hash
stringlengths 32
32
| doc_id
stringlengths 7
13
| section
stringlengths 3
121
| content
stringlengths 0
3.82M
|
|---|---|---|---|
bdb2368fe245f24f55528d6ee26c2023
|
104 104
|
5.3.8.8.3 Security Controls
|
SEC-CTL-SLM-FLD-1: Security logs should use the ISO 8601 [62] date and time format. SEC-CTL-SLM-FLD-2: Security logs shall use IP addresses for the location field.
|
bdb2368fe245f24f55528d6ee26c2023
|
104 104
|
5.3.8.9 Authenticated Time Stamping and Missing Time Source
| |
bdb2368fe245f24f55528d6ee26c2023
|
104 104
|
5.3.8.9.1 Requirements
|
REQ-SEC-SLM-ATS-1: All network functions shall be synchronised to a common and authenticated time source. REQ-SEC-SLM-ATS-2: Any successful as well as the unsuccessful synchronization to the common time source shall be logged. REQ-SEC-SLM-ATS-3: The Security Log-data shall be time-stamped with the system time in case of unsuccessful synchronisation to a common time source. REQ-SEC-SLM-ATS-4: The Security Log-data recording shall take place in the order in which the (security) log events occur. REQ-SEC-SLM-ATS-5: The Security Log data shall contain a timestamp that includes a timezone. ETSI ETSI TS 104 104 V9.1.0 (2025-06) 60
|
bdb2368fe245f24f55528d6ee26c2023
|
104 104
|
5.3.8.9.2 Security Controls
|
5.3.8.9.2.1 Authenticated Time Stamping SEC-CTL-SLM-ATS-1: The Network Time Protocol (NTP) version 4 should be supported as specified by IETF RFC 5905 [60] for the support of authenticated time stamping. SEC-CTL-SLM-ATS-2: If NTPv4 authentication is in use, then AES-CMAC as specified by IETF RFC 4493 [78] shall be supported. In this use case the NTP client can verify the integrity of the received NTP-packet. SEC-CTL-SLM-ATS-3: If NTP security (as specified by IETF RFC 5905 [60]) is in use for the integrity and replay protection of NTP-packets, then NTS (IETF RFC 8915 [63]) shall be supported. In this use case the NTP client can verify the authenticity of the NTP packets by use of X.509 PKI infrastructure. 5.3.8.9.2.2 Common Time Source SEC-CTL-SLM-CTS-1: The Time Stamp representation should be in a standardized format, and the format in use should be logged. For reference to the formatting, refer to IETF RFC 3339 [61] and ISO 8601 [62].
|
bdb2368fe245f24f55528d6ee26c2023
|
104 104
|
5.3.8.10 Security Log Management Due Diligence and Auditing
| |
bdb2368fe245f24f55528d6ee26c2023
|
104 104
|
5.3.8.10.1 Requirements
|
REQ-SEC-SLM-DDA-1: The organization should define a policy and procedure for security logging. The security log management policy shall define periodic audits to confirm that logging standards and guidelines are being followed throughout the organization. REQ-SEC-SLM-DDA-2: The organization should ensure that the policies and procedures in the log management process are being performed properly. REQ-SEC-SLM-DDA-3: The security log management should be prioritized appropriate throughout the organisation. REQ-SEC-SLM-DDA-4: The organization should prioritize its goals based on balancing the organization's reduction of risk with the time and resources needed to perform security log management functions. REQ-SEC-SLM-DDA-5: The organization should create and maintain a secure log management infrastructure. REQ-SEC-SLM-DDA-6: The organization should create an infrastructure that is robust enough to handle not only expected volumes of log data, but also peak-data volumes during extreme situations. REQ-SEC-SLM-DDA-7: The organization should provide adequate support for all staff with log management responsibilities. REQ-SEC-SLM-DDA-8: As part of the log management planning process, the organization should define the roles and responsibilities of individuals and teams who are expected to be involved in log management. REQ-SEC-SLM-DDA-9: The security log management policy should define how to provide confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the results of log analysis which are to be protected while at rest, in use and in motion. REQ-SEC-SLM-DDA-10: The security log management policy should provide a definition of how to handle inadvertent disclosures of sensitive information that is recorded in logs. REQ-SEC-SLM-DDA-11: The security log management policy should provide a definition of which type of log-data to be analyzed and how often.
|
bdb2368fe245f24f55528d6ee26c2023
|
104 104
|
5.3.8.10.2 Security Controls
|
SEC-CTL-SLM-DDA-1: Testing and validation should be used to ensure that the policies and procedures in the log management process are being performed properly. ETSI ETSI TS 104 104 V9.1.0 (2025-06) 61 SEC-CTL-SLM-DDA-2: While defining the log management scheme, organizations should ensure that they provide the necessary training to relevant staff regarding their log management responsibilities as well as skill instruction for the needed resources to support log management. The support also includes the provision of log management tools and tool documentation, the provision of technical guidance on log management activities, and the disseminating information to log management staff. SEC-CTL-SLM-DDA-3: The organisations should assign team and individual roles which are often involved in log management as follows: • System and network administrators, who are usually responsible for configuring logging on individual systems and network devices, analyzing those logs periodically, reporting on the results of log management activities, and performing regular maintenance of the logs and logging software. • Security administrators, who are usually responsible for managing and monitoring the log management infrastructures, configuring logging on security devices (e.g. firewalls, network-based intrusion detection systems, antivirus servers), reporting on the results of log management activities, and assisting others with configuring logging and performing log analysis. • Computer security incident response teams, who use log data when handling some incidents. • Application developers, who may need to design or customize applications so that they perform logging in accordance with the logging requirements and recommendations. • Information security officers, who may oversee the log management infrastructures. • Chief information officers (CIO), who oversee the IT resources that generate, transmit, and store the logs. • Auditors, who may use log data when performing audits. Individuals involved in the procurement of software that should or can generate computer security log data.
|
bdb2368fe245f24f55528d6ee26c2023
|
104 104
|
5.3.8.11 Security Events to be Logged
| |
bdb2368fe245f24f55528d6ee26c2023
|
104 104
|
5.3.8.11.1 Introduction
|
During O-RAN operations, components generate many events. Some of these events have security utility and are thus termed security events. Logging these security events is critical to maintaining a secure O-RAN environment. For convenience, security event log requirements are organized by high-level categories. These categories are mapped against the following O-RAN architectural elements: SMO, O-RAN Network Functions (NF), and O-Cloud (see Table 5.3.8.11.1-1). • The SMO has security events related to management and orchestration. • O-RAN Network Functions have application security events. • O-Cloud has both network security events and system security events related to operating systems, hypervisors, and container runtimes. • The following security event types occur in all O-RAN components (SMO, O-RAN NF, and O-Cloud): account and identity event, data access events, and general security events. Table 5.3.8.11.1-1: Types of Security Events by O-RAN Component O-RAN Architectural Component Types of Security Events SMO O-RAN NF O-Cloud Management and Orchestration Events X Application Events X Network Events X System Events X Data Access Events X X X Account and Identity Events X X X General Security Events X X X ETSI ETSI TS 104 104 V9.1.0 (2025-06) 62
|
bdb2368fe245f24f55528d6ee26c2023
|
104 104
|
5.3.8.11.2 Network Security Event Log Requirements
|
REQ-SEC-SLM-NET-EVT-1: O-Cloud shall log all physical and virtual network events related to creating and modifying network configurations, enabling, and disabling ports, network connections, and packets over limit from the firewalls from all host operating systems, hypervisors, and container engines.
|
bdb2368fe245f24f55528d6ee26c2023
|
104 104
|
5.3.8.11.3 System Security Event Log Requirements
|
5.3.8.11.3.1 General O-Cloud Security Events 5.3.8.11.3.1.1 Requirements REQ-SEC-SLM-GEN-EVT-1: O-Cloud shall log the following resource-related events: shortages, system crashes, reboots, shutdowns, resource creation, and deletion from all host operating systems, hypervisors, and container engines. REQ-SEC-SLM-GEN-EVT-2: O-Cloud shall log when maintenance activity is undertaken for host operating systems, hypervisors, and container engines. REQ-SEC-SLM-GEN-EVT-3: O-Cloud shall log the creation of scheduled jobs and the particular time the job will run for all host operating systems, hypervisors, and container engines. REQ-SEC-SLM-GEN-EVT-4: O-Cloud shall log a security event when driver tampering is detected. This includes but is not limited to modifications made to the main driver executable and any associated files, libraries, dependencies, or configuration files. REQ-SEC-SLM-GEN-EVT-5: O-Cloud shall log a security event when it detects unauthorized changes to the O-Cloud hardware resource configuration. REQ-SEC-SLM-GEN-EVT-6: O-Cloud shall log a security event when it detects unauthorized changes to the Application configuration. 5.3.8.11.3.1.2 Security Controls SEC-CTL-SLM-GEN-EVT-1: O-Cloud shall log a security event if driver signature verification fails. SEC-CTL-SLM-GEN-EVT-2: O-Cloud shall implement a robust File Integrity Monitoring (FIM) system that continuously monitors the integrity of all driver-related files, including executables, libraries, configuration files, and dependencies. The FIM system shall be configured to calculate cryptographic hashes of these files as baseline values and regularly compare the current cryptographic hashes with their baseline hashes stored in the FIM system. SEC-CTL-SLM-GEN-EVT-3: O-Cloud shall log a security event if any hashes of driver files do not match their baseline values. SEC-CTL-SLM-GEN-EVT-4: Baseline configurations for the hardware resource shall be established by the SMO, and regularly compared to the current state. SEC-CTL-SLM-GEN-EVT-5: O-Cloud shall log a security event when it detects unauthorized deviation from the O-Cloud hardware resource configuration baseline. SEC-CTL-SLM-GEN-EVT-6: Baseline configurations for each Application shall be established by the SMO, and regularly compared to the current state. SEC-CTL-SLM-GEN-EVT-7: O-Cloud shall log a security event when it detects unauthorized deviation from the Application configuration baseline. NOTE: Log management systems, such as SIEM, fall beyond the purview of O-RAN and are considered external entities. In the context of O-Cloud, it is recommended to set up these log management systems to dispatch notifications to the administrator when any of the following security events take place: Driver signature verification fails. Driver file hash verification fails. Unauthorized deviations from the O-Cloud hardware resource configuration baseline are detected. ETSI ETSI TS 104 104 V9.1.0 (2025-06) 63 Unauthorized deviations from the application configuration baseline are detected. 5.3.8.11.3.2 Hypervisor Specific System Security Events REQ-SEC-SLM-HYP-EVT-1: O-Cloud shall log all changes to operating system configurations, hypervisor configurations, changes to virtualization settings, and changes to resource allocations. REQ-SEC-SLM-HYP-EVT-2: O-Cloud shall log all hypervisor events related to attaching or detaching virtual disks. REQ-SEC-SLM-HYP-EVT-3: O-Cloud shall log all hypervisor events related to creating, starting, stopping, restarting, and deleting virtual machines. 5.3.8.11.3.3 Container Engine Specific System Events REQ-SEC-SLM-CON-EVT-1: O-Cloud shall log all image repository events related to additions, modifications, and removal of images. REQ-SEC-SLM-CON-EVT-2: O-Cloud shall log all container engine events related to volume creation, deletion, and mounting. REQ-SEC-SLM-CON-EVT-3: O-Cloud shall log all container engine events related to creating, starting, stopping, restarting, and deleting containers.
|
bdb2368fe245f24f55528d6ee26c2023
|
104 104
|
5.3.8.11.4 Application Security Event Log Requirements
|
REQ-SEC-SLM-APP-EVT-1: O-RAN Network Functions shall log any errors or exceptions generated. REQ-SEC-SLM-APP-EVT-2: O-RAN Network Functions shall log the use of any dynamically loaded libraries, including the name and version information of the library being loaded.
|
bdb2368fe245f24f55528d6ee26c2023
|
104 104
|
5.3.8.11.5 Data Access Security Event Log Requirements
|
REQ-SEC-SLM-DAT-EVT-1: O-RAN components shall log successful file additions, deletions, and unsuccessful attempts due to errors and authorization issues. REQ-SEC-SLM-DAT-EVT-2: O-RAN components should log successful file reads and writes. REQ-SEC-SLM-DAT-EVT-3: O-RAN components shall log unsuccessful attempts of file reads and writes due to errors and authorization issues. REQ-SEC-SLM-DAT-EVT-4: O-RAN components shall log successful directory additions, deletions, and unsuccessful attempts due to errors and authorization issues. REQ-SEC-SLM-DAT-EVT-5: O-RAN components shall log successful database or data store additions, deletions, and unsuccessful attempts due to errors and authorization issues. REQ-SEC-SLM-DAT-EVT-6: O-RAN components should log successful database or data store reads and writes. REQ-SEC-SLM-DAT-EVT-7: O-RAN components shall log unsuccessful attempts of database and data store reads and writes. REQ-SEC-SLM-DAT-EVT-8: O-RAN components shall log permission changes to files, directories, databases, or data stores.
|
bdb2368fe245f24f55528d6ee26c2023
|
104 104
|
5.3.8.11.6 Account and Identity Security Event Log Requirements
|
REQ-SEC-SLM-AAI-EVT-1: O-RAN components shall log account creation, modification, deletion, and unsuccessful attempts. REQ-SEC-SLM-AAI-EVT-2: O-RAN components shall log changes to account privilege levels and unsuccessful attempts. REQ-SEC-SLM-AAI-EVT-3: O-RAN components shall log successful group membership changes for accounts and unsuccessful change attempts. ETSI ETSI TS 104 104 V9.1.0 (2025-06) 64 REQ-SEC-SLM-AAI-EVT-4: O-RAN components shall log successful and unsuccessful authentication attempts for accounts. REQ-SEC-SLM-AAI-EVT-5: O-RAN components shall log successful and unsuccessful authorization attempts to create a session or initiate a transaction. REQ-SEC-SLM-AAI-EVT-6: O-RAN components shall log the termination of sessions or transactions. REQ-SEC-SLM-AAI-EVT-7: O-RAN components shall log the occurrence of downgraded privileges or elevation of privileges for accounts. REQ-SEC-SLM-AAI-EVT-8: VOID. REQ-SEC-SLM-AAI-EVT-9: O-RAN components shall log transactions successfully executed by accounts and unsuccessful attempts. REQ-SEC-SLM-AAI-EVT-10: O-RAN components shall log requests that do not require an authenticated account.
|
bdb2368fe245f24f55528d6ee26c2023
|
104 104
|
5.3.8.11.7 General Security Event Log Requirements
|
REQ-SEC-SLM-GSE-1: O-RAN components shall log the activation and deactivation of security software related to security logging, firewalls, malware protection, Data Loss Prevention (DLP), and Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS). REQ-SEC-SLM-GSE-2: O-RAN components shall log the use of administrative privileges. REQ-SEC-SLM-GSE-3: O-RAN components shall log any change to a security-related configuration item, including a description of the configuration change. REQ-SEC-SLM-GSE-4: O-RAN components shall log the occurrence of viewing, renewing, exporting, importing, modifying, and deleting of certificates and keys. The logged data for these events shall not include any sensitive information related to the certificates or the keys. REQ-SEC-SLM-GSE-5: O-RAN components shall log the occurrence of cryptographic operations on resources involved in signatures, encryption, decryption, hashing, key generation, and key destruction. The logged data for these events shall not include any sensitive information related to the cryptographic operations. REQ-SEC-SLM-GSE-6: O-RAN components shall log security patches submitted but not applied.
|
bdb2368fe245f24f55528d6ee26c2023
|
104 104
|
5.3.8.12 Log data Lifecycle Management
|
REQ-SEC-LCSS-2: The Security Log data process shall support Log data rotation. Log data rotation in this context refers to a closing of a Log-storage and opening a new Log-storage when the first Log-storage is complete. REQ-SEC-LCSS-3: The Security Log data rotation process shall be configurable at regular time intervals and when the maximum log size is reached. REQ-SEC-LCSS-4: The Security Log data process shall log any log rotation reconfiguration. REQ-SEC-LCSS-5: The system shall be capable of creating, processing, transmitting, and always storing all required security log events.
|
bdb2368fe245f24f55528d6ee26c2023
|
104 104
|
5.3.8.13 Requirements on Security Log data Policy
|
REQ-SEC-POL-5: The archived Security Log data and their storage media shall be checked periodically to determine whether the Security Log data is accessible. REQ-SEC-POL-6: The archived Log data and their media shall be physically protected. REQ-SEC-POL-7: The Personally Identifiable Information (PII) shall be removed from archived Security Log data. For details on PII, refer to [68]. REQ-SEC-POL-8: The archived Security Log data shall be integrity and confidentiality protected. REQ-SEC-POL-9: For the Security Log data lifecycle a policy shall be supported for log retention and log preservation. If this provides filter options, then security Log data shall not be filtered out. ETSI ETSI TS 104 104 V9.1.0 (2025-06) 65 REQ-SEC-POL-10: The log policy shall include requirements for log generation, log transmission, storage and disposal, and log analysis.
|
bdb2368fe245f24f55528d6ee26c2023
|
104 104
|
5.3.8.14 Preventing (D)DoS to Security Log Data
| |
bdb2368fe245f24f55528d6ee26c2023
|
104 104
|
5.3.8.14.1 General
|
The Requirements below are applicable to the vendors of the log management infrastructure.
|
bdb2368fe245f24f55528d6ee26c2023
|
104 104
|
5.3.8.14.2 Requirements
|
REQ-SEC-SLM-DoS-1: The log management infrastructure should be designed to support typical and peak volume of log data to be processed per hour and day [58]. REQ-SEC-SLM-DoS-2: The log management infrastructure should support the handling of peak situations for extreme situations. Extreme situations in this context refer to widespread malware incidents, vulnerability scanning, and penetration tests that may cause unusual large number of log entries [58]. REQ-SEC-SLM-DoS-3: The log management infrastructure should provide notifications at different log data volumes. This refers to the introduction of escalation levels at different log data volumes. REQ-SEC-SLM-DoS-4: The log management infrastructure should provide notifications at different log data event rates. This refers to the introduction of escalation levels at different log data event rates. REQ-SEC-SLM-DoS-5: The log management infrastructure should support mechanisms for log data redundancy. REQ-SEC-SLM-DoS-6: The log management infrastructure should trigger the archiving of log data based on the level of escalation achieved. The escalation level may be triggered by increased log data volume or log data event rates. REQ-SEC-SLM-DoS-7: The log management infrastructure should trigger the retention of log data based on the level of escalation achieved. The escalation level may be triggered by increased log data volume or log data event rates.
|
bdb2368fe245f24f55528d6ee26c2023
|
104 104
|
5.3.8.15 Preventing Tampering of Log Data
| |
bdb2368fe245f24f55528d6ee26c2023
|
104 104
|
5.3.8.15.1 General
|
The Requirements below are applicable to the vendors of the log management infrastructure.
|
bdb2368fe245f24f55528d6ee26c2023
|
104 104
|
5.3.8.15.2 Requirements
|
REQ-SEC-SLM-TLD-1: The log management infrastructure should support access management for log data. REQ-SEC-SLM-TLD-2: The log management infrastructure should support real time logging (log data streaming). REQ-SEC-SLM-TLD-3: The log management infrastructure should support replication of log data. REQ-SEC-SLM-TLD-4: The log management infrastructure should support the derivation of digests of log-data to existing and preceding digests with the aim to keep the cryptographic chain and to attest the completeness and the integrity of the security events.
|
bdb2368fe245f24f55528d6ee26c2023
|
104 104
|
5.3.9 Certificate Management Framework
| |
bdb2368fe245f24f55528d6ee26c2023
|
104 104
|
5.3.9.1 Requirements
| |
bdb2368fe245f24f55528d6ee26c2023
|
104 104
|
5.3.9.1.1 PNFs
|
REQ-SEC-CMF-PNF-1: An O-RAN PNF requiring a PKI certificate shall support certificate management protocol. REQ-SEC-CMF-PNF-2: In order to facilitate vendor certificate-based initial enrolment of PNFs, vendors shall pre-install vendor-signed certificates in PNFs. ETSI ETSI TS 104 104 V9.1.0 (2025-06) 66 REQ-SEC-CMF-PNF-3: In order to facilitate vendor certificate-based initial enrolment of PNFs, operators shall pre-provision the FQDN/IP address of RA/CA to PNFs. EXAMPLE 1: Pre-configurations before deployment. EXAMPLE 2: Startup installation procedure as defined in [14], clause 6.1. REQ-SEC-CMF-PNF-4: PNFs which use vendor-signed certificates for initial certificate enrolment should monitor the expiry of the vendor root CA certificate or any of the sub-CA certificates in the trust chain used to sign the certificate. REQ-SEC-CMF-PNF-5: When the expiry of the vendor root CA certificate or any of the sub-CA certificates in the trust chain is approaching, PNFs should raise notifications (alarms) with increasing levels of severity as the expiry date gets closer.
|
bdb2368fe245f24f55528d6ee26c2023
|
104 104
|
5.3.9.1.2 VNFs/CNFs
|
REQ-SEC-CMF-VNF_CNF-1: The O-Cloud shall support a certificate management protocol for use by O-RAN VNFs/CNFs that require a PKI certificate. REQ-SEC-CMF-VNF_CNF-2: An O-RAN VNF/CNF requiring a PKI certificate directly from a CA/RA, without O-Cloud involvement, shall support a certificate management protocol.
|
bdb2368fe245f24f55528d6ee26c2023
|
104 104
|
5.3.9.1.3 Any NF (PNF/VNF/CNF)
|
REQ-SEC-CMF-ANYNF-1: Any offline or out-of-band (automated or manual) PSK/Refnum generation, distribution and provisioning systems shall provide PSK/Refnum values only to an authorized PNF/CNF/VNF. REQ-SEC-CMF-ANYNF-2: NFs shall raise alarms/notifications and/or security events to SMO or certificate management systems alerting about the certificates about to expire in the near future with increasing severity levels as the expiry date approaches. REQ-SEC-CMF-ANYNF-3: SMO or certificate management systems should instruct NFs to trigger certificate renewal procedures according to operator's policies. EXAMPLE 1: Policy 1 instruct NFs to trigger certificate renewals in a staggered manner. EXAMPLE 2: Policy 2 instruct NFs to trigger certificate renewals according to resource availability. REQ-SEC-CMF-ANYNF-4: NFs shall provide interfaces to allow configuration of the advance alarms/notifications/security events interval prior to certificate expiry for different severity levels. EXAMPLE 3: Configuration Minor alarm N1 days before expiry, Major alarm, and security event N2 days before expiry, Critical alarm, and security events N3 days before expiry of certificates, Critical alarm, and security event every day after expiry. REQ-SEC-CMF-ANYNF-5: NFs shall trigger certificate renewal procedure before the certificate expiry using policies provided by the operator. EXAMPLE 4: Policy 1Trigger renewal N1/N2/N3 days before expiry. EXAMPLE 5: Policy 2Trigger renewal when instructed by SMO or certificate management. REQ-SEC-CMF-ANYNF-6: NFs shall provide interfaces to enable certificate management systems to trigger certificate renewal before the expiry. REQ-SEC-CMF-ANYNF-7: NFs shall send a notification to the SMO indicating the success or failure state after the certificate renewal completion. REQ-SEC-CMF-ANYNF-8: NFs should raise a critical alarm as well as log security events if the certificate for NF(s) has expired. REQ-SEC-CMF-ANYNF-9: NFs should raise a critical alarm as well as log security events if the certificate renewal has failed. ETSI ETSI TS 104 104 V9.1.0 (2025-06) 67 REQ-SEC-CMF-ANYNF-10: In the event if the newly installed/renewed certificate fails, NFs shall continue to use its previous certificate until that certificate expires.
|
bdb2368fe245f24f55528d6ee26c2023
|
104 104
|
5.3.9.2 Security Controls
| |
bdb2368fe245f24f55528d6ee26c2023
|
104 104
|
5.3.9.2.1 PNFs
|
SEC-CTL-CMF-PNF-1: An O-RAN PNF requiring a PKI certificate shall support CMPv2 as specified in O-RAN Security Protocols Specification [3], clause 4.6.
|
bdb2368fe245f24f55528d6ee26c2023
|
104 104
|
5.3.9.2.2 VNFs/CNFs
|
SEC-CTL-CMF-VNF_CNF-1: The O-Cloud shall support CMPv2 as specified in O-RAN Security Protocols Specification [3], clause 4.6. SEC-CTL-CMF-VNF_CNF-2: An O-RAN VNF/CNF requiring a PKI certificate directly from a CA/RA, without O-Cloud involvement, shall support CMPv2 as specified in O-RAN Security Protocols Specification [3], clause 4.6.
|
bdb2368fe245f24f55528d6ee26c2023
|
104 104
|
5.3.9.2.3 Any NF (PNF/VNF/CNF)
|
SEC-CTL-CMF-ANYNF-1: NFs may establish TLS connection using renewed certificates before terminating existing TLS connections. SEC-CTL-CMF-ANYNF-2: NFs may terminate any established TLS connection after the renewed certificates are validated and re-establish TLS connection with new certificate. SEC-CTL-CMF-ANYNF-3: NFs may wait for already established TLS connections to close before applying the renewed certificate for new TLS connections.
|
bdb2368fe245f24f55528d6ee26c2023
|
104 104
|
5.3.10 Application Programming Interfaces (APIs)
| |
bdb2368fe245f24f55528d6ee26c2023
|
104 104
|
5.3.10.1 Introduction
|
The security requirements in this clause provide protections against the vulnerabilities and security risks identified in the OWASP API Security Project Top 10 2023 vulnerabilities and security risks of Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) [i.9]. APIs as referred to in this clause are transactional APIs based on REST or gRPC. The terms client, resource owner, and resource server are defined in IETF RFC 6749 [34].
|
bdb2368fe245f24f55528d6ee26c2023
|
104 104
|
5.3.10.2 Security Requirements
|
REQ-SEC-API-1: APIs used in O-RAN to access an internal or external data source should perform object-level authorization checks. REQ-SEC-API-2: O-RAN endpoints using APIs shall support certificate-based authentication. REQ-SEC-API-3: O-RAN endpoints using APIs may support password-based authentication that is a factor used in multi-factor authentication (MFA). Password-based single-factor authentication should not be used. REQ-SEC-API-4: O-RAN endpoints using APIs should provide strong authorization. REQ-SEC-API-5: O-RAN endpoints using APIs shall validate the authenticity of tokens. Unsigned JWT tokens shall not be accepted. REQ-SEC-API-6: O-RAN endpoints shall validate API client requests to return sensitive data. REQ-SEC-API-7: APIs used in O-RAN shall have confidentiality and integrity protection for data-in-transit. REQ-SEC-API-8: APIs used in O-RAN shall implement a schema-based validation mechanism to enforce returned data. REQ-SEC-API-9: APIs used in O-RAN shall impose a restriction on the size and number of resources that a client requests. ETSI ETSI TS 104 104 V9.1.0 (2025-06) 68 REQ-SEC-API-10: APIs used in O-RAN shall support authorization that denies all access by default and requires explicit grants to specific roles for access to every function. REQ-SEC-API-11: APIs used in O-RAN shall default-deny properties that should not be accessed by clients. REQ-SEC-API-12: APIs used in O-RAN shall only be accessed by valid HTTP verbs. All other HTTP verbs should be disabled. REQ-SEC-API-13: APIs used in O-RAN shall validate, filter, and sanitize client-provided data and other data coming from integrated systems. Data validation shall be performed using a single, trustworthy, and actively maintained library. Special characters shall be escaped using the specific syntax for the target interpreter. REQ-SEC-API-14: APIs used in O-RAN shall limit the number of returned records to prevent mass disclosure in case of injection. REQ-SEC-API-15: APIs used in O-RAN shall log all failed authentication attempts, denied access, and input validation errors.
|
bdb2368fe245f24f55528d6ee26c2023
|
104 104
|
5.3.10.3 Security Controls
|
SEC-CTL-API-01: API client and server shall support mTLS 1.2, or higher, as specified in O-RAN Security Protocols Specifications [3], clause 4.2 for mutual authentication. SEC-CTL-API-02: API server shall support OAuth 2.0 resource server functionality, as specified in O-RAN Security Protocols Specifications [3], clause 4.7, for service requests received from API clients. SEC-CTL-API-03: API server shall support OAuth 2.0 resource owner functionality, as specified in O-RAN Security Protocols Specifications [3], clause 4.7, for service requests received from API clients. SEC-CTL-API-04: API client shall support OAuth 2.0 client functionality, as specified in O-RAN Security Protocols Specifications [3], clause 4.7 for each service request. SEC-CTL-API-05: API client and server shall support TLS 1.2, or higher, as specified in O-RAN Security Protocols Specifications [3], clause 4.2, for protection of data-in-transit.
|
bdb2368fe245f24f55528d6ee26c2023
|
104 104
|
5.3.11 Trust Anchor Provisioning
| |
bdb2368fe245f24f55528d6ee26c2023
|
104 104
|
5.3.11.0 Introduction
|
Before an O-RAN component can establish a mutual TLS connection with a signalling peer, the O-RAN component needs to be able to trace the peer's certificate path to a valid trust anchor.
|
bdb2368fe245f24f55528d6ee26c2023
|
104 104
|
5.3.11.1 Requirements
|
REQ-SEC-TAP-1: An O-RAN PNF using PKIX certificates shall be shipped with one or more pre-provisioned Trust Anchors, which may be a vendor-signed certificate or operator-signed certificate. REQ-SEC-TAP-2: An O-RAN PNF shall support the secure storage of the trust anchors in a secure element or a secure enclave such that they cannot be tampered with or modified. REQ-SEC-TAP-3: An O-RAN PNF using PKIX certificates shall enable an authorized function to recover the list of provisioned trust anchors and associated public keys. REQ-SEC-TAP-4: An O-RAN PNF shall be able to be securely provisioned with new trust anchors and have an existing trust anchor replaced, for events such as expiration. REQ-SEC-TAP-5: An O-RAN PNF shall log an event for each trust anchor provisioning operation.
|
bdb2368fe245f24f55528d6ee26c2023
|
104 104
|
5.3.11.2 Security Controls
|
SEC-CTL-TAP-1: An O-RAN PNF shall support CMPv2, as specified in O-RAN Security Protocols Specification [3], clause 4.6, for trust anchor provisioning. ETSI ETSI TS 104 104 V9.1.0 (2025-06) 69 SEC-CTL-TAP-2: An O-RAN PNF may support voucher-based protocols [69] to enable an O-RAN function to be securely provisioned with a new trust anchor. SEC-CTL-TAP-3: An O-RAN PNF may support BRSKI [70] for trust anchor provisioning. SEC-CTL-TAP-4: An O-RAN PNF may support SZTP [71] for trust anchor provisioning. SEC-CTL-TAP-5: An O-RAN PNF may support 3GPP SCS [72], [73], [74] for download of initial security configuration.
|
bdb2368fe245f24f55528d6ee26c2023
|
104 104
|
6 SBOM Guidelines for O-RAN
| |
bdb2368fe245f24f55528d6ee26c2023
|
104 104
|
6.1 SBOM Overview
|
This clause provides guidance for generation, delivery, and use of a Software Bill Of Materials (SBOM). SBOM is a fundamental component of a mature Software Development Lifecycle (SDLC) process. SBOM is an industry best practice part of secure software development that enhances the understanding of the upstream software supply chain so that vulnerability notifications and updates can be properly and safely handled across the installed customer base. The U.S. Department of Commerce (DoC) and the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) define SBOM as "a formal record containing the details and supply chain relationships of various components used in building software." The DoC, in coordination with NTIA, published a report "The Minimum Elements for a Software Bill of Materials (SBOM)" [17] that provides guidance on the data fields, automation, and processes to be used by suppliers and customers. The SBOM documents proprietary and third-party software, including commercial and Free and Open-Source Software (FOSS), used in software products. The SBOM is maintained and used by the software supplier and stored and viewed by the network operator.
|
bdb2368fe245f24f55528d6ee26c2023
|
104 104
|
6.2 Void
|
[Intentionally blank]
|
bdb2368fe245f24f55528d6ee26c2023
|
104 104
|
6.3 SBOM Requirements for O-RAN
| |
bdb2368fe245f24f55528d6ee26c2023
|
104 104
|
6.3.0 Introduction
|
The SBOM delivery should be made under contractual agreement with specific terms that include the following requirements and controls.
|
bdb2368fe245f24f55528d6ee26c2023
|
104 104
|
6.3.1 Requirements
|
REQ-SBOM-001: The O-RAN vendor shall provide the SBOM with every O-RAN software delivery package, including patches. REQ-SBOM-002: The minimum set of data fields shall include Supplier Name, Component Name, Version of the Component, Other Unique Identifiers as available, Dependency Relationship, Author of the SBOM data, and Timestamp [17]. REQ-SBOM-003: Vulnerabilities shall not be included as an additional data field because it would represent a static view from a specific point in time, while vulnerabilities are constantly evolving. NOTE 1: The SBOM should be used by vendors and operators to periodically check against known vulnerability databases to identify potential risk. NOTE 2: The level of risk for a vulnerability should be determined by the software vendor and operator with consideration of the software product, use case, and network environment. ETSI ETSI TS 104 104 V9.1.0 (2025-06) 70 NOTE 3: The SBOM provides visibility into the use of open-source and third-party provided software having known vulnerabilities or contributions from individuals or companies in adversarial nations, but it does not protect against zero-day vulnerabilities that were unintentionally or maliciously inserted, exploited, or discovered and not reported. REQ-SBOM-004: SBOM depth shall be provided at top-level. REQ-SBOM-005: SBOM depth shall be provided to a second-level for O-RAN Software Community (OSC) sourced software to indicate which OSC modules are used and which individual and/or company contributed the software for that module. REQ-SBOM-006: SBOM depth shall be provided to second-level for any used open source software. REQ-SBOM-007: SBOM shall be authenticity and integrity protected when in transit and at rest. REQ-SBOM-008: Commercial software vendors using software from the O-RAN Software Community (OSC) shall provide an SBOM that includes the components used from the OSC. REQ-SBOM-009: SBOM for commercial software shall be access controlled. REQ-SBOM-010: The consumer of an SBOM shall maintain confidentiality protection on the SBOM delivered from the SBOM producer. REQ-SBOM-011: The SBOM shall be provided in Software Package Data eXchange (SPDX) [17], CycloneDX [18], or Software Identification (SWID) [19] format. NOTE 4: ISO/IEC 5962:2021 [21] specifies SPDX as a standard data format for communicating the component and metadata information associated with SBOM.
|
bdb2368fe245f24f55528d6ee26c2023
|
104 104
|
6.3.2 Security Controls
|
SEC-CTL-SBOM-001: For integrity, a hash shall be generated for the SBOM, as specified in O-RAN Security Protocols Specification [3], clause 5. SEC-CTL-SBOM-002: For authenticity, a digital signature shall be provided for the SBOM, as specified in O-RAN Security Protocols Specification [3], clause 5. ETSI ETSI TS 104 104 V9.1.0 (2025-06) 71 Annex A (informative): Security Principles mapping to Security Requirements Table A.1: Security Principles mapping to Security Requirements defined in [4] Components Interfaces SP O- RU O- DU O- CU O-CLOUD Near RT RIC Non RT RIC SMO FH M- Plane FH S- Plane FH CU- Plane E2 O1 A1 SP-AUTH REQ-SEC- OCLOUD-1 SP-ACC SP- CRYPTO SP-TCOMM REQ- SEC- O2-1 REQ- SEC- A1-1 SP-SS SP-SB SP-UPDT SP-RECO SP-OPNS SP-ASSU SP-PRV SP-SLC SP-ISO REQ-SEC- OCLOUD-2 SP-PHY SP-CLD SP-ROB SP-AUTH REQ-SEC- OCLOUD-1 SP-ACC SP- CRYPTO SP-TCOMM REQ- SEC- O2-1 REQ- SEC- A1-1 SP-SS SP-SB SP-UPDT SP-RECO SP-OPNS SP-ASSU SP-PRV SP-SLC SP-ISO REQ-SEC- OCLOUD-2 SP-PHY SP-CLD SP-ROB ETSI ETSI TS 104 104 V9.1.0 (2025-06) 72 Annex B (informative): Security: List of 3GPP security requirements Table B.1: References for 3GPP Security requirements Reference Title ETSI TS 133 501 Security architecture and procedures for 5G system ETSI TS 133 511 Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) for the next generation - Node B (gNodeB) network product class TS 33.117 Catalogue of general security assurance requirements TR 33.818 Security Assurance Methodology (SECAM) and Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) for 3GPP virtualized network products TR 33.848 Study on security impacts of virtualisation Table B.2: 3GPP Security requirements Item Title 3GPP Security requirements 3GPP specifications NESAS/SCAS gNodeB-specific security functional requirements #1 Mitigation of bidding down attacks in Xn handovers An attacker could attempt a bidding down attack by making the UE and the network entities respectively believe that the other side does not support a security feature, even when both sides in fact support that security feature. It shall be ensured that a bidding down attack, in the above sense, can be prevented. In the Path-Switch message, the target gNB shall send the UE's 5G security capabilities, UP security policy with corresponding PDU session ID received from the source gNB to the AMF. ETSI TS 133 501 clauses 5.1.1 & 6.7.3.1 ETSI TS 133 511 clause 4.2.2.1.14 #2 Authentication and Authorization Access network authorization: Assurance shall be provided to the UE that it is connected to an access network that is authorized by the serving network to provide services to the UE. This authorization is 'implicit' in the sense that it is implied by a successful establishment of access network security. This access network authorization applies to all types of access networks. ETSI TS 133 501 clause 5.1.2 #3 Requirements on gNB related to keys The gNB shall allow for use of encryption and integrity protection algorithms for AS (Access Stratum) and NAS (Non Access Stratum) protection having keys of length 128 bits. The network interfaces shall support the transport of 256-bit keys. The keys used for UP (User Plane), NAS and AS protection shall be dependent on the algorithm with which they are used. ETSI TS 133 501 clause 5.1.3 #4 Subscriber privacy The SUPI should not be transferred in clear text over gNB except routing information, e.g. Mobile Country Code (MCC) and Mobile Network Code (MNC). ETSI TS 133 501 clause 5.2.5 ETSI ETSI TS 104 104 V9.1.0 (2025-06) 73 Item Title 3GPP Security requirements 3GPP specifications NESAS/SCAS gNodeB-specific security functional requirements #5 User data and signalling data confidentiality The gNB shall support ciphering of user data between the UE and the gNB. The gNB shall activate ciphering of user data based on the security policy sent by the SMF. The gNB shall support ciphering of RRC-signalling. The gNB shall implement the following ciphering algorithms: - NEA0, 128-NEA1, 128-NEA2 as defined in Annex D of ETSI TS 133 501. The gNB may implement the following ciphering algorithm: - 128-NEA3 as defined in Annex D of ETSI TS 133 501. Confidentiality protection of user data between the UE and the gNB is optional to use. Confidentiality protection of the RRC-signalling is optional to use. Confidentiality protection should be used whenever regulations permit. The PDCP protocol, as specified in ETSI TS 138 323 between the UE and the NG-RAN, shall be responsible for user plane data confidentiality protection. ETSI TS 133 501 clause 5.3.2 ETSI TS 133 511 clauses 4.2.2.1.6 & 4.2.2.1.7 & 4.2.2.1.10 & 4.2.2.1.11 #6 User data and signalling data integrity The gNB shall support integrity protection and replay protection of user data between the UE and the gNB. The gNB shall activate integrity protection of user data based on the security policy sent by the SMF. The gNB shall support integrity protection and replay protection of RRC-signalling. The gNB shall support the following integrity protection algorithms: - NIA0, 128-NIA1, 128-NIA2 as defined in Annex D of ETSI TS 133 501. The gNB may support the following integrity protection algorithm: - 128-NIA3 as defined in Annex D of ETSI TS 133 501. Integrity protection of the user data between the UE and the gNB is optional to use, and shall not use NIA0. All RRC signalling messages except those explicitly listed in TS 38.331 as exceptions shall be integrity-protected with an integrity protection algorithm different from NIA0, except for unauthenticated emergency calls. NIA0 shall be disabled in gNB in the deployments where support of unauthenticated emergency session is not a regulatory requirement. The PDCP protocol, as specified in ETSI TS 138 323 between the UE and the NG-RAN, shall be responsible for user plane data integrity protection. ETSI TS 133 501 clause 5.3.3 ETSI TS 133 511 clauses 4.2.2.1.1 & 4.2.2.1.2 & 4.2.2.1.8 & 4.2.2.1.9 #7 RRC integrity check failure The RRC integrity checks shall be performed both in the ME and the gNB. In case failed integrity check (i.e. faulty or missing MAC-I) is detected after the start of integrity protection, the concerned message shall be discarded. This can happen on the gNB side or on the ME side. ETSI TS 133 501 clause 6.5.1 #8 UP integrity check failure If the gNB or the UE receives a PDCP PDU which fails integrity check with faulty or missing MAC-I after the start of integrity protection, the PDU shall be discarded. ETSI TS 133 501 clause 6.6.4 ETSI ETSI TS 104 104 V9.1.0 (2025-06) 74 Item Title 3GPP Security requirements 3GPP specifications NESAS/SCAS gNodeB-specific security functional requirements #9 Requirements for the gNB setup and configuration Setting up and configuring gNBs by O&M systems shall be authenticated and authorized by gNB so that attackers shall not be able to modify the gNB settings and software configurations via local or remote access. - The certificate enrolment mechanism specified in 3GPP TS 33.310 for base station should be supported for gNBs. The decision on whether to use the enrolment mechanism is left to operators. - Communication between the O&M systems and the gNB shall be confidentiality, integrity and replay protected from unauthorized parties. The security associations between the gNB and an entity in the 5G Core or in an O&M domain trusted by the operator shall be supported. These security association establishments shall be mutually authenticated. The security associations shall be realized according to ETSI TS 133 210 and 3GPP TS 33.310. - The gNB shall be able to ensure that software/data change attempts are authorized. - The gNB shall use authorized data/software. - Sensitive parts of the boot-up process shall be executed with the help of the secure environment. - Confidentiality of software transfer towards the gNB shall be ensured. - Integrity protection of software transfer towards the gNB shall be ensured. - The gNB software update shall be verified before its installation (see clause 4.2.3.3.5 of 3GPP TS 33.117). ETSI TS 133 501 clause 5.3.4 #10 Requirements for key management inside the gNB Any part of a gNB deployment that stores or processes keys in cleartext shall be protected from physical attacks. If not, the whole entity is placed in a physically secure location, then keys in cleartext shall be stored and processed in a secure environment. Keys stored inside a secure environment in any part of the gNB shall never leave the secure environment except when done in accordance with 3GPP specifications. ETSI TS 133 501 clause 5.3.5 #11 Requirements for handling user plane data for the gNB Any part of a gNB deployment that stores or processes user plane data in cleartext shall be protected from physical attacks. If not, the whole entity is placed in a physically secure location, then user plane data in cleartext shall be stored and processed in a secure environment. ETSI TS 133 501 clause 5.3.6 #12 Requirements for handling control plane data for the gNB Any part of a gNB deployment that stores or processes control plane data in cleartext shall be protected from physical attacks. If not, the whole entity is placed in a physically secure location, then control plane data in cleartext shall be stored and processed in a secure environment. ETSI TS 133 501 clause 5.3.7 #13 Requirements for secure environment of the gNB The secure environment shall support secure storage of sensitive data, e.g. long-term cryptographic secrets and vital configuration data. The secure environment shall support the execution of sensitive functions, e.g. en-/decryption of user data and the basic steps within protocols which use long term secrets (e.g. in authentication protocols). The secure environment shall support the execution of sensitive parts of the boot process. The secure environment's integrity shall be assured. Only authorised access shall be granted to the secure environment, i.e. to data stored and used within it, and to functions executed within it. ETSI TS 133 501 clause 5.3.8 ETSI ETSI TS 104 104 V9.1.0 (2025-06) 75 Item Title 3GPP Security requirements 3GPP specifications NESAS/SCAS gNodeB-specific security functional requirements #14 Requirements for the gNB F1 interfaces F1-C interface shall support confidentiality, integrity, and replay protection. All management traffic carried over the CU-DU link shall be integrity, confidentiality and replay protected. The gNB shall support confidentiality, integrity and replay protection on the gNB DU-CU F1-U interface for user plane. F1-C and management traffic carried over the CU-DU link shall be protected independently from F1-U traffic. Security mechanisms In order to protect the traffic on the F1-U interface, IPsec ESP and IKEv2 certificates-based authentication shall be supported as specified in sub-clause 9.1.2 of ETSI TS 133 501 with confidentiality, integrity and replay protection. In order to protect the traffic on the F1-C interface, IPsec ESP and IKEv2 certificates-based authentication shall be supported as specified in sub-clause 9.1.2 of ETSI TS 133 501 with confidentiality, integrity, and replay protection. IPsec is mandatory to implement on the gNB-DU and on the gNB-CU. On the gNB-CU side, a SEG may be used to terminate the IPsec tunnel. In addition to IPsec, for the F1-C interface, DTLS shall be supported as specified in IETF RFC 6083 to provide integrity protection, replay protection and confidentiality protection. Security profiles for DTLS implementation and usage shall follow the provisions given in clause 6.2 of ETSI TS 133 210. ETSI TS 133 501 clauses 5.3.9 & 9.8.2 #15 Requirements for the gNB E1 interfaces The E1 interface between CU-CP and CU-UP shall be confidentiality, integrity and replay protected. Security mechanisms In order to protect the traffic on the E1 interface, IPsec ESP and IKEv2 certificates-based authentication shall be supported as specified in sub-clause 9.1.2 of of ETSI TS 133 501 with confidentiality, integrity, and replay protection. In addition to IPsec, DTLS shall be supported as specified in RFC 6083 to provide integrity protection, replay protection and confidentiality protection. Security profiles for DTLS implementation and usage shall follow the provisions given in clause 6.2 of ETSI TS 133 210. IPsec is mandatory to support on the gNB-CU-UP and the gNB-CU-CP. Observe that on both the gNB-CU-CP and the gNB-CU-UP sides, a SEG may be used to terminate the IPsec tunnel. ETSI TS 133 501 clauses 5.3.10 & 9.8.3 ETSI ETSI TS 104 104 V9.1.0 (2025-06) 76 Item Title 3GPP Security requirements 3GPP specifications NESAS/SCAS gNodeB-specific security functional requirements #16 Security mechanisms for the N2/Xn interface The transport of control plane data and user data over Xn/N2 shall be integrity, confidentiality and replay- protected. Security mechanisms In order to protect the traffic on the Xn reference point, it is required to implement IPsec ESP and IKEv2 certificate- based authentication as specified in sub-clause 9.1.2 of ETSI TS 133 501 with confidentiality, integrity, and replay protection. IPsec shall be supported on the gNB. In addition to IPsec, for the Xn-C interface, DTLS shall be supported as specified in IETF RFC 6083 to provide integrity protection, replay protection and confidentiality protection. Security profiles for DTLS implementation and usage shall follow the provisions given in clause 6.2 of ETSI TS 133 210. ETSI TS 133 501 clauses 9.2 & 9.4 ETSI TS 133 511 clauses 4.2.2.1.16 & 4.2.2.1.17 #17 AS algorithms selection The serving network shall select the algorithms to use dependent on: the UE security capabilities of the UE, the configured allowed list of security capabilities of the currently serving network entity. Each gNB shall be configured via network management with lists of algorithms which are allowed for usage. There shall be one list for integrity algorithms, and one for ciphering algorithms. These lists shall be ordered according to a priority decided by the operator. ETSI TS 133 501 clauses 6.7.3.0 & 5.11.2 ETSI TS 133 511 clause 4.2.2.1.12 #18 Key refresh at the gNB Key refresh shall be possible for KgNB, KRRC-enc, KRRC-int, KUP-int, and KUP-enc and shall be initiated by the gNB when a PDCP COUNTs are about to be re-used with the same Radio Bearer identity and with the same KgNB. The network is responsible for avoiding reuse of the COUNT with the same RB identity and with the same key, e.g. due to the transfer of large volumes of data, release and establishment of new RBs, and multiple termination point changes for RLC-UM bearers. In order to avoid such re-use, the network may e.g. use different RB identities for RB establishments, change the AS security key, or an RRC_CONNECTED to RRC_IDLE/RRC_INACTIVE and then to RRC_CONNECTED transition." as specified in 3GPP TS 38.331, clause 5.3.1.2. ETSI TS 133 501 clause 6.9.4.1 TS 38.331 clause 5.3.1.2 ETSI TS 133 511 clause 4.2.2.1.13 #19 AS protection algorithm selection in gNB change The target gNB shall select the algorithm with highest priority from the UE's 5G security capabilities according to the locally configured prioritized list of algorithms (this applies for both integrity and ciphering algorithms). The chosen algorithms shall be indicated to the UE in the Handover Command message if the target gNB selects different algorithms compared to the source gNB. ETSI TS 133 501 clauses 6.7.3.1 & 6.7.3.2 ETSI TS 133 511 clause 4.2.2.1.15 #20 Key update at the gNB on dual connectivity When executing the procedure for adding subsequent radio bearer(s) to the same SN, the MN shall, for each new radio bearer, assign a radio bearer identity that has not previously been used since the last KSN change. If the MN cannot allocate an unused radio bearer identity for a new radio bearer in the SN, due to radio bearer identity space exhaustion, the MN shall increment the SN Counter and compute a fresh KSN, and then shall perform a SN Modification procedure to update the KSN. The SN shall request the Master Node to update the KSN over the Xn-C, when uplink and/or downlink PDCP COUNTs are about to wrap around for any of the SCG DRBs or SCG SRB. ETSI TS 133 501 clauses 6.10.2.1 & 6.10.2.2.1 ETSI TS 133 511 clause 4.2.2.1.18 ETSI ETSI TS 104 104 V9.1.0 (2025-06) 77 Item Title 3GPP Security requirements 3GPP specifications NESAS/SCAS gNodeB-specific security functional requirements #21 Unauthorized Viewing When the system is not under maintenance, there shall be no system function that reveals confidential system internal data in the clear to users and administrators. Such functions could be, for example, local or remote OAM CLI or GUI, logging messages, alarms, configuration file exports. Confidential system internal data contains authentication data (i.e. PINs, cryptographic keys, passwords, cookies) as well as system internal data that is not required for systems administration and could be of advantage to attackers (i.e. stack traces in error messages). ETSI TS 133 511 clause 4.2.3.2.2 TS 33.117 clause 4.2.3.2.2 #22 Protecting data and information in storage For sensitive data in (persistent or temporary) storage read access rights shall be restricted. Files of a system that are needed for the functionality shall be protected against manipulation. In addition, the following rules apply for: - Systems that need access to identification and authentication data in the clear, e.g. in order to perform an authentication. Such systems shall not store this data in the clear, but scramble or encrypt it by implementation-specific means. - Systems that do not need access to sensitive data (e.g. user passwords) in the clear. Such systems shall hash this sensitive data. - Stored files on the network product: examples for protection against manipulation are the use of checksum or cryptographic methods. ETSI TS 133 511 clause 4.2.3.2.3 TS 33.117 clause 4.2.3.2.3 #23 Protecting data and information in transfer Usage of cryptographically protected network protocols is required. The transmission of data with a need of protection shall use industry standard network protocols with sufficient security measures and industry accepted algorithms. In particular, a protocol version without known vulnerabilities or a secure alternative shall be used. ETSI TS 133 511 clause 4.2.3.2.4 TS 33.117 clause 4.2.3.2.4 #24 System handling during overload situations The system shall provide security measures to deal with overload situations which may occur as a result of a denial of service attack or during periods of increased traffic or reach the congestion threshold. In particular, partial, or complete impairment of system availability shall be avoided. Potential protective measures include: - Restricting available RAM per application. - Restricting maximum sessions for a Web application. - Defining the maximum size of a dataset. - Restricting CPU resources per process. - Prioritizing processes. - Overload control method, e.g. limiting amount or size of transactions of a user or from an IP address in a specific time range. ETSI TS 133 511 clause 4.2.3.3 TS 33.117 clause 4.2.3.3.1 #25 Boot from intended memory devices only The network product can boot only from the memory devices intended for this purpose. ETSI TS 133 511 clause 4.2.3.3 TS 33.117 clause 4.2.3.3.2 ETSI ETSI TS 104 104 V9.1.0 (2025-06) 78 Item Title 3GPP Security requirements 3GPP specifications NESAS/SCAS gNodeB-specific security functional requirements #26 System handling during excessive overload situations The system shall act in a predictable way if an overload situation cannot be prevented. A system shall be built in this way that it can react on an overload situation in a controlled way. However, it is possible that a situation happens where the security measures are no longer sufficient. In such case it shall be ensured that the system cannot reach an undefined and thus potentially insecure state. In an extreme case this means that a controlled system shutdown is preferable to uncontrolled failure of the security functions and thus loss of system protection. The vendor shall provide a technical description of the network product's Over Load Control mechanisms (especially whether these mechanisms rely on cooperation of other network elements e.g. eNode B) and the accompanying test case for this requirement will check that the description provides sufficient detail in order for an evaluator to understand how the mechanism is designed. ETSI TS 133 511 clause 4.2.3.3 TS 33.117 clause 4.2.3.3.3 #27 System robustness against unexpected input During transmission of data to a system it is necessary to validate input to the network product before processing. This includes all data which is sent to the system. Examples of this are user input, values in arrays and content in protocols. The following typical implementation error shall be avoided: - No validation on the lengths of transferred data - Incorrect assumptions about data formats - No validation that received data complies with the specification - Insufficient handling of protocol errors in received data - Insufficient restriction on recursion when parsing complex data formats - White listing or escaping for inputs outside the values margin ETSI TS 133 511 clause 4.2.3.3 TS 33.117 clause 4.2.3.3.4 #28 Network product Software integrity validation 1) Software package integrity shall be validated in the installation/upgrade stage. 2) Network product shall support software package integrity validation via cryptographic means, e.g. digital signature. To this end, the network product has a list of public keys or certificates of authorised software sources, and uses the keys to verify that the software update is originated from only these sources. 3) Tampered software shall not be executed or installed if integrity check fails. 4) A security mechanism is required to guarantee that only authorized individuals can initiate and deploy a software update, and modify the list mentioned in bullet 2. ETSI TS 133 511 clause 4.2.3.3 TS 33.117 clause 4.2.3.3.5 #29 System functions shall not be used or accessed without successful authentication and authorization The usage of a system function without successful authentication on basis of the user identity and at least one authentication attribute (e.g. password, certificate) shall be prevented. System functions comprise, for example network services (like SSH, SFTP, Web services), local access via a management console, local usage of operating system and applications. This requirement shall also be applied to accounts that are only used for communication between systems. An exception to the authentication and authorization requirement are functions for public use such as those for a Web server on the Internet, via which information is made available to the public. 3GPP TS 33.117 clause 4.2.3.4.1.1 ETSI ETSI TS 104 104 V9.1.0 (2025-06) 79 Item Title 3GPP Security requirements 3GPP specifications NESAS/SCAS gNodeB-specific security functional requirements #30 The network product shall use accounts that allow unambiguous identification of the user Users shall be identified unambiguously by the network product. The network product shall support assignment of individual accounts per user, where a user could be a person, or, for Machine Accounts, an application, or a system. The network product shall not enable the use of group accounts or group credentials, or sharing of the same account between several users, by default. The network product shall support a minimum number of 50 individual accounts per user data base if not explicitly specified in a SCAS of a particular network product, so that accountability for each user is ensured even in large operator networks. The network product shall not support user access credentials unrelated to an account (see note 1). 3GPP TS 33.117 clause 4.2.3.4.1.2 #31 Account protection by at least one authentication attribute The various user and machine accounts on a system shall be protected from misuse. To this end, an authentication attribute is typically used, which, when combined with the user name, enables unambiguous authentication and identification of the authorized user. Authentication attributes include: - Cryptographic keys - Token - Passwords This means that authentication based on a parameter that can be spoofed (e.g. phone numbers, public IP addresses or VPN membership) is not permitted. Exceptions are attributes that cannot be faked or spoofed by an attacker. ETSI TS 133 511 clause 4.2.3.4.1 TS 33.117 clause 4.2.3.4.2.1 #32 Predefined accounts shall be deleted or disabled All predefined or default accounts shall be deleted or disabled. Many systems have default accounts (e.g. guest, ctxsys), some of which are preconfigured with or without known passwords. These standard users shall be deleted or disabled. Should this measure not be possible the accounts shall be locked for remote login. In any case disabled or locked accounts shall be configured with a complex password as specified in clause 4.2.3.4.3.1 Password Structure of 3GPP TS 33.117. This is necessary to prevent unauthorized use of such an account in case of misconfiguration. Exceptions to this requirement to delete or disable accounts are accounts that are used only internally on the system involved and that are required for one or more applications on the system to function. Also, for these accounts remote access or local login shall be forbidden to prevent abusive use by users of the system. ETSI TS 133 511 clause 4.2.3.4.1 3GPP TS 33.117 clause 4.2.3.4.2.2 #33 Predefined or default authentication attributes shall be deleted or disabled Normally, authentication attributes such as password or cryptographic keys will be preconfigured from producer, vendor, or developer of a system. Such authentication attributes shall be changed by automatically forcing a user to change it on 1st time login to the system or the vendor provides instructions on how to manually change it. ETSI TS 133 511 clause 4.2.3.4.1 3GPP TS 33.117 clause 4.2.3.4.2.3 ETSI ETSI TS 104 104 V9.1.0 (2025-06) 80 Item Title 3GPP Security requirements 3GPP specifications NESAS/SCAS gNodeB-specific security functional requirements #34 Password Complexity rule The setting by the vendor shall be such that a network product shall only accept passwords that comply with the following complexity criteria: 1) Absolute minimum length of 8 characters (shorter lengths shall be rejected by the network product). It shall not be possible setting this absolute minimum length to a lower value by configuration. 2) Comprising at least three of the following categories: - at least 1 uppercase character (A-Z) - at least 1 lowercase character (a-z) - at least 1 digit (0-9) - at least 1 special character (e.g. @;!$.) The network product shall use a default minimum length of 10 characters. The minimum length of characters in the passwords shall be configurable by the operator. The default minimum length is the value configured by the vendor before any operator-specific configuration has been applied. The special characters may be categorized in sets according to their Unicode category. The network product shall at least support passwords of a length of 64 characters or a length greater than 64 characters. If a central system is used for user authentication, password policy is performed on the central system and additional assurance shall be provided that the central system enforces the same password complexity rules as laid down for the local system in this subclause. If a central system is not used for user authentication, the assurance on password complexity rules shall be performed on the Network Product. When a user is changing a password or entering a new password, the system checks and ensures that it meets the password requirements. Above requirements shall be applicable for all passwords used (e.g. application-level, OS-level). 3GPP TS 33.117 clause 4.2.3.4.3.1 #35 Password changes If a password is used as an authentication attribute, then the system shall offer a function that enables a user to change his password at any time. When an external centralized system for user authentication is used it is possible to redirect or implement this function on this system. Password change shall be enforced after initial login. The system shall enforce password change based on password management policy. In particular, the system shall enforce password expiry. Previously used passwords shall not be allowed up to a certain number (Password History). The number of disallowed previously used passwords shall be: - Configurable; - Greater than 0; - And its default value shall be 3. This means that the network product shall store at least the three previously set passwords. The maximum number of passwords that the network product can store for each user is up to the manufacturer. When a password is about to expire a password expiry notification shall be provided to the user. Above requirements shall be applicable for all passwords used (e.g. application-level, OS-level.). An exception to this requirement is machine accounts. 3GPP TS 33.117 clause 4.2.3.4.3.2 ETSI ETSI TS 104 104 V9.1.0 (2025-06) 81 Item Title 3GPP Security requirements 3GPP specifications NESAS/SCAS gNodeB-specific security functional requirements #36 Protection against brute force and dictionary attacks If a password is used as an authentication attribute, a protection against brute force and dictionary attacks that hinder password guessing shall be implemented. Brute force and dictionary attacks aim to use automated guessing to ascertain passwords for user and machine accounts. Various measures or a combination of these measures can be taken to prevent this. The most commonly used protection measures are: 1) Using the timer delay (this delay could be the same or increased depending the operator's policy for each attempt, e.g. double the delay, or 5 minutes delay, or 10 minutes delay) for each newly entered password input following an incorrect entry ("tar pit"). 2) Blocking an account following a specified number of incorrect attempts, refer to 4.2.3.4.5 of 3GPP TS 33.117. However, it has to be taken into account that this solution needs a process for unlocking and an attacker can force this to deactivate accounts and make them unusable. 3) Using CAPTCHA to prevent automated attempts (often used for Web applications). 4) Using a password blacklist to prevent vulnerable passwords. (see note 2) In order to achieve higher security, it is often meaningful to combine two or more of the measures named here. It is left to the vendor to select appropriate measures. Above requirements shall be applicable for all passwords used (e.g. application-level, OS-level.). An exception to this requirement is machine accounts. 3GPP TS 33.117 clause 4.2.3.4.3.3 #37 Hiding password display The password shall not be displayed in such a way that it could be seen and misused by a casual local observer. Typically, the individual characters of the password are replaced by a character such as "*". Under certain circumstances it may be permissible for an individual character to be displayed briefly during input. Such a function is used, for ex ample, on smartphones to make input easier. However, the entire password is never output to the display in plaintext. Above requirements shall be applicable for all passwords used (e.g. application-level, OS-level.). An exception to this requirement is machine accounts. 3GPP TS 33.117 clause 4.2.3.4.3.4 #38 Network Product Management and Maintenance interfaces The network product management shall support mutual authentication mechanisms, the mutual authentication mechanism can rely on the protocol used for the interface itself or other means. 3GPP TS 33.117 clause 4.2.3.4.4.1 ETSI ETSI TS 104 104 V9.1.0 (2025-06) 82 Item Title 3GPP Security requirements 3GPP specifications NESAS/SCAS gNodeB-specific security functional requirements #39 Policy regarding consecutive failed login attempts a) The maximum permissible number of consecutive failed user account login attempts should be configurable by the operator. The definition of the default value set at manufacturing time for maximum number of failed user account login attempts shall be less than or equal to 8, typically 5. After the maximum permissible number of consecutive failed user account login attempts is exceeded by a user there shall be a block delay in allowing the user to attempt login again. This block delay and also the capability to set period of the block delay, e.g. double the delay, or 5 minutes delay, or 10 minutes delay, after each login failure should be configurable by the operator. The default value set at manufacturing time for this delay shall be greater than or equal to 5 sec. b) If supported, infinite (permanent) locking of an account that has exceeded maximum permissible number of consecutive failed user account login attempts should also be possible via configuration, with the exception of administrative accounts which shall get only temporarily locked. 3GPP TS 33.117 clause 4.2.3.4.5 #40 Authorization policy The authorizations for accounts and applications shall be reduced to the minimum required for the tasks they have to perform. Authorizations to a system shall be restricted to a level in which a user can only access data and use functions that he needs in the course of his work. Suitable authorizations shall also be assigned for access to files that are components of the operating system or of applications or that are generated by the same (e.g. configuration and logging files). Alongside access to data, execution of applications and components shall also take place with rights that are as low as possible. Applications should not be executed with administrator or system rights. TS 33.117 clause 4.2.3.4.6.1 #41 Role-based access control The network product shall support Role Based Access Control (RBAC). A role-based access control system uses a set of controls which determines how users interact with domains and resources. The domains could be Fault Management (FM), Performance Management (PM), System Admin. The RBAC system controls how users or groups of users are allowed access to the various domains and what type of operation they can perform, i.e. the specific operation command or command group (e.g. View, Modify, Execute). The network product supports RBAC, in particular, for OAM privilege management for network product Management and Maintenance, including authorization of the operation for configuration data and software via the network product console interface. 3GPP TS 33.117 clause 4.2.3.4.6.2 #42 Protecting sessions - logout function The system shall have a function that allows a signed in user to logout at any time. All processes under the logged in user ID shall be terminated on log out. The network product shall be able to continue to operate without interactive sessions. Only for debugging purposes, processes under a logged in user ID may be allowed to continue to run after detaching the interactive session. ETSI TS 133 511 clause 4.2.3.5 3GPP TS 33.117 clause 4.2.3.5.1 #43 Protecting sessions - inactivity timeout An OAM user interactive session shall be terminated automatically after a specified period of inactivity. It shall be possible to configure an inactivity time-out period (see note 3). ETSI TS 133 511 clause 4.2.3.5 3GPP TS 33.117 clause 4.2.3.5.2 ETSI ETSI TS 104 104 V9.1.0 (2025-06) 83 Item Title 3GPP Security requirements 3GPP specifications NESAS/SCAS gNodeB-specific security functional requirements #44 Security event logging Security events shall be logged together with a unique system reference (e.g. host name, IP or MAC address) and the exact time the incident occurred. For each security event, the log entry shall include user name and/or timestamp and/or performed action and/or result and/or length of session and/or values exceeded and/or value reached. IETF RFC 3871, clause 2.11.10 specifies the minimum set of security events. Each vendor shall document what security events the product logs so that it can be verified by testing. ETSI TS 133 511 clause .2.3.6 3GPP TS 33.117 clause 4.2.3.6.1 #45 Log transfer to centralized storage a) The Network Product shall support forwarding of security event logging data to an external system. Secure transport protocols in accordance with clause 4.2.3.2.4 of 3GPP TS 33.117, shall be used. b) Log functions should support secure uploading of log files to a central location or to an external system for the Network Product that is logging. ETSI TS 133 511 clause 4.2.3.6 3GPP TS 33.117 clause 4.2.3.6.2 #46 Protection of security event log files The security event log shall be access controlled (file access rights) so only privileged users have access to the log files. ETSI TS 133 511 clause 4.2.3.6 3GPP TS 33.117 clause 4.2.3.6.3 #47 Growing (dynamic) content shall not influence system functions Growing or dynamic content (e.g. log files, uploads) shall not influence system functions. A file system that reaches its maximum capacity shall not stop a system from operating properly. Therefore, countermeasures shall be taken such as usage of dedicated filesystems, separated from main system functions, or quotas, or at least a file system monitoring to ensure that this scenario is avoided. ETSI TS 133 511 clause 4.2.4 3GPP TS 33.117 clause 4.2.4.1.1.1 #48 Processing of ICMPv4 and ICMPv6 packets Processing of ICMPv4 and ICMPv6 packets which are not required for operation shall be disabled on the network product. In particular, there are certain types of ICMP4 and ICMPv6 that are not used in most networks, but represent a risk. ICMP message types which on receipt lead to responses or to configuration changes are not mentioned in this requirement, but they may be necessary to support relevant and specified networking features. Those must be documented. Certain ICMP types are generally permitted and do not need to be specifically documented. Those are marked as "Permitted" in this table below. The network product shall not send certain ICMP types by default, but it may support the option to enable utilization of these types (e.g. for debugging). Echo Reply can be sent by default. In case of remote base station auto deployment, Router Advertisement can be processed. ETSI TS 133 511 clause 4.2.4 3GPP TS 33.117 clause 4.2.4.1.1.2 #49 IP packets with unnecessary options or extension headers shall not be processed IP packets with unnecessary options or extension headers shall not be processed. IP options and extension headers (e.g. source routing) are only required in exceptional cases. So, all packets with enabled IP options or extension headers shall be filtered. ETSI TS 133 511 clause 4.2.4 3GPP TS 33.117 clause 4.2.4.1.1.3 #50 Authenticated Privilege Escalation only There shall not be a privilege escalation method in interactive sessions (CLI or GUI) which allows a user to gain administrator/root privileges from another user account without re-authentication. Implementation example: Disable insecure privilege escalation methods so that users are required to (re-)login directly into the account with the required permissions. ETSI TS 133 511 clause 4.2.4 3GPP TS 33.117 clause 4.2.4.1.2.1 ETSI ETSI TS 104 104 V9.1.0 (2025-06) 84 Item Title 3GPP Security requirements 3GPP specifications NESAS/SCAS gNodeB-specific security functional requirements #51 System account identification Each system account in UNIX® shall have a unique UID. ETSI TS 133 511 clause 4.2.4 3GPP TS 33.117 clause 4.2.4.2.2 #52 HTTPS The communication between Web client and Web server shall be protected using TLS. The TLS profile defined in Annex E of 3GPP TS 33.310 shall be followed with the following modifications: Cipher suites with NULL encryption shall not be supported ETSI TS 133 511 clause 4.2.5 3GPP TS 33.117 clause 4.2.5.1 #53 Webserver logging Access to the webserver shall be logged. The web server log shall contain the following information: - Access timestamp - Source (IP address) - (Optional) Account (if known) - (Optional) Attempted login name (if the associated account does not exist) - Relevant fields in http request. The URL should be included whenever possible. - Status code of web server response ETSI TS 133 511 clause 4.2.5 3GPP TS 33.117 clause 4.2.5.2.1 #54 User sessions To protect user sessions the Network Product shall support the following session ID and session cookie requirements: 1. The session ID shall uniquely identify the user and distinguish the session from all other active sessions. 2. The session ID shall be unpredictable. 3. The session ID shall not contain sensitive information in clear text (e.g. account number, social security.). 4. In addition to the Session Idle Timeout (see clause 4.2.3.5.2 Protecting sessions - Inactivity timeout of 3GPP TS 33.117), the Network Product shall automatically terminate sessions after a configurable maximum lifetime This maximum lifetime defines the maximum session span. When the maximum lifetime expires, the session shall be closed, the session ID shall be deleted, and the user shall be forced to (re)authenticate in the web application and to establish a new session. The default value for this maximum lifetime shall be set to 8 hours. 5. Session ID's shall be regenerated for each new session (e.g. each time a user log in). 6. The session ID shall not be reused or renewed in subsequent sessions. 7. The Network Product shall not use persistent cookies to manage sessions but only session cookies. This means that neither the "expire" nor the "max-age" attribute shall be set in the cookies. 8. Where session cookies are used the attribute 'HttpOnly' shall be set to true. 9. Where session cookies are used the 'domain' attribute shall be set to ensure that the cookie can only be sent to the specified domain. 10. Where session cookies are used the 'path' attribute shall be set to ensure that the cookie can only be sent to the specified directory or sub-directory. 11. The Network Product shall not accept session identifiers from GET/POST variables. 12. The Network Product shall be configured to only accept server generated session ID's. ETSI TS 133 511 clause 4.2.5 3GPP TS 33.117 clause 4.2.5.3 #55 HTTP input validation The Network Product shall have a mechanism in place to ensure that web application inputs are not vulnerable to command injection or cross-site scripting attacks. The Network Product shall validate, filter, escape, and encode user-controllable input before it is placed in output that is used as a web page that is served to other users. ETSI TS 133 511 clause 4.2.5 3GPP TS 33.117 clause 4.2.5.4 ETSI ETSI TS 104 104 V9.1.0 (2025-06) 85 Item Title 3GPP Security requirements 3GPP specifications NESAS/SCAS gNodeB-specific security functional requirements #56 Packet filtering The Network Product shall provide a mechanism to filter incoming IP packets on any IP interface (see IETF RFC 3871 for further information). In particular the Network Product shall provide a mechanism: 1) To filter incoming IP packets on any IP interface at Network Layer .and Transport Layer of the stack ISO/OSI. 2) To allow specified actions to be taken when a filter rule matches. In particular at least the following actions should be supported: a. Discard/Drop: the matching message is discarded; no subsequent rules are applied and no answer is sent back. b. Accept: the matching message is accepted. c. Account: the matching message is accounted for i.e. a counter for the rule is incremented. This action can be combined with the previous ones. This feature is useful to monitor traffic before its blocking. 3) To enable/disable for each rule the logging for Dropped packets, i.e. details on messages matching the rule for troubleshooting. 4) To filter on the basis of the value(s) of any portion of the protocol header. 5) To reset the accounting. 6) The Network Product shall provide a mechanism to disable/enable each defined rule. ETSI TS 133 511 clause 4.2.6.2.1 3GPP TS 33.117 clause 4.2.6.2.1 #57 Manipulated packets that are sent to an address of the network device shall not lead to an impairment of availability A network device shall be not affected in its availability or robustness by incoming packets, from other network element, that are manipulated or differing the norm. This means that appropriate packets shall be detected as invalid and be discarded. The process shall not be affecting the performance of the network device. This robustness shall be just as effective for a great mass of invalid packets as for individual or a small number of packets. Examples of such packets are: - Mass-produced TCP packets with a set SYN flag to produce half-open TCP connections (SYN flooding attack). - Packets with the same IP sender address and IP recipient address (Land attack). - Mass-produced ICMP packets with the broadcast address of a network as target address (Smurf attack). - Fragmented IP packets with overlapping offset fields (Teardrop attack). - ICMP packets that are larger than the maximum permitted size (65 535 Bytes) of IPv4 packets (Ping-of- death attack). - Uncorrelated reply packets (i.e. packets which cannot be correlated to any request). Sometimes the relevant behaviour of the network device will be configured. In other cases, the behaviour of the network device may only be verified by the relevant tests. ETSI TS 133 511 clause 4.2.6.2.2 3GPP TS 33.117 clause 4.2.6.2.2 ETSI ETSI TS 104 104 V9.1.0 (2025-06) 86 Item Title 3GPP Security requirements 3GPP specifications NESAS/SCAS gNodeB-specific security functional requirements #58 GTP-U Filtering The following capability is conditionally required: - For each message of a GTP-U-based protocol, it shall be possible to check whether the sender of this message is authorized to send a message pertaining to this protocol (see note 4). - At least the following actions should be supported when the check is satisfied: - Discard: the matching message is discarded. - Accept: the matching message is accepted. - Account: the matching message is accounted for, i.e. a counter for the rule is incremented. This action can be combined with the previous ones. This feature is useful to monitor traffic before its blocking. This requirement is conditional in the following sense: It is required that at least one of the following two statements holds: - The Network Product supports the capability described above and this is stated in the product documentation. - The Network Product's product documentation states that the capability is not supported and that the Network Product needs to be deployed together with a separate entity which provides the capability described above. See notes 5, 6 and 7. ETSI TS 133 511 clause 4.2.6.2.4 3GPP TS 33.117 clause 4.2.6.2.4 gNodeB-specific security hardening requirements Technical Baseline #59 No unnecessary or insecure services / protocols The network product shall only run protocol handlers and services which are needed for its operation, and which do not have any known security vulnerabilities. 3GPP TS 33.117 clause 4.3.2.1 #60 Restricted reachability of services The network product shall restrict the reachability of services so that they can only be reached on interfaces where their usage is required. On interfaces were services are active, the reachability should be limited to legitimate communication peers. 3GPP TS 33.117 clause 4.3.2.2 #61 No unused software Unused software components or parts of software which are not needed for operation or functionality of the network product shall not be installed or shall be deleted after installation. 3GPP TS 33.117 clause 4.3.2.3 #62 No unused functions During installation of software and hardware often functions will be activated that are not required for operation or function of the system. Also, hardware functions which are not required for operation or function of the system (e.g. unused interfaces) shall be permanently deactivated. Permanently means that they shall not be reactivated again after network product reboot. EXAMPLE: A debugging function in software which can be used for troubleshooting shall not be activated during normal operation of the network product. 3GPP TS 33.117 clause 4.3.2.4 #63 No unsupported components The network product shall not contain software and hardware components that are no longer supported by their vendor, producer, or developer, such as components that have reached end-of-life or end-of-support. Excluded are components that have a special support contract. This contract shall guarantee the correction of vulnerabilities over components' lifetime. 3GPP TS 33.117 clause 4.3.2.5 #64 Remote login restrictions for privileged users Direct login as root or equivalent highest privileged user shall be limited to the system console only. Root user will not be allowed to login to the system remotely. 3GPP TS 33.117 clause 4.3.2.6 ETSI ETSI TS 104 104 V9.1.0 (2025-06) 87 Item Title 3GPP Security requirements 3GPP specifications NESAS/SCAS gNodeB-specific security functional requirements #65 Filesystem Authorization privileges The system shall be designed to ensure that only users that are authorized to modify files, data, directories, or file systems have the necessary privileges to do so. EXAMPLE: On unix® systems a 'sticky' bit may be set on all directories where all users have written permissions. This ensures that only the file's owner, the directory's owner, or root user can rename or delete the file. Without the sticky bit being set, any user that has write and execute permissions for the directory can rename or delete files within the directory, regardless of the file's owner. 3GPP TS 33.117 clause 4.3.2.7 Operating Systems #66 IP-Source address spoofing mitigation Systems shall not process IP packets if their source address is not reachable via the incoming interface. Implementation example: Use of "Reverse Path Filter" (RPF) provides this function. 3GPP TS 33.117 clause 4.3.3.1.1 #67 Minimized kernel network functions Kernel based network functions not needed for the operation of the network element shall be deactivated. In particular the following ones shall be disabled by default: - IP Packet Forwarding between different interfaces of the network product. 3GPP TS 33.117 clause 4.3.3.1.2 #68 No automatic launch of removable media The network product shall not automatically launch any application when removable media device such as CD-, DVD-, USB-Sticks or USB-Storage drive is connected. If the operating system supports an automatic launch, it shall be deactivated unless it is required to support availability requirements. 3GPP TS 33.117 clause 4.3.3.1.3 #69 Syn Flood Prevention The network product shall support a mechanism to prevent Syn Flood attacks (e.g. implement the TCP Syn Cookie technique in the TCP stack by setting net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies = 1 in the linux sysctl.conf file). This feature shall be enabled by default. 3GPP TS 33.117 clause 4.3.3.1.4 #70 Protection mechanisms against buffer overflows The system shall support mechanisms for buffer overflow protection. Documentation which describes these buffer overflow mechanisms and also how to check that they have been enabled and/or implemented shall be provided. 3GPP TS 33.117 clause 4.3.3.1.5 #71 External file system mount restrictions If normal users are allowed to mount external file systems (attached locally or via the network), OS-level restrictions shall be set properly in order to prevent privilege escalation or extended access permissions due to the contents of the mounted file systems. Implementation example: In Linux® systems, administrators shall set the options nodev and nosuid in the /etc/fstab for all filesystems, which also have the "user" option. See note 8. 3GPP TS 33.117 clause 4.3.3.1.6 Web Servers #72 No system privileges for web server No web server processes shall run with system privileges. This is best achieved if the web server runs under an account that has minimum privileges. If a process is started by a user with system privileges, execution shall be transferred to a different user without system privileges after the start. 3GPP TS 33.117 clause 4.3.4.2 #73 Unused HTTP methods shall be deactivated HTTP methods that are not required shall be deactivated. Standard requests to web servers only use GET, HEAD, and POST. If other methods are required, they shall not introduce security leaks such as TRACK or TRACE. 3GPP TS 33.117 clause 4.3.4.3 #74 Any add-ons and components that are not required shall be deactivated All optional add-ons and components of the web server shall be deactivated if they are not required. In particular, CGI or other scripting components, Server Side Includes (SSI), and WebDAV shall be deactivated if they are not required. 3GPP TS 33.117 clause 4.3.4.4 ETSI ETSI TS 104 104 V9.1.0 (2025-06) 88 Item Title 3GPP Security requirements 3GPP specifications NESAS/SCAS gNodeB-specific security functional requirements #75 No compiler, interpreter, or shell via CGI or other server-side scripting If Common Gateway Interface (CGI) or other scripting technology is used, the CGI directory - or other corresponding scripting directory - shall not include compilers or interpreters (e.g. PERL interpreter, PHP interpreter/compiler, Tcl interpreter/compiler or operating system shells). 3GPP TS 33.117 clause 4.3.4.5 #76 No CGI or other scripting for uploads If CGI or other scripting technology is used, the associated CGI/script directory shall not be used for uploads. 3GPP TS 33.117 clause 4.3.4.6 #77 No execution of system commands with SSI If Server Side Includes (SSI) is active, the execution of system commands shall be deactivated. 3GPP TS 33.117 clause 4.3.4.7 #78 Access rights for web server configuration files shall only be granted to the owner of the web server process or to a user with system privileges Access rights for web server configuration files shall only be granted to the owner of the web server process or to a user with system privileges. Implementation example: Delete "read" and "write" access rights for "others." Only grant "write" access to the user who configures the web server. 3GPP TS 33.117 clause 4.3.4.8 #79 Default content shall be removed Default content (examples, help files, documentation, aliases) that is provided with the standard installation of the web server shall be removed. 3GPP TS 33.117 clause 4.3.4.9 #80 No directory listings / Directory Browsing Directory listings (indexing) / "Directory browsing" shall be deactivated. 3GPP TS 33.117 clause 4.3.4.10 #81 Information about the web server in HTTP headers shall be minimized The HTTP header shall not include information on the version of the web server and the modules/add-ons used. 3GPP TS 33.117 clause 4.3.4.11 #82 Web server information in error pages shall be deleted User-defined error pages shall not include version information about the web server and the modules/add- ons used. Error messages shall not include internal information such as internal server names, error codes. Default error pages of the web server shall be replaced by error pages defined by the vendor. 3GPP TS 33.117 clause 4.3.4.12 #83 File type- or script- mappings that are not required shall be deleted File type- or script-mappings that are not required shall be deleted, e.g. php, phtml, js, sh, csh, bin, exe, pl, vbe, vbs. 3GPP TS 33.117 clause 4.3.4.13 #84 The web server shall only deliver files which are meant to be delivered Restrictive access rights shall be assigned to all files which are directly or indirectly (e.g. via links or in virtual directories) in the web server's document directory. In particular, the web server shall not be able to access files which are not meant to be delivered. 3GPP TS 33.117 clause 4.3.4.14 #85 Only execute rights in CGI/Scripting directory If CGI or other scripting technology is used, only the CGI/Scripting directory is configured with execute rights. Other directories used or meant for web content do not have execute rights. 3GPP TS 33.117 clause 4.3.4.15 Network Devices #86 Traffic Separation The network product shall support physical or logical separation of traffic belonging to different network domains. For example, O&M traffic and control plane traffic belong to different network domains. See IETF RFC 3871 for further information. 3GPP TS 33.117 clause 4.3.5.1 ETSI ETSI TS 104 104 V9.1.0 (2025-06) 89 Item Title 3GPP Security requirements 3GPP specifications NESAS/SCAS gNodeB-specific security functional requirements Basic vulnerability testing requirements #87 Port scanning It shall be ensured that on all network interfaces, only documented ports on the transport layer respond to requests from outside the system. 3GPP TS 33.117 clause 4.4.2 #88 Vulnerability scanning The purpose of vulnerability scanning is to ensure that there are no known vulnerabilities (or that relevant vulnerabilities are identified and remediation plans in place to mitigate them) on the Network Product, both in the OS and in the applications installed, that can be detected by means of automatic testing tools via the Internet Protocol enabled network interfaces. Vulnerability scanning tools may also report false positives and they shall be investigated and documented in the test report. 3GPP TS 33.117 clause 4.4.3 #89 Robustness and fuzz testing It shall be ensured that externally reachable services are reasonably robust when receiving unexpected input. 3GPP TS 33.117 clause 4.4.4 Virtualization #90 VNF package and VNF image integrity 1) VNF package and image shall contain integrity validation value (e.g. MAC). 2) VNF package shall be integrity protected during onboarding and its integrity shall be validated by the NFVO. 3GPP TR 33.818 clause 5.2.5.5.3.3.5.1 3GPP TR 33.848 clause 5.18.3 #91 GVNP lifecycle management security 1) VNF shall authenticate VNFM when VNFM initiates a communication to VNF. 2) VNF shall be able to establish securely protected connection with the VNFM. 3) VNF shall check whether VNFM has been authorized when VNFM access VNF's API. 4) VNF shall log VNFM's management operations for auditing. 3GPP TR 33.818 clause 5.2.5.5.7.1 #92 Secure executive environment provision The VNF shall support to compare the owned resource state with the parsed resource state from VNFD (VNF Description) by the VNFM. The VNF can query the parsed resource state by the VNFM from the OAM. The VNF shall send an alarm to the OAM if the two resource states are inconsistent. This comparing process can be triggered periodically by the VNF, or the administrator can manually trigger the VNF to perform the comparing process. 3GPP TR 33.818 clause 5.2.5.5.7.2 #93 Traffic Separation The virtualised network product shall support logical separation of traffic belonging to different network domains. For example, O&M traffic and control plane traffic belong to different network domains. See IETF RFC 3871 for further information. 3GPP TR 33.818 clause 5.2.5.5.8.5.1 3GPP TS 33.117 clause 4.3.5.1 #94 Inter-VNF and intra-VNF Traffic Separation The network used for the communication between the VNFCs of a VNF (intra-VNF traffic) and the network used for the communication between VNFs (inter-VNF traffic) shall be separated to prevent the security threats from the different networks affect each other. 3GPP TR 33.818 clause 5.2.5.5.8.5.2 #95 Instantiating VNF from trusted VNF image A VNF shall be initiated from a trusted VNF image which includes one or more than one images. The VNF image shall be signed by an authorized party. The authorized party is trusted by the operators. 3GPP TR 33.818 clause 5.2.5.6.6.1 3GPP TR 33.848 clause 5.18.3 #96 Secure virtualisation resource management To prevent a compromised VIM from changing the assigned virtualised resource, the VNF shall alert to the OAM. For example, when an instantiated VNF is running, a compromised VIM can delete a VM which is running VNFCI, the VNF shall alert to the OAM when the VNF cannot detect a VNFC message. A VNF shall log the access from the VIM. See note 9. 3GPP TR 33.818 clause 5.2.5.6.7.1 ETSI ETSI TS 104 104 V9.1.0 (2025-06) 90 Item Title 3GPP Security requirements 3GPP specifications NESAS/SCAS gNodeB-specific security functional requirements #97 Secure executive environment creation When an attacker tampers a driver which provided by the hardware and used to create the executive environment, the virtualisation layer shall alert the driver error to the administrator for checking the error and finding the attack at latter (see note 10). 3GPP TR 33.818 clause 5.2.5.6.7.2 #98 VM escape protection To defence the attack that an attacker utilizes a vulnerability of a VNF to attack a virtualisation layer and then control the virtualisation layer, the virtualisation layer shall implement the following requirements: The virtualisation shall reject the abnormal access from the VNF (e.g. the VNF accesses the memory which is not allocated to the VNF) and log the attacks. 3GPP TR 33.818 clause 5.2.5.6.7.3 #99 Secure hardware resource management The VIM manages the hardware resource configuration and state information exchange. When the VIM is compromised to change the hardware resource configuration, an alert shall be triggered by the hardware. The administrator can check the alert and find the attack at latter. 3GPP TR 33.818 clause 5.2.5.7.7.1 #100 Secure hardware resource management information When a compromised Virtualisation layer tampers the hardware resource configuration which is received from the VIM to result in the configuration error of the hardware, the hardware shall trigger an alert. The administrator can check the alert and find the attack at latter (see note 11). 3GPP TR 33.818 clause 5.2.5.7.7.2 #101 Trusted platform The host system shall implement a Hardware-Based Root of Trust (HBRT) ((e.g. TPM, HSM)) as Initial Root of Trust, see ETSI GS NFV-SEC 012. The trust state of the platform shall be measured and a trusted chain shall be built, see ETSI GR NFV-SEC 007. 3GPP TR 33.818 clause 5.2.5.7.7.3 NOTE 1: The network product may support independent user data bases for different access methods, e.g. one data base for command shell access on OS level and another data base for GUI access. User data bases may be stored locally on the network product or on a central AAA system that the network product accesses for user authentication. NOTE 2: Password management and blacklist configuration may be done in a separate node that is different to the node under test, e.g. a SSO server or any other central credential manager. NOTE 3: The kind of activity required to reset the timeout timer depends on the type of user session. NOTE 4: The check could be performed e.g. against a whitelist or blacklist of permitted message type / sender identity combinations. NOTE 5: Such a separate entity could e.g. be a GTP Firewall. NOTE 6: Test cases for this separate entity are not provided in the present document, but are believed to be similar to them. NOTE 7: The test cases are only applicable to all network product classes utilizing GTP-U based protocol. NOTE 8: Linux® is the registered trademark of Linus Torvalds in the U.S. and other countries. NOTE 9: The VIM manages the virtualisation resource assignment and synchronization of virtualised resource state information. In the implementation, the VIM and the virtualisation layer are coupled and provided by one vendor, they trust each other. Whether the VIM is trust or not is based on operator's decision. NOTE 10: Whether the hardware is trust or not is based on operator's decision to ensure the virtualisation layer and the VNF to be run on the trusted hardware. NOTE 11: Whether the virtualisation layer is trust or not is based on operator's decision. ETSI ETSI TS 104 104 V9.1.0 (2025-06) 91 Annex C (informative): Guidance on Security Requirements & Controls C.1 O-Cloud Controls given in this clause are designed as a guidance and non-normative. The implementation of those non-normative controls depends on the security policies within the O-Cloud Service Provider, O-RAN Application Provider and Service Provider. C.1.1 Secure protection of cryptographic keys and sensitive data Potential solutions for SEC-CTL-OCLOUD-SS-1 The following potential implementation options for encrypting cryptographic keys and sensitive data within the O-Cloud platform could be used. The appropriate option to be used depends on the sensitivity of the data to be protected and needs to be assessed/determined by the Service provider. 1. Software based: a. Software-based KMS vaults supporting management of keys, including creation, rotation, and revocation, as well as encrypting and decrypting sensitive data with managed keys [51]. b. Use a vTPM: A virtual Trusted Platform Module (vTPM) is a software-based representation of a physical Trusted Platform Module 2.0 chip to provide secure storage of credentials or keys [54]. A vTPM acts as any other virtual device. It performs the same functions as a TPM, but it performs cryptographic coprocessor capabilities in software. It should comply with the TPM 2.0 specification [53]. 2. Hardware based a. Hardware-based key vaults: The use of Key Management Service (KMS) based on an HSM [i.5], [i.6], [52]. The data is encrypted using a Data Encryption Key (DEK); a new DEK is generated for each encryption. The DEKs are encrypted with a Key Encryption Key (KEK) that is stored and managed in the HSM of the KMS provider. b. A hardware TPM [i.8], [53]. For data encryption, an encryption key is stored on disk but encrypted with the TPM master key (the Storage Root Key (SRK)). This encryption key can only be used after it was decrypted by an authenticated TPM. The actual data encryption/decryption is then done by the main CPU, only decryption/encryption of the encryption key is done inside the TPM. Potential solutions for SEC-CTL-OCLOUD-SS-2 • Overwriting with zero (e.g. /dev/zero) or simple patterns. • Overwriting with random data using: - True random data source (e.g. /dev/random). This solution takes too long to wait for the entropy generation. - Pseudorandom data source (e.g. /dev/urandom) can be used as a reasonable source of pseudorandom data. Potential solutions for SEC-CTL-OCLOUD-SS-3 Each data center adheres to a strict disposal policy and uses the techniques described to achieve compliance with NIST SP 800-88 [75] and DoD 5220.22-M [50]. ETSI ETSI TS 104 104 V9.1.0 (2025-06) 92 Potential solutions for REQ-SEC-OCLOUD-SS-5 Automatic memory scrubbing on boot: • Implement a process that automatically clears all volatile memory as early as possible during the boot sequence. This can be achieved through BIOS settings or early-stage boot loader scripts that overwrite memory with zeros or random data to ensure no residual data is left accessible. Watchdog timers: • Use timers that watch for unexpected shutdowns or power losses. If something goes wrong, these timers help make sure memory is cleaned properly before the system starts up again. Work with power backup systems: • For systems with an Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS), integrate the memory scrubbing mechanism with UPS software to initiate secure shutdown procedures that include clearing volatile memory when the UPS detects a power outage and is about to run out of battery. C.1.2 Chain of Trust Potential solutions for SEC-CTL-OCLOUD-COT-1 There are many ways to measure platform integrity. In many cases, a hardware security module is used to store measurement data such as a HSM and TPM. Various platform integrity technologies build their own CoTs [i.7] and listed here below: • UEFI Secure Boot (SB) • Intel Trusted Execution Technology (TXT) • Intel Boot Guard • Intel Platform Firmware Resilience (PFR) • Intel Technology Example Summary • AMD Platform Secure Boot (AMD PSB) • Arm TrustZone Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) for Armv8-A • Arm Secure Boot and the Chain of Trust (CoT) • Cisco Platform Roots of Trust • IBM Chain of Trust (CoT) For more details, see [i.7], clause 3.2. Potential solutions for SEC-CTL-OCLOUD-COT-2 A vTPM can be considered a software-based implementation of a root of trust. It emulates the behavior and functionalities of a physical TPM through software mechanisms and cryptographic libraries [53], [54]. A vTPM operates within a virtual machine or as a software module within an operating system, leveraging the underlying hardware and security features provided by the host system. It can perform key generation, storage, and cryptographic operations similar to a physical TPM. However, since it is implemented in software, its security relies on the host system's security measures and may be more vulnerable to compromise if the host system is compromised. Therefore, it is crucial to ensure the overall security of the O-Cloud where the vTPM is deployed and to consider additional security measures to protect the software root of trust. Potential solutions for SEC-CTL-OCLOUD-COT-3 Refer to the following technology examples in [i.7], clause 6.1 for more information: • Intel Security Libraries for the Data Center (ISecL-DC) ETSI ETSI TS 104 104 V9.1.0 (2025-06) 93 • Remote AS - Project Veraison (VERificAtIon of atteStatiON) • IBM Platform Attestation Tooling Relevant information on the Attestation Server is provided in [i.7], clause 6.1 and [44], clause 6.6. Figure C.1.2-1 shows an example of remote AS: Figure C.1.2-1 The AS from the hardware layer to the O-RAN Application includes the following steps (see figure C.1.2-1): Attestation of the O-Cloud platform 1. RoT measures and verifies hardware resources (server platform) including firmware/BIOS. It then launches the hardware resources. 2. The server act as the attester of the OS/virtualization layer. It measures, verifies, and launches the OS/virtualization layer. The attestation results and corresponding measurements are maintained by the management platform (e.g. Kubernetes) acting as the trust agent. Attestation of Application The attestation process is initiated by the management platform requesting to instantiate a new Application: 1. The virtualization layer verifies the virtual instance. 2. Virtualized RoT (vRoT) measures the Application. The vRoT is a virtual instance associated to the hardware protected RoT. The virtualization layer provides this virtual resource to the virtual instance. Corresponding measurements are reported to the trust agent. The trust agent exposes the attestation results to authorized attestation server (could be within the SMO) so that it verifies collected measurements against trust policies already defined by administrators. ETSI ETSI TS 104 104 V9.1.0 (2025-06) 94 C.2 Common Application Lifecycle Management C.2.1 Software Package Protection Potential controls on REQ-SEC-ALM-PKG-1 and REQ-SEC-ALM-PKG-4 Application packages need to be frequently tested throughout the lifecycle of the Application: During Development During on-boarding and during instantiation During Runtime Vulnerability scanning Static Application Security Testing (SAST) Dynamic Application Security Testing (DAST) Penetration testing Software composition analysis Testing to be performed frequently for vulnerability scanning or misconfiguration on Application packages. EXAMPLE: To check for malware or secrets stored in package. Responsible: Application Provider Vulnerability scanning Dynamic Application Security testing (DAST) to be performed for: • Certifying the Application for functionality as well as authenticity, integrity, and packaging compliance. • Blocking deployments if the package does not comply with the Service Provider security policies • For scanning and detecting potential vulnerabilities • Checking for malware • Scanning for unnecessary system tools and libraries not required by Application • Software composition analysis Responsible: Application Provider, Service Provider Perform continuous scanning/monitoring for known vulnerability or misconfiguration on runtime workloads, check for any open ports, VM/Container escape. Responsible: Service Provider Tools used for static code and dynamic security analysis, analysis of code being released, and penetration test results must be shared with the Service Provider. ETSI ETSI TS 104 104 V9.1.0 (2025-06) 95 Annex D (informative): Change history Date Revision Description 2024.03.20 09.00 AT&T.AO: Correct usages of "Must" 2024.03.20 09.00 Ericsson: Update NFO and FOCOM security requirements and controls 2024.03.20 09.00 Ericsson: Add Shared O-RU Security Requirements 2024.03.20 09.00 Keysight.AO: Added unexpected input management requirements for S-Plane and C- Plane 2024.03.20 09.00 MITRE: Resolve duplicate requirement reference IDs in SLM section 2024.03.20 09.00 MITRE: SRS Typos in SLM Reqs 2024.03.20 09.00 NEC.AO: Removal of Requirement REQ-SEC-DEL-1, REQ-CTL-DEL-1, REQ-CTL-DEL-2 2024.03.20 09.00 NOKIA.AO: Security requirements for PSK/Refnum based certificate enrolment 2024.03.20 09.00 NOKIA.AO: Security requirements for vendor root CA certificate renewal for PNFs 2024.03.20 09.00 NOKIA.AO: Security requirements for Certificate Renewal procedure for PNFs, CNFs and VNFs 2024.03.20 09.00 NOKIA.AO: Security requirements for vendor certificate based certificate initial enrolment for PNFs 2024.03.20 09.00 Rakuten Symphony: Correction to 802.1X security control clause 2024.03.20 09.00 WG11.AO: New requirement for the support of CMPv2 by VNF/CNF 2024.03.20 09.00 WG11.AO: Update of O-Cloud controls on secure storage 2024.03.20 09.00 WG11: New requirements focusing on O-Cloud SW images verification, vulnerability scanning and secure update 2023.11.06 08.00 Ericsson: Update the outdated reference of 3GPP references in Clause 2 and Annex B 2023.11.06 08.00 Ericsson: Editorial update in Clause 5.1.2.2 Security Controls 2023.11.06 08.00 Ericsson: Proposed changes in Clause 5.3.2 Common Application Lifecycle Management 2023.11.06 08.00 MITRE: New requirements on rAppIDs 2023.11.06 08.00 MITRE: New requirement on App decommissioning 2023.11.06 08.00 MITRE: Duplicate Account and Identity Security Event Log Requirement. 2023.11.06 08.00 NIST: SecRecSpec-O1-Interface-Modification 2023.11.06 08.00 NOKIA.AO: Near-RT RIC Secure mechanisms for Y1 interface 2023.11.06 08.00 NOKIA: Security requirements and controls for xApp registration procedure 2023.11.06 08.00 NOKIA: Security requirements for preventing tampering of log data 2023.11.06 08.00 NOKIA: security requirements for prevention of (D)DoS to Security Log Data management 2023.11.06 08.00 NOKIA: Security requirements for prevention of (D)DoS to Security Log Data management 2023.11.06 08.00 NOKIA: Security Log data one-way access 2023.11.06 08.00 NOKIA: Near-RT RIC Secure mechanisms for E2 interface 2023.11.06 08.00 Rakuten Symphony: New security requirements and controls for NFO/FOCOM 2023.11.06 08.00 Rakuten Symphony: New security controls for DoS / DDoS mitigation requirement REQ- SEC-DOS-1 2023.11.06 08.00 Rakuten Symphony: New security control covering REQ-SEC-AAL-4 2023.11.06 08.00 Rakuten Symphony: New Security Control for User Management Requirements for Cloud Platform Management 2023.11.06 08.00 WG11: New requirments on O-Cloud logging 2023.11.06 08.00 WG11: New requirements on O-Cloud instance ID 2023.11.06 08.00 WG11: New requirements on O-Cloud Time Synchronization 2023.07.12 07.00 AT&T.AO: Security Requirements specifications CMPv2 2023.07.12 07.00 AT&T.AO: Security Requirements specifications TA Provisoning 2023.07.12 07.00 Ericsson.AO: API Security Requirements 2023.07.12 07.00 Ericsson.AO: Update to informative SBOM statements 2023.07.12 07.00 Ericsson.AO: Revise Password requirements clause 2023.07.12 07.00 Ericsson: Shared O-RU Security Requirements and Security Controls 2023.07.12 07.00 Ericsson: Kafka Security Requirements 2023.07.12 07.00 Fujitsu.AO: Update Security requirements documents with secure deletion 2023.07.12 07.00 Fujitsu: Update Security requirements documents with secure decommissioning 2023.07.12 07.00 MITRE.AO: Common application package requirements 2023.07.12 07.00 MITRE: Security Log Management requirement for a standard security log format and security related log fields 2023.07.12 07.00 MITRE: Common application package security controls 2023.07.12 07.00 MITRE: Common application terminology 2023.07.12 07.00 MITRE: Security related activities and events to be logged 2023.07.12 07.00 MITRE: PART 2: Security related activities and events to be logged 2023.07.12 07.00 NOKIA: First security log management related requirements 2023.07.12 07.00 NOKIA: Near-RT RIC Secure mechanisms for A1 interface ETSI ETSI TS 104 104 V9.1.0 (2025-06) 96 Date Revision Description 2023.07.12 07.00 NOKIA: Security requirements for the Y1 interface 2023.07.12 07.00 NOKIA: Security requirements for storage and transfer of logs 2023.07.12 07.00 NOKIA: Security requirements on Trusted Environment for Cluster Node 2023.07.12 07.00 NOKIA: Security requirements on Trusted Environment for Log-data Repository 2023.07.12 07.00 NOKIA: Security Requirements for Log-data Lifecycle Management 2023.07.12 07.00 NOKIA: Security controls for the Y1 interface solution 1 2023.07.12 07.00 NOKIA: Security Requirements for Time stamps in Log-data 2023.07.12 07.00 NOKIA: Security requirements for Authenticated Time Stamping (Sol#5) and (Missing) Common Time Source (Sol#15) 2023.07.12 07.00 NOKIA: Security Requirements for Due Diligence and (Security) Log-Data Auditing (Sol#6) 2023.07.12 07.00 NOKIA: Security requirements for the support of syslog over tls 2023.07.12 07.00 Rakuten Symphony :Remove references to <running> and <candidate> datastores for NACM rules of O1 interface 2023.07.12 07.00 Rakuten Symphony: NACM group O1_software_management of O1 interface is applicable only for PNFs 2023.07.12 07.00 Rakuten Symphony.AO: New security requirements and controls for O-Cloud hardware 2023.07.12 07.00 Rakuten Symphony.AO: New security requirements and controls for O-Cloud Virtualization and Isolation 2023.07.12 07.00 Rakuten Symphony: ETSI PAS Adaption for O-RAN Security Requirement Specification 2023.07.12 07.00 Rakuten Symphony.AO: Rename the Security Requirement Specification document to include Security Controls 2023.07.12 07.00 Rakuten Symphony.AO: ETSI Adaptation and changes for the Near-RT RIC Section in the Security Requirement Specification 2023.07.12 07.00 Rakuten Symphony.AO: ETSI Adaptation and Changes for the Security Requirement Specification_Ocloud 2023.07.12 07.00 Rakuten Symphony: ETSI PAS Adaption for O-RAN Security Requirement Specification_Interfaces maintained by ORAN 2023.07.12 07.00 Rakuten Symphony: ETSI PAS Adaption for O-RAN Security Requirement Specification_Ph3_Section5.3_Transversal Requirements 2023.07.12 07.00 WG11: Update on the requirement REQ-SEC-DOS-1 against O-RAN DoS attacks 2023.07.12 07.00 WG11: Minor updates: VNF/CNF are replaced by Application, some reference have been updated 2023.03.21 06.00 Ericsson: Update format for references to O-RAN documents 2023.03.21 06.00 Ericsson: O-Cloud Management User Authentication and Authorization 2023.03.21 06.00 Ericsson: SMO Security Requirements and Security Controls 2023.03.21 06.00 Orange: New security requirements on AAL components 2023.03.21 06.00 Orange: New security requirements on security descriptor 2023.03.21 06.00 Qualcomm Incorporated: Security requirements and controls for O-CU-CP/UP, O-DU, O- RU and O-eNB 2023.03.21 06.00 Orange: New security requirements on AAL interfaces 2023.03.21 06.00 MITRE: New security requirements on secure update for apps/VNFs/CNF 2023.03.21 06.00 Orange: New security requirements on the protection of O2 interface and O-Cloud notification APIs 2023.03.21 06.00 MITRE: Update SBOM requirements from AppLCMSec TR recommendation 2022.11.10 05.00 Tbd. 2022.07.20 04.00 Added/updated requirements and controls for: • O-Cloud Image Security • Non-RT RIC, rApps, and A1 and R1 Interfaces • Near-RT RIC 2022.03.23 03.00 Added/updated requirements and controls for: • Near-RT RIC and xApps • Open Fronthaul Interface - C, S and U Planes • Open Fronthaul Point-to-Point LAN Segment 2021.11.09 02.00 Added requirements for: • Open Fronthaul Point-to-Point LAN Segment • SBOM • Network Protocols and Services • Robustness of Common Transport Protocols • Robustness against Volumetric DDoS Attack • Robustness of OS and Applications • Password-Based Authentication 2021.07.01 01.00 Final initial version 01.00 ETSI ETSI TS 104 104 V9.1.0 (2025-06) 97 Date Revision Description 2024.03.20 09.00 Published as Final version 09.00 2023.11.06 08.00 Published as Final version 08.00 2023.07.14 07.00 Published as Final version 07.00 2023.03.22 06.00 Published as Final version 06.00 2022.11.18 05.00 Published as Final version 05.00 2022.07.20 04.00 Published as Final version 04.00 2022.03.23 03.00 Published as Final version 03.00 2021.11.09 02.00 Published as Final version 02.00 2021.07.01 01.00 Published as Final version 01.00 ETSI ETSI TS 104 104 V9.1.0 (2025-06) 98 History Document history V9.1.0 June 2025 Publication
|
39b61e004ed3d157fb60cbfebc5644d7
|
104 063
|
1 Scope
|
The present document specifies a signal-based analysis method and overall measure for linearity of electrical or acoustical recordings that were transmitted via speech communication terminals. The analysis considers the influence of the full transmission paths (talker to POI and POI to listener), including acoustical paths and components like signal processing and/or speech/audio codecs. The method specified in the present document is intended to be used for (but not limited to) communication terminals, which are optimized for the transmission of speech/audio signals - but may at the same time significantly distort or even suppress artificial test signals like e.g. sweeps, noise bursts or single-/multi-sine tones, as these are identified as irrelevant or even unwanted signal components. For this reason, source signals that do not correspond to the envisioned use case of the terminal are out of scope. The method specified in the present document is intended to be used mainly as a technical measure and in a similar way as traditional distortion measures. These assume a mostly linear and time-invariant behaviour of the device under test and are typically used for e.g. detecting defective transducers (e.g. loudspeakers or microphones). Even though a certain correlation can be anticipated, any relation to perceptual quality (independent if assessed auditorily and/or instrumentally) is out of scope. The specified method requires a sufficiently low idle noise floor in the analysed signals. Usage under ambient noise conditions is out of scope.
|
39b61e004ed3d157fb60cbfebc5644d7
|
104 063
|
2 References
| |
39b61e004ed3d157fb60cbfebc5644d7
|
104 063
|
2.1 Normative references
|
References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. Referenced documents which are not found to be publicly available in the expected location might be found in the ETSI docbox. NOTE: While any hyperlinks included in this clause were valid at the time of publication, ETSI cannot guarantee their long-term validity. The following referenced documents are necessary for the application of the present document. [1] Recommendation ITU-T P.10 (05/2024): "Vocabulary for performance, quality of service and quality of experience". [2] Recommendation ITU-T P.501 (04/2025): "Test signals for use in telephony and other speech- based applications". [3] Recommendation ITU-T P.56 (12/2011): "Objective measurement of active speech level". [4] Welch P. D.: "The use of Fast Fourier Transform for the estimation of power spectra: A method based on time averaging over short, modified periodograms", IEEE Transactions on Audio and Electroacoustics, Volume AU-15 (2), pages 70–73, June 1967. [5] D'Antona Gabriele and A. Ferrero: "Digital Signal Processing for Measurement Systems", 2006, page 70. [6] Ramaswamy Sivaramakrishnan: "Frequency sampling digital filters for multirate applications and pipelined implementations" (1994). University of Nevada, Las Vegas, Retrospective Theses & Dissertations. 426. [7] Steven W. Smith: "The Scientist and Engineer's Guide to Digital Signal Processing", California Technical Publishing, 1997. ETSI ETSI TS 104 063 V1.1.1 (2025-07) 7 [8] Alan V. Oppenheim and Ronald W. Schafer: "Discrete-Time Signal Processing" (1989, third edition). [9] Recommendation ITU-T P.58 (03/2023): "Head and torso simulator for telephonometry". [10] Recommendation ITU-T P.581 (07/2022): "Use of head and torso simulator for hands-free and handset terminal testing".
|
39b61e004ed3d157fb60cbfebc5644d7
|
104 063
|
2.2 Informative references
|
References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. NOTE: While any hyperlinks included in this clause were valid at the time of publication, ETSI cannot guarantee their long-term validity. The following referenced documents may be useful in implementing an ETSI deliverable or add to the reader's understanding, but are not required for conformance to the present document. [i.1] ETSI TS 126 071 (V18.0.0): "Mandatory speech codec speech processing functions; AMR speech codec; General description". [i.2] ETSI TS 126 171 (V18.0.0): "Speech codec speech processing functions; Adaptive Multi-Rate – Wideband (AMR-WB) speech codec; General description". [i.3] ETSI TS 126 441 (V18.0.0): "Codec for Enhanced Voice Services (EVS); General Overview".
|
39b61e004ed3d157fb60cbfebc5644d7
|
104 063
|
3 Definition of terms, symbols and abbreviations
| |
39b61e004ed3d157fb60cbfebc5644d7
|
104 063
|
3.1 Terms
|
For the purposes of the present document, the following terms apply: distortion: undesired modification of a signal's original waveform or the relationship between its frequency components, typically resulting in a degradation of the signal intermodulation distortion: special type of distortion occurring when two or more signals of different frequencies pass through a non-linear system, creating frequency components that are the sum and difference of the original ones harmonic distortion: addition of overtones to an audio signal that were not present in the original input signal, and which occur at integer multiples of the original signal's fundamental frequency, typically due to non-linear effects within a system or device total harmonic distortion: measurement of the harmonic distortion in a signal, defined as the ratio of the sum of the powers of a certain number of harmonic components to the power of the fundamental frequency
|
39b61e004ed3d157fb60cbfebc5644d7
|
104 063
|
3.2 Symbols
|
For the purposes of the present document, the following symbols apply: C Spectral coherence min threshold to avoid division by zero i segment index of a STFT calculation iA segment index of a STFT calculation considered as active j frequency index frequency at index j of a STFT calculation ′ frequency at index j of a STFT calculation considered as coherent min minimum frequency of energy integration range ETSI ETSI TS 104 063 V1.1.1 (2025-07) 8 max maximum frequency of energy integration range ⋅ function to be applied to obtain non-linear component of any signal ℎ() real impulse response between and ℎ estimate of ℎ() ′ initial estimate of ℎ ′ final estimate of ℎ L number of (overlapping) segments of a STFT calculation lin average level of linear signal component nl average level of non-linear signal component nl Non-linearity measure (in dB) () noise component of N number of samples in a segment of a STFT calculation Estimated spectrum of () averaged versus time power spectral density of averaged versus time , power spectral density of versus time cross-power spectral density between and averaged versus time , cross-power spectral density between and versus time power spectral density of averaged versus time , power spectral density of versus time act activity ratio inact inactivity ratio TC coherence threshold (in %) source signal used for the measurement and/or calculation of the non-linearity measure ′ source signal used for the measurement but not for the calculation of the non-linearity measure () acoustically /electrically measured or otherwise generated signal that may be subject to non-linear transmission , () binaurally recorded or otherwise generated version of () containing left and right ear signals lin Linear component of (, ) STFT representation of , STFT representation of Averaged spectrum versus time of lin Estimate of the linear frequency component of averaged over time nl Estimate of the non-linear frequency component of averaged over time
|
39b61e004ed3d157fb60cbfebc5644d7
|
104 063
|
3.3 Abbreviations
|
For the purposes of the present document, the following abbreviations apply: A/D Analogue-to-Digital AEC Acoustic Echo Cancellation AGC Automatic Gain Control AI Artificial Intelligence AMR Adaptive Multi-Rate AMR-WB Adaptive Multi-Rate for Wideband ASL Active Speech Level CPSD Cross-Power Spectral Density D/A Digital-to-Analogue DRP Drum Reference Point DSP Digital Signal Processing DUT Device Under Test EVS Enhanced Voice Service FB Fullband FIR Finite Impulse Response FSM Frequency Sampling Method HATS Head And Torso Simulator LTI Linear and Time-Invariant MLS Maximum-Length Sequence MRP Mouth Reference Point ETSI ETSI TS 104 063 V1.1.1 (2025-07) 9 NB Narrowband NLM Non-Linearity Measure NR Noise Reduction PLC Packet Loss Concealment POI Point Of Interconnect PSD Power Spectral Density STFT Short-Time Fourier Transformation SWB Super-Wideband THD Total Harmonic Distortion WB Wideband
|
39b61e004ed3d157fb60cbfebc5644d7
|
104 063
|
4 Distortions in speech communication terminals
| |
39b61e004ed3d157fb60cbfebc5644d7
|
104 063
|
4.1 Overview
|
Historically, the analysis of distortions in communication terminals focused on the electro-acoustic components, namely the microphone and the loudspeaker. These transducers were the primary sources of non-linearity in otherwise largely analogue and linear systems. The distortions they introduced, such as harmonic and intermodulation distortion, could be reliably characterized using simple, artificial test signals like sine tones. The assumption was that the Device Under Test (DUT) behaved as a Linear and Time-Invariant (LTI) system, where any deviation from this ideal could be quantified. This LTI assumption is no longer valid for modern speech communication terminals. The signal path in today's devices, from mobile phones to conferencing systems, is dominated by sophisticated and highly non-linear Digital Signal Processing (DSP). Components such as noise suppressors, acoustic echo cancellers, automatic gain controllers, and advanced speech codecs are designed to be adaptive and time-variant. They actively modify the signal based on its content and the surrounding acoustic environment. While these processes are intended to enhance the perceived quality and intelligibility of speech, they can introduce complex distortions that bear little resemblance to the classic harmonic distortions of analogue systems. These modern distortions are often highly signal-dependent and transient, making them difficult to quantify with traditional metrics that rely on static, artificial signals. Consequently, a comprehensive understanding of distortion in contemporary terminals requires considering the entire processing chain, as detailed in the following clauses.
|
39b61e004ed3d157fb60cbfebc5644d7
|
104 063
|
4.2 Signal Processing
|
Modern terminals apply various real-time signal processing algorithms to enhance speech intelligibility and suppress unwanted signals. While these techniques serve important functions, they often introduce side effects that may be perceived as distortions: • Automatic Gain Control (AGC): AGC attempts to normalize signal levels but may cause unnatural fluctuations in signal amplitude. Sudden changes in gain, particularly in response to non-speech events, can lead to distortions that are difficult to detect using linear analysis methods. • Noise Reduction (NR): NR algorithms attenuate background noise, typically based on spectral subtraction or statistical modelling. However, aggressive noise suppression may introduce musical noise artifacts, modulated background sounds, or speech component suppression - particularly during transient speech segments or in fluctuating noise environments. • Acoustic Echo Cancellation (AEC): AEC systems are designed to suppress acoustic echoes, particularly in hands-free setups. Imperfect modelling or adaptation delays may lead to residual echo artifacts, double-talk suppression effects, or partial speech dropouts. • Limiter and Clipping Effects: In scenarios with high signal levels or insufficient dynamic range, signal clipping may occur. This results in waveform distortion, which introduces high-frequency energy and harmonic components unrelated to the speech signal. • Time-Variant Processing: Many algorithms operate in a non-linear and time-variant manner, making the distortion pattern dependent on context, input characteristics, and prior signal history. This dynamic behaviour cannot be fully characterized using static test signals. ETSI ETSI TS 104 063 V1.1.1 (2025-07) 10 These processing-induced distortions are often non-stationary, occur intermittently, and exhibit complex spectral- temporal patterns, which complicates traditional linear analysis.
|
39b61e004ed3d157fb60cbfebc5644d7
|
104 063
|
4.3 Codec
|
The integration of speech and audio codecs is a fundamental part of modern digital communication systems. While codecs are essential for efficient transmission, they inherently introduce quantization noise, bandwidth limitations, and signal reconstruction errors: • Influence of speech codecs: Speech codecs such as AMR [i.1], AMR-WB [i.2], or EVS [i.3] operate at bitrates where perceptually irrelevant information is discarded. At low bitrates, the signal reconstruction is coarse, and artifacts such as pre-echo, temporal smearing, or spectral warping may appear. In addition, many speech codecs use codebook structures for synthesis. The reconstruction accuracy depends on the selected excitation vector and filter coefficients, leading to signal-dependent distortions that are often non-linear in nature. • Frame Loss and Packet Loss Concealment (PLC): In network-based communication, frame or packet loss can occur. PLC algorithms aim to reconstruct the missing information using prediction or interpolation, but these approximations may introduce synthetic or repetitive distortions. • Bandwidth Mismatch and Filtering: When the codec input or output bandwidth differs from the nominal transmission range (e.g. sending wideband speech through a narrowband channel), additional spectral distortion or aliasing artifacts may result. • Bitrate and Complexity Trade-offs: In low-complexity devices, simplified codec implementations may be used. These may compromise fidelity to reduce computational cost, introducing further distortions not present in the reference implementations. Overall, codec-induced distortions are tightly coupled to the speech signal characteristics and exhibit non-linear, signal- dependent behaviour. Moreover, they often affect both spectral and temporal properties of the signal, making them difficult to isolate using traditional linear system assumptions.
|
39b61e004ed3d157fb60cbfebc5644d7
|
104 063
|
5 Non-linearity measure
| |
39b61e004ed3d157fb60cbfebc5644d7
|
104 063
|
5.1 Overview & conventions
|
In general, the Non-Linearity Measure (NLM) is based on a source signal (), which is fed acoustically or electrically into a terminal, device or system under test. The signal is transmitted through one or multiple linear or non-linear components/paths, which could be either variant or invariant versus time. The signal recorded at the output is denoted as () and may contain an unknown degree of degradations/distortions compared to the source signal. In addition, () is also subject to additive noise () (e.g. ambient noise of test room, idle noise introduced by D/A or A/D converters, etc.), which is assumed to be uncorrelated to the input signal (). NLM is based on the signal model as defined in equation (1) and illustrated in Figure 1, which assumes that () is composed of a linear component lin() (corresponding to a convolution of () and an impulse response ℎ(), i.e. a FIR filter), a non-linear component nl() (corresponding to a non-linear function applied on ()) and the aforementioned noise signal (). = lin + nl + () = ∗ℎ() + ( ()) + () (1) ETSI ETSI TS 104 063 V1.1.1 (2025-07) 11 Figure 1: Signal model of the non-linearity measure NOTE: The NLM analysis method is designed to quantify non-linear signal components in a similar way as traditional distortion measurements, which focus on harmonic components introduced by electro-acoustic transducers. However, for the estimate of the non-linear component, the non-linear function is not modelled by any prototype, kernel or basis function(s), as in approaches like e.g. ETSI TS 126 171 [i.2] or ETSI TS 126 441 [i.3]. The analysis method and corresponding parameters specified in the following clauses assume that signals are sampled at 48 kHz. In general, the analysis method can be applied also with different sampling rates, which requires that several values like e.g. frame sizes, have to be adapted. Several calculation steps in the following clauses utilize a certain analysis range min to max, which should be adapted to the audio bandwidth used by the transmission system during the recording of . Typically, the bandwidth definitions for NB, WB, SWB and FB telephony according to Recommendation ITU-T P.10 [1] are used in such cases. However, since several sub-analyses in the following (like e.g. coherence or impulse response estimation) are sensitive for low signal energy content at very low and/or high frequencies, it is recommended to use slightly decreased frequency ranges for some bandwidths, as exemplarily shown in Table 1. Table 1: Frequency ranges Bandwidth Nominal audio bandwidths [i.1] Recommend audio bandwidths min [Hz] max [Hz] min [Hz] max [Hz] Narrowband (NB) 300 3 400 300 3 400 Wideband (WB) 100 7 000 100 7 000 Super-wideband (SWB) 50 14 000 100 12 000 Fullband (FB) 20 20 000 100 12 000 NLM results shall always be stated in the test report together with the values chosen for min and max.
|
39b61e004ed3d157fb60cbfebc5644d7
|
104 063
|
5.2 Preparation and preprocessing
|
The following requirements and recommendations apply for the source signal used for testing: • The signal-to-noise ratio of the source signal shall be equal to or greater than the signal-to-noise ratio of the British English speech sequence specified in clause 7.3 of Recommendation ITU-T P.501 [2]. • The source signal should contain speech activity of at least 60 %, measured according to Recommendation ITU-T P.56 [3]. • The source signal shall contain at least 2,0 s of active speech. • The source signal shall provide at least super-wideband audio bandwidth (fullband is recommended). The nominal audio bandwidth of the recording should be at least narrowband. For definitions of audio bandwidths, see Recommendation ITU-T P.10 [1]. Speech signals from Recommendation P.501 [2] listed in clauses 7.3, 7.4, Annexes C and D are recommended to use, as these already meet the requirements specified above. ETSI ETSI TS 104 063 V1.1.1 (2025-07) 12 NOTE: The usage of the non-linearity measure with signal types other than speech might be possible but is for further study. Before inserting source signal () and measured signal into the analysis method, several recommended and required pre-processing steps have to be conducted: • The average level of the recording shall be at least 40 dB above the idle noise level. • The delay between () and shall be minimized and within a margin of ±1 ms. • () and shall contain (or zero-padded to) the same number of samples after compensating delay. The pre-processing steps described above are not part of the analysis and out of scope of the present document.
|
39b61e004ed3d157fb60cbfebc5644d7
|
104 063
|
5.3 Activity detection
|
Since () (and in consequence also ()) could possibly contain longer inactive/silence segments, these need to be excluded for some analyses in the following clauses. This is achieved with classification into active and inactive level-vs-time instances. In a first step, the Short-Time Fourier Transformation (STFT) is calculated for () leading to (, ). The parameters and window function for this transformation are provided in Table 2. Table 2: STFT parameter for estimation of impulse response Parameter Value Window function Flat top [5] Number of samples per frame 16 384 Overlap 97,5 % For the classification of active/inactive frames, the Active Speech Level (ASL) according to Recommendation ITU-T P.56 [3] is calculated for source signal (). Depending on the audio bandwidth, the input bandpass filter according to Annex B of [3] for WB or SWB or Annex C of [3] for FB shall be used for the ASL calculation. The ASL analysis also provides an activity ratio act (in %) as an additional result value. A corresponding inactivity ratio inact (in %) is defined in equation (2). inact = 100 % − act (2) Then, the power spectral density (PSD) , versus time is calculated for (, ) according to equation (3). , = (, ) ∗(, ) (3) Where: • X(, ) is the STFTs of the i-th segment of (). • ∗(, ) is the complex conjugate of (, ). • N is the number of points in the segment. Based on the PSD, a level-vs-time representation () is calculated according to equation (4). () = ∑ , (4) Next, activity threshold act is determined using inact as a percentile according to equation (5). act = percentile (), inact (5) Finally, all frames that are considered as active speech can be defined as per equation (6). = | > act (6) ETSI ETSI TS 104 063 V1.1.1 (2025-07) 13 An example result of the activity frame classification is illustrated in Figure 2, for which the file P501_D_EN_fm_SWB_48k.wav from Annex D of Recommendation ITU-T P.501 [2] was used (ASL = -26 dBov, act ≈ 80 %). Figure 2: Example result of activity detection
|
39b61e004ed3d157fb60cbfebc5644d7
|
104 063
|
5.4 Estimate of impulse response
|
The first step of the analysis is to estimate an impulse response ℎ based on the available signals and . The calculation method is illustrated in Figure 3. Figure 3: Estimation of impulse response In addition to the STFT , as already determined in clause 5.3, , is calculated accordingly for the measured signal . Welch's averaged, modified periodogram method [4] is then used to calculate cross-power spectral density (CPSD) for , and , according to equation (7). ∑ , ∗, (7) Where: • X, and , are the STFTs of the iA-th active segment of signals and . • ∗, is the complex conjugate of , . • N is the number of points in the segment. • LA is the number of active frames / overlapping segments. Accordingly, power spectral densities (PSDs) and are calculated. Note that in contrast to CPSD, the two PSDs result in real-valued spectra. ETSI ETSI TS 104 063 V1.1.1 (2025-07) 14 A first estimate of the complex transfer function is calculated according to equation (8). = max (min, ) (8) Where: • min is a minimum threshold applied to avoid division by very small values and corresponds to -120 dB. In order to remove possibly unreliable magnitude values in , the spectral coherence is calculated according to equation (9). = () max !min , " # (9) Only frequency bins ′ providing a coherence more than the threshold TC = 2,5 % are considered in the modified and real-valued transfer function , as given by equation (10). ′ = $ %arg ≥&$ (10) Within the specified frequency range, at least 25 % of all frequency bins should be above the threshold TC. If TC is not met, the calculation steps in the following might still succeed, but could lead to inaccurate overall result. The impulse response estimate ℎ is determined by the Frequency Sampling Method (FSM) as described in [6], [7] and [8], which designs an FIR filter by specifying the desired magnitude response at discrete frequency points. The filter coefficients are computed by interpolating between these points, ensuring linear phase and performing an inverse Fourier transform to obtain the impulse response. FSM is applied on the magnitude of ′ and shall only consider frequencies between min and max (including) in the spectral interpolation step. The impulse response ℎ shall be estimated for 8 192 coefficients.
|
39b61e004ed3d157fb60cbfebc5644d7
|
104 063
|
5.5 Estimate of linear signal component
|
The estimate of the linear component lin is calculated according to equation (11) as the convolution of the source signal () with the impulse response estimate ℎ . lin = ℎ ∗ () (11)
|
39b61e004ed3d157fb60cbfebc5644d7
|
104 063
|
5.6 Estimate of spectral noise component
|
For the measured signal (), the STFT is calculated, leading to (, ). The parameters and window function for this transformation are provided in Table 3. Table 3: STFT parameter for spectral analysis Parameter Value Window function Hann Number of samples per frame 16 384 Overlap 75 % The magnitude of the estimated noise component in the frequency domain is calculated as the 3 %-percentile range versus time from the magnitude of the measured spectrum (, ) according to equation (12). = percentile ' , ', 3 % (12) ETSI ETSI TS 104 063 V1.1.1 (2025-07) 15 NOTE: The percentile analysis performs a noise estimate based on the lower/lowest magnitude values in the spectrum. It is thus assumed that idle noise can be observed in at least 3 % of the time per frequency, which depends on the signal used for testing. These idle ranges can either be realized individually per frequency band, i.e. by ensuring a sufficient amount of inactive time instances for each frequency - or globally, by ensuring speech pauses of suitable duration.
|
39b61e004ed3d157fb60cbfebc5644d7
|
104 063
|
5.7 Spectral analysis
|
To estimate the average non-linear signal component nl , first the STFT is calculated for estimate of the linear component lin, leading to lin(, ). Then the average magnitudes of the measured and the linear spectrum lin are calculated according to equations (13) and (14). The parameters and window function for the STFT are provided in Table 3. = ( ∑ (, ) ( (13) lin = min !max − , 0 , ( ∑ lin(, ) (" (14) Finally, nl is obtained by subtracting the estimates of the noise (see clause 5.6) and the linear component (see equation (14)) from the measured average spectrum , as shown in equation (15). nl = max !0, − −lin " (15)
|
39b61e004ed3d157fb60cbfebc5644d7
|
104 063
|
5.8 Aggregated non-linearity measure
|
The non-linearity measure nl is determined as the ratio of linear and non-linear signal component levels, calculated in the frequency range from min to max according to equations (16) to (18). lin = ∑ lin() max min (16) nl = ∑ nl max min (17) nl )dB* = 10 log(lin nl + ) (18)
|
39b61e004ed3d157fb60cbfebc5644d7
|
104 063
|
6 Application of the non-linearity measure
| |
39b61e004ed3d157fb60cbfebc5644d7
|
104 063
|
6.1 Overview
|
Since NLM is agnostic to the actual recording conditions, the following clauses provide additional guidelines for testing speech communication terminals, in particular in the context of test specifications, which typically refer to sending and/or receiving directions. The naming conventions for both directions are illustrated in Figure 4. ETSI ETSI TS 104 063 V1.1.1 (2025-07) 16 Figure 4: Signals convention used for sending (green) and receiving (red) direction
|
39b61e004ed3d157fb60cbfebc5644d7
|
104 063
|
6.2 Sending direction
|
The recording procedure for speech communication devices and acoustical insertion in sending direction is illustrated in Figure 5. If not specified otherwise, a HATS equipped with an artificial mouth simulator according to Recommendation ITU-T P.58 [9] shall be used for the playback of the source signal , which corresponds to the equalized output at MRP. See Recommendation ITU-T P.581 [10] for use of HATS for testing specific device types/form factors (like e.g. handset or hands-free mode). The recording is captured electrically at the POI. Figure 5: Measurement in sending direction
|
39b61e004ed3d157fb60cbfebc5644d7
|
104 063
|
6.3 Receiving direction
|
The recording procedure for speech communication devices and electrical insertion in receiving direction is illustrated in Figure 6. If not specified otherwise, a HATS equipped with artificial ears according to Recommendation ITU-T P.58 [9] shall be used to obtain the signal , which is recorded at the DRP and corrected for diffuse-field. See Recommendation ITU-T P.581 [10] for use of HATS for testing specific device types/form factors (like e.g. handset or hands-free mode). Since the source signal is expected to be a fullband signal, typically such test signals are pre- filtered and resampled to the audio bandwidth of a specific test setup, which might depend on e.g. terminal, codec or connection/network type. This intermediate signal ′ is inserted electrically at the POI. However, for the calculation of NLM, the fullband source signal shall always be used. ETSI ETSI TS 104 063 V1.1.1 (2025-07) 17 Figure 6: Measurement in receiving direction Two types of recordings with different implications for calculating NLM might be obtained in receiving direction: 1) Monaural signals (captured at a measurement microphone or single ear with e.g. handsets or monaural headsets) shall be analysed and reported in the same way as in sending direction. 2) Binaural signals (captured with two ears, e.g. headset or hands-free mode) shall be analysed and reported individually for left and right ear. In case an indicator for overall performance is needed, the average of both ears may be used. ETSI ETSI TS 104 063 V1.1.1 (2025-07) 18 Annex A (normative): Reference code An example implementation of the non-linearity measure as specified in clause 5 is available at https://forge.etsi.org/rep/stq/ts104063-nonlinearity-measure. The source code repository provides a version tag that corresponds to the version number of the present document. It also contains several examples to demonstrate the use of the non-linearity measure. ETSI ETSI TS 104 063 V1.1.1 (2025-07) 19 Annex B (informative): Bibliography • A. Farina: "Simultaneous measurement of impulse response and distortion with a swept-sine technique", 108th Audio Engineering Society Convention, 19-22 February 2000, Paris, France. • A. Novak, P. Lotton, and L. Simon: "Synchronized Swept-Sine: Theory, Application, and Implementation", Journal of the Audio Engineering Society, Vol. 63(10), pp. 786-798, 2015. • ETSI ES 202 739 (V1.8.1): "Speech and multimedia Transmission Quality (STQ); Transmission requirements for wideband VoIP terminals (handset and headset) from a QoS perspective as perceived by the user". • ETSI ES 202 740 (V1.8.2): "Speech and multimedia Transmission Quality (STQ); Transmission requirements for wideband VoIP loudspeaking and handsfree terminals from a QoS perspective as perceived by the user." ETSI ETSI TS 104 063 V1.1.1 (2025-07) 20 Annex C (informative): Change history Date Version Information about changes 10/2024 0.0.1 First draft 02/2025 0.1.1 Input to STQ#78 02/2025 0.1.2 Edits/comments during STQ#78 06/2025 0.2.1 Input to "STQ-Ad-hoc on TS 104 063" 06/2025 0.3.1 Input to STQ#79, uploaded for approval 06/2025 0.3.2 1st revision during meeting 07/2025 0.3.3 2nd revision during meeting, for approval ETSI ETSI TS 104 063 V1.1.1 (2025-07) 21 History Document history V1.1.1 July 2025 Publication
|
a858fc3ebe3acca0443e845025991f62
|
104 018-3
|
1 Scope
|
The present document contains the Abstract Test Suite (ATS) for Vulnerable Road Users (VRU) Awareness Basic Service as defined in ETSI TS 103 300-3 [1] in compliance with the relevant requirements and in accordance with the relevant guidance given in ISO/IEC 9646-7 [i.7]. The objective of the present document is to provide a basis for conformance tests for Vulnerable Road Users (VRU) Awareness Basic Service equipment giving a high probability of interoperability between different manufacturers' equipment. The ISO standards for the methodology of conformance testing (ISO/IEC 9646-1 [i.4] and ISO/IEC 9646-2 [i.5]) as well as the ETSI rules for conformance testing (ETSI ETS 300 406 [i.8]) are used as a basis for the test methodology. The development of ITS test specifications follows the guidance provided in the ETSI EG 202 798 [i.1]. Therefore, the ATS documentation outlined in the present document is also based on the guidance provided in ETSI EG 202 798 [i.1].
|
a858fc3ebe3acca0443e845025991f62
|
104 018-3
|
2 References
| |
a858fc3ebe3acca0443e845025991f62
|
104 018-3
|
2.1 Normative references
|
References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. Referenced documents which are not found to be publicly available in the expected location might be found in the ETSI docbox. NOTE: While any hyperlinks included in this clause were valid at the time of publication, ETSI cannot guarantee their long-term validity. The following referenced documents are necessary for the application of the present document. [1] ETSI TS 103 300-3 (V2.2.1): "Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS); Vulnerable Road Users (VRU) awareness; Part 3: Specification of VRU awareness basic service; Release 2". [2] ETSI TS 104 018-1 (V2.1.1): "Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS); Testing; Conformance test specifications for Vulnerable Road Users (VRU) awareness service; Part 1: Test requirements and Protocol Implementation Conformance Statement (PICS) pro forma; Release 2". [3] ETSI TS 104 018-2 (V2.1.1): "Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS); Testing; Conformance test specifications for Vulnerable Road Users (VRU) awareness service; Part 2: Test Suite Structure and Test Purposes (TSS & TP); Release 2". [4] ETSI TS 102 894-2 (V2.3.1): "Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS); Users and applications requirements; Part 2: Applications and facilities layer common data dictionary; Release 2".
|
a858fc3ebe3acca0443e845025991f62
|
104 018-3
|
2.2 Informative references
|
References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. NOTE: While any hyperlinks included in this clause were valid at the time of publication, ETSI cannot guarantee their long-term validity. The following referenced documents may be useful in implementing an ETSI deliverable or add to the reader's understanding, but are not required for conformance to the present document. [i.1] ETSI EG 202 798 (V1.1.1): "Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS); Testing; Framework for conformance and interoperability testing". ETSI ETSI TS 104 018-3 V2.1.1 (2025-07) 7 [i.2] ETSI TS 103 096-3 (V1.3.1): "Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS); Testing; Conformance test specifications for ITS Security; Part 3: Abstract Test Suite (ATS) and Protocol Implementation eXtra Information for Testing (PIXIT)". [i.3] ETSI TR 103 099 (V1.4.1): "Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS); Architecture of conformance validation framework". [i.4] ISO/IEC 9646-1 (1994): "Information technology — Open Systems Interconnection — Conformance testing methodology and framework — Part 1: General concepts". [i.5] ISO/IEC 9646-2 (1994): "Information technology — Open Systems Interconnection — Conformance testing methodology and framework — Part 2: Abstract Test Suite specification". [i.6] ISO/IEC 9646-6 (1994): "Information technology — Open Systems Interconnection — Conformance testing methodology and framework — Part 6: Protocol profile test specification". [i.7] ISO/IEC 9646-7 (1995): "Information technology — Open Systems Interconnection — Conformance testing methodology and framework — Part 7: Implementation Conformance Statements". [i.8] ETSI ETS 300 406 (1995): "Methods for testing and Specification (MTS); Protocol and profile conformance testing specifications; Standardization methodology". [i.9] ETSI ES 201 873-1 (V4.5.1): "Methods for Testing and Specification (MTS); The Testing and Test Control Notation version 3; Part 1: TTCN-3 Core Language". [i.10] ETSI ES 201 873-7 (V4.5.1): "Methods for Testing and Specification (MTS); The Testing and Test Control Notation version 3; Part 7: Using ASN.1 with TTCN-3". [i.11] ETSI EN 302 637-3: "Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS); Vehicular Communications; Basic Set of Applications; Part 3: Specifications of Decentralized Environmental Notification Basic Service".
|
a858fc3ebe3acca0443e845025991f62
|
104 018-3
|
3 Definition of terms, symbols and abbreviations
| |
a858fc3ebe3acca0443e845025991f62
|
104 018-3
|
3.1 Terms
|
For the purposes of the present document, the terms given in ETSI TS 103 300-3 [1], ISO/IEC 9646-1 [i.4] and ISO/IEC 9646-7 [i.7] apply.
|
a858fc3ebe3acca0443e845025991f62
|
104 018-3
|
3.2 Symbols
|
Void.
|
a858fc3ebe3acca0443e845025991f62
|
104 018-3
|
3.3 Abbreviations
|
For the purposes of the present document, the following abbreviations apply: ASN.1 Abstract Syntax Notation One ATM Abstract Test Method ATS Abstract Test Suite BTP Basic Transport Protocol BV Valid test events for Behaviour tests EG ETSI Guide EN European Norm ES ETSI Standard GeoN GeoNetworking GNSS Global Navigation Satellite System ISO International Organization for Standardization ETSI ETSI TS 104 018-3 V2.1.1 (2025-07) 8 ITS Intelligent Transport Systems IUT Implementation Under Test LDM Local Dynamic Map MSGF Message Format MTC Main Test Component PCTR Protocol Conformance Test Report PDU Protocol Data Unit PICS Protocol Implementation Conformance Statement PIXIT Partial Protocol Implementation eXtra Information for Testing SAP Service Access Point SCS System Conformance Statement SCTR Static Conformance Test Report SSP Specific Service Permission SUT System Under Test TC Test Case TI Timer tests TP Test Purposes TS Technical Specification TSS Test Suite Structure TTCN Testing and Test Control Notation V2X Vehicle to any VAM VRU Awareness Message VBS VRU Basic Service VRU Vulnerable Road User
|
a858fc3ebe3acca0443e845025991f62
|
104 018-3
|
4 Abstract Test Method (ATM)
| |
a858fc3ebe3acca0443e845025991f62
|
104 018-3
|
4.1 Abstract protocol tester
|
The abstract protocol tester used by this test suite is described in Figure 1. The test system simulates valid and invalid protocol behaviour, and analyses the reaction of the IUT. Figure 1: Abstract protocol tester - VBS
|
a858fc3ebe3acca0443e845025991f62
|
104 018-3
|
4.2 Test Configuration
|
This test suite uses a unique test configuration in order to cover the different test scenarios. In this configuration, the tester simulates one ITS station implementing the VBS protocol. Test System SUT ITS-G5/ LTE V2X IUT VAM ITS-G5/ LTE V2X Lower tester PDUs Upper Tester GeoN GeoN BTP BTP ETSI ETSI TS 104 018-3 V2.1.1 (2025-07) 9
|
a858fc3ebe3acca0443e845025991f62
|
104 018-3
|
4.3 Test architecture
|
The present document implements the general TTCN-3 test architecture described in ETSI EG 202 798 [i.1], clauses 6.3.2 and 8.3.1. Figure 2 shows the test architecture used in for the VBS ATS. The VBS test component requires using only the Main Test Component (MTC). The MTC communicates with the VBS SUT over the vamPort. The vamPort is used to exchange VBS protocol messages between the VBS test component and the VBS IUT. The Upper tester entity in the SUT enables triggering VBS functionalities by simulating primitives from application or LDM entities. It is required to trigger the VBS layer in the SUT to send VBS messages, which are resulting from upper layer primitives. Furthermore, receiving VBS messages may result for the VBS layer in sending primitives to the upper layer (sending Data to LDM, for instance). Figure 2: Test system architecture
|
a858fc3ebe3acca0443e845025991f62
|
104 018-3
|
4.4 Ports and ASPs (Abstract Services Primitives)
| |
a858fc3ebe3acca0443e845025991f62
|
104 018-3
|
4.4.1 Introduction
|
Two ports are used by the VBS ATS: • The vamPort, of type VamPort. • The utPort of type UpperTesterPort. ITS TTCN-3 test execution ItsMtc (Sync component) ITS lower layers stack Upper tester transport ITS Test Adaptor SUT Adpt_Ctlr control port UTport control port External functions CODECS System adaptor (SA) Platform adaptor (PA) NT2 SUT Group of TTCN-3 ports TTCN-3 ports TTCN-3 external functions geoNetworking Port NT ItsNt (PTCs) ETSI ETSI TS 104 018-3 V2.1.1 (2025-07) 10
|
a858fc3ebe3acca0443e845025991f62
|
104 018-3
|
4.4.2 Primitives of the vamPort
|
Two types of primitives are used in the vamPort: • The VamInd primitive, containing the received messages of type VAM, and a timestamp corresponding to the receipt time. • The VamReq primitive containing the sent messages of type VAM. The VAM type is declared in the VAM.asn ASN.1 module, following the ASN.1 definition from ETSI TS 103 300-3 [1]. VAM ::= SEQUENCE { header ItsPduHeader, vam VruAwareness }
|
a858fc3ebe3acca0443e845025991f62
|
104 018-3
|
4.4.3 Primitives of the utPort
|
This port uses two types of primitives: • The UtInitialize primitive used to initialize IUT. • The UtTrigger primitive used trigger upper layer events in IUT.
|
a858fc3ebe3acca0443e845025991f62
|
104 018-3
|
4.5 Executing VBS tests in secured mode
|
All the VBS tests, with the exception of the SSP tests, can be executed with security enabled or with security disabled. The choice of running the VBS tests in secured or non-secured mode has no impact on the result of the VBS tests because the test verdicts assess VBS protocol behaviour only. The SSP tests can only be executed in secured mode. The choice of running the VBS tests in secured or non-secured mode can be controlled via the test suite parameter PICS_SECURITY, see table A.5/1 of ETSI TS 104 018-1 [2]. Before running the VBS tests in secured mode, the following steps need to be executed: • security certificates need to be generated for the tester as well as for the IUT, see ETSI TS 103 096-3 [i.2], clause 5.3.2.5; • security certificates need to be installed onto the IUT, see ETSI TS 103 096-3 [i.2], clause 5.3.2.6; • in case of usage of the ETSI test adapter, the following test adapter parameters need to be configured: Test adapter parameter Default value Comment TsSecuredRootPath Data/certificates The path to the location where all certificates (tester and IUT certificates) are installed TsSecuredConfigId Void Name of the subfolder in TsSecuredRootPath in order to organize multiple IUTs UtSecuredMode FALSE To use upper-tester interface in non-secured mode
|
a858fc3ebe3acca0443e845025991f62
|
104 018-3
|
4.6 ETSI test adapter
|
All information of the ETSI test adapter is described in ETSI TR 103 099 [i.3]. ETSI ETSI TS 104 018-3 V2.1.1 (2025-07) 11
|
a858fc3ebe3acca0443e845025991f62
|
104 018-3
|
5 Untestable Test Purposes
|
Table 1 gives a list of TPs, which are not implemented in the ATS due to the chosen ATM or other restrictions. Table 1: Untestable TP Test purpose Reason TP/VBS/MSGF/BV-04 It is not possible to automatically test if the VRU reference point is the ground position of the center of the bounding box of the VRU because this data is not available in automatic testing.
|
a858fc3ebe3acca0443e845025991f62
|
104 018-3
|
6 ATS conventions
| |
a858fc3ebe3acca0443e845025991f62
|
104 018-3
|
6.1 Introduction
|
The ATS conventions are intended to give a better understanding of the ATS but they also describe the conventions made for the development of the ATS. These conventions shall be considered during any later maintenance or further development of the ATS. The ATS conventions contain two clauses, the testing conventions and the naming conventions. The testing conventions describe the functional structure of the ATS. The naming conventions describe the structure of the naming of all ATS elements. To define the ATS, the guidelines of the document ETSI ETS 300 406 [i.8] were considered.
|
a858fc3ebe3acca0443e845025991f62
|
104 018-3
|
6.2 Testing conventions
| |
a858fc3ebe3acca0443e845025991f62
|
104 018-3
|
6.2.1 Testing states
| |
a858fc3ebe3acca0443e845025991f62
|
104 018-3
|
6.2.1.1 Initial state
|
All test cases start with the function f_prInitialState. This function brings the IUT in an "initialized" state by invoking the upper tester primitive UtInitialize.
|
a858fc3ebe3acca0443e845025991f62
|
104 018-3
|
6.2.1.2 Final state
|
All test cases end with the function f_poDefault. This function brings the IUT back in an "idle" state. As no specific actions are required for the idle state in ETSI EN 302 637-3 [i.11], the function f_ poDefault does not invoke any action. As necessary, further actions may be included in the f_poDefault function.
|
a858fc3ebe3acca0443e845025991f62
|
104 018-3
|
6.2.2 Message types - ASN.1 definitions
|
ASN.1 definitions from ETSI TS 103 300-3 [1] are directly imported in TTCN-3 using the ASN.1 import method specified in ETSI ES 201 873-7 [i.10]. The following example shows the TTCN-3 import statement used to import ASN.1 definitions in the TTCN-3 modules: import from VAM_PDU_Descriptions language "ASN.1:1997" all; ETSI ETSI TS 104 018-3 V2.1.1 (2025-07) 12 Generic ASN.1 definitions (message header, station Id, etc.), are defined in the Common Data Dictionary ETSI TS 102 894-2 [4] ASN.1 module. Thus the VBS ASN.1 modules shall import these definitions from the Common Data Dictionary ETSI TS 102 894-2 [4] ASN.1 module (see the following ASN.1 import statement extracted from the VBS ASN.1 module): IMPORTS ItsPduHeader, StationID, ... FROM ETSI-ITS-CDD {itu-t (0) identified-organization (4) etsi (0) itsDomain (5) wg1 (1) 102894 cdd (2) major-version-4 (4) minor-version-2 (2) };
|
a858fc3ebe3acca0443e845025991f62
|
104 018-3
|
6.3 Naming conventions
| |
a858fc3ebe3acca0443e845025991f62
|
104 018-3
|
6.3.1 General guidelines
|
The naming convention is based on the following underlying principles: • in most cases, identifiers should be prefixed with a short alphabetic string (specified in Table 2) indicating the type of TTCN-3 element it represents; • suffixes should not be used except in those specific cases identified in table 2; • prefixes and suffixes should be separated from the body of the identifier with an underscore ("_"); EXAMPLE 1: c_sixteen, t_wait. • only module names, data type names and module parameters should begin with an upper-case letter. All other names (i.e. the part of the identifier following the prefix) should begin with a lower-case letter; • the start of second and subsequent words in an identifier should be indicated by capitalizing the first character. Underscores should not be used for this purpose. EXAMPLE 2: f_initialState. Table 2 specifies the naming guidelines for each element of the TTCN-3 language indicating the recommended prefix, suffixes (if any) and capitalization. Table 2: ETSI TTCN-3 generic naming conventions Language element Naming convention Prefix Example identifier Module Use upper-case initial letter none IPv6Templates Group within a module Use lower-case initial letter none messageGroup Data type Use upper-case initial letter none SetupContents Message template Use lower-case initial letter m_ m_setupInit Message template with wildcard or matching expression Use lower-case initial letters mw_ mw_anyUserReply Signature template Use lower-case initial letter s_ s_callSignature Port instance Use lower-case initial letter none signallingPort Test component instance Use lower-case initial letter none userTerminal Constant Use lower-case initial letter c_ c_maxRetransmission Constant (defined within component type) Use lower-case initial letter cc_ cc_minDuration External constant Use lower-case initial letter cx_ cx_macId Function Use lower-case initial letter f_ f_authentication() External function Use lower-case initial letter fx_ fx_calculateLength() Altstep (incl. Default) Use lower-case initial letter a_ a_receiveSetup() Test case Use ETSI numbering TC_ TC_COR_0009_47_ND Variable (local) Use lower-case initial letter v_ v_macId Variable (defined within a component type) Use lower-case initial letters vc_ vc_systemName Timer (local) Use lower-case initial letter t_ t_wait Timer (defined within a component) Use lower-case initial letters tc_ tc_authMin Module parameters for PICS Use all upper case letters PICS_ PICS_DOOROPEN Module parameters for other parameters Use all upper case letters PX_ PX_TESTER_STATION_ID Formal Parameters Use lower-case initial letter p_ p_macId Enumerated Values Use lower-case initial letter e_ e_syncOk ETSI ETSI TS 104 018-3 V2.1.1 (2025-07) 13
|
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.