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41074056
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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Motaalleq%20Mahalleh-ye%20Arbastan
|
Motaalleq Mahalleh-ye Arbastan
|
Motaalleq Mahalleh-ye Arbastan (, also Romanized as Mota‘alleq Maḩalleh-ye Ārbāstān; also known as Mota‘alleq Maḩalleh-ye Langerūd) is a village in Shirju Posht Rural District, Rudboneh District, Lahijan County, Gilan Province, Iran. At the 2006 census, its population was 72, in 25 families.
References
Populated places in Lahijan County
|
41074058
|
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Naser%20Kiadeh-ye%20Mian%20Mahalleh
|
Naser Kiadeh-ye Mian Mahalleh
|
Naser Kiadeh-ye Mian Mahalleh (, also Romanized as Nāşer Kīādeh-ye Mīān Maḩalleh; also known as Mīān Maḩalleh-ye Nāşer Kīādeh) is a village in Shirju Posht Rural District, Rudboneh District, Lahijan County, Gilan Province, Iran. At the 2006 census, its population was 226, in 68 families.
References
Populated places in Lahijan County
|
41074062
|
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nowshar%2C%20Lahijan
|
Nowshar, Lahijan
|
Nowshar () is a village in Shirju Posht Rural District, Rudboneh District, Lahijan County, Gilan Province, Iran. At the 2006 census, its population was 552, in 175 families.
References
Populated places in Lahijan County
|
41074074
|
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bethany%20Hall-Long
|
Bethany Hall-Long
|
Bethany A. Hall-Long (born November 12, 1963) is an American politician and a member of the Democratic Party. She has served as the 26th lieutenant governor of Delaware since 2017. Hall-Long previously served in the Delaware Senate from 2008 to 2016 and in the Delaware House of Representatives from 2002 to 2008.
Early life and career
Hall-Long was born on November 12, 1963 in Sussex County. She is a descendant of David Hall, the 15th Governor of Delaware. She was raised on a farm with her two older brothers and attended Indian River High School. She earned a BSN from Thomas Jefferson University, an MSN from the Medical University of South Carolina, and a PhD in health policy and nursing administration from George Mason University.
Hall-Long began a teaching career at George Mason University before moving to the University of Delaware, where she is a professor of nursing.
Lieutenant Governor of Delaware
Hall-Long was elected Lieutenant Governor of Delaware in 2016, taking office on January 17, 2017. She helped create a Behavioral Health Consortium in June 2017, which she now chairs. The consortium's role is to develop short-term and long-term plans to address addiction and mental health issues in Delaware. In 2018, Pew Charitable Trusts partnered with the Consortium to help increase access to opioid treatment. In June 2022 Hall-Long worked with state senator Sarah McBride and state representative Melissa Minor-Brown to secure $3.2 million in funding from the Delaware Department of Health and Social Services for the first in-patient addiction treatment facility for pregnant and parenting women in Delaware. She was reelected in 2020 over Republican Donyale Hall.
She served as Chair of the National Lieutenant Governor's Association from 2020 to 2021.
Electoral history
In 2000, Hall-Long initially challenged incumbent Republican Representative Richard C. Cathcart for the District 9 seat, but lost in the general election.
In 2002, Hall-Long was redistricted to District 8 and won the general election with 3,591 votes (60.7%) against Republican nominee William Hutchinson.
In 2004, Hall-Long won the general election unopposed with 8,228 votes.
In 2006, Hall-Long won the general election with 5,864 votes (77.0%) against Republican nominee Edward Colaprete.
In 2008, Republican Senator Steven H. Amick retired and left the District 10 seat open. Hall-Long won the general election with 13,965 votes (64.9%) against Republican nominee James Weldin for the senate seat.
In 2012, Hall-Long won the general election unopposed with 16,498 votes.
Personal life
Hall-Long met her husband Dana while in high school and they married in 1987. Dana served in the U.S. Navy from 1982 to 1991 as a data systems technician. On October 30, 2014, he was arrested after being caught on video taking down political signs erected by Republicans.
See also
List of female lieutenant governors in the United States
References
External links
Lt. Governor of Delaware official government website
Campaign website
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|-
1963 births
Living people
Lieutenant Governors of Delaware
Democratic Party Delaware state senators
Democratic Party members of the Delaware House of Representatives
Women state legislators in Delaware
21st-century American women politicians
21st-century American politicians
Thomas Jefferson University alumni
Medical University of South Carolina alumni
George Mason University alumni
New Castle County, Delaware politicians
Sussex County, Delaware politicians
|
41074075
|
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Naser%20Kiadeh
|
Naser Kiadeh
|
Naser Kiadeh () may refer to:
Bala Mahalleh-ye Naser Kiadeh
Naser Kiadeh-ye Mian Mahalleh
Pain Mahalleh-ye Naser Kiadeh
|
41074078
|
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List%20of%20doping%20cases%20in%20sport%20%28F%29
|
List of doping cases in sport (F)
|
This is a sub-list from List of doping cases in sport representing a full list of surnames starting with F.
References
F
|
41074081
|
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Climatic%20changes
|
Climatic changes
|
Climatic changes may refer to:
Global warming, climate change seen since the pre-industrial period
Climate change (general concept), climate change throughout Earth's history
|
41074093
|
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deh%20Baneh
|
Deh Baneh
|
Deh Baneh () may refer to:
Deh Baneh, Lahijan
Deh Baneh, Rasht
Deh Baneh, Siahkal
See also
Deh Boneh (disambiguation)
|
41074110
|
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Motaalleq%20Mahalleh
|
Motaalleq Mahalleh
|
Motaalleq Mahalleh or Motaaleq Mahalleh () may refer to:
Motaalleq Mahalleh-ye Arbastan
Motaalleq Mahalleh-ye Nowbijar
|
41074139
|
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wealth%20Partaking%20Scheme
|
Wealth Partaking Scheme
|
Wealth Partaking Scheme (; ) is a cash disbursement policy to holders of a Macau Resident Identity Card by the Macau Special Administrative Region since 2008. The main purpose of the scheme is to share the results of the region's economic development with its people and help mitigate the effects of inflation.
Target beneficiaries
Residents who have a valid or renewable Macau Resident Identity Card are the target beneficiaries of the scheme.
Payment methods
Beneficiaries of the Social Welfare Bureau (IAS), which include teachers who receive direct subsidies, students who are subsidized with scholarships or from the Student Welfare Fund by the Education and Youth Affairs Bureau (DESJ), other retired civil service employees, and senior citizens may have their money automatically deposited in a banking account or they can receive a crossed cheque by post.
Details of the scheme
Francis Tam, the Secretary for Economy and Finance, announced the Wealth Partaking Scheme at the Macau Government Headquarters on May 23, 2008. He said that for the initial run of the scheme, holders of permanent and non-permanent Macau Resident Identity Cards could receive 5,000 and 3,000 patacas respectively. More than 11,000 people who qualified for Macau Resident Identity Card applied for one after the scheme was announced, hoping to receive money. This is 10 times more than the normal number of applications.
In his policy address on November 11, 2008, Chief Executive of Macau Edmund Ho announced that the region would have another wealth sharing scheme in the next fiscal year (2009) to help offset the negative economic influence of the Financial crisis of 2007–08. This time, permanent and non-permanent residents would receive 6,000 and 3,600 patacas as announced by Edmund Ho during the question and answer session in the Legislative Assembly of Macau on April 16, 2009. Every year since, the scheme has been a regular part of the Policy Address.
In his policy address on November 16, 2010, Chief Executive of Macau Fernando Chui announced a substantial decrease for the scheme to 4,000 and 2,400 patacas for permanent and non-permanent residents respectively. The next year on April 21, 2011, Chui announced that "Cash Subsidy" (, ) would be 3,000 and 1,800 patacas to permanent and non-permanent residents respectively for that fiscal year. Despite this reduction, the total subsidy distribution in fiscal year 2011 was more than the previous fiscal year and it was the fiscal year to have cash subsidy policy only.
Subsidy amount by year
Supporting department
The Government of Macau set up the "Support Centre for Wealth Disbursement" (, ) in Largo Tap Seac on July 1, 2008 to disburse the payments and provide related services for the scheme. As the cheque from the scheme for each fiscal year is valid for 3 years, the Service Center of the Civic and Municipal Affairs Bureau (IACM) has acted on behalf of the Wealth Partaking Payment Assistance Center which located in 2/F, Edifício China Plaza, Avenida da Praia Grande since November 3, 2008.
See also
Basic income, unconditional government cash payments to the public
Scheme $6,000, a similar scheme by the Hong Kong Government
Social dividend, unconditional cash payment to the public derived from assets under public ownership
References
External links
Official website for the Wealth Partaking Scheme
2008 in Macau
Politics of Macau
Economy of Macau
Taxation and redistribution
|
41074145
|
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pain%20Mahalleh-ye%20Naser%20Kiadeh
|
Pain Mahalleh-ye Naser Kiadeh
|
Pain Mahalleh-ye Naser Kiadeh (, also Romanized as Pā’īn Maḩalleh-ye Nāşer Kīādeh) is a village in Shirju Posht Rural District, Rudboneh District, Lahijan County, Gilan Province, Iran. At the 2006 census, its population was 511, in 153 families.
References
Populated places in Lahijan County
|
41074148
|
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saharkhiz%20Mahalleh
|
Saharkhiz Mahalleh
|
Saharkhiz Mahalleh (, also Romanized as Saḩarkhīz Maḩalleh; also known as Saḩarkhīz) is a village in Shirju Posht Rural District, Rudboneh District, Lahijan County, Gilan Province, Iran. At the 2006 census, its population was 474, in 127 families.
References
Populated places in Lahijan County
|
41074149
|
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Seyyed%20Mahalleh%2C%20Lahijan
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Seyyed Mahalleh, Lahijan
|
Seyyed Mahalleh (, also Romanized as Seyyed Maḩalleh) is a village in Shirju Posht Rural District, Rudboneh District, Lahijan County, Gilan Province, Iran. At the 2006 census, its population was 239, in 77 families.
References
Populated places in Lahijan County
|
41074150
|
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/I%20Am%20Malala
|
I Am Malala
|
I Am Malala: The Story of the Girl Who Stood Up for Education and was Shot by the Taliban is an autobiographical book by Malala Yousafzai, co-written with Christina Lamb. It was published on 8 October 2013, by Weidenfeld & Nicolson in the UK and Little, Brown and Company in the US.
The book details the early life of Yousafzai, her father's ownership of schools and activism, the rise and fall of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan in Swat Valley and the assassination attempt made against Yousafzai on 9 October 2012, when she was aged 15, following her activism for female education. It received a positive critical reception and won several awards, though it has been banned in many schools in Pakistan.
Synopsis
Part One covers Malala Yousafzai's life "Before the Taliban". She describes her childhood home Swat Valley. Named for Malalai of Maiwand, Yousafzai lived with her father Ziauddin, her mother Toor Pekai and two younger brothers Khushal and Atal. Ziauddin's father Rohul Amin was an imam and a teacher. Ziauddin studied a Master's in English at Jehanzeb College. He opened the Khushal School with a partner Naeem, who later left due to financial difficulties. Ziauddin found a new partner Hidayatullah, with whom the school slowly began to make a profit. As Ziauddin began to open more schools, Toor Pekai would bring children in need to live with them and Ziauddin would give free places in his schools to poor children. Yousafzai describes the changing political regimes in Pakistan, the first drone strikes in Pakistan in 2004 following the September 11 attacks.
Part Two, "The Valley of Death", details the rise of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan in Swat. In 2006, Fazlullah began a popular "Radio Mullah" broadcast which initially gave advice on such matters as ritual ablutions and drug abstinence, but progressed into the condemnation of music and dancing, and instruction on women staying in the home. The book also describes the continuing War in North-West Pakistan, and the return of Benazir Bhutto in Pakistan which culminated in her assassination. The Taliban began to commit further murders such as that of Shabana, and Ziauddin Yousafzai continued outspoken activism. During the First Battle of Swat, Malala begins to write a BBC Urdu blog under the pseudonym "Gul Mukai". Her school is shut down following a Taliban edict in 2009, and her family are forced to move to Shangla for three months.
Part Three is entitled "Three Bullets, Three Girls". By August 2009, the army have fought off the Taliban in Swat, and the Yousafzai family return. Malala's school re-opens, and she visits Islamabad with school friends, meeting with Major General Athar Abbas and giving a public speech. With her father, Yousafzai speaks at many interviews, critical of the Taliban and the army's ineffectiveness. The 2010 Pakistan floods devastate Swat, destroying buildings and leaving many without food, clean water and electricity. In the rest of the country, CIA agent Raymond Davis murders two men and the Americans kill bin Laden, leading to widespread mistrust of American influence in Pakistan by the public. In late 2011, Yousafzai begins to receive prizes for her activism. She travels to Karachi to talk to Geo TV, also visiting the mausoleum of Muhammad Ali Jinnah. Yousafzai receives death threats, which worries her parents. Following the shooting of Zahid Khan in August 2012, Ziauddin expected to be targeted next. Malala also begins to fear an attack on her. She revises hard for her exams, staying up late at night. After her Pakistan Studies paper on 9 October, two men stop her bus and come aboard. One shouts "Who is Malala?" and shoots three bullets.
Part Four is named "Between Life and Death". One bullet travelled from Yousafzai's left eye to her shoulder, and her friends Shazia and Kainat were also non-fatally injured. Yousafzai's father gave a speech with the Association of Private Schools before rushing to the hospital, while Yousafzai's mother was learning to read and rushed home to pray. Malala was taken by helicopter to the Combined Military Hospital in Peshawar and then airlifted to a military hospital in Rawalpindi. Yousafzai was taken on 15 October to Queen Elizabeth Hospital in Birmingham, aboard a United Arab Emirates jet, but her father refused to come as the rest of the family could not travel without passports.
Part Five is called "A Second Life". Yousafzai woke up in Birmingham on 16 October, and spent the following days obsessed with the location of her father, and not being able to afford medical treatment, though the Pakistani government was covering costs. Yousafzai received 8000 cards and many presents. When she awoke, she was confused about all the cards she had received, as there was supposed to be a news blackout in Pakistan so no one would know anything had happened to her or where she was being taken, but someone had seen her being flown out to the UK, and word got around quickly. Her family finally arrived on 25 October. The day her family got to the hospital was also the first day since arriving in Birmingham that she had any access to windows. Malala had not seen the city she was being kept in for 10 days. She underwent surgery on 11 November to repair her facial nerve; in January 2013, she was discharged, and in February she received surgery to get a cochlear implant. Yousafzai lives in Birmingham, though she misses Swat, and plans to continue her activism so she can be known not as "the girl who was shot by the Taliban" but as "the girl who fought for education".
Reception
According to Publishers Weekly, in 2017 the book had sold almost 2 million copies, and there were 750,000 copies of the children's edition in print. In March 2018, The Bookseller reported that 328,000 copies of the book had been sold in the UK, netting over £2.47 million.
Accolades
2013 Specsavers National Book Awards, Popular Non-Fiction Book of the Year
2013 Goodreads Choice Awards, Best Memoir & Autobiography
2014 Political Book Awards, Finalist, Political Book of the Year
Critical reviews
Sayeeda Warsi, writing for The Daily Telegraph, giving the book four stars out of five, wrote "Malala has turned a tragedy into something positive". Entertainment Weekly gave the book a "B+", writing "Malala's bravely eager voice can seem a little thin here, in I Am Malala, likely thanks to her co-writer, but her powerful message remains undiluted." Metro list the book as one of the "20 best non-fiction books of 2013", praising that Yousafzai's story is "one of idealism and stubborn courage".
In The Observer, the reviewer Yvonne Roberts praised Lamb for ensuring "the teenager's voice is never lost", and summarises that "this extraordinary schoolgirl's words are a reminder of all that is best in human nature". Fatima Bhutto in The Guardian called the book "fearless" and stated that "the haters and conspiracy theorists would do well to read this book", though she criticised "the stiff, know-it-all voice of a foreign correspondent" that is interwoven with Yousafzai's. In The Spectator, the journalist Owen Bennett-Jones describes Yousafzai's story as "astonishing", and writes that "as the story progresses, Malala’s voice definitely cuts through, clear and defiant". Marie Arana in The Washington Post called the book "riveting" and wrote "It is difficult to imagine a chronicle of a war more moving, apart from perhaps the diary of Anne Frank."
Response in Pakistan
The All Pakistan Private School's Federation announced that the book would be banned in its 152,000 member institutions, stating that it disrespected Islam and could have a "negative" influence. Pakistani investigative editor Ansar Abbasi described her work as "providing her critics something 'concrete' to prove her as an 'agent' of the West against Islam and Pakistan".
Following the book's release, the Pakistani Taliban released a statement threatening to kill Yousafzai, and target bookshops which sell the book.
The book, however, continues to be available in leading bookstores. It remains a popular reading among educated people especially young girls. Some schools, in fact, encourage students to read this book by keeping it in their libraries. Pakistan does not have high literacy rate, and therefore, the popularity or otherwise of any literature is always subject to how the educated people have received it.
Release details
I Am Malala was published on 8 October 2013, by Weidenfeld & Nicolson in the UK and Little, Brown and Company in the US. The book has been translated into more than 40 languages.
A children's edition of the memoir was published in 2014 under the title I Am Malala: How One Girl Stood Up for Education and Changed the World. The audio book edition, narrated by Neela Vaswani, won the 2015 Grammy Award for Best Children's Album.
References
External links
Official website
Malala Yousafzai
2013 non-fiction books
Pakistani autobiographies
Autobiographical novels
Political autobiographies
Books about politics of Pakistan
Books about activism
Books about terrorism
Collaborative non-fiction books
Obscenity controversies in literature
Censored books
Islam-related controversies in Asia
Weidenfeld & Nicolson books
Little, Brown and Company books
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41074151
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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Seyqal%20Boneh
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Seyqal Boneh
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Seyqal Boneh (, also Romanized as Şeyqal Boneh; also known as Eslām Deh and Sakhl-e Baneh Bārgū Sarā) is a village in Shirju Posht Rural District, Rudboneh District, Lahijan County, Gilan Province, Iran. At the 2006 census, its population was 201, in 57 families.
References
Populated places in Lahijan County
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41074153
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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shirju%20Posht-e%20Bala
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Shirju Posht-e Bala
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Shirju Posht-e Bala (, also Romanized as Shīrjū Posht-e Bālā; also known as Shīrjū Posht and Shīrjū Posht-e Bālā Maḩalleh) is a village in Shirju Posht Rural District, Rudboneh District, Lahijan County, Gilan Province, Iran. At the 2006 census, its population was 594, in 164 families.
References
Populated places in Lahijan County
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41074155
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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Photo%20elicitation
|
Photo elicitation
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Photo-elicitation is a method of interview used in research which incorporates photographs in the interviews. The method is participatory-oriented and is used in different research areas such as visual sociology, marketing research, and public health. In the method, images are used to prompt and guide in-depth interviews and to evoke reactions from the interview participant. The types of images used include photographs, video, paintings, cartoons, graffiti, and advertising, among others. Either the interviewer or the subject may provide the images.
Objective
The purposes of photo-elicitation interviewing is to record how subjects respond to images, attributing their social and personal meanings and values, and to allow the interview to be more driven by the participant. The meanings and emotions elicited may differ from or supplement those obtained through strict verbal inquiry. Regions of the brain that process visual information are evolutionarily and developmentally older than the parts that process verbal information.
Description
Visual images can evoke emphatic understanding of how other people experience their world. Photo-elicitation has been used successfully in a range of studies and is common in participatory research with young children and marginalised communities.
Photo-Elicitation is unique to the interviewer as well as to the subject. When a photograph is taken, it has meaning to the interviewer, formed in part by the context of the image. To another interviewer, the same photograph may illustrate a similar concept, but two interviewers will never have exactly the same initial reaction to any image.
This is an ideal method of qualitative research for those who are naturally visual learners. Also, our brain processes visuals differently from verbal communication. Therefore, photographs may also help to alleviate certain social anxieties that arise when discussing "difficult emotional subjects," such as illness, death, poverty, etc.
Many still question photo-elicitation as a research method, claiming the photographs taken during social experiments to be better known as art, than as research. But there are certain sub-sets of data that can be produced when the interviewer and subject collaborate to create an image that are hard to capture by other traditional means of data gathering. Without these sub-sets, sometimes even the most important conclusions of research are empty when it comes to human emotion and expression.
See also
Advertising research
Consumer behaviour
Market research
Visual sociology
Visual anthropology
Visual communication
Visual culture
References
Methods in sociology
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41074156
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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shirju%20Posht-e%20Pain
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Shirju Posht-e Pain
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Shirju Posht-e Pain (, also Romanized as Shīrjū Posht-e Pā’īn; also known as Shīrjū Posht-e Pā’īn Maḩalleh) is a village in Shirju Posht Rural District, Rudboneh District, Lahijan County, Gilan Province, Iran. At the 2006 census, its population was 343, in 96 families.
References
Populated places in Lahijan County
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41074157
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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sarajar
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Sarajar
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Sarajar (, also Romanized as Sarājār; also known as Sarachar and Sarājār-e Pā’īn Maḩalleh) is a village in Shirju Posht Rural District, Rudboneh District, Lahijan County, Gilan Province, Iran. At the 2006 census, its population was 852, in 258 families.
References
Populated places in Lahijan County
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41074160
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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Titi%20Parizad
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Titi Parizad
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Titi Parizad (, also Romanized as Tītī Parīzād; also known as Tītī Parīzādeh) is a village in Shirju Posht Rural District, Rudboneh District, Lahijan County, Gilan Province, Iran. At the 2006 census, its population was 78, in 25 families.
References
Populated places in Lahijan County
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41074162
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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cynthia%20Biggs
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Cynthia Biggs
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Cynthia Biggs, lawfully known as Cynthia Biggs El, is an American songwriter, producer, publisher and vocalist who wrote music and lyrics for the Philadelphia International Records label. Her main collaborations were with composers Dexter Wansel, Bruce Hawes, and Theodore Wortham. Cynthia has more than 350 songwriting credits including Patti LaBelle's 1983 single If Only You Knew, which reached number 1 on Billboard magazine's Top 100 R&B Singles chart for four consecutive weeks in January 1984.
Born near North Carolina territory, Cynthia was three when her family moved near Philadelphia territory. She joined her high school's gospel choir, continuing to write music for them after she graduated. Her original music garnered attention during the group's performances, leading to the offer to sign an exclusive songwriter's contract with Philadelphia International Records' Mighty Three Music Group in 1974.
Discography
Writer
MFSB - Love Has No Time Or Place (written with Bruce Hawes) (1975)
City Limits - People (We Need A Change)(written with Bruce Hawes) (1975)
City Limits - Love (I Guess That's The Fool In Me) (written with Bruce Hawes) (1975)
City Limits - Circles (written with Bruce Hawes and Ted Wortham) (1975)
The Jacksons - Jump For Joy (written with Dexter Wansel) (1977)
Billy Paul - Where I Belong (written with Dexter Wansel) (1977)
Dee Dee Sharp - I Believe In Love (written with Dexter Wansel) (1977)
Dee Dee Sharp - I Love You Anyway (written with Dexter Wansel and Kenneth Gamble) (1977)
Dexter Wansel - Dance With Me Tonight (written with Dexter Wansel) (1977)
Dexter Wansel - Solutions (written with Dexter Wansel) (1978)
Dexter Wansel - I'm In Love (written with Dexter Wansel) (1978)
The Futures - Deep Inside Of Me (written with Cary Gilbert and Ted Wortham) (1978)
Teddy Pendergrass/Stephanie Mills - Take Me in Your Arms Tonight (written with Dexter Wansel) (1979)
The Stylistics - Hurry Up This Way Again (written with Dexter Wansel) (1979)
The Stylistics - Driving Me Wild (written with Ted Wortham and Cary Gilbert) (1979)
Dexter Wansel - I'll Never Forget (My Favorite Disco) (written with Dexter Wansel) (1979)
Dexter Wansel - Sweetest Pain (written with Dexter Wansel) (1979)
Dexter Wansel - Time is Slipping Away (written with Dexter Wansel) (1979)
The Jones Girls - We're A Melody (written with Dexter Wansel) (1979)
The Jones Girls - You Made Me Love You (written with Dexter Wansel) (1979)
Cindy & Roy - While We Still Have Time (written with Ted Wortham) (1979)
Lou Rawls - Old Times (written with Dexter Wansel) (1979)
Lou Rawls - Lover's Holiday (written with Dexter Wansel) (1980)
The Jones Girls - Nights Over Egypt (written with Dexter Wansel) (1981)
Grover Washington Jr. featuring Patti LaBelle - The Best is Yet to Come (written with Dexter Wansel) (1984)
Phyllis Hyman - Living All Alone (written with Dexter Wansel and Kenneth Gamble) (1985)
Phyllis Hyman - You Just Don't Know (written with Thom Bell and Kenneth Gamble) (1985)
Pieces of a Dream - Fo-Fi-Fo (written with Dexter Wansel and Grover Washington Jr.) (1983)
Eternal - Don't You Love Me (written with Carolyn Mitchell, Terence Dudley, and Christopher Kellum) (1995)
The Jones Girls - When I'm Gone (written with Dexter Wansel) (1979)
Lou Rawls - Forever I Do (The Wedding Song) (written with Dexter Wansel) (1984)
Lou Rawls - When We Were Young (written with Dexter Wansel) (1984)
Lou Rawls - Pretty Eyes (written with Dexter Wansel) (1984)
Lou Rawls - In the Middle of the Night (written with Dexter Wansel) (Close Company, 1983)
Pieces of a Dream - Warm Weather (written with Dexter Wansel) (1980)
Jay-Z - Politics As Usual (written with Dexter Wansel, Shawn Carter, and David Willis) (1994)
T.I. - Praying for Help (written with Dexter Wansel, Clifford Harris, and Marquinarius Holmes) (2003)
Tank - You Don't Know (written with Dexter Wansel, Kenneth Gamble, Durrell Babbs, Victor Olubowale Akintimehin, Alvin Isaacs, Bryan Nelson, Eric Bellinger) (2015)
The O'Jays - I Really Need You Now (written with Dexter Wansel) (1984)
Cynthia Biggs El - Stay Just as You Are (written with Rex Rideout) (1996)
Vocalist
Pieces Of A Dream - We Are One (1982)
Lou Rawls - Close Company (1984)
Patti LaBelle - Patti (album) (1985)
52nd Street - Children Of The Night (1986)
Michelle Goulet - Michelle Goulet (album) (1986)
Jean Carne - Closer Than Close (1986)
Miki Howard - Love Confessions (1987)
Judy Mowatt - Love Is Overdue (album) (1987)
Regina Belle - All By Myself (1987)
Stephanie Mills - If I Were Your Woman (album) (1987)
Miles Jaye - Miles (1987)
Kiara (group) - To Change And / Or Make A Difference (1988)
Teddy Pendergrass - Joy (1988)
Jean Carne - You're A Part Of Me (album) (1988)
Leata Galloway - The Naked Truth (Leata Galloway album) (1988)
Miki Howard - Miki Howard (album) (1989)
Regina Belle - Stay With Me (1989)
D'Atra Hicks - D'Atra Hicks (album) (1989)
Peabo Bryson - All My Love (1989)
Phyllis Hyman - Prime Of My Life (1991)
Starleana Young-Taylor - Starleana (album) (1991)
Gerald Alston - Always In The Mood (album) (1992)
Charles Christopher - Think About It (album) (1992)
Regina Belle - Passion (1993)
Producer
Teddy Pendergrass - Love TKO (produced with Dexter Wansel and Cecil Womack) (1979)
The Stylistics - Driving Me Wild (produced with Ted Wortham) (1979)
The Stylistics - Mine All Mine (produced with Dexter Wansel) (1980)
The Futures - Deep Inside of Me (produced with Ted Wortham) (1978)
Jean Carn - Lonely Girl (In a Cold, Cold World) (produced with Ted Wortham) (1980)
Publisher
Living All Alone - Now and Ever Moor Music (published with DGW Music Publishing and Warner/Chappell) (1985)
Fo-Fi-Fo - Now an Ever Moor Music (published with DGW Music Publishing) (1983)
Nights Over Egypt - Moor Great Songs International (published with Warner-Tamerlane Publishing Corp) (2016)
Sweetest Pain - Moor Great Songs International (published with DGW Music Publishing) (2014)
Love Don't Ever Say Goodbye - Moor Great Songs International (published with Warner-Tamerlane Publishing Corp) (2016)
Don't You Love Me - Sole Heart Publishing Co (published with Peach Pie Music and Kool Shoes Music) (1995)
Hurry Up This Way Again - Moor Great Songs International (published with Warner-Tamerlane Publishing Corp) (2014)
Warm Weather - Moor Great Songs International (published with Warner-Tamerlane Publishing Corp) (2016)
Deep Inside of Me - Moor Great Songs International (published with Warner-Tamerlane Publishing Corp) (2013)
When I'm Gone - Moor Great Songs International (published with Warner-Tamerlane Publishing Corp) (2015)
Forever I Do (The Wedding Song) - Now and Ever Moor Music (published with DGW Music Publishing) (1984)
When We Were Young - Now and Ever Moor Music (published with DGW Music Publishing) (1984)
Pretty Eyes - Now and Ever Moor Music (published with DGW Music Publishing) (1984)
In the Middle of the Night - Now and Ever Moor Music (published with DGW Music Publishing) (1984)
Sunshine (When Are You Coming My Way) - Now and Ever Moor Music (published with DGW Music Publishing and Jean Claude Renauld) (1984)
Driving Me Wild - Moor Great Songs International (published with Warner-Tamerlane Publishing Corp) (2014)
Politics As Usual - Moor Great Songs International (published with Warner-Tamerlane Publishing Corp, Biggie Music, Motown Songs, and Lil Lu Lu Publishing ) (2014)
Praying for Help - Moor Great Songs International (published with Warner-Tamerlane Publishing Corp, Down Holmes Publishing, Songs of Universal,Inc., and Domani and Ya Majesty's Music) (2014)
Global Warming - Now and Ever Moor Music (published with DGW Music Publishing) (1993)
Through the Universe - Now and Ever Moor Music (published with DGW Music Publishing) (1993)
Vision Quest - Now and Ever Moor Music (published with DGW Music Publishing) (1993)
Something Just for Us - Now and Ever Moor Music (published with DGW Music Publishing) (1993)
Earth Matters a/k/a Earth Signs - Now and Ever Moor Music (published with DGW Music Publishing) (1983)
Ancient Mariner - Now and Ever Moor Music (published with DGW Music Publishing) (1993)
Stay Just As You Are - Sole Heart Publishing Co (published with Uncle Buddie's Music and International Songs of PolyGram) (1996)
References
External links
Cynthia Biggs at soultracks.com
Year of birth missing (living people)
Living people
American women singer-songwriters
Philadelphia International Records artists
Singer-songwriters from Pennsylvania
21st-century American women
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41074173
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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shirju%20Posht
|
Shirju Posht
|
Shirju Posht () may refer to:
Shirju Posht-e Bala
Shirju Posht-e Pain
Shirju Posht Rural District
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41074204
|
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Castles%20of%20Dahn
|
Castles of Dahn
|
The castles of Dahn (, literally "Dahn castle group"), near the little town of Dahn in the German state of Rhineland-Palatinate, consist of three rock castles:
Altdahn
Grafendahn
Tanstein
Geography
The so-called Dahner Felsenland area of the Wasgau, the region forming the southern part of the Palatine Forest and the northern part of the Vosges, has a large number of castles and rock formations. For example, northwest of the castles at Dahn is Neudahn Castle and, close to the edge of the town, there are natural rock formations like the Jungfernsprung and the Bride and Groom (Braut und Bräutigam).
History
The three castles were built next to one another, but not at the same time, utilizing five neighbouring rocks on a single ridge situated just under a kilometre east of Dahn. Their construction involved several generations of noble families from Dahn and lasted almost two centuries: Tanstein dates to the early 12th century; Altdahn to the early 13th century and Grafendahn to the late 13th century.
Similar castle groups
A similar arrangement of two or three castles clustered closely together may be found in several places in the south part of neighbouring Alsatian Vosges: the Dreistein at Odilienberg near Obernai, the three castles on the Schlossberg near Reinhardsmunster, the Drei Exen near Eguisheim and the castle group of Haut-Kœnigsbourg/Oedenburg.
Literature
External links
Dahner Felsenland: Altdahn–Grafendahn–Tanstein
Stefan Grathoff: Die Dahner Burgen und ihre Besitzer
Rock castles
Castles in Rhineland-Palatinate
!
Heritage sites in Rhineland-Palatinate
Buildings and structures in Südwestpfalz
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41074205
|
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Azarsetanaki
|
Azarsetanaki
|
Azarsetanaki (, also Romanized as Āzārsetānakī; also known as Āzārsetān) is a village in Ahandan Rural District, in the Central District of Lahijan County, Gilan Province, Iran. At the 2006 census, its population was 261, in 82 families.
References
Populated places in Lahijan County
|
41074206
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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bala%20Bijar%20Ankish
|
Bala Bijar Ankish
|
Bala Bijar Ankish (, also Romanized as Bālā Bījār Ankīsh; also known as Bījār Ankīsh-e Bālā) is a village in Ahandan Rural District, in the Central District of Lahijan County, Gilan Province, Iran. At the 2006 census, its population was 38, in 7 families.
References
Populated places in Lahijan County
|
41074209
|
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bala%20Tamushal
|
Bala Tamushal
|
Bala Tamushal (, also Romanized as Bālā Tamūshal; also known as Bālāmaḩalleh-ye Tamūshal) is a village in Ahandan Rural District, in the Central District of Lahijan County, Gilan Province, Iran. At the 2006 census, its population was 387, in 112 families.
References
Populated places in Lahijan County
|
41074210
|
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bilazh%20Mahalleh
|
Bilazh Mahalleh
|
Bilazh Mahalleh (, also Romanized as Bīlāzh Maḩalleh) is a village in Ahandan Rural District, in the Central District of Lahijan County, Gilan Province, Iran. At the 2006 census, its population was 60, in 22 families.
References
Populated places in Lahijan County
|
41074211
|
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bandbon-e%20Bala
|
Bandbon-e Bala
|
Bandbon-e Bala (, also Romanized as Bandbon-e Bālā; also known as Bālā Bandbūn and Bandbūn) is a village in Ahandan Rural District, in the Central District of Lahijan County, Gilan Province, Iran. At the 2006 census, its population was 76, in 22 families.
References
Populated places in Lahijan County
|
41074212
|
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bandbon-e%20Pain
|
Bandbon-e Pain
|
Bandbon-e Pain (, also Romanized as Bandbon-e Pā’īn) is a village in Ahandan Rural District, in the Central District of Lahijan County, Gilan Province, Iran. At the 2006 census, its population was 122, in 38 families.
References
Populated places in Lahijan County
|
41074213
|
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bujayeh
|
Bujayeh
|
Bujayeh (, also Romanized as Būjāyeh; also known as Būjā’ī, Bū Jā’ī, Būjā’ī, Būjāneh, and Bū Jāneh-ye Bālā) is a village in Ahandan Rural District, in the Central District of Lahijan County, Gilan Province, Iran. At the 2006 census, its population was 3,186, in 888 families.
References
Populated places in Lahijan County
|
41074214
|
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chichi%20Nikuti
|
Chichi Nikuti
|
Chichi Nikuti (, also Romanized as Chīchī Nīkūtī) is a village in Ahandan Rural District, in the Central District of Lahijan County, Gilan Province, Iran. At the 2006 census, its population was 174, in 45 families.
References
Populated places in Lahijan County
|
41074217
|
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chamandan
|
Chamandan
|
Chamandan (, also romanized as Chamandān) is a village in Ahandan Rural District, in the Central District of Lahijan County, Gilan Province, Iran. At the 2006 census, its population was 168, in 44 families.
References
Populated places in Lahijan County
|
41074218
|
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coquitlam%20Search%20and%20Rescue
|
Coquitlam Search and Rescue
|
Coquitlam Search and Rescue (SAR) is a volunteer, non-profit organization dedicated to wilderness search and rescue in the Coquitlam area of British Columbia, Canada. Its service area includes the communities of Anmore, Belcarra, Burnaby, Coquitlam, New Westminster, Port Coquitlam and Port Moody.
Operations
Coquitlam Search and Rescue responds to an average of 35 tasks per year.
Volunteers
The all-volunteer team is made up of highly skilled hikers, mountaineers and back country skiers, some of whom dedicate more than 500 hours per year and often conduct rescues at night, in bad weather, and on short notice. The team trains together every Tuesday night. Volunteers also attend special courses, devote time to education and fundraising, and pay for their own personal equipment and clothing.
References
Non-profit organizations based in British Columbia
Volunteer search and rescue organizations
Coquitlam
|
41074219
|
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dehsar%2C%20Ahandan
|
Dehsar, Ahandan
|
Dehsar (, also Romanized as Deh Sar) is a village in Ahandan Rural District, in the Central District of Lahijan County, Gilan Province, Iran. At the 2006 census, its population was 398, in 103 families.
References
Populated places in Lahijan County
|
41074220
|
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CGR%202-6-0ST%201900
|
CGR 2-6-0ST 1900
|
The Cape Government Railways 2-6-0ST of 1900 was a South African steam locomotive from the pre-Union era in the Cape of Good Hope.
In 1900, two 2-6-0 Mogul type saddle-tank locomotives entered service on the Port Elizabeth Harbour works, followed by one more in 1904. They were later taken onto the Cape Government Railways roster and were all still in service when the South African Railways was established in 1912.
Manufacturer
In 1900, two 2-6-0 saddle-tank locomotives were delivered to the Port Elizabeth Harbour Board (PEHB) from Kitson and Company. In 1904, they were followed by one more from the same manufacturer.
The builder’s works numbers of the first two locomotives are not known, but are probably two of Kitson numbers 4079 to 4083 in respect of which no trial date or owner are given in the Kitson Works Trial Book. The third locomotive, Kitson no. 4245, is listed with trial date 8 December 1903 and customer H Chaplin P.E.H.B. From the trial date, it would follow that the locomotive could only have entered service in Port Elizabeth early in 1904.
The locomotives were similar in appearance and general dimensions to the 1st Class 2-6-0ST of 1876 which had been delivered as a pair of Stephenson's Patent back-to-back side-tank locomotives, before being rebuilt to saddle-tank locomotives by the Cape Government Railways (CGR) in the 1880s. The new locomotives were slightly larger, with an increased heating surface and tractive effort.
Service
Port Elizabeth Harbour Board
The locomotives were acquired as construction locomotives for use on the Port Elizabeth harbour works. The PEHB used letters to number its locomotives at the time, and the first two of these engines were lettered I and J, while the one which was delivered in 1904 was lettered O.
Cape Government Railways
In terms of Cape Act 38 of 1908, the Cape Government Railways (CGR) became responsible for the administration of the three major harbours in the Cape of Good Hope with effect from 1 January 1909. The locomotives were therefore all taken onto the CGR roster and renumbered in the range from 1024 to 1026. They spent their entire service lives as dock shunting engines in the Port Elizabeth Harbour.
South African Railways
When the Union of South Africa was established on 31 May 1910, the three Colonial government railways (CGR, Natal Government Railways and Central South African Railways) were united under a single administration to control and administer the railways, ports and harbours of the Union. Although the South African Railways and Harbours came into existence in 1910, the actual classification and renumbering of all the rolling stock of the three constituent railways were only implemented with effect from 1 January 1912.
In 1912, the locomotives were considered obsolete by the SAR and renumbered by having the numeral "0" prefixed to their existing engine numbers. Even though obsolete, they remained in service until 1931.
References
0110
2-6-0 locomotives
1C locomotives
Kitson locomotives
Cape gauge railway locomotives
Railway locomotives introduced in 1900
1900 in South Africa
Scrapped locomotives
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41074221
|
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Darreh%20Jir
|
Darreh Jir
|
Darreh Jir (, also Romanized as Darreh Jīr) is a village in Ahandan Rural District, in the Central District of Lahijan County, Gilan Province, Iran. At the 2006 census, its population was 215, in 71 families.
References
Populated places in Lahijan County
|
41074223
|
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dozdaksu
|
Dozdaksu
|
Dozdaksu (, also Romanized as Dozdaksū; also known as Dozdak) is a village in Ahandan Rural District, in the Central District of Lahijan County, Gilan Province, Iran. At the 2006 census, its population was 43, in 10 families.
References
Populated places in Lahijan County
|
41074226
|
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jir%20Gavabar%2C%20Lahijan
|
Jir Gavabar, Lahijan
|
Jir Gavabar (, also Romanized as Jīr Gavābar; also known as Jirgaver) is a village in Ahandan Rural District, in the Central District of Lahijan County, Gilan Province, Iran. At the 2006 census, its population was 90, in 27 families.
References
Populated places in Lahijan County
|
41074228
|
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Golestan%2C%20Gilan
|
Golestan, Gilan
|
Golestan (, also Romanized as Golestān) is a village in Ahandan Rural District, in the Central District of Lahijan County, Gilan Province, Iran. At the 2006 census, its population was 42, in 10 families.
References
Populated places in Lahijan County
|
41074229
|
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gerd-e%20Kuh%2C%20Lahijan
|
Gerd-e Kuh, Lahijan
|
Gerd-e Kuh (, also Romanized as Gerd-e Kūh) is a village in Ahandan Rural District, in the Central District of Lahijan County, Gilan Province, Iran. At the 2006 census, its population was 171, in 46 families.
References
Populated places in Lahijan County
|
41074233
|
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Halukhani
|
Halukhani
|
Halukhani (, also Romanized as Hālūkhānī) is a village in Ahandan Rural District, in the Central District of Lahijan County, Gilan Province, Iran. At the 2006 census, its population was 96, in 21 families.
References
Populated places in Lahijan County
|
41074236
|
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Khurtay
|
Khurtay
|
Khurtay (, also Romanized as Khūrtāy) is a village in Ahandan Rural District, in the Central District of Lahijan County, Gilan Province, Iran. At the 2006 census, its population was 121, in 29 families.
References
Populated places in Lahijan County
|
41074238
|
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kuh%20Boneh
|
Kuh Boneh
|
Kuh Boneh (, also Romanized as Kūh Boneh, Kouhbane, and Kooh Boneh) is a village in Ahandan Rural District of the Central District of Lahijan County, Gilan province, Iran. Most villagers are engaged in agriculture, especially the cultivation of tea and rice.
At the 2006 National Census, its population was 1,453 in 398 households. The following census in 2011 counted 1,314 people in 414 households. The latest census in 2016 showed a population of 1,630 people in 556 households. It was the largest village in its rural district.
References
Lahijan County
Populated places in Gilan Province
Populated places in Lahijan County
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41074240
|
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kureh%20Bar
|
Kureh Bar
|
Kureh Bar (, also Romanized as Kūreh Bar and Kūrehbar) is a village in Ahandan Rural District, in the Central District of Lahijan County, Gilan Province, Iran. At the 2006 census, its population was 216, in 59 families.
References
Populated places in Lahijan County
|
41074252
|
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Two-dimensional%20filter
|
Two-dimensional filter
|
Two dimensional filters have seen substantial development effort due to their importance and high applicability across several domains. In the 2-D case the situation is quite different from the 1-D case, because the multi-dimensional polynomials cannot in general be factored. This means that an arbitrary transfer function cannot generally be manipulated into a form required by a particular implementation. The input-output relationship of a 2-D IIR filter obeys a constant-coefficient linear partial difference equation from which the value of an output sample can be computed using the input samples and previously computed output samples. Because the values of the output samples are fed back, the 2-D filter, like its 1-D counterpart, can be unstable.
Motivation and applications
Due to the rapid development of information science and computing technology, the theory of digital filters design and application has achieved leap-forward development. We encounter a variety of signals in real-life, such as broadcasting signals, television signals, radar signals, mobile phone signals, navigation signals, radio astronomy signal, biomedical signals, control signals, weather signal, seismic signal, mechanical vibration signal, remote sensing and telemetry signals, etc. Most of these signals are analog signals and just a small portion of them are digital signals. The analog signals are continuous function of the independent variables, which can be one-dimensional, two-dimensional or multidimensional. In most cases, the variable of one-dimensional analog signals are time. After the time sampling and discretization of magnitude, such analog signal will become a one-dimensional digital signal. The resulting digital signal can be represented by a discrete sequence. For example, one common signal is voice signal. An example of a two-dimensional signal is an image. A filter is a system that can transform a signal into another signal. Examples of such transformation include smoothing the signal for noise removal, removing frequency components from a signal and amplifying frequency components for signal enhancement. The design and implementation of filter is an important branch in signal analysis and processing technology. Filters also play a main role in signal acquisition, transmission, processing and exchange.
Problem statement & basic concepts
Digital filters
Digital signal filtering is implementing a digital filter. A digital filter is a system that performs mathematical operations on a sampled, discrete-time signal to reduce or enhance certain aspects of that signal. The input and output signals are all digital signals. This is in contrast to the other major type of electronic filter, the analog filter, which is an electronic circuit operating on a continuous-time analog signal. Actually the basic concept of digital filters and analog filters are the same. The only difference is the types of signals and the methods to filtering. Digital filters can be implemented numerically in software and have the advantages of high processing accuracy, steady system, little volume and light weight. There is no impedance matching in digital filters and digital filters can accomplish some special filtering functions that can’t be accomplished by analog filters. Analog signals can also be processed through digital filters by using Analog to Digital converters.
Two-dimensional digital filters
Two-dimensional filters are used to process two-dimensional digital signals. There is an important difference between the design of 1-D and 2-D digital filter problems. In 1-D case, the design and the implementation of filters can be more easily considered separately. The filter can first be designed and then, through the appropriate manipulations of the transfer function, the coefficients required by a particular network structure can be determined. While in the 2-D case, the design and implementation are more closely related. Since multidimensional polynomials can’t be factored in general. This means that an arbitrary multi-dimensional transfer function can generally not be manipulated into a form required by a particular implementation. If our implementation can realize only factorable transfer functions, our design algorithm must be tailored to design only filters of this class. This has the effect of complicating the design problem and also limiting the number of practical implementations. Digital filters can be categorized into two main types, namely finite impulse response (FIR) and infinite impulse response (IIR). 2-D FIR digital filter is achieved by a non-recursive algorithm structure while 2-D IIR digital filter is achieved by a recursive feedback algorithm structure.
Existing approaches
Direct form implementations of 2-D IIR filters
An IIR filter may be implemented in direct form by rearranging its difference equation to express one output sample in terms of the input samples and previously computed output samples. For a first-quadrant filter, the input signal and the output signal are related by
Since the response of the filter to an impulse is by definition the impulse response , we can derive the relationship
By taking the 2-D z-transform of both sides, we can solve for the system function , which is given by
This ratio may be viewed as resulting from the cascade of two filters, an FIR filter with a system function equal to and an IIR filter with a system function equal to , as shown in the figure below.
Parallel implementations of 2-D IIR filters
Another method to build up complicated 2-D IIR filters is by the parallel interconnection of subfilters. In this case, the overall transfer function becomes
Using equation
and putting the sum in transfer function over a common denominator, we get the expanded form
The parallel form cannot be used to implement an arbitrary 2-D rational system function. Nevertheless, we can synthesize interesting 2-D IIR filters which can be implemented by a parallel architecture. For example, the parallel form may be advantageous when designing a filter with multiple passband. The parallel implementation can also be useful for implementing a 2-D IIR filter whose impulse response is not confined to a single quadrant, such as a symmetric filter.
Design of 2-D IIR filters with genetic algorithm
Many design techniques for 2-D IIR digital filters have been reported in the literature. In 2013, genetic algorithm had been successfully used to digital filter design for about a decade. Here we present a method for designing 2-D IIR Filters called GA-Based design method.
Initialization
The figure below shows the proposed GA-Based design flow. Filter coefficients are encoded in their CSD number representation. In the population initialization, chromosomes are generated randomly. Each coefficient has the pre-specified wordlength and maximum number of non-zero digits, which can be set to any desired values.
Genetic operators
Roulette Wheel Selection is used as the reproduction operator. After each crossover operation, the coefficient where the crossover point lies in will be checked upon CSD format. Mutation operation is the simple single bit flip. After mutation, each coefficient in the offspring is checked upon CSD format.
Fitness evaluation and replacement strategy
The fitness evaluation is a two-step process. The first step is to check the stability of each second order section using the stability triangle. Chromosomes failing the check are assigned fitness value 0. Elitist strategy is applied for old generation replacement. After reproduction the best chromosome and the worst chromosome in the offspring are found out. The designed filter has non-separable numerator and separable denominator transfer function. The number restoration technique is used to ensure that the filter coefficients are represented in the pre-specified CSD format.
References
Digital signal processing
Multidimensional signal processing
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41074253
|
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bijar%20Ankish
|
Bijar Ankish
|
Bijar Ankish () may refer to:
Bala Bijar Ankish
Pain Bijar Ankish
|
41074259
|
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South%20African%20constitutional%20litigation
|
South African constitutional litigation
|
In law, South African constitutional litigation is the area dealing with the rules and principles concerning constitutional matters in the country of South Africa. It includes the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court of South Africa, the High Court of South Africa, the Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa, and certain other specialist courts. It also includes the consideration of rules peculiar to these courts that are relevant to constitutional litigation, such as the admission of an amicus curiae, the duty to raise a constitutional matter as early as possible in proceedings, and the duty to join the relevant organ of state in a case involving a constitutional issue.
Litigating fundamental rights
The South Africa Bill of Rights is "the principal source of substantive constraints on public power in the Constitution." The Bill of Rights instructs the state to use the power that the Constitution of South Africa gives it in ways that do not violate fundamental rights. The state must promote and fulfill those rights. If it fails to do so, it is deemed to have acted unconstitutionally; its actions or laws will be unlawful and invalid. Although the Constitution is mainly concerned with state power and law, a number of provisions of the Bill of Rights place duties on private individuals in certain circumstances.
A fundamental principle of South African law is expressed by the maxim ubi ius ubi remedium (). In other words, the existence of a legal rule implies the existence of an authority with the power to grant a remedy if that rule is infringed. As such, a legal rule is deficient if there is no means of enforcing it and if no sanction attaches to a breach of that rule. Breaches of the Bill of Rights may be remedied by litigation that seeks to directly enforce the principles of set out in the document.
Direct Bill of Rights litigation takes place in several stages. There is an initial procedural stage, followed by several stages dealing with issues of substance.
Initially, a court hearing a Bill-of-Rights case considers possible procedural issues, including:
the application of the Bill of Rights to the subject-matter of the litigation;
the justiciability of the issue to be decided (including the standing of the applicant); and
the jurisdiction of the court to grant the relief claimed by the applicant.
Often, these procedural aspects of the case will be uncontroversial and the court can proceed directly to the substance of the case. The first step in the substantive stage of the litigation involves interpreting the provisions in the Bill of Rights. The court must consider, by reference to the facts of the case and to the Bill of Rights, whether a right has been violated. If the court does find that a right has been violated, it must then consider whether that violation is a justifiable limitation of the right. Finally, if the court finds that a violation of a right is not a justifiable limitation, it will have to consider the proper remedy to deal with the unconstitutional infringement of a fundamental right. At each distinct stage of the litigation, the court must consider whether the burden of proof is on the applicant or respondent.
Stages
Before a court may proceed to consider the issues of substance raised in human rights litigation, it must first consider several preliminary, procedural issues.
Procedural issues
Application and the principle of avoidance
Application of the Bill of Rights concerns the issues of whether and how the Bill of Rights applies in a legal dispute. The first of these issues (whether the Bill of Rights applies) raises four questions:
Who benefits from the Bill of Rights?
Who is bound by the Bill of Rights?
Does the Bill of Rights apply to matters arising before its commencement?
Does the Bill of Rights apply only in the national territory, or does it have extraterritorial effect?
Answering these questions involves determining the "reach" or "scope" of the Bill of Rights.
Application is concerned not only with whether the Bill of Rights applies, however, but also with how it applies in a legal dispute. The question here is this: What is the relationship between the Bill of Rights and the principles or rules of ordinary law? Currie and de Waal argue that the two application issues should be resolved in the following way:
The reach of the Bill of Rights (beneficiaries, duties, time and territory) demarcates the types of legal disputes to which the Bill of Rights directly applies. Within this area, the Bill of Rights overrides ordinary law and conduct that is inconsistent with it. In addition, and subject to considerations of justiciability and jurisdiction, the Bill of Rights generates its own set of remedies. This form of application, which is geared towards showing inconsistency between the Bill of Rights and law or conduct, is called the direct application of the Bill of Rights.
At the same time, the Bill of Rights contains a set of values that must be respected whenever the common law or legislation is interpreted, developed or applied. This form of application, which aims at creating harmony between the Bill of Rights and ordinary law, is called the indirect application of the Bill of Rights. When indirectly applied, the Bill of Rights does not override ordinary law; nor does it generate its own remedies. Instead, law is interpreted or developed in a way that makes it conform to the Constitution. The special constitutional rules relating to the procedural issues of standing and the jurisdiction of the courts are also irrelevant to this form of application. Rather, the Bill of Rights respects the procedural rules, the purpose and remedies of ordinary law, but demands the furtherance of its values through the operation of ordinary law.
Indirect application of the Bill of Rights must be considered before direct application. This is due to the principle of avoidance, which states that constitutional issues should be avoided whenever possible. This principle requires a court first to try to resolve a dispute by applying ordinary legal principles, as interpreted or developed with reference to the Bill of Rights, before applying the Bill of Rights directly to the dispute.
An important implication of the principle of avoidance is that the special rules in the Bill of Rights relating to the standing of litigants and the jurisdiction of the courts apply only when it is impossible to give effect to the values in the Bill of Rights by applying, interpreting or developing the ordinary law. Similarly, constitutional remedies are only relevant when the Bill of Rights is directly applied to an issue. If it is possible to resolve the dispute through indirect application, ordinary procedural rules and remedies apply to the dispute.
However, in order to apply the Bill of Rights indirectly, a court must obviously determine the effect of the provisions of the Bill of Rights. A court cannot interpret or develop the ordinary law with reference to the values contained in the Bill of Rights without knowing what they are. The interpretation of the Bill of Rights and its limitation clause therefore remain important, even when the Bill of Rights is indirectly applied.
Justiciability
In some cases, an applicant may lack standing to seek a remedy. In other cases, the issue may have become moot or academic and therefore not justiciable. An issue may also be non-justiciable because it is not yet ripe for decision by a court. The Bill of Rights contains special rules relating to these issues when it is directly applied. In such cases, it demands a broader approach to standing. In cases of indirect application, the ordinary legal rules apply.
Jurisdiction
In cases of indirect application, the ordinary procedural rules apply. The constitutional jurisdiction of the courts and the procedures that must be observed when the Bill of Rights is directly applied to law or conduct are not simply technical issues, but are of paramount importance for the protection of fundamental rights in practice. It is important to know in which forum to challenge an alleged violation of a right, since not all courts have the same jurisdiction in constitutional matters. If the court does not have the jurisdiction to grant the relief claimed, it must dismiss the application, whatever its merits may be.
Substantive questions
At the substantive stage of Bill-of-Rights litigation, the court is concerned with the substance of the applicant's allegation that a right has been infringed by law, or by the conduct of the other party. The court must assess the merits of this allegation. This assessment primarily involves the interpretation of the provisions of the Constitution in general, and the Bill of Rights in particular.
Interpretation
The court must determine whether or not the Bill of Rights protects a particular interest of the applicant. It must then determine whether or not the law that has been challenged or the conduct of the respondent impairs that interest, thereby trespassing in an area protected by the Bill of Rights.
Limitation
Fundamental rights and freedoms are not absolute: "Their boundaries are set by the rights of others and by the legitimate needs of society. Generally, it is recognized that public order, safety, health and democratic values justify the imposition of restrictions on the exercise of fundamental rights." In the South African Constitution, a general limitation clause, section 36, sets out specific criteria for the restriction of the fundamental rights in the Bill of Rights. The clause is general because it applies in the same way to all the rights in the Bill of Rights. In this regard the Constitution differs from, for example, the United States Constitution, which does not contain a limitations clause at all. The German Bill of Rights does not have a general limitations clause, but it does contain specific limitations clauses attached to most of the fundamental rights.
The court, in determining whether or not a right has been unjustifiably infringed, undertakes what is
essentially a two-stage exercise. First, there is the threshold enquiry aimed at determining whether or not the enactment in question constitutes a limitation on one or other guaranteed right. This entails examining (a) the content and scope of the relevant protected right(s) and (b) the meaning and effect of the impugned enactment to see whether there is any limitation of (a) by (b). Subsections (1) and (2) of section 39 of the Constitution give guidance as to the interpretation of both the rights and the enactment, essentially requiring them to be interpreted so as to promote the value system of an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom. If upon such analysis no limitation is found, that is the end of the matter. The constitutional challenge is dismissed there and then.
If, however, the court determines that a law, or the conduct of the respondent, impairs a fundamental right, "the second stage ensues. This is ordinarily called the limitations exercise." It must then consider whether the infringement is nevertheless a justifiable limitation of the right in question: "In essence this requires a weighing-up of the nature and importance of the right(s) that are limited together with the extent of the limitation as against the importance and purpose of the limiting enactment."
Not all laws or conduct that infringe fundamental rights are unconstitutional. Sometimes a law may be a justifiable limitation on a particular fundamental right. This means that, although the law or conduct infringes the right, the infringement (which is called a limitation) is justifiable. While infringing conduct itself cannot validly limit a fundamental right, the challenged conduct may be authorized by law. If the law passes the limitations test, the conduct it authorizes will survive a constitutional challenge. The question, ultimately, which falls for determination by this balancing exercise is whether or not a balance can be struck. If not—if, that is, there is no proportionality—the limitation will not be found to be reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society.
In the case of the death penalty, for example, the purposes served by such a penalty—at least, the purposes as considered by the Constitutional Court in S v Makwanyane—are deterrence, prevention. and retribution. In serving these purposes, however, the impugned right is obliterated completely; its essential content, according to the Constitutional Court, is negated. There is, in other words, no proportionality between means and end.
One consequence of the inclusion of a general limitation clause in the Bill of Rights is that the process of considering the limitation of fundamental rights must be distinguished from that of interpretation of the rights. If it is argued that conduct or a provision of the law infringes a right in the Bill of Rights, it will first have to be determined whether that right has in fact been infringed, and thereafter whether the infringement is justified. The question of whether an infringement of a right is a legitimate limitation of that right "frequently involves a far more factual enquiry than the question of interpretation." Appropriate evidence must be led to justify the limitation of a right in accordance with the criteria laid down in section 36. A court cannot determine in the abstract whether the limitation of a right is "reasonable" or "justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom." This determination requires "evidence, such as sociological or statistical data," on the impact that the legislative restriction has on society.
Remedies
Should a court find that a right has been infringed, and that the infringement does not satisfy the test for a valid limitation of a right, the question of the appropriate remedy for the infringement arises. The constitutional remedies are only available when the Bill of Rights is directly applied. In cases of indirect application, ordinary legal remedies are used to give effect to the fundamental values in the Bill of Rights.
Onus
The Constitutional Court has dealt with the issue of onus, or burden of proof, by dividing the substantive stage of human-rights litigation into two further sub-stages:
interpretation; and
limitation.
The approach of the court to onus in respect of these stages is set out by Ackermann J in the following extract from Ferreira v Levin NO:
The task of determining whether the provisions of [an] Act are invalid because they are inconsistent with the guaranteed rights here under discussion involves two stages, first, an enquiry as to whether there has been an infringement of the [...] guaranteed right; if so, a further enquiry as to whether such infringement is justified under [...] the limitation clause. The task of interpreting the [...] fundamental rights rests, of course, with the Courts, but it is for the applicants to prove the facts upon which they rely for the claim of infringement of the particular right in question. Concerning the second stage, [it] is for the legislature or the party relying on the legislation to establish this justification [in terms of the limitation clause], and not for the party challenging it, to show that it was not justified.
This description focuses on the difference in onus relating to the questions of interpretation and limitation. The applicant has to show that an infringement of a right has taken place. This requires the applicant to prove the facts on which he relies. The respondent then has to show that an infringement is a justifiable limitation of the right in terms of section 36.
In addition to the applicant's onus at the substantive stage of litigation, the applicant must also show, at the preliminary stage of litigation,
that the Bill of Rights applies to the challenged law or conduct;
that the issue is justiciable;
that he or she has standing; and
that he or she is in the right forum to obtain the desired relief.
Only once these issues have been decided in the applicant' s favour, and a violation of the Bill of Rights is found, will the party relying on the validity of the challenged decision or legislation be called upon to justify it in terms of section 36, the limitation clause.
The question of who bears the onus when considering the appropriate relief for unconstitutional legislation or conduct is "more complicated." When the Bill of Rights is indirectly applied, an ordinary legal remedy is granted, and the ordinary legal rules apply in respect of the burden of proof. When the Bill of Rights is directly applied, the remedy that flows from a finding of inconsistency between the Bill of Rights, on the one hand, and law or conduct, on the other, is invalidation by the court of the offending law or conduct. A party proposing a variation of this form of relief in terms of section 172(l)(b)(i) or (ii) must justify the request. Since section 172 allows a court to limit or suspend the effects of a declaration of invalidity, the respondent will in most cases be called upon to justify such a request. However, a court may also grant relief in addition to the declaration of invalidity, as in the case of an interdict or constitutional damages. In most cases, the applicant will request such relief, and will therefore bear the burden of persuasion.
Summary
The stages through which Bill-of-Rights litigation typically proceeds may be summarized as follows:
Procedural stage
Does the Bill of Rights apply in the dispute between the parties?
How does the Bill of Rights apply in the dispute?
As for the first question, it must be determined whether the applicant is entitled to claim the benefits of the Bill of Rights. It must also be determined whether the Bill of Rights applies to the conduct of the respondent, in the sense that the respondent has obligations under the Bill of Rights. Finally, it must be determined whether the cause of action arose in the national territory during the period of application of either the interim or 1996 Bill of Rights.
As for the second question, indirect application must be considered before direct application. If the Bill of Rights is indirectly applied to the issue, the questions of justiciability, jurisdiction and an appropriate remedy are resolved in terms of ordinary legal rules. If directly applied, special constitutional rules apply.
Is the issue to be decided justiciable?
Does the applicant in the matter have standing in respect of the particular relief sought?
Does the court have jurisdiction to grant the relief claimed?
Substantive stage
If the answer to all three questions is "yes," the court is able to move on to the substantive stage.
Has the law or conduct of the respondent infringed a fundamental right of the applicant? If so, the court will consider whether the infringement is justifiable. If not, then the application must be dismissed.
Is the infringement a justifiable limitation of the right in question according to the criteria set out in section 36? If yes, then the conduct of the respondent is not unconstitutional; the application must be dismissed. If no, then the conduct is unconstitutional, and the question of the appropriate remedy must be canvassed.
Remedies
What remedy is appropriate in this case?
Application of the Bill of Rights
The South African Bill of Rights applies directly to a legal dispute when
a right of a beneficiary of the Bill of Rights has been infringed by
a person or entity on whom the Bill of Rights has imposed the duty not to infringe the right
during the period of operation of the Bill of Rights
in the national territory.
In addition, even if the Bill of Rights does not apply directly to a dispute because one or more of the elements above is not present, it may apply indirectly. This is because all of South African law must be developed, interpreted and applied in a way that conforms to the Bill of Rights.
A conceptual distinction, then, must be made between two forms of application of the Bill of Rights:
Indirect application: The Constitution and the Bill of Rights establish an "objective normative value system," a set of values that must be respected when interpreting, developing, or applying the common law or legislation. This form of application is called the "indirect" application of the Bill of Rights. When indirectly applied, the Bill of Rights does not override ordinary law or create its own remedies. Rather, the Bill of Rights respects the rules and remedies of ordinary law, but demands furtherance of its values mediated through the operation of ordinary law.
Direct application: In disputes in which the Bill of Rights applies as directly applicable law, it overrides ordinary law and any conduct inconsistent with it. To the extent that ordinary legal remedies are inadequate or do not give proper effect to the fundamental rights, the Bill of Rights creates its own remedies. The methodology for the conduct of direct-rights litigation is applicable.
This distinction was of "decisive significance" under the interim Constitution, but it has "comparatively less significance" under the 1996 Constitution. This is because of changes made to the jurisdictional and application scheme by the 1996 Constitution. Nevertheless, the form of application has important consequences, so the distinction between direct and indirect application "continues to play a role in constitutional litigation."
The application of the Bill of Rights has been "one of the most troublesome issues in South African constitutional law." The principal reason for the difficulty is that, since 1994, South Africa has had two Constitutions that have treated the issue differently. Much of the relevant jurisprudence, particularly relating to the application of the Bill of Rights to the common law, was decided under the interim Constitution and does not always bear precisely on the altered jurisdictional and application schemes of the 1996 Constitution.
Interim Constitution
The narrowest conception of a bill of rights is that it is a "charter of negative liberties." This means that it is intended to protect individuals against state power by listing rights that cannot be violated by the state, either by means of law or through the conduct of state actors. This is the "vertical" relationship—between individuals and the state. A bill of rights that has solely vertical application will place duties on the state not to violate the rights of individuals. It will not place any similar duties on individuals.
According to the Constitutional Court, in Du Plessis v De Klerk, the Bill of Rights in Chapter 3 of the interim Constitution conformed to this traditional model, in so far as it had no direct application to so-called "horizontal" disputes: that is, to disputes between private litigants governed by the common law. "Constitutional rights under Chapter 3," the court held, "may be invoked against an organ of government but not by one private litigant against another." This was principally because of the absence of the word "judiciary" in section 7, the application section of the interim Constitution, which provided that the Bill of Rights "shall bind all legislative and executive organs of state at all levels of government." The omission meant that the Bill of Rights placed duties to uphold constitutional rights only on the legislative and executive organs of state. Individuals were not directly bound by the Bill of Rights. Nor was the judiciary, which had the task of adjudicating and enforcing the rights and duties of individuals.
However, while the interim Bill of Rights did not apply directly to horizontal cases, it did have indirect application. The Bill of Rights applied to "all law in force," including all pre- and post-1994 legislation and the un-codified common law (provisions of the common law which had not been incorporated into legislation). Even if individuals were not directly bound by the Bill of Rights, the courts had to interpret legislation, and develop the common law, so that the ordinary law recognised and protected the rights in the Bill of Rights. In Du Plessis v Klerk, the Constitutional Court held that the Bill of Rights in the Interim Constitution "may and should have an influence on the development of the common law as it governs relations between individuals." This was provided for in section 35(3) of the interim Constitution: "In the interpretation of any law and the application and development of the common law and customary law, a court shall have due regard to the spirit, purport and objects of" the Bill of Rights. "In private litigation," held the court, "any litigant may nonetheless contend that a statute (or executive act) relied on by the other party is invalid as being inconsistent with the limitations placed on legislature and executive under Chapter 3." Accordingly, "as Chapter 3 applies to common law, governmental acts or omissions in reliance on the common law may be attacked by a private litigant as being inconsistent with Chapter 3 in any dispute with an organ of government."
In Du Plessis, the Constitutional Court also decided a crucial jurisdictional issue. The court's conclusion that the Constitution distinguished between direct and indirect application of the Bill of Rights was bolstered by the close fit between this distinction and the "two-track" jurisdictional scheme of the interim Constitution, which distinguished between "constitutional matters" and other matters, the former being the preserve of the Constitutional Court, and the latter the preserve of the Appellate Division. The development of the common law was a non-constitutional matter, and therefore remained within the jurisdiction of the court that had overseen the development of the common law for the past century: the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court. "The development of the common law," held the court in Du Plessis, "is within the jurisdiction of the Appellate Division, but not of the Constitutional Court."
1996 Constitution
With the Du Plessis decision in mind, and concerned that confining the Bill of Rights to direct vertical application amounted to the toleration of private violations of rights, the Constitutional Assembly created a different application and jurisdictional scheme in the 1996 Constitution. To provide for direct horizontal application, two textual changes were made. The first was the addition of the word "judiciary" in section 8(1), missing from the application provisions of the interim Constitution. The second was the imposition of a duty on individuals, in section 8(2), to uphold the rights of other individuals: "A provision of the Bill of Rights binds a natural or a juristic person if, and to the extent that, it is applicable, taking into account the nature of the right and the nature of any duty imposed by the right."
The 1996 Constitution also made significant changes to the powers of the courts to enforce the Constitution. The "two-track" jurisdictional scheme of the interim Constitution was replaced by a unified scheme in which the High Courts, Supreme Court of Appeal and the Constitutional Court shared jurisdiction over constitutional matters. This scheme required revision of the holding in Du Plessis that the application of the Constitution to the common law was a non-constitutional matter. Under the 1996 Constitution, the Constitutional Court held in the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers case, "there are not two systems of law, each dealing with the same subject matter, each having similar requirements, each operating in its own field with its own highest court. There is only one system of law. It is shaped by the Constitution which is the supreme law, and all law, including the common law, derives its force from the Constitution and is subject to constitutional control."
While clearly envisaging direct horizontal application in applicable cases, the 1996 Bill of Rights also requires the courts to apply the Bill of Rights indirectly, in similar terms to section 35(3) of the interim Constitution. This is section 39(2): "When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common law or customary law, every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights."
To summarise, the 1996 Constitution, like its predecessor, distinguishes two forms of application of the Bill of Rights:
Direct application entails the imposition of duties by the Bill of Rights on specified actors: A breach of such a duty is a violation of a constitutional right.
Indirect application occurs where there is a provision of ordinary law (legislation, common law or customary law) that mediates between the Bill of Rights and the actors who are subject to that law. The duty of the courts is to ensure that the ordinary law conforms to the values to which the Bill of Rights, by conferring the rights and duties that it does, gives effect.
Like its predecessor, the 1996 Constitution provides for direct vertical application of the Bill of Rights but, unlike its predecessor, does not confine itself to this form of direct application. Section 8(2) clearly envisages direct application of the Bill of Rights in the horizontal relationship in certain circumstances.
Direct application
There are four elements that are determinative of the direct application of the Bill of Rights. The first relates to beneficiaries, the second to the duties imposed by the Bill of Rights, the third to time and the fourth to the limited territorial effect of the Bill of Rights.
Legal rights are a correlative relationship. If Armand has a legal right to something, this postulates that Theo has a legal duty to Armand to uphold that right. Armand is therefore the beneficiary of the right and Theo is the duty-bearer in respect of the right. The first application issue to confront when considering the reach of the Bill of Rights is to identify the beneficiaries and the duty-bearers of the rights in the Bill of Rights.
Beneficiaries
Natural persons
Most of the rights in the Bill of Rights are for the benefit of "everyone." The negative phrase, which is to the same effect, is that a right may be denied to "no-one." For example, section 11 provides that "everyone has the right to life." Section 13 is phrased negatively but, like section 11, accords the right universally: "No one may be subjected to slavery, servitude or forced labour." Rights phrased in this way are accorded to all natural persons within the territory of the Republic.
Other rights are accorded to narrower categories of beneficiaries. The political rights in section 19, the citizens' rights in section 20, certain of the freedom-of-movement rights in section 21, and the freedom-of-trade right in section 22, are accorded to "every citizen." The right to vote and to stand for political office, in section 19(3), is restricted to "every adult citizen." Further examples of restrictions on the category of beneficiaries are the cultural rights contained in section 31, which are for the benefit only of "persons belonging to a cultural, religious or linguistic community." The rights contained in section 35 are restricted to arrested, detained and accused persons.
The restriction of a right to a particular category of beneficiaries is an attempt to circumscribe the scope of the right. A right accorded only to citizens obviously has a more limited scope of operation than a right accorded universally. The circumscription of rights in this manner "does not really concern the application of the rights, but may raise difficult issues of interpretation." The courts will have to interpret the Bill of Rights to determine who is, for example, a "detained person," or "a worker," or a "person belonging to a cultural religious or linguistic community." The activities of persons who are excluded from the scope of a right will not be protected by the right.
Juristic persons
Are the rights accorded to "everyone" also available for the benefit of juristic persons? In other words, are companies protected by the Bill of Rights? What about state-owned or state-controlled corporations such as Eskom or the SABC? These questions are answered by reference to s 8(4): "A juristic person is entitled to the rights in the Bill of Rights to the extent required by the nature of the rights and the nature of that juristic person."
In order to decide whether a juristic person is protected, regard must be had to two factors:
the nature of the fundamental right in question; and
the nature of the juristic person.
In Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In Re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, an objection was raised that, inconsistently with Constitutional Principle II, the extension of the rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights to juristic persons would diminish the rights of natural persons. This Constitutional Court rejected the objection in the following terms:
Many "universally accepted fundamental rights" will be fully recognised only if afforded to juristic persons as well as natural persons. For example, freedom of speech, to be given proper effect, must be afforded to the media, which are often owned or controlled by juristic persons. While it is true that some rights are not appropriate to enjoyment by juristic persons, the text of s 8(4) specifically recognises this. The text also recognises that the nature of a juristic person may be taken into account by a court in determining whether a particular right is available to such person or not.
The nature of some of the fundamental rights prevents them from benefiting juristic persons. The rights to life and physical integrity, and to human dignity, for example, cannot sensibly be applied to juristic persons. A company cannot claim protection of its right to life or human dignity, or its right not to be deprived of liberty or tortured, "because these rights protect aspects of human existence that a company does not possess." However, the nature of most of the rights that are likely to be relied on by juristic persons makes them applicable to the protection of juristic persons. However, in the case of rights that stem from the protection of human dignity (such as privacy), the Constitutional Court has indicated, in Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences and Others v Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd In re: Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd v Smit NO, that juristic persons are entitled only to a reduced level of protection compared to natural persons:
Privacy is a right which becomes more intense the closer it moves to the intimate personal sphere of the life of human beings, and less intense as it moves away from that core. This understanding of the right flows [...] from the value placed on human dignity by the Constitution. Juristic persons are not the bearers of human dignity. Their privacy rights, therefore, can never be as intense as those of human beings. However, this does not mean that juristic persons are not protected by the right to privacy. Exclusion of juristic persons would lead to the possibility of grave violations of privacy in our society, with serious implications for the conduct of affairs. The state might, for instance, have free licence to search and seize material from any non-profit organisation or corporate entity at will. This would obviously lead to grave disruptions and would undermine the very fabric of our democratic state. Juristic persons therefore do enjoy the right to privacy, although not to the same extent as natural persons.
It is the second of section 8(4)'s criteria (the nature of the juristic person) that may place greater restrictions on the availability of human rights to juristic persons. "It is difficult to see," write Currie and De Waal,
how organs of state exercising core government functions such as Parliament, a cabinet minister or the police will ever be able to rely on the protection of the Bill of Rights. Although arguably they are 'juristic persons', the nature of such organs of state makes them unsuitable to be beneficiaries of fundamental rights. They are not used by individuals for the collective exercise of their fundamental rights, but are instead used by the state for the exercise of its powers."
However, state-owned corporations, such as the South African Broadcasting Corporation or the Post Office, or entities such as universities, which are set up by the state for the purpose, amongst other things, of realising particular fundamental rights, are differently situated: "Clearly a state-owned corporation like the SABC should be able to invoke the right to freedom of speech and the press when it becomes involved in a dispute with the state or even with an individual." In Hoffmann v South African Airways, the Constitutional Court held,
Transnet is a statutory body, under the control of the state, which has public powers and performs public functions in the public interest. It was common cause that SAA is a business unit of Transnet. As such, it is an organ of state and is bound by the provisions of the Bill of Rights in terms of section 8(1), read with section 239, of the Constitution. It is, therefore, expressly prohibited from discriminating unfairly.
As for private juristic persons, the size or activities of the juristic person are not necessarily decisive. Of greater significance, in the view of Currie and De Waal, is "the relationship between the activities of the juristic person and the fundamental rights of the natural persons who stand behind the juristic person." In other words, juristic persons are not in and of themselves worthy of protection; they become so when they are used by natural persons for the collective exercise of their fundamental rights. For example, companies are routinely used by individuals as an entity for conducting business, necessitating the exercise of property rights by companies. As the Constitutional Court put it in First National Bank of SA Limited t/a Wesbank v Commissioner for the South African Revenue Services,
It is trite that a company is a legal entity altogether separate and distinct from its members, that its continued existence is independent of the continued existence of its members, and that its assets are its exclusive property. Nevertheless, a shareholder in a company has a financial interest in the dividends paid by the company and in its success or failure because she "... is entitled to an aliquot share in the distribution of the surplus assets when the company is wound up" No matter how complex the holding structure of a company or groups of companies may be, ultimately—in the vast majority of cases—the holders of shares are natural persons.
The court also commented on "the universal phenomenon" that "natural persons are increasingly forming companies and purchasing shares in companies for a wide variety of legitimate purposes, including earning a livelihood, making investments and for structuring a pension scheme." The use of companies, the court found, "has come to be regarded as indispensable for the conduct of business, whether large or small. It is in today's world difficult to conceive of meaningful business activity without the institution and utilisation of companies." The court saw that "denying companies entitlement to property rights," even more so than in relation to the right to privacy, would
"lead to grave disruptions and would undermine the very fabric of our democratic State." It would have a disastrous impact on the business world generally, on creditors of companies and, more especially, on shareholders in companies. The property rights of natural persons can only be fully and properly realised if such rights are afforded to companies as well as to natural persons.
What section 8(4) envisages is that there should be a link between protecting the activity of the juristic person and protecting the fundamental rights of the natural persons that lie behind it.
Much of the debate about the meaning of the guidelines contained in section 8(4)—that is, "the nature of the right" and "the nature of the juristic person"—is made "irrelevant," write Currie and De Waal, by the courts' approach to standing in constitutional litigation. A person has standing to challenge the constitutionality of laws or conduct,
provided that he alleges that a fundamental right is infringed or threatened; and
provided that he has, in terms of the categories listed in section 38, a sufficient interest in obtaining a remedy.
The first enquiry is objective: It is sufficient to show that a right in the Bill of Rights is violated by a law or conduct; it is not necessary to show that a right of the applicant has been violated. This approach allows anyone with a sufficient interest to rely on the objective inconsistency between the Bill of Rights and a law or conduct. For example, it will seldom be necessary for juristic persons to invoke section 8(4), which sometimes extends the protection of the right to the juristic person itself. Laws, and many forms of state and private conduct, inevitably impact on the activities of both natural and juristic persons. Provided that a juristic person has a sufficient interest of its own, or, if it is an association, a sufficient interest of its members, it may challenge such laws or conduct on the basis of fundamental rights that do not necessarily benefit the juristic person. For example, a law which prohibits the sale of wine on Sunday may be challenged by a company on the basis of the right to freedom of religion, provided that the company has a sufficient interest in the outcome of the litigation. It is not necessary in such a case for the company to show that the right to freedom of religion benefits juristic persons.
It is only when a law or conduct impacts solely on the activities of juristic persons that it will not be possible to follow this course of action. Then there can be no objective inconsistency between the Bill of Rights and the law or conduct, unless section 8(4) extends protection of the relevant right to juristic persons. For example, when a special tax on companies is challenged, a person challenging the tax will have to do so on the basis of a right that benefits juristic persons.
Waiver
Waiver may be considered an application issue, and can be accommodated under the consideration of the beneficiaries of the Bill of Rights in that someone who has waived a right has agreed that he will not claim the benefit of it. Although the distinction may be difficult to make in some cases, the waiver of fundamental rights should be distinguished from a decision not to exercise a fundamental right. Where a person chooses not to take part in an assembly, or not to join an association, he cannot later complain about a violation of his rights to freedom of assembly or association. The same applies when an arrested person makes an informed choice to co-operate with the police by making a statement or a confession, or when a person allows the police to search his or her home: "Such a person cannot subsequently object at the trial that the introduction of the evidence violates his or her right to remain silent or his or her right to privacy of the home." In principle, the accused may nevertheless object to the use of the evidence if it would render the trial unfair. In the absence, however, of other circumstances—for example, that the accused was improperly persuaded to co-operate—"it is difficult to see why the use of the evidence would result in an unfair trial."
Waiver is different. One is dealing with waiver when someone undertakes not to exercise a fundamental right in future. For example, a contractual restraint of trade is an undertaking to waive one's right, guaranteed by section 22, to occupational freedom for a period of time. A person may also undertake not to disclose sensitive information, or undertake to vote for a particular political party on election day; he may agree to have his telephone calls recorded and listened to by his or her employer, or to attend religious instruction classes in a private school. These are, respectively, attempts to waive the rights to freedom of expression, to vote, to privacy and to freedom of religion. The question is whether people may be obliged to honour such an undertaking even if they subsequently change their minds.
A waiver, write Currie and De Waal, "cannot make otherwise unconstitutional laws or conduct constitutional and valid." Section 2 of the Constitution provides that law or conduct inconsistent with the Constitution is invalid. This is an objective consideration: "The actions of the beneficiary of the right can have no influence on the invalidity of unconstitutional law or conduct." That is why a person cannot validly undertake to behave unconstitutionally; such an undertaking will have no force and effect.
Similarly, a person cannot waive the indirect application of the Bill of Rights. Two people may not undertake, for example, that the law of defamation must be applied in future disputes between them without any reference to the Bill of Rights. The reason for this is that section 39(2) requires the courts to promote the Bill of Rights when developing the common law. Individuals may not prevent the court from fulfilling its constitutional obligations.
What individuals may do is to waive the right to exercise a fundamental right. The individual may undertake not to invoke the constitutional invalidity of state or private conduct. Although, "from a constitutional point of view, such a waiver is hardly ever decisive of an issue," nonetheless "it is also seldom irrelevant." Although waiver is dealt with here as an issue of application, "we do not mean to suggest that it must be answered by simply asking whether the individual may exclude him or herself from the 'benefits' of a particular fundamental right in the circumstances of the case." Waiver, and more generally, victim responsibility, may also influence the limitation stage and the remedy that a court will award for breach of the fundamental right.
The effect of waiver depends firstly on the nature and purpose of the fundamental right in question. In principle, many of the freedom rights may be waived as long as the undertaking is made clearly and freely, and without the subject's being placed under duress or labouring under a misapprehension: "To be enforceable, however, it would have to be a fully informed consent and one clearly showing that the applicant was aware of the exact nature and extent of the rights being waived in consequence of such consent."
For example, the right to occupational freedom is often waived by employees when concluding a contract of employment. There is also no reason why one cannot waive the right to privacy. Similarly, one may validly undertake not to demonstrate, not to join a political party, or not to leave the Republic. One may also waive many of the procedural rights, such as the right to legal representation or the right of access to court. As far as these rights are concerned, it is not so much the nature of the right that may be decisive, "but the length of the period of the waiver, the danger of abuse and the position of the beneficiary." The waiver may not be contrary to some other constitutional principle or otherwise contra bonos mores.
In contrast to the freedom rights, the nature of the rights to human dignity, to life, and not to be discriminated against, or the right to a fair trial, does not permit them to be waived: "Unlike the freedom rights, these rights cannot be exercised negatively." The right to freedom of expression, for example, can be exercised by keeping quiet, but the right to dignity cannot be exercised by being abused. One cannot therefore assume that the right is exercised when it is waived (as one can, subject to the above considerations, with the freedom rights).
Although some rights may not be waived, this does not mean that the fact of waiver then becomes legally irrelevant. Waiver may also be relevant when considering the remedy to be awarded for the violation of a fundamental right. For example, a court would not enforce an undertaking to vote for a particular political party, but it would also probably not grant relief for such a violation of the right to vote, other than to declare the agreement to be invalid. On the other hand, if a person is prevented from voting against his or her will, "it may well be appropriate to award damages for the infringement."
"An interesting illustration" of some of the principles discussed above is provided by Garden Cities Inc Association v Northpine Islamic Society. The High Court granted an interdict enforcing a contractual undertaking not to use loud-speaking equipment to broadcast calls to prayer from a suburban mosque. An undertaking not to use any amplification equipment had been given by the respondent in 1986, in the deed of the sale of the land on which the mosque was built. Despite the contract, the respondent started broadcasting amplified calls to prayer through a loudspeaker, and the applicants applied for an interdict to stop it.
The argument of the respondent was that enforcing the contract would amount to a violation of the constitutional right to freedom of religion, and that the Constitution did not permit the waiver of a fundamental aspect of one's religion. Conradie J was able to avoid the waiver issue by holding that amplification of the call to prayer had not been shown to be a fundamental precept of the Islamic faith, and that the agreement therefore did not infringe the right to religious freedom. Currie and De Waal, however, argue
that it was not necessary for the court to decide on what constitutes a "fundamental precept" of the respondent's religion. If the respondent had waived its right to practice its religion in this way, it would have made the decision itself. But it is in any event doubtful that the waiver would have been binding since it cannot have qualified as having been given in full knowledge of the freedom that is being surrendered. In Northpine the undertaking was made in 1986, at a time when there was no constitutionally protected right to religious freedom. It is therefore not feasible to argue that a properly informed waiver of rights took place, since the right in question did not exist at the time.
Direct horizontal and vertical application of the Bill of Rights
Traditionally, a bill of rights confines itself to regulating the "vertical" relationship between the individual and the state. This is not a relationship of equality. The state is far more powerful than any individual. If not protected by a bill of rights against abuse of the state's powers, the individual would be "in an extremely vulnerable position." The 1996 Bill of Rights performs this traditional task of protecting individuals against the state by imposing a duty on all branches of the state to respect its provisions.
The 1996 Bill of Rights goes further than is traditional, however. It recognises that "private abuse of human rights may be as pernicious as violations perpetrated by the state." For this reason, the Bill of Rights is not confined to protecting individuals against the state. In certain circumstances, the Bill of Rights directly protects individuals against abuses of their rights by other individuals, by providing for the direct horizontal application of the Bill of Rights.
The direct application of the duties under the Bill of Rights is governed by section 8. Broadly speaking, section 8(1) deals with direct vertical application. It describes the circumstances in which law and conduct of the state may be challenged for being inconsistent with the Bill of Rights. Section 8(2), on the other hand, deals with direct horizontal application. It sets out the circumstances in which the conduct of private individuals may be attacked for infringing the Bill of Rights. Section 8(3) grants powers to the courts to remedy such infringements.
We are concerned at this point with direct application. Recall, though, that the Bill of Rights also applies indirectly on both the vertical and horizontal axes. Indirect application means that, instead of the Bill of Rights' directly imposing duties and conferring rights, rights and duties are instead imposed by the common law or legislation. In turn, the development and interpretation of the common law and legislation is influenced by the Bill of Rights.
Direct vertical application: duties of state actors
Section 8(1) provides that the South African legislature, executive, judiciary and other organs of state are bound by the Bill of Rights. An applicant may therefore challenge the conduct of any of these state institutions as a breach of their duties under the Bill of Rights.
Legislatures
The term "legislature" refers to the institutions that exercise the legislative authority of the Republic: Parliament, the provincial legislatures and the municipal councils. The primary duty of all of these bodies, and their principal form of conduct, is legislating. The output of the legislative process—legislation of the central, provincial and local governments, as well as any form of delegated legislation—must comply with the Bill of Rights. This is because, in the words of section 8(1), the Bill of Rights "applies to all law."
As far as conduct of the legislatures other than law-making is concerned, the implication of section 8(1) is that legislatures and their committees and functionaries are bound by the Bill of Rights when they perform non-legislative functions, such as the determination of internal arrangements, proceedings, rules and procedures. In De Lille v Speaker of the National Assembly, the High Court stated:
The National Assembly is subject to the supremacy of the Constitution. It is an organ of state and therefore it is bound by the Bill of Rights. All its decisions and acts are subject to the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. Parliament can no longer claim supreme power subject to limitations imposed by the Constitution. It subject in all respects to the provisions of our Constitution [... T]he nature and exercise of parliamentary privilege must be consonant with the Constitution. The exercise of parliamentary privilege which is clearly a constitutional power is not immune from judicial review. If a parliamentary privilege is exercised in breach of a constitutional provision, redress may be sought by an aggrieved party from law courts whose primary function is to protect rights of individuals.
Executive
The Bill of Rights binds the "executive [...] and all organs of state." This means that conduct of the executive and organs of state can be tested against any of the provisions of the Bill of Rights, with the exception of section 33, which can only be applied to conduct of the executive and organs of state that amounts to "administrative action." Although the executive and organs of state are primarily responsible for executing the law, it must be kept in mind that the Bill of Rights also binds these actors when they make law. All delegated legislation may therefore be directly tested against the Bill of Rights for this reason, and for the reason that the Bill of Rights applies to "all law."
The "executive" may be taken to refer to the party-political appointees who collectively head the government, whether at the national or provincial level. At the national level of government, for example, the executive consists of the President, the Deputy President, the Ministers and the Deputy Ministers. On this definition, "it is difficult to envisage conduct of the 'executive' that would not also amount to conduct of an 'organ of state' as defined in s 239."
Organs of state
The phrase "organ of state" is defined in section 239 of the Constitution. In terms of this definition, the conduct of organs of state may be divided into three categories:
conduct of any department of state or administration in the national, provincial or local spheres of government;
conduct of any other functionary or institution exercising a power or performing a function in terms of the Constitution or a provincial constitution; and
conduct of any functionary or institution exercising a public power or performing a public function in terms of any legislation.
A court or a judicial officer is specifically excluded from the definition.
The first category refers to any department of state or administration in the national, provincial or local spheres of government. When read in context, the implication of this provision is that state departments (or the administration) are bound by the Bill of Rights whether they exercise a power in terms of legislation or act in another capacity. State departments will therefore be bound by the Bill of Rights when, for example, they decide whether to enter into contracts.
By providing that the exercise of a power or the performance of a function in terms of the Constitution, or of a provincial constitution, amounts to conduct of an organ of state, section 239 makes it clear that the exercise of constitutional executive powers (previously referred to as "prerogative powers") may be challenged for consistency with the Bill of Rights.
Finally, a functionary or an institution qualifies as an "organ of state" in terms of s 239 when it exercises a public power or performs a public function in terms of legislation. This provision means, first, that the functionary or the institution must derive powers from a statute or perform a function in terms of a statute (as opposed to merely being incorporated pursuant to a statute, such as all companies and close corporations are). Secondly, it means that the nature of the power or function (and not the nature of the functionary or institution) must be "public." The phrase "public power" is used in section 239 of the Constitution, but it is not defined there. It has gained wide currency in the constitutional jurisprudence, but definition or theorisation of the concept are seldom ventured, "because of its difficulty and abstraction." The concept is best understood as occupying similar terrain to the concept of "public law." Like public law, which operates in distinction to private law, public power operates "in necessary but sometimes fuzzy distinction to an opposite—private power." Currie and De Waal propose the following understanding of public power:
Public power is power with a state-like dimension—either because it derives from the state or because it does what the state typically does—exercise power in a general and public-regarding way. The term therefore connotes use of the state's lawfully derived powers of regulation and compulsion. It is to be distinguished from exercises of what can be called private power—the domain of voluntary obligations.
Judiciary
When the members of the judiciary (judges and magistrates) act in a judicial capacity—that is to say, when they adjudicate legal disputes—they are required to conduct themselves in a manner that complies with the Bill of Rights. Some provisions of the Bill of Rights, such as section 35(5), which provides for the exclusion of evidence in certain circumstances, are indeed specifically directed at the conduct of the judiciary when presiding over criminal trials. When members of the judiciary perform administrative actions, they are also bound to comply with the administrative-justice right in section 33.
The difficult issue is to determine the extent to which the judiciary is bound when it makes law. Every court decision may be considered to become part of the common law and add to the common law (unless and until it is overturned by a higher court or the legislature). If this is so, "it can be argued that no court may give legal effect to private conduct that is inconsistent with the Bill of Rights." This means that, for practical purposes, private persons will then always be bound to the Bill of Rights, because they will be unable to seek the assistance of the courts to enforce their unconstitutional conduct.
However, this argument has been rejected by the Constitutional Court, on the basis that it would make section 8(2) and (3) redundant. The 1996 Constitution specifically provides that private individuals are directly bound by the Bill of Rights in some instances, not in every instance. This means, in effect, that common-law rules and principles may only be directly tested against the Bill of Rights in so far as they are relied upon by actors who are directly bound by the Bill of Rights. Whenever such an actor, private or state, is bound, the Bill of Rights becomes directly applicable law which overrides the common law in so far as it is inconsistent with the Bill of Rights. In disputes between private parties regulated by common law, the extent to which the Bill of Rights applies to private conduct therefore determines its reach or direct application to the common law.
Direct horizontal application: duties of private actors
The near-redundancy of direct horizontal application
Like its predecessor, the 1996 Constitution provides for direct vertical application of the Bill of Rights but, unlike its predecessor, is not confined to this form of direct application. Section 8(2) clearly envisages direct application of the Bill of Rights in the horizontal relationship in certain circumstances, and therefore "points unequivocally toward a much broader conception of direct application." The 1996 Constitution also still permits, however, in section 39(2) (as the Interim Constitution did in section 35(3)), indirect application of the Bill of Rights in horizontal cases.
The presence of section 39(2), as Kentridge AJ stated, "prophetically," in Du Plessis v De Klerk, "makes much of the vertical-horizontal debate irrelevant." Since Du Plessis, the courts have routinely approached the issue of the effect of the Bill of Rights on the common law indirectly. The invitation of section 8(2)—to apply rights directly in horizontal situations—was "snubbed."
For a while, therefore, direct horizontality, "this deliberate innovation in the Constitution," threatened "to become a dead letter." As Iain Currie and Johan de Waal observe, "Certainly, one attraction of indirect application was that courts did not have to confront the opacity and apparent circularity of s 8 (the Bill of Rights was to be applied to private actors 'where applicable')." Whatever the reasons, indirect horizontality provided the default form of application by which the courts approached the common law. The trouble with this was that, besides rendering section 8(2) of the Constitution "irrelevant," the "model of indirect application or, if you will indirect horizontality," as Kentridge AJ pointed out in Du Plessis, "seems peculiarly appropriate to a judicial system which, as in Germany, separates constitutional jurisdiction from ordinary jurisdiction." But, under the 1996 Constitution, and in a deliberate alteration of the position under the interim Constitution, South Africa no longer separates constitutional jurisdiction from ordinary jurisdiction. Moreover, indirect application suggests that there is a body of common law that is "conceptually separate from the Constitution, exercising a mediating influence between the actors to whom it applies and the Constitution. This," write Currie and De Waal, "is difficult to accommodate" in the remodelled constitutional system in which there is "only one system of law."
The question of direct application was definitively settled by O'Regan J in Khumalo v Holomisa, "an extremely significant decision," where she held that "the right to freedom of expression is of direct horizontal application" to the law of defamation. By implication and in principle, that holding extends to other areas of private law. This case, the Constitutional Court's first use of the direct-horizontality provisions of the 1996 Constitution,
might be read as bringing to end the long reign of indirect application of the Bill of Rights to the common law. It holds (although admittedly not in so many words) that the Bill of Rights must be applied directly to the common law wherever appropriate. It should be directly applied, in other words, in many (perhaps most) of the horizontal cases that have previously been treated as indirect application cases (ie, cases involving private litigants relying on common-law provisions).
Khumalo, writes Stu Woolman, "committed the Constitutional Court to the proposition that common-law rules—whether challenged in disputes between the state and private parties or in disputes between private parties—were subject to the direct application of the Bill of Rights."
However, despite Khumalo, indirect horizontal application "has proven to be extremely robust and remains the preferred judicial method for dealing with rights claims in the horizontal dimension."
In its only other encounter with direct horizontality, in Barkhuizen v Napier, the Constitutional Court declined to apply the Bill of Rights directly to a challenge to a time-limitation clause in an insurance contract. An insurance company had rejected an insurance claim on the grounds that, at the time of the accident, the vehicle was being used for business purposes, despite its being insured for private use only. Two years after the rejection of the claim, the insured issued summons against the insurance company for the insured amount. The summons was met with a special plea that a term of the insurance policy required any summons to be served within ninety days of the rejection of the claim. In his replication, the insured argued that the term requiring him to issue a summons within ninety days was a breach of section 34 of the Constitution.
This gave the Constitutional Court the opportunity to consider what it termed the "proper approach" to the determination of constitutional validity of contractual clauses concluded between private parties. The High Court had considered the matter as an instance of direct application of section 34 to the contract, and had held that the impugned term of the contract was in conflict with the right. The clause, it held, was a law of general application, because it was underpinned by the principle of pacta sunt servanda. This analysis permitted the High Court to consider whether the limitation of section 34 by the contract was a justifiable limitation of the right. It was held not to be; the clause was declared invalid.
The Constitutional Court expressed "grave doubt" about this approach, which entailed "testing the validity of a contractual term directly against a provision in the Bill of Rights." Instead, the approach ordinarily to be adopted entailed indirect application via the principle that contracts that are contrary to public policy are unenforceable. This principle must be understood to be "deeply rooted in our Constitution and the values that underlie it." This meant that
what public policy is and whether a term in a contract is contrary to public policy is now to be determined by reference to the values that underlie our constitutional democracy as given expression by the provisions of the Bill of Rights. Thus a term in a contract that is inimical to the values enshrined in our Constitution is contrary to public policy and therefore unenforceable [...]. This approach leaves space for the doctrine of pacta sunt servanda to operate, but at the same time allows courts to decline to enforce contractual terms that are in conflict with the constitutional values even though the parties may have consented to them.
The view of Currie and De Waal is that Barkhuizen "largely renders s 8(2) nugatory." The Constitution applies to all law and, in the case of the common law ("the courts' own law"), the default approach of the courts is to assess its constitutionality and to develop it where necessary by way of the indirect application methodology set out below. "The only remaining reason" to deploy direct horizontal application would be to take advantage of the holding of the Supreme Court of Appeal in Afrox Healthcare v Strydom, to the effect that courts in direct-application cases are not bound by pre-1994 decisions.
See also in this regard Barkhuizen v Napier (especially its consideration of pacta sunt servanda) and Fraser v ABSA.
How to interpret s 8(2)
The Bill of Rights binds private persons in certain circumstances. According to section 8(2), a provision of the Bill of Rights applies to the conduct of a private person or a juristic person only to the extent that the provision is applicable, taking into account the nature of the right and the nature of any duty imposed by the right. It binds a private or juristic person, in other words, if it is applicable to a private or juristic person. This, it has been noted, is almost tautological.
In Khumalo, the Constitutional Court had regard to what it described as the "intensity of the constitutional right in question." The meaning of this phrase, which Currie and De Waal regard as "opaque," appears in context "to have something to do with the scope of the right." The applicants were members of the media (who are expressly identified as bearers of the constitutional right to freedom of expression). The second factor considered by the court was the "potential of invasion of that right by persons other than the State." The result was a holding that the right to freedom of expression was horizontally applicable in a defamation case.
In the view of Currie and De Waal, these two factors form part of a broader inquiry, consisting of five general considerations that must be kept in mind when interpreting s 8(2):
Section 8(2) states that a "provision" may apply to private conduct. It does not say that a "right" may apply to private conduct. Currie and De Waal argue that "it is therefore possible, and quite reasonable," that some provisions of the Bill of Rights may apply to the conduct of a private person or juristic persons, while other provisions in the same section (and pertaining to the same right) will not apply to such conduct. For example, the right of access to health care services "probably does not apply directly horizontally." However, the right not to be refused emergency medical treatment (s 27(3)) probably does apply horizontally. Also, the freedom to make political choices and the right to vote may be violated by private conduct, but the right to free, fair and regular elections only places duties on the state.
Questions concerning the horizontal application of the Bill of Rights cannot be determined a priori and in the abstract. Although this is not explicitly stated, whether a provision of the Bill of Rights applies horizontally also depends on the nature of the private conduct in question and the circumstances of a particular case. This explains why section 8(2) states that a provision in the Bill of Rights binds a natural or juristic person if, and to the extent that, it is applicable. The extent to which a provision is applicable can only be determined by reference to the context within which it is sought to be relied upon. For example, the right of every arrested person to be informed promptly of the right to remain silent is of a nature that makes it generally inapplicable to private arrests. But there may be circumstances in which the right should apply to private arrests. There is no reason why a private security officer, who knows of the existence of the section-35(1)(a) right, or who may reasonably be expected to know of the right, should not observe it. Conversely, the right to assemble peacefully and unarmed generally applies on the horizontal level. The right to assemble in, for example, shopping malls and on the property of an employer is therefore guaranteed. In some circumstances, however, it may be inappropriate to apply the right horizontally. For example, "it is unlikely that the right to assemble can be relied on to justify demonstrations in or in front of someone's private home." However, a resort to context or the circumstances of a particular case "should not be used to frustrate the clear intention of the drafters of the 1996 Constitution" to extend the direct operation of the provisions of the Bill of Rights to private conduct: "It is not permissible to argue, for example, that it is only when private persons find themselves in a position comparable to the powerful state, that s 8(2) binds them to the Bill of Rights." It may be that most private or juristic persons do not have the capacity to infringe human rights in a manner and on a scale comparable to the state, "but any interpretation of s 8(2) must avoid relying on such generalizations. The subsection was after all included to overcome the conventional assumption that human rights need only be protected in vertical relationships."
The purpose of a provision is an important consideration in determining whether it is applicable to private conduct or not. For example, the purpose of the right to leave the Republic is, in principle, to prevent the state from keeping person captive in their own country. The right to reside anywhere in the Republic is aimed at preventing the state from reintroducing group areas-style legislation that divides the country into racial zones. "It follows," write Currie and De Waal, "that these rights are not intended to have general horizontal application. On the other hand, the purpose of the right to human dignity does not necessarily demand differentiation between state and private conduct." The right is to protect an individual against an assault on his or her dignity from any source, whether private or public. The proper interpretation of a right in terms of its purpose may therefore sometimes result in a right's not being applicable to private conduct, either generally or in a particular situation.
The nature of any duty imposed by the right must be taken into account. This recognizes that private or juristic persons are often primarily driven by a concern for themselves. On the other hand, the state is supposed to be motivated by a concern for the well-being of society as a whole: "The application of the Bill of Rights to private conduct should not undermine private autonomy to the same extent that it places restrictions on the sovereignty of the government." This consideration is of particular importance when it comes to the imposition of duties which entail the spending of money. Since the conduct of private persons has to be funded from their own pockets, the same duties may not be imposed on them as may be imposed on an organ of state which relies on public funds. For example, a private hospital cannot (unlike a state hospital) be saddled with the duty to provide every child with basic health care services.
In some instances, indications are found in the Bill of Rights itself as to whether a particular right may be applied to private conduct or not. Section 9(4), for example, states that "no person" may discriminate, directly or indirectly, against anyone on one or more of the grounds listed in section 9(3). Similarly, section 12(1)(c) is explicitly made applicable to the conduct of private and juristic persons. The section states that the right to freedom and security of the person includes the right "to be free from all forms of violence from either public or private sources."
Subject to the five considerations discussed above, "it may be said," write Currie and De Waal, that the nature of citizenship rights, the right to just administrative action, and the rights of detained, arrested and accused persons, generally preclude them from being directly applied to private conduct. Also, the nature of the positive duties imposed by the right to have legislative and other measures taken to protect the environment, to realize the right to housing, the right to health care, food, water and social security, and the right to education, "would usually result in them not being applicable to private conduct." The remaining rights in the Bill of Rights can, depending on the circumstances of a particular case, be applied directly horizontally, so as to impose duties on private individuals to conform their conduct to the Bill of Rights.
Temporal application of the Bill of Rights
The constitution that applies
An unconstitutional law becomes invalid the moment the Constitution comes into effect. This is the effect of the supremacy clause of the Constitution: All law and conduct inconsistent with the Constitution is invalidated by it. When making an order of invalidity, a court simply declares invalid what has already been made invalid by the Constitution. This means that an unconstitutional law in force at the time of commencement of the interim Constitution is invalidated by the interim Constitution with effect from 27 April 1994: "If the law is challenged in litigation brought during the period of operation of the 1996 Constitution, the invalidity of the law should be assessed in terms of the interim Constitution."
The doctrine described above is known as "objective constitutional invalidity." It means that an applicant will always have a choice between the interim and 1996 Constitutions when challenging old-order (pre-1994) laws. In other words, "nothing prevents an applicant whose cause of action arose after the commencement of the 1996 Constitution came into force from arguing that an old-order law was invalidated by the interim Constitution." For example, in Prince v President, Cape Law Society, the Constitutional Court held, in litigation brought under the 1996 Constitution, that the requirement in the Supreme Court Act that eleven judges of appeal sit in cases in which the validity of an Act of Parliament was in question was inconsistent with the interim Constitution. According to the Constitutional Court, the quorum requirement in the Supreme Court Act was in conflict with the interim Constitution, which expressly provided that the Appellate Division lacked jurisdiction to enquire into the constitutional validity of legislation. To the extent that the Supreme Court Act provided that the Appellate Division had jurisdiction to adjudicate the constitutionality of Acts of Parliament, it was invalid. Moreover, it had been invalid since the moment of commencement of the interim Constitution on 27 April 1994.
"Clearly," write Currie and De Waal, "there is no difficulty with the application of the rule in Prince if the interim Constitution and 1996 Constitution contain substantively identical provisions." If law in force at the time of commencement of the interim Constitution violates that Constitution, it is invalid with effect from April 27, 1994, and will remain an invalid violation of the 1996 Constitution, notwithstanding the repeal of the interim Constitution by its successor. Prince, however, confronts the situation of a law invalidated by a provision of the interim Constitution that has no equivalent in its successor. The 1996 Constitution granted the SCA the constitutional jurisdiction that it had been denied under the interim Constitution, including jurisdiction to adjudicate on the constitutional validity of Acts of Parliament. This mean that section 12(1)(b) was resuscitated, as the Constitutional Court stated:
Once section 12(1)(b) became invalid because of its inconsistency with the interim Constitution, it could not be validated simply by the fact that under the Constitution the SCA now has constitutional jurisdiction. Section 168(2) of the Constitution which stipulates that the quorum of the SCA shall be determined by an Act of Parliament must therefore, in the absence of the proviso in section 12(l)(b), refer, at present, to section 12(1) of the Supreme Court Act which determines that the ordinary quorum of that Court shall be five judges. This result is consistent with the new constitutional order. Section 12(l)(b) of the Supreme Court Act was enacted at a time when the SCA was the highest court of appeal. That is no longer the case. Its decisions on the constitutionality of an Act of Parliament or conduct of the President have no force or effect unless confirmed by this Court. Its powers in this regard are therefore no different from those conferred upon the High Court.
Currie and De Waal criticize this explanation as "evasive" and "far from clear." Despite this, "it is probably safe to say that, as a general rule, a law invalidated by the interim Constitution remains invalid after its repeal, notwithstanding any substantive difference that there might be in the provisions of the two Constitutions." This, they argue, is "the logical implication" of item 2 of Schedule 6 of the 1996 Constitution: "All law that was in force when the new Constitution took effect, continues in force." Repeal of the interim Constitution does not deprive it of the legal effect that it had while it was in force. One effect was the automatic invalidation of all inconsistent law. Such law is therefore not in force at the time of the transition to the 1996 Constitution and cannot be resuscitated by it.
"Where the interim Constitution is more protective than the final," observes Currie and De Waal, "the implications of Prince may be significant." For example, an applicant may choose to attack an old-order law for inconsistency with the right to freedom of economic activity, rather than relying on the narrower right to professional freedom.
"Logically speaking," the doctrine of objective invalidity means that in the case of old-order legislation, invalidity must first be assessed in terms of the interim Constitution, notwithstanding that the cause of action may have arisen during the operation of the 1996 Constitution. "This, however, does not happen in practice." In Ex parte Women's Legal Centre: In re Moise v Greater Germiston Transitional Local Council (Moise II), the court dealt with an application to amend the order that it had made earlier, in Moise v Greater Germiston Transitional Local Council (Moise I). In Moise I, the court had confirmed the declaration of invalidity by a High Court of section 2(1)(a) of the Limitation of Legal Proceedings (Provincial and Local Authorities) Act. The point made by the applicants in Moise II was that the Limitation Act was pre-constitutional legislation. It was found by the High Court to be a violation of the right of access to court in s 34 of the 1996 Constitution. Section 22 of the Interim Constitution also contained a right of access to court in all relevant respects identical to the one in s 34: "One would therefore have expected, in the light of the Prince decision, that the subsection had become invalid at the moment of commencement of the interim Constitution."
The Constitutional Court dismissed the application for an amendment on the basis that the consistency of the Limitation Act with the interim Constitution had not been raised or canvassed in the High Court: "Arguably, and if properly raised, a court should consider whether a law should be declared [invalid] with reference to the interim Constitution if it survives a challenge under the 1996 Constitution."
The rules and principles stated above apply to the Bill of Rights and not to the other provisions of the Constitution.
The non-retrospectivity rule
Neither the interim nor the 1996 Constitution is retrospective in its operation. A law is a retrospective if it states that, at a past date, the law shall be taken to have been that which it was not, so as to invalidate what was previously valid or vice versa. Neither the interim nor the 1996 Constitution reaches backward so as to invalidate actions taken under laws valid at the time, even if those laws were contrary to fundamental rights. The corollary also holds: The Constitution cannot retrospectively validate actions that were unlawful in terms of pre-1994 law. Also, the Constitution does not interfere with rights that vested before it came into force.
The rule that the Constitution does not apply retrospectively affects challenges to violations of human rights that occurred before the commencement of the Constitution. Put another way, the rule means that a litigant can only seek constitutional relief for a violation of human rights by conduct that occurred after commencement. As already stated, the implication of the doctrine of objective constitutional invalidity is that on the date of the Constitution's commencement, laws that are inconsistent with the Constitution cease to have legal effect. But this does not mean that acts performed and things done under such (unconstitutional) laws before the Constitution came into force are also invalid. Since the Constitution does not operate retrospectively, they remain valid. An applicant who complains about such actions will not be allowed to challenge the constitutionality of the enabling laws. The constitutional validity of the enabling law becomes irrelevant since the conduct authorized by the law remains valid.
The rule of non-retrospectivity only limits the "reach" of the Bill of Rights. In other words, it covers only the direct application of the Bill of Rights; it does not prevent the courts from applying the Bill of Rights indirectly to the law when developing the common law or interpreting a statute, even if the dispute arose before the commencement of the Constitution. This is because the post-constitutional development of the common law, or reading down of statutes with reference to the Constitution, does not result in the Constitution's working retroactively. "It is sometimes said," the court noted in Du Plessis v De Klerk, "that 'judge-made law' is retrospective in its operation." Currie and De Waal contend that it is "always" so. It must be added, however, that the Constitutional Court has not explicitly decided that the rule of non-retrospectivity does not hold for the indirect application of the Bill of Rights.
In Du Plessis v De Kierk, the Constitutional Court expressly "left open" the question of whether a litigant could rely on section 35(3) of the interim Constitution in respect of a common-law claim which arose prior to the date on which the interim Constitution came into force. Kentridge AJ nevertheless remarked that "it may be that a purely prospective operation of a change in the common law will be found to be appropriate when it results from the application of a constitutional enactment which does not itself have retrospective operation."
However, in Gardener v Whitaker, Kentridge AJ "seemed to condone the indirect application of the Bill of Rights to the law of defamation" in relation to alleged defamation that took place before the commencement of the interim Constitution.'04 Similarly, in Key v Attorney-General a search and seizure of documents had been completed before the interim Constitution came into force. This meant that the statutory provisions authorizing the search and seizure could not be attacked as violations of the Constitution. Kriegler J nevertheless stated that if the evidence obtained by way of the search and seizure was tendered in criminal proceedings against the applicant, he would be entitled to raise Constitution-based objections to its admissibility. While the non-retrospectivity rule prevented the applicant in Key from challenging the provisions of the Investigation of Serious Economic Offences Act before or during the trial, a discretion to exclude otherwise admissible evidence could be developed by indirectly applying the Bill of Rights.
In Masiya v Director of Public Prosecutions, the Constitutional Court accepted that retrospective consequences would ordinarily follow from the development of the common law in terms of section 39(2) of the Constitution. However, it held that, on the exceptional facts at issue—the development of the common-law definition of rape to include anal rape of a woman—the retrospective development would offend the principle of legality. Legality, noted the court, included the principle of foreseeability. The rules of criminal law had to be clear so that individuals know which conduct is proscribed by law. The definition was accordingly held to apply only to conduct taking place after the judgment.
Application of the Bill of Rights to matters pending at the date of commencement
Court proceedings that commenced prior to the coming into effect of the interim or 1996 Constitutions, but which had not yet been finalized when those Constitutions took effect, are governed by item 17 of Schedule 6, which provides that court proceedings that commenced before the coming into effect of the 1996 Constitution, but after the coming into effect of the interim Constitution, must be decided in terms of the interim Constitution unless the interests of justice require otherwise. Proceedings that commenced before the coming into effect of the interim Constitution must be dealt with in accordance with the law in force at the time, unless the interests of justice require otherwise.
Territorial application of the Bill of Rights
"Though it is obvious," write Currie and De Waal, that the Constitution applies throughout the national territory, "it is less obvious whether it has any extraterritorial application." The question was considered by the Constitutional Court in Kaunda v President of the Republic of South Africa. The case arose from an incident in which the applicants, all South African citizens, had been arrested in Zimbabwe on charges that they had plotted to stage a coup in Equatorial Guinea. The applicants sought relief in the form of an order directing the South African government to seek assurances from the governments of Zimbabwe and Equatorial Guinea that the death penalty would not be imposed on the applicants. The basis of the application was a contention that the applicants' constitutional rights to a fair trial, to dignity, life and freedom and security of the person were being infringed in Zimbabwe, and were likely to be infringed if they were extradited to Equatorial Guinea. The state's duty to protect the rights of the applicants (stemming from section 7(2)) required them to be provided with diplomatic protection.
This argument, Chaskalson CJ held for the majority of the court, required acceptance of the proposition that "the rights nationals have under our Constitution attach to them when they are outside of South Africa, or that the state has an obligation under section 7(2) to 'respect, protect, promote, and fulfill' the rights in the Bill of Rights which extends beyond its borders." According to the court, to the extent that the Constitution provides the framework for the governance of South Africa, it is territorially bound and has no application beyond the borders of the Republic. As for the Bill of Rights, although foreigners are entitled to require the South African state to respect, protect and promote their rights, they lose the benefit of that protection when they leave the national territory. The argument of the applicant, to the effect that section 7(2) places a more extensive obligation on the state to respect, protect and promote the rights of South Africans when they are in foreign countries, was rejected. The bearers of the rights in the Bill of Rights are people in South Africa. The Bill of Rights does not have general application beyond the national territory.
Section 7(1) does not deal withstanding, but rather with the definition of the class of beneficiaries of the rights in the Bill of Rights. It therefore does not bar a foreign litigant who has a protectable interest in this country from seeking to protect that interest before a South African court.
Indirect application
Indirect application means that the Constitution and the Bill of Rights do not directly bind actors. Instead, the influence of the Bill of Rights is mediated through other laws: statutory or common law. In principle, and where possible, a legal dispute should be decided in terms of the existing principles or rules of ordinary law, properly interpreted or developed with reference to the values contained in the Bill of Rights, prior to any direct application of the Bill of Rights to the dispute. When it comes to statutory law, the principle simply means that a court must first attempt to interpret legislation in conformity with the Bill of Rights (indirect application) before considering a declaration that the legislation is in conflict with the Bill of Rights and invalid (direct application). When it comes to the common law, the principle supports the courts' routine practice of developing the common law in conformity with the Bill of Rights (indirect application) in preference to assessing whether the common law is in conflict with the Bill of Rights (direct application).
Indirect application to legislation: the duty to interpret legislation in conformity with the Bill of Rights
Since the Bill of Rights binds all the original and delegated law-making actors, it is always capable of being applied directly to legislation. But, before a court may resort to direct application and to invalidation, it must first consider indirectly applying the Bill of Rights to the statutory provision by interpreting it in such a way as to conform to the Bill of Rights.
Section 39(2) places a general duty on every court, tribunal or forum to promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights when interpreting any legislation. Statutory interpretation must positively promote the Bill of Rights and the other provisions of the Constitution, particularly the fundamental values in section 1. "This means," according to the Constitutional Court in Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences v Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd In re: Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd v Smit NO,
that all statutes must be interpreted through the prism of the Bill of Rights. All law-making authority must be exercised in accordance with the Constitution. The Constitution is located in a history that involves a transition from a society based on division, injustice and exclusion from the democratic process to one which respects the dignity of all citizens, and includes all in the process of governance. As such, the process of interpreting the Constitution must recognize the context in which we find ourselves and the Constitution's goal of a society based on democratic values, social justice and fundamental human rights. This spirit of transition and transformation characterizes the constitutional enterprise as a whole.
The court held further that "the purport and objects of the Constitution find expression in section 1 which lays out the fundamental values which the Constitution is designed to achieve." In other words, the legislature is presumed to have intended to further the values underlying the Bill of Rights by passing legislation that is in accordance with the Bill of Rights, unless the contrary is established. The duty of courts, tribunals or forums to interpret in accordance with the Bill of Rights applies even if a litigant has failed to rely on section 39(2). The duty is therefore extensive, "requiring courts to be alert to the normative framework of the Constitution not only when some startling new development of the common law is in issue, but in all cases where the incremental development of [... a common-law] rule is in the issue."
The general duty to promote the Bill of Rights becomes particularly important when it is possible to avoid inconsistency between a legislative provision and the Bill of Rights by interpreting the legislation so that it conforms to the Bill of Rights. Under the interim Constitution, such a process of interpretation became known as "reading down." According to section 35(2) of the interim Constitution, where legislation was capable of being read in two ways—as a violation of fundamental rights or, if read more restrictively, as not violating rights—the latter reading was to be preferred. Section 35(2) is not repeated in the 1996 Constitution, but the courts and other tribunals are still permitted, and indeed required, to "read down" by virtue of section 39(2). In any event, section 35(3) of the interim Constitution, which is the predecessor to s 39(2), always encapsulated the notion of reading down without any need for it to be expressly spelled out in the section.
In De Lange v Smuts, Ackermann J stated that "reading down" does
no more than giving expression to a sound principle of constitutional interpretation recognized by other open and democratic societies based on human dignity, equality and freedom such as, for example, the United States of America, Canada and Germany, whose constitutions, like our 1996 Constitution, contain no express provision to such effect. In my view, the same interpretative approach should be adopted under the 1996 Constitution.
"Accordingly," wrote Langa DP in Hyundai Motor Distributors, "judicial officers must prefer interpretations of legislation that fall within constitutional bounds over those that do not, provided that such an interpretation can be reasonably ascribed to the section."
The duty to interpret in accordance with the Constitution applies also where two or more interpretations of a legislative provision are possible. The court must prefer the reading of a statute that "better" promotes the spirit, purport, and objects of the Bill of Rights, even if neither interpretation would render the provision unconstitutional.
Methodology
In Govender v Minister of Safety and Security, the Supreme Court of Appeal set out a standard formula for dealing with constitutional challenges to legislation. A judge, magistrate, or presiding officer of a tribunal is required
to examine the objects and purport of the Act or the section under consideration;
to examine the ambit and meaning of the rights protected by the Constitution;
to ascertain whether it is reasonably possible to interpret the Act or section under consideration in such a manner that it conforms to the Constitution (by protecting the rights therein protected);
if such interpretation is possible, to give effect to it; and,
if it is not possible, to initiate steps leading to a declaration of constitutional invalidity.
This power of interpretation, "considerable though it is," is not unconstrained. As the Constitutional Court recognized in Hyundai Motor Distributors,
Limits must [...] be placed on the application of this principle. On the one hand, it is the duty of a judicial officer to interpret legislation in conformity with the Constitution so far as this is reasonably possible. On the other hand, the legislature is under a duty to pass legislation that is reasonably clear and precise, enabling citizens and officials to understand what is expected of them. A balance will often have to be struck as to how this tension is to be resolved when considering the constitutionality of legislation."
"Taken to its limit," agree Currie and De Waal,
the power to interpret legislation in conformity with the Constitution would mean that any legislative provision could be made to conform to the Constitution by a suitably determined exercise of interpretative will. This would make the powers of the courts to declare legislation invalid superfluous and would deny the legislatures any significant role in the interpretation of the Constitution.
Therefore, according to the Supreme Court of Appeal, an interpretation of legislation is constrained by the requirement that it must be "reasonably possible." The Constitutional Court earlier expressed the same qualification in different words in the Hyundai Motor Distributors case: "There will be occasions when a judicial officer will find that the legislation, though open to a meaning which would be unconstitutional, is reasonably capable of being read "in conformity with the Constitution". Such an interpretation should not, however, be unduly strained."
In National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Home Affairs, it was said that
There is a clear distinction between interpreting legislation in a way which "promote[s] the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights" as required by s 39(2) of the Constitution and the process of reading words into or severing them from a statutory provision which is a remedial measure under s 172(1)(b), following upon a declaration of constitutional invalidity under s 172(1)(a) [...]. The first process, being an interpretative one, is limited to what the text is reasonably capable of meaning. The latter can only take place after the statutory provision in question, notwithstanding the application of all legitimate interpretative aids, is found to be constitutionally invalid.
"It follows," held the court in Hyundai Motor Distributors, "that where a legislative provision is reasonably capable of meaning that places it within constitutional bounds, it should be preserved. Only if this is not possible should one resort to the remedy of reading in or notional severance."
These qualifications may be taken to mean something along the lines of "plausible"—the result of the interpretative process must be a reading of the legislation that is defensible using "all legitimate interpretive aids," by which is meant the repertoire of justificatory arguments supplied by the law of interpretation of statutes. The process of reaching a plausible, constitutionally-compliant interpretation entails reading legislation purposively and contextually. If the only plausible interpretation of a statutory provision is one that entails an infringement of the Bill of Rights, the court must proceed to consider whether the infringement is justifiable. It is not, it must declare the provision unconstitutional.
Interpretation in conformity is not confined to the restrictive reading of legislation
"Reading down" should perhaps be avoided as a description of the practice of interpretation in conformity with the Constitution, as it tends to suggest that the practice always entails reading restrictively. But section 39(2) sometimes requires more than simply narrowing the ambit of legislation so as to avoid conflict with rights. A narrow construction of a legislative provision will often have the result of avoiding an alleged conflict between the provision and the Bill of Rights: for example, when discretionary powers conferred are too wide, or when the scope of regulation is over-inclusive, or to restrict the impact of changes to the criminal law. But, on other occasions, the statute may have to be generously interpreted to avoid the conflict: for example, where the constitutional invalidity lies in the lack of any express grant of discretionary power. The point is that, if the statutory provision is genuinely ambiguous or otherwise unclear, the interpretation which best conforms to the Bill of Rights must be chosen.
Section 39(2) does not have any bearing on the interpretation of the Constitution or the Bill of Rights; the subsection deals with statutory interpretation only.
Indirect application of the Bill of Rights to disputes governed by the common law
The obligation to develop the common law
As already stated, legislation is approached by first interpreting it with the Constitution in mind, prior to any direct application of the Constitution (and any finding of unconstitutionality). In the case of the common law, the approach is similar but not identical, the difference lies in the remedial powers of the courts. If impugned legislation is found to limit a right, and if the limitation does not satisfy the justification standard in section 36, the court provides a remedy by declaring the legislation unconstitutional and, where possible, ameliorating the constitutional defect through reading in or notional or actual severance. "In that event," according to Moseneke J in S v Thebus, "the responsibility and power to address the consequences of the declaration of invalidity resides, not with the courts, but pre-eminently with the legislative authority." The Constitutional Court was unanimous on this issue. In Du Plessis v De Klerk, furthermore, the court noted that "the common law, it is often said, is developed on incremental lines. Certainly, it has not been developed by the process of 'striking down.'"
But the common law is different. It is the law of the courts and not the legislature:
The superior courts have always had an inherent power to refashion and develop the common law in order to reflect the changing social, moral, and economic make-up of society. That power is now constitutionally authorized and must be exercised within the prescripts and ethos of the Constitution.
According to the court, the need to develop the common law under section 39(2) could arise in at least two instances:
The first was when a rule of the common law is inconsistent with a constitutional provision. The repugnancy of this kind would compel an adaptation of the common law to resolve the inconsistency.
The second possibility was that "a rule of the common law is not inconsistent with a specific constitutional provision but may fall short of its spirit, purport and objects." If so, "the common law must be adapted so that it grows in harmony with the 'objective normative value system' found in the Constitution."
In a constitutional challenge of the first type the court must perform a "threshold analysis," being whether the rule limits an entrenched right, if the limitation is not reasonable and justifiable, the court itself is obliged to adapt or develop the common law in order to harmonize it with the constitutional norm.
In its earlier decision in Carinichele, the Constitutional Court emphasized that the constitutional obligation to develop the common law is not discretionary, but is rather a "general obligation" to consider whether the common law is deficient and if so, to develop it to promote the objectives of the Bill of Rights. The obligation applied in both civil and criminal cases, irrespective of whether or not the parties had requested the court to develop the common law.
The methodology of indirect application to the common law
The indirect application of the Bill of Rights to the common law can take many forms. The first method is to argue for a change in the existing principles of the common law so that the law gives better effect to the Bill of Rights. This argument has been made in the areas of defamation and restraint of trade. In restraint of cases, the argument that the incidence and content of the onus have to be reformed with reference to the section 22 right to occupational freedom has been less successful. The courts have been less inclined to reform the principles of the law of contract in a similar manner to the development of the law of delict.
The second method is to "apply" the common law with due regard to the Bill of Rights. This method was employed by Davis AJ in Rivett-Carnac v Wiggins. Davis AJ declined to consider the constitutionality of the presumption relating to animus iniuriandi in defamation cases, but "clearly took the Bill of Rights into account in reaching the conclusion that the statements made in this particular case were not defamatory." Davis AJ held that the "boundary between criticizing professional work without reducing such professional's reputation in the eyes of colleagues and the publication of defamatory statements about such a professional must be carefully drawn, particularly in the light of our new constitutional commitments."
The third method, which is closely related to the second, is to give constitutionally-informed content to open-ended common-law concepts, such as "public policy" or "contra bonos mores" or "unlawfulness." This has been held to be the proper approach to Bill of Rights challenges to contractual provisions. Barkhuizen v Napier dealt with a contractual time-bar clause requiring action to be instituted against an insurer within ninety days of the rejection of an insurance claim. The insured contended that this clause infringed his right of access to court in terms of section 34. The approach to be adopted to this contention was to apply a "constitutionalized" conception of the common-law doctrine of public policy: a conception informed by the values given effect to in the Bill of Rights.
The analysis was then undertaken by the Constitutional Court in Barkhuizen essentially entailed an application of the test for the validity of legislative time-bar provisions set out in Mohlomi v Minister of Defence: A time-bar provision will unjustifiably limit the right of access to court if it is unreasonably short and if it is inflexible. If it is an unjustifiable limitation of section 34, it will be contrary to public policy and unenforceable. The justifiability of the provision had to be determined in the light of a number of factors, including the bargaining position of the respective parties and their ability to enforce their rights.
In Barkhuizen, the court found that the applicant was well-resourced and there was nothing on the facts to explain why no steps had been taken to enforce his rights at the earlier stages. Similarly, the facts did not disclose the extent of the bargaining between the parties prior to the conclusion of the contract. It could not be said, for instance, whether the insured was in a weak bargaining position and could not influence the terms of the contract.
Bredenkamp v Standard Bank is an application of the Barkhuizen methodology. The issue was whether the contractual right of a banker to close a client's account was subject to the requirements of fairness. The Supreme Court of Appeal held that the Constitution does not envisage the duty of fairness to apply in all contractual settings. Rather, one must consider the specific circumstances of each case to determine whether a constitutional value is implicated. If not, one cannot complain about an overarching requirement of fairness: "If a contract is prima facie contrary to constitutional values, questions of enforcement would not arise. However, enforcement of a prima facie innocent contract may implicate an identified constitutional value. If the value is unjustifiably affected, the term will not be enforced."
This means that fairness is not a self-standing requirement against which contractual clauses must be assessed: "Fairness is part of a matrix of constitutional values, which inform the interpretation of contracts. Such values are an embodiment of the legal convictions of the community. The autonomy of individuals to freely conclude contracts which are binding upon them is also part of the legal convictions of the community."
Limits on indirect application to the common law
A rule of the common law must be assessed for inconsistency with the Bill of Rights and, if necessary, developed within the "matrix of [... the] objective, normative value system" established by the Constitution. Courts have far more scope to "develop" the common law by way of indirect application than they have when they "interpret" legislation, where they are bound to a reasonable interpretation of the statute.
There are limits on the power to develop the common law. When the common law is developed, it must be done incrementally and on a case-by-case basis. The development cannot take place in the abstract; the court must apply the law as it is found to be in the case before it. This approach has also found favor when the Bill of Rights is directly applied to the common law. Indeed, it is even more important when the Bill of Rights is directly applied because the consequences of a direct application differ from those of an indirect application. For example, in Shabalala v Attorney-General, Transvaal, the Constitutional Court was careful, after striking down a common-law rule, to balance the need to provide guidance with the danger of being prescriptive. Such care must also be taken when the Bill of Rights is indirectly applied. "Some guidance on the new approach has to be provided," writes Currie and De Waal, "while room must be left for the courts to develop the principle on a case by case basis."
Stare decisis and indirect application
"One of the most important" limitations on the power to develop the common law via the indirect application of the Constitution is the doctrine of stare decisis. In Govender v Minister of Safety and Security, reading down was employed to hold that section 49(l)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Act was not unconstitutional. In a subsequent decision, the Transkei High Court, in S v Walters, confronted with the precedent of the SCA decision in Govender, held that it did not have to follow it. Appeal-court decisions on the constitutional validity of legislation, according to Jafta AJP, "rank in the same level" as High Court decisions. The reason is that both decisions had no force unless confirmed by the Constitutional Court. Since, in the view of Jafta AJP, the SCA's decision on section 49(1)(b) in Govender was clearly wrong, it did not have to be followed by the High Court. The subsection was struck down to the extent that it permitted the use of force to prevent a suspect from fleeing.
The High Court's approach to the issue was repudiated by the Constitutional Court in the confirmation proceedings:
The trial court in the instant matter was bound by the interpretation put on section 49 by the SCA in Govender. The judge was obliged to approach the case before him on the basis that such interpretation was correct, however much he may personally have had his misgivings about it. High courts are obliged to follow legal interpretations of the SCA, whether they relate to constitutional issues or to other issues, and remain so obliged unless and until the SCA itself decides otherwise or [... the Constitutional Court] does so in respect of a constitutional issue.
But this holding, Kriegler J emphasized, applied only to the binding effect of decisions of higher tribunals "delivered after the advent of the constitutional regime and in compliance with the requirements of section 39 of the Constitution." The extent of application of stare decisis to pre-1994 decisions (if this is what "the advent of the constitutional regime" means), and to direct applications of the Constitution, was not decided.
The subsequent decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal in Afrox v Strydom "fills the gap left open by the Constitutional Court." As regards the binding effect of the pre-constitutional authority of the appeal court, there are three distinct situations that can arise:
Direct application of the Constitution to the common law: "The High Court is convinced that the relevant rule of the common law is in conflict with a provision of the Constitution." In such situations, pre-Constitutional authority is not binding on a High Court.
Pre-constitutional decisions of the appeal court based on open-ended considerations such as boni mores or public interest: In such situations, the High Court may depart from earlier authority if convinced, taking the values of the Constitution into account, that it no longer reflects the boni mores or the public interest.
The third situation is that of an indirect application of the Constitution to the common law, by way of section 39(2). Even if convinced that the rule must be developed to promote the spirit, purport, and objects of the Bill of Rights, a High Court is obliged to follow the authority of pre-constitutional decisions of the appeal court.
Currie and De Waal put Afrox and Walters together in the following way:
Post-constitutional decisions of higher courts are binding, whether they are on constitutional issues or not.
Pre-1994 decisions of higher courts on the common law are binding, except in cases of direct conflict with the Constitution or in cases involving the development of open-ended standards such as Boni mores.
The distinction between direct and indirect application is, therefore "crucial to the impact of the Afrox decision." Section 39(2), the SCA holds, does not authorise lower courts to depart from higher authority, whether pre-or post-constitutional. The subsection must be read with section 173, recognizing the inherent jurisdiction of the High Courts to develop the common law. It is that power that is exercised when the courts develop the common law in accordance with section 39(2). But the power has always been constrained by the doctrine of stare decisis: "There is nothing to indicate that the Constitution has changed this."
The Afrox and Walters decisions have been strongly criticized. There is, however, "a significant omission from the Afrox decision." As already stated, indirect application in terms of section 39(2) does not involve only the development of the common law, but also statutory interpretation, taking the spirit, purport, and objects of the Bill of Rights into account. But the SCA in Afrox "seems to confine itself to the first type of indirect application only." This may be taken to mean that "post-Afrox High Courts still possess the jurisdiction to depart from pre-constitutional statutory interpretations of the AD." Currie and De Waal argue that "a great deal also turns on the distinction between direct and indirect application." Khumalo v Holomisa appears to treat the direct horizontal application as a relatively simple and unexceptional process. If so, "awkward appeal court precedent can easily be sidestepped. A High Court, by opting for direct application, will be understood to distinguish the case before it from a precedent arising from the indirect application."
Manner of application of the Bill of Rights in legal disputes
Under the 1996 Constitution, there is only one system of law. The Constitution applies to all law, informing its interpretation and development by the courts and determining its validity. This means that the parallel systems of "constitutional" law and "non-constitutional" law (and "constitutional" and "non-constitutional litigation") developed under the interim Constitution are no longer theoretically sustainable. Nevertheless, the distinction between the direct and indirect methods of application of the Constitution to the law has not been abandoned and "continues to have some practical significance at least in so far as the common law is concerned."
Jurisdiction
We have seen that, under the interim Constitution, the distinction between the direct and indirect application of the Bill of Rights had important jurisdictional implications. The interim Constitution distinguished between constitutional matters and other matters and provided that the Constitutional Court could hear only the former and the Appellate Division only the latter. In Du Plessis, the Constitutional Court held that indirect application of the Bill of Rights to the common law was not a constitutional matter, and therefore was within Appellate Division jurisdiction. The main task of the Constitutional Court was to test the validity of the law and state conduct against the Constitution. In order to trigger the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court, it was, therefore, necessary to show that the Bill of Rights applied directly to the challenged law or conduct. Whenever the Bill of Rights merely applied indirectly to a dispute, the Appellate Division and not the Constitutional Court was primarily responsible.
Under the unitary jurisdictional system established by the 1996 Constitution, all superior courts have the power to apply the Constitution directly and indirectly to the common law. This means that the jurisdictional motivation for distinguishing between direct and indirect application no longer holds for common-law disputes. However, since decisions of the High Courts and the Supreme Court of Appeal declaring certain forms of legislation invalid must be confirmed by the Constitutional Court, "it remains important for jurisdictional reasons," whether legislation is directly tested against the Bill of Rights, or whether it is merely interpreted with reference to the Bill of Rights.
The purpose and effect of direct application differ from that of indirect application
The purpose of the direct application is to determine whether there is, on a proper interpretation of the law and the Bill of Rights, any inconsistency between the two. The purpose of the indirect application is to determine whether it is possible to avoid, in the first place, any inconsistency between the law and the Bill of Rights by a proper interpretation of the two.
Direct application of the Bill of Rights generates a constitutional remedy, whereas indirect application does not. The reason for this is that direct application is aimed at exposing inconsistency between the Bill of Rights and law or conduct. If there is, the court then declares that law or conduct constitutionally invalid. The effect of such a declaration, according to Ackermann J and Sachs J in Du Plessis, is to restrict the legislature's options in amending the law or enacting a similar law. Much depends of course on the terms of the court's order and its reasoning and the application of the doctrine of stare decisis, but as a general rule direct application rules out certain possibilities as constitutionally impermissible, whereas an indirect application merely proposes the construction of the law that conforms to the Constitution. Although there is, therefore, a difference in principle between direct and indirect application, the problem alluded to by Ackermann J and Sachs J also depends on the extent to which a court is prepared to "pronounce on the meaning" of the Constitution: "Courts generally avoid making extensive pronouncements on what the Constitution demands the common law to be, whether they apply the Bill of Rights directly or indirectly." The preferred approach is to give narrow rulings limited to the facts before the court: "Such orders will preserve considerable space for the legislature to reform the common law." Direct application, however, "inevitably rules out certain options." When a law or conduct is ruled to be inconsistent with the Constitution, it can no longer form part of the law. The scope of the limitation on the legislature's discretion will therefore depend on the extent of the court's ruling.
That said, there is little practical difference between the two forms of application when it comes to the common law. This is because, although notionally methodologically distinct, direct and indirect application of the Bill of Rights end up at the same point: the need to develop rules of the common law in conformity with the Bill of Rights.
"There are," observe Currie and De Waal, "only a few common-law cases where the method of application is likely to make a substantive difference to the result." These are cases in which a plaintiff cannot find a cause of action in the existing common law. Since the common law does not provide a right, it will be necessary to invoke directly a right in the Bill of Rights.
Indirect application must be considered before direct application
In S v Mhlungu, Kentridge AJ stated,
I would lay it down as a general principle that, where it is possible to decide any case, civil or criminal, without reaching a constitutional issue, that is the course which should be followed.
This statement was subsequently approved by the unanimous court in Zantsi v Council of State, Ciskei. In this case, Chaskalson P referred to the "salutary rule" which is followed in the United States "never to anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it" and "never to formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied." This rule, Chaskalson P added,
allows the law to develop incrementally. In view of the far-reaching implications attaching to constitutional decisions, it is a rule which should ordinarily be adhered to by this and all other South African Courts before whom constitutional issues are raised [.... I]t is not ordinarily desirable for a Court to give rulings in the abstract on issues which are not the subject of controversy and are only of academic interest.
There are several reasons for observing this "salutary rule" under the South African Constitution. The first is procedural. The interim Constitution contained complicated provisions governing the referral of a constitutional issue to the Constitutional Court where that issue was beyond the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. A referral was, for example, necessary whenever the constitutionality of an Act of Parliament was in dispute. The statements in Mhlungu and Zantsi "were meant to deter the divisions of the Supreme Court from referring irrelevant issues or issues that were within their jurisdiction to the Constitutional Court." Since the system of referrals has now been replaced by a wider High Court jurisdiction and a system of appeals, this justification should no longer carry the same weight. However, it would be wrong to conclude that the justification did not survive the changes in constitutional jurisdiction brought about by the 1996 Constitution and the abolition of referrals. It remains an important factor when considering applications for direct access to the Constitutional Court and applications for leave to appeal using the "leapfrog" appeal procedure. It also informs the doctrine of justiciability, particularly the principles that courts should not decide moot cases or cases that are not ripe for judicial resolution.
There are also substantive reasons for observing the rule: "Courts should avoid making pronouncements on the meaning of the Constitution where it is not necessary to do so, so as to leave space for the legislature to reform the law in accordance with its own interpretation of the Constitution." Lengthy expositions of the Constitution may result in actual or perceived restrictions on the legislature, a "constitutional straitjacket" which makes it difficult for the legislature to respond to changing circumstances. The courts, and particularly the Constitutional Court, are not the only interpreters of the Constitution. They are, however, its final and authoritative interpreters. Before pronouncing on the meaning of the Constitution, "the courts should allow other organs of the government the opportunity to interpret and give effect to the Constitution." Practically, this means that the legislature should be given the opportunity to address an issue before a court decides on it: "The legislature and the executive are better equipped to ascertain the needs of society and to respond to those needs." Once such a response finds expression in legislation, courts may then test the legislation against the provisions of the Bill of Rights. Even then, the Constitutional Court (the final court in constitutional matters) often seeks to avoid ruling on the constitutionality of a statutory provision until trial, and appeal-court judges have expressed their views on the effect of the provision and the likely consequences of invalidating it. "It is sound judicial policy," write Currie and De Waal, "to decide only that which is demanded by the facts of a case and that is necessary for its proper disposition; this allows constitutional jurisprudence to develop incrementally."
When applying the Bill of Rights in a legal dispute, the principle of avoidance is "of crucial importance." As already stated, the Bill of Rights always applies in a legal dispute. It is usually capable of direct or indirect application and, in a limited number of cases, of indirect application only. The availability of direct application is qualified by the principle that the Bill of Rights should not be applied directly in a legal dispute unless it is necessary to do so. The principle has "a number of important consequences."
Even when the Bill of Rights applies directly, a court must apply the provisions of ordinary law to resolve the dispute, especially in so far as the ordinary law is intended to give effect to the rights contained in the Bill of Rights. Many recent statutes, such as the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 and the Equality and Administrative Justice Acts are intended to implement the Bill of Rights. They must first be applied, and if necessary interpreted generously to give effect to the Bill of Rights, before a direct application is considered.
The same applies to disputes governed by the common law. The ordinary principles of common law must first be applied, and if necessary developed with reference to the Bill of Rights, before a direct application is considered.
When the Bill of Rights is directly applied in disputes governed by legislation, conduct must be challenged before law. In other words, the implementation of the statute must be challenged before the provisions of the statute itself.
However, "to complicate matters further," the principle that constitutional issues should be avoided is not an absolute rule. It does not require that litigants may only directly invoke the Constitution as a last resort. As with many legal principles, its force depends on the circumstances of the case. Where the violation of the Constitution is clear and directly relevant to the matter, and there is no apparent alternative form of ordinary relief, it is not necessary to waste time and effort by seeking a non-constitutional way of resolving a dispute. This will often be the case when the constitutionality of a statutory provision is placed in dispute because, apart from a reading down, there are no other remedies available to a litigant affected by the provision. On the other hand, the principle of avoiding constitutional issues is particularly relevant when the interest of an applicant in the resolution of a constitutional issue is not clear, and where the issue is not ripe for decision, or when it has become academic or moot.
References
Bibliography
Books
Currie, Iain, and De Waal, Johan. The Bill of Rights Handbook. Juta, 2013.
Currie, Iain, et al. The New Constitutional and Administrative Law: Constitutional law. Vol. 1. Juta, 2010.
Woolman, Stu, and Michael Bishop. Constitutional conversations. PULP, 2008.
Papers and journal articles
Further reading
Litigation
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41074267
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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tamushal
|
Tamushal
|
Tamushal () may refer to:
Bala Tamushal
Pain Tamushal
|
41074274
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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Seth%20Rosenfeld
|
Seth Rosenfeld
|
Seth Rosenfeld (born 1956) is an American journalist. He is the author of Subversives: The FBI's War on Student Radicals, and Reagan's Rise to Power, published in hardback in 2012 by Farrar, Straus and Giroux, and in paperback in 2013 by Picador. Subversives was a New York Times best-seller and won the 2013 Ridenhour Prize for books; PEN Center USA's Literary Award for Research Nonfiction; the National Society of Professional Journalists' Sunshine Award; and the American Book Award from the Before Columbus Foundation.
Rosenfeld was a staff reporter for the San Francisco Examiner from 1984 to 2000, and for the San Francisco Chronicle from 2000 to 2009. Since then his articles have appeared in the New York Times, The Los Angeles Times, The San Francisco Chronicle, Harper's Magazine, and other publications. He is a contributor to the Center for Investigative Reporting and the center's Reveal.
During the 1980s, Rosenfeld's reports for the San Francisco Examiner revealed that poor medical care in California prisons had led to inmate injuries and costly legal settlements. He also disclosed that California's massive prison construction program suffered from construction flaws, cost overruns, and fire and safety problems.
In other articles, Rosenfeld reported alleged links between contra rebels seeking to overthrow the Sandinista government of Nicaragua and a cocaine smuggling ring in the so-called Frogman Case. One story reported that federal prosecutors had returned $36,020 that had been seized as drug funds to one of the Frogman defendants after he claimed it was actually money to support the contras. The articles led to congressional inquiries, and a subsequent report released by the U.S. Department of Justice's Inspector General found that the prosecutors had returned the money at the request of the CIA. According to the Inspector General's report, the prosecutors made no determination as to whether the cash was really contra political money, but sought to eliminate grounds for defense attorneys to ask questions that could reveal the CIA's covert support of the contras. The late journalist Gary Webb cited Rosenfeld as first disclosing this aspect of the contra-cocaine story.
In the 1990s, Rosenfeld's series, Anatomy of a Killing, revealed a systemic breakdown in the San Francisco Police Department's investigation into an officer's fatal shooting of a young man in the back. A second series, Shots Fired, uncovered flaws in the department's investigations into several other police shootings of suspects, and showed that the department's failure to fairly investigate police shootings fell hardest on people who were minorities or low-income. The articles prompted the department to re-examine how it investigated officer-involved-shootings and won a Mencken Award from the Free Press Association.
Rosenfeld received a 1992 George Polk Award for articles in the Examiner revealing internal Dow Corning Corp. documents that showed the company knowingly marketed defective silicone gel breast implants that leaked inside women and caused them to undergo otherwise avoidable surgeries to remove the implants. The articles led the U.S. Food and Drug Administration to impose a moratorium on the use of implants and adopt rules restricting the use of silicone. The Polk judges said, "Rosenfeld's determination to look beyond an obscure verdict and his newspaper's dedication to public service sparked a national debate and prompted reforms that otherwise might not have happened."
In 2002, the Chronicle published Rosenfeld's article, The Campus Files, which was based on FBI records showing that the bureau had engaged in unlawful surveillance and harassment of students, professors and administrators at the University of California in the 1960s. The articles led to inquires by U.S. Senator Dianne Feinstein and a response from then-FBI Director Robert Mueller that the FBI's covert activities at UC were "wrong and anti-democratic." The Campus Files won several national awards.
In Subversives, Rosenfeld expanded his examination of FBI activities at UC during the Cold War, documenting how J. Edgar Hoover's FBI secretly worked to get UC President Clark Kerr fired because bureau officials disagreed with his campus policies; harassed Free Speech Movement leader Mario Savio; and gave personal and political help to Ronald Reagan, who had been a more active FBI informant in Hollywood than previously known.
On August 20, 2012, Rosenfeld's report for the Center for Investigative Reporting alleged that Richard Aoki was an FBI informant who had infiltrated chapters of the Communist Party, the Socialist Workers' Party and, nearly from its inception, the Black Panther Party. In response to a FOIA request by Rosenfeld, it was revealed that a November 16, 1967 FBI intelligence report listed Aoki as an informant with the code number "T-2". FBI agent Burney Threadgill Jr. also said that he worked with Aoki, stating, "He was my informant. I developed him."
Bibliography
Subversives: The FBI's War on Student Radicals, and Reagan's Rise to Power. Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2012.
San Francisco Chronicle, "Trouble on campus" by Seth Rosenfeld, Chronicle Staff Writer, Sunday, June 9, 2002
"60s Free Speech Leader got caught in FBI web," San Francisco Chronicle, 10 October 2004, p. A1
References
Living people
American reporters and correspondents
1956 births
American Book Award winners
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41074299
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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/I%20Remember%20Love
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I Remember Love
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"I Remember Love" is a song written by Peter Hallström and Sarah Dawn Finer, and performed by Sarah Dawn Finer at Melodifestivalen 2007. The song participated in the semifinal in Gävle on 24 February 2007, and reached the finals in the Stockholm Globe Arena on 10 March 2007, where it ended up 4th.
On 5 March 2007, the single was released, and by mid June 2007 the single sold gold, after being at the Swedish singles chart since its first week of release.
The song also charted at Svensktoppen, entering on 1 April 2007 reaching a second position, topping the chart the next week, before being knocked down by Andreas Johnson's "A Little Bit of Love" on 15 April 2007. The song made its 30th final Svensktoppen visit on 21 October 2007, before leaving the chart the next week.
Charts
Weekly charts
Year-end charts
References
External links
Information at Svensk mediedatabas
2007 singles
2007 songs
Melodifestivalen songs of 2007
Sarah Dawn Finer songs
Songs written by Sarah Dawn Finer
English-language Swedish songs
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41074321
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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2013%E2%80%9314%20Iowa%20Hawkeyes%20women%27s%20basketball%20team
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2013–14 Iowa Hawkeyes women's basketball team
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The 2013–14 Iowa Hawkeyes women's basketball team will represent University of Iowa during the 2013–14 NCAA Division I women's basketball season. The Hawkeyes, led by fourteenth year head coach Lisa Bluder, play their home games at the Carver-Hawkeye Arena and were a members of the Big Ten Conference. They finished with a record of 27–9 overall, 11–5 overall for a tie for a fourth-place finish. They lost in the championship game of the 2014 Big Ten Conference women's basketball tournament to Nebraska. They were invited to the 2014 NCAA Division I women's basketball tournament which they defeated Marist in the first round before getting defeated by Louisville in the second round.
Roster
Schedule
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!colspan=9| Exhibition
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!colspan=9| Regular Season
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!colspan=9| 2014 Big Ten Conference women's basketball tournament
|-
!colspan=9| NCAA women's tournament
Source
See also
2013–14 Iowa Hawkeyes men's basketball team
Rankings
References
Iowa Hawkeyes women's basketball seasons
Iowa
Iowa Hawkeyes women's basketball
Iowa Hawkeyes women's basketball
Iowa
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41074357
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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gerd-e%20Kuh
|
Gerd-e Kuh
|
Gerd-e Kuh () may refer to:
Gerd-e Kuh, Lahijan
Gerd-e Kuh, Siahkal
|
41074358
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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List%20of%20doping%20cases%20in%20sport%20%28G%29
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List of doping cases in sport (G)
|
This is a sub-list from List of doping cases in sport representing a full list of surnames starting with G.
References
G
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41074368
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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pr%C3%A1xedes%20Mateo%20Sagasta
|
Práxedes Mateo Sagasta
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Práxedes Mariano Mateo Sagasta y Escolar (21 July 1825 – 5 January 1903) was a Spanish civil engineer and politician who served as Prime Minister on eight occasions between 1870 and 1902—always in charge of the Liberal Party—as part of the turno pacifico, alternating with the Conservative leader Antonio Cánovas. He was known as an excellent orator.
Biography
Mateo Sagasta was born on 21 July 1825 at Torrecilla en Cameros, province of Logroño, Spain. As a member of the Progressive Party while a student at the Civil Engineering School of Madrid in 1848, Sagasta was the only one in the school who refused to sign a letter supporting Queen Isabel II.
After his studies, he took an active role in government. Sagasta served in the Spanish Cortes between 1854–1857 and 1858–1863. In 1866 he went into exile in France after a failed coup. After the Spanish Revolution of 1868, he returned to Spain to take part in the newly created provisional government.
He served as Prime Minister of Spain during the Spanish–American War of 1898 when Spain lost its remaining colonies. Mateo Sagasta agreed to an autonomous constitution for both Cuba and Puerto Rico. Mateo Sagasta's political opponents saw his action as a betrayal of Spain and blamed him for the country's defeat in the war and the loss of its island territories in the Treaty of Paris of 1898. He continued to be active in politics for another four years.
Mateo Sagasta's ministry lost a vote in the Cortes on 2 December 1902, he handed in his resignation to the King on the following day, and formally resigned on 10 December 1902.
Mateo Sagasta died just a month after his last resignation, on 5 January 1903 in Madrid at the age of 77.
See also
Regency of Maria Christina of Austria
Reign of Alfonso XIII
References
External links
U.S. Library of Congress Profile
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1825 births
1903 deaths
Politicians from La Rioja
Progressive Party (Spain) politicians
Constitutional Party (Spain) politicians
Liberal Party (Spain, 1880) politicians
Prime Ministers of Spain
Economy and finance ministers of Spain
Presidents of the Congress of Deputies (Spain)
Members of the Congress of Deputies (Spain)
Members of the Congress of Deputies of the Spanish Restoration
Leaders of political parties in Spain
Spanish civil engineers
Spanish people of the Spanish–American War
Polytechnic University of Madrid alumni
Knights of the Golden Fleece of Spain
Knights of the Holy Sepulchre
Government ministers during the First Spanish Republic
Spanish political party founders
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41074371
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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Western%20Pennsylvania%20League
|
Western Pennsylvania League
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The Western Pennsylvania League was a Class D level minor league baseball league consisting of teams based in Pennsylvania, West Virginia and Maryland that played during the 1907 season.
History
The Class D level Western Pennsylvania League began the 1907 season with eight teams. The Beaver Falls Beavers, Butler White Sox, Clarksburg Bees, Connellsville Cokers, Fairmont Champions, Greensburg Red Sox, Scottdale Giants and the Latrobe, Pennsylvania team were charter members.
On May 28, 1907, the Latrobe team was forfeited to the league. The Cumberland Rooters took its place, but that team moved to Piedmont, West Virginia on June 27, then to Somerset, Pennsylvania on July 11. It eventually folded altogether later that month. On August 1, the Kittanning Infants entered the league, but disbanded, along with Beaver Falls, on August 11, 1907. Greensburg disbanded on August 25, 1907. Fairmont finished in first place with a 68–36 record. Jim Clark, Dick Hoblitzell and Reddy Mack played in the league.
A league by the same name existed in the late 1889.
1907 Western Pennsylvania League standings
The Latrobe (7–10) franchise was forfeited to the league May 28. The league then awarded it to Cumberland. Cumberland (5–20) moved to Piedmont (4–6) June 27, then to Somerset (0–5) July 11. It disbanded later that month.Kittanning entered the league August 1. Beaver Falls and Kittanning withdrew August 11. Greensburg disbanded August 25
References
Defunct baseball leagues in the United States
Baseball leagues in Pennsylvania
Sports leagues established in 1907
1907 establishments in Pennsylvania
Sports leagues disestablished in 1907
1907 disestablishments in Pennsylvania
Defunct minor baseball leagues in the United States
Baseball leagues in West Virginia
Baseball leagues in Maryland
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41074405
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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dialium%20guineense
|
Dialium guineense
|
Dialium guineense, the velvet tamarind, is a tall, tropical, fruit-bearing tree in the flowering plant family Fabaceae. It has small, typically grape-sized, edible fruits with brown, hard, inedible shells.
Distribution
It grows in dense forests in Africa along the southern edge of the Sahel. In Togo it is called atchethewh.
The velvet tamarind can be found in West African countries such as Benin where it is called "Assiswè", Ghana where it is known as Yoyi, Sierra Leone where it is known as “”, Senegal, Guinea-Bissau where because of its texture is called "Veludo", Portuguese for velvet, and Nigeria where it is known as awin or igbaru in Yoruba, icheku in Igbo and tsamiyar biri in Hausa.
Uses
The bark and leaves have medicinal properties and are used against several diseases.
Fruit
Each fruit typically has one hard, flat, round, brown seed, typically 7-8 millimeters across and 3 millimeters thick. The seed somewhat resembles a watermelon seed (Citrullus lanatus). Some have two seeds. The seeds are shiny, coated with a thin layer of starch.
The pulp is edible and may be eaten raw or soaked in water and consumed as a beverage. The bitter leaves are ingredients in a Ghanaian dish called domoda.
Timber
Wood is hard and heavy and used for construction. The wood is also used for firewood and charcoal production
References
External links
World Agroforestry
guineense
Fruits originating in Africa
Trees of Africa
Flora of West Tropical Africa
Flora of West-Central Tropical Africa
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41074408
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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lialeman
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Lialeman
|
Lialeman (, also Romanized as Līālemān) is a village in Ahandan Rural District, in the Central District of Lahijan County, Gilan Province, Iran. At the 2006 census, its population was 819, in 223 families.
References
Populated places in Lahijan County
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41074409
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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lavasi%20Mahalleh
|
Lavasi Mahalleh
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Lavasi Mahalleh (, also Romanized as Lavāsī Maḩalleh) is a village in Ahandan Rural District, in the Central District of Lahijan County, Gilan Province, Iran. At the 2006 census, its population was 45, in 13 families.
References
Populated places in Lahijan County
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41074412
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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mazi%20Kalleh
|
Mazi Kalleh
|
Mazi Kalleh (, also Romanized as Māzī Kalleh; also known as Muzikalah) is a village in Ahandan Rural District, in the Central District of Lahijan County, Gilan Province, Iran. At the 2006 census, its population was 131, in 34 families.
References
Populated places in Lahijan County
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41074414
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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mian%20Gavaber%2C%20Lahijan
|
Mian Gavaber, Lahijan
|
Mian Gavaber (, also Romanized as Mīān Gavāber; also known as Miyangaver) is a village in Ahandan Rural District, in the Central District of Lahijan County, Gilan Province, Iran. At the 2006 census, its population was 18, in 4 families.
References
Populated places in Lahijan County
|
41074416
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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mian%20Mahalleh-ye%20Zakleh%20Bar
|
Mian Mahalleh-ye Zakleh Bar
|
Mian Mahalleh-ye Zakleh Bar (, also Romanized as Mīān Maḩalleh-ye Zākleh Bar; also known as Zāklebar and Zāklīvar) is a village in Ahandan Rural District, in the Central District of Lahijan County, Gilan Province, Iran. At the 2006 census, its population was 274, in 77 families.
References
Populated places in Lahijan County
|
41074419
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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Molla%20Mahalleh-ye%20Chehel%20Setun
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Molla Mahalleh-ye Chehel Setun
|
Molla Mahalleh-ye Chehel Setun (, also Romanized as Mollā Maḩalleh-ye Chehel Setūn; also known as Chehel Setūn) is a village in Ahandan Rural District, in the Central District of Lahijan County, Gilan Province, Iran. At the 2006 census, its population was 84, in 23 families.
References
Populated places in Lahijan County
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41074420
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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pain%20Bijar%20Ankish
|
Pain Bijar Ankish
|
Pain Bijar Ankish (, also Romanized as Pā’īn Bījār Ankīsh; also known as Bījār Ankīsh-e Pā’īn) is a village in Ahandan Rural District, in the Central District of Lahijan County, Gilan Province, Iran. At the 2006 census, its population was 16, in 4 families.
References
Populated places in Lahijan County
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41074422
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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pain%20Narenj%20Lengeh
|
Pain Narenj Lengeh
|
Pain Narenj Lengeh (, also Romanized as Pā’īn Nārenj Lengeh) is a village in Ahandan Rural District, in the Central District of Lahijan County, Gilan Province, Iran. At the 2006 census, its population was 192, in 40 families.
References
Populated places in Lahijan County
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41074424
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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pain%20Tamushal
|
Pain Tamushal
|
Pain Tamushal (, also Romanized as Pā’īn Tamūshal; also known as Pāeenmaḩalleh-ye Tamūshal) is a village in Ahandan Rural District, in the Central District of Lahijan County, Gilan Province, Iran. At the 2006 census, its population was 245, in 65 families.
References
Populated places in Lahijan County
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41074425
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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qazi%20Gavaber
|
Qazi Gavaber
|
Qazi Gavaber (, also Romanized as Qāẕī Gavāber) is a village in Ahandan Rural District, in the Central District of Lahijan County, Gilan Province, Iran. At the 2006 census, its population was 54, in 16 families.
References
Populated places in Lahijan County
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41074426
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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rahdar%20Khaneh%2C%20Gilan
|
Rahdar Khaneh, Gilan
|
Rahdar Khaneh (, also Romanized as Rāhdār Khāneh) is a village in Ahandan Rural District, in the Central District of Lahijan County, Gilan Province, Iran. At the 2006 census, its population was 36, in 10 families.
References
Populated places in Lahijan County
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41074429
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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sadat%20Mahalleh%2C%20Ahandan
|
Sadat Mahalleh, Ahandan
|
Sadat Mahalleh (, also Romanized as Sādāt Maḩalleh) is a village in Ahandan Rural District, in the Central District of Lahijan County, Gilan Province, Iran. At the 2006 census, its population was 862, in 225 families.
References
Populated places in Lahijan County
|
41074431
|
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Salehbar
|
Salehbar
|
Salehbar (, also Romanized as Şāleḩbar) is a village in Ahandan Rural District, in the Central District of Lahijan County, Gilan Province, Iran. At the 2006 census, its population was 76, in 20 families.
References
Populated places in Lahijan County
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41074432
|
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sharam%20Lengeh
|
Sharam Lengeh
|
Sharam Lengeh () is a village in Ahandan Rural District, in the Central District of Lahijan County, Gilan Province, Iran. At the 2006 census, its population was 55, in 14 families.
References
Populated places in Lahijan County
|
41074435
|
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sukhteh%20Kuh%2C%20Lahijan
|
Sukhteh Kuh, Lahijan
|
Sukhteh Kuh (, also Romanized as Sūkhteh Kūh; also known as Sūkhtkūh) is a village in Ahandan Rural District, in the Central District of Lahijan County, Gilan Province, Iran. At the 2006 census, its population was 340, in 92 families.
References
Populated places in Lahijan County
|
41074437
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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ishgah%2C%20Lahijan
|
Ishgah, Lahijan
|
Ishgah (, also Romanized as Īshgāh; also known as Īshkā’) is a village in Baz Kia Gurab Rural District, in the Central District of Lahijan County, Gilan Province, Iran. At the 2006 census, its population was 373, in 102 families.
References
Populated places in Lahijan County
|
41074438
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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anarestan%2C%20Gilan
|
Anarestan, Gilan
|
Anarestan (, also Romanized as Anārestān and Anarstan) is a village in Baz Kia Gurab Rural District, in the Central District of Lahijan County, Gilan Province, Iran. At the 2006 census, its population was 419, in 127 families.
References
Populated places in Lahijan County
|
41074439
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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lotf%20Ali%20Khan
|
Lotf Ali Khan
|
Lotf Ali Khan (; ) was the last Shah of the Zand dynasty. He ruled from 1789 to 1794.
Early life
Lotf Ali Khan Zand came to power after a decade of infighting among a succession of violent and inept Zand chiefs following the death in 1779 of the dynasty's founder, Karim Khan Zand. Their failure to agree on a successor and to govern with the same benevolence as Karim Khan eroded public faith in the Zands. An increasing number of local and regional leaders began aligning themselves with the eunuch Agha Mohammad Khan Qajar, who sought to defeat and succeed the Zands.
The son of Jafar Khan, Lotf Ali Khan claimed the throne in 1789 upon the death of his father. Jafar Khan had been poisoned by a slave bribed by a rival family member, Sayed Morad Khan Zand. On hearing of his father's murder, Lotf Ali Khan marched to the Zand capital of Shiraz. Sayed Morad Khan was forced to surrender and was executed.
Reign
Soon after assuming his title, Lotf Ali Khan's principal rival, Agha Mohammad Khan of the Qajar dynasty, marched south to Shiraz. Their two armies met outside of the city in a battle in which Agha Mohammad Khan prevailed, using camels to scare the Zand horses on the battlefield. Despite this defeat, the Zand leader was able to hold Shiraz until the Qajar forces withdrew to Tehran.
The following year, 1790, Lotf Ali Khan led his forces against the Governor of Kerman, who had refused to appear in person to acknowledge the Zand leader. This campaign failed due to harsh winter conditions which led to the loss of a large number of men.
In 1791, Lotf Ali Khan marched to reestablish his control over Isfahan. He had grown increasingly suspicious of the loyalties of Haji Ibrahim, the kalantar of Shiraz. As a result, he took the kalantar's son with him. Once the Zand army had left the city, Haji Ibrahim had the remaining Zand officers arrested and sent word to his brother, a member of Lotf Ali's army, that the city was now under his control. A mutiny ensued and Lotf Ali and several hundred loyal soldiers fled back to Shiraz, where they found the gates barred against them. Fearing reprisals against their families locked within the gates, most of Lotf Ali's men deserted him.
With only a handful of followers remaining, the Zand ruler then fled to Bushehr. Here, too, he encountered a hostile local leader. With the help of a sympathetic governor in the port city of Bandar Rig Lotf Ali Khan managed to raise a small army made up of sympathetic locals. With their help, Lotf Ali defeated an attack from Bushire and Kazerun. The governor of Kazerun was captured and blinded, an impulsive act by Lotf Ali Khan that "weakened the sympathy which his youth, his courage, and his misfortunes were so calculated to incite."
Emboldened, Lotf Ali Khan returned to Shiraz, which Haji Ibrahim had offered to Agha Mohammad Khan. There he defeated an army led by Mostafa Qoli Khan Qajar. Lotf Ali Khan's smaller force also succeeded in repelling the attack of a second Qajar force. At this point, Agha Mohammad Khan himself led 30–40 thousand men against the much smaller Zand army.
In a pivotal battle near Persepolis whose outcome would determine the leadership of the nation, Lotf Ali Khan gained the upper hand over the much larger Qajar army, launching a nighttime raid on the main camp of the Agha Mohammad Khan. As the Qajar soldiers scattered, Lotf Ali assumed Agha Mohammad Khan had fled with them and that the camp was secured. He forbade his men from plundering the camp and withdrew to wait for sunrise. But Agha Mohammad Khan had remained hidden in the royal pavilion. At dawn the call to prayer signaled that the Qajar army had regrouped. Lotf Ali Khan had no choice but to retreat. (An alternate version of this story suggests that Lotf Ali Khan was tricked into waiting until daybreak to enter the enemy camp on advice of a Qajar spy named Mirza Fathollah-e Ardelani.)
He and his followers fled first to Kerman (1792), but with the Qajars in pursuit they were forced to Tabas. With the aid of a sympathetic governor in Tabas, Lotf Ali attempted without success to retake Shiraz. At this time, the former Zand capital was firmly under the control of Agha Mohammad Khan. In July 1792, the Qajar shah ordered the family and harem of Lotf Ali Khan and other Zand nobles and their families sent to his new capital, Tehran.
Repelled in his effort to reclaim Shiraz, Lotf Ali Khan decided to travel east to Kandahar in modern-day Afghanistan to solicit the aid of Timur Shah, but after a few days he learned of Timur Shah's death. Feeling indecisive and depressed Lotf Ali Khan turned back. His spirits were restored by pledges of support from tribal leaders from Bam and Narmashir. Bolstered by an additional 1,000 horsemen Lotf Ali Khan took Kerman in 1794. He held the city for four months against Agha Mohammad Khan and a large army. During this time gold coins were struck in Kerman in tribute to the Zand leader. One of these coins found its way to Agha Mohammad Khan who was so enraged that he sent orders that Fatollah Khan, the son of Lotf Ali who had been taken to Tehran with other Zand nobility, was to be castrated. As the siege of Kerman wore on, some troops became disaffected and ultimately opened the citadel gates to the Qajar army. After a three-hour battle Lotf Ali fled by night to Bam.
Agha Mohammad Khan exacted a brutal revenge on the people of Kerman for harboring his enemy. All the male inhabitants were killed or blinded, and a pile was made out of 20,000 detached eyeballs and poured in front of the victorious Qajar leader. The women and children were sold into slavery, and the city was destroyed over ninety days.
Captivity and death
Finally, Lotf Ali Khan was betrayed by the ruler of Bam who feared that his brother had fallen into Qajar hands in Kerman. Lotf Ali Khan was captured soon after, nearby. According to legend, Lotf Ali Khan took on 14 men single-handedly for two full hours before being overcome.
The last of the Zand rulers was finally delivered to Agha Mohammad Khan Qajar, who had long waited to exact revenge on his arch-rival. "The page of history would be stained by a recital of the indignities offered to the royal captive..." It is reported that Lotf Ali Khan was blinded. Lotf Ali Khan was imprisoned and tortured in Tehran before being choked to death in the late of 1794.
Legacy
The British writer Sir Harford Jones Brydges knew Lotf Ali, whom he called, "the last chivalrous figure among the kings of Persia." Brydges writes sadly of Lotf Ali's death, of his "little son" who was castrated, his daughters who were forced to marry "the scum of the earth" and his wife who was dishonoured.
Accounts of Lotf Ali Khan's personality and behavior depict a person of courage and perseverance who inspired great loyalty among his followers. Had he been able to defeat Agha Mohammad Khan, he might have restored his family's dynasty and its good name. But a fatal mistake in a pivotal battle effectively ended Lotf Ali Khan's ambitions. With his defeat, the 44-year reign of the Zands came to an end and the first chapter in the 131-year Qajar dynasty was written.
His tomb is in Emamzadeh Zeid in the Old Bazaar of Tehran. His portrait is in the Museum of Fine Arts in Sadabad Palace. It is said that Lotf Ali Khan was uniquely handsome and tremendously skillful with the sword.
Today one of the main avenues in Shiraz bears Lotf Ali Khan Zand's name. In Shiraz and other cities, streets bear the name of the Zand patriarch Karim Khan. They are the only former rulers of Persia whose names have been preserved in this way in the post-revolutionary period. This is largely due to the fact that Karim Khan Zand never claimed the title of king or shah, but chose simply to declare himself the advocate or regent of the people.
References
Sources
Perry, John R., Karim Khan Zand A History of Iran 1747–1779, , Univ. of Chicago Press, 1979, pp. 299–301
Mostafa, Abdollah, The Administrative and Social History of the Qajar Period Vol. 1, , Mazda Publishers, 1997, pp. 6–8
Malcolm, John, "The History of Persia, Volume II Part 1, 1829 (Reprinted 2004 by Elibron Classics)
Sykes, Percy Molesworth, "A History of Persia Vol 1", MacMillan and Co, 1915
Executed monarchs
Zand monarchs
1760s births
1794 deaths
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41074441
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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bala%20Mahalleh-ye%20Golrudbar
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Bala Mahalleh-ye Golrudbar
|
Bala Mahalleh-ye Golrudbar (, also Romanized as Bālā Maḩalleh-ye Golrūdbār and Bālā Maḩalleh-ye Gol-e Rūdbār) is a village in Baz Kia Gurab Rural District, in the Central District of Lahijan County, Gilan Province, Iran. At the 2006 census, its population was 209, in 63 families.
References
Populated places in Lahijan County
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41074442
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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Baz%20Kia%20Gurab
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Baz Kia Gurab
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Baz Kia Gurab (, also Romanized as Bāz Kīā Gūrāb, Bāzkīā Gūrāb, Bāz Kīyā Gūrāb, and Bāz Keyā Gūrāb; also known as Bāzgīā Gūrāb, Bazkiya Koorab, Bāzkiya Qurāb, Blzkiya-Kurab, and Keyā Gūrāb) is a village in Baz Kia Gurab Rural District of the Central District of Lahijan County, Gilan province, Iran.
At the 2006 National Census, its population was 4,213 in 1,220 households. The following census in 2011 counted 4,491 people in 1,489 households. The latest census in 2016 showed a population of 4,166 people in 1,469 households. It was the largest village in its rural district.
References
Lahijan County
Populated places in Gilan Province
Populated places in Lahijan County
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41074444
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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bahador%20Kalayeh
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Bahador Kalayeh
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Bahador Kalayeh (, also Romanized as Bahādor Kalāyeh) is a village in Baz Kia Gurab Rural District, in the Central District of Lahijan County, Gilan Province, Iran. At the 2006 census, its population was 199, in 71 families.
References
Populated places in Lahijan County
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41074449
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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Don%20R.%20Pears
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Don R. Pears
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Don R. Pears (September 18, 1899 – July 17, 1992) was a Republican politician from Michigan who served in the Michigan House of Representatives, and as its Speaker during the 70th and 71st Legislatures. He also served as register of deeds and later as clerk of Berrien County.
A lifelong resident of southwest Michigan, Pears was a school principal and a real estate broker. He was also a veteran of the U.S. Army and a member of the American Legion, the Veterans of Foreign Wars, AMVETS, and the Reserve Officers Association, as well as of the Elks, Eagles, Moose, and Odd Fellows.
References
1899 births
1992 deaths
Speakers of the Michigan House of Representatives
Republican Party members of the Michigan House of Representatives
People from Buchanan, Michigan
American school administrators
American real estate brokers
United States Army personnel of World War I
United States Army personnel of World War II
Businesspeople from Michigan
20th-century American politicians
Educators from Michigan
20th-century American businesspeople
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41074455
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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List%20of%20Roman%20tribunes
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List of Roman tribunes
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The following is a list of Roman tribunes as reported by ancient sources.
A tribune in ancient Rome was a person who held one of a number of offices, including tribune of the plebs (a political office to represent the interests of the plebs), Military tribune (a rank in the Roman army), Tribune of the Celeres (the commander of the king's personal bodyguard), and various other positions. Unless otherwise noted all dates are reported in BC.
List of Tribunes of the Celeres of the Roman Kingdom
The following individuals held the position of Tribune of the Celeres (Tribunus Celerum), the captain of the king's bodyguard who had authority to preside over the Curiate Assembly (Comitia Curiata) during the period of the Roman Kingdom (753–509).
List of tribunes of the plebs of the Roman Republic
The following individuals held the position of tribune of the plebs (tribunus plebis) during the Roman Republic, starting with the creation of the office in 493 BC.
5th century BC
493: Lucius Albinius C. f. Paterculus
493: Gaius Icilius (Viscellius?) Ruga
493: Lucius Junius Brutus
493: Gaius Licinius
493: Publius Licinius
493: Lucius Sicinius L. f. Vellutus (Bellutus?)
493: Spurius Icilius
492: Spurius Sicinius Bellutus (or Spurius Icilius?)
491: Lucius Sicinius Vellutus
491: Marcus Decius
489: Maenius
486: Gaius Rabuleius
486: Publius Mucius Scaevola
486: Spurius Cassius
483: Gaius Maenius
481: Spurius Licinius (or Spurius Icilius?)
480: Titus Pontificius
476: Titus Genucius
476: Quintus Considius
475: Lucius Caedicius
475: Titus Statius
473: Gnaeus Genucius
472: Volero Publilius
472: Lucius Numitorius
472: Volero Publilius
471: Gaius Laetorius
470: Spurius Icilius
470: Lucius Mecilius
470: Lucius Numitorius
470: Marcus Duillius
470: Gaius Sicinius
462: Gaius Terentilius (Terentilius?) Arsa
462: Sextus Titius
461: Marcus Volscius Fictor
461: Aulus Verginius
460: Aulus Verginius
460: Marcus Volscius Fictor
459: Aulus Verginius
459: Marcus Volscius Fictor
458: Aulus Verginius
458: Marcus Volscius Fictor
457: Aulus Verginius
457: Marcus Volscius Fictor
456: Lucius Alienus
456: Lucius Icilius S. f.
455: Lucius Icilius S. f.
454: Lucius Siccius Dentatus
454: Gaius Calvius Cicero
449: Gaius Apronius
449: Publius Numitorius
449: Gaius Oppius
449: Marcus Pomponius
449: Lucius Verginius
449: Appius (Publius?) Villius
449: Lucius Icilius S. f.
449: Marcuis Duillius
449: Gaius Sicinius
449: Marcus Titinius
448: Aulus Aternius Varus (Varus Fontinalis)
448: Spurius Tarpeius (Montanus Capitolinus)
448: Lucius Trebonius Asper
445: Gaius Canuleius
445: Gaius Furnius
442: Poetilius
439: Quintus Caecilius
439: Quintus Junius
439: Lucius Minucius (Esquilinus Augurinus)
439: Sextus Titinius
438: Lucius Minucius Augurinus
436: Spurius Maelius
423: Gaius Junius
422: Sextus (Tiberius?) Antistius
422: Marcus Asellius
422: Tiberius Spurillius
422: Sextus Tempanius
422: Quintus Hortensius
420: Aulus Antistius
420: Manius Canuleius
420: Marcus Canuleius
420: Sextus Pompilius
416: Spurius Maecilius (at least four times, the fourth occasion in 416 BC)
416: Spurius (Marcus?) Metilius
415: Lucius Decius
414: Marcus Sextius
413: Lucius Icilius
412: Lucius Icilius
410: Marcus Menenius
409: Icilius (brother to the other two this year)
409: Icilius (brother to the other two this year)
409: Lucius Icilius
401: Marcus Minucius
401: Gnaeus Trebonius
401: Marcus Acutius
401: Gaius Lacerius
401: Marcus Metilius
401: Publius Curatius
401: Marcus Acutius
4th century BC
3rd century BC
300: Quintus Ogulnius (Gallus)
300: Gnaeus Ogulnius
298: Marcus Curius Dentatus
293: Marcus Scantius
286: Maenius
286: Aquilius
285: Gaius Aelius
279: Maenius
270: Marcus Fulvius Flaccus
248: Gaius Fundanius Fundulus
248: Pullius
241: Genucius
232: Gaius Flaminius
220: Marcus Metilius
219: Maenius
218: Quintus Claudius
217: Quintus Baebius Herennius
217: Marcus Metilius
216: Marcus Minucius Augurinus
216: Lucius Scribonius Libo
216: Quintus Baebius Herennius
215: Gaius Oppius
213: Lucius Caecilius L. f. L. n. Metellus
213: Marcus Caecilius Metellus
212: Spurius Carvilius
212: Lucius Carvilius
212: Gaius Servilius Casca
211: Gaius Sempronius Blaesus
211: Publius Aquilius
211: Gaius Servilius Geminus
211: Publius Villius
210: Marcus Lucretius
210: Gaius Arrenius
210: Lucius Arrenius
210: Lucius Atilius
210: Marcus Lucretius
209: Gaius Publicius Bibulus
204: Marcus Cincius Alimentus
204: Tiberius Claudius Asellus
204: Gnaeus Baebius (Tamphilus)
204: Marcus Claudius Marcellus
204: Licinius
204: Marcus Silius
204: Publius Silius
203: Gnaeus Baebius (Tamphilus)
201: Manius Acilius Glabrio
201: Quintus Minucius Thermus
200: Quintus Baebius
200: Tiberius Sempronius Longus
2nd century BC
Unless otherwise indicated, entries are based on T.R.S. Broughton, Magistrates of the Roman Republic, vol. I (1951).
199: P. Porcius Laeca
198: M. Fulvius
198: M'. Curius
197: Gaius Acilius Glabrio
197: Q. Fulvius
197: L. Oppius (Salinator)
196: C. Afranius (Stellio?)
196: C. Atinius Labeo (probably)
196: C. Licinius Lucullus
196: Q. Marcius Ralla
195: M. Fundanius
195: M. Junius Brutus
195: P. Junius Brutus
195: L. Valerius (Tappo)
194: M. Baebius (Tamphilus) (uncertain)
193: Q. Aelius Tubero
193: M. Sempronius (Tuditanus)
192: C. Titinius
192: M. Titinius (Curvus?)
before 192: Plaetorius
191: P. Sempronius Blaesus
189: P. Sempronius Gracchus
189: C. Sempronius Rutilus
189: (Q.) Terentius Culleo
188: C. Valerius Tappo
187: M. Aburius
187: L. Mummius
187: Q. Mummius
187: Q. Petillius
187: Q. Petillius (Spurinus)
c. 184: M. Caelius
184: C. Fannius
184: C. Minucius Augurinus
184: M. Naevius
184: Ti. Sempronius Gracchus
182: C. Orchius
180: L. Villius Annalis
177: Q. Aelius
177: Licinius Nerva
177: C. Papirius Turdus
bef. 175: Plaetorius
172: M. Lucretius
172: Q. Marcius Scilla
172: M. Marcius Sermo
171: M. Claudius Marcellus
171: M. Fulvius Nobilior
170: Cn. Aufidius
170: M'. Juventius Thalna
169: P. Rutilius
169: Q. Voconius Saxa
168: Cn. Tremellius
167: M. Antonius
167: M. Pomponius
167: Ti. Sempronius
c. 154: L. Aurelius Cotta
c. 154: Q. Caecilius Metellus (Macedonicus)
c. 153: Aelius (probably)
c. 153: Fufius (probably)
c. 149: Atinius
149: L. Calpurnius Piso Frugi
149: L. Scribonius Libo
149: M. Scantius (or Scantinius?) (uncertain)
146: Livius
145: C. Licinius Crassus
143: (T.?) Didius
c. 142: C. Fannius
141: P. Mucius Scaevola
140: Ti. Claudius Asellus
139: A. Gabinius
138: C. Curiatius
138: Sp. Licinius
137: M. Antius Briso
137: L. Cassius Longinus Ravilla
137: C. Fannius Strabo
136: P. Rutilius
133: (Q.?) Mucius (or Minucius? Mummius?)
133: M. Octavius
133: Rubrius
133: P. Satureius
133: Ti. Sempronius Gracchus
132: Pompeius
131: C. Atinius Labeo Macerio
c. 130: Q. Aelius Tubero
130 (or 131): C. Papirius Carbo
126: M. Junius Pennus
c. 123: Aufeius
c. 123: M. Junius (Silanus)
123: C. Sempronius Gracchus
c. 122: (M'.?) Acilius Glabrio
122: M. Fulvius Flaccus
122: M. Livius Drusus
c. 122: Cn. Marcius Censorinus
122: (C.?) Rubrius
122: C. Sempronius Gracchus
c. 121: Maevius
121: Minucius Rufus
120 (or 121): L. Calpurnius Bestia
120: P. Decius
119: C. Marius
113: Sex. Peducaeus
111: C. Baebius
c. 111: C. Licinius Nerva
111: C. Memmius
c. 111: Sp. Thorius
110: L. Annius
110: P. Licinius Lucullus
109: C. Mamilius Limetanus
107: C. Coelius Caldus
107: L. Licinius Crassus
107: T. Manlius Mancinus
106: Q. Mucius Scaevola (Pontifex)
104: L. Cassius Longinus
104: Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus
c. 104: L. Marcius Philippus
c. 104: Clodius (possibly)
103: L. Appuleius Saturninus
103: L. Aurelius Cotta
103: (M.?) Baebius (Tamphilus?)
103: T. Didius
103: C. Norbanus
103: L. (Antistius?) Reginus
102: A. Pompeius
101: C. Servilius Glaucia
100: L. Appuleius Saturninus
1st century BC
Unless otherwise indicated, entries are based on T.R.S. Broughton, Magistrates of the Roman Republic, vol. II (1952).
References
Bibliography
Titus Livius Patavinus (Livy), Ab Urbe Condita (History of Rome).
Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Romaike Archaiologia (Roman Antiquities).
Smith, William (ed. 1870), Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology.
Marcus Tullius Cicero, Brutus, De Oratore, De Officiis, De Natura Deorum, Epistulae ad Familiares, Laelius de Amicitia, In Verrem, Pro Gaio Rabirio Perduellionis Reo, Florus, Pro Quintus Roscius, Epistulae ad Atticum, Epistulae ad Quintum Fratrem, In Vatinium Testem, Post Reditum in Senatu, De Haruspicum Responsis, Pro Plancio, De Domo Sua, Pro Sestio, Pro Rabirio Postumo, Philippicae.
Plutarch, The Life of Gaius Gracchus, The Life of Tiberius Gracchus, The Life of Marius, The Life of Pompey, The Life of Crassus, The Life of Cato the Younger, The Life of Cicero, The Life of Caesar, The Life of Antony.
Macrobius Ambrosius Theodosius, Saturnalia.
Publius Cornelius Tacitus, Annales (Annals), Historiae (Histories), De Origine et Situ Germanorum (The Origin and Situation of the Germans, or "Germania").
Stockton, David (1979). The Gracchi. Oxford University Press.
Cornell, T. J. The Fragments of the Roman Historians (2013)
Appianus Alexandrinus (Appian), Bellum Civile (The Civil War), Bella Mithridatica (The Mithridatic Wars)
Gaius Sallustius Crispus (Sallust), Bellum Jugurthinum (The Jugurthine War).
Auctor, De Viris Illustribus (On Illustrious Men)
Julius Obsequens, Liber de Prodigiis (Book of Prodigies)
Marcus Velleius Paterculus, Compendium of Roman History
Hazel, John. Who's Who in the Roman World, Psychology Press (2001).
Tyrrell, William B. Biography of Titus Labienus, Caesar's Lieutenant in Gaul. Diss. Michigan State Univ., 1970. 10 May 2007
Valerius Maximus, Factorum ac Dictorum Memorabilium (Memorable Facts and Sayings).
Gaius Suetonius Tranquilis (Suetonius), Caligula, The Life Of Caesar
Quintus Asconius Pedianus, Commentarius in Oratio Ciceronis Pro Milone (Commentary on Cicero's Oration Pro Milone).
https://web.archive.org/web/20080422073924/http://www.ancientlibrary.com/smith-bio/1334.html
Chisholm, Hugh, ed. (1911). "Cassius s.v Quintus Cassius Longinus". Encyclopædia Britannica. 5 (11th ed.). Cambridge University Press.
Gaius Julius Caesar, De Bello Civili (On the Civil War)
Lucius Cassius Dio Cocceianus (Cassius Dio), Roman History.
Michel Crawford & Timothy Peter Wiseman, "The Coinage of the Age of Sulla", in The Numismatic Chronicle and Journal of the Royal Numismatic Society, Seventh Series, Vol. 4 (1964), pp. 141–158, Appendix II, pp. 156, 157.
Tribune
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41074463
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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mian%20Gavaber
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Mian Gavaber
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Mian Gavaber () may refer to:
Mian Gavaber, Lahijan
Mian Gavaber, Langarud
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41074488
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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Type%20Media%20Center
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Type Media Center
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Type Media Center (formerly The Nation Institute) is a nonprofit media organization that was previously associated with The Nation magazine. It sponsors fellows, hosts forums, publishes books and investigative reporting, and awards several annual journalism prizes. Orville Schell worked for the organization, and Katrina vanden Heuvel is currently a member of their board of trustees.
Type Media Center fellows have included Naomi Klein, Wayne Barrett, Chris Hedges, David Moberg, Jeremy Scahill, and Chris Hayes. The organization has also funded podcasts, short-form broadcast media, and documentaries, including several by Habiba Nosheen.
Type is one of the presenters of the Ridenhour Prizes. It collaborates on the Puffin Prize for Creative Citizenship with the Puffin Foundation. Tom Engelhardt is the creator of the organization's TomDispatch.com, a widely syndicated online blog.
Type started its publishing imprint Bold Type Books (formerly Nation Books) in 2000, in partnership with Thunder's Mouth Press. In 2007, Perseus Books Group acquired Avalon Publishing Group, which was the parent company of Thunder's Mouth Press. Bold Type Books’ current partner imprint is Hachette Book Group.
Type's investigative newsroom, Type Investigations (formerly The Investigative Fund), was founded in 1996. It is known for producing long-form investigations, primarily for national magazines, into abuses of power, inequality, and government malfeasance. Unlike a conventional outlet that maintains its own distribution platform, Type Investigations primarily publishes via partnerships with print, radio, and television outlets. It is one of the only women-led investigative newsrooms among Institute for Nonprofit News member organizations.
In addition to working with freelance reporters, Type Investigations’ past and current reporting fellows have included Nick Turse, Wayne Barrett, Jeremy Scahill, Sharon Lerner, Janine di Giovanni, Lee Fang, Sarah Posner, John Carlos Frey, and Ali Gharib. The project has received four Emmy Awards, three National Magazine Awards, and a Peabody, and a 2019 investigation into the U.S. Department of the Interior prompted a congressional inquiry.
References
External links
The Nation
Non-profit organizations based in New York City
Publishing companies established in 2000
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41074500
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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert%20Wade-Gery
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Robert Wade-Gery
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Sir Robert Wade-Gery (22 April 1929 – 16 February 2015) was a British diplomat who was High Commissioner to India 1982–87.
Biography
Wade-Gery was born in Oxford on 22 April 1929. His father, Theodore Wade-Gery was an ancient historian and fellow of Wadham College, Oxford and his mother was Vivian Whitfield, an archaeologist.
Wade-Gery was educated at Winchester College and New College, Oxford, where he achieved a double first class degree. He then passed the examination to become a Fellow of All Souls 1951–58; subsequently he was a "Fifty-Pound Fellow" 1959–73 and a "Two-Year Fellow" 1987–89; he was an Honorary Fellow from 2011 until his death in 2015.
On 16 June 1962, he married Sarah Marris and they had two children together. He died, after having a stroke, on the 16 February 2015 in Gloucestershire.
Wade-Gery was appointed CMG in the Queen's Birthday Honours of 1979, knighted KCMG in the New Year Honours of 1983 and given the additional knighthood of KCVO in November 1983.
Career
Exempted from national service due to poor eyesight, he joined the Foreign Service in 1951 and served at Bonn, Tel Aviv and Saigon as well as posts at the Foreign Office (later the Foreign and Commonwealth Office). His Saigon posting was during the Vietnam War, including a period where the American Embassy across the road was captured by the Viet Cong and his wife and daughter had to be evacuated..
He was Minister at Madrid 1973–77 and at Moscow 1977–79, deputy Secretary of the Cabinet 1979–82, and High Commissioner to India 1982–87. He then left the Diplomatic Service and was a director of Barclays Capital 1987–99. He was a member and treasurer (1991–2005) of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, and was chairman of the governors of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London (1990–1999).
References
WADE-GERY, Sir Robert (Lucian), Who's Who 2014, A & C Black, 2014; online edn, Oxford University Press, Nov 2014
Interview with Sir Robert Wade-Gery (including biography), British Diplomatic Oral History Programme, Churchill College, Cambridge
External links
Sir Robert Wade-Gery: Diplomat who as a member of Margaret Thatcher’s war cabinet during the Falklands crisis delivered the order to sink the Belgrano (full-page obituary), The Times, London, 26 February 2015, page 57
Obituary: Sir Robert Wade-Gery KCMG KCVO, 1929–2015, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 20 February 2015
Sir Robert Wade-Gery, diplomat - obituary, The Telegraph, London, 5 March 2015
1929 births
2015 deaths
People educated at Winchester College
Alumni of New College, Oxford
Fellows of All Souls College, Oxford
High Commissioners of the United Kingdom to India
Knights Commander of the Order of St Michael and St George
Knights Commander of the Royal Victorian Order
Barclays people
People associated with SOAS University of London
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41074513
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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ali%20Al-Wardi
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Ali Al-Wardi
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Ali Al-Wardi () was an Iraqi Social Scientist specialized in the field of Social history.
Early life and education
Born in Kadhimiya, Baghdad in 1913, to a religious and very traditional family. He grew up defying his family's strict non-modern-educational policy, where his father wanted him to learn a craft instead of reading books. Nevertheless, Al-Wardi grew up with a disliking for work and crafts and a strong liking for books.
He managed to finish his elementary and high school and was awarded the number one student in the Kingdom of Iraq. He later was appointed as a teacher in different elementary and high schools across Iraq, before winning a scholarship to the American University of Beirut, where he received his bachelor's degree in 1943. He was back in Iraq and was forced into marriage per his father's orders.
A few years later, he traveled to the United States to attain his master's and PhD degrees. He earned his master's degree in 1948 from The University of Texas and his PhD in 1950 from the same university. During that time he used to spend his summers in the United Kingdom learning English in available institutes.
Career
He came back to Iraq to start his career in writing many of his books based on the theory of Ibn Khaldun about Al-Badwa (Nomadic society) vs Al-Hadhara (Civil society).
Works
The most important works of Ali Al-Wardi are:
Psychological Insights from Modern Iraqi History
A Study into the Nature of Iraqi Society
The Personality of the Iraqi Individual: A Study of Iraqi Personality in Light of New Psychological Science
The Sultans' Preachers ()
The Mockery of the Human Mind ()
Ibn Khaldoon's Teachings based on his Character, Civilization and Personality
The Sage of the Fine Arts
Dreams Between Science and Belief
The Secrets of a Successful Personality
That is How they Killed the Princess (water-cress)
In 2014, the Iraqi Ministry of Culture, through its publishing house, Dar al-Mamoon, has commissioned a team of the best Iraqi translators to translate al-Wardi's major work لمحات اجتماعية من تاريخ العراق الحديث (Social Glimpses of Iraq's Modern History), and Yasin T. al-Jibouri, is one of them. Al-Jibouri's contribution is the translation of Volume Six and its supplement which is renamed Volume Seven.
See also
Ibn al-Wardi
References
1913 births
1995 deaths
Writers from Baghdad
20th-century Iraqi historians
Iraqi anthropologists
Iraqi sociologists
Iraqi social sciences writers
American University of Beirut alumni
University of Texas alumni
Iraqi secularists
20th-century anthropologists
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41074539
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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Golrudbar
|
Golrudbar
|
Golrudbar or Gol-e Rudbar or Galrudbar or Gelrudbar or Gol Roodbar (), also rendered as Gil-i-Rudbar or Gul-i-Rudbar or Kolrudbar, may refer to:
Bala Mahalleh-ye Golrudbar
Mian Mahalleh-ye Golrudbar
Pain Mahalleh-ye Golrudbar
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41074540
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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chormaqan
|
Chormaqan
|
Chormaqan (also Chormagan or Chormaqan Noyan) (; Khalkha Mongolian: ; died c. 1241) was one of the most famous generals of the Mongol Empire under Genghis Khan and Ögedei Khan. He was also a member of the keshik.
Career
A member of the Sunud tribe, Chormaqan is mentioned in The Secret History of Mongols many times. He probably participated in the Mongol campaigns in North China and later in the Subutai's and Jebe's famous journey through Caucasus and Russian steppes. He was a quiver bearer, as such often mentioned in sources as "Qurchi".
Appointed by Ögedei in the winter of 1230 to renew the Mongol conquests in Persia, which had languished since Genghis Khan's assault on and near destruction of the Khwarezmid Empire from 1218 to 1223. His army reportedly consisted of from 30.000 to 50.000 men. At the approach of Chormagan and the new Mongol army, the small Khwarezmid band under Jalal ad-Din were swept away. Further campaigns in the mid-1230s, based from the steppes in Azerbaijan around Tabriz, firmly established the Kingdom of Georgia and Armenian Kingdom of Cilicia as vassals. It is theorized that these moves may have been made to secure communications for the attack westward led by Batu that followed shortly thereafter.
Chormaqan also received submission of Qutlugkhanids in Kerman, whose ruler Buraq Hajib sent his son Rukn al-Din Mubarak Khwaja to Ögedei's court. Another local noble who submitted was Salghurid atabeg Abu Bakr b. Sa'd I, who sent his brother or nephew Tahamtan to Karakorum. Isfahan didn't submit to Mongol rule, therefore he had to lay a siege to there in 1236. Upon submission of Georgian and Armenian feudals, he divided Georgia up to 8 tumens and set up Ganja as his powerbase, although some sources state he Ani, Kars and environs. His rule weakened in 1239 on arrival of Chinqai and Korguz to Khorasan, to whom fiscal administrator was transferred by Ögedei.
Chormaqan died around 1241 and was replaced by Baiju, his lieutenant.
Family
His wife Altani held considerable amount of influence in ordo, upon whose suggestion Baiju was appointed. His son Shiramun later served under the Il-khans Hulagu and Abaqa. His daughter Esukan was married to King David VII of Georgia. His other son was Bora. Armenian Prince Hasan Jalal offered him the hand of his daughter Ruzanna (Ruzukan). Bora was executed during reign of Hulagu.
References
External links
Chormaqan Noyan: The First Mongol Military Governor in the Middle East by Timothy May
Chormaqan and the Mongol Conquest of the Middle East by Timothy May
Generals of the Mongol Empire
Genghis Khan
1241 deaths
Year of birth unknown
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41074589
|
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Woodson%20Farmstead
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Woodson Farmstead
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Woodson Farmstead was a historic agricultural property located off of Three Bridges Road near the intersection of South Carolina Highway 153 in Powdersville, South Carolina. It consisted of an early twentieth century fruit and pecan grove, a ca. 1875 well house and cotton house and a farmhouse built in 1895. The property was originally purchased in 1850 by William Woodson, who sold the property to his nephew, James Allen Woodson in 1892. It is listed on the National Register of Historic Places (NRHP).
In 1895, James Woodson commissioned Washington, D.C.-based builder John O. Scheck to design and construct his farmhouse. Unlike a typical farmhouse in the region, the two-story house was built with Eastlake and Queen Anne ornamentation including stained glass windows and an elaborately detailed porch.
The farmhouse was the last building standing and it was demolished in 2011. However, the farmstead has not been delisted from the NRHP as of November 13, 2013.
References
National Register of Historic Places in Anderson County, South Carolina
Houses completed in 1895
Houses on the National Register of Historic Places in South Carolina
Demolished buildings and structures in South Carolina
Victorian architecture in South Carolina
1890s establishments in South Carolina
Houses in Anderson County, South Carolina
Buildings and structures demolished in 2011
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41074591
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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chafal
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Chafal
|
Chafal (, also Romanized as Chofel; also known as Chepul, Chofīl, Pol-e Shomrūd, and Shamrūd) is a village in Baz Kia Gurab Rural District, in the Central District of Lahijan County, Gilan Province, Iran. At the 2006 census, its population was 401, in 125 families.
References
Populated places in Lahijan County
|
41074594
|
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Delijan%2C%20Lahijan
|
Delijan, Lahijan
|
Delijan (, also Romanized as Delījān) is a village in Baz Kia Gurab Rural District, in the Central District of Lahijan County, Gilan Province, Iran. At the 2006 census, its population was 130, in 38 families.
References
Populated places in Lahijan County
|
41074596
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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deh%20Sar%2C%20Baz%20Kia%20Gurab
|
Deh Sar, Baz Kia Gurab
|
Dehsar () is a village in Baz Kia Gurab Rural District, in the Central District of Lahijan County, Gilan Province, Iran. At the 2006 census, its population was 432, in 127 families. The village is surrounded by rice fields which is the main job of most people who live here.
References
Populated places in Lahijan County
|
41074598
|
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Derapeshtan
|
Derapeshtan
|
Derapeshtan (, also Romanized as Derāpeshtān) is a village in Baz Kia Gurab Rural District, in the Central District of Lahijan County, Gilan Province, Iran. At the 2006 census, its population was 192, in 60 families.
References
Populated places in Lahijan County
|
41074599
|
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hajjiabad%2C%20Lahijan
|
Hajjiabad, Lahijan
|
Hajjiabad (, also Romanized as Ḩājjīābād) is a village in Baz Kia Gurab Rural District, in the Central District of Lahijan County, Gilan Province, Iran. At the 2006 census, its population was 1,673, in 468 families.
References
Populated places in Lahijan County
|
41074602
|
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Khalu%20Bagh
|
Khalu Bagh
|
Khalu Bagh (, also Romanized as Khālū Bāgh) is a village in Baz Kia Gurab Rural District, in the Central District of Lahijan County, Gilan Province, Iran. At the 2006 census, its population was 1,057, in 300 families.
References
Populated places in Lahijan County
|
41074605
|
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kolashta%20Jan
|
Kolashta Jan
|
Kolashta Jan (, also Romanized as Kolashtā Jān and Koleshtājān; also known as Kolashtjān and Kulushtladzhan) is a village in Baz Kia Gurab Rural District, in the Central District of Lahijan County, Gilan Province, Iran. At the 2006 census, its population was 805, in 257 families.
References
Populated places in Lahijan County
|
41074606
|
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lashidan-e%20Hokumati
|
Lashidan-e Hokumati
|
Lashidan-e Hokumati (, also Romanized as Lāshīdān-e Ḩokūmatī) is a village in Baz Kia Gurab Rural District, in the Central District of Lahijan County, Gilan Province, Iran. At the 2006 census, its population was 1,425, in 402 families.
References
Populated places in Lahijan County
|
41074607
|
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Malbijar
|
Malbijar
|
Malbijar (, also Romanized as Mālbījār) is a village in Baz Kia Gurab Rural District, in the Central District of Lahijan County, Gilan Province, Iran. At the 2006 census, its population was 158, in 42 families.
References
Populated places in Lahijan County
|
41074609
|
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pain%20Mahalleh-ye%20Golrudbar
|
Pain Mahalleh-ye Golrudbar
|
Pain Mahalleh-ye Golrudbar (, also Romanized as Pā’īn Maḩalleh-ye Golrūdbār and Pā’īn Maḩalleh-ye Gol-e Rūdbār; also known as Galrūdbār) is a village in Baz Kia Gurab Rural District, in the Central District of Lahijan County, Gilan Province, Iran. At the 2006 census, its population was 188, in 58 families.
References
Populated places in Lahijan County
|
41074610
|
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mian%20Mahalleh-ye%20Golrudbar
|
Mian Mahalleh-ye Golrudbar
|
Mian Mahalleh-ye Golrudbar (, also Romanized as Mīān Maḩalleh-ye Golrūdbār; also known as Gelrūdbār, Gil-i-Rudbar, Gol Roodbar, Golrūdbār, Gul-i-Rūdbār, and Kolrūdbār) is a village in Baz Kia Gurab Rural District, in the Central District of Lahijan County, Gilan Province, Iran. At the 2006 census, its population was 503, in 145 families.
References
Populated places in Lahijan County
|
41074611
|
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sadat%20Mahalleh%2C%20Baz%20Kia%20Gurab
|
Sadat Mahalleh, Baz Kia Gurab
|
Sadat Mahalleh (, also Romanized as Sādāt Maḩalleh; also known as Sādāt Maḩalleh-ye Gelrūdbār) is a village in Baz Kia Gurab Rural District, in the Central District of Lahijan County, Gilan Province, Iran. At the 2006 census, its population was 198, in 56 families.
References
Populated places in Lahijan County
|
41074613
|
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David%20Bews
|
David Bews
|
David Bews (April 1850 – 24 February 1891) was a newspaper editor, politician in colonial South Australia and Minister of Education. He was a member of the South Australian House of Assembly from 1885 until his death in 1891, representing the electorate of Wallaroo.
Bews was born near Kirkwall, in the Orkney Islands of Scotland, and went to South Australia with his parents the following year. In 1853, during the gold rush in Victoria, his family removed to that colony, but only to return one year later. Bews' father then engaged in farming operations near Port Elliot, and afterwards near Adelaide. Bews was educated at Allen Martin's school in Port Adelaide then worked as a farmer until he reached the age of majority, when he secured a position as clerk with the Kadina & Wallaroo Railway Company. He subsequently became goods manager, but seven years later (in 1878), when the Government took over the line, he left the service to work for the Kadina and Wallaroo Times. He soon became editor of the newspaper, serving in that position for the rest of his life. He was mayor of the Corporate Town of Wallaroo from 1880 to 1882, besides which he was a member of the Yorke's Peninsula Board of Main Roads and the School Board of Advice.
Bews was elected to the South Australian House of Assembly on 16 February 1885, at a by-election following the resignation of Henry Allerdale Grainger; he had previously contested and lost the seat at the 1884 election. Bews was re-elected on 19 March 1887, and at the 1890 election. In August of that year he accepted the office of Minister of Education in Thomas Playford II's Government. Bews, who had been appointed one of the South Australian delegates at the Postal Convention, died in Melbourne whilst en route to Sydney on 24 February 1891. A memorial fountain in honour of Bews was constructed in 1893.
References
1850 births
1891 deaths
Members of the South Australian House of Assembly
Scottish emigrants to Australia
People from Orkney
19th-century Australian politicians
Mayors of places in South Australia
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41074614
|
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shakakom
|
Shakakom
|
Shakakom (, also Romanized as Shakākom) is a village in Baz Kia Gurab Rural District, in the Central District of Lahijan County, Gilan Province, Iran. At the 2006 census, its population was 391, in 120 families.
References
Populated places in Lahijan County
|
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