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11.1.3.1.3 FH M-plane SSH Certificate-Based NACM Access Control
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Requirement Name: M-Plane access control protection over FH interface using SSH Requirement Reference & Description: clause 5.4 in O-RAN Fronthaul Working Group Management Plane Specification [21] Threat References: 'T-O-RAN-05' clause 5.4.1, 'T-FRHAUL-01, T-FRHAUL-02, T-MPLANE-01' clause 5.4.1.2 in O-RAN Security Threat Modeling and Risk Assessment [3] DUT/s: O-RU Test Name: TC_FH_MPLANE_SSH-CERTIFICATE-BASED_NACM_ACCESS_CONTROL Test description and applicability Purpose: The purpose of this test is to verify the SSH-certificate-based NACM access control on the FH interface between O-RU and O-DU. Test setup and configuration 1) NACM with NETCONF is enabled and configured for SSH-certificate-based authorization on the FH interface. 2) Access control rules and permissions are defined and configured on both the O-RU and O-DU. 3) SSH is properly implemented and configured as defined in [2] clause 4.1. Test procedure 1) Execute the test on the SSH protocol as defined in clause 6.2. 2) Positive Case: Successful SSH-certificate-based NACM authorization and access control. - Test the successful enforcement of SSH-certificate-based NACM policies on the FH interface. a) Establish an SSH connection using the SSH key and certificate. b) Perform an operation on the FH interface with the O-RU using the SSH connection. c) Verify that the O-RU grants or denies access based on the SSH-certificate-based NACM rules and permissions. 3) Negative Case: Unauthorized access denial. - Test the denial of access to unauthorized operations on the FH interface, including attempts with invalid credentials and invalid usernames. d) Attempt with invalid key or certificate • Attempt to establish an SSH connection using an invalid key or certificate.. • Confirm that the O-RU denies the SSH connection due to invalid credentials. ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 105 e) Attempt with invalid username • Attempt to establish an SSH connection using a valid SSH key and certificate but with an invalid username. • Verify that the O-RU denies the SSH connection attempt due to the invalid username. Expected Results 1) For step 1): Expected results in clause 6.2.4 2) For step 2): - The SSH connection is successfully established using the SSH key and certificate. - The O-RU evaluates the SSH certificate-based NACM rules and permissions. - The O-RU grants or denies access to the O-DU based on the SSH-certificate-based NACM configuration. 3) For step 3): - Denial of SSH connection due to invalid key or certificate. - Denial of SSH connection due to an invalid username. Expected format of evidence 1) For step 1): Logs and screenshots showing adherence to SSH protocol specifications as defined in [2] clause 4.1. 2) For step 2), Logs or audit records indicating both successful access and access denial based on SSH-certificate-based NACM. 3) For step 3), Logs or error messages indicating access denial for unauthorized operations for both invalid credentials (key/certificate) and invalid usernames.
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11.1.3.2 SSH-based M-Plane integrity, confidentiality and replay protection
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11.1.3.2.0 Overview
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The following test cases verify the M-Plane integrity, confidentiality, and replay protection over the FH interface using SSH.
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11.1.3.2.1 FH M-plane SSH Confidentiality
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Requirement Name: M-Plane confidentiality protection over FH interface using SSH Requirement Reference & Description: clause 5.4 in O-RAN Fronthaul Working Group Management Plane Specification [21] Threat References: 'T-O-RAN-05' clause 5.4.1, 'T-FRHAUL-01, T-FRHAUL-02, T-MPLANE-01' clause 5.4.1.2 in O-RAN Security Threat Modeling and Risk Assessment [3] DUT/s: O-RU, O-DU Test Name: TC_FH_MPLANE_SSH_CONFIDENTIALITY Test description and applicability Purpose: The purpose of this test is to verify the confidentiality of M-Plane data transmitted over the front-haul (FH) interface. ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 106 Test setup and configuration 1) The O-RU and O-DU devices are properly configured and operational. 2) SSH keys and certificates are generated and installed on both the O-RU and O-DU devices. 3) SSH configuration is enabled to enforce confidentiality on the FH interface. 4) SSH is properly implemented and configured as defined in [2] clause 4.1. Test procedure 1) Execute the test on the SSH protocol as defined in clause 6.2. 2) Encryption and decryption of M-Plan over FH - Test the encryption and decryption of M-Plane data transmitted over the FH interface. a) Establish an SSH connection from the O-RU to the O-DU using the SSH key and certificate. EXAMPLE: "Command: ssh -i <path_to_private_key> -o CertificateFile=<path_to_certificate> <username>@<O-DU_IP>" b) Transmit data from the O-RU to the O-DU over the SSH connection. c) Verify that the data received by the O-DU is successfully decrypted and in the original form. Expected Results 1) For step 1): Expected results in clause 6.2.4 2) For step 2): a) The SSH connection is successfully established using the SSH key and certificate. b) The transmitted data is encrypted during transmission. c) The O-DU successfully decrypts the received data. The decrypted data matches the original data transmitted by the O-RU. Expected format of evidence 1) For step 1): Logs and screenshots showing adherence to SSH protocol specifications as defined in [2] clause 4.1. 2) For step 2): Logs or output showing successful encryption and decryption of data.
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11.1.3.2.2 FH M-plane SSH Integrity
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Requirement Name: M-Plane integrity protection over FH interface using SSH Requirement Reference & Description: clause 5.4 in O-RAN Fronthaul Working Group Management Plane Specification [21] Threat References: 'T-O-RAN-05' clause 5.4.1, 'T-FRHAUL-01, T-FRHAUL-02, T-MPLANE-01' clause 5.4.1.2 in O-RAN Security Threat Modeling and Risk Assessment [3] DUT/s: O-RU, O-DU Test Name: TC_FH_MPLANE_SSH_INTEGRITY Test description and applicability Purpose: The purpose of this test is to verify the integrity of M-Plane data transmitted over the front-haul (FH) interface. ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 107 Test setup and configuration 1) The O-RU and O-DU devices are properly configured and operational. 2) SSH keys and certificates are generated and installed on both the O-RU and O-DU devices. 3) SSH configuration is enabled to enforce data integrity on the FH interface. 4) SSH is properly implemented and configured as defined in [2] clause 4.1. Test procedure 1) Execute the test on the SSH protocol as defined in clause 6.2. 2) Data integrity verification and tampering detection. - Test the successful verification of M-Plane data integrity transmitted over the FH interface and the detection of tampering by the O-DU. a) Establish an SSH connection from the O-RU to the O-DU using the SSH key and certificate. EXAMPLE: "Command: ssh -i <path_to_private_key> -o CertificateFile=<path_to_certificate> <username>@<O-DU_IP>" b) Transmit data from the O-RU to the O-DU over the SSH connection. c) Verify the integrity of the received data on the O-DU. d) Modify the transmitted data during transmission and attempt to pass it to the O-DU. e) Verify that the O-DU detects the data tampering and rejects the tampered data. Expected Results 1) For step 1): Expected results in clause 6.2.4 2) For step 2): a) The SSH connection is successfully established using the SSH key and certificate. b) The transmitted data is protected with integrity checks. c) The O-DU successfully verifies the integrity of the received data. d) The O-DU detects the data tampering and rejects the tampered data. Expected format of evidence 1) For step 1): Logs and screenshots showing adherence to SSH protocol specifications as defined in [2] clause 4.1. 2) For step 2): Logs or output indicating successful integrity verification of data and detection of data tampering.
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11.1.3.2.3 FH M-plane SSH Replay
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Requirement Name: M-Plane replay protection over FH interface using SSH Requirement Reference & Description: clause 5.4 in O-RAN Fronthaul Working Group Management Plane Specification [21] Threat References: 'T-O-RAN-05' clause 5.4.1, 'T-FRHAUL-01, T-FRHAUL-02, T-MPLANE-01' clause 5.4.1.2 in O-RAN Security Threat Modeling and Risk Assessment [3] DUT/s: O-RU, O-DU Test Name: TC_FH_MPLANE_SSH_REPLAY ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 108 Test description and applicability Purpose: The purpose of this test is to verify the replay protection mechanism on the front-haul (FH) interface using SSH. Test setup and configuration 1) The O-RU and O-DU devices are properly configured and operational. 2) SSH keys and certificates are generated and installed on both the O-RU and O-DU devices. 3) SSH configuration is enabled to enforce replay protection on the FH interface. 4) SSH is properly implemented and configured as defined in [2] clause 4.1. Test procedure 1) Execute the test on the SSH protocol as defined in clause 6.2. 2) Successful detection and prevention of replayed data. • Test the successful detection and prevention of replayed data on the FH interface. a) Establish an SSH connection. b) Validate the successful establishment of the SSH connection c) Transmit data from the O-DU to the O-RU over the SSH connection. EXAMPLE: • Packets containing configurations changes. A retransmission of these packets could lead to misconfigurations. • Packets initiating software updates. Replay attacks could cause re-initiation of updates, leading to service disruptions or the introduction of vulnerabilities. d) Capture the transmitted data in a manner that it can be used for a replay attack attempt. e) Verify if the data packet contains unique identifiers (like sequence numbers or timestamps). f) Attempt to replay the transmitted data to the O-RU. g) Check how the O-RU compares incoming data against expected sequence numbers or timestamps. h) Verify that the O-RU detects the replayed data and discards it. Expected Results 1) For step 1): Expected results in clause 6.2.4 2) For step 2): a) The SSH connection is successfully established using the SSH key and certificate. b) The transmitted data is protected with a replay protection mechanism. c) The O-RU detects the replayed data and discards it. Expected format of evidence 1) For step 1): Logs and screenshots showing adherence to SSH protocol specifications as defined in [2] clause 4.1. 2) For step 2): Logs or output indicating successful detection and prevention of replayed data. ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 109 11.1.3.3 TLS-based M-Plane authentication, authorization and access control protection
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11.1.3.3.0 Overview
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The test cases outlined in this clause verify M-Plane authenticity, authorization, and access control protection over the FH interface using TLS.
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11.1.3.3.1 FH M-plane TLS Authentication
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Requirement Name: M-Plane authenticity protection over FH interface using TLS Requirement Reference & Description: clause 5.4 in O-RAN Fronthaul Working Group Management Plane Specification [21] Threat References: 'T-O-RAN-05' clause 5.4.1, 'T-FRHAUL-01, T-FRHAUL-02, T-MPLANE-01' clause 5.4.1.2 in O-RAN Security Threat Modeling and Risk Assessment [3] DUT/s: O-RU, O-DU Test Name: TC_FH_MPLANE_TLS_AUTHENTICATION Test description and applicability Purpose: The purpose of this test is to verify the authentication mechanism between the O-RU and O-DU components over the TLS-based NACM with NETCONF on the FH interface for M-Plane. Test setup and configuration 1) For positive case: The O-RU and O-DU components are configured with valid TLS certificates for mutual authentication. 2) For negative case: The O-RU and O-DU components have misconfigured or invalid TLS certificates. 3) The NETCONF server is configured to enforce client authentication as defined in [2] clause 4.3. 4) TLS is properly implemented and configured as defined in [2] clause 4.2. Test procedure 1) Execute the test on the TLS protocol as defined in clause 6.3. 2) Positive Case: Successful authentication. • Test the successful authentication of the O-RU and O-DU components over the TLS-based NACM with NETCONF on the FH interface. a) Initiates a TLS handshake. • Use a command or tool that starts a TLS session. b) Observe and validate that the O-RU checks the O-DU's certificate. • Check O-RU logs or use network monitoring tools to confirm certificate verification and presentation. c) Confirm that the O-RU successfully verifies the O-DU's certificate, completing the mutual authentication. • Review O-RU logs or use network monitoring tools to confirm the certificate verification. 3) Negative Case: Failed authentication. ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 110 • Test the failure of authentication over the TLS-based NACM with NETCONF on the FH interface due to invalid certificates. a) Initiate a TLS handshake from the O-DU with an invalid certificate. b) Check O-RU logs or network monitoring tools to observe the certificate verification attempt. c) Confirm that the TLS handshake fails and mutual authentication is not completed. • Look for error messages or handshake failure indicators in the network traffic or logs. Expected Results 1) For step 1): Expected results in clause 6.3.4. 2) For step 2), The O-RU and O-DU components successfully authenticate each other over the TLS-based NACM with NETCONF on the FH interface. 3) For step 3), The O-RU and O-DU components fail to authenticate each other over the TLS-based NACM with NETCONF on the FH interface. Expected format of evidence 1) For step 1): Logs and screenshots showing adherence to TLS protocol specifications as defined in [2] clause 4.2. 2) For step 2), Logs or output indicating successful authentication. 3) For step 3), Logs or output indicating failed authentication.
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11.1.3.3.2 FH M-plane TLS Authorization
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Requirement Name: M-Plane authorization and access control protection over FH interface using TLS Requirement Reference & Description: clause 5.4 in O-RAN Fronthaul Working Group Management Plane Specification [21] Threat References: 'T-O-RAN-05' clause 5.4.1, 'T-FRHAUL-01, T-FRHAUL-02, T-MPLANE-01' clause 5.4.1.2 in O-RAN Security Threat Modeling and Risk Assessment [3] DUT/s: O-RU, O-DU Test Name: TC_FH_MPLANE_TLS_AUTHORIZATION Test description and applicability Purpose: The purpose of this test is to verify the authorization mechanism for the O-RU and O-DU components over the TLS-based NACM with NETCONF on the FH interface. Test setup and configuration 1) The O-RU and O-DU components are successfully authenticated and have established a secure connection with the NETCONF server. 2) For positive case: The NACM rules and policies are properly configured on the NETCONF server to enforce authorization. 3) For negative case: The NACM rules and policies are misconfigured, or the O-RU is attempting an unauthorized operation. Test procedure 1) Positive Case: Successful authorization. ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 111 • Test the successful authorization of the O-RU and O-DU components over the TLS-based NACM with NETCONF on the FH interface. a) The O-RU sends a NETCONF request to the O-DU component to perform an authorized operation. b) The NETCONF server evaluates the NACM rules and policies to determine if the O-RU is authorized to perform the requested operation. c) The O-DU component executes the authorized operation and sends a response to the O-RU. 2) Negative Case: Failed authorization. • Test the failure of authorization for the O-RU and O-DU components over the TLS-based NACM with NETCONF on the FH interface. a) The O-RU sends a NETCONF request to the O-DU component to perform an unauthorized operation. b) The NETCONF server evaluates the NACM rules and policies and denies the unauthorized operation. c) The O-DU component rejects the unauthorized operation and sends an error response to the O-RU. Expected Results 1) For step 1) Positive case: successful authorization: a) The O-RU's NETCONF request for an authorized operation is successfully received by the O-DU. b) The NETCONF server, after evaluating the NACM rules and policies, grants permission for the authorized operation. c) The O-DU successfully executes the authorized operation and sends a confirmation response to the O-RU. 2) For step 2) Negative case: failed authorization: a) The O-RU's NETCONF request for an unauthorized operation is received by the O-DU. b) The NETCONF server, upon evaluating the NACM rules and policies, denies the unauthorized operation. c) The O-DU does not execute the unauthorized operation and sends an error response to the O-RU, indicating the rejection. Expected format of evidence 1) For step 1), Logs or output indicating successful authorization. 2) For step 2), Logs or output indicating failed authorization.
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11.1.3.4 TLS-based M-Plane integrity, confidentiality and replay protection
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11.1.3.4.0 Overview
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The following test cases verify the M-Plane integrity, confidentiality, and replay protection over the FH interface using TLS. ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 112
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104 105
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11.1.3.4.1 FH M-plane TLS Confidentiality
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Requirement Name: M-Plane confidentiality protection over FH interface using TLS Requirement Reference & Description: clause 5.4 in O-RAN Fronthaul Working Group Management Plane Specification [21] Threat References: 'T-O-RAN-05' clause 5.4.1, 'T-FRHAUL-01, 02, T-MPLANE-01' clause 5.4.1.2 in O-RAN Security Threat Modeling and Risk Assessment [3] DUT/s: O-RU, O-DU Test Name: TC_FH_MPLANE_TLS_CONFIDENTIALITY Test description and applicability Purpose: The purpose of this test is to verify that no sensitive data is revealed at the FH M-Plane interface. It ensures that sensitive information remains protected from unauthorized access or disclosure. Test setup and configuration 1) O-RU, O-DU support TLS and be connected in simulated/real network environment. 2) The test environment is set up with FH M-Plane interface configured. 3) The tester has access to the original data transported over the FH M-Plane interface. 4) TLS is properly implemented and configured as defined in [2] clause 4.2. 5) The tester has knowledge of the confidentiality algorithm and confidentiality protection keys used for encrypting the encapsulated payload. Test procedure 1) The tester executes the test on the TLS protocol as defined in clause 6.3. 2) The tester establishes a secure communication session over the FH M-Plane interface and verifies that all protocol versions and combinations of cryptographic algorithms for confidentiality protection that are mandated by the security profile in clause 4.2 of O-RAN security protocols specification [2] are supported by O-RU and O-DU. 3) The tester establishes a secure communication session over the FH M-Plane interface and verifies that this is not possible when the O-RU and O-DU only offers a feature, including protocol version and combination of cryptographic algorithms for confidentiality protection, that is forbidden by the security profile in clause 4.2 of O-RAN security protocols specification [2]. 4) The tester establishes a secure communication session over the FH M-Plane interface and captures the network traffic during the communication session using each protocol version and cryptographic algorithm combination outlined in in clause 4.2 of O-RAN security protocols specification [2]. - Use a tool or command that allows specification of TLS protocol versions and cryptographic algorithms during the session initiation. 5) The tester analyses the captured traffic to identify any instances where information is transmitted in clear text or without appropriate encryption. EXAMPLE 1: Use network capturing tools like Wireshark during an active TLS session to capture the encrypted data transmitted between the O-RU and O-DU. 6) The tester verifies the captured data so that only the intended recipient can decrypt it. - Use a tool capable of decrypting TLS traffic. EXAMPLE 2: The tester might use OpenSSL or a similar tool. 7) The tester ensures that the encryption process does not allow the attacker to intercept the data in transit between the O-RU and O-DU except with the provision of the appropriate decryption key. ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 113 Expected results 1) Expected results in clause 6.3.4. 2) All sensitive data transmitted over the FH M-Plane interface is properly encrypted. 3) No instances of sensitive information being transmitted in clear text is observed. 4) Insecure options of protocol version and combination of cryptographic algorithms is not accepted by O-RU and O-DU. Expected format of evidence 1) Logs or screenshots showing the execution of tests as per TLS protocol in clause 6.3. 2) Network captures or logs demonstrating successful session establishments using the mandated protocol versions and algorithms. 3) Logs or network captures showing attempts to establish sessions with forbidden protocol versions and algorithms, and their subsequent rejections. 4) Screenshots or reports from the analysis tools used to inspect the encrypted data showing no instances of clear text sensitive information. 5) Logs or reports from testing tools, illustrating the failure to intercept or decrypt the data in transit without the correct key.
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0ce77be9f03a15fedfc038153382bd6a
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104 105
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11.1.3.4.2 FH M-plane TLS Integrity
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Requirement Name: M-Plane integrity protection over FH interface using TLS Requirement Reference & Description: clause 5.4 in O-RAN Fronthaul Working Group Management Plane Specification [21] Threat References: 'T-O-RAN-05' clause 5.4.1, 'T-FRHAUL-01, 02, T-MPLANE-01' clause 5.4.1.2 in O-RAN Security Threat Modeling and Risk Assessment [3] DUT/s: O-RU, O-DU Test Name: TC_FH_MPLANE_TLS_INTEGRITY Test description and applicability Purpose: The purpose of this test is to verify the integrity of the data transmitted over the FH M-Plane interface, ensuring that no data is modified or altered during transmission (Integrity). Test setup and configuration • O-RU and O-DU support TLS and be connected in simulated/real network environment. • The test environment is set up with FH M-Plane interface configured. • The tester has access to the original data transported over the FH M-Plane interface. • TLS is properly implemented and configured as defined in [2] clause 4.2. • The tester has knowledge of the integrity algorithm (Hash Message Authentication Code) and the protection keys. Test procedure 1) Execution of the test on the TLS protocol as defined in clause 6.3. 2) Setup and verification of supported protocols and algorithms: - Establish a secure communication session over the FH M-Plane interface. ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 114 - Using a protocol analyser tool, verify that all protocol versions and combinations of cryptographic algorithms for integrity protection mandated by the security profile in clause 4.2 of O-RAN security protocols specification [2] are supported by both O-RU and O-DU. - Ensure that the session establishment fails, indicating that forbidden features are not supported. 3) Capture and analysis of network traffic: - Using a network packet capture tool (e.g. Wireshark), establish a secure communication session over the FH M-Plane interface and capture the network traffic during the session. EXAMPLE 1: Use Wireshark. - The tester modifies captured packets using a packet editing tool to simulate potential integrity breaches. This involves altering the MAC. EXAMPLE 2: Use Scapy or a custom script. - After modifying the packets, the tester reinjects them back into the network to simulate an integrity breach scenario. The tester monitors the DUT's response to the reinjected packets. Specifically, the tester observes whether the DUT detects and drops/ignores the packets with compromised integrity. - Analyse the captured traffic to identify any instances where data integrity might be compromised. Look for signs of modified, tampered, or out-of-sequence packets. Expected Results • Expected results in clause 6.3.4 • For modified traffic: Any modified packets are detected and rejected. • There is no modification/corruption of data between sending and receiving nodes. The MAC always matches with the calculated and derived at sending and receiving nodes respectively. Expected format of evidence • Logs demonstrating successful session establishments using the compliant configurations. • Logs indicating any detection of tampered packets injected into the network.
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0ce77be9f03a15fedfc038153382bd6a
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104 105
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11.1.3.4.3 FH M-plane TLS Replay
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Requirement Name: M-Plane replay protection over FH interface using TLS Requirement Reference & Description: clause 5.4 in O-RAN Fronthaul Working Group Management Plane Specification [21] Threat References: 'T-O-RAN-05' clause 5.4.1, 'T-FRHAUL-01, 02, T-MPLANE-01' clause 5.4.1.2 in O-RAN Security Threat Modeling and Risk Assessment [3] DUT/s: O-RU, O-DU Test Name: TC_FH_MPLANE_REPLAY Test description and applicability Purpose: The purpose of this test is to verify that no malicious capture and subsequent replay of network traffic to deceive the system or gain unauthorized access over the FH M-Plane interface. (Anti-replay). Test setup and configuration • O-RU and O-DU support TLS and be connected in simulated/real network environment. • The test environment is set up with the FH M-Plane interface configured. • The tester has access to the original data transported over the FH M-Plane interface. ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 115 • TLS is properly implemented and configured as defined in [2] clause 4.2. • The tester has knowledge of the anti-replay security controls implemented over FH M-Plane interface. Test procedure 1) The tester executes the test on the TLS protocol as defined in clause 6.3. 2) The tester establishes a secure communication session over the FH M-Plane interface and captures the network traffic during the communication session. 3) The tester identifies packets or data that are susceptible to replay attacks, such as those containing authentication credentials, session identifiers, or critical commands. 4) The tester attempts to replay the captured packets or data by resending them to the O-RU and O-DU. 5) The tester observes O-RU and O-DU behaviour and response to the replayed packets. 6) The tester verifies each data packet assigned with a unique sequence number included in the packet header. 7) The tester verifies each data packet contains a timestamp. 8) The tester also verifies the sequence number of each received packet and compares it to the previously received packet's sequence number and if the sequence number is too low or too high, the packet is considered a replay attack and is discarded. Expected Results • Expected results in clause 6.3.4 • O-RU and O-DU implement countermeasures to detect and prevent replay attacks. This may include the use of sequence numbers, timestamps, or other forms of message authentication codes. • O-RU and O-DU reject or ignore replayed packets and not perform any sensitive or unauthorized actions. Expected format of evidence 1) Logs demonstrating the detection and rejection of replayed packets, validating the effectiveness of anti-replay mechanisms.
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11.1.4 U-Plane
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11.1.4.1 U-Plane eCPRI Unexpected Input
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11.1.4.1.0 Overview
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The test cases in this clause focus on the O-DU's capability to recognize, handle, and respond appropriately to such anomalies in user plane packets over the eCPRI. This includes scenarios where packets are malformed or when they present unexpected payload sizes.
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11.1.4.1.1 FH U-Plane Malformed Packet
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Requirement Name: Handling and rejection of malformed or invalid user plane packets Requirement Reference & Description: clause 5.2.5.2.1 in O-RAN Security Requirements and Controls Specifications [5] Threat References: 'T-FRHAUL-01, T-FRHAUL-02, T-UPLANE-01' clause 7.4.1.2 in O-RAN Security Threat Modeling and Risk Assessment [3] DUT/s: O-RU, O-DU Test Name: TC_FH_U-PLANE_MALFORMED_PACKET ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 116 Test description and applicability Purpose: The purpose of this test is to verify the O-DU's ability to handle and reject malformed or invalid user plane packets. Test setup and configuration • A valid eCPRI connection between the O-RU and O-DU. Test procedure 1) Generate a user plane packet with invalid or malformed data, such as incorrect headers, corrupted payload, or unsupported formats. 2) Transmit the malformed packet over the eCPRI. 3) Monitor the O-DU's response and behaviour. 4) Verify that the O-DU identifies and rejects the malformed packet. 5) Observe the impact on the O-DU, such as error messages, logging, or abnormal behavior. Expected Results • The O-DU detects and rejects malformed or invalid user plane packets. • It handles the rejection gracefully without affecting normal operation. • Appropriate error messages or log entries are generated. Expected Format of Evidence: • Steps performed with detailed execution logs. • Screenshots or logs indicating the detection and rejection of the malformed packet.
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11.1.4.1.2 FH U-Plane Unexpected Payload Size
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Requirement Name: Handling and rejection of malformed or invalid user plane packets Requirement Reference & Description: clause 5.2.5.2.1 in O-RAN Security Requirements and Controls Specifications [5] Threat References: 'T-FRHAUL-01, T-FRHAUL-02, T-UPLANE-01' clause 7.4.1.2 in O-RAN Security Threat Modeling and Risk Assessment [3] DUT/s: O-RU, O-DU Test Name: TC_FH_U-PLANE_UNEXPECTED_PAYLOAD_SIZE Test description and applicability Purpose: The purpose of this test is to verify the O-DU's ability to handle unexpected payload sizes in user plane packets. Test setup and configuration • A valid eCPRI connection between the O-RU and O-DU. Test procedure 1) Generate a user plane packet with an unexpected payload size, exceeding the normal or allowed range. 2) Transmit the packet with the unexpected payload size over the eCPRI. 3) Monitor the O-DU's response and behaviour. ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 117 4) Verify that the O-DU detects the unexpected payload size and takes appropriate action. 5) Observe the impact on the O-DU, such as error handling, packet drops, or performance degradation. Expected Results • The O-DU detects and handles unexpected payload sizes in user plane packets. • It either rejects the packet or handles it with appropriate error handling mechanisms. • The O-DU maintains acceptable performance levels despite the unexpected payload size. Expected Format of Evidence: • Steps performed with detailed execution logs. • Screenshots or logs indicating the detection and handling of the unexpected payload size.
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0ce77be9f03a15fedfc038153382bd6a
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104 105
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11.1.5 S-Plane
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104 105
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11.1.5.1 DoS Attack against a Master Clock
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104 105
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11.1.5.1.0 Overview
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The tests outlined in this clause evaluate the system's defence capabilities against DoS attacks targeting the master clock, especially in different LLS configurations.
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104 105
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11.1.5.1.1 DOS Master Clock LLS C1 C2 C3
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Requirement Name: S-Plane DoS protection Requirement Reference & Description: 'REQ-SEC-DOS-1' clause 5.3.5 in O-RAN Security Requirements and Controls Specifications [5] Threat References: 'T-SPLANE-01' clause 5.4.1.2 in O-RAN Security Threat Modeling and Risk Assessment [3] DUT/s: O-RU, O-DU Test Name: TC_DOS_MASTER_CLOCK_LLS_C1_C2_C3 Test description and applicability Purpose: The purpose of this test is to verify the protection of the S-plane against a denial of service (DoS) attack targeting the master clock in LLS-C1, LLS-C2, LLS-C3 configurations. Test setup and configuration 1) O-DU and O-RU are properly configured and connected. 2) For LLS-C1: The master clock functionality is enabled on the O-DU. O-DU is acting as a master and directly synchronizes O-RU. 3) For LLS-C2: One or more Ethernet switches are allowed in the fronthaul network. O-DU acting as master to distribute network timing toward O-RU. 4) For LLS-C3: One or more PRTC/T-GM are implemented in the fronthaul network to distribute network timing toward O-DU and O-RU. 5) A network monitoring tool is set up to capture and analyse network traffic. Test procedure 1) Start monitoring the network traffic between the O-DU and O-RU. ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 118 2) Simulate a DoS attack by sending an excessive number of time protocol packets to the master clock using a testing tool. - Simulate DoS attack for LLS-C1 Use a command-line tool like ptp4l or pgrptp with appropriate options to flood the Master clock's IP address or hostname with an excessive number of time protocol packets. - Simulate DoS attack for LLS-C2 Use a custom script or tool that supports PTP communication to generate and send a large volume of time protocol packets targeting the IP address or hostname of the Master clock. - Simulate DoS attack for LLS-C3 Use a custom script or tool that supports PTP communication to generate and send a large volume of time protocol packets targeting the PRTC/T-GM in the LLS-C3 configuration. 3) Verify the functionality of the master clock and the synchronization status between the O-DU and O-RU during the attack. 4) Observe the impact on the accuracy and availability of the master clock. 5) Verify the functionality of the slave clocks at the O-RUs and their synchronization status with the master clock during the attack. 6) Evaluate the impact on O-RUs relying on accurate timing information: - Measure the timing accuracy at the O-RUs before initiating the DoS attack to establish a baseline. - During the DoS attack, continuously monitor the timing accuracy at the O-RUs at regular intervals (e.g. every 10 seconds). - Compare the timing accuracy measurements taken during the attack to the baseline measurements. - Identify any deviations or discrepancies in timing accuracy that exceed acceptable thresholds. - Document any observed impact on O-RU operations that rely on precise timing, such as frame alignment, data transmission synchronization, or other time-sensitive processes. - After the DoS attack has concluded, continue monitoring the O-RUs to determine how quickly they recover and return to their baseline timing accuracy. Expected Results 1) The S-plane detects and mitigates the DoS attack against the master clock for each LLS configuration (C1, C2, C3). 2) The master clock continues to operate with minimal impact on accuracy and availability. 3) The synchronization status between the O-DU and O-RU remains stable. 4) The slave clocks maintain synchronization with their respective master clocks, although some minor degradation may be expected. 5) O-RUs relying on accurate timing information should continue to function, although some degradation may be observed during the attack. Expected Format of Evidence: The following evidence, in one or more formats as applicable, should be provided for each LLS configuration (C1, C2, C3): 1) Network traffic logs showing the excessive time protocol packets sent to the mater clock during the attack in LLS-C1, through Ethernet switches in LLS-C2 and targeting PRTC/T-GM in LLS-C3. 2) Monitoring reports indicating the behaviour of the master clock and synchronization status between the O-DU and O-RU during the attack. ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 119 3) Analysis of the impact on the accuracy and availability of the master clock. 4) Evaluation of the synchronization status of the slave clocks during the attack.
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0ce77be9f03a15fedfc038153382bd6a
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104 105
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11.1.5.1.2 DOS Master Clock LLS C4
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Requirement Name: S-Plane DoS protection Requirement Reference & Description: 'REQ-SEC-DOS-1' clause 5.3.5 in O-RAN Security Requirements and Controls Specifications [5] Threat References: 'T-SPLANE-01' clause 5.4.1.2 in O-RAN Security Threat Modeling and Risk Assessment [3] DUT/s: O-RU, O-DU Test Name: TC_DOS_MASTER_CLOCK_LLS_C4 Test description and applicability Purpose: The purpose of this test is to verify the protection of the S-plane against a denial of service (DoS) attack targeting the local PRTC timing in an LLS-C4 configuration. Test setup and configuration 1) The O-RU is configured with a local PRTC timing that provides time synchronization. 2) Local PRTC timing is enabled that provides time synchronization to the O-RU (it could be embedded in the O-RU). 3) A network monitoring tool is set up to capture and analyse network traffic. Test procedure 1) Start monitoring the network traffic between the O-RU and the fronthaul network. 2) Simulate a DoS attack by sending an excessive number of time protocol packets to the O-RU's local PRTC timing using a testing tool. 3) Monitor the behavior of the local PRTC timing and the synchronization status between the O-RU and the fronthaul network during the attack. 4) Observe the impact on the accuracy and availability of the local PRTC timing. 5) Verify the functionality of the O-RU during the attack to ensure that it can still operate normally despite the DoS attack on the local PRTC timing. Expected Results 1) The S-plane detects and mitigates the DoS attack against the local PRTC timing in the O-RU. 2) The local PRTC timing continues to operate with minimal impact on accuracy and availability. 3) The synchronization status between the O-RU and the fronthaul network should remain stable. 4) The O-RU should continue to function normally, even with the DoS attack targeting the local PRTC timing. Expected Format of Evidence: The following evidence, in one or more formats as applicable, should be provided: 1) Network traffic logs showing the excessive time protocol packets sent to the local PRTC timing during the attack. 2) Monitoring reports indicating the behavior of the local PRTC timing and synchronization status between the O-RU and the fronthaul network during the attack. 3) Analysis of the impact on the accuracy and availability of the local PRTC timing. ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 120
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0ce77be9f03a15fedfc038153382bd6a
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104 105
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11.1.5.2 Spoofing of Master Clocks in the S-Plane
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0ce77be9f03a15fedfc038153382bd6a
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104 105
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11.1.5.2.0 Overview
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The tests presented in this clause focus on assessing the system's defences against potential spoofing attacks on master clocks. Specifically, these tests examine scenarios where attackers may try to impersonate or manipulate the master clock's communications to disrupt accurate time synchronization.
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0ce77be9f03a15fedfc038153382bd6a
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104 105
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11.1.5.2.1 Impersonation Master Clock
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Requirement Name: Spoofing Prevention for Master Clocks in the S-Plane Requirement Reference & Description: 'REQ-SEC-OFSP-2' clause 5.2.5.3.2 in O-RAN Security and Controls Requirements Specifications [5] Threat References: 'T-SPLANE-02, T-SPLANE-03' clause 5.4.1.2 in O-RAN Security Threat Modeling and Risk Assessment [3] DUT/s: O-RU, O-DU Test Name: TC_IMPERSONATION_MASTER_CLOCK Test description and applicability Purpose: The purpose of this test is to verify the protection of the S-plane against an impersonation attack where an attacker sends fake ANNOUNCE messages to declare itself as the best clock (Grand Master). Test setup and configuration 1) For LLS-C1: The master clock functionality is enabled on the O-DU. O-DU is acting as a master and directly synchronizes O-RU. 2) For LLS-C2: One or more Ethernet switches are allowed in the fronthaul network. O-DU acting as master to distribute network timing toward O-RU. 3) For LLS-C3: One or more PRTC/T-GM are implemented in the fronthaul network to distribute network timing toward O-DU and O-RU. 4) For LLS-C4: Local PRTC timing is enabled that provides time synchronization to the O-RU (it could be embedded in the O-RU). 5) The master clock functionality of the O-DU is enabled and functioning correctly (not applicable in the LLS-C4 configuration). 6) A network monitoring tool is set up to capture and analyse network traffic. Test procedure 1) Start monitoring the network traffic between the O-DU and O-RU. 2) Simulate an impersonation attack by sending a fake ANNOUNCE message declaring a different clock as the best clock in the network to the O-DU using a testing tool. - For LLS-C1, use a command-line tool like ptp4l or pgrptp with appropriate options to send fake ANNOUNCE messages to the IP address or hostname of the O-DU acting as the legitimate Master clock. - For LLS-C2, use a PTP simulation tool like pysimulatedptp or ptpd to generate fake ANNOUNCE messages with the attacker's clock information, targeting the IP address or hostname of the O-DU acting as the legitimate Master clock. - For LLS-C3, use a custom script or tool that supports PTP communication to craft and send fake ANNOUNCE messages to the IP addresses or hostnames of the PRTC/T-GM devices within the fronthaul network. ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 121 - For LLS-C4, use a PTP simulation tool or a custom script that can craft and send PTP ANNOUNCE messages that impersonates a legitimate PRTC or Grand Master clock, declaring a different clock (controlled by the attacker) as the best clock, and target this message to the O-RU's IP address or hostname. 3) Verify the functionality of the O-DU and O-RU upon receiving the fake ANNOUNCE message. 4) Observe the synchronization status between the O-DU and O-RU. 5) Verify that the O-DU and O-RU reject the impersonated clock and maintain the synchronization based on the legitimate master clock. Expected Results 1) The S-plane detects and mitigates the impersonation attack by recognizing the fake ANNOUNCE message. 2) The O-DU and O-RU reject the impersonated clock and maintain synchronization with the legitimate master clock. 3) The synchronization status between the O-DU and O-RU remains stable and accurate. 4) The O-RU continues to receive accurate timing information from the legitimate master clock. Expected Format of Evidence: The following evidence, in one or more formats as applicable, should be provided for each configuration (LLS-C1, LLS-C2, LLS-C3, LLS-C4): 1) Network traffic logs showing the transmission of the fake ANNOUNCE message to the O-DU. This includes logs for direct transmission to the O-DU (LLS-C1), through Ethernet switches (LLS-C2), to PRTC/T-GM devices (LLS-C3), and to O-RU with local PRTC (LLS-C4). 2) Monitoring reports indicating the behaviour of the O-DU and O-RU upon receiving the fake ANNOUNCE message. 3) Analysis of the synchronization status between the O-DU and O-RU. 4) Verification that the O-DU and O-RU reject the impersonated clock and maintain synchronization with the legitimate master clock.
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0ce77be9f03a15fedfc038153382bd6a
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104 105
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11.1.5.2.2 Rogue PTP Instance
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Requirement Name: Spoofing Prevention for Master Clocks in the S-Plane Requirement Reference & Description: 'REQ-SEC-OFSP-2' clause 5.2.5.3.2 in O-RAN Security and Controls Requirements Specifications [5] Threat References: 'T-SPLANE-02, T-SPLANE-03' clause 5.4.1.2 in O-RAN Security Threat Modeling and Risk Assessment [3] DUT/s: O-RU, O-DU Test Name: TC_ROGUE_PTP_INSTANCE Test description and applicability Purpose: The purpose of this test is to verify the protection of the S-plane against an attacker sending manipulated or malicious ANNOUNCE messages to declare itself as the best clock (Grand Master). Test setup and configuration 1) For LLS-C1: The master clock functionality is enabled on the O-DU. O-DU is acting as a master and directly synchronizes O-RU. 2) For LLS-C2: One or more Ethernet switches are allowed in the fronthaul network. O-DU acting as master to distribute network timing toward O-RU. ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 122 3) For LLS-C3: One or more PRTC/T-GM are implemented in the fronthaul network to distribute network timing toward O-DU and O-RU. 4) For LLS-C4: Local PRTC timing is enabled that provides time synchronization to the O-RU (it could be embedded in the O-RU). 5) The O-DU and O-RU are synchronized and functioning correctly. 6) A network monitoring tool is set up to capture and analyse network traffic. Test procedure 1) Start monitoring the network traffic between the O-DU and O-RU. 2) Simulate an attack by injecting manipulated or malicious ANNOUNCE messages declaring the attacker as the best clock in the network by sending manipulated or malicious ANNOUNCE messages impersonating a Grand Master clock. - For LLS-C1, use a command-line tool like ptp4l or pgrptp with appropriate options to send manipulated ANNOUNCE messages to the IP address or hostname of the O-DU acting as the legitimate Master clock. - For LLS-C2, use a PTP simulation tool like pysimulatedptp or ptpd to generate manipulated ANNOUNCE messages with the attacker's clock information, targeting the IP address or hostname of the O-DU acting as the legitimate Master clock. - For LLS-C3, use a custom script or tool that supports PTP communication to craft and send manipulated ANNOUNCE messages to the IP addresses or hostnames of the PRTC/T-GM devices within the fronthaul network. - For LLS-C4, if the Master clock is embedded in the O-RU, simulate the attack by sending manipulated ANNOUNCE messages directly to the O-RU. 3) Verify the functionality of the O-DU and O-RU upon receiving the manipulated or malicious ANNOUNCE messages. 4) Observe the synchronization status between the O-DU and O-RU. 5) Verify that the O-DU and O-RU detect and reject the attacker's proposed grandmaster candidate. Expected Results 1) The S-plane detects and mitigates the attack by recognizing the manipulated or malicious ANNOUNCE messages. 2) The O-DU and O-RU reject the attacker's proposed grandmaster candidate and maintain synchronization based on the legitimate master clock. 3) The synchronization status between the O-DU and O-RU remains stable and accurate. 4) The O-RU continues to receive accurate timing information from the legitimate master clock. Expected Format of Evidence: The following evidence, in one or more formats as applicable, should be provided for each configuration (LLS-C1, LLS-C2, LLS-C3, LLS-C4): 1) Network traffic logs showing the transmission of the manipulated or malicious ANNOUNCE messages. These logs should demonstrate the attack simulation for LLS-C1 (O-DU as master), LLS-C2 (with Ethernet switches), LLS-C3 (with PRTC/T-GM), and LLS-C4 (local PRTC timing in O-RU). 2) Monitoring reports indicating the behaviour of the O-DU and O-RU upon receiving the manipulated or malicious ANNOUNCE messages. 3) Analysis of the synchronization status between the O-DU and O-RU. 4) Verification that the O-DU and O-RU reject the attacker's proposed grandmaster candidate and maintain synchronization with the legitimate master clock. ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 123
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0ce77be9f03a15fedfc038153382bd6a
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104 105
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11.1.5.3 Clock Accuracy Protection Against MITM Attacks
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0ce77be9f03a15fedfc038153382bd6a
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104 105
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11.1.5.3.0 Overview
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This clause delves into tests specifically designed to gauge the system's robustness when facing MITM attacks targeting clock synchronization. Such MITM attacks could manifest as the selective interception and removal of crucial PTP timing packets or the deliberate introduction of delays to these packets.
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0ce77be9f03a15fedfc038153382bd6a
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104 105
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11.1.5.3.1 Selective Interception and Removal of PTP Timing Packets
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Requirement Name: Clock Accuracy Protection Against MITM Attacks Requirement Reference & Description: 'REQ-SEC-OFSP-3' clause 5.2.5.3.2 in O-RAN Security Requirements and Controls Specifications [5] Threat References: 'T-SPLANE-04, T-SPLANE-05' clause 5.4.1.2 in O-RAN Security Threat Modeling and Risk Assessment [3] DUT/s: O-RU, O-DU Test Name: TC_SELECTIVE_INTERCEPTION_REMOVAL_PTP_TIMING_PACKETS Test description and applicability Purpose: The purpose of this test is to verify the resilience of the S-plane against an attack where PTP timing packets are selectively intercepted and removed. Test setup and configuration 1) For LLS-C1: The master clock functionality is enabled on the O-DU. O-DU is acting as a master and directly synchronizes O-RU. 2) For LLS-C2: One or more Ethernet switches are allowed in the fronthaul network. O-DU acting as master to distribute network timing toward O-RU. 3) For LLS-C3: One or more PRTC/T-GM are implemented in the fronthaul network to distribute network timing toward O-DU and O-RU. 4) For LLS-C4: Local PRTC timing is enabled that provides time synchronization to the O-RU (it could be embedded in the O-RU). 5) The network monitoring tool is set up to capture and analyse network traffic between the O-RU and O-DU. Test procedure 1) Set up the test environment with the O-RAN O-RU, O-DU, and other relevant network components. 2) Configure the network monitoring tool to capture PTP timing packets between the O-RU and O-DU. 3) Start the network monitoring tool to capture the initial state of PTP timing packets. 4) Simulate an attack by using a packet manipulation tool to selectively intercept and remove specific PTP timing packets. - For LLS-C1, use a packet capture tool like Wireshark or tcpdump to capture PTP network traffic on the interface connected to the O-RU or O-DU. Modify the captured packets to selectively remove PTP timing packets using a packet editing tool like Scapy or custom scripts. - For LLS-C2, use a network device or software with packet interception capabilities to intercept PTP timing packets between the O-RU and O-DU. Modify the intercepted packets to selectively remove PTP timing packets. - For LLS-C3, use a network device or software capable of deep packet inspection (DPI) to intercept and analyse PTP timing packets. Modify the intercepted packets to selectively remove PTP timing packets. ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 124 - For LLS-C4, if the O-RU embeds the local PRTC timing, use a network device or software to intercept PTP timing packets between the O-RU and O-DU. Modify the intercepted packets to selectively remove PTP timing packets. 5) Verify the functionality of the O-RU and O-DU during the attack simulation. 6) Observe the synchronization status and the impact on timing accuracy between the O-RU and O-DU. 7) Capture and analyse the network traffic using the network monitoring tool during the attack simulation. NOTE: The network monitoring tool can be Wireshark or tcpdump, configured to capture packets on the interfaces between the O-RU, O-DU and to identify the intercepted and removed PTP timing packets. 8) Stop the network monitoring tool to finalize the captured traffic. Expected Results 1) Detection of missing PTP timing packets: The S-plane is able to detect the absence of specific PTP timing packets that were selectively intercepted and removed. 2) Synchronization maintenance: Despite the missing PTP timing packets, the O-RU and O-DU still maintain synchronization. Any deviations from expected synchronization are minimal and within acceptable thresholds. 3) Corrective actions: Upon detecting the missing PTP timing packets, the O-RU and O-DU initiate predefined corrective actions to restore synchronization and mitigate the effects of the missing packets. 4) Network traffic analysis: The captured network traffic clearly shows the instances where specific PTP timing packets were intercepted and removed. 5) No system failures: The system (O-RU and O-DU) does not experience any catastrophic failures or shutdowns due to the missing PTP timing packets. Expected Format of Evidence: The following evidence, in one or more formats as applicable, should be provided for each configuration (LLS-C1, LLS-C2, LLS-C3, LLS-C4): 1) Recorded network traffic captured by the monitoring tool during the attack simulation showing selective interception and removal of PTP timing packets in LLS-C1 (O-DU as master), LLS-C2 (with Ethernet switches), LLS-C3 (with PRTC/T-GM), and LLS-C4 (local PRTC timing in O-RU). 2) Observations and analysis of the impact on synchronization and timing accuracy. 3) Any issues or anomalies encountered during the attack simulation.
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0ce77be9f03a15fedfc038153382bd6a
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104 105
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11.1.5.3.2 Delay Attack on PTP Timing Packets
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Requirement Name: Clock Accuracy Protection Against MITM Attacks Requirement Reference & Description: 'REQ-SEC-OFSP-3' clause 5.2.5.3.2 in O-RAN Security Requirements and Controls Specifications [5] Threat References: 'T-SPLANE-04, T-SPLANE-05' clause 5.4.1.2 in O-RAN Security Threat Modeling and Risk Assessment [3] DUT/s: O-RU, O-DU Test Name: TC_DELAY_ATTACK_PTP_TIMING_PACKETS Test description and applicability Purpose: The purpose of this test is to verify the S-plane's resilience against a delay attack on PTP timing packets. Test setup and configuration 1) For LLS-C1: The master clock functionality is enabled on the O-DU. O-DU is acting as a master and directly synchronizes O-RU. ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 125 2) For LLS-C2: One or more Ethernet switches are allowed in the fronthaul network. O-DU acting as master to distribute network timing toward O-RU. 3) For LLS-C3: One or more PRTC/T-GM are implemented in the fronthaul network to distribute network timing toward O-DU and O-RU. 4) For LLS-C4: Local PRTC timing is enabled that provides time synchronization to the O-RU (it could be embedded in the O-RU). 5) Time synchronization is established and operational within the network. Test procedure 1) Start the network monitoring tool to capture the initial state of PTP timing packets. 2) Simulate an attack by introducing delays in PTP timing packets using a network emulation tool. - For LLS-C1, use a network emulator tool like WANem or NIST Net to introduce artificial delays in PTP timing packets between the O-RU and O-DU. - For LLS-C2 and LLS-C3, use a custom script or tool that supports packet manipulation and delay to introduce artificial delays in PTP timing packets between the O-RU and O-DU or between PRTC/T-GM devices. - For LLS-C4, if the O-RU embeds the local PRTC timing, use a network emulator tool or custom script to introduce delays in PTP timing packets between the O-RU and O-DU. 3) Verify the functionality of the O-RU and O-DU during the delay attack on PTP timing packets. 4) Observe the synchronization status and timing accuracy within the LLS configuration. Expected Results 1) The S-plane detects the delay attack on PTP timing packets and applies appropriate measures to mitigate the impact within all LLS configurations. 2) The O-RU and O-DU detects the delayed PTP timing packets, compensate for the introduced delays, and maintain synchronization. Expected Format of Evidence: The following evidence, in one or more formats as applicable, should be provided for each configuration (LLS-C1, LLS-C2, LLS-C3, LLS-C4): 1) Recorded network traffic captured by the monitoring tool during the attack. This includes logs showing the introduction of delays in PTP timing packets for LLS-C1 (O-DU as master), LLS-C2 (with Ethernet switches), LLS-C3 (with PRTC/T-GM), and LLS-C4 (local PRTC timing in O-RU). 2) Observations and analysis of the impact on synchronization and timing accuracy within each LLS configuration. 3) Any issues or anomalies encountered during the attack simulation.
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0ce77be9f03a15fedfc038153382bd6a
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104 105
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11.2 Y1
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0ce77be9f03a15fedfc038153382bd6a
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104 105
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11.2.0 Overview
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This clause delineates a series of test cases aimed at validating the security of the Y1 interface within the O-RAN architecture. The tests focus on five critical security facets: confidentiality, integrity, anti-replay, authenticity, and authorization. These are paramount in ensuring a robust and secure communication over the Y1 interface.
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0ce77be9f03a15fedfc038153382bd6a
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104 105
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11.2.1 Y1 Authenticity
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Requirement Name: Y1 protection in terms of authenticity ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 126 Requirement Reference & Description: 'REQ-SEC-Y1-1', 'REQ-SEC-Y1-5', 'REQ-SEC-Y1-6' clause 5.2.7.2 in O-RAN Security Requirements and Controls Specifications [5] Threat References: 'T-Y1-01', T-Y1-02', T-Y1-03' clause 7.4.1.13 in O-RAN Security Threat Modeling and Risk Assessment [3] DUT/s: Near-RT RIC, Y1 consumers Test Name: TC_Y1_AUTHENTICATION Test description and applicability Purpose: The purpose of this test is to verify the authenticity of the Y1 interface, ensuring that only legitimate and mutually authenticated Near-RT RIC, Y1 consumers can participate in the communication over the Y1 interface. Test setup and configuration 1. Near-RT RIC & Y1 Consumers support mTLS and be connected in a simulated/real network environment. 2. The test environment is set up with the Y1 interface configured. 3. The tester has access to the original data transported over the Y1 interface. 4. mTLS is properly implemented and configured as defined in [2] clause 4.2. Test procedure 1. Execute the test on the mTLS protocol as defined in clause 6.3. 2. Valid Authentication Certificates (positive case): a. The tester sends a request to establish a connection with the Y1 interface using valid authentication certificates. b. The tester verifies the mutual certificate verification between Near-RT RIC and Y1 consumers. c. The tester captures and analyses the response received from the Y1 interface. 3. Invalid Authentication Certificates (negative case): a. The tester sends a request to establish a connection with the Y1 interface with invalid certificates. b. The tester captures and analyses the response received from the Y1 interface. 4. No Authentication Certificates (Negative Case): a. The tester sends a request to establish a connection without any certificates. b. The tester captures and analyses the response from the Y1 interface. Expected results 1) For 1. Expected results in clause 6.3.4 2) For 2. 'Valid Authentication Certificates': The Y1 interface accepts the valid certificates and responds with a successful authentication message. The mutual certificate verification process is successful. 3) For 3. 'Invalid Authentication Certificates': The connection attempt is rejected, and an authentication failure message is received. The mutual certificate verification process fails due to the use of invalid certificates. 4) For 4. 'No Authentication Certificates': The connection attempt is rejected, and an authentication failure message is received. The mutual certificate verification process fails due to the absence of certificates. Expected Format of Evidence: The following evidence, in one or more formats as applicable, should be provided: ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 127 • Logs and screenshots showing adherence to mTLS protocol specifications as defined in [2] clause 4.2. • Logs of authentication requests and responses on the Y1 interface. • Logs of the mutual certificate verification process. • Screenshots or logs of error messages or unusual behaviours for both invalid and no certificate scenarios.
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0ce77be9f03a15fedfc038153382bd6a
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104 105
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11.2.2 Y1 Confidentiality, integrity, and replay
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0ce77be9f03a15fedfc038153382bd6a
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104 105
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11.2.2.1 Y1 Confidentiality
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Requirement Name: Y1 protection in terms of confidentiality Requirement Reference & Description: 'REQ-SEC-Y1-3', 'REQ-SEC-Y1-4' clause 5.2.7.2 in O-RAN Security Requirements and Controls Specifications [5] Threat References: 'T-Y1-01', T-Y1-02', T-Y1-03' clause 7.4.1.13 in O-RAN Security Threat Modeling and Risk Assessment [3] DUT/s: Near-RT RIC, Y1 consumers Test Name: TC_Y1_CONFIDENTIALITY Test description and applicability Purpose: The purpose of this test is to verify that no sensitive data is exposed on the Y1 interface. It ensures that sensitive information remains protected from unauthorized access or disclosure. Test setup and configuration 1) Near-RT RIC and Y1 consumers support TLS and connected within simulated or real network environments. 2) The test environment is set up with the Y1 interface configured. 3) The tester has access to the original data transported over the Y1 interface. 4) TLS is properly implemented and configured as defined in [2] clause 4.2. 5) The tester has knowledge of the confidentiality algorithm and confidentiality protection keys used for encrypting the encapsulated payload. Test procedure 1) Execute the test on the TLS protocol as defined in clause 6.3. 2) Support for mandated security profile: a. The tester establishes a secure communication session over the Y1 interface and verifies that all protocol versions and combinations of cryptographic algorithms for confidentiality protection that are mandated by the security profile in clause 4.2 of O-RAN security protocols specification [2] are supported by Near-RT RIC and Y1 consumers. 3) Rejection of forbidden security profile: b. The tester establishes a secure communication session over the Y1 interface and verifies that this is not possible when the Near-RT RIC or Y1 consumers only offers a feature, including protocol version and combination of cryptographic algorithms for confidentiality protection, that is forbidden by the security profile in clause 4.2 of O-RAN security protocols specification [2]. EXAMPLE: Forbidden Features: This could include outdated TLS protocol versions (e.g. TLS 1.0 or 1.1), cryptographic algorithms known to be insecure (e.g. RC4, MD5, SHA-1, DES, 3DES, CBC-mode ciphers), or any other features explicitly listed as forbidden in the security profile (see clause 4.2 of O-RAN security protocols specification [2]). ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 128 c. Document the configuration used for each attempt, ensuring clear differentiation between the features tested. d. Capture and analyse the response from the Y1 interface. 4) Traffic capture and analysis: e. The tester establishes a secure communication session over the Y1 interface and captures the network traffic during the communication session. f. The tester analyses the captured traffic to identify any instances where information is transmitted in clear text or without appropriate encryption. g. The tester verifies the captured data so that only the intended recipient can decrypt it. h. The tester ensures the encryption process that does not allow the attacker to intercept the data in transit between Near-RT RIC and Y1 consumers except with the provision of the appropriate decryption key. Expected results 1) Expected results in clause 6.3.4 2) Support for mandated security profile: a. All sensitive data transmitted through the Y1 interface is properly encrypted in accordance with the mandated security profile. The communication session demonstrates support for the specified protocol versions and cryptographic algorithms. 3) Rejection of forbidden security profile: a. The Y1 interface rejects attempts to establish a communication session offering forbidden protocol versions or cryptographic algorithms. The security profile's restrictions are enforced by Near-RT RIC and Y1 consumers. 4) Traffic capture and analysis: a. No instances are observed where sensitive information is transmitted without proper encryption or in clear text. The captured traffic confirms the proper application of encryption. b. The captured data remains confidential, with only the designated recipient able to decrypt it. The encryption process ensures data confidentiality and prevents unauthorized access. Expected Format of Evidence: The following evidence, in one or more formats as applicable, should be provided: • Logs and screenshots showing adherence to TLS protocol specifications as defined in [2] clause 4.2. • Logs of secure communication sessions established over the Y1 interface. • Verification logs or data confirming proper encryption and decryption. • Screenshots or logs showing rejection of forbidden security profiles.
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0ce77be9f03a15fedfc038153382bd6a
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104 105
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11.2.2.2 Y1 Integrity
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Requirement Name: Y1 protection in terms of integrity Requirement Reference & Description: 'REQ-SEC-Y1-3', 'REQ-SEC-Y1-4' clause 5.2.7.2 in O-RAN Security Requirements and Controls Specifications [5] Threat References: 'T-Y1-01', T-Y1-02', T-Y1-03' clause 7.4.1.13 in O-RAN Security Threat Modeling and Risk Assessment [3] ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 129 DUT/s: Near-RT RIC, Y1 consumers Test Name: TC_Y1_INTEGRITY Test description and applicability Purpose: The purpose of this test is to verify that the DUT can detect and reject packets with incorrect integrity over the Y1 interface. Test setup and configuration • Near-RT RIC and Y1 consumers support TLS and connected within simulated or real network environments. • The test environment is set up with the Y1 interface configured. • The tester has access to the original data transported over the Y1 interface. • TLS is properly implemented and configured as defined in [2] clause 4.2. • The tester has knowledge of the integrity algorithm (Hash Message Authentication Code) and the protection keys. Test procedure 1) Execute the test on the TLS protocol as defined in clause 6.3. 2) Support for mandated security profile: a. The tester establishes a secure communication session over the Y1 interface and verifies that all protocol versions and combinations of cryptographic algorithms for integrity protection that are mandated by the security profile in clause 4.2 of O-RAN security protocols specification [2] are supported by Near-RT RIC and Y1 consumers. 3) Rejection of forbidden security profile: a. The tester establishes a secure communication session over the Y1 interface and verifies that this is not possible when Near-RT RIC or Y1 consumers only offers a feature, including protocol version and combination of cryptographic algorithms for integrity protection, that is forbidden by the security profile in clause 4.2 of O-RAN security protocols specification [2]. EXAMPLE 1: Forbidden Features: This could include outdated TLS protocol versions (e.g. TLS 1.0 or 1.1), cryptographic algorithms known to be insecure (e.g. RC4, MD5, SHA-1, DES, 3DES, CBC-mode ciphers), or any other features explicitly listed as forbidden in the security profile (see clause 4.2 of O-RAN security protocols specification [2]). b. Document the configuration used for each attempt, ensuring clear differentiation between the features tested. c. Capture and analyse the response from the Y1 interface. 4) Traffic capture and analysis: a. The tester establishes a secure communication session over the Y1 interface and captures the network traffic during the communication session. EXAMPLE 2: Use Wireshark b. The tester uses a packet editing tool, modifies captured packets to simulate potential integrity breaches. This involves altering the MAC. EXAMPLE 3: Use Scapy or a custom script c. After modifying the packets, the tester reinjects them back into the network to simulate an integrity breach scenario. ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 130 d. The tester monitors the DUT's response to the reinjected packets. Specifically, the tester observes whether the DUT detects and drops/ignores the packets with compromised integrity. Expected Results 1) Expected results in clause 6.3.4 2) Support for mandated security profile: a. Data transmitted via the Y1 interface maintains its integrity between sending and receiving nodes. The security profile's specified protocol versions and cryptographic algorithms are upheld. 3) Rejection of forbidden security profile: a. Near-RT RIC and Y1 consumers reject communication sessions that involve forbidden protocol versions or cryptographic algorithms. The security profile's restrictions are enforced. 4) Traffic capture and analysis: a. The DUT ignores or drops the injected packets with altered integrity. Expected Format of Evidence: The following evidence, in one or more formats as applicable, should be provided: • Logs and screenshots showing adherence to TLS protocol specifications as defined in [2] clause 4.2. • Captured network traffic during secure sessions, highlighting any modified packets and their handling. • Logs or data confirming the implementation and effectiveness of MAC algorithm integrity checks.
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0ce77be9f03a15fedfc038153382bd6a
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104 105
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11.2.2.3 Y1 Replay
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Requirement Name: Y1 protection in terms of replay Requirement Reference & Description: 'REQ-SEC-Y1-3', 'REQ-SEC-Y1-4' clause 5.2.7.2 in O-RAN Security Requirements and Controls Specifications [5] Threat References: 'T-Y1-01', T-Y1-02', T-Y1-03' clause 7.4.1.13 in O-RAN Security Threat Modeling and Risk Assessment [3] DUT/s: Near-RT RIC, Y1 consumers Test Name: TC_Y1_REPLAY Test description and applicability Purpose: The purpose of this test is to verify that no malicious capture and subsequent replay of network traffic to deceive the system or gain unauthorized access over the Y1 interface. (Anti-replay). Test setup and configuration 1) Near-RT RIC and Y1 consumers support TLS and be connected in simulated/real network environments. 2) The test environment is set up with the Y1 interface configured. 3) The tester has access to the original data transported over the Y1 interface. 4) TLS is properly implemented and configured as defined in [2] clause 4.2. 5) The tester has knowledge of the anti-replay security controls implemented over the Y1 interface. Test procedure 1) The tester executes the test on the TLS protocol as defined in clause 6.3. ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 131 2) The tester establishes a secure communication session over the Y1 interface and captures the network traffic during the communication session. The tester focuses on capturing packets that typically are involved in replay attacks, such as those containing authentication credentials, session identifiers, or critical commands. These packets are more likely to be targeted in replay attacks due to their sensitive content. 3) The tester attempts to replay the captured packets or data by resending them to the O-RAN component (Near-RT RIC and Y1 consumers). 4) The tester observes the O-RAN component's behaviour and response to the replayed packets. 5) The tester verifies each data packet assigned with a unique sequence number included in the packet header. 6) The tester verifies each data packet contains a timestamp. 7) The tester also verifies the sequence number of each received packet and compares it to the previously received packet's sequence number and if the sequence number is too low or too high, the packet is considered a replay attack and is discarded. Expected Results • Expected results in clause 6.3.4 • Near-RT RIC and Y1 consumers implement countermeasures to detect and prevent replay attacks. This may include the use of sequence numbers, timestamps, or other forms of message authentication codes. • Near-RT RIC and Y1 consumers reject or ignore replayed packets and do not perform any sensitive or unauthorized actions. Expected Format of Evidence: The following evidence, in one or more formats as applicable, should be provided: • Logs and screenshots showing adherence to TLS protocol specifications as defined in [2] clause 4.2. • Details of identified packets or data susceptible to replay attacks. • Verification logs or data confirming the use of unique sequence numbers and timestamps in packet headers. • Screenshots or logs of the system's behaviour and response to the replayed packets.
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0ce77be9f03a15fedfc038153382bd6a
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104 105
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11.2.3 Y1 Authorization
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Requirement Name: Y1 protection in terms of mutual Authorization Requirement Reference & Description: 'REQ-SEC-Y1-2', 'REQ-SEC-Y1-6' clause 5.2.7.2 in O-RAN Security Requirements and Controls Specifications [5] Threat References: 'T-Y1-01', T-Y1-02', T-Y1-03' clause 7.4.1.13 in O-RAN Security Threat Modeling and Risk Assessment [3] DUT/s: Near-RT RIC and Y1 consumers Test Name: TC_Y1_AUTHORIZATION Test description and applicability Purpose: The purpose of this test is to validate that the Y1 interface enforces an authorization mechanism to prevent unauthorized access. Test setup and configuration 1) Near-RT RIC and Y1 consumers support OAuth 2.0 and are connected in simulated/real network environment. 2) The test environment is set up with Y1 interface configured. 3) The tester has access to the original data transported over the Y1 interface. ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 132 4) OAuth 2.0 is properly implemented and configured. Test procedure 1) Execute the test on the OAuth 2.0 protocol as defined in clause 6.6. 2) Valid access tokens (positive case): a. The tester sends a request to access protected resources using a valid access token. b. The tester captures and analyses the response from the Y1 interface. 3) Invalid access tokens (negative case): c. The tester sends a request to access protected resources using an invalid or incorrect access token. d. The tester captures and analyses the response from the Y1 interface. 4) No access tokens (negative case): e. The tester sends a request to access protected resources without providing any access token. f. The tester captures and analyses the response from the Y1 interface. Expected Results • For 1. Expected results in clause 6.6.4 • For 2. 'Valid access tokens': The Y1 interface accepts the valid access tokens and responds with a successful authorization message. • For 3. 'Invalid access tokens': The access is rejected, and an access failure message is received. • For 4. 'No access tokens': The access is rejected due to the absence of tokens, and an appropriate error or unauthorized access message is received. Expected Format of Evidence: The following evidence, in one or more formats as applicable, should be provided: • Logs of the request sent to access protected resources using valid access tokens. • Screenshots or logs highlighting the successful authorization message. • Logs of the request sent to access protected resources using invalid or incorrect access tokens. • Screenshots or logs showing the rejection of the access and the access failure message.
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0ce77be9f03a15fedfc038153382bd6a
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104 105
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11.3 O1
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0ce77be9f03a15fedfc038153382bd6a
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104 105
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11.3.0 Overview
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This clause delineates a series of test cases aimed at validating the security of the O1 interface within the O-RAN architecture. The tests focus on five critical security facets: confidentiality, integrity, anti-replay, authenticity, and authorization. These are paramount in ensuring a robust and secure communication over the O1 interface.
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0ce77be9f03a15fedfc038153382bd6a
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104 105
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11.3.1 O1 Authenticity
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Requirement Name: O1 protection in terms of authenticity Requirement Reference & Description: 'REQ-TLS-FUN-1' clause 5.2.2.1 in O-RAN Security Requirements and Controls Specifications [5] ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 133 Threat References: 'T-MPLANE-01' clause 5.4.1.2, clause 5.4.1.1 'T-O-RAN-05' in O-RAN Security Threat Modeling and Risk Assessment [3] DUT/s: SMO, O-CU, O-DU, Near-RT RIC Test Name: TC_O1_AUTHENTICATION Test description and applicability Purpose: The purpose of this test is to verify the authenticity of the O1 interface, ensuring that only legitimate and authenticated O-RAN NFs can participate in the communication over the O1 interface. Test setup and configuration • SMO, O-CU, O-DU, Near-RT RIC support mTLS and be connected in simulated/real network environment. • The test environment is set up with O1 interface configured. • The tester has access to the original data transported over the O1 interface. • mTLS is properly implemented and configured as defined in [2] clause 4.2. Test procedure 1) Execute the test on the mTLS protocol as defined in clause 6.3. 2) Valid Authentication Certificates (positive case): a. The tester sends a request to establish a connection with the O1 interface using valid authentication certificates. b. The tester verifies the mutual certificate verification between the ORAN NFs c. The tester captures and analyses the response received from the O1 interface. 3) Invalid Authentication Certificates (negative case): d. The tester sends a request to establish a connection with the O1 interface with invalid certificates. e. The tester captures and analyses the response received from the O1 interface. 4) No Authentication Certificates (Negative Case): f. The tester sends a request to establish a connection without any certificates. g. The tester captures and analyses the response from the O1 interface. Expected results 1) For 1. Expected results in clause 6.3.4 2) For 2. 'Valid Authentication Certificates': The O1 interface accepts the valid certificates and responds with a successful authentication message. The mutual certificate verification process is successful. 3) For 3. 'Invalid Authentication Certificates': The connection attempt is rejected, and an authentication failure message is received. The mutual certificate verification process fails due to the use of invalid certificates. 4) For 4. 'No Authentication Certificates': The connection attempt is rejected, and an authentication failure message is received. The mutual certificate verification process fails due to the absence of certificates. Expected Format of Evidence: The following evidence, in one or more formats as applicable, should be provided: • Logs and screenshots showing adherence to mTLS protocol specifications as defined in [2] clause 4.2. • Logs of authentication requests sent to the O1 interface. ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 134 • Logs of the mutual certificate verification process. • Screenshots or logs of error messages or unusual behaviours for both invalid and no certificate scenarios.
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0ce77be9f03a15fedfc038153382bd6a
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104 105
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11.3.2 O1 Confidentiality, integrity and replay
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0ce77be9f03a15fedfc038153382bd6a
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104 105
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11.3.2.1 O1 Confidentiality
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Requirement Name: O1 protection in terms of confidentiality Requirement Reference & Description: 'REQ-TLS-FUN-1' clause 5.2.2.1 in O-RAN Security Requirements and Controls Specifications [5] Threat References: 'T-MPLANE-01' clause 5.4.1.2, 'T-O-RAN-05' clause 5.4.1.1 in O-RAN Security Threat Modeling and Risk Assessment [3] DUT/s: SMO, O-CU, O-DU, Near-RT RIC Test Name: TC_O1_CONFIDENTIALITY Test description and applicability Purpose: The purpose of this test is to verify that no sensitive data is exposed on the O1 interface. It ensures that sensitive information remains protected from unauthorized access or disclosure. Test setup and configuration • SMO, O-CU, O-DU, Near-RT RIC support TLS and be connected in simulated/real network environment. • The test environment is set up with O1 interface configured. • The tester has access to the original data transported over the O1 interface. • TLS is properly implemented and configured as defined in [2] clause 4.2. • The tester has knowledge of the confidentiality algorithm and confidentiality protection keys used for encrypting the encapsulated payload. Test procedure 1) Execute the test on the TLS protocol as defined in clause 6.3. 2) Support for mandated security profile: a. The tester establishes a secure communication session over the O1 interface and verifies that all protocol versions and combinations of cryptographic algorithms for confidentiality protection that are mandated by the security profile in clause 4.2 of O-RAN security protocols specification [2] are supported by SMO, O-CU, O-DU and Near-RT RIC. 3) Rejection of forbidden security profile: a. The tester establishes a secure communication session over the O1 interface and verifies that this is not possible when the SMO, O-CU, O-DU or Near-RT RIC only offers a feature, including protocol version and combination of cryptographic algorithms for confidentiality protection, that is forbidden by the security profile in clause 4.2 of O-RAN security protocols specification [2]. EXAMPLE: Forbidden Features: This could include outdated TLS protocol versions (e.g. TLS 1.0 or 1.1), cryptographic algorithms known to be insecure (e.g. RC4, MD5, SHA-1, DES, 3DES, CBC-mode ciphers), or any other features explicitly listed as forbidden in the security profile (see clause 4.2 of O-RAN security protocols specification [2]). b. Document the configuration used for each attempt, ensuring clear differentiation between the features tested. ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 135 c. Capture and analyse the response from the O1 interface. 4) Traffic capture and analysis: a. The tester establishes a secure communication session over the O1 interface and captures the network traffic during the communication session. b. The tester analyses the captured traffic to identify any instances where information is transmitted in clear text or without appropriate encryption. c. The tester verifies the captured data so that only the intended recipient can decrypt it. d. The tester ensures the encryption process that does not allow the attacker to intercept the data in transit between the SMO, O-CU, O-DU and Near-RT RIC except with the provision of the appropriate decryption key. Expected results 1) Expected results in clause 6.3.4 2) Support for mandated security profile: a. All sensitive data transmitted through the O1 interface is properly encrypted in accordance with the mandated security profile. The communication session demonstrates support for the specified protocol versions and cryptographic algorithms. 3) Rejection of forbidden security profile: a. The O1 interface rejects attempts to establish a communication session offering forbidden protocol versions or cryptographic algorithms. The security profile's restrictions are enforced by SMO, O-CU, O-DU and Near-RT RIC. 4) Traffic capture and analysis: a. No instances are observed where sensitive information is transmitted without proper encryption or in clear text. The captured traffic confirms the proper application of encryption. b. The captured data remains confidential, with only the designated recipient able to decrypt it. The encryption process ensures data confidentiality and prevents unauthorized access. Expected Format of Evidence: The following evidence, in one or more formats as applicable, should be provided: • Logs and screenshots showing adherence to TLS protocol specifications as defined in [2] clause 4.2. • Logs of secure communication sessions established over the O1 interface. • Verification logs or data confirming proper encryption and decryption. • Screenshots or logs showing rejection of forbidden security profiles.
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0ce77be9f03a15fedfc038153382bd6a
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104 105
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11.3.2.2 O1 Integrity
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Requirement Name: O1 protection in terms of integrity Requirement Reference & Description: 'REQ-TLS-FUN-1' clause 5.2.2.1 in O-RAN Security Requirements and Controls Specifications [5] Threat References: 'T-MPLANE-01' clause 5.4.1.2, 'T-O-RAN-05' clause 5.4.1.1 in O-RAN Security Threat Modeling and Risk Assessment [3] DUT/s: SMO, O-CU, O-DU, Near-RT RIC Test Name: TC_O1_INTEGRITY ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 136 Test description and applicability Purpose: The purpose of this test is to verify that the DUT can detect and reject packets with incorrect integrity over the O1 interface Test setup and configuration • SMO, O-CU, O-DU, Near-RT RIC support TLS and be connected in simulated/real network environment. • The test environment is set up with O1 interface configured. • The tester has access to the original data transported over the O1 interface. • TLS is properly implemented and configured as defined in [2] clause 4.2. • The tester has knowledge of the integrity algorithm (Hash Message Authentication Code) and the protection keys. Test procedure 1) Execute the test on the TLS protocol as defined in clause 6.3. 2) Support for mandated security profile: a. The tester establishes a secure communication session over the O1 interface and verifies that all protocol versions and combinations of cryptographic algorithms for integrity protection that are mandated by the security profile in clause 4.2 of O-RAN security protocols specification [2] are supported by SMO, O-CU, O-DU and Near-RT RIC. 3) Rejection of forbidden security profile: a. The tester establishes a secure communication session over the O1 interface and verifies that this is not possible when the SMO, O-CU, O-DU or Near-RT RIC only offers a feature, including protocol version and combination of cryptographic algorithms for integrity protection, that is forbidden by the security profile in clause 4.2 of O-RAN security protocols specification [2]. EXAMPLE 1: Forbidden Features: This could include outdated TLS protocol versions (e.g. TLS 1.0 or 1.1), cryptographic algorithms known to be insecure (e.g. RC4, MD5, SHA-1, DES, 3DES, CBC-mode ciphers), or any other features explicitly listed as forbidden in the security profile (see clause 4.2 of O-RAN security protocols specification [2]). b. Document the configuration used for each attempt, ensuring clear differentiation between the features tested. c. Capture and analyse the response from the O1 interface. 4) Traffic capture and analysis: a. The tester establishes a secure communication session over the O1 interface and captures the network traffic during the communication session. EXAMPLE 2: Use Wireshark e. The tester uses a packet editing tool, modifies captured packets to simulate potential integrity breaches. This involves altering the MAC. EXAMPLE 3: Use Scapy or a custom script b. After modifying the packets, the tester reinjects them back into the network to simulate an integrity breach scenario. c. The tester monitors the DUT's response to the reinjected packets. Specifically, the tester observes whether the DUT detects and drops/ignores the packets with compromised integrity. ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 137 Expected Results 1) Expected results in clause 6.3.4 2) Support for mandated security profile: a. Data transmitted via the O1 interface maintains its integrity between sending and receiving nodes. The security profile's specified protocol versions and cryptographic algorithms are upheld. 3) Rejection of forbidden security profile: a. SMO, O-CU, O-DU or Near-RT RIC reject communication sessions that involve forbidden protocol versions or cryptographic algorithms. The security profile's restrictions are enforced. 4) Traffic capture and analysis: a. The DUT ignores or drops the injected packets with altered integrity. Expected Format of Evidence: The following evidence, in one or more formats as applicable, should be provided: • Logs and screenshots showing adherence to TLS protocol specifications as defined in [2] clause 4.2. • Captured network traffic during secure sessions, highlighting any modified packets and their handling. 11.3.2.3 Logs or data confirming the implementation and effectiveness of MAC algorithm integrity checks.O1 Replay Requirement Name: O1 protection in terms of replay Requirement Reference & Description: 'REQ-TLS-FUN-1' clause 5.2.2.1 in O-RAN Security Requirements and Controls Specifications [5] Threat References: 'T-MPLANE-01' clause 5.4.1.2, 'T-O-RAN-05' clause 5.4.1.1 in O-RAN Security Threat Modeling and Risk Assessment [3] DUT/s: SMO, O-CU, O-DU, Near-RT RIC Test Name: TC_O1_REPLAY Test description and applicability Purpose: The purpose of this test is to verify that no malicious capture and subsequent replay of network traffic to deceive the system or gain unauthorized access over the O1 interface. (Anti-replay). Test setup and configuration • SMO, O-CU, O-DU, Near-RT RIC support TLS and be connected in simulated/real network environment. • The test environment is set up with O1 interface configured. • The tester has access to the original data transported over the O1 interface. • TLS is properly implemented and configured as defined in [2] clause 4.2. • The tester has knowledge of the anti-replay security controls implemented over O1 interface. Test procedure 1) The tester executes the tests on the TLS protocol as defined in clause 6.3. 2) The tester establishes a secure communication session over the O1 interface and captures the network traffic during the communication session. The tester focuses on capturing packets that typically are involved in replay attacks, such as those containing authentication credentials, session identifiers, or critical commands. These packets are more likely to be targeted in replay attacks due to their sensitive content. ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 138 3) The tester attempts to replay the captured packets or data by resending them to the O-RAN component (SMO, O-CU, O-DU or Near-RT RIC). 4) The tester observes the O-RAN components behaviour and response to the replayed packets. 5) The tester verifies each data packet assigned with a unique sequence number included in the packet header. 6) The tester verifies each data packet contains a timestamp. 7) The tester also verifies the sequence number of each received packet and compares it to the previously received packet's sequence number and if the sequence number is too low or too high, the packet is considered a replay attack and is discarded. Expected Results • Expected results in clause 6.3.4 • SMO, O-CU, O-DU and Near-RT RIC implement countermeasures to detect and prevent replay attacks. This may include the use of sequence numbers, timestamps, or other forms of message authentication codes. • SMO, O-CU, O-DU and Near-RT RIC reject or ignore replayed packets and not perform any sensitive or unauthorized actions. Expected Format of Evidence: The following evidence, in one or more formats as applicable, should be provided: • Logs and screenshots showing adherence to TLS protocol specifications as defined in [2] clause 4.2. • Details of identified packets or data susceptible to replay attacks. • Verification logs or data confirming the use of unique sequence numbers and timestamps in packet headers. • Screenshots or logs of the system's behaviour and response to the replayed packets. 11.3.3 O1 Interface Network Configuration Access Control Model (NACM) Validation
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0ce77be9f03a15fedfc038153382bd6a
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104 105
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11.3.3.0 Overview
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Following zero trust principles, O-RAN O1 interface shall enforce confidentiality, integrity and authenticity through an encrypted transport, and shall support least privilege access control using the network configuration access control model. The network configuration access control model (NACM) [14] provides the means to restrict access for users to a preconfigured subset of all available NETCONF protocol operations and content. The security test case in this clause validates the NACM enforcement on the O-RAN component O1 interface for the role-based access control.
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0ce77be9f03a15fedfc038153382bd6a
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104 105
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11.3.3.1 O1 Interface NACM Validation
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Requirement Name: O1 Interface security requirements Requirement Reference: 'REQ-NAC-FUN-1 to REQ-NAC-FUN-10', clause 5.2.2.1 in O-RAN Security Requirements and Controls Specifications [5] Requirement Description: Requirements of O1 Interface Confidentiality, Integrity & Authenticity protection and Least Privilege Access Control Threat References: 'T-O-RAN-02, T-O-RAN-06' clause 5.4.1.1 in O-RAN Security Threat Modeling and Risk Assessment [3] DUT/s: Non-RT RIC, Near-RT RIC, O-CU-CP, O-CU-UP, O-DU Test Name: TC_O1_NACM_VALIDATION ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 139 Test description and applicability Purpose: O-RAN component(s) managed by SMO through O1 interface shall support secured NETCONF sessions over TLS and role-based least privilege access control enforced by NACM [14]. This test validates the O1 interface security requirements of the O-RAN component(s) with the focus on role-based NACM rule(s) set enforcement. Test setup and configuration DUT shall be the O-RAN component with: • IP enabled O1 interface, reachable from the authentication server; • Valid certificate loaded for the server and necessary certificate authorities (CAs) • Client's root CA required to validate NETCONF client certificate • Valid TLS Client-to-NETCONF username mapping • Configure the O-RAN element with the SMO details (SMO network address and port) Test procedure First set up a host/device with TLS client software installed, valid client certificates, keys, root CA certificate for the server (O-RAN component), and all intermediate CA certificates required to validate the client certificate. The following test steps shall be validated: 1) Initiate NETCONF call home procedure from the O-RAN element towards SMO over O1 interface. NOTE: The O-RAN element may initiate the NETCONF call home procedure as part of its initialization automatically. 2) SMO connects with O-RAN element over O1 interface using TLSv1.2 or TLSv1.3 - if available with a user account from the O1_nacm_management group 3) Verify the session is established and mapped to the correct NETCONF user 4) Verify the global NACM enforcement control setting of a) enable-nacm = true b) read-default = permit c) write-default = deny d) exec-default = deny e) enable-external-groups = true 5) Verify the NACM rule sets for the following pre-defined groups a) O1_nacm_management b) O1_user_management c) O1_network_management d) O1_network_monitoring e) O1_software_management for only PNFs 6) Close the NETCONF session and TLS connection Upon availability of the NETCONF operations set(s) definition per NACM group, the NACM rule set(s) enforcement by the DUT shall be validated for each of those pre-defined groups listed above. ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 140 Expected results The O-RAN component supports the NETCONF over TLS session over its O1 interface and NACM enforcement control settings. Expected format of evidence: Logs or screenshots showing: • O1 interface setup. • Valid server certificate and CA details. • Client's root CA and intermediate CA certificates. • TLS Client-to-NETCONF username mapping. • O-RAN element configured with SMO details. • Initiation of NETCONF call home procedure. • TLSv1.2 or TLSv1.3 connection establishment. • Correct NETCONF user session mapping.
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0ce77be9f03a15fedfc038153382bd6a
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104 105
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11.4 O2
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104 105
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11.4.0 Overview
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This clause delineates a series of test cases aimed at validating the security of the O2 interface within the O-RAN architecture. The tests focus on five critical security facets: confidentiality, integrity, anti-replay, authenticity, and authorization. These are paramount in ensuring a robust and secure communication over the O2 interface.
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0ce77be9f03a15fedfc038153382bd6a
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104 105
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11.4.1 O2 Authenticity
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Requirement Name: O2 protection in terms of authenticity Requirement Reference: 'REQ-SEC-OCLOUD-O2dms-1, REQ-SEC-OCLOUD-O2ims-1', clause 5.1.7.9 in O-RAN Security Requirements and Controls Specifications [5] Threat References: 'T-O2-01' clause 5.4.2.5.1 in O-RAN Security Threat Modeling and Risk Assessment [3] DUT/s: SMO, O-Cloud Test Name: TC_O2_AUTHENTICATION Test description and applicability Purpose: The purpose of this test is to verify the authenticity of the O2 interface, ensuring that only legitimate and authenticated O-Cloud and SMO can participate in the communication over the O2 interface. Test setup and configuration 1) O-Cloud and SMO support mTLS and be connected in simulated/real network environment. 2) The test environment is set up with O2 interface configured. 3) The tester has access to the original data transported over the O2 interface. 4) mTLS is properly implemented and configured as defined in [2] clause 4.2. Test procedure 1) Executes the tests on the mTLS protocol as defined in clause 6.3 ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 141 2) Valid Authentication Certificates (positive case): a. The tester sends a request to establish a connection with the O2 interface using valid authentication certificates. b. The tester verifies the mutual certificate verification between the ORAN NFs. c. The tester captures and analyses the response from the O2 interface. 3) Invalid Authentication Certificates (negative case): d. The tester sends a request to establish a connection with the O2 interface with invalid certificates. e. The tester captures and analyses the response from the O2 interface. 4) No Authentication Certificates (negative case): f. The tester sends a request to establish a connection without any certificates. g. The tester captures and analyses the response from the O2 interface. Expected results 1) For 1. Expected results in clause 6.3.4 2) For 2. 'Valid Authentication Certificates': The O2 interface accepts the valid certificates and respond with a successful authentication message. 3) For 3. 'Invalid Authentication Certificates': The connection is rejected, and an authentication failure message is received. The mutual certificate verification process fails due to the use of invalid certificates. 4) For 4. 'No Authentication Certificates': The connection attempt is rejected, and an authentication failure message is received. The mutual certificate verification process fails due to the absence of certificates. Expected Format of Evidence: The following evidence, in one or more formats as applicable, should be provided: 1) Logs and screenshots showing adherence to mTLS protocol specifications as defined in [2] clause 4.2. 2) Logs of authentication requests and responses on the O2 interface. 3) Logs of the mutual certificate verification process. 4) Screenshots or logs of error messages or unusual behaviours for both invalid and no certificate scenarios.
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0ce77be9f03a15fedfc038153382bd6a
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104 105
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11.4.2 O2 Confidentiality
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Requirement Name: O2 protection in terms of confidentiality Requirement Reference: 'REQ-SEC-OCLOUD-O2dms-2, REQ-SEC-OCLOUD-O2ims-2' clause 5.1.7.9 in O-RAN Security Requirements and Controls Specifications [5] Threat References: 'T-O2-01' clause 5.4.2.5.1 in O-RAN Security Threat Modeling and Risk Assessment [3] DUT/s: SMO, O-Cloud Test Name: TC_O2_CONFIDENTIALITY Test description and applicability Purpose: The purpose of this test is to verify that no sensitive data is revealed at the O2 interface. It ensures that sensitive information remains protected from unauthorized access or disclosure. Test setup and configuration 1) O-Cloud and SMO support TLS and be connected in simulated/real network environment. ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 142 2) The test environment is set up with O2 interface configured. 3) The tester has access to the original data transported over the O2 interface. 4) TLS is properly implemented and configured as defined in [2] clause 4.2. 5) The tester has knowledge of the confidentiality algorithm and confidentiality protection keys used for encrypting the encapsulated payload. Test procedure 1) The tester executes the test on the TLS protocol as defined in clause 6.3 2) Support for mandated security profile: - The tester establishes a secure communication session over the O2 interface and verifies that all protocol versions and combinations of cryptographic algorithms for confidentiality protection that are mandated by the security profile in clause 4.2 of O-RAN security protocols specification [2] are supported by both O-Cloud and SMO. 3) Rejection of forbidden security profile: - The tester establishes a secure communication session over the O2 interface and verifies that this is not possible when the O-Cloud or SMO only offers a feature, including protocol version and combination of cryptographic algorithms for confidentiality protection, that is forbidden by the security profile in clause 4.2 of O-RAN security protocols specification [2]. EXAMPLE: Forbidden Features: This could include outdated TLS protocol versions (e.g. TLS 1.0 or 1.1), cryptographic algorithms known to be insecure (e.g. RC4, MD5, SHA-1, DES, 3DES, CBC-mode ciphers), or any other features explicitly listed as forbidden in the security profile (see clause 4.2 of O-RAN security protocols specification [2]). - Document the configuration used for each attempt, ensuring clear differentiation between the features tested. - Capture and analyse the response from the O2 interface. 4) Traffic capture and analysis: - The tester establishes a secure communication session over the O2 interface and captures the network traffic during the communication session. - The tester analyses the captured traffic to identify any instances where information is transmitted in clear text or without appropriate encryption. - The tester verifies the captured data so that only the intended recipient can decrypt it. - The tester ensures the encryption process that does not allow the attacker to intercept the data in transit between the O-Cloud, and SMO except with the provision of the appropriate decryption key. Expected results 1) Expected results in clause 6.3.4 2) Support for mandated security profile: a. All sensitive data transmitted over the O2 interface is properly encrypted in accordance with the mandated security profile. The communication session demonstrates support for the specified protocol versions and cryptographic algorithms. 3) Rejection of forbidden security profile: a. The O2 interface rejects attempts to establish a communication session offering forbidden protocol versions or cryptographic algorithms. The security profile's restrictions are enforced by O-Cloud and SMO. ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 143 4) Traffic capture and analysis: a. No instances are observed where sensitive information is transmitted without proper encryption or in clear text. The captured traffic confirms the proper application of encryption. b. The captured data remains confidential, with only the designated recipient able to decrypt it. The encryption process ensures data confidentiality and prevents unauthorized access. Expected Format of Evidence: The following evidence, in one or more formats as applicable, should be provided: • Logs and screenshots showing adherence to TLS protocol specifications as defined in [2] clause 4.2. • Logs of secure communication sessions established over the O2 interface. • Verification logs or data confirming proper encryption and decryption. Screenshots or logs showing rejection of forbidden security profiles.
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0ce77be9f03a15fedfc038153382bd6a
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104 105
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11.4.3 O2 Integrity
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Requirement Name: O2 protection in terms of integrity Requirement Reference: 'REQ-SEC-OCLOUD-O2dms-2, REQ-SEC-OCLOUD-O2ims-2' clause 5.1.7.9 in O-RAN Security Requirements and Controls Specifications [5] Threat References: 'T-O2-01' clause 5.4.2.5.1 in O-RAN Security Threat Modeling and Risk Assessment [3] DUT/s: SMO, O-Cloud Test Name: TC_O2_INTEGRITY Test description and applicability Purpose: The purpose of this test is to verify that the DUT can detect and reject packets with incorrect integrity over the O2 interface. Test setup and configuration 1) O-Cloud and SMO support TLS and be connected in simulated/real network environment. 2) The test environment is set up with O2 interface configured. 3) The tester has access to the original data transported over the O2 interface. 4) TLS is properly implemented and configured as defined in [2] clause 4.2. 5) The tester has knowledge of the integrity algorithm (Hash Message Authentication Code) and the protection keys. Test procedure 1) The tester executes the test on the TLS protocol as defined in clause 6.3 2) Support for mandated security profile: a) The tester establishes a secure communication session over the O2 interface and verifies that all protocol versions and combinations of cryptographic algorithms for integrity protection that are mandated by the security profile in clause 4.2 of O-RAN security protocols specification [2] are supported by both O- Cloud and SMO. ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 144 3) Rejection of forbidden security profile: a) The tester establishes a secure communication session over the O2 interface and verifies that this is not possible when the O-Cloud or SMO only offers a feature, including protocol version and combination of cryptographic algorithms for integrity protection, that is forbidden by the security profile in clause 4.2 of O-RAN security protocols specification [2]. EXAMPLE 1: Forbidden Features: This could include outdated TLS protocol versions (e.g. TLS 1.0 or 1.1), cryptographic algorithms known to be insecure (e.g. RC4, MD5, SHA-1, DES, 3DES, CBC-mode ciphers), or any other features explicitly listed as forbidden in the security profile (see clause 4.2 of O-RAN security protocols specification [2]). b) Document the configuration used for each attempt, ensuring clear differentiation between the features tested. c) Capture and analyse the response from the O2 interface. 4) Traffic capture and analysis: a) The tester establishes a secure communication session over the O2 interface and captures the network traffic during the communication session. EXAMPLE 2: Use Wireshark b) The tester modifies captured packets using a packet editing tool to simulate potential integrity breaches. This involves altering the MAC. EXAMPLE 3: Use Scapy or a custom script c) After modifying the packets, the tester reinjects them back into the network to simulate an integrity breach scenario. d) The tester monitors the DUT's response to the reinjected packets. Specifically, the tester observes whether the DUT detects and drops/ignores the packets with compromised integrity, verifies the MAC algorithms used on the O2 interface. Expected results 1) Expected results in clause 6.3.4 2) Support for mandated security profile: a) Data transmitted via the O2 interface maintains its integrity between sending and receiving nodes. The security profile's specified protocol versions and cryptographic algorithms are upheld. 3) Rejection of forbidden security profile: a) O-Cloud and SMO reject communication sessions that involve forbidden protocol versions or cryptographic algorithms. The security profile's restrictions are enforced. 4) Traffic capture and analysis: a) The DUT ignores or drops the injected packets with altered integrity. Expected Format of Evidence: The following evidence, in one or more formats as applicable, should be provided: • Logs and screenshots showing adherence to TLS protocol specifications as defined in [2] clause 4.2. • Captured network traffic during secure sessions, highlighting any modified packets and their handling. • Logs or data confirming the implementation and effectiveness of MAC algorithm integrity checks. ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 145
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0ce77be9f03a15fedfc038153382bd6a
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104 105
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11.4.4 O2 Replay
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Requirement Name: O2 protection in terms of anti-replay Requirement Reference: 'REQ-SEC-OCLOUD-O2dms-2, REQ-SEC-OCLOUD-O2ims-2' clause 5.1.7.9 in O-RAN Security Requirements and Controls Specifications [5] Threat References: 'T-O2-01' clause 5.4.2.5.1 in O-RAN Security Threat Modeling and Risk Assessment [3] DUT/s: SMO, O-Cloud Test Name: TC_O2_REPLAY Test description and applicability Purpose: The purpose of this test is to verify that no malicious capture and subsequent replay of network traffic to deceive the system or gain unauthorized access over the O2 interface. (Anti-replay). Test setup and configuration 1) O-Cloud and SMO supports TLS and be connected in simulated/real network environment. 2) The test environment is set up with O2 interface configured. 3) The tester has access to the original data transported over the O2 interface. 4) TLS is properly implemented and configured as defined in [2] clause 4.2. 5) The tester has knowledge of the anti-replay security controls implemented over O2 interface. Test procedure 1) The tester executes the tests on the TLS protocol as defined in clause 6.3. 2) The tester establishes a secure communication session over the O2 interface and captures the network traffic during the communication session. The tester focuses on capturing packets that typically are involved in replay attacks, such as those containing authentication credentials, session identifiers, or critical commands. These packets are more likely to be targeted in replay attacks due to their sensitive content. 3) The tester attempts to replay the captured packets or data by resending them to the O-RAN component (O- Cloud or SMO). 4) The tester observes the O-RAN components behaviour and response to the replayed packets. 5) The tester verifies each data packet assigned with a unique sequence number included in the packet header. 6) The tester verifies each data packet contains a timestamp. 7) The tester also verifies the sequence number of each received packet and compares it to the previously received packet's sequence number and if the sequence number is too low or too high, the packet is considered a replay attack and is discarded. Expected results 1) Expected results in clause 6.3.4 2) O-Cloud and SMO implements countermeasures to detect and prevent replay attacks. This may include the use of sequence numbers, timestamps, or other forms of message authentication codes. 3) O-Cloud and SMO reject or ignore replayed packets and not perform any sensitive or unauthorized actions. Expected Format of Evidence: The following evidence, in one or more formats as applicable, should be provided: • Logs and screenshots showing adherence to TLS protocol specifications as defined in [2] clause 4.2. ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 146 • Logs of secure communication sessions and captured network traffic over the O2 interface. • Details of identified packets or data susceptible to replay attacks. • Verification logs or data confirming the use of unique sequence numbers and timestamps in packet headers. • Screenshots or logs of the system's behaviour and response to the replayed packets.
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0ce77be9f03a15fedfc038153382bd6a
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104 105
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11.4.5 O2 Authorization
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Requirement Name: O2 protection in terms of authorization Requirement Reference: 'REQ-SEC-OCLOUD-O2dms-3, REQ-SEC-OCLOUD-O2ims-3' clause 5.1.7.9 in O-RAN Security Requirements and Controls Specifications [5] Threat References: 'T-O2-01' clause 5.4.2.5.1 in O-RAN Security Threat Modeling and Risk Assessment [3] DUT/s: SMO, O-Cloud Test Name: TC_O2_AUTHORIZATION Test description and applicability Purpose: The purpose of this test is to validate that the O2 interface enforces an authorization mechanism to prevent unauthorized access. Test setup and configuration • O-Cloud and SMO support OAuth 2.0 and are connected in simulated/real network environment. • The test environment is set up with O2 interface configured. • The tester has access to the original data transported over the O2 interface. • OAuth 2.0 is properly implemented and configured. Test procedure 1) Execute the tests on the OAuth 2.0 protocol as defined in clause 6.6 2) Valid access tokens (positive case): a) The tester sends a request to access protected resources using a valid access token. b) The tester captures and analyses the response from the O2 interface. 3) Invalid access tokens (negative case): a) The tester sends a request to access protected resources using an invalid or incorrect access token. b) The tester captures and analyses the response from the O2 interface. 4) No access tokens (negative case): a) The tester sends a request to access protected resources without providing any access token. b) The tester captures and analyses the response from the O2 interface. Expected results • For 1. Expected results in clause 6.6.4 • For 2. 'Valid access tokens': The O2 interface accepts the valid access tokens and responds with a successful authorization message. • For 3. 'Invalid access tokens': The access is rejected, and an access failure message is received. ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 147 • For 4. 'No access tokens': The access is rejected due to the absence of tokens, and an appropriate error or unauthorized access message is received. Expected Format of Evidence: The following evidence, in one or more formats as applicable, should be provided: 1) Logs of the request sent to access protected resources using valid access tokens. 2) Screenshots or logs highlighting the successful authorization message. 3) Logs of the request sent to access protected resources using invalid or incorrect access tokens. 4) Screenshots or logs showing the rejection of the access and the access failure message.
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0ce77be9f03a15fedfc038153382bd6a
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104 105
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11.5 E2
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0ce77be9f03a15fedfc038153382bd6a
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104 105
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11.5.0 Overview
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This clause focuses on verifying the confidentiality, integrity, replay protection, and authenticity of data over the E2 interface. Through a series of meticulously designed tests, the E2 interface's robustness against potential threats is ascertained.
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0ce77be9f03a15fedfc038153382bd6a
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104 105
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11.5.1 E2 Confidentiality
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Requirement Name: Data confidentiality protection over E2 interface Requirement Reference & Description: 'REQ-SEC-E2-1, SEC-CTL-E2, SEC-CTL-NEAR-RT-2, SEC-CTL-NEAR- RT-7' clause 5.2.4 in O-RAN Security Requirements and Controls Specifications [5] Threat References: 'T-O-RAN-05' clause 5.4.1, 'T-NEAR-RT-01, 02, 03 & 04' clause 5.4.1.4 in O-RAN Security Threat Modeling and Risk Assessment [3] DUT/s: O-CU, O-DU, Near-RT RIC Test Name: TC_E2_CONFIDENTIALITY Test description and applicability Purpose: The purpose of this test is to verify that no sensitive data is revealed at the E2 interface between the Near-RT RIC and E2 nodes (CU & DU). It ensures that sensitive information remains protected from unauthorized access or disclosure. Test setup and configuration • Near-RT RIC and E2 nodes support IPsec and are connected in simulated/real network environment. • The test environment is set up with E2 interface configured. Communication sessions over the E2 interface are established. • The vendor provides documentation describing how confidentiality is achieved for the data transmission over the E2 interface. • The tunnel mode IPsec ESP and IKE certificate authentication is implemented. • Tester has knowledge of the security parameters of tunnel for decrypting the ESP packets. • Tester has knowledge of the confidentiality algorithm and confidentiality protection keys used for encrypting the encapsulated payload. • IPsec is properly implemented and configured. The tester shall base the test on the profile defined in [2] clause 4.5. ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 148 Test procedure 1) Execute the tests on the IPsec protocol as defined in clause 6.5. 2) Secure communication session establishment - Establish a secure communication session over the E2 interface. - Verify that all protocol versions and combinations of cryptographic algorithms for confidentiality protection mandated by the security profile are supported by the network product. 3) Attempt using forbidden protocols and algorithms. - Attempt to establish a secure communication session over the E2 interface using protocol versions and cryptographic algorithms for confidentiality protection that are forbidden by the security profile. 4) Traffic capture - Establish a secure communication session over the E2 interface. - Captures the network traffic during the communication session. - Analyse the captured traffic to identify any instances where sensitive information is transmitted in clear text or without appropriate encryption. 5) Data decryption verification - Verify the captured data to ensure only the intended recipient can decrypt it. 6) Encryption process verification - Ensure the encryption process does not allow an attacker to intercept the data in transit between the Near- RT RIC and E2 nodes, except with the provision of the appropriate decryption key. Expected Results 1) Expected results in clause 6.5.4 2) The secure communication session is successfully established using the mandated protocol versions and cryptographic algorithms. 3) The attempts to establish a session using forbidden protocols and algorithms fail. 4) No instances of sensitive information being transmitted in clear text are observed. 5) The captured data is encrypted in such a way that only the intended recipient can decrypt it. 6) The encryption process is robust, preventing any unauthorized interception of data. Expected format of evidence: The following evidence, in one or more formats as applicable, should be provided: • Logs and screenshots showing adherence to IPsec protocol specifications as defined in [2] clause 4.5. • A screenshot containing the operational results. • Executed commands: Details of the test setup and configuration. • Captured network traffic: Sniffed packets or network captures during the test. • Analysis results: Documentation highlighting the presence or absence of encryption and clear text transmission. • Logs ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 149
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0ce77be9f03a15fedfc038153382bd6a
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104 105
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11.5.2 E2 Integrity
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Requirement Name: Data integrity protection over E2 interface Requirement Reference & Description: 'REQ-SEC-E2-1' clause 5.2.4 in O-RAN Security Requirements and Controls Specifications [5] Threat References: 'T-O-RAN-05' clause 5.4.1, 'T-NEAR-RT-01, 02, 03, 04' clause 5.4.1.4 in O-RAN Security Threat Modeling and Risk Assessment [3] DUT/s: O-CU, O-DU, Near-RT RIC Test Name: TC_E2_INTEGRITY Test description and applicability Purpose: The purpose of this test is to verify that the DUT can detect and reject packets with incorrect integrity over the E2 interface. Test setup and configuration • Near-RT RIC and E2 nodes support IPsec and are connected in simulated/real network environment. • The test environment is set up with E2 interface configured. Communication sessions over the E2 interface are established. • The vendor provides documentation describing how integrity is achieved for the data transmission over the E2 interface. • The tunnel mode IPsec ESP and IKE certificate authentication is implemented. • Tester has knowledge of the security parameters of tunnel for decrypting the ESP packets. • Tester has knowledge of the integrity algorithm (Hash Message Authentication Code) and the protection keys. • IPsec is properly implemented and configured. The tester bases the test on the profile defined in [2] clause 4.5. Test procedure 1) Execute the tests on the IPsec protocol as defined in clause 6.5. 2) Secure communication session establishment - Establish a secure communication session over the E2 interface. - Verify that all protocol versions and combinations of cryptographic algorithms for integrity protection mandated by the security profile are supported by the network product (see clause 4.5 of O-RAN security protocols specification [2]). 3) Attempt using forbidden protocols and algorithms. - Attempt to establish a secure communication session over the E2 interface using protocol versions and cryptographic algorithms for integrity protection that are forbidden by the security profile (see clause 4.5 of O-RAN security protocols specification [2]). 4) Traffic capture and analysis - Establish a secure communication session over the E2 interface. - Capture the network traffic during the session. EXAMPLE 1: Use Wireshark. - Modify captured packets using a packet editing tool to simulate potential integrity breaches. This involves altering the MAC. ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 150 EXAMPLE 2: Use Scapy or a custom script. - After modifying the packets, the tester reinjects them back into the network to simulate an integrity breach scenario. - Monitor the DUT's response to the reinjected packets. Specifically, the tester observes whether the DUT detects and drops/ignores the packets with compromised integrity. Expected Results 1) Expected results in clause 6.5.4 2) The DUT supports all mandated protocol versions and combinations of cryptographic algorithms for integrity protection. The session is established without any errors or interruptions. 3) The DUT rejects or does not support any protocol versions and cryptographic algorithms for integrity protection that are forbidden by the security profile. No secure communication session is established using the forbidden protocols and algorithms. 4) The DUT ignores or drops the injected packets with altered integrity. Expected format of evidence: The following evidence, in one or more formats as applicable, should be provided: • Logs and screenshots showing adherence to IPsec protocol specifications as defined in [2] clause 4.5. • Captured network traffic during secure sessions, highlighting any modified packets and their handling. • Logs or data confirming the implementation and effectiveness of MAC algorithm integrity checks.
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0ce77be9f03a15fedfc038153382bd6a
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104 105
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11.5.3 E2 Replay
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Requirement Name: Data replay protection over E2 interface Requirement Reference & Description: 'REQ-SEC-E2-1' clause 5.2.4 in O-RAN Security Requirements and Controls Specifications [5] Threat References: 'T-O-RAN-05' clause 5.4.1, 'T-NEAR-RT-01, 02, 03 & 04' clause 5.4.1.4, 'T-xAPP-01' clause 5.4.1.6 in O-RAN Security Threat Modeling and Risk Assessment [3] DUT/s: O-CU, O-DU, Near-RT RIC Test Name: TC_E2_REPLAY Test description and applicability Purpose: The purpose of this test is to verify that no malicious capture and subsequent replay of network traffic to deceive the system or gain unauthorized access over the E2 interface. Test setup and configuration • Near-RT RIC and E2 nodes support IPsec and are connected in simulated/real network environment. • The test environment is set up with E2 interface configured. Communication sessions over the E2 interface are established. • The vendor provides documentation describing how replay protection is achieved for the data transmission over the E2 interface. • The tunnel mode IPsec ESP and IKE certificate authentication is implemented. • Tester has knowledge of the security parameters of tunnel for decrypting the ESP packets. • Tester has access to the original user data transported over the E2 interface. ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 151 • IPsec is properly implemented and configured. The tester bases the test on the profile defined in [2] clause 4.5. Test procedure 1) Execute the tests on the IPsec protocol as defined in clause 6.5. 2) The tester establishes a secure communication session over the E2 interface and verifies that all protocol versions and combinations of cryptographic algorithms for replay protection that are mandated by the security profile are supported by the network product. 3) The tester attempts to establish a secure communication session over the E2 interface using protocol versions and cryptographic algorithms for replay protection that are forbidden by the security profile. 4) The tester establishes a secure communication session over the E2 interface and captures the network traffic during the communication session. The tester focuses on capturing packets that typically are involved in replay attacks, such as those containing authentication credentials, session identifiers, or critical commands. These packets are more likely to be targeted in replay attacks due to their sensitive content. 5) The tester attempts to replay the captured packets or data by resending them to the system (Near-RT RIC or E2 nodes). 6) The tester observes the system's behaviour and response to the replayed packets. 7) The tester verifies each data packet assigned with a unique sequence number included in the packet header. 8) The tester verifies each data packet contains a timestamp. 9) The tester also verifies the sequence number of each received packet and compares it to the previously received packet's sequence number and if the sequence number is too low or too high, the packet is considered a replay attack and is discarded. Expected Results • Expected results in clause 6.5.4 • The system has implemented countermeasures to detect and prevent replay attacks. This includes the use of sequence numbers, timestamps, or other forms of message authentication codes. • The system rejects or ignores replayed packets and not performs any sensitive or unauthorized actions. Expected format of evidence: The following evidence, in one or more formats as applicable, should be provided: • Logs and screenshots showing adherence to IPsec protocol specifications as defined in [2] clause 4.5. • Executed commands: Details of the test setup and configuration. • Records of sniffed packets or network captures during the test. • Screenshots or logs of the system's behaviour and response to the replayed packets.
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0ce77be9f03a15fedfc038153382bd6a
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104 105
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11.5.4 E2 Authenticity
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0ce77be9f03a15fedfc038153382bd6a
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104 105
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11.5.4.1 E2 Authenticity with certificate
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Requirement Name: Data Authentication over E2 interface Requirement Reference & Description: 'REQ-SEC-E2-1' clause 5.2.4 in O-RAN Security Requirements and Controls Specifications [5] Threat References: 'T-O-RAN-05' clause 5.4.1, 'T-NEAR-RT-01, 02, 03 & 04' clause 5.4.1.4 in O-RAN Security Threat Modeling and Risk Assessment [3] DUT/s: O-CU, O-DU, Near-RT RIC ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 152 Test Name: TC_E2_AUTHENTICATION_CERT Test description and applicability Purpose: The purpose of this test is to verify the authenticity of the E2 interface with valid certificates, ensuring that only legitimate and authenticated Near-RT RIC and E2 nodes can participate in the communication over the E2 interface. Test setup and configuration • Near-RT RIC and E2 nodes support IPsec and are connected in simulated/real network environment. • Near-RT RIC and E2 nodes support IPsec and are configured to use certificate-based authentication. • The test environment is set up with E2 interface configured. Communication sessions over the E2 interface are established. • The vendor provides documentation describing how authenticity protection is achieved for the data transmission over the E2 interface. • The tunnel mode IPsec ESP and IKE certificate authentication is implemented. • Tester has knowledge of the security parameters of tunnel for decrypting the ESP packets. • Tester has access to the original user data transported over the E2 interface. • IPsec is properly implemented and configured. The tester bases the test on the profile defined in [2] clause 4.5. Test procedure 1) Execute the tests on the IPsec protocol as defined in clause 6.5. 2) Valid Authentication Credentials: a. The tester sends a request to establish a connection with the E2 interface using valid certificates. b. The tester captures and analyses the response from the E2 interface. 3) Invalid Authentication Credentials: a. The tester sends a request to establish a connection with the E2 interface using invalid certificates. b. The tester captures and analyses the response from the E2 interface. 4) No Authentication Credentials: a. The tester sends a request to establish a connection with the E2 interface without providing any certificates. b. The tester captures and analyses the response from the E2 interface. Expected Results • For 1. Expected results in clause 6.5.4 • For 2. 'Valid Authentication Credentials': The E2 interface accepts the valid certificate and responds with a successful authentication message. • For 3. 'Invalid Authentication Credentials': The connection is rejected due to the certificate verification failure, and an authentication failure message is received. • For 4. 'No Authentication Credentials': The connection attempt fails due to the absence of certificates, and an authentication failure message is received. Expected format of evidence: • Logs and screenshots showing adherence to IPsec protocol specifications as defined in [2] clause 4.5. ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 153 • Screenshots or logs of request-response messages confirming authentication with valid credentials. • Screenshots or logs capturing the rejection of requests with invalid credentials. • Screenshots or logs documenting attempts to connect without credentials and their rejection.
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0ce77be9f03a15fedfc038153382bd6a
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104 105
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11.5.4.2 E2 Authenticity with PSK
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Requirement Name: Data Authentication over E2 interface Requirement Reference & Description: 'REQ-SEC-E2-1' clause 5.2.4 in O-RAN Security Requirements and Controls Specifications [5] Threat References: 'T-O-RAN-05' clause 5.4.1, 'T-NEAR-RT-01, 02, 03 & 04' clause 5.4.1.4 in O-RAN Security Threat Modeling and Risk Assessment [3] DUT/s: O-CU, O-DU, Near-RT RIC Test Name: TC_E2_AUTHENTICATION_PSK Test description and applicability Purpose: The purpose of this test is to verify the authenticity of the E2 interface with valid PSK, ensuring that only legitimate and authenticated Near-RT RIC and E2 nodes can participate in the communication over the E2 interface. Test setup and configuration • Near-RT RIC and E2 nodes support IPsec and are connected in simulated/real network environment. • Near-RT RIC and E2 nodes support IPsec and are configured to use PSK-based authentication. • The test environment is set up with E2 interface configured. Communication sessions over the E2 interface are established. • The vendor provides documentation describing how authenticity protection is achieved for the data transmission over the E2 interface. • The tunnel mode IPsec ESP and IKE certificate authentication is implemented. • Tester has knowledge of the security parameters of tunnel for decrypting the ESP packets. • Tester has access to the original user data transported over the E2 interface. • IPsec is properly implemented and configured. The bases the test on the profile defined in [2] clause 4.5. Test procedure 1) Execute the tests on the IPsec protocol as defined in clause 6.5. 2) Valid Authentication Credentials: a. The tester sends a request to establish a connection with the E2 interface using valid PSKs. b. The tester captures and analyses the response from the E2 interface. 3) Invalid Authentication Credentials (Incorrect PSKs): a. The tester sends a request to establish a connection with the E2 interface with incorrect PSKs. b. The tester captures and analyses the response from the E2 interface. 4) No Authentication Credentials (No PSKs): a. The tester sends a request to establish a connection with the E2 interface without providing any PSKs. ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 154 b. The tester captures and analyses the response from the E2 interface. Expected Results • For 1. Expected results in clause 6.5.4 • For 2. 'Valid Authentication Credentials': The E2 interface accepts the valid PSK and responds with a successful authentication message. • For 3. 'Invalid Authentication Credentials (Incorrect PSKs)': The connection is rejected due to PSK verification failure, and an authentication failure message is received. • For 4. 'No Authentication Credentials (No PSKs)': The connection attempt fails due to the absence of PSKs, and an authentication failure message is received. Expected format of evidence: • Logs and screenshots showing adherence to IPsec protocol specifications as defined in [2] clause 4.5. • Logs or screenshots documenting request and response messages for successful authentication using valid credentials. • Logs or screenshots capturing the request and response messages when invalid credentials are rejected. • Logs or screenshots documenting the request and response messages for rejections of connections without PSKs.
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0ce77be9f03a15fedfc038153382bd6a
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104 105
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11.5.4.3 E2 Interface data validation by Near-RT RIC
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Requirement Name: Validation of the data received via E2 interface by Near-RT RIC Requirement Reference: - SEC-CTL-NEAR-RT-17 - clause 5.1.3.2, Security Controls, Near-RT RIC and xApps, O- RAN Security Requirements and Controls Specification [5] Requirement Description:- The Near-RT RIC shall verify data received through the E2 interface as follows: The data values are valid. The data is being received at or below a pre-defined rate. The Near-RT RIC shall log security event(s) if any of the verification steps fail. Threat References: T-NEAR-RT-01, T-xApp-01 DUT/s: Near-RT RIC Test Name: TC_E2_Interface_data_validation_by_NearRTRIC Test Description Purpose: To validate the E2 traffic that is received by Near-RT RIC via E2 interface. The Near-RT RIC uses E2 interface to collect near real-time information (EXAMPLE:- UE basis, Cell basis) and provide value added services. These real-time information needs to be validated when it gets received at Near-RT RIC and security events are to be logged if data validation fails. E2 interface connects the Near-Real-Time RIC with other E2 nodes like O-CU, O-DU, and O-eNB. EXAMPLE: One of the incoming data values to the Near-RT RIC are the measurement reports (carried in E2 Indication messages) that include: Channel quality reports: Signal strength, signal-to-noise ratio (SNR), and modulation quality. Interference reports: Identifying sources of interference. Load reports: Current load on E2 nodes. ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 155 Test setup and configuration 1) Client is the test system which simulates E2 data traffic towards Near-RT RIC. This includes all the supported E2 support services (EXAMPLE:- E2 RESET procedure), Measurement reports and other supported services. Test system is also capable of simulating multiple E2 connections where E2 traffic can be pushed. Precondition: 1) Near-RT RIC is fully operational and data value validation in Near-RT RIC is defined, and the pre-defined data threshold rate is set. By fully operational Near-RT-RIC, this means the Near-RT RIC is enabled with necessary xApps and configurations at the platform level. 2) Client system is logged in and the initial control connections are up with Near-RT RIC. At this point the Near-RT RIC has subscribed with E2 Nodes in the Client system and is expecting data at a predefined rate. 3) Login to the DUT with authorized credentials and start data collection required for checking the data handling. Test procedure 1) From the client system, Initiate the E2 traffic with valid data values towards Near-RT RIC over single E2 connection 2) From the client test system, Initiate the E2 traffic with valid data on multiple E2 connections simultaneously 3) From the client test system, initiate invalid E2 traffic data Example: Invalid values (or) Invalid format in the measurement reports (or) Invalid E2 Node configuration information sent in E2 setup request (or) Invalid cause in the E2 reset request 4) From the client test system, initiate the E2 data which is equal to the Near-RT RIC predefined data rate via multiple E2 connections simultaneously 5) From the client test system, initiate sudden burst of E2 data which is more than the Near-RT RIC predefined data rate via multiple E2 connections simultaneously Expected results After step 1, the DUT processes the data traffic received over a single E2 connection. After step 2, the DUT processes the data traffic received simultaneously over multiple E2 connections. After step 3, the DUT discards the data and security event is logged with the logs fields as per clause 5.3.8.8 of [5]. After step 4, the DUT receives E2 traffic and handles it because E2 data is at, or below the pre-defined rate in DUT. After step 5, the DUT discards the spilled over data and security events are logged with the log fields are as per clause 5.3.8.8 of [5] because the E2 data rate is higher than the pre-defined rate in DUT. Expected format of evidence: Log files, traffic captures and/or report files.
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0ce77be9f03a15fedfc038153382bd6a
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104 105
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11.6 A1
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0ce77be9f03a15fedfc038153382bd6a
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104 105
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11.6.1 A1 Authenticity
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Requirement Name: A1 protection in terms of authenticity Requirement Reference & Description: 'REQ-SEC-A1-2, SEC-CTL-A1-2' clause 5.2.1 in O-RAN Security Requirements and Controls Specifications [5] Threat References: 'T-A1-01' clause 7.4.1.10 in O-RAN Security Threat Modeling and Risk Assessment [3] DUT/s: Non-RT RIC, Near-RT RIC Test Name: TC_A1_Authentication Test description and applicability ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 156 Purpose: The purpose of this test is to verify the authenticity of the A1 interface, ensuring that only legitimate and authenticated Non-RT RIC, Near-RT RIC can participate in the communication over the A1 interface. Test setup and configuration • Non-RT RIC & Near-RT RIC support mTLS and be connected in a simulated/real network environment. • The test environment is set up with the A1 interface configured. • The tester has access to the original data transported over the A1 interface. • mTLS is properly implemented and configured as defined in [2] clause 4.2. Test procedure 1) Execute the test on the mTLS protocol as defined in clause 6.3. 2) Valid Authentication Certificates (positive case): a. The tester sends a request to establish a connection with the A1 interface using valid authentication certificates. b. The tester verifies the mutual certificate verification between Non-RT RIC and Near-RT RIC. c. The tester captures and analyses the response received from the A1 interface. 3) Invalid Authentication Certificates (negative case): a. The tester sends a request to establish a connection with the A1 interface with invalid certificates. b. The tester captures and analyses the response received from the A1 interface. 4) No Authentication Certificates (negative Case): a. The tester sends a request to establish a connection without any certificates. b. The tester captures and analyses the response from the A1 interface. Expected results • For 1. Expected results in clause 6.3.4 • For 2. 'Valid Authentication Certificates': The A1 interface accepts the valid certificates and responds with a successful authentication message. The mutual certificate verification process is successful. • For 3. 'Invalid Authentication Certificates': The connection attempt is rejected, and an authentication failure message is received. The mutual certificate verification process fails due to the use of invalid certificates. • For 4. 'No Authentication Certificates': The connection attempt is rejected, and an authentication failure message is received. The mutual certificate verification process fails due to the absence of certificates. Expected Format of Evidence: The following evidence, in one or more formats as applicable, should be provided: • Logs and screenshots showing adherence to mTLS protocol specifications as defined in [2] clause 4.2. • Logs of authentication requests and responses on the A1 interface. • Logs of the mutual certificate verification process. • Screenshots or logs of error messages or unusual behaviours for both invalid and no certificate scenarios.
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0ce77be9f03a15fedfc038153382bd6a
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104 105
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11.6.2 A1 Confidentiality, integrity and replay
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Requirement Name: A1 protection in terms of confidentiality, integrity, and replay ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 157 Requirement Reference & Description: 'REQ-SEC-A1-1', 'SEC-CTL-A1' clause 5.2.1.1 in O-RAN Security Requirements and Controls Specifications [5] Threat References: 'T-A1-02', T-A1-03' clause 7.4.1.10 in O-RAN Security Threat Modeling and Risk Assessment [3] DUT/s: Non-RT RIC, Near-RT RIC Test Name: TC_A1_CONFIDENTIALITY_INTEGRITY_REPLAY Test description and applicability Purpose: To verify the enforcement of security policies over the A1 interface, ensuring that sensitive data remains protected through confidentiality, integrity, and replay protection. Test setup and configuration • Non-RT RIC & Near-RT RIC support TLS and connected within simulated or real network environments. • The A1 interface is configured for testing. • TLS is properly implemented and configured as defined in [2] clause 4.2. Test procedure 1) Confidentiality verification: - Establish a secure communication session over the A1 interface. - Capture the network traffic during the session. - Analyse the captured traffic to verify that all data is encrypted, ensuring confidentiality. 2) Integrity protection verification: - Capture protected packets after the TLS handshake. - Modify the captured packets. - Inject the modified packets to the DUT. - Confirm that the DUT discards the injected packets, e.g. does not deliver it to the higher layer. 3) Replay protection verification: - Capture protected packets after the TLS handshake. - Replay the captured packets to the DUT. - Confirm that the DUT discards the replayed packets. Expected results • Confidentiality: All sensitive data transmitted over the A1 interface is encrypted, with no data exposed in clear text. • Integrity protection: The DUT detects and discards altered packets, ensuring data has not been tampered with. • Replay protection: The DUT detects and discards replayed packets, preventing replay attacks. Expected Format of Evidence: The following evidence, in one or more formats as applicable, should be provided: Logs or screenshots showing TLS protocol adherence, as defined in the O-RAN security protocols specification [2] clause 4.2. Evidence of secure communication sessions established over the A1 interface, including details of encryption verification. ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 158 Logs or screenshots showing the DUT's response to replayed and integrity-compromised packets, demonstrating the effectiveness of the security mechanisms in place.
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0ce77be9f03a15fedfc038153382bd6a
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104 105
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11.6.3 A1 Authorization
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Requirement Name: A1 protection in terms of authorization Requirement Reference & Description: 'REQ-SEC-A1-2', 'SEC-CTL-A3' clause 5.2.1.1 in O-RAN Security Requirements and Controls Specifications [5] Threat References: 'T-A1-01' clause 7.4.1.10 in O-RAN Security Threat Modeling and Risk Assessment [3] DUT/s: Non-RT RIC, Near-RT RIC Test Name: TC_A1_Authorization Test description and applicability Purpose: The purpose of this test is to validate that the A1 interface enforces an authorization mechanism to prevent unauthorized access. Test setup and configuration • Non-RT RIC and Near-RT RIC support OAuth 2.0 and are connected in simulated/real network environment. • The test environment is set up with A1 interface configured. • The tester has access to the original data transported over the A1 interface. • OAuth 2.0 is properly implemented and configured. Test procedure 1) Execute the test on the OAuth 2.0 protocol as defined in clause 6.6. 2) Valid access tokens (positive case): a. The tester sends a request to access protected resources using a valid access token. b. The tester captures and analyses the response from the A1 interface. 3) Invalid access tokens (negative case): a. The tester sends a request to access protected resources using an invalid or incorrect access token. b. The tester captures and analyses the response from the A1 interface. 4) No access tokens (negative case): a. The tester sends a request to access protected resources without providing any access token. b. The tester captures and analyses the response from the A1 interface. Expected Results • For 1. Expected results in clause 6.6.4 • For 2. 'Valid access tokens': The A1 interface accepts the valid access tokens and responds with a successful authorization message. • For 3. 'Invalid access tokens': The access is rejected, and an access failure message is received. • For 4. 'No access tokens': The access is rejected due to the absence of tokens, and an appropriate error or unauthorized access message is received. ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 159 Expected Format of Evidence: The following evidence, in one or more formats as applicable, should be provided: • Logs of the request sent to access protected resources using valid access tokens. • Screenshots or logs highlighting the successful authorization message. • Logs of the request sent to access protected resources using invalid or incorrect access tokens. • Screenshots or logs showing the rejection of the access and the access failure message.
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0ce77be9f03a15fedfc038153382bd6a
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104 105
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11.7 R1
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0ce77be9f03a15fedfc038153382bd6a
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104 105
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11.7.1 R1 Authenticity
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Requirement Name: R1 protection in terms of authenticity Requirement Reference & Description: 'REQ-SEC-R1-2' clause 5.2.6.1 in O-RAN Security Requirements and Controls Specifications [5] Threat References: 'T-R1-03' clause 7.4.1.9 in O-RAN Security Threat Modeling and Risk Assessment [3] DUT/s: Non-RT RIC, rApps Test Name: TC_R1_AUTHENTICATION Test description and applicability Purpose: The purpose of this test is to verify the authenticity of the R1 interface, ensuring that only legitimate and authenticated Non-RT RIC, rApps can participate in the communication over the R1 interface. Test setup and configuration • Non-RT RIC & rApps support mTLS and be connected in a simulated/real network environment. • The test environment is set up with the R1 interface configured. • The tester has access to the original data transported over the R1 interface. • mTLS is properly implemented and configured as defined in [2] clause 4.2. Test procedure 1) Execute the test on the mTLS protocol as defined in clause 6.3. 2) Valid Authentication Certificates (positive case): a. The tester sends a request to establish a connection with the R1 interface using valid authentication certificates. b. The tester verifies the mutual certificate verification between Non-RT RIC and rApps. c. The tester captures and analyses the response received from the R1 interface. 3) Invalid Authentication Certificates (negative case): a. The tester sends a request to establish a connection with the R1 interface with invalid certificates. b. The tester captures and analyses the response received from the R1 interface. 4) No Authentication Certificates (negative case): a. The tester sends a request to establish a connection without any certificates. ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 160 b. The tester captures and analyses the response from the R1 interface. Expected results 1) For 1. Expected results in clause 6.3.4 2) For 2. 'Valid Authentication Certificates': The R1 interface accepts the valid certificates and responds with a successful authentication message. The mutual certificate verification process is successful. 3) For 3. 'Invalid Authentication Certificates': The connection attempt is rejected, and an authentication failure message is received. The mutual certificate verification process fails due to the use of invalid certificates. 4) For 4. 'No Authentication Certificates': The connection attempt is rejected, and an authentication failure message is received. The mutual certificate verification process fails due to the absence of certificates. Expected Format of Evidence: The following evidence, in one or more formats as applicable, should be provided: • Logs and screenshots showing adherence to mTLS protocol specifications as defined in [2] clause 4.2. • Logs of authentication requests and responses on the R1 interface. • Logs of the mutual certificate verification process. • Screenshots or logs of error messages or unusual behaviours for both invalid and no certificate scenarios.
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0ce77be9f03a15fedfc038153382bd6a
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104 105
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11.7.2 R1 Confidentiality, integrity and replay
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Requirement Name: R1 protection in terms of confidentiality, integrity and replay Requirement Reference & Description: 'REQ-SEC-R1-1' clause 5.2.6.1 in O-RAN Security Requirements and Controls Specifications [5] Threat References: 'T-R1-06, T-R1-07' clause 7.4.1.9 in O-RAN Security Threat Modeling and Risk Assessment [3] DUT/s: Non-RT RIC, rApps Test Name: TC_R1_CONFIDENTIALITY_INTEGRITY_REPLAY Test description and applicability Purpose: To verify the enforcement of security policies over the R1 interface, ensuring that sensitive data remains protected through confidentiality, integrity and replay protection. Test setup and configuration • Non-RT RIC & rApps supporting TLS, connected within simulated or real network environments. • The R1 interface is configured for testing. • TLS is properly implemented and configured as defined in [2] clause 4.2. Test procedure 1) Confidentiality verification: - Establish a secure communication session over the R1 interface. - Capture the network traffic during the session. - Analyse the captured traffic to verify that all data is encrypted, ensuring confidentiality. 2) Integrity protection verification: - Capture protected packets after the TLS handshake. ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 161 - Modify the captured packets. - Inject the modified packets to the DUT. - Confirm that the DUT discards the injected packets, e.g. does not deliver it to the higher layer. 3) Replay protection verification: - Capture protected packets after the TLS handshake. - Replay the captured packets to the DUT. - Confirm that the DUT discards the replayed packets. Expected results • Confidentiality: All sensitive data transmitted over the R1 interface is encrypted, with no data exposed in clear text. • Integrity protection: The DUT detects and discards altered packets, ensuring data has not been tampered with. • Replay protection: The DUT detects and discards replayed packets, preventing replay attacks. Expected Format of Evidence: The following evidence, in one or more formats as applicable, should be provided: Logs or screenshots showing TLS protocol adherence, as defined in the O-RAN security protocols specification [2] clause 4.2. Evidence of secure communication sessions established over the R1 interface, including details of encryption verification. Logs or screenshots showing the DUT's response to replayed and integrity-compromised packets, demonstrating the effectiveness of the security mechanisms in place.
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0ce77be9f03a15fedfc038153382bd6a
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104 105
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11.7.3 R1 Authorization
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Requirement Name: R1 protection in terms of authorization Requirement Reference & Description: 'REQ-SEC-R1-2' clause 5.2.6.1 in O-RAN Security Requirements and Controls Specifications [5] Threat References: 'T-R1-01, T-R1-04, T-R1-05' clause 7.4.1.9 in O-RAN Security Threat Modeling and Risk Assessment [3] DUT/s: Non-RT RIC, rApps Test Name: TC_R1_AUTHORIZATION Test description and applicability Purpose: The purpose of this test is to validate that the R1 interface enforces an authorization mechanism to prevent unauthorized access. Test setup and configuration • Non-RT RIC and rApps support OAuth 2.0 and are connected in simulated/real network environment. • The test environment is set up with R1 interface configured. • The tester has access to the original data transported over the R1 interface. • OAuth 2.0 is properly implemented and configured. ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 162 Test procedure 1) Execute the test on the OAuth 2.0 protocol as defined in clause 6.6. 2) Valid access tokens (positive case): a. The tester sends a request to access protected resources using a valid access token. b. The tester captures and analyses the response from the R1 interface. 3) Invalid access tokens (negative case): a. The tester sends a request to access protected resources using an invalid or incorrect access token. b. The tester captures and analyses the response from the R1 interface. 4) No access tokens (negative case): a. The tester sends a request to access protected resources without providing any access token. b. The tester captures and analyses the response from the R1 interface. Expected Results 1) For 1. Expected results in clause 6.6.4 2) For 2. 'Valid access tokens': The R1 interface accepts the valid access tokens and responds with a successful authorization message. 3) For 3. 'Invalid access tokens': The access is rejected, and an access failure message is received. 4) For 4. 'No access tokens': The access is rejected due to the absence of tokens, and an appropriate error or unauthorized access message is received. Expected Format of Evidence: The following evidence, in one or more formats as applicable, should be provided: • Logs of the request sent to access protected resources using valid access tokens. • Screenshots or logs highlighting the successful authorization message. • Logs of the request sent to access protected resources using invalid or incorrect access tokens. Screenshots or logs showing the rejection of the access and the access failure message.
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0ce77be9f03a15fedfc038153382bd6a
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104 105
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12 Security test of O-RU
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0ce77be9f03a15fedfc038153382bd6a
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104 105
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12.1 Overview
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This clause contains security tests to validate the security protection mechanism specific to O-RU.
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0ce77be9f03a15fedfc038153382bd6a
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104 105
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12.2 SSH on M-Plane interface
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Requirement Name: Network Security Protocol - SSH Requirement Reference: clause 5.4, O-RAN Fronthaul Management Plane Specification [21] Requirement Description: Robust protocol implementation with adequately strong cipher suites is being required for SSH Threat References: T-O-RAN-05 ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 163 DUT/s: O-RU Test name: TC_SSH_MPlane Test Description Purpose: To verify implementation of the SSH protocol in O-RU along with validation of supported SSH version and robustness of cryptographic algorithms used for host key, symmetric encryption, key exchange, and MACs as specified in [21] Test setup and configuration DUT is the O-RU with SSH service enabled as server. Client is a test equipment with SSH audit tool which is used for server-side testing. Test procedure This test case follows the "server-side testing" procedure for SSH specified in TC_SSH_Server_and_Client_Protocol, clause 6.2 of the present document. Expected results O-RU as SSH server supports only SSHv2 version with no older version supported and algorithms (for host key, symmetric encryption, key exchange, and MACs) defined in clause 5.4 of [21]. Expected format of evidence: As defined in clause 6.2 of the present document.
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0ce77be9f03a15fedfc038153382bd6a
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104 105
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12.3 TLS on M-Plane interface
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Requirement Name: Network Security Protocol - TLS Requirement Reference: clause 5.4, O-RAN Fronthaul Management Plane Specification [21] Requirement Description: Support TLS v1.2 and/or TLS v1.3 with protocol profiles Threat References: T-O-RAN-05 DUT/s: O-RU Test name: TC_TLS_MPlane Test Description Purpose: To verify implementation of the TLS protocol in O-RU along with validation of mandated/optional TLS versions and cipher suites specified in clause 5.4 of [21]. Since NETCONF implementations support X.509v3 certificate-based authentication using TLS 1.2, mutual authentication shall also be tested using both valid and Invalid client certificates. Test setup and configuration DUT is the O-RU with TLS service enabled as server equipped with CA cert for signing client certificate(s). Client is a testing equipment with TLS scanning tool with client certificate(s). Test procedure This test case follows the test procedure for TLS specified in TC_TLS_Protocol, clause 6.3 of the present document. Expected results O-RU as TLS server shall support TLS starting from version 1.2 with no older version enabled along with protocol profiles/Cipher suites defined in clause 5.4 of [21]. Expected format of evidence: As defined in clause 6.3 of the present document. ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 164
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0ce77be9f03a15fedfc038153382bd6a
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104 105
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12.4 Security functional requirements and test cases
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The 802.1X Supplicant Validation test cases in clause 11.2.2 of the present document apply to O-RU.
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0ce77be9f03a15fedfc038153382bd6a
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104 105
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13 Security test of Near-RT RIC
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0ce77be9f03a15fedfc038153382bd6a
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104 105
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13.1 Overview
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This clause contains security tests to validate the security protection mechanism specific to Near-RT RIC.
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0ce77be9f03a15fedfc038153382bd6a
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104 105
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13.2 Void
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0ce77be9f03a15fedfc038153382bd6a
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104 105
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13.3 Transactional APIs
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0ce77be9f03a15fedfc038153382bd6a
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104 105
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13.3.1 Introduction
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Transactional APIs in the Near-RT RIC are APIs that are based on HTTP/TLS, i.e. APIs based on REST or gRPC.
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0ce77be9f03a15fedfc038153382bd6a
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104 105
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13.3.2 TLS for transactional APIs
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Requirement Name: TLS for transactional APIs Requirement Reference: SEC-CTL-NEAR-RT-6, clause 5.1.3.2, O-RAN Security Requirements and Controls Specification [5]. Requirement Description: "Transactional APIs (REST and gRPC) shall support TLS to provide message confidentiality and integrity." Threat References: T-NEAR-RT-01, T-NEAR-RT-02, T-NEAR-RT-03, T-NEAR-RT-04 DUT/s: xApp, Near-RT RIC Test name: TC_TLS_APIs Test description and applicability Purpose: To verify the transactional APIs (REST and gRPC) supports TLS to provide message confidentiality and integrity. Test setup and configuration DUT is configured and with TLS support enabled. The other end may be simulated or a testing equipment. Test procedure This test case follows the test procedure for TLS specified in TLS Test Procedure, clause 6.3.3 of the present document. Expected results The transaction APIs provides confidentiality and integrity protection for data in transit. Expected format of evidence: Tool reports, log files, traffic captures and/or screenshots.
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0ce77be9f03a15fedfc038153382bd6a
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104 105
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13.3.3 mTLS for transactional APIs
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Requirement Name: mTLS for transactional APIs ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 165 Requirement Reference: REQ-SEC-NEAR-RT-3, clause 5.1.3.2, O-RAN Security Requirements and Controls Specification [5]. Requirement Description: "The communication between xApps and Near-RT RIC platform APIs shall be mutually authenticated." Threat References: T-NEAR-RT-01, T-NEAR-RT-02, T-NEAR-RT-03, T-NEAR-RT-04 DUT/s: xApp, Near-RT RIC Test Name: TC_mTLS_APIs Test description and applicability Purpose: To verify the transactional APIs (REST and gRPC) supports mutual TLS (mTLS) authentication via X.509v3 certificates. Applicability: DUTs that support mTLS as a mutual authentication mechanism. Test setup and configuration DUT is configured and with mTLS support enabled. The other end may be simulated or a testing equipment. Test procedure This test case follows the test procedure for TLS specified in TLS Test Procedure, clause 6.3.3 of the present document. Expected results The transaction APIs supports mutual TLS (mTLS) authentication. Expected format of evidence: Tool reports, log files, traffic captures and/or screenshots.
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0ce77be9f03a15fedfc038153382bd6a
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104 105
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13.3.4 OAuth 2.0 for transactional APIs
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Requirement Name: OAuth 2.0 for transactional APIs Requirement Reference: REQ-SEC-NEAR-RT-4, REQ-SEC-NEAR-RT-5, clause 5.1.3.1, O-RAN Security Requirements and Controls Specification [5]. Requirement Description: Near-RT RIC architecture provides an authorization framework. Threat References: T-NEAR-RT-01, T-NEAR-RT-02, T-NEAR-RT-03, T-NEAR-RT-04 DUT/s: xApp, Near-RT RIC Test Name: TC_OAuth2.0_API Test description and applicability Purpose: To verify the transactional APIs (REST and gRPC) in the DUT supports the OAuth 2.0 authorization framework. Test setup and configuration DUT is configured and with OAuth 2.0 support enabled. The other end may be simulated or a testing equipment. Test procedure This test case follows the test procedure for OAuth2.0 specified in OAuth Test Procedure, clause 6.6.3 of the present document. Expected results The transaction APIs supports the use of OAuth 2.0. ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 166 Expected format of evidence: Tool reports, log files, traffic captures and/or screenshots. 13.4 Security test of Near-RT RIC OAuth 2.0 Resource Owner/Server
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0ce77be9f03a15fedfc038153382bd6a
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104 105
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13.4.1 Overview
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This clause contains security tests to verify OAuth2.0 implementation on Near-RT RIC as resource owner/server for A1-P.
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0ce77be9f03a15fedfc038153382bd6a
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104 105
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13.4.2 Near-RT RIC OAuth 2.0 Resource Owner/Server
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Requirement Name: Near-RT RIC support as OAuth2.0 resource owner/server Requirement Reference: Clause 5.1.3.2, Security Controls, Near-RT RIC and xApps, O -RAN Security Requirements and Controls Specification [5] Requirement Description: OAuth 2.0 security controls for Near-RT RIC authorization of service requests Threat References: T-NEAR-RT-01, T-NEAR-RT-02, T-NEAR-RT-03, T-NEAR-RT-04 DUT/s: Near-RT RIC Test Name: TC_NearRTRIC_OAuth2.0_Server Test Description Purpose: To validate the Near-RT RIC support as OAuth 2.0 resource owner/server for A1-P, as specified in clause 4.7, O-RAN.WG11.O-RAN-Security-Protocols-Specification [2] for service requests received from a Near-RT RIC. Test setup and configuration DUT is acting as a resource owner/server with OAuth 2.0 support enabled. OAuth2.0 Client is the test system equipped to send the service requests over a secured TLS communication with mutual TLS authentication. Test procedure This test case shall follow test procedure for OAuth2.0 specified in clause 6.6.3 of the present document. Expected results The Near-RT RIC shall be able to authorize/deny access to resources using OAuth 2.0. Expected format of evidence: Log files, traffic captures and/or report files.
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0ce77be9f03a15fedfc038153382bd6a
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104 105
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13.5 Security test of Near-RT RIC OAuth 2.0 client
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0ce77be9f03a15fedfc038153382bd6a
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104 105
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13.5.1 Overview
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This clause contains security tests to verify the implementation on Near-RT RIC as OAuth2.0 client for A1-EI.
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0ce77be9f03a15fedfc038153382bd6a
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104 105
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13.5.2 Near-RT RIC OAuth 2.0 client
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Requirement Name: Near-RT RIC support as OAuth2.0 client for A1-EI Requirement Reference: Clause 5.1.3.2, Security Controls, Near-RT RIC and xApps, O-RAN Security Requirements and Controls Specification [5] Requirement Description: OAuth 2.0 security controls for Near-RT RIC authorization of service requests ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 167 Threat References: T-NEAR-RT-01, T-NEAR-RT-02, T-NEAR-RT-03, T-NEAR-RT-04 DUT/s: Near-RT RIC Test Name: TC_NearRTRIC_OAuth2.0_Client Test Description Purpose: To validate the Near-RT RIC support as OAuth 2.0 client for A1-EI, as specified in clause 4.7, O-RAN.WG11.O-RAN-Security-Protocols-Specification [2] Test setup and configuration DUT is acting as a resource client with OAuth 2.0 support enabled. Test procedure This test case shall follow test procedure for OAuth2.0 specified in clause 6.6.3 of the present document. Expected results The Near-RT RIC shall be able to request and be permitted access to resources using OAuth2.0 Expected format of evidence: Log files, traffic captures and/or report files.
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0ce77be9f03a15fedfc038153382bd6a
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104 105
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14 Security test of xApps
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0ce77be9f03a15fedfc038153382bd6a
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104 105
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14.1 Overview
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This clause contains security tests to validate the security protection mechanism specific to xApps deployed on Near- RT RIC.
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0ce77be9f03a15fedfc038153382bd6a
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104 105
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14.2 xApp Signing and Verification
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Security test cases "TC_SW_Img_Pkg_Signing" and "TC_SW_Img_Pkg_Verification" shall be performed.
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0ce77be9f03a15fedfc038153382bd6a
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104 105
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14.3 xAppID
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0ce77be9f03a15fedfc038153382bd6a
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104 105
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14.3.0 Overview
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This clause contains security tests to validate the xApp ID which is a string that uniquely identifies the xApp instance. The format of this string is a Universally Unique Identifier (UUID) version 4 (as described in IETF RFC 4122 [6]).
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0ce77be9f03a15fedfc038153382bd6a
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104 105
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14.3.1 xApp ID format check
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Requirement Name: xApp ID uniqueness check for the xApp instance Requirement Reference: - SEC-CTL-NEAR-RT-13- clause 5.1.3.2, Security Controls, Near-RT RIC and xApps, O-RAN.WG11.Security Requirements and Controls Specification [5] Requirement Description: To validate the format of xApp ID string and the uniqueness of the same which will be a Universally Unique Identifier (UUID) version 4 (as described in IETF RFC 4122 [6]). Threat References: T-xApp-01, T-xApp-02, T-xApp-03 DUT/s: xApp, Near-RT RIC platform Test Name: TC_xApp_ID_validation ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 168 Test Description Purpose: To validate the xApp ID format that uniquely identifies the xApp instance. In this test, registration requests are initiated from 3 xApp instances and validating the response from Near-RT RIC platform. The xApp ID format is checked against Universally Unique Identifier (UUID) version 4 (as described in IETF RFC 4122 [6]). Test setup and configuration DUT's are both xApps and Near-RT RIC platform. Precondition: xApp instances are pre-provisioned with initial registration credential (OAuth 2.0 token), and the xApp instance CSR message. NOTE: xApp instances can be instantiated of the same or different xApps Test procedure Table 14.3.1-1: Scenarios to be executed Scenario ID Configuration 1 Initiate the first xApp instance registration procedure with Near-RT RIC platform and check for the registration response 2 Check the compliancy of the xApp ID for the first xApp instance 3 Initiate the second xApp instance registration procedure with Near-RT RIC platform and check for the registration response 4 Check the compliancy of the xApp ID for the second xApp instance 5 Initiate the third xApp instance registration procedure with Near-RT RIC platform and check for the registration response 6 Check the compliancy of the xApp ID for the third xApp instance Expected results Table 14.3.1-2: Expected results Scenario ID Expected result Reason 1 The Registration response from Near-RT RIC platform includes xApp certificate for the xApp instance. "Subject Alternative Name" in the xApp instance certificate contains URI for the xApp ID as an URN. This URI shall contain the xApp ID of the first xApp instance. First xApp instance registration is successful and the certificate details are seen with openssl command 2 The assigned xApp ID is unique to this first xApp instance and the format is complaint with Universally Unique Identifier (UUID) version 4 (as described in IETF RFC 4122 [6]). xApp ID is embedded in SAN field of xApp instance certificate 3 The Registration response from Near-RT RIC platform includes xApp certificate for the xApp instance. "Subject Alternative Name" in the xApp instance certificate contains URI for the xApp ID as an URN. This URI shall contain the xApp ID of the second xApp instance. Second xApp instance registration is successful and the certificate details are seen with openssl command 4 The assigned xApp ID is unique to this second xApp instance and the format is complaint with Universally Unique Identifier (UUID) version 4 (as described in IETF RFC 4122 [6]). xApp ID is embedded in SAN field of xApp instance certificate 5 The Registration response from Near-RT RIC platform includes xApp certificate for the xApp instance. "Subject Alternative Name" in the xApp instance certificate contains URI for the xApp ID as an URN. This URI shall contain the xApp ID of the third xApp instance. Third xApp instance registration is successful and the certificate details are seen with openssl command ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 169 Scenario ID Expected result Reason 6 The assigned xApp ID is unique to this third xApp instance and the format is complaint with Universally Unique Identifier (UUID) version 4 (as described in IETF RFC 4122 [6]). xApp ID is embedded in SAN field of xApp instance certificate Expected format of evidence: Log files, traffic captures and/or report files.
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0ce77be9f03a15fedfc038153382bd6a
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104 105
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14.3.2 xApp ID in xApp instance Certificate
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Requirement Name: xApp ID presence in "Subject Alternative Name" field of the xApp instance certificate. Requirement Reference: - SEC-CTL-NEAR-RT-14 - clause 5.1.3.2, Security Controls, Near-RT RIC and xApps, O-RAN.WG11.Security Requirements and Controls Specification [5]. Requirement Description: "Subject Alternative Name" in the xApp instance certificate contains URI for the xApp ID as an URN. This URI shall contain the xApp ID of the xApp instance using the UUID format as described in IETF RFC 4122 [6]. Threat References: T-xApp-01, T-xApp-02, T-xApp-03 DUT/s: xApp, Near-RT RIC platform Test Name: TC_xApp_ID_check_in_xApp_instance_certificate Test Description Purpose: To check the xApp ID embedded in subject Alternate Name field of xApp instance certificate. "Subject Alternative Name" in the xApp instance certificate contains URI for the xApp ID as an URN. This URI shall contain the xApp ID of the xApp instance using the UUID format as described in IETF RFC 4122 [6]. Test setup and configuration DUT's are both xApp and Near-RT RIC platform. Precondition: xApp Registration procedure is successfully done and xApp instance certificate has been assigned to xApp as part of the Registration response. Test procedure Table 14.3.2-1: Scenarios to be executed Scenario ID Configuration 1 Establish a TLS session to the xApp instance with authorized credentials. EXAMPLE: TLS session may be established using one of the services that xApp instance provides 2 Capture the xApp instance certificate (X.509v3) on the xApp instance and open the certificate using openssl command to check the details. EXAMPLE:- Openssl x509 -in <xApp_certificate.pem> -text -noout 3 Check the "Subject Alternative Name" field in the certificate details. ETSI ETSI TS 104 105 V7.0.0 (2025-06) 170 Expected results Table 14.3.2-2: Expected results Scenario ID Expected result Reason 1 Connection established. Success event is logged by the xApp, and the log fields are as per clause 5.3.8.8 of [5] Authentication successful. 2 xApp instance certificate details are shown successfully with the openssl command. Appropriate openssl command 3 "Subject Alternative Name" in the xApp instance certificate contains URI for the xApp ID as an URN. This URI shall contain the xApp ID of the xApp instance using the UUID format as described in IETF RFC 4122 [6]. Ex:- urn:uuid:f81d4fae-7dec-11d0-a765- 00a0c91e6bf6 xApp ID is present in the xApp Instance certificate Expected format of evidence: Log files, traffic captures and/or report files.
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0ce77be9f03a15fedfc038153382bd6a
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104 105
|
15 Security test of Non-RT RIC
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0ce77be9f03a15fedfc038153382bd6a
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104 105
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15.1 Overview
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This clause contains security tests to validate the security protection mechanism specific to Non-RT RIC and the R1 and A1 interfaces. Security test cases for rApps are covered in a separate sub-clause.
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0ce77be9f03a15fedfc038153382bd6a
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104 105
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15.2 Non-RT RIC
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