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104 144
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6.2.2 Message contents
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The Header section of each HI-1 message (see ETSI TS 103 120 [1], clause 6.2) shall be populated as described in table 6.2.2-1 below. ETSI ETSI TS 104 144 V1.1.1 (2025-06) 33 Table 6.2.2-1: HI-1 Message Header Field Description M/C/O Reference SenderIdentifier Shall be set to a value which identifies the Service Provider, and which will shall be agreed when the Service Provider is on-boarded to the E-Evidence platform. M ETSI TS 103 120 [1], clause 6.2.4 ReceiverIdentifier Shall be set to a value which identifies the RI-API, which shall be made known to the SP when they are on-boarded to the e-Evidence platform. M ETSI TS 103 120 [1], clause 6.2.4 TransactionIdentifier Shall be set to a unique UUID value for this transaction. M ETSI TS 103 120 [1], table 6.1 Timestamp Shall be set to the time the message was sent by the RI-API. M ETSI TS 103 120 [1], table 6.1 Version Shall be populated with a version of ETSI TS 103 120 [1] no earlier than V1.19.1. The NationalProfileOwner shall be set to "EU" and the NationalProfileVersion shall be set to the version of the present document. M ETSI TS 103 120 [1], clause 6.2.3 The Payload of each message shall be set according to details given in the relevant Workflow Endpoint clause.
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104 144
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6.3 Outcome Endpoint
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fa996e7c0d58726f9bbde1165f5aaff3
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104 144
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6.3.1 Description
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This endpoint covers the Service Provider sending the requested data back to the nominated recipient. In case of large file sizes, only a download URL and associated metadata is sent, indicating how to download the requested data outside of the decentralised IT system.
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fa996e7c0d58726f9bbde1165f5aaff3
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104 144
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6.3.2 Message contents
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The contents of the Request shall be as per table 6.3.2-1 below. Table 6.3.2-1: HI-1 Objects for the Outcome Workflow Endpoint Verb HI-1 Object Cardinality Description Reference DELIVER DeliveryObject 1..n Provides the outcome of the request. Clause 6.3.3
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104 144
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6.3.3 DeliveryObject
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The Request shall contain a DELIVER Request for a DeliveryObject containing the outcome of the request. The fields in table 6.3.3-1 shall be present in the DeliveryObject. The sequencing mechanism described in ETSI TS 103 120 [1], clause 10.2.3 shall not be used. ETSI ETSI TS 104 144 V1.1.1 (2025-06) 34 Table 6.3.3-1: DeliveryObject fields in the Outcome Workflow Endpoint Field Description M/C/O Reference CountryCode Shall be set to the appropriate ISO country code for the Service Provider. M ETSI TS 103 120 [1], table 7.1 OwnerIdentifier Shall be set to the appropriate technical identifier for the Service Provider. M ETSI TS 103 120 [1], table 7.1 AssociatedObjects Shall be set to include the ObjectID of the original AuthorisationObject used in the Production Workflow Endpoint (see clause 5.3). Shall also include a reference to each of the LDTaskObjects (see clause 5.3) as per ETSI TS 103 120 [1], clause 10.2.1. M ETSI TS 103 120 [1], clause 7.1.4 Reference Shall be set to the Reference used in the LDTaskObject(s) created in the Production Workflow Endpoint (see clause 5.3). If multiple references were used, a separate DeliveryObject shall be created for the data covered by each reference. M ETSI TS 103 120 [1], table 10.1 SequenceNumber Since DeliveryObjects may not be split across multiple DELIVER actions, this field shall be omitted as per ETSI TS 103 120 [1], table 10.1. N/A ETSI TS 103 120 [1], table 10.1 LastSequence Since DeliveryObjects may not be split across multiple DELIVER actions, this field shall be omitted as per ETSI TS 103 120 [1], table 10.1. N/A ETSI TS 103 120 [1], table 10.1 Manifest Shall be present and populated according to ETSI TS 103 120 [1], clause 10.2.2. M ETSI TS 103 120 [1], clause 10.2.2 Delivery See table 6.3.3-2. M Table 6.3.3-2 and ETSI TS 103 120 [1], table 10.1 Table 6.3.3-2: Delivery fields in the Outcome Workflow Endpoint Field Description Reference XMLData Shall be chosen if the Service Provider wishes to provide the data in XML format. ETSI TS 103 120 [1], clause 10.2.3 BinaryData Shall be chosen if the Service Provider wishes to provide the data in any other format than XML (or wishes to encode the XML in another encapsulation prior to delivery). This includes JSON (e.g. if ETSI TS 103 705 [i.4] is chosen as a delivery format). ETSI TS 103 120 [1], clause 10.2.3 URL Shall be chosen by the Service Provider if the size of the data exceeds the limits of the decentralised IT system, and therefore wishes to provide a URL for the recipient to download the data. ETSI TS 103 120 [1], table 10.7
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104 144
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6.4 De Facto Impossibility Workflow Endpoint
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104 144
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6.4.1 Description
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This endpoint covers the Service Provider notifying the Issuing Authority of a de-facto impossibility concerning an EPOC or EPOC-PR (Form 3).
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fa996e7c0d58726f9bbde1165f5aaff3
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104 144
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6.4.2 Message contents
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The contents of the Request shall be as per table 6.4.2-1 below. Table 6.4.2-1: HI-1 Objects for the De Facto Impossibility Workflow Endpoint Verb HI-1 Object Cardinality Description Reference CREATE NotificationObject 1 Indicates that the state of the AuthorisationObject has changed to reflect the de-facto impossibility. Clause 6.4.3 DELIVER DocumentObject 1 Provides the signed PDF containing Form 3. Annex C ETSI ETSI TS 104 144 V1.1.1 (2025-06) 35
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104 144
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6.4.3 NotificationObject
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The Request shall contain a CREATE Request for a NotificationObject that indicates that the state of the Authorisation has changed to reflect the de-facto impossibility. The fields given in table 6.4.3-1 shall be present in the NotificationObject. Table 6.4.3-1: NotificationObject fields in the De Facto Impossibility Workflow Endpoint Field Description M/C/O Reference AssociatedObjects Shall contain a reference to the original EPOC or EPOC-PR as created during the Production (see clause 5.3) or Preservation (see clause 5.4). M Clause 5.4 NotificationDetails May contain any human-readable information that the Service Provider wishes to provide. C ETSI TS 103 120 [1], table 7.19 NotificationType Shall be set to the EPOCNotificationType DictionaryEntry value "DeFactoImpossibility". M Table 6.4.3-2 NewNotification Shall be set to "true", following the rules set out in ETSI TS 103 120 [1], clause 7.4.4. M ETSI TS 103 120 [1], clause 7.4.4 NotificationTimestamp Shall be set to the time at which the objection was raised. M ETSI TS 103 120 [1], clause 7.4.5 StatusOfAssociatedObjects Shall include one StatusOfAssociatedObject structure populated as per table 6.4.3-3 to indicate the change of status of the AuthorisationObject for the EPOC (see clause 5.3.3) or EPOC-PR (see clause 5.7.3) to "Invalid". Shall also include a StatusOfAssociatedObject structure populated as per table 6.4.3-4 for each LDTask Object (see clause 5.3.4) or LPTask Object (see clause 5.7.4) associated with an identifier for which there is an issue. M Table 6.4.3-3, table 6.4.3-4 and ETSI TS 103 120 [1], clause 7.4.7 Table 6.4.3-2: EPOCNotificationType Dictionary Dictionary Owner Dictionary Name ETSI EPOCNotificationType Defined DictionaryEntries Value Meaning DeFactoImpossibility Indicates that the Service Provider has raised an object to the EPOC or EPOC-PR according to the Regulation [i.1] Form 3. DataPreserved Indicates that the Service Provider has preserved data in accordance with the associated EPOC-PR. ConfirmationOfWithdrawal Indicates that the Service Provider is confirming the withdrawal of an EPOC. Table 6.4.3-3: StatusOfAssociatedObject for AuthorisationObject Field Description M/C/O Reference AssociatedObject Shall be set to the Object Identifier of the AuthorisationObject. M Clause 5.3.3 and ETSI TS 103 120 [1], table 7.20 Status Shall be set to the value "Invalid" from the AuthorisationStatus Dictionary. M ETSI TS 103 120 [1], table 7.6 Details Shall include the relevant information from Form 3 Section E, along with any other relevant information which the Service Provider wishes to provide. M ETSI TS 103 120 [1], table 7.20 ETSI ETSI TS 104 144 V1.1.1 (2025-06) 36 Table 6.4.3-4: StatusOfAssociatedObject for LPTask or LDTask Field Description M/C/O Reference AssociatedObject Shall be set to the Object Identifier of the LPTask or LDTask related to the identifier for which there is an issue (see clauses 5.3.4 and 5.7.4). M Clause 5.3.4, 5.7.4, and ETSI TS 103 120 [1], table 7.20 Status Shall be set to the value "Invalid" from the LPTaskStatus or LDTaskStatus Dictionary. M ETSI TS 103 120 [1], tables 8.3 and 8.17 Details Shall include the relevant information from Form 3 Section D, along with any other relevant information which the Service Provider wishes to provide. M ETSI TS 103 120 [1], table 7.20
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104 144
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6.5 Data Preserved Workflow Endpoint
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fa996e7c0d58726f9bbde1165f5aaff3
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104 144
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6.5.1 Description
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This endpoint covers the Service Provider notifying the Issuing Authority that data has been preserved according to an EPOC-PR.
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104 144
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6.5.2 Message contents
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The contents of the Request shall be as per table 6.5.2-1 below. Table 6.5.2-1: HI-1 Objects for the Data Preserved Workflow Endpoint Verb HI-1 Object Cardinality Description Reference CREATE NotificationObject 1 Indicates that the state of the LDTaskObject status has changed to reflect the preservation of data. Clause 6.5.3
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104 144
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6.5.3 NotificationObject
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The Request shall contain a CREATE Request for a NotificationObject that indicates that the state of the Authorisation has changed to reflect the de-facto impossibility. The fields in table 6.5.3-1 shall be present in the NotificationObject. Table 6.5.3-1: NotificationObject fields in the Data Preserved Workflow Endpoint Field Description M/C/O Reference NotificationDetails May contain any human-readable information that the Service Provider wishes to provide. C ETSI TS 103 120 [1], table 7.19 NotificationType Shall be set to the EPOCNotificationType DictionaryEntry value "DataPreserved". M Table 6.4.3-2 NewNotification Shall be set to True, following the rules set out in ETSI TS 103 120 [1], clause 7.4.4. M ETSI TS 103 120 [1], clause 7.4.4 NotificationTimestamp Shall be set to the time at which the notification was raised. M ETSI TS 103 120 [1], clause 7.4.5 StatusOfAssociatedObjects Shall be set to indicate that the status of each LDTaskObject related to the EPOC-PR (see clause 5.4) has changed to "Preserved". M ETSI TS 103 120 [1], clauses 7.4.7 and 8.2.8 ETSI ETSI TS 104 144 V1.1.1 (2025-06) 37
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104 144
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6.6 Correspondence Endpoint
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fa996e7c0d58726f9bbde1165f5aaff3
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104 144
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6.6.1 Description
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This endpoint is used by the Service Provider to exchange free-text correspondence with the Issuing Authority or Enforcing Authority, together with associated documentation, for one of the following purposes: • To request additional information from the relevant Authority. • To provide additional information to the relevant Authority in response to a query.
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104 144
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6.6.2 Message contents
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The contents of the Request shall be as per table 6.6.2-1 below. Table 6.6.2-1: HI-1 Objects for the Correspondence Workflow Endpoint Verb HI-1 Object Cardinality Description Reference DELIVER DocumentObject 1 Document containing the correspondence. Clause 6.6.3
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104 144
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6.6.3 DocumentObject
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The Request shall contain at least one DELIVER Request for a DocumentObject that represents the correspondence, which shall contain the fields given in table 6.6.3-1. Table 6.6.3-1: DocumentObject fields in the Correspondence Workflow Endpoint Field Description M/C/O Reference CountryCode Shall be set to the appropriate ISO country code for source of the correspondence. M ETSI TS 103 120 [1], table 7.1 OwnerIdentifier Shall be set to the appropriate technical identifier for the source of the correspondence. M ETSI TS 103 120 [1], table 7.1 AssociatedObjects Shall include the Object ID of the original AuthorisationObject created with either the Production Workflow Endpoint (see clause 5.3) or Preservation Workflow Endpoint (see clause 5.7). M ETSI TS 103 120 [1], clause 7.1.4 DocumentName Shall be set to "Correspondence". M ETSI TS 103 120 [1], clause 7.3.3 DocumentType Shall be set to either "RequestAdditionalInformation" or "ProvideAdditionalInformation" from the EPOCDocumentType dictionary as appropriate. M Table 5.12.3-2 DocumentProperties If the DocumentType "RequestAdditionalInformation" is chosen, and a response is required by a particular deadline, then this field shall contain a property with a PropertyType of "ResponseRequiredBy" from the "EPOCDocumentPropertyType" dictionary (see table 5.12.3-3), and a date-time given as a string matching the format required by a QualifiedDateTime (see ETSI TS 103 280 [2], clause 6.4). C ETSI TS 103 120 [1], clause 7.3.8 DocumentBody Contains a binary document containing supporting information, along with relevant metadata according to ETSI TS 103 120 [1], clause 7.3.9. Shall be populated if the chosen DocumentType is "RequestAdditionalInformation" or "ProvideAdditionalInformation", and may be provided in all other circumstances. C ETSI TS 103 120 [1], clause 7.3.9 ETSI ETSI TS 104 144 V1.1.1 (2025-06) 38
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104 144
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6.7 Confirm Withdrawal Workflow Endpoint
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fa996e7c0d58726f9bbde1165f5aaff3
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104 144
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6.7.1 Description
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This endpoint covers the Service Provider confirming that an EPOC has been withdrawn by the Issuing Authority (see clause 5.6).
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fa996e7c0d58726f9bbde1165f5aaff3
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104 144
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6.7.2 Message contents
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The contents of the Request shall be as per table 6.7.2-1 below. Table 6.7.2-1: HI-1 Objects for the Confirm Withdrawal Workflow Endpoint Verb HI-1 Object Cardinality Description Reference CREATE NotificationObject 1 Indicates that the state of the LDTaskObject status has changed to reflect the preservation of data. Clause 6.7.3
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104 144
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6.7.3 NotificationObject
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The Request shall contain a CREATE Request for a NotificationObject that indicates that the state of the Authorisation has changed to reflect the de-facto impossibility. The fields given in table 6.7.3-1 shall be present in the NotificationObject. Table 6.7.3-1: NotificationObject fields in the Confirm Withdrawal Workflow Endpoint Field Description M/C/O Reference NotificationDetails May contain any human-readable information that the Service Provider wishes to provide. C ETSI TS 103 120 [1], table 7.19 NotificationType Shall be set to the EPOCNotificationType DictionaryEntry value "ConfirmationOfWithdrawal". M Table 6.4.3-2 NewNotification Shall be set to True, following the rules set out in ETSI TS 103 120 [1], clause 7.4.4. M ETSI TS 103 120 [1], clause 7.4.4 NotificationTimestamp Shall be set to the time at which the notification was raised. M ETSI TS 103 120 [1], clause 7.4.5 StatusOfAssociatedObjects Shall be set to indicate that the AuthorisationObject related to the EPOC (see clause 5.2) has changed to "Cancelled". M ETSI TS 103 120 [1], clauses 7.4.7 and 8.2.8
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104 144
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6.8 Enforcing Authority Identifier Endpoint
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fa996e7c0d58726f9bbde1165f5aaff3
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104 144
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6.8.1 Description
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This endpoint allows a Service Provider to retrieve the identifier of the Enforcing Authority it is associated with. The Service Provider gets the identifier of the Issuing Authority when it receives a message from it, since all of the messages between Service Providers and Issuing Authorities are initiated by the Issuing Authority. However, a Service Provider may need to initiate a message exchange to the Enforcing Authority.
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fa996e7c0d58726f9bbde1165f5aaff3
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104 144
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6.8.2 Message contents
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The Header section of this HI-1 message is different than for all the other RI-API Workflow Endpoint and shall be populated as per table 6.8.2-1 below. ETSI ETSI TS 104 144 V1.1.1 (2025-06) 39 Table 6.8.2-1: HI-1 Message Header Field Description M/C/O Reference SenderIdentifier Shall be set to a value which identifies the Service Provider, and which will shall be agreed when the Service Provider is on- boarded to the E-Evidence platform. M ETSI TS 103 120 [1], clause 6.2.4 ReceiverIdentifier Unspecified. TransactionIdentifier Shall be set to a unique UUID value for this transaction. M ETSI TS 103 120 [1], table 6.1 Timestamp Shall be set to the time the message was sent by the RI-API. M ETSI TS 103 120 [1], table 6.1 Version Shall be populated with a version of ETSI TS 103 120 [1] no earlier than V1.19.1. The NationalProfileOwner shall be set to "EU" and the NationalProfileVersion shall be set to the version of the present document. M ETSI TS 103 120 [1], clause 6.2.3 The Payload of the message shall be empty. In response to this message, the RI-API shall reply with a fully populated HI-1 message header and an empty payload.
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104 144
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7 Transport and security
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104 144
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7.1 Transport
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Transport shall be HTTP as per ETSI TS 103 120 [1], clause 9.3 and shall use HTTPS as per ETSI TS 103 120 [1], clause 9.3.4. See also clause 7.2 of the present document. Messages shall be encoded using XML according to ETSI TS 103 120 [1], clause 9.2.1. JSON encoding shall not be used.
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104 144
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7.2 Security
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ETSI TS 103 120 [1], clause 9.3.4 shall be followed. ETSI ETSI TS 104 144 V1.1.1 (2025-06) 40 Annex A (normative): Object Model A.1 Object Model ETSI TS 103 120 [1] defines a set of HI-1 Objects. Each of these Objects contains information about a specific part of a given workflow. ETSI TS 103 120 [1], clauses 7, 8 and 10 define a set of standard Objects, while Annex B of the present document defines further HI-1 Objects that are specific to e-Evidence. Associations between Objects can be made using the AssociatedObjects field (see ETSI TS 103 120 [1], clause 7.1.4). The state of a given business process (such as an e-Evidence request) is therefore represented by a set of HI-1 Objects that are related to each other in a particular way. This is referred to as an Object Model. The Workflow Profile defined in the present document uses the Object Model shown in figure A.1-1 below. Authorisation Object Document Objects LDTask / LPTask Objects EPOCAdditionalInfo Objects Figure A.1-1: Object model for the EPOC Workflow Profile There is a single AuthorisationObject that represents the current overall state of the lawful authority covering the EPOC / EPOC-PR. There is at most one Document Object that contain a PDF representation of the E-Evidence forms that form the lawful authority under which the EPOC / EPOC-PR is issued (see annex C). There are one or more LDTask or LPTask Objects which contain ETSI TS 103 120 [1] format descriptions of what is required to be disclosed or preserved under the EPOC / EPOC-PR. There are zero or more EPOCAdditionalInfo Objects which contain implementation-specific unmapped XML information (see clause B.2). There are zero or more additional Document Objects that contain arbitrary attachments provided by the calling party as part of the Workflow Endpoint (see clause B.3). The Workflow Profile operations described in the following clauses provide mechanisms to create, maintain and terminate EPOC and EPOC-PR procedures. ETSI ETSI TS 104 144 V1.1.1 (2025-06) 41 Annex B (normative): Supplementary information in Workflow Endpoints B.1 Overview The present clause describes how additional unmapped XML and arbitrary attachments may be communicated along with any Request message to a Workflow Endpoint. B.2 EPOCAdditionalInfo Each Request to a Workflow Endpoint may contain an EPOCAdditionalInfo object, which is used to carry any additional structured information beyond that being mapped to other HI1 Objects, following the principles described in clause 4.2. This information is provided at the discretion of the RI implementation, and the format and meaning of any such information is left to the implementer providing it. The fields in each EPOCAdditionalInfo shall be as given in table B.2-1. Table B.2-1: EPOCAdditionalInfo Field Description M/C/O Reference UnmappedXML Provides a means of communicating additional structured XML information that is not covered by the present document. The format, structure and meaning of this information is left to the implementer providing it. M None B.3 Arbitrary attachments Each Request to a Workflow Endpoint may contain zero or more arbitrary attachments. Each such attachment is represented as a Document Object, with fields populated as per table B.3-1 below. Table B.3-1: DocumentObject fields for arbitrary attachments Field Description M/C/O Reference CountryCode Shall be set to the appropriate ISO country code for the source of the attachment. M ETSI TS 103 120 [1], table 7.1 OwnerIdentifier Shall be set to the appropriate technical identifier for the source of the attachment. M ETSI TS 103 120 [1], table 7.1 AssociatedObjects If associated with an EPOC or EPOC-PR, this shall include the Object ID of the original AuthorisationObject created with either the Production Workflow Endpoint (see clause 5.3) or Preservation Workflow Endpoint (see clause 5.7). M ETSI TS 103 120 [1], clause 7.1.4 DocumentName May be set to a value chosen by the source of the attachment. C ETSI TS 103 120 [1], clause 7.3.3 DocumentType Shall be set to the value "OtherAttachment" from the EPOCDocumentType Dictionary (see table C.2-2). M Table 5.5.3-2 DocumentBody Contains the contents of the attachment. M ETSI TS 103 120 [1], clause 7.3.9 ETSI ETSI TS 104 144 V1.1.1 (2025-06) 42 Annex C (normative): DocumentObject encoding for EPOC/EPOC-PR forms C.1 Overview This clause defines how the forms defined in the Regulation [i.1] (e.g. Form 1, Form 2, etc.) are carried using the DocumentObject format defined in ETSI TS 103 120 [1], clause 7.3. C.2 DocumentObject fields The DocumentObject fields shall be set as per table C.2-1 below. Table C.2-1: DocumentObject fields for EPOC/EPOC-PR forms Field Description M/C/O Reference CountryCode Shall be set to the appropriate ISO country code for the Issuing Authority of the form. M ETSI TS 103 120 [1], table 7.1 OwnerIdentifier Shall be set to the appropriate technical identifier for the Issuing Authority of the form. M ETSI TS 103 120 [1], table 7.1 AssociatedObjects Shall include the Object ID of the original AuthorisationObject created with either the Production Workflow Endpoint (see clause 5.3) or Preservation Workflow Endpoint (see clause 5.7). M ETSI TS 103 120 [1], clause 7.1.4 DocumentName Shall be set to "EPOC/EPOC-PR Form". M ETSI TS 103 120 [1], clause 7.3.3 DocumentType Shall be set to the relevant value from the EPOCDocumentType Dictionary (see table C.2-2). M Table C.2-2 DocumentBody Contains a binary document containing the signed PDF. M ETSI TS 103 120 [1], clause 7.3.9 Table C.2-2: EPOCDocumentType Dictionary (partial) Dictionary Owner Dictionary Name ETSI EPOCDocumentType Defined DictionaryEntries Value Meaning Form1 The DocumentObject contains a signed EPOC certificate from Annex I of the Regulation [i.1] (Form 1). Form2 The DocumentObject contains a signed EPOC-PR certificate from Annex II of the Regulation [i.1] (Form 2). Form3 The DocumentObject contains a signed notice regarding the impossibility of executing an EPOC/EPOC-PR as defined in Annex III of the Regulation [i.1] (Form 3). Form5 The DocumentObject contains a signed confirmation of issuance of request for production following an EPOC-PR as defined in Annex V of the Regulation [i.1] (Form 5). Form6 The DocumentObject contains a signed notice of extension of an EPOC-PR as defined in Annex VI of the Regulation [i.1] (Form 6). OtherAttachment The DocumentObject contains an arbitrary attachment as described in clause B.3 of the present document. ETSI ETSI TS 104 144 V1.1.1 (2025-06) 43 Annex D (informative): Examples D.1 Example files The ETSI Forge provides a list of example XML files that illustrate how the message flows given in the present document may be rendered. These examples are intended only as illustrations and are not exhaustive. In the event of a discrepancy between the present document and an example, the present document is considered authoritative. https://forge.etsi.org/rep/li/schemas-definitions/-/tree/main/104144/examples?ref_type=heads These examples demonstrate Workflow Endpoints that exchange forms defined by the Regulation [i.1], but should not be considered as representative of real signed documents. In particular, they do not contain digital signatures. Table D.1-1: Example XML files Example file Description form1.xml Production request (EPOC Form 1) form2.xml Preservation request (EPOC-PR Form 2) form3.xml Notification of impossibility (Form 3) form5.xml Notification of subsequent production (Form 5) form6.xml Extension of preservation (Form 6) ETSI ETSI TS 104 144 V1.1.1 (2025-06) 44 Annex E (informative): Change history Status of Technical Report ETSI TS 104 144 Interface definition for the e-Evidence Regulation (EU) 2023/1543 for National Authorities and Service Providers TC LI approval date Version Remarks June 2025 1.1.1 First publication of the TS after approval at ETSI TC LI#69 in Trondheim (Norway) ETSI ETSI TS 104 144 V1.1.1 (2025-06) 45 History Document history V1.1.1 June 2025 Publication
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55a2b1d7665a995538ef4d737dc827e7
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103 994-2
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1 Scope
|
The present document provides requirements that are specific enough to define the desired security outcomes, but flexible enough that there can be innovation and different ways for how they can be achieved. Whilst it is initially targeted towards the Telecoms Sector, the principles are designed to be industry agnostic. The present document covers the connectivity and follows on from Part 1 - Devices [1]. Additional documents will cover other aspects of PAWs that can work in conjunction with each other to meet the needs of the overall system architecture and achieve the relevant security aims.
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55a2b1d7665a995538ef4d737dc827e7
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103 994-2
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2 References
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55a2b1d7665a995538ef4d737dc827e7
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103 994-2
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2.1 Normative references
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References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. Referenced documents which are not found to be publicly available in the expected location might be found in the ETSI docbox. NOTE: While any hyperlinks included in this clause were valid at the time of publication, ETSI cannot guarantee their long-term validity. The following referenced documents are necessary for the application of the present document. [1] ETSI TS 103 994-1 (V1.1.1): "Cyber Security (CYBER); Privileged Access Workstations; Part 1: Physical Device".
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55a2b1d7665a995538ef4d737dc827e7
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103 994-2
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2.2 Informative references
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References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. NOTE: While any hyperlinks included in this clause were valid at the time of publication, ETSI cannot guarantee their long-term validity. The following referenced documents may be useful in implementing an ETSI deliverable or add to the reader's understanding, but are not required for conformance to the present document. [i.1] UK Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport: "Telecommunications Security Code of Practice". [i.2] https://attack.mitre.org/. [i.3] MITRE D3FEND™ Internet Network - Artifact Details. [i.4] UK National Cyber Security Centre: "Principles for secure privileged access workstations (PAWs)". [i.5] UK National Cyber Security Centre: "Using Transport Layer Security to protect data". [i.6] UK National Cyber Security Centre: "Security principles for cross domain solutions". ETSI ETSI TS 103 994-2 V1.1.1 (2025-07) 7
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103 994-2
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3 Definition of terms, symbols and abbreviations
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55a2b1d7665a995538ef4d737dc827e7
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103 994-2
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3.1 Terms
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For the purposes of the present document, the following terms apply: internet: network of multiple, connected networks NOTE: Internetworking is the practice of connecting a computer network with other networks through the use of gateways that provide a common method of routing information packets between the networks. The resulting system of interconnected networks are called an internetwork, or simply an internet. Internetworking is a combination of the words inter ("between") and networking; not internet-working or international-network. As defined in [i.3]. Privileged Access Workstation (PAW): appropriately secured device that enables an admin user to access data and/or make changes to security critical functions via a management plane NOTE: As defined in ETSI TS 103 994-1 [i.1]. Security Critical Function (SCF): 'security critical function' in relation to a telecoms provider means any function of the network or service whose operation is likely to have a material impact on the proper operation of the entire network or service or a material part of it NOTE: As defined in ETSI TS 103 994-1 [i.1].
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3.2 Symbols
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Void.
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3.3 Abbreviations
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For the purposes of the present document, the following abbreviations apply: APN Access Point Name CDS Cross Domain Solution CRL Certificate Revocation List DNS Domain Name Server DoH DNS over HTTPS DoQ DNS over QUIC DoT DNS over TLS EDR Endpoint Detection and Response Software GUI Graphical User Interface IPSec Internet Protocol Security JIT Just In Time MDM Mobile Device Management MFA Multi-Factor Authentication NAT Network Address Translation NCSC National Cyber Security Centre PAM Privileged Access Management PAW Privileged Access Workstation PSM Privileged Session Manager SaaS Security as a Service SASE Secure Access Service Edge SCF Security Critical Function SIEM Security Information and Event Management SOC Security Operations Centre SSH Secure SHell TLS Transport Layer Security TPM Trusted Platform Module ETSI ETSI TS 103 994-2 V1.1.1 (2025-07) 8 UK United Kingdom USB Universal Serial Bus VPN Virtual Private Network XSS Cross Site Scripting
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4 Concepts
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4.1 Introduction
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The following concepts provide a reference to the architecture that is acceptable for a PAW system. So, "Let's dive in!". It is essential that a PAW follows the concept of 'browse down' [i.4], where a high-trust system administers a system of equal or lower trust. This means the PAW controls shall only be managed from another PAW device; consider this carefully to avoid locking administrators out of the solution. Browse up [i.4], however, refers to an architectural anti-pattern in which a system is administered from low to high trust.
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4.1.1 Browse Down Architecture
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Browse down is where the physical device has a high level of trust and administrative access into a management system and can be managed appropriately within the high trust area. To access lower-trust systems, the device would be required to cross trust boundaries which can be protected to prevent exploitation of the device. Due to the direction of connectivity, no high trust services are exposed to the low trust area. A PAW device should follow the principle of browse down, using the security features and policy controls discussed in ETSI TS 103 994-1 [1]. By providing a high level of trust in the device and restricting the device activity it is possible to significantly increase the cost to a threat actor in attempting to compromise the PAW system. It is essential that high trust environments are completely inaccessible from lower-trust devices. This prevents potential unauthorized access by malicious intruders, especially through vulnerabilities associated with lower-trust devices, open services such as Web GUIs, Remote Desktop or SSH can provide an access vector when exposed to low trust networks. ETSI ETSI TS 103 994-2 V1.1.1 (2025-07) 9 Figure 1: Browse Down
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4.1.2 Browse Up Antipattern
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The antipattern browse up is where a low-trust device is used for privileged access into a high trust environment. This could be via any means, such as VPN, Jump Box, etc. Crucially browse up means a connection is initiated from low-trust into a high-trust environment. Standard corporate devices are not suitable for performing privileged administrative tasks. While these devices may be 'hardened' for security, they also maintain essential business functionality, which often requires a broad range of applications and user capabilities. Corporate devices are commonly used as 'engineering devices' that provide access to management functions through a VPN or 'jump' box. This setup can create pathways for threat actors to exploit corporate communication services (like email or chat) or general web browsing. ETSI ETSI TS 103 994-2 V1.1.1 (2025-07) 10 Figure 2: Browse Up
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4.2 Secure Communications
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To ensure the integrity, confidentiality, and authenticity of communications, all connectivity involving a PAW device shall employ strong security controls. This should include the use of authenticated, encrypted, and non-repudiable protocols for all communications that leave the PAW device. Understanding the type of connectivity is essential to enable adequate controls to be implemented. This could be remote (across an external network), direct (local physical connectivity), or to less trusted systems. A PAW device should employ strong controls on all connectivity. A PAW device shall not use any unencrypted network protocols where they traverse over an external network. Where protocols do not support this requirement, they shall be tunnelled over a secure protocol or only used on a suitably isolated network or direct (device to device) connection. Careful consideration should be given to using secure protocols throughout the device, such as encrypted DNS (e.g. DoH, DoQ, DoT). This will ensure the device remains protected, even when any VPN service is not running or during its initiation. Applying appropriate protections ensures that data in transit is protected from tampering and eavesdropping.
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5 Connectivity
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5.1 Minimize connectivity to external networks
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In most use cases, a PAW requires connectivity to external networks or internet services. But its access to external services shall be restricted to the services that are essential for it to operate. This may include receiving updates or configurations from an MDM or carrying out administrative tasks on a cloud portal. ETSI ETSI TS 103 994-2 V1.1.1 (2025-07) 11 By removing access to unnecessary internet services and enforcing strict network traffic rules, it is possible to limit a threat actor's initial access and make data exfiltration more difficult. A PAW should have technical controls in place to prevent unnecessary network connectivity. The controls implemented should depend on the accesses to which it is connecting, as well as the organisation's threat context and resiliency requirements. It is common for controls to be implemented in one of two ways: • Locally on the device, such as through a software firewall with policy controls. These controls are typically static, providing a set of permanently enabled connection routes to the required services. When using local controls, users shall not be able to change the rules and policies to enable broad internet access. Automated auditing should help to make sure that internet access remains disabled. • Off-device or remote controls, such as through Secure Access Services Edge (SASE). These controls typically use local software to securely connect to the SASE service, where a policy function can then be applied to the traffic. These types of services can be useful when connecting multiple sites together and can provide a single internet edge for all devices, making lockdown policy and audit functionally easier. They also enable a more dynamic approach to controls, as connectivity routes are only enabled when required, rather than permanently enabled. As with any third-party service, the supply chain risks associated with any SASE products used should be considered. The chosen control should be well designed so that it works as intended. Think about how a threat actor could bypass these controls - for example, by using the device proxy settings to restrict internet access. Although this would restrict a device's ability to connect to the wider internet, it could easily be defeated by a DNS poisoning attack. An organisation in a regulated sector should also consider any legal and regulatory requirements where failure or loss of connectivity to the SASE service would disrupt its ability to manage its network(s). SASE products should offer appropriate resilience to meet these regulatory requirements. Where appropriate, contingency plans should still be put in place. This includes having a defined backup route to services, so that privileged management can still be carried out from trusted PAW devices. This backup route should be treated as a break-glass solution and controlled and monitored appropriately.
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5.2 Connectivity technology
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To reduce the attack surface, make sure the connectivity methods the PAW uses, such as Wi-Fi® or cellular, are adequately secured. Public Wi-Fi networks can present a major risk to a PAW device, as they often require use of a captive portal, where the local device connects directly to the local service to authenticate. The requirement for an unsecured connection to the captive portal conflicts with the on-device controls and would require an exception to a critical PAW control. For this reason, connectivity to a captive portal from a PAW should not be allowed. A corporate cellular device providing a Wi-Fi hotspot for the PAW device should be used if 'on-the-go' is unavoidable. The cellular device could be a corporate phone or a mobile Wi-Fi device that allows authentication with the captive portal and then acts as a bridge, providing network connectivity while ensuring there is no direct connectivity between the two devices. The PAW controls ensure that all traffic leaves the device encrypted, and there are no open services available that could be exploited from the corporate device to attack the PAW. For organisations that use cellular networks with a private Access Point Name (APN), be aware that although an APN provides separation, it does not provide encryption within the telecoms network.
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5.3 Securely connect to administration targets
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5.3.1 Introduction
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A PAW needs to communicate with the systems and devices it manages and for many use cases, this could mean multiple systems or devices. Some may be less trusted or more vulnerable than others, which presents a threat to the PAW and any other system it is used to access. ETSI ETSI TS 103 994-2 V1.1.1 (2025-07) 12 Depending on how the PAW device connects to its target system or asset, it may be exposed to different risks. The important thing is to design it in such a way to reduce its risk of compromise, if connected to a compromised asset.
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5.3.2 Remote connectivity
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Many use cases for PAWs involve connecting to a system over a network, either locally or remotely. It is important that communications from the PAW are protected from any threats on that network: • Secure protocols, such as TLS or IPSec, should be used to authenticate the systems or networks which are being connected. This also protects the confidentiality, integrity and authenticity of the data in transit. It is important that the product uses an encryption protocol that offers an appropriate strength. Follow the advice by local National Technical Authorities, for example, the UK NCSC has guidance on recommended profiles [i.5] on how to use TLS to protect data. • The PAW device itself should not run any network services that accept incoming connections, and all communication should be established outbound from the PAW. • Where the use of insecure protocols is required, tunnel them over a secure protocol, or only use them on a suitably isolated network. • For services that are considered high risk, add technical controls which ensure they can only be accessed if authenticating from the PAW device.
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5.3.3 Direct connectivity
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Some use cases may require direct physical connectivity to the administrated device, such as over serial or Ethernet links. When using direct physical connectivity to a system or asset, the controls on the PAW device are the only layer of security between the PAW device and the asset being managed. It is important to understand the risks this could introduce to the system and mitigate them using the controls on the PAW device. A mitigation would be the use of a hypervisor locally on the PAW to run specialist software, rather than this running directly on the PAW. This would remove the requirement to add specific exemptions for the software to execute and protect the PAW network from software that may be legacy or vulnerable.
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5.3.4 Isolated devices and systems
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In many cases, a PAW which is used to manage standalone or isolated equipment is also used to manage or connect to other systems and networks. Where this is the case, the PAW device acts as a bridge between the systems and networks, even if the connections are not active at the same time. Even if a network is temporarily disconnected, malicious data could be stored and transferred via the PAW once it reconnects. Where possible, avoid intentionally disabling connectivity from the PAW to its supporting systems, such as its MDM and logging solution. Removing this connectivity could limit the user's ability to carry out their role, for example, by blocking access to the file transfer solution. It also disrupts monitoring and threat detection, especially where anti-virus solutions are configured to use cloud-based analytics.
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5.3.5 Less trusted systems
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A system or device managed by a PAW could be considered less trusted for several reasons, for example: • it processes high-risk data; • it is one of many systems which need segregating from one another; • a third party has privileged access to it. ETSI ETSI TS 103 994-2 V1.1.1 (2025-07) 13 If one of these systems is compromised, consider the risks it would present to the PAW device and the wider estate. If the risk is unacceptable, add additional security controls between the PAW and the less trusted system. This protects the PAW device by creating stronger separation. The NCSC cross domain principles [i.6] provide an appropriate level of separation. For example, implement a jump host (bastion host), a Privileged Session Manager (PSM) or a hardware-based Cross Domain Solution (CDS) solution. A PSM can offer additional functionality for screen recording or session management, and it also keeps an audit trail of established sessions. PSMs are often provided as a part of a broader PAM product. Although they offer many benefits, the impact of compromised privileged access is very high, so it is important to use a PAW to access the PSM solution.
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6 Third Parties and PAWs
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6.1 Definitions
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A third party is characterized as an individual or entity external to an organisation. This typically implies there is no direct control over the employees working on behalf of the contracting organisation. It is crucial to establish contractual agreements with any third-party company to ensure compliance with legal and regulatory obligations, and to ensure their policies and procedures are compatible. Involvement of third parties may encompass the following scenarios: 1) The design, construction, and continuous upkeep of a portion or the entirety of the PAW system - see clause 6.3. 2) The installation and/or continuous maintenance of the contracting organisation's part of critical systems, excluding the PAW system. This could include software based within the contracting organisation's on-premises or part of a cloud-based solution - see clause 6.4. These situations are notably distinct and hence necessitate different degrees of supervision.
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6.2 Apply equivalent controls to third parties
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If a third party is compromised, it offers an access route to all the organisations to which they provide services. This is why third-party access is viewed as a significant risk and should be managed appropriately. To ensure that the PAW solution is an effective defence, any third party that requires access to the contracting organisation's administration interfaces shall also adhere to the same controls. "Don't lose it, reuse it!" Where possible, supply third parties with both a PAW device and user account from the contracting organisation. This is the most effective way to ensure trust in the devices being used. It may not be feasible in cases where a third party is providing management services to multiple organisations. Where this is the case, make sure that the PAW device that they use is built to the same security standards that the contracting organisation has in place. Validate this either through technical or contractual controls. To build trust in the devices a third party uses, a penetration test or risk-based review shall be carried out. If a third party is allowed to use their own devices, it is essential that they still authenticate through the contracting organisation's identity provider. By retaining control over the identities a third party uses, an organisation can more effectively control the policies used to validate a user's identity in their environment. This could include, for example, the locations from which a user is allowed to authenticate, or the type of MFA used. A risk assessment associated with access levels should be carried out when allowing a third party into the contracting organisation's environment, and this access should be reviewed regularly. Regular auditing and continuous monitoring of third-party access is critical to manage the risks around it. Only allow a third party to access equipment where there is a requirement for them to do so and use technical controls to limit any further access. A PAW is defined as a physical device in ETSI TS 103 994-1 [1]. Any third-party PAW device which connects to the administration interfaces should also be a physical device. Allowing a third party that is working on the contracting organisation's behalf to use virtualization instead of a PAW is not a secure alternative. They shall put in place a physical PAW device which complies with the contracting organisation's polices on PAWs. ETSI ETSI TS 103 994-2 V1.1.1 (2025-07) 14
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6.3 Third party acting as a Managed Service Provider
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Engaging a third party to design, construct, and/or upkeep the privileged system poses a substantial threat to a business's operational security. The business's security is intrinsically linked to the third party's security, given their need for significant privileged access. If a PAW system is to be developed and constructed by a third party, it should be done without direct access to operational systems; only test systems should be utilized during this phase. After completion, the third party's privileged access should be terminated, and full control should be transferred to the business's IT service function, along with necessary operational documentation, patching instructions, and training. Operational systems should be migrated by in-house engineers only after the third-party administration has concluded. Third parties should not retain any remote administration access to PAW systems i.e. the ability to change PAW controls. If assistance is needed, it should be provided under the supervision of in-house IT teams. In-house IT teams should handle all continuous maintenance of PAW systems. If a third party is given the contract to continually maintain a PAW system, they shall maintain access using a dedicated PAW device. It is recommended that audit and logging controls are overseen by a separate team. 6.4 Third party access to privilege systems (excluding PAW system) Third parties may require access to either their own equipment or systems that they manage within the contracting organisation's network, which may include critical components of the network. It is essential that third parties employ a secure access method (i.e. a PAW) to reach sensitive areas of any network, following all the same security requirements that any employee would need to follow to gain sensitive access. Consider the following recommendations when permitting third parties into the privileged network: • Just-in-Time Access: Third parties shall not have permanent access. Instead, a process involving a SOC/in-house IT team shall be in place to grant access as needed with an associated trouble ticket. • Device Access: Third parties shall only have access to the devices they need. • Credential Management: Credentials should be managed solely by a PAM. No third party shall possess "back-door" credentials. These should be rotated immediately after the third party completes any task. • Non-repudiation: Access shall be logged, recorded and reviewed, and the third-party user shall be authenticated, i.e. the user is known and verified. • PAW Verification: They shall use a verifiable PAW to gain privileged access. It does not have to be the contracting organisation's PAW; it could be their own, providing it meets the PAW requirements, and it can be validated. • Secure Access: Access for third parties should be granted through a secure and encrypted pathway. This could involve the use of a VPN or SASE-type access, depending on the contracting organisation's specific architecture. It is crucial to ensure that the security requirements for third-party access align with the contracting organisation's existing standards.
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7 Specification
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Section Specification Browse down All privileged access shall use a high trust device. High trust devices shall limit external connectivity and applications to only those required. Browse up Low trust devices shall not be used for privileged administration. Remote access services should use conditional access where appropriate to limit connectivity to only trusted devices. Secure communications All protocols should be encrypted leaving the PAW device. Limited unencrypted protocols shall have defence in depth techniques to protect the device if these are exploited. ETSI ETSI TS 103 994-2 V1.1.1 (2025-07) 15 Section Specification Minimize connectivity to external networks By default, the PAW shall have no direct internet access. By exception, the PAW should be able to connect to required internet services for the purpose of device security and administration of systems. A documented list of services that are permitted should exist with defined reasons as to why a service is enabled - for example Cloud-based EDR software. Connectivity technology A PAW shall be connected to trusted, secure, private networks. Public/untrusted networks should be avoided where possible. Captive Portals shall not be allowed; policy controls shall block by default. In fixed environments (i.e. PAW as a Terminal), networks shall use 802.1X for authentication. Connectivity technology (continued) USB to Serial/USB to Ethernet adapters may be used in situations that require direct connection. This shall be between a PAW guest Virtual Machine and the equipment. The PAW policy shall allow the USB pass-through device, by exception using the hardware ID of the USB device. Bluetooth® shall be disabled by policy and only used by exception where required. Cellular can be used as connectivity when required, but consider the risks involved with direct access to cellular networks from a PAW, for example device tracking via the signalling network. It is acceptable to use a Wi-Fi® hotspot from a corporate mobile device. This should not provide any connectivity between devices; the corporate device is acting as a network bridge/router. The PAW device protections i.e. communication encryption, no accessible ports etc will protect the PAW from anything malicious on the corporate device. Remote connectivity VPNs shall follow National Technical Authority guidelines for encryption types and strength. VPN should use an on-device certificate utilizing the TPM for private key protection. VPN shall be signed by a root certificate, with CRLs in use. All VPN configurations shall be controlled by policy, the device shall block additional VPNs if not set by policy. All VPN certificates shall be controlled by policy, device shall block additional certificate installations by the user. SASE service shall be resilient, or device fleets shall use different regions/providers to provide resilience. SASE shall have restrictive rules applied to block internet access, with allow-list for limited services if required. SASE service shall log all activity, with data retained and available to a SIEM. The SASE software running on the PAW shall not be overruled or disabled by the end user. Software shall use encryption between devices and endpoint. Where a SaaS service is directly internet reachable, policy shall enforce connectivity from a trusted source (i.e. a PAW). Direct connectivity A PAW may be connected to an operational network (e.g. via Serial or Ethernet adapter). Where specialist software is required, a virtual machine should be used to provide separation between the software and the PAW network. Apply equivalent controls to third parties All third parties shall use the same controls as any other users. If some controls are not possible, then extra controls shall be implemented. For example, if using a third-party identity provider, and it's not possible to prove the level of MFA, then further MFA shall be implemented. ETSI ETSI TS 103 994-2 V1.1.1 (2025-07) 16 Section Specification Third Party acting as a Managed Service Provider Third parties may design and build the PAW system and devices. Overall responsibility for privileged access system shall remain with the primary business. PAW systems shall not be migrated by third party providers; this responsibility belongs with the system owner. The third party should hand over all responsibility after design and/or build to the primary business. Third-party providers should not be responsible for the PAW system's continued management. If a third party does continue to manage a PAW system, they should use a dedicated fleet of devices for each network they manage. Third party access to privilege systems (Excluding PAW System) Third parties should not maintain permanent access into privilege systems. Third parties shall use Just in Time (JIT) access, using in-house Security Operations Centre (SOC) team/administrators to facility access as required. Third parties shall only be able to access the equipment they need to during the permitted access time. Third parties shall only gain access via credentials retained by the business; they shall not use their own access/"backdoor" credentials. Third parties shall use a recognized physical PAW device to gain privileged access. Third parties' access shall be audited/logged/recorded and this record maintained by the business for a period of at least 12 months.
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8 Threats and Mitigations
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There is significant risk over the communication channels between a PAW device, and its corresponding network(s), given the privileged access the device is protecting. If the device itself is well-protected, then an attacker may refocus attention towards the communications between the device and any external networks. This is fundamentally why all communications emanating from a PAW should be encrypted by default. Exceptions to this shall be understood and be limited to only what is required, for example direct access to a device not connected to a network. PAW devices can be used across different operator networks; providing they meet the specification of a PAW device. However extra controls should be implemented to ensure that communications between different operator networks are not possible. Data transfer should be restricted to only the provided method of Import/Export (i.e. no Copy/Paste). ETSI ETSI TS 103 994-2 V1.1.1 (2025-07) 17 MITRE® Framework examples but more specific to communications risks or lack of security that comes from poor communications security: Threat Vector Risk Mitigation and Effect Content Injection The ability of an adversary to maintain access to victim systems by injecting malicious content into online network traffic. Instead of directing victims to compromised websites, they exploit vulnerable data-transfer channels to manipulate or inject traffic directly. These channels can also deliver additional payloads to already compromised systems. Injection methods include: • In-the-middle: Intercepting and altering traffic between client and server (distinct from enterprise-focused Adversary-in-the-Middle). • From-the-side: Sending fake responses that reach the client before legitimate ones. Such attacks often stem from compromised upstream infrastructure. Encrypted protocols help prevent content injection by ensuring that traffic cannot be modified in transit. One exception is a Captive Portal which poses a unique risk, even with encrypted traffic, since an adversary controlling the portal can still inject malicious content. Blocking the use of Captive Portals mitigates this threat. A drive-by Compromise Access can be gained from visiting a website with malicious content e.g. JavaScript, iFrames or Cross Site-Scripting (XSS). This could be down to the user clicking a link - often a referrer or shorten link without knowing the true destination. Alternatively, it could be that a known website has been hijacked, and malicious content has been embedded which would execute without the user knowing. The limiting of internet-based services will significantly curtail the ability of any adversary in using this method. The removal of corporate tools such as email and instant messaging services removes the ability to receive spear phishing links or malicious payloads directly on the PAW device. Supply Chain compromise Attacking a third-party supplier to gain access to a key service/function is becoming increasingly common. Third parties often require deep, specialist access to the systems which they have supplied for on-going maintenance and support. Third party suppliers following the same stringent privilege access process, including the use of PAWs, MFA, and credential management will ensure that these suppliers are not an easy "backdoor" into sensitive systems. Exploit Public Facing Application A running service which exposes a TCP/IP port on a device can be used to gain access to the device, whilst end user devices are typically behind a Network Address Translation (NAT), (which means they are not directly reachable from the internet) this does not stop a local attacker gaining access to the device (e.g. where the device is on an untrusted network - Open Wi-Fi®) or where an attacker has already gained network access and can now move laterally within a network. Designing a browse down architecture removes the requirement of leaving open services available to lower trust systems. ETSI ETSI TS 103 994-2 V1.1.1 (2025-07) 18 Annex A (informative): Bibliography • MITRE ATT&CK®: "Content Injection". • MITRE ATT&CK®: "Drive-by Compromise". • MITRE ATT&CK®: "Supply Chain Compromise". • MITRE ATT&CK®: "Exploit Public-Facing Application". ETSI ETSI TS 103 994-2 V1.1.1 (2025-07) 19 Annex B (informative): Change history Date Version Information about changes May 2025 V0.0.1 First draft. May 2025 V0.0.2 Filled out many of the headings with text. Updated with the new template wording for normative and informative references. May 2025 V0.0.3 Included specification table. June 2025 V0.0.4 Reordered specification and threats and mitigations headings and populated clause 8. June 2025 V0.0.5 Minor amendments. ETSI ETSI TS 103 994-2 V1.1.1 (2025-07) 20 History Document history V1.1.1 July 2025 Publication
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1 Scope
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The present document provides the Protocol Implementation Conformance Statement (PICS) pro forma for the conformance test specifications for Vulnerable Road Users (VRU) Awareness Basic Service as defined in ETSI TS 103 300-3 [1] in compliance with the relevant requirements and in accordance with the relevant guidance given in ISO/IEC 9646-7 [i.2].
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2 References
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2.1 Normative references
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References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. Referenced documents which are not found to be publicly available in the expected location might be found in the ETSI docbox. NOTE: While any hyperlinks included in this clause were valid at the time of publication, ETSI cannot guarantee their long-term validity. The following referenced documents are necessary for the application of the present document. [1] ETSI TS 103 300-3 (V2.2.1): "Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS); Vulnerable Road Users (VRU) awareness; Part 3: Specification of VRU awareness basic service; Release 2 ".
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2.2 Informative references
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References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. NOTE: While any hyperlinks included in this clause were valid at the time of publication, ETSI cannot guarantee their long-term validity. The following referenced documents may be useful in implementing an ETSI deliverable or add to the reader's understanding, but are not required for conformance to the present document. [i.1] ISO/IEC 9646-1 (1994): "Information technology — Open Systems Interconnection — Conformance testing methodology and framework — Part 1: General concepts". [i.2] ISO/IEC 9646-7 (1995): "Information technology — Open Systems Interconnection — Conformance testing methodology and framework — Part 7: Implementation Conformance Statements". [i.3] ETSI TS 103 097: "Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS); Security; Security header and certificate formats; Release 2". [i.4] IEEE 1609.2TM: "IEEE Standard for Wireless Access in Vehicular Environments--Security Services for Application and Management Messages". ETSI ETSI TS 104 018-1 V2.1.1 (2025-07) 6
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3 Definition of terms, symbols and abbreviations
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104 018-1
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3.1 Terms
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For the purposes of the present document, the terms given in ETSI TS 103 300-3 [1], ISO/IEC 9646-1 [i.1] and ISO/IEC 9646-7 [i.2] apply.
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3.2 Symbols
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Void.
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104 018-1
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3.3 Abbreviations
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For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in ETSI TS 103 300-3 [1] and the following apply: CAN Controller Area Network DE Data Element ITS Intelligent Transportation Systems IUT Implementation Under Test PICS Protocol Implementation Conformance Statement SUT System Under Test VAM VRU Awareness Message VBS VRU Basic Service VRU Vulnerable Road User
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104 018-1
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4 Conformance requirement concerning PICS
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If it claims to conform to the present document, the actual PICS pro forma to be filled in by a supplier shall be technically equivalent to the text of the PICS pro forma given in annex A, and shall preserve the numbering, naming and ordering of the pro forma items. A PICS which conforms to the present document shall be a conforming PICS pro forma completed in accordance with the instructions for completion given in clause A.2. ETSI ETSI TS 104 018-1 V2.1.1 (2025-07) 7 Annex A (normative): VBS PICS pro forma A.1 The right to copy Notwithstanding the provisions of the copyright clause related to the text of the present document, ETSI grants that users of the present document may freely reproduce the Security PICS pro forma in this annex so that it can be used for its intended purposes and may further publish the completed PICS pro forma. A.2 Guidance for completing the PICS pro forma A.2.1 Purposes and structure The purpose of the present document is to provide a mechanism whereby a supplier of an implementation of the requirements defined in relevant specifications may provide information about the implementation in a standardized manner. The PICS pro forma is subdivided into clauses for the following categories of information: • instructions for completing the PICS pro forma; • identification of the implementation; • identification of the protocol; • PICS pro forma tables (for example: major capabilities, etc.). A.2.2 Abbreviations and conventions This annex does not reflect dynamic conformance requirements but static ones. In particular, a condition for support of a PDU parameter does not reflect requirements about the syntax of the PDU (i.e. the presence of a parameter) but the capability of the implementation to support the parameter. In the sending direction, the support of a parameter means that the implementation is able to send this parameter (but it does not mean that the implementation always sends it). In the receiving direction, it means that the implementation supports the whole semantic of the parameter that is described in the main part of the present document. The PICS pro forma contained in this annex is comprised of information in tabular form in accordance with the guidelines presented in ISO/IEC 9646-7. Item column The item column contains a number which identifies the item in the table. Item description column The item description column describes in free text each respective item (e.g. parameters, timers, etc.). It implicitly means "is <item description> supported by the implementation?". Reference column The reference column gives reference to ETSI TS 103 097 unless otherwise stated. ETSI ETSI TS 104 018-1 V2.1.1 (2025-07) 8 Status column The status column describes the status of the item. The various status used in this annex are in accordance with the rules described in IEEE 1609.2, annex A. Predicate in conditional and optional items is of form of Reference to items, as described below. Support column The support column shall be filled in by the supplier of the implementation. The following common notations, defined in ISO/IEC 9646-7, are used for the support column: Y or y supported by the implementation N or n not supported by the implementation N/A, n/a or - no answer required (allowed only if the status is N/A, directly or after evaluation of a conditional status) References to items For each possible item answer (answer in the support column) within the PICS pro forma there exists a unique reference, used, for example, in the conditional expressions. It is defined as the table identifier, followed by a dot character ".", followed by the item number in the table. A.2.3 Instructions for completing the PICS pro forma The supplier of the implementation may complete the PICS pro forma in each of the spaces provided. More detailed instructions are given at the beginning of the different clauses of the PICS pro forma. A.3 Identification of the implementation A.3.1 Introduction Identification of the Equipment shall be filled in so as to provide as much details as possible regarding version numbers and configuration options. Both the product supplier information and client information shall be filled in if they are different. A person who can answer queries regarding information supplied in the PICS shall be named as the contact person. A.3.2 Date of the statement ......................................................................................................................................................................................... A.3.3 Implementation Under Test (IUT) identification IUT name: ......................................................................................................................................................................................... ......................................................................................................................................................................................... IUT version: ......................................................................................................................................................................................... ETSI ETSI TS 104 018-1 V2.1.1 (2025-07) 9 A.3.4 System Under Test (SUT) identification SUT name: ......................................................................................................................................................................................... ......................................................................................................................................................................................... Hardware configuration: ......................................................................................................................................................................................... ......................................................................................................................................................................................... ......................................................................................................................................................................................... Operating system: ......................................................................................................................................................................................... A.3.5 Product supplier Name: ......................................................................................................................................................................................... Address: ......................................................................................................................................................................................... ......................................................................................................................................................................................... ......................................................................................................................................................................................... Telephone number: ......................................................................................................................................................................................... Facsimile number: ......................................................................................................................................................................................... E-mail address: ......................................................................................................................................................................................... Additional information: ......................................................................................................................................................................................... ......................................................................................................................................................................................... ......................................................................................................................................................................................... A.3.6 Client (if different from product supplier) Name: ......................................................................................................................................................................................... ETSI ETSI TS 104 018-1 V2.1.1 (2025-07) 10 Address: ......................................................................................................................................................................................... ......................................................................................................................................................................................... ......................................................................................................................................................................................... Telephone number: ......................................................................................................................................................................................... Facsimile number: ......................................................................................................................................................................................... E-mail address: ......................................................................................................................................................................................... Additional information: ......................................................................................................................................................................................... ......................................................................................................................................................................................... A.3.7 PICS contact person (A person to contact if there are any queries concerning the content of the PICS) Name: ......................................................................................................................................................................................... Telephone number: ......................................................................................................................................................................................... Facsimile number: ......................................................................................................................................................................................... E-mail address: ......................................................................................................................................................................................... Additional information: ......................................................................................................................................................................................... ......................................................................................................................................................................................... ......................................................................................................................................................................................... A.4 Identification of the protocol This PICS pro forma applies to the following standard: ETSI TS 103 300-3 (V2.2.1): Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS); Vulnerable Road Users (VRU) awareness; Part 3: Specification of VRU awareness basic service; Release 2". ETSI ETSI TS 104 018-1 V2.1.1 (2025-07) 11 A.5 Global statement of conformance Are all mandatory capabilities implemented? (Yes/No) ..................... NOTE: Answering "No" to this question indicates non-conformance to the VBS standard specification. Non-supported mandatory capabilities are to be identified in the PICS, with an explanation of why the implementation is non-conforming, on pages attached to the PICS pro forma. A.6 Tables Unless stated otherwise, the column references of all tables below indicates the clause numbers of ETSI TS 103 300-3. Table A.1: VAM generation Item Type Reference Status Support 1 IUT supports VAM generation 6.1 m 2 IUT supports VAM transmission 6.1 m Table A.2: Communication type Item Type Reference Status Support 1 G5 Radio communication 5.3.3.2 o.201 2 CV2X radio communication 5.3.3.2 o.201 o.201: It is mandatory to support at least one of these types. Table A.3: ITS-S VRU profiles Item CA vehicle profile Reference Status Support 1 Pedestrian (1) 7.3.4 (Table 10) o.201 2 Bicyclist or Light Vehicle (2) 7.3.4 (Table 10) o.201 3 Motorcyclist (3) 7.3.4 (Table 10) o.201 4 Animal (4) 7.3.4 (Table 10) o.201 o.301: It is mandatory to support at least one VRU profile Table A.4: VBS basic functionality Item Vehicle Type Reference Status Support 1 IUT supports cluster join 5.4.2 o 2 IUT supports cluster leader role 5.4.2.1 o Table A.5: ITS Security mode Item Type Reference Status Support 1 ITS-S security mode enabled 6.5 m Table A.6: Timing requirements Item Name of field Reference Default value Status Support 1 Maximum time interval between VAM generation (T_GenVamMax) 6.2 5 000 ms m 2 Minimum time interval between VAM generation (T_ GenVamMin) 6.2 100 ms m 3 T_ GenVam 6.2 T_ GenVamMin ≤ T_ GenVam ≤ T_ GenVamMax c.601 c.601: This item is mandatory when the item A.2.2 is supported. ETSI ETSI TS 104 018-1 V2.1.1 (2025-07) 12 Table A.7: Elevated hazard situation Item Type Reference Status Support 1 Elevated hazard situation active 5.3.5 o ETSI ETSI TS 104 018-1 V2.1.1 (2025-07) 13 History Version Date Status V2.1.1 July 2025 Publication
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1 Scope
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The present document defines network functions which are necessary to support services and facilities provided by PLMNs. A summary of the network functions is given in Table 1, where also an indication is given whether the network must support the function. The table also indicates whether or not a function requires internetworking signalling between PLMNs (i.e. use of Mobile Application Part, Technical Specification GSM 09.02). All functions require signalling on the radio path as specified in Technical Specification GSM 04.08.
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1.1 References
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The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document. • References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non-specific. • For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply. • For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. • A non-specific reference to an ETS shall also be taken to refer to later versions published as an EN with the same number. • For this Release 1998 document, references to GSM documents are for Release 1998 versions (version 7.x.y). [1] GSM 01.04: "Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+); Abbreviations and acronyms". [2] GSM 02.04: "Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+); General on supplementary service". [3] GSM 02.09: "Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+); Security aspects". [4] GSM 02.60: "Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+); General Packet Radio Service (GPRS); Service Description - Stage 1". [5] GSM 03.03: "Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+); Numbering, addressing and identification". [6] GSM 03.07: "Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+); Restoration procedures". [7] GSM 03.08: "Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+); Organisation of subscriber data". [8] GSM 03.12: "Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+); Location registration procedures". [9] GSM 03.13: "Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+); Discontinuous Reception (DRX) in the GSM system". [10] GSM 03.14: "Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+); Support of Dual Tone Multi- Frequency signalling (DTMF) via the GSM system". [11] GSM 03.20: "Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+); Security related network functions". [12] GSM 03.22: "Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+); Functions related to Mobile Station (MS) in idle mode". [13] GSM 03.40: "Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+); Technical realization of the Short Message Service (SMS) Point to Point (PP)". ETSI ETSI TS 100 521 V7.0.0 (1999-09) 7 (GSM 03.01 version 7.0.0 Release 1998) [14] GSM 03.60: "Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+); General Packet Radio Service (GPRS); Service Description; Stage 2". [15] GSM 03.64: "Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+); Overall Description of the General Packet Radio Service (GPRS) Radio Interface; Stage 2". [16] GSM 03.81: "Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+); Line identification supplementary services - Stage 2". [17] GSM 03.82: "Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+); Call Forwarding (CF) supplementary services - Stage 2". [18] GSM 03.83: "Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+); Call Waiting (CW) and Call Hold (HOLD) supplementary services - Stage 2". [19] GSM 03.84: "Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+); MultiParty (MPTY) supplementary services - Stage 2". [20] GSM 03.85: "Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+); Closed User Group (CUG) supplementary services - Stage 2". [21] GSM 03.86: "Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+); Advice of Charge (AoC) supplementary services - Stage 2". [22] GSM 03.88: "Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+); Call Barring (CB) supplementary services - Stage 2". [23] GSM 04.08: "Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+); Mobile radio interface layer 3 specification". [24] GSM 05.08: "Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+); Radio subsystem link control". [25] GSM 09.02: "Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+); Mobile Application Part (MAP) specification". [26] GSM 12.00: "Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+); Objectives and structure of Network Management (NM)". [27] GSM 12.01: "Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+); Common aspects of GSM Network Management (NM)". [28] GSM 12.07: "Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+); Operations and performance management". [29] GSM 12.02: "Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+); Subscriber, Mobile Equipment (ME) and services data administration". [30] GSM 12.03: "Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+); Security management". [31] GSM 12.04: "Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+); Performance data measurements". [32] GSM 12.05: "Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+); Subscriber related event and call data". [33] GSM 12.06: "Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+); GSM Network change control". [34] GSM 12.10: "Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+); Maintenance provisions for operational integrity of Mobile Stations (MS)". [35] GSM 12.11: "Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+); Maintenance of the Base Station System (BSS)". ETSI ETSI TS 100 521 V7.0.0 (1999-09) 8 (GSM 03.01 version 7.0.0 Release 1998) [36] GSM 12.13: "Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+); Maintenance of the Mobile- services Switching Centre (MSC)". [37] GSM 12.14: "Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+); Maintenance of location registers". [38] GSM 12.20: "Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+); Network Management (NM) procedures and messages". [39] GSM 12.21: "Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+); Network Management (NM) procedures and message on the A-bis interface". [40] GSM 12.22: "Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+); Interworking of GSM Network Management (NM) procedures and messages at the Base Station Controller (BSC)".
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1.2 Abbreviations
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Abbreviations used in the present document are listed in GSM 01.04.
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2 Network functions for basic service provision
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2.1 Call handling
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This set of functions enables the establishment of communications between a mobile subscriber and another network subscriber in one of the following types of network PSTN, ISDN, PSPDN, CSPDN and other PLMNs.
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2.1.1 Call from a mobile subscriber registered in VLR
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This is the normal case where the call is routed according to the dialled number. After the call, the MSC will send the charging information to the HLR, a billing entity and/or store the charging data on tapes or discs as described in Technical Specification GSM 12.05.
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2.1.2 Call from a mobile subscriber not registered in VLR
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When the VLR receives a request for call set-up parameters from an MSC for an MS originating call, where the MS is not registered in the VLR, the VLR shall initiate a location updating procedure towards the HLR and in response parameters are given concerning category, services and restrictions. The call is then set up as in 2.1.1. This case only happens when a VLR or an MS failure has occurred.
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2.1.3 Call to a mobile subscriber
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The call is routed (re-routed or forwarded) according to location data obtained from the HLR to the actual MSC and the MS is paged over the standardised radio interface. For MSs in mode of operation A and B the paging may be performed via SGSN. This optional network function is further described in the Technical Specification GSM 03.60. ETSI ETSI TS 100 521 V7.0.0 (1999-09) 9 (GSM 03.01 version 7.0.0 Release 1998) Table 1: Overview of network functions Class of Network Network Function Network Interworking Function (NF) Support with MAP NF for basic Call Handling (Note 3) M X service provision Packet Handling (Note 4) M X Subscriber Authentication M X Emergency calls (Note 3) M - Supplementary Services M X Voice group services (Note 3) O X Short Message Service (SMS) M X Signalling information element confidentiality M X NF for Location registration M X supporting: Handover (Note 3) - in the same BSS M - - in the same MSC M - - in the same PLMN M X Call re-establishment (Note 3) M - Additional NF Queueing O - for call handling OACSU (Note 3) O - Security related services M X Discontinuous reception M - Discontinuous Transmission M/O - Note 2 DTMF (Note 3) M - Network management M X oriented NF (Note 1) NOTE 1: The function will not be fully specified by GSM (national specifications will complement). NOTE 2: Only the receiver requirements are mandatory, the transmitter requirements support are optional. NOTE 3: Only applicable for circuit switched services NOTE 4: Only applicable for packet switched services
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2.1.4 Call handling functions in HLR
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The HLR should also support control functions for handling of supplementary services as described for each service in the GSM 03.8x series of Technical Specifications. The HLR should provide information to the gateway MSC to allow it to route calls directed to a mobile subscriber: either a Mobile Station Roaming Number (MSRN) to allow the call to be routed to the visited MSC or a forwarding number if the call is to be forwarded to a destination different from the original one. The HLR should provide the identity of the visited MSC to the SMS gateway MSC to allow it to route short messages directed to a mobile subscriber; further detail is given in Technical Specification GSM 03.40. ETSI ETSI TS 100 521 V7.0.0 (1999-09) 10 (GSM 03.01 version 7.0.0 Release 1998)
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2.1.5 Call handling functions in VLR
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The VLR must provide subscriber parameters to the MSC as required for call handling. The VLR must also support control functions for handling of supplementary services as described for each service in the GSM 03.8x series of Technical Specifications. For a MS in mode of operation A or B, the VLR may optionally support establishment and maintenance of an association with an SGSN. This allows paging for a circuit switched call to be performed via SGSN.
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2.1.6 Call handling functions in MSC
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The MSC must perform normal call routing and call control functions. The MSC will obtain subscriber parameters from its associated VLR. The MSC must also be capable of performing handover as defined in section 3.2. In some cases, the MSC must be able to act as a gateway MSC to provide an interface to other circuit-switched networks.
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2.1.7 Call handling functions in SGSN
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For a MS in mode of operation A or B, the SGSN may optionally support establishment and maintenance of an association with a VLR. This allows paging for a circuit switched call to be performed via SGSN.
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2.2 Subscriber identity authentication
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The purpose of subscriber identity authentication is defined in Technical Specification GSM 02.09. The authentication mechanism is defined in Technical Specification GSM 03.20 and corresponding procedures on the MS-BSS interface are defined in Technical Specification GSM 04.08.
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2.3 Emergency call
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2.3.1 General
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The land mobile system should be capable of efficient handling of emergency calls fromMS. The signalling procedures on the radio path for emergency calls are given in Technical Specification GSM 04.08.
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2.3.2 Routeing
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The call should be routed automatically to an appropriate emergency centre based on the geographical location of the MS(e.g. based on the identity of the cell on which the call is established).
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2.4 Supplementary services
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PLMN may offer supplementary services as shown in Technical Specification GSM 02.04. The support of supplementary services will require control procedures in HLRs, VLRs and MSCs in addition to the control procedure in the fixed network. The technical realisation of supplementary services is given in the GSM 03.8x series of Technical Specifications. ETSI ETSI TS 100 521 V7.0.0 (1999-09) 11 (GSM 03.01 version 7.0.0 Release 1998)
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2.5 Voice group services
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The PLMN may offer the voice group services. These are the voice group call service (VGCS) and voice broadcast service (VBS), as shown in GSM 02.68 and GSM 02.69, respectively. The support of the voice group call and voice broadcast services will require control procedures in HLRs, VLRs, MSCs and Group Call Register (GCR) and possibly control procedures in the fixed network. The technical realisation of these services is given in GSM 03.68 and GSM 03.69, respectively.
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2.6 Short Message Service
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This set of functions allows the transfer of short messages i either direction between a mobile station and a short message service centre. More detailed information is given in Technical Specification GSM 03.40.
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2.6.1 Short Message Handling functions in the HLR
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The HLR should be able to provide information to allow a short message to be routed from the SMS gateway MSC to the visited MSC and/or visited SGSN and then to the required MS.
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2.6.2 Short Message Handling Functions in the VLR
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The VLR should provide subscriber parameters to the MSC as required for handling short messages.
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2.6.3 Short Message Handling Functions in the MSC
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The MSC should perform the functions of relaying short messages in both directions between the fixed network of the PLMN and the BSS. In some cases the MSC should be able to act as an SMS Gateway MSC to relay short messages from a Short Message Service Centre (SC) to a PLMN, or an SMS Interworking MSC to relay short messages from a PLMN to an SC.
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2.6.4 Short Message Handling Functions in the SGSN
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The SGSN should perform the functions of relaying short messages in both directions between the fixed network of the PLMN and the BSS. The SGSN should also provide subscriber parameters required for handling the short messages relaying function. The SGSN should also download (from HLR or another SGSN) and store subscriber parameters required for handling the short message relaying functions.
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2.7 Signalling information element confidentiality
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A procedure should be implemented providing for the confidentiality of signalling information elements on the radio path. In Technical Specification GSM 02.09 the signalling information elements which need to be protected are given. The Encryption Key is calculated in both the MS and the network. Detailed information is given in Technical Specification GSM 03.20.
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2.8 Packet Handling
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This set of functions enables routing of packets between an MS and a network host in one of the following types of network: PSPDN, networks based on the Internet Protocol (IP) and other PLMNs.
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2.8.1 Packet handling functions in SGSN
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The SGSN should perform the functions of routing packets in both directions between one or more GGSN’s and the BSS. The SGSN should also download (from HLR or another SGSN) and store subscriber parameters required for handling the packet routing functions. ETSI ETSI TS 100 521 V7.0.0 (1999-09) 12 (GSM 03.01 version 7.0.0 Release 1998)
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2.8.2 Packet handling functions in GGSN
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The GGSN should act as a gateway that provides interface(s) to other packet data networks. The GGSN should further perform the functions of routing packets in both directions between these networks and one or more SGSN’s. The GGSN should also download (from SGSN) and store subscriber parameters required for handling the packet routing functions.
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2.8.3 Packet switched service functions in HLR
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The HLR should provide permanent storage of subscriber data. The HLR should provide the identity of the visited SGSN to the SMS gateway MSC to allow it to route short messages directed to a mobile subscriber; further detail is given in Technical Specification GSM 03.40.
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3 Network functions for supporting cellular operation
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3.1 Location registration
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3.1.1 Definitions
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Location registration means that the PLMNs keep track of where MSs are located in the system area. The location information is stored in functional units called location registers. Functionally there are four types of location registers: - the home location register (HLR) where the current location and all subscriber parameters of a MSare permanently stored; - the visitor location register (VLR) where all relevant parameters concerning a MS are stored aslong as the station is within the area controlled by that visitor location register. - the serving GPRS support node (SGSN) where all relevant parameters concerning a MS using packet switched services are stored as long as the MS is controlled by that SGSN, - the GGSN node where routing information for all static PDP addresses related to a mobile subscriber is stored. See also Technical Specification GSM 03.02 where the network architecture is described.
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3.1.2 Procedures
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Procedures related to location registration are specified in Technical Specification GSM 03.12. They comprise: i) location updating which enables the MS to inform the network that its location area has to be updated, i.e. the MS has received a location area identity which is different from that contained in its memory. In order to avoid unnecessary updating, the current location area identity should be stored in a non-volatile memory in the MS; ii) location cancellation which is used to delete an MS from a VLR or from an SGSN; iii) periodic location updating which enables the location of stationary MSs to be confirmed at a rate determined by the operator; iv) as a network option, IMSI detach/attach operation. When a MS has informed the network that it is IMSI detached, the network is aware that the subscriber is not active; v) routing updating which enables the MS to inform the network that its routing area has to be updated; vi) periodic routing updating which enables the location of stationary MSs to be confirmed at a rate determined by the operator; ETSI ETSI TS 100 521 V7.0.0 (1999-09) 13 (GSM 03.01 version 7.0.0 Release 1998) vii) GPRS detach/attach operation. When a MS has informed the network that it is GPRS detached, the network is aware that the subscriber is not active; viii) cell updating which enables the MS to inform the network that its cell has been updated. The procedures i) to iv) are defined for circuit switched services, and ii) and v) to viii) are defined for packet switched services. Combined procedures for circuit and packet switched services are also defined in GSM 03.60 for GPRS. The procedure i) may be combined with v), iii) may be combined with vi) and iv) may be combined with vii). The procedures also include mechanisms for restoration of location registers after failure. These procedures are defined in Technical Specification GSM 03.07.
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3.1.3 Information stored in location registers
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Information to be stored in location registers is listed in Technical Specification GSM 03.08.
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3.2 Handover
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3.2.1 Definitions
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The following case are required: i) handover between physical channels of the same Base Station System (BSS). This capability could be used in the following situations: - when the physical channel carrying the call is subject to interference or other disturbances; - when a physical channel or channel equipment carrying a call has be to be taken out of service for maintenance or other reasons; ii) handover between Base Station Systems (BSSs) of the same MSC; iii) handover between BSSs of different MSCs of the same PLMN. Cases ii) and iii) are used in order to ensure continuity of the connection when an MS moves from one BSS area to another. For case iii) two procedures are defined: a) basic handover procedure where the call is handed over from the controlling MSC (MSC-A) to another MSC (MSC-B); b) subsequent handover procedure where the call is handed over from MSC-B to MSC-A or to a third MSC (MSC- B').
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3e324ca7bd9a22c18382e613feac7446
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100 521
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3.2.2 Procedures
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The procedures are described in Technical Specification GSM 03.09.
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