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David Assanidze | 51. The Supreme Court went on to note that, in addition to Mr David Assanidze, Mr Mosiava and Mr Jincharadze had also belatedly accused the applicant of participating in the activities of the criminal gang led by Mr |
Vidzha Umayev’s | 14. On their way, about 2.5 km from the bridge, where the first applicant, her son and brother had been stopped by the Chechen servicemen, the applicants saw their VAZ-2107 vehicle. It was parked about fifty metres from the road, at a dugout in which were two Russian servicemen. In the applicants’ submission, on that day Russian military forces had groups of servicemen stationed at the Shatoy road at about 200 metres distance from each other. The applicants saw that three of the doors of their VAZ-2107 vehicle were open and its headlights were on. |
Vahan Yeranosyan | 5. According to the applicants, they enjoyed a right of use of accommodation in respect of a house which measured 60.2 sq. m and was situated at 15 Byuzand Street, Yerevan. The house was owned by their family member, A.Y. The Government contested this allegation and claimed that only the applicants |
Jakov Jakeljić | 23. On 4 April 2002 the applicants brought a civil action in the Split Municipal Court against Split Township, seeking a declaration of their ownership of the three plots of land and registration in their names in the land register. They submitted that the property at issue, even though it had been recorded in the land register in the name of Stobreč Municipality as the legal predecessor of Split Township, had been in the possession of their legal predecessors for more than 100 years. Given that the statutory period for acquiring ownership by adverse possession had elapsed in respect of their legal predecessors, the applicants claimed that by buying the land from them they had validly acquired ownership. Their statement of claim read as follows:
“The plaintiffs together, each in one half, bought from R.K. and M.K. ... the plots of land no. 866/34 (...) ... from T.F. ... the plot of land no. 866/59 (...), ... and from M.S. ... the plot of land no. 866/35 (...) ...
EVIDENCE: [The three sale and purchase agreements between the plaintiffs and the above mentioned individuals]
The plaintiffs immediately, upon the conclusion of the above sale and purchase agreements entered into possession of all the immovable property listed above. They remained in possession of it until the present day. After the [relevant tax authority ordered them to pay tax] they paid it.
EVIDENCE: Tax payment receipt
Witness testimonies of R.K., M.K., T.F., and M.S. ...
All the above-mentioned immovable property is registered in the land register in the name of the Stobreč Municipality even though the vendors in the enclosed [sale purchase] agreements and their legal predecessors have been in possession of that immovable property for more than 100 years, which means that they acquired ownership of that immovable property by adverse possession.
EVIDENCE: Extract from the land register;
Witness testimonies of R.K., M.K., T.F., and M.S., ... ; and
other evidence, if needed.
Given that the vendors were non-registered owners of the above-mentioned immovable property, they have by the sale purchase agreements transferred their right of ownership to the plaintiffs as buyers. [In this way] the plaintiffs, through their legal predecessors, acquired ownership of the plots nos. 866/34 (...), 866/59 (...) and 866/35 (...) ...
EVIDENCE: See above.
For these reasons it is proposed that the court adopt the following
Judgment 1. It is [hereby] established that the plaintiffs |
Süleyman Yeter | 16. On 9 March 1999 the applicants’ lawyers filed a complaint with the Fatih public prosecutor’s office against H.O. (the Istanbul police commissioner), A.C. (the deputy to the commissioner of the Istanbul anti-terrorism branch), and S.K. (the director of the anti-terrorism branch), as well as the police officers who had allegedly detained and interrogated Mr |
Visadi Shokkarov’s | 36. On 10 September 2003 the applicants requested the Nadterechniy prosecutor’s office to provide them with copies of documents relating to the investigation of Visadi Shokkarov’s death. On the same date they appealed against the decision to discontinue the criminal investigation into |
Hikmet Kılıçarslan | 55. The witness, who used to live in the Düzcealan village, stated that on 29 December 1993 at about 4 p.m. a bus had been burned by the PKK on the Tatvan-Van highway. Subsequently a clash broke out between the security forces and PKK members. The PKK members escaped to the village of Düzcealan. When they arrived in the village, they burned and destroyed his house and harvest. The houses of |
Shakhid Baysayev | 33. The applicant collected the money. On the next day she saw the same car at the same place. This time a different man was inside. He showed her on a small TV set inside the car extracts from a videotape, in which the applicant recognised her husband. In the footage |
Kazbek Vakhayev | 11. After the search the servicemen proceeded with the document check, and requested the passports of the adult men who were present, namely Kazbek Vakhayev and his father, Lecha Vakhayev. They showed their passports, both of which were valid and bore registration stamps confirming their legal address, which was the place where they were being checked. The servicemen examined the passports and asked who |
Musa Temergeriyev | 161. Further to a query from the International Committee of the Red Cross Mission in the Northern Caucasus concerning the abduction of over sixty men by federal servicemen in Chechnya, the deputy commander of the UGA replied in April 2003 that he had no information concerning most of those persons, including |
Ibragim Makhashev | 45. On the morning of 15 November 2004, upon the order of the town prosecutor’s office, the applicants underwent a medical examination at the Bureau of Forensic Expert Evaluations of the Ministry of Health of Kabardino-Balkaria (hereafter “the Bureau”). The expert evaluation of the first applicant, dated 15 November 2004, stated, inter alia, the following:
“... the circumstances of the case: on 14 November 2004 ... |
Jaho Mulosmani | 28. On 15 December 1999 the District Court ordered the applicant’s arrest. Its decision read, inter alia, as follows:
“The accused’s authorship of the crime was declared by the DP’s chairman, Mr Berisha, in a press statement on the very day, immediately after the murder. This position was maintained in the DP’s press release, naming the accused |
Amir Damirovich Kaboulov | 29. On 10 September 2004 the Deputy Prosecutor of Kyiv informed the Extradition Department of the GPO of Ukraine of the details as to the applicant's identity. In particular, it was established that the applicant's name was Mr |
The Minister of Internal Affairs | 6. In issue No. 4 of a newspaper “Gazeta Polska”, of which the applicant was an editor-in-chief, a list of informants of the communist secret police was published. This list had been submitted to Parliament (Sejm) in June 1992 by the Minister of Internal Affairs, following a resolution of the Parliament. The list was originally meant to remain strictly confidential, but its contents were subsequently immediately leaked to the public. In the same issue of the newspaper, apart from the list, the following text, entitled “Deleted at the Last Minute” (“Wykreśleni w ostatniej chwili”), was published: “[ |
Şevki Yılmaz | 41. The Constitutional Court observed that the public statements of Refah’s leaders, namely those of Mr Necmettin Erbakan, Mr Şevket Kazan and Mr Ahmet Tekdal, had directly engaged Refah’s responsibility with regard to the constitutionality of its activities. It further observed that the public statements made by MPs Mr |
Rauf Badikov” | 21. Three or four days after the arrests, the sixth applicant was invited to the VOVD premises located in the building of a former boarding school. He went through a gymnasium and a room where he saw two cages. A police officer who introduced himself as “ |
Khaled El-Masri | 37. On 13 December 2005 the President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe asked the Assembly’s Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights to investigate allegations of “extraordinary renditions” in Europe. Senator Dick Marty of Switzerland was appointed as Special Rapporteur. On 12 June 2006 the Assembly published the 2006 Marty Report. It set out, on the basis of meetings that took place between 27 and 29 April 2006, the position of the Macedonian authorities regarding the applicant’s case. It stated, inter alia:
“3.1.3.1. The position of the authorities 106. The ‘official line’ of the Macedonian Government was first contained in a letter from the Minister of Interior ... to the Ambassador of the European Commission ... dated 27 December 2005. In its simplest form, it essentially contains four items of information ‘according to police records’: first, Mr El-Masri arrived by bus at the Macedonian border crossing of Tabanovce at 4 p.m. on 31 December 2003; second, he was interviewed by ‘authorised police officials’ who suspected ‘possession of a falsified travel document’; third, approximately five hours later, Mr El-Masri ‘was allowed entrance’ into Macedonia, apparently freely; and fourth, on 23 January 2004, he left Macedonia over the border crossing of Blace into Kosovo.
... 108. The President of the Republic ... set out a firm stance in the very first meeting with the European Parliament delegation, providing a strong disincentive to any official who may have wished to break ranks by expressing an independent viewpoint: ‘Up to this moment, I would like to assure you that I have not come across any reason not to believe the official position of our Ministry of Interior. I have no additional comments or facts, from any side, to convince me that what has been established in the official report of our Ministry is not the truth.’ 109. On Friday 28 April the official position was presented in far greater detail during a meeting with ... [the] Head of the UBK, Macedonia’s main intelligence service, at the time of the El-Masri case. [He] stated that the UBK’s Department for Control and Professional Standards had undertaken an investigation into the case and traced official records of all Mr El-Masri’s contact with the Macedonian authorities. The further details as presented by [the Head of the UBK] are summarized as follows:
Mr El-Masri arrived on the Macedonian border on 31 December 2003, New Year’s Eve. The Ministry of Interior had intensified security for the festive period and was operating a higher state of alert around the possible criminal activity. In line with these more intense activities, bus passengers were being subjected to a thorough security check, including an examination of their identity documents.
Upon examining Mr El-Masri’s passport, the Macedonian border police developed certain suspicions and decided to ‘detain him’. In order not to make the other passengers wait at the border, the bus was at this point allowed to continue its journey.
The objective of holding Mr El-Masri was to conduct an interview with him, which (according to [the Head of the UBK]) was carried out in accordance with all applicable European standards. Members of the UBK, the security and counter-intelligence service, are present at all border points in Macedonia as part of what is described as ‘Integrated Border Management and Security’. UBK officials participated in the interview of Mr El-Masri.
The officials enquired into Mr El-Masri’s reasons for travelling into the country, where he intended to stay and whether he was carrying sufficient amounts of money. [The Head of the UBK] explained: ‘I think these were all standard questions that are asked in the context of such a routine procedure – I don’t think I need to go into further details.’
At the same time, Macedonian officials undertook a preliminary visual examination of Mr El-Masri’s travel documents. They suspected that the passport might be faked or forged – noting in particular that Mr El-Masri was born in Kuwait, yet claimed to possess German citizenship.
A further passport check was carried out against an Interpol database. The border point at Tabanovce is not linked to Interpol’s network, so the information had to be transmitted to Skopje, from where an electronic request was made to the central Interpol database in Lyon[s]. A UBK official in the Analytical Department apparently made this request using an electronic code, so the Macedonian authorities can produce no record of it. Mr El-Masri was made to wait on the border point while the Interpol search was carried out.
When it was established that there existed no Interpol warrant against Mr El-Masri and no further grounds on which to hold him, he was released. He then left the border point at Tabanovce, although Macedonian officials were not able to describe how. Asked directly about this point in a separate meeting, the Minister of Interior ... said: ‘we’re not able to tell you exactly what happened to him after he was released because it is not in our interest; after the person leaves the border crossing, we’re not in a position to know how he traveled further.’
The Ministry of Interior subsequently established ... that Mr El-Masri had stayed at a hotel in Skopje called the ‘Skopski Merak’. Mr El-Masri is said to have checked in on the evening of 31 December 2003 and registered in the guest book. He stayed for 23 nights, including daily breakfast, and checked out on 23 January 2004.
The Ministry then conducted a further check on all border crossings and discovered that on the same day, 23 January 2004, in the evening, Mr El-Masri left the territory of Macedonia over the border crossing at Blace, into the territory of Kosovo. When asked whether Mr El-Masri had received a stamp to indicate his departure by this means, [the Head of the UBK] answered: ‘Normally there should be a stamp on the passport as you cross the border out of Macedonia, but I can’t be sure. UNMIK [United Nations Administration Mission in Kosovo] is also present on the Kosovo border and is in charge of the protocol on that side ... My UBK colleague has just informed me that he has crossed the border at Blace twice in recent times and didn’t receive a stamp on either occasion.’
... 116. What is not said in the official version is the fact that the Macedonian UBK routinely consults with the CIA on such matters (which, on a certain level, is quite comprehensible and logical). According to confidential information we received (of which we know the source), a full description of Mr El-Masri was transmitted to the CIA via its Bureau Chief in Skopje for an analysis ... did the person in question have contact with terrorist movements, in particular with [al-Qaeda]? Based on the intelligence material about |
Khasin Yunusov's | 107. In December 2002 the Chechnya Department of the Interior carried out an internal investigation into the disappearance of its staff member Khasin Yunusov. It did not establish his whereabouts and the Grozny ROVD concluded that |
Alipanah Aliyev | 9. From 7 a.m. to 4 p.m. the applicant was detained at the airport by the State Customs Committee. During this time, he was not allowed to contact his family or a lawyer of his choosing. At around 4 p.m. the applicant was taken to the Investigation Department of the State Border Service. At 9 p.m. he was allowed to contact one of his brothers, |
Balavdi Ustarkhanov | 13. According to Mr Magomed M.'s neighbour, Mr I.A., who lived across the street, at about 5 a.m. on 7 January 2003 he and his relatives had seen from their windows two vehicles and a large group of armed servicemen, who spoke unaccented Russian. Some of them wore helmets; they were equipped with portable radio sets. The servicemen were standing next to their house and talking. One of the officers noticed the family car parked in the yard and asked Mr I.A's granddaughter whose car it was. When the girl responded that the car belonged to her uncle, the son of Mr I.A., the servicemen went into the house, dragged Mr I.A.'s son outside and started beating him with truncheons. Mr I.A. started screaming for help and begging the servicemen not to kill his son. Then one of them called someone via his radio set and said that they had apprehended three men, one of whom was not a local resident. Mr I.A. heard someone on the radio instructing the servicemen to leave the locals alone, to take the stranger with the wounded head and to leave the place. According to Mr I.A., he saw from his house a GAZ vehicle and a UAZ vehicle parked next to the house of his neighbour Mr Magomed M. After the servicemen left, Mr I.A. learned from his neighbours that the servicemen had taken away their guest, |
Yevgeniy Geppa's | 41. On the same day the prosecutor's office decided to refuse to institute criminal proceedings concerning Yevgeniy Geppa's death. It referred to the medical records dated October-November 1997 relating to his head injury and concluded that it had predated his imprisonment. It further stated that the medical equipment available at the institutions and medical centres of the penitentiary system could not be used to diagnose the early stages of a brain tumour or to assess the necessity of a CT scan. The scan was recommended on 1 December 2004, after the examination at the psychiatric hospital, and carried out on 6 December 2004, two days before |
Salaudi Zubayrayev | 19. The Government submitted that on 17 September 2000, immediately following the receipt of news of the murders in Starye Atagi, a group of investigators had arrived in the village and taken immediate action. They had submitted copies of documents that had been drawn up by the investigators on 17 September 2000, including descriptions of the scenes of the murders and of the bodies, including that of |
Kushtanashvili | 127. None of the applicants confirmed that he had been informed by a member of the Procurator-General's Office that extradition proceedings were pending against him. They all claimed to have received visits from numerous persons while in prison (officially assigned lawyers, investigators and prosecutors), whose names they did not remember. They remembered having met once, in the absence of their lawyers, a man and a young woman (see paragraphs 162-66 below) who asked them to sign documents drawn up in Russian (in Georgian, according to Mr |
Abdurrahman Karakoç | 11. The Commission, in order to establish the facts disputed by the parties, conducted an investigation with the assistance of the parties, pursuant to former Article 28 § 1 (a) of the Convention. It appointed three delegates who took evidence in Ankara from 10 March 1997 to 13 March 1997. They interviewed the second and the third applicants as well as the following 17 witnesses: |
Stojko Arsovski | 7. Since 1952 the applicants’ predecessor had title to a plot of land no. 1339, a pasture (“the plot”). On the basis of a gift contract of 1968 the plot in question was transferred into the possession of Mr |
Shamkhan Yesiyev | 42. The applicants are:
1) Ms Laylya Yesiyeva, born in 1937;
2) Ms Zulkahn Dzukayeva, born in 1973;
3) Mr Ziaudi Yesiyev, born in 1936;
4) Ms Malika Yesiyeva, born in 1996;
5) Mr Shamil Yesiyev, born in 1998;
6) Mr |
Kenan Bilgin | 29. On 16 September 1995 the applicant had given a statement at Kısıklı (Istanbul) police station. He said that he had lodged a complaint with the Ankara public prosecutor’s office and had given the names of witnesses who said that they had seen |
Patrick Finucane's | 18. Forensic evidence showed that the victim had been hit at least eleven times by a 9 mm Browning automatic pistol and twice by a .38 Special revolver. Detective Superintendent (D/S) Simpson of the RUC, who was in charge of the murder investigation, gave evidence that the Browning pistol was one of thirteen weapons stolen from Palace army barracks in August 1987 by a member of the UDR who was subsequently jailed for theft. These weapons found their way into the hands of three members of the UFF who were convicted of possession of the weapons and of membership of the UFF. However, the police were satisfied that those individuals had not been in possession of the weapons at the time of |
Kurbika Zinabdiyeva | 15. Since 16 May 2003 the applicants, primarily the second applicant, have been searching for Kurbika Zinabdiyeva and Aminat Dugayeva. The first applicant joined the search with a slight delay, as she was ill after the events of 16 May 2003. Both in person and in writing they applied to various official bodies, trying to find out the whereabouts and fate of those missing. The applicants retained copies of some of their letters to the authorities and the replies, which they submitted to the Court. Their attempts to find out the whereabouts of |
Marjan Mrkonjić | 156. The relevant parts of that decision read:
“The Osijek Municipal Court ... decided: ...
II. The costs of the enforcement proceedings shall be paid out of the amount obtained by the sale as follows:
... 9. |
Murtazaliyeva | 59. The judgment referred to witness A.’s testimony only in one part, which read as follows:
“Witness A. [a police officer] testified that at the end of December 2003 under instructions of his superiors he established relations of trust with |
Umar-Khadzhi Damayev | 6. The applicant was married to Ms Maydat Tsintsayeva, born in 1975. The couple were the parents of six children: Mr Umar Damayev, born in 1994; Ms Zharadat Damayeva, born in 2000; Ms Dzhaneta Damayeva, born in 2000; Mr |
S. Aleskerov | 44. The trial was conducted by the Assize Court. It commenced with several preliminary hearings, the first of which took place on 7 May 2004. The three-judge panel hearing the case was composed of Judges M. Ibayev (presiding), |
A. Boltiyev | 69. On 12 August 2003 the investigation in the criminal case was referred back to the district prosecutor’s office, as it had been established that after being apprehended, three of the applicants’ relatives, namely |
Yaroslav Belousov | 6. The background facts relating to the planning, conduct and dispersal of the demonstration at Bolotnaya Square are set out in more detail in Frumkin v. Russia (no. 74568/12, §§ 7-65, 5 January 2016) and |
Arbi Karimov | 73. On an unspecified date the military prosecutor’s office of the UGA informed the investigators that a representative of the Red Cross had been provided with incorrect information concerning the death of |
Iriskhanovs | 39. On 27 June 2002 the investigators questioned the applicants' neighbour, Ms L.A., who stated that at about 8 p.m. on 19 June 2002 she had heard from her house gunshots, screams, loud swearing in Russian and the noise of armoured vehicles. After the shooting had stopped, she had gone to the |
Jon Bartlett | 34. On Mr Pearman’s previous convictions, the trial judge directed the jury:
“You have heard this evidence because it may help you to resolve two issues in the case, namely: (a) whether the convictions show that on 31st May 2006 he had a tendency to be a drug dealer, carry a firearm and commit murder, and whether this makes it more likely that he was the gunman in this case; and (b) whether he was being truthful and reliable in denying his involvement in the present case in his telephone calls to his son and wife. A person of bad character may be less likely to tell the truth, but it does not follow that he is incapable of doing so.
You may use the evidence of his bad character for the particular purposes I have just indicated, if you find it helpful to do so. It is for you to decide the extent to which the evidence of bad character helps you, if at all. The prosecution submit that the only reason Seton chose to name Pearman as the murderer in his defence statement on 1st April 2008 was because he knew he had an extremely bad character for drugs offences, firearm offences and murder, and therefore was an ideal person for him to blame for the murder in this case. The defendant Seton says he named him because he believed Pearman killed |
Hüseyin Duran | 11. On 19 December 1998 the Adıyaman Public Prosecutor issued a search warrant in respect of the Adıyaman regional office of HADEP. On the same day the police conducted a search of the Adıyaman regional office of HADEP. According to the arrest report of the same date, the police arrested forty-five people including the applicants, who were present in the office when the search was taking place except |
Bayram Duran’s | 14. On 15 September 1995 the Gaziosmanpaşa Magistrates’ Court heard evidence from the first applicant and two witnesses, H.K. and Ü.Y. The court then ordered the Forensic Medicine Institute to draft a report in order to determine whether the haemorrhage in |
Apti Isigov | 21. The men from Sernovodsk remained detained at the passport checkpoint in the field until the early hours of 3 July 2001. At about 11 p.m. the military started to release them in small groups, and by 2 a.m. there was no one left in the field. About forty men were not released, however, and their relatives were eventually told that they had been taken to the Temporary Office of the Interior of Achkhoy-Martan District (“the Achkhoy-Martan VOVD”). |
[A.A.] Isigov | 52. On 21 May 2003 the Prosecutor's Office of the Chechen Republic transferred the criminal case to the Military Prosecutor's Office of the United Group Alignment (UGA, Объединенная группировка войск). The decision, submitted by the Government, read as follows:
“On 2 July 2001, during a special operation in the village of Sernovodsk of the Sunzhenskiy District of the Chechen Republic conducted by federal forces, Ministry of the Interior troops detained |
Shakhit Gelayev | 5. The applicants are:
(1) Mr Vakhit Gelayev, born in 1949,
(2) Ms Amint (also spelled as Aminat) Gelayeva, born in 1952,
(3) Ms Zarema Gelayeva, born in 1983,
(4) Ms Pakanat Gelayeva, born in 1928,
(5) Mr |
Garip Selvi | 19. On 15 February 2002 the applicant’s representative applied to the Bornova Assize Court requesting it to order a criminal investigation concerning the police officers whose actions had led to the unjust detention and trial of the applicant. Relying on the statements given by the defence witnesses |
Mustapha Labsi | 56. On 28 April 2010 the Registrar of the Court sent the following letter to the Government:
“The President of the Court ... has instructed me to express on his behalf his profound regret at the decision taken by your authorities to extradite Mr |
A. Yu. Ivanov | 36. On 10 November 2002 the Moscow Region Prosecutor's Office discontinued the criminal proceedings that had been instituted as a result of the events of 23 June 2002. The order read as follows:
“The present criminal proceedings were instituted on 26 June 2002 [and concerned] abuse of authority with violence and the use of special equipment by officers from units of the Ministry of Justice penitentiary department of the Moscow Region. The criminal proceedings were instituted on the basis of a complaint lodged with the regional prosecutor's office on 24 June 2002 by relatives of the detainees concerning [a] beating [they received] in facility IZ-50/9 (Moscow Region). The ... injuries to the detainees ... were confirmed in the course of the inquiry. The investigation has shown that between 10 p.m. and 12 noon on 23 June 2002 in facility IZ-50/9 (Moscow Region) officers from the facility and three officers from the special forces unit Fakel ( |
Volen Siderov | 24. In November 2006 the group of the Greens/European Free Alliance in the European Parliament proposed an amendment to the report on Bulgaria’s accession to the European Union, suggesting that it should include text calling on the Bulgarian authorities “to prevent any further obstruction to the registration of the political party of the ethnic Macedonians and to put an end to all forms of discrimination and harassment vis‑à‑vis that minority”. A number of Bulgarian observer members of the European Parliament objected to that amendment. The political party Attack (“Атака”) proposed a draft declaration, to be adopted by Bulgaria’s National Assembly and saying that the proposal of the Group of the Greens was a gross provocation and amounted to meddling in the country’s internal affairs. Attack’s leader, Mr |
Magomed Dzhabayev | 27. On 19 July 2001 the applicant was granted victim status and questioned. She submitted that at the end of 1999 she had left for the Republic of Ingushetia. On 11 March 2000 she had learned from her husband’s relatives that he and his neighbour had been apprehended by servicemen and taken to the Oktyabrskiy VOVD. In the evening of 11 March 2000 Mr D., her husband’s relative, after visiting the Oktyabrskiy VOVD, had stated that her husband had been held there and that he had been shown an “explanation” written by Mr |
Rizvan Aziyev | 39. On 4 February 2011 the first applicant complained to the head of the Chechnya investigating department that the investigation of her brother’s abduction was ineffective, stating, amongst other things, the following:
“... I familiarised myself with the contents of the criminal case file as a result of which the following has been established: 1. My brother had been detained at about 7.20 p.m. on 31 October 2009. The case file contains the list of his mobile phone connections for that day. According to that list, after the abduction, my brother’s mobile telephone had received a text message while being in Argun. At that time a checkpoint had been functioning on the roads leading from Grozny to Argun. Therefore, the persons who had detained my brother had taken him or his telephone to Argun; they had passed through two checkpoints of the law enforcement agencies. However, there is nothing in the case file showing that the investigators had taken any steps in respect of the staff who had manned those checkpoints on 31 October 2009. 2. On 31 October 2009 the persons who had detained my brother had carried out a special operation in Staraya Sunzha. From the information obtained from the local residents, they had condoned off several streets and had not allowed anyone into the sealed off area.... In addition, these persons had used at least ten vehicles ... from the case file it does not follow that the investigation took steps to verify this information. 3. The investigators, when questioning the local residents, could have asked them not only of the vehicles used by the abductors, but also of the direction in which they had left. However, no such steps have been taken. 4. Mr |
François Lambert | 50. In that connection the Conseil d’État ruled as follows.
“Firstly, it is clear from the examination of the case that the collective procedure conducted by Dr Kariger ..., prior to the taking of the decision of 11 January 2014, was carried out in accordance with the requirements of Article R. 4127-37 of the Public Health Code and involved the consultation of six doctors, although that Article simply requires that the opinion of one doctor and, where appropriate, of a second be sought. Dr Kariger was not legally bound to allow the meeting of 9 December 2013 to be attended by a second doctor designated by Mr Lambert’s parents in addition to the one they had already designated. Nor does it appear from the examination of the case that some members of the care team were deliberately excluded from that meeting. Furthermore, Dr Kariger was entitled to speak with Mr |
Aslambek Dishiyev | 86. There are a number of transcripts of witness interviews among the documents submitted by the Government. In particular, Ilyas Akiyev, Baymurza Aldiyev, Aslambek Imagamayev and Aslambek Dishniyev described the attack of 6 August 2000 as stated in the applicant’s version of events (see paragraphs 12-20) and insisted that they had had no firearms and that it had been obvious that they had been civilians cutting grass and had posed no danger. |
Sami Seppilä | 21. Meanwhile, on 18 June 1997 applicants Sanna Seppilä, Soini, Uosukainen, Särkisilta, Kaihovaara, Pelkonen, Riska, Karlstedt, Salonen, Miettinen and Mikola were convicted of violation of Stockmann’s domiciliary peace and sentenced to forty, fifty or sixty days’ conditional imprisonment respectively. Mr |
Dejan Petrović | 29. Almost a year later, in an expert opinion dated 13 September 2004, the experts stated, on the basis of the autopsy report and other medical records, that a person of Mr Dejan Petrović’s height and build could have “squeezed through” the window in question. They further maintained that Mr |
Murtazaliyeva | 57. The applicant and her lawyers U. and S. in their closing arguments maintained that the applicant was innocent and that the prosecution had failed to prove her guilt. They provided their own account of the events, alleging that the substance of the accusation was based on misinterpretation of the applicant’s conversations and actions and that the explosives had been planted by the police. The speech by the lawyer U. included the following statement made in passing while describing the applicant’s attitude to the military conflict in Chechnya and religion: “I think that this whole criminal case is a set-up against |
Adam Makharbiyev’s | 24. On 8 June 2001 the second applicant again complained to the district prosecutor about his son’s abduction at the checkpoint. He stated, amongst other things, that his two relatives, who had been abducted with his son, had later been released from the VOVD and that one of them had been given |
Sıddık Onar | 10. The applicants also requested legal aid for the court fees. On 15 August 2005, the Batman Civil Court of First Instance ordered the Security Directorate in Batman to investigate the economical means of the applicants. According to the report submitted by the Security Directorate, it was revealed that the applicants were unemployed and lived on state benefits and help from their neighbours. Nevertheless, the trial court rejected the applicants’ legal aid request on the basis of |
Elikhadjiev | 88. On 16 May 2003 the Supreme Court upheld this decision in so far as it concerned the impossibility of extraditing Mr Baymurzayev. It ordered that Mr Gelogayev's extradition be suspended pending completion of the administrative proceedings instigated by him against the decision of 25 November 2002 to withdraw his refugee status. As to Mr Khashiev, the Supreme Court noted that his photograph, taken by the Georgian authorities, had been sent to the Russian authorities for the purpose of identifying him, but that this had been unsuccessful. Furthermore, the defence submitted a copy of a Russian passport indicating that Mr Khashiev was not in fact named either Khashiev or |
Olga Dubetska | 28. Thirdly, some of the applicants were alleged to have developed chronic health conditions associated with the factory operation, especially with air pollution. They presented medical certificates which stated that |
Zekyria Karaman | 15. According to an article published by the German newspaper Frankfurter Rundschau on the Internet on 18 September 2008, the Acting President of the Frankfurt am Main Regional Court’s Extended Economic Crimes Chamber had stated, when delivering the judgment, that the donated funds had been used by the persons behind the scenes for a mixture of their own economic and political purposes even though part of the money had indeed been spent on aid projects. The same newspaper had reported in an article published on the Internet on 15 September 2008 that the prosecution authorities (Staatsanwaltschaft) had referred to the applicant as the “main perpetrator and leader (führender Kopf) of the whole organisation”. Similar quotations were published in several Turkish newspapers on 17 and 18 September 2008. For instance, according to an article published in the Turkish newspaper Hürriyet on 18 September 2008, the presiding judge had declared when delivering the judgment, that “strings were pulled at the level of Kanal 7. G. and T. acted in accordance with instructions they had received from Kanal 7, in particular from |
Marzet Imakayeva | 9. The facts of the case are linked to the application Imakayeva v. Russia (no. 7615/02, ECHR 2006‑... (extracts)), in that the four relatives of the applicants in the present case were detained together with the husband of |
Umar Bekayev | 22. The first applicant is the mother of Mr Shamkhan Shavkhayev, who was born in 1980 (in certain documents the year of birth also indicated as 1981), and the wife of Mr Sharip Shavkhayev, who was born in 1941. The second applicant is the wife of Mr |
Apti Dombayev | 181. It appears from the criminal case file submitted by the Government that only two witnesses, Ms K.D. and a neighbour, Ms Kh.Kh, were questioned by the investigation. Ms K.D. stated that at about 6 a.m. on 4 November 2002 unidentified armed men in camouflage uniforms had broken into their house, searched it and then taken |
Ahmadinejad | 26. In respect of his political past he explained, inter alia, that he had had contact with the student movement and quite a lot of students and had helped them with their home pages. His computer had been taken from his business premises while he was in prison. Material that was critical of the regime was stored on his computer. While he had not personally criticised the regime, or President |
Pertti Jukka Tapio Ruotsalainen | 12. On 28 August 2002 the Helsinki Administrative Court (hallinto-oikeus, förvaltningsdomstolen), having received the observations of the Tax Ombudsman (veroasiamies, skatteombudet) and the Vehicle Administration and the applicant’s observations in reply, rejected the appeal. It reasoned:
“Section 4 of the Fuel Fee Act provides that a fuel fee (polttoainemaksu, bränsleavgift) is collected for the number of days the vehicle has been continuously located in Finland prior to the noted use, but not for more than 20 days at a time. Section 5 provides that the fuel fee for a pickup van is FIM 1,500 [some EUR 252] per diem. Section 6 provides that if the use of more leniently taxed fuel than diesel oil is discovered in a vehicle in respect of which no prior notice has been given, the fuel fee collected is treble the [normal] amount.
The pickup van owned by |
Al-Hamasher | 12. The applicant maintains that the evidence against him was predominantly based upon an incriminating statement from a co-defendant, Abdul Nasser Al-Hamasher (also known as Al-Khamayseh). In his confession to the Public (or State) Prosecutor, Mr |
Nura Luluyeva's | 47. During that period several witnesses were questioned, including the applicants and the investigator K. who was originally in charge of investigating case no. 12073. It was established that on the day of |
Christopher Edwards's | 15. In the late afternoon, Christopher Edwards was taken to Chelmsford Prison. The reception staff were aware of the information passed on from the police at the Magistrates' Court and that he was a potential danger to women. He was placed in a holding area while the other prison arrivals were processed. His behaviour was noted as “strange” and “odd” and when being placed in the holding cell he was aggressive and tried to punch a prison officer. After two hours he was screened by Mr N., a member of the prison health care staff, who saw no reason to admit him to the health care centre. Mr N. knew nothing about previous discussions in the court or the concerns passed on to the prison about |
Ali Khadayev | 10. Seven days later the applicants were approached by Z., an officer of the Military Commander’s Office. He told them that Mr Ali Khadayev could be released against the payment of 2,000 United States dollars (USD). By 1 May 2002 they gathered the money and handed it over, following which Mr |
Magomed Goygov | 48. An examination of the bodies of Khamid Khashiyev, Rizvan Taymeskhanov and Magomed Goygov was conducted by an investigator from the Malgobek Town Prosecutor's Office in the municipal morgue on 10 February 2000. The bodies were frozen. In respect of |
Branislav Marković | 35. On 23 October 2014 the Constitutional Court rejected her appeal for failure to adequately substantiate her complaint. In particular it held that one relevant judgment submitted by the applicant could not amount to proof of either profound or long-standing differences in the adjudication of the courts’ ruling at final instance in cases similar to the applicant’s.
(d) As regards application no. 27779/15 (Mr |
the Children’s Rights Commissioner | 25. On 26 September 2013 a meeting was held between the parties on the subject of the first applicant’s and N.B.’s communication with the child with the participation of the Krasnenkaya Rechka municipal entity, the childcare authorities, the Children’s Rights Commissioner in St Petersburg, the prosecutor’s assistant of the district prosecutor’s office, an expert specialising in conflict resolution and a psychologist of the District Centre for Social Assistance to the Family and Children. An oral agreement was reached between Ms Z. and the first applicant to the effect that the latter’s meetings with the child were to take place on 5 October and 12 October 2013 for two hours in the presence of Ms Z. On 1 November 2013 Ms Z. and the first applicant were to come to the office of |
Ganna German’s | 11. On 18 December 2007 the District Court allowed the plaintiff’s claims in part. It found that the following extracts constituted an untrue statement:
“And [if I had an offer] to become a member of parliament, as in |
Dag Dreyer Sæter | 15. The article stated:
“The Tjøme Municipality is now in the process of tightening up the obligation to comply with the residence requirement in the municipality. A zero concession limit has long since been introduced. This means that year-round properties must be lived in all year.
Confrontation
In the near future the technical services department of the Tjøme Municipality will approach the County Governor in order to report its suspicion that the residence requirement is not being fulfilled for a number of properties. It is then up to the County Governor to confront the owners of these properties.
The director of the Planning and Building Department, Mr |
Khamid Mukayev | 18. At about 4 a.m. on 16 September 2004 the applicants' neighbour A.Kh., who lived in Pervogo Maya Street, was woken up by the noise of military vehicles. When he went outside he saw a convoy consisting of an APC with a large number of servicemen on it and Gazel and UAZ vehicles on the Pervogo Maya Street. He immediately went back into his house. Some fifteen to twenty minutes later he again heard the noise of the vehicles coming from the street. When he looked outside his window, he saw the same vehicles reversing. Shortly after this his nephew I.M. came to his house and told him that Russian servicemen had taken away |
Seliverstov | 76. The Government did not contest the factual circumstances of the events as presented by the applicants. They added only that at the material time four Deputy Ministers of the Interior had been residing at the hotel. In addition to Mr |
Bashir Mutsolgov's | 21. In mid-November 2004, when returning from his parents' home, the third applicant was allegedly approached by a young man in a camouflage uniform and a black knitted hat, who called the third applicant by name. He spoke Russian without accent. The man identified himself as an FSB officer and showed the third applicant a dark-red or brown certificate with a laminated picture. The third applicant could not read the man's family name on the certificate because it was dark and the latter was covering it with his fingers. Having showed the certificate the man told the third applicant that he was not going to identify himself because “if (the third applicant) fell into the hands of the FSB he would tell them everything”. While the man was talking, the third applicant noticed two grey VAZ vehicles and a white VAZ vehicle on the opposite side of the street. The man offered to give the third applicant the name of one of |
Sharip Elmurzayev | 37. On 8 April 2004 the prosecutor's office of the Chechen Republic (“the republican prosecutor's office”) forwarded the thirty-fourth applicant's complaint about the disappearance of Bayali, Idris and |
Magomed Temurkayev | 31. On 1 February 2001 the prosecutor's office of the Chechen Republic (“the Chechnya prosecutor's office”) forwarded the sixth applicant's complaint to the town prosecutor's office and commented that |
Vedat Erten's | 359. The search of Tahir Elçi's office revealed a note addressed to “Comrade Tahir Elçi”, bearing the stamp “ERNK” (the political wing of the PKK) and sent to him by the PKK. A note addressed “to the office of the co-ordinator of the Amed State (Amed being the PKK's name for Diyarbakır) was found in |
Zara Masayeva | 66. Khava Dadayeva lives in Katyr-Yurt at 2 Chkalova Street. On the morning of 4 February 2000 her extended family gathered in their neighbours, the Vakhayevs', basement. Later in the morning, despite the shelling, the applicant left the basement and went to her house in order to fetch some food. When she was returning to the basement she saw two explosions – one near the house and one directly hitting it. There was a lot of smoke and debris thrown around. Among the wounded people taken out of the basement, the applicant saw her mother-in-law, |
Petros Kakoulli | 39. The witness, who lives on the Vrysoulles refugee housing estate, was collecting snails in the same area where Petros Kyriakou Kakoulli met his death. He stated, inter alia:
“...At about 7.25 a.m. I heard a shot and within a short period of time another one, coming from the east of the police station in the occupied area. Because at that time I was in a dried-out river, I could not identify what was happening at the police station... When I returned to my car I saw one young person who looked panic-stricken and told me that the Turkish troops had shot his father-in-law on the eastern side of the police station... I forgot to tell you that as I was heading towards my car I heard a third shot coming from the same direction. While I was with this person he told me he was called Panikos and that he lived in Avgorou, also that his father-in-law who was shot by the Turks was called |
Bashir Mutsolgov | 54. On being questioned as a victim on 30 December 2003, the third applicant submitted that on 18 December 2003 at about 3 p.m. unidentified persons wearing masks had abducted and taken away his brother, |
Ibragim Uruskhanov | 86. On 26 October 2006 the investigators questioned the applicant’s daughter, Mrs Z.M. She stated that at the material time she had lived close to the applicant’s house in Urus-Martan. According to the witness, on the night of 12 April 2002 the applicant had arrived at her house at about 3 a.m. and told her |
Sigurður A. Sigurjόnsson | 14. On 18 November 1998 the High Court found for FDB, stating as follows:
“The High Court finds it established that the applicant was aware that membership of SID was a condition for his employment in the company. Thus, since the applicant did not comply with this requirement the conditions for dismissing him are fulfilled in accordance with section 2, subsection (2), in conjunction with subsection (1), of the Protection against Dismissal due to Association Membership Act.
Therefore, the pertinent question is whether the Act in issue, and with it the applicant's dismissal, is at variance with Article 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights, in the light of the interpretation this Article has been given by the European Court of Human Rights in its recent case-law.
The Protection against Dismissal due to Association Membership Act was passed by Parliament in 1982 as a result, inter alia, of the British Rail judgment (Young, James and Webster v. the United Kingdom, Series A no. 44) delivered by the European Court of Human Rights in 1981. In this judgment it was established that in certain circumstances Article 11 also secured the negative right to freedom of association. In the assessment of whether, subsequent to the Court's recent case-law, the domestic courts should disregard section 2(2) of the Protection against Dismissal due to Association Membership Act, the starting-point must be taken from the Act of 1992 incorporating the European Convention on Human Rights. According to the preparatory notes, incorporation of the Convention was not intended to change the existing balance between the Danish parliament and the Danish courts. Thus, in the view of the High Court, while taking into account the rights and obligations that may be inferred from the European Convention on Human Rights, Parliament still has considerable discretion when laying down Danish law. In this connection, it is also of importance to note that a decision abolishing or limiting the existing possibility of entering into closed-shop agreements will have far-reaching consequences for the Danish labour market.
In support of the applicant's understanding of the scope of Article 11, reference has been made to the |
Mansur Ismailov | 83. On 15 June 2004 the Basmanniy District Court of Moscow dismissed the seventh applicant’s claim. The court found that on 9 June 2002 the applicant’s son had been apprehended in Duba-Yurt by unknown persons and that his whereabouts were unknown. The court further held that the evidence presented at the hearing did not show that the disappearance of Mr |
Kemal Aktaş | 75. The Constitutional Court then considered whether the applicant’s initial and continued pre-trial detention were proportionate to the aim pursued. In that context, the applicant had alleged that his detention had prevented him from carrying out his political activities. Referring to several Constitutional Court judgments concerning the pre-trial detention of members of parliament, he had argued that his detention was disproportionate to the aim pursued, in view of his status as a member of parliament. In relation to that point, the Constitutional Court noted firstly that, contrary to what the applicant had maintained, it had never given a judgment in which it had found that the pre-trial detention of a member of parliament whose immunity had been lifted amounted in itself to a breach of the Constitution. It noted that in the cases of |
Poltorachenko | 10. Prior to the adoption of the Ivanov pilot judgment the Court had dealt with a number of cases concerning the non-enforcement of domestic court decisions in Ukraine. The first decision on this issue was rendered in the case of Kaysin and Others v. Ukraine ((friendly settlement), no. 46144/99, 3 May 2001). Even though the case was settled by the parties and the applicants received the sums indicated in the friendly settlement agreement, the general issue of non‑enforcement remained unresolved largely owing to the lack of funds of the State entities, State-owned or State‑controlled debtors (hereinafter “State debtors”). Subsequent cases concerning non‑enforcement or delayed enforcement of domestic court decisions related to payments of salaries and allowances to military servicemen, employees of the mining companies, judges, school teachers, debts of municipalities or State hospitals, State-owned banks, State-owned enterprises and the Cabinet of Ministers (see, among many other examples, the judgments in the cases of Voytenko v. Ukraine, no. 18966/02, 29 June 2004, Romashov v. Ukraine, no. 67534/01, 27 July 2004, Zubko and Others v. Ukraine, nos. 3955/04 and 3 others, ECHR 2006‑VI (extracts), Belanova v. Ukraine, no. 1093/02, 29 November 2005, Kucherenko v. Ukraine, no. 27347/02, 15 December 2005, Shmalko v. Ukraine, no. 60750/00, 20 July 2004, and |
Summaya Abdurashidova's | 20. From the beginning of her correspondence with the authorities the applicant was assisted by Mr B., head of the local human rights organisation Romashka (Ромашка). The applicant and Mr B. contacted various official bodies, including the Russian President, the Dagestan Government, the Khasavyurt district administration, the mass media and prosecutors' offices at different levels, describing the circumstances of |
Yevgeniy Vitalyevich Olius | 4. The first applicant, Terem Ltd, is a Ukrainian company registered in 1998. The second applicant, Mr Igor Vladimirovich Chechetkin is a Ukrainian national, who was born in 1967 and lives in Kiev. The third applicant, Mr |
Pinderfields | 38. In a report dated 13 September 2000, the doctor consulted by the applicants stated, inter alia, as follows:
“It is my understanding that repeated vomiting can be a symptom of heroin withdrawal and while I have no personal experience in managing people undergoing a detoxification programme, I would, however, be very unhappy about managing anyone who was vomiting repeatedly, without the use of intravenous fluids, the intravenous administration of anti-emetic drugs and the facility to monitor blood chemistry frequently.
... Judith was severely under weight.
Her poor overall nutritional state was almost certainly longstanding and probably connected to her heroin addiction but any prolonged bout of vomiting, from whatever cause, was likely to cause a serious imbalance of her blood chemistry very quickly. Apart from electrolyte disturbance and dehydration, she would be very likely to have had difficulty maintaining an adequate blood sugar level, as she would have had no reserves in the form of stored carbohydrate substances within the body, that could have been utilised, when she was unable to absorb adequate nutrients from her gastrointestinal system due to her persistent vomiting.
In such circumstances a vicious circle can occur. A low blood sugar level itself can cause more nausea and vomiting. Multiple metabolic pathways can be interfered with. The subject can become irritable. The level of consciousness may be severely reduced and coma can even occur.
Intravenous access is often very difficult in intravenous drug abusers, even for clinicians such as anaesthetists who routinely insert needles. Central lines are likely to be needed. These are special long catheters, often with more than one lumen, that are inserted into major blood vessels close to the heart. I would not expect the average prison medical officer to be proficient in inserting such a line.
It is preferable for these lines to be inserted in hospital, by personnel with the necessary skills. After insertion, the correct positioning ... needs to be checked by X‑ray before it is used to administer drugs and fluids. Once inserted their maintenance requires skilled, aseptic nursing care ...
I would be inclined to attribute the agitation and apparent lack of cooperation displayed by Judith after her admission ... and before her second collapse to cerebral irritation. Cerebral irritation is often seen following a period of cerebral hypoxia. Certainly, a degree of cerebral hypoxia probably occurred at the time of her collapse [in prison] and continued up to the time that resuscitation was underway at |
Zbigniew Dzieciak | 60. On 23 September 2002 the prosecutor ordered the Gdańsk Medical Academy to prepare an expert opinion. The prosecutor asked the experts to answer following questions:
“1. Was the death of Zbigniew Dzieciak a consequence of:
- unsuccessful medical treatment for which nobody can be held responsible (niezawinione niepowodzenie lekarskie),
- medical malpractice,
- failure to apply due diligence during his medical treatment at the Mokotów Detention Centre and hospital in Lindley Street,
- other circumstances, different from the above? 2. Did the state of health of |
Movsar Tagirov's | 26. On 22 April 2003 the FSB Department informed the first applicant that they had not instituted any criminal proceedings against Movsar Tagirov. They further noted that they had carried out a fruitless inquiry into |
Musa Temergeriyev | 133. On 27 April 2007 the decision of the district prosecutor’s office to suspend the investigation stated as follows:
“On 27 December 2002 at around 10.20 a.m. unidentified servicemen of the law‑enforcement authorities entered the private house at no. 55 Mikhaylika Street ... [They] arrested |
Şevket Epözdemir | 23. In the meantime, on 10 January 1995 the applicants brought compensation proceedings against the Ministry of the Interior. In their petition the applicants argued that the perpetrators of the killing had not been found, despite the fact that more than one year had elapsed since the incident. They submitted that their relative had been a well-liked person in Tatvan and that he had never had any problems with anyone. The applicants argued that States were responsible for protecting their citizens’ lives and that in the event that they failed to do so, they had a duty to find and punish the perpetrators of any resultant unlawful death; otherwise they themselves should be held responsible for such loss of life. The applicants also submitted that, because of the failure to find and punish the perpetrators of the killing of |
Biryukov Ryakib Ismailovich | 9. At the close of the hearing the court read out the following operative part of the judgment:
“On 2 April 2001 the Nikolayevskiy District Court, composed of ..., having examined in an open court session a civil case which originated in an application by |
Maksut Yıldırım | 23. According to the statements of Osman Özer, Durmuş Kaplan, Maksut Yıldırım, Rasim Ağpak and Abit Şahin, who had been present when Mr Şen was abducted on 26 March 1994, three people entered the café where Mehmet Şen was playing cards. One of them asked where he could find Mr Şen. When Mehmet Şen presented himself, he was asked to show his identity card. Then the person in question came closer to Mr Şen and showed him a card, the details of which the witnesses could not see. Osman Özer and |
Armando Maresti | 10. On 19 May 2006 the Municipal Court found the applicant guilty on two counts of assault causing grievous bodily injury and one count of making death threats. In respect of the incident at the Pazin coach terminal on 15 June 2005, it found that the applicant had approached D.R. and insulted him verbally before proceeding to punch and kick him about the body. He was sentenced to one year’s imprisonment in respect of all the offences of which he was convicted. The time he had already served in connection with his conviction in the summary proceedings before the Minor-Offences Court was to be deducted from his sentence. He was ordered to undergo compulsory treatment for alcohol addiction during his imprisonment. The relevant part of the judgment reads:
“Defendant |
Khamzat Merzhoyev | 12. On the night of 23 November 2003 the first applicant, her mother and the second, fourth, fifth and sixth applicants were sleeping in the first house. The first applicant shared a room with her mother. The second applicant and her children were in another room. The third applicant, |
Nebi Akyürek | 13. The woman killed outside the café was identified as 22-year-old Selma Çıtlak. The man killed next to her was identified as 21-year-old Mehmet Salgın. The three men inside were 16-year-old Sabri Atılmış, 32‑year-old |
Jon Bartlett | 33. On Mr Pearman’s telephone calls, the trial judge directed the jury as follows:
“It is for you to decide what weight, if any, you attach to this evidence; but it does have certain limitations which I must draw to your attention: (a) you had not had the opportunity of seeing and hearing the witnesses in the witness box and sometimes when you do see and hear a witness you get a much clearer idea of whether his evidence is honest and accurate; (b) their evidence has not been tested under cross‑examination and you have not had the opportunity of seeing how their evidence survived this form of challenge; (c) in the case of Pearman these were self-serving statements, that is he was saying he was not involved in the murder of |
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