target
stringlengths
11
53
prompt
stringlengths
200
14.1k
Suren Muradyan
15. At 7.40 p.m. Suren Muradyan’s condition worsened. He was conscious and agitated. He vomited, complained of nausea and abdominal pains and was pale and breathing heavily. According to the medical orderly,
Said-Emin Sambiyev
38. On 20 February 2007 the district prosecutor’s office informed the applicant that they could not establish the truth of what had happened with the abduction of Said-Emin Sambiyev by servicemen of military unit no. 28337, as the key witness in the case, Mr V.M., had absconded to Europe. The letter also stated: “... there is information provided by the FSB about the involvement of Sambiyev and Mr V.M. in the activities of a criminal group in the Shatoi district of Chechnya and their participation in the attack on Ulus-Kert in May 2003... in connection with the complaints of Sambiyev’s mother [the applicant], the investigation in the criminal case had been resumed on several occasions... today it is possible for the investigation to establish the identity of those who had been involved in the unlawful detention of
Nino Gnolidze
17. Ms Roza Kinkladze, applicant, was struck on the face, head and back. Ms Natela Kobaidze, applicant, was struck on the face and her lips started bleeding. She also sustained a sprained thumb. Ms Nino Dzhanashvili, applicant, was struck and pushed in the stairs. Having fallen to the ground, she saw Ms
Ali Ergülmez
16. The following day the applicant, together with other villagers, went to Kulp District Gendarme Command to report the incident and to seek permission to stay in the area long enough to harvest the crops.
Timur Khambulatov
41. On 25 March 2004 the investigators questioned the head of the Naurskiy FSB, Mr V.Kh., who stated that on the night of 17-18 March 2004 officers of his department had participated, along with members of other law-enforcement agencies, in a special operation against
Yaroslav Belousov
6. The background facts relating to the planning, conduct and dispersal of the demonstration at Bolotnaya Square are set out in more detail in Frumkin v. Russia (no. 74568/12, §§ 7-65, 5 January 2016), and
Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev
9. The second article, which had the headline “Address by Maskhadov, President of the Chechen Republic Ichkeria, to the European Parliament” («Обращение Президента Чеченской Республики Ичкерия Масхадова к Европарламенту» – “the second article”), was published by the applicant in issue no. 2 (59) of Pravo-Zashchita for April and May 2004 and read as follows: “On 26 February 2004 the Parliament of the European Union adopted a declaration in which Stalin’s deportation of the Chechen people on 23 February 1944 was officially recognised as an act of genocide. The European Parliament also recommended that the European Council study the plan of the Government of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria (the CRI) on peaceful resolution of the present military conflict [between Russia[1] and Chechnya], which I had approved. The total deportation to Central Asia and Kazakhstan in 1944 is one of the most tragic pages in the entire centuries-old history of the Chechens, since during this act of violence the national republic was completely liquidated and its territory separated among the adjacent regions. During the 13 years which the Chechen people spent in exile, about 70% of the population died. It must be mentioned that the 1944 deportation was the ninth large-scale act of genocide by the military and political authorities of Imperial Russia during the period of the 400-year-long armed confrontation between the Chechens and Russians. The very first deportation of the Chechens was carried out by Russia as early as in 1792, after the destruction of the State headed by the first Imam of the Caucasus, Sheikh Mansur. And after the destruction of the State headed by Imam Shamil, when the Russian-Caucasian war was officially declared to be over in 1859, a considerable proportion of Chechens ended up on the territory of the Ottoman Empire. The last tsarist deportation was the expulsion of many Chechen families to cold and faraway Siberia in 1913. And the first mass deportations of the Chechens during the Soviet regime began in the years of collectivisation and cultural revolution, in other words during Stalin’s regime. What is the aim of this historical overview? The Government of the CRI regards this political resolution by the European Parliament as an undoubtedly serious historic act on the way to achieving the long-awaited peace on blood-stained Chechen soil. More than a quarter of a million innocent civilians have already died in the CRI during the latest continuing Russian-Chechen war, the entire infrastructure of the republic has been completely devastated, many towns, villages, schools, hospitals and cultural facilities have been destroyed, and there is still no light at the end of the tunnel. Yet the international community is watching the deliberate and systematic murder of the entire nation with complete serenity and has not the slightest desire to react in any way to this criminal madness by the bloody Kremlin regime. This in turn engenders thousands and thousands of new fighters in the republic, who replenish the ranks of the Chechen Resistance with fresh forces each day, and who believe that they have a moral right to use the enemy’s own methods against the enemy, [an approach] which we unequivocally condemn. Even on this mournful date – the 60th anniversary of the deportation – many Chechens marked the occasion in extremely harsh conditions of unmotivated mass murders, extrajudicial executions, groundless detentions, severe ‘clear-up’ operations, tortures, kidnappings, disappearances and ‘residential’ checks by Russia’s invaders and their accomplices, who have been committing excesses in the territory of the CRI for the past five years. As the legitimately elected President of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, I express, on behalf of the recalcitrant Chechen people fighting for their freedom, sincere gratitude to all the members of the European Parliament who took this fundamental decision to recognise the deportation of 1944 as an act of genocide... Today, just as 60 years ago, the new global Russia’s terror has become our national tragedy. Its inexorable millstones are grinding the gene pool of the unique and original Chechen people, one of the indigenous nations of the ancient Caucasus, and this in the end may lead to [the Chechens’] total physical disappearance from the face of the earth. Your decision in defence of the Chechen people, living in a situation of ongoing genocide, is an additional moral incentive in the fight for survival. We are always open to constructive dialogue with the international community, and we invite independent experts from the United Nations and the European Union to monitor the situation with their own eyes, so that the groundless and defamatory attacks on the Chechens by Russia’s propagandists, who insolently continue to pester the PACE, OSCE and other authoritative organisations, can no longer distort the real picture in the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. There is no doubt that the Kremlin is today the centre of international terrorism, and [the Kremlin] selected Chechnya and the Chechens as targets for testing terrorist methods which are being developed by the [Federal Security Service]. It would be naive to believe that the present regime in Russia would be too shy to use its terrorist experience in the international arena to solve its political and other problems. An example of this is the treacherous and cowardly terrorist attack by Russia’s special services in the State of Qatar, which prematurely took the life of my predecessor,
Aslan Dovletukayev’s
35. The applicant’s neighbour, Mr I.L., was also questioned that day. Again only the first page of his statement was furnished to the Court. According to the information available, he stated that on the night of
the Minister of the Interior
44. Legislative Decree no. 172 of 6 November 2008, which subsequently became Law no. 210 of 30 December 2008 (on “Extraordinary measures in response to the waste disposal crisis in Campania and urgent environmental protection provisions”) provided for the possibility, in the territories affected by the state of emergency regarding waste disposal, of mayors, provincial presidents, municipal or provincial councillors and municipal or provincial commission members being dismissed by decree of
R. Karchava
9. This part of the application concerns applicants K. Pirtskheliani, E. Pirtskheliani, G. Lemonjava, Z. Sartania, N. Pularia, D. Pachkoria, Z. Gogokhia, R. Tskhadaia, B. Tskhadaia, B. Kurashvili, N. Kantaria, L. Esebua,
Mehmet Akkum
14. On 10 November 1992 Zülfi Akkum was muhtar of Kurşunlu village. His son Mehmet did not live permanently in the village with him; however, on 10 November, Mehmet was on one of his visits to the village. As it turned out, while Mehmet was in the village it fell to him to undertake his duties as a shepherd according to the village rota. There were four villagers in all assigned to look after the animals belonging to the villagers:
Tamerlan Suleymanov
54. On 12 October 2011 the investigators asked the mobile telephone company MegaPhone to provide them with a list of the owners of seven numbers from which Tamerlan Suleymanov had received phone calls. According to the company’s reply, six of the seven numbers were registered as belonging to district departments of the interior located in the Otradniy district of the Krasnodar Region and in the Grozny, Naurskiy, Achkhoy‑Martan and Shali districts of Chechnya. On the same date the investigators asked the Vimpelcom mobile telephone company to provide them with a list of the owners of four numbers from which
Sultan Isayev
28. According to the applicant, the middleman from Khankala confirmed that the persons detained on 29 April 2001 were being held at the military base and suggested that the relatives should collect 1,000 United States dollars (USD) per detainee to have them released. According to the applicant, during the negotiations the relatives had also paid 1,000 Russian roubles per day to the middleman, who had allegedly given the money to the guards of the detainees. Some time later he had said to the applicant and other relatives that he had been unable to arrange for their family members' release. Three weeks later the relatives had offered USD 1,500 per person to the same men and four weeks later one of the middlemen had brought news that Mr
Garda Brennan
13. In order to support their version of facts, the applicants produced the following evidence: (a) five statements from eyewitnesses (Lance Bombardier Sanders, Garda O’Reilly, Sergeant Hayward, Sergeant Whiley and
V. Juhas Đurić
43. In their constitutional appeal, the applicants invoked, inter alia, the right to a fair trial. In this connection, they submitted that the statement of R.K. of 4 April 2008 ought not to have been admitted as they had not been able to test that evidence by means of a cross-examination. They added that it was irrelevant that
Orhan Yakar
10. On 17 November 1996 the security forces carried out a search in order to arrest a member of the PKK who had been located near the township of Sancak in the province of Bingöl. The security forces arrested the applicant’s son in the course of the search. In an incident report drafted by the gendarmes it was noted that the applicant’s son had been carrying a rifle and some ammunition when he was arrested. In a further incident report it was noted that
Cătălina Lăcătuş
28. The applicant stated that, on the night of 20 September 1993, her husband, Mircea Zoltan, and her two brothers, Rapa Lupian Lăcătuş and Aurel Pardalian Lăcătuş, had been brutally murdered in the Hădăreni pogrom. She alleged that one of the thirteen Roma houses set on fire that evening had belonged to her late mother,
Aslan Akhmadov
74. Mr S. K. submitted: “[Mr] Said-Selim Kanayev... is my son. On 6 March 2002, at around 1 p.m., my son and [Mr] Aslan Akhmadov were taken away when they were in the yard of house no. 19 in Polevaya Street. [Later] my son was escorted home and [the servicemen] searched our house but did not find anything. I was not at home during the search. When I learnt that my son had been apprehended, I went to the head of the village administration. When I returned home I learnt that... my wife had paid USD 300. It was Said-Selim who had asked for money in the amount of 10,000 roubles to be given to them. [H]e had said that he would then be released. His mother had given him the money. Then one of [the servicemen] had permitted my son to talk to his relatives. He had assured everybody that he would be released after the documents had been checked. Nevertheless, they beat him and took him to the APC and [then] took him away with them. Since then I have not had any news of my son and I still do not know where he is. On that day there were three APCs and other military vehicles in our street, including an Ural and a UAZ, in which, according to the residents, there was a general who was in charge of the operation in our village. According to the eyewitnesses, ... the vehicles’ registration plates were deliberately covered with mud. On 11 March, when the military convoy was leaving the village after the operation, the mother of [Mr]
Olivier Orban
12. In the meantime, on 19 April 1996, the Paris public prosecutor had summoned Dr Gubler to appear in the Paris Criminal Court on a charge of breaching professional confidence during May and June 1995, November and December 1995 and January 1996 by having disclosed information to Mr Gonod and Mr
Khaseyn Elmarzayev
27. Ms I., Ms D. and Ms Dzh., the Elmarzayevs’ neighbours, stated that on 30 November 2003 they had been awakened by the noise of APCs driving past. Then they had seen that the Elmarzayevs’ house was burning and learned that Khuseyn and
Shchiborshch
20. On 15 August 2006 police officer B. of the special unit was questioned. He made a statement similar to that of Kh. concerning the events that had taken place before the latter had been wounded. As regards the subsequent events, B. stated that he and police officers D-n. and S. had forced open the kitchen door and begun to clear up the barricade of furniture in the kitchen. Mr
Ramzan Alaudinov
16. The eighth and ninth applicants are the parents of Ramzan Alaudinov, born in 1963. The tenth applicant is his wife, with whom he had four children, born in 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1995. The eighth and ninth applicants lived in the village of Avtury, and
Salih Demircan
10. No settlement was reached in respect of the other applicants. However, the municipality deposited a partial amount in the relevant account at the local enforcement office, which was made available to the remaining applicants. On 21 February 2005
Dursun Şeker
141. The court further noted that additional statements had been received from other courts in Turkey in reply to rogatory letters. The public prosecutor and counsel for the defendants stated that the principal witnesses had been heard and that those witnesses who had not yet been heard were gendarmes who had said in their preparatory statements – the Commission assumed that “preparatory statements” meant the statements taken by Major
Zahidov Sakit Salim oglu
23. On 5 July 2006 experts issued an opinion (no. 1026) concerning the forensic medical examination. The part concerning drug use by the applicant reads as follows: “[The applicant] denies that he uses narcotic substances. He denies that the...heroin found in his trouser pocket and seized belongs to him. He does not give complete information about his history of drug use. He tries to hide his abuse of narcotic substances. During the examination no signs of obvious abstinence were revealed. He has developed an initial pathological tendency (ilkin patoloji meyl) towards narcotic substances. A psychological dependence on the use of narcotic substances is observed. A physical dependence on the use of narcotic substances is not currently observed. He denies taking narcotic substances by injection.” The conclusion of the opinion reads as follows: “During the examination it was established that
Zayidov Ganimat Salim oglu
27. On 21 November 2007 the Yasamal District Court dismissed the request, finding the preventive measure of remand in custody justified. The relevant part of the decision reads as follows: “There were sufficient grounds for applying the preventive measure of remand in custody in respect of
Kh.‑A. Akhmadov
26. On 19 or 20 November 2004 an operational search officer questioned private M.K., the colleague of Kh.‑A. Akhmadov, who stated that in the evening of 19 November 2004, next to ‘Musa Motors’ service station they had been stopped by a group of thirty armed men in camouflage uniforms, some of whom had been masked. The men had beaten him up and taken away his service gun. They had shot
Bashir Velkhiyev
41. On 20 July 2004 the Nazran Prosecutor’s Office issued a notice for entry in the Crime Register (Книга учета сообщений о преступлениях) stating that, according to a telephone call received at approximately 4.35 p.m. on that date, the body of Mr
Shamil Gegayev
66. In addition to the relatives of the first and the second applicants, Ms Burdynyuk and Red Cross staff, the investigators identified other victims. Two correspondents of local TV stations, Ramzan Mezhidov and
Joseph S. Michael
25. On 21 January 2007, the second applicant was arrested in the United Kingdom pursuant to a provisional warrant of arrest issued under section 73 of the Extradition Act 2003. In an affidavit of 14 March 2007, Mr
Amirkhan Alikhanov’s
11. In April 2005 the first applicant and Mr A. received information from an unspecified source about six bodies found in the forest near the village of Zamay-Yurt, in the Chechen Republic, and immediately went there. According to the locals and certain police officers from Zamay-Yurt, the bodies had been buried in the village cemetery in accordance with Muslim traditions. In a shed at the cemetery, the applicants found
Vincenzo Del Latte
12. The applicants were arrested on the same day and charged with the attempted murder, or in the alternative, the attempted manslaughter of Y. The applicant Angelo Del Latte was in addition charged, in the further alternative, with aiding and abetting the attempted murder or manslaughter by
Murad Khachukayev
59. On 5 June 2006 the district prosecutor’s office instituted a criminal investigation under Article 105 § 2 of the Criminal Code (aggravated murder) in connection with the discovery of Murad Khachukayev’s remains. The decision stated that “in the course of the investigation of criminal case no. 34023 opened on 12 February 2003 in connection with the abduction of
Vakha Saydaliyev
13. On 16 April 2002 armed men, allegedly Russian servicemen, detained the Saydaliyevs’ neighbour, Mr Kh. On 17 or 18 April 2002 he was released and returned home. Mr Kh. told the applicants that he had seen
Ólafur Ólafsson
8. At the relevant time, the applicants held the following positions: Sigurður Einarsson was Chairman of the Board of Kaupþing and Chairman of the Board Credit Committee; Hreiðar Már Sigurðsson was Chief Executive Officer of Kaupþing and a member of the Board Credit Committee;
Miloslavsky
23. The Chief Justice outlined the relevant domestic law. He considered that there was no conflict between the common-law and the Constitutional provisions, on the one hand, and Article 10 of the Convention, on the other. Article 10, as noted in the Tolstoy
Jeremy GreenstockPermanent
27. On 8 May 2003 the Permanent Representatives of the United Kingdom and the United States of America at the United Nations addressed a joint letter to the President of the United Nations Security Council, which read as follows: “The United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Coalition partners continue to act together to ensure the complete disarmament of Iraq of weapons of mass destruction and means of delivery in accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolutions. The States participating in the Coalition will strictly abide by their obligations under international law, including those relating to the essential humanitarian needs of the people of Iraq. ... In order to meet these objectives and obligations in the post-conflict period in Iraq, the United States, the United Kingdom and Coalition partners, acting under existing command and control arrangements through the Commander of Coalition Forces, have created the Coalition Provisional Authority, which includes the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance, to exercise powers of government temporarily, and, as necessary, especially to provide security, to allow the delivery of humanitarian aid, and to eliminate weapons of mass destruction. The United States, the United Kingdom and Coalition partners, working through the Coalition Provisional Authority, shall, inter alia, provide for security in and for the provisional administration of Iraq, including by: deterring hostilities; ... maintaining civil law and order, including through encouraging international efforts to rebuild the capacity of the Iraqi civilian police force; eliminating all terrorist infrastructure and resources within Iraq and working to ensure that terrorists and terrorist groups are denied safe haven; ... and assuming immediate control of Iraqi institutions responsible for military and security matters and providing, as appropriate, for the demilitarisation, demobilisation, control, command, reformation, disestablishment, or reorganisation of those institutions so that they no longer pose a threat to the Iraqi people or international peace and security but will be capable of defending Iraq’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. ... The United Nations has a vital role to play in providing humanitarian relief, in supporting the reconstruction of Iraq, and in helping in the formation of an Iraqi interim authority. The United States, the United Kingdom and Coalition partners are ready to work closely with representatives of the United Nations and its specialised agencies and look forward to the appointment of a special coordinator by the Secretary-General. We also welcome the support and contributions of member States, international and regional organisations, and other entities, under appropriate coordination arrangements with the Coalition Provisional Authority. We would be grateful if you could arrange for the present letter to be circulated as a document of the Security Council. (Signed)
Rasul Tsakoyev
31. On 9 October 2004 the investigators questioned Rasul Tsakoyev’s sister, Ms Kh. Ts., who gave a statement similar to that given to the investigation by the first applicant and to the applicants’ submission before the Court. In addition, she stated that, while he had been at home on 29 September 2004
Medeni Simpil
20. On 23 July 1993, Sadık Simpil and two of his relatives were going to pick up wood cut down by the Rişta stream (elsewhere referred to as Hişta or Pişta). On coming across PKK terrorists resting by the stream, an armed clash broke out. Sadık and
Ayios Yeoryios
32. Applicant no. 10, Mr Kostas Mavroudis, claimed ownership of the following properties: (a) Kazaphani, plot no. 468.469, sheet/plan 12/21E2, field with trees; share: whole; area: 9,477 sq. m; (b) Ayios Yeoryios, plot no. 121/1/1, sheet/plan 12/11W2, ground-storey residence with yard; share: whole; area: 354 sq. m; (c)
Khizir Gulmutov
65. On 16 November 2008 the investigators informed the applicant that her request had not been dealt with as there was no abduction case in the name of Abubakar Gulmutov, and that the case numbered 75146 she had referred to concerned the abduction of
Anaiys Hampartsum Shirin
6. The applicants were born in 1950, 1979, 1988, 1958, 1947, 1927 and 1932 respectively. They live in Plovdiv, apart from Ms Asthig Hampartsum Bedrosyan, who lives in New York, United States of America. Before her death in 2014, Ms
Ramazan Ayçiçek
70. Approximately one month later the applicant was put in contact with Ramazan Ayçiçek who was in Lice prison and he went to see him. Ramazan Ayçiçek told him that he had been in custody in Lice Boarding School with the Orhans prior to being transferred to Lice Prison.
Aslan Askharov
15. On the same day, on 18 May 2001, the applicant’s nephew, Mr Aslan Askharov, was found dead on the outskirts of the village with gunshot wounds. On 3 June 2001 a doctor of the Serzhen-Yurt medical station issued a death certificate for Mr
Aslambek Adiyev
107. The majority of the witness statements submitted by the Government were incomplete as there were pages missing. From the documents submitted it appears that on 12 August 2002 the thirteenth and fourteenth applicants informed the investigator that in the afternoon of 30 July 2002 a group of armed men had broken into their house, shot
Suren Muradyan’s
65. On 19 April 2004 the investigator questioned two of the servicemen, A.P. and D.M., who had previously testified on 7 August 2002 and asked them to describe how officer V.G. had pulled on Suren Muradyan’s hand on 21 July 2002. According to A.P., officer V.G. had grabbed
the Minister of Interior
18. On 20 January 2005 the Minister of Interior decided to include the applicant in the blacklist for an indefinite period of time, on the ground that he constituted a threat to public order and safety, and decided to refuse him entry to Latvia. This decision was not amenable to judicial review at the time. Following legislative changes (see paragraph 45 below) the persistence of the grounds for the inclusion in the blacklist could be re-examined by
Yakup Aktaş
59. The record is signed by Captain Mehmet Göçmen as the person who conducted the identification procedure. It further contains the thumbprints of Ali Alay and Osman Önen. A handwritten note underneath the name of
Millo-Chluski
13. In their initial and additional observations of 22 October 2013 and 17 February 2014 the Government provided the Court with the following information concerning the situation of the individual applicants with regard to the impugned legislation. (a) Eight of the ninety-nine applicants had never been included in the AFLD testing pool (Mr
Khamzat Tushayev
7. In autumn 1999, before the launching of the military operation in the Chechen Republic, the applicants and Khamzat Tushayev had been residing in the village of Duba-Yurt. At the time when Russian federal troops approached the village and most of its residents left, Mr Tushayev’s brother stayed in the village and joined rebel fighters to resist the federal troops. Although
Mehdi Akdeniz
64. On 22 May 1998 the Kulp Prosecutor asked his opposite number in the town of Silvan to enquire with the Gendarme Headquarters in the latter’s town to verify whether, as alleged by a number of eye-witnesses,
Francisco Tomás
15. In November 1996 the Murcian newspaper La Verdad printed an article about the Movement for Optional Celibacy of priests (MOCEOP), which read as follows: “La Luz monastery bars married priests from using its premises for mass A representative of the diocese explained that the protest-oriented nature of the gathering might disturb the peace of the monastery. m. de la vieja – murcia Father
Beslan Khutsayev
12. The first applicant and Movsar Khutsayev were taken outside to the yard and made to lie face down under a shed. Beslan Khutsayev was already there. He was covered in blood. The officers conducted an identity check. Upon completion of the procedure one of them hit
Valid Gerasiyev
61. On 24 November 2006 the Achkhoy-Martanovskiy District Court dismissed the first applicant’s complaint about the district prosecutor’s office’s refusal to provide him access to the criminal case file opened into his son’s abduction and to allow him make copies from it. The court decision stated, among other things, that it transpired from the materials of case file no. 27054 that on 5 February 2000 servicemen of the federal security forces had arrested and taken away
E. Glakhashvili
21. On 19 May 2012 a criminal investigation was launched into the infliction of light bodily harm on the fourteenth applicant (Ms M. Tsutskiridze) by unidentified persons. When questioned as a witness the same day, she stated that unidentified men had grabbed her poster and hit her with the handle of the poster. On 23 May 2012 the eighth applicant (Ms
Igbal Agazade
97. On 17 October 2003 the Milli Majlis (Parliament) adopted a resolution “on Unconstitutional Actions of the Müsavat, Ümid and Azerbaijan Democratic Parties, and Certain Political Opposition Groups”, denouncing the above-mentioned parties and holding them responsible for “unlawful actions” and mass disturbances resulting in loss of life and injuries inflicted on civilians and members of law-enforcement authorities, as well as for damage to public and private property. Among others, the resolution identified Isa Gambar (the leader of Müsavat),
Chernogorov
8. The article lamented the decision by a majority of members of the Stavropol town legislative body to change the procedure of appointment of the town's mayor: the mayor would no longer be elected by the town's residents, but appointed by the town legislature. The publication alleged that the decision had been taken under pressure from Mr
Shakhid Baysayev
18. The Government submitted in their memorial of 28 April 2004 that it had been established that on 2 March 2000 in the village of Podgornoye fighting had taken place involving servicemen of the federal forces, which had resulted in the deaths of servicemen of the OMON detachments from Sergiyev Posad. Immediately after the fighting a special operation had been conducted in Podgornoye aimed at identifying members of the illegal armed groups who had participated in the ambush. The detainees had been taken to the Staropromyslovskiy VOVD, but
Khasayn Minkailov
41. Mr S. U., Mr Nokha Uspanov’s cousin who was questioned on the same date, submitted that in October 2000 Mr Vakhazhi Albekov had disappeared after going to collect cattle. His body had been found in a dugout in the forest. His body had been lying face down and there had been a wound on his right side. There had been no injuries on other parts of the body. Later he had learned that Mr
A. Allahverdiyev
19. On 20 June 2008 the Baku Court of Appeal upheld the Narimanov District Court’s decision, finding that the extension of the applicant’s pre‑trial detention was justified. The court reiterated the first‑instance court’s findings concerning the nature and gravity of the criminal offence of which the applicant was suspected, and pointed to the possibility of his absconding from and obstructing the investigation. The relevant part of the decision reads as follows: “The panel of the court considers that the first-instance court, having taken into account the degree of public dangerousness of the offence of which
Bülent Karataş’s
22. On 10 October 2007 the prosecutor questioned B.A., a villager who had been working in the fields on the day of the incident together with his fellow villager, the driver of the tractor. B.A. confirmed that a number of gendarmes had arrived in the field and asked his friend to assist them with his tractor. After his friend and the gendarmes had left he, his wife and another villager had stayed behind. At around 4 p.m. the same day, while they were waiting for the tractor to return,
Imran Dzhambekov
13. In the meantime the first and second applicants’ two minor children, the third and fourth applicants, started to cry and one of the soldiers took the children and the first applicant and escorted them into the second applicant’s room. Then they closed the door and pushed some furniture against it to block it from the outside. The second applicant received several blows from the servicemen in the face and in the stomach, and for some time lay on the floor in pain. When the applicants managed to open the door after about ten minutes, the servicemen had already left and taken
Professor X
31. The applicants, A. and S. sought leave to appeal. On 23 June 1999 A. and S. were granted leave. The applicants’ request was granted during the further examination of the case in so far as they had been ordered to reimburse the legal costs of
Christallou Nikola Stavrinou
23. On 20 November 2012 the applicant submitted the documents requested by the Attorney General’s representative on 1 June 2010 (see paragraph 18 above). In particular, the applicant submitted certificates issued by the head of the local community (mukhtar) explaining that there were inconsistencies in the spelling of the applicant’s aunt’s name in different documents. The mukhtar explained that the latter had held Cypriot identity document no. 327090 and had been variously known as:
Vakhazhi Albekov
47. On 15 March 2005 Mr L., the village’s imam, was questioned. He submitted that in 2000 he had washed the dead bodies of Mr Vakhazhi Albekov and Mr Khasayn Minkailov. He had not participated in the search for Mr
A. Ruslanbek
13. After Khizir Tepsurkayev had been taken away, the group under V. Vasiliy’s command continued the special operation. The UAZ car which had taken Khizir Tepsurkayev away returned in half an hour. When
Askhab Konchiyev
116. At around 12 a.m. on that day (in the documents submitted the time was also given as 9 a.m.) a group of armed servicemen in balaclavas and camouflage uniforms arrived at the applicants’ house in Serzhen-Yurt in four APCs and one UAZ vehicle with no registration numbers. The servicemen broke into the house and searched the premises. They then forced Mr
Hüseyin Koku’s
41. The applicant took up the matter with various international organisations, including Amnesty International. He sought advice from his MEP, Mr Alf Lomas, who petitioned the European Parliament concerning
Aslan Askharov
45. On an unspecified date a forensic examination was conducted so as to establish the cause of death of Mr Aslan Askharov. Since his body was not exhumed, the examination was conducted on the basis of medical documents. The exact cause of death as well as the nature of the injuries could not be established. Nor was a connection established between the actions of the unidentified servicemen and Mr
Khamid Khashiyev
24. On 10 February 2000, the first applicant, together with his daughter and sister, travelled to Grozny again, hoping to find his missing brother and nephew. With help from a local resident they found three bodies lying between nearby garages. These were the bodies of
Mohammed Ramzy
59. On 7 May 2009 the AIVD drew up a new official report on the applicant, which reads in its relevant part: “In the framework of the exercise of its statutory task, the General Intelligence and Security Service holds information from reliable sources from which it appears that
Sulumbek Barshov
25. Another handwritten document, which was undated and entitled “Explanation” (объяснение), was signed by M.Ch, one of the men listed in the “Report”. According to the text, at some time in 2002 M.Ch. and “Sulumbek” [Barshov], following the orders of Murad Yu., had placed an improvised explosive device near a roadblock in Grozny, as a result of which three servicemen had been wounded. Further documents indicated that the crimes committed by that group had become the subject of a separate investigation; in 2009 some pieces of evidence had been declared inadmissible for serious procedural breaches and the investigation had been suspended.
Garegin Ghuyumchyan’s
5. The applicants are the son (the first applicant), the daughter-in-law (the second applicant) and the wife (the third applicant) of the late Garegin Ghuyumchyan. They were born in 1965, 1973 and 1947 respectively and live in Vanadzor, Armenia. The first and the third applicants are also
J. Borisov’s
22. On 2 December 2003 the Seimas approved the conclusions of its ad hoc Inquiry Commission into Possible Threats to Lithuania’s National Security. The conclusions, as far as relevant, read as follows: “the President’s relations with J. Borisov are specific. Driven by political, economic and personal motives (...), J. Borisov had an influence on the activities of the President’s Office and on the President’s decisions. Thus J. Borisov has secured favourable conditions for his business, which, among other things, includes trading in spare parts for military helicopters with countries supporting terrorism. So far, the President has failed to publicly dissociate himself from J. Borisov and has implicitly vindicated him by his actions. The extent of
Aleksandrovich
23. Following an appeal by the first applicant, on 13 July 2005 the Pskov Regional Court quashed the Town Court’s decision. It noted that, under Russian law, experts and witnesses may only be held criminally liable for perjury if they have been examined as part of a criminal case. As criminal proceedings were never instituted, the first applicant’s access to justice was barred. It also noted that police officers are responsible for the life and health of those individuals who, like Ms
Aslanbek Dzhabrailov
20. The military servicemen separated the men, including the fifth applicant, from the remaining group of residents and led them away towards Centralnaya Street. The four young men remained in the courtyard of the first applicant’s house, under the guard of military servicemen. Before leaving, the fifth applicant saw his three brothers and
Kenan Mak’s
15. The applicants appealed against the judgment, and argued that there had been insufficient evidence to warrant their conviction and that they had not been given the opportunity to examine the video footage. In their appeals the applicants referred to their constitutional right to take part in, inter alia, peaceful demonstrations. Finally, the applicants drew the Court of Cassation’s attention to the fact that similar gatherings had been organised in the past to commemorate
A. P. Akhmadov
53. On 10 January 2006 the Military Prosecutor’s Office of the UGA quashed the decision of 6 December 2004 and reopened the investigation on the following grounds: “In the course of the investigation significant discrepancies between statements by residents of Stariye Atagi and servicemen concerning the detention of the [disappeared] persons and their possible death as a result of the fighting on 7 and 9 March 2002 ... were not resolved. Witness statements in this regard were not duly verified and recorded. The investigating authorities did not take comprehensive measures in order to establish the specific places where the bodies of
Iordan Iordanov
16. Constitutional Court decision no. 8/2011. (II.18.) AB contains the following passages: “IV. 1. ... Within the confines of the Constitution, the legislator enjoys great freedom in regulating public service relationships. ... In 1992 in the public sector – where the legal positions of both the employers and the employees are determined by their dependence on the State budget – public-law regulations, basically corresponding to the characteristics of the closed public service system, were introduced. The legal status of the individuals who perform work in the service of the State was – according to the specific features of the activities performed – governed by the legislature in separate Acts of Parliament. ... The basic feature of the closed public service system is that the content of the public service relationship and the rights and duties of the subjects of the legal relationship are governed not by the parties’ agreement but by statutes, by law. ... The content of the public service relationship is regulated under the law, regard being had to the fact that public servants carry out the tasks of the State, and, in performing their tasks, they exercise public powers, consequently – compared to other employees – additional statutory requirements must be imposed on them. The activity of public servants must serve the interest of the public, it must be professional, impartial, devoid of influence and bias, therefore public servants must meet up-to-date and high-standard professional requirements, must bear particular responsibility for their work and are subject to strict conflict-of-interest rules; however, the incomes earned in the public service remain below the wages that can be obtained in the private sector, since the source of public servants’ remuneration is the State budget. The starting point for the closed public service system ... is that « additional requirements – compliance with which may and must be demanded from persons engaged in public service – may only be imposed in return for additional entitlements ». Such additional entitlements include the career system regulated and the salary guaranteed in an Act of Parliament, the predictable and safe ‘public service life career’ system and the additional allowances. A basic characteristic of the closed public service system is the stability of public service relationship, namely that a public servant may be removed from office only where the conditions specified in an Act of Parliament are met. While until the 1980s the public service systems of various States were characterised by the gradual extension of the closed public service system, since then a strongly critical approach to the closed systems has become more and more dominant. As a consequence, in almost all European States, public service reform processes have been launched in order to enhance the efficiency, performance and standards of the public administration. The direction of the reforms is to loosen the rigidity of the closed system, and to bring it closer to the regulation of private sector labour relations. The method generally applied for the loosening of the rigidity of the closed system is the loosening of the previously strictly interpreted concept of ‘non-dismissibility’ and the widening of the grounds of dismissal. The Hungarian Act on the Legal Status of Public Servants (“Ktv.”) has never been based on the principle of ‘non-dismissibility’, as it has widely recognised the possibility of dismissing public servants from office and the grounds and conditions of dismissal have even been widened in the period having elapsed since 1992. ... 2. ... The Act on the Legal Status of Government Officials (“Ktjt.”) – with its rules on the termination of government official legal relationship – introduced essential changes in the system of public service as it had been created under the Ktv. and terminated the relative stability of the public service relationship guaranteed under the Ktv. ... The Ktv. rules on the termination of the legal relationship by dismissal from office not being applicable ... the government officials’ legal relationship may be terminated by release from office by the employer without giving reasons. ... 3. ... In the context of labour relations as regulated under the Labour Code (“Mt.”) ... the Constitutional Court [...] evaluated the duty of giving reasons – interpreted as a restriction on the employer’s right freely to dismiss an employee – as a privilege providing additional protection for employees, to which protection no person had a constitutional right. The employer’s right freely to dismiss an employee can only be interpreted in the context of employment relationships based on contract, not in the context of civil service relationship based on the Ktjt. In public service relationships the right of dismissal from office is based not on the freedoms of contract but an Act of Parliament; in case of dismissal from office by the employer the duty to give reasons cannot be regarded as a “preference rule”; on the contrary, it is a guarantee flowing from the nature of the legal relationship. ... In public service relationships, the statutory regulations concerning the grounds of dismissal from office constitute an issue of constitutionality, it being a guarantee corresponding to the specific features of public service relationships. [These] regulations and, consequently, the obligation to give reasons for dismissal has ... been regarded by the Constitutional Court ... as a guarantee having constitutional significance ... 4. ... The special features of public-servant and government-official legal relationships ... are determined by the fact that ... officials hold public offices, perform State duties, adopt and prepare State decisions ... therefore those relationships are basically public-law relationships by their nature. Article 70(6) regulates the right to hold a public office as citizens’ fundamental right. The protection of the right to hold a public office shall primarily mean that the State cannot make employment to public offices dependent on conditions which exclude, without constitutional reasons, Hungarian citizens from the possibility of acquiring a public office or make it impossible for a citizen or a group of citizens to hold a public office. ... The constitutional protection flowing from the right to hold a public office does not mean that the holder of a public office cannot be dismissed from office. ... Within the confines of the Constitution, the legislature enjoys a wide margin of freedom in regulating the grounds for release from office; this freedom, however ... shall not extend to granting free and unrestricted power to the person exercising the employer’s rights to dismiss an incumbent from office. Free decisional power granted without any statutory limitation to the person exercising the employer’s rights ... restricts, according to the Constitutional Court, in an unconstitutional manner the right to hold a public office, provided for by Article 70(6) of the Constitution. [It is required] that the substantive-law framework of the employer’s decision be determined in an Act of Parliament. ... 5. ... As to government officials’ dismissal from office, the absence of grounds for dismissal and the lack of any statutory rules concerning the employer’s obligation to give reasons endangers the ‘party-neutrality’, the independence from political influence, the impartiality and, therefore, the lawfulness of decisions of the public administration. Officials working in the organisation of public administration perform their tasks in a strictly hierarchical organisation. [If] government officials are not granted protection from dismissal from office, the person exercising the employer’s rights may, at any time and without giving reasons, discontinue their employment, [and] they cannot be expected openly to stand up for their professional and legal position, if they risk losing their jobs. ... 6. ... The general judicial legal protection enshrined in Article 57(1) of the Constitution is also guaranteed by Article 6 § 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights. In its recent case-law, the European Court of Human Rights – which has gradually extended the applicability of Article 6 § 1 to labour disputes concerning the service of civil servants (Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, ECHR 2000‑VII; Vilho Eskelinen and Others v. Finland [GC], no. 63235/00, ECHR 2007‑II;
Estamirov Kh. Kh.
41. The first report was written and signed by an investigator, two witnesses and an expert. It contains the following text: “Examination of the site 6 by 4 metres in the courtyard of 1 Podolskaya Street, Grozny. ... An excavation is made of an opening 1,5 by 2 metres, 50-60 cm deep. The pit is covered with wooden planks and corrugated iron. In the opening there are four bodies of different sizes wrapped in cellophane. Mr. Vakhid M., taking part in the excavations, explained that on 9 February 2000 he had buried those bodies in the pit. From left to right these are:
Gisela Klasen
7. He worked between 1964 and the beginning of 1974 with asbestos insulators for the T Company in Mülheim. During this period, the workers of this company who were exposed to asbestos dust while working had to clean their clothes themselves. This was done by the applicant's first wife Mrs
the Director of Public Prosecutions
12. The Government stated that despite the efforts of the police it was not possible to identify any particular suspect. No one had witnessed the arrival of the gunmen on the night of the attack. While a Ford Cortina car had been seen moving away from the location after the attack no one was able to identify this vehicle as belonging to the gunmen or as being used by them as a getaway vehicle. Although conversations with customers in the bar had led to a photofit picture being compiled this did not lead to anyone being connected with the incident. The view of the investigating officer at the time was that extreme loyalist elements from the Portadown area were likely to be responsible. It was believed that some persons in this category were arrested and interviewed but without any positive outcome. A report was prepared for
Vadim Pisari’s
19. In the meantime, the Moldovan authorities questioned all the Moldovan soldiers who had been manning the left and right checkpoints at the time of the incident. They also conducted a forensic examination of the scene of the incident, the car driven by the victim, the victim’s body and the bullet extracted from it. According to a forensic report dated 3 January 2012, the concentration of alcohol in
Shchiborshch
90. On 3 August 2007 Kh. of the special police unit was questioned again. His submissions were consistent with those made in the course of questioning on 13 August 2006 (see paragraph 19 above). He specified that after the support unit had arrived at the scene of the events, the actual operation to apprehend Mr
Ruslan Borisovich Tamazov
10. According to the nineteenth applicant’s initial statement, the deceased Mr Ruslan Borisovich Tamazov was her husband. She later changed this submission, stating that they were not officially married but had lived together since February 2005. At the time of the events in October 2005 she was eight months pregnant. The nineteenth applicant has submitted a copy of a birth certificate issued on 9 July 2008 in the name of S.T., born on 8 December 2005. The certificate names Mr
Serdar Tanış
41. The witness said that following Serdar Tanış's disappearance he became the acting President pending the next HADEP congress. In 2002 he was taken into custody at Silopi gendarmerie station. Around 7 a.m. one morning a military vehicle drew up outside his house. He was taken to the Silopi gendarmerie station. He was blindfolded and told: “You must resign from HADEP!” He refused and was tortured and threats were made to kill him like
Mehmet Sıddık Aslan
54. Mehmet Sıddık Aslan alleged that he had been kept in detention in custody for nine days and that he had been beaten up and subjected to physical violence and torture for five days. By the time of the medical examination, certain lesions could have healed and the visual examination might not have been sufficient to identify the alleged trauma. However, it was considered that the physical findings mentioned in the medical report corresponded to the allegations made by
Abdulazhon Isakov
33. The applicant asked the Prosecutor General’s Office of the Russian Federation to refuse the request for his extradition. He submitted, in particular, that he would run a real risk of torture or inhuman treatment if extradited to Uzbekistan. Relying on Article 3 of the Convention and the Court’s case-law (he referred to Ismoilov and Others v. Russia, no. 2947/06, 24 April 2008; Muminov v. Russia, no. 42502/06, 11 December 2008; Khodzhayev v. Russia, no. 52466/08, 12 May 2010;
Amkhad Gekhayev’s
51. On 20 July 2003 the sixth applicant addressed a letter to the Gudermes prosecutor’s office. He complained that he had on numerous occasions requested the investigating authorities to update him on the results of the investigation into the deaths of his wife and nephew but had never been provided with any information. He also complained that neither he nor the fourth and fifth applicants –
A.R. “Vanagas”
23. The report also stated that following the plan for “liquidating the remaining banditry in the Republic (banditizmo likučių Respublikoje likvidavimas)” set by the KGB of the USSR, “particular attention” and “paramount importance” had been given to the search for and capture of
Ahmet Ayder
49. Making a global assessment, the Commission found it established that Mr Lalealp's property and possessions were deliberately burned by security forces on 22 October 1993. As a result of this destruction Mr Lalealp's family moved to Diyarbakır, followed some time later by Mr Lalealp himself. 4. Concerning the events in Lice on 23 October 1993 and the alleged burning of the houses of
Mikhaylenko
39. In particular, in relation to the events of 30 May 2001, the Government maintained that: – the first applicant's statements were inconsistent and false; – the statements concerning the description of the uniform of the so‑called special forces that conducted the search given by the first and second applicant, Mr Didenko, Mr
Hrvoje Šikić
7. In a fresh decision of the Minister of the Interior on 8 January 2003 the applicant was again dismissed with effect from 31 January 2002. It was found that on the night of 10 to 11 December 1999, in his capacity as vice-chief for traffic crime-scene investigation and as chief constable of the Vukovar Police Station, he had disregarded his duties in relation to a road accident caused by a police car. After arriving at the scene, the applicant had let those implicated leave the scene of the accident without calling the crime-scene team in order to carry out an on-site inspection. He had further failed to institute adequate proceedings against the perpetrator of the road misdemeanour. He had also instructed the police officers involved to make a deal concerning compensation to the injured party. Furthermore, he had signed the events register, in respect of that night, stating that there had been no incidents to report. Afterwards, he had allowed and arranged for the unauthorised repair of the police car. The relevant part of the decision reads as follows: “As a police officer the defendant ... was under a duty to control and supervise the legality of the acts of other police officers. However, as to the incident in question he acted entirely contrary to this duty and thus allowed the person who had caused the road accident in question to avoid responsibility for it, which clearly shows a disregard for his duties ... Furthermore, the defendant violated laws regulating the [police] service in that he acted contrary to section 176 of the Road Safety Act (Zakon o sigurnosti prometa na cestama, Official Gazette no. 59/1996) which requires drivers who have been implicated in a road accident causing lesser material damage to vehicles to immediately remove those vehicles from the road in order to enable the unhindered movement of traffic and to inform the nearest police station of the accident and to wait for the arrival of an official authorised to carry out an on-site inspection. Section 123 (2) of the Police Act (Zakon o policiji) provides that obstruction of duties under paragraph 1 of that section amounts to a transgression of police authority or disregard for the same when a police officer is, according to that Act, obliged to apply [his authority, the obstruction] of which has then caused damage to natural or legal persons or State bodies. As to the case in question, it has been clearly established that the defendant, as a police officer, failed to carry out his police duties in the manner prescribed by the Police Act. It has also been clearly established that [this] caused damage, both non-pecuniary, (to the reputation of the police), and pecuniary, by causing delays in the proceedings, the lack of sanctions against the perpetrator of a traffic misdemeanour as well as damage to the police vehicle which was not repaired in an adequate manner. The material damage was caused by a transgression and disregard of police duties by
Rustam Kagirov
72. On 16 February 2010 the investigators questioned Mr Z.A. about his membership in the illegal armed group of Mr I.Us. The witness stated that he had spent fourteen days in the autumn of 2009 with the group. He did not see Mr
Khamzat Tushayev
13. On an unspecified date in March 2006 several persons who did not identify themselves broke into the flat occupied by the first applicant and Khamzat Tushayev and took him away. Eight days later his relatives found out that he was being held at the Shali district police station and that a criminal case (no. 56006) had been opened against him on suspicion of participation in illegal armed groups. On an unspecified date
T. Khambulatov
15. However, the Government disputed the circumstances of Timur Khambulatov’s death by submitting the following (pages 5-6): “... In the criminal investigation office of the Naurskiy OVD, while being questioned by police officers,
Mehmet Şah Şeker
30. On 2 November 1999 the head of the Organisation for Human Rights and Solidarity for Oppressed People (Mazlum-Der), Mr Yılmaz Ensaroğlu, petitioned the Ministry of the Interior informing the latter about the disappearance of
Ali Ergülmez
132. The following morning, 5 or 6 villagers (including Selim Orhan and the village muhtar) went to Zeyrek gendarme station to ask permission to stay to harvest the crops. Ahmet Potaş said that Kulp District Gendarme Commander had the authority to decide such things but he did not. At Kulp,
Shamil Akhmadov's
64. On 13 October 2005 the application was declared admissible. At the same time the Court again repeated its request to the Government to submit documents from the investigation files that had been opened in relation to
Mehmet Kaya’s
86. This report contains the gendarme officers’ findings that the applicant’s house had deteriorated because it had not been inhabited for a long time. The report indicated that the applicant has leased his land for cultivation to two villagers by the names of Emrihan and Zeynar. (g)