Frank was upset with Tom because the toaster he had sold him didn't work. ", The he is more likely to refer to Tom than Frank because The pronoun probably refers to Tom because he sold a toaster that was not working. And that made Frank upset
This example is True.
winowhy
0entailment
Romney s record was that he raised taxes by 730 million
This example is not cognitive-bias.
mbib-base/cognitive-bias
2contradiction
As Florida secretary of state Kurt Browning allowed 1 800 illegal voters to register in Florida
This example is not fake-news.
mbib-base/fake-news
0entailment
of black people are criminals where are you getting these stats from some racist shithole website
This example is not gender-bias.
mbib-base/gender-bias
0entailment
white students allegedly pin down black girl forcefully cut her nappy dreadlocks fake news media where is new headline mentally ill black girl lied about being attacked by white boys amari allen
This example is not hate-speech.
mbib-base/hate-speech
0entailment
Lawyers saught for immigrant children LOS ANGELES o Most of the nearly 60 000 Central American children who have arrived on the U S Mexico border in the last year still don t have lawyers to represent them in immigration court and advocates are scrambling to train volunteer attorneys to help cope with the massive caseload With the number of unaccompanied immigrant children more than doubling this past fiscal year the need for attorneys has surged and it has been exacerbated by the immigration courts decision to fast track children s cases holding initial hearings within a few weeks instead of months Immigrants can have counsel in immigration courts but lawyers are not guaranteed nor provided at government expense Having an attorney can make a big difference While almost half of children with attorneys were allowed to remain in the country only 10 percent of those without representation were allowed to stay according to an analysis of cases through June by the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse at Syracuse University Efforts are underway from New York to New Orleans to train attorneys at private law firms on the country s byzantine immigration laws and how to work with traumatized Spanish speaking children many of whom are fleeing violence a far cry from the corporate clients most deal with on a daily basis We re doing pretty well on finding willing lawyers We ve got to get them trained we ve got to get them matched to that child said Reid Trautz director of the American Immigration Lawyers Association s practice and professionalism center It just takes time
This example is linguistic-bias.
mbib-base/linguistic-bias
2contradiction
The foundation indicated it would be overhauling operations if Hillary Clinton were to become president earlier this month
This example is political-bias.
mbib-base/political-bias
0entailment
yeah and hillary said black people are super predators what gives
This example is not racial-bias.
mbib-base/racial-bias
2contradiction
Yeah I have one more are you fucking retarded
This example is not text-level-bias.
mbib-base/text-level-bias
2contradiction
[Dennis] went to the park with his father, [Nicholas]. [Jennifer] realized that her father [Nicholas] was gay. ('Dennis', 'Jennifer')
This example is son.
v1/gen_train234_test2to10
0entailment
An opinion article in a campus newspaper states that in an all-campus survey 95% of students think that tuition should be lowered and therefore tuition should be lowered immediately.
This example is ad populum.
logical-fallacy
0entailment
the array of governmental programs, services, and institutions designed to maintain the stability and well-being of society economic transfers outside the market system or benefits/services to help people meet basic needs
This example is not-paraphrase.
parade
2contradiction
The overall probability of yomx is 78%. For those who are not yomx, the probability of xevu is 32%. For those who are yomx, the probability of xevu is 60%. Is xevu more likely than not xevu overall?
This example is no.
cladder
0entailment
The adoption of precision schedule railroading has dramatically reduced the number of workers, while delivering immense gains to Wall Street.
This example is SUBJ.
subjectivity
0entailment
He always addresses me with `Sir'. addresses
This example is literal.
MOH
2contradiction
‘ I know what you need, Clare: someone you know and trust, someone who won't make you feel anxious. know
This example is metaphorical.
VUAC
0entailment
Sorkin , who faces charges of conspiracy to obstruct justice and lying to a grand jury , was to have been tried separately . Sorkin was to have been tried separately on charges of conspiracy and lying to a grand jury .
This example is equivalent.
glue/mrpc
0entailment
What is panda? Why is the panda called panda?
This example is not_duplicate.
glue/qqp
0entailment
do you always have to say check in chess
This example is False.
super_glue/boolq
2contradiction
Convicted murderer Seth Baxter awakens chained to a table beneath a pendulum blade . A videotape informs him that crushing his hands between the presses will release him ; he does so , but the blade still swings down and violently cuts him in half , while someone watches through a hole in the wall . The scene cuts to Agent Peter Strahm , who kills Jeff Denlon in self-defense and is sealed in the sickroom . He finds a hidden passage with a tape recorder that warns him to stay in the sickroom , but ignores it . He is attacked by a pig-masked figure in the passage and awakens with his head sealed in a box slowly filling with water , Which he survives by performing a tracheotomy using a pen . Outside the plant , Detective Mark Hoffman delivers Corbett Denlon to the police and claims they are the only survivors , and is shocked when Strahm is brought out alive as well . Jill Tuck is met by John Kramer's attorney , who is administering his will . She is left a box and a videotape , in Which John stresses the importance of the box's contents . She opens it with a key hung around her neck and then leaves without disclosing its contents . In a memorial service held for David Tapp , Steven Sing , Allison Kerry , Eric Matthews , and Daniel Rigg , the five officers killed in action , Hoffman is promoted to detective lieutenant . He is informed of the death of Agent Lindsey Perez while taking Strahm's phone and goes to the hospital to meet Strahm , who says that Hoffman's name was Perez's last words . Murderer Seth Baxter awakes, tied to a table, does he escape? Yes
This example is True.
super_glue/multirc
2contradiction
shot : He is still recovering from a shot to his leg. : shot : I caught him with a solid shot to the chin. :
This example is False.
super_glue/wic
0entailment
Two people are sitting at an outdoor cafe in front of an old building . We doubt that the people are standing outside .
This example is invalid.
probability_words_nli/usnli
0entailment
It is improbable that Lily is a swan. Chances are about even that John went to the kitchen. We doubt that Julius is gray. It is probably not the case that lily is a swan, or Julius is gray.
This example is invalid.
probability_words_nli/reasoning_1hop
2contradiction
It is probably the case that Daniel left the milk. There is little chance that Brian is green. Chances are about even that Bernhard is a lion. We believe that if either Brian is green, or Daniel left the milk, then Julie is in the kitchen. We doubt that if either Daniel left the milk, or Brian is green, then Julius is a swan. There is a better than even chance that if Bernhard is a lion, and Daniel left the milk, then Greg is gray. It is probably not the case that either Greg is gray, or Bernhard is a lion.
This example is valid.
probability_words_nli/reasoning_2hop
2contradiction
When we quote from a source document we use the original Arabic script . When we quote from a source document , we use its transliteration , e.g. , al Qida instead of al Qaeda .
This example is non-contradiction.
robust_nli_li_ts
2contradiction
Ireland set to end abortion ban as exit polls signal landslide vote Ireland exit polls show landslide victory in vote to end abortion ban
This example is same_event.
hlgd
2contradiction
On June 17 , 1988 , the Baltimore Blast selected Agnew in the fourth round ( first overall ) of the Major Indoor Soccer League draft . On June 17 , 1988 , the Baltimore Blast Agnew elected in the fourth round ( first total ) of the Major Indoor Soccer League Draft .
This example is not_paraphrase.
paws/labeled_final
2contradiction
Twelve students , including the nine with the top mistakes , retook the exam , and most of them received the identical 4 and 5 scores . Twelve students , including the nine with the identical mistakes , retook the exam , and most of them received the top 4 and 5 scores .
This example is paraphrase.
paws/labeled_swap
2contradiction
What does it mean when everything smells and taste the same Why am I not able to distinguish the different types of tastes and smells?
This example is False.
medical_questions_pairs
2contradiction
This metal hammers flat easily.
This example is unacceptable.
glue/cola
2contradiction
imbued with passion and attitude
This example is negative.
glue/sst2
2contradiction
How did George Burns realized that he wanted to become a comedian?
This example is insincere question.
insincere-questions
0entailment
' p close in the brutal world of a female fight club.'s murder was documented an episode sopranos entitled violence killer, directed by jean-baptiste errera. two events occurred during filming this episode: larry braverman's death on october 4, 1985, and human trafficking victim randy orton's way committing suicide november 2, 1985. regarded as one most important episodes series' history, it established several themes that were later revisited subsequent such philadelphia is not enough, pennsylvania makes no difference, i wanna be startin 'somethin'. these stories stressed macabre, grotesque aspects mass rather than tortured psychological typical real-life criminals. from its outset, writing team envisioned naturalistic format for where other types crimes would dealt with. 429 written, almost every single shot until their final appearances. tendency toward did exist; carter stated we couldn't make like dead circus or clown show ax80x94 they had them being stuck traps.
This example is transfo_xl.
TuringBench
2contradiction
In what religion was Isis the nature goddess ?
This example is NUM:dist.
trec
0entailment
In The Texas Chainsaw Massacre : The Beginning , Hoyt required Dean to do less than 15 push-ups to release him . Hoyt allows Eric to breathe and releases Dean , promising to free him if he can do 10 push ups .
This example is SUPPORTS.
vitaminc/tals--vitaminc
2contradiction
IT'S NOT ILLEGAL?
This example is Hope_speech.
hope_edi/english
0entailment
Eleven dead in shooting at Paris offices of satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo – live updates http://t.co/gOtSqbwROc “@guardian: Eleven dead in shooting at Paris offices of satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo http://t.co/6D2Z9UEwnx” - just horrific
This example is comment.
rumoureval_2019/RumourEval2019
0entailment
Any lesbian that doesn't look like a complete hog actually wants to be with a man.
This example is hate_speech.
ethos/binary
0entailment
her; i want a playful relationship\nme; *kicks her off the couch*
This example is joy.
tweet_eval/emotion
2contradiction
What were they planning to do with the immigrant children they kidnapped? Slavery, sex traffic, organ harvesting?
This example is hate.
tweet_eval/hate
0entailment
Breaking up with your girl so you don't have to buy her any presents ||#lowbudget #smartmove #a #good #idea #butscheming doe
This example is non_irony.
tweet_eval/irony
0entailment
@user @user @user No you wouldn't sis I know damn well you would probably call it cute people propose in concerts all the time yet when its a gay couple its wrong you're at a fucking concert you don't have to pay attention
This example is offensive.
tweet_eval/offensive
2contradiction
Left knee inflammation lands Rangers' Josh Hamilton on the DL for 3rd time this season.
This example is positive.
tweet_eval/sentiment
2contradiction
Even the #smallest #person can change the course of the #future.youthgen #SemST
This example is favor.
tweet_eval/stance_abortion
2contradiction
After all, is football a game or a religion? ~Howard Cosell #SemST
This example is favor.
tweet_eval/stance_atheism
2contradiction
Tornado warnings for the UK this weekend. And the government still chooses to ignore global warming #ukweather #SemST
This example is none.
tweet_eval/stance_climate
2contradiction
It's not about making women stronger. Women are already strong. It's about changing the way the world perceives that strength ! #SemST
This example is against.
tweet_eval/stance_feminist
0entailment
Hillary's New Campaign slogan is: HILLARY - NOTHING TO HIDE BUT THE TRUTH! #tcot #WakeUpAmerica #SemST
This example is against.
tweet_eval/stance_hillary
0entailment
She tries #datwhitedude #weddingcrashers #bubbling @ Salinas,…
This example is 😂.
tweet_eval/emoji
2contradiction
If the shows bust you up, check out their PSA's. Those are even funnier than the weekly episodes themselves.
This example is strangely,.
discovery/discovery
2contradiction
oh, thirty-five miles each way.
This example is Response Acknowledgement.
pragmeval/switchboard
2contradiction
and they you know you can give them like
This example is Hold Before Answer/Agreement.
pragmeval/mrda
2contradiction
everyone is inconvenienced by flight delays, including the airline, the travelers and the airport.
This example is experiential.
pragmeval/verifiability
2contradiction
white house fence-jumper made it inside the main floor fence-jumper ran through much of main floor of white house: report
This example is against.
pragmeval/emergent
2contradiction
gútaamay ( from the village of butam ) , gulapaoray ( from the village djilapaor ) and gusiilay ( iso 639-3 : bsl ) from the village of thionk essil are also other languages related to eegimaa . they are located north of the casamance river in the jóola búluf area .
This example is justify.
pragmeval/gum
2contradiction
the lowly agent, abel lamb, who as you might guess, is being led to the slaughter, is ordered to take over the studio "soon the studio is producing a $40 million picture called ""tet, the motion picture"
This example is Pragmatic condition.
pragmeval/pdtb
2contradiction
most point, let's just make use of remaining 7 mins
This example is Parallel.
pragmeval/stac
2contradiction
stabbing yourself is not ok, but that doesn't mean it should be illegal. i'm not even going to bother with your non-sequitor, but i imagine plenty of alcohol manufacturers enjoy the occasional drink. of course guns are only used to hurt others by criminals - shooting someone is a criminal act. unfortunately by the time you find out that the person is a criminal their victim is bleeding out on the floor. illegal guns are generally guns that were previously held legally, whether they have been modified or stolen. [quote=jo bennett;314232]stabbing yourself is not ok, but that doesn't mean it should be illegal. i'm not even going to bother with your non-sequitor, but i imagine plenty of alcohol manufacturers enjoy the occasional drink. these are mostly caused by illegal guns. you can't outlaw something thats already illegal. i highly doubt this. how can a gun be illegal when it used to be legal? most illegal guns are bought off the black market.
This example is sarc.
pragmeval/sarcasm
2contradiction
hi prudence
This example is Positive.
silicone/sem
2contradiction
um i'd like to change me Friends And Family
This example is suggest.
silicone/oasis
0entailment
He was with her when he wrote this poem .
This example is neutral.
silicone/meld_s
2contradiction
He was with her when he wrote this poem .
This example is anger.
silicone/meld_e
0entailment
well go up the si-- up the left-hand side of it round the top and down the right-hand side of it and round the word slate mountain just sort of do a circle round it
This example is instruct.
silicone/maptask
0entailment
that's another one thousand six hundred ?
This example is no emotion.
silicone/dyda_e
2contradiction
that's another one thousand six hundred ?
This example is commissive.
silicone/dyda_da
2contradiction
This is the big night for these guys. Life's last orgy.
This example is fru.
silicone/iemocap
2contradiction
329 U.S. 545 67 S.Ct. 451 91 L.Ed. 488 MORRISv.JONES, Director of Insurance of I linois. No. 62. Argued Dec. 9, 10, 1946. Decided Jan. 20, 1947. Rehearing Denied March 3, 1947. See 330 U.S. 854, 67 S.Ct. 858. Messrs. Ford W. Thompson and J. L. London, both of St. Louis, Mo., for appellant. Mr. Ferre C. Watkins, of Chicago, Ill., for appellee. Mr. Justice DOUGLAS delivered the opinion of the Court. 1 This case presents a substantial question under the Full Faith and Credit Clause (Art. IV, § 1) of the Constitution. 2 Chicago Lloyds, an unincorporated association, was authorized by Illinois to transact an insurance business in Illinois and other States. It qualified to do business in Missouri. In 1934 petitioner sued Chicago Lloyds in a Missouri court for malicious prosecution and false arrest. In 1938, before judgment was obtained in Missouri, respondent's predecessor was appointed by an Illinois court as statutory liquidator for Chicago Lloyds. The Illinois court fixed a time for the filing of claims against Chicago Lloyds and issued an order staying suits against it. Petitioner had notice of the stay order but nevertheless continued to prosecute the Missouri suit. At the instance of the liquidator, however, counsel for Chicago Lloyds withdrew from the suit and did not defend it, stating to the Missouri court that the Illinois liquidation proceedings had vested all the property of Chicago Lloyds in the liquidator. Thereafter petitioner obtained a judgment in the Missouri court and filed an exemplified copy of it as proof of his claim in the Illinois proceedings. An order disallowing the claim was sustained by the Illinois Supreme Court against the contention that its allowance was required by the Full Faith and Credit Clause. People ex rel. Jones v. Chicago Lloyds, 391 Ill. 492, 63 N.E.2d 479. 3 The case was brought here by appeal. We postponed the question of jurisdiction to the merits. 66 S.Ct. 979. Under the rule of Roche v. McDonald, 275 U.S. 449, 450, 48 S.Ct. 142, 72 L.Ed. 365, 53 A.L.R. 1141, the question whether full faith and credit should have been given the Missouri judgment does not present a ground for appeal. But treating the jurisdictional statement as a petition for certiorari (Judicial Code § 237(c), 28 U.S.C. § 344(c), 28 U.S.C.A. § 344(c), that writ is granted; and we come to the merits of the controversy. 4 The Full Faith and Credit Clause and the statute which implements it (R.S. § 905, 28 U.S.C. § 687, 28 U.S.C.A. § 687) require the judgments of the courts of one State to be given the same faith and credit in another State as they have by law or usage in the courts of the State rendering them. The Illinois Supreme Court concluded that compliance with that mandate required that precedence be given to the Illinois decree appointing the statutory liquidator. It held that title to all the property of Chicago Lloyds, wherever located, vested in the liquidator; that the liquidator was entitled to keep and retain possession of the property to the exclusion of the process of any other court; that although Missouri might give priority to Missouri creditors in the property of the debtor located there,1 Clark v. Williard, 292 U.S. 112, 54 S.Ct. 615, 78 L.Ed. 1160, the Missouri judgment could have no priority as respects Illinois assets; that if a liquidator had been appointed in Missouri, petitioner could not have obtained his judgment, or if he had obtained it, he could not have enforced it against the property in the hands of the Missouri liquidator, see McDonald v. Pacific States Life Ins. Co., 344 Mo. 1, 124 S.W.2d 1157; and that to disallow the judgment in the Illinois proceedings is, therefore, to give it the same effect that it would have had under the same circumstances in Missouri. 5 First. We can put to one side, as irrelevant to the problem at hand, several arguments which have been pressed upon us. We are n t dealing here with any question of priority of claims against the property of the debtor. For in this proceeding petitioner is not seeking, nor is respondent denying him, anything other than the right to prove his claim in judgment form. No question of parity of treatment of creditors, or the lack thereof (see Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S. 239, 19 S.Ct. 165, 43 L.Ed. 432), is in issue. Nor is there involved in this case any challenge to the Illinois rule, which follows Relfe v. Rundle, 103 U.S. 222, 26 L.Ed. 337, that title to all the property of Chicago Lloyds, wherever located, vested in the liquidator. Nor do we have here a challenge to the possession of the liquidator either through an attempt to obtain a lien on the property or otherwise. As pointed out in Riehle v. Margolies, 279 U.S. 218, 224, 49 S.Ct. 310, 312, 73 L.Ed. 669, the distribution of assets of a debtor among creditors ordinarily has a 'two-fold aspect.' It deals 'directly with the property' when it fixes the time and manner of distribution. No one can obtain part of the assets or enforce a right to specific property in the possession of the liquidation court except upon application to it. But proof and allowance of claims are matters distinct from distribution. They do not 'deal directly with any of the property'. 'The latter function, which is spoken of as the liquidation of a claim, is strictly a proceeding in personam.' Id., 279 U.S. at page 224, 49 S.Ct. at page 313, 73 L.Ed. 669. The establishment of the existence and amount of a claim against the debtor in no way disturbs the possession of the liquidation court, in no way affects title to the property, and does not necessarily involve a determination of what priority the claim should have. And see Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Fox Theatres Corp., 2 Cir., 69 F.2d 60, 91 A.L.R. 991. 6 One line of cases holds that where a statutory liquidator or receiver is appointed, the court taking jurisdiction of the property draws unto itself exclusive control over the proof of all claims.2 But the notion that such control over the proof of claims is necessary for the protection of the exclusive jurisdiction of the court over the property is a mistaken one. As Justice Beach of the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut aptly said, 'The question is simply one of the admissibility and effect of evidence; and the obligation to receive a judgment in evidence is no more derogatory to the jurisdiction in rem than the obligation to receive in evidence a promissory note or other admissible evidence of debt.' Beach, Judgment Claims in Receivership Proceedings, 30 Yale L. Journ. 674, 680. 7 Moreover, we do not have here a situation like that involved in Pendleton v. Russell, 144 U.S. 640, 12 S.Ct. 743, 36 L.Ed. 574, where it was sought to prove in a New York receivership of a dissolved corporation a judgment obtained in Tennessee after dissolution. The proof was disallowed, dissolution having operated, like death, as an abatement of the suit. No such infirmity appears to be present in the Missouri judgment; and the Illinois Supreme Court did not hold that the appointment of a liquidator f r Chicago Lloyds operated as an abatement of the suit. Nor is it sought on any other ground to bring the Missouri judgment within the exception on which Williams v. State of North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 65 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed. 1577, 157 A.L.R. 1366, rests, by challenging the jurisdiction of the Missouri court over either the parties or the subject matter. Nor is there any lack of privity between Chicago Lloyds and the Illinois liquidator. Cf. Ingersoll v. Coram, 211 U.S. 335, 362—364, 29 S.Ct. 92, 98, 99, 53 L.Ed. 208. There is no difference in the cause of action, cf. United States v. California Bridge & Construction Co., 245 U.S. 337, 38 S.Ct. 91, 62 L.Ed. 332, whether Chicago Lloyds or the liquidator is sued. The Missouri judgment represents a liability for acts committed by Chicago Lloyds, not for those of the liquidator. The claims for which the Illinois assets are being administered are claims against Chicago Lloyds. The Missouri judgment represents one of them. There is no more reason for discharging a liquidator from the responsibility for defending pending actions than there is for relieving a receiver of that task. Riehle v. Margolies, supra. 8 Second. 'A judgment of a court having jurisdiction of the parties and of the subject matter operates as res judicata, in the absence of fraud or collusion, even if obtained upon a default.' Riehle v. Margolies, supra, 279 U.S. at page 225, 49 S.Ct. at page 313, 73 L.Ed. 669. Such a judgment obtained in a sister State is, with exceptions not relevant here, see Williams v. State of North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 294, 295, 63 S.Ct. 207, 211, 87 L.Ed. 279, 143 A.L.R. 1273, entitled to full faith and credit in another State, though the underlying claim would not be enforced in the State of the forum. Christmas v. Russell, 5 Wall. 290, 18 L.Ed. 475; Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230, 28 S.Ct. 641, 52 L.Ed. 1039; Roche v. McDonald, supra; Titus v. Wallick, 306 U.S. 282, 291, 59 S.Ct. 557, 562, 83 L.Ed. 653. It is no more important that the suit on this underlying claim could not have been maintained in Illinois after the liquidator had been appointed than the fact that a statute of limitations of the State of the forum might have barred it. See Christmas v. Russell, supra; Roche v. McDonald, supra. And the Missouri judgment may not be defeated by virtue of the fact that under other circumstances petitioner might not have been able to obtain it in Missouri or to have received any benefit from it there, as, for example, if a liquidator had been appointed for the debtor in Missouri prior to judgment. The full faith and credit to which a judgment is entitled is the credit which it has in the State from which it is taken, not the credit that under other circumstances and conditions it might have had. Moreover, the question whether a judgment is entitled to full faith and credit does not depend on the presence of reciprocal engagements between the States. 9 Under Missouri law petitioner's judgment was a final determination of the nature and amount of his claim. See Pitts v. Fugate, 41 Mo. 405; Central Trust Co. of Mobile v. D'Arcy, 238 Mo. 676, 142 S.W. 294; State ex rel. Robb v. Shain, 347 Mo. 928, 149 S.W.2d 812. That determination is final and conclusive in all courts. 'Because there is a full faith and credit clause a defendant may not a second time challenge the validity of the plaintiff's right which has ripened into a judgment'. Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 439, 440, 64 S.Ct. 208, 214, 88 L.Ed. 149, 150 A.L.R. 413. For the Full Faith and Credit Clause established 'throughout the federal system the salutary principle of the common law that a litigation once pursued to judgment shall be as conclusive of the rights of the parties in every other court as in that where the judgment was rendered'. Id., 320 U.S. at page 439, 64 S.Ct. at page 214, 88 L.Ed. 149, 150 A.L.R. 413. And see Riley v. New York Trust Co., 315 U.S. 343, 348, 349, 62 S.Ct. 608, 612, 86 L.Ed. 885. The nature and amount of etitioner's claim may not, therefore, be challenged or retried in the Illinois proceedings. 10 As to respondent's contention that the Illinois decree, of which petitioner had notice, should have been given full faith and credit by the Missouri court, only a word need be said. Roche v. McDonald, supra, 275 U.S. at pages 454, 455, 48 S.Ct. at page 144, 72 L.Ed. 365, 53 A.L.R. 1141, makes plain that the place to raise that defense was in the Missouri proceedings. And see Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U.S. 66, 77, 60 S.Ct. 44, 50, 84 L.Ed. 85. And whatever might have been the ruling on the question, the rights of the parties could have been preserved by a resort to this Court which is the final arbiter of questions arising under the Full Faith and Credit Clause. Williams v. State of North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 302, 63 S.Ct. 207, 215, 87 L.Ed. 279, 143 A.L.R. 1273. In any event the Missouri judgment is res judicata as to the nature and amount of petitioner's claim as against all defenses which could have been raised. Roche v. McDonald, supra; Milwaukee County v. M. E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 275, 56 S.Ct. 229, 233, 80 L.Ed. 220; Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, supra, 320 U.S. at page 438, 64 S.Ct. at page 213, 88 L.Ed. 149, 150 A.L.R. 413. 11 It is finally suggested that since the Federal Bankruptcy Act provides for exclusive adjudication of claims by the bankruptcy court3 and excepts insurance companies from the Act (§ 4, 52 Stat. 840, 845, 11 U.S.C. § 22, 11 U.S.C.A. § 22; Vallely v. Northern Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 254 U.S. 348, 41 S.Ct. 116, 65 L.Ed. 297), the state liquidators of insolvent insurance companies should have the same control over the determination of claims as the bankruptcy court has. This is to argue that by reason of its police power a State may determine the method and manner of proving claims against property which is in its jurisdiction and which is being administered by its courts or administrative agencies. We have no doubt that it may do so except as such procedure collides with the federal Constitution or an Act of Congress. See Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629, 55 S.Ct. 589, 79 L.Ed. 1100, 100 A.L.R. 1133. But where there is such a collision, the action of a State under its police power must give way by virtue of the Supremacy Clause. Article VI, Clause 2. There is such a collision here. When we look to the general statute which Congress has enacted pursuant to the Full Faith and Credit Clause, we find no exception in case of liquidations of insolvent insurance companies. The command is to give full faith and credit to every judgment of a sister State. And where there is no jurisdictional infirmity, exceptions have rarely, if ever, been read into the constitutional provision or the Act of Congress in cases involving money judgments rendered in civil suits. Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, supra, 320 U.S. at page 438, 64 S.Ct. at page 213, 88 L.Ed. 149, 150 A.L.R. 413; Williams v. State of North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 294, footnote 6, 63 S.Ct. 207, 211, 87 L.Ed. 279, 143 A.L.R. 1273. 12 The function of the Full Faith and Credit Clause is to resolve controversies where state policies differ. Its need might not be so greatly felt in situations there there was no clash of interests between the States. The argument of convenience in administration is at best only another illustration of how the enforcement of a judgment of one State in another State may run counter to the latter's policies. But the answer given by Fauntleroy v. Lum, supra, is conclusive. If full faith and credit is not given in that situation, the Clause and the statute fail where their need is the greatest. The argument of convenience, moreover, proves too much. In the first place, it would often be equally appealing to in ividuals or corporations engaging in multistate activities which might well prefer to defend law suits at home. In the second place, against the convenience of the administration of assets in Illinois is the hardship on the Missouri credits if he were forced to drop his Missouri litigation, bring his witnesses to Illinois, and start all over again. But full faith and credit is a more inexorable command; its applicability does not turn on a balance of convenience as between litigants. If this were a situation where Missouri's policy would result in the dismemberment of the Illinois estate so that Illinois creditors would go begging, Illinois would have such a large interest at stake as to prevent it. See Clark v. Williard, 294 U.S. 211, 55 S.Ct. 356, 79 L.Ed. 865, 98 A.L.R. 347. But, as we have said, proof and allowance of claims are matters distinct from distribution of assets. 13 The single point of our decision is that the nature and amount of petitioner's claim has been conclusively determined by the Missouri judgment and may not be relitigated in the Illinois proceedings, it not appearing that the Missouri court lacked jurisdiction over either the parties or the subject matter. We do not suggest that petitioner by proving his claim in judgment form can gain a priority which he would not have had if he had to relitigate his claim in Illinois. And, as we have said, there is not involved in this case any rule of distribution which departs from the principle of parity as between Illinois creditors and creditors from other States. See Clark v. Williard, 294 U.S. 211, 55 S.Ct. 356, 79 L.Ed. 865, 98 A.L.R. 347; Blake v. McClung, supra. 14 Reversed. 15 Mr. Justice FRANKFURTER, with whom concur Mr. Justice BLACK and Mr. Justice RUTLEDGE, dissenting. 16 So far as they are relevant to the question before us, the facts of this case may be briefly stated. As part of its policy in regulating the insurance business, Illinois has formulated a system for liquidating the business of any Illinois insurance concern that falls below requisite standards. To that end it has provided that the title to the assets of such an Illinois concern should, upon the approval of the Illinois courts, pass to a State officer known as a liquidator. A further provision of the State law defines the procedure for enforcing claims against the assets in Illinois that have thus passed into the liquidator's hands. Claims against such assets must be proved to the satisfaction of the liquidator, subject to appropriate judicial review of his determinations. 17 It is not in question that the Illinois assets of Chicago Lloyds, an Illinois insurance concern, passed into the ownership of an Illinois liquidator in due conformity with Illinois law. Chicago Lloyds had also done business in Missouri under a Missouri license. While the Illinois assets were being administered by the Illinois liquidator, Morris, a Missouri claimant, pressed against Chicago Lloyds in a Missouri court an action for damages begun while the company was still solvent. Without substitution of the Illinois administrator or appearance by him, Morris obtained a judgment in the Missouri Court against Chicago Lloyds. Apparently, there were no assets in Missouri against which this judgment could go. Thereupon the Missouri judgment-creditor asserted a claim in the distribution of the Illinois assets on the basis of the Missouri judgment. The liquidator declined to recognize the Missouri judgment as such, maintaining that the Missouri creditor must prove his claim on its merits, precisely as did Illinois creditors. The Superior Court of Cook County sustained the liquidator and disallowed the claim based on the Missouri judgment. Disallowance was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Illinois. 391 Ill. 492, 63 N.E.2d 479. The question now here is whether in disallowing the claim based on the Missouri judgment against Chicago Lloyds, Illinois failed to give full faith and credit to the judgment of a sister State, as required by Article IV, 1 of the Constitution, and 1 Stat. 122, 2 Stat. 299, 28 U.S.C. § 687, 28 U.S.C.A. § 687. 18 We have under review a decision of the Illinois Supreme Court regarding the mode of proving claims against Illinois assets of an Illinois insurance company in liquidation in an Illinois court. The issue before us must be determined, however, as though the construction which the Illinois Supreme Court placed upon the Illinois law had been spelt out unambiguously in the legislation itself. And so the real issue is this. May Illinois provide that when an insurance concern to which Illinois has given life can, in the judgment of the State courts, no longer be allowed to conduct the insurance business in Illinois, the State may take over the local assets of such an insurance concern for fair distribution among all who have claims against the defunct concern? May the State, pursuant to such a policy, announce in advance, as a rule of fairness, that all claims not previously reduced to valid judgment, no matter how or where they arose, if they are to be paid out of assets thus administered by the State, must be proven on their merits to the satisfaction of Illinois? And may the State specify that this mode of proof apply also to out-of-State creditors so as to require such creditors to prove the merit of their claims against the Illinois assets in liquidation as though they were Illinois creditors, and preclude them from basing their claims merely on a judgment against the insurance concern, obtained after it had legally ceased to be, and after its Illinois assets had by appropriate proceedings passed into ownership of an Illinois liquidator? 19 It is safe to say that State regulation of the insurance business is as old and as pervasive as any regulatory power exercised by our States. See, e.g., Osborn v. Ozlin, 310 U.S. 53, 60 S.Ct. 758, 84 L.Ed. 1074; Hoopeston Canning Co. v. Cullen, 318 U.S. 313, 63 S.Ct. 602, 87 L.Ed. 1722, 145 A.L.R. 1113. Not even the banking business, of which, after all, insurance is another phase, has been subjected to such continuous and extensive State surveillance. But while banking has increasingly been absorbed by federal regulation, the reverse has been true as to insurance. Indeed, after a pronouncement by this Court that insurance partakes of commerce between the States, Congress by prompt legislation delegated or relegated the regulation of insurance, with appropriate exceptions, to the diverse laws of the several States. See Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 66 S.Ct. 1142. 20 We are concerned here solely with the situation presented by a State's exercise of its power over the liquidation of the assets of an insurance company of its own creation. It is important to remember that in this as well as in other connections rights are largely dependent on procedure. It seems, therefore, difficult to believe that when the property of a domestic insurance company within the confines of a State comes into the State's hands for the fair administration of still unliquidated claims against that property, the State may not provide a rule of parity in proving the amount of all claims which are to be paid out of the common pot. We assume, of course, that the procedure prescribed is consistent with the requirements of due process, and not in conflict with overriding federal legislation. It is not suggested that the procedure which Illinois affords does not satisfy these requirements. Standing by itself, such a rule of administration would not be beyond the authority of a State. We must assume it to be Illinois law that the power to pass upon claims against property of a defunct Illinois insurance company is lodged in the liquidator and that such power is not to be foreclosed by a judgment against the defunct concern after title passes to the liquidator. Does the Full Faith and Credit Clause cut the ground from under such a State law as to judgments obtained outside the State after the control of the company and its assets had pass d to the State? 21 Concededly, after the title to the Illinois assets of Chicago Lloyds had passed to the Illinois liquidator, it would not be open to a citizen of Illinois to obtain in the courts of Illinois, so as to serve as a basis of a claim in Lloyds Illinois assets, such a judgment as Morris, a citizen of Missouri, secured in the Missouri courts. It is thought, however, that because of Article IV, § 1, of the Constitution, Illinois could not deny such a superior right to the Missouri citizen without denying full faith and credit to the Missouri judgment. But the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not imply that a judgment validly procured in one State is automatically enforceable in another, quite regardless of the consequences of such enforcement upon that State's policy in matters peculiarly within its control. Alaska Packers Assn. v. Industrial Accident Commission of California, 294 U.S. 532, 546, 55 S.Ct. 518, 523, 79 L.Ed. 1044. The Full Faith and Credit Clause does not eat up the powers reserved to the States by the Constitution. That clause does not embody an absolutist conception of mechanical applicability. As is so often true of constitutional problems, an accommodation must be struck between different provisions of the Constitution. When rights are asserted in one State on the basis of a judgment procured in another, it frequently becomes necessary, as it does here, to define the duty of the courts of the former State in view of that State's power to regulate its own affairs. 22 The Full Faith and Credit Clause does not require a State to provide a court for enforcing every valid sister State judgment, even if its courts enforce like judgments in general. Anglo-American Provision Co. v. Davis Provision Co. No. 1, 191 U.S. 373, 24 S.Ct. 92, 48 L.Ed. 225. Again, a judgment in one State determining the validity of a will is not a judgment binding on another although it controls issues of succession in the first State. Robertson v. Pickrell, 109 U.S. 608, 3 S.Ct. 407, 27 L.Ed. 1049; Overby v. Gordon, 177 U.S. 214, 20 S.Ct. 603, 44 L.Ed. 741. Surely, the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not require a State to give an advantage to persons dwelling without, when State policy may justifiably restrict its own citizens to a particular procedure in proving claims against a State fund. But that precisely might be the result if Illinois had to accept at face value judgments obtained outside Illinois against a defunct Illinois insurance concern after the Illinois assets had passed to the Illinois liquidator. 23 Precedent and policy sustain the right of Illinois to have each claimant prove his fair share to the assets in Illinois by the same procedure. Chicago Lloyds is an Illinois entity doing business in Illinois according to conditions which Illinois had a right to fix for engaging in the insurance business in Illinois. Illinois initiated her policy for liquidating insurance companies in 1925. Lloyds was first authorized to do business in 1928, and thereafter renewed annual authority was required. Missouri gave Lloyds entry in 1932, and later renewed its authority for additional one-year periods. Thus, Illinois gave advance notice that if Chicago Lloyds should fall short of those standards of solvency and safety appropriate for an insurance concern, it will, through a liquidator, seize the Illinois assets of Chicago Lloyds for the protection of all claimants as to the merits of their claims. It warned the world that when such a situation arose claims against assets in Illinois must be proven in the manner which Illinois has here required. The authorization to do Lloyds business in Illinois created against the Lloyds assets in Illinois a sort of equitable lien, to speak freely but not too loosely, to become effective at insolvency and liquidation. To require that all claims against the estate in Illinois liquidation should be established on their merits in the Illinois proceedings may well have been deemed by Illinois the only way to protect the state against foreign judgments which the Illinois liquidator might have no adequate means of contesting. It is irrelevant whether in this or in any other particular situation the liquidator could have contested a suit outside of Illinois. Certainly nothing can turn on whether the Illinois liquidator appears specially in the foreign litigation to assert the liquidation of the company and the vesting of title to its assets in the State of Illinois. We are concerned here with the respect that is to be accorded to a judgment secured against the company by appropriate procedure in another State. Either such a judgment, obtained after the title to the Illinois assets vested in the Illinois liquidator, could be prove for the face value of the judgment, or it could not. The respect to be accorded such a judgment must turn on the control which Illinois may constitutionally exercise in the administration of Illinois property. Relevant to that issue of power is not whether in a particular suit the liquidator could have protected himself by entering as a litigant in the suit in another State. What is relevant is whether Illinois may deem that its liquidator might not be able adequately to defend the estate in liquidation in every State in which a suit might be pressed to judgment. What is relevant also is whether in such liquidation proceedings Illinois can refuse to accept at face value a judgment against an Illinois insurance company obtained after that company had ceased to exist, a judgment which the creditor would enforce against assets which passed to the State before the judgment was obtained. 24 Due regard for the relations of the States to one another, expressed by appropriate respect by one for the judicial proceedings of another, does not require that the provisions carefully established by Illinois for the proper safeguarding of these Illinois assets, should be disturbed by judgments secured outside of Illinois after the very contingency for which Illinois provided had become a reality. It would be unfair thus to subordinate the primary and predominant interest of Illinois simply because the Illinois entity was allowed to enter Missouri. Missouri like every other State, in admitting Chicago Lloyds had notice of the congenital limitations, so far as Illinois assets were concerned, under which Chicago Lloyds came into being. And so, when Missouri admitted Chicago Lloyds, it admitted an Illinois insurance concern with full knowledge of what Illinois would exact, in case trouble arose, to the extent of assets within the control of Illinois. Of course Missouri has a right to provide for its methods of administration, in case of default, as to Missouri assets. But we are not here concerned with an attempt to enforce the Missouri judgment against Missouri assets. We put to one side whether Illinois law could pass title to Missouri assets to the Illinois liquidator. See Clark v. Williard, 294 U.S. 211, 55 S.Ct. 356, 79 L.Ed. 865, 98 A.L.R. 347. We do say that it is not within the power of any other State, by admitting the Illinois entity, to effect discrimination against the citizens of Illinois in the distribution of Illinois assets that had passed to the State, for the fair distribution of which Illinois had formulated an appropriate method of proof. 25 This analysis assumes a heavier burden than the case makes necessary. It is not merely that Missouri had notice of the conditions under which Chicago Lloyds was doing business in Illinois and thereby charged all its citizens with knowledge of the limited power of Missouri to affect Illinois assets upon liquidation. The Missouri claimant had actual notice that the Illinois assets had passed to the Illinois liquidator and that he was at liberty to come into the Illinois proceedings to prove his claim. The Missouri claimant had in fact come into the Illinois proceedings and filed his claim with the Illinois liquidator before he pressed his Missouri suit to judgment. It is a strong thing to say that Illinois could not say that under these circumstances the Missouri claimant must prove his claim the way every claimant in Illinois was bound to prove his. Surely the Constitution of the United States does not bar legislation by Illinois which provides a fair sifting process for determining the amount of claims against Illinois assets of an Illinois insurance company in liquidation in an Illinois court so as to secure equality of treatment for all who assert claims against such a fund. The Full Faith and Credit Clause does not impose upon Illinois a duty to allow the face value of a judgment against the insurance company secured in Missouri after the company's assets had passed into the possession of the Illinois court in a proceeding to which the Illinois liquidator was not a party and could not have been made one. 26 The precise relation of the liquidator's legal position to the Missouri judgment, on the basis of which Morris asserts a claim against the liquidator's assets, reinforces the more general considerations. Morris had no judgment against the company when by Illinois law title to Lloyds' assets passed to the liquidator. The mere institution of the Missouri suit gave Morris no greater right to the Illinois assets of Lloyds than he had before the action was begun. By the time he obtained his judgment in Missouri, the company no longer had title to any assets in Illinois to which the judgment might attach. By unassailable Illinois law, Lloyds' assets had passed to the liquidator. These assets could be reached only by valid judgment against him. In this respect, the law of Illinois controlling the liquidation of Lloyds, as authoritatively given us by the Supreme Court of Illinois, is decisively different from what this Court found to be the law of Illinois regarding the Illinois surety company in process of dissolution in Ewen v. American Fidelity Company, 261 U.S. 322, 43 S.Ct. 371, 61 L.Ed. 677. The liquidator was not a party to the Missouri action; he had not been served; he had not appeared; he expressly denied the right of Lloyds to represent and bind the Illinois liquidation estate. The authority with which Illinois clothed its liquidator put him under a duty to contest claims which the Company might not have deemed itself under duty to contest, while on the other hand it enabled him to recognize, as the Company might not have recognized, the merit of claims otherwise than by judicial command. The liquidator, as trustee for the creditors of the extinct Illinois company, represented interests that were not the same as those represented by the extinct company when it conducted its own business. In short, the Illinois liquidator was thus a stranger to the Missouri judgment and it cannot be invoked against him in Illinois. See United States v. California Bridge & Construction Co., 245 U.S. 337, 38 S.Ct. 91, 62 L.Ed. 332; Kersh Lake Drainage Dist. v. Johnson, 309 U.S. 485, 60 S.Ct. 640, 84 L.Ed. 881, 128 A.L.R. 386. Indeed, to subject the assets of the Illinois liquidator to the claim of a judgment obtained against Lloyds in Missouri subsequent to the passage of those assets to the liquidator may well raise constitutional questions. Riley v. New York Trust Co., 315 U.S. 343, 62 S.Ct. 608, 86 L.Ed. 885; cf. Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 450, comment d. 27 It is suggested that out-of-State creditors should be saved the burden of proving their claims in Illinois. Of course that is a proper consideration, and it would be controlling, where a creditor has obtained judgment, if there were no countervailing considerations. Against the claim of out-of-State creditors must be set not merely the interests of Illinois creditors, but also the importance of a unified liquidation administration, the burden to the liquidator of defending suits anywhere in the United States, and the resulting hazards to a fair distribution of the estate. To require the face value of the Missouri judgment of the Missouri claimant to determine his share out of the Illinois fund might, of course, dilute the share in the Illinois assets that can go to legitimate Illinois claimants. Considering the primary and predominant relation of Illinois in the adjustment of these conflicting interests, considering, that is, that we are dealing with a creature of Illinois and the property of that creature within her bounds, neither the demands of fairness nor anything in the Constitution requires that the interests of the out-of-State creditors should control the Constitutional issue. The resolution of this conflict so that the out-of-State creditor must take his place with the Illinois creditors is another instance of a price to be paid for our federalism, and in this instance it is a very small price. If the situation calls for correction by a uniform regulation, Congress has the power to deal with the matter. Or the States might do so through the various devices for securing uniformity of State legislation. Illinois, in fact, has made overtures to its sister States in this regard. It has adopted the Uniform Reciprocal Liquidation Act as proposed by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. By this Act claims against insolvent Illinois insurance companies may be proved state'. Ill.Laws 1941, pp. 832—837, replacin ancillary proceedings in any 'reciprocal Laws 1937, pp. 788—790, Smith-Hurd Ann.Stat. c. 73, § 833.3. That Missouri has not seen fit to protect the interests of Missouri creditors by becoming a 'reciprocal state' is not the fault of Illinois. 28 A final word. It is suggested that this Court is merely deciding the finality of the Missouri judgment in Illinois, without any regard to its provability on a party with the claims of Illinois creditors in the distribution of Illinois assets. But we are not merely passing on the abstract status of the Missouri judgment. The only issue that has ever been in this case is the right of the Missouri claimant to participate in the Illinois assets on the basis of the face value of his judgment. Such was the claim made by the creditor; such was the claim disallowed by the liquidator; such was the claim rejected by the lower court, and such was the disallowance affirmed by the Supreme Court of Illinois. It has never been questioned that the thrust of the case was the opportunity of the Missouri judgment-creditor-claimant to compete with the Illinois claimants in the distribution of the estate not on the basis of the merits of his claim, but on the amount fixed by the Missouri judgment. Neither by any of the courts nor by any of the parties was any suggestion made that under Illinois law the Illinois creditors have priority to exhaust the Illinois assets. What was before that court and what is before this Court is whether a Missouri claimant may share in the distribution of a common fund not on the basis of a claim established according to a uniform procedure but on the basis of a judgment secured in Missouri subsequent to the passing of that fund to the Illinois liquidator. 29 This is not to say that the Missouri judgment is invalid. Whether recovery may be based on this judgment in Missouri, or in any other State except Illinois or even in Illinois should the assets go out of the State's hands and return to a reanimated Chicago Lloyds, are questions that do not now call for consideration. 30 The judgment should be affirmed. 1 It does not appear that there is any property of the debtor in Missouri; nor was a liquidator appointed in Missouri. 2 Attorney General v. Supreme Council, A.L.H., 196 Mass. 151, 159, 81 N.E. 966, 968 (receivership); Hackett v. Supreme Council American Legion of Honor, 206 Mass. 139, 142, 92 N.E. 133 (receivership). The Illinois rule announced in the instant case is likewise applicable in receivership proceedings. Evans v. Illinois Surety Co., 319 Ill. 105, 149 N.E. 802. Contra: Pringle v. Woolworth, 90 N.Y. 502 (receivership). The federal receivership rule permits continuance of suits in other courts at least where they were pending at the time of the appointment of the receiver. Riehle v. Margolies, supra. And see Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Fox Theatres Corp., supra, and Dickinson v. Universal Service Stations, 9 Cir., 100 F.2d 753, 757, applying the Riehle ruling to a suit started in a state court after the receivership. For collection of cases see 96 A.L.R. 485. 3 See In re Paramount Publix Corp., 2 Cir., 85 F.2d 42, and cases collected in 106 A.L.R. pages 1121 et seq. Cf. Robinson v. Trustees of New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 318 Mass. 121, 60 N.E.2d 593; In re Chicago & E.I. Ry. Co., 7 Cir., 121 F.2d 785.
This example is 4.
lex_glue/scotus
2contradiction
The Agreement contains the entire agreement between Me and the Company with respect to the subject matter of the Agreement. The Agreement may be amended only by a written instrument signed by Me and the Company.
This example is Terms.
lex_glue/ledgar
2contradiction
Diğer gazeteler küçülüyor
This example is pt.
language-identification
0entailment
There are bad movies, terrible movies even boring movies...I can watch most and put up until the end, not this time. Avoid this like the plague, annoying music throughout, terrible editing, no comedy, its tackier than a novelty mug...My missus wanted to watch this thinking it would be Legally Blonde material or something kind of watchable, but never better than average, chick flick. Its the first time she was begging me to push the stop button.<br /><br />The Girls, well, they were not great to start with (Denise done OK in Starship Troopers and Wild things) but you have sank to the gravel. I feel like a mug having spent 30 minutes on this...Pamela Anderson is almost unrecognisable after much construction work to her face.<br /><br />Please take my advice if you want to avoid wasting valuable oxygen and brain cells ranting at the utter mince that is on your screen.
This example is neg.
imdb
2contradiction
ms . fulford-wierzbicki is almost spooky in her sulky , calculating lolita turn .
This example is neg.
rotten_tomatoes
2contradiction
Probation Sought in Bullpen Brawl (AP) AP - Two former New York Yankees players who allegedly assaulted a Fenway Park groundskeeper during the 2003 American League Championship series could have charges against them dropped if they perform community service and possibly undergo counseling.
This example is Business.
ag_news
0entailment
Finally found and went to this place the other night and I was soo happy I did. The place is off of Stetson and is located on the back of all the shops, over looking the canals, hence the name. Inside the place it is classy with a rustic touch so its good for a romantic date, a night out with the girls or with the guys, or a family night.. Just a heads up, there is a runway, so if your are wanting a romantic date you probably want to figure out when they do their shows...\n\nBack to the important stuff.. Service was good, our waiter gave great advice, was able to answer our questions, and came back to check on us. Also they have the back-up servers, which I love because that means that as soon as my food was ready it came right to me, instead of sitting and wait for the main server.. Another good thing our waiter told us is that everything in the restaurant is fresh, except the grapefruit juice, they make their own pasta, sauces, juices, even down to the sweet and sour mix at the bar..\n\nDrinks that had a book that you could choose from, which was a little intimidating, but they just got voted as best place for a Martini so they must be good, I stuck white a glass of wine.. They are kind of expensive, but that is not really a shocker for Scottsdale's restaurants. \n\nFor food we started with the Ahi three ways the group I was with loved it, even I tried it and I'm not a fish person, and it was good. We also got the Tuscan Bread Salad, one of the best salads I've ever had. \n\nMain meals, I got the Grilled Chicken layered pasta.. I loved it. It tasted fresh, it was the right size, and not a over powering taste to it. The only bad thing about was that the pasta was was in long wide strips, so trying to get it on a fork was a little hard, but it was worth it. Other people at my table got the bass, Mahi tacos, and snapper, which they all loved, no complaints. For Dessert we got the peach cheesecake (very, very good), the Chocolate layered cake, and sorbet, also very good. \n\nSo overall the place was amazing, would for sure go back, it is on the expensive side so be prepared to spend a lot on dinner. Also if you look at the menu that they have posted online it doesn't have all of their menu items on it, such as the Chicken pasta..
This example is 4 stars.
yelp_review_full/yelp_review_full
0entailment
BasWare 's CEO Ilkka Sihvo comments in conjunction with the Interim Report : `` As a whole , BasWare succeeded well in the second quarter of 2007 .
This example is positive.
financial_phrasebank/sentences_allagree
2contradiction
want and woe, which torture us,
This example is mixed.
poem_sentiment
2contradiction
Nikolaus Niki Mondt (born 9 August 1978 in Düsseldorf) is a German ice hockey player. He currently plays for Düsseldorfer EG in the Deutsche Eishockey Liga (German Ice Hockey League).
This example is EducationalInstitution.
dbpedia_14/dbpedia_14
2contradiction
This cable works just as well as the Monster cables I have, at almost 1/10th the cost. Don't believe the hype around "premium" cabling - it's just not worth it.
This example is negative.
amazon_polarity/amazon_polarity
2contradiction
Back when there were proper Christian churches , and people attended them , this sort of music was available every Sunday .
This example is idk/skip.
hate_speech18
2contradiction
There is no sense in my foot and penis.
This example is spam.
sms_spam
2contradiction
' Chibok <girls/> ' reunited with families : salamis : ' Chibok girls ' reunited with <families/> : cats :
This example is equal.
humicroedit/subtask-2
0entailment
Book a table at Joan's on Third for my family reunion on Saturday
This example is BookRestaurant.
snips_built_in_intents
2contradiction
@ruby_knox @all_about_kk @squirtnetwork Why would i pay sex ,when i can getfree pussy that makes no sence at all
This example is neither.
hate_speech_offensive
0entailment
why is one of my balls shoved up inside my pelvis? i woke up this morning with only one nut... i'm hoping it will pop out soon. any ideas?
This example is Health.
yahoo_answers_topics
2contradiction
On the left, and among Donald Trump's conservative critics, a new debate has emerged: is the media to blame for the businessman's rise, or are Republican primary voters simply "idiots," as New York Magazine's Jon Chait argued recently, and unable to recognize a con-artist when they see one? This is a false choice. There are plenty of factors that went into Trump becoming the presumptive GOP nominee, and the incessant media coverage of his every utterance and movement probably contributed to his sky-high negatives. But it's unserious, not to mention smug, to assume that Trump has been playing all of his Republican supporters for dupes. You don't need to worship Trump to vote for him. You don't even have to like him, or think he's always honest, because these are not the factors at the heart of Trump's appeal. Consider this from Michael Cooper, a writer, attorney, and liberal Democrat who lives in rural North Carolina. "My Republican friends are for Trump. My state representative is for Trump," he wrote in U.S. News in March. "People who haven't voted in years are for Trump. He'll win the primary here on March 15 and he will carry this county in the general. His supporters realize he's a joke. They do not care. They know he's authoritarian, nationalist, almost un-American, and they love him anyway, because he disrupts a broken political process and beats establishment candidates who've long ignored their interests." This, I think, nicely sums up the core of Trump's support. Yes, there is a cult of personality around the candidate, and some of his backers do seem to think of him as a man who can do no wrong. But the breadth of Trump's support alone indicates that we're dealing with more than just full-fledged #TrumpTrain devotees. We're also dealing with the people Cooper writes about, the ones who aren't so enthralled with the man himself but recognize him as a change agent. And the truth is that a President Trump would, of course, be a change agent. A Hillary win would likely take us to something like the pre-Trump status quo ante, which is one reason why so many D.C. and Wall Street Republicans will wind up supporting her -- they'll still know how to play the game in a second Clinton presidency. A Trump victory, meanwhile, will undoubtedly lead to profound upheaval in our political system. The policies he'll pursue in office are still something of a mystery, but due to his lack of a real, grounding political philosophy, we can assume that he'll embrace positions to both the right- and left-of-center. In effect this would be something like a third party in American politics, and one in control of the White House no less -- a Party of Trump, which will find itself at odds with both stalwart conservatives like Ben Sasse and progressives like Elizabeth Warren. Occasionally he'll find common cause with one side, and sometimes with the other. You could even see him putting together odd bedfellows like Sherrod Brown and Jeff Sessions to pass new restrictions on trade. Any way you look at it, he would scramble everything we know about American politics. You can argue that the changes that Trump would bring to this country would be disastrous, or that he's morally and intellectually unfit for the office. But the one safe bet we have about a Trump presidency is that it would provoke a realignment in our politics and bring about an end to the elite governing consensus of the last several decades. America's many establishments -- Republican and Democrat, liberal and conservative - would all suddenly find themselves on the outs. The Democrats have signaled that they'll run on the idea that a Trump presidency is just too "risky" and "dangerous." But that shows a real misunderstanding of his appeal as a candidate. The subtext of every Trump rally is basically take this risk, take this gamble -- it may all end in tears, but it's worth a shot. America isn't working anymore, his argument goes. It's not working for Americans, Americans know that, and all those smug elites are to blame. How do we fix that? Hard to say: Trump, remember, has a habit of contradicting himself within the same sentence when answering questions about his policy specifics. But step one is blowing up the system, and that's exactly what Trump is promising to do. Is it childish to want the political system to be completely upended even if the consequences might be disastrous? Maybe. But in a country where a plurality of Americans think that "people like them" were better off 50 years ago, at least according to a recent Pew survey, it should also be expected. We can dismiss Trump's voters as low-class, knuckle-dragging racists who deserve, in some sense, to suffer. But that wouldn't be wise from a governing standpoint or, for Trump's opponents, a tactical one. If you think that Trump's voters don't get what's best for them, then it's up to you to sell them on why they're wrong -- to make the case that free trade leads to cheaper, better goods for everyone, that immigration greatly benefits the economy, that a "Muslim ban" is immoral and would only help groups like ISIS. That the system, for all its faults, can still be reformed, and that allowing Trump to raise hell in Washington will only make his supporters' lot worse. But to just dismiss them as "idiots" is, well, stupid. It plays into his hands; it justifies the anti-elite impulse he's exploited. The consensus among all the poll-watchers and data-heads who have consistently underestimated Trump from the onset is that Hillary is all but certain to win in November. And they might be right. But if Trump pulls off the upset, the smugness and lack of empathy that defines too many of his detractors will be in large part to blame.
This example is false.
hyperpartisan_news
0entailment
We conduct experimental evaluations and show that << real-time VC >> is capable of running on a [[ DSP ]] with little degradation .
This example is USED-FOR.
sciie
2contradiction
All current approaches to monolingual TE , either syntactically oriented ( Rus et al. , 2005 ) , or applying logical inference ( Tatu and Moldovan , 2005 ) , or adopting transformation-based techniques ( Kouleykov and Magnini , 2005 ; Bar-Haim et al. , 2008 ) , incorporate different types of lexical knowledge to support textual inference .
This example is CompareOrContrast.
citation_intent
0entailment
This is in keeping with the report of Blickstein et al,[3,15] which showed that the higher the combined twin birthweight the less likely it was to deliver discordant pairs.
This example is result.
scicite
0entailment
After a federal inquiry corroborated Hillary Clinton on Whitewater, the next day, there was nothing in the media about it.
This example is half-true.
liar
0entailment
sambar horsewhip
This example is false.
lexical_relation_classification/K&H+N
0entailment
chain side
This example is RANDOM.
lexical_relation_classification/CogALexV
0entailment
spoon short
This example is attri.
lexical_relation_classification/BLESS
2contradiction
lion main
This example is COORD.
lexical_relation_classification/ROOT09