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104 105
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15.2.0 Overview
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Following zero trust principles, O-RAN Non-RT RIC shall enforce authorization using OAuth 2.0
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104 105
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15.2.1 Non-RT RIC OAuth 2.0 Resource Owner/Server
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Requirement Name: Server authorization support Requirement Reference: REQ-SEC-NonRTRIC-1, clause 5.1.2.1, O-RAN Security Requirements and Controls Specifications [5] Requirement Description: Non-RT RIC supports OAuth 2.0 as a Server Threat References: T-NONRTRIC-01, T-NONRTRIC-02, T-NONRTRIC-03 DUT/s: Non-RT RIC Test Name: TC_NonRTRIC_OAuth2.0_Server Test description and applicability Purpose: To verify the Non-RT RIC supports OAuth 2.0 resource owner/server for A1-EI. Test setup and configuration The DUT is acting as a Resource Owner/Server and has OAuth 2.0 support enabled. The rest of the elements of the setup may be real or simulated. ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 171 Test procedure This test case follows the test procedure for OAuth2.0 specified in OAuth Test Procedure, clause 6.6.3. Expected results The Non-RT RIC is able to authorize/deny access to resources using OAuth 2.0. Expected format of evidence: Log files, traffic captures and/or report files.
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104 105
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15.2.2 Non-RT RIC OAuth 2.0 Client
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Requirement Name: Client authorization support Requirement Reference: REQ-SEC-NonRTRIC-1, clause 5.1.2.1, O-RAN Security Requirements and Controls Specifications [5] Requirement Description: Non-RT RIC supports OAuth 2.0 as a Client Threat References: T-NONRTRIC-01, T-NONRTRIC-02, T-NONRTRIC-03 DUT/s: Non-RT RIC Test Name: TC_NonRTRIC_OAuth2.0_Client Test description and applicability Purpose: To verify the Non-RT RIC supports OAuth 2.0 client for A1-P. Test setup and configuration The DUT is acting as a Client and has OAuth 2.0 support enabled. The rest of the elements of the setup may be real or simulated. Test procedure This test case follows the test procedure for OAuth2.0 specified in OAuth Test Procedure, clause 6.6.3. Expected results The Non-RT RIC is able to request and be permitted access to resources using OAuth 2.0. Expected format of evidence: Log files, traffic captures and/or report files.
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104 105
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15.2.3 Non-RT RIC Framework OAuth 2.0
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Requirement Name: Framework Server authorization support Requirement Reference: REQ-SEC-NonRTRIC-2, clause 5.1.2.1, O-RAN Security Requirements and Controls Specifications [5] Requirement Description: Non-RT RIC Framework supports OAuth 2.0 as a Server Threat References: T-NONRTRIC-01, T-NONRTRIC-02, T-NONRTRIC-03 DUT/s: Non-RT RIC Test Name: TC_NonRTRIC_OAuth2.0_Framework_Server Test description and applicability Purpose: To verify the Non-RT RIC Framework supports OAuth 2.0 as a resource owner/server. Test setup and configuration The DUT is acting as a Resource Owner and has OAuth 2.0 support enabled. ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 172 The rest of the elements of the setup may be real or simulated. Test procedure This test case follows the test procedure for OAuth2.0 specified in OAuth Test Procedure, clause 6.6.3. Expected results The Non-RT RIC Framework is able to authorize access to resources using OAuth 2.0. Expected format of evidence: Log files, traffic captures and/or report files.
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15.3 R1 interface
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Void.
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15.4 A1 interface
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Void.
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16 Security test of rApps
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104 105
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16.1 Overview
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This clause contains security tests to validate the security protection mechanism specific to rApps deployed on Non-RT RIC.
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104 105
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16.2 rApp Signing and Verification
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Security test cases "TC_SW_Img_Pkg_Signing" and "TC_SW_Img_Pkg_Verification" shall be performed.
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104 105
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16.3 rApp Authorization
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104 105
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16.3.1 rApp OAuth 2.0 Client
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Requirement Name: rApp OAuth2.0 Client support Requirement Reference: REQ-SEC-NonRTRIC-3, clause 5.1.2.1, O-RAN Security Requirements and Controls Specifications [5] Requirement Description: "rApps shall provide client authorization requests to the Non-RT RIC Framework." Threat References: T-rAPP-04 DUT/s: rApps Test Name: TC_OAuth2.0_rApp Test description and applicability Purpose: To verify the rApp supports OAuth 2.0 client. Test setup and configuration The DUT is acting as an OAuth2.0 Client with OAuth 2.0 support enabled. The rest of the elements of the setup may be real or simulated. ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 173 Test procedure This test case follows the test procedure for OAuth2.0 specified in OAuth Test Procedure, clause 6.6.3. Expected results The rApp is able to request access and be permitted access to resources using OAuth 2.0. Expected format of evidence: Log files, traffic captures and/or report files.
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104 105
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17 Security test of SMO
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104 105
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17.1 Overview
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This clause contains security tests to validate security protection mechanisms related to the SMO. The test cases validate the security of SMO termination of O1 interfaces, SMO, SMO Services (SMOS) Communications, SMO External Interfaces, and SMO Logging are secured to zero trust principles for confidentiality, integrity, authentication, and authorization. Definitions for the O-RAN terms SMO Service (SMOS), SMO Function (SMOF), SMO External Interfaces, and SMO External System are provided in [1]. The test cases apply to the normative security requirements specified in [5] based upon the following approved security architecture: The SMO enforces confidentiality, integrity and authenticity through an encrypted transport for the O1 interface and supports least privilege access control using the network configuration access control model (NACM) for authorization. The SMO supports mutual authentication and authorization of SMO Functions (SMOF) and External Interfaces. SMO Internal Communications provide communication and services between the SMO, SMOFs, Non-RT RIC Functions, and rApps. SMO Internal Communications shall provide confidentiality and integrity protection of data in transit and shall support mutual authentication and authorization for access to services and resources. SMO External Interfaces provide import of AI enrichment data from external data sources to the SMO. SMO External Interfaces shall provide confidentiality and integrity protection of data in transit and shall support mutual authentication and authorization for access to services and resources.
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104 105
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17.2 Void
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17.3 SMO
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17.3.1 SMO OAuth 2.0 Resource Owner/Server
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Requirement Name: SEC-CTL-SMO-3 Requirement Reference: Clause 5.2.1.2.1, Security Controls, SMO, O-RAN Security Requirements and Controls Specifications [5] Requirement Description: OAuth 2.0 security controls for SMO to authorize service requests from SMO Functions. Threat References: T-SMO-02, T-SMO-05 DUT/s: SMO, SMO Functions Test Name: TC_SMO_OAuth2.0_Resource_Owner_Server Test description and applicability Purpose: To verify the SMO shall support OAuth 2.0 resource owner/server. ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 174 Test setup and configuration DUT shall be the SMO with OAuth 2.0 support enabled. Test procedure This test case shall follow the test procedure for OAuth2.0 specified in OAuth Test Procedure, clause 6.6.3. Expected results The SMO shall be able to authorize/deny access requests received from SMO Functions using OAuth 2.0. Expected format of evidence: Log entries, packet captures, and screenshots.
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104 105
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17.3.2 SMO OAuth 2.0 Client
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Requirement Name: SEC-CTL-SMO-4 Requirement Reference: Clause 5.2.1.2.1, Security Controls, SMO, O-RAN Security Requirements and Controls Specifications [5] Requirement Description: OAuth 2.0 security controls for SMO to support client functionality for service requests to other SMO Functions Threat References: T-SMO-02, T-SMO-05 DUT/s: SMO Test Name: TC_SMO_OAuth2.0_Client Test description and applicability Purpose: To verify the SMO supports OAuth 2.0 client. Test setup and configuration DUT shall be the SMO with OAuth 2.0 support enabled. Test procedure This test case follows the test procedure for OAuth2.0 specified in OAuth Test Procedure, clause 6.6.3. Expected results The SMO shall be able to request and be permitted/denied access to resources using OAuth 2.0. Expected format of evidence: Log entries, packet captures, and screenshots.
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104 105
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17.3.3 SMO mTLS for mutual authentication
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Requirement Name: SEC-CTL-SMO-5 Requirement Reference: Clause 5.2.1.2.1, Security Controls, SMO, O-RAN Security Requirements and Controls Specifications [5] Requirement Description: SMO support mTLS for mutual authentication with SMO Functions. Threat References: T-SMO-01, T-SMO-04 DUT/s: SMO Test Name: TC_SMO_mTLS Test description and applicability Purpose: To verify the SMO supports mutual authentication with SMO Functions using mTLS, with PKI and X.509 certificates. ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 175 Test setup and configuration DUT shall be the SMO with mTLS support enabled. An external OAuth 2.0 Authorization Server is available and configured. Test procedure This test case follows the test procedure for mTLS specified in mTLS Test Procedure, clause 6.3.3. Expected results The SMO shall support mutual authentication of SMO Functions using mTLS. Expected format of evidence: Log entries, packet captures, and screenshots.
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104 105
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17.4 SMO Internal Communications
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104 105
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17.4.1 TLS for SMO Internal Communications
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Requirement Name: SEC-CTL-SMO-Internal-1 Requirement Reference: Clause 5.2.1.2.2, Security Controls, SMO Internal Communications, O-RAN Security Requirements and Controls Specifications [5] Requirement Description: Data in transit protection with TLS for SMO Internal Communications Threat References: T-SMO-09 DUT/s: SMO, Non-RT RIC Test Name: TC_SMO_TLS_Internal_Communications Test description and applicability Purpose: To verify the SMO supports TLS on SMO Internal Communications. Test setup and configuration DUT shall be the SMO with TLS support enabled. Test procedure This test case shall follow the test procedure for TLS specified in TLS Test Procedure, clause 6.3.3. Expected results SMO Internal Communications shall provide confidentiality and integrity protection using TLS for data in transit. Expected format of evidence: Log entries, packet captures, and screenshots. 17.4.2 mTLS for SMO Internal Communications – SMO Functions Requirement Name: SEC-CTL-SMO-Internal-2 Requirement Reference: Clause 5.2.1.2.2, Security Controls, SMO Internal Communications, O-RAN Security Requirements and Controls Specifications [5] Requirement Description: Mutual authentication with mTLS for SMO Internal Communications Threat References: T-SMO-01, T-SMO-04 DUT/s: SMO Functions Test Name: TC_SMO_mTLS_Internal_Communications ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 176 Test description and applicability Purpose: To verify SMO Functions support mutual authentication using mTLS, with PKI and X.509 certificates, for SMO Internal Communications. Test setup and configuration DUT shall be the SMO Function with mTLS support enabled. Test procedure This test case follows the test procedure for mTLS specified in mTLS Test Procedure, clause 6.3.3. Expected results The SMO Function shall support mutual authentication using mTLS. Expected format of evidence: Log entries, packet captures, and screenshots.
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104 105
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17.5 SMO External Interfaces
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104 105
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17.5.1 TLS for SMO External Interfaces
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Requirement Name: SEC-CTL-SMO-External-1 Requirement Reference: Clause 5.2.1.2.3, Security Controls, SMO External Interfaces, O-RAN Security Requirements and Controls Specifications [5] Requirement Description: Data in transit protection with TLS on SMO External Interfaces Threat References: T-SMO-09 DUT/s: SMO Test Name: TC_SMO_TLS_External_Interfaces Test description and applicability Purpose: To verify the SMO supports TLS on SMO External Interface. Test setup and configuration DUT shall be the SMO with TLS support enabled. Test procedure This test case shall follow the test procedure for TLS specified in TLS Test Procedure, clause 6.3.3. Expected results SMO External Interface shall provide confidentiality and integrity protection using TLS for data in transit. Expected format of evidence: Log entries, packet captures, and screenshots.
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0ce77be9f03a15fedfc038153382bd6a
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104 105
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17.5.2 mTLS for SMO External Interfaces
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Requirement Name: SEC-CTL-SMO-External-2 Requirement Reference: Clause 5.2.1.2.3, Security Controls, SMO External Interfaces, O-RAN Security Requirements and Controls Specifications [5] Requirement Description: Mutual authentication with mTLS on SMO External Interfaces Threat References: T-SMO-01, T-SMO-04 ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 177 DUT/s: SMO Test Name: TC_SMO_mTLS_External_Interfaces Test description and applicability Purpose: To verify the SMO supports mutual authentication using mTLS, with PKI and X.509 certificates for SMO External Interfaces. Test setup and configuration DUT shall be the SMO with mTLS support enabled. Test procedure This test case follows the test procedure for mTLS specified in mTLS Test Procedure, clause 6.3.3. Expected results The SMO shall support mutual authentication of SMO Functions using mTLS for SMO External Interfaces. Expected format of evidence: Log entries, packet captures, and screenshots. 17.5.3 SMO Framework OAuth 2.0 Resource Owner/Server for External Interface Requirement Name: SEC-CTL-SMO-External-3 Requirement Reference: Clause 5.2.1.2.3, Security Controls, SMO External Interfaces, O-RAN Security Requirements and Controls Specifications [5] Requirement Description: OAuth 2.0 security controls for SMO to authorize service requests from external systems Threat References: T-SMO-02, T-SMO-05 DUT/s: SMO Test Name: TC_SMO_OAuth2.0_Resource_Owner_Server_External_Interface Test description and applicability Purpose: To verify the SMO supports OAuth 2.0 resource owner/server for SMO External Interfaces. Test setup and configuration DUT shall be the SMO with OAuth 2.0 support enabled. An external OAuth 2.0 Authorization Server is available and configured. Test procedure This test case shall follow the test procedure for OAuth2.0 specified in OAuth Test Procedure, clause 6.6.3. Expected results The SMO shall be able to authorize/deny access requests received from an external system using OAuth 2.0. Expected format of evidence: Log entries, packet captures, and screenshots.
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104 105
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17.5.4 SMO Functions OAuth 2.0 Client
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Requirement Name: SEC-CTL-SMO-External-4 Requirement Reference: Clause 5.2.1.2.3, Security Controls, SMO External Interfaces, O-RAN Security Requirements and Controls Specifications [5] ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 178 Requirement Description: OAuth 2.0 security controls for SMO support client functionality for service requests to external systems Threat References: T-SMO-02, T-SMO-05 DUT/S: SMO Test Name: TC_SMO_OAuth2.0_Client_External_Interface Test description and applicability Purpose: To verify the SMO shall supports OAuth 2.0 client for External Interfaces. Test setup and configuration DUT shall be the SMO with OAuth 2.0 support enabled. An external OAuth 2.0 Authorization Server is available and configured. Test procedure This test case follows the test procedure for OAuth2.0 specified in OAuth Test Procedure, clause 6.6.3. Expected results The SMO shall be able to request and be permitted/denied access to external resources using OAuth 2.0. Expected format of evidence: Log entries, packet captures, and screenshots.
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104 105
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17.6 SMO Logging
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104 105
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17.6.1 TLS for SMO Logging Export
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Requirement Name: SEC-CTL-SMO-Log-1 Requirement Reference: Clause 5.2.1.2.4, Security Controls, SMO Logging, O-RAN Security Requirements and Controls Specifications [5] Requirement Description: TLS for SMO Logging Export Threat References: T-SMO-16 DUT/s: SMO Test Name: TC_SMO_TLS_Logging_Export Test description and applicability Purpose: To verify the SMO supports TLS for SMO logging export. Test setup and configuration DUT shall be the SMO with TLS support enabled. Test procedure This test case shall follow the test procedure for TLS specified in TLS Test Procedure, clause 6.3.3. Expected results SMO shall provide confidentiality and integrity protection for logging export. Expected format of evidence: Log entries, packet captures, and screenshots. ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 179
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104 105
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17.6.2 mTLS for SMO Logging Export
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Requirement Name: SEC-CTL-SMO-Log-3 Requirement Reference: Clause 5.1.1.2.4, Security Controls, SMO Logging, O-RAN Security Requirements and Controls Specifications [5] Requirement Description: mTLS on SMO Logging Export Threat References: T-SMO-01 DUT/s: SMO Test Name: TC_SMO_mTLS_Logging_Export Test description and applicability Purpose: To verify the SMO supports mutual authentication using mTLS, with PKI and X.509 certificates, for SMO logging export. Test setup and configuration DUT shall be the SMO with mTLS support enabled. Test procedure This test case follows the test procedure for mTLS specified in mTLS Test Procedure, clause 6.3.3. Expected results The SMO shall support mutual authentication using mTLS for SMO logging export. Expected format of evidence: Log entries, packet captures, and screenshots.
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104 105
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18 Security test of O-Cloud
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104 105
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18.1 Overview
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This clause contains security tests to validate the security protection mechanism specific to O-Cloud hosting the O-RAN components/system.
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104 105
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18.2 Void
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104 105
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18.3 O-Cloud virtualization layer
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104 105
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18.3.1 Secure authentication (positive case)
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Requirement Name: Secure authentication to O-Cloud APIs Requirement Reference: Clause 5.1.8.4.2 'REQ-SEC-O-CLOUD-ISO-1 to REQ-SEC-O-CLOUD-ISO-6' in O-RAN Security Requirements Specifications [5] Threat References: Clause 5.4.2.2 'T-VM-C-01 to T-VM-C-06' in O-RAN Security Threat Modeling and Remediation Analysis [3] DUT/s: O-Cloud Test Name: TC_OCloud_Secure_Authentication_Positive ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 180 Test description and applicability The purpose of this test is to ensure secure authentication to O-Cloud APIs. Test setup and configuration • O-Cloud authentication mechanism are enabled. • Valid credentials are available for authentication. Test procedure 1) Attempt to access O-Cloud APIs with valid authentication credentials: a) Send an API request with providing valid authentication credentials. EXAMPLE: Send an API request by executing a Kubernetes® curl command or using a Kubernetes® client using the valid API key or access token for authentication (e.g. valid kubeconfig file or service account token). b) Capture the response received, including the status code and response body. c) Verify that the API response returns a success status code. Expected results The API response returns a success status code.
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104 105
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18.3.2 Secure authentication (negative case)
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Requirement Name: Secure authentication to O-Cloud APIs Requirement Reference: Clause 5.1.8.4.2 'REQ-SEC-O-CLOUD-ISO-1 to REQ-SEC-O-CLOUD-ISO-6' in O-RAN Security Requirements Specifications [5] Threat References: Clause 5.4.2.2 'T-VM-C-01 to T-VM-C-06' in O-RAN Security Threat Modeling and Remediation Analysis [3] DUT/s: O-Cloud Test Name: TC_OCloud_Secure_Authentication_Negative Test description and applicability The purpose of this test is to intentionally validate the behavior of the authentication mechanism when encountering invalid or unauthorized authentication credentials. Test setup and configuration O-Cloud authentication mechanism is enabled. Test procedure 1) Attempt to access O-Cloud APIs with invalid or expired authentication credentials: a) Send an API request with providing invalid or expired authentication credentials. EXAMPLE: Send an API request by executing a Kubernetes® curl command or using a Kubernetes® client using the invalid or expired API key or access token for authentication (e.g. invalid kubeconfig file, expired service account token). b) Capture the response received, including the status code and response body. c) Verify that the API response returns an authentication failure status code. ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 181 Expected results The API response returns an authentication failure status code.
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104 105
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18.3.3 Secure authorization (positive case)
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Requirement Name: Secure authorization for accessing O-Cloud APIs Requirement Reference: Clause 5.1.8.4.2 'REQ-SEC-O-CLOUD-ISO-1 to REQ-SEC-O-CLOUD-ISO-6' in O-RAN Security Requirements Specifications [5] Threat References: Clause 5.4.2.2 'T-VM-C-01 to T-VM-C-06' in O-RAN Security Threat Modeling and Remediation Analysis [3] DUT/s: O-Cloud Test Name: TC_OCloud_Secure_Authorization_Positive Test description and applicability The purpose of this test is to verify that the authorization mechanism for accessing O-Cloud APIs is functioning correctly, ensuring that entities have appropriate permissions to perform specific actions on O-Cloud resources. NOTE: Entities include Applications, SMO and O-Cloud software components. Test setup and configuration • Valid authentication credentials. • O-Cloud access control system is enabled containing different levels of permissions assigned to entities. EXAMPLE 1: Access control system such as Role-Based Access Control (RBAC), Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC). Test procedure 1) Authenticate with valid credentials: a) Use valid authentication credentials to establish a connection with the O-Cloud API. 2) Send an API request with authorized permissions: a) Construct a valid API request to perform a specific action, EXAMPLE 2: Specific action includes creating a pod, updating a deployment, or deleting a service. b) Ensure that the requested action aligns with the entity's assigned permissions. c) Send the request to the O-Cloud API endpoint. 3) Validate the response: a) Verify that the API response returns a success status code indicating the action was successfully executed. Expected results The API response returns a success status code, confirming that the requested action was authorized and executed successfully.
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104 105
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18.3.4 Secure authorization (negative case)
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Requirement Name: Secure authorization for accessing O-Cloud APIs Requirement Reference: Clause 5.1.8.4.2 'REQ-SEC-O-CLOUD-ISO-1 to REQ-SEC-O-CLOUD-ISO-6' in O-RAN Security Requirements Specifications [5] ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 182 Threat References: Clause 5.4.2.2 'T-VM-C-01 to T-VM-C-06' in O-RAN Security Threat Modeling and Remediation Analysis [3] DUT/s: O-Cloud Test Name: TC_OCloud_Secure_Authorization_Negative Test description and applicability The purpose of this test is to intentionally validate the behavior of the authorization mechanism when encountering unauthorized or invalid access attempts. Test setup and configuration • Valid authentication credentials. • O-Cloud access control system is enabled containing different levels of permissions assigned to entities. EXAMPLE 1: Access control system such as Role-Based Access Control (RBAC), Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC). Test procedure 1) Authenticate with valid credentials: a) Use valid authentication credentials to establish a connection with the O-Cloud API. 2) Send an API request with unauthorized permissions: a) Construct a valid API request to perform a specific action that exceeds the entity's assigned permissions, EXAMPLE 2: Specific action includes creating a pod, updating a deployment, or deleting a service. b) Send the request to the O-Cloud API endpoint. 3) Validate the response: a) Verify that the API response returns a failure status code indicating the action was unauthorized. Expected results The API response returns a failure status code, indicating that the requested action was unauthorized.
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0ce77be9f03a15fedfc038153382bd6a
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104 105
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18.3.5 Validate network connections allowed by network policies
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Requirement Name: Isolation & secure communication between Applications Requirement Reference: Clause 5.1.8.4.2 'REQ-SEC-O-CLOUD-ISO-1 to REQ-SEC-O-CLOUD-ISO-6' in O-RAN Security Requirements Specifications [5] Threat References: Clause 5.4.2.2 'T-VM-C-01 to T-VM-C-06' in O-RAN Security Threat Modeling and Remediation Analysis [3] DUT/s: O-Cloud Test Name: TC_OCloud_Connection_Allowed_Policies Test description and applicability The purpose of this test is to ensure that network connections between VMs/Containers allowed by network policies are successfully established. Test setup and configuration O-Cloud with network policies is configured to allow specific VMs/Containers to VMs/Containers communication. ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 183 Test procedure 1) Deploy two VMs/Containers A and B, in different zones or with different environment. EXAMPLE 1: Zones such as namespaces in Kubernetes®, environment such as labels in Kubernetes® 2) Define network policies that explicitly allow communication between the two VMs/Containers. 3) Attempt to establish a network connection from VM/Container A to VM/Container B using tools. EXAMPLE 2: Tools such as curl or ping in Kubernetes® 4) Capture the response or output received. Expected results The network connection from VM/Container A to VM/Container B is successfully established, indicating that the network policies allow the communication between the VMs/Containers.
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104 105
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18.3.6 Validate network connections not allowed by network policies
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Requirement Name: Isolation & secure communication between Applications Requirement Reference: Clause 5.1.8.4.2 'REQ-SEC-O-CLOUD-ISO-1 to REQ-SEC-O-CLOUD-ISO-6' in O-RAN Security Requirements Specifications [5] Threat References: Clause 5.4.2.2 'T-VM-C-01 to T-VM-C-06' in O-RAN Security Threat Modeling and Remediation Analysis [3] DUT/s: O-Cloud Test Name: TC_OCloud_Connection_Not_Allowed_Policies Test description and applicability The purpose of this test is to ensure that network connections between VMs/Containers not allowed by network policies are blocked. Test setup and configuration O-Cloud with network policies is configured to deny specific VM/Container to VM/Container communication. Test procedure 1) Deploy two VMs/Containers A and B, in different zones or with different environment. EXAMPLE 1: Zones such as namespaces in Kubernetes®, environment such as labels in Kubernetes® 2) Define network policies that explicitly deny communication between the two VMs/Containers. 3) Attempt to establish a network connection from VM/Container A to VM/Container B using tools. EXAMPLE 2: Tools such as curl or ping in Kubernetes® 4) Capture the response or output received. Expected results The network connection from VM/Container A to VM/Container B is blocked, indicating that the network policies correctly deny the communication between the VMs/Containers. 18.3.7 Validate network connections from outside the allowed network ranges Requirement Name: Isolation & secure communication between Applications ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 184 Requirement Reference: Clause 5.1.8.4.2 'REQ-SEC-O-CLOUD-ISO-1 to REQ-SEC-O-CLOUD-ISO-6' in O-RAN Security Requirements Specifications [5] Threat References: Clause 5.4.2.2 'T-VM-C-01 to T-VM-C-06' in O-RAN Security Threat Modeling and Remediation Analysis [3] DUT/s: O-Cloud Test Name: TC_OCloud_Connection_Allowed_Outside Test description and applicability The purpose of this test is to ensure that network connections from IP addresses outside the allowed network ranges are denied. Test setup and configuration O-Cloud with network policies is configured to restrict access based on IP ranges. Test procedure 1) Define network policies that restrict access to certain IP ranges. 2) Attempt to access services or VMs/Containers from IP addresses outside the allowed ranges, either through direct IP access or using service names. 3) Capture the response or output received. EXAMPLE: In this test case, the service name refers to the Kubernetes® service object's name. The service acts as a load balancer and provides a stable DNS name that can be used to access the pods associated with it. For example, consider a service named my-service that is linked with a set of pods. The test case involves attempting to access my-service from IP addresses outside the allowed ranges. This can be done using tools like curl or by making HTTP requests to http://my-service. Expected results Access attempts from outside the allowed IP ranges is denied, and the response or output indicates a connection failure.
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0ce77be9f03a15fedfc038153382bd6a
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104 105
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18.3.8 Exploitation of O-Cloud component vulnerabilities
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Requirement Name: O-Cloud hardening and secure configuration. Requirement Reference: Clause 5.1.8.5.1 'REQ-SEC-OCLOUD-SU-1', clause 5.3.6.1 'REQ-SEC-SYS-1' clause 5.1.8.4.2 'REQ-SEC-O-CLOUD-ISO-7' in O-RAN Security Requirements Specifications [5] Threat References: Clause 5.4.1.1 'T-O-RAN-02', clause 5.4.2.2 'T-VM-C-01, T-VM-C-05' in O-RAN Security Threat Modeling and Remediation Analysis [3] DUT/s: O-Cloud Test Name: TC_OCloud_Vulnerability_Scanning Test description and applicability The purpose of this test is to identify and assess the presence of vulnerabilities in O-Cloud components and evaluate the effectiveness of their mitigation measures. Test setup and configuration • O-Cloud with various O-Cloud components deployed. EXAMPLE: In the context of Kubernetes®, components include etcd, kubelet. • O-Cloud with security best practices is implemented. ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 185 Test procedure 1) Identify known vulnerabilities specific to the versions of used O-Cloud components using vulnerability scanning tools. 2) If known vulnerabilities exist, follow publicly available exploit scenarios or utilize penetration testing tools to attempt exploitation. 3) Monitor the O-Cloud and capture any signs of successful exploitation or vulnerabilities being triggered. Expected results • For step 1), no known vulnerabilities exist in the O-Cloud. • For step 2), mitigation measures, such as applying security patches or configuration changes are implemented to address known vulnerabilities. • For step 3), Exploit attempts fails to compromise the O-Cloud.
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0ce77be9f03a15fedfc038153382bd6a
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104 105
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18.3.9 Identification and remediation of insecure configuration settings
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Requirement Name: O-Cloud hardening and secure configuration Requirement Reference: Clause 5.1.8.5.1 'REQ-SEC-OCLOUD-SU-1', clause 5.3.6.1 REQ-SEC-SYS-1' clause 5.1.8.4.2 'REQ-SEC-O-CLOUD-ISO-7' in O-RAN Security Requirements Specifications [5] Threat References: Clause 5.4.1.1 'T-O-RAN-02', clause 5.4.2.2 'T-VM-C-01, T-VM-C-05' in O-RAN Security Threat Modeling and Remediation Analysis [3] DUT/s: O-Cloud Test Name: TC_OCloud_Insecure_Configuration Test description and applicability The purpose of this test is to identify insecure configuration settings in the O-Cloud and verify the effectiveness of remediation measures. Test setup and configuration O-Cloud with a configuration review and hardening process in place. Test procedure 1) Review the O-Cloud configuration for common security misconfigurations, such as weak authentication settings, insecure defaults, or unencrypted communication. 2) Identify and simulate scenarios where insecure configurations can be exploited. 3) Monitor the O-Cloud and capture any signs of insecure configurations being successfully exploited. Expected results • The O-Cloud configuration is hardened and securely configured to mitigate common security misconfigurations. • Insecure scenarios are identified and remediated, ensuring a hardened O-Cloud. If insecure scenarios are rectified, testing has to be repeated. 18.3.10 Validation of logging and monitoring for security incidents Requirement Name: logging and monitoring for security incidents Requirement Reference: Clause 5.1.8.9.1.1 'REQ-SEC-OCLOUD-O2dms-4', clause 5.1.8.9.1.2 'REQ-SEC-OCLOUD- O2ims-4' in O-RAN Security Requirements Specifications [5] ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 186 Threat References: Clause 5.4.2 in O-RAN Security Threat Modeling and Remediation Analysis [3] DUT/s: O-Cloud Test Name: TC_OCloud_Security_Logs Test description and applicability The purpose of this test is to validate logging and monitoring for security incidents. Test setup and configuration O-Cloud with centralized logging and monitoring systems is implemented. Test procedure 1) Simulate security incidents such as unauthorized access attempts or Application compromise: - Attempt to perform unauthorized API requests or access o-Cloud resources without appropriate permissions. - Mimic a compromised Application by running malicious code or attempting privilege escalation. - Monitor the O-Cloud and capture any signs of security incidents being logged or detected. 2) Monitor the O-Cloud for detection and alerting of security events: - Configure the logging and monitoring systems to capture relevant security events, such as failed authentication attempts, privilege escalation, or anomalous Application behavior. - Monitor the O-Cloud in real-time or periodically to detect the simulated security incidents. - Verify that the monitoring system generates alerts or notifications for detected security events. Expected results • For the first step, unauthorized access attempts and Application compromise attempts are captured as security events in the logs. • For the second step, the monitoring system detects and generates alerts for the simulated security incidents. 18.3.11 O-Cloud Privilege Escalation Prevention Requirement Name: O-Cloud privilege escalation prevention Requirement Reference & Description: Clause 5.1.8.4.2 'REQ-SEC-OCLOUD-ISO-1, REQ-SEC-OCLOUD-ISO-3' [5] Threat References: Clause 7.4.2.2 'T-VM-C-01' [3] DUT/s: O-Cloud Test Name: TC_OCloud_Privilege_Escalation_Prevention Test description and applicability Purpose: To verify that privilege escalation is effectively prevented in O-Cloud by enforcing security policies (EXAMPE: PodSecurity admission (PSA). Test setup and configuration: • O-Cloud with security policies (example: Kubernetes® cluster with PodSecurity admission (PSA)) configured and enforced. Test procedure: 1) Attempt to create a VM or Container that attempts to escalate privileges ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 187 EXAMPLE: In Kubernetes® by specifying the hostPID: true or hostNetwork: true field in the pod's security context. 2) Monitor the API server response and logs Expected results: • For step 1: The VM or Container creation request is denied by the O-Cloud API server. • For step 2: The O-Cloud API server logs should show a message indicating a violation of the security policies. Expected format of evidence: • Screenshot: Displaying the API server's response to the VM or Container creation attempt. • Executed Commands: Details of the VM or Container creation parameters and security context used. • API Server Logs: Messages indicating a violation of security policies. • Conclusion Logs: Indicating whether the test passed or failed based on expected results. 18.3.12 O-Cloud mutual authentication Requirement Name: O-Cloud mutual authentication between applications Requirement Reference & Description: 'REQ-SEC-OCLOUD-ISO-2' clause 5.1.8.4.2, 'SEC-CTL-O-CLOUD-ISO-2' clause 5.1.8.4.3 in O-RAN Security Requirements and Controls Specifications [5] Threat References: 'T-GEN-04' clause 7.4.2.1 in O-RAN Security Threat Modeling and Risk Assessment [3] DUT/s: O-Cloud Test Name: TC_O-CLOUD_MUTUAL_AUTHENTICATION Test description and applicability Purpose: To verify that communication between different applications running on the O-Cloud is secured through mutual TLS (mTLS) authentication. Test setup and configuration: • Environment: An O-Cloud is set up with two or more deployed applications EXAMPLE: A cluster with two applications, each running in separate pods. • mTLS configuration: Deployed applications in the O-Cloud are configured with mTLS as defined in [2] clause 4.2. • Tools setup: Network sniffers, packet capture and TLS inspection tools are deployed to monitor and verify TLS handshake process. • Valid, expired, and revoked certificates are prepared for testing. Ensure that the infrastructure for checking revoked certificates (CRL/OCSP server) is operational and accessible to the applications. Test procedure: • Initiate mTLS-secured sessions between applications and capture the TLS handshake process. • Validate the exchange and authentication of certificates using TLS inspection tools. 1) Attempt connections using valid certificates and record the outcomes. 2) Attempt connections using expired certificates and record the outcomes. 3) Attempt connections, confirm that applications recognize the certificates as revoked (evidenced by querying the CRL or OCSP server), and record outcomes. ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 188 4) Attempt to establish an unauthenticated session (no certificate presented) and record the outcome. Expected results: 1) mTLS sessions are successfully established only with valid certificates. 2) mTLS session establishment with expired certificates fails. 3) mTLS session establishment with revoked certificates fails. 4) Any attempt to initiate an unauthenticated session (without presenting a certificate) is rejected. Expected format of evidence: Logs from network sniffers, packet captures and TLS inspection tools showing: 1) Successful mTLS handshakes with valid certificates. 2) Rejections due to expired certificates, ensuring the application appropriately identifies and handles certificates beyond their validity period. 3) Rejections due to revoked certificates, with specific emphasis on the application's process for recognizing revoked certificates through mechanisms such as CRL (Certificate Revocation List) and OCSP (Online Certificate Status Protocol) queries. 4) Rejection of unauthenticated sessions, demonstrating the system's enforcement of mTLS authentication by not allowing sessions without certificate authentication. 18.3.13 O-Cloud authorization Requirement Name: O-Cloud authorization Requirement Reference & Description: 'REQ-SEC-OCLOUD-ISO-2' clause 5.1.8.4.2, 'SEC-CTL-O-CLOUD-ISO-3' clause 5.1.8.4.3 in O-RAN Security Requirements and Controls Specifications [5] Threat References: 'T-GEN-04' clause 7.4.2.1 in O-RAN Security Threat Modeling and Risk Assessment [3] DUT/s: O-Cloud Test Name: TC_O-CLOUD_AUTHORIZATION Test description and applicability Purpose: To verify that that authorization policies are correctly enforced according to the least privilege principle. Test setup and configuration: • Environment: An O-Cloud is set up with two or more applications EXAMPLE 1: A cluster with two applications, each running in separate pods. • Access control configuration: Access control policies are defined and applied to applications, ensuring permissions are scoped to the minimum necessary privileges. • Tools setup: auditing tools are deployed to monitor and verify access control policies. EXAMPLE 2: Kubernetes® audit logs for access control verification. Test procedure: • Map out the actions each application can perform on another according to the access control policies. EXAMPLE 3: Using 'kubectl describe role' and 'kubectl describe rolebinding' to detail the actions each application is permitted to perform on another under the access control policies. 1) Perform an action that is allowed by the access control policy and record the outcomes. Validate that permitted actions align with the mapped policies. ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 189 EXAMPLE 4: Using 'kubectl auth can-i' to validate that the action is permitted. 2) Attempt actions that are not permitted by the access control policies and record the outcomes. EXAMPLE 5: Using 'kubectl auth can-i' to confirm that actions beyond the scope of granted permissions are denied. Expected results: 1) All actions that are explicitly granted by the access control policies are successfully performed without errors. Audit logs reflect the correct enforcement of these policies. 2) Any attempts to perform actions outside the scope of granted permissions are denied, with audit logs accurately recording these access denials in accordance with the access control policies. EXAMPLE 6: Monitor Kubernetes® audit logs to capture policy decisions, noting both allowed and denied actions. Expected format of evidence: Detailed logs capturing: 1) Allowed actions, correlating with the defined access control policies. 2) Denied actions, specifically those attempted outside the granted permissions, highlighting the effective enforcement of access control policies.
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0ce77be9f03a15fedfc038153382bd6a
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104 105
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18.4 Application instantiation by O-Cloud
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18.4.1 Verification of Application with valid signature by O-Cloud during Instantiation Requirement Name: Verification of Application by O-Cloud during Instantiation Requirement Reference & Description: Clause 5.1.8.2.1 'REQ-SEC-OCLOUD-PKG-1, REQ-SEC-OCLOUD-PKG- 2' [5] Threat References: Clause 7.4.2.3 'T-IMG-01, T-IMG-04', Clause 7.4.1.11 'T-AppLCM-02' [3] DUT/s: O-Cloud Test Name: TC_OCloud_Valid_Signature_Verification_During_Instantiation Test description and applicability Purpose: To verify the O-Cloud ability to check the cryptographic signature of an Application image during the process of instantiation, ensuring the integrity of Applications deployed in the O-Cloud when the signature is valid. Test setup and configuration: • O-Cloud configured to enforce image verification (EXAMPLE: Kubernetes® cluster with Kubelet using an appropriate mechanism such as the ImagePolicyWebhook admission controller). • Valid Application images with associated signatures. Test procedure: 1) Valid Signature: a) Prepare a valid Application image and its valid cryptographic signature. b) Create a VM or Container (EXAMPLE: Kubernetes® Pod) specification using the valid Application image and deploy the VM or Container. ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 190 c) Monitor the O-Cloud logs (EXAMPLE: Kubelet logs) for any signature verification events related to the deployment. d) Verify that the O-Cloud (EXAMPLE: Kubelet) successfully verifies the cryptographic signature of the Application image. Expected results: 1) Valid Signature: a) Logs show successful signature verification events for the deployment. b) The O-Cloud verifies the cryptographic signature of the application image, and the VM or Container is instantiated without issues. Expected format of evidence: • Screenshot: Displaying the O-Cloud's response to the VM or Container instantiation attempt. • Executed Commands: Details of the VM or Container creation parameters, including the Application image and its cryptographic signature. • O-Cloud Logs: Messages indicating signature verification events related to the deployment. • Verification Status: Logs or screenshots indicating the O-Cloud's successful verification during the instantiation process. 18.4.2 Verification of Application with incorrect signature by O-Cloud during Instantiation Requirement Name: Verification of Application by O-Cloud during Instantiation Requirement Reference & Description: Clause 5.1.8.2.1 'REQ-SEC-OCLOUD-PKG-1, REQ-SEC-OCLOUD-PKG- 2' [5] Threat References: Clause 7.4.2.3 'T-IMG-01, T-IMG-04', clause 7.4.1.11 'T-AppLCM-02' [3] DUT/s: O-Cloud Test Name: TC_OCloud_Incorrect_Signature_Verification_During_Instantiation Test description and applicability Purpose: To verify the O-Cloud ability to detect and reject an incorrect cryptographic signature of an Application image during instantiation, ensuring the integrity of Applications deployed in the O-Cloud when the signature is invalid. Test setup and configuration: • O-Cloud configured to enforce image verification (example: Kubernetes® cluster with Kubelet using an appropriate mechanism such as the ImagePolicyWebhook admission controller). • Application image with an incorrect associated signature. Test procedure: 1) Incorrect Signature: a) Prepare an Application image with an incorrect cryptographic signature. b) Create a VM or Container (example: Kubernetes® Pod) specification using the image with an incorrect signature and deploy the VM or Container. c) Monitor the O-Cloud logs (example: Kubelet logs) for any signature verification events related to the deployment. ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 191 d) Verify that the O-Cloud (example: Kubelet) detects the incorrect cryptographic signature and denies the instantiation of the VM or Container. Expected results: 1) Incorrect Signature: a) Logs show signature verification events indicating a failed verification for the deployment. b) O-Cloud detects the incorrect cryptographic signature, and the VM or Container instantiation is denied. Expected format of evidence: • Screenshot: Displaying the O-Cloud's response to the VM or Container instantiation attempt. • Executed Commands: Details of the VM or Container creation parameters, including the Application image and its cryptographic signature. • O-Cloud Logs: Messages indicating failed signature verification events related to the deployment. • Verification Status: Logs or screenshots indicating the O-Cloud's denial due to incorrect signature during the instantiation process
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0ce77be9f03a15fedfc038153382bd6a
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104 105
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18.5 Resource Management and enforcement in O-Cloud
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0ce77be9f03a15fedfc038153382bd6a
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104 105
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18.5.1 O-Cloud Resource Consumption Limit Enforcement
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Requirement Name: Resource Management and enforcement in O-Cloud Requirement Reference & Description: Clause 5.3.2.3.1 'REQ-SEC-LCM-SD-1 to REQ-SEC-LCM-SD-4' [5] Threat References: Clause 7.4.2.2 'T-VM-C-05', clause 7.4.1.11 'T-AppLCM-04, T-AppLCM-05' [3] DUT/s: O-Cloud Test Name: TC_OCloud_Resource_Consumption_Limit_Enforcement Test description and applicability Purpose: To verify the DUT is able to ensure that resources (CPU, memory, etc.) consumed by VMs or Containers are within the defined limits, preventing any single application from monopolizing the system's resources. Test setup and configuration: • O-Cloud environment with resource quotas and limits enforced. • A configured SMO to set and enforce resource quotas and limits. Test procedure: 1) Set up resource quotas and limit ranges: - Create a dedicated isolated environment for testing. - Define a resource quota for the environment, specifying the maximum allowed CPU and memory. - Define a limit range to set default request and limit values for resources. 2) Attempt to deploy a VM or Container that requests resources beyond the defined limits: - Create a VM or Container configuration that requests resources exceeding the set limits. - Try to deploy the VM or Container in the test environment. ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 192 3) Monitor the deployment status and logs: - Check the deployment status of the VM or Container. Expected results: • For step 1: Confirmation that a dedicated isolated environment for testing has been setup and both resource quota and limit range have been established. • For step 2: The deployment request for the VM or Container is denied or remains in a "Pending" or equivalent state. • For step 3: Logs or descriptions should show a message indicating a violation of the resource quotas or limits. Expected format of evidence: • Configuration Details: Information on the set resource quotas and limit ranges, including the maximum allowed CPU and memory. • Executed Commands: Details of the VM or Container creation parameters, specifically the requested resources. • O-Cloud Logs: Messages indicating any violations of the resource quotas or limits during the deployment attempt. • Deployment Status: Logs or screenshots showing the status of the VM or Container deployment, especially if it is denied or remains in a "Pending" state due to resource constraints. EXAMPLE using Kubernetes®: 1) Set up resource quotas and limit ranges in Kubernetes®: - Create a namespace: kubectl create namespace test-limits - Apply a ResourceQuota and LimitRange as previously detailed. 2) Attempt to deploy a Pod in Kubernetes®: - Create a pod configuration (resource-hog-pod.yaml) that requests excessive resources. - Deploy using: kubectl apply -f resource-hog-pod.yaml 3) Monitor the deployment status and logs in Kubernetes®: - Check pod status: kubectl get pods -n test-limits - Describe the pod for details: kubectl describe pod resource-hog -n test-limits
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0ce77be9f03a15fedfc038153382bd6a
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104 105
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18.5.2 O-Cloud Storage Volume Limit Enforcement
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Requirement Name: Resource Management and enforcement in O-Cloud Requirement Reference & Description: Clause 5.3.2.3.1 'REQ-SEC-LCM-SD-1 to REQ-SEC-LCM-SD-4' [5] Threat References: Clause 7.4.2.2 'T-VM-C-05', clause 7.4.1.11 'T-AppLCM-04, T-AppLCM-05' [3] DUT/s: O-Cloud Test Name: TC_OCloud_Storage_Volume_Limit_Enforcement Test description and applicability: Purpose: To verify the DUT is able to limit the storage volume allocations for applications predefined in a O-Cloud environment. ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 193 Test setup and configuration: • O-Cloud environment with storage volume configurations. • A configured SMO to set and enforce resource quotas for storage. Test procedure: 1) Set up Storage Volume Quotas: - Create a dedicated isolated environment for testing. - Define a storage volume quota for the environment, specifying the maximum allowed storage volume size. 2) Attempt to allocate a storage volume beyond the defined limits: - Create a configuration that requests a storage volume size exceeding the set limits. - Deploy the configuration in the test environment. 3) Monitor the storage allocation status and logs: - Check the status of the storage allocation. Expected results: • For step 1: Confirmation that a dedicated isolated environment for testing has been setup and storage volume quota has been defined. • For step 2: The storage volume allocation request is denied. • For step 3: Logs or descriptions should show a message indicating a violation of the storage quotas. Expected format of evidence: • Configuration Details: Information on the set storage volume quotas, including the maximum allowed storage volume size. • Executed Commands: Details of the storage volume allocation parameters, specifically the requested storage size. • O-Cloud Logs: Messages indicating any violations of the storage volume quotas during the allocation attempt. • Allocation Status: Logs or screenshots showing the status of the storage volume allocation, especially if it is denied due to exceeding the set limits. EXAMPLE using Kubernetes®: • Create a namespace: kubectl create namespace test-storage • Apply a ResourceQuota for storage: apiVersion: v1 kind: ResourceQuota metadata: name: storage-quota namespace: test-storage spec: hard: requests.storage: 10 Gi. ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 194 • Apply the ResourceQuota: kubectl apply -f storage-quota.yaml • Create and deploy a PersistentVolumeClaim (PVC) requesting 15 Gi. • Monitor the PVC status and logs.
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104 105
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18.5.3 O-Cloud CPU Overcommit Prevention
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Requirement Name: Resource Management and enforcement in O-Cloud Requirement Reference & Description: Clause 5.3.2.3.1 'REQ-SEC-LCM-SD-1 to REQ-SEC-LCM-SD-4' [5] Threat References: Clause 7.4.2.2 'T-VM-C-05', clause 7.4.1.11 'T-AppLCM-04, T-AppLCM-05' [3] DUT/s: O-Cloud Test Name: TC_OCloud_CPU_Overcommit_Prevention Test description and applicability Purpose: To verify that the O-Cloud does not overcommit CPU resources, leading to performance degradation or system instability. Test setup and configuration: • O-Cloud with CPU allocation settings. • A configured SMO to manage CPU overcommitment. Test procedure: 1) Set CPU Overcommit Ratios: - Create a dedicated isolated environment for testing. - Define CPU overcommit ratios. 2) Attempt to deploy multiple applications: - Sequentially deploy applications until the CPU limits are reached based on the overcommit ratios. - Monitor the CPU utilization of each deployed application. 3) Monitor the deployment status and CPU utilization metrics: - Check the deployment status of the applications. - Monitor CPU utilization metrics. Expected results: • For step 1: Confirmation that a dedicated isolated environment for testing has been setup and CPU overcommit ratios has been defined. • For step 2: Applications should not be deployed beyond the capacity determined by the CPU overcommit ratios. • For step 3: CPU utilization metrics should remain stable and within acceptable thresholds. Expected format of evidence: • Configuration Details: Information on the set CPU overcommit ratios. • Executed Commands: Details of the application deployments and their respective CPU utilization. • O-Cloud Logs: Messages indicating any violations of the CPU overcommit ratios during application deployments. ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 195 • Deployment Status: Logs or screenshots showing the status of the application deployments, especially if any are denied due to reaching CPU limits. • CPU Utilization Metrics: Graphs or logs showing the CPU utilization of each deployed application, ensuring they remain within acceptable thresholds. Example using Kubernetes®: 1) Set CPU Overcommit Ratios: - Manage CPU overcommitment in Kubernetes® by setting CPU requests and limits on Pods. 2) Attempt to deploy multiple applications: - Deploy a Pod with a CPU request of '500m' (half a CPU core) and a limit of '1' (one full CPU core). 3) Monitor the deployment status and CPU utilization metrics: - Use 'kubectl describe node <NODE_NAME>' to view CPU allocation and utilization. - Monitor CPU metrics using tools like Prometheus.
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0ce77be9f03a15fedfc038153382bd6a
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104 105
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18.5.4 O-Cloud Memory Overcommit Prevention
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Requirement Name: Resource Management and enforcement in O-Cloud Requirement Reference & Description: Clause 5.3.2.3.1 'REQ-SEC-LCM-SD-1 to REQ-SEC-LCM-SD-4' [5] Threat References: Clause 7.4.2.2 'T-VM-C-05', clause 7.4.1.11 'T-AppLCM-04, T-AppLCM-05' [3] DUT/s: O-Cloud Test Name: TC_OCloud_Memory_Overcommit_Prevention Test description and applicability Purpose: To verify that the O-Cloud does not overcommit memory resources. Test setup and configuration: • O-Cloud with memory allocation settings. • A configured SMO to manage memory overcommitment Test procedure: 1) Set Memory Overcommit Ratios: - Create a dedicated isolated environment for testing. - Define memory overcommit ratios. 2) Attempt to deploy applications: - Sequentially deploy applications until memory limits are reached based on the overcommit ratios. - Monitor memory utilization of each deployed application. 3) Monitor deployment status and memory utilization metrics: - Check deployment status of the applications. - Monitor memory utilization metrics. ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 196 Expected results: • For step 1: Confirmation that a dedicated isolated environment for testing has been setup and memory overcommit ratios has been defined. • For step 2: Applications should not be deployed beyond the capacity determined by the memory overcommit ratios. • For step 3: Memory utilization should remain stable and within acceptable thresholds. Expected format of evidence: • Configuration Details: Information on the set memory overcommit ratios. • Executed Commands: Details of the application deployments and their respective memory use. • O-Cloud Logs: Messages indicating any violations of the memory overcommit ratios during application deployments. • Deployment Status: Logs or screenshots showing the status of the application deployments, especially if any are denied due to reaching memory limits. • Memory Use Metrics: Graphs or logs showing the memory utilization of each deployed application, ensuring they remain within acceptable thresholds. Example using Kubernetes®: 1) Set Memory Overcommit Ratios: • Manage memory overcommitment in Kubernetes® by setting memory requests and limits on Pods. 2) Attempt to deploy applications: - Deploy a Pod with a memory request of '256Mi' and a limit of '512Mi'. 3) Monitor deployment status and memory utilization metrics: - Use kubectl describe node <NODE_NAME> to view memory allocation and utilization. - Monitor memory metrics using tools like Prometheus.
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0ce77be9f03a15fedfc038153382bd6a
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104 105
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18.5.5 O-Cloud Network Overcommit Prevention
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Requirement Name: Resource Management and enforcement in O-Cloud Requirement Reference & Description: Clause 5.1.8.4.2 'REQ-SEC-O-CLOUD-ISO-6', clause 5.3.2.3.1 'REQ-SEC- LCM-SD-1 to REQ-SEC-LCM-SD-4' [5] Threat References: Clause 7.4.2.2 'T-VM-C-05', clause 7.4.1.11 'T-AppLCM-04, T-AppLCM-05' [3] DUT/s: O-Cloud Test Name: TC_OCloud_Network_Overcommit_Prevention Test description and applicability Purpose: To verify that the O-Cloud environment does not overcommit network bandwidth. Test setup and configuration: • O-Cloud environment with network configurations. • Tools to manage network overcommitment. ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 197 Test procedure: 1) Set Network Overcommit Ratios: - Define network bandwidth overcommit ratios. 2) Attempt to utilize network bandwidth: - Deploy applications designed to generate high network traffic. - Monitor network traffic. 3) Monitor network traffic metrics: - Check network traffic metrics for the applications. Expected results: • For step 1: Confirmation that network bandwidth overcommit ratios has been defined. • For steps 2 and 3: Applications' network traffic should be throttled or limited once the bandwidth determined by the overcommit ratios is reached. Expected format of evidence: • Configuration Details: Information on the set network bandwidth overcommit ratios. • Executed Commands: Details of the application deployments and their respective network traffic generation. • O-Cloud Logs: Messages indicating any violations of the network overcommit ratios during high network traffic. • Deployment Status: Logs or screenshots showing the status of the application deployments, especially if network traffic is throttled or limited. • Network Traffic Metrics: Graphs or logs showing the network traffic of each deployed application, ensuring they remain within the set bandwidth limits. Example using Kubernetes®: 1) Set Network Overcommit Ratios: - Native Kubernetes® does not offer direct network bandwidth controls. However, third-party plugins like 'Calico' or 'Cilium' can be used to set network policies that limit bandwidth. 2) Attempt to utilize network bandwidth: - Deploy a Pod and apply a network policy that limits its bandwidth. 3) Monitor network traffic metrics: - Use monitoring tools integrated with the network plugin (e.g. 'calicoctl' for Calico) to observe the network traffic metrics.
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104 105
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18.5.6 O-Cloud Storage Overcommit Prevention
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Requirement Name: Resource Management and enforcement in O-Cloud Requirement Reference & Description: Clause 5.3.2.3.1 'REQ-SEC-LCM-SD-1 to REQ-SEC-LCM-SD-4' [5] Threat References: Clause 7.4.2.2 'T-VM-C-05', clause 7.4.1.11 'T-AppLCM-04, T-AppLCM-05' [3] DUT/s: O-Cloud Test Name: TC_OCloud_Storage_Overcommit_Prevention Test description and applicability ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 198 Purpose: To verify that the O-Cloud does not overcommit storage resources. Test setup and configuration: • O-Cloud environment with storage configurations. • A configured SMO to manage Storage overcommitment. Test procedure: 1) Set Storage Overcommit Ratios: - Define storage overcommit ratios. 2) Attempt to allocate storage beyond defined limits: - Deploy applications that request storage space. - Monitor storage allocation and utilization. 3) Monitor storage allocation and utilization metrics: - Check storage metrics for the applications. Expected results: • For step 1: Confirmation that storage overcommit ratios has been defined. • For step 2: Storage allocations should not exceed the capacity determined by the storage overcommit ratios. • For step 3: Storage usage should remain stable and within acceptable thresholds. Expected format of evidence: • Configuration Details: Information on the set storage overcommit ratios. • Executed Commands: Details of the application deployments and their respective storage requests. • O-Cloud Logs: Messages indicating any violations of the storage overcommit ratios during storage allocation. • Deployment Status: Logs or screenshots showing the status of the application deployments, especially if storage allocations are denied or limited. • Storage usage Metrics: Graphs or logs showing the storage utilization of each deployed application, ensuring they remain within the set storage limits. Example using Kubernetes®: 1) Set Storage Overcommit Ratios: - Use PersistentVolumeClaims (PVCs) with specific storage requests. Overcommitment can occur if the total storage requested by PVCs exceeds the actual available storage. 2) Attempt to allocate storage beyond defined limits: - Deploy a Pod that uses a PVC requesting more storage than available on the PersistentVolume (PV). 3) Monitor storage allocation and utilization metrics: - Use 'kubectl get pvc' and 'kubectl get pv' to monitor storage allocations. - Monitor storage metrics using tools like Prometheus. NOTE: Below are the general guidelines to ensure effective monitoring across all test cases: - Immediate Feedback Expectation: Upon executing any test case, especially those involving security or resource constraints, immediate feedback is typically anticipated. This feedback can be in the form of API responses, system alerts, or log entries. ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 199 - Monitoring Duration: While immediate feedback is expected, it is recommended to monitor for an additional 1-3 minutes post-execution to capture any delayed logs, alerts, or system responses. This ensures that asynchronous events or alerts are not missed. - Tools and Logs: Use appropriate monitoring tools, logging systems, or commands (e.g. In Kubernetes® like kubectl describe or kubectl logs) to gain insights into the test execution. Ensure that these tools are set up in advance and are accessible to the testing team.
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0ce77be9f03a15fedfc038153382bd6a
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104 105
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18.6 Secure Update
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104 105
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18.6.1 O-Cloud Infrastructure Software Package Integrity - Positive
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Requirement Name: O-Cloud software images authenticity and Integrity Requirement Reference: Clause 5.1.8.5 "REQ-SEC-O-CLOUD-SU-2" in O-RAN Security Requirements and Controls Specifications [5] Requirement Description: Ensure Authenticity and Integrity of O-Cloud Software Images Threat References: Clause 5.4.2.2 'T-GEN-01' in O-RAN Security Threat Modeling and Remediation Analysis [3] DUT/s: O-Cloud Test Name: TC_OCloud_Software_Package_Integrity Test description and applicability Purpose: To verify the O-Cloud software image authenticity and integrity. Test setup and configuration • Signed O-Cloud software package as per clause 5 of O-RAN Security Protocols Specification [2] • All necessary artifacts of the O-Cloud software image (public key, digitally signed certificates, signature (Signed hash) encryption key if any for security-sensitive artifacts) are provided. EXAMPLE: O-Cloud software includes AAL drivers, IMS, DMS, Host OS, Hypervisor, Container Engine. Test procedure 1) The Tester is properly authenticated and have the required access privileges to perform the test activity. 2) The tester shall verify the authenticity and integrity of the list of images. The O-Cloud software package shall be verified with the provided X.509 certificate and signature provided by the O-Cloud Software Provider. The cryptographic hash of the software image is calculated and verified against the hash in the signature by the Software Provider. 3) On successful validation of O-Cloud software images in Step 2, the Service Provider shall sign the verified O- cloud software image with its private key and onboard it to the SMO. 4) The newly signed O-Cloud images shall be onboarded to the O-cloud Image Repository. 5) The tester shall verify the digital signature of the O-Cloud software image bundle provided by the Software and Service Provider before deployment. 6) Monitor the SMO logs for signature verification events related to the upgrade. 7) Monitor the O-Cloud logs for any signature verification events related to the upgrade. Expected results Logs show that the software package integrity check has been executed for the O-Cloud software at each stage. The signature validation for the O-Cloud software image during onboarding are checked and is successful. ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 200 Expected format of evidence: Snapshots captured in SMO logs regarding the Signature verification success. Logs from SMO and O-Cloud (O2ims logs) to indicate the successful signature verification from the Software Provider. 18.6.2 O-Cloud Infrastructure Software Package Integrity Failure – Negative Requirement Name: O-Cloud software images authenticity and Integrity Requirement Reference: Clause 5.1.8.5 "REQ-SEC-O-CLOUD-SU-2" in O-RAN Security Requirements and Controls Specifications [5] Requirement Description: Ensure Authenticity and Integrity of O-Cloud Software Images Threat References: Clause 5.4.2.2 'T-GEN-01' in O-RAN Security Threat Modeling and Remediation Analysis [3] DUT/s: O-Cloud Test Name: TC_OCloud_Software_Package_Integrity_Failure Test description and applicability Purpose: To verify the O-Cloud software image authenticity and integrity validation failure for invalid O-cloud software image. Test setup and configuration • O-Cloud software package obtained from the Software Provider. • All necessary artifacts of the O-Cloud software image (public key, digitally signed certificates, Signature (signed hash) encryption key if any for security-sensitive artifacts) are provided. EXAMPLE: O-Cloud software includes AAL drivers, IMS, DMS, Host OS, Hypervisor, Container Engine. Test procedure 1) The Tester is properly authenticated and has the required access privileges to perform the upgrade activity. 2) Attempt to validate the O-Cloud Software with the wrong public key. 3) Verify that the SMO detects the incorrect cryptographic signature and does not allow onboarding of the software package. 4) Monitor the SMO logs for any signature verification events related to the software integrity check. Expected results Logs show that the software package integrity check has failed. The O-cloud software image shall not be onboarded due to the software integrity failure. Expected format of evidence: Snapshots captured in SMO regarding the signature verification failure. SMO Logs: Onboarding failure logs to indicate that integrity failure for the O-Cloud software Package.
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0ce77be9f03a15fedfc038153382bd6a
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104 105
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18.6.3 Secure Update procedure for O-Cloud Platform -Positive
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Requirement Name: Secure update of O-Cloud software at the infrastructure level layer. Requirement Reference: Clause 5.1.8.5 "REQ-SEC-O-CLOUD-SU-2" in O-RAN Security Requirements and Controls Specifications [5] ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 201 Requirement Description: Ensure secure update of O-Cloud Software Images at the Infrastructure level. Threat References: Clause 5.4.2.2 'T-GEN-01' in O-RAN Security Threat Modeling and Remediation Analysis [3] DUT/s: O-Cloud Test Name: TC_SECURE_UPDATE_OF_O-CLOUD_PLATFORM Test description and applicability Purpose: To verify the secure update procedure for the O-Cloud Infrastructure using verified O-cloud software image. Test setup and configuration • Verified O-Cloud software package obtained from Service Provider. • All necessary artifacts of the O-Cloud software image (public key, digitally signed certificates, encryption key if any for security-sensitive artifacts) shall be provided. • All necessary documents related to the Upgrade procedure of the O-Cloud components shall be available. • All necessary dependencies for O-Cloud software packages are considered prior to update. • All documents related to backward compatibility are made available by the O-Cloud Software provider. EXAMPLE 1: O-Cloud software includes AAL drivers, IMS, DMS, Host OS, Hypervisor, Container Engine. Test procedure 1) The Tester is properly authenticated and has the required access privileges to perform the upgrade activity. 2) The O-Cloud Platform to ensure image verification. 3) The tester performs all the necessary pre-upgrade steps on the O-Cloud Platform to ensure successful update. EXAMPLE 2: a. Back up any important components, such as app-level state stored in a database, or state of critical nodes. EXAMPLE: Snapshots, Clones 4) As per the Upgrade documentation, the tester shall perform the upgrade of the O-Cloud Platform components. EXAMPLE 3: a. Phased upgrades for service availability. b. Stage the Upgrade procedure: upgrade control plane nodes and upgrade the worker nodes. 5) Monitor the O-Cloud logs (EXAMPLE: O2ims logs) for the update steps performed on the platform. 6) Perform a Post-Update Audit to verify the status of the O-Cloud Platform. 7) Verify in the SMO that the software version for the O-Cloud platform components is updated to the required version. Expected results The version of the O-Cloud software components is updated to the required version. EXAMPLE 4: AAL driver version, IMS version, DMS version, Host OS version, Hypervisor, Container Engine. Expected format of evidence: O-Cloud logs: Log captures indicating the Steps performed during the Update. Snapshot: Executed command on CLI, GUI, API server SMO Log: Notification on the successful upgrade of the O-Cloud components. ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 202
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0ce77be9f03a15fedfc038153382bd6a
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104 105
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18.6.4 Secure Update failure for O-Cloud Platform-Negative
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Requirement Name: Rollback to the previous version on the unsuccessful update of the O-Cloud Platform. Requirement Reference: Clause 5.1.8.5 "REQ-SEC-O-CLOUD-SU-5, REQ-SEC-O-CLOUD-SU-6" in O-RAN Security Requirements and Controls Specifications [5] Requirement Description: The O-Cloud platform maintains its initial state if updates fail or incidents occur during update. Threat References: Clause 5.4.2.2 'T-GEN-01' in O-RAN Security Threat Modeling and Remediation Analysis [3] DUT/s: O-Cloud Test Name: TC_SECURE_UPDATE_FAILURE_OF_O-CLOUD_PLATFORM Test description and applicability Purpose: To verify on failure of secure Update procedure for the O-Cloud platform, it shall remain in its initial working state. Test setup and configuration • Verified O-Cloud platform software package obtained from Service Provider. • All necessary artifacts of the O-Cloud platform software image (public key, digitally signed certificates, encryption key if any for security-sensitive artifacts) shall be provided. • All necessary documents related to the Upgrade procedure of the O-Cloud components are made available. EXAMPLE 1: O-Cloud software includes AAL drivers, IMS, DMS, Host OS, Hypervisor, Container Engine. Test procedure 1) The Tester is properly authenticated and have the required access privileges to perform the upgrade activity. 2) The O-Cloud Platform to ensure image verification. 3) The tester performs all the pre-upgrade steps on the O-Cloud Platform. EXAMPLE 2: a. Back up any important components, such as app-level state stored in a database, state of critical nodes. 4) As per the Upgrade documentation, the tester shall stage and perform the upgrade of the O-Cloud Platform EXAMPLE 3: a. Phased upgrades for service availability. b. Stage the Upgrade procedure: Upgrade control nodes and upgrade the worker nodes. 5) Attempt to simulate an upgrade failure scenario. EXAMPLE: Unexpected upgrade termination, Abrupt Power failure, Network disruption. 6) Monitor the O-Cloud logs (EXAMPLE: O2ims logs) for the upgrade steps performed on the platform. 7) Perform a Post-Update Audit to verify the status of the O-Cloud Platform. 8) The O-Cloud Platform shall automatically roll-back to its previous version. 9) Verify in the SMO that the software version for the O-Cloud platform components remains the same as the previous version. Expected results The O-Cloud Platform shall automatically roll-back to its previous version and initial working state. ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 203 SMO logs to indicate the notification of the Update failure and the version of the O-Cloud components maintains its initial state. Expected format of evidence: O-Cloud and SMO logs: Log captures indicating the Steps performed during the Upgrade and the version of the O- Cloud components Snapshot: Executed command on CLI, GUI, API server
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0ce77be9f03a15fedfc038153382bd6a
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104 105
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18.7 Secure Storage
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104 105
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18.7.1 Sensitive data protection in O-Cloud
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Requirement Name: Sensitive data protection in O-Cloud Requirement Reference & Description: 'REQ-SEC-APP-PKG-13' clause 5.3.2.1.1, 'REQ-SEC-OCLOUD-SS-1' clause 5.1.8.6.1, 'SEC-CTL-OCLOUD-SS-1' clause 5.1.8.6.2 in O-RAN Security Requirements and Controls Specifications [5] Threat References: T-GEN-05' clause 7.4.2.1 in O-RAN Security Threat Modeling and Risk Assessment [3] DUT/s: O-Cloud Test Name: TC_DATA_PROTECTION_OCLOUD Test Description and Applicability: Purpose: To validate that the O-Cloud ensures the integrity and confidentiality of sensitive data at rest, in use, and in transit, using state-of-the-art encryption and security practices. Test Setup and Configuration: • O-Cloud operational with a simulated deployment of workloads. Test Procedure: 1. Data at rest: a) Store simulated sensitive data (e.g. secrets) in O-Cloud storage. b) Verify encryption using tools designed to check for industry-standard encryption mechanisms, focusing on confirming that data is encrypted to current security standards. 2. Data in use: a) Process sensitive data using an application. b) Identify write operations involving sensitive data 1. Employ process monitoring tools to monitor file I/O operations and capture all write activities. 2. Look for write operations to temporary file paths, cache directories or outside of the application secure storage. 3. Analyse the context of write operations – are they occurring during a process that handles sensitive data? c) Ensure that the application does not log sensitive information 1. Review the application's logging configuration and log output. ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 204 2. Verify that sensitive data is either not logged or appropriately anonymized/encrypted before being logged. d) Check for the use of secure enclaves, if applicable. 3. Data in Transit: a) Initiate data transfer between O-Cloud services. b) Use packet-sniffing tools to capture the data packets. c) Analyse the TLS encrypted data, ensuring TLS is used as specified in O-RAN Security Protocols Specifications [2], clause 4.2. Expected Results: 1) Sensitive data in O-Cloud storage is encrypted according to current industry standards. Unauthorized access attempts are logged and denied. 2) Data processing is secure, with no plaintext data exposure in logs or disk. Secure enclaves are used where relevant. 3) All data transfers employ TLS as specified in O-RAN Security Protocols Specifications [2], clause 4.2. Expected Format of Evidence: 1) Screenshots and logs showing encryption validation and the response to unauthorized access attempts. 2) Logs from process monitoring tools demonstrating the handling of sensitive data during processing. 3) Packet capture files confirming the data encryption in transit using TLS as specified in O-RAN Security Protocols Specifications [2], clause 4.2.
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0ce77be9f03a15fedfc038153382bd6a
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104 105
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18.7.2 Secure data deletion in O-Cloud
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Requirement Name: Secure data deletion in O-Cloud Requirement Reference & Description: 'SEC-CTL-OCLOUD-SS-2', 'REQ-SEC-OCLOUD-SS-4' clause 5.1.8.6.1, 'SEC-CTL-OCLOUD-SS-2' clause 5.1.8.6.2 in O-RAN Security Requirements and Controls Specifications [5] Threat References: T-GEN-05' clause 7.4.2.1 in O-RAN Security Threat Modeling and Risk Assessment [3] DUT/s: O-Cloud Test Name: TC_DATA_DELETION_OCLOUD Test Description and Applicability: Purpose: To ensure that the O-Cloud platform securely deletes data from addressable memory locations that are no longer in use, by overwriting them with specific binary patterns. Test Setup and Configuration: • O-Cloud platform operational with workloads. • Tools for memory analysis are available. EXAMPLE 1: dd for Unix/Linux or sdelete for Windows environments • File recovery tools for testing data recoverability after deletion. EXAMPLE 2: TestDisk. ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 205 Test Procedure: 1) Data preparation: - Create files with identifiable data patterns. EXAMPLE 3: A file filled with a repeating pattern of '1234'. - Store these files in the O-Cloud platform's memory or storage system. 2) Data deletion: - Delete the files using the O-Cloud platform's standard deletion process, which should invoke secure deletion process. 3) Verification of secure deletion: - Inspect the memory or storage locations where the files were stored to confirm that the data has been overwritten. - Search for both the original data patterns and the specific overwriting patterns (zeroes, ones, random). 4) Data recovery attempt: - Use data recovery tools to attempt to retrieve the deleted files or any part of them. - Assess if any of the original data or identifiable patterns can be recovered. Expected Results: 1) Deleted data locations are overwritten with the specified binary patterns. 2) File recovery attempts are not able to reconstruct any meaningful data from these locations. Expected Format of Evidence: 1) Logs or screenshots from memory analysis tools showing the overwriting patterns. 2) Reports from file recovery tools indicating the failure to recover any meaningful data.
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0ce77be9f03a15fedfc038153382bd6a
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104 105
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18.7.3 Data isolation in VM/Container reallocation
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Requirement Name: Data isolation in VM/Container reallocation Requirement Reference & Description: 'REQ-SEC-OCLOUD-SS-3' in O-RAN Security Requirements and Controls Specifications Threat References: T-GEN-05' clause 7.4.2.1 in O-RAN Security Threat Modeling and Risk Assessment [3] DUT/s: O-Cloud Test Name: TC_DATA_ISOLATION_VM_CONTAINER_OCLOUD Test Description and Applicability: Purpose: To verify that the O-Cloud effectively prevents data contained in a resource (like memory or storage) from being accessible after it is de-allocated from one VM/Container and reallocated to another. Test Setup and Configuration: • Set up multiple VMs/Containers within the O-Cloud. • Tools for analysing memory and storage content EXAMPLE: hexdump, dd, memory inspection tools ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 206 Test Procedure: 1) Resource allocation and data storage: - Allocate a dedicated resource (like a disk volume or memory segment) to a VM/Container. - Store known test data in this resource. 2) Resource de-allocation & re-allocation: - De-allocate the resource from the first VM/Container. - Re-allocate the same resource to a different VM/Container. 3) Data accessibility check: - Within the new VM/Container, attempt to access any residual data from the previous allocation. - Use data analysis tools to inspect the resource for traces of the previous data. 4) Verification of data isolation: - Confirm that no data from the first VM/Container is accessible or present in the resource after re- allocation. Expected Results: • No trace of the test data is found in the reallocated resource. • The new VM/Container does not have access to any residual data from the previous allocation. Expected Format of Evidence: Logs or screenshots showing the absence of the test data in the re-allocated resource.
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0ce77be9f03a15fedfc038153382bd6a
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104 105
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18.8 Chain of trust
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104 105
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18.8.1 Chain of Trust verification in static O-Cloud SW
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Requirement Name: Support of root of trust and integrity verification of static O-Cloud SW (Firmware and BIOS/UEFI, Bootloader, OS kernel) Requirement Reference & Description: 'REQ-SEC-OCLOUD-COT-1' clause 5.1.8.7.1, 'SEC-CTL-OCLOUD-COT- 1' clause 5.1.8.7.2 in O-RAN Security Requirements and Controls Specifications [5] Threat References: 'T-VL-02' clause 7.4.2.4 in O-RAN Security Threat Modeling and Risk Assessment [3] DUT/s: O-Cloud Test Name: TC_OCLOUD_ CHAIN_OF_TRUST_STATIC_SW Test Description and Applicability: Purpose: To confirm the presence and proper functioning of a secure boot process and integrity verification for O- Cloud static SW (Firmware and BIOS/UEFI, Bootloader, OS kernel), using hardware-based or software-based roots of trust mechanisms. Test Setup and Configuration: • Ensure the O-Cloud is set up with all components, including hardware, operating system, virtualization layer, and any applications or services running on the O-Cloud. • Use tools capable of interfacing with the O-Cloud's root of trust mechanism. ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 207 EXAMPLE 1: TPM management tools for hardware-based roots of trust, Keylime or any equivalent integrity verification system for automated integrity verification. • Access requirements: Tester needs administrative access to the O-Cloud platform to execute integrity verification commands and to collect integrity verification reports. Test Procedure: Hardware RoT verification: Confirm the functionality of the root of trust mechanism in each O-Cloud node, whether it is hardware-based or an equivalent software-based solution. EXAMPLE 2: Use a Kubernetes® DaemonSet to run tpm2_pcrread on all nodes, which verifies TPM presence and functionality by reading the PCR (Platform Configuration Registers) values. The DaemonSet collects outputs and send them for verification. Integrity check: Verify the integrity measurements against known good baselines. These measurements ensure the boot process and static O-Cloud SW integrity. EXAMPLE 3: • Use a securely stored baseline to obtain the expected PCR values for a known secure state of the O-Cloud static SWs. This could involve securely storing PCR values following a clean installation or using manufacturer-provided values. • Schedule Kubernetes® CronJobs to use Keylime for periodic integrity verification. Keylime agents on nodes interact with the TPM to attest the integrity measurements, comparing them against known good values stored in Keylime's verifier. Report collection and analysis: Collect integrity reports and analyse them for discrepancies or signs of tampering. EXAMPLE 4: Use Keylime's centralized reporting and alerting features to collect and analyse attestation data. Integrate Keylime with an ELK stack deployed within the Kubernetes® cluster for enhanced log analysis and visualization of attestation outcomes. Expected Results: All O-Cloud nodes demonstrate the presence of RoT. Integrity measurements align with known good baselines. Expected Format of Evidence: Logs confirming RoT presence on each node. Logs indicating successful integrity verification against known good baselines.
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0ce77be9f03a15fedfc038153382bd6a
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104 105
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18.8.2 Chain of Trust verification of dynamic O-Cloud SW
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Requirement Name: Support of root of trust and integrity verification of dynamic O-Cloud SW (virtualization layer and workloads) Requirement Reference & Description: 'REQ-SEC-OCLOUD-COT-2' clause 5.1.8.7.1, 'SEC-CTL-OCLOUD-COT- 3' clause 5.1.8.7.2 in O-RAN Security Requirements and Controls Specifications [5] Threat References: 'T-VL-02' clause 7.4.2.4 in O-RAN Security Threat Modeling and Risk Assessment [3] DUT/s: O-Cloud Test Name: TC_OCLOUD_INTEGRITY_VERIFICATION_DYNAMIC_SW ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 208 Test Description and Applicability: Purpose: To ensure the integrity of dynamic software in the O-Cloud through continuous verification. Test Setup and Configuration: • Ensure the O-Cloud is set up with all components, including hardware, operating system, virtualization layer, and any applications or services running on the O-Cloud. • Use tools capable of interfacing with the O-Cloud's root of trust mechanism. EXAMPLE 1: TPM management tools for hardware-based roots of trust, Keylime to automate integrity measurements and attestation of dynamic software components, integrating with IMA for capturing runtime integrity measurements. • Access requirements: Tester needs administrative access to the O-Cloud platform to execute integrity verification commands and to collect integrity verification reports. Test Procedure: Dynamic software verification: Initiate continuous integrity verification of the dynamic O-Cloud SW, including executable binaries and configuration files used by the container engine and workloads. EXAMPLE 2: Implement an IMA policy to measure container images and runtime configurations upon execution. Configure Keylime to monitor the integrity of container runtime environments and deployed containers on Kubernetes® nodes. This involves setting up Keylime agents within the cluster that automatically update integrity measurements for dynamic software components and verify them against expected values. Attestation: Perform attestation of the container engine configurations and active workloads to detect any unauthorized changes or potential integrity breaches. EXAMPLE 3: Deploy Keylime agents on each O-Cloud node to periodically attest the integrity of dynamic SW components based on IMA measurements. Use Keylime to trigger attestation procedures that verify IMA logs against expected integrity measurements for containerized applications. Report collection and anomaly detection: Collect attestation reports and analyse them for any discrepancies, unauthorized changes, or signs of tampering in the container engine and workloads. EXAMPLE 4: Use Keylime's web interface or API integrated with an ELK stack for logging and monitoring attestation results. Set up alerts for any attestation failures or integrity breaches detected in dynamic software. Expected Results: Dynamic software components are measured upon execution, with their integrity measurements securely recorded. • Integrity measurements are successfully captured and verified against known good baselines, indicating no unauthorized modifications. Expected Format of Evidence: Logs attesting the integrity of dynamic software components, including any alerts generated for integrity failures. Reports detailing the comparison of runtime integrity measurements against known good baselines, demonstrating continuous integrity verification of dynamic O-Cloud dynamic software. ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 209
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0ce77be9f03a15fedfc038153382bd6a
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104 105
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19 Security test of VNF/CNF
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104 105
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19.1 Overview
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This clause contains security tests to validate the security protection mechanism specific to O-RAN virtualized/containerized applications deployed on the O-Cloud. NOTE: O-RAN Applications stand for xApps, rApps, O-CU, O-DU, Near-RT RIC.
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0ce77be9f03a15fedfc038153382bd6a
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104 105
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19.2 Executive environment protection
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Requirement Name: secure executive environment provision Requirement Reference & Description: 'REQ-SEC-LCM-SD-5, REQ-SEC-LCM-SD-6' clause 5.3.2.3.1 in O-RAN Security Requirements and Controls Specifications [5] Threat References: 'T-AppLCM-04, T-AppLCM-05' clause 7.4.1.11 in O-RAN Security Threat Modeling and Risk Assessment [3] DUT/s: O-CU, O-DU, Near-RT RIC, xApps, rApps Test Name: TC_SECURE_EXECUTIVE_ENV_PROVISION Test description and applicability Purpose: 1) To test whether the Application compares the owned resource state with the parsed resource state. 2) To test whether the Application send an alarm to the OAM if the two resource states are inconsistent. Test setup and configuration There are an Application, an O-Cloud, an OAM, a NFO-DMS, a FOCOM-IMS (or simulated O-Cloud, OAM, NFO- DMS, FOCOM-IMS) on the test environment. Test procedure Execute the following steps: 1) The tester utilizes the O-Cloud to change the resource state of Application (e.g. change vCPU size of the Application). 2) The tester uses the Application to query the parsed resource state from the OAM. 3) The tester uses the OAM to query the parsed resource state of the Application from the NFO and send the received resource state to the Application. 4) The tester checks whether the Application sends an alarm to the OAM when the Application receives the parsed resource state from the OAM and finds that the owned resource state and the parsed resource state are inconsistent. Expected Results The Application sends an alarm to the OAM when the Application receives the parsed resource state from the OAM and find that the owned resource state and the parsed resource state are inconsistent. Expected format of evidence: Screenshot contains the alarm on the OAM. ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 210
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0ce77be9f03a15fedfc038153382bd6a
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104 105
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19.3 Signature validation during App image onboarding
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Requirement Name: Signature validation during App image onboarding Requirement Reference & Description: 'REQ-SEC-ALM-PKG-5, REQ-SEC-ALM-PKG-6' clause 5.3.2.1.1 in O- RAN Security Requirements and Controls Specifications [5] Threat References: 'T-IMG-04' clause 7.4.1.11, 'T-AppLCM-01' clause 5.4.2.3 in O-RAN Security Threat Modeling and Risk Assessment [3] DUT/s: O-CU, O-DU, Near-RT RIC, xApps, rApps Test Name: TC_SIGNATURE_VALIDATION_DURING_APP_IMAGE_ONBOARDING Test description and applicability Purpose: The purpose of this test is to validate the digital signature verification mechanism during the onboarding process of application images into the NFO. Test setup and configuration • The Application document describes information regarding digital signature protection of Application images, including details of how the signature check is carried out, who makes the digital signature of Application image, etc. • One Application package included two trusted Application images and the Application package carries a correct digital signature of the Application package. • Another Application package included untrusted Application image which carry wrong digital signature of Application image and the Application package carries a correct digital signature of the Application package. • There are a NFO, or a simulated NFO. A certificate or public key which is used to verify the digital signature of Application image has been pre-configured in the NFO. This certificate is trusted by the operator. It means the digital signature of the Application image is successfully verified by using the public key in the certificate trusted by the operator. Test procedure Execute the following steps: 1) Review the documentation provided by the vendor describing how digital signature of the Application image is verified. 2) The tester uploads an Application package included two trusted Application images into a NFO. The NFO verifies the Application images by validating each digital signature of the Application image using the pre- configured certificate or the public key according to the documentation. 3) The tester uploads another Application package included un-trusted Application image into NFO. The NFO verifies the Application image(s) by validating each digital signature of the Application image using the pre- configured certificate or the public key according to the documentation. Expected Results 1) In the step 2, the signatures of the Application images are successfully validated, and the Application package is successfully on boarded into the NFO. 2) In the step 3, the signature of the un-trusted Application image is failed to be validated and the Application package is not on boarded into the NFO. Expected format of evidence: Snapshots containing the result of the Application package on boarding. ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 211
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0ce77be9f03a15fedfc038153382bd6a
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104 105
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19.4 Application image deployment security
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Requirement Name: Application image deployment security Requirement Reference & Description: 'REQ-SEC-ALM-PKG-12' clause 5.3.2.1.1 in O-RAN Security Requirements and Controls Specifications [5] Threat References: 'T-IMG-04', clause 7.4.1.11, 'T-AppLCM-02' clause 5.4.2.3 in O-RAN Security Threat Modeling and Risk Assessment [3] DUT/s: O-CU, O-DU, Near-RT RIC, xApps, rApps Test Name: TC_APP_IMAGE_VULNERABILITY_CHECK_ON_DEPLOY Test description and applicability Purpose: The purpose of this test is to verify that an Application image is free from known vulnerabilities. Test setup and configuration O-Cloud with Application image scanning tools integrated. Test procedure 1) Deploy an Application image known to have vulnerabilities: - Select an Application image with known vulnerabilities, such as an image with outdated software or documented security issues. - Attempt to deploy the image to an O-Cloud using the appropriate deployment configuration. - Monitor the deployment process and capture any error messages or logs. 2) Deploy an Application image with outdated or unapproved software libraries: - Create a custom Application image that includes outdated or unapproved software libraries. - Attempt to deploy the custom image to an O-Cloud using the appropriate deployment configuration. - Monitor the deployment process and capture any error messages or logs. Expected Results 1) For the first step, the container image with known vulnerabilities is rejected or flagged as insecure, preventing its deployment. 2) For the second step, the container image with outdated or unapproved software is blocked from deployment, ensuring compliance with security policies. Expected format of evidence: 1) Vulnerability scan reports generated by the Application image scanning tool, indicating the detected vulnerabilities and their severity. 2) Rejection logs or error messages from the Application image registry or O-Cloud, indicating the rejection or blocking of insecure images. ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 212 20 Security tests of Common Application Lifecycle Management
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104 105
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20.1 Overview
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This clause contains security tests to validate the security protection relevant to Common App LCM.
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104 105
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20.2 Application package
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20.2.1 Application package signature verification
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Requirement Name: Application package authenticity and integrity protection Requirement Reference: REQ-SEC-ALM-PKG-2, REQ-SEC-ALM-SU-1, clause 5.3.2, O-RAN Security Requirements and Controls Specifications [5] Requirement Description: "The Application package shall be signed by the Application Provider prior to its delivery to the Service Provider to ensure its authenticity and integrity." Threat References: T-IMG-01, T-NEAR-RT-02, T-rAPP-05, T-xApp-02, clause 7.4 in O-RAN Security Threat Modeling and Risk Assessment [3] DUT/s: Non-RT RIC, Near-RT RIC, O-CU, O-DU, O-RU, xApps, rApps Test Name: TC_App_Signature_Verification Test description and applicability Purpose: To verify the application package authenticity and integrity validation during onboarding and instantiation. Test setup and configuration The Application package is signed by the Application Provider prior to its delivery to the Service Provider. Test procedure Upon reception of the Application package from the Application Provider, the Service Provider verifies the Application Provider signature using the test procedure in clause 9.5.2. Upon verification of the Application Provider signature, the Service Provider signs the Application package prior to its onboarding onto the image's repository using the test procedure in clause 9.5.1. Expected Results Validation of the Application package's Application Provider signature is successful. Signing of the Application package by the Service Provider is successful. Validation of Application package signature and the Service Provider signature during instantiation of the application is successful. If verification is unsuccessful, the Service Provider may suspend the application instantiation process. Expected format of evidence: Log files for each step of the procedure.
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104 105
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20.2.2 Minimum Requirements
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Requirement Name: Application package includes minimal artifacts. Requirement Reference & Description: 'REQ-SEC-ALM-PKG-3', clause 5.3 in O-RAN Security Requirements and Controls Specifications [5] Threat References: 'T-O-RAN-09', clause 7.4.1.1 in O-RAN Security Threat Modeling and Risk Assessment [3] ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 213 DUT/s: O-RU, O-DU, O-CU, Near-RT RIC, xApp, rApp Test Name: TC_App_Pkg_Min_Artifacts Test Description and Applicability Purpose: The purpose of this test is to verify that an Application package includes minimal artifacts according to REQ- SEC-ALM-PKG-3. Test Setup and Configuration Application package available for access. Test Procedure: 1) Access the Application package contents. 2) Verify the Application package includes minimally the following artifacts: a. Application software image b. Signing certificate c. Application provider signature(s) Expected Results: Application package includes the minimal artifacts required. Expected format of evidence: Screenshot(s)
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104 105
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20.2.3 App Package Change Log
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Requirement Name: Application package shall have change logs. Requirement Reference & Description: 'REQ-SEC-ALM-PKG-15', clause 5.3 in O-RAN Security Requirements and Controls Specifications [5] Threat References: 'T-O-RAN-09', clause 7.4.1.1 in O-RAN Security Threat Modeling and Risk Assessment [3] DUT/s: O-RU, O-DU, O-CU, Near-RT RIC, xApp, rApp Test Name: TC_App_Pkg_Change_Log Test Description and Applicability Purpose: The purpose of this test is to verify that the Application packages contains a change log according to REQ- SEC-ALM-PKG-15. Test Setup and Configuration Application package available for access. Test Procedure: • Access the Application package and external artifacts if present. • Verify the Application package or external artifacts includes change log. • Verify latest version noted in change log matches the current Application version. Expected Results: Change log is included in the Application package. ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 214 Expected format of evidence: Screenshot(s)
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104 105
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20.3 Secure Decommissioning
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104 105
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20.3.1 Post-Decommission Report
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Requirement Name: A complete post-decommission report shall be generated. Requirement Reference & Description: 'REQ-SEC-ALM-DECOM-1, clause 5.3 in O-RAN Security Requirements and Controls Specifications [5] Threat References: 'T-AppLCM-06', clause 7.4.1.11 in O-RAN Security Threat Modeling and Risk Assessment [3] DUT/s: O-RU, O-DU, O-CU, Near-RT RIC, xApp, rApp Test Name: TC_App_Decomm_Report Test Description and Applicability Purpose: The purpose of this test is to ensure a decommissioning report is generated for a decommissioned Application. Test Setup and Configuration • Ensure Application subject to decommissioning has no running instance(s) on O-RAN system. Test Procedure: 1) Execute decommissioning of Application 2) Generate report of decommissioning whether through manual or automated means Expected Results: • Decommissioning report documenting Application decommissioning is generated. Expected format of evidence: • A report detailing: - Decommissioned Application name and version - Date and time of Application decommissioning - Tasks performed during decommissioning - Other pertinent details
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0ce77be9f03a15fedfc038153382bd6a
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104 105
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20.3.2 Trust Artifact Revocation
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Requirement Name: Trust artifacts revoked during Application decommissioning. Requirement Reference & Description: 'REQ-SEC-ALM-DECOM-3', clause 5.3 in O-RAN Security Requirements and Controls Specifications [5] Threat References: 'T-AppLCM-06', clause 7.4.1.11 in O-RAN Security Threat Modeling and Risk Assessment [3] DUT/s: O-RU, O-DU, O-CU, Near-RT RIC, xApp, rApp Test Name: TC_App_Trust_Artifact_Revocation Test Description and Applicability ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 215 Purpose: The purpose of this test is to verify that all trust artifacts associated with an Application are revoked at the time of Application decommissioning. Test Setup and Configuration • Locate and prepare Application trust artifacts for revocation. • Ensure Application subject to decommissioning has no running instance(s) on O-RAN system. Test Procedure: 1) Revoke trust artifacts from Application subject to decommissioning. 2) Perform a scan and verify that all trust artifacts associated with Application have been revoked. EXAMPLE: If trust artifact is a certificate, verify that certificate is in certification revocation list. 3) Execute decommissioning of Application. 4) Attempt to instantiate Application and verify that it cannot be re-instantiated without the trust artifacts. Expected Results: • All trust artifacts are removed from the Application and the decommissioned Application cannot be re- instantiated. Expected format of evidence: Screenshot(s), report
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104 105
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21 Security test of O-CU-CP
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104 105
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21.1 Overview
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The present clause contains 3GPP security test cases applicable to O-CU-CP and O-RAN specific O-CU-CP test cases. 21.2 O-CU-CP 3GPP specific security functional requirements and test cases Requirement Name: 3GPP specific O-CU-CP security Requirement Reference: REQ-SEC-OCU-1, clause 5.1.4.1, O-RAN Security Requirements Specifications [5] Requirement Description: "O-CU-CP and O-CU-UP shall meet the security requirements for gNB-CU-CP and gNB- CU-UP respectively", as specified in ETSI TS 133 501 [25] DUT/s: O-CU-CP Test Name: TC_O_CU_CP_3GPP_33_523_Cl_5_2_2 (As defined in clause 5.2.2 of ETSI TS 133 523 [23]) Purpose: To verify the O-CU-CP meet the security requirements for gNB-CU-CP gNB-CU-CP specific security functional requirements and test cases specified in clause 5.2.2 of ETSI TS 133 523 [23] apply to O-CU-CP. 21.3 O-RAN specific security functional requirements and test cases The TLS test cases in clause 6.3 of the present document apply to the O1 interface of O-CU-CP. ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 216 The IPsec test cases in clause 6.4 of the present document apply to the E2 interface of O-CU-CP.
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0ce77be9f03a15fedfc038153382bd6a
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104 105
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22 Security test of O-CU-UP
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0ce77be9f03a15fedfc038153382bd6a
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104 105
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22.1 Overview
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The present clause contains 3GPP security test cases applicable to O-CU-UP and O-RAN specific O-CU-UP test cases. 22.2 O-CU-UP 3GPP specific security functional requirements and test cases Requirement Name: 3GPP specific O-CU-UP security Requirement Reference: REQ-SEC-OCU-1, clause 5.1.4.1, O-RAN Security Requirements and Controls Specifications [5] Requirement Description: "O-CU-CP and O-CU-UP shall meet the security requirements for gNB-CU-CP and gNB- CU-UP respectively", as specified in ETSI TS 133 501 [25] DUT/s: O-CU-UP Purpose: To verify the O-CU-CP meet the security requirements for gNB-CU-UP gNB-CU-UP specific security functional requirements and test cases specified in clause 6.2.2 of ETSI TS 133 523 [23] apply to O-CU-UP. Test Name: TC_O_CU_UP_3GPP_33_523_Cl_6_2_2 (As defined in clause 6.2.2 of ETSI TS 133 523 [23]) 22.3 O-RAN specific security functional requirements and test cases The TLS test cases in clause 6.3 of the present document apply to the O1 interface of O-CU-UP. The IPsec test cases in clause 6.4 of the present document apply to the E2 interface of O-CU-UP.
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0ce77be9f03a15fedfc038153382bd6a
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104 105
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23 Security test of O-DU
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104 105
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23.1 Overview
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The present clause contains 3GPP security test cases applicable to O-DU and O-RAN specific O-DU test cases. 23.2 O-DU 3GPP specific security functional requirements and test cases Requirement Name: 3GPP specific O-DU security Requirement Reference: REQ-SEC-ODU-1, clause 5.1.5.1, O-RAN Security Requirements and Controls Specifications [5] Requirement Description: "O-DU shall meet the security requirements for gNB-DU" as specified in ETSI TS 133 501 [25]. DUT/s: O-DU ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 217 gNB-DU specific security functional requirements and test cases specified in clause 7.2.2 of ETSI TS 133 523 [23] apply to O-DU. Test Name: TC_O_DU_3GPP_33_523_Cl_7_2_2 (As defined in clause 7.2.2 of ETSI TS 133 523 [23]) 23.3 O-RAN specific security functional requirements and test cases The 802.1X Authenticator Validation test cases in clause 11.2.1 applies to O-DU for the network configuration where O-DU acts as an 802.1X authenticator. The 802.1X Supplicant Validation test cases in clause 11.2.2 apply to O-DU. The TLS test cases in clause 6.3 of the present document apply to the O1 interface and M-Plane of O-DU. The IPsec test cases in clause 6.4 of the present document apply to the E2 interface of O-DU. The SSH Server & Client test cases in clause 6.2 of the present document apply to the M-Plane of O-DU.
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104 105
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24 End-to-End security test cases
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104 105
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24.0 Overview
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This clause describes the tests evaluating and assessing the security aspects of the E2E of a radio access network. The whole O-RAN system (i.e. O-RU, O-DU, O-CU-CP and O-CU-UP) as defined in O-RAN Architecture Description [1] is the System under Test (SUT) and can be viewed as an integrated black box in the context of the E2E security testing.
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104 105
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24.1 3GPP Security Assurance Specification (SCAS)
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For NR technology, the table 24.1-1 applies. The test cases referred in this table are ETSI TS 133 511 [8], which are applied for O-RAN System. For LTE technology, the table 24.1-2 applies. The test cases referred in this table are ETSI TS 133 216 [9], which are applied for O-RAN system. The tables also contain the information relative to the 3GPP releases affected for each test case. Table 24.1-1: List of SCAS Test Cases for NR and applicable technology from clause 4.2.2 of ETSI TS 133 511 [8] Test Case (O-RAN Ref. #) Test Case (3GPP Ref. #) Requirement Test Name Description Applicable Technology 3GPP Releases affected SCAS_NR_E2E_24.1 .1 4.2.2.1.1 Integrity protection of RRC- signalling TC_CP_DATA_INT_RRC-SIGN Verify that the RRC- signaling data sent between UE and O- RAN System over the air interface are integrity protected NR NSA (Options 3 and 4) NR SA 16 17 18 ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 218 Test Case (O-RAN Ref. #) Test Case (3GPP Ref. #) Requirement Test Name Description Applicable Technology 3GPP Releases affected SCAS_NR_E2E_24.1 .2 4.2.2.1.2 Integrity protection of user data TC-UP-DATA-INT Verify that the user data packets sent between UE and O- RAN System are integrity protected over the air interface. NR NSA (Options 4 and 7) NR SA 16 17 18 SCAS_NR_E2E_24.1 .3 4.2.2.1.4 RRC integrity check failure TC-CP-DATA-RRC-INT-CHECK Verify that RRC integrity check failure is handled correctly by O-RAN System. NR NSA NR SA 16 17 18 SCAS_NR_E2E_24.1 .4 4.2.2.1.5 UP integrity check failure TC-UP-DATA-RRC-INT-CHECK Verify that UP integrity check failure is handled correctly by the O-RAN System. NR NSA NR SA 16 17 18 SCAS_NR_E2E_24.1 .5 4.2.2.1.6 Ciphering of RRC- signalling TC-CP-DATA-CIP-RRC-SIGN Verify that the RRC- signaling data sent between UE and O- RAN System over the air interface are confidentiali ty protected. NR NSA NR SA 16 17 18 SCAS_NR_E2E_24.1 .6 4.2.2.1.7 Ciphering of user data TC-UP-DATA-CIP Verify that the user data packets are confidentiali ty protected over the air interface. NR NSA NR SA 16 17 18 SCAS_NR_E2E_24.1 .7 4.2.2.1.8 Replay protection of user data TC-UP-DATA-REPLAY Verify that the user data packets are replay protected between the UE and the O-RAN System. NR NSA NR SA 16 17 18 ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 219 Test Case (O-RAN Ref. #) Test Case (3GPP Ref. #) Requirement Test Name Description Applicable Technology 3GPP Releases affected SCAS_NR_E2E_24.1 .8 4.2.2.1.9 Replay protection of RRC- signalling TC-UP-DATA-RRC-REPLAY Verify the replay protection of RRC- signaling between UE and O- RAN System over the air interface. NR NSA NR SA 16 17 18 SCAS_NR_E2E_24.1 .9 4.2.2.1.1 0 Ciphering of user data based on the security policy sent by the SMF TC-UP-DATA-CIP-SMF Verify that the user data packets are confidentiali ty protected based on the security policy sent by the SMF via AMF NR NSA (Options 4 and 7) NR SA 16 17 18 SCAS_NR_E2E_24.1 .10 4.2.2.1.1 1 Integrity of user data based on the security policy sent by the SMF TC-UP-DATA-INT-SMF Verify that the user data packets are integrity protected based on the security policy sent by the SMF. NR NSA (Options 4 and 7) NR SA 16 17 18 SCAS_NR_E2E_24.1 .11 4.2.2.1.1 2 AS algorithms selection TC-AS-alg-select Verify that the O-RAN System selects the algorithms with the highest priority in its configured list. NR NSA NR SA 16 17 18 SCAS_NR_E2E_24.1 .12 4.2.2.1.1 3 Key refresh TC_GNB_KEY_REFRESH_DR B_ID Key refresh at O-RAN System NR NSA NR SA 16 17 18 SCAS_NR_E2E_24.1 .13 4.2.2.1.1 4 Bidding down prevention in Xn- handovers TC-Xn-handover_bid_down Verify that bidding down is prevented in Xn- handovers. NR NSA NR SA 16 17 18 SCAS_NR_E2E_24.1 .14 4.2.2.1.1 5 AS protection algorithm selection in O-RAN System change TC_Alg_select_change Verify that AS protection algorithm is selected correctly NR NSA NR SA 16 17 18 ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 220 Test Case (O-RAN Ref. #) Test Case (3GPP Ref. #) Requirement Test Name Description Applicable Technology 3GPP Releases affected SCAS_NR_E2E_24.1 .15 4.2.2.1.1 6 Control plane data confidentiali ty protection over N2/Xn interface TC_CP_CONF_N2_Xn Verify the control plane data confidentiali ty protection over N2/Xn interface NR NSA NR SA 16 17 18 SCAS_NR_E2E_24.1 .16 4.2.2.1.1 7 Control plane data integrity protection over S1/NG/Xn interface TC_CP_INT_S1_NG_Xn Verify the control plane data integrity protection over S1/NG/Xn interface NR NSA NR SA 16 17 18 SCAS_NR_E2E_24.1 .17 4.2.2.1.1 8 Key update on dual connectivity TC_DC_KEY_UPDATE_DRB_I D Key update at the O- RAN System on dual connectivity – 2 test cases NR NSA NR SA 16 17 18 SCAS_NR_E2E_24.1 .18 4.2.2.1.1 9 UserPlane security activation in Inactive scenario TC_INACTIVE_TO_ACTIVE Verify that the target O-RAN System uses the UserPlane security activation status to activate the UP security. NR NSA NR SA 16 17 18 SCAS_NR_E2E_24.1 .19 4.2.2.1.2 0 User plane data confidentiali ty protection over N3/Xn interface TC_UP_CONF_N3_Xn Verify the user plane data confidentiali ty protection over N3/Xn interface NR NSA NR SA 18 SCAS_NR_E2E_24.1 .20 4.2.2.1.2 1 User plane data integrity protection over N3/Xn interface TC_UP_INT_N3_Xn Verify the user plane data integrity protection over N3/Xn interface NR NSA NR SA 18 ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 221 Table 24.1-2: List of SCAS Test Cases for LTE and applicable technology from clause 4.2.2 of ETSI TS 133 216 [9] Test Case (O-RAN Ref. #) Test Case (3GPP Ref. #) Requirement Test Name Description Applicable Technolog y 3GPP Releas es affecte d SCAS_LTE_E2E_ 24.1.1 4.2.2.1 .1 Control plane data confidentialit y protection over S1/X2 TC_CP_DATA_CONF_S1_X2 Verify the O-RAN System provide confidentiali ty protection for control plane packets on the S1/X2 LTE 16 17 18 SCAS_LTE_E2E_ 24.1.2 4.2.2.1 .2 Control plane data integrity protection over S1/X2 TC_CP_DATA_INT_S1_X2 Verify the O-RAN System provides integrity protection for control plane packets on the S1/X2 LTE 16 17 18 SCAS_LTE_E2E_ 24.1.3 4.2.2.1 .3 User plane data ciphering TC-DATA-CIP-Uu Verify that the user data packets are confidentiali ty protected over the air interface LTE 16 17 18 SCAS_LTE_E2E_ 24.1.4 4.2.2.1 .4 User plane data integrity protection TC_UP_DATA_S1_X2 Verify the O-RAN System handles integrity protection for user plane packets for the S1/X2 LTE 16 17 18 SCAS_LTE_E2E_ 24.1.5 4.2.2.1 .5 AS algorithms selection TC-AS-alg-select Verify that AS protection algorithm is selected correctly LTE 16 17 18 SCAS_LTE_E2E_ 24.1.6 4.2.2.1 .6 RRC integrity protection TC-UP-DATA-RRC-INT-CHECK Verify that the message is discarded in case of failed integrity check LTE 16 17 18 SCAS_LTE_E2E_ 24.1.7 4.2.2.1 .7 Selection of EIA0 TC_EIA0 Verify that AS NULL integrity algorithm is used correctly LTE 16 17 18 ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 222 Test Case (O-RAN Ref. #) Test Case (3GPP Ref. #) Requirement Test Name Description Applicable Technolog y 3GPP Releas es affecte d SCAS_LTE_E2E_ 24.1.8 4.2.2.1 .8 (1) Key refresh (PDCP Count) TC_KEY_REFRESH_ PDCP_COUNT Verify that the O-RAN System performs K refresh when PDCP COUNTs are about to wrap around LTE 16 17 18 SCAS_LTE_E2E_ 24.1.9 4.2.2.1 .8 (2) Key refresh (DRB ID) TC_KEY_REFRESH_DRB_ID Verify that the O-RAN System performs K refresh when DRB- IDs are about to be reused LTE 16 17 18 SCAS_LTE_E2E_ 24.1.10 4.2.2.1 .9 AS integrity algorithm selection TC_AS_INT_SEL Verify that AS integrity protection algorithm is selected and applied correctly LTE 16 17 18 SCAS_LTE_E2E_ 24.1.11 4.2.2.1 .10 Bidding down prevention in X2- handovers TC_BID_DOWN_X2_HO Verify that bidding down is prevented in X2- handovers LTE 16 17 18 SCAS_LTE_E2E_ 24.1.12 4.2.2.1 .11 AS protection algorithm selection in O-RAN System change TC_AS_PROT_SEL Verify that AS protection algorithm is selected correctly LTE 16 17 18 SCAS_LTE_E2E_ 24.1.13 4.2.2.1 .12 RRC and UP downlink ciphering TC_DL_Cipher Verify that the O-RAN System performs RRC and UP downlink ciphering after sending the AS security mode command message LTE 16 17 18 SCAS_LTE_E2E_ 24.1.14 4.2.2.1 .13 Map a UE NR security capability TC_MAP_NR_SEC_CAP Verify that the O-RAN System creates mapped UE NR security capabilities LTE 16 17 18 ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 223 Test Case (O-RAN Ref. #) Test Case (3GPP Ref. #) Requirement Test Name Description Applicable Technolog y 3GPP Releas es affecte d SCAS_LTE_E2E_ 24.1.15 4.2.2.1 .14 UE NR security capability is only sent to a Secondary O-RAN System TC_NR_SEC_CAP_SENT Verify that the UE NR security capabilities are only sent to a O- RAN System LTE 16 17 18 SCAS_LTE_E2E_ 24.1.16 4.2.2.1 .15 Bidding down prevention in X2- handovers TC_BID_DOWN_X2 Verify that bidding down is prevented in X2- handovers when target O-RAN System receives a NR security capability LTE 16 17 18 SCAS_LTE_E2E_ 24.1.17 4.2.2.1 .16 Integrity protection of user data TC-UP-DATA-INT Verify that the user data packets are integrity protected over the air interface LTE 18 SCAS_LTE_E2E_ 24.1.18 4.2.2.1 .17 Select the right UP integrity protection policy TC_LOCAL_UP_INTEGRITY_PROTE CTION_CONFIGURATION Verify that the O-RAN System is locally configured with a UP integrity protection policy LTE 18 SCAS_LTE_E2E_ 24.1.19 4.2.2.1 .18 Select the right UP IP policy TC_UP_IP_POLICY_Selection Verify that the O-RAN System has a locally configured UP IP policy LTE 18 SCAS_LTE_E2E_ 24.1.20 4.2.2.1 .19 Select the right UP IP policy in S1 handover TC_UP_IP_POLICY_Selection_S1_Ha ndover Verify that the O-RAN System has correct selection on UP IP policy in S1 handover LTE 18 SCAS_LTE_E2E_ 24.1.21 4.2.2.1 .20 Bidding down prevention for UP IP Policy TC_BID_DOWN_UP_IP_Policy Verify that bidding down for UP IP policy is prevented in X2- handovers LTE 18 ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 224
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0ce77be9f03a15fedfc038153382bd6a
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104 105
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24.2 DoS, fuzzing and blind exploitation test
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104 105
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24.2.0 Overview
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Due to the open and disaggregated nature of the O-RAN system (SUT), the attack surfaces associated with some of its critical transport protocols and major interfaces of the O-RAN system become easy targets for potential attackers. Cyberattacks like DoS, fuzzing and blind exploitation types are easy to launch, require little information on the target system, and could cause significant performance degradation, or even the service interruption if not properly mitigated. The duration of test TRAFFIC GENERATION specified in this clause shall be at minimum 3 minutes. Table 24.2.0-1 summarizes the test cases and the applicable technology. Table 24-2.0-1: End-to-end test cases and applicable technology Applicable technology Test case LTE NSA SA Test ID Name 24.2.1.1 TC_E2E_ODU_SPlane_DoS N/A Y Y 24.2.1.2 TC_E2E_ODU_SPlane_Robustness N/A Y Y 24.2.2.1 TC_E2E_ODU_CPlane_eCPRI_DoS N/A Y Y 24.2.2.2 TC_E2E_ODU_CPlane_eCPRI_Robustness N/A Y Y 24.2.3.1 TC_E2E_NearRTRIC_A1_DoS N/A Y Y 24.2.3.2 TC_E2E_NearRTRIC_A1_Robustness N/A Y Y 24.2.3.3 TC_E2E_NearRTRIC_A1_Vulnerabilities N/A Y Y 24.2.4.1 TC_E2E_OCloud_SideChannel_DoS N/A Y Y
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0ce77be9f03a15fedfc038153382bd6a
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104 105
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24.2.1 S-Plane
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0ce77be9f03a15fedfc038153382bd6a
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104 105
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24.2.1.1 S-Plane PTP DoS Attack
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Requirement Name: O-DU S-Plane DoS Attack Requirement Reference: REQ-SEC-DOS-1 from clause 5.3.5.1, O-RAN Security Requirements and Control Specification [5] Requirement Description: "An O-RAN component with external network interface shall be able to withstand network transport protocol based volumetric DDoS attack without system crash and returning to service level after the attack.". Threat References: T-O-RAN-09 in O-RAN Security Threat Modeling and Risk Assessment [3] SUT/s: O-RAN system Test Name: TC_E2E_ODU_SPlane_DoS Test description and applicability Purpose: To verify that a predefined volumetric DoS attack against O-DU S-Plane will not crash the SUT, returning to service level after the attack. Test setup and configuration • The tester requires easy to access MAC address information of the O-DU's open fronthaul interface and L2 connectivity (e.g. over L2 network switching device) to the target from the emulated attacker. • The test requires the normal UE procedures and user-plane traffic can be handled properly through the SUT. RECOMMENDATION: Use clause 5.6 Bidirectional throughput in different radio conditions and clause 6.1 Data Services tests from O-RAN TIFG End-to-End Test Specifications [4] as a benchmark for indicating correct behavior of the SUT. ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 225 Refer to the diagram below for the test setup and configuration: Figure 24.2.1.1-1: S-Plane O-DU Test setup Test procedure • The tester uses a test tool to generate different types of volumetric DoS attack against the MAC address of the O-DU S-Plane 1) Volumetric tiers: 10 Mbps, 100 Mbps, 1 Gbps 2) DoS Traffic random mixed of: generic Ethernet frames, PTP announce/sync message 3) DoS source address: spoofed MAC of T-GM/T-BC or T-TC (depending on the setup), random source MACs Expected results 1) During the test, the SUT maintains an operational level. 2) After the execution of the test, the degradation of service availability and performance of the SUT is not noticeable. RECOMMENDATION: Use clause 5.6 Bidirectional throughput in different radio conditions and clause 6.1 Data Services tests from O-RAN TIFG End-to-End Test Specifications [4] as a benchmark for indicating correct behavior of the SUT. Expected format of evidence: Traffic captures and/or report files
|
0ce77be9f03a15fedfc038153382bd6a
|
104 105
|
24.2.1.2 S-Plane PTP Unexpected Input
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Requirement Name: O-DU S-Plane Robustness Requirement Reference: REQ-SEC-OFSP-4 from clause 5.2.5.3.2, O-RAN Security Requirements and Control Specification [5] Requirement Description: The O-DU is able to detect and defend against application level attacks across the S-Plane interface, due to misbehavior or malicious intent. Threat References: T-O-RAN-09 in O-RAN Security Threat Modeling and Risk Assessment [3] SUT/s: O-RAN system Test Name: TC_E2E_ODU_SPlane_Robustness Test description and applicability ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 226 Purpose: To verify that an unexpected (not in-line with protocol specification) input sent towards O-DU S-Plane will not compromise the security of the SUT. Test setup and configuration: • The test requires easy to access MAC address information of the O-DU's open fronthaul interface and L2 connectivity (e.g. over L2 network switching device) to the target from the emulated attacker. • The test requires the normal UE procedures and user-plane traffic can be handled properly through the SUT. RECOMMENDATION: Use clause 5.6 Bidirectional throughput in different radio conditions and clause 6.1 Data Services tests from O-RAN TIFG End-to-End Test Specifications [4] as a benchmark for indicating correct behavior of the SUT. Refer to the diagram below for the test setup and configuration: Figure 24.2.1.2-1: S-Plane PTP Unexpected Input Test Setup Test procedure 1) The tester uses a packet capture tool to capture sample of legitimate PTP message sent towards the O-DU S-Plane. 2) The tester uses fuzzing tool to replay the captured PTP message while mutating its content and keeping original source/destination MAC address. Send at least 250 000 iterations of mutated PTP message based on a random seed. Expected results During the execution of the test, the degradation of service availability and performance of the SUT is not noticeable. RECOMMENDATION: Use clause 5.6 Bidirectional throughput in different radio conditions and clause 6.1 Data Services tests from O-RAN TIFG End-to-End Test Specifications [4] as a benchmark for indicating correct behavior of the SUT. Expected format of evidence: Log files, traffic captures and/or reports
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0ce77be9f03a15fedfc038153382bd6a
|
104 105
|
24.2.2 C-Plane
| |
0ce77be9f03a15fedfc038153382bd6a
|
104 105
|
24.2.2.1 C-Plane eCPRI DoS Attack
|
Requirement Name: O-DU C-Plane eCPRI DoS Attack ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 227 Requirement Reference: REQ-SEC-DOS-1 from clause 5.3.5.1, O-RAN Security Requirements and Control Specification [5] Requirement Description: "An O-RAN component with external network interface shall be able to withstand network transport protocol based volumetric DDoS attack without system crash and returning to service level after the attack". Threat References: T-CPLANE-O2 and T-O-RAN-09 in O-RAN Security Threat Modeling and Risk Assessment [3] SUT/s: O-RAN system Test Name: TC_E2E_ODU_CPlane_eCPRI_DoS Test description and applicability Purpose: To verify that a predefined volumetric DoS attack against O-DU C-Plane will not crash the SUT, returning to service level after the attack. Test setup and configuration • The test requires easy to access MAC address information of the O-DU's open fronthaul interface and L2 connectivity (e.g. over L2 network switching device) to the target from the emulated attacker. • The test requires the normal UE procedures and user-plane traffic can be handled properly through the SUT. RECOMMENDATION: Use clause 5.6 Bidirectional throughput in different radio conditions and clause 6.1 Data Services tests from O-RAN TIFG End-to-End Test Specifications [4] as a benchmark for indicating correct behavior of the SUT. Refer to the diagram below for the test setup and configuration: Figure 24.2.2.1-1: C-Plane eCPRI DoS Attack Test Setup Test procedure • Use test tool to generate several types of volumetric DoS attack against the MAC address of the O-DU C-Plane 1) Volumetric tiers: 10 Mbps, 100 Mbps, 1 Gbps 2) DoS Traffic types: eCPRI real-time Control data message over Ethernet. The C-Plane message types that are made to flow towards O-DU are: i) LAA LBT Status and response messages; ii) Ack/Nack Messages; and ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 228 iii) Wake-up Ready indication Messages. Refer to Figure 4.2-1 Lower layer fronthaul data flows in [26]. 3) DoS source address random mixed of: spoofed MAC of O-RU(s), random source MACs Expected results 1) During the test, the SUT maintains an operational level. 2) After the execution of the test, the degradation of service availability and performance of the SUT is not noticeable. RECOMMENDATION: Use clause 5.6 Bidirectional throughput in different radio conditions and clause 6.1 Data Services tests from TIFG E2E Test Specifications [4] as a benchmark for indicating correct behavior of the SUT. Expected format of evidence: Traffic captures and/or report files
|
0ce77be9f03a15fedfc038153382bd6a
|
104 105
|
24.2.2.2 C-Plane eCPRI Unexpected Input
|
Requirement Name: O-DU C-Plane Robustness Requirement Reference: REQ-SEC-OFCP-2 from clause 5.2.5.1.2, O-RAN Security Requirements and Control Specification [5] Requirement Description: The O-DU is able to detect and defend against application level attacks across the C-Plane messages with O-RUs, due to misbehavior or malicious intent. Threat References: T-O-RAN-09 in O-RAN Security Threat Modeling and Risk Assessment [3] SUT/s: O-RAN system Test Name: TC_E2E_ODU_CPlane_eCPRI_Robustness Test description and applicability Purpose: To verify that an unexpected (not in-line with protocol specification) input sent towards O-DU C-Plane will not compromise the security of the SUT. Test setup and configuration • The test requires easy to access MAC address information of the O-DU's open fronthaul interface and L2 connectivity (e.g. over L2 network switching device) to the target from the emulated attacker. • The test requires the normal UE procedures and user-plane traffic can be handled properly through the SUT. RECOMMENDATION: Use clause 5.6 Bidirectional throughput in different radio conditions and clause 6.1 Data Services tests from O-RAN E2E Test Specifications [4] as a benchmark for indicating correct behavior of the SUT. ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 229 Refer to the diagram below for the test setup and configuration: Figure 24.2.2.2-1: C-Plane eCPRI Unexpected Input Test Setup Test procedure 1) The tester uses a packet capture tool to capture sample of legitimate eCPRI message sent towards the O-DU C-Plane. 2) The tester uses a fuzzing tool to replay the captured eCPRI message while mutating its content (message type and/or payload) and keeping original source/destination MAC address. Send at least 250 000 iterations of mutated eCPRI message based on a random seed. Expected results During the execution of the test, the degradation of service availability and performance of the SUT is not noticeable. RECOMMENDATION: Use clause 5.6 Bidirectional throughput in different radio conditions and clause 6.1 Data Services tests from TIFG E2E Test Specifications [4] as a benchmark for indicating correct behavior of the SUT. Expected format of evidence: Traffic captures and/or report files
|
0ce77be9f03a15fedfc038153382bd6a
|
104 105
|
24.2.2.3 C-Plane eCPRI DoS Attack on O-RU
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Requirement Name: O-RU C-Plane eCPRI DoS Attack Requirement Reference: REQ-SEC-DOS-1 from clause 5.3.5.1, O-RAN Security Requirements and Control Specification [5] Requirement Description: "An O-RAN component with external network interface shall be able to withstand network transport protocol based volumetric DDoS attack without system crash and returning to service level after the attack". Threat References: T-O-RAN-09 in O-RAN Security Threat Modeling and Risk Assessment [3] SUT/s: O-RAN system Test Name: TC_E2E_ORU_CPlane_eCPRI_DoS Test description and applicability Purpose: To verify that a predefined volumetric DoS attack against O-RU C-Plane will not crash the SUT, returning to service level after the attack. ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 230 Test setup and configuration The test requires easy to access MAC address information of the O-RU's open fronthaul interface and L2 connectivity (e.g. over L2 network switching device) to the target from the emulated attacker. The test requires the normal UE procedures and user-plane traffic can be handled properly through the SUT. RECOMMENDATION: Use clause 5.6 Bidirectional throughput in different radio conditions and clause 6.1 Data Services tests from O-RAN TIFG End-to-End Test Specifications [4] as a benchmark for indicating correct behavior of the SUT. Refer to the diagram below for the test setup and configuration: Figure 24.2.2.3-1: C-Plane eCPRI DoS Attack on O-RU Test Setup Test procedure • Use test tool to generate several types of volumetric DoS attack against the MAC address of the O-RU C-Plane 1) Volumetric tiers: 10 Mbps, 100 Mbps, 1 Gbps 2) DoS Traffic types: eCPRI real-time ctrl data message over Ethernet. The valid C-Plane message types that are made to flow towards O-DU are: i) Scheduling commands (DL & UL) & Beamforming commands; ii) LAA LBT configuration commands and requests; iii) UE Channel information. 3) DoS source address, a mixed of: spoofed MAC of O-DU(s), random source MACs Expected results • During the test, the SUT maintains an operational level • After the execution of the test, the degradation of service availability and performance of the SUT is not noticeable. Expected format of evidence: Traffic captures and/or report files
|
0ce77be9f03a15fedfc038153382bd6a
|
104 105
|
24.2.2.4 C-Plane eCPRI Unexpected Input on O-RU
|
Requirement Name: O-RU C-Plane Robustness Requirement Reference: REQ-SEC-OFCP-2 from clause 5.2.5.1.2, O-RAN Security Requirements and Control Specification [5] ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 231 Requirement Description: The O-RU is able to detect and defend against application level attacks across the C-Plane messages with O-DUs, due to misbehavior or malicious intent. Threat References: T-O-RAN-09 in O-RAN Security Threat Modeling and Risk Assessment [3] SUT/s: O-RAN system Test Name: TC_E2E_ORU_CPlane_eCPRI_Robustness Test description and applicability Purpose: To verify that an unexpected (not in-line with protocol specification) input sent towards O-RU C-Plane will not compromise the security of the SUT. Test setup and configuration • The test requires easy to access MAC address information of the O-RU's open fronthaul interface and L2 connectivity (e.g. over L2 network switching device) to the target from the emulated attacker. • The test requires the normal UE procedures and user-plane traffic can be handled properly through the SUT. RECOMMENDATION: Use clause 5.6 Bidirectional throughput in different radio conditions and clause 6.1 Data Services tests from O-RAN E2E Test Specifications [4] as a benchmark for indicating correct behavior of the DUT. Refer to the diagram below for the test setup and configuration: Figure 24.2.2.4-1: C-Plane eCPRI Unexpected Input on O-RU Test Setup Test procedure 1) The tester uses a packet capture tool to capture sample of legitimate eCPRI message sent towards the O-RU C-Plane. 2) The tester uses a fuzzing tool to replay the captured eCPRI message while mutating its content (message type and/or payload) and keeping original source/destination MAC address. Send at least 250 000 iterations of mutated eCPRI message based on a random seed. Expected results • After the execution of the test, the degradation of service availability and performance of the SUT is not noticeable. RECOMMENDATION: Use clause 5.6 Bidirectional throughput in different radio conditions and clause 6.1 Data Services tests from TIFG E2E Test Specifications [4] as a benchmark for indicating correct behavior of the DUT. Expected format of evidence: Traffic captures and/or report files ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 232
|
0ce77be9f03a15fedfc038153382bd6a
|
104 105
|
24.2.3 A1 interface
| |
0ce77be9f03a15fedfc038153382bd6a
|
104 105
|
24.2.3.1 Near-RT RIC A1 Interface DoS Attack
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Requirement Name: Near-RT RIC A1 interface DoS recover Requirement Reference: REQ-SEC-NEAR-RT-6, O-RAN Security Requirements and Control Specification [5], clause 5.1.3.1 Requirement Description: "The Near-RT RIC shall be able to recover, without catastrophic failure, from a volumetric DDoS attack across the A1 interface, due to misbehavior or malicious intent." Threat References: T-O-RAN-09 in O-RAN Security Threat Modeling and Risk Assessment [3] SUT/s: O-RAN system Test Name: TC_E2E_NearRTRIC_A1_DoS Test description and applicability Purpose: to verify that a predefined volumetric DoS attack against Near-RT RIC A1 interface will not crash the SUT, returning to service level after the attack. Test setup and configuration • The test requires easy to access IP address information of the Near-RT RIC's A1 interface and a routable path to the target from the emulated attacker. • The test requires the normal UE procedures and user-plane traffic can be handled properly through the SUT. RECOMMENDATION: Use clause 5.6 Bidirectional throughput in different radio conditions and clause 6.1 Data Services tests from O-RAN E2E Test Specifications [4] as a benchmark for indicating correct behavior of the SUT. Refer to the diagram below for the test setup and configuration: Figure 24.2.3.1-1: Near-RT RIC A1 Interface DoS Attack Test Setup Test procedure 1) The tester uses a test tool to generate several types of volumetric DoS attack against the IP address of the Near-RT RIC A1 interface: 2) Volumetric tiers: 10 Mbps, 100 Mbps, 1 Gbps 3) DoS Traffic random mixed of: generic UDP packets, HTTP/HTTPs REST API calls ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 233 4) DoS source address: spoofed IP of Non-RT RIC, random source IPs or broadcast IP (UDP only) Expected results 1) During the test, the SUT maintains an operational level. 2) After the execution of the test, the degradation of service availability and performance of the SUT is not noticeable. RECOMMENDATION: Use clause 5.6 Bidirectional throughput in different radio conditions and clause 6.1 Data Services tests from TIFG E2E Test Specifications [4] as a benchmark for indicating correct behavior of the SUT. Expected format of evidence: Traffic captures and/or report files
|
0ce77be9f03a15fedfc038153382bd6a
|
104 105
|
24.2.3.2 Near-RT RIC A1 Interface Unexpected Input
|
Requirement Name: NearRT-RIC A1 Robustness Requirement Reference: REQ-SEC-NEAR-RT-7, O-RAN Security Requirements and Control Specification [5] clause 5.1.3.1 Requirement Description: "The Near-RT RIC shall be able to detect and defend against content-related attacks across the A1 interface, due to misbehavior or malicious intent." Threat References: T-O-RAN-09 in O-RAN Security Threat Modeling and Risk Assessment [3] SUT/s: O-RAN system Test Name: TC_E2E_NearRTRIC_A1_Robustness Test description and applicability Purpose: To verify that an unexpected (not in-line with protocol specification) input sent towards Near-RT RIC A1 interface will not compromise the security of the SUT. Test setup and configuration • The test requires easy to access IP address information of the Near-RT RIC's A1 interface and a routable path to the target from the emulated attacker. • The test requires the normal UE procedures and user-plane traffic can be handled properly through the SUT. RECOMMENDATION: Use clause 5.6 Bidirectional throughput in different radio conditions and clause 6.1 Data Services tests from O-RAN E2E Test Specifications [4] as a benchmark for indicating correct behavior of the SUT. Refer to the diagram below for the test setup and configuration: ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 234 Figure 24.2.3.2-1: Near-RT RIC A1 Interface Unexpected Input Test Setup Test procedure 1) The tester uses a packet capture tool to capture sample of legitimate HTTP/HTTPs REST API message sent towards the Near-RT RIC A1 interface 2) The tester uses a fuzzing tool to replay the captured HTTP/HTTPs REST API message while mutating its content and keeping original source/destination IP/port. Send at least 250 000 iterations of mutated HTTP/HTTPs REST API message based on a random seed Expected results 1) During the execution of the test, the degradation of service availability and performance of the SUT is not noticeable. RECOMMENDATION: Use clause 5.6 Bidirectional throughput in different radio conditions and clause 6.1 Data Services tests from TIFG E2E Test Specifications [4] as a benchmark for indicating correct behavior of the SUT. Expected format of evidence: Traffic captures and/or report files
|
0ce77be9f03a15fedfc038153382bd6a
|
104 105
|
24.2.3.3 Near-RT RIC A1 Vulnerability Assessment
|
Requirement Name: NearRT-RIC A1 Vulnerability Assessment Requirement Reference: REQ-SEC-SYS-1, O-RAN Security Requirements and Control Specification [5], clause 5.3.6 Requirement Description: "Known vulnerabilities in the OS and applications of an O-RAN component shall be clearly identified". Threat References: T-OPENSRC-01, T-OPENSRC-02 din O-RAN Security Threat Modeling and Risk Assessment [3] SUT/s: O-RAN system Test Name: TC_E2E_NearRTRIC_A1_Vulnerabilities Test description and applicability Purpose: To verify that exploitation attempts of well-known vulnerabilities executed blindly against Near-RT RIC A1 interface will not compromise security of the SUT Test setup and configuration • The test requires easy to access IP address information of the Near-RT RIC's A1 interface and a routable path to the target from the emulated attacker. ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 235 • The test requires the normal UE procedures and user-plane traffic can be handled properly through the SUT. • The test requires the vulnerability scanning tool has up-to-date database of well-known vulnerabilities (signatures/plugins) based on Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE). Document the actual version of vulnerability database (signatures/plugins) for further reference. RECOMMENDATION: Use clause 5.6 Bidirectional throughput in different radio conditions and clause 6.1 Data Services tests from O-RAN E2E Test Specifications [4] as a benchmark for indicating correct behavior of the SUT. Refer to the diagram below for the test setup and configuration: Figure 24.2.3.3-1: Near-RT RIC A1 Vulnerability Assessment Test Setup Test procedure 1) The tester uses a vulnerability scanning tool to execute a scan against the IP address of the Near-RT RIC A1 interface. The scan should have the following parameters defined: - TCP Ports: Port scanner scans all TCP ports in range 0-65535 on the IP interface of SUT. TCP SYN/ACK response by SUT are interpreted as open port. - UDP Ports: All UDP ports documented in vendor-provided list. Other UDP ports may be considered as open for the purpose of service detection. - Safe Checks: Disabled (to make sure that exploitation attempts of the vulnerabilities will be performed) NOTE: Due to the nature of UDP protocol, there is no simple method of open port detection similar to TCP/SCTP methods based on analysis of response message type (TCP: SYN/ACK, SCTP: INIT-ACK). In case of UDP, open port detection inevitably relies on service detection which is discussed in step 2 of this test procedure. In practice, port scans of entire UDP port range 0-65535 are impractical and time consuming. Typically, service detection is performed only for subset of UDP ports. UDP port subset selection is arbitrary and not standardized. Service detection in this test procedure is required for UDP ports from vendor-provided list and is optional for other UDP ports. Expected results During the execution of the test, the degradation of service availability and performance of the SUT is not noticeable. RECOMMENDATION: Use clause 5.6 Bidirectional throughput in different radio conditions and clause 6.1 Data Services tests from TIFG E2E Test Specifications [4] as a benchmark for indicating correct behavior of the SUT. Expected format of evidence: Tool testing report and traffic captures ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 236
|
0ce77be9f03a15fedfc038153382bd6a
|
104 105
|
24.2.4 O-Cloud
| |
0ce77be9f03a15fedfc038153382bd6a
|
104 105
|
24.2.4.1 O-Cloud side-channel DoS attack
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Requirement Name: O-Cloud DoS Attack Requirement Reference: REQ-SEC-DOS-1 from clause 5.3.5.1, O-RAN Security Requirements and Control Specification [5] Requirement Description: "An O-RAN component with external network interface shall be able to withstand network transport protocol based volumetric DDoS attack without system crash and returning to service level after the attack". Threat References: T-O-RAN-09 in O-RAN Security Threat Modeling and Risk Assessment [3] SUT/s: O-RAN system Test Name: TC_E2E_OCloud_SideChannel_DoS Test description and applicability Purpose: To verify that a noisy neighbor DoS attack against O-Cloud for resource starvation will not crash the SUT, returning to service level after the attack. Test setup and configuration • The test requires access to the O-Cloud platform hosting the network slice(s) of the O-RAN system. • The test requires the normal UE procedures and user-plane traffic can be handled properly through the SUT. • Logging and alerts in the O-cloud are enabled. Network monitoring tools may be used. RECOMMENDATION: Use clause 5.6 Bidirectional throughput in different radio conditions and clause 6.1 Data Services tests from O-RAN E2E Test Specifications [4] as a benchmark for indicating correct behavior of the SUT. Refer to the diagram below for the test setup and configuration: Figure 24.2.4.1-1: O-Cloud side-channel DoS attack Test Setup Noisy Neighbor VNF(s) can be deployed into an existing slice or a new slice of the shared resources with the existing slice under test. Test procedure 1) The tester uses test tool (through O-Cloud MANO) to instantiate noisy neighbor VNFs. ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 237 a) Noisy Neighbor tenant: existing slice or a new slice of the shared resources with the existing slice. b) The Noisy Neighbor tenants utilizes these shared resources including CPU, memory, storage, and network. The Noisy Neighbor tenants exhaust all the remaining shared resources. The duration of the test is at least 3 minutes or long enough to cover the benchmarking tests. 2) Run the benchmark test again with the noisy neighbors. 3) Check the logs and alerts that are associated to the test at steps 2 and 3. Expected results • After the execution of the test, the degradation of service availability and performance of the SUT is not noticeable. • The Noisy Neighbor attack is properly logged and alerted by the O-Cloud. RECOMMENDATION: Use clause 5.6 Bidirectional throughput in different radio conditions and clause 6.1 Data Services tests from TIFG E2E Test Specifications [4] as a benchmark for indicating correct behavior of the SUT. Expected format of evidence: Logs, results, screenshots, report
|
0ce77be9f03a15fedfc038153382bd6a
|
104 105
|
25 Security test of Shared O-RU
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0ce77be9f03a15fedfc038153382bd6a
|
104 105
|
25.1 Overview
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This clause contains security tests to validate security controls related to the Shared O-RU and the Shared O-RU architecture.
|
0ce77be9f03a15fedfc038153382bd6a
|
104 105
|
25.2 Shared O-RU test cases
| |
0ce77be9f03a15fedfc038153382bd6a
|
104 105
|
25.2.1 mTLS for mutual authentication
|
Requirement Name: SEC-CTL-SharedORU-1 Requirement Reference: Clause 5.1.9.2, Security Controls, Shared O-RU, O-RAN Security Requirements and Controls Specifications [5] Requirement Description: mTLS support on Shared O-RU Threat References: T-SharedORU-06 DUT/s: Shared O-RU Test Name: TC_SharedORU_mTLS Test description and applicability Purpose: To verify the Shared O-RU is able to mutually authenticate with an O-RU Controller using mTLS, with PKI- based X.509 certificates. Test setup and configuration DUT shall be the Shared O-RU with mTLS 1.2, or 1.3, support enabled. Test procedure This test case follows the test procedure for mTLS specified in mTLS Test Procedure, clause 6.3.3. ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 238 Expected results The Shared O-RU supports mutual authentication with an O-RU Controller using mTLS. Expected format of evidence: Log entries and packet captures.
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