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25.2.2 NACM Authorization
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Requirement Name: Open Fronthaul Interface security requirements Requirement Reference: Clause 5.1.9.2, O-RAN Security Requirements Specifications [5] Requirement Description: NACM support for Shared O-RU Threat References: T-SharedORU-22, T-SharedORU-23 DUT/s: Shared O-RU Test Name: TC_SharedORU_NACM_Authorization Test description and applicability Purpose: To verify the Shared O-RU through is able to enforce role-based least privilege access control on the Open Fronthaul by using NACM [14]. Test setup and configuration DUT shall be the Shared O-RU with: • IP enabled Open Fronthaul M-Plane interface, reachable from the authentication server; • Valid certificate loaded for the server and necessary Certificate Authorities (CAs) • Client's root CA required to validate NETCONF client certificate • Valid TLS Client-to-NETCONF username mapping Test procedure First set up a host/device with TLS client software installed, valid client certificates, keys, root CA certificate for the server (Shared O-RU), and all intermediate CA certificates required to validate the client certificate. The following test steps shall be validated: 1) Start the NETCONF-over-TLS session using OpenSSL s_client command to connect with DUT using TLSv1.2 or TLSv1.3 2) Verify the session is established and mapped to the correct NETCONF user 3) Verify the global NACM enforcement control setting of a) enable-nacm = true b) read-default = permit c) write-default = deny d) exec-default = deny e) enable-external-groups = true 4) Verify the NACM rule sets for the pre-defined groups 5) Close the NETCONF session and TLS connection Upon availability of the NETCONF operations set(s) definition per NACM group, the NACM rule set(s) enforcement by the DUT shall be validated for each of those pre-defined groups listed above. ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 239 Expected results The Shared O-RU shall support the NETCONF over TLS session over its Open Fronthaul M-Plane interface and NACM enforcement control settings. Expected format of evidence: Log entries and packet captures.
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25.2.3 TLS across Open Fronthaul
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Requirement Name: SEC-CTL-SharedORU-4 Requirement Reference: Clause 5.1.9.2, Security Controls, Shared O-RU, O-RAN Security Requirements and Controls Specifications [5] Requirement Description: TLS on Shared O-RU Threat References: T-SharedORU-27, T-SharedORU-28 DUT/s: Shared O-RU Test Name: TC_SharedORU_TLS Test description and applicability Purpose: To verify the Shared O-RU is able to establish a TLS session with an O-RU Controller and provide confidentiality and integrity protection for messages exchanged with the O-RU Controller. Test setup and configuration DUT shall be the Shared O-RU with TLS support enabled. Test procedure This test case shall follow the test procedure for TLS specified in TLS Test Procedure, clause 6.3.3. Expected results Shared O-RU shall provide confidentiality and integrity protection for data in transit on the Open Fronthaul M-Plane interface. Expected format of evidence: Log entries and packet captures.
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25.2.4 Reject Password-based authentication
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Requirement Name: SEC-CTL-SharedORU-2 Requirement Reference: Clause 5.1.9.2, Security Controls, Shared O-RU, O-RAN Security Requirements and Controls Specifications [5] Requirement Description: Shared O-RU is able to reject password-based authentication on the Open Fronthaul M- Plane Threat References: T-SharedORU-04 DUT/s: Shared O-RU Test Name: TC_SharedORU_SSH_Password_Based_Authentication Test description and applicability Purpose: To verify the Shared O-RU can reject a SSH session using password-based authentication on the Open Fronthaul. Test setup and configuration DUT shall be the Shared O-RU with password-based authentication for SSH on the Open Fronthaul disabled. ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 240 Test procedure 1) Enable SSH on the Open Fronthaul for the Shared O-RU. Ensure password-based authentication is not enabled on the Shared O-RU for SSH on the Open Fronthaul. 2) Configure the O-RU Controller as the SSH client with password-based authentication on the Open Fronthaul M-Plane. 3) Attempt to establish the Open Fronthaul M-Plane session between the Shared O-RU and O-RU Controller. Expected results The Shared O-RU rejects the Open Fronthaul M-Plane session with the O-RU Controller. Expected format of evidence: Log entries, packet captures, and/or screenshots. ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 241 Annex A (informative): Example of Security Testing Tools / Toolset Table A-1: List of sample open source security testing tools/toolset Testing Tool Example(s) DTLS scanning tool open source "pySSLScan": https://github.com/DinoTools/pysslscan IPsec IKE scanning tool open source "ike-scan": https://github.com/royhills/ike-scan Port scanner open source "Nmap": https://nmap.org/ SSH audit tool open source "ssh-audit": https://github.com/jtesta/ssh-audit TLS scanning tool open source "sslyze": https://github.com/nabla-c0d3/sslyze Software image signing tool open source "Sigstore": https://github.com/sigstore ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 242 Annex B (informative): Template of test report A. GENERAL INFORMATION A1 Name of test campaign A2 Version of the report – reference ID A3 Date(s) of testing A4 Contact person (tester) – incl. Name, Organization, E-mail address A4 Test location (lab) – incl. the address A5 Description of test campaign, summary of test results, conclusions List of tests - details of each test can be found in Section E. Test No. Test name Test status [ PASS / FAIL / - ] 01 02 03 B. TEST AND MEASUREMENT EQUIPMENT AND TOOLS # Equipment or tool Type Manufacture Version (HW/SW) Notes* 01 02 03 * Specific details such as the sub-module version (such as vulnerability database version) C. SYSTEM UNDER TEST C1 Total number of DUTs included in SUT C2 Deployment architecture C3 Description of SUT – connection/block diagram DUT 1* C3 Type C4 Serial Number C5 Supplier (manufacture) C6 SW version C7 HW version (if applicable) C8 Interface/IOT profile(s) if applied C9 Description incl. parameters, setting/configuration ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 243 * If SUT contains more DUTs, please copy the table. D. TEST CONFIGURATION D1 Function(s) and Service(s) setting D2 Network setting E. TEST RESULTS E1 Test No. E2 Test name E3 Date(s) of test execution E4 Reference to test specification E5 Utilized test and measurement equipment and tools, incl. the specific setting/configuration – reference to Section B E6 Test setup – connection/block diagram – deployment scenario E7 Test procedure – describe differences in comparison with the test procedure defined in test spec. – limitations E8 Test results –including outputs of the test properties and the attachment of log file(s) and/or screenshots E9 Notes, including observed issues with the solutions E10 Conclusions – pass/fail – assessment of test results in comparison with the expected results – gap analysis ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 244 Annex C (informative): Change history Date Version Information about changes 2021.11 01.00 Final initial version 01.00 2022.03 02.00.07 Updated sections: 7.4 Network Protocol Fuzzing 9.4 Software Bill of Materials (SBOM) 11.2 Open Fronthaul Point-to-Point LAN Segment 17.2 O1 Interface Network Configuration Access Control Model (NACM) Validation 2022.07 03.00.01 Applied the latest O-RAN technical specifications template Updated sections: 2.1 Normative references 3.2 Abbreviations 6.3 TLS 6.6 OAuth 2.0 9.5 Software Image Signing and Verification 13.2 Testing of IPSec on E2 14.2 Testing of TLS on A1 2022.07 03.00.02 Updated cross-reference section numbers of the test cases to align with latest WG11 specs Updated table of contents 2023.03 04.00.00 Updated sections: • 14 Security Test of xApps • 15 Security test of Non-RT RIC • 16 Security test of rApps Added content to: • 14.2 xApp Signing and Verification • 16.2 rApp Signing and Verification Change wording in many places to align document with ETSI PAS 2023.07 05.00.00 Added content to: • 9.4.3 SBOM Format • 9.4.4 SBOM Depth • 9.5.2 Software Signature Verification • 12.4 O-RU Security functional requirement and test cases • 13.2 IPSec on E2 interface • 13.3 Transactional APIs • 18.2 O2 Interface • 18.3 O-Cloud virtualization layer • 20 Security tests of Common Application Lifecycle Management • 21 Security test of O-CU-CP • 22 Security test of O-CU-UP • 23 Security test of O-DU Alignment for ETSI PAS ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 245 Date Version Information about changes 2024.03 07.00.00 • OAuth2.0 in Near-RT RIC • OCloud tests • Reorganization of interfaces testing (A1, R1) • Update of SCTP test cases, removing not related with security • TIFG E2E test cases adoption into clause 24, and needed update • SBOM and Package testing increased E2 data validation tests for Near-RT RIC ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 246 History Document history V7.0.0 June 2025 Publication
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1 Scope
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The present document specifies the Security Requirements and appropriate Security Controls per O-RAN interface and per O-RAN component.
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2 References
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2.1 Normative references
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References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. Referenced documents which are not found to be publicly available in the expected location might be found in the ETSI docbox. NOTE: While any hyperlinks included in this clause were valid at the time of publication, ETSI cannot guarantee their long-term validity. The following referenced documents are necessary for the application of the present document. [1] Void. [2] ETSI TS 103 982: "Publicly Available Specification (PAS); O-RAN Architecture Description (O-RAN.WG1.OAD-R003-v08.00)". [3] O-RAN ALLIANCE TS: "O-RAN Security Protocols Specification". [4] O-RAN ALLIANCE TR: "O-RAN Security Threat Modeling and Risk Assessment". [5] O-RAN ALLIANCE TS: "O-RAN A1 interface: Transport Protocol". [6] O-RAN ALLIANCE TS: "O-RAN O2 General Aspects and Principles". [7] O-RAN ALLIANCE TS: "O-RAN Near-Real-time RAN Intelligent Controller Architecture & E2 General Aspects and Principles". [8] O-RAN ALLIANCE TS: "Cloud Platform Reference Designs". [9] Void. [10] IETF RFC 8341: "Network Configuration Access Control Model". [11] IETF RFC 4513: "Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP): Authentication Methods and Security Mechanisms". [12] IEEE Std 802.1X™-2020: "IEEE Standard for Local and Metropolitan Area Networks -- Port-Based Network Access Control", (Revision of IEEE Std 802.1X™-2010 Incorporating IEEE Std 802.1Xbx™-2014 and IEEE Std 802.1Xck™-2018), pp. 1-289, 28 February 2020, doi: 10.1109/IEEESTD.2020.9018454. [13] ETSI TS 103 859: "Publicly Available Specification (PAS); O-RAN Fronthaul Control, User and Synchronization Plane Specification v12.01; (O-RAN.WG4.CUS.0-R003-v12.01)". [14] ETSI TS 104 023: "Publicly Available Specification (PAS); O-RAN Fronthaul Management Plane Specification v12.01; (O-RAN.WG4.MP.0-R003-v12.01)". [15] "O-RAN Deployment Scenarios and Base Station Classes For White Box Hardware 2.0", July 2020 (ORAN-WG7.DSC.0-v02.00). [16] O-RAN ALLIANCE TS: "O-RAN Operation and Maintenance Architecture". ETSI ETSI TS 104 104 V9.1.0 (2025-06) 10 [17] U.S. DoC and NTIA: "The Minimum Elements for a Software Bill of Materials (SBOM), Pursuant to Executive Order 14028 on Improving the Nation's Cybersecurity", July 2021. [18] The System Package Data Exchange™ (SPDX®). [19] CycloneDX. [20] NISTIR 8060: "Guidelines for the Creation of Interoperable Software Identification (SWID) Tags", David Waltermire et al., U.S. NIST, 2016. [21] ISO/IEC 5962:2021: "Information technology — SPDX® Specification V2.2.1", August 2021. [22] IETF RFC 2865: "Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)". [23] IETF RFC 2866: "RADIUS accounting". [24] IETF RFC 2869: "RADIUS Extensions". [25] IETF RFC 4072: "Diameter Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) Application". [26] O-RAN ALLIANCE TS: "Xhaul Packet Switched Architectures and Solutions". [27] IEEE 1588™-2019: "IEEE Standard for a Precision Clock Synchronization Protocol for Networked Measurement and Control Systems". [28] IETF RFC 7384: "Security Requirements of Time Protocols in Packet Switched Networks". [29] ETSI TS 133 511: "5G; Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) for the next generation Node B (gNodeB) network product class (3GPP TS 33.511)". [30] O-RAN ALLIANCE TS: "Synchronization Architecture and Solution Specification". [31] O-RAN ALLIANCE TS: "O-RAN Control, User, and Synchronization Plane Specification". [32] ETSI TS 138 323: "5G; NR; Packet Data Convergence Protocol (PDCP) specification (3GPP TS 38.323)". [33] O-RAN ALLIANCE TS: "Near-RT RIC Architecture". [34] IETF RFC 6749: "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework". [35] Void. [36] Void. [37] O-RAN ALLIANCE TS: "Non-RT RIC Architecture". [38] Void. [39] O-RAN ALLIANCE TS: "R1 interface: General Aspects and Principles". [40] Void. [41] ETSI GS NFV-SEC 021: "Network Functions Virtualisation (NFV); Security; VNF Package Security Specification". [42] ETSI GS NFV-SOL 004: "Network Functions Virtualisation (NFV); Protocols and Data Models; VNF Package and PNFD Archive specification". [43] ETSI GS NFV-IFA 011: "Network Functions Virtualisation (NFV); Management and Orchestration; VNF Descriptor and Packaging Specification". [44] 3GPP TR 33.848: "Study on Security Impacts of Virtualisation". [45] 3GPP TR 33.818: "Security Assurance Methodology (SECAM) and Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) for 3GPP virtualised network products". ETSI ETSI TS 104 104 V9.1.0 (2025-06) 11 [46] US NSA ESF and US DHS CISA: "Security Guidance for 5G Cloud Infrastructures, Part I: Prevent and Detect Lateral Movement", page 5, October 2021. [47] Void. [48] Void. [49] ETSI GR NFV-SEC 018 (V1.1.1): "Network Functions Virtualisation (NFV); Security; Report on NFV Remote Attestation Architecture". [50] DoD 5220.22-M: "Data sanitization method". [51] Kubernetes® Documentation: "Encrypting Confidential Data at Rest". [52] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication (FIPS PUB) 140-3: "Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules". NOTE: "Implementation Guidance for FIPS 140-3 and the Cryptographic Module Validation Program". [53] TPM 2.0 Library. [54] ETSI GR NFV-SEC 003 (V12.1): "Network Functions Virtualisation (NFV); NFV Security; Security and Trust Guidance". [55] ETSI TS 133 501: "5G; Security architecture and procedures for 5G System (3GPP TS 33.501)". [56] ETSI TS 133 401: "Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+) (GSM); Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); LTE; 3GPP System Architecture Evolution (SAE); Security architecture (3GPP TS 33.401)". [57] ISO/IEC 27000:2018: "Information technology — Security techniques — Information security management systems — Overview and vocabulary". [58] NIST SP 800-92: "Guide to Computer Security Log Management". [59] Void. [60] IETF RFC 5905: "Network Time Protocol Version 4: Protocol and Algorithms Specification". [61] IETF RFC 3339: "Date and Time on the Internet: Timestamps". [62] ISO 86001: "Date and time — Representations for information interchange". [63] IETF RFC 8915: "Network Time Security for the Network Time Protocol". [64] IETF RFC 5424: "The Syslog Protocol". [65] IETF RFC 5425: "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Transport Mapping for Syslog". [66] O-RAN ALLIANCE TS: "Y1 interface: General Aspects and Principles". [67] NIST SP800-162: "Guide to Attribute Based Access Control (ABAC) Definition and Considerations". [68] NIST SP800-122: "Guide to Protecting the Confidentiality of Personally Identifiable Information (PII)". [69] IETF RFC 8366: "A Voucher Artifact for Bootstrapping Protocols". [70] IETF RFC 8995: "Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key Infrastructure (BRSKI)". [71] IETF RFC 8572: "Secure Zero Touch Provisioning (SZTP)". [72] ETSI TS 128 314: "5G; Management and orchestration; Plug and Connect; Concepts and requirements (3GPP TS 28.314)". [73] ETSI TS 128 315: "5G; Management and orchestration; Plug and Connect; Procedure flows (3GPP TS 28.315)". ETSI ETSI TS 104 104 V9.1.0 (2025-06) 12 [74] ETSI TS 128 316: "5G; Management and orchestration; Plug and Connect; Data formats (3GPP TS 28.316)". [75] NIST SP 800-88: "Guidelines for Media Sanitization". [76] ETSI TS 133 117: "Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); LTE; 5G; Catalogue of general security assurance requirements (3GPP TS 33.117)". [77] IETF RFC 4122: "A Universally Unique IDentifier (UUID) URN Namespace". [78] IETF RFC 4493: "The AES-CMAC Algorithm".
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2.2 Informative references
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References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. NOTE: While any hyperlinks included in this clause were valid at the time of publication, ETSI cannot guarantee their long-term validity. The following referenced documents may be useful in implementing an ETSI deliverable or add to the reader's understanding, but are not required for conformance to the present document. [i.1] NIST SP 800-190: "Application Container Security Guide". [i.2] ENISA: "NFV Security in 5G-Challenges and Best Practices". [i.3] Void. [i.4] Void. [i.5] Thales: "Kubernetes Secrets Encryption - Integration Guide". [i.6] IBM: "Encrypting Kubernetes secrets with Key Management Service plug-in". [i.7] NIST IR 8320: "Hardware-Enabled Security: Enabling a Layered Approach to Platform Security for Cloud and Edge Computing Use Cases". [i.8] "Recent trends in applying TPM to cloud computing". [i.9] Open Worldwide Application Security Project (OWASP): "OWASP API Security Project". [i.10] Void. [i.11] O-RAN ALLIANCE TR: "Application Life Cycle Management (LCM) for Deployment Technical". [i.12] ETSI TR 121 905: "Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+) (GSM); Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); LTE; 5G; Vocabulary for 3GPP Specifications (3GPP TR 21.905)". [i.13] ETSI TS 133 210: "Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+) (GSM); Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); LTE; 5G; Network Domain Security (NDS); IP network layer security (3GPP TS 33.210)". [i.14] ETSI TS 133 310: "Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); LTE; 5G; Network Domain Security (NDS); Authentication Framework (AF) (3GPP TS 33.310)". [i.15] IETF RFC 6083: "Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) for Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP)". [i.16] IETF RFC 3871: "Operational Security Requirements for Large Internet Service Provider (ISP) IP Network Infrastructure". ETSI ETSI TS 104 104 V9.1.0 (2025-06) 13 [i.17] ETSI GS NFV-SEC 012: "Network Functions Virtualisation (NFV) Release 3; Security; System architecture specification for execution of sensitive NFV components". [i.18] ETSI GR NFV-SEC 007: "Network Functions Virtualisation (NFV); Trust; Report on Attestation Technologies and Practices for Secure Deployments".
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3 Definition of terms, symbols and abbreviations
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3.1 Terms
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For the purposes of the present document, the following terms apply: A1: interface between Non-RT RIC and Near-RT RIC to enable policy-driven guidance of Near-RT RIC applications/functions, and support AI/ML workflow A1 Enrichment Information (EI): information utilized by Near-RT RIC that is collected or derived at SMO/Non-RT RIC either from non-network data sources or from network functions themselves A1 policy: type of declarative policies expressed using formal statements that enable the Non-RT RIC function in the SMO to guide the Near-RT RIC function, and hence the RAN, towards better fulfilment of the RAN intent account and identity events: events generated by user identification and access control application descriptor: template that defines the characteristics and requirements of the Application, allowing it to be deployed, managed, and orchestrated within the O-Cloud. It typically includes information such as the Application's functional behavior, deployment requirements, resource needs (such as CPU, memory, and storage), connectivity requirements, performance metrics, scalability options, and any dependencies or prerequisites. It also contains information related to security, including the service availability requirements and access rules for controlling the traffic direction to the Application. application events: events generated by O-RAN Network Functions application package: software package of xApps, rApps, and VNFs/CNFs (i.e. O-CU, O-DU, and Near-RT RIC) audit records: "Audit records contain security event information such as successful and failed authentication attempts, file accesses, security policy changes, account changes (e.g. account creation and deletion, account privilege assignment), and use of privileges. OSs typically permit system administrators to specify which types of events should be audited and whether successful and/or failed attempts to perform certain actions should be logged." Defined in NIST SP 800-92 [58], clause 2.1.2. data access event: events generated by any O-RAN component accessing, retrieving, modifying, or deleting data in files or databases E2: interface connecting the Near-RT RIC and one or more O-CU-CPs, one or more O-CU-UPs, and one or more O-DUs E2 Node: logical node terminating E2 interface. In this version of the specification, O-RAN nodes terminating E2 interface are: - for NR access: O-CU-CP, O-CU-UP, O-DU or any combination. - for E-UTRA access: O-eNB. entity: individual (person), device, or process that interacts with an ORAN component external interface: interface between the SMO and an External System external system: data source outside the O-RAN domain that provides enrichment data to the SMO general security event: events generated by the enabling, disabling or configuration of security features in O-RAN components ETSI ETSI TS 104 104 V9.1.0 (2025-06) 14 information security event: "Identified occurrence of a system, service or network state indicating a possible breach of information security policy or failure of controls, or a previously unknown situation that can be security relevant." Defined in ISO/IEC 27000:2018 [57], clause 3.30. information security incident: "Single or a series of unwanted or unexpected information security events that have a significant probability of compromising business operations and threatening information security." Defined in ISO/IEC 27000:2018 [57], clause 3.31. intents: declarative policy to steer or guide the behavior of RAN functions, allowing the RAN function to calculate the optimal result to achieve stated objective isolation: security strategy that separates individual applications or software components from one another, ensuring that they run independently and do not interfere with each other's operations log: "A log is a record of the events occurring within an organization's systems and networks. Logs are composed of log entries; each entry contains information related to a specific event that has occurred within a system or network." Defined in NIST SP 800-92 [58], clause 2. log streaming: in information technology, log streaming refers to the near real-time transmission and analysis of log data generated by various software applications, systems, or devices management and orchestration event: events generated by SMO operations O-RAN near-real-time RAN Intelligent Controller (Near-RT RIC): logical function that enables real-time control and optimization of RAN elements and resources via fine-grained data collection and actions over E2 interface network events: events generated by network activity from operating systems, hypervisors, or container engines O-Cloud compute pool: cohesive set of computational resources within the O-Cloud infrastructure where multiple nodes work in harmony to provide a unified environment designed to host and manage O-RAN applications and services O-Cloud instance ID: unique identifier assigned to components within the O-Cloud platform, including VMs, pods, containers, nodes, and compute pools (e.g. a cluster in Kubernetes). This ensures uniqueness across the entire O-Cloud environment, irrespective of the component type. For instance, a VM, a pod, a container, a node, and a cluster will each have a distinct O-Cloud instance ID within the platform, ensuring that there is no ambiguity in identification. O-Cloud nodes: computational unit or entity within the O-Cloud infrastructure O-Cloud platform software component: software module within the O-Cloud platform that provides essential functionalities and services to enable the deployment, management, and utilization of O-Cloud resources by O-RAN Network Functions O-RAN Central Unit (O-CU): logical node hosting O-CU-CP and O-CU-UP O-RAN Central Unit - Control Plane (O-CU-CP): logical node hosting the RRC and the control plane part of the PDCP protocol O-RAN Central Unit - User Plane (O-CU-UP): logical node hosting the user plane part of the PDCP protocol and the SDAP protocol O-RAN Distributed Unit (O-DU): logical node hosting RLC/MAC/High-PHY layers based on a lower layer functional split O-RAN non-real-time RAN Intelligent Controller (Non-RT RIC): logical function that enables non-real-time control and optimization of RAN elements and resources, AI/ML workflow including model training and updates, and policy-based guidance of applications/features in Near-RT RIC O-RAN Radio Unit (O-RU): logical node hosting Low-PHY layer and RF processing based on a lower layer functional split O-RAN vendor: provider of any component of O-RAN O1: interface between management entities (NMS/EMS/MANO) and O-RAN managed elements, for operation and management ETSI ETSI TS 104 104 V9.1.0 (2025-06) 15 O2: interface between SMO and the O-Cloud to provide cloud resources management and workload management for supporting O-RAN cloudified network functions R1: interface between rApps and Non-RT RIC Framework via which R1 Services can be produced and consumed R1 Services: collection of services including, but not limited to, service registration and discovery services, authentication and authorization services, AI/ML workflow services, and A1, O1 and O2 related services non-RT RIC application (rApps): application designed to consume and/or produce R1 services rApp instance: individual occurrence of an application running in the Non-RT RIC runtime environment NOTE: As defined in [37]. rApp instance identifier: unique identifier for each rApp instance, assigned by the SMO/Non-RT RIC framework during rApp registration NOTE: As defined in [37]. security controls: solution designed to meet a set of defined security requirements to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of O-RAN elements security log: log that contains audit records and security-related system events Service Management and Orchestration (SMO): The O-RAN Service Management and Orchestration system as specified in the O-RAN Architecture Description (OAD) document [2], clause 5.3.1. service provider: network provider who is planning to deploy applications into their network NOTE: As defined in [16]. Shared Data Layer (SDL): API for accessing shared data storage solution provider: application developer who delivers applications to Service Providers NOTE: As defined in [16]. system events: "System events are operational actions performed by OS components, such as shutting down the system or starting a service. Typically, failed events and the most significant successful events are logged, but many OSs permit administrators to specify which types of events will be logged. The details logged for each event also vary widely; each event is usually timestamped, and other supporting information could include event, status, and error codes; service name; and user or system account associated with an event. "Defined in NIST SP 800-92 [58], clause 2.1.2. Time of Day (ToD): precise hour, minute, and second of a day, serving as a unified time reference across the infrastructure to ensure that all nodes operate in synchronization Y1: interface between Near-RT RIC and Y1 consumers, as defined in O-RAN Architecture Description [2], clause 5.4.18, that enables RAN analytics information exposure from Near-RT RIC
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3.2 Symbols
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Void.
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3.3 Abbreviations
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For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in ETSI TR 121 905 [i.12] and the following apply: NOTE: An abbreviation defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same abbreviation, if any, in ETSI TR 121 905 [i.12]. AI/ML Artificial Intelligence/Machine Learning BMCA Best Master Clock Algorithm CNF Cloud-native Network Function ETSI ETSI TS 104 104 V9.1.0 (2025-06) 16 DDoS Distributed Denial of Service DMS Deployment Management Services (of O-Cloud) DTLS Datagram Transport Layer Security eNB eNodeB (applies to LTE) FCAPS Fault, Configuration, Accounting, Performance, SecurityFOCOM Federated O-Cloud Orchestration & Management FOSS Free and Open Source Software FTPES File Transfer Protocol Explicit Secure sockets layer gNB g NodeB (applies to NR) IMS Infrastructure Management Services (of O-Cloud) IPSEC Internet Protocol Security LLS Lower Layer Split MFA Multi-Factor Authentication mTLS mutual Transport Layer Security NETCONF Network Configuration Protocol NF Network Function NFO Network Function Orchestration O-DU O-RAN Distributed Unit O-RU O-RAN Radio Unit OSC O-RAN Software Community PDCP Packet Data Convergence Protocol PNF Physical Network Function PTP Precision Timing Protocol RAN Radio Access Network RBAC Role-Based Access Control RIC O-RAN RAN Intelligent Controller SBOM Software Bill of Materials SDL Shared Data Layer SDLC Software Development Life Cycle SMO Service Management and Orchestration SPDX Software Package Data eXchange SRO Shared Resource Operator SSH Secure Shell SWID Software Identification TLS Transport Layer Security VM Virtual Machine VNF Virtualised Network Function
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4 Objectives and scope
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4.1 Objectives
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The present document specifies security requirements and security controls per O-RAN defined interface and O-RAN defined network function. It elaborates on O-RAN Threats and Risk Assessment [4] that identified assets to be protected, analysed the O-RAN components for vulnerabilities, examined potential threats associated with those vulnerabilities and provided security principles which stakeholders should address when building a secure end-to-end O-RAN system. ETSI ETSI TS 104 104 V9.1.0 (2025-06) 17
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4.2 Perimeter
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4.2.0 Introduction
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Figure 4.2.0-1: Logical Architecture of O-RAN system 2 As specified in [2] and illustrated in Figure 4.2.0-1, the logical architecture of O-RAN includes the following components, interfaces, and protocols.
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4.2.1 O-RAN Architecture components
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• Network functions and applications: - Service Management and Orchestration (SMO) - Non-RT RIC and rApps - Near-RT RIC and xApps - O-CU-CP/UP - O-DU - O-RU - O-eNB • Cloud computing platform: - O-Cloud comprising physical infrastructure nodes to host the relevant O-RAN functions (such as Near-RT RIC, O-CU-CP, O-CU-UP, and O-DU) and, supporting software components (such as Operating System, Virtual Machine Monitor, Container Runtime) and the appropriate management and orchestration functions. ETSI ETSI TS 104 104 V9.1.0 (2025-06) 18
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4.2.2 Interfaces defined by O-RAN
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• A1 Interface between Non-RT RIC and Near-RT RIC to enable policy-driven guidance of Near-RT RIC applications/functions, and support AI/ML workflow. • O1 Interface connecting the SMO to the Near-RT RIC, one or more O-CU-CPs, one or more O-CU-UPs, and one or more O-DUs. • O2 Interface between the SMO and the O-Cloud. • E2 Interface connecting the Near-RT RIC and one or more O-CU-CPs, one or more O-CU-UPs, one or more O-DUs, and one or more O-eNBs. • Open Fronthaul CUS-Plane Interface between O-RU and O-DU. • Open Fronthaul M-Plane Interface between O-RU and O-DU as well as between O-RU and SMO.
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4.2.3 Interfaces not covered in the present document
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• E1 • F1-c • F1-u • NG-c • NG-u • X2-c • X2-u • Xn-c • Xn-u • Uu
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5 Security Requirements
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5.0 Introduction
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This clause describes the O-RAN Security Requirements per O-RAN maintained interfaces and network functions. Security Requirements specified in the present document are built upon Security Principles defined in [4] which intent to protect critical assets identified. Protection levels of critical assets as defined in [4] - Confidentiality, Integrity, Replay, Authentication, Authorisation - are now specified as normative security requirements. ETSI ETSI TS 104 104 V9.1.0 (2025-06) 19
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5.1 Network Functions and Applications maintained by O-RAN
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5.1.1 Service Management and Orchestration (SMO)
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5.1.1.1 Security Requirements
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5.1.1.1.1 SMO
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REQ-SEC-SMO-1: SMO shall support authentication of SMO functions. REQ-SEC-SMO-2: SMO shall support authentication of External Systems. REQ-SEC-SMO-3: SMO functions shall support authorization as a resource owner/server and client for internal requests. REQ-SEC-SMO-4: SMO shall support authorization of the service requests received from External Systems. REQ-SEC-SMO-5: SMO shall be able to recover, without catastrophic failure, from a volumetric DDoS attack across the O2 interface, due to anomalous behavior or malicious intent. REQ-SEC-SMO-6: SMO shall be able to recover, without catastrophic failure, from a volumetric DDoS attack across an External Interface, due to anomalous behavior or malicious intent. REQ-SEC-SMO-7: Each SMO function shall be able to recover, without catastrophic failure, from a volumetric DDoS attack during SMO Internal Communications, due to anomalous behavior or malicious intent.
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5.1.1.1.2 SMO Internal Communications
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REQ-SEC-SMO-Internal-1: SMO Internal Communications shall support confidentiality, integrity, and replay protection between SMO functions. REQ-SEC-SMO-Internal-2: SMO Internal Communications shall support mutual authentication between SMO functions.
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5.1.1.1.3 SMO External Interfaces
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External Interfaces not specified by O-RAN that provide services to SMO, acting in a consumer role, shall meet security requirements specified in this clause. REQ-SEC-SMO-External-1: SMO External Interfaces shall support confidentiality, integrity, and replay protection. REQ-SEC-SMO-External-2: SMO External Interfaces shall support mutual authentication and authorization.
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5.1.1.1.4 SMO Logging
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The below mentioned requirements are referring to securing the event logs in SMO. REQ-SEC-SMO-Log-1: SMO shall support forwarding of event logs to a mutually authenticated remote location. REQ-SEC-SMO-Log-2: SMO shall provide confidentiality and integrity protection for event logs transferred to a remote server. REQ-SEC-SMO-Log-3: SMO may support configuration settings that allow selection of remote servers to securely transfer the event logs. REQ-SEC-SMO-Log-4: SMO shall be capable of logging the event logs locally on itself. REQ-SEC-SMO-Log-5: SMO shall provide confidentiality protection for the locally stored event logs. REQ-SEC-SMO-Log-6: SMO shall provide integrity protection for the locally stored event logs. REQ-SEC-SMO-Log-7: SMO shall support access to event logs by authorized external services. ETSI ETSI TS 104 104 V9.1.0 (2025-06) 20 REQ-SEC-SMO-Log-8: SMO shall be capable of forwarding event logs to an authorized remote location. REQ-SEC-SMO-Log-9: SMO shall be able to record all the security related log events. REQ-SEC-SMO-Log-10: The security logs of SMO should be separate from other system logs. REQ-SEC-SMO-Log-11: The SMO shall not permit configuration change to logging level(s) of any component on the SMO system without proper authorization. REQ-SEC-SMO-Log-12: SMO shall support access to event logs by authorized internal services.
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5.1.1.1.5 NFO and FOCOM
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The below mentioned requirements are referring to securing the NFO and FOCOM in SMO. REQ-SEC-NFO-FOCOM-1: NFO and FOCOM shall support confidentiality, integrity, and replay protection. REQ-SEC-NFO-FOCOM-2: VOID. REQ-SEC-NFO-FOCOM-3: NFO shall support mutual authentication with the O-Cloud on the O2dms interface. REQ-SEC-NFO-FOCOM-4: FOCOM shall support mutual authentication with the O-Cloud on the O2ims interface. REQ-SEC-NFO-FOCOM-5: NFO and FOCOM shall support authorization with the principle of least privilege for access attempts by O-Cloud service consumers, on a per-session basis. REQ-SEC-NFO-FOCOM-6: NFO shall be able to recover, without catastrophic failure, from a volumetric DDoS attack due to anomalous behavior or malicious intent. REQ-SEC-NFO-FOCOM-7: VOID. REQ-SEC-NFO FOCOM-8: FOCOM shall be able to recover, without catastrophic failure, from a volumetric DDoS attack due to anomalous behavior or malicious intent.
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5.1.1.2 Security Controls
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5.1.1.2.1 SMO
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SEC-CTL-SMO-1: SMO may support OAuth 2.0 authorization server and provide a token end-point, as specified in O-RAN Security Protocols Specifications [3], clause 4.7. SEC-CTL-SMO-3: SMO shall support OAuth 2.0 resource owner/server, as specified in O-RAN Security Protocols Specifications [3], clause 4.7, for service requests received from other SMO functions. SEC-CTL-SMO-4: SMO shall support OAuth 2.0 client functionality, as specified in O-RAN Security Protocols Specifications [3], clause 4.7, for service requests to other SMO functions. SEC-CTL-SMO-5: SMO shall support mutual authentication of SMO functions using mTLS with PKI X.509v3 certificates as specified in O-RAN Security Protocols Specifications [3], clause 4.2. SEC-CTL-SMO-6: SMO functions may support authentication of other SMO functions using TLS with pre-shared key (PSK) as specified in O-RAN Security Protocols Specifications [3], clause 4.2. ETSI ETSI TS 104 104 V9.1.0 (2025-06) 21
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5.1.1.2.2 SMO Internal Communications
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Figure 5.1.1.2.2-1: mTLS or TLS for SMO Internal Communications SEC-CTL-SMO-Internal-1: For security protection at the transport layer, SMO Internal Communications shall support TLS as specified in O-RAN Security Protocols Specifications [3], clause 4.2. SEC-CTL-SMO-Internal-2: For mutual authentication between SMO functions, SMO Internal Communications shall support mTLS as shown in Figure 5.1.1.2.2-1 and specified in O-RAN Security Protocols Specifications [3], clause 4.2. SEC-CTL-SMO-Internal-3: For authentication between SMO functions, SMO Internal Communications may support TLS with Pre-Shared Key (PSK), as specified in O-RAN Security Protocols Specifications [3], clause 4.2.
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5.1.1.2.3 SMO External Interfaces
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External Interfaces not specified by O-RAN that provide services to SMO, acting in a consumer role, shall meet security controls specified in this clause. Figure 5.1.1.2.3-1: mTLS on SMO External interfaces SEC-CTL-SMO-External-1: For confidentiality and integrity protection of data in transit, SMO External Interfaces shall support TLS as specified in O-RAN Security Protocols Specifications [3], clause 4.2. SEC-CTL-SMO-External-2: For mutual authentication between the SMO and External Source, SMO External Interfaces shall support mTLS as shown in Figure 5.1.1.2.3-1 and specified in O-RAN Security Protocols Specifications [3], clause 4.2. SEC-CTL-SMO-External-3: SMO External Interfaces shall support OAuth 2.0 resource owner/server, as specified in O-RAN Security Protocols Specifications [3], clause 4.7. SEC-CTL-SMO-External-4: SMO External Interfaces shall support OAuth 2.0 client functionality, as specified in O-RAN Security Protocols Specifications [3], clause 4.7.
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5.1.1.2.4 SMO Logging
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SEC-CTL-SMO-Log-1: A SMO External Interface used for SMO log export shall support TLS as specified in O-RAN Security Protocols Specifications [3], clause 4.2, and FTPES. SEC-CTL-SMO-Log-2: SMO log export may support SSH as specified in O-RAN Security Protocols Specifications [3], clause 4.1, and SFTP. mTLS or TLS-PSK SMO Internal Communications SMO function SMO function SMO External System mTLS SMO External Interface External Termination ETSI ETSI TS 104 104 V9.1.0 (2025-06) 22 SEC-CTL-SMO-Log-3: SMO log export shall support mutual authentication using mTLS with public key infrastructure (PKI) and X.509v3 certificates as specified in O-RAN Security Protocols Specifications [3], clause 4.2. SEC-CTL-SMO-Log-4: When SSH is supported for SMO log export, SSH shall support authentication using public and private keys in a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). SEC-CTL-SMO-Log-5: When SSH is supported for SMO log export, SSH may support authentication using PKI and X.509v3 certificates.
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5.1.1.2.5 NFO and FOCOM
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SEC-CTL-NFO-FOCOM-1: NFO shall support mutual authentication with O-Cloud DMS using mTLS with PKI X.509v3 certificates, as specified in O-RAN Security Protocols Specifications [3], clause 4.2. SEC-CTL-NFO-FOCOM-2: FOCOM shall support mutual authentication with O-Cloud IMS using mTLS with PKI X.509v3 certificates, as specified in O-RAN Security Protocols Specifications [3], clause 4.2. SEC-CTL-NFO-FOCOM-3: NFO shall support OAuth 2.0 resource owner/server as specified in O-RAN Security Protocols Specifications [3], clause 4.7, for service requests from O-Cloud resources. SEC-CTL-NFO-FOCOM-4: FOCOM shall support OAuth 2.0 resource owner/server, as specified in O-RAN Security Protocols Specifications [3], clause 4.7, for service requests from O-Cloud resources. SEC-CTL-NFO-FOCOM-5: NFO shall support OAuth 2.0 client functionality as specified in O-RAN Security Protocols Specifications [3], clause 4.7, for service requests to O-Cloud resources. SEC-CTL-NFO-FOCOM-6: FOCOM shall support OAuth 2.0 client functionality, as specified in O-RAN Security Protocols Specifications [3], clause 4.7, for service requests to O-Cloud resources. SEC-CTL-NFO-FOCOM-7: NFO shall support TLS, as specified in O-RAN Security Protocols Specifications [3], clause 4.2, on the O2 interface. SEC-CTL-NFO-FOCOM-8: FOCOM shall support TLS, as specified in O-RAN Security Protocols Specifications [3], clause 4.2, on the O2 interface. 5.1.2 Non-RT RIC and rApps
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5.1.2.1 Requirements
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rApp packages shall follow the security requirements and controls in the Common App LCM clause 5.3.2.1 in the present document. REQ-SEC-NonRTRIC-1: The Non-RT RIC shall support authorization as a resource owner/server and client. REQ-SEC-NonRTRIC-2: The Non-RT RIC Framework, as a resource owner/server, shall provide authorization to requests from rApps as a client. REQ-SEC-NonRTRIC-3: rApps shall provide client authorization requests to the Non-RT RIC Framework. REQ-SEC-NonRTRIC-4: The Non-RT RIC shall be able to recover, without catastrophic failure, from a volumetric DDoS attack across the A1 interface, due to misbehavior or malicious intent. REQ-SEC-NonRTRIC-5: The Non-RT RIC Framework shall be able to recover, without catastrophic failure, from a volumetric DDoS attack across the R1 interface, due to misbehavior or malicious intent. REQ-SEC-NonRTRIC-6: rApps shall be able to recover, without catastrophic failure, from a volumetric DDoS attack across the R1 interface, due to misbehavior or malicious intent. REQ-SEC-NonRTRIC-7: The SMO/Non-RT RIC Framework shall authenticate both API Producer and API Consumer across R1 interface using Kafka based protocol for data streaming. REQ-SEC-NonRTRIC-8: The SMO/Non-RT RIC Framework shall support authorization mechanism for Kafka based protocol to provision access for data streaming by API Producer and API Consumer across R1 interface. ETSI ETSI TS 104 104 V9.1.0 (2025-06) 23 Figure 5.1.2.1-1: SMO/Non-RT RIC Framework supporting Kafka based protocol using TLS REQ-SEC-NonRTRIC-9: rAppIDs shall be unique within the Non-RT RIC runtime environment. REQ-SEC-NonRTRIC-10: rAppIDs shall be generated using strong randomization methods. NOTE: Strong randomization methods can help resist brute force attacks.
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5.1.2.2 Security Controls
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SEC-CTL-NonRTRIC-1: For A1-EI, Non-RT RIC shall support OAuth 2.0 resource owner/server, as specified in O-RAN Security Protocols Specifications [3], clause 4.7, for service requests received from one or more Near-RT RICs. SEC-CTL-NonRTRIC-2: For A1-P, Non-RT RIC shall support OAuth 2.0 client, as specified in O-RAN Security Protocols Specifications [3], clause 4.7. SEC-CTL-NonRTRIC-3: For R1, SMO/Non-RT RIC Framework may support TLS, as specified in O-RAN Security Protocols Specifications [3], clause 4.2. SEC-CTL-NonRTRIC-4: For R1, SMO/Non-RT RIC Framework shall support authorization using OAuth 2.0, as specified in O-RAN Security Protocols Specifications [3], clause 4.7. SEC-CTL-NonRTRIC-5: For R1, Non-RT RIC Framework shall support OAuth 2.0 resource owner/server functionality, as specified in O-RAN Security Protocols Specifications [3], clause 4.7. SEC-CTL-NonRTRIC-6: For R1, rApps shall support OAuth 2.0 client functionality, as specified in O-RAN Security Protocols Specifications [3], clause 4.7. 5.1.3 Near-RT RIC and xApps
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5.1.3.1 Requirements
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xApp packages shall follow the security requirements and controls in the Common App LCM clause 5.3.2.1 in the present document. REQ-SEC-XAPP-1: VOID REQ-SEC-XAPP-2: VOID REQ-SEC-XAPP-3: During the xApp registration procedure the xApp identifier (xApp ID) shall be associated with xApp credentials used for authentication. REQ-SEC-XAPP-4: xApp IDs shall be created ensuring uniqueness. REQ-SEC-NEAR-RT-1: Near-RT RIC shall authenticate xApp access to the Near-RT RIC database(s) during SDL registration. REQ-SEC-NEAR-RT-2: Near-RT RIC shall provide authorized access to Near-RT RIC database(s). REQ-SEC-NEAR-RT-3: The communication between xApps and Near-RT RIC platform APIs shall be mutually authenticated. REQ-SEC-NEAR-RT-4: Near-RT RIC architecture shall provide an authorization framework for the consumption of the services exposed in the platform APIs by the xApps, that takes operator policies into consideration. The framework should be used by the specified API procedures in [33]. SMO/Non - RT RIC Framework DME rAPP Kafka using TLS Kafka using TLS ETSI ETSI TS 104 104 V9.1.0 (2025-06) 24 REQ-SEC-NEAR-RT-5: The Near-RT RIC shall support authorization as a resource owner/server (A1-P) and client (A1-EI). REQ-SEC-NEAR-RT-6: The Near-RT RIC shall be able to recover, without catastrophic failure, from a volumetric DDoS attack across the A1 interface, due to misbehavior or malicious intent. REQ-SEC-NEAR-RT-7: The Near-RT RIC shall be able to detect and defend against content-related attacks across the A1 interface, due to misbehavior or malicious intent. NOTE 1: In practice, injection attacks and buffer overflow attacks are the most common classes of content-related attacks. REQ-SEC-NEAR-RT-8: The Near-RT RIC shall be able to detect and defend against content-related attacks across the Y1 interface. NOTE 2: In practice, injection attacks and buffer overflow attacks are the most common classes of content-related attacks. REQ-SEC-NEAR-RT-9: The Near-RT RIC shall be able to detect and defend against content-related attacks across the E2 interface, due to misbehavior or malicious intent. NOTE 3: In practice, injection attacks and buffer overflow attacks are the most common classes of content-related attacks.
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5.1.3.2 Security Controls
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API Security - Authentication SEC-CTL-NEAR-RT-1: Transactional APIs (REST and gRPC) shall support mutual TLS (mTLS) authentication via X.509v3 certificates as specified in the O-RAN Security Protocols Specification [3], clause 4.2. SEC-CTL-NEAR-RT-2: Time critical APIs, not supported by TLS protocol, shall support IPsec with IKEv2 certificate- based authentication according to O-RAN security protocol specification [3]. EXAMPLE 1: E2 related APIs are considered time critical APIs. API Security - Authorization In the actual context of Near-RT RIC, the platform as API producer shall be responsible to specify those rights/privileges for the platform services as resources to the xApps as consumers. As a guideline, an xApp should only have the required set of permissions to perform the actions for which they are authorized, and no more. Authorization mechanisms shall be enforced by the Near-RT RIC platform in the following key API procedures [33]: • Discovery of Near-RT RIC APIs: The Near-RT RIC platform shall provide means to restrict xApps from discovery of some published APIs based on configuration policies. • E2 Subscription API procedure: The subscription management shall be based on operator's policies. An xApp may be restricted to interface with only a subset of E2 Nodes by such policies. This procedure establishes a set of preconditions that assume authorization processes: - xApp has been authorized to issue E2 Subscription API requests. - xApp has been authorized to request guidance from Conflict mitigation. - xApp Subscription Management has been configured to permit E2 Subscription API requests only from specific list of xApps. • E2 Control API procedure: Only authorized xApps may initiate RIC control request messages issued by the Near-RT RIC over the E2 interface to the E2 Nodes, for a specific scope. EXAMPLE 2: E2Nodes include E2 Node list, RAN function. • E2 Guidance API procedure: Ensure only authorized xApp obtain guidance from the conflict mitigation platform function prior to initiating an action. ETSI ETSI TS 104 104 V9.1.0 (2025-06) 25 • SDL API procedures: xApps shall have been successfully registered and authorized prior to consuming the services exposed by SDL API. EXAMPLE 3: Services exposed by SDL API may be client registration, fetch data, notification, store. SEC-CTL-NEAR-RT-3: Transactional APIs (REST and gRPC) in Near-RT RIC shall support OAuth 2.0 authorization framework as specified in in O-RAN Security Protocols Specifications [3], clause 4.7. The roles defined in OAuth 2.0 are assigned as follows: • Resource owner / Resource server (producer): Near-RT RIC platform modules providing services via APIs • Client (consumer): xApp Grants shall be of the type Client Credentials Grant, as described in clause 4.4. of IETF RFC 6749 [34]. Mutual authentication using mTLS as specified in the O-RAN Security Protocols Specification [3], clause 4.2 shall be used. SEC-CTL-NEAR-RT-4: For A1-P, Near-RT RIC shall support OAuth 2.0 resource owner/server, as specified in O-RAN Security Protocols Specifications [3], clause 4.7, for service requests received from a Non-RT RIC. SEC-CTL-NEAR-RT-5: For A1-EI, Near-RT RIC shall support OAuth 2.0 client, as specified in O-RAN Security Protocols Specifications [3], clause 4.7. API Security - Confidentiality and Integrity SEC-CTL-NEAR-RT-6: Transactional APIs (REST and gRPC) shall support TLS as specified in the O-RAN Security Protocols Specification [3], clause 4.2 to provide message confidentiality and integrity. SEC-CTL-NEAR-RT-7: Time critical, not supported by TLS protocol, shall support IPsec as specified in the O-RAN Security Protocols Specification [3], clause 4.5 to provide message confidentiality and integrity. Table 5.1.3.2-1 provides a summary of the security controls (SEC-CTL- NEAR-RT-1 to -7) and a mapping of those to the related interface/API transport protocols considered in Near-RT RIC platform. Table 5.1.3.2-1: Summary of the Security Controls for Near-RT RIC APIs API protocol Authentication method Authorization method Confidentiality method Integrity method gRPC mTLS OAuth2 mTLS mTLS SCTP IKEv2 - IPsec IPsec REST/HTTP mTLS OAuth2 mTLS mTLS SEC-CTL- NEAR-RT-8: The Near-RT RIC shall verify policies received through the A1 interface as follows: • The policies conform to a pre-defined schema. • The policy values are valid. • The policies are being received at or below a pre-defined rate. The Near-RT RIC shall log security event(s) if any of the policy verification steps fail. EXAMPLE 4: In practice, policy value validation verifies that values are within the predefined range. Security controls for the Y1 interface protocol structure solution 1 The Y1 interface protocol structure solution 1 is defined in the O-RAN ALLIANCE TS: "Y1 interface: General Aspects and Principles" [66], clause 7.2. SEC-CTL-NEAR-RT-9: The Y1 interface shall support mutual TLS (mTLS) authentication via X.509v3 certificates as specified in O-RAN Security Protocols Specifications [3], clause 4.2. Both the client (the Y1 consumer) and the server (the Y1 provider) require a certificate, and both sides authenticate each other using their public/private key pair. SEC-CTL-NEAR-RT-10: The Y1 interface shall support the OAuth 2.0 authorization framework as specified in O-RAN Security Protocols Specifications [3], clause 4.7. ETSI ETSI TS 104 104 V9.1.0 (2025-06) 26 The roles defined in OAuth 2.0 shall be assigned as follows: • Resource owner / Resource server (producer): Y1 provider • Client (consumer): Y1 consumer SEC-CTL-NEAR-RT-11: The Y1 interface shall support TLS as specified in O-RAN Security Protocols Specifications [3], clause 4.2 to provide data confidentiality, integrity, and replay-protection. xApp Registration - Security procedure As part of the xApp registration procedure to the Near-RT RIC platform, the platform assigns an identity (ID) to the xApp, so called xApp ID. This xApp ID is used in xApp's API request messages to the Near-RT RIC platform to facilitate the Near-RT RIC platform the identification of the xApp (API service consumer). SEC-CTL-NEAR-RT-12: The xApp ID shall be embedded into the provided xApp X.509 certificate used for authentication (mTLS) according to the parametrization in [3], issued by operator RA/CA PKI infrastructure. The security procedure to become part of the existing xApp registration procedure, specified in O-RAN.WG3.RICARCH (clause 9.1.4) where xApp ID is assigned, is detailed in Figures 5.1.3.2-1 and 5.1.3.2-2: @startuml participant xapp as "xApp\n[API service consumer]" participant nfo as "Provisioning system\n(NFO in SMO)" participant pf as "Near-RT RIC platform \n(Operator RA functionality)\n[API service producer]" participant pki as "Operator PKI\nCA" xapp <- nfo : 1. Registration information\n[Near-RT RIC Platform\n(Address,Root CA Certificate),\n OAuth 2.0 Access token] xapp -> pf : 2. TLS (Server side certificate based authentication) rnote over xapp 3. Generate the private/public key pair and CSR endnote xapp -> pf : 4. Registration request (by xApp instance)\n[OAuth 2.0 access token, xApp Instance CSR] rnote over pf 5. Verify OAuth 2.0 access token Generate the xApp ID POP (Proof of Possession of Private Key) RA policy: Add xApp ID to the request to be in the SAN field of the certificate endnote pf -> pki : 6. Request of the certificate by the RA pf <- pki : 7. Issued certificate \n(embedded xApp ID in SAN) rnote over pf 8. Generate xApp MOI endnote xapp <- pf : 9. Registration Response (for xApp instance)\n[xApp ID, xApp Certificate, (service API authentication \nand Authorization information)] @enduml Figure 5.1.3.2-1: UML code for secure xApp registration ETSI ETSI TS 104 104 V9.1.0 (2025-06) 27 Figure 5.1.3.2-2: Security procedure for xApp registration 1. As a pre-requisite to the registration procedure, the xApp obtains information from a provisioning system (NFO in SMO) during the onboarding/deployment phase in the infrastructure. This information is used to authenticate and establish a secure TLS communication with the Near-RT RIC platform during the registration process. The information includes details of the Near-RT RIC platform (address, Root CA certificate) and includes an initial registration credential. NOTE 1: An OAuth 2.0 access token is provided as initial registration credential in the example. Other types of credentials in the initial registration can be used. 2. The xApp and Near-RT RIC platform establish a TLS session (server-side certificate authentication) using the information obtained in step 1. 3. The xApp generates the private and public key pair, and CSR (Certificate Signing Request). 4. After successful establishment of the TLS session, the xApp instance sends a registration request message to the Near-RT RIC platform along with the pre-provisioned initial registration credential (OAuth 2.0 token), and the xApp instance CSR message. 5. The Near-RT RIC platform shall validate the initial registration credential, and the Management Function of the platform shall generate an xApp ID for that particular xApp instance. At the reception of the CSR message from the xApp, the Registration Authority (RA), implemented in the Near-RT RIC platform, shall prove that the xApp instance is in possession of the private key. If the proof of possession procedure is positive, the RA shall configure a policy to add the xApp ID in the Subject Alt Name (SAN) field of the certificate request message to be forwarded to the Operator CA to fetch the end entity certificate. ETSI ETSI TS 104 104 V9.1.0 (2025-06) 28 NOTE 2: The RA may use an enrolment protocol to fetch the certificate from the CA. The authentication mechanism between RA and CA are part of the operator PKI implementation. 6. The RA requests the certificate for the xApp instance. 7. Operator CA issues a certificate, embedding the xApp ID in SAN field of the certificate. The issued certificate by the operator CA will be used by the xApp for subsequent authentication and authorization procedures between the xApp and the Near-RT RIC platform when services/resources are consumed by xApps via APIs. 8. The Near-RT RIC platform (Management Function) generates an xApp Managed Object Instance (MOI) as specified in [33], which may contain the mechanism for authentication (mTLS) and authorization (OAuth 2.0) between the xApp and the corresponding module of the Near-RT RIC platform. 9. The Near-RT RIC platform (Management Function) responds with a xApp registration response message. The response shall include the assigned xApp ID, authentication, and authorization mechanism (if provided in step 8) and xApp certificate. SEC-CTL-NEAR-RT-13: The data type of the xApp ID shall be a string that uniquely identifies the xApp instance. The format of this string shall be a Universally Unique Identifier (UUID) version 4 (as described in IETF RFC 4122 [77]). SEC-CTL-NEAR-RT-14: subjectAltName in the xApp instance certificate shall contain a URI-ID with the URI for the xApp ID as an URN; this URI-ID shall contain the xApp ID of the xApp instance using the UUID format as described in IETF RFC 4122 [77]. EXAMPLE 5: urn:uuid:f81d4fae-7dec-11d0-a765-00a0c91e6bf6 SEC-CTL- NEAR-RT-15: The Near-RT RIC shall verify data received through the Y1 interface as follows: • The data values are valid. • The data is being received at or below a pre-defined message rate. EXAMPLE 6: In practice, data value validation verifies that values are within the predefined ranges. SEC-CTL- NEAR-RT-16: The Near-RT RIC shall log a security event each time an input validation step fails for data received through the Y1 interface. SEC-CTL- NEAR-RT-17: The Near-RT RIC shall verify data received through the E2 interface as follows: • The data values are valid. • The data is being received at or below a pre-defined rate. • The Near-RT RIC shall log security event(s) if any of the verification steps fail. EXAMPLE 7: In practice, data value validation verifies that values are within the predefined ranges.
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104 104
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5.1.4 O-CU-CP/UP
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104 104
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5.1.4.1 Requirements
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REQ-SEC-OCU-1: O-CU-CP and O-CU-UP shall meet the security requirements for gNB-CU-CP and gNB-CU-UP respectively, as specified in ETSI TS 133 501 [55].
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104 104
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5.1.4.2 Security Controls
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SEC-CTL-OCU-1: O-CU-CP and O-CU-UP shall support the security controls for gNB-CU-CP and gNB-CU-UP respectively, as specified in ETSI TS 133 501 [55]. ETSI ETSI TS 104 104 V9.1.0 (2025-06) 29
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104 104
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5.1.5 O-DU
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104 104
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5.1.5.1 Requirements
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REQ-SEC-ODU-1: O-DU shall meet the security requirements for gNB-DU as specified in ETSI TS 133 501 [55]. The security requirements for the Open Fronthaul Interface are specified in clause 5.2.5 of the present document.
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104 104
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5.1.5.2 Security Controls
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SEC-CTL-ODU-1: O-DU shall support the security controls for gNB-DU as specified in ETSI TS 133 501 [55]. The security controls for the Open Fronthaul Interface are specified in clause 5.2.5 of the present document.
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104 104
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5.1.6 O-RU
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104 104
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5.1.6.1 Requirements
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REQ-SEC-ORU-1: O-RU shall meet the security requirements for gNB setup and configuration as specified in ETSI TS 133 501 [55]. REQ-SEC-ORU-2: O-RU shall meet the security requirements for gNB secure environment as specified in ETSI TS 133 501 [55]. The security requirements for the Open Fronthaul Interface are specified in clause 5.2.5 of the present document.
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104 104
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5.1.6.2 Security Controls
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The security controls for the Open Fronthaul Interface are specified in clause 5.2.5 of the present document.
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104 104
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5.1.7 O-eNB
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5.1.7.1 Requirements REQ-SEC-OeNB-1: O-eNB shall meet the security requirements for eNB as specified in ETSI TS 133 401 [56].
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104 104
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5.1.7.2 Security Controls
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SEC-CTL-OeNB-1: O-eNB shall support the security controls for eNB as specified in ETSI TS 133 401 [56].
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104 104
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5.1.8 O-Cloud
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104 104
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5.1.8.0 Introduction
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NOTE 1: In the following requirements and controls, 'App' is intended to include both xApp and rApp. NOTE 2: In the following requirements and controls, the actor 'Service Provider' is used to refer to the Telco Operator and/or the O-Cloud Provider since the Application package verification may be performed by both or by one or the other, depending upon the O-Cloud deployment models. The Telco Operator may act as the O-Cloud Provider (in case of private cloud model), or they may be two different entities (in case of hybrid or public cloud models).
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104 104
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5.1.8.1 Generic requirements
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Generic requirements for Cloud Platform Management are specified in [8].
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104 104
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5.1.8.1.1 User Management Requirements for Cloud Platform Management
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REQ-SEC-OCLOUD-1: Users shall be authenticated. ETSI ETSI TS 104 104 V9.1.0 (2025-06) 30 REQ-SEC-OCLOUD-2: Users shall be authorized. O-Cloud platform shall use an authorization mechanism to control the access rights of users. REQ-SEC-OCLOUD-3: Means of isolation of control and resources among different users shall be implemented.
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104 104
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5.1.8.1.2 Security Controls
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SEC-CTL-OCLOUD-1: O-Cloud platform should support access management to O-Cloud resources based on RBAC (Role-based access control) policies. SEC-CTL-OCLOUD-2: O-Cloud platform shall support Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) [46] to ensure secure access. 5.1.8.2 Software Package Protection at the O-Cloud Network Functions and Applications Layer
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104 104
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5.1.8.2.1 Requirements
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REQ-SEC-OCLOUD-IMG-1 to 18: VOID. REQ-SEC-OCLOUD-PKG-1: The Application package shall be successfully authenticated and verified by the O-Cloud Platform during instantiation from the trust images repository using signatures from both Application Provider and Service Provider. REQ-SEC-OCLOUD-PKG-2: O-Cloud Platform shall verify the integrity of Application package during instantiation to determine if any unauthorized modification, deletion, or insertion has occurred. REQ-SEC-OCLOUD-PKG-3: SMO and O-Cloud Platform shall support algorithms for the code signing and encryption/decryption processes and protection of keys.
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104 104
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5.1.8.2.2 Security Controls
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SEC-CTL-OCLOUD-IMG-1 to 4: VOID.
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104 104
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5.1.8.3 O-Cloud Software Images Protection
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104 104
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5.1.8.3.0 Introduction
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The identified requirements and controls in this clause are enforcing the protection of O-Cloud software images during both initial deployment and subsequent updates. EXAMPLE: O-Cloud software includes AAL drivers, IMS, DMS, Host OS, Hypervisor/Container Engine.
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104 104
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5.1.8.3.1 Requirements
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REQ-SEC-OCLOUD-SW-1: All O-Cloud software images shall be protected to ensure their integrity and authenticity. REQ-SEC-OCLOUD-SW-2: The O-Cloud shall support the capability to perform vulnerability scanning on O-Cloud software images. The activation and enforcement of this vulnerability scanning prior to the deployment or updating of software images in the O-Cloud shall be configurable. NOTE: This flexibility allows service providers to decide on the application of vulnerability scanning based on a comprehensive risk assessment, taking into account specific operational needs, deployment scenarios, or time constraints.
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104 104
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5.1.8.3.2 Security Controls
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SEC-CTL-OCLOUD-SW-1: For all deployments and updates, the O-Cloud shall verify the digital signature associated with the new O-Cloud software image before installing the software package. The algorithms, key sizes, and standards used for signature generation and verification shall adhere to the 'O-RAN Security Protocol Specification' [3], clause 5. ETSI ETSI TS 104 104 V9.1.0 (2025-06) 31
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104 104
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5.1.8.4 O-Cloud Virtualization and Isolation
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104 104
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5.1.8.4.1 Introduction
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This clause contains security requirements and controls to mitigate threats to O-Cloud Virtualization layer (Host OS-Hypervisor/Container engine/Cloud platform software components) and provide isolation to the Applications hosted on the O-Cloud.
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104 104
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5.1.8.4.2 Requirements
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REQ-SEC-OCLOUD-ISO-1: O-Cloud shall implement means of preventing privilege escalation by Applications. REQ-SEC-OCLOUD-ISO-2: The communication between the different Applications shall be mutually authenticated and authorized. REQ-SEC-OCLOUD-ISO-3: The O-Cloud consumer and provider shall together ensure that the Applications have only the minimum required capabilities and privileges as well as minimum required access to the O-Cloud resources. REQ-SEC-OCLOUD-ISO-4: The O-Cloud platform shall ensure that there is strict isolation between Applications in terms of data in transit, data in use and data at rest. REQ-SEC-OCLOUD-ISO-5: Communication between O-Cloud platform software components shall be protected in terms of authenticity, confidentiality, integrity, and replay. REQ-SEC-OCLOUD-ISO-6: The O-Cloud platform shall provide the capability to define network policies that restrict ingress and egress traffic and configure rate limiting between Applications. REQ-SEC-OCloud-ISO-7: The O-Cloud platform shall not permit configuration change of any component on the O-Cloud platform without proper authorization.
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104 104
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5.1.8.4.3 Security Controls
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SEC-CTL-O-CLOUD-ISO-1: For mutual authentication between O-Cloud platform software components, mTLS shall be supported as specified in O-RAN Security Protocols Specifications [3], clause 4.2. SEC-CTL-O-CLOUD-ISO-2: For confidentiality and integrity protection of data in transit, O-Cloud platform software components shall support TLS as specified in O-RAN Security Protocols Specifications [3], clause 4.2. SEC-CTL-O-CLOUD-ISO-3: The O-Cloud platform shall support an access control system to enforce access control policies that align with the principle of least privilege, ensuring that O-Cloud platform components or Applications have the necessary permissions to perform their tasks while preventing unauthorized access to sensitive resources.
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104 104
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5.1.8.5 Secure update
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104 104
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5.1.8.5.0 Introduction
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The identified requirements and controls in this clause are enforcing the secure update of O-Cloud software. EXAMPLE: O-Cloud software includes AAL drivers, IMS, DMS, Host OS, Hypervisor/Container Engine.
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104 104
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5.1.8.5.1 Requirements
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REQ-SEC-OCLOUD-SU-1: All software within the O-Cloud platform shall be kept up to date with the last security updates for adding additional security protections and correcting vulnerabilities [i.1]. REQ-SEC-OCLOUD-SU-2: VOID. REQ-SEC-OCLOUD-SU-3: VOID. REQ-SEC-OCLOUD-SU-4: VOID. REQ-SEC-OCLOUD-SU-5: In case of an incomplete update, or incident during the installation process, the O-Cloud platform shall remain in its initial working state. ETSI ETSI TS 104 104 V9.1.0 (2025-06) 32 REQ-SEC-OCLOUD-SU-6: The O-Cloud platform shall prevent the unauthorized rollback of its software to an earlier vulnerable version. REQ-SEC-OCLOUD-SU-7: The update of O-Cloud software should be completed with minimal disruption and downtime.
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104 104
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5.1.8.5.2 Security Controls
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SEC-CTL-OCLOUD-SU-1: VOID. SEC-CTL-OCLOUD-SU-2: VOID. SEC-CTL-OCLOUD-SU-3: VOID. SEC-CTL-OCLOUD-SU-4: The O-Cloud shall possess the capability to detect and retrieve the latest security updates of the O-Cloud software images. NOTE: This ensures that all O-Cloud software components can be consistently updated with the latest security patches for enhanced protection and vulnerability mitigation. The operation of this system should be automated. SEC-CTL-OCLOUD-SU-5: The O-Cloud shall possess the capability to securely log and control software versions, thereby preventing unauthorized rollbacks to older, less secure software versions. SEC-CTL-OCLOUD-SU-6: The O-Cloud should possess the capability to revert an O-Cloud software component to its previous stable version in the event of an incomplete update or installation incident, ensuring operational continuity. SEC-CTL-OCLOUD-SU-7: The O-Cloud should be designed for redundancy and high availability, to maintain uninterrupted service during both the update process and in scenarios of unexpected update failures.
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104 104
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5.1.8.6 Secure Protection of cryptographic keys and sensitive data
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104 104
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5.1.8.6.1 Requirements
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REQ-SEC-OCLOUD-SS-1: Sensitive data within the O-Cloud platform shall be protected in terms of integrity and confidentiality at rest, in use and in transit. REQ-SEC-OCLOUD-SS-2: The O-Cloud platform shall support a secure deletion method from both active and backup storage medias. REQ-SEC-OCLOUD-SS-3: The O-Cloud platform shall ensure that any data contained in a resource is not available when the resource is de-allocated from one VM/Container and reallocated to a different VM/Container. This requirement requires protection for any data contained in a resource that has been logically deleted or released but may still be present within the resource which in turn may be re-allocated to another VM/Container. REQ-SEC-OCLOUD-SS-4: The O-Cloud platform shall have the capability that allows an Application to securely erase sensitive data owned by the Application. EXAMPLE: Sensitive data includes, but is not limited to, cryptographic keys, Personally Identifiable Information (PII), credentials, tokens, and configuration data. REQ-SEC-OCLOUD-SS-5: The secure deletion method should activate automatically during the boot process after a power outage to prevent unauthorized access to any residual data from all volatile memories, including RAM and cache. NOTE: Data may linger in volatile memory for a short period after power is lost, potentially allowing for data recovery through cold boot attacks if the system is quickly powered back on. See Annex C for the guidance to implement REQ-SEC-OCLOUD-SS-5.
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104 104
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5.1.8.6.2 Security Controls
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SEC-CTL-OCLOUD-SS-1: The O-Cloud shall support the capability for encryption of all sensitive data, including cryptographic keys, credentials, tokens, and configuration data. ETSI ETSI TS 104 104 V9.1.0 (2025-06) 33 SEC-CTL-OCLOUD-SS-2: The O-Cloud shall support the capability for secure deletion of data in addressable memory locations that are no longer in use due to reallocation. This includes the ability to overwrite these locations with specific binary patterns, such as zeroes, ones, or a random bit pattern. SEC-CTL-OCLOUD-SS-3: Medias containing sensitive information shall be sanitized using media-specific techniques. See Annex C for the guidance to implement these controls.
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104 104
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5.1.8.7 Chain of Trust
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104 104
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5.1.8.7.1 Requirements
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REQ-SEC-OCLOUD-COT-1: The O-Cloud platform shall support a root of trust that verifies the integrity of every relevant component in the O-Cloud platform [i.1], [i.2]. REQ-SEC-OCLOUD-COT-2: It shall be possible to attest an O-RAN Application through the full attestation chain from the hardware layer through the virtualization layer to the O-RAN Application layer [44], [49].
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104 104
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5.1.8.7.2 Security Controls
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SEC-CTL-OCLOUD-COT-1: The chain of trust shall be built from measurements stored in a hardware root of trust. SEC-CTL-OCLOUD-COT-2: The chain of trust shall be built from measurements stored in a software root of trust for scenarios where a hardware root of trust is not feasible or available. SEC-CTL-OCLOUD-COT-3: A remote Attestation Service (AS) should be supported for providing additional benefits beside verifying O-Cloud platform integrity by CoT. The remote AS should collect O-Cloud platform configurations and integrity measurements from data center servers at a O-Cloud service provider via a trust agent service running on the O-Cloud platform servers [i.7]. The O-Cloud service provider is responsible for defining allowlisted trust policies. These policies should include information and expected measurements for desired platform CoT technologies. The collected data is compared and verified against the policies, and a report is generated to record the relevant trust information in the AS database [i.7].The remote AS should be extended to include O-RAN Applications integrity. See Annex C for the guidance to implement these controls.
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104 104
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5.1.8.8 AAL
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104 104
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5.1.8.8.0 Introduction
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There are two different scenarios of deployment of the hardware accelerator manager: • Scenario 1: the hardware accelerator manager is a SW component part of the O-Cloud platform and outside the hardware accelerator device. It is linked to the hardware accelerator device via a vendor specific interface. • Scenario 2: The hardware accelerator manager is part of the hardware accelerator device. In this scenario, the vendor specific interface does not exist. For both scenarios, AALI-C-Mgmt interface is the same between the hardware accelerator manager and the O-Cloud IMS/DMS. AAL components are parts of the O-Cloud platform, therefore the O-Cloud security requirements and controls on image protection, secure update, isolation, secure storage, and chain of trust shall apply to AAL components (see clause 5.1.8). ETSI ETSI TS 104 104 V9.1.0 (2025-06) 34
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104 104
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5.1.8.8.1 Requirements and Security Controls on AAL interfaces
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5.1.8.8.1.1 AALI-C-Mgmt 5.1.8.8.1.1.1 Requirements REQ-SEC-AALI-C-Mgmt-1: The hardware accelerator manager shall authenticate O-Cloud IMS/DMS when O-Cloud IMS/DMS initiates a communication to the hardware accelerator manager over AALI-C-Mgmt interface. REQ-SEC-AALI-C-Mgmt-2: The hardware accelerator manager shall check whether O-Cloud IMS/DMS is authorized when O-Cloud IMS/DMS accesses the hardware accelerator manager. REQ-SEC-AALI-C-Mgmt-3: AALI-C-Mgmt interface shall support confidentiality, integrity, and replay protection between the hardware accelerator manager and O-Cloud IMS/DMS. 5.1.8.8.1.1.2 Security Controls SEC-CTL-AALI-C-Mgmt-1: AALI-C-Mgmt interface shall support TLS as specified in O-RAN Security Protocols Specifications [3], clause 4.2. SEC-CTL-AALI-C-Mgmt-2: For mutual authentication between the hardware accelerator manager and O-Cloud IMS/DMS, AALI-C-Mgmt interface shall support mTLS as specified in O-RAN Security Protocols Specifications [3], clause 4.2. SEC-CTL-AALI-C-Mgmt-3: AALI-C-Mgmt interface shall support authorization using OAuth 2.0, as specified in O-RAN Security Protocols Specifications [3], clause 4.7. 5.1.8.8.1.2 Vendor specific interface 5.1.8.8.1.2.1 Requirements The following requirements apply only for Scenario 1. REQ-SEC-AAL-VS-1: The hardware accelerator device shall authenticate the hardware accelerator manager when the hardware accelerator manager initiates a communication to the hardware accelerator device over the vendor specific interface. REQ-SEC-AAL-VS-2: The hardware accelerator manager shall check whether the hardware accelerator device is authorized when the hardware accelerator manager accesses the hardware accelerator device. REQ-SEC-AAL-VS-3: The vendor specific interface shall support integrity between the hardware accelerator manager and the hardware accelerator device. REQ-SEC-AAL-VS-4: The vendor specific interface may support confidentiality and replay protection between the hardware accelerator manager and the hardware accelerator device. NOTE: The implementation of confidentiality and replay protection over the vendor specific interface depends on the capacity/capability of the hardware accelerator device.
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104 104
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5.1.8.8.2 Specific Requirements and Security Controls on AAL components
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5.1.8.8.2.1 Requirements REQ-SEC-AAL-1: The hardware accelerator device shall provide the capability for memory to be cleared securely prior to allocation or when indicated by the AAL Application on returning the memory. REQ-SEC-AAL-2: The AAL Implementation shall clear memory prior to allocation or when indicated by the AAL Application on returning the memory. ETSI ETSI TS 104 104 V9.1.0 (2025-06) 35 REQ-SEC-AAL-3: The hardware accelerator device shall have a unique identity for a proper identification and tracking of the hardware accelerator device by the hardware acceleration manager. NOTE: This requirement allows the O-Cloud platform for proper identification and tracking of the accelerator, as well as ensuring that it is not tampered with or replaced without proper authorization. REQ-SEC-AAL-4: Hardware accelerators should be procured from vendors who can demonstrate the security of their supply chain and manufacturing processes (supply chain security). REQ-SEC-AAL-5: The hardware accelerator device shall provide the capability for fine grained memory access control. An AAL Application or AAL Profile Instance access shall be restricted to only given buffer(s), and access requests outside that buffer(s) shall fail. REQ-SEC-AAL-6: The Hardware accelerator manager shall log security events to track and monitor any potential security incidents and to ensure accountability. Such security events include: • Hardware accelerator failures. • Hardware accelerator configuration changes. • Hardware accelerator software update and boot process. • Hardware accelerator access attempts by unauthorized users/systems, network connectivity issues, successful authentication/authorization events. • Hardware accelerator performance issues or degradation. 5.1.8.8.2.2 Security Controls SEC-CTL-AAL-1: The clear memory mechanism should involve overwriting data that was previously stored in the memory with a known pattern, such as all zeros or a random value, to memory buffers. SEC-CTL-AAL-2: Supply chain audit of hardware accelerator vendors should be performed for establishing trust in vendor's supply chain management based on evidence presented. NOTE: The evidence can be of different forms and some of them are described below: - Process to identify and map the hardware accelerator components of each hardware accelerator to the sourcing information. - A repeatable process of procuring components for building hardware accelerator. - Ability and procedures to detect counterfeit hardware components. - Procedures with strict access control measures for hardware accelerator inventory storage, transport, and distribution.
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104 104
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5.1.8.9 O2dms/O2ims/O-Cloud Notification APIs
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104 104
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5.1.8.9.1 Requirements
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5.1.8.9.1.1 O2dms REQ-SEC-OCLOUD-O2dms-1: O-Cloud DMS shall authenticate SMO (NFO or any other entity using O2dms) when SMO initiates a communication to O-Cloud for the deployment and management of Applications over O2dms interface. REQ-SEC-OCLOUD-O2dms-2: O-Cloud DMS shall be able to establish securely protected connection in terms of confidentiality, integrity, and replay with the SMO (NFO or any other entity using O2dms) over the O2dms interface. REQ-SEC-OCLOUD-O2dms-3: O-Cloud DMS shall check whether SMO (NFO or any other entity using O2dms) has been authorized when SMO access O-Cloud for the deployment and management of Applications. REQ-SEC-OCLOUD-O2dms-4: O-Cloud DMS shall log SMO's management operations for auditing. ETSI ETSI TS 104 104 V9.1.0 (2025-06) 36 5.1.8.9.1.2 O2ims REQ-SEC-OCLOUD-O2ims-1: O-Cloud IMS shall authenticate SMO (FOCOM or any other entity using O2ims) when SMO initiates a communication to O-Cloud for the management of infrastructure over O2ims interface. REQ-SEC-OCLOUD-O2ims-2: O-Cloud IMS shall be able to establish securely protected connection in terms of confidentiality, integrity, and replay with the SMO (FOCOM or any other entity using O2ims) over the O2ims interface. REQ-SEC-OCLOUD-O2ims-3: O-Cloud IMS shall check whether SMO (FOCOM or any other entity using O2ims) has been authorized when SMO access the O-Cloud infrastructure. REQ-SEC-OCLOUD-O2ims-4: O-Cloud IMS shall log SMO's management operations for auditing. 5.1.8.9.1.3 O-Cloud Notification API REQ-SEC-O-CLOUD-NotifAPI-1: The communication between Applications and the O-Cloud platform through the O-Cloud Notification API shall be mutually authenticated. REQ-SEC-O-CLOUD-NotifAPI-2: The O-Cloud platform shall provide an authorization framework for the consumption of the services exposed in the O-Cloud Notification API by Applications.
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104 104
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5.1.8.9.2 Security Controls
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SEC-CTL-O-CLOUD-INTERFACE-1: For the security protection at the transport layer on O2 interface, TLS shall be supported as specified in O-RAN Security Protocols Specifications [3], clause 4.2. SEC-CTL-O-CLOUD-INTERFACE-2: For the authorization of O2 RESTful and O-Cloud Notification APIs requests and notifications, OAuth 2.0 shall be supported as specified in O-RAN Security Protocols Specifications [3], clause 4.7. NOTE: In the actual context of O-Cloud, the platform as API producer shall be responsible to specify those rights/privileges for the platform services as resources to Applications as consumers. As a guideline, an Application should only have the required set of permissions to perform the actions for which they are authorized, and no more. Authorization mechanisms shall be enforced by the O-Cloud platform in the following procedures: • Subscription to events/status from the O-Cloud. SEC-CTL-O-CLOUD-INTERFACE-3: For the mutual authentication between O-Cloud platform and Applications , and between O-Cloud platform and SMO, O2 interface and O-Cloud Notification APIs shall support mutual TLS (mTLS) authentication via X.509v3 certificates as specified in O-RAN Security Protocols Specifications [3], clause 4.2.
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104 104
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5.1.8.10 O-Cloud hardware
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104 104
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5.1.8.10.1 Introduction
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This clause contains security requirements and controls on the O-Cloud hardware to protect sensitive data.
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104 104
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5.1.8.10.2 Requirements
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REQ-SEC-O-CLOUD-HW-1: O-Cloud hardware deployment shall be protected against unauthorized extraction or inference of sensitive information using physical methods. NOTE: O-Cloud hardware deployment refers to the hardware used to build the operator's O-Cloud infrastructure.
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104 104
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5.1.8.10.3 Security Controls
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SEC-CTL-O-CLOUD-HW-1: O-Cloud hardware deployment should implement physical access restrictions to deny unauthorized access. NOTE: O-Cloud hardware deployment refers to the hardware used to build the operator's O-Cloud infrastructure. ETSI ETSI TS 104 104 V9.1.0 (2025-06) 37
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104 104
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5.1.8.11 O-Cloud instance ID
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104 104
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5.1.8.11.0 Introduction
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The following set of requirements and controls outlines the essential criteria concerning the O-Cloud instance ID. This ID is a cornerstone for uniquely identifying and managing various components, including VMs, pods, containers, nodes, and compute pools within the O-Cloud platform. Safeguarding its global uniqueness, preserving its confidentiality and integrity, and controlling its accessibility are crucial to prevent conflicts, unauthorized access, and potential system compromises.
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104 104
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5.1.8.11.1 Requirements
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REQ-SEC-OCLOUD-INST-ID-1: The O-Cloud instance ID shall be unique within the O-Cloud platform to prevent conflicts and ensure accurate identification. REQ-SEC-OCLOUD-INST-ID-2: The O-Cloud instance ID shall not be exposed in public-facing interfaces, APIs, or logs without proper authentication and authorization mechanisms in place. REQ-SEC-OCLOUD-INST-ID-3: The O-Cloud instance ID shall be protected to ensure confidentiality and integrity, both during storage (at rest) and while being transmitted (in transit). REQ-SEC-OCLOUD-INST-ID-4: The O-Cloud instance ID shall be subject to auditing and monitoring, with detailed logs maintained to track activities related to the instance's creation, usage, modification, and deletion. REQ-SEC-OCLOUD-INST-ID-5: The O-Cloud instance ID shall be associated with a single component, be it a VM, container, pod, node, or compute pool, to ensure clear resource ownership, traceability, and accountability.
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104 104
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5.1.8.11.2 Security Controls
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SEC-CTL-OCLOUD-INST-ID-1: O-Cloud instance IDs shall be generated using strong randomization methods to ensure a high degree of uniqueness and minimize the likelihood of collisions. EXAMPLE: Implementation (Kubernetes-specific): - Kubernetes generates unique instance IDs, called Pod names, by combining factors like pseudorandom number generators (PRNGs) and contextual information. PRNGs use an initial seed and deterministic algorithms to produce random-like numbers. These numbers, along with contextual elements like timestamps and namespace identifiers, form the basis of the Pod names. This approach ensures that generated names are non-guessable, unpredictable, and unlikely to collide within the Kubernetes cluster. The combination of PRNGs, randomization, and context guarantees that instance IDs are secure, unique, and suitable for identifying pods within the system. SEC-CTL-OCLOUD-INST-ID-2: O-Cloud should validate newly generated instance IDs against existing IDs to guarantee uniqueness before finalizing instance creation.
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104 104
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5.1.8.12 Time Synchronization and Consistency Requirements for O-Cloud
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104 104
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5.1.8.12.0 Introduction
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The requirements listed below highlight the O-Cloud's focus on creating a secure time synchronization framework with NTP as the focus. The requirement and security controls below in this clause are not applicable to PTP. By ensuring each node of the O-Cloud connects to a trusted and authenticated time source, O-Cloud aims to enhance its defences against threats such as clock manipulation, data inconsistencies and operational disruptions.
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104 104
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5.1.8.12.1 Requirements
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REQ-SEC-OCLOUD-TS-1: All O-Cloud nodes shall be configured to connect to a secure and authenticated time synchronization server for ToD synchronization. ETSI ETSI TS 104 104 V9.1.0 (2025-06) 38 REQ-SEC-OCLOUD-TS-2: The O-Cloud shall be configured such that ToD synchronization is maintained across all nodes in an O-Cloud compute pool, there by guaranteeing uniform time references for all applications hosted on these nodes. REQ-SEC-OCLOUD-TS-3: The O-Cloud shall guarantee that the timestamp consistency is preserved even when applications are relocated across different nodes of the O-Cloud infrastructure. NOTE 1: Timestamp refers to: 1. Log/event timestamps: These are associated with each log entry generated. Examples include application start/stop, application relocation, node failures, network events, change in applications and O-Cloud configuration, resource allocation, deallocation, etc. 2. Data Transaction timestamps: For applications that rely on time-sensitive data within O-Cloud, consistent timestamps are crucial. Whenever data is read, written, or modified, a timestamp is generated to ensure both data integrity and consistency across nodes. REQ-SEC-OCLOUD-TS-4: The O-Cloud shall guarantee that various instances of an identical application, irrespective of their location, generate logs with consistent timestamps. NOTE 2: Within the O-Cloud infrastructure, a "consistent timestamp" denotes the synchronized and uniform chronological markers generated by various instances of an identical application, irrespective of their location. This uniformity ensures that aggregated or analysed logs from different instances present a coherent chronological sequence, aiding in precise event correlation and analysis. To achieve and maintain this consistency, it is recommended for O-Cloud to synchronize its internal clocks with trusted time sources, such as NTP servers, guaranteeing both the accuracy and trustworthiness of these timestamps. REQ-SEC-OCLOUD-TS-5: All O-Cloud nodes within a compute pool, especially those serving a specific geographic region or co-located, shall be configured to operate using a consistent time reference, preferably UTC with a Time Zone (TZ) modifier. NOTE 3: This requirement ensures: 1. Uniformity in Time-Related Operations: Simplifies the process of correlating logs, events, and time-sensitive operations across nodes, aiding in quicker identification of anomalies or malicious activities. 2. Operational Consistency: Ensures that scheduled tasks, backups, updates, or maintenance activities are executed consistently across the compute pool. 3. Data Integrity: Provides consistency for applications and databases that rely on timestamps for transactions, ensuring no discrepancies due to time differences.
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104 104
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5.1.8.12.2 Security Controls
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SEC-CTL-OCLOUD-TS-1: The O-Cloud shall ensure that all nodes are configured to exclusively connect to a secure and authenticated time synchronization server for Time of Day (ToD) synchronization. EXAMPLE 1: • NTP Usage: The O-Cloud should primarily use the Network Time Protocol (NTP) for general time synchronization needs, ensuring consistent timestamps for operations such as logging security events. This connection should prioritize the use of NTP with authentication mechanisms in place to ensure the integrity and authenticity of the time data. The authentication mechanisms provided by NTPv4 should be employed for NTP. This includes the use of symmetric key cryptography to authenticate the time server. Additionally, consideration will be given to implementing NTP over MACsec to enhance security, ensuring the confidentiality and integrity of the time synchronization data. SEC-CTL-OCLOUD-TS-2: All O-Cloud nodes shall be configured to synchronize their clocks exclusively with centralized time servers at regular intervals to ensure uniformity in time-related operations and data across the O-Cloud infrastructure. EXAMPLE 2: Time synchronization protocol such as NTP can be used to achieve this consistency. ETSI ETSI TS 104 104 V9.1.0 (2025-06) 39 • NTP: While NTP provides millisecond-level accuracy, it is widely adopted and can be sufficient for many applications in the O-Cloud. The reference points here would be the stratum 1-time servers or atomic clocks that NTP servers synchronize with. SEC-CTL-OCLOUD-TS-3: The O-Cloud should establish multiple time servers for redundancy. This ensures that nodes can switch to an alternative trusted server if the primary server becomes unavailable, thereby maintaining consistent time synchronization. EXAMPLE 3: • NTP Redundancy: By configuring nodes to have a list of NTP servers, they can automatically switch to a secondary or tertiary server if the primary server fails. This ensures continuous time synchronization and mitigates the risk of a single point of failure. NOTE: See clause 5.3.8.9.2 for additional security controls.
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104 104
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5.1.9 Shared O-RU
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104 104
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5.1.9.1 Security Requirements
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REQ-SEC-SharedORU-1: The Shared O-RU shall mutually authenticate with an O-RU Controller. REQ-SEC-SharedORU-2: The Shared O-RU shall provide least privilege access to each SRO based upon its sro-id. REQ-SEC-SharedORU-3: The Shared O-RU shall provide separate confidentiality and integrity protection of data-at-rest for the Host MNO and each SRO. REQ-SEC-SharedORU-4: The Shared O-RU shall provide separate confidentiality, integrity, and replay protection for data-in-transit for the Host MNO and each SRO. REQ-SEC-SharedORU-5: The Shared O-RU shall support Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) for human user login. REQ-SEC-SharedORU-6: The Shared O-RU shall support access controls for human users to access data. REQ-SEC-SharedORU-7: The Shared O-RU shall be able to recover, without catastrophic failure, from a volumetric DDoS attack due to misbehavior or malicious intent. REQ-SEC-SharedORU-8: The Shared O-RU shall support event logging with tenant-awareness.
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104 104
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5.1.9.2 Security Controls
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SEC-CTL-SharedORU-1: The Shared O-RU shall support mTLS 1.2, or higher, as specified in O-RAN Security Protocols Specifications [3], clause 4.2 for mutual authentication on the M-Plane interface with an O-RU Controller. SEC-CTL-SharedORU-2: The Shared O-RU should not use password-based authentication with an O-RU Controller. SEC-CTL-SharedORU-3: The Shared O-RU shall support NACM for permitting or denying access to an SRO. SEC-CTL- SharedORU-4: The Shared O-RU shall support TLS 1.2, or higher, as specified in O-RAN Security Protocols Specifications [3], clause 4.2, for confidentiality and integrity protection of data-in-transit on the M-Plane interface with an O-RU Controller.
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104 104
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5.2 Interfaces maintained by O-RAN
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104 104
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5.2.1 A1 Interface
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104 104
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5.2.1.0 Introduction
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The A1 Interface is defined in the A1 specifications [5]. ETSI ETSI TS 104 104 V9.1.0 (2025-06) 40
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104 104
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5.2.1.1 Requirements
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REQ-SEC-A1-1: A1 interface shall support confidentiality, integrity, replay protection. REQ-SEC-A1-2: A1 interface shall support mutual authentication and authorization.
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