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5.2.1.2 Security Controls
Figure 5.2.1.2-1: mTLS on A1 interface SEC-CTL-A1-1: For the security protection at the transport layer on A1 interface, TLS shall be supported as specified in O-RAN Security Protocols Specifications [3], clause 4.2. SEC-CTL-A1-2: For the mutual authentication of the Non-RT RIC and one or more Near-RT RICs, the A1 interface shall support mTLS as shown in Figure 5.2.1.2-1 and specified in O-RAN Security Protocols Specifications [3], clause 4.2. SEC-CTL-A1-3: The A1 interface shall support authorization using OAuth 2.0, as specified in O-RAN Security Protocols Specifications [3], clause 4.7.
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5.2.2 O1 Interface
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5.2.2.0 Introduction
O1 Interface connecting the SMO to the Near-RT RIC, may have one or more O-CU-CPs, one or more O-CU-UPs, and one or more O-DUs.
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5.2.2.1 Requirements
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5.2.2.1.1 Summary
This clause specifies the requirements for O1 NACM support post function initialization when the function is in operation. NACM requirements related to network function initialization and when repairing broken access control configuration will be addressed in a future release of the present document.
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5.2.2.1.2 Confidentiality, Integrity and Authenticity
REQ-TLS-FUN-1: O1 interface implementations that support TLS for confidentiality and integrity protection shall support TLS as specified in O-RAN Security Protocols Specification [3], clause 4.2. REQ-TLS-FUN-2: O1 interface implementations that support mTLS for mutual authentication shall support mTLS 1.2, or higher, as specified in O-RAN Security Protocols Specification [3], clause 4.2. REQ-TLS-FUN-3: The O1 interface in a Shared O-RU configuration shall support mTLS 1.2, or higher, as specified in O-RAN Security Protocols Specifications [3], clause 4.2, for mutual authentication. REQ-TLS-FUN-4: The O1 interface in a Shared O-RU configuration shall support TLS 1.2, or higher, as specified in O-RAN Security Protocols Specifications [3], clause 4.2, for confidentiality and integrity protection of data-in-transit. Non-RT RIC Near RT RIC A1 mTLS mTLS Near RT RIC . . . A1 ETSI ETSI TS 104 104 V9.1.0 (2025-06) 41
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5.2.2.1.3 Least Privilege Access Control
REQ-NAC-FUN-1: Management Service providers and consumers that use NETCONF shall support the Network Configuration Access Control Model (NACM) as specified in IETF RFC 8341 [10] to restrict NETCONF protocol access for users to a preconfigured subset of available NETCONF protocol operations and content. REQ-NAC-FUN-2: The NETCONF implementation for O1 shall set the default values of the NACM Global Enforcement Controls as follows: • enable-nacm = true • read-default = permit • write-default = deny • exec-default = deny • enable-external-groups = true REQ-NAC-FUN-3: Management Service providers that support NETCONF shall support the following pre-defined groups in NACM to restrict NETCONF protocol access for users: • O1_nacm_management: Allows changes to the /nacm objects which includes the NACM Global Enforcement Controls. • O1_user_management: Allows assignment and deletion of users and assignment of users to roles on the O1 node. - Mandatory if the network device supports a local user store. - Not provided if the network device does not support a local user store and requires all user/role information to be provided by an external authentication/authorization service. • O1_network_management: Allows read, write, and execute operations on the datastores. All operations on the /nacm objects are prohibited. • O1_ network_monitoring: Allows read operations on configuration data in the datastore, except for the /nacm objects. • O1_software_management: Allows installation of new software including new software versions for a PNF. REQ-NAC-FUN-4: Users assigned to the O1_nacm_management group shall have read and write permission for the /nacm objects and attributes. REQ-NAC-FUN-5: Users assigned to the O1_user_management group shall have read and write permissions for the locally defined user store objects and attributes. REQ-NAC-FUN-6: Users assigned to the O1_network_management group shall have read, write, and execute permissions for the datastores. Users assigned to the O1_network_management group shall not have any permissions for the /nacm objects. REQ-NAC-FUN-7: Users assigned to the O1_network_monitoring group shall have read permissions for the datastores. Users assigned to the O1_network_monitoring group shall not have read permissions for the /nacm objects. REQ-NAC-FUN-8: Users assigned to the O1_software_management group shall have permissions to install new software on the PNF. REQ-NAC-FUN-9: NETCONF endpoints shall support external user-to-group mapping via at least one of the following protocols: LDAP with StartTLS [11], OAuth 2.0, RADIUS with EAP, and TACACS/TACACS+. REQ-NAC-FUN-10: Management Service providers may allow the definition of users in the <groups> NACM object. ETSI ETSI TS 104 104 V9.1.0 (2025-06) 42
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5.2.2.2 Security Controls
As defined in the previous clause 5.2.2.1.2, the O1 will use TLS 1.2 or higher to enforce confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity; and will use NACM [10] to enforce least privileged access.
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5.2.3 O2 Interface
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5.2.3.0 Introduction
General Aspects and Principles of O2 Interface between the SMO and the O-Cloud are defined in [6].
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5.2.3.1 Requirements
REQ-SEC-O2-1: O2 interface shall support confidentiality, integrity, replay protection and data origin authentication.
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5.2.3.2 Security Controls
SEC-CTL-O2-1: Management Service providers and consumers that use TLS shall support TLS as specified in O-RAN Security Protocols Specifications [3], clause 4.2.
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5.2.4 E2 Interface
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5.2.4.0 Introduction
General Aspects and Principles of E2 Interface connecting the Near-RT RIC and one or more O-CU-CPs, one or more O-CU-UPs, one or more O-DUs, and one or more O-eNBs are defined in [7].
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5.2.4.1 Requirements
REQ-SEC-E2-1: E2 interface shall support confidentiality, integrity, replay protection and data origin authentication.
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5.2.4.2 Security Controls
SEC-CTL-E2-1: For the security protection at the IP layer on E2 interface, IPsec shall be supported as specified in O-RAN Security Protocols Specifications [3], clause 4.5.
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5.2.5 Open Fronthaul Interface
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5.2.5.1 C-plane
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5.2.5.1.1 Introduction
The O-DU sends UL C-plane messages and DL C-plane messages to O-RU to trigger transmission and reception of RF signals. The DL C-plane message describing multiple symbols must arrive at O-RU within a certain time window for the O-RU to successfully receive DL I/Q data in U-plane messages from O-DU. Likewise, the UL C-plane message describing multiple symbols must arrive within a certain time window for the O-RU to successfully receive RF signal and send UL I/Q data in U-plane messages to O-DU. Any delay of these messages would cause the O-RU to drop/discard U-plane traffic from O-DU and the UE [31]. An adversary can inject its own DL C-plane or UL C-plane messages by spoofing the associated O-DU. As a result, it would block the O-RU from processing the corresponding U-Plane packets received from the O-DU and O-RU respectively, leading to temporary DoS and, limited cell performance on cells served by the O-RU [4].
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5.2.5.1.2 Requirements
REQ-SEC-OFCP-1: The C-Plane shall support authentication and authorization of O-DUs that exchange C-plane messages with O-RUs. ETSI ETSI TS 104 104 V9.1.0 (2025-06) 43 REQ-SEC-OFCP-2: The O-DU shall be able to detect and defend against application level attacks across the C-Plane messages with O-RUs, due to misbehavior or malicious intent.
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5.2.5.1.3 Security Controls
5.2.5.1.3.1 Authentication and Authorization of network elements supporting the C-Plane This clause addresses requirements REQ-SEC-OFCP-1 based on the use of IEEE 802.1X-2020 Port-based Network Access Control [12] for authentication and subsequent authorization of nodes that exchange C-Plane messages. Clause 5.2.5.5 of the present document provides requirements and security controls for the authentication and authorization of an O-DU and other network elements supporting the C-Plane within Open Fronthaul point-to-point LAN segments.
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5.2.5.2 U-plane
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5.2.5.2.1 Requirements
Open Fronthaul U-plane transports 5G System Control Plane and User Plane messages between O-CU-CP and UE, and O-CU-UP and UE. The Packet Data Convergence Protocol (PDCP) [32] is an optional feature that may provide confidentiality and integrity protection of 5G System Control Plane and User Plane between O-CU-CP and UE, and O-CU-UP and UE.
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5.2.5.2.2 Security Controls
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5.2.5.3 S-plane
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5.2.5.3.1 Introduction
The Precision Time Protocol (PTP) is a protocol used to synchronize clocks within a PTP network. Within a PTP domain [27], the grandmaster clock is the source of time to which all other PTP clocks in the domain are synchronized. The IEEE 1588 standard specifies the Best Master Clock Algorithm (BMCA) for electing the best clock from PTP Network and Local PTP Clock. The BMCA runs on PTP instances in the network continuously and is adjusting to changes in that network. PTP ANNOUNCE messages are used to build a timing distribution hierarchy with grandmaster at the top. There can be many grandmasters in PTP Network, but PTP Domain can have only one. The chosen grandmaster clock is responsible for providing timing to the PTP slave nodes. Following the selection of the new grandmaster, the grandmaster begins transmitting the current time within the SYNC message and FOLLOW_UP messages if applicable. This allows the other clocks to synchronize their time to the grandmaster. S-Plane attacks include an attacker masquerading as a grandmaster or manipulating PTP to degrade synchronization. Details are covered in clause 5.4.1.2 of [4]. The two most common deployment models for O-DU in O-RAN are: • O-DU at the cell site deployment model: the O-DU is collocated with the O-RU with a direct connection between the two (LLS-C1) through a cell site gateway router. • O-DU at the Data Centre deployment model: the O-DU is at a Data Centre. The O-RU's at the cell site connect to the O-DU via a direct connection between O-RU and O-DU (LLS-C1) or intermediary Ethernet switches (LLS-C2 or LLS-C3).
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5.2.5.3.2 Requirements
REQ-SEC-OFSP-1: The S-Plane shall support authentication and authorization of PTP nodes that communicate with other PTP nodes within Configuration LLS-C1, Configuration LLS-C2, or Configuration LLS-C3. NOTE 1: This ensures least privilege access to the S-Plane where authenticated and authorized PTP nodes communicate over the Open Fronthaul network. ETSI ETSI TS 104 104 V9.1.0 (2025-06) 44 NOTE 2: There is no specific requirement for authentication and authorization mechanism of S-plane PTP messages. REQ-SEC-OFSP-2: The S-Plane should provide a means to prevent spoofing of master clocks. REQ-SEC-OFSP-3: For the O-DU at the Data Centre deployment model the S-Plane should protect against MITM attacks that degrade the clock accuracy due to packet delay attacks or selective interception and removal attacks [28]. REQ-SEC-OFSP-4: The O-DU shall be able to detect and defend against application level attacks across the S-Plane interface, due to misbehavior or malicious intent.
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5.2.5.3.3 Security Controls
5.2.5.3.3.1 Synchronization Architecture Redundancy This clause addresses requirement REQ-SEC-OFSP-3 by providing an architectural recommendation to S-plane security based on redundancy in the Open Fronthaul Synchronization architecture. The following architectural recommendations for security controls build S-Plane redundancy into to the Open Fronthaul for increased robustness against security breaches. SEC-CTL-OFSP-1: The Open Fronthaul Synchronization architecture should support simultaneous Grandmasters. SEC-CTL-OFSP-2: The Open Fronthaul Synchronization architecture should support the assignment of GMs to physically separated PTP ports. Multiple masters could be connected to offer topology resilience. O-RAN Synchronization Architecture and Solution Specification [30], clause 8.2.3 Timing/Synchronization Redundancy & Resiliency provides additional details on redundancy for the Open Fronthaul Synchronization architecture. 5.2.5.3.3.2 Authentication and Authorization of PTP nodes This clause addresses requirements REQ-SEC-OFSP-1 and REQ-SEC-OFSP-2 based on the use of IEEE 802.1X-2020 [12] Port-based Network Access Control for authentication and subsequent authorization of PTP nodes. Clause 5.2.5.5 of the present document provides requirements and security controls for the authentication and authorization of S-Plane PTP nodes within Open Fronthaul point-to-point LAN segments.
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5.2.5.4 M-plane
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5.2.5.4.1 Requirements
The security requirements for M-Plane are defined in [14].
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5.2.5.4.2 Security Controls
The security controls for M-plane are defined in [14].
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5.2.5.5 Open Fronthaul Point-to-Point LAN Segment
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5.2.5.5.0 Introduction
The Open Fronthaul Ethernet L1 physical interface comprises one or more coaxial cables, twisted pairs, or optical fibers. These are also known as point-to-point LAN segments [12]. Each end of the Open Fronthaul point-to-point LAN segment comprises a physical connection (colloquially known as an Ethernet Port) to physical O-RAN network elements, as described in [13] and [14]. EXAMPLE: Physical O-RAN network elements includes O-DU, O-RU. ETSI ETSI TS 104 104 V9.1.0 (2025-06) 45 An Open Fronthaul network element is an entity in a point-to-point LAN segment. Xhaul Transport Network Elements that share a point-to-point LAN segment with Open Fronthaul network elements are also Open Fronthaul network elements. Examples of O-RAN Alliance defined Open Fronthaul network elements include, but are not limited to, O-DU, O-RU, switches, FHM, FHGW, TNE and PRTC-T/GM [13], [14], [15], [26].
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5.2.5.5.1 Requirements
REQ-SEC-OFHPLS-1: The Open Fronthaul shall provide a means to authenticate and authorize point-to-point LAN segments between Open Fronthaul network elements. REQ-SEC-OFHPLS-2: The Open Fronthaul shall provide a means to detect and report when an authorized point-to-point LAN segment is made or broken. REQ-SEC-OFHPLS-3: The Open Fronthaul shall provide a means to block access to unused Ethernet ports in an Open Fronthaul network element. Open Fronthaul implementations may support IEEE 802.1X-2020 [12] to satisfy the requirements listed above. Implementations that support optional 802.1X shall provide the security controls as specified in clause 5.2.5.5.2.
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5.2.5.5.2 Security Controls
5.2.5.5.2.1 Solution #1: Authentication and Authorization based on 802.1x Port based Network Access Control IEEE 802.1X-2020 is optional to support. NOTE 1: Further security requirements for IEEE 802.1X-2020 [12] will continue to be studied. It is intended to evolve IEEE 802.1X-2020 [12] to a mandatory requirement for the Open Fronthaul interface after completion of the study. IEEE 802.1X-2020 Port-based Network Access Control [12] provides the means to control network access in point-to-point LAN segments within the Open Fronthaul network. Port-based network access control in the O-RAN Alliance Open Fronthaul comprises supplicant, authenticator, and authentication server entities described in IEEE 802.1X-2020 [12] and as further described in this clause. All other entities and functionality described in IEEE 802.1X are out of scope of this O-RAN Alliance specification and are determined by vendor implementation in agreement with operator-specific requirements. SEC-CTL-OFHPLS-1: Operator implementation of IEEE 802.1X-2020 [12] for Open Fronthaul port-based network access control is optional to use for each point-to-point LAN segment. Supplicants in the Open Fronthaul Network SEC-CTL-OFHPLS-2: Open Fronthaul network elements shall support IEEE 802.1X-2020 [12] supplicant functionality for each port connection in the Open Fronthaul network element. Authenticators in the Open Fronthaul Network In IEEE 802.1X-2020 [12] a supplicant mutually authenticates with an authenticator. SEC-CTL-OFHPLS-3: Any Open Fronthaul network element may be an authenticator in the Open Fronthaul network. SEC-CTL-OFHPLS-4: An authenticator in an Open Fronthaul network shall perform port-based network access control on each point-to-point LAN segment as defined in IEEE 802.1X-2020 [12]. SEC-CTL-OFHPLS-5: Port-based network access control between a supplicant and authenticator in an Open Fronthaul network shall use EAP-TLS authentication as defined in IEEE 802.1X-2020 [12]. O-DU as an Authenticator Configuration LLS-C1 [13] and Cascade Mode in the Shared Cell Concept [12] are cases where an O-DU and O-RU are Open Fronthaul network elements in a point-to-point LAN segment. SEC-CTL-OFHPLS-6: In the case of Configuration LLS-C1, the O-DU shall support the authenticator functionality as defined in IEEE 802.1X-2020 [12]. ETSI ETSI TS 104 104 V9.1.0 (2025-06) 46 Authenticator interface to an Authentication Server in the Open Fronthaul Network IEEE 802.1X [12] describes an EAP-TLS exchange which includes an interface between an authenticator and authentication server. SEC-CTL-OFHPLS-7: The interface between an authenticator and authentication server shall support IETF RADIUS standards, IETF RFC 2865 [22], IETF RFC 2866 [23], IETF RFC 3579 [24], and successor standards. SEC-CTL-OFHPLS-8: The interface between an authenticator and authentication server should support IETF Diameter standards, IETF RFC 4072 [25] and successor standards. NOTE 2: Mechanisms to secure the interface between the authenticator and authentication server are out of scope of the O-RAN Alliance. 5.2.5.5.2.2 Authentication and authorization procedure for 802.1x Port based Network Access Control General requirements Only those Open Fronthaul network elements acting as a supplicant that have mutually authenticated with an authenticator are authorized to participate in the Open Fronthaul network. If an authenticator port is to be activated in the Open Fronthaul, then the authenticator places the port into an unauthorized state that allows EAP over LAN (EAPOL) packets for EAP authentication and blocks all other traffic. If the mutual authentication has been successful and the operator authorizes operation for the network element port, then the port is switched to the authorized state whereby non-EAPOL packets can be sent and received. SEC-CTL-OFHPLS-9: Open Fronthaul network elements acting as an authenticator shall place each of its unauthorized ports into a state that allows EAPOL traffic and block all other Ethernet traffic. SEC-CTL-OFHPLS-10: Open Fronthaul network elements acting as an authenticator should be able to implement authorization policies that apply to its authorized ports. Authorization policies may include tagging authorized traffic with a particular VLAN-ID as it egresses the Open Fronthaul network element and/or enforcing access control policies that restrict the type of traffic able to be forwarded by the Open Fronthaul network element. Manufacturer Install Certificates This clause applies to the Extensible Authentication Protocol as defined in IEEE 802.1X [12] where such an approach is used. A supplicant implements an EAP method according to its supported credentials. Prior to a supplicant enrolling in an operator's PKI, a manufacturer installed certificate shall be used together with an EAP-TLS dialogue to enable certificate-based mutual authentication to be performed between an authenticator and a supplicant. SEC-CTL-OFHPLS-11: The O-RU shall have installed a Manufacturer Installed X.509 Certificate. Security Procedure The following procedure describes the authentication and authorization, based on IEEE 802.1 Port based Network Access Control, of point-to-point LAN segments between a supplicant and another Open Fronthaul network element acting as an authenticator. SEC-CTL-OFHPLS-12: The normal operation procedure defined in IEEE 802.1X [12] shown in Figure 5.2.5.5.2.2-1 and Figure 5.2.5.5.2.2-2 shall be performed to authenticate and authorize an O-RU within an Open Fronthaul network. @startuml !pragma teoz true skinparam defaultTextAlignment center participant "Authentication\nServer" as AAA participant "IEEE 802.1x\nAuthenticator" as AUT participant "IEEE 802.1x \nSupplicant" as SUP note over AAA Manufacturer Trust Root Installed end note ETSI ETSI TS 104 104 V9.1.0 (2025-06) 47 &note over SUP Manufacturer Installed X.509 Certificate end note &note over AUT Port in unauthorized state - blocks all traffic other than EAPOL traffic end note group Initial limited-access when authenticated using manufacturer certificate SUP->AUT: EAPoL Start AUT->SUP: EAP-Request/Identity SUP->AUT: EAP-Response/Identity (from Manufacturer Installed X.509 Certificate Subject DN) AUT->AAA: RADIUS-Access-Request or Diameter-EAP-Request (EAP-Response) AAA->AUT: RADIUS-Access-Challenge or Diameter-EAP-Answer (EAP-Request) AUT->SUP: EAPoL (EAP-Request) note over AAA, SUP EAP Dialogue Continues using Manufacturer Installed X.509 Certificate end note AAA->AAA: Select Security Policy \nfor Manufacturer Installed X.509 Certificate AAA->AUT: RADIUS-Access-Accept or Diameter-EAP-Answer (EAP-Success) \nIncluding security policy, e.g. Provisioning/Enrollment VLAN AUT->SUP: EAP-Success AUT->AUT: Set port to authorized state.\nAssign port to provided security policy, \ne.g., Provisioning/Enrollment VLAN end group Enrollment into operator PKI note over AUT, SUP Certificate Enrollment Completes & Provision of Operator X.509 Certificate end note SUP->SUP: Install\nOperator X.509\nCertificate end group Subsequent full operational access when authenticated using operator installed certificate note over SUP re-start of Supplicant triggers interface re-initialization end note note over AUT Interface re-initialization: resets port to unauthorized state - blocks all traffic other than EAPOL traffic end note SUP->AUT: EAPoL Start AUT->SUP: EAP-Request/Identity SUP->AUT: EAP-Response/Identity (from Operator X.509 Certificate Subject DN) AUT->AAA: RADIUS-Access-Request or Diameter-EAP-Request (EAP-Response) AAA->AUT: RADIUS-Access-Challenge or Diameter-EAP-Answer (EAP-Request) AUT->SUP: EAPoL (EAP-Request) note over AAA, SUP EAP Dialogue Continues using Operator Installed X.509 Certificate ETSI ETSI TS 104 104 V9.1.0 (2025-06) 48 end note AAA->AAA: Select Security Policy\nfor Operator Installed X.509 Cert AAA->AUT: RADIUS-Access-Accept or Diameter-EAP-Answer (EAP-Success) \nIncluding security policy, e.g. Operational VLAN AUT->SUP: EAP-Success AUT->AUT: Set port to authorized state.\nAssign port to provided security policy, \ne.g., Operational VLAN note over SUP Normal Supplicant start up continues end note end @enduml Figure 5.2.5.5.2.2-1: UML code for 802.1X Port Based Authentication in the O-RAN Fronthaul architecture ETSI ETSI TS 104 104 V9.1.0 (2025-06) 49 Figure 5.2.5.5.2.2-2: Operation of 802.1X Port Based Authentication in the O-RAN Fronthaul architecture The authentication and authorization procedure may fail at any moment, for example because of no response from the supplicant after a network request. In that case, the operation procedure as specified in Figure 5.2.5.5.2.2-1 will be terminated as specified in IEEE 802.1X-2020 [12]. ETSI ETSI TS 104 104 V9.1.0 (2025-06) 50
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5.2.6 R1 Interface
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5.2.6.0 Introduction
R1 is the interface between rApps and Non-RT RIC Framework via which R1 Services can be produced and consumed. See R1 specification [39].
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5.2.6.1 Requirements
REQ-SEC-R1-1: R1 interface shall support confidentiality, integrity, and replay protection. REQ-SEC-R1-2: R1 interface shall support mutual authentication and authorization.
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5.2.6.2 Security Controls
Figure 5.2.6.2-1: mTLS on R1 interface SEC-CTL-R1-1: For the security protection at the transport layer on R1 interface, TLS shall be supported as specified in O-RAN Security Protocols Specifications [3], clause 4.2. SEC-CTL-R1-2: For the mutual authentication of the Non-RT RIC Framework and rApps, the R1 interface shall support mTLS as shown in Figure 5.2.6.2-1 and specified in O-RAN Security Protocols Specifications [3], clause 4.2. SEC-CTL-R1-3: The R1 interface shall support authorization using OAuth 2.0, as specified in O-RAN Security Protocols Specifications [3], clause 4.7.
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5.2.7 Y1 Interface
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5.2.7.1 Introduction
The Near-RT RIC provides RAN analytics information services via Y1 service interface. These services can be consumed by Y1 consumers by subscribing to or requesting the RAN analytics information via the Y1 service interface. Y1 consumers may be Application Functions (AFs). The Near-RT RIC serves as Y1 provider.
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5.2.7.2 Requirements
REQ-SEC-Y1-1: The Y1 provider shall provide mechanisms to authenticate the Y1 consumer and allow for the Y1 consumer to authenticate the Y1 provider (mutual authentication). REQ-SEC-Y1-2: The Y1 provider shall authorize the Y1 consumer before allowing access to any service over the Y1 interface. REQ-SEC-Y1-3: The Y1 interface shall provide confidentiality and integrity protection for all data exchanged. REQ-SEC-Y1-4: The Y1 interface shall provide replay-protection for all data exchanged. REQ-SEC-Y1-5: The Y1 interface shall enforce the result of the authentication for the duration of communications. REQ-SEC-Y1-6: The Near-RT RIC shall hide its topology from the Y1 consumers accessing the Y1 interface. Non-RT RIC Framework rApp R1 mTLS ETSI ETSI TS 104 104 V9.1.0 (2025-06) 51
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5.3 Transversal requirements
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5.3.1 Software Bill of Materials
Void.
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5.3.1.1 Requirements
Void.
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5.3.2 Common Application Lifecycle Management
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5.3.2.1 Package Protection
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5.3.2.1.1 Requirements
REQ-SEC-ALM-FUN2-1: VOID. REQ-SEC-ALM-FUN3-1: VOID. REQ-SEC-ALM-PKG-1: The Application package shall be certified by the Application Provider. EXAMPLE 1: Software testing suites for certification include vulnerability scanning, static and dynamic testing, and penetration testing. Refer to clause C.2.1 for additional information. REQ-SEC-ALM-PKG-2: The Application package shall be signed by the Application Provider prior to its delivery to the Service Provider to ensure its authenticity and integrity. REQ-SEC-ALM-PKG-3: The Application package shall include minimally the following artifacts according to [41], [42]: the Application software image, the signing certificate, and signature(s) of Application Provider. REQ-SEC-ALM-PKG-4: Each Application package artifact shall be digitally signed individually by the Application Provider [41], [42]. REQ-SEC-ALM-PKG-5: The SMO shall verify all Application package artifacts upon reception using the signatures generated and provided by the Application Provider. REQ-SEC-ALM-PKG-6: The Application package shall be validated by SMO upon its reception using the signature generated and provided by the Application Provider. REQ-SEC-ALM-PKG-7a: The Application package shall be tested by the Service Provider for known security vulnerabilities. All discovered vulnerabilities shall be reported to the Application Provider. REQ-SEC-ALM-PKG-7b: The Application Provider shall have a vulnerability management process in place allowing the Service Provider to report discovered vulnerabilities. REQ-SEC-ALM-PKG-7c: Vulnerabilities discovered in Application packages during testing by Service Provider shall be remediated by the Application Provider. REQ-SEC-ALM-PKG-8: The Application package shall be cryptographically bound to one Service Provider before its onboarding to the catalogue [i.11] and [16]. This prevents an unauthorized package to be instantiated even if it has valid Application certificate [41], [44] and [45]. REQ-SEC-ALM-PKG-9: Signatures shall be renewed before the certificate reaches the end of its validity period (signatures provided by the Application Provider may be ignored if the signature of the Service Provider is valid). REQ-SEC-ALM-PKG-10: Application packages stored within the catalogue [i.11] and [16] shall be protected in terms of integrity and confidentiality. REQ-SEC-ALM-PKG-11: Application packages stored within the catalogue [i.11] and [16] shall be accessible to only authorized entities and over networks that enforce authentication, integrity, and confidentiality. ETSI ETSI TS 104 104 V9.1.0 (2025-06) 52 REQ-SEC-ALM-PKG-12: Catalogue [i.11] and [16] shall be clear of vulnerable Application packages and of packages with missing certificates. REQ-SEC-ALM-PKG-13: Sensitive information used during the lifecycle of the Application shall be protected in terms of confidentiality at rest and in transit [46], [41] and [42]. EXAMPLE 2: Sensitive information includes LI Applications, keys, PII, passwords and other critical configuration data. REQ-SEC-ALM-PKG-14: SMO shall contain a pre-installed root certificate of trusted CA (trusted by the Service Provider) before the onboarding of the Application package for verifying its authenticity and integrity. Root certificate shall be delivered via a trusted channel separately from an Application package [42]. REQ-SEC-ALM-PKG-15: Application packages shall have a Change Log. All the changes in the Application package shall be versioned, tracked, and inventoried in the Change Log [43]. NOTE: Change log can also be provided separately as an external artifact.
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5.3.2.1.2 Security Controls
SEC-CTL-ALM-PKG-1: Application package shall be signed and verified for integrity and authenticity protection. To provide the authenticity and integrity protection for the Application package, one of the two following options shall be followed as defined in ETSI GS NFV-SEC 021 [41] and ETSI GS NFV-SOL 004 [42]: • Option 1: The Application package contains a Digest (a.k.a. hash) for each of the artifacts of the Application package. The table of hashes is signed with the Application Provider private key. • Option 2: The complete Application package is signed with the Application Provider private key. The signature verification process comprises the following steps: Responsible: Application Provider, Service Provider 1) A signed Application package shall be delivered to the Service Provider containing the Application package, the signing X.509v3 certificate, and the signature (signed hash value) of Application Provider. 2) The root CA certificate shall be pre-installed within the NFO for the validation of the Application Provider signing certificate. 3) Upon reception of the signed Application package from Application Provider by the Service Provider. 4) New hash(es) of the received Application package shall be calculated and verified by the Service Provider against the hash(es) in the signature using the Application Provider certificate retrieved from the received Application package. 5) Service Provider shall sign the verified Application package prior to its onboarding. 6) Service Provider shall compute the hash value of the Application package and the signature of the Application Provider. 7) The hash value shall be signed with the private key(s) of the Service Provider. 8) A signed Application package shall be onboarded containing the Application package, certificate(s), and signature(s) (signed hash value) of the Application Provider and Service Provider. 9) During instantiation, the Application package shall be authenticated and verified using signatures from both Application Provider and Service Provider. SEC-CTL-ALM-PKG-1A: Algorithms, key sizes, and standards to be used for signature generation/verification shall follow the "O-RAN Security Protocol Specification" [3], clause 5. SEC-CTL-ALM-PKG-2: Sensitive artifacts shall be encrypted for confidentiality protection. SEC-CTL-ALM-PKG-2A: Algorithms, key sizes, and standards to be used for encryption/decryption shall follow the "O-RAN Security Protocol Specification" [3], clause 5. ETSI ETSI TS 104 104 V9.1.0 (2025-06) 53 SEC-CTL-ALM-PKG-3: Application packages shall be compliant with ETSI NFV specifications, ETSI GS NFV-SOL 004 [42], ETSI GS NFV-IFA 011 [43] and ETSI GS NFV-SEC 021 [39] for package formats and signing/verification procedures. SEC-CTL-ALM-PKG-4: Encryption shall be used to secure cryptographic keys used by the cryptographic operations. EXAMPLE: Cryptographic operations include signature generation/verification, encryption/decryption, and hashing.
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5.3.2.2 Secure Update
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5.3.2.2.1 Requirements
REQ-SEC-ALM-SU-1: Application updates shall follow the same security requirements as Application packages. REQ-SEC-ALM-SU-2: Applications should be updated with their latest security updates. REQ-SEC-ALM-SU-3: Applications should be protected from downgrade attacks to older, possibly vulnerable, software versions. REQ-SEC-ALM-SU-4: Security updates for Application vulnerabilities should be available in a timely manner after discovery of known vulnerability or vulnerabilities for an Application.
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5.3.2.3 Security Descriptor
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5.3.2.3.1 Requirements
REQ-SEC-LCM-SD-1: The Application descriptor shall support a description of the security group rules. Those rules shall be associated to the relevant Application interfaces. EXAMPLE: Security group rules include permissions, access control and filtering rules REQ-SEC-LCM-SD-2: The Application descriptor shall support a description of the Service Availability Level (SAL) requirements for virtual resources on the underlying O-Cloud platform. REQ-SEC-LCM-SD-3: The O-Cloud platform shall use the security group rules in the application descriptor for controlling the traffic direction, who can access the Application, what actions they can perform, and what level of access they have. REQ-SEC-LCM-SD-4: The SMO shall use the Service Availability Level (SAL) in the Application descriptor for governing the status (availability, deployment, and operation) of Applications and reacting whenever a SAL requirement is being breached. REQ-SEC-LCM-SD-5: The Application shall support the ability to compare the current owned resource consumption with the defined resource quotas from the Application descriptor. REQ-SEC-LCM-SD-6: The Application shall send an alarm to the SMO if the current owned resource consumption and the defined resource quotas are inconsistent. REQ-SEC-LCM-SD-7: The comparing process between the current owned resource consumption and the defined resource quotas should be triggered periodically by the Application.
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5.3.2.4 Secure Deletion of Sensitive Data
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5.3.2.4.1 Introduction
Support for secure deletion of data owned by the Application is included in clause 5.1.8.6 for O-Cloud secure storage requirements and controls. NIST SP 800-88 [75] can provide additional guidance for data sanitization.
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5.3.2.4.2 Requirements
REQ-SEC-DEL-1: VOID. ETSI ETSI TS 104 104 V9.1.0 (2025-06) 54
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5.3.2.4.3 Security Controls
SEC-CTL-DEL-1: VOID. SEC-CTL-DEL-2: VOID.
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5.3.2.5 Decommissioning of Applications
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5.3.2.5.0 Introduction
NOTE: When an application is decommissioned, it is important to document the entire process. Another crucial task is to archive the legacy data and software for historical purposes.
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5.3.2.5.1 Requirements
REQ-SEC-ALM-DECOM-1: A complete post-decommission report documenting the performed tasks shall be generated. REQ-SEC-ALM-DECOM-2: Legacy data and software should be archived. REQ-SEC-ALM-DECOM-3: All trust artifacts associated with an application shall be revoked at the time of decommissioning. EXAMPLE: Trust artifacts include digital certificates, OAuth tokens, and application identifiers, etc.
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5.3.3 Network Protocols and Services
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5.3.3.0 Introduction
Each O-RAN component serves important network function(s) based on a list of its necessary network protocols and services supported through its network interface(s). Proper, transparent, and secure network protocols and services enabled on each O-RAN component is essential for its overall security posture with the reduced risk.
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5.3.3.1 Requirements
REQ-SEC-NET-1: A list of network protocols and services supported on the O-RAN component shall be clearly documented by its vendor. Unused protocols shall be disabled.
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5.3.4 Robustness of Common Transport Protocols
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5.3.4.0 Introduction
IP, UDP, TCP, SCTP, SSH, HTTP and HTTP2 are the common transport protocols widely used by any O-RAN components for network communications and services. Robust implementation of those common transport protocols can significantly improve the security of each O-RAN component and system overall.
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5.3.4.1 Requirements
REQ-SEC-TRAN-1: Common transport protocols (IP, UDP, TCP, SCTP, SSH, HTTP and HTTP2) used in O-RAN system should be able to handle unexpected inputs (not in-line with protocol specification) without functional compromise. The unexpected inputs include random mutations of the protocol headers and payloads, as well as targeted fuzzing with state awareness. ETSI ETSI TS 104 104 V9.1.0 (2025-06) 55
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5.3.5 Robustness against Volumetric DDoS Attack
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5.3.5.0 Introduction
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack is one of the most common security risks for any O-RAN component. DDoS attack often results in service interruption and even worse system crash and prolonged network outage. A volumetric DDoS attack can come from a bad actor or adversary, or a misconfiguration by the operator.
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5.3.5.1 Requirements
REQ-SEC-DOS-1: An O-RAN element with external network interface shall be able to withstand network transport protocol based volumetric DDoS attack without system crash and returning to its normal service level after the attack subsides.
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5.3.5.2 Security Controls
SEC-CTL-DOS-1: An O-RAN element should be designed to incorporate redundant elements to achieve High Availability (HA). NOTE: The redundant High Availability (HA) elements play a crucial role in scalability of the O-RAN element to address the requirements of legitimate users when facing a volumetric Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack. Vendors should provide robust support for these HA features. Operators, in turn, should evaluate deployment scenarios in order to make an informed decision about deploying these HA features, aiming to enhance network performance and resilience.
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5.3.6 Robustness of OS and Applications
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5.3.6.0 Introduction
The robustness of the O-RAN component in the OS and application(s) installed is fundamental to the overall security posture of the O-RAN system.
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5.3.6.1 Requirements
REQ-SEC-SYS-1: Known vulnerabilities in the OS and applications of an O-RAN component shall be clearly identified.
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5.3.7 Password-Based Authentication
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5.3.7.0 Introduction
Weak, stolen, and mis-used passwords are some of the common and leading causes of data breaches and methods of gaining access to systems, services, and applications. Password policy and management are applicable to both remote and Web UI login interfaces for user and automated machine password-based authentication on O-RAN components.
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5.3.7.1 Requirements
REQ-SEC-PASS-1: If password is used as an authentication attribute, O-RAN component vendors should follow security best practices to mitigate risks resulting from different password-based authentication attacks such as brute-forcing, unauthorized password resets, man-in-the-middle, and dictionary attacks.
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5.3.7.2 Security Controls
SEC-CTL-PASS-1: Default passwords should be changed upon installation. Configured passwords should follow the organization's policies for strong passwords. SEC-CTL-PASS-2: O-RAN components shall support account lock-out for repeated failed login attempts. The number of failed login attempts shall be configurable. The number of attempts may be guided by the organization's policy. ETSI ETSI TS 104 104 V9.1.0 (2025-06) 56 SEC-CTL-PASS-3: Passwords shall be encrypted when stored and transmitted.
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5.3.8 Security Log Management
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5.3.8.1 Introduction
Security log management is "the process for generating, transmitting, storing, analyzing, and disposing of computer security log data. Log management is essential to ensuring that computer security records are stored in sufficient detail for an appropriate period of time. Routine log analysis is beneficial for identifying security incidents, policy violations, fraudulent activity, and operational problems. Logs are also useful when performing auditing and forensic analysis, supporting internal investigations, establishing baselines, and identifying operational trends and long-term problems." Defined in NIST SP 800-92 [58], executive summary.
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5.3.8.2 Generic Requirements
REQ-SEC-SLM-1: An O-RAN component shall support the generation and transmission of security log data.
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5.3.8.3 Micro Perimeter for Cluster Node
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5.3.8.3.1 Requirements on Security Log Data Storage
REQ-SEC-SLM-TESS-1: The Security Log data which have been created within a micro perimeter shall be persistently stored in a non-volatile memory. This refers to Security Log data at rest. This applies to back-up Security Log data as well. REQ-SEC-SLM-TESS-2: Any anomalies detected in log settings, configurations, and processes shall be logged. REQ-SEC-SLM-TESS-3: The O-RAN Network Function(s), the O-Cloud platform and infrastructure, and the SMO Framework shall create Security Log data. REQ-SEC-SLM-TESS-4: Security Log data shall be created and maintained per App, per xApp, or per rApp. REQ-SEC-SLM-TESS-5: The created and stored Security Log data shall provide all necessary information to deduce the root cause of a system behaviour. REQ-SEC-SLM-TESS-6: The Security Log data access management shall be protected with the help of the micro perimeter. REQ-SEC-SLM-TESS-7: The access to Security Log data shall be authenticated and authorized. REQ-SEC-SLM-TESS-8: Any change of access rights to Security Log data shall be logged. REQ-SEC-SLM-TESS-9: Changing the access rights of security log data is only possible with privileged access rights. REQ- SEC-SLM-TESS-10: The Security Log data process shall support Log data rotation. Log data rotation in this context refers to a closing of a Log-storage and opening a new Log-storage when the first Log-storage is complete. REQ- SEC-SLM-TESS-11: The Security Log data rotation process shall be configurable at regular time and when the maximum log size is reached. REQ- SEC-SLM-TESS-12: The Security Log data process shall log any log rotation reconfiguration. REQ- SEC-SLM-TESS-13: The system shall be capable of creating, processing, transmitting, and always storing all required security log events.
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5.3.8.3.2 Requirements on Security Log-data in Motion
REQ-SEC-SLM-TESM-1: The Security Log data in motion shall be protected with the help of the micro perimeter. REQ-SEC-SLM-TESM-2: The Security Log data in motion shall be confidentiality, integrity and replay protected if this is going to leave the micro perimeter. ETSI ETSI TS 104 104 V9.1.0 (2025-06) 57 REQ-SEC-SLM-TESM-3: A mutual authentication shall be performed for any setup of a secure communication channel between at least two micro perimeters. REQ-SEC-SLM-TESM-4: If a Security Log data integrity verification has failed, the Security Log data and a related failure notification shall be logged. REQ-SEC-SLM-TESM-5: If a Security Log data appears outside of its expected receiving window, the Security Log data and the related notification shall be logged.
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5.3.8.3.3 Requirements for Setup of a Micro Perimeter
REQ-SEC-SLM-TE-1: The Micro Perimeter shall support the secure storage of sensitive data. REQ-SEC-SLM-TE-2: The Micro Perimeter shall support the execution of Security Log data sensitive functions, which are hosting the Log-Agent(s) and the Log-Collector. REQ-SEC-SLM-TE-3: The Micro Perimeter shall support the execution of instantiated Application VNF's and Platform/Operating System level software. REQ-SEC-SLM-TE-4: The Micro Perimeter's integrity shall be assured. REQ-SEC-SLM-TE-5: Only authorized access shall be granted to the Micro Perimeter, i.e. access to Security Log data stored and used within it, and to instantiated functions within it. REQ-SEC-SLM-TE-6: The Micro Perimeter shall support the deployment of software and the booting-up and execution of a single software instance or multiple software instances.
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5.3.8.4 Micro Perimeter for Log data Repository
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5.3.8.4.1 Requirements on Storage in Log data Repository
REQ-SEC-TESR-1: The Security Log data stored in the repository shall be protected with the help of the micro perimeter. REQ-SEC-TESR-2: The Security Log data which have been created inside the trusted environment of the repository shall be persistently stored in a non-volatile memory. This refers to Log data at rest. This applies to back-up Log data. REQ-SEC-TESR-4: Security Log data from different cluster node(s) shall be stored isolated from each other. REQ-SEC-TESR-5: The Security Log data repository shall grant write only operation to cluster node(s). REQ-SEC-TESR-6: Security Log data which are stored in the repository shall be confidentiality and integrity protected. REQ-SEC-TESR-7: The Security Log data repository shall support attribute-based (ABAC) access management according to NIST SP 800-162 [67]. REQ-SEC-TESR-8: The Security Log data access management shall support operations for read, write, edit, delete, copy, execute and modify. REQ-SEC-TESR-9: The access management ABAC mechanisms shall include the Subject Attributes, the Resource Objects Attributes, the Access Control Rules (policy), and the environmental conditions. REQ-SEC-TESR-10: The Log data repository shall create and store Security Log data in a non-volatile memory. REQ-SEC-TESR-11: Security Log data in use shall be protected with the help of the micro perimeter.
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5.3.8.5 Secure storage of security log data
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5.3.8.5.1 Introduction
Security log data storage involves the safekeeping and retention of security log data for a certain period of time. Security log data storage should ensure that all data of security events is retained reliably for a certain time so that no data is lost or altered, and access to the data is restricted to authorized personnel only. ETSI ETSI TS 104 104 V9.1.0 (2025-06) 58
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5.3.8.5.2 Requirements
REQ-SEC-SLM-SST-1: Security log data shall be stored in a centralized location for easy management and analysis. REQ-SEC-SLM-SST-2: Security log data shall be stored in a tamper-proof manner to ensure their integrity and authenticity. REQ-SEC-SLM-SST-3: Retention policies for security log data shall be established to determine how long logs shall be kept. REQ-SEC-SLM-SST-4: Access to the log storage shall be restricted to authorized personnel only. REQ-SEC-SLM-SST-5: Access to the log storage shall be logged. REQ-SEC-SLM-SST-6: Backup of the log storage shall be performed regularly. REQ-SEC-SLM-SST-7: O-RAN elements shall be authorized to only send security log data to centralized log storage.
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5.3.8.5.3 Security Controls
SEC-CTL-SLM-SST-1: Centralized storage for security log data should be realized using centralized logging servers or cloud-based services. SEC-CTL-SLM-SST-2: Tamper-proof storage of security log data may be achieved through digital signature, encryption, and hashing techniques. SEC-CTL-SLM-SST-3: The retention period should be based on legal, regulatory, and compliance requirements, as well as the organization's own policies.
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5.3.8.6 Secure Transfer of security log data
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5.3.8.6.1 Introduction
Security log transfer involves the movement of security log data from one location to another, such as from a local device to a centralized logging server.
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5.3.8.6.2 Requirements
REQ-SEC-SLM-STR-1: Security log data shall be confidentiality- and integrity- protected during transfer to protect them from unauthorized access or tampering. REQ-SEC-SLM-STR-2: The parties involved in the security log transfer shall mutually authenticate each other to ensure that the logs are coming from a trusted source and going to a trusted destination. Failures detected during the authentication shall be logged. REQ-SEC-SLM-STR-3: Mechanisms shall be in place to ensure the integrity of the security log data during transfer. REQ-SEC-SLM-STR-4: The log transfer process shall be auditable to enable the tracking and identification of any unauthorized or suspicious log transfers. REQ-SEC-SLM-STR-5: An O-RAN component may support log streaming for security log events.
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5.3.8.6.3 Security Controls
SEC-CTL-SLM-STR-1: Digital signatures or Hash-based Message Authentication Codes (HMACs) may be used to provide integrity protection of security log data. SEC-CTL-SLM-STR-2: An O-RAN component may support the transport of Syslog as defined in IETF RFC 5424 [64] over TLS as defined in IETF RFC 5425 [65] for log streaming of security log events. ETSI ETSI TS 104 104 V9.1.0 (2025-06) 59
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5.3.8.7 Log Format
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5.3.8.7.1 Introduction
Each O-RAN component produces logs in various formats. The logs are collected at a central and trusted location where the logs are unified.
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5.3.8.7.2 Requirements
REQ-SEC-SLM-FMT-1: Security logs shall be formatted in a consistent, standard, and machine-readable format that maintains backward compatibility with previous log format versions.
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5.3.8.8 Log Fields
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5.3.8.8.1 Introduction
To enable effective security analytics, it is important to include additional details in the security logs of the security event. These details help to identify adversarial operations within the O-RAN environment. A typical security log entry consists of two main parts: the log fields and the log message. The log fields provide metadata about the security log entry, while the log message contains the actual content and details of the security event being logged. The requirements specified in this clause pertain to the log fields.
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5.3.8.8.2 Requirements
REQ-SEC-SLM-FLD-1: Security logs shall include the date and time of the security event for each log entry, using a consistent and standardized format that logs time to at least the second. REQ-SEC-SLM-FLD-2: Security logs shall record the location of the security event for each log entry. For network transactions, the location shall incorporate both the source and destination IP addresses. In cases where security events transpire within a single component, the location field shall only contain the source IP address. REQ-SEC-SLM-FLD-3: Security logs shall include the entity that is the cause of the security event for each log entry.