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- Captured from Unit (enemy or warring faction) (including national
identifying letters in accordance with STANAG 1059).
- Summary of circumstances of capture.
- Associated CPERS.
e. CE and ATD to be used as evidence in legal proceedings against
CPERS suspected of crimes against humanity and war crimes will be kept
under guard separate from other CE and ATD. |
2-22.3 | 303 | FM 2-22.3
Appendix F
NATO System of Allocating Interrogation Serial Numbers
1. Every captured person selected for interrogation will be given an Interrogation Serial
Number. This number shall be allocated by the Interrogation Unit conducting the first
interrogation of the captured person.
2. The number should not be confused with the Prisoner of War Internment Serial Number
(ISN), which is to be used for administrative purposes only.
3. The purpose of the Interrogation Serial Number is to identify the source of information to
ensure its proper evaluation, processing, and follow-up action. It will also identify the nationality
and location of the interrogation unit.
4. The number shall be constituted as follows:
a. 2 letters to indicate the Nationality of the captured person (see para 6).
b. 2 letters to indicate the Service of the captured person (see para 7).
c. 1 letter to indicate the Arm of Service of the captured person (see para 8).
d. 4 numbers to indicate the Interrogation Sequence Number of the captured person (see
para 9).
e. 4 numbers to indicate the Day and Month of Capture.
f. A dash (-) to show a sequence break.
g. 4 letters to indicate the Nationality and Service of the Interrogation Unit (see para 10).
h. 4 letters to indicate the Interrogation Unit.
5. Each group shall be separated by a dash. The final number shall therefore appear as in the
following examples:
LS – NV – B – 0012 – 2105 – USNV – 0159
Liechtenstein – Naval prisoner – Seaman – 12th captured person interrogated -
captured 21 May – interrogated by US Navy – team 159
AN – AF – H – 0357 – 0211 – GEAF – 0007
Andorra – Air force prisoner – Intelligence – 357th captured person interrogated –
captured 2 Nov – interrogated by GE Air Force – team 7 |
2-22.3 | 304 | FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
SM – AR – X – 0431 – 0707 – UKAR – 0019
San Marino – Army prisoner – One star or above – 431st captured person interrogated –
captured 7 Jul – interrogated by UK Army – team 19
6. The two letters used for indicating the Nationality of the captured person will be in
accordance with established NATO Country codes in STANAG 1059.
7. The following list of letters is to be used to indicate the Service of the captured person:
AR - Army NI - Naval Infantry
NV - Navy AB - Airborne Forces
NA - Naval Air Arm SF - Special Purpose Forces
AF - Air Force PL - Police
IR - Irregular CV - Civilian (other than Police)
8. The following list of letters is to be used to indicate the Arm of Service of the captured person:
Navy Army Air Force Other/Partisan
(A) (B) (C) Forces
(D)
A. Aircrew Aircrew Aircrew Aircrew
B. Seamen Infantry Ground Crew Merchant Marine
C. Communications Signals Communications Radio
Officers/Operators
D. Weapons/ Electrical/Electronic Electrical/Electronic
Electronic Engineer Engineer Engineer
E. Mechanical/ Engineers Mechanical/Air
Marine/Engineers Frame/Engineers
F. Gunnery Artillery Ordnance Weapons/Ordnance
Explosives
G. *HQ Staff *HQ Staff *HQ Staff *HQ Staff
H. Intelligence Intelligence Intelligence Intelligence
I. Marines Airborne Forces Airfield Defense
J. Cooks/Stewards Catering Catering Catering
K. Legal/Political Legal/Political Legal/Political Legal/Political
L. Medical/Dental/ Medical/Dental/ Medical/Dental/ Medical/Dental/
Nursing Nursing Nursing Nursing
M. Electronic Electronic Warfare Electronic Warfare Electronic Warfare
Warfare
N. Operations Operations Operations Operations
O. Police Police Police Police
P. Supply Quartermaster Supply Supply
Q. Strategic Strategic Weapons Strategic Weapons Strategic Weapons
Weapons
R. Special Purpose Special Purpose Special Purpose Special Purpose
Forces Forces Forces Forces
S. Air Traffic Control Armored Air Traffic Control Air Traffic Control
T. *Unknown *Unknown *Unknown *Unknown |
2-22.3 | 305 | _________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
Navy Army Air Force Other/Partisan
(A) (B) (C) Forces
(D)
U. Instructors Education Education Instructors
V. Ministers of Ministers of Religion Ministers of Religion Ministers of Religion
Religion
W. *Submarines Artillery Spotters Forward Air Couriers, etc.
Controllers
X. *One Star + *One Star + *One Star + *Officers in Command
of Irregular Forces
Y. *Other *Other *Other *Other
*Notes: G – Headquarters staffs below one star rank
T – Captured Person’s arm of service not known to report writer
W – To be used in respect of all submarines regardless of arm or specialization
X – To be used in respect of all ONE STAR or above officers regardless of army
Y – PW arm of service not included in the appropriate list
9. The sequence number of the interrogated captured personnel shall be of four digits allocated
in numerical order of interrogation by the team first interrogating the captured person.
10. Country, services and team codes.
a. Country codes, as laid down in STANAG 1059, are to be used for indication of the
Nationality of the Interrogation Team.
b. The following lists of letters are to be used for indicating the Service of the Interrogation
Team:
ARMY - AR AIR FORCE - AF
NAVY - NV MARINE - MR
COAST GUARD - CG PARA-MILITARY - PM
c. NATO teams will use the following abbreviations: (These will be determined as
command changes are implemented and STANAG 1059 is revised).
SC EUROPE RC SOUTH
RC NORTH JHQ SOUTHWEST
JHQ NORTH JHQ SOUTH
JHQ NORTHEAST JHQ SOUTH CENTER
JHQ CENTER JHQ SOUTHEAST
CC AIR NORTH CC AIR SOUTH
CC NAV NORTH CC NAV SOUTH
SC ATLANTIC RC EAST
RC WEST STRIK FLTLANT
RC SOUTHEAST SUB ACLANT
11. Nations will allocate 4-digit serial numbers to their interrogation teams. NATO Commands
will issue similar numbers to subordinate national interrogation teams under their command. |
2-22.3 | 307 | FM 2-22.3
Appendix G
Questioning Quick Reference
This appendix offers a quick reference for the trained HUMINT collector. It is not meant to be
all-inclusive, nor instructive in proper questioning technique, but lays out frequently used
requirements grouped logically by OB factor. Proper formation of questions is covered in detail
in Chapter 9.
Missions: Mission questioning consists of three areas: Time of Capture Mission, Future
Mission, and Past Mission. Missions are questioned in that order, to ensure that the information
is collected in the order of importance to a supported commander. Logical follow-up questioning
may lead the collector into any of the OB factors at any time during questioning in order to
provide complete information.
Offensive Missions:
When will the enemy attack?
Where will they attack?
What is the main objective of the attack?
What units will participate in the attack?
What tactics will be employed?
What artillery, air, and other units will support the attack?
Defensive Missions:
Where will the enemy establish lines of defense?
What units have been assigned to the defensive lines?
What obstacles have been emplaced (mines, trenches, wire, etc.)?
What artillery support is there for the defensive operation?
Retrograde Operations:
What units will take part in the retreat?
What are the current positions of the retreating units?
When will they start to retreat?
What routes will be used?
What is the planned destination of the retreating units?
What units will cover the retreat?
Composition:
What is the command and control element of (the target unit)?
What types of units are directly subordinate to (the target unit)?
What is the designation of (each of the subordinate units)?
How many units of that type are directly subordinate to (target unit)?
What units are attached? When? Why? What unit(s) are they detached from?
What units are detached? When? Why? What unit(s) are they attached to now? |
2-22.3 | 308 | FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
Weapons and Equipment Strength:
Individual Weapons:
What individual weapons are there in (target unit)?
How many?
What is the distribution of the weapons?
Crew-Served Weapons: What crew-served weapons are in (target unit)?
How many?
What is the distribution of the weapons?
Other Weapons: What other weapons are there in (target unit)?
What types?
How many?
How are they distributed?
Vehicles: What armored vehicles are in (unit)?
How many?
What nomenclature?
What other vehicles are in (unit)?
Dispositions:
Disposition questioning is ideally done with the aid of a map.
Where is (the target disposition)?
Show (on the map) the location of (the target disposition).
What enemy units, activities, or equipment are at that location?
What security measures are being employed at that location?
Additionally, specific types of dispositions require additional follow-up:
Area-Type Dispositions: (Staging Areas, Assembly Areas, Trains, etc.)
Show on the map (or describe) the perimeter of the disposition.
Where are units or activities located within it?
Where are the approaches/entrance?
What unit is in charge?
What vehicles or equipment are located within the disposition?
What is the date of information?
Line-Type Dispositions: (Line of Departure, Artillery emplacement, etc.)
Show on the map (or describe) the location of the disposition.
Define and locate both ends of the disposition.
What equipment is located there?
In the case of artillery, describe the placement and orientation of the guns,
ammunition, radar, and support vehicles.
Tactics:
Offensive: What offensive tactics are being employed by (unit)?
What other units are involved?
When did (unit) begin employing these tactics?
What are the major objectives?
Defensive: What defensive tactics are being employed by (unit)?
What other units are involved?
When did (unit) begin employing these tactics?
Special Operations: What special operations tactics are being employed by (unit)?
What are the designations of the units employing special operations tactics? When did
(unit) begin employing special operations tactics?
Where/Why are these tactics being employed? |
2-22.3 | 309 | _________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
Training:
Individual Training: What individual training is being conducted by (unit)?
Who is being trained?
How effective is the training?
Where is the training conducted?
What are the training standards?
Unit Training: What unit training is being conducted by (unit)?
Who is being trained?
How effective is the training?
Where is the training conducted?
What are the training standards?
Specialized Training: What specialized training is being conducted by (unit)?
Who is being trained?
How effective is the training?
Where is the training conducted?
What are the training standards?
What specialized equipment is used in the conduct of the training?
Combat Effectiveness:
Losses:
Personnel: What personnel losses have been incurred by (unit)?
When? Where? How?
What were the duty positions/ranks of the lost personnel?
Equipment: What equipment losses have been sustained by (unit)?
What type of equipment was lost?
When? Where? How many?
How were they lost?
Replacements (Personnel):
Received: What replacements have been received by (unit)?
What replacements are available to (unit)?
How many?
From where were the replacements received?
Available: What personnel replacements are available to (unit)?
From where are replacements available?
How many? What ranks?
How long would it take for replacements to arrive once requested?
Replacements (Equipment):
Received: What equipment replacements have been received by (unit)?
How many?
From where were the replacements received?
How does the quality of the replacement equipment compare to that of the original
equipment?
What is the level of confidence in the replacement equipment, compared to the original?
Available: What equipment replacements are available to (unit)?
From where are replacements available?
How long would it take to receive replacement equipment once requested?
How many of each type of equipment are available? |
2-22.3 | 310 | FM 2-22.3_________________________________________________________________________________
Reinforcements:
Received: What reinforcements have been received by (unit)?
What type was the reinforcing unit?
What is the designation of the reinforcing unit?
What equipment did the reinforcing unit bring?
To which unit was the reinforcing unit further assigned?
Why did (receiving unit) receive reinforcements?
How long will the reinforcing unit be assigned as reinforcement to (unit)?
Available: What reinforcements are available to (unit)?
From where (parent unit/location) are reinforcements available?
What types of units are available to reinforce (unit)?
How long would it take for reinforcements to arrive, once requested?
Morale:
Describe the morale of the members of (unit).
How long has the morale been…?
What is the unit leadership doing to (maintain/improve) the morale?
What effect has (high/low) morale had on the behavior or performance of the unit
members?
Logistics:
Weapons: What is the condition of the (specific weapons) in (the unit)?
Why are (the weapons) in that condition?
What is being done to improve the condition of (the weapons)?
How often is maintenance performed? By whom?
Who inspects weapons? How often?
Is there an increased emphasis on maintenance? If so, why?
What is done to prevent/alleviate a shortage while weapons are being maintained?
What spare parts are there for weapons in (unit)?
What shortages of spare parts are there?
What problems are there with spare parts (quality, fit, delays, etc)?
Ammunition: What types of ammunition are available for the (weapon/weapon system)
in the (unit)?
What problems are being experienced with ammunition for (weapon or weapon system)
in (unit)? Why? Since when?
What is being done to correct the problem(s)?
What shortages of ammunition for (weapon or weapon system) are there in (unit)?
What is being done to correct the shortage?
When was the last issue of ammunition for the (weapon or weapon system) in the (unit)?
How much was issued?
When is the next issue of ammunition planned?
(For insurgents/irregulars - Where is funding obtained for ammunition/explosive
purchases?
Where are ammunition/explosives obtained?
How are ammunition/explosives transported/delivered?
Vehicles: What is the condition of the (specific vehicle) in (the unit)?
Why are (the vehicles) in that condition?
What is being done to improve the condition of (the vehicles)?
How often is maintenance performed? By whom?
Who inspects vehicles? How often? |
2-22.3 | 311 | _________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
Is there an increased emphasis on maintenance? If so, why?
What is done to prevent/alleviate a shortage while vehicles are being maintained?
What spare parts are there for vehicles in (unit)?
What shortages of spare parts are there?
What problems are there with spare parts (quality, fit, delays, etc)?
POL:
What problems have been experienced with the petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL) for
the (vehicle type) in the (unit)?
Why are there problems?
Since when have there been problems?
What is being done to correct the problems?
What shortages of POL are there? Why?
What is being done to alleviate the shortages?
When was the last resupply of POL in (unit)? Where? How much?
When is the next resupply of POL planned?
Communications Equipment:
What is the condition of the (specific radio set) in (the unit)?
Why are (the radios) in that condition?
What is being done to improve the condition of (the radios)?
How often is maintenance performed? By whom?
Who inspects communication equipment? How often?
Is there an increased emphasis on maintenance? If so, why?
What is done to prevent/alleviate a shortage while radios are being maintained? What
spare parts are there for communication equipment in (unit)?
What shortages of spare parts are there?
What problems are there with spare parts (quality, fit, delays, etc)?
Medical:
Equipment: What individual medical equipment is in (unit)? How many?
What is the distribution?
What are the contents of individual medical kits in the (unit)?
What is the quality?
What shortages are there?
What problems are there with the individual medical equipment/supplies in (unit)?
What vehicular medical equipment is in (unit)? How many?
What is the distribution?
What are the contents of vehicular medical kits in (unit)?
What is the quality?
What shortages are there?
What problems are there with the vehicular medical equipment/supplies in (unit)?
Personnel: What medical personnel are assigned to (unit)?
What medical personnel are available to treat members of (unit)? How many? What are
the duty positions of the medical personnel?
What level of medical care are the medical personnel able to provide to members of
(unit)?
Facilities: What medical facilities are available to members of (unit)?
Where are the medical facilities?
What level of care is available there?
What higher echelons of medical care are available? |
2-22.3 | 312 | FM 2-22.3_________________________________________________________________________________
Medical Evacuation (MEDEVAC) Procedures: What MEDEVAC procedures are
available to members of (unit)?
Where are MEDEVAC collection points?
What different MEDEVAC procedures are used for more seriously wounded personnel,
compared to lightly wounded?
Food: What rations are members of (unit) eating?
What shortages are there of food?
What is the quality?
What problems have been encountered with the rations provided to (unit)?
When was the last issue of rations to members of (unit)?
When is the next issue?
What reserve stocks of field rations are there in (unit)?
Water: What is the source of drinking water for members of (unit)?
What problems have been encountered with quality, shortages, or contamination of
drinking water?
What water purification methods are available to members of (unit)?
Under what circumstances will they be used?
If water purification tablets are used, what color are they?
Electronic Technical Data:
Radio Frequencies: What are the primary and alternate frequencies for radios in
(each unit)?
Under what circumstances will alternate frequencies be used?
What networks operate on the various frequencies?
Call Signs: What is the call sign of (unit)?
What is the call sign of (each) person of authority in the unit?
When do call signs change?
What informal call signs are in use?
Miscellaneous:
Personalities: Question for name, rank, unit, duty position, and unit of key leaders.
Collect identifying characteristics such as age, height, weight, build, hair and eye color,
writing hand, facial hair and teeth.
Report contact information such as work and home addresses, telephone numbers, fax
number, and email address.
Complete biographical IIR format is in DIAM 58-12 (S//NF).
Code Names: What is the code name of (each unit)?
What code names are being used for specific operations?
Passwords: What is the current challenge/password for (unit)?
When did it go into effect?
When will it change?
What will the next challenge/password be?
What other (informal, “run in”) passwords are in use?
Obstacles:
Enemy: What obstacles have the enemy forces emplaced?
Where, when, what type of obstacles?
What safe lanes are there through or around the obstacles?
(If mine fields, collect type, pattern, quantity, and method of emplacement of mines.)
How are the obstacles being covered (artillery, ambush, etc.)? |
2-22.3 | 313 | _________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
Why have the obstacles been emplaced where they are (denial of terrain, canalization
into a fire sack, etc.)?
Friendly: What friendly obstacles have enemy forces encountered?
Where? When?
Have those obstacles been breached or otherwise neutralized?
What effect have the friendly obstacles had on enemy maneuver?
PSYOP:
Enemy: What PSYOP are being conducted by (unit)?
What is the text of the messages?
Who is the target audience?
Where are the PSYOP materials prepared?
Where and how are they delivered? What is the hoped-for effect?
Friendly: What PSYOP have members of (unit) encountered? Where? When?
What form of PSYOP was encountered?
What effect have the PSYOP had on the officers/NCOs/enlisted of (unit)?
What is the leadership of (unit) doing to counter the effects of friendly PSYOP? |
2-22.3 | 315 | FM 2-22.3
Appendix H
SALUTE Reporting
H-1. The SALUTE report format requires brief entries which require the
collector to break information down into basic elements: who, what, where,
when, why, and how. This allows for efficient reporting via electronic or
hardcopy medium. It also allows the analyst to quickly scan multiple reports
to find specific information.
H-2. Figure H-1 provides guidance and is not to be construed as strict
requirements. SALUTE reports of combat activity may only contain a word
or two in each entry, whereas Intelligence reports tend to include more
detail. |
2-22.3 | 316 | FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
TO: Usually the address of the supported S2/G2 (according to unit SOP)
FROM: Your unit or team designation, or your duty position, as appropriate
DTG: The date-time group of when the report is being submitted
Report Number: From local SOP
1. (S)ize/Who: Expressed as a quantity, and echelon, or size (e.g., 1 x BDE). If
multiple echelons are involved in the activity being reported, there can be multiple
entries (e.g.,1 x BDE; 2 x BN). Non-standard units are reported as such (e.g., bomb-
making class; support staff).
2. (A)ctivity/What: This line is the focal point of the report and relates to the PIR or
important non-PIR information being reported. It should be a concise bullet
statement.
3. (L)ocation/Where: Generally a grid coordinate, including the 100,000 meter grid
zone designator. The entry can also be an address, if appropriate, but still should
include an 8-digit grid coordinate. City names will always be followed by the two-
character country code. If the activity being reported involves movement (advance,
withdrawal, etc.) the location entry will include “From” and “To” entries. The route
used will be reported under “Equipment/How.”
4. (U)nit/Who: This entry identifies who is performing the activity described in the
“Activity/What” entry. Include the complete designation of a military unit,
identification of a civilian or insurgent group, or the full name of an individual, as
appropriate.
5. (T)ime/When: For a future event, this is when the activity will initiate. Past
events are usually not the subject of SALUTE reports, but if a past event is to be
reported, the Time/When entry will generally reflect when the event ended. Ongoing
events are reported as such. Reports of composition of forces, morale, and Electronic
Technical Data and other non-event topics are reported as ongoing. When reporting
on a disposition, the “Time/When” entry is generally the last time the source was at
the disposition.
6. (E)quipment/How: The information reported in this entry clarifies, completes,
and/or expands upon information reported in any of the previous entries. It includes
information concerning equipment involved, tactics used, and any essential elements
of information not reported in the previous paragraphs.
7. Remarks: Use this entry to report the source of the information, whether a person,
a CED, open-source media, or other source. Include the date of information and the
PIR that the reported information addresses. Map data for coordinates given in the
“Location/Where” entry are included, stating map series name, sheet number, scale
and edition. If there are enclosures to the SALUTE report, such as sketches, they are
annotated here.
Figure H-1. Example of a Written SALUTE Report. |
2-22.3 | 317 | FM 2-22.3
Appendix I
Document Exploitation and Handling
I-1. DOCEX is a vital information source in the development of the all-
source intelligence picture. Unless planned for and carefully monitored, the
volume of CEDs in all operations can rapidly overwhelm a unit’s capability to
extract meaningful information.
DEFINITIONS
I-2. A document, as defined by AJP 2.5, is any piece of recorded information,
regardless of form. Documents include printed material such as books,
newspapers, pamphlets, OPORDs, and identity cards as well as handwritten
materials such as letters, diaries, and notes. Documents also include
electronically recorded media such as computer files, tape recordings, and
video recordings and the electronic equipment which contains documents or
other vitally important intelligence. Examples include hard drives, operating
systems, and personal electronic devices, including phones, PDAs, and GPS
devices. A CED may be needed by several collection or exploitation activities
at the same time, requiring copies to be made. Collectors must have ready
access to copying equipment. Documents often must be evacuated through
two different channels for proper exploitation, which also makes copying
necessary. Such documents and equipment require special handling to
assure that they are returned to their owners.
I-3. DOCEX is the systematic extraction of information from threat
documents for the purpose of producing intelligence or answering IRs. A
threat document has been in the possession of the threat, written by the
threat, or is directly related to a future threat situation. DOCEX can occur in
conjunction with HUMINT collection activities or as a separate activity.
I-4. A CED is any document that was in the possession of an enemy force
that subsequently comes into the hands of a friendly force, regardless of the
origin of that document. There are three types of CEDs.
• Official - documents of government or military origin.
• Identity - personal items such as identification (ID) cards or books,
passports, driver licenses.
• Personal - documents of a private nature such as diaries, letters, and
photographs.
I-5. Open-source documents are documents that are available to the general
public including but not limited to newspapers, books, videotapes, public
records, and documents available on the Internet or other publicly available
electronic media. |
2-22.3 | 318 | FM 2.22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
I-6. Source-associated documents are documents that are encountered on or
in immediate association with a human source. These may include both
official and personal documents. Documents associated with human sources
are normally exploited, at least initially, during the interrogation or
debriefing of the source. Interrogators typically use these documents during
planning and preparation for interrogation of the associated EPW. These
personal documents and source identification documents are therefore
evacuated in conjunction with the associated source and sent through
prisoner, detainee, or refugee evacuation channels rather than through
intelligence channels. If the duplication capability exists, collectors should
copy personal documents that contain intelligence information and evacuate
the copy through intelligence channels. The original personal document
should be evacuated with the detainee but not on his person until the
HUMINT collector has exploited it. Collectors evacuate official documents
through intelligence channels after initial exploitation. If possible, the
collector will copy official documents and evacuate the copy with, but not on,
the source.
OPEN-SOURCE INFORMATION
I-7. Open-source information is publicly available information appearing in
print or electronic form. Open-source information may be transmitted via
radio, television, newspapers, commercial databases, electronic mail
networks, or other electronic media like CD-ROMs. Whatever form they take,
open sources are not—
• Classified at their origin.
• Subject to proprietary constraints.
• The product of sensitive contacts with US or foreign persons.
I-8. In all operations, open-source collection can be a valuable addition to the
overall intelligence collection and each intelligence discipline’s efforts. Open-
source information supplements the HUMINT collection effort, and all types
of open sources must be considered for exploitation.
I-9. Open sources are evaluated and categorized as friendly, neutral, or
hostile. Certain high-value, open-source information sources may be
identified for continuous monitoring. Other open-source information sources
may be identified to screen for the presence or lack of specific indicators. In
addition, the information obtained from open sources is extremely helpful for
the HCT members to be current with the latest developments in the AO,
which enables them to establish rapport and effectively converse with their
sources. Open-source documents are exploited in the same manner as CEDs.
OPEN-SOURCE DOCUMENT OPERATIONS
I-10.Open-source document operations are the systematic extraction of
information from publicly available documents in response to command IRs.
Open-source document operations can be separate operations or can be
included as part of other ongoing operations. Open-source documents are
significant in the planning of all operations, especially during the execution |
2-22.3 | 319 | _________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
of stability and reconstruction operations and civil support operations. As
well as hard data, open-source information can provide valuable background
information on the opinions, values, cultural nuances, and other sociopolitical
aspects in AOIs. In evaluating open-source documents, collectors and
analysts must be careful to determine the origin of the document and the
possibilities of inherent biases contained within the document.
CAPTURED DOCUMENT OPERATIONS
I-11.One of the significant characteristics of operations is the proliferation of
recordkeeping and communications by digital methods (faxes, e-mails, typed,
or computer-generated documents). The rapid and accurate extraction of
information from these documents contributes significantly to the
commander’s accurate visualization of his battlefield. Documents may be
captured on or in immediate association with EPWs and detainees, may be
found on or turned in by refugees, line crossers, DPs or local civilians, or may
be found in abandoned enemy positions or anywhere on the battlefield.
DOCUMENT EVACUATION AND HANDLING
I-12.The rapid evacuation and exploitation of documents is a shared
responsibility. It originates with the capturing unit and continues to the
complete extraction of pertinent information and the arrival of the document
at a permanent repository, normally at the joint level, either within the
theater of operations or outside of it. Documents captured in association with
detainees and EPWs, with the exception of identity documents, are removed
from the individual to ensure that documents of intelligence interest are not
destroyed. These documents are evacuated through EPW evacuation
channels with, but not on the person of, the detainee. With the exception of
official documents, all documents are eventually returned to the detainee.
I-13.CEDs not associated with a detainee are evacuated through MI
channels, generally starting with the capturing unit’s S2. Depending on the
type of documents, they may eventually be evacuated to the National Center
for Document Exploitation. HUMINT collectors and translators can extract
information of intelligence interest from CEDs at every echelon; they will
make an attempt to exploit CEDs within their expertise and technical
support constraints. Collectors evacuate CEDs to different elements based
upon the information contained and the type of document concerned. For
example, documents related to criminal activity may be evacuated to the
nearest criminal investigative unit. Direct evacuation to an element outside
the chain of command takes place at the lowest practical echelon but is
normally done by the first MI unit in the chain of command. Document
evacuation procedures are outlined in Annex B (Intelligence) of the unit’s
OPORD and SOPs.
Actions by the Capturing Unit
I-14.Document accountability begins at the time the document comes into US
possession. Original documents must not be marked, altered, or defaced in
any way. The capturing unit attaches a DD Form 2745 (Enemy Prisoner of
War Capture Tag), Part C, to each document. Only in the case where a |
2-22.3 | 320 | FM 2.22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
capturing unit does not have the time nor the manpower to mark each
document due to ongoing combat operations should the capturing unit fill out
one capture tag for a group of documents. In this case, the capturing unit
should place the documents in a weatherproof container (box or plastic bag).
The capturing unit should fill out two copies of the DD Form 2745, placing
one copy inside the container and attaching one to the outside of the
container. If these forms are not available, the capturing unit records the
required data on any piece of paper. Figure I-1 shows an example of a field
expedient tag. At a minimum, the capturing unit should record the
information as follows:
• Time the document was captured as a DTG.
• Place document was captured, including an 8-digit coordinate, and
description of the location. This should be as detailed as time allows.
For example, if a terrorist safe house was searched, documents might
be “bagged and tagged” based on what room of the house they were in,
what file cabinet, what desk, and so forth.
• Identity of the capturing unit.
• Identity of the source from whom the document was taken, if
applicable.
• Summary of the circumstances under which the document was found.
I-15.Document evacuation procedures are listed in Annex B (Intelligence) to
the OPORD. If the capturing unit does not contain a supporting HCT, it
forwards any CEDs found on the battlefield directly to its S2. The S2 extracts
PIR information as practicable, ensures that the documents are properly
tagged, and ensures speedy evacuation to the next higher echelon through
intelligence channels. Normally, a capturing unit will use any available
vehicle, and in particular empty returning supply vehicles, to evacuate
documents. Documents captured on or in association with detainees,
including EPWs, should be tagged and removed from the detainee. They are
evacuated with (but not on) the detainees to an MP escort unit or an EPW
holding facility.
I-16.When large numbers of documents are captured in a single location, it is
often more expedient for the capturing unit to request a DOCEX team or
HCT from the supporting MI unit be sent to the documents rather than
attempting to evacuate all the documents. This reduces the burden on the
capturing unit, facilitates the rapid extraction of information, and enables
the priority evacuation of documents of importance to higher echelons. This
method should only be used if the capturing unit can adequately secure the
documents until the arrival of the DOCEX team and if the battlefield
situation and MI resources permit the dispatch of a team. The capturing unit
should include in its request the following:
• The identification of the capturing unit.
• Its location and the location of the documents. |
2-22.3 | 321 | _________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
CCCAAAPPPTTTUUURRREEEDDD DDDOOOCCCUUUMMM EEENNNTTT TTTAAAGGG
NNNAAATTTIIIOOONNNAAALLLIIITTTYYY OOOFFF CCCAAAPPPTTTUUURRRIIINNNGGG FFFOOORRRCCCEEE
:::_________UUU ______SSS
________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
DDDAAATTTEEE///TTTIIIMMMEEE CCCAAAPPPTTTUUURRREEEDDD:::_______________111___555___111___333___111___000___ZZZ___AAA______UUU___GGG___222___000___000___444_____________________________________________________________________
PPPLLLAAACCCEEE CCCAAAPPPTTTUUURRREEEDDD________________________BBB___HHH___555___666___333___222___111___777___888___555___,,,___ SSS___mmm______aaa___llllll___tttooo___www___nnn______,,, ___IIIZZZ___________________________________________________
CCCAAAPPPTTTUUURRRIIINNNGGG UUUNNNIIITTT:::__________________111___sss___ttt___PPP___lllttt___///BBB___ ___TTT___rrr___ppp___///111___---___111___ CCC______aaa___vvv_____________________________________________________________________
IIIDDDEEENNNTTTIIITTTYYY OOOFFF SSSOOOUUURRRCCCEEE (((IIIfff AAAppppppllliiicccaaabbbllleee))):::___ ____________MMM___AAA___JJJ___,,,___ RRR___eee___ppp___uuu___bbb___lll___iiiccc___aaa___nnn___ ___GGG___uuu___aaa___rrr___ddd__________________
___________________________________________________________________________________________________ _______________________________________________________________________________________
CCCIIIRRRCCCUUUMMMSSSTTTAAANNNCCCEEESSS OOOFFF CCCAAAPPPTTTUUURRREEE:::____________SSS___ ___uuu___rrrrrr___eee___nnn___ddd___eee___rrreee___ddd___ ___hhh___iiisss___ ___cccooo___mmm______ppp___aaa___nnn___yyy___ ttt___ooo_____________________
____________aaa___ ___ppp___aaa___sss___sssiii___nnn___ggg___ UUU______SSS___ ccc___aaa___vvv___aaa___lllrrr___yyy___ ppp___aaa___ttt___rrr___ooo___lll____________________________________________________________________________________________________________
DDDEEESSSCCCRRRIIIPPPTTTIIIOOONNN OOOFFF WWWEEEAAAPPPOOONNN///DDDOOOCCCUUUMMMEEENNNTTT:::_________111___ xxx___ ___PPP___SSS___YYY___OOO______PPP___ ddd___ooo___ccc___uuu___mmm______eee___nnn___ttt_____________________
_______________ppp___rrr___ooo___ddd___uuu___ccc___eee___ddd___ bbb___yyy___ ___UUU___SSS___ ___111___666___ttthhh ___PPP___SSS______YYY___OOO___PPP___ ___BBB___nnn___ _____________________________________________________________________________________________
Figure I-1. Example of a Field Expedient Capture Document Tag.
• The general description of the document site (such as an enemy
brigade headquarters).
• The approximate number and type of documents.
• The presence of captured computers or similar equipment.
I-17. The MI unit dispatching the team should notify the requesting team as
soon as possible to provide them an estimated time of arrival and to
coordinate the arrival of the team. There is no set time for how long any
particular echelon may keep a document for study. The primary aim of
speedy evacuation to the rear for examination by qualified DOCEX elements
remains. Each echelon is responsible to prevent recapture, loss, or
destruction of the CEDs.
ACTIONS BY THE FIRST HUMINT COLLECTION OR DOCEX UNIT
I-18. The first HUMINT collection or DOCEX unit to receive CEDs should
log, categorize, and exploit the documents to the best of its abilities based on
METT-TC factors. They should rapidly identify documents requiring special
handling or special expertise to exploit and evacuate those documents to the
appropriate agencies. The MI unit SOP or OPORD should list special
document evacuation requirements and priorities. |
2-22.3 | 322 | FM 2.22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
Accountability
I-19.The capturing unit and each higher echelon take steps to ensure that
they maintain CED accountability during document evacuation. To establish
accountability, the responsible element inventories all incoming CEDs.
Anyone who captures, evacuates, processes, or handles CEDs must maintain
accountability. All CEDs should have completed captured document tags. An
incoming batch of documents should include a captured document
transmittal. Figure I-2 shows this format. The exact format for a document
transmittal is a matter of local SOP, but it should contain the information
listed below:
• The identity of the element to which the CEDs are to be evacuated.
• The identity of the unit forwarding the CEDs.
• The identification number of the document transmittal.
• Whether or not CEDs in the package have been screened and the
screening category. (If not screened, NA is circled.) Document
handlers should package documents that have been screened
separately, by category.
• A list of the document serial numbers of the CEDs in the package.
TTTTOOOO::::________________________________________________________________________________________________________ DDDDTTTTGGGG::::____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
FFFFRRRROOOOMMMM::::____________________________________________________________________________________________ TTTTRRRRAAAANNNNSSSSMMMMIIIITTTTTTTTAAAALLLL NNNNOOOO::::____________________________________________________________________
SSSSCCCCRRRREEEEEEEENNNNEEEEDDDD:::: YYYYEEEESSSS //// NNNNOOOO CCCCAAAATTTTEEEEGGGGOOOORRRRYYYY:::: AAAA BBBB CCCC DDDD NNNNAAAA
CCCCEEEEDDDD SSSSEEEERRRRIIIIAAAALLLL NNNNUUUUMMMMBBBBEEEERRRRSSSS::::
Figure I-2. Example of a Captured Document Transmittal Sheet.
I-20.When a batch is received without a transmittal, the HUMINT collection
element contacts the forwarding units and obtains a list of document serial
numbers (if possible). The HUMINT collection element records all trace
actions in its journal. Accountability includes—
• Inventorying the CEDs as they arrive.
• Initiating necessary trace actions. |
2-22.3 | 323 | _________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
• Maintaining the captured document log. (See Figure I-3.)
I-21.When a collector includes intelligence derived from a CED in an
intelligence report, he references the identification letters and number of the
document concerned to avoid false confirmation.
Inventory
I-22.The receiving element conducts an initial inventory of incoming CEDs
by comparing the CED to the captured document tag and accompanying
transmittal documents. This comparison identifies—
• Transmittals that list missing CEDs.
• Document tags not attached to CEDs.
• CEDs not attached to document tags.
• CEDs not listed on the accompanying transmittal documents.
UUUUNNNNIIIITTTT::::________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
FFFFIIIILLLLEEEE RRRREEEECCCCEEEEIIIIVVVVEEEEDDDD DDDDOOOOCCCCUUUUMMMMEEEENNNNTTTT IIIINNNNCCCCOOOOMMMMIIIINNNNGGGG FFFFOOOORRRRWWWWAAAARRRRDDDDIIIINNNNGGGG RRRREEEECCCCEEEEIIIIVVVVEEEEDDDD DDDDTTTTGGGG AAAANNNNDDDD PPPPLLLLAAAACCCCEEEE
NNNNUUUUMMMMBBBBEEEERRRR DDDDTTTTGGGG SSSSEEEERRRRIIIIAAAALLLL #### TTTTRRRRAAAANNNNSSSSMMMMIIIITTTTTTTTAAAALLLL#### UUUUNNNNIIIITTTT BBBBYYYY OOOOFFFF CCCCAAAAPPPPTTTTUUUURRRREEEE
1111555500001111 111155550000888833330000AAAAUUUUGGGG99999999 0000111100002222333366668888 1111TTTT00008888 1111////88882222dddd AAAAbbbbnnnn DDDDiiiivvvv SSSSSSSSGGGG KKKKIIIIMMMM 111155550000555500000000AAAAUUUUGGGG99999999////EEEEKKKK000033330000999944449999
1111555500002222 111155550000999933330000AAAAUUUUGGGG99999999 0000111111110000444444443333 2222TTTT11111111 2222////88882222dddd AAAAbbbbnnnn DDDDiiiivvvv SSSSSSSSGGGG KKKKIIIIMMMM 111155550000666622220000AAAAUUUUGGGG99999999////EEEEKKKK000044445555888866660000
1111555500003333 111155550000999933330000AAAAUUUUGGGG99999999 1111000033339999999966664444 2222TTTT11111111 2222////88882222dddd AAAAbbbbnnnn DDDDiiiivvvv SSSSSSSSGGGG KKKKIIIIMMMM 111155550000777722225555AAAAUUUUGGGG99999999////EEEEKKKK000055558888333388883333
1111555500004444 111155550000999933330000AAAAUUUUGGGG99999999 1111111199992222555588883333 2222TTTT11111111 2222////88882222dddd AAAAbbbbnnnn DDDDiiiivvvv SSSSSSSSGGGG KKKKIIIIMMMM 111155550000777722225555AAAAUUUUGGGG99999999////EEEEKKKK000055558888333388883333
CCCCAAAAPPPPTTTTUUUURRRRIIIINNNNGGGG SSSSCCCCRRRREEEEEEEENNNNIIIINNNNGGGG DDDDEEEESSSSCCCCRRRRIIIIPPPPTTTTIIIIOOOONNNN DDDDEEEESSSSTTTTIIIINNNNAAAATTTTIIIIOOOONNNN////
RRRREEEEMMMMAAAARRRRKKKKSSSS
UUUUNNNNIIIITTTT CCCCAAAATTTTEEEEGGGGOOOORRRRYYYY OOOOFFFF DDDDOOOOCCCCUUUUMMMMEEEENNNNTTTT TTTTRRRRAAAANNNNSSSSMMMMIIIITTTTTTTTAAAALLLL ####
CCCCoooo AAAA,,,, 1111////555500004444tttthhhh,,,, 1111 BBBBddddeeee,,,, 88882222dddd AAAA LLLLeeeetttttttteeeerrrr ooooffff pppprrrroooommmmoooottttiiiioooonnnn,,,, KKKKPPPP,,,, 1111PPPPgggg JJJJDDDDEEEECCCC,,,, 11115555TTTT00001111 SSSSAAAALLLLUUUUTTTTEEEE wwwwrrrriiiitttttttteeeennnn
CCCCoooo BBBB,,,, 2222////555500004444tttthhhh,,,, 2222 BBBBddddeeee,,,, 88882222dddd AAAA LLLLeeeetttttttteeeerrrr ddddeeeessssccccrrrriiiibbbbiiiinnnngggg aaaattttttttaaaacccckkkk,,,, RRRRUUUU,,,, 3333 PPPPgggg JJJJDDDDEEEECCCC,,,, 11115555TTTT00001111 SSSSAAAALLLLUUUUTTTTEEEE wwwwrrrriiiitttttttteeeennnn
CCCCoooo BBBB,,,, 2222////555500004444tttthhhh,,,, 2222 BBBBddddeeee,,,, 88882222dddd BBBB LLLLiiiisssstttt ooooffff ccccaaaallllllll ssssiiiiggggnnnnssss,,,, RRRRUUUU,,,, 1111PPPPgggg JJJJDDDDEEEECCCC,,,, 11115555TTTT00003333 NNNNoooonnnneeee
CCCCoooo BBBB,,,, 2222////555500004444tttthhhh,,,, 2222 BBBBddddeeee,,,, 88882222dddd CCCC PPPPeeeerrrrssssoooonnnnaaaallll lllleeeetttttttteeeerrrr,,,, KKKKPPPP,,,, 2222 PPPPgggg JJJJDDDDEEEECCCC 11115555TTTT00002222 TTTTrrrraaaannnnssssllllaaaattttiiiioooonnnn eeeennnndddd
Figure I-3. Example of a Captured Document Log.
Trace Actions
I-23.The receiving unit initiates trace actions on all missing CEDs, missing
captured document tags, and all information missing from the captured
document tags. They initiate trace actions by contacting elements from which
the documents were received. The receiving unit can complete this corrective
action swiftly if that unit's captured document log was filled out completely.
If necessary, the trace action continues to other elements that have handled
the document. If a captured document tag is unavailable from elements that
have previously handled the CED, the document examiner fills out a |
2-22.3 | 324 | FM 2.22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
captured document tag for the document using whatever information is
available. Attempts to obtain missing CEDs are critical because of the
information those CEDs might contain.
Document Logs
I-24.The captured document log is a record of what an element knows about
a CED. After trace actions are initiated for any missing documents, the CEDs
are entered in the REMARKS section of the captured document log. This log
must contain the following:
• Name of capturing unit.
• File number (a sequential number to identify the order of entry).
• DTG the CED was received at this element.
• Document serial number of the captured document tag.
• Identification number of the transmittal document accompanying the
CED.
• Complete designation of the unit that forwarded the CED.
• Name and rank of individual that received the CED.
• DTG and place of capture (as listed on the captured document tag).
• Identity of the capturing units (as listed on the captured document
tag).
• Document category (after screening).
• Description of the CED. (At a minimum, the description includes the
original language; number of pages; type of document such as a map,
letter, or photograph; and the enemy's identification number for the
CED, if available.)
• Destination and identification number of the outgoing transmittal.
• Remarks to include any other information that can assist the unit in
identifying the CED including processing codes. These are set up by
local SOPs to denote all actions taken with the document while at the
element, including intelligence reports, translations, reproductions, or
return of the CED to the source from whom it was taken.
DOCUMENT SCREENING
I-25.Document screening is the rapid but systematic evaluation of documents
to determine which documents contain priority information. Selected priority
documents will be exploited immediately for PIR information and evacuated
expeditiously (often electronically) to a DOCEX facility. Document screening
can be done manually (requiring a linguist who is well versed in the current
collection requirements) or through the use of scanning devices with key
word identification capability. Document processing does not require the
complete translation of a document but requires sufficient translation to |
2-22.3 | 325 | _________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
determine the significance of the document. A non-linguist may be able to do
a degree of preliminary screening based on document format and the location
where the document was found.
I-26.As screeners screen each document, they assign one of four category
designations. The assigned category determines the document's priority for
exploitation and evacuation. Document screening requires that the screening
units receive the most current PIR and intelligence requirements; current
friendly and enemy situation update; and relevant OB information.
Screeners at higher echelons can re-categorize CEDs, to more accurately
reflect the requirements at that level or information that has past its LTIOV.
DOCUMENT CATEGORIES
I-27.Documents are divided into categories to prioritize their evacuation and
the extraction of information from them for intelligence purposes. Document
categories are discussed below.
Category A
I-28.Category A documents are those that require priority evacuation and/or
special handling because of their special intelligence value. They contain
SALUTE reportable information. Category A documents also include those
that are of interest to another command, collecting agency, or other agency
(for example, TECHINT, Air Force, Navy, PSYOP, Cryptography).
I-29. What determines if a document is a Category A document changes
according to the operational environment and will be set forth in each
DOCEX element's SOP and in Annex B (Intelligence) of the unit’s OPORD.
Documents that are evidence in legal proceedings against captured personnel
suspected of crimes against humanity and war crimes will be handled as
Category A documents. All Category A documents are handled as SECRET.
Standard Category A documents include but are not limited to—
• Unmarked maps.
•
Maps and charts containing any operational graphics, which are sent
to the G2/S2. From G2/S2, they would be evacuated to the all-source
analysis center.
•
Air Force related documents, which should go to the nearest Air Force
headquarters.
• Navy related documents, which should be sent to the nearest Navy
headquarters.
• TECHINT-related documents, which are evacuated to the nearest
TECHINT unit.
• Cryptographic and communications-related documents, which are
evacuated to the nearest SIGINT analysis unit.
• Documents constituting evidence to be used in legal proceedings
against persons suspected of crimes against humanity and war crimes, |
2-22.3 | 326 | FM 2.22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
which will be marked “CRIMINAL EVIDENCE.” Such documents will
be kept separate from other documents and will be stored under guard
or in a secure area until turned over to a war crimes investigative unit.
SJA should be consulted concerning chain of custody requirements.
Category B
I-30.Category B documents contain information of intelligence interest to the
supported command. The lowest echelon possible exploits the documents and
evacuates them through intelligence channels. Category B documents are
handled as SECRET.
Category C
I-31.Category C documents and items contain no information of intelligence
interest but still require special administrative accountability (for example,
currency, works of art, narcotics). Currency is accounted for on DA Form
4137 (Evidence/Property Custody Document).
Category D
I-32.Category D documents contain no information of intelligence value.
Only the theater or higher document repository can categorize documents as
Category D.
GROUP DOCUMENTS
I-33.CEDs are first grouped according to their assigned screening category.
Personnel must be careful when sorting CEDs to ensure no CED is separated
from its associated documents. These large groupings can be broken down
into smaller groups. Each of these smaller groupings consists of CEDs that
were—
• Captured by the same unit.
• Captured in the same place.
• Captured on the same day at the same time.
• Received at the DOCEX element at the same time.
TRANSMITTAL OF CEDS FROM FIRST AND SUBSEQUENT MI UNITS
I-34.Unless they have an HCT in DS, most units that capture or find
documents normally have no way of evaluating, categorizing, or otherwise
differentiating documents. They are all tagged and evacuated together by the
most expedient means through MI channels. Once these documents arrive at
a HUMINT collection or DOCEX unit, the unit can screen, categorize, and
extract information from the documents. The degree that documents are
exploited at each echelon is dependent on mission priorities and available
resources. Document handlers must note any attempts to exploit CEDs on
the transmittal documents to prevent unnecessary duplication of effort by
higher echelons. |
2-22.3 | 327 | _________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
I-35.When transportation assets are limited, CEDs are evacuated according
to priority based on document categorization. All Category A CEDs will be
evacuated first, followed in order by Categories B, C, and D. Documents that
have not yet been screened will be evacuated as Category C documents, but
the transmittal slip will clearly indicate that the documents have not been
screened.
I-36.Documents will be evacuated in accordance with unit SOP and Annex B
(Intelligence) in the unit OPORD. Lower priority CEDs, no matter how old,
are never evacuated ahead of those with higher priority. CEDs are packaged
so that a package of documents contains CEDs of only one category. If the
CED cannot be screened because of time or language constraints, it should be
treated as a Category C, but kept separate from screened Category C CEDs.
I-37.When CEDs are evacuated from any echelon, a document transmittal
sheet is used (Figure I-2). A separate transmittal document is prepared for
each group of CEDs to be evacuated. The sending unit prepares a separate
transmittal document for each separate addressee. The transmittal
identification number is recorded in the captured document log (Figure I-3)
as part of the entry for each captured document. Copies of all translations
should accompany the documents to avoid duplication of effort. If the sending
unit submitted intelligence reports electronically, it should note the report
number or include a copy of the report with the document to avoid duplicate
reporting.
I-38.All CEDs being evacuated must be accompanied with the appropriate—
• Technical document (TECHDOC) cover sheet.
• SECRET cover sheet on Categories A and B documents.
• Translation reports and hardcopy reports accompanying translated
documents.
• Captured document tags.
JOINT DOCUMENT EXPLOITATION FACILITY
I-39.The Theater MI brigade or group is normally tasked with the
establishment of the theater JDEF. The JDEF is staffed by Army linguists,
supported by technical experts from the Army and from the other services,
and supplemented as required by military and civilian contract translators.
The JDEF will normally contain MI experts from SIGINT, CI, TECHINT,
and other areas as required to identify and exploit documents of interest to
these specialties.
I-40.Military and civilian translators must have security clearances
appropriate to their mission requirements. This normally equates to at least
a Secret clearance since the translators must be made aware of US collection
requirements to facilitate their work. The JDEF performs a final
examination of all documents of possible theater intelligence value before
storing or evacuating them. The DIA sets procedures for exploitation of
documents above theater Army level. |
2-22.3 | 328 | FM 2.22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
DOCUMENT PROCESSING (RECOVERY AND TRANSLATION)
I-41.Units must normally process documents prior to exploiting them.
Document processing includes the translation of foreign language documents
into English, the recovery of damaged documents, the decryption of
encrypted documents, and the extraction of documents from electronic media
such as the extraction or downloading of files from a computer disc or hard
drive. This need for processing frequently limits the amount of DOCEX that
can be done outside a DOCEX facility.
DOCUMENT RECOVERY
I-42.At a minimum, the JDEF manning includes teams trained in extracting
and downloading information from electronic media such as computer hard
drives. These individuals work in conjunction with TECHINT personnel
responsible for the evaluation of captured computer hardware and software.
These teams are prepared to deploy forward as necessary to accomplish their
mission.
DOCUMENT TRANSLATION
I-43.Translations are not intelligence information reports. They are,
however, often a precondition for DOCEX. Once translated, intelligence
information can be extracted and reported on an IIR, SALUTE, or similar
report. A translation should accompany the original foreign language
document; a copy of the translation should accompany any copies of the
original foreign language document and, as required, the intelligence reports.
A translation report should contain the following information:
• Where the report will be sent.
• Which element prepared the report.
• DTG of the document translation.
• Report number as designated by local SOPs.
• Document number taken from the captured document tag.
• Document description including type of document, number of pages,
physical construction of document, and enemy identification number, if
applicable.
• Original captured document language.
• DTG document was received at element preparing the report.
• DTG document was captured.
• Place document was captured.
• Identity of capturing unit.
• Circumstances under which document was captured.
• Name of translator. |
2-22.3 | 329 | _________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
• Type of translation: full, extract, or summary.
• Remarks for clarification or explanation, including the identification of
the portions of the document translated in an extract translation.
• Classification and downgrading instructions in accordance with
AR 380-5.
TYPES OF TRANSLATION
I-44.There are three types of translations:
• Full—one in which the entire document is translated. This is both time
and manpower intensive, especially for lengthy or highly technical
documents. Normally only a DOCEX facility at theater or national
level will do full translations, and then only when the value of the
information, technical complexity, or political sensitivity of the
document requires a full translation. Even when dealing with Category
A documents, it may not be necessary to translate the entire document
to gain the relevant information it contains.
• Extract—one in which only a portion of the document is translated. For
instance, a TECHINT analyst may decide that only a few paragraphs
in the middle of a 600-page helicopter maintenance manual merit
translation, and that a full translation is not necessary. The analyst
would request only what he needed.
• Summary—one in which a translator begins by reading the entire
document. He then summarizes the main points of information instead
of rendering a full or extract translation. A summary translation is
normally written, but may be presented orally, particularly at the
tactical level. Summary translations may be done as part of the
document screening process. A summary translation requires a
translator have more analytical abilities. The translator must balance
the need for complete exploitation of the document against time
available in combat operations. Translators working in languages of
which they have a limited working knowledge may also use a summary
translation. For instance, a Russian linguist may not be able to
accurately deliver a full translation of a Bulgarian language document.
However, he can probably render a usable summary of its content.
TRANSLATOR SUPPORT TO DOCEX
I-45.When HUMINT collectors are not available due to shortages or other
mission requirements, DOCEX can be performed by military or civilian
linguists under the management of a cadre of HUMINT collectors.
SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
I-46.Document translators will usually need to have a clearance in order to
conduct document translation. An exception is that open-source document
translation does not require a security clearance unless the information
collected from the open-source documents is linked to specific US collection |
2-22.3 | 330 | FM 2.22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
requirements, plans, or operations. In this case the translator will need a
clearance appropriate to the level of the particular contingency plan or
operation to which the information is linked. Individuals without a security
clearance should not be used in the exploitation of a closed source or CEDs.
By their very nature, the translation of these documents gives keys into the
level of US knowledge and the direction of US planning and intentions that
precludes their translation by individuals without a security clearance.
SOURCES OF TRANSLATORS
I-47.There are various sources that a commander can use to obtain the
linguists necessary to support DOCEX operations.
• RC and AC MI linguists. Dependent on their mission requirements,
any MI soldiers with the required language qualification may be used
as document translators. The advantage of using MI soldiers is that
they have the appropriate security clearance and have a firm grasp of
collection requirements. The DOCEX operation will usually require MI
officers to manage the administrative portions.
• Other linguists. Non-MI Army linguists include numerous soldiers who
have proficiency in a foreign language, regardless of MOS. US civilians
can be contracted to provide translator support as can local nationals.
Local national hires will provide the bulk of the translator support.
REQUIREMENTS FOR A DOCEX OPERATION
I-48.The number of personnel required to conduct DOCEX varies with the
echelon and with the volume of documents. Regardless of the size of the
operation, certain basic functions must occur:
• Supervision and Administration. These are the C2 and logistical
aspects of the DOCEX operation that ensure that operations are
smooth and uninterrupted.
• Accountability. Accountability includes logging documents in and out,
copying documents as required, storing documents, receiving and
transmitting documents, maintaining files, and other routine
activities. This ranges from a parttime task for one individual at a low
echelon, to warehouse-sized operations involving tons of documents at
an EAC document repository.
• Screening. Screening involves the review and categorization of all
documents, the prioritization for translation and exploitation, and the
identification of documents for special handling and immediate
transmittal to specialized units for exploitation. Screening requires
senior, experienced individuals well versed in the target language and
the collection requirements, capable of making rapid decisions based
on minimal information. The number of screeners required depends on
the document flow that may range from only a few per day at a low
echelon, to literally thousands of documents a day at a theater-level
activity. |
2-22.3 | 331 | _________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
• Security Requirements. Security requirements include ensuring that
the personnel dealing with the documents have the appropriate
security level and that they do not pose a security risk to the US. This
is particularly important when dealing with non-US translators.
Security also evolves ensuring that the documents are marked in
accordance with regulation and that proper security measures are in
place to prevent compromise of information. At higher echelons,
dealing with large numbers of non-US translators normally requires a
designated CI team conducting recurring personnel security
evaluations.
• Translation. This function involves the directed translation of
documents from the target language to English. It requires personnel
with the appropriate clearance level who have a working idiomatic
knowledge of the target language and English. Higher echelon
activities, such as the EAC document repository, group their
translation efforts by subject area. For example, one person or group
could translate all medical-related documents. At lower echelons, the
translators require a more general knowledge. At lower echelons, the
same person may translate a document, extract the pertinent
information, and report that information. At higher echelons, these are
often separate functions.
• Exploitation and Reporting. This task is the identification and
extraction of information in response to collection requirements and
requires a high level of expertise. The individual must be totally
knowledgeable of collection requirements and must be able to readily
identify indicators of activity or identify the significance of minute
pieces of information that could contribute to answering requirements.
Reporting involves placing that extracted information into a coherent,
properly formatted report so that the all-source analyst can add it to
the intelligence picture.
• Quality Control. This aspect includes ensuring that all aspects of the
DOCEX operation⎯including accounting for, screening, translating,
exploiting, and reporting––are functioning correctly.
REPORTING
I-49.Information collected from documents is normally reported in a
SALUTE report or an IIR. Reporting through other reporting formats is
discouraged. Intelligence reports are normally forwarded electronically or as
otherwise directed by SOPs and operational instructions. Normally an
electronic or hardcopy file of each report is maintained at the unit of origin;
one electronic or hardcopy is submitted through intelligence reporting
channels; and one is forwarded with evacuated documents to the next unit to
receive the document to prevent redundant reporting. In the event that the
document itself cannot be evacuated in a timely manner, a verified copy of a
translation report can be forwarded separately from the original document to
an exploitation agency. |
2-22.3 | 332 | FM 2.22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
DOCUMENT EXPLOITATION IN SUPPORT OF HUMINT COLLECTION
I-50.Documents found on detainees, including EPWs––that can be exploited
more efficiently when combined with HUMINT collection––are forwarded
with the detainee to the next echelon in the EPW/detainee evacuation
channel. In exceptional cases, documents may be evacuated ahead of the
EPW or other detainee for advance study by intelligence units. A notation
should be made on the EPW’s capture tag or accompanying administrative
papers about the existence of such documents and their location if they
become separated from the detainee.
SOURCE-ASSOCIATED DOCUMENTS
I-51.Documents captured on or in association with a human source play an
important role in the HUMINT collection process. These documents may
contain reportable information the same as with any other CED. The
information is immediately extracted from the documents and forwarded in
the appropriate intelligence report. In addition to reportable information,
documents (in particular personal documents) may provide valuable insight
into the attitude and motivation of the source and can be effectively used by
the HUMINT collector in the approach process (see Chapter 8). Guidelines
for the disposition of the detainee's documents and valuables are set by
international agreements and discussed in more detail in AR 190-8 and
FM 19-4.
I-52.The capturing unit removes all documents, with the exception of the
source's primary identification document, from an EPW or other detainee to
prevent their destruction. These are placed in a waterproof container
(usually a plastic bag) and Part C of the capture tag is placed in the bag.
Documents from each source should be placed in a separate bag. These
documents are turned over to the first MP EPW handling unit in the chain of
command. The MPs will inventory all documents and prepare a handreceipt
and provide a copy to the EPW or detainee.
I-53.To ensure proper handling and expeditious disposition of these
documents, the first HUMINT collection element to see the detainee should
review the documents as part of the source screening process. If an official
document is confiscated and evacuated through MI channels, the HUMINT
collector must obtain a receipt for that document from the MPs. If possible,
the HUMINT collection unit copies any documents that contain information
of intelligence interest and forwards the copies through MI channels. With
the exception of an identification document, documents are normally kept
separate from the detainee until the detainee arrives at a permanent
confinement facility, at which time documents are returned to them per AR
190-8.
I-54.Three possible actions may be taken with documents captured with a
source. The documents may be confiscated, impounded, or returned to the
source. |
2-22.3 | 333 | _________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
Confiscated
I-55.Documents confiscated from a source are taken away with no intention
of returning them. Official documents, except identification documents, are
confiscated and appropriately evacuated. The intelligence value of the
document should be weighed against the document's support in the HUMINT
collection of the source. The HUMINT collector must comply with the
accounting procedures established for CEDs by the MPs in accordance with
AR 190-8.
Impounded
I-56.Some CEDs will contain information that must be exploited at higher
echelons. These documents may be impounded by the HUMINT collector and
evacuated through intelligence channels. The HUMINT collector must issue
a receipt to the source for any personal documents that he impounds. He
must comply with the accounting procedures established for CEDs
impounded by the MPs in accordance with AR 190-8. When a CED is
impounded, it is taken with the intent of eventual return. Personal
documents with military information will be impounded if the military value
is greater than the sentimental value. An example of a personal document
whose military value might outweigh the sentimental value could be a
personal photograph that includes military installations or equipment.
I-57.When a CED is impounded, it must be receipted. The receipt will
include an itemized list of all the items taken from the prisoner, and the
name, rank, and unit of the person issuing the receipt. Items of high value
may be impounded for security reasons. For instance, an EPW or detainee
apprehended with an unusually large amount of money would have the
money impounded and receipted. The MPs will establish and maintain a DA
Form 4237-R (Detainee Personnel Record) for impounded items. The register
will identity the owner of the impounded items and provide a detailed
description of the items impounded. A receipt will be given to anyone who
has items impounded. Also, the OIC or authorized representative will
complete and sign DA Form 1132-R (Prisoner's Personal Property List –
Personal Deposit Fund). A copy will be provided the source. See AR 190-8 for
procedures on handling personal effects.
Returned
I-58.Returned CEDs are usually personal in nature. They are taken only to
be inspected for information of interest and are given back to the source.
Personal documents belonging to a source will be returned to the source after
examination in accordance with the GPW. These documents are CEDs whose
sentimental value outweighs their military value and may be returned to the
source. Copies of these documents may be made and forwarded if deemed
necessary. Except for an identification document (which is always returned
to the source), documents are evacuated with the source, rather than on the
source, until the source reaches a permanent confinement facility at EAC. |
2-22.3 | 335 | FM 2-22.3
Appendix J
References
The following references are provided to assist HUMINT collectors, commanders, and
trainers in obtaining regulatory guidance for HUMINT collection operations. These and
other references are in the bibliography.
1. AR 350-1. Army Training and Education. 9 April 2003.
2. AR 380-5. Department of the Army Information Security Program. September 2000.
3. AR 380-10. Technology Transfer, Disclosure of Information, and Contacts with Foreign
Representatives. 15 February 2001.
4. AR 380-15. (C) Safeguarding NATO Classified Information. 1 March 1984.
5. AR 380-28. Department of the Army Special Security System. 12 December 1991.
6. AR 380-40. Policy for Controlling and Safeguarding Communications Security (COMSEC)
Material. 22 October 1990.
7. AR 380-49. Industrial Security. 15 April 1982.
8. AR 380-53. Telecommunications Security Monitoring. 29 April 1998.
9. AR 380-67. Personnel Security Program. 9 September 1988.
10. AR 381-1. Security Controls on Dissemination of Intelligence Information.
12 February 1990.
11. AR 381-10. U.S. Army Intelligence Activities. 1 July 1984.
12. AR 381-12. Subversion and Espionage Directed Against the US Army (SAEDA).
15 January 1993.
13. AR 381-14. Technical Counterintelligence (TCI). 30 September 2002.
14. AR 381-20. (U) US Army Counterintelligence Activities (S). 26 September 1986.
15. AR 381-45. Investigative Records Repository. 25 August 1989.
16. AR 381-47. (U) US Army Offensive Counterespionage Activities (S). 30 July 1990.
17. AR 381-100. (U) Army Human Intelligence Collection Program (S). 15 May 1988.
18. AR 381-102. (U) US Army Cover Support Program (S). 10 January 1991.
19. AR 381-143. Military Intelligence Nonstandard Material Policies and Procedures.
1 December 1986. |
2-22.3 | 336 | FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
20. AR 381-172. Counterintelligence Force Protection Source Operations and Low-Level Source
Operations. 30 December 1994.
21. AR 614-115. Military Intelligence Excepted Career Program. 12 April 2004.
22. AR 614-200. Military Intelligence Civilian Excepted Career Program. 30 September 2004.
23. DA Pam 381-15. Foreign Military Intelligence Collection Activities Program. 1 June 1988.
24. Executive Order 12333. United States Intelligence Activities. 4 December 1981.
25. DOD Directive 2310.1. DOD Program for Enemy Prisoners of War (EPOW) and Detainees
(Short Title: DOD Enemy POW Detainee Program). 18 August 1994.
26. DOD Directive 3115.09. DOD Intelligence Interrogations, Detainee Debriefings, and
Tactical Questioning. 3 November 2005.
27. DOD Directive 5100.77. DOD Law of War Program. 9 December 1998.
28. DOD Directive 5240.1. DOD Intelligence Activities. 3 December 1982.
29. DOD Instruction 3020.41. Contractor Personnel Authorized to Accompany the U.S. Armed
Forces. 3 October 2005.
30. The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I) Memorandum, Guidance for the
Conduct and Oversight of Defense Human Intelligence (HUMINT) (U). 14 December 2004.
31. USD(I) Memorandum, Implementation Instructions for USD(I) Memorandum, Guidance
for the Conduct and Oversight of Defense Human Intelligence HUMINT (U). 7 September
2005.
32. DOD Regulation 5240.0-R. Procedures Governing the Activities of DOD Intelligence
Components That Affect United States Persons. December 1982.
33. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Public Law No. 109-163, Title XIV.
Further information and links to many of the above publications can be found at:
http://www.dami.army.pentagon.mil/offices/dami-cd/
ARTEPS, MTPs, and other intelligence training products are available at the Reimer
Digital Library http://www.adtdl.army.mil. |
2-22.3 | 337 | FM 2-22.3
Appendix K
Contract Interrogators
INTRODUCTION
K-1. Contractors are used increasingly to augment existing capabilities and
bridge gaps in the deployed force structure. With the increased use of
contractors comes the need to identify the doctrine and procedures affecting
their employment. Leaders and those working with contractors must
understand that contractors are civilians authorized to accompany the force
in the field and should be provided with an ID card as proof of their
authorization. In accordance with GPW Article 4, contractors are to be
accorded POW status if captured.
KEY TERMS
K-2. Contract Interrogator. A contract interrogator is a contractor who is
specifically trained and DOD certified for, tasked with, and engages in the
collection of information from individuals (HUMINT sources) for the
purpose of answering intelligence information requirements. Their
operations must be conducted in accordance with all applicable law and
policy. Applicable law and policy include US law; the law of war; relevant
international law; relevant directives including DOD Directive 3115.09,
“DOD Intelligence Interrogations, Detainee Debriefings, and Tactical
Questioning”; DOD Directive 2310.1E, “The Department of Defense
Detainee Program”; DOD instructions; and military execute orders
including FRAGOs. Contract interrogators will operate only in fixed
facilities and not in tactical operations. See DOD Instruction 3020.41 for
additional information.
K-3. External Support Contractor. Contract interrogators fall into the
category of External Support Contractor. They work under contracts
awarded by contracting officers serving under the command and
procurement authority of supporting headquarters outside the theater.
Their support augments the commander's organic capability.
K-4. Contracting Officer Representative (COR). A COR is the
contracting officer’s designated representative who assists in the technical
monitoring and administration of a contract. Typically, a COR is
responsible for assisting the contracting officer in contractor-employee day-
to-day management of issues that may affect contractor or unit
requirements.
K-5. Statement of Work (SOW) or Performance Work Statement:
• Contractor roles and functional requirements, as well as security
issues and the relationship to the military chain of command, must be
accurately and adequately defined in the SOW. The SOW should
include a description of the essential service and require the contractor |
2-22.3 | 338 | FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
to prepare contingency plans to reasonably ensure continuation.
Contractors are required to perform all tasks identified within the
SOW and all other provisions defined within the contract. The SOW
may also stipulate the appointment of a senior contractor at each
echelon or facility to be the point of contact for the commander and the
COR for resolving contract performance and scheduling challenges.
• The contract must stipulate whether the duty of a senior contractor is
an additional duty or the full-time job of the selected contractor.
Considering that contractors are “managed” rather than “commanded,”
having a senior contractor will assist the commander in managing the
contract. Without an onsite contractor supervisor, the default chain of
command for contract interrogators might otherwise reside in CONUS,
at the contractor’s headquarters.
CIVILIAN STATUS
K-6. A contract employee cannot be made to engage in any activity
inconsistent with his civilian status such as serving as a crew member on a
weapon system. Interrogations are presumptively consistent with civilian
contractor status, but other tasks should be vetted with the command’s
legal advisor to ensure they are legally permissible.
COMMAND CONSIDERATIONS
K-7. Theaters in which large-scale operations are conducted are very likely
to employ contract interrogators, due to limited numbers of Army HUMINT
collectors available. The presence of contractors in the AO adds an
additional dimension to the commander’s planning process. Force protection
is a critical issue. Even in "permissive" environments such as in the case of
humanitarian operations, contractors may be placed in danger. The
commander must protect his contractors since they have limited capacity to
protect themselves.
K-8. The commander has no command authority over contractor personnel.
Their relationship with the Government is governed by the terms and
conditions of their contract. In short, the commander must "manage"
contractor personnel through the contracting process. He has no authority
to command or discipline them unless it is a declared war, at which time
contractors may fall under the provisions of the UCMJ. This distinction
between command and management does not prohibit the commander from
directing contractors to carry out essential activities, such as activities
related to security and safety, consistent with the terms of their contracts.
K-9. The terms and conditions of any contract must be constructed so as to
include provisions requiring contractor personnel to abide by all guidance
and obey all instructions and general orders applicable to US Armed Forces
and DOD civilians including those issued by the Theater Commander. The
contractor can be required to "take reasonable steps" to ensure his
personnel comply with the above and to ensure "the good conduct" of his
employees. Furthermore, the contractor can be required to promptly
resolve, to the satisfaction of the COR, all contractor employee performance
and conduct problems identified by the COR. The COR can direct the |
2-22.3 | 339 | _________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
contractor, at the contractor's expense (for example, a non-allowable charge
to the contract) to remove and replace any contractor employee failing to
comply with the above. This provides a significant tool to aid in achieving
good order and discipline within an AO. The commander also has the
authority to initiate proceedings that could lead to charges under Military
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA) or the War Crimes Act.
K-10. Contractors will be subject to the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the
United States and will comply with all applicable law and policy. Applicable
law and policy include US law; the law of war; relevant international law;
relevant directives including DOD Directive 3115.09, “DOD Intelligence
Interrogations, Detainee Debriefings, and Tactical Questioning”; DOD
Directive 2310.1E, “The Department of Defense Detainee Program”; DOD
instructions; and military execute orders including FRAGOs. Contractor
misconduct may be subject to prosecution under federal jurisdiction
pursuant to the MEJA or the War Crimes Act, or both. Procedures for
initiating investigation into such misconduct will normally be established
by the operational command.
K-11. The operational command will also establish procedures for referral
to federal civilian authorities and necessary pre-trial confinement.
Contractors normally will also be subject to the criminal jurisdiction of the
HN unless granted immunity from jurisdiction through the provisions of a
SOFA or equivalent agreement, or unless the HN waives jurisdiction. As a
general rule, contractors are not subject to the UCMJ (with the possible
exception for periods of formally declared war).
K-12. The commander should expect contractors to use all means at their
disposal to continue to provide essential services, in accordance with the
terms and conditions of contracts, until the military releases them. The
combatant commander determines when to execute contingency plans for
essential services and when to release a contractor.
INTERROGATOR CONTRACT CONSIDERATIONS
K-13. Contracts should be written with the following principles and
considerations:
• Contractors will be deployable under all operational scenarios. They
will be subject to the same time-phased force deployment data
requirements as deploying military units.
• The contractor information system will interface with the Standard
Army Management Information System at both retail and wholesale
levels. Army units should not have to contend with two separate
information systems.
• The contractors will provide interrogation support at fixed facilities as
needed. During deployments, the commander (subject to contract terms
and conditions) will determine where contractors operate in their AO.
• The contractors will not replace force structure. They will augment
Army capabilities and provide an additional option for meeting support
requirements. |
2-22.3 | 340 | FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
• Force protection, including the protection of contractors, is the
responsibility of commanders.
• The unit must integrate contractor support into the overall support
plan. Transportation of contractors on the battlefield must be planned.
• Command and control of contract personnel is dependent upon terms
and conditions of the contract. The contracting officer or his designated
representative is the appointed liaison for monitoring contractor
performance requirements and will ensure that contractors move
material and personnel according to the combatant commander’s plan.
A good technique is for the command to designate and train a unit
COR or Contracting Officer’s Technical Representative (COTR) at each
facility where contract interrogators will be working. Because
international and domestic law, including SOFAs, affect the
relationship between commanders and contract personnel,
commanders and CORs should seek legal advice concerning issues
arising during operations.
• The unit must establish a contractor personnel reporting and
accountability system. Again, a good technique is for the command to
designate and train a unit COR or TCOR at each facility where
contract interrogators will be working.
• During deployments, contractors will live and work in field conditions
comparable to those for the supported ARFOR. Living arrangements,
transportation requirements, food, medical, and other support services
will be provided according to the contract. These services may include
but are not limited to––
Non-routine medical and dental care.
Mess.
Quarters.
Special clothing, equipment, weapons, or training mandated by the
applicable commander.
Mail.
Emergency notification.
• Planning must be accomplished to ensure agreed upon support to
contractors is available to the responsible commander.
CONTRACT INTERROGATOR REQUIREMENTS
SELECTION AND EMPLOYMENT CRITERIA
K-14. Contract personnel must meet certain minimum requirements to be
qualified to work as contract interrogators. It is the responsibility of the
hiring contracting company to ensure that these criteria, set by the
Government, are met by the personnel they hire.
K-15. Policy will dictate employment criteria such as minimum education,
military service, security clearance, and previous training. Certain civilian
experience and training may also meet the policy requirements for contract |
2-22.3 | 341 | _________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
interrogator qualifications. Commanders and CORs should refer to the
current DA policy on contract interrogators for appropriate guidance.
TRAINING REQUIREMENTS
K-16. All contractor interrogators must successfully complete a training
program approved by the United States Army Intelligence Center and Fort
Huachuca, or the Defense HUMINT Management Office, which will serve
as validation to perform MI interrogations (see DODD 3115.09). The
organization Commander or Director initiating the contract must certify
that the training has been completed. The training program will ensure
that contract interrogators are trained and certified on—
• The most current TTP of interrogation as promulgated by DOD.
• The applicable law and policy related to the treatment of detainees.
Applicable law and policy include US law; the law of war; relevant
international law; relevant directives including DOD Directive
3115.09, “DOD Intelligence Interrogations, Detainee Debriefings, and
Tactical Questioning”; DOD Directive 2310.1E, “The Department of
Defense Detainee Program”; DOD instructions; and military execute
orders including FRAGOs.
K-17. Contract interrogators must also receive training on the supported
unit’s mission and Interrogation Counter-Resistance Policy pertinent to the
AOR they are supporting. This training will be conducted in-theater by the
gaining unit.
EQUIPMENT
K-18. Contractors must be issued personal protection gear appropriate for
the threat environment. This may include ballistic helmet, personal body
armor, NBC protective gear, and in certain circumstances a personal
weapon. Contract interrogators must have access to automation equipment
to support their mission of intelligence collection and reporting.
UTILIZATION
K-19. Only trained and certified contractors working under the supervision
of MI personnel are authorized to conduct interrogations. Contract
interrogators may conduct interrogations with an interpreter in the room;
however, an OIC or NCO will monitor the interrogation by personal
presence or by means of live video camera feed.
K-20. Contract interrogators—
• Will not supervise any military personnel or federal government
employees, nor will they be in charge of interrogation facilities.
• Will operate only in fixed facilities. This requirement provides a
measure of force protection to the contract interrogator and frees up
Army HUMINT collectors for tactical missions.
• Must submit a written interrogation plan to the OIC or NCOIC, and
receive approval for the plan, in advance of each interrogation. The
plan will specify the information desired and identify what techniques |
2-22.3 | 342 | FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
and approaches for obtaining information will be used to conduct the
interrogations.
WORK LOCATIONS
K-21. The commander may position contract interrogators in fixed
detention facilities anywhere in the theater, in accordance with the terms
and conditions of their contract.
ATTIRE
K-22. Contractors accompanying the force should be visibly distinct from
soldiers so as not to jeopardize their status. The JTF or combatant
commander may direct contract personnel to wear civilian clothing or a
uniform that says “civilian.” Specific items of military attire required for
safety or security may also be worn, such as chemical defense equipment,
cold weather equipment, or mission specific safety equipment.
FIRE ARMS
K-23. A contractor authorized to accompany the force in the field is not
entitled to be issued a firearm. However, a contract employee may be armed
only if all of following conditions are met:
• The theater commander grants his approval.
• The employee's corporate policy allows it.
• The employee agrees.
K-24. If all three conditions are met, then the employee must pass proper
military side-arm training and will be issued a military specification
weapon and ammunition (generally, a 9-millimeter pistol) for personal
protection. The contractor must also comply with all applicable DOD,
service, and local command policies on weapons.
RECOMMENDED READING
DOD Instruction 3020.41. Contractor Personnel Authorized to
Accompany the U.S. Armed Forces. 3 October 2005.
AR 715-9. Contractors Accompanying the Force. 29 October 1999.
DA Pamphlet 715-16. Contractor Deployment Guide. 27 February
1998.
FM 3-100.21. Contractors on the Battlefield. 3 January 2003.
FM 63-11. Logistics Support Element Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures.
8 October 1996.
AMC Pamphlet 715-18. AMC Contracts and Contractors Supporting
Military Operations. June 2000. |
2-22.3 | 343 | FM 2-22.3
Appendix L
Sample Equipment for HCT Operations
L-1. This materiel and equipment list is provided as a sample of what an
HCT may require to support the commander’s intelligence requirements.
Some of the equipment that is intended to be given to a source should be
considered expendable.
L-2. HCT Kit Bag - Assumes four-person configuration for each echelon.
Regardless of support relationship (Organic/DS/GS/GSR), HCTs inherently
require the following.
L-3. Movement/Survivability/Security:
• Two M998 1-¼ ton vehicle (or non-tactical vehicle as appropriate for
mission) per team.
• One crew/squad served weapon per team.
• One M16A2 per team.
• Three M4s per team.
• Four 9mms per team.
• M68 Aim-point System.
• One x body armor with protective plate per team member.
L-4. Collection and Reporting System - Hardware 1 x System per HCT:
• Scaleable collection and reporting tool that changes configuration
depending on where it is on the battlefield.
• Should include an individual collection and reporting tool.
• Should include a tool for stand-alone SIPRNET connectivity via satellite
or other.
L-5. Collection and Reporting System - Software 1 x per System:
• Simple, intuitive Graphic User Interface (GUI).
• Standardized Reports - SALUTE, IIR, Tactical Interrogation Report,
Contact Report, BSD Report. (Policy states that once filled out, the BSD
becomes classified; therefore, change policy or make the collection or
reporting tool classified as well.)
• Source Management Tool.
• CI Investigations Reports.
• Link Analysis (capable of interface with coalition systems––in this case,
Analyst Notebook).
• Mapping - Single, standardized tool (down to 1:12,500 scale maps,
operational graphics, GPS interface). |
2-22.3 | 344 | FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
• Biometrics Integration/Biometrics Enrollment Tools (Integrated
Automated Fingerprint Identification System [IAFIS]-compliant 10-print
fingerprint scanners, iris scanners, photographing station).
• Basic DOCEX application.
• Foreign Language Translation.
• Mission Planning Software.
• Query Tools: basic, advanced, multi-entity, multi-media, save user-
defined queries.
L-6. Collection and Reporting System - Peripherals 1 x HCT:
• Digital video/still.
• Printer with print and scanner head (photo quality with ports for flash
cards/memory sticks).
• Separate collection kit for biometrics (ink/card packets and/or IAFIS-
compliant live scanner, iris scanner). Must be FBI compliant and
portable).
• GPS.
• Digital voice recorder (Universal Serial Bus [USB] interface).
L-7. Communications - Requires organic communications systems to higher
and laterally (non-line of sight and line of sight):
• Intra-team communications - 1 x individual:
Secure or nonsecure (prefer secure).
Hands-free and/or handheld.
• Team to all - 1 x HCT:
Secure.
FM/UHF/Microwave.
Line of sight.
Non-line of sight.
Voice.
Digital.
Cellular telephone:
-Voice.
-Backup for transmitting data.
- GPS enabled.
Friendly force identification and tracking system.
• HCT to Source - 2 sets x HCT:
Phone cards.
Cell phones.
Radios.
Email or “Blackberry-like” communications.
One-way pager.
Clandestine signaling. |
2-22.3 | 345 | _________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
L-8. Source Support - 2 sets x HCT:
• Source tracking (blue-force tracker-like capability).
• Digital Voice Recorder (micro, USB interface).
• Digital video or still camera, with telephoto lenses.
• GPS.
• 1 x 1Gb Thumb Drive.
L-9. Data Storage - 1 x HCT:
• 2 x hard drives (one for UNCLASS, one for SECRET).
• 2 x Micro/Thumb, 1Gb drive (one for UNCLASS, one for SECRET).
L-10. Power Generation - 1 x liquid fuel generator or high-capacity (12
hour) (battery - silent, vehicle recharge), power source - 1 x HCT.
L-11. 1 x Universal Power Conversion Kit per HCT and OMT.
L-12. Vision Enhancement:
• 2 x night vision goggles (NVG) per HCT.
• 1 x thermal sensor per HCT.
• 1 x binoculars per individual (4 each).
• 1 x laser range finder per HCT. |
2-22.3 | 347 | FM 2-22.3
Appendix M
Restricted Interrogation Technique – Separation
INTRODUCTION
M-1. As part of the Army's efforts to gain actionable intelligence in the war
on terrorism, HUMINT collectors may be authorized, in accordance with this
appendix, to employ the separation interrogation technique, by exception, to
meet unique and critical operational requirements. The purpose of separation
is to deny the detainee the opportunity to communicate with other detainees
in order to keep him from learning counter-resistance techniques or
gathering new information to support a cover story; decreasing the detainee's
resistance to interrogation. Separation, further described in paragraphs M-2
and M-28, is the only restricted interrogation technique that may be
authorized for use. Separation will only be used during the interrogation of
specific unlawful enemy combatants for whom proper approvals have been
granted in accordance with this appendix. However, separation may not be
employed on detainees covered by Geneva Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War (GPW), primarily enemy prisoners of war
(EPWs). The separation technique will be used only at COCOM-approved
locations. Separation may be employed in combination with authorized
interrogation approaches—
• On specific unlawful enemy combatants.
• To help overcome resistance and gain actionable intelligence.
• To safeguard US and coalition forces.
• To protect US interests.
GENERAL
M-2. This appendix provides doctrinal guidance for the use of separation as
an interrogation technique. Separation involves removing the detainee from
other detainees and their environment, while still complying with the basic
standards of humane treatment and prohibitions against torture or cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, as defined in the Detainee
Treatment Act of 2005 and addressed in GPW Article 3 (Common Article III).
Separation is to be distinguished from segregation, which refers to removing
a detainee from other detainees and their environment for legitimate
purposes unrelated to interrogation, such as when necessary for the
movement, health, safety and/or security of the detainee, or the detention
facility or its personnel. This appendix—
• Will be reviewed annually and may be amended or updated from time
to time to account for changes in doctrine, policy, or law, and to address
lessons learned.
•
Is not a stand-alone doctrinal product and must be used in conjunction
with the main portion of this manual. |
2-22.3 | 348 | FM 2-22.3_________________________________________________________________________________
M-3. Careful consideration should be given prior to employing separation as
an interrogation technique in order to mitigate the risks associated with its
use. The use of separation should not be confused with the detainee-handling
techniques approved in Appendix D. Specifically, the use of segregation
during prisoner handling (Search, Silence, Segregate, Speed, Safeguard, and
Tag [5 S's and a T]) should not be confused with the use of separation as a
restricted interrogation technique.
M-4. Members of all DOD Components are required to comply with the law of
war during all armed conflicts, however such conflicts are characterized, and
in all other military operations. Proper application of separation as a
restricted interrogation technique in selective cases involving specific
unlawful enemy combatants and in accordance with the safeguards outlined
in this manual is consistent with the minimum humane standards of
treatment required by US law, the law of war; and does not constitute cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment as defined in the Detainee
Treatment Act of 2005 and addressed in GPW Common Article III.
M-5. Use of separation for interrogation is authorized by exception.
Separation will be applied on a case-by-case basis when there is a good basis
to believe that the detainee is likely to possess important intelligence and the
interrogation approach techniques provided in Chapter 8 are insufficient.
Separation should be used as part of a well-orchestrated strategy involving
the innovative application of unrestricted approach techniques. Separation
requires special approval, judicious execution, special control measures, and
rigorous oversight.
M-6. Additionally, the use of separation as a restricted interrogation
technique shall be conducted humanely in accordance with applicable law
and policy. Applicable law and policy for purposes of this appendix include
US law; the law of war; relevant international law; relevant directives
including DOD Directive 3115.09, “DOD Intelligence Interrogations, Detainee
Debriefings, and Tactical Questioning”; DOD Directive 2310.1E, “The
Department of Defense Detainee Program”; DOD instructions; and military
execute orders including FRAGOs.
M-7. More stringent than normal safeguards must be applied when using the
separation technique. Use of separation is subject to USD(I) oversight.
Compared to approach techniques, there are two additional steps in the
approval process (see Figure M-l) for the use of the separation technique:
• First, the COCOM Commander approves (after SJA review) use of the
separation technique in theater.
• Second, following the COCOM Commander's approval, the first
General Officer/Flag Officer (GO/FO) in an interrogator's chain of
command approves each specific use of separation and the
interrogation plan that implements separation (this is non-delegable).
Interrogation supervisors shall have their servicing SJA review the
interrogation plan before submitting it to the GO/FO for approval. |
2-22.3 | 349 | _________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
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Figure M-1. Separation Approval Process.
M-8. The employment of separation requires notification, acknowledgment,
and periodic review, in accordance with USD(I) Memorandum, "(S//NF)
Guidance for the Conduct and Oversight of Defense Human Intelligence
(HUMINT) (U)," dated 14 December 2004. This means that after the
separation is approved for use by COCOMs, the I&WS must be notified as
soon as practical. The Office of the Secretary of Defense will review these
activities periodically in accordance with DOD Directive 3115.09.
M-9. The planning process for the employment of standard interrogation
operations also applies to the employment of the separation technique
(see Chapter 4). |
2-22.3 | 350 | FM 2-22.3_________________________________________________________________________________
RESPONSIBILITIES
M-10. Commanders of interrogation or detention facilities and forces
employing the approved separation technique are responsible for compliance
with applicable law and policy. Commanders must understand that
separation poses a higher risk to the detainee than do standard techniques,
and so require strenuous oversight to avoid misapplication and potential
abuse.
M-11. The interrogation chain of command must coordinate the interrogation
plan with the detention operations commander. Close coordination must
occur between intelligence personnel and personnel responsible for detainee
operations, including MP, security forces, Master at Arms, and other
individuals providing security for detainees (hereafter referred to as guards).
Guards do not conduct intelligence interrogations and, in accordance with
DOD Directive 3115.09, will not set the conditions for interrogations. Guards
may support interrogators as requested for detainee custody, control, escort,
and/or additional security (for example, for combative detainees), in
accordance with paragraphs 5-57 through 5-66 and FM 3-19.40, JP 3-63, and
the approved interrogation plan.
M-12. The detention operations commander (in conjunction with the MI
commander) may convene a multidiscipline custody and control oversight
team including, but not limited to, MP, MI, BSC (if available), and legal
representatives. The team can advise and provide measures to ensure
effective custody and control in compliance with applicable law and policy.
M-13. Commanders must consider the following when employing separation:
• Is separation directed against the appropriate individual and is it
necessary for collecting important intelligence?
• Does separation complement the overall interrogation strategy and
interrogation approach technique or techniques?
• Is the application of separation with the specific detainee at issue
consistent with humane treatment and in accordance with applicable
law and policy?
M-14. Planning for the use of separation requires coordination with staff
elements that provide support to interrogation operations. Staff elements
that support interrogation facilities and forces employing separation will
comply with paragraphs 4-59 and 4-60 and all controls and safeguards
identified in paragraphs M-17 through M-26.
GENERAL CONTROLS AND SAFEGUARDS
HUMANE TREATMENT
M-15. All captured or detained personnel shall be treated humanely at all
times and in accordance with DOD Directive 3115.09, "DOD Intelligence
Interrogations, Detainee Debriefings, and Tactical Questioning"; DOD
Directive 2310.1E, “Department of Defense Detainee Program,” and no
person in the custody or under the control of the DOD, regardless of
nationality or physical location, shall be subject to cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment or punishment as defined in US law, including the |
2-22.3 | 351 | _________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
Detainee Treatment Act of 2005. All intelligence interrogations, debriefings,
or tactical questioning to gain intelligence from captured or detained
personnel shall be conducted in accordance with applicable law and policy.
M-16. Any inhumane treatment—including abusive practices, torture, or
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment as defined in US law,
including the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005—is prohibited and all
instances of such treatment will be reported immediately in accordance with
paragraph 5-69 thru 5-72. Beyond being impermissible, these unlawful and
unauthorized forms of treatment are unproductive because they may yield
unreliable results, damage subsequent collection efforts, and result in
extremely negative consequences at national and international levels. Review
by the servicing SJA is required prior to using separation. Each interrogation
plan must include specific safeguards to be followed: limits on duration,
interval between applications, and termination criteria. Medical personnel
will be available to respond in the event a medical emergency occurs.
FM 2-22.3 REQUIREMENTS
M-17. Separation must be employed in accordance with the standards in this
manual. These standards include the following:
• Prohibitions against abusive and unlawful actions (see para 5-75) and
against the employment of military working dogs in the conduct of
interrogation (see paras 5-59 and 8-2).
• Requirement for non-DOD agencies to observe the same standards for
the conduct of interrogation operations and treatment of detainees
when in DOD facilities (see para 5-55).
• Prohibition on guards conducting intelligence interrogations or taking
any actions to set the conditions for interrogations. Humane treatment,
evacuation, custody and control (reception, processing, administration,
internment, and safety) of detainees; force protection; and the
operation of the internment facility are discussed in paragraphs 5-57
through 5-66. (FM 3-19 .40 and JP 3-63 also thoroughly discuss
detainee operations.)
• Assignment of ISNs to all detainees in DOD control, whether or not
interrogation has commenced, as soon as possible; normally within 14
days of capture. (See AR 190-8 and Secretary of Defense Memorandum
dated 20 September 2005, "(S//NF) Policy on Assigning Detainee
Internment Serial Numbers (ISN)(U)."
• Access to detainees by the ICRC.
REPORTING OF ABUSES AND SUSPECTED ABUSES
M-18. As an interrogation technique, separation is particularly sensitive due
to the possibility that it could be perceived as an impermissible act.
Interrogators applying the separation technique and the chain of command
supervising must be acutely sensitive to the application of the technique to
ensure that the line between permissible or lawful actions and impermissible
or unlawful actions is distinct and maintained. Therefore, HUMINT
collectors should have heightened awareness and understanding of the risks, |
2-22.3 | 352 | FM 2-22.3_________________________________________________________________________________
control measures, and safeguards associated with the use of separation. Any
interrogation technique that appears to be cruel, inhuman, or degrading as
defined in US law; or impermissibly coercive, or is not listed in this manual,
is prohibited and should be reported immediately to the chain of command or
other appropriate channels for resolution. Orders given to treat detainees
inhumanely are unlawful. Every interrogator must know how to respond to
orders that the individual interrogator perceives to be unlawful
(see paras 5-80 through 5-82).
M-19. If the order is a lawful order, it should be obeyed. Failure to obey a
lawful order is an offense under the UCMJ.
COMMAND POLICY AND OPERATION ORDERS
M-20. The provisions of this appendix must be written into COCOM policy
and/or OPORDs when using the restricted interrogation technique of
separation.
MEDICAL
M-21. Commanders are responsible to ensure that detainees undergoing
separation during interrogation receive adequate health care as described in
greater detail in paragraph 5-91.
TRAINING AND CERTIFICATION
M-22. Only those DOD interrogators who have been trained and certified by
the United States Army Intelligence Center (USAIC), or other Defense
HUMINT Management Office (DHMO) designated agency, in accordance
with guidance established by USD(I) to use separation, are authorized to
employ this technique. The training must meet certification standards
established by the Defense HUMINT Manager in coordination with
applicable DOD components. Properly trained and certified contract
interrogators are authorized to initiate interrogation plans that request the
use separation, and, once the plan is approved, to employ the technique in
accordance with the provisions of this appendix and Appendix K. Contract
interrogators will always be utilized under the supervision and control of US
government or military personnel (see para K-19 and K- 20). Non-DOD
personnel conducting interrogations in DOD facilities must be certified by
their agency and separately gain approval (through their agency's chain of
command) for the additional technique described in this appendix. They must
present this written certification and agency approval to the COCOM before
use is permitted (see para 5-55).
PLANNING
M-23. Planning for the use of separation must include—
• An interrogation plan that addresses safeguards, limits of duration,
interval between applications, termination criteria, and presence of
qualified medical personnel for emergencies (see Figure M-2).
• A provision for detainees to be checked periodically in accordance with
command health care directives, guidance, and SOPs applicable to all
detainees.
• A legal review. |
2-22.3 | 353 | _________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
Figure M-2. Installation Plan for Restricted Separation Techniques.
Figure M-2. Installation Plan for Restricted Separation Techniques. |
2-22.3 | 354 | FM 2-22.3_________________________________________________________________________________
• Documentation of the use of separation, including photographs and/or
videotaping, if appropriate and available (see para 5-54).
M-24. Separation is only authorized for use in interrogation operations, not
for other Military Source Operations. Separation may be approved for use in
combination with authorized approach techniques. General controls and
safeguards contained in this manual must be applied during the use
separation, in conjunction with the safeguards specific to the separation
technique. Planning must consider the possible cumulative effect of
using multiple techniques and take into account the age, sex, and
health of detainees, as appropriate.
TECHNICAL CONTROL
M-25. Requests for approval of separation will be forwarded (for information
purposes only) via secure means through intelligence technical channels at
the same time as they are sent through command channels. Intelligence
technical channels are those used for forwarding of source information and
technical parameters of collection operations from lower to higher and
passing tasking specifics, source information, technical control measures, and
other sensitive information from higher to lower. The technical chain extends
from the HCT through the OMT and Operations Section (if one exists) to the
C/J/G/S2X.
APPLICATION OF SEPARATION TECHNIQUE
M-26. The purpose of separation is to deny the detainee the opportunity to
communicate with other detainees in order to keep him from learning
counter-resistance techniques or gathering new information to support a
cover story, decreasing the detainee's resistance to interrogation. Separation
does not constitute sensory deprivation, which is prohibited. For the purposes
of this manual, sensory deprivation is defined as an arranged situation
causing significant psychological distress due to a prolonged absence, or
significant reduction, of the usual external stimuli and perceptual
opportunities. Sensory deprivation may result in extreme anxiety,
hallucinations, bizarre thoughts, depression, and anti-social behavior.
Detainees will not be subjected to sensory deprivation.
M-27. Physical separation is the best and preferred method of separation. As
a last resort, when physical separation of detainees is not feasible, goggles or
blindfolds and earmuffs may be utilized as a field expedient method to
generate a perception of separation.
M-28. Objectives:
• Physical Separation: Prevent the detainee from communicating with
other detainees (which might increase the detainee's resistance to
interrogation) and foster a feeling of futility.
• Field Expedient Separation: Prolong the shock of capture. Prevent the
detainee from communicating with other detainees (which might
increase the detainee's resistance to interrogation) and foster a feeling
of futility. |
2-22.3 | 355 | _________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
M-29. Safeguards:
• Duration: Self-explanatory.
• Physical Separation: Limited to 30 days of initial duration.
• Field Expedient Separation: Limited to 12 hours of initial
duration at the initial interrogation site. This limit on duration does
not include the time that goggles or blindfolds and earmuffs are used
on detainees for security purposes during transit and evacuation.
• Oversight Considerations for Field Expedient Separation:
(cid:131) The intended use of field expedient means of separation must be
specified on the interrogation plan that is submitted to the GO/FO
for approval.
(cid:131) Detainees must be protected from self-injury when field expedient
means of separation are used. The effect of the application of field
expedient separation means on the detainee must be monitored to
detect any possible health concerns.
M-30. The following safeguards apply to both Physical Separation and Field
Expedient Separation.
• Break: Additional periods of separation will not be applied without the
approving GO/FO's determination of the length of a break between
iterations.
• Extension:
(cid:131) Physical Separation Method: Extensions of this technique past 30
days must be reviewed by the servicing SJA and approved by the
original approving GO/FO or his replacement in that position.
(cid:131) Field Expedient Method: Extensions past 12 hours of initial
duration at the initial interrogation site must be reviewed by the
servicing SJA and approved by the original approving/replacement
GO/FO.
(cid:131) Medical: Detainees will be checked periodically in accordance with
command health care directives, guidance, and SOPs applicable to
all detainees.
(cid:131) Custody and Control: The interrogation chain of command must
coordinate the interrogation plan with the Detention Operations
Commander. The Detention Operations Commander (in conjunction
with the MI commander) may convene a multidiscipline custody and
control oversight team including, but not limited to, MP, MI, BSC (if
available), and legal representatives. The team can advise and
provide measures to ensure effective custody and control in
compliance with the requirements of applicable law and policy.
• Oversight Considerations:
(cid:131) Use of hoods (sacks) over the head, or of duct tape or adhesive tape
over the eyes, as a separation method is prohibited.
(cid:131) If separation has been approved, and the interrogator subsequently
determines that there may be a problem, the interrogator should
seek further guidance through the chain of command before applying
the technique. |
2-22.3 | 356 | FM 2-22.3_________________________________________________________________________________
(cid:131) Care should be taken to protect the detainee from exposure (in
accordance with all appropriate standards addressing excessive or
inadequate environmental conditions) to—
− Excessive noise.
− Excessive dampness.
− Excessive or inadequate heat, light, or ventilation.
− Inadequate bedding and blankets.
− Interrogation activity leadership will periodically monitor the
application of this technique.
(cid:131) Use of separation must not preclude the detainee getting four hours
of continuous sleep every 24 hours.
(cid:131) Oversight should account for moving a detainee from one
environment to another (thus a different location) or arrangements
to modify the environment within the same location in accordance
with the approved interrogation plan.
M-31. Suggested Approach Combinations:
• Futility.
• Incentive.
• Fear Up. |
2-22.3 | 357 | _________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
Glossary
The glossary lists acronyms and terms with Army or joint definitions, and other selected terms.
Where Army and joint definitions are different, (Army) follows the term. Terms for which
FM 2-22.3 is the proponent manual (the authority) are marked with an asterisk (*) and followed
by the number of the paragraph (¶) or page where they are defined. For other terms, refer to the
manual listed. JP 1-02, Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms and FM 1-02 Operational
Terms and Graphics are posted on the Joint Electronic Library, which is available online and on
CD ROM.
• Use this URL to access JP 1-02 online:
http://atiam.train.army.mil/soldierPortal/atia/adlsc/view/public/11444-1/FM/1
02/TOC.HTM
• Use this URL to access FM 1-02 online:
http://atiam.train.army.mil/soldierPortal/atia/adlsc/view/public/11444-1/FM/1
02/TOC.HTM
• /jel/service_pubs/101_5_1.pdf
• Follow this path to access JP 1-02 on the Joint Electronic Library CD-ROM:
Mainmenu>Joint Electronic Library>DOD Dictionary.
• Follow this path to access FM 1-02 on the Joint Electronic Library CD-ROM:
Mainmenu>Joint Electronic Library>Service Publications>Multiservice Pubs>
FM 101-5-1.
*2X The *2X Staff conducts mission and RM for all HUMINT and CI
entities located within the designated AOIR. It coordinates,
deconflicts, and synchronizes all HUMINT and CI activities in the
designated AOIR. (“*2X” indicates 2X functions at all levels.)
AC Active Component
ACCO Army Central Control Office
ACE analysis and control element
ACT Analysis Control Team
ADA Air Defense Artillery
ADP automated data processing
ADCON administrative control
aka also known as
AMHS Automated Message Handling System
AMID allied military intelligence battalion
AO area of operations
AOI area of interest
AOIR area of intelligence responsibility
AOR area of responsibility |
2-22.3 | 358 | FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
approx approximately
ARNG Army Reserve National Guard
ASAS All-Source Analysis System
ASCC Army Service Component Command
ASD(C3I) Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control,
Communications, and Intelligence)
ASI additional skill identifier
assn assassination
ATD associated technical document
BAT Biometric Automated Toolset
BCT brigade combat team
BDA battle damage assessment
BOS Battlefield Operating System
BSC Behavioral Science Consultant
BSD basic source data
C2 command and control
CA civil affairs
CAT category
CCIR commander’s critical information requirement
CCNY City College of New York
CDOC captured document
CDR commander
CGS common ground station
CE captured equipment (STANAG term)
CED captured enemy document
CEE captured enemy equipment
CENTCOM US Central Command
CFSO Counterintelligence Force Protection Source Operations
CHAMS CI/HUMINT Automated Management System
CHATS CI/HUMINT Automated Tool Set
CI counterintelligence
CIA Central Intelligence Agency
CICA Counterintelligence Coordination Authority
CIAC Counterintelligence Analysis Cell |
2-22.3 | 359 | _________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
CID Criminal Investigation Division
CIFA Counterintelligence Field Agency
C2X Coalition Intelligence Staff Officer
C/J2X LNO Coalition/Joint Intelligence Staff Liaison Officer
C/J/G2X Coalition/Joint/Corps/Division Intelligence Staff Officer
C/J/G/S2 Coalition/Joint/Corps/Division/Brigade and Below Intelligence
Staff Officer
C/J/G/S2X Coalition/Joint/Corps/Division/Brigade and Below Intelligence
Staff Officer
CMO civil-military operations
COA course of action
COCOM Combatant Command
COE common operating environment
COLISEUM Community On-Line Intelligence System for End Users and
Managers
COMMZ communications zone
CONUS continental United States
CONOP contingency operations
COP common operational picture
COR contracting officer representative
COT commercial off-the-shelf
COTR Contracting Officer’s Technical Representative
counterintelligence Information gathered and activities conducted to protect against
espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or
assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments
or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign persons, or
international terrorist activities. (FM 2-0)
Counterintelligence Subordinate to the J/G2X and coordinates all CI activities for a
Coordinating Authority deployed force. It provides technical support to all CI assets and
coordinates and deconflicts CI activities in the deployed AO.
(FM 2-0)
CP command post
CPERS captured personnel (JP-2.5)
CPR Common Point of Reference
CS combat support
CSS combat service support
CTF coalition task force |
2-22.3 | 360 | FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
DA Department of the Army
DCGS-A Distributed Common Ground System-Army
DCIS Defense Criminal Investigative Service
DCISS Defense Intelligence Agency CI Information System
DCP detainee collection point
DEA Drug Enforcement Agency
debriefing The systematic questioning of individuals to procure information
to answer specific collection requirements by direct and indirect
questioning techniques. (FM 2-0)
DED Data Element Dictionary
DH Defense HUMINT
DHMO Defense HUMINT Management Office
DHS Department of Homeland Security
DIA Defense Intelligence Agency
DII DOD Information Infrastructure
DISCOM Division Support Command
DOCEX document exploitation
document exploitation The systematic extraction of information from all media formats
in response to collection requirements. (FM 2-0)
DOD Department of Defense
DOE Department of Energy
DP displaced person
DRP Detainee Reporting
DRS Detainee Report System
DS direct support
DSCA defense support of civilian authorities
DSS decision support software
DST decision support template
DTG date-time group
EAC echelons above corps
EEFI essential elements of friendly information
EPW enemy prisoner of war
evaluating In intelligence usage, appraisal of an item of information in
terms of credibility, reliability, pertinence, and accuracy.
(FM 2-0) |
2-22.3 | 361 | _________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
EW electronic warfare
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation
FEO forced entry operations
FFIR friendly force information requirement
FHA foreign humanitarian assistance
FISS Foreign Intelligence Security Service
Five S’s search, seize, segregate, safeguard, and silence
FORSCOM US Army Forces Command
FRAGO fragmentary order
FRN field reporting number
FSE fire support element
Gb gigabyte
GC Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons
in Time of War
GPS Global Positioning System
GPW Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War
GRCS Guardrail Common Sensor
GRIFN Guardrail Information Node
GS general support
GSR general support-reinforcing
GUI graphic user interface
GWS Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field
HAC HUMINT analysis cell
HAT HUMINT analysis team
HCR HUMINT collection requirement
HCT HUMINT collection team
HET human exploitation team
HN host nation
HOC HUMINT operations cell
HSOC Homeland Security Operations Center
HQ headquarters
HQDA Headquarters, Department of the Army |
2-22.3 | 362 | FM 2-22.3_________________________________________________________________________________
human intelligence The collection by a trained HUMINT collector of foreign
information from people and multimedia to identify elements,
intentions, composition, strength, dispositions, tactics, equip-
ment, and capabilities. (FM 2-0)
HUMINT Human Intelligence
HUMINT Analysis Cell The “fusion point” for all HUMINT reporting and operational
analysis in the ACE and JISE. It determines gaps in reporting
and coordinates with the requirements manager to cross-cue
other intelligence sensor systems.
HUMINT Analysis Team Sub-element of the G2 ACE that supports the G2 development of
IPB products and developing and tailoring requirements to match
HUMINT collection capabilities.
HUMINT Operations Cell Assigned under the J/G2X to track all HUMINT activities in the
area of intelligence responsibility (AOIR). It provides technical
support to all HUMINT collection operations and deconflicts
HUMINT collection operations in the AO. (FM 2-0)
I&WS Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and
Warfighting Support
IAFIS Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System
IBS Integrated Broadcast Services
ICF intelligence contingency fund
ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross
ID identification
IED improvised explosive device
IG Inspector General
IIMG Interagency Incident Management Group
IIR intelligence information report
IMINT imagery intelligence
INTREP intelligence report
INTSUM intelligence summary
IPB intelligence preparation of the battlefield
IPF Intelligence Processing Facility
IPSP Intelligence Priorities for Strategic Planning
IR information requirements
ISA International Standardization Agreement
ISN Internment Serial Number
ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
IU Interrogation Unit (AJP-2.5) |
2-22.3 | 363 | _________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
J2 Joint Intelligence Directorate/Staff
J2X Joint Intelligence Staff Officer
J2X Responsible for controlling, coordinating and deconflicting all
HUMINT and CI collection activities and keeping the joint force
J2 informed on all HUMINT and CI activities conducted in the
joint force AOR. (*2X Staff Handbook) Umbrella organization
consisting of human intelligence operation cell and the task force
counterintelligence coordinating authority. The J2X is
responsible for coordination and deconfliction of all human
source-related activity. See also counterintelligence; human
intelligence. (JP 2-01)
J5 Joint Staff Directorate, Civil Affairs
J/G2 Joint/Corps/Division Intelligence Staff Officer
J/G/S2 Joint/Corps/Division/Brigade and Below Intelligence Staff Officer
J/G/S2X Joint/Corps/Division/Brigade and Below Intelligence Staff Officer
JAC Joint Analysis Center
JAO joint area of operations
JCMEC Joint Captured Materiel Exploitation Center
JDEF joint document exploitation facility
JDS Joint Dissemination System
JFC Joint Forces Commander
JIC Joint Interrogation Center
JIDC Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center
JISE Joint Intelligence Support Element
JTF joint task force
JUMPS job, unit, mission, PIR and IR, and supporting information
JWICS Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System
KB knowledgeability brief
LCC Land Component Command
LDR Lead Development Report
LEA law enforcement agency
LNO Liaison Officer
LRS long-range surveillance
LTIOV latest time information is of value
MAGTF Marine Air-Ground Task Force
MASINT measurement and signature intelligence
MDMP Military Decisionmaking Process |
2-22.3 | 364 | FM 2-22.3_________________________________________________________________________________
MEDEVAC medical evacuation
MEF Marine expeditionary force
MEJA Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act
METT-TC mission, equipment, terrain and weather, troops and support
available, time available, and civil considerations
MI Military Intelligence
MILO mission, identification, location, and organization
MSO military source operations
MOS military occupation specialty
MP Military Police
MTOE modified table of organization and equipment
MTW major theater war
NA not applicable
NAC national agency check
NAI named area of interest
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NBC nuclear, biological, and chemical
NCO noncommissioned officer
NCOIC noncommissioned officer in charge
NGA National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
NGO non-governmental organization
NIP Notice of Intelligence Potential
NIST national intelligence support team
NOFORN no foreign dissemination
NRT near-real time
NSA National Security Agency
NVG night vision goggles
OB order of battle
OCONUS outside continental United States
OCR optical character recognition
OGA other government agencies
O/I operations and intelligence
OIC officer in charge
OMT operational management team |
2-22.3 | 365 | _________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
OPCON operational control
OPLAN operations plan
OPORD operations order
OSC operations support cell
OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense
OSINT open-source intelligence
OPTEMPO operational tempo
OVOP overt operational proposal
PDA Personal Digital Assistant
PIR priority intelligence requirement
PME peacetime military engagement
PMO Provost Marshal Office
POL petroleum, oils, and lubricants
POW prisoner of war
PRETECHREP preliminary technical report
priority intelligence Those intelligence requirements for which a commander has
requirements an anticipated and stated priority in the task of planning and
decisionmaking. (JP 1-02)
PSO peacetime stability operation (STANAG term)
PSYOP Psychological Operations
PVO private volunteer organization
PW Prisoner of War (as used in the GPW)
R reinforcing
R&S reconnaissance and surveillance
RC Reserve Components
RFI request for information
RM requirements management
ROE rules of engagement
RSR Resource Status Report
SALUTE Size, Activity, Location, Unit, Time, Equipment
SBI special background investigation
SCC Service Component Commands
SCI sensitive compartmented information
SCO Sub-Control Office
SDR Source-Directed Requirement |
2-22.3 | 366 | FM 2-22.3_________________________________________________________________________________
security detainee Those detainees who are not combatants, but who may be under
investigation or pose a threat to US forces if released.
SE southeast
SECDEF Secretary of Defense
SERE survival, evasion, resistance, and escape
S.F.P. Students for Peace
SIGINT signals intelligence
SII statement of intelligence interest
SIO senior intelligence officer
SIPRNET Secret Internet Protocol Router Network
SIR specific information requirement
SITMAP situation map
SJA Staff Judge Advocate
SME subject matter expert
SOF Special Operations Forces
SOFA Status of Forces Agreement
SOI signal operating instruction
SOP standing operating procedure
SOW statement of work
Source (DOD) 1. A person, thing, or activity from which information is obtained.
2. In clandestine activities, a person (agent), normally a foreign
national, in the employ of an intelligence activity for intelligence
purposes. 3. In interrogation activities, any person who furnishes
information, either with or without the knowledge that the
information is being used for intelligence purposes. In this
context, a controlled source is in the employment or under the
control of the intelligence activity and knows that the information
is to be used for intelligence purposes. An uncontrolled source is a
voluntary contributor of information and may or may not know
that the information is to be used for intelligence purposes. See
also agent; collection agency. (JP 1-02)
SQL structured query language
SSC small-scale contingency
Stability and Reconstruction
Operations Those operations that sustain and exploit security and control
over areas, populations, and resources. They employ military
capabilities to reconstruct or establish services and support
civilian agencies. Stability and reconstruction operations involve
both coercive and cooperative actions.
STANAG Standardization Agreement |
2-22.3 | 367 | _________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
TACON tactical control
tactical questioning The expedient initial questioning for information of immediate
tactical value. Soldiers conduct tactical questioning based on the
unit’s SOP, ROE, and the order for that mission. Unit leaders
must include specific guidance for tactical questioning in the
order for appropriate missions. The unit S3 and S2 must also
provide specific guidance down to the unit level to help guide
tactical questioning. (FM 2-0)
TCICA Theater Counterintelligence Coordination Authority
TCP traffic control point
TDA table of distribution and allowances
TDRC Theater Detainee Reporting Center
TECHDOC technical document
TECHNINT technical intelligence
TES Tactical Exploitation System
TF task force
THREATCON threat condition
TOE table of organization and equipment
TPFDDL Time-Phased Forces Deployment Data List
TTP tactics, techniques, and procedures
TS Top Secret
tvl travel
TWS Trusted Workstation
UCMJ Uniform Code of Military Justice
UNCLASS unclassified
unk unknown
USAR US Army Reserve
USB Universal Serial Bus
USCENTCOM US Central Command
USD(I) Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
UTM universal transverse mercator (grid)
UW unconventional warfare
WARNO warning order
WMD weapons of mass destruction
WO warrant officer
WTC World Trade Center |
2-22.3 | 369 | _________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
Bibliography
The bibliography lists field manuals by new number followed by old number,
as indicated.
DOCUMENTS NEEDED
These documents must be available to the intended users of this publication.
JP 0-2. Unified Action Armed Forces. 10 July 2001.
JP 2-0. Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations. 9 March 2000.
JP 2-01.2. (U) Joint Doctrine and Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for
Counterintelligence Support to Operations (S//NF). 13 June 2006.
JP 3-0. Doctrine for Joint Operations. 10 September 2001.
JP 3-63. Joint Doctrine for Detainee Operations. September 2005.
JP 4-0. Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations. 6 April 2000.
AR 40-25. Nutrition Standards and Education. 15 June 2001.
AR 715-9. Contractors Accompanying the Force. 29 October 1999.
DA Pam 715-16. Contractor Deployment Guide. 27 February 1998.
FM 1. The Army. 14 June 2005.
FM 1-02. Operational Terms and Graphics. 21 September 2004.
FM 2-0. Intelligence. 17 May 2004.
FM 3-0. Operations. 14 June 2001.
FM 3-100.21. Contractors on the Battlefield. 3 January 2003.
FM 5-0. Army Planning and Orders Production. 20 January 2005.
FM 6-0. Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces. 11 August 2003.
FM 27-10. Law of Land Warfare. July 1956.
FM 34-5. (U) Human Intelligence and Related Counterintelligence Operations (S//NF).
29 July 1994.
FM 34-130. Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield. 8 July 1994.
FM 63-11. Logistics Support Element Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures. 8 October
1996.
FM 71-100. Division Operations. 28 August 1996.
FM 100-15. Corps Operations. 13 September 1989.
FM 101-5. Staff Organization and Operations. 31 May 1997.
AMC Pam 715-18. AMC Contracts and Contractors Supporting Military Operations.
June 2000. |
2-22.3 | 370 | FM 2-22.3_____________________________________________________________________________________
READINGS RECOMMENDED
These sources contain relevant supplemental information.
ARMY PUBLICATIONS
Most Army doctrinal publications are available online:
http://155.217.58.58/atdls.htm
AR 190-8. Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees and Other
Detainees. 1 October 1997.
AR 190-40. Serious Incident Report. 15 July 2005.
AR 195-5. Criminal Investigation Evidence Procedures. 28 August 1982.
AR 380-5. Department of the Army Information Security Program. September 2000.
AR 380-10. Technology Transfer, Disclosure of Information, and Contacts with
Foreign Representatives. 15 February 2001.
AR 380-15. (C) Safeguarding Classified NATO Information. 1 March 1984.
AR 380-28. Department of the Army Special Security System. 12 December 1991.
AR 380-40. Policy for Controlling and Safeguarding Communications Security
(COMSEC) Material. 22 October 1990.
AR 380-49. Industrial Security. 15 April 1982.
AR 380-53. Telecommunications Security Monitoring. 29 April 1998.
AR 380-67. Personnel Security Program. 9 September 1988.
AR 381-1. Security Controls on Dissemination of Intelligence Information.
12 February 1990.
AR 381-10. US Army Intelligence Activities. 1 July 1984.
AR 381-12. Subversion and Espionage Directed Against the US Army (SAEDA).
15 January 1993.
AR 381-14. Technical Counterintelligence (TCI). 30 September 2002.
AR 381-20. (U) US Army Counterintelligence Activities (S). 26 September 1986.
AR 381-45. Investigative Records Repository. 25 August 1989.
AR 381-47. (U) US Army Offensive Counterespionage Activities (S). 30 July 1990.
AR 381-100. (U) Army Human Intelligence Collection Program (S//NF). 15 May
1988.
AR 381-102. (U) US Army Cover Support Program (S). 10 January 1991.
AR 381-143. Military Intelligence Nonstandard Material Polices and Procedures.
1 December 1986.
AR 381-172. (U) Counterintelligence Force Protection Operations (CFSO) and Low
Level Source Operations (LLSO) (S//NF). 30 December 1994.
AR 385-10. The Army Safety Program. 23 May 1988.
AR 614-115. Military Intelligence Excepted Career Program. 12 April 2004. |
2-22.3 | 371 | _________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
AR 614-200. Military Intelligence Civilian Excepted Career Program.
30 September 2004.
AR 715-9. Contractors Accompanying the Force. 29 October 1999.
DA Pam 381-15. Foreign Military Intelligence Collection Activities Program.
1 June 1988.
DA Pam 385-1. Small Unit Safety Officer/NCO Guide. 29 November 2001.
TRADOC Reg 25-36. The TRADOC Doctrinal Literature Program (DLP). 1 October
2004.
FM 2-0. Intelligence. 17 May 2004.
FM 3-19.4. Military Police Leader’s Handbook. March 2002.
FM 3-19-40. Military Police Internment/Resettlement Operations. August 2001.
FM 4-02.21. Division and Brigade Surgeon’s Handbook of Tactics, Techniques and
Procedures. November 2000.
FM 5-0. Staff Organizations and Operations. 31 May 1997.
FM 19-4. Military Police Battlefield Circulation Control, Area Security, and Enemy
Prisoner of War Operations. 7 May 1993.
FM 27-10. Law of Land Warfare. July 1956.
FM 34-3. Intelligence Analysis. March 1990.
FM 34-7-1. Tactical Human Intelligence and Counterintelligence Operations.
April 2002.
FM 34-8. Combat Commander’s Handbook for Intelligence. September 1992.
FM 34-54. Technical Intelligence. January 1998.
FM 34-60. Counterintelligence. 3 October 1995.
FM 41-10. Civil Affairs Operations. 11 January 1993.
FMI 3-19.40. Military Police Internment/Resettlement Operations. 30 September
2005.
TC 25-20. A Leader’s Guide to After-Action Reviews. 30 September 1993.
ST 2-22.7. Tactical Human Intelligence and Counterintelligence Operations.
April 2002.
ST 2-33.5. US Army Intelligence Reach Operations. 1 June 2001.
ST 2-50. Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Assets. June 2002.
ST 2-91.6. Small Unit Support to Intelligence. March 2004.
OTHER PUBLICATIONS
JP 2-01. Joint Intelligence Support to Military Operations. November 1996.
AR 350-1. Army Training and Education. 9 April 2003.
DIAM 58-11. (U) DOD HUMINT Policies and Procedures (S//NF). August 1993.
DIAM 58-12. (U) DOD HUMINT Management Systems (S//NF). June 1997. |
2-22.3 | 372 | FM 2-22.3_____________________________________________________________________________________
AJP-2.5. Handling of Captured Personnel, Materiel, and Documents. September
2001.
DOD Directive 2310.1. DOD Program for Enemy Prisoners of War (POW) and Other
Detainees (Short Title: DOD Enemy POW Detainee Program). 18 August 1994.
DOD Directive 2310.1E. The Department of Defense Detainee Program.
DOD Directive 3115.09. DOD Intelligence Interrogations, Detainee Debriefings, and
Tactical Questioning. 3 November 2005.
DOD Directive 5100.77. DOD Law of War Program. 9 December 1998.
DOD Directive 5240.1. DOD Intelligence Activities. 3 December 1982.
DOD Directive 5525.5. DOD Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Officials. 15
January 1986.
DOD Instruction 3020.41. Contractor Personnel Authorized to Accompany the U.S.
Armed Forces. 3 October 2005
DOD Regulation 5200.1-R. Information Security Program, 1977.
DOD Regulation 5240.0-R. Procedures Governing the Activities of DOD Intelligence
Components That Affect United States Persons. December 1982.
DOD SOP for Collecting and Processing Detainee Biometric Data. 11 February 05
Protocol 1 Additional to the Geneva Conventions. Part IV: Civilian Population,
Section 1: General Protection Against Effects of Hostilities. 1977.
Executive Order 12333, United States Intelligence Activities. 4 December 1981.
Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I) Memorandum, “Guidance for the
Conduct and Oversight of Defense Human Intelligence (HUMINT) (U).” 14
December 2004.
Implementing Instructions to the USD(I) Memorandum. “Guidance for the Conduct
and Oversight of Defense Human Intelligence (HUMINT) (U).” 7 September
2004.
SECDEF Memorandum, Policy on Assigning Detainee Serial Numbers (ISN) (U). 20
September 2005.
18 U.S.C. Posse Comitatus Act of 1878, § 1385.
Homeland Security Act of 2002.
Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Public Law No. 109-163, Title XIV.
DA Form 1132-R. Prisoner’s Personal Property List – Personal Deposit Fund (LRA).
April 1986.
DA Form 4137. Evidence/Property Custody Document. July 1976.
DA Form 4237-R. Detainee Personal Record. August 1995.
DD Form 2745. Enemy Prisoner of War Capture Tag. May 1996.
Standardization Agreements (STANAG):
STANAG 1059. Distinguishing Letters for Geographic Entities for Use by
NATO Armed Forces. Edition 8. April 2003.
STANAG 2022. Intelligence Reports. 29 September 1988. |
2-22.3 | 373 | _________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
STANAG 2033. Interrogation of Prisoners of War (PW). Edition 6. December
1994.
STANAG 2044. Procedures for Dealing with Prisoners of War (PW). Edition 5.
June 1994.
STANAG 2084. Handling and Reporting of Captured Enemy Equipment and
Documents. June 1986. |
2-22.3 | 375 | FM 2-22.3
Index
Entries are by paragraph number
A Area of operations, 1-29 Change of Scenery Approach,
ACE. See analysis and control Assets, HUMINT Collection, 8-63
element. 4-40 Checkpoint Operations, 5-7,
AJP 2.5, Appendix E Association Matrix, 12-19, Figure 5-36, 5-42
12-2 CIA. See Central Intelligence
AO. See area of operations.
Audio recording, 9-29 Agency.
Activities matrix, 12-23,
Figure 12-3. See also Automation, 13-2 CICA. See Counterintelligence
Coordination Authority.
Automation analysis tools. Analysis tools, 13-13
CID. See Criminal Investigation
Analysis and control element, Requirements for collectors,
Division.
2-16 13-24
Civil Affairs (CA) Units, 4-47,
Analyst support, 9-30. Systems, 13-21, L-3
4-58
Analytical Workstation requirements,
Cold leads, 9-22
Support, 12-2 13-25
Collect, 1-2
Tools, 12-16
B Collection
Approach, 1-10, 7-15, 8-1
Objectives, 7-2
Basic Source Data Reports
Phase, 8-4
(BSD), 10-13 Priority, 4-45
Rapport, 8-9
Battlefield Operating System Requirements, 7-4
Strategies, 8-77
(BOS), 1-1 Combat Service Support Units,
Debriefing, 8-82 BEST MAPS, 5-45 4-58
Elicitation, 8-86 Biographic Intelligence, 5-45 Combatants, viii
Interrogation, 8-77 Biometrics, 13-4 Lawful, 6-18
Techniques, 8-17 Unlawful, 6-18
Transitions, 8-73 C Command Debriefing Team,
Approaches C2X, 2-4 2-13
Change of Scenery, 8-63 CA. See Civil Affairs. Command Relationships,
(HUMINT) 4-11
Direct, 8-19 Capabilities, 1-31
Army, Table 4-2
Emotional, 8-23 Capture Rates, 5-90
Joint, Table 4-3
Establish Your Identity, 8-58 Capture tag, Figure D-1
Common points of reference,
False Flag, 8-69 Captured document
9-39. See also Map tracking.
File and Dossier, 8-55 Handling, I-12
Communication requirements,
Incentive, 8-21 Log, I-24, Figure I-3
13-27, 13-30, L-7
Mutt and Jeff, 8-65 Transmittal sheet, I-19,
Contact reports, 10-14
Rapid Fire, 8-60 Figure I-2
Continuous Contacts, 5-16
Repetition, 8-59 Captured equipment handling,
Contractor, 1-7, K-1
Silent, 8-62 D-21
Control Questions, 9-10
We Know All, 8-53 Central Intelligence Agency,
Coordinates register, 12-41
3-24
Area Handbook, 7-4 |
2-22.3 | 376 | _________________________________________________________________________________ Index
Coordination with other units and Drug Enforcement Agency, 4-58 Restricted to Base Camp,
operations, 5-42, 5-56, 5-102 3-14
Counterintelligence E Hot leads, 9-21
Coordination Authority, 2-8 EAC HUMINT, 3-22 Human Intelligence, 1-4,
Functions, 1-7, Figure 1-2 Emotional Approach, 8-23 Structure, 2-1
Screening, 6-39, table 6-1 EPW HUMINT, 1-4
Courses of Action, 4-44 Serial number, 6-12, 6-13 Agencies, 3-24
Criminal Investigation Division, Status, 6-14 Analysis, 12-1
4-58, 4-60, 5-42 Early Entry Operations. See also Analysis Cell, 2-16
Cultural Awareness, 1-29, 8-4 HUMINT operations. Asset Capabilities, 4-17,
HUMINT Support of, 3-6 4-26, 4-45
D
Economic Intelligence, 5-45 HUMINT Collection, 1-8, 5-1
DEA. See Drug Enforcement Elicitation, 8-80 Aids, 9-28
Agency.
Establish Your Identity Constraints, 4-41
Databases, 12-46, 13-18 Approach, 8-58 In a Hostile Environment,
Debriefing, 1-21 Exploit dispositions, 9-43 3-21
Debriefing Operations, 1-21,
In Permissive Environment,
5-30 F 3-19
Legal Guidelines, 5-33 False Flag, 8-69 In Semi-permissive
Operational Considerations,
Field Interrogations Operations,
Environment, 3-20
5-34 5-95 Phases, 1-8
Deceit, 9-23, 9-25, 9-26 File and Dossier Approach, 8-55 Plan, 7-9
Defensive Operations, 3-7 Fingerprint scanner, 13-4 HUMINT Collection Team, 2-11
Detainee, 5-26 Five S’s, D-7 Allocation to maneuver
Geneva Convention
Forced Entry Operations. See
units, 5-96
categories, 6-14 also HUMINT operations. HUMINT Collector, 1-7
Security, 5-58, 5-78 HUMINT Support of , 3-5 Traits, 1-28
Interrogation Operations, Formal Contacts, 5-28 HUMINT Command and Control,
1-20
Friendly Force Debriefing
4-9
Direct Approach, 8-19 Operations, 1-21, 5-39 HUMINT Contacts, 5-5
Direct Questioning, 9-4 One Time Contact, 5-7
Document G Continuous Contacts, 5-16
Accountability, I-19 G2X, 2-4 Formal Contact, 5-28
Associated with a source, Geneva Conventions, 5-68, 5-72 HUMINT Control Organizations,
I-51 Categories of detainees, 2-3 through 2-14
Categories, I-27 6-15 HUMINT Collection and Related
Exploitation (DOCEX) Excerpts, Appendix A Activities, 1-14
Operations, 1-24, 4-51, HUMINT Methodology, 1-14,
E-12, I-1, I-11, I-48 H 1-18
Exploitation Team, 2-14 HCT, 2-11. See also HUMINT HUMINT Mission Planning, 4-35,
Evacuation, I-12 Collection Team. 4-44
Handling, I-14 As an Independent Patrol, HUMINT Operations, 1-23
Screening, I-25 3-14 Assessing, 4-8
Tag, I-14 Integrated with other Executing, 4-7
operations, 3-14
Translation, I-43 Planning, 4-3
Transmittal, I-34 Preparing, 4-5 |
2-22.3 | 377 | FM 2-22.3_______________________________________________________________________________
HUMINT Organization, Advantages, 11-2 M
Figure 2-1 Briefing, 11-18 Machine translation, 13-8
HUMINT Requirements Cautions, 11-4 Maneuver unit support, 4-9
Analysis, 4-18
Controlling and correcting, Map tracking, 9-35
HUMINT Requirements 11-24
Management, 4-16
Matrices, 12-18
Disadvantages, 11-3
HUMINT Source, 1-6
Measurement and Signals
Evaluating, 11-28 Intelligence (MASINT), 4-57
Database, 2-9, 12-7
Methods, 11-6, 11-7 Military geographic intelligence,
Collection Activities, 1-16
Placement, 11-21 5-46
Selection, 12-45
Techniques, 11-16 Military Intelligence
HUMINT Structure, 2-1 Organizations, 4-57
Interpreters, 11-1, 11-26
HUMINT Tasks, 1-5 Military Police in Association
Civilian, 11-15
HUMINT Technical Control, 4-10 with Interrogation Operations,
Evaluating, 11-28
5-56, Figure 6-2
I Military, 11-14 Internment/resettlement
INTSUM, 7-4 operations, 6-14,
Imagery Intelligence, 4-57
Iris scanner, 13-6 Figure 6-2
Incentive Approach, 8-21
ISR Plan (Integrated), 4-3, 4-27, Units, 4-58, 5-42
Information Dissemination, 4-32
4-28 Mutt and Jeff, 8-65
INSCOM, 3-22
Updating, 4-34
Intelligence Battlefield Operating N
System, 1-1
J
National level intelligence
Intelligence Estimate, 7-4
J2X, 2-4 agencies, 3-24
Intelligence information reports,
JIDC Analysis Section, 2-17 Notice of intelligence potential,
10-6
10-15
Joint HUMINT, 3-23, 5-91
Intelligence preparation of the
battlefield, 12-3 Joint Interrogation and O
Debriefing Center (JIDC),
Intelligence Process, 1-2,
5-102 OB Factors, 12-43
Figure 1-1
Joint interrogation operations, Offensive Operations, 3-2
Intelligence Production, 4-31
5-99 One-Time Contact, 5-7
Intelligence Reach, 7-5, 7-6
Open source documents, I-10
Interrogation, 1-20, 5-50 K
Operational analysis and
Of wounded detainees,
Knowledgeability Brief, 10-15 assessment, 12-8
5-91
Operational Coordination, 4-9
Priorities, Figure, 6-3 L
Operational Management Team
Prohibited techniques, 5-68,
Lawful enemy combatants, 6-18 (OMT), 2-10
5-74
Lead development report, 10-15 Team leader requirements,
Prohibition against use of
Leads, 9-20 13-23
force, 5-73
Levels of Employment, 3-14 Operational reports, 10-4
Serial number allocation,
Appendix F Liaison Operations, 1-22, 5-46 Operations Orders, 4-53
Interrogation Operations, 5-50 Link analysis diagram, 12-16, Operations Plans, 4-54
12-25, Figure 12-4 Operations Support Cell, 2-7
Field, 5-96
Limitations, 1-32 Orders
Joint, 5-100
Local civilian debriefing Illegal, 5-80, 5-82
Interpreter program, 11-28,
operations, 1-21
11-29, 11-30 Organizational Chart, 9-28,
Long-Range Surveillance, 5-42 Figure 2-1
Interpreter use, 11-2 |
2-22.3 | 378 | _________________________________________________________________________________ Index
P Repetition Approach, 8-59 Single-discipline HUMINT
Pattern analysis, 12-40, 12-42 Reporting, 1-13, 7-24, 10-1
analysis and production,
12-14
Plan, 1-2 Channels, 10-3, 10-16,
Figure 10-1
Situation Map (SITMAP), 7-4
Planning and Preparation, 1-9,
7-1 Evaluation, 4-33
Sociological Intelligence, 5-45
Political intelligence, 5-45 Principles, 10-2
SOF. See Special operation
forces.
Polygraph, 13-7 Report types, 10-3
SOR development, 12-5
Detainee status, 6-14 through Required areas of knowledge,
6-23, E-8 1-29
Source, 1-6
Pre-deployment planning, Research, 7-3
Administrative reports, 10-5
Appendix C Source-specific, 7-8, 7-25 Analysis, 12-11
Prepare, 1-2 Reserve component integration, Assessment, 6-36
Primary approach strategy, 7-15 4-50 Coverage overlay, 12-50
Process, 1-2 Restricted Interrogation Map reading skills, 9-38
Produce, 1-2 Techniques, 8-71 Profiles, 12-51
Protected persons, 6-17 Retained personnel, 6-22 Reliability matrix, B-1
Protocol I Additional to the Risk assessment, 4-43 Special Operation Forces, 5-42
Geneva Conventions, Stability and reconstruction
S
Appendix B operations, 3-9
Psychological Operations S2 Guide for Handling Staff coordination, 4-59
(PSYOP) Units, 4-58, 5-42 Detainees, Appendix D
Strategic Debriefing Operations,
S2X, 2-4 5-43
Q
SALUTE reports, 10-10 Subject matter expert (SME),
Questioning, 1-11 Format, Appendix H 7-4
Illiterates, 9-46 Science and technical Support Operations, 3-15
Plan, 7-18 intelligence, 5-45 Support Relationships
Principles, 9-2 Screening, 1-18, 6-1 (HUMINT), 4-13
Quick reference guide, Codes, Table 6-1 Direct Support, Table 4-2
Appendix G Community, 6-38 General Support, Table 4-2
Sequence, 7-19, 7-20 Documents, I-25 Support Scheme Development,
Questions, 9-2 Local employees, 6-37 4-27, 4-60
Direct, 9-4 Methodologies, 6-9
T
Follow Up, 9-7 MP support, 6-14, Figure
Non-pertinent, 9-8 6-2 Tactical Debriefing Operations,
5-35
Prepared, 9-12 Observations, 6-30
Tactical questioning, 1-17
Repeat, 9-9 Operations, 1-19, 6-7, 6-8
Target Folder, 4-39, 12-47
To avoid, 9-14 Prisoner of war and refugee,
6-9 , 6-13 Task Organization, 4-47
R Reports, 10-15 Taskings and Requests, 4-28
Rapid Fire Approach, 8-60 Requirements, 6-7 Technical expert support, 9-30
Reach. See Intelligence Reach. Sheet, Figure 6-1 Technical intelligence
(TECHINT), 4-57
Recording principles and Search engine, 13-14
Screening requirements for,
techniques, 9-29 Separation, M-1
6-42
References, Appendix J Signals Intelligence, 4-57
Support, 7-17
Refugee debriefing operations, Silent Approach, 8-62
Termination, 1-12
1-21, 5-31 |
2-22.3 | 379 | FM 2-22.3_______________________________________________________________________________
Phase, 8-84 Trusted Workstation (TWS), Warning Order, 4-37
Report, 10-15
13-3
W
Third-party information, 9-33
U
Time Event Chart, 9-28, 12-17, We Know All Approach, 8-53
Figure 12-1 Umbrella concept, 7-4 Web-based reporting, 13-15
Traits of a HUMINT Collector, Unit Augmentation, 4-58 Wounded detainees
1-28 Unlawful enemy combatant, viii, Interrogation of, 5-91,
Translation machines, 13-8 6-18 9-45
Translators, I-47 Urban Operations, 3-16
Transportation and
V
telecommunication
intelligence, 5-45 Video Recording, 9-29 |
2-22.3 | 381 | FM 2-22.3 (FM 34-52)
6 September 2006
I have approved FM 2-22.3 in accordance with DOD Directive 3115.09, DOD Intelligence
Interrogations, Detainee Debriefings, and Tactical Questioning.
STEPHEN A. CAMBONE
Under Secretary of Defense
for Intelligence
0516001
DISTRIBUTION:
Regular Army, Army National Guard, and the Army Reserve: To be distributed in accordance with |
3-21.38 | 1 | FM 3-21.38
Pathfinder Operations
APRIL 2006
DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Headquarters |
3-21.38 | 2 | This publication is available at
Army Knowledge Online (www.us.army.mil) and
General Dennis J. Reimer Training and Doctrine |
3-21.38 | 3 | *FM 3-21.38
Field Manual Headquarters
Department of the Army
No. 3-21.38
Washington, DC, 25 April 2006
Pathfinder Operations
Contents
Page
PREFACE............................................................................................................................................viii
Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION.......................................................................................................1-1
Employment .........................................................................................................1-1
Capabilities...........................................................................................................1-2
Limitations ............................................................................................................1-2
Equipment............................................................................................................1-2
Communications Security ....................................................................................1-5
Training ................................................................................................................1-5
Chapter 2 PLANS, ORGANIZATION, CONDUCT, AND THREAT...........................................2-1
Section I. PLANS .....................................................................................................2-1
Warning Order......................................................................................................2-1
Initial Preparations................................................................................................2-1
Coordination.........................................................................................................2-2
Linkup with Supported Unit..................................................................................2-4
Final Preparations................................................................................................2-4
Section II. ORGANIZATION FOR COMBAT...........................................................2-4
Insertion................................................................................................................2-4
Overland Movement.............................................................................................2-5
Stay-Behind Operation.........................................................................................2-6
Section III. CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS ..............................................................2-6
Daylight Assault....................................................................................................2-6
Night Assault........................................................................................................2-6
Extraction .............................................................................................................2-6
Staging Areas.......................................................................................................2-7
Artillery Displacement ..........................................................................................2-7
Support of Ground Operations.............................................................................2-7
Support of Air Force.............................................................................................2-7
Mixed Operations.................................................................................................2-7
Radio Communications........................................................................................2-8
Distribution Restriction: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
*This publication supersedes FM 3-21.38, 1 October 2002. |
3-21.38 | 4 | Contents
Terminal Guidance by Supported Units............................................................... 2-9
Section IV. HIGH-THREAT ENVIRONMENT.......................................................... 2-9
Control and Navigation ........................................................................................ 2-9
Tactical Instrument Flights................................................................................... 2-9
Air Routes .......................................................................................................... 2-10
Chapter 3 AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL......................................................................................... 3-1
Section I. PATHFINDER AIR TRAFFIC .................................................................. 3-1
Safety ................................................................................................................... 3-1
Voice Control ....................................................................................................... 3-1
Formats................................................................................................................ 3-2
Numbers .............................................................................................................. 3-3
Phrases and Terms ............................................................................................. 3-4
Section II. LANDINGS ............................................................................................. 3-6
Traffic Patterns..................................................................................................... 3-6
Methods of Entry.................................................................................................. 3-6
Traffic Pattern Legs ............................................................................................. 3-8
Advisory Service .................................................................................................. 3-8
Spacing Techniques ............................................................................................ 3-9
Final Landing Instructions.................................................................................. 3-10
Taxiing Aircraft................................................................................................... 3-10
Minimum Aircraft Separation Requirements...................................................... 3-11
Section III. GROUND-TO-AIR COMMUNICATIONS ............................................ 3-12
Electronic Warfare Environment........................................................................ 3-12
Ground-to-Air Transmissions............................................................................. 3-13
Chapter 4 HELICOPTER LANDING ZONES............................................................................ 4-1
Section I. SELECTION OF LANDING SITES ......................................................... 4-1
Considerations..................................................................................................... 4-1
Alternate Sites.................................................................................................... 4-10
Section II. ORGANIZATION AND DUTIES........................................................... 4-10
Control Center ................................................................................................... 4-10
Landing Site Party ............................................................................................. 4-12
Section III. LANDING SITE OPERATIONS........................................................... 4-13
Communications ................................................................................................ 4-13
Flight Formations ............................................................................................... 4-14
Landing Zone and Obstacle Markings............................................................... 4-14
Air Assaults........................................................................................................ 4-14
Intercept Headings............................................................................................. 4-23
Section IV. LANDING ZONE OPERATIONS ........................................................ 4-23
Communications Checkpoint............................................................................. 4-23
Air Control Points............................................................................................... 4-25
Section V. NIGHT OPERATIONS.......................................................................... 4-25
Tactical Landing Lights...................................................................................... 4-26
External Loads................................................................................................... 4-28
Multihelicopter Operations................................................................................. 4-28
Night Vision Goggles ......................................................................................... 4-28 |
3-21.38 | 5 | Contents
Section VI. ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS............................................4-29
Pilot Input ...........................................................................................................4-29
Cold Weather .....................................................................................................4-29
Jungle.................................................................................................................4-32
Desert.................................................................................................................4-33
Mountains...........................................................................................................4-34
Section VII. APPROACH PATH CONSIDERATIONS...........................................4-35
Vertical Air Currents...........................................................................................4-36
Escape Routes...................................................................................................4-36
Terrain Contour and Obstacles..........................................................................4-36
Position of the Sun.............................................................................................4-36
Chapter 5 EXTERNAL LOADS..................................................................................................5-1
Landing Points......................................................................................................5-1
Types of Loads.....................................................................................................5-1
Unit Responsibilities.............................................................................................5-2
Equipment............................................................................................................5-2
Service Life of Aerial-Delivery Slings.................................................................5-10
Aircraft Load Limitations.....................................................................................5-15
Standard Weights...............................................................................................5-18
Air Items Required For Common Standard Loads.............................................5-19
Slingload Theory ................................................................................................5-20
Hookup and Release Procedures......................................................................5-21
Slingload Inspection Record ..............................................................................5-29
Chapter 6 DROP ZONES...........................................................................................................6-1
Section I. SELECTION FACTORS ..........................................................................6-1
Airdrop Airspeeds.................................................................................................6-1
Drop Altitude.........................................................................................................6-2
Type of Load ........................................................................................................6-3
Methods of Delivery..............................................................................................6-4
Obstacles .............................................................................................................6-6
Access..................................................................................................................6-8
Size ...................................................................................................................6-9
Approach and Departure Routes .......................................................................6-18
Section II. DROP ZONE SUPPORT TEAM ...........................................................6-18
Organization.......................................................................................................6-18
Missions .............................................................................................................6-18
Equipment Familiarization..................................................................................6-18
Coordination.......................................................................................................6-24
Support Requirements.......................................................................................6-25
Duties of the Leader...........................................................................................6-27
Control Center....................................................................................................6-29
Signals................................................................................................................6-29
Determination of Release Point Location...........................................................6-31
Ground-Marked Release System.......................................................................6-32
Army Verbally Initiated Release System............................................................6-37
Air Force Verbally Initiated Release System......................................................6-40 |
3-21.38 | 6 | Contents
Air Force Computed Air Release Point.............................................................. 6-40
Assault Zone Availability Report........................................................................ 6-46
AF IMT 3823, Drop Zone Survey....................................................................... 6-46
AF IMT 4304, Drop Zone/Landing Zone Control Log........................................ 6-53
Appendix A CLOSE AIR SUPPORT AND CLOSE COMBAT ATTACK.....................................A-1
Definitions............................................................................................................A-1
Purpose................................................................................................................A-1
Types of Aircraft...................................................................................................A-2
Target Types........................................................................................................A-3
Weapons Effects..................................................................................................A-3
Aircraft Weapons Types ......................................................................................A-4
Risk Estimated Distances....................................................................................A-5
Target to Weapons..............................................................................................A-5
Appendix B OPERATIONAL FORMATS.....................................................................................B-1
Planning Format ..................................................................................................B-1
Landing Zone and Drop Zone Control Records ..................................................B-2
Troop-Leading Procedures..................................................................................B-5
Appendix C ARMY HELICOPTER SPECIFICATIONS................................................................C-1
Observation Helicopters ......................................................................................C-2
Attack Helicopters................................................................................................C-4
Utility Helicopters.................................................................................................C-8
Cargo Helicopters..............................................................................................C-12
Appendix D DIGITIZATION SUPPLEMENT ................................................................................D-1
Definition..............................................................................................................D-1
Purpose, Advantages, and Capabilities...............................................................D-1
Appendix E AIR FORCE INSTRUCTION.....................................................................................E-1
Airdrop Airspeeds................................................................................................E-1
Drop Zone Size....................................................................................................E-2
Ground Marked Release System ........................................................................E-3
Point of Impact.....................................................................................................E-4
GLOSSARY...........................................................................................................................Glossary-1
REFERENCES...................................................................................................................References-1
INDEX ..........................................................................................................................................Index-1 |
3-21.38 | 7 | Contents
Figures
Figure 2-1. En route communication procedures with pathfinders in a landing zone.....................2-8
Figure 2-2. Comparison of air routes with and without a high-threat environment.......................2-11
Figure 3-1. Air traffic patterns..........................................................................................................3-7
Figure 3-2. 360-degree turnout. ......................................................................................................3-9
Figure 3-3. Traffic pattern extension.............................................................................................3-10
Figure 3-4. Minimum separation requirements.............................................................................3-11
Figure 4-1. Landing point sizes.......................................................................................................4-2
Figure 4-2. Standard flight and landing formations.........................................................................4-4
Figure 4-3. Determination of ground slope. ....................................................................................4-6
Figure 4-4. Maximum angle of approach (daylight). .......................................................................4-7
Figure 4-5. Maximum angle of approach (night)............................................................................4-8
Figure 4-6. Approach and exit path.................................................................................................4-8
Figure 4-7. Example completed DA Form 7461-R........................................................................4-12
Figure 4-8. Helicopter day landing site, staggered trail-right formation........................................4-16
Figure 4-9. Helicopter day landing site, echelon right formation...................................................4-17
Figure 4-10. Day or night slingload operation site. .........................................................................4-18
Figure 4-11. Day or night cargo landing site, "V" formation............................................................4-19
Figure 4-12. Night landing site with landing points for aircraft and slingloads...............................4-20
Figure 4-13. Utility helicopter night landing site, diamond formations. ...........................................4-21
Figure 4-14. Lighted night landing symbols as the pilot would see them from different
approach angles.........................................................................................................4-22
Figure 4-15. Intercept heading technique.......................................................................................4-23
Figure 4-16. Terrain flight modes....................................................................................................4-24
Figure 4-17. Placement of the inverted "Y" or NATO "T" at the number one touchdown point......4-26
Figure 4-18. Placement of additional touchdown point markings for night use..............................4-26
Figure 4-19. Placement of fifth light using inverted "Y," when coordinated....................................4-27
Figure 4-20. Emergency night lighting by vehicle headlights..........................................................4-27
Figure 4-21. Lessening the effects of loose snow on the ground...................................................4-30
Figure 6-1. Recommended safety zones for high-tension lines......................................................6-8
Figure 6-2. Example application of D=RT formula........................................................................6-12
Figure 6-3. Example application of T=D/R formula.......................................................................6-13
Figure 6-4. Example application of D=KAV formula. ....................................................................6-14
Figure 6-5. Raised-angle marker. .................................................................................................6-21
Figure 6-6. Drop zone coordination checklist................................................................................6-24
Figure 6-7. Drop zone cancellation and closing markers..............................................................6-30
Figure 6-8. Release point location. ...............................................................................................6-31
Figure 6-9. Panel emplacement....................................................................................................6-33
Figure 6-10. Horizontal clearance and marker construction...........................................................6-36
Figure 6-11. The 15-to-1 mask clearance ratio...............................................................................6-37 |
3-21.38 | 8 | Contents
Figure 6-12. Example Army VIRS offset......................................................................................... 6-38
Figure 6-13. Wind streamer vector count. ...................................................................................... 6-39
Figure 6-14. Example USAF VIRS transmission............................................................................ 6-40
Figure 6-15. Drop zone placement (day)........................................................................................ 6-41
Figure 6-16. Code letters................................................................................................................ 6-42
Figure 6-17. Drop zone placement (night)...................................................................................... 6-43
Figure 6-18. Area drop zone........................................................................................................... 6-44
Figure 6-19. Computation of circular drop zone. ............................................................................ 6-45
Figure 6-20A. Example completed AF IMT 3823 (front). .................................................................. 6-51
Figure 6-20B. Example completed AF IMT 3823 (back)................................................................... 6-52
Figure 6-21. Example completed AF IMT 4304.............................................................................. 6-56
Figure C-1. OH-58D Kiowa. ............................................................................................................C-3
Figure C-2. AH 64A Apache............................................................................................................C-5
Figure C-3. AH 64D Apache............................................................................................................C-7
Figure C-4. UH-1H Iroquois.............................................................................................................C-9
Figure C-5. UH-60A/L Blackhawk. ................................................................................................C-11 |
3-21.38 | 9 | Contents
Tables
Table 2-1. Air liaison officer's and ground unit commander's coordination of air movement
table..............................................................................................................................2-2
Table 3-1. Numbers transmitted by units or digits........................................................................3-3
Table 3-2. Phrases.........................................................................................................................3-4
Table 3-3. Terms............................................................................................................................3-5
Table 3-4. Traffic pattern legs........................................................................................................3-8
Table 3-5. A 360-degree turnout....................................................................................................3-9
Table 3-6. Light signals on or near a landing zone......................................................................3-13
Table 3-7. Information included in advisories..............................................................................3-15
Table 4-1. Landing point uses........................................................................................................4-3
Table 4-2. Length of minimum width area. ....................................................................................4-9
Table 5-1. Aerial delivery specifications for the Type XXVI sling. .................................................5-3
Table 5-2. Safe working loads (lift capacities) of polyester roundslings........................................5-9
Table 5-3. Large-capacity sling sets............................................................................................5-12
Table 5-4. POL for external loads only. .......................................................................................5-18
Table 5-5. Standard vehicle weights............................................................................................5-19
Table 5-6. Standard artillery weights. ..........................................................................................5-19
Table 6-1. Airspeeds for rotary-wing aircraft..................................................................................6-1
Table 6-2. Airspeeds for fixed-wing aircraft...................................................................................6-2
Table 6-3. Example calculation of drop altitude in feet indicated. .................................................6-2
Table 6-4. Airdrop altitudes for rotary- and fixed-wing aircraft.......................................................6-3
Table 6-5. Minimum aerial delivery altitudes. ................................................................................6-4
Table 6-6. Size criteria for tactical airlift drop zones, personnel, and heavy equipment...............6-9
Table 6-7. Size criteria for tactical airlift drop zones, Container Delivery System.......................6-10
Table 6-8A. Conversion chart for 10-gram helium (pilot) balloons. ...............................................6-16
Table 6-8B. Conversion chart for 30-gram helium (pilot) balloons. ...............................................6-17
Table 6-9. Forward throw distances for fixed-wing aircraft..........................................................6-17
Table 6-10. Surface wind limits for airdrops. .................................................................................6-28
Table 6-11. Favorable conditions for airdrops on tactically assessed DZs...................................6-47
Table A-1. CAS theater aircraft. .....................................................................................................A-2
Table A-2. Risk estimated distances..............................................................................................A-5
Table A-3. Target to weapons........................................................................................................A-5
Table C-1. Specifications for the OH-58D Kiowa. ......................................................................... C-2
Table C-2. Specifications for the AH 64A Apache......................................................................... C-4
Table C-3. Specifications for the AH 64D Apache. ....................................................................... C-6
Table C-4. Specifications for the UH-1H Iroquois. ........................................................................ C-8
Table C-5. Specifications for the UH-60A Blackhawk. ................................................................ C-10
Table C-6. Specifications for the CH-47 D Chinook.................................................................... C-12 |
3-21.38 | 10 | Contents
Table E-1. Airdrop airspeeds. ........................................................................................................E-1
Table E-2. Standard drop zone size criteria. .................................................................................E-2
Table E-3. Ground marked release system load drift constants (K)..............................................E-3
Table E-4. Ground marked release system forward throw distance. ............................................E-4
Table E-5. Standard point-of-impact placement............................................................................E-4 |
3-21.38 | 11 | Preface
This publication provides a foundation for training and employing pathfinder and terminal guidance personnel.
The tactics, techniques, and procedures that describe the conduct of the various missions are guides. The
pathfinder leader can modify them to suit the particular air assault operation.
This publication applies to the Active Army, the Army National Guard (ARNG), the Army National Guard of
the United States (ARNGUS), and the United States Army Reserve (USAR) unless otherwise stated.
The manual includes an extensive glossary of acronyms and terminology peculiar to air assault operations,
pathfinder operations, and Army-Air Force air traffic control. Using this glossary will help the reader
understand the text.
This publication prescribes DA Form 7461-R, Internal Net Record, and implements the following international
agreements:
• QSTAG 585, Marshaling Helicopters in Multinational Land Operations, 23 Apr 81
(see Chapter 4).
• STANAG 2863, Navigational and Communication Capabilities for Helicopters
in Multinational Land Operations, 26 Sep 88
(see Chapters 2 and 3).
• STANAG 3117, Aircraft Marshaling Signals, 17 Oct 85
(see Chapters 1 and 2).
• STANAG 3281, Personnel Locator Beacons, 3 Apr 78
(see Chapters 1, 3, and 4).
• STANAG 3570, Drop Zones and Extraction Zones--Criteria and Markings, 26 Mar 86
(see Chapters 2 and 6).
• STANAG 3619, Helipad Marking, 10 Jul 80
(see Chapter 4).
The proponent for this publication is the United States Army Training and Doctrine Command. The preparing
agency is the U.S. Army Infantry School. You may send comments and recommendations by any means, US
mail, e-mail, fax, or telephone, as long as you use or follow the format of DA Form 2028, Recommended
Changes to Publications and Blank Forms. You may also phone for more information.
E-mail [email protected]
Phone COM 706-545-3458 or DSN 835-3458
Fax COM 706-545-6489 or DSN 835-6489
US Mail Commandant, USAIS
ATTN: ATSH-TPP-H /Bldg 2767
Fort Benning, GA 31905-5593
Unless this publication states otherwise, masculine nouns and pronouns do not refer exclusively to the
male gender. |
3-21.38 | 13 | THIS CHAPTER IMPLEMENTS STANAGs 3117 AND 3281.
Chapter 1
Introduction
Army pathfinders mainly provide navigational aid and advisory services to military
aircraft in areas designated by supported unit commanders. The pathfinders’
secondary missions include providing advice and limited aid to units planning air
assault or airdrop operations.
EMPLOYMENT
1-1. The pathfinders provide navigational aid and air traffic advisories for Army aircraft. This occurs
at any phase of an air assault or ground operation that requires sustained support by Army aircraft. The
commander employs pathfinders on a short-term basis for some missions. He can redeploy the pathfinders
after they complete a major troop lift or airdrop.
PRIMARY
1-2. Ideally, the commander assigns a pathfinder team to each combat aviation battalion. This
enhances the relationship between aviators and pathfinders, who have to work well together and
understand each other to complete a mission successfully. Aviators and pathfinders must maintain a good
working relationship, despite the limited number of pathfinder units and the assignment of
pathfinder-coded positions to ground units.
1-3. Many units might have no trained pathfinder assets. In this case, higher headquarters must
temporarily assign pathfinder assets from an external source to train supported unit personnel and oversee
the conduct of pathfinder operations.
1-4. Non-pathfinder-qualified Soldiers receive training from the pathfinders and form a company-level
pathfinder team. Once trained, the team provides navigational aid, air traffic advisories, and any other
relevant information. Around the clock, the pathfinder team supports any type of air movement or resupply
operation conducted by or for the ground unit and supported by an aviation unit.
1-5. Trained, equipped pathfinders select, mark, improve, and control landing sites. Engineers in direct
support (DS) of lifted ground units may help pathfinders improve landing zones (LZs). In most situations,
pathfinders perform two or more of these jobs at the same time. In each case, they start out by setting up
ground-to-air radio communications. Combat lifesaver-qualified and emergency medical technician
(EMT)-qualified pathfinders also supplement internal medical support.
SECONDARY
1-6. When not performing duties for supported units, pathfinders remain with their equipment, near
and in communication with the supported ground unit command post (CP). While pathfinders await further
missions, the parent or supported CP may task them to help control the aviation unit base airfield; to
perform minor demolition work; or, in staff sections, to perform map and aerial photographic work.
However, before the pathfinders perform secondary missions, they must train and perform routine
maintenance on their equipment. |
3-21.38 | 14 | Chapter 1
CAPABILITIES
1-7. Appropriately equipped and trained pathfinders—
y Reconnoiter areas selected by supported unit commanders.
y Select helicopter land zones (HLZs) and drop zones (DZs).
y Infiltrate areas of operation by foot, vehicle, watercraft, or air.
y Rappel, fast rope, or parachute from aircraft.
y Prepare HLZs and DZs.
y Establish and operate visual and electronic navigation aids.
y Remove minor obstacles.
y Use ground-to-air (GTA) radio communications to guide pilots and advise them of air traffic
within the area of operations (AO).
y Coordinate directly with fire support units and keep pilots informed about friendly mortar and
artillery fires.
y Provide technical assistance in assembling supplies, equipment, and troops before loading the
aircraft for deployment to HLZs and DZs.
y Advise and provide limited physical assistance in preparing and positioning supplies,
equipment, and troops for air movement.
y Conduct limited chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) monitoring and
surveying of designated areas.
y Provide limited weather observations, to include wind velocity and direction, cloud cover,
visibility, and approximate cloud ceiling.
y In the absence of a special tactics team (STT), by agreement with the United States Air Force
(USAF), operate DZs and airfields for USAF aircraft.
y Survey DZs for use by USAF and Army aircraft. In this situation, pathfinders might require
USAF-compatible ultra high frequency (UHF) or very high frequency (VHF) radios. Aviators
and pathfinders coordinate to make sure everyone knows the ground marking and radio
procedures.
LIMITATIONS
1-8. Pathfinders require augmentation when they guide aircraft or perform other, related primary tasks
such as the following:
y Provide security.
y Remove major obstacles.
y Recover and assemble equipment and supplies.
y Operate additional radio nets and telephones.
y Transport equipment.
y Conduct detailed CBRN monitoring and surveying.
EQUIPMENT
1-9. Pathfinders use a variety of equipment. Though the aviation unit standing operating procedures
(SOP) may specify the type of equipment pathfinders will use, the mission dictates what specific items of
equipment the pathfinders will take on the operation.
NAVIGATION AIDS
1-10. Pathfinders use navigation aids to help aviators find and identify an exact area. |
3-21.38 | 15 | Introduction
Electronic
1-11. With these aids, pathfinders can signal farther than they can with visual navigation aids.
Electronic navigation aids include—
y Homing beacons.
y Transponders.
y Radios.
y Any other electronic devices that can aid in aircraft navigation.
Visual
1-12. With these aids, pathfinders can designate specific areas or points on LZs and DZs. They use them
as GTA signals. Unfortunately, because visual aids are visible, the enemy can also see them.
Day
1-13. Visual navigation aids that can be used during the day include—
y Panels.
y Smoke.
y Signal mirrors.
y Colored gloves and vests for signalmen.
Night
1-14. Visual navigation aids that can be used during the night include—
y Light beacons.
y Lanterns.
y Baton flashlights.
y Strobe lights.
y Pyrotechnics.
y Chem-lights.
Day or Night
1-15. Pathfinders can make field-expedient visual aids for day or night.
Infrared
1-16. At night, pathfinders can use any infrared navigation aids that are compatible with their night
vision goggles (NVG).
COMMUNICATIONS
1-17. Pathfinders use FM radios with secure capability and limited wire equipment. These radios allow
pathfinders to communicate with aircraft, other pathfinder elements, and supported units. Incorporated
homing capabilities in these radios allow pathfinders to provide navigational aid to aircraft.
ASSEMBLY AIDS
1-18. Pathfinders use assembly aids to designate troop and supply assembly areas. Assembly aids
include electronic, visual, and infrared devices. The pathfinders can also use or make field-expedient |
3-21.38 | 16 | Chapter 1
devices to aid in assembly. Because assembly aids can attract the enemy’s attention, pathfinders must
carefully avoid compromise.
Electronic
1-19. These include radios and homing devices that work by radio signal. Enemy direction-finding
equipment detects electronic signals.
Visual
1-20. These simple-to-use aids allow positive identification of assembly areas. The enemy can also see
them. To ensure understanding, pathfinders must closely coordinate the use of visual assembly aids. (See
TM 9-1370-206-10, FM 21-60, and STANAGs 3117 and 3281.) Visual assembly aids include the
following:
Day
1-21. Visual assembly aids that can be used during the day, which include—
y Panels.
y Smoke.
y Armbands.
Night
1-22. Visual assembly aids that can be used during the night, which include—
y Lanterns.
y Flashlights.
y Light beacons.
y Strobe lights.
y Chem-lights.
y Pyrotechnics.
Infrared
1-23. Pathfinders can use infrared light sources as assembly aids, but if they do so, both the pathfinders
and the pilots must use night vision devices (NVDs).
MISCELLANEOUS
1-24. Pathfinder equipment also includes—
y Vehicles.
y Binoculars.
y Night vision devices.
y Nonelectric demolition kits.
y Wind-measurement equipment.
y Parachutes.
y Equipment for detecting CBRN.
y Thermal sights. |
3-21.38 | 17 | Introduction
COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY
1-25. Pathfinders and terminal guidance personnel must know about any hostile data collection and
exploitation activities. Such activities seek to disrupt, deceive, harass, or otherwise interfere with the
command and control of pathfinder operations.
ENEMY INTERCEPTION
1-26. The enemy can intercept, analyze, determine the direction of, and exploit electromagnetic energy
radiating from any signal equipment such as radios, radar, and more. He uses this intelligence for fire and
maneuver and for electronic countermeasures.
1-27. The enemy may collect pathfinder emissions data for immediate or later use. He may use jamming
or deception, or he may continue to monitor and analyze the data for later use.
1-28. Time-distance factors limit the enemy’s ability to exploit signal intelligence in support of his
ground operations. He may use a reaction force, or he may find the source of the signal using direction
finding (DF) equipment. If he uses DF equipment, he can also use electronic countermeasures (ECM) to
jam and deceive the pathfinder’s electronic aids.
PATHFINDER AWARENESS
1-29. Pathfinders must plan for the enemy’s DF capabilities. Automated DF systems determine line
bearings for each signal detected. The enemy continuously processes and compares line bearings and plots
fixes for pathfinder signals. Depending on the size of the DF base and the number of DF systems available,
the enemy may accurately locate a friendly position with little difficulty.
1-30. What the enemy does to gain signals intelligence (SIGINT) reveals his intent. In combating
enemy DF systems, pathfinders consider the following:
y The high priority of aviation-related missions.
y The length of time the pathfinders remain on the air.
y The number of pathfinder transmitters.
y The distance of friendly forces from enemy DF systems, enemy fire and maneuver elements,
and enemy collection and jamming resources.
y Friendly actions to mask pathfinder operations.
1-31. Strict signal security practices, to include electronic warfare (EW), greatly reduce the vulnerability
of signal devices to enemy exploitation. (FM 24-18 provides more information on communications.)
TRAINING
1-32. Personnel qualify as pathfinders only by completing the pathfinder course at the US Army
Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia.
GOALS
1-33. The pathfinder training program stresses—
y The development of individual proficiency in air traffic control procedures.
y That pathfinders learn and know the SOP of the aviation and ground units they support.
y Proficiency in slingload operations.
y Establishment of helicopter landing zones and drop zones. |
3-21.38 | 18 | Chapter 1
y Drop zone support team leader (DZSTL) and drop zone safety officer (DZSO) operations.
y Expertise in all aspects of long- and short-range communication (both of which are conducted
at unit level).
COMMANDER’S RESPONSIBILITIES
1-34. Major unit commanders who use pathfinders bear the responsibility for sustaining the pathfinders’
training and proficiency. Pathfinder training works best when integrated with the training of supported
aviation and ground units.
PATHFINDER’S RESPONSIBILITIES
1-35. The assigned, qualified, and trained pathfinder must ensure that any nonqualified Soldiers
assigned to his unit team receive adequate pathfinder training before going on a mission. |
3-21.38 | 19 | THIS CHAPTER IMPLEMENTS STANAGs 2863, 3117, AND 3570.
Chapter 2
Plans, Organization, Conduct, and Threat
Pathfinders conduct many different missions. Several of these supplement the ground
unit's operation.
SECTION I. PLANS
To ensure success of the ground mission, pathfinders plan their own missions in detail. The more time they
have to make plans, the more detailed plans they can make.
WARNING ORDER
2-1. As soon as he receives word of a pending operation, the senior pathfinder issues a mission alert.
He immediately follows with a warning order. He includes just enough information to allow the other
pathfinders to start preparing for the operation. This includes—
y Roll call.
y Enemy and friendly situations (in brief).
y Mission.
y Chain of command and task organization.
y Individual uniform and equipment (if not discussed in the SOP).
y Required equipment.
y Work priorities (who does what, when, and where).
y Specific instructions.
y Attached personnel.
y Coordination times.
INITIAL PREPARATIONS
2-2. On receiving the alert or warning order, pathfinders inspect and, as needed, augment personnel
and equipment. Pathfinders prepare equipment in the following order, from the most to the least important:
y Radios.
y Navigation aids (electronic and visual).
y Weapons.
y Essential individual equipment.
y Assembly aids.
y Other items as needed.
2-3. The pathfinder element leader (or his representative) and the air mission commander begin
coordinating with the supported aviation unit(s), ground unit(s), or both.
2-4. As the pathfinders receive more information, they reorganize personnel and equipment to
accomplish the mission better. If time permits, they rehearse. Rehearsals are the time to make sure the
members on the pathfinder team are completely aware of their duties for that specific mission. They use
available briefing aids, and they rehearse on terrain that most nearly resembles the AO. |
3-21.38 | 20 | Chapter 2
2-5. To succeed, an operation must have security. So, each person receives only the information he
must have to complete each phase of the operation. For example, the commander isolates any Soldiers who
know the details of the operation. The situation dictates the extent of security requirements.
COORDINATION
2-6. Ground and aviation commanders work together to coordinate and plan the details of operations
for which they require pathfinder assistance.
2-7. In any type of operation (combat assault, reinforcement, artillery displacement, resupply, or
evacuation), the pathfinders might have to recommend—
y Exact locations for DZs or LZs.
y A time schedule.
y Landing formations.
y Employment techniques.
2-8. Before selecting a DZ or LZ, the supported unit commander considers the factors of METT-TC
(mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops, time, and civil considerations). He also considers what the
pathfinder and aviation commanders (or their representatives) suggest.
2-9. While preparing for an operation, air liaison officers (ALOs) and ground unit commanders
(GUCs) coordinate with pathfinders to make an air movement table. Table 2-1 shows who
coordinates what.
Sequence ALO GUC Coordinate with Pathfinders
1 X X Operational location (coordinates).
2 X Locations of the primary and alternate communications checkpoints
(coordinates).
3 X Location of release point.
• Coordinates.
• Whether manned or unmanned.
4 X X Time the site can begin operating.
5 X Aircraft information.
• Formation.
• Time interval.
• Time of flight.
• Drop speed.
• Drop altitude.
6 X Pathfinder transportation and time available for briefing.
7 X Pathfinder transportation station time.
8 X X Routes into the objective area.
Table 2-1. Air liaison officer's and ground unit commander's coordination
of air movement table. |
3-21.38 | 21 | Plans, Organization, Conduct, and Threat
Sequence ALO GUC Coordinate with Pathfinders
9 X X Call signs.
• Aircraft.
• Pathfinders.
• Supported units.
• Other friendly units.
10 X X Primary and alternate frequencies.
• Aircraft.
• Pathfinders.
• Supported units.
• Other friendly units.
• Homing beacon.
11 X X Fire support.
• Artillery.
• Tactical air support.
12 X Weather forecast.
• Ceiling.
• Visibility.
• Temperatures (high and low).
13. X X Logistical support, including locations of—
• Medical aid station.
• Prisoner collection point.
• Fuel.
• Ammunition.
• Rations.
14 X X Alternate plans (ALO and GUC).
• Evacuation plan.
• Escape and evasion.
15 X X Friendly unit locations.
16 X X Authority to implement mission change.
17 X Support personnel required.
18 X No-land or no-drop signals (day and night).
19 Markings for obstacles (only on request of flight commander).
20 X Marking of objective site for identification from the air.
21 X X Time allowed for approval.
Table 2-1. Air liaison officer's and ground unit commander's coordination of air movement table
(continued).
2-10. The pathfinder needs this information because he helps coordinate planning. He uses the
information to make final plans for the pathfinder phase of the operation. To make sure that he can safely
and efficiently control all aircraft in and around the DZs or LZs, he must know all about the operation's air
movement phase. Aviation and ground commanders inform pathfinders of all changes to plans and landing
sites, and about any emergencies. The pathfinder coordinates all activities with every agency or unit
involved, and then gives the information to all of the pathfinders involved in the operation.
2-11. When the pathfinder reaches the objective site, he may find it unsuitable. He evaluates the
coordinated landing formation, heading, drop altitude, and the ground site itself. Then he coordinates with |
3-21.38 | 22 | Chapter 2
the ground commander, aviation commander(s), or both to see whether any of the original requirements
have changed. Depending on the mission, enemy, terrain, troops, time, and civil considerations
(METT-TC), the commander(s) determines what, if any, changes to make to accomplish the mission. If for
any reason he cannot contact the GUC or aviation commander, the pathfinder can also coordinate for
authority to change requirements.
2-12. The pathfinder limits augmentation to that appropriate to the amount and type of transport. The
reinforced pathfinder team remains under the command of the pathfinder leader, who is responsible for
team functions. Based on the coordinated plans for the operation, the pathfinder requests augmentation in
personnel and equipment. He considers—
y Mission.
y Use of personnel and equipment for security.
y Requirement to help assemble the supported units' personnel, supplies, and equipment.
y Need for assistance in removing obstacles.
y Assistance required to transport and operate navigation aids under pathfinder direction.
LINKUP WITH SUPPORTED UNIT
2-13. Pathfinders join the supported unit early enough to allow final coordination between pathfinder,
aviation, and lifted ground unit representatives. Pathfinders designated to accompany and provide
continuous support to a ground unit can enter a DZ or LZ ahead of the assault echelon. After the initial
phase of the air movement, they link up with the supported unit.
FINAL PREPARATIONS
2-14. The pathfinder leader issues his operation order (OPORD). If he issues it before linking up with
the supported unit, he issues any changes as a fragmentary order (FRAGO). The order describes any
member's duties not covered in the unit SOP. Team members must have a chance to study maps, aerial
photos, and terrain models of the area. The order provides details about the location and operation of
proposed air delivery facilities, flight routes, flight formations, time schedules, release points (RPs), and
communication checkpoints (CCPs).
2-15. The pathfinder conducts a final, thorough check of equipment. The commander decides exactly
how to transport the equipment into the objective area. Then the pathfinders prepare all of the equipment
for rapid displacement.
2-16. Just before departure, at a final weather and operational briefing, the pathfinders and supported
units conduct final coordination.
SECTION II. ORGANIZATION FOR COMBAT
The pathfinder mission itself determines the specific requirements of the mission. In most operations, three to
six Soldiers comprise the pathfinder element supporting a DZ or an LZ or continuously supporting an Infantry
battalion. Seldom does a pathfinder section deploy as a unit from a single location. The pathfinder leader plans
for his elements to operate widely separated and disconnected.
INSERTION
2-17. Pathfinders can insert by a variety of air, sea, or land transportation modes.
HELICOPTER DELIVERY
2-18. Helicopters can deliver more personnel and equipment in a better state of operational readiness
than any other means. Even in marginal weather, helicopters allow more precise, flexible deliveries than |
3-21.38 | 23 | Plans, Organization, Conduct, and Threat
parachutes do. Some terrain does not allow helicopter landings. In these cases, trained Soldiers rappel or
fast rope from helicopters while the helicopters hover over the unsuitable landing areas. Personnel can
insert or withdraw by ladders suspended from hovering helicopters, or extract using special patrol
insertion-extraction system (SPIES) techniques. Helicopters can also—
y Rapidly shift or evacuate pathfinders.
y Carry nonparachutists to support pathfinders.
y Deliver when rain or low ceilings prohibit parachuting.
y Rapidly change insertion locations.
PARACHUTE DELIVERY
2-19. Parachute delivery by fixed-wing aircraft normally affords greater range and speed of movement
than landing by helicopter. In a short-distance operation, helicopters can serve as the jump aircraft.
2-20. Depending on wind conditions, pathfinders should compute their desired parachute RPs before
arriving over the DZ. For accuracy and security, the pathfinders jump at the lowest practical altitude.
Aircraft SOPs prescribe jump altitudes and personnel procedures. Such procedures vary in accordance with
(IAW) peacetime and wartime restrictions.
2-21. As highly trained parachutists, pathfinders can insert into unimproved and marginal DZs. They
know how to control the canopy of a maneuverable parachute, and they know how to make emergency
landings. They also know how to parachute into rough-terrain DZs. These skills give them some flexibility
in planning parachute delivery.
CAUTION
During preparation for the operation, pathfinders carefully arrange and
pad all essential items of operational equipment into appropriate
containers. Carrying this equipment with them when they insert
ensures they have it as soon as they land.
2-22. The best time to insert by parachute is during nonilluminated, nonsupported night operations that
emphasize secrecy.
2-23. Because fixed-wing aircraft need large, secure, obstacle-free landing areas, they seldom deliver
pathfinders.
WATER AND LAND DELIVERY
2-24. Delivering pathfinders by watercraft offers security only up to the point of debarkation from the
craft. The pathfinders still must move from the landing point (debarkation) to their final destination. To do
this, they infiltrate by land.
OVERLAND MOVEMENT
2-25. Because it limits small elements to short movements, infiltrating by land is the worst way to insert
pathfinders.
2-26. A well-organized, stable, close-knit enemy defense in depth can prohibit land infiltration. When
time allows, the pathfinders can increase infiltration security by combining overland infiltration with
parachute or airland infiltration.
2-27. Pathfinders infiltrate overland when the following conditions exist: |
3-21.38 | 24 | Chapter 2
y Limited visibility over difficult terrain.
y Overextended enemy lines.
y Fluid combat zone.
y Unsecured portions of enemy boundaries.
STAY-BEHIND OPERATION
2-28. In a stay-behind operation, pathfinder elements remain in the operational area while another
friendly force withdraws from the area. The commander can use stay-behind operations for the following
reasons:
y To lure enemy forces into a vulnerable position.
y To hold an area for reoccupation. If the commander plans to reoccupy a friendly area he knows
the enemy could overrun, he leaves a stay-behind force to hold it. If he leaves the stay-behind
force for this reason, then he must also plan an air assault to regain the area, if needed.
SECTION III. CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS
Pathfinders provide air traffic advisories and navigational aid for airplanes and helicopters. They also perform
limited physical improvement and CBRN monitoring and surveying within DZs or LZs. Pathfinder availability,
the tactical plan, the complexity of the operation, the terrain, and the air assault proficiency of the supported
ground unit dictate pathfinder support. However, every air assault operation requires positive aircraft control.
During an air-assault operation, pathfinders cross load before entering an LZ with the initial assault elements.
DAYLIGHT ASSAULT
2-29. In daylight operations, pathfinders insert into an LZ before the initial assault echelon only if the
LZ requires extensive improvement or if planners expect unusual control problems. Either way, the
pathfinders start setting up at once so they can provide air traffic control and other aid to all subsequent
lifts of troops, supplies, and equipment. They may have a few minutes or several hours to do this before the
other elements arrive. The tactical plan spells out exactly when and how the pathfinders will enter the area,
whether they will go in alone or not, and what time the next element will arrive.
NIGHT ASSAULT
2-30. Security and operational requirements determine the method of delivering pathfinders at night.
Pathfinders can move cross-country on foot, airdrop onto or near objective areas, airland in total blackout,
or airland with minimum natural illumination. When they do insert this way, they sometimes arrive before
the main body does. As soon as they arrive, the pathfinders reconnoiter the LZ, install visual and electronic
aids, and establish air traffic control. Soldiers from the supported ground unit sometimes accompany the
pathfinders. These additional Soldiers provide security and help clear obstacles. The on-site pathfinder
element remains concealed and observes the objective. Pathfinders analyze the planned landing formation,
heading, and assembly area. To avoid compromising the mission, no one on the DZ or LZ moves until an
incoming aircraft reaches the CCP.
EXTRACTION
2-31. As the ground force at the LZ shrinks, vulnerability to attack increases. Therefore, the commander
has pathfinders speed up the air assault extraction operations.
2-32. Planned artillery fires and air strikes as well as the need to maintain ground security to the last
minute require that ground controllers control supporting aircraft throughout the extraction. This means
they make sure aircraft land at specific points within the extraction site where ground security can cover |
3-21.38 | 25 | Plans, Organization, Conduct, and Threat
them. This speeds the operation and helps ensure the safe withdrawal of personnel, equipment, and aircraft
from the area.
2-33. Unless they land with the lifted unit, pathfinders must arrive at the extraction site in time to
reconnoiter thoroughly and coordinate with the lifted unit.
2-34. During the planning stage, the pathfinder team leader designates near and far rally points for use
in case the DZ or LZ becomes unusable. Pathfinders may have to fight their way to these rally points and
reorganize. To increase the chance of survival, evasion, resistance, and escape, the team leader designates
far rally points several kilometers from the DZ or LZ.
STAGING AREAS
2-35. In staging areas, in the absence of air traffic control (ATC) units, pathfinders can provide air
traffic advisories. They may also act as liaison between the aviation and ground units and help the ground
unit commander prepare and position troops, supplies, and equipment for air movement. When pathfinders
must set up a temporary staging area to support an operation of short duration, they move into the area
before the operation begins. This gives them enough time to reconnoiter, mark the site, coordinate, and set
up positive ATC. Safe, efficient, and rapid movement of helicopters or airplanes requires positive ATC in
staging areas. The need for positive ATC increases when the weather deteriorates, when the number of
aircraft increases, or when changes in the situation or plans require it.
ARTILLERY DISPLACEMENT
2-36. Pathfinders should help safely and rapidly displace artillery, day or night. Coordinating with
ground and aviation unit commanders and understanding their SOPs ensure pathfinders accurately and
efficiently deliver equipment, personnel, and ammunition.
SUPPORT OF GROUND OPERATIONS
2-37. During ground operations that require sustained Army aviation support, pathfinders might
continuously aid and control aircraft. The commander can attach pathfinders he has already attached to
Infantry battalions to companies as well. The pathfinders provide support consistent with the availability of
personnel and equipment. Continuous support improves operational efficiency and aviation safety during
all types of air assault operations. However, aviation units with limited pathfinder resources cannot provide
continuous support. In such cases, commanders usually employ pathfinders on a short-term, priority basis
wherever the pathfinders can help accomplish major unit missions. In the absence of pathfinders, selected
personnel in the ground units must receive enough training and preparation to allow them to provide
minimum aid to supporting aircraft.
SUPPORT OF AIR FORCE
2-38. By joint US Army and USAF agreement, in the absence of USAF STTs, Army pathfinders can
provide day or night control for USAF aircraft on airfields, DZs, and LZs. However, the pathfinders may
need UHF and VHF communications equipment that is compatible with USAF aircraft.
MIXED OPERATIONS
2-39. Some situations could require the simultaneous control of mixed air traffic at the same location,
such as resupply parachute drops into forward helicopter LZs. Fixed-wing airfields can expect helicopter
traffic. Mixed air traffic often presents difficult control problems, so controllers must apply strict control
measures. To ensure control, they designate, coordinate, and clearly identify landing, parking, loading,
unloading, refueling, and rearming areas. |
3-21.38 | 26 | Chapter 2
RADIO COMMUNICATIONS
2-40. For success, a pathfinder requires the essential element of communication by GTA voice radio.
The pathfinders place this into operation first at a DZ or LZ, and they take it out of operation last.
2-41. Pathfinders must thoroughly understand radio procedures. This includes the phraseology unique to
ATC (Chapter 3). They must send clear, concise, applicable, accurate, and correctly-timed
communications. To achieve speed and clarity of transmission, pathfinders and aviators practice radio
discipline. They transmit only necessary messages. Also, except in emergencies, they use pathfinder ATC
frequencies only for ATC (Figure 2-1).
2-42. Because they exchange a lot of vital information, aircraft crews normally record the important
parts of GTA messages. This helps them to make sure they understand and can follow instructions.
2-43. Pathfinders use electronic homing beacons, visual aids, and arm-and-hand signals to complement
voice communications. Pilots and transported troops must know the purpose and meaning of the aids used
and the techniques for using them (see STANAG 3570). (FM 21-60 discusses arm-and-hand signals and
visual aids.)
2-44. When possible, to keep informed about changing situations that could influence their operations,
pathfinders monitor supported unit command radio nets.
2-45. Pathfinders set up positive communications between pathfinder ATC facilities and collocated fire
support elements. This ensures aircraft receive timely and accurate information about friendly fires.
2-46. Pathfinder operations require the constant use of radios. This gives the enemy force many chances
to intercept, analyze, and exploit friendly transmissions. They try to gain intelligence and conduct
electronic jamming and deception. Defeating enemy jamming or imitative deception methods falls mostly
to the radio operator. He must know how to recognize and report this deliberate interference. To plan and
execute a tactical mission, he must know how to—
y Defend against and beat ECM using electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCM).
y Secure transmissions.
y Communicate using other means.
Figure 2-1. En route communication procedures with pathfinders in a landing zone. |
3-21.38 | 27 | Plans, Organization, Conduct, and Threat
TERMINAL GUIDANCE BY SUPPORTED UNITS
2-47. Terminal guidance refers to information and minimal guidance given to pilots by anyone in a
ground unit other than a qualified pathfinder. Selected personnel normally furnish terminal guidance within
the supported unit. To do so, they use both organic and improvised equipment.
2-48. When pathfinders accompany ground units, aviation unit SOP may direct that terminal guidance
personnel augment pathfinder elements.
2-49. Terminal guidance personnel should know the following:
y The supporting aviation unit SOP.
y How to operate electronic and visual navigation aids to help aircraft find DZs or LZs.
y To provide essential information through GTA radio to guide and control Army aircraft.
y To reconnoiter and recommend suitable DZs or LZs.
y To determine, recommend, or perform ground-clearing pioneer work to prepare DZs or LZs.
SECTION IV. HIGH-THREAT ENVIRONMENT
The threat comes in many forms. To ensure mission success, aviation and ground commanders must consider
all possibilities. They must consider a threat anything that could disrupt or delay the mission, or that could
otherwise cause the mission to fail.
CONTROL AND NAVIGATION
2-50. Pathfinders have limited voice control of aircraft. Thus, the ground unit commander and the air
mission commander must coordinate closely. Navigation presents special problems—aviators must fly low
to avoid detection. In a high-threat environment, critical factors include time, distance, routes, and tactical
instruments.
2-51. For example, two pathfinders with beacons could emplace along a route in advance of the initial
flight. They provide pilots with air control points. If the pilot needs the beacon turned on due to
navigational error, he can transmit a prearranged signal or code word.
2-52. Pathfinders might discover a threat, such as an antiaircraft weapon, along the primary route. If so,
they can alert pilots by prearranged code word or signal to change to an alternate route.
TACTICAL INSTRUMENT FLIGHTS
2-53. Flying under instrument meteorological conditions poses special problems in a high-threat
environment. This threat overrides the controlled instrument flight rules in the aviation-series manuals. It
forces aircraft to fly at altitudes well below the minimums for normal instrument flight.
2-54. Weather variances can create a tactical emergency. If so, the commander might have to use
aviation assets under instrument conditions and well below the altitudes specified by standard instrument
flight rules. The commander will only send aircraft on a mission in a high-threat environment under these
conditions when the situation meets the following criteria:
y The aviation and ground commanders cannot postpone the mission to wait for better weather.
y The pathfinders must conduct the mission in a high-threat environment.
y Low visibility en route precludes nap-of-the-earth flight.
2-55. Aviation and ground commanders employ tactical instrument flight whenever weather or time and
distance considerations prevent mission completion in other flight modes. Therefore, they must often use
tactical instrument flight during round-the-clock operations on the high-threat battlefield. Aircrews and
pathfinders must rehearse tactical instrument flight until they achieve proficiency. |
3-21.38 | 28 | Chapter 2
2-56. Pilots fly in one of two altitude modes.
MODE 1
2-57. When the air defense threat keeps flight altitudes below those established by AR 95-1
(for standard instrument flight), then pilots can fly at least 1,000 feet over mountainous terrain, and 500
feet over flat terrain.
MODE 2
2-58. When the threat limits flight altitudes to the least possible clearances, pilots can fly as low as 50 to
500 feet above the ground, regardless of terrain.
AIR ROUTES
2-59. Aircraft traffic management personnel (and pathfinders) can expect to move their equipment as
often as every four hours, depending on the threat. Terrain, weather, and, most importantly, whether the
enemy could intercept friendly aircraft from that location, determine when to move.
THREAT AND TERRAIN
2-60. In many instances, the threat and terrain prohibit a straight-line flight between the takeoff (liftoff)
point and the destination (Figure 2-2). This applies to both Modes 1 and 2.
FLIGHT MONITORING AND LANDING ZONE APPROACH
2-61. Enemy presence keeps the pathfinders from using nondirectional beacons. However, for pilots to
approach and land on the LZ visually, they need good visibility. Using radio homing signals for directional
guidance presents a dubious option. Whether or not aircraft traffic-management personnel decide to use
this electronic device, they should try to orient its signal away from the FEBA. This reduces the chance of
detection. |
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