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3-24.2 | 10 | Preface
This field manual establishes doctrine (fundamental principles) for tactical counterinsurgency (COIN)
operations at the company, battalion, and brigade level. It is based on lessons learned from historic
counterinsurgencies and current operations. This manual continues the efforts of FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency,
in combining the historic approaches to COIN with the realities of today’s operational environment (OE)—an
environment modified by a population explosion, urbanization, globalization, technology, the spread
of religious fundamentalism, resource demand, climate change and natural disasters, and proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction. This manual is generic in its geographic focus and should be used with other
doctrinal sources.
• Chapter 1, Operational Environment of Counterinsurgency, defines insurgent
and counterinsurgent while using the operational variables and mission variables to describe the
OE. Finally, it stresses developing a culture capability for Soldiers and leaders.
• Chapter 2, Foundations of Insurgency, categorizes insurgent groups by their components—
elements, dynamics, and strategies and their manifestations—tactics, strengths,
and vulnerabilities.
• Chapter 3, Foundations of Counterinsurgency, covers the seven lines of effort, tactical
considerations, clear-hold-build operations, and counterinsurgency phases.
• Chapter 4, Planning in Counterinsurgency, arguably the most important chapter, covers
planning for tactical units during counterinsurgency operations. It also covers planning
horizons and targeting.
• Chapter 5, Offensive Operations in Counterinsurgency, addresses offensive techniques used by
tactical units during counterinsurgency operations.
• Chapter 6, Defensive Operations in Counterinsurgency, addresses defensive techniques used by
tactical units during counterinsurgency operations.
• Chapter 7, Stability Operations in Counterinsurgency, addresses stability techniques used by
tactical units during counterinsurgency operations.
• Chapter 8, Working with Host Nation Security Forces, covers the seven steps (MORTEAM)
units use to train, advise, and partner with Host Nation security forces.
The target audience is commanders, staff, and Soldiers of US Army units up to brigade level.
This manual applies to the Active Army, the Army National Guard (ARNG)/Army National Guard of the
United States (ARNGUS), and the US Army Reserve (USAR) unless otherwise stated.
The proponent for this publication is the US Army Training and Doctrine Command. The preparing agency is
the US Army Infantry School. You may send comments and recommendations by any means, US mail, e-mail,
or telephone, as long as you provide the same information required on DA Form 2028, Recommended Changes
to Publications and Blank Forms.
E-mail [email protected]
Phone ........................................COM 706-545-7114 or DSN 835-7114
US Mail ....................................Commandant, USAIS
8150 Marne Road, BLDG 9230
Fort Benning, GA 31905-5593
Unless this publication states otherwise, masculine nouns and pronouns may refer to either men or women. |
3-24.2 | 11 | Introduction
This manual gives the US Army a common language, concept, and purpose to fight and achieve success in a
counterinsurgency. COIN is a complex subset of warfare that encompasses all military, paramilitary, political,
economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat an insurgency at the company, battalion,
and brigade levels. To do this, the manual merges traditional approaches to COIN with the realities of the current
operational environment.
The US Army thinking and doctrine on COIN tactics since the end of World War II have focused on the conduct
of counterguerrilla operations in the later stages of insurgency. The Army has seen itself as defeating guerrilla
forces—usually communist forces—rather than defeating an entire insurgency. It saw success as something it could
achieve by using the force of arms directly against guerrilla forces. This doctrine of COIN began to take shape shortly
after World War II in manuals such as FM 31-20, Operations against Guerrilla Forces (1951) and later in FM 31-15,
Operations against Irregular Forces (1961). The Army refined its counterinsurgency doctrine during Vietnam
in FM 31-22, US Counterinsurgency Force, FM 31-16, Counterguerrilla Operations (both published in 1963)
and in FM 31-23, Stability and Support Operations (1972). After Vietnam, the Army split COIN doctrine off from
conventional “high intensity” operations in FM 100-20, Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict (1990) in which
the “light” forces owned counterinsurgency, and FM 90-8, Counterguerrilla Operations (1986), where the focus
remained on defeating the guerrilla force. This manual is the historical successor to FM 90-8. In addition, parts of FM
100-20 have been integrated into this FM, as have the Army’s concept of full-spectrum operations and all elements
of COIN operations.
At its heart, a counterinsurgency is an armed struggle for the support of the population. This support can be achieved
or lost through information engagement, strong representative government, access to goods and services, fear,
or violence. This armed struggle also involves eliminating insurgents who threaten the safety and security of the
population. However, military units alone cannot defeat an insurgency. Most of the work involves discovering
and solving the population’s underlying issues, that is, the root causes of their dissatisfaction with the current
arrangement of political power. Dealing with diverse issues such as land reform, unemployment, oppressive
leadership, or ethical tensions places a premium on tactical leaders who can not only close with the enemy, but also
negotiate agreements, operate with nonmilitary agencies and other nations, restore basic services, speak the native (a
foreign) language, orchestrate political deals, and get "the word" on the street.
Today’s counterinsurgent battlefield is increasingly cluttered with US, Host Nation, and other coalition forces, each
with its own strengths and limitations. In addition, multiple insurgent groups, nongovernmental organizations, armed
contractors, and a local population divided into several ethnic groups add to this clutter. A counterinsurgency
long-range plan for a tactical unit combines offensive, defensive and stability operations. To achieve the appropriate
ratio between these and accomplish unity of effort among diverse units and actors, units must build long-term plans
around the seven counterinsurgency lines of effort: establish civil security, establish civil control, support Host Nation
forces, support to governance, restore essential services, support economic and infrastructure development,
and conduct information engagement.
All seven lines of effort are critical to establishing unity of effort for actions conducted by US units, Host Nation
security forces, and the Host Nation government. These actions can range from killing or capturing an insurgent cell
known to emplace IEDs, to solving unemployment in an area, to publicizing the opening of a water treatment facility.
Without unity of effort over time, the tactical unit’s long-range plan will face challenges in securing the population,
gathering the population’s support, and defeating the insurgency.
Counterinsurgency is an iterative process. Tactical units can conduct a wide variety of operations. These can include
anything from a combined cordon and search operation with Host Nation security forces, to a medical operation
to inoculate a hamlet’s children against disease, to a road project to connect a village to the highway, to a loudspeaker
broadcast to inform a village about a recent council meeting. Regardless of the mission, successful tactical units learn
and adapt as they discover more about their own strengths and limitations—and the strengths and limitations of the
Host Nation government, the populace, and the insurgents. This manual furthers FM 3-24’s theory that “in COIN, the
side that learns faster and adapts more rapidly—the better learning organization—usually wins.”
Each counterinsurgency is unique. Leaders must always execute good judgment, tactical patience, and innovation
to defeat an insurgency. As the US Army continues its lengthy battles against insurgency around the world, tactical
units must continue to focus on securing the support of the population, achieving unity of effort, and learning
and adapting faster than the insurgents do. |
3-24.2 | 13 | Chapter 1
Operational Environment of Counterinsurgency
“Learn all you can about your Ashraf and Bedu. Get to know their families, clans
and tribes, friends and enemies, wells, hills and roads.”
T. E. Lawrence, The 27 Articles of T.E. Lawrence.
FM 3-0 defines an operational environment as “…a composite of the conditions,
circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on
the decisions of the commander.” The particular operational environment heavily
influences both the nature of insurgent warfare and the methods of counterinsurgency
operations. This chapter helps units define the operational environment of COIN by
using operational variables, employing mission variables; understanding the effects
of the operational environment; and comprehending the importance of cultural
awareness.
Section I—OVERVIEW
For more than two centuries, the United States military has been called upon to defeat insurgencies like the
Whiskey Rebellion in the eastern United States, the Native Americans on the western plains of the United
States, the Boxer Rebellion in China, Pancho Villa in Mexico, Augusto Sandino in Nicaragua, and the Viet
Cong in Vietnam. Although the Army does have historic examples of COIN operations, our doctrine and COIN
skills atrophied between Vietnam and the invasion of Afghanistan. In addition, the world is increasingly shaped
by population explosion, urbanization, globalization, technology, religious fundamentalism, resource demand,
climate change and natural disasters, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The increasing
complexity of the world has made it more challenging for governments to maintain order and satisfy the rapidly
growing needs of their populations. As these governments try to maintain their tenuous hold on power,
dissatisfied portions of their population have, like dissatisfied groups for thousands of years, turned to violence
to achieve political goals. Using violence to achieve political goals is known as insurgency. As a result, US
forces have conducted counterinsurgency operations around the world in Colombia, Somalia, Kosovo,
Afghanistan, the Philippines, and Iraq. Before developing a better understanding of the operational environment
(OE), it is important to understand what insurgencies, counterinsurgencies, and the influences shaping the
OE are—
INSURGENCY
1-1. This is an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use
of subversion and armed conflict (JP 1-02). The key distinction between an insurgency and other
movements is the decision to use violence to achieve political goals. An insurgency is typically an internal
struggle within a state, not between states. It is normally a protracted political and military struggle
designed to weaken the existing government’s power, control, and legitimacy, while increasing the
insurgency’s power, control, and legitimacy.
1-2. The majority of insurgencies have been limited to local regions or specific countries. However,
today’s instant communications allow insurgent groups and leaders to communicate worldwide to find
support for their cause, and to support causes they view as compatible with their own goals. External
forces, including nation-states, may support an insurgency for their own benefit. They may also oppose a
competing nation-state that supports the existing government. As a result, modern insurgencies can often
cross multiple countries. |
3-24.2 | 14 | Chapter 1
1-3. An insurgency is made up of components (the five insurgent elements, the eight dynamics,
and one or more of the six insurgent strategies) and manifestations (tactics, strengths and vulnerabilities).
(For a greater understanding of insurgencies, see Chapter 2.)
COUNTERINSURGENCY
1-4. COIN involves all political, economic, military, paramilitary, psychological, and civic actions that
can be taken by a government to defeat an insurgency (JP 1-02). COIN operations include supporting a
Host Nation’s military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken to defeat
an insurgency. Avoiding the creation of new insurgents and forcing existing insurgents to end their
participation is vital to defeating an insurgency. COIN operations often include security assistance
programs such as foreign military sales programs, the foreign military financing program, and international
military training and education programs.
1-5. Counterguerrilla operations, on the other hand, focus on detecting and defeating the armed
insurgent or guerrilla, without solving the society’s underlying problems. Military efforts alone, however,
cannot defeat an insurgency. (For a better understanding of counterinsurgency, see Chapter 3.)
INFLUENCES ON CURRENT OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENTS
1-6. Eight forces are shaping current operational environments:
POPULATION EXPLOSION
1-7. Population explosion is the rapid growth of the world’s population over the last six decades.
In 1950, the world’s population was 2.5 billion people; in 2008, the population is estimated at 6.5 billion
people; and in 2050, the population is expected to reach 9 billion. The population explosion provides more
opportunities for the insurgent to hide within the population and places a premium on winning the struggle
for the populace’s support. As the population continues to grow, governments will struggle to provide their
people with food, water, and power, giving potential insurgent groups an opportunity to exploit a
vulnerable population.
URBANIZATION
1-8. Urbanization is the growth of urban areas due to both a population surge and migration. In 1950,
29 percent of the world’s population lived in urban areas; in 2008, almost 50 percent of the population
lives in urban areas; and by 2050, it is estimated that 60 percent of the population will live in urban areas.
This rapid growth of urban areas indicates that there is a greater potential that future insurgencies will be
fought in urban areas.
GLOBALIZATION
1-9. Globalization is a combination of the technological, economic, social, cultural, and political forces
that are bringing nation-states and the people of the world closer together. These forces are making the
world more interconnected and economically linked. Positively, it has reduced poverty in nations like
China and India. It has increased the gap between rich and poor nations, caused an increased demand
for resources, and may be affecting the climate.
TECHNOLOGY
1-10. Technological developments such as the computer, the internet, the digital camera, and satellite
television have transformed the world since 1950. Information can be exchanged around the world in less
than a second. This has also increased the reach, impact, and influence of the media to the insurgent
and the counterinsurgent. Additionally these same technologies, along with advanced weaponry, have |
3-24.2 | 15 | Operational Environment of Counterinsurgency
dramatically changed the battlefield. Both insurgents and counterinsurgents will continue to innovate
and adapt these technologies to the battlefield of today and the future.
RELIGIOUS FUNDAMENTALISM
1-11. Religious fundamentalism is defined as a belief in the infallibility of holy scriptures, absolute
religious authority, and strict adherence to a set of basic religious principles without any compromise with
modern life. As nation-states struggle to provide for their people, some of the dissatisfied population, as a
backlash against globalization, will turn to religious fundamentalism to provide those needs that the
nation-state cannot. (This is a primary insurgent ideology, and is further discussed in Chapter 2.)
RESOURCE DEMAND
1-12. Demand for energy, water, and food for growing populations will increase competition and,
potentially, conflict.
CLIMATE CHANGE AND NATURAL DISASTERS
1-13. Climate change and natural disasters will compound already difficult conditions in developing
countries and have the ability to cause humanitarian crises, driving regionally destabilizing population
migrations and raising potential for epidemic diseases.
PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND EFFECTS
1-14. Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and effects will increase the potential
for catastrophic attacks, especially if used by failed states or terrorist organizations.
Section II—OPERATIONAL AND MISSION VARIABLES
A thorough analysis of the population, the insurgency, and the counterinsurgent using the eight operational
variables and the six mission variables is critical to developing a counterinsurgency plan that can defeat the
insurgency. Even, a tactical unit will use the operational variables as a way to define their operational
environment, which often corresponds to their area of interest (AI).
OPERATIONAL VARIABLES
1-15. Army doctrine uses eight interrelated operational variables to analyze the operational
environment. Known as PMESII-PT, the eight operational variables are—
POLITICAL
1-16. The political variable describes the distribution of responsibility and power at all levels
of government. Since an insurgency is fundamentally a struggle for political power, the political
environment in the HN country is critical. Attention should be paid not just to the formal political system
(such as political parties and elected officials) but also to informal political systems (such as tribes, ethnic
groups, and other centers of power). Long-term success in COIN is ultimately based on political efforts; all
counterinsurgents must focus on the political impact of their actions. Therefore, tactical leaders may be
expected to broker local political solutions.
1-17. Host Nation (HN), US and coalition political considerations drive the conduct of COIN
operations. This is especially true concerning the involvement of the US Government and US public
opinion. A major goal of most insurgencies is to influence US public opinion against US involvement as a |
3-24.2 | 16 | Chapter 1
counterinsurgent force. Successful counterinsurgents must therefore not only prevent insurgents from
obtaining this goal, but also actively work to influence public opinion for the COIN mission.
1-18. Commanders must be prepared to operate within a broad range of political structures. The Host
Nation’s form of government may range from a despotic dictatorship to a struggling democracy.
Commanders at all levels, including platoon leaders and company commanders, need to recognize the
importance of establishing and reinforcing the HN as the lead authority for all operations. This reinforces
the legitimacy of the HN government.
MILITARY
1-19. This variable includes the military capabilities of all armed forces. Most COIN units will need
to analyze the insurgency’s military forces (guerrillas), local militias, and the Host Nation security forces.
Commanders should consider qualitative aspects, such as conscription or recruitment systems, economic
basis (to include appropriations system), and position of forces in national and local government structure.
Additional qualitative considerations are general organization, training and doctrine, efficiency, rapport
with population, and the police role in the nation’s internal security. For example, a typical US brigade
in Iraq might have to analyze a Sunni guerrilla force, a Shia guerrilla force, an Iraqi National Police
brigade, an Iraqi Army brigade, the Iraqi local police, and a Sons of Iraq militia unit.
ECONOMIC
1-20. The economic variable consists of the general economic categories of an Area of Operations
(AO), such as energy; raw materials; government development policy; distribution of labor and labor
policies; income distribution; national food distribution; free market or socialist interface and functions;
consumption patterns; external investment, taxation policy; port authorities; movement of goods; consumer
issues; border controls; foreign trade; tariffs; and graft or corruption.
1-21. A low standard of living and a desire for economic reform may be a cause of resentment toward
the government. Generally, the counterinsurgents plan their operations to minimize damage to the
economic structure of an area to avoid causing adverse psychological and economic impacts and to support
economic development.
SOCIAL
1-22. The social variable describes societies within an operational environment. A society is a
population whose members are subject to the same political authority, occupy a common territory, have a
common culture, and share a sense of identity. Both insurgents and counterinsurgents need the support
of the population to be successful. Most insurgencies attempt to increase friction between different groups
in a society and to gain or increase support from any group that shares common elements with the
insurgency. These groups may be aligned along racial, ethnic, religious, or social lines. Language
similarities or tradition can also be a reason for alignment. Religious influences often play a major role in
the sociological factors that affect the insurgent.
1-23. To be successful against insurgents in a particular area and to avoid alienating the populace,
counterinsurgents must understand the local environment. This includes local social issues and national
issues that effect the local environment. For instance, Afghanistan units may interact with groups
of Pashtuns, Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks, and Nuristani across their AO.
INFORMATION
1-24. The information variable involves the collection, access, use, manipulation, rapid distribution,
and reliance on data, media, and knowledge systems—both civilian and military—by the global and local
communities. Insurgents seek to control and manipulate how the local, regional, national, and international |
3-24.2 | 17 | Operational Environment of Counterinsurgency
community perceives its cause and events within their operational environment. To achieve this, they try to
control, manipulate, and distribute information.
1-25. Understanding the existing communication system is important because it influences local,
regional, national, and international audiences. Media coverage, in particular, influences US political
decision-making, popular opinion, and the sensitivities of coalition members, while the local teahouse may
control the community’s opinion and the “word on the street.” Commanders must use information
engagements to fully achieve their tactical goals.
1-26. Insurgents observe the actions of both government and COIN forces. Insurgents often use
propaganda to gain creditability and legitimacy with the population, while simultaneously undermining
their opponents. Successful insurgents strive to seize the moral high ground on any counterinsurgent
mistakes, both real and perceived. This includes political, military, economic, social, religious, cultural,
or legal errors. They will use all available means, including the media, nongovernmental organizations,
and religious and civic leaders, to get their information out to all audiences.
INFRASTRUCTURE
1-27. The infrastructure variable includes the basic facilities, services, and installations needed for a
community or society to function. The state of the infrastructure determines the resources required
for reconstruction. Typical key infrastructure includes sewers, water, electrical, academic, trash, medical
facilities, safety, and other considerations (also known as SWEAT-MSO). The degradation or destruction
of infrastructure will negatively affect both the Host Nation and its population. Thus, the degradation
or destruction of infrastructure often helps the insurgency, especially with respect to propaganda and the
population’s perception of the HN.
PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT
1-28. The physical environment variable is often the most noticeable aspect of an operational
environment. Terrain affects people, equipment, trafficability, visibility, and the employment of many
weapons. The terrain aspects of each area of operations must be evaluated to determine the impact on both
insurgent and counterinsurgent forces. For COIN operations, terrain is categorized as either rural or urban.
Weather and climate influence insurgents, the population, and counterinsurgents, who analyze the weather
to determine its effect on the population’s well-being and operations. They pay particular attention to
trafficability, visibility, and equipment. Despite weather extremes, most insurgents have an advantage,
since they are usually native to the climate.
TIME
1-29. Time affects everything and influences all decisions. However, the population, the
counterinsurgent, and the insurgent often view time differently. Insurgents may design operations with the
intent to influence the American political process or elections. In contrast, counterinsurgents must
understand that popular support for extended operations may diminish over time. Figure 1-1 shows the
difference between a western counterinsurgent’s and an insurgent’s perspective of time. |
3-24.2 | 18 | Chapter 1
Figure 1-1. Comparison of insurgent's and counterinsurgent's perspectives of time.
MISSION VARIABLES
1-30. While analysis, in terms of the operational variables, improves understanding of the operational
environment, it does not lend itself directly to mission accomplishment. For operations at the tactical level,
the Army uses the mission variables of METT-TC (mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops available,
time available, and civil considerations) to help a unit understand its mission within the context of its
specific OE. For COIN, civil considerations are especially important. When commanders and staff receive
a specific mission, or identify a particular problem, they can draw relevant information from their ongoing
analysis of their OE (using operational variables) to further complement their analysis of mission variables.
Use of the mission variables, combined with the knowledge of the operational variables, enables leaders
to understand the threat, act effectively, and anticipate the consequences of their operations before
and during mission execution.
MISSION
1-31. Mission is the task, together with the purpose, that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the
reason therefore (FM 1-02). At the brigade, battalion, and company level, the COIN force conducts tactical
operations, across seven COIN lines of effort. These incorporate the five stability tasks—establish civil
security, establish civil control, support HN security forces, support to governance, restore essential
services, support to economic development, and conduct information engagement. These tasks are
described in detail in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4. Lethal efforts may include patrols, raids, and cordon
and searches. Nonlethal efforts may include attending council meetings, engaging tribal leaders,
or repairing damaged infrastructure.
ENEMY
1-32. COIN operations, by nature, involve a confusing enemy situation, since the enemy generally lacks
a traditional task organization (FM 34-130). Moreover, the enemy (insurgents) can have a varying level
of training, capability, commitment, involvement, and experience. In addition to analyzing the insurgent’s
disposition, composition, strengths, and weaknesses, counterinsurgents must identify and understand the
five elements of the insurgency—leaders, guerrillas, auxiliary, underground, and mass base. Furthermore,
it is important to understand the eight dynamics of the insurgency—its leadership, ideology, objectives,
environment and geography, external support, internal support, phasing and timing, organizational
and operational patterns. Finally, it is critical to identify which of the six strategies—urban, military
focused, protracted popular war, conspiratorial, identity, and composite and coalition—the insurgent
is employing. (For more on insurgency, see Chapter 2.) |
3-24.2 | 19 | Operational Environment of Counterinsurgency
TERRAIN AND WEATHER
1-33. Terrain includes natural features, such as rivers and mountains, and man-made features, such
as cities, airfields, and bridges. Weather describes the conditions of temperature, wind velocity,
precipitation, and visibility at a specific place and time. When evaluating the effects of terrain and weather
on COIN operations, the commander should consider the effects of seasons of the year (to include planting
and harvesting periods); phases of the moon; and coastal tides. In particular, he concentrates on—
• The effects of the weather—which mainly includes his Soldiers, equipment, and visibility, but
also includes other factors such as mobility;
• The suitability of terrain and road nets for tactical and logistical operations.
1-34. He focuses on the effects of the terrain on Soldiers, equipment, visibility, and mobility. Units and
staffs study the terrain in relation to the factors of OAKOC:
• Observation and fields of fire
• Avenues of approach
• Key and decisive terrain
• Obstacles
• Cover and concealment.
TROOPS AND SUPPORT AVAILABLE
1-35. Successful counterinsurgency operations depend upon the commander using his available assets
to maximize force strengths and minimize vulnerabilities. To do this, the commander realistically appraises
the capabilities and limitations of his assets, as well as joint, interagency, international, and multinational
elements, to organize and employ them on suitable missions. In the COIN environment, the tactical unit
must identify, account for, and leverage all HN security forces—police, army and paramilitary—to secure
and control the population and disrupt the insurgency.
TIME AVAILABLE
1-36. For tactical operations, time available for planning and execution varies. Major operations need
prolonged periods of time for detailed planning. Stability operations that address political, economic,
and social issues usually take a considerable length of time to complete. As such, after the initial period
of planning, the time available for modified or future planning is often quite long.
1-37. When planning short-term actions such as offensive operations against fleeting insurgent targets,
planning time is usually short, and information is scarce. Commanders at all levels can use the time
available to them more efficiently by planning contingency missions. One method to reduce planning time
is to codify routine tasks common to similar missions in SOP. When the need to execute a contingency
mission arises, the basic plan can be reviewed and planning expedited by making minor adjustment
as required.
CIVIL CONSIDERATIONS
1-38. In COIN operations, the population is vital—since whoever the population supports has the
advantage. Consequently, civil considerations are normally the most important mission variable for COIN.
This variable comprises the influence of manmade infrastructure on the conduct of military operations. |
3-24.2 | 20 | Chapter 1
Section III—ANALYSIS OF CIVIL CONSIDERATIONS USING ASCOPE
An in-depth analysis of the civil considerations is vital for the long-term success of the counterinsurgent unit.
There are six categories of civil considerations: areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events,
represented by the useful memory aid, ASCOPE (Figure 1-2). During intelligence preparation of the battlefield
(IPB), the commander and staff analyze civil considerations from several perspectives—the population, the
insurgents, and the counterinsurgents—to determine the effects on friendly and enemy courses of action.
Analyzing the six categories of civil considerations from multiple perspectives aids in understanding of the OE,
and helps to isolate the insurgents from the population (FM 3-0 and FM 6-0).
Figure 1-2. ASCOPE.
METHODOLOGY
1-39. While analyzing civil considerations, counterinsurgents should develop both ASCOPE matrixes
and map overlays. Developing these products should be done in partnership with HN security forces
and local government officials. Effective civil considerations analysis facilitates understanding. Table 1-1
lists typical examples in each of the ASCOPE categories. |
3-24.2 | 21 | Operational Environment of Counterinsurgency
Table 1-1. Typical civil considerations within each ASCOPE category.
Area Structure Capabilities Organization People Events
Tribe Cemeteries Sewer Tribal Phones Weddings
Families/Clans Religious Water Family/clan Speeches Birthdays
shrines
Ethnicity Houses Electrical Religious Face-to-face Religious
of worship meetings gatherings
Religion Bars/tea shops Academic Ethnic Media/radio Funerals
Economic Social Trash US/coalition Media/TV Major religious
districts gathering forces events
places
Smuggling Print shops Medical Governmental Media/print Anniversaries
routes agencies (newspaper) of wars
or battles
National Internet cafes Security Farmers or Visual Holidays
Unions (graffiti, signs)
Social classes Television Market (use Community Visual (videos, Harvests
and goods) DVDs)
Political districts Radio station Employment Military or militia Audio (pirated Reconstruction
and commerce units or illegal radio) openings
Military districts Hospitals Crime Illicit organizations Rallies Town
and justice or demonstrations or council
meetings
School districts Banks Basic needs Insurgent groups Restaurants Elections
Road system Dams Public health Gangs Door-to-door Sports events
Water sources Bridges Economic (jobs) Businesses Internet
organizations
Water coverage Police stations Religion Police Markets
Water districts Gas stations Displaced Nomads Sports
persons
and refugees
Construction Military Political voice Displaced Religious
sites barracks persons gatherings
and refugees
Gang territory Jails Civil rights, Volunteer groups Parks
individual rights
Safe areas/ Water pumping Intergovernmental Family gatherings
sanctuary stations organizations
Trade routes Oil/gas Political Gas lines
pipelines
Power grids Water lines Contractors Bars/tea shops
Power lines NGOs Food lines
Storage Labor unions Job lines
facilities
CIVIL CONSIDERATIONS OVERLAY
1-40. The civil considerations overlay provides insights to the area of operations by identifying
sectarian fault lines, demographic groups, and their issues. Figure 1-3 shows an example of a civil
considerations (ASCOPE) overlay. |
3-24.2 | 22 | Chapter 1
Figure 1-3. Civil considerations overlay.
CIVIL CONSIDERATION MATRIXES
1-41. A separate matrix is a useful tool for each of the six ASCOPE categories for any demographic
group. Also helpful is an ASCOPE map overlay that shows the boundaries of each identified demographic
group. The government’s districts (police, utilities, political) often fall along natural demographic lines.
When they do not, the boundary conflicts with how the population defines its neighborhood. This can
cause friction between the population and government. For each area, staffs might want to first identify the
demographic group it contains. Then, they can work through the rest of the ASCOPE categories. For
example, a unit with an area that has two main tribes should develop a separate ASCOPE matrix for each
tribe. Three key perspectives aid in understanding the categories of ASCOPE:
POPULATION OR POPULACE
1-42. This refers to the local community.
INSURGENT
1-43. This refers to any group illegally impeding the functions of the government, such as insurgents,
militias, gangs, criminals, foreign agents, and terrorists.
COUNTERINSURGENT
1-44. This refers to the perspective of the forces and groups conducting the counterinsurgency and those
supporting them. These elements can include HN security forces, local police, government leadership
and employees, US military, government agencies, Provincial reconstruction teams, and coalition
members. |
3-24.2 | 23 | Operational Environment of Counterinsurgency
AREAS
1-45. This term refers to the specific localities within an AO, where a particular demographic group s
lives, neighborhood by neighborhood and block by block. Unless a unit occupies an ethnically
homogenous area, it will have multiple “areas” within its AO. In addition, a single demographic area may
cross several unit boundaries. Examples of specific areas include—
• Those defined by political boundaries such as city districts or regional municipalities.
• Social, political, religious, or criminal enclaves.
1-46. Once a unit defines the geographic area occupied by a demographic group, then it should
complete the remainder of the ASCOPE for that area. They repeat this for other areas. Table 1-2 shows an
example area matrix. Columns in this matrix include—
Area
1-47. This column names or describes each of the sub areas of a unit’s AO, such as tribal, religious,
economic, or political districts.
Location
1-48. This column describes the location or boundaries of each group. These boundaries will rarely be
pure, since often groups overlap.
Population
1-49. This column describes how the population perceives and uses the area.
Insurgent
1-50. This column shows how the adversary perceives and uses the area.
Counterinsurgent
1-51. This column describes how counterinsurgents look at and use this area.
Table 1-2. Example area matrix.
From the Perspective of
Area Location Population Insurgent Counterinsurgent
Group/Tribe A Grid Safe haven; Area provides Nonpermissive
(specific name) coordinates/boundaries, Provides early freedom of terrain. All roads in
for example warning from movement, area are high
attack; protection from threat. History of
community government IEDs/SAFs.
watches out for forces, cache
each other sites, safe
houses
Religious Group A Boundary Perspective is… Perspective is… Perspective is…
Political District A Boundary Perspective is… Perspective is… Perspective is…
STRUCTURES
1-52. Existing structures can play many significant roles. Bridges, communications towers, power
plants, and dams are important infrastructure. Others, such as churches, mosques, national libraries,
and hospitals are cultural sites, play important roles in the community. Still others are facilities with
practical applications such as jails, warehouses, television/radio stations, and print plants. Some aspects |
3-24.2 | 24 | Chapter 1
of the civilian infrastructure, such as the location of toxic industrial materials, may influence operations.
Analyzing a structure involves determining how its location, functions, and capabilities support an
operation. Commanders also consider the consequences of using a certain structure. Commanders must
carefully weigh the expected military benefits against costs to the community that will have to be addressed
in the future. Table 1-3 shows an example structures matrix. Considerations for each of the
columns include—
Structure
1-53. This identifies, defines, and names the specific structures within the AO.
Location
1-54. This describes the specific location (grid coordinates) of each structure.
Population
1-55. This describes how the population perceives and uses the structure.
Insurgent
1-56. This describes how the insurgent perceives and uses the structure.
Counterinsurgent
1-57. This describes how counterinsurgents look at this structure.
Table 1-3. Example structures matrix.
From the Perspective of
Area Location Population Insurgent Counterinsurgent
Hospital (specific name) XM123456 Needed medical Can provide black Funding and
care, however, market meds to fill personnel
shortage of staff shortages shortfalls, needs
and meds expanding
Houses of worship Grid Perspective is… Perspective is… Perspective is…
coordinates
Police stations Grid Perspective is… Perspective is… Perspective is…
coordinates
CAPABILITIES
1-58. Capabilities refer to the ability of local authorities to provide citizens with key services such
as public administration, public safety, emergency services, and food. Capabilities include areas in which
the populace may need help after combat operations, such as public works and utilities, public health,
economics, and commerce. Capabilities also refer to resources and services that can be contracted
to support the military mission such as interpreters, laundry services, construction materials,
and equipment. The Host Nation or other nations might provide these resources and services. Commanders
and staffs analyze capabilities from different perspectives. They view capabilities in terms of those
required to save, sustain, or enhance life, in that priority.
1-59. Within each demographic group, identify who is responsible overall for each item that is required
to save, sustain, or enhance life. Include preexisting needs as well as the needs of the populace after
combat operations or disaster. This will play a large part identifying root causes of the insurgency. These
items are listed here as well but the focus is on who is responsible for each item. Table 1-4 shows an
example capabilities matrix. Considerations for each of the columns include— |
3-24.2 | 25 | Operational Environment of Counterinsurgency
Capabilities
1-60. This, at a minimum, describes the SWEAT-MSO (sewer, water, electricity, academic, trash,
medical, safety, and other considerations) items.
Status
1-61. This lists the status of each of the SWEAT-MSO items, for example—
Red
1-62. Nonexistent or nonfunctioning.
Yellow
1-63. Present but not fulfilling the requirements of the population, needs labor/parts/fuel
to maintain, expected to fail without support.
Green
1-64. Satisfactory to sustain population.
Population
1-65. This lists individuals that the population consider responsible for each specific
SWEAT-MSO item.
Insurgent
1-66. This shows the perspective of the insurgency.
Counterinsurgent
1-67. This lists the individual the local government considers responsible for each SWEAT-MSO item.
Table 1-4. Example capabilities matrix.
From the Perspective of
Area Location Population Insurgent Counterinsurgent
Sewer Often red in Blame tribal sheik; Major issue to use City manager
slums hurts economic against tribal places low priority
development sheiks; will destroy on this tribal area
repairs
Water Grid Perspective is… Perspective is… Perspective is…
coordinates
Electrical Grid Perspective is… Perspective is… Perspective is…
coordinates
ORGANIZATIONS
1-68. Organizations are nonmilitary groups or institutions in the AO. They influence and interact with
the populace, military units, and each other. Organizations generally have a hierarchical structure, defined
goals, established operations, fixed facilities or meeting places, and a means of financial or logistic support.
Some organizations may be indigenous to the area such as tribes and ethnic based groupings. Other
organizations include church groups, fraternal, patriotic or service organizations, labor unions, criminal
organizations, political parties, and community watch groups. Other organizations may come from outside
the AO. Examples of these include multinational corporations, United Nations agencies, US governmental |
3-24.2 | 26 | Chapter 1
agencies, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Table 1-5 shows an example organizations matrix.
Considerations for each of the columns include—
Organization
1-69. This identifies, defines, and names the specific organizations within the AO. Some may be
identified in the area matrix but this gives the details of the group where the area matrix identifies its
location.
Location
1-70. This shows the specific location (grid coordinates) of each organization.
Population
1-71. This shows how the population perceives and uses the organization.
Insurgent
1-72. This shows how the insurgent perceives and uses the organization.
Counterinsurgent
1-73. This tackles how the counterinsurgents look at this organization.
Table 1-5. Example organizations matrix.
From the Perspective of
Area Location Population Insurgent Counterinsurgent
Tribal XM123456 Tribal loyalties and Looks to increase Must include tribal
interactions intertribal strife, leaders in
dominate life violence government
Political Grid Perspective is… Perspective is… Perspective is…
coordinates
Social Grid Perspective is… Perspective is… Perspective is…
coordinates
PEOPLE (MEANS OF COMMUNICATION)
1-74. An important aspect of people is how they communicate. The term people includes all civilians
within the AO or AI whose actions or opinions can affect the mission. Both formal and informal means
of passing information, actions, opinions and political influence, are critical to understanding the AO. All
counterinsurgents should look for the obvious visual and audible signals as well as where people gather.
Visual examples include graffiti, posters, signs, billboards, murals, videos and DVDs, and television.
Audible examples include pirated radio broadcasts, loudspeakers from a Mosque, someone reading to a
group, speeches, and religious teachings or services.
1-75. Most people who serve as the spokesmen in the community (community, labor, and religious
leaders) should also appear in the people matrix. If the counterinsurgent's information dissemination
techniques differ from the insurgents, this difference could explain why the enemy’s propaganda is more
credible, timely, and considered to be more legitimate by the target audience. Table 1-6 shows an example
people matrix. Considerations for each of the columns include—
People
1-76. This column identifies, defines and names the specific methods people use to communicate in this
area or key communicators. |
3-24.2 | 27 | Operational Environment of Counterinsurgency
Location
1-77. This column shows the locations where people communicate or where key communicators live
and work.
Population
1-78. This column describes who the population perceives as being a key source of communication.
Insurgent
1-79. This column shows who the insurgents use to communicate with the population.
Counterinsurgent
1-80. This column shows who the HN uses to communicate with the population.
Table 1-6. Example people (means of communications) matrix.
From the Perspective of
Area Location Population Insurgent Counterinsurgent
Phones Grid Local store owner Unknown Tribal and
coordinates community leader
cell phones
Mass Media - Radio Grid Individual names… Individual names… Individual names…
coordinates
Religious services Grid Individual names… Individual names… Individual names…
coordinates
Individuals such as Grid Respected leader Enemy of the Tolerated because
mayor, police chief, of coordinates believed to be people not from same
store owner unbiased ethnic group
EVENTS
1-81. Events, both public and private, are routine, cyclical, planned, or spontaneous activities that affect
organizations, people, and military operations. Examples include national and religious holidays,
agricultural crop/livestock and market cycles, elections, civil disturbances, and celebrations. Once tactical
units determine significant events, they must template the events and analyze them for their political,
economic, psychological, environmental, and legal implications. Table 1-7 shows an example event matrix.
Event
1-82. This column identifies and lists all events important to the populace. This includes annual events
such as religious holidays; seasonal harvests or migration of insurgents; or more frequent events like
council meetings, religious services, and special shopping days.
Location
1-83. This column shows the location, normally in military format and includes a date-time-group
(DTG).
Population
1-84. This column describes the population’s perception of the event. |
3-24.2 | 28 | Chapter 1
Insurgent
1-85. This column comments on the insurgent’s perception of the event.
Counterinsurgent
1-86. This column comments on how the HN perceives the event.
Table 1-7. Example event matrix.
From the Perspective of
Area Location Population Insurgent Counterinsurgent
Religious Festival XX Route XYZ One religion Gives an Religious freedom
approves; another opportunity to must be accepted
disapproves promote religious
strife
Fire Station XX Opening Grid Perspective is… Perspective is… Perspective is…
coordinates
Funeral for XX Grid Perspective is… Perspective is… Perspective is…
coordinates
Section IV—EFFECTS
Describing the effects of the operational environment is the second step in IPB. It involves taking the facts
about an area of operations grouped by mission variables of terrain, weather, and civil considerations
and analyzing them to arrive at a conclusion about their effects on enemy and friendly courses of action.
In addition to the normal analytical tools, examining each of the prerequisites of an insurgency and the root
causes that lead to the insurgency have proved to be useful in identifying long-term societal problems. These
problems lie at the heart of the competition for the population’s support between the insurgent
and counterinsurgent.
PREREQUISITES
1-87. There are three prerequisites for an insurgency to be successful in an area—a vulnerable
population, leadership available for direction, and lack of government control. When all three exist in an
area, an insurgency can operate with some freedom of movement, gain the support of the people,
and become entrenched over time.
VULNERABLE POPULATION
1-88. A population is vulnerable if the people have real or perceived grievances that insurgents can
exploit. The insurgents can exploit the population by offering hope for change as well as exploiting
political, economic, or social dissatisfaction with the current government. A gap between population’s
expectations and the capability to meet these expectations may cause unrest within the population,
including turning to insurgency. The larger the gap, the greater the population’s perceived, or relative,
sense of deprivation between what they have and what they perceive they should have. Similarly, the larger
the gap, the more susceptible the population is to insurgent influence through promises to close the gap. |
3-24.2 | 29 | Operational Environment of Counterinsurgency
LEADERSHIP AVAILABLE FOR DIRECTION
1-89. A vulnerable population alone will not support an insurgency. There must be a leadership element
that can direct the frustrations of the population. If insurgents can recruit, co-opt, or coerce local leaders or
the local leaders are part of the insurgency, these leaders can direct the frustrations of the populace.
LACK OF GOVERNMENT CONTROL
1-90. Real or perceived lack of governmental control can allow insurgents to operate with little or no
interference from security forces or other agencies. The greater the control the government has over the
situation, the less likely are the chances for insurgent success. The opposite is also true. If the government
is not providing what the people believe their government should, insurgents may provide an alternative
government, or “shadow” government, or they may merely nullify governance to allow freedom of action
and movement, depending on their end state. Host Nation failure to see or admit that there is an issue
or outright refusal to change can further strengthen this prerequisite.
ROOT CAUSES
1-91. There are five general categories of root causes for insurgencies. A root cause is the basis of a
grievance among the population. Some or all of these grievances may fuel an insurgency to varying
degrees. The importance of the root causes, or even their existence, can change over time. Additionally,
insurgents may be adept at manipulating or creating root causes and grievances to serve their purpose.
IDENTITY
1-92. Many factors impact a person’s sense of identity, but membership in a socio cultural group may
have the deepest influence. Strong feelings based on identity can be in conflict with the group identity
of the majority of the members of the Host Nation government, potentially leading to insurgencies with
secession or political overthrow as goals. External nations with similar social identities as the insurgents
may assist.
RELIGION
1-93. While religion is often a primary identity, it can become important enough to be a considered a
separate identity unto itself. In this way, religious fundamentalism or extremism can become a root cause
of an insurgency in and of itself. External groups with similar extremist religious views as the insurgents
may assist.
OCCUPATION OR EXPLOITATION
1-94. Popular perception of outsiders either occupying the HN, or excessive HN pandering to outsiders,
can be a source of insurgency. For example, foreign businesses can dominate critical portions of the local
economy. This can occur to the point that some may feel that they or their country are being exploited.
An outside military presence or military treaty may offend national sentiment. The mere presence
or specific actions of foreigners may offend religious or cultural sensibilities as well.
ECONOMIC FAILURE
1-95. Pervasive and desperate poverty can often be a root cause of an insurgency. Starving young
people without jobs or hope are ripe for insurgent recruitment. A large gap between the vast poor majority
and a small extremely rich minority will exacerbate these issues. |
3-24.2 | 30 | Chapter 1
CORRUPTION AND REPRESSION
1-96. Corruption and repression can lead to popular dissatisfaction with the current government.
Rampant corruption leads to the loss of HN legitimacy and possibly a desire to change or replace the Host
Nation government.
Section V—CULTURAL COMPETENCE AND SITUATIONAL AWARENESS
Culture can be defined as the set of a system of shared beliefs, values, customs, behaviors, and artifacts that
members of a society use to cope with their world and one another. Since all wars are fought in and amongst a
population, the Army seeks to develop an ability to understand and work with a culture for its Soldiers
and leaders. Cultural capability is the blend of individual competence in understanding the general
characteristics and the characteristics of specific cultures, derived from a cumulative set of cultural knowledge,
skills, and attributes to help forecast and favorably influence the behavior of the target group or society. This
section will define culture; identify the two major components of culture capability—cross-cultural competence
and regional competence; and discuss the three cultural proficiency levels—cultural awareness, cultural
understanding, and cultural expertise—within a culture capability.
CULTURE
1-97. Each society is composed of both a social structure and culture. Social structure refers to the
relations among groups of persons within a system of groups. Social structures persist over time. That is, it
is regular and continuous despite disturbances, and the relation between the parts holds steady even
as groups export contract. In an army, for example, the structure consists of the arrangement into groups
like divisions, battalions, and companies, and the hierarchy of ranks. In a society, the social structure
includes groups, institutions, organizations, and networks. Social structure involves the arrangement of the
parts that constitute society, the organization of social positions, and the distribution of people within those
positions. Some elements of the social structure are considered here:
SOCIAL GROUPS
• What are the major groups both inside and outside their AO?
• What are the formal relationships, such as treaties or alliances; and the informal relationships
such as tolerance or friction between groups? What are the cleavages between groups
and crosscutting ties, for example, religious alignments that cut across ethnic differences?
• Do the insurgent leadership and their rank and file belong to separate groups? Does the
population belong to a different social group than the insurgents? Can seams among insurgents
or between insurgents and the population be widened?
• How do people identify themselves (tribes, religions, ethnicity, provinces/regions, classes,
occupations, and common language)?
• Are there a large number of homeless, refugees, squatters, internally displaced persons (IDPs)?
What do the people think of them?
NORMS, ROLES, AND STATUSES
• What are the expected behaviors (roles) of people in different social status? How should a
parent, political leader, military figure, or religious leader behave? What are the appropriate
treatments for women and children? What are the common courtesies, such as gift giving?
What are the local business practices, such as bribes and haggling?
• What are the traditional roles of each family member?
• What are people in the society expected to do (norm)? Norms may be either moral (incest
prohibition, homicide prohibition) or customary (prayer before a meal, removing shoes before
entering a house). How important is being on time in the society (business, social gatherings)? |
3-24.2 | 31 | Operational Environment of Counterinsurgency
• What are the punishments (formal and informal) for role violations? What will the people
disapprove of? What are the requirements for revenge if honor is lost?
Interrelated Nature of Culture
1-98. Culture is learned, shared by members of a society, patterned, changeable, arbitrary,
and internalized, in the sense that it is habitual, taken for granted, and perceived as “natural” by people in
the society. Culture conditions the individual’s range of action and ideas, including what to do and not do,
how to do or not do it, and whom to do it with or not to do it with. Culture also includes under what
circumstances the “rules” shift and change. Culture influences how people make judgments about what
is right and wrong, assess what is important and unimportant, categorize things, and deal with things that
do not fit into existing categories. Cultural rules are flexible in practice.
Taxonomy
1-99. One simple way to show a culture is to build a chart that systematically distinguishes, orders,
and names groups—a cultural taxonomy. In order to do this, leaders and staffs must define a culture’s
influences, variations, and manifestations. Cultural influences and cultural variations explain why the
culture is the way it is. Cultural manifestations refer to what one may encounter in a culture. Figure 1-4
shows an example of a culture’s taxonomy.
Figure 1-4. Taxonomy of culture.
ELEMENTS OF CULTURE
1-100. The size of a nation, its diverse subcultures, different educational levels and geographic
backgrounds contribute to a great range of cultural variances amongst individuals and groups. Members
of the population view cultural influences differently depending on their geographic location or identifying
group. Some elements of culture should be identified and evaluated in a counterinsurgency operation. The
following questions can aid units in defining the different elements of culture:
History
• What are the major wars, massacres, and conflicts that shaped the culture?
• What are some of the great leaders, heroes, or legends in the nation's history?
• What are some of the villains (infamous) people in the nation's history? |
3-24.2 | 32 | Chapter 1
• Who founded the country? Who brought it to its modern form?
• What are some of the significant eras, generations or major shifts in a nation that are
significant?
Language
• What are the common languages or dialects spoken?
• Standard words and phrases universal in all cultures (formal and informal):
(cid:131) Hello.
(cid:131) Goodbye.
(cid:131) Please.
(cid:131) Thank you.
(cid:131) You're welcome.
(cid:131) How are you?
(cid:131) May I help you?
• Common sayings in a culture, for example, "God bless you" or "God save the Queen."
• "Excuse me" or "Pardon me."
• Toasts with appropriate beverages, such as coffee or beer, are sociable.
• Grace or well wishes (for food)—meals are sociable.
• What are the common sayings, clichés, or slang?
• What is customary during greeting and departing (shake hands, kiss, and bowing)?
Geography
• What typically defines a community or neighborhoods, for example, economic, ethnic, tribal,
religious, or political traits? Where are the neighborhood boundaries?
• Where do new arrivals, immigrants, workers, and IDPs typically come from? Why did they
migrate here? Is the migration seasonal, temporary, or permanent?
• What are the most significant local natural and man-made landmarks and structures (for
example, religious, historical, cultural)?
Religion
• What are the main religions? Is there an official religion?
• What are important religious events and holidays?
• What is the role of religious leaders within the society?
• What is traditional for funerals and mourning?
• Are there any tensions in the nation due to religious differences?
• What are the tenets of the main religions?
Communications
• How do people communicate?
• How do the people receive information? Radio, TV, newspaper, meetings, word of mouth)?
• Where do the people usually gather? Bars, tea or coffee shops, cafes, or markets?
• Where do people socialize or congregate randomly in previously unrecognized manners, for
example, wait in long lines, for day labor, in traffic, or at sporting events and tournaments)?
• Who are the principal communicators within the local community?
Political Science
• How do people view the role of the Host Nation government?
• What are the roles of and how important are civilian (nongovernmental) community leaders?
• What are the major political parties?
• Is the local government effective? Why or why not?
• What civil and human rights do the populace hold most sacred? |
3-24.2 | 33 | Operational Environment of Counterinsurgency
• Is the government secular or religious?
• Does the country have a constitution, document, guideline that lays out the role of government,
rights of the people, and laws?
Military Arts and Science
• How respected is military service in the culture? How are veterans treated?
• Who are some of the famous military leaders or revolutionaries in the country?
• Is there an NCO corps? How are NCOs selected? What are their duties and responsibilities?
What is their relationship with officers and Soldiers?
• What oath of allegiance, if any, do members of the military swear upon enrollment?
• What colors, banners, symbols, or uniforms do antigovernment forces use?
Sociology
• Do the people identify themselves with organizations or affiliations (tribes, religions, ethnicity,
provinces/regions, classes, occupations, and common language)?
• What are the major problems and underlying issues with the people (root causes)?
• Are there a large number of homeless, refugees, squatters, internally displaced persons (IDPs)?
What do the people think of them?
• What is customary in dealing with guests or strangers? Are people friendly or guarded with
strangers?
• What are some of the core values of the people that define who they are?
• What is the daily or weekly schedule of most citizens (wakeup, meals, work, social time,
sleep)?
Cultural Anthropology
• Have current warring groups/factions ever lived side-by-side in peace? What changed?
• What are some of the key cultural aspects of the local tribes or nomadic groups?
• What are the traditional roles of each family member?
• Whom do the people look to for leadership (governmental and nongovernmental)?
• How important is being on time in the society (business, social gatherings)?
• How do they correct social mistakes?
Economics
• What export or local product are the people known for and the most proud of?
• Are bribes or "gifts" normal in dealing with businesses, government officials, or police? What
is acceptable (levels of corruption)?
• What infrastructure is required to support economic growth (electricity for factories, roads
to move produce, security to minimize extortion/black market)?
• What is the daily wage of an average worker/laborer? Which jobs are considered honorable?
• What economic organizations are important and influential in the society (labor unions,
merchant guilds)?
• Is there a local black market? Who is involved, what products, and how tied to the community
and local government?
• Are prices fixed or negotiated in normal commerce?
Education
• What is the literacy rate?
• Who goes to school (males, females, all, optional)? What is the last year of general public
education?
• Are public schools secular or religious? How? |
3-24.2 | 34 | Chapter 1
• What influence do local universities have, for example, do the professors promote radicalism
and do the schools serve as recruiting centers?
Art, Music, and Entertainment
• How important is the national anthem to the populace? What do the lyrics mean?
• What types of music do the most people listen like?
• What types of movies do they like?
• What are their favorite holidays, and how do they celebrate them? What types of food do they
eat during holidays and special occasions?
• What are some of the most popular hobbies and recreations?
Literature
• What types of stories do children read? What are the morals of these stories?
• What stories, fables, and epics, oral or written, pass down through families or communities?
Do these help define the culture?
• Who are the most famous—or infamous—characters in popular literature?
• What are some the legends of the nation's past?
• What are the popular books, and who are the controversial authors (past and present)?
Food and Drink
• What is the local cuisine?
• What are some typical or traditional foods and drinks?
• How are they prepared?
• How important is sharing a meal?
• Is there any food or drink culturally forbidden?
Psychology
• Who or what do people fear?
• Rank the following from 1 (most important) to 7 (least important):
(cid:131) God
(cid:131) Family
(cid:131) Tribe
(cid:131) Neighborhood
(cid:131) Country
(cid:131) Political party
(cid:131) Ethnic group
• Rank the following from 1 to 7 (most to least important):
(cid:131) Esteem needs (self-esteem and respect of others).
(cid:131) Safety needs (security and stability).
(cid:131) Self-actualization (meet ones potential).
(cid:131) Love needs (belonging).
(cid:131) Physiological needs (basics necessities—water, food, shelter).
Law and Criminal Justice
• Who makes and enforces the local laws? What justice can the victims or their families
exercise?
• What are the basic rules of the road, traffic laws, and right of way? Are they followed?
• What types of organized crime exists? What symbols, colors, graffiti, or uniforms do local
gangs or organized crime use? What does each mean (marks territory, identifies targets,
intimidates populace)?
• How do the people feel about corporal punishment and capital punishment? |
3-24.2 | 35 | Operational Environment of Counterinsurgency
• What could dishonor an individual, family, or group? How do you correct serious situations
between individuals, families, or groups or families?
Science and Technology
• Does the country or area have Internet service? Satellite or hardwired?
• Does the enemy use the Internet? How and why?
• What Internet sites are forbidden or blocked?
• What is the country recognized for inventing or discovering? What do the people generally
believe their country invented or discovered?
CULTURAL VARIATIONS
1-101. Cultural variations are the behaviors, values, and interests common to a culture. Understanding
these variations allows US and HN security forces to interact and thus to operate more effectively
in negotiations, advisory roles, population control, and daily interaction with the populace to gain better
cultural competence.
Behaviors
1-102. A culture’s behavior consists of actions which can be sensed; specifically a group’s language,
social mores, customs, structures, and institutions. Culturally competent units understand and train
to recognize these behaviors as a means to identify insurgent actions, anticipate the population actions,
and detect subtle changes within the population. Actions inconsistent with the population’s behavioral
norms could be indicators of guerrilla activity, internal conflict, or the confirmation or denial
of intelligence. Living and operating among the population is essential to understanding population
behavior.
Values
1-103. Values are the principles the population uses to evaluate alternatives or consequences of decisions
and actions. A value is a concept that describes the beliefs of an individual or culture and is identity based,
for example, Army Values. Values are how people understand what they are and what they will and will
not tolerate. Values define their sense of honor and respect. Values are often unchangeable. Soldiers never
attempt to change the population’s values, confuse its interests with its values, or use its interests in an
attempt to alter its values. During tactical operations, counterinsurgent forces prioritize the population’s
values over its interests to demonstrate the Host Nation government’s legitimacy in supporting the
population.
Interests
1-104. An interest is what the population wants or desires for a group’s benefit or advantage (it is often
perceived as a right or legitimate claim). An interest may be flexible and can change. Interests are linked to
the situation, such as what people want at present. US perceptions should not dictate what the population
needs and wants. The insurgency likely understands these needs and wants and eagerly exploits them
to gain support, as well as to turn the population away from the HN government. A vulnerable population
gravitates towards who it feels best understands and satisfies its needs and wants. During tactical COIN
operations, the counterinsurgent must know the local population’s difference between a need and a want
and not operate with a US cultural bias.
CULTURAL MANIFESTATIONS
1-105. Cultural manifestations are the concrete displays of a culture’s thought and behavior measured by
the senses. It is how a population demonstrates its views on authority, legitimacy, negotiation style,
compromise, and other similar thoughts and behaviors. |
3-24.2 | 36 | Chapter 1
CULTURAL CAPABILITY
1-106. Cultural capability has two major components:
CROSS-CULTURAL COMPETENCY
1-107. Cross-cultural competency (3C) includes general cultural knowledge, skills, and attributes. All
Soldiers must devote time to developing cross-cultural competency. It forms the foundation
for understanding any culture, and is developed by studying the humanities, including movies and other
media; traveling to other countries; and personally interacting with people from countries outside the US.
REGIONAL COMPETENCE
1-108. Regional competence includes culture-specific knowledge, skills, and attributes that pertain to a
given country or region. Regional competence is developed by lifelong study of a region and tailored
training during preparation for a deployment.
CULTURAL PROFICIENCY LEVELS
1-109. As Soldiers develop cross-cultural competence and regional competencies over time, broad
descriptions of their proficiency levels show the depth of their knowledge, skills, and attributes in those
competencies. These descriptions represent a standard that culture and foreign language education
and training are designed to achieve. The following paragraphs define the cultural proficiency levels,
and Figure 1-5 shows how they change over time:
Figure 1-5. Changes in cultural capability over time. |
3-24.2 | 37 | Operational Environment of Counterinsurgency
CULTURAL AWARENESS
1-110. This proficiency level describes Soldiers who demonstrate basic cross-cultural competence in all
three subcomponent areas: culture fundamentals, cultural self-awareness, and culture skills. They will have
a minimal level of regional competence necessary to perform assigned tasks in a specific geographic area.
These Soldiers will be able to describe key culture terms, factors, and concepts. Additional characteristics
of cultural awareness are—
• Cultural awareness sets the conditions to learn about foreign cultures and people.
• Cultural awareness includes Soldiers who have an appropriate mind-set and a basic culture
capability.
CULTURAL UNDERSTANDING
1-111. This proficiency level describes Soldiers and leaders with well-developed cross-cultural
competence. They will have a comprehensive level of regional competence that allows them to accomplish
the mission in a specific geographic area. These Soldiers will be able to apply relevant terms, factors,
concepts, and regional information to their tasks and mission. Additional characteristics of cultural
understanding are—
• The proficiency category of cultural understanding includes Soldiers who are familiar with a
specific region and have the ability to identify economic, religious, legal, governmental,
political, and infrastructural features of a specific region.
• Cultural understanding also includes Soldiers who are aware of regional sensitivities regarding
gender, race, local observances and local perception of the US and its allies.
CULTURAL EXPERTISE
1-112. Cultural expertise is a proficiency level that describes culture professionals and leaders who
possess an advanced level of cross-cultural competence. They will have an advanced and sophisticated
level of regional competence pertaining to a specific geographic area. These Soldiers will be able
to integrate and synthesize terms, factors, concepts, and regional information into plans, programs,
and advice to commanders. In addition—
• In most cases, cultural expertise entails some degree of proficiency in a language or a few
relevant languages; proficiency in the skills that enable effective cross-cultural persuasion,
negotiation, conflict resolution, influence, or leadership; and an understanding of the most
salient historic and present-day regional structural and cultural factors of a specific
geographic area.
• Cultural expertise also describes Soldiers and leaders with the ability to advise commanders
of the region on military operations.
CULTURALLY INFLUENCED SITUATIONAL AWARENESS
1-113. Situational awareness, the goal of every leader and Soldier, is the immediate knowledge of the
conditions of the operation, constrained geographically and in time (FM 3-0). Culturally influenced
situational awareness allows counterinsurgents to detect subtle indicators of change or threat in the
operational environment and understand how this will affect insurgent decisions and planning. When
conducting counterinsurgency operations, cultural capability is a key part of achieving culturally
influenced situational awareness for a Soldier, leader, or tactical unit. Within small units, superb cultural
capability and improved situational awareness results in a greater chance of mission accomplishment,
tactical effectiveness, and protection.
ASSESSMENT
1-114. A leader or Soldier has begun to achieve culturally influenced situational awareness when he/she
can ask and answer such questions accurately: |
3-24.2 | 38 | Chapter 1
• What is my adversary thinking and why?
• What are my Host Nation security forces thinking and why?
• What are groups of people thinking and why?
• What will my adversaries, groups of people, adjacent units, and coalition partners, and Host
Nation security forces do if I take action X, and why?
• How are cultural factors influencing my operations?
• How can I make groups of people and Host Nation security forces do what I want them to do?
SUMMARY
Counterinsurgency can be extremely complex. At its core, COIN is a struggle for the population’s support.
Understanding that struggle or becoming “the world expert on your district” (28 Articles, Kilcullen) is the
foundation for any unit. A unit that uses the four tools described in this chapter dramatically increases its
likelihood of success against an insurgency. These four tools are—
• Studies carefully its operational environment (OE) using the operational variables of PMESII-PT
(political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment and time).
• Defines its situation using METT-TC.
• Determines the root causes of the insurgency and analyzes the three prerequisites.
• Develops cultural capability to increase their ability to understand and interact with the population. |
3-24.2 | 39 | Chapter 2
Foundations of Insurgency
“It is certainly easier to launch an insurgency than it is to repress it.”
David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare.
An insurgency and the operational environment must be understood before the
insurgency can be defeated. Tools that assist the counterinsurgent in understanding
and predicting the insurgent’s actions are the five elements of an insurgency, the eight
dynamics of an insurgency, the six insurgent strategies, insurgent tactics, and the
strengths and vulnerabilities of insurgents. Together these tools, known as the
components and manifestations of an insurgency, provide leaders at all levels a means
to comprehend and defeat the insurgent.
Section I—OVERVIEW
This section introduces the relationship between the components and the manifestations of an insurgency. If a
counterinsurgent understands both the components and manifestations of the insurgency, then the unit can
correctly apply pressure along the seven counterinsurgency lines of effort (Chapter 3) to defeat it.
COMPONENTS
2-1. The components of an insurgency are comprised of the five elements, the eight dynamics, and six
strategies. The elements are the five groups of people—leaders, guerrillas, underground, auxiliary,
and mass base—that form the insurgency’s organization. The dynamics are the eight categories that define
an insurgency—leadership, ideology, objectives, environment and geography, external support, internal
support, phasing and timing, organizational and operational patterns. Finally, the six insurgent strategies
are the urban, military focused, protracted popular war, identity focused, conspiratorial, and the composite
and coalition. Together, the components—the five elements, the eight dynamics, and the six strategies—are
tools of analysis that allow the counterinsurgent to fully grasp the nature of the insurgency.
MANIFESTATIONS
2-2. The manifestations are the visible outputs of the insurgency. Made up of the insurgent’s tactics,
strengths and vulnerabilities, the counterinsurgent will be able to track, categorize, and develop the
insurgency’s pattern, and a means to defeat it. Figure 2-1 shows the relationship between the components
and manifestations of an insurgency.
Figure 2-1. Insurgency. |
3-24.2 | 40 | Chapter 2
HISTORICAL INSURGENCY
2-3. With an understanding of the components of an insurgency, a counterinsurgent unit can identify,
describe, and categorize any insurgency. Figure 2-2 shows the components of an historical insurgency.
Figure 2-2. Components of Malaysian Insurgency (circa 1950).
Section II—ELEMENTS
Insurgent organizations vary considerably, but are typically made up of five elements supported by a military
wing and a political wing. The proportions of each element depend upon insurgent strategy and the degree
of active support obtained from the populace. If the existing government presence is eliminated in any
particular area, these elements can exist openly. If the HN government presence is strong in a particular area,
the elements of an insurgency will maintain a clandestine existence. The five elements of an insurgency are—
leaders, guerrillas, underground, auxiliaries, and mass base (Figure 2-3). |
3-24.2 | 41 | Foundations of Insurgency
Figure 2-3. Organizational elements of an insurgency.
LEADERS
2-4. Leaders provide direction to the insurgency. They are the “idea people” and the planners.
They usually exercise leadership through force of personality, the power of revolutionary ideas,
and personal charisma. Generally, they convey the ideology of the insurgency into objectives and direct the
military efforts of the guerrillas. In some insurgencies, they may hold their position through religious, clan,
or tribal authority.
2-5. Leaders who form the political core of the insurgency are often called the political leaders.
They are actively engaged politically in the struggle to accomplish the goals of the insurgency. They may
also make up a formal political party to signify their political importance. These political leaders are the
driving force behind propaganda. Insurgencies based on religious extremism usually include religious
and spiritual advisors among their political cadre.
2-6. At a tactical level, units may identify leaders as IED cell leaders; political, religious, or social
leaders who direct the propaganda and nonviolent efforts of the insurgency; or as business leaders who
provide extensive resource support to the insurgency, and other roles.
GUERRILLAS
2-7. A guerrilla is any insurgent who uses a weapon of any sort and does the actual fighting for the
insurgency. They may conduct acts of terror, guerrilla warfare, criminal activities, or conventional
operations. They are often mistaken for the movement or insurgency itself; but they are merely the foot
soldiers of the movement or insurgency. Guerrillas vary widely in size, make-up, tactics, and methods from
one insurgency to another. They even vary widely within an insurgency, especially in each of the three
phases of an insurgency. |
3-24.2 | 42 | Chapter 2
2-8. Guerrillas may continue in their normal positions in society and lead clandestine lives for the
insurgent movement. Guerrillas tend to organize themselves based upon the activity they will be
conducting. Those focused on using terrorism usually operate individually or in small cells and are often
armed with explosives instead of weapons. Guerrilla bands, historically, have lived in remote areas
and conducted raids on HN government infrastructure. Historical examples of guerrillas include the
Maquis in World War II France, the Viet Cong in the Vietnam War and the Mahdi Army in Iraq.
UNDERGROUND
2-9. The underground is a cellular organization of active supporters of the insurgency, which may
contain an element that works in the HN government. Keeping the nature of their work for the insurgency
secret is often paramount to them. They are more engaged than the auxiliaries are and may at times be
guerrillas, if they use weapons or conduct combat operations. They operate in all areas; especially in areas
denied to any established guerrilla force and where operations are not suitable for guerrilla forces.
They conduct clandestine, covert, and overt operations, sometimes infiltrating the HN government.
Members of the underground often continue in their normal positions in society, but lead second,
clandestine lives for the insurgent movement. Some insurgencies are unique in that they conduct most
of their political activities inside the underground while a different section trains recruits, maintains
propaganda, and helps in population control. The underground may—
• Spread propaganda.
• Support sabotage, assassination and subversion.
• Support intelligence and counterintelligence operations.
• Run safe houses.
• Provide transportation.
• Manufacture and maintain arms and explosives.
AUXILIARIES
2-10. An auxiliary is the support element of the insurgency. Auxiliaries are active sympathizers who
provide important logistical services but do not directly participate in combat operations. If they participate
in guerrilla activities, they become guerrillas. Auxiliaries may work full time or part time for the
insurgency and generally conduct safer activities than the underground. They often include women,
children and other individuals that tend to be less scrutinized by counterinsurgent forces. Examples
of auxiliaries include shepherds or street merchants that may openly operate near a counterinsurgent base
and provide intelligence on that site. Examples of support that auxiliaries provide include—
• Store weapons and supplies.
• Perform courier operations.
• Provide passive intelligence collection.
• Give early warning of counterinsurgent movements.
• Acquire funds from lawful and unlawful sources.
• Provide forged or stolen documents.
• Promote and facilitate desertion of security forces.
• Recruit and screen new members.
• Create and spread propaganda.
• Provide medical support.
• Manufacture and maintain equipment.
MASS BASE
2-11. The mass base consists of the population of the state who are sympathetic to the insurgent
movement. This sympathy varies between the specific elements within the population such as religious
and ethnic groups and within those specific elements themselves. This mass base, by default, passively |
3-24.2 | 43 | Foundations of Insurgency
supports the insurgency. As occasions arise, they may provide active support. Leaders often recruit
members of the mass base, who are more actively oriented, to serve as auxiliaries, underground
or guerrillas. Mass base members are the true silent supporters of the insurgency and are often the most
available for the HN government to positively influence.
EXAMPLE
2-12. Although no two insurgencies or insurgent organizations are alike, they still have elements that
can be identified and some form of hierarchy. Figure 2-4 shows an example insurgent organization with a
developed structure. In this insurgency, the underground finances the insurgency.
Figure 2-4. Example insurgent organization.
Section III—DYNAMICS
Insurgencies are political movements that result from real or perceived grievances, or neglect that leads
to alienation from an established government. Eight dynamics are common to an insurgency. Knowing
and understanding these dynamics helps to understanding the insurgency. The eight dynamics are leadership,
objectives, ideology, environment and geography, external support, internal support, phasing and timing,
organizational and operational patterns.
LEADERSHIP
2-13. Insurgent leaders provide vision, direction, guidance, coordination, organization for an insurgent
movement. Successful insurgent leaders use, interpret and shape the frustrations of a dissatisfied populace
into the insurgent strategy. They often provide solutions to grievances by advancing alternatives to existing
conditions that support the insurgency. Effective insurgent leaders make their cause and solutions known to
the people to gain popular support. Individual leaders of an insurgency are often members of the elite
of society who have been somehow alienated from the power structure. Their education, background,
family connections, social standing, and experiences contribute to their ability to organize and inspire the
people who makeup the insurgency. To be successful, they must break the ties between the people and the
government and establish credibility for their movement. |
3-24.2 | 44 | Chapter 2
STRUCTURE
2-14. In general, there are three categories of leadership found in insurgencies. They are—
Single person
2-15. One person may be the overall leader of an insurgency. This leadership structure has one person
who provides cohesion, motivation, and direction for the insurgency. Cuba’s Fidel Castro is an excellent
example of a single person leadership structure. However, this single leader may centralize power
or decentralize decision-making and execution, leaving decision-making and execution to subordinates. At
the local level, most units will see organizations controlled by a single person.
Single group or party
2-16. The insurgency may be headed by a ruling council that makes and executes policy. This
leadership group or party may also control other groups involved in the insurgency. China’s Communist
Party, before the ascendancy of Mao, is an example of a group leading an insurgency.
Group of groups
2-17. Different groups that have different concepts of how the country should be governed make up the
leadership. Under this kind of leadership, there will be many leaders, possibly unified only by their
opposition to the government. They compete with each other and the government. Example: The partisan
forces in Yugoslavia and Greece during World War II were united in their fight against the German
occupation, but ranged from monarchist to democratic to communist. Sometimes, they fought each other
more violently than they did the Germans.
2-18. As a group, insurgent leaders operate in either a decentralized or centralized manner.
Decentralized
2-19. The power base of some insurgencies is collective and does not depend on specific leaders
or personalities to be effective. These insurgencies are easier to penetrate, but recover rapidly when they
lose key personnel. Decentralization restricts an insurgency in its ability to function as a coherent body
and to create a viable counter state. However, decentralized insurgencies are very hard to destroy and can
continue to sow disorder, even when degraded. For example, Al Qaeda in 2008 is a loose, decentralized
organization held together by an ideal of re-establishing the Caliphate.
Centralized
2-20. Other organizations depend on a single, often charismatic personality to provide cohesion,
motivation, and direction. Centralized insurgencies make decisions and initiate new actions rapidly.
However, they are vulnerable to disruptions if key personalities are removed, co-opted, discredited,
or eliminated. These insurgencies are often led by traditional authority figures such as tribal sheikhs, local
warlords, and religious leaders. For example, Tecumseh was the major factor in the creation of Shawnee
confederation. After he was killed in battle, the confederation fell apart.
IDENTIFICATION OF KEY LEADERS
2-21. Identifying leaders can be critical in determining an insurgency’s organizational structure,
strategy, and tactics. Understanding the basic beliefs, intentions, capabilities, and vulnerabilities of known
key leaders is extremely important to countering insurgency. Removing these key leaders will normally
degrade an organization’s capabilities. Che Guevara was a well-known, centralized leader that
counterinsurgents effectively targeted, when he was killed, his insurgency fell apart. Alternately, in the
case of the decentralized leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, his organization, Al-Qaeda in Iraq, although
severely disrupted, continued as a functioning organization after his death. The following information
is vital to understand and target an insurgent leader: |
3-24.2 | 45 | Foundations of Insurgency
• Role.
• Activities.
• Associates.
• Personal background.
• Personal beliefs, motivations, and ideology.
• Education and training.
• Temperament.
• Position within the organization.
• Public popularity.
OBJECTIVE
2-22. Insurgencies normally seek to achieve one of three objectives: to overthrow the existing
government in order to reallocate power, to expel whom they perceive to be “outsiders” or “occupiers," or
to seek to create or maintain a region where there is little or no governmental control that they can exploit.
Insurgents’ objectives include struggles for independence against colonial powers; the rising up
of political, ethnic, or religious groups against their rivals; and resistance to foreign invaders. The central
issue in an insurgency is the reallocation of power. Usually, an insurgency mounts a political challenge to
the existing state through the formation of a counter state, which is promoted as an alternative to the
existing state.
2-23. Understanding the root causes of the insurgency is essential to analyzing the insurgents’
objectives. Effective analysis of an insurgency requires knowing its strategic, operational, and tactical
objectives. These objectives can be psychological in nature, physical in nature or a combination of the two.
STRATEGIC
2-24. The insurgent’s overall political goals are their strategic objectives. The set of required conditions
that define achievement of the insurgents’ objectives are their desired end state. Examples of strategic
objectives include—
• Overthrow an established government.
• Establish an autonomous national territory.
• Cause the withdrawal of a foreign occupying power.
• Extract political concessions.
OPERATIONAL
2-25. Insurgent operational objectives are those that insurgents pursue to destroy government legitimacy
and progressively achieve their political end state. These are the means they use to link tactical goals with
strategic end states. They often target the government’s inability to address the root causes that lead to the
insurgency. The insurgent’s operational objectives define their overall plan, although most insurgents will
not have a formal plan. These objectives are based on the insurgent’s strategy across political, military,
economic, and social objectives. Examples of operational objectives include—
Political
2-26. Disrupt elections; develop or strengthen an insurgency’s political wing, attack government
legitimacy; gain recognition of their political party by the government; attack the legitimacy of the
government; or gain ability to run candidates for elected office
Military
2-27. Disrupt operational lines of communication and supply routes; force US or HN units out of an
area; keep government forces in their bases; draw US or HN forces into fight; or provoke over-reaction
from US or HN forces, which result in media-reported civilian casualties. |
3-24.2 | 46 | Chapter 2
Economic
2-28. Disrupt reconstruction and attack infrastructure; thereby preventing the government from
addressing root causes; prevent government from addressing the populace’s issues.
Social
2-29. Spark sectarian violence; subvert education system; cause population to question the government;
highlight corrupt or oppressive police; or establish a regular means for mass communication (radio
or paper).
TACTICAL
2-30. Tactical objectives are the immediate aims of insurgent acts such as disseminating propaganda
such as posters, compact discs and handbills, killing individuals, or the attack and seizure of key facilities.
Tactical objectives can be both physical and psychological aspects. Counterinsurgents can often gain
insight into tactical goals by analyzing the insurgent propaganda. Examples of tactical objectives include—
Political
2-31. Intimidation of a local official or the dissemination of propaganda products.
Military
2-32. Attack a US or HN government convoy or checkpoint or random indirect fire attacks on bases.
Economic
2-33. Attack manufacturing centers, stores and markets; sabotage roads, bridges, electrical lines
and pipelines. Threaten violence against storeowners, employees and customers.
Social
2-34. Attack a police station or directly interact with the population in order to communicate directly to
the populace.
GENERAL INSURGENT GOALS FOR TERRORISM AND GUERRILLA WARFARE
2-35. Insurgents typically work toward achieving ten general objectives as they gain the support of the
population. Insurgent activity, like all other aspect of the insurgency, develops and evolves over time.
Obtaining Popular Support
2-36. Insurgent operations are normally focused directly or indirectly at decreasing support to the
existing government. Simultaneously, competent insurgents try to gain support for the insurgent movement
through propaganda, coercion, or by causing terror. If they cannot gain active support, they will seek
passive support such as silence.
Undermining Host Nation Legitimacy
2-37. Insurgent efforts can damage or destroy both real and perceived economic and political targets.
The loss of government services, overreaction by government forces, or the belief that the government
is powerless against the insurgency contributes to the population’s dissatisfaction with the government.
Lessening Government Control
2-38. By defeating small government forces, remaining government forces can be forced to consolidate
in larger size elements or bases. This can reduce the overall presence of the counterinsurgent forces
and allow an insurgent force to operate openly where counterinsurgent forces are not, if even for a short |
3-24.2 | 47 | Foundations of Insurgency
amount of time. This can create the perception that the insurgency is increasing its control or the
government is losing control and legitimacy.
Providing Psychological Victories
2-39. The guerrilla seeks to gain small psychological victories. These victories do not need to be
significant in terms of material damage to the government or its armed forces. These tactical victories show
that a small guerrilla force can defeat the much larger government force.
Tying Up or Blocking Host Nation Government Resources
2-40. By forcing the HN government to expend resources on military operations against guerrillas, the
insurgency seeks to tie up resources that could best be used by the government to provide services
and development programs to the populace.
Weakening Host Nation Government Resolve
2-41. By defeating small elements of the HN’s security forces and attacking government agencies, the
guerrilla weakens the resolve of government employees and forces. Small government forces and agencies
become aware of their vulnerability. Desertion, absence from work, willingness to compromise, difficulty
in recruiting, or limitations on services to dangerous areas all benefit the insurgency’s purpose.
Intimidating the Population
2-42. By attacking vocal opponents and certain types of individuals, such as teachers, the insurgents
seek to frighten the population.
Acquiring Supplies and Equipment
2-43. Guerrillas seek to acquire government weapons, uniforms, equipment, supplies, or vehicles.
Infiltrating Host Nation Government and Government Forces
2-44. Insurgents will often attempt to infiltrate various government ministries and security forces by
emplacing sympathizers and by converting existing members of those agencies. These infiltrators are used
to gather intelligence and to subvert operations.
Causing COIN Security Force Overreaction
2-45. Since a COIN fight is the fight for the population, often the intent of insurgents using terrorism
or guerrilla warfare is to cause a heavy-handed response to attacks on the part of the COIN force or HN
security force. These responses will often drive the population to support the insurgency.
IDEOLOGY
2-46. Insurgents often use their ideology to show the population how they can address the root causes
that the government cannot provide or is not providing. Insurgent ideology attempts to provide a vision
of how a society, including a political and economic system, should be structured. Ideology should not be
confused with the insurgent strategy, which is the way that the insurgents intend to achieve their end state.
Two of the most identifiable insurgent ideologies have been communism and religious extremism.
2-47. Ideology is a motivating factor in insurgent activities. Insurgencies can gather recruits and amass
popular support through ideological appeal, which includes religious or other cultural factors. The
insurgency’s ideology explains its followers’ difficulties and provides a means to remedy those ills. The
most powerful ideologies tap latent, emotional concerns of the populace. Tactical units could see ideology
expressed in the propaganda and recruitment techniques of local insurgents. |
3-24.2 | 48 | Chapter 2
COMMUNISM
2-48. Communism is a political system where private property is eliminated and controlled by the state.
Historically, it has been advocated in countries where wealth is unevenly distributed among the classes.
Communism was once the most typical form of insurgent ideology and often experienced success. With the
fall of Soviet Union, communism has not been a successful motivation for insurgents, especially since
there is currently little or no external support for communist-based insurgency.
RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM
2-49. Religious extremism, often a byproduct of religious fundamentalism, can be defined by strict
adherence to a set of religious principles and the rejection of compromise. These ideologies are often
energized by inequities in social, political or economic development and further helped by
counterinsurgent attempts to marginalize religious issues. Globalization creates opportunities for an
increase in religious extremism based on both real and perceived inequities. Insurgencies based on
religious extremism want their values incorporated into the nation’s governmental structure. This fulfills
the frustration and dissatisfaction of the religious extremists. Adherents often receive formal instruction on
the religion’s fundamentals and use adherence to these fundamentals as a recruiting tool. Religious leaders
are often leaders of the insurgency and nonextremist leaders are often replaced. Characteristics
of insurgencies motivated by religious extremism that differ from traditional insurgencies are—
• Individual duty with an indifference to popular support.
• Use of violence that maximizes shock, awe, and casualties.
• Disinterest with governance and lack of a practical political objective in organizations with
global reach or establishing a theocracy in local cases.
• Ability to regenerate guerrillas without popular support.
NARRATIVE
2-50. The central mechanism through which ideologies are expressed and absorbed is a narrative.
A narrative is when a story is used to display the benefits of a certain ideology. Narratives are often central
to representing identity, particularly the collective identity of religious sects, ethnic groupings, and tribal
elements. Stories about a community’s history provide models of how actions and consequences are linked.
Stories are often the basis for strategies and actions, as well as for interpreting others’ intentions. Insurgent
organizations use narratives and religious-based concepts very effectively in developing, spreading,
and mobilizing followers.
2-51. In the Al Qaeda narrative, Osama bin Laden shows himself as a man purified in the mountains
of Afghanistan who is gathering and inspiring followers and punishing infidels. In the collective
imagination of Bin Laden and his followers, they are agents of Islamic history who will reverse the decline
of the umma [Muslim community], reestablish the Caliphate, and bring about its inevitable triumph over
Western imperialism. This image mobilizes support for Al Qaeda among some of the most traditional
Muslims.
ENVIRONMENT AND GEOGRAPHY
2-52. Environment and geography, including cultural, religious, tribal affiliation, and other
demographic factors along with terrain and weather, affect all participants in an operational environment.
How insurgents and counterinsurgents adapt to these realities creates advantages and disadvantages
for each. In Chapter 1, this manual stressed the importance of understanding an AO’s civil considerations
(ASCOPE). Considerations for environment and geography include—
• Population density and distribution, especially degree of urbanization
• Root causes of the insurgency within an urban population, such as lack of basic services,
security, markets, governance, municipal council representation, or schools. |
3-24.2 | 49 | Foundations of Insurgency
• Root causes that lead to the insurgency within a rural population, such as lack of land
ownership, grazing rights, water rights, isolation or inclusion in political process, access
to markets, or schools.
• Growing seasons, rainy/dry seasons, planting/harvest time (key events). These may influence
level and type of insurgent activity.
• Use of structures and infrastructures by both the insurgent and population.
• Tribal, religious, or other affiliations, which may have tremendous effect on the local
populace’s willingness to support an insurgency, or where people and insurgents can expect
sanctuary or will avoid.
• Proximity to international borders that may provide sanctuary or support.
• Rugged, inaccessible terrain with often hostile populations to outsiders that may provide
sanctuary or support.
• Economic enclaves, such as slums, market areas, middle class areas, and wealthy areas.
• Geographic divisions along ethnic, tribal, religious, political or other factors.
EXTERNAL SUPPORT
2-53. External support includes moral support, political support, resource support, or sanctuary support.
External support can come from any entity outside of the Host Nation—not just neighboring states.
Countries from outside the region seeking political or economic influence can also support insurgencies.
Insurgencies may turn to transnational criminal elements for funding or use the Internet to create a support
network. Ethnic or religious communities in other states may also provide a form of external support
and sanctuary, particularly for transnational insurgencies. Access to external support influences the
effectiveness of insurgencies.
2-54. Accepting external support can affect the legitimacy of both insurgents and counterinsurgents.
The act of acceptance implies the inability to sustain oneself. In addition, the country or group providing
support attaches its legitimacy along with the insurgent group it supports. The consequences can affect
programs in the supporting nation wholly unrelated to the insurgent situation.
MORAL SUPPORT
2-55. Moral support is the acknowledgement that the insurgent or their cause is just and admirable. It
starts as outside popular approval and can manifest with negative media attention focused towards the
counterinsurgent or Host Nation. Moral support often leads to political, resource, and sanctuary support.
POLITICAL SUPPORT
2-56. Political support is the active promotion of insurgents’ strategic goals in international forums.
International forums such as the United Nations, trade sanctions and embargoes, and the creation
of political discussion in the Unites States can all provide political support, which negatively influences the
counterinsurgent’s effort. Another form of political support can come when a legitimate state actually
recognizes an insurgent group as a legitimate authority. Political support is the most dangerous form
of support as it can result in an insurgency gaining international legitimacy, forcing the counterinsurgent
to stop actively targeting them.
RESOURCE SUPPORT
2-57. Resource support is typically guerrillas, money, weapons, equipment, food, advisors, and training.
Resource support is often the most important form of support, such as, during the French experience
in Algeria. Although insurgents were numerous, weapons were not, because the French closed
international borders, preventing arms smuggling. |
3-24.2 | 50 | Chapter 2
SANCTUARY SUPPORT
2-58. Sanctuary support is a secure site to train, obtain sustainment, rest and refit. Historically,
sanctuaries provided insurgents a place to rebuild and reorganize without fear of Host Nation
or counterinsurgent interference. Often these were in neighboring countries or remote areas difficult
to access. Sanctuaries may also include areas within a state, including neighborhoods where HN security
forces cannot or will not conduct operations. The meaning of the term sanctuary is evolving. Today,
insurgents can draw on “virtual” sanctuaries in the Internet, global financial systems, and the international
media. These virtual sanctuaries can be used to present insurgent actions as acceptable activities worthy of
internal and external support. Effective COIN operations work to eliminate all sanctuaries.
INTERNAL SUPPORT
2-59. Internal support is any support provided from inside the country. It is normally broken down into
the two general categories: popular and logistical support. Together, these two form the mass base. For the
purposes of this manual, one other category is added—insurgent bases.
POPULAR SUPPORT
2-60. An insurgent movement requires popular support (Figure 2-5) to survive, and popular support
is even more essential for an insurgency to succeed. Typically, there is also a relationship between the
amount of popular support and the size of the insurgency. To grow, an insurgency needs an adequately
sized mass base that will support this growth. One of the best means of defeating insurgencies is to shrink
this mass bass by causing the local population to become hostile or at least apathetic toward the insurgents.
Figure 2-5. Range of popular support.
Types of Support
2-61. Popular support can be either active or passive and may come from only a small segment of the
population or from a broad base of the population. Supporters of an insurgency may also be overt
or clandestine.
Active Support
2-62. Active supporters provide open sympathy to the movement, participate in legal insurgent
activities, such as strikes, find new recruits, and may transition to being an active element of the insurgency
such as guerrillas, underground, or auxiliary. Active supporters are usually central to the insurgency’s
propaganda efforts.
Passive Support
2-63. Passive supporters vary from those who are sympathetic yet inactive to those who are not
sympathetic, but who choose to remain silent about insurgent activities. Silence on the part of the populace
concerning insurgent activities provides passive insurgent support. |
3-24.2 | 51 | Foundations of Insurgency
Recruitment
2-64. Local insurgent representatives address local grievances and conduct recruiting. Elements of the
population who are dissatisfied with existing conditions or those who have been marginalized through
psychological alienation are prone to insurgent recruitment. The cadre often gives credit to the insurgent
movement for all local successes and blames government forces for all failures and problems. Every
promise and appeal made by cadre members is associated with tangible solutions and deeds. Competent
insurgents and counterinsurgents both seek to mobilize and sustain popular support for their cause while
discouraging popular support for their adversaries. There are five common methods, used individually or
in various combinations, to mobilize popular support. Knowing these five means provides an opportunity
for the counterinsurgent to identify when they are being used and then counter them. The five common
methods are—
Persuasion
2-65. Political, social, religious, security, and economic promises can often entice people to support one
side or the other.
Coercion
2-66. Through threat of violence or abuse, insurgents can force people to support them. Citizens seek
to ally with groups that can guarantee their safety.
Reaction to Abuses
2-67. Though firmness by security forces is often necessary to establish a secure operational
environment, a tyrannical government can generate resistance to its rule.
Foreign Support
2-68. Foreign governments can provide the expertise, international legitimacy, and money needed
to start or intensify a conflict.
Apolitical Motivations
2-69. Insurgencies attract foreign volunteers, criminals, and mercenaries who are often motivated by
money or extremism.
Measurement
2-70. The reality of insurgencies is that the support of the population fluctuates between the government
and the insurgency due to many factors, but no one side will ever possess the support of the total
population. Trying to quantify why the populace favors the government or the insurgency is difficult, but
evaluating the issue is important. Gauging aspects such as the reaction of a local populace to the presence
of troops or government leaders can help estimate popular support at the tactical level. Asking the
population directly or using surveys can produce valuable insight into popular support and attitudes.
LOGISTICAL SUPPORT
2-71. Modern warfare is inherently resource intensive. The insurgent needs to ensure continual access
to supplies, weapons, ammunition, and money, and this requires insurgents to maintain open supply lines.
While logistical support may be an insurgent’s greatest vulnerability, it can be difficult to interdict. As an
insurgency develops and expands, logistical support increasingly relies on external sources. In a
conventional war, insurgent forces often receive significant amounts of supplies from external sources—
usually from one of the opposing nations involved in the conflict. The protracted popular war strategy
emphasizes mobilization of the masses and requires considerable resources to build and maintain a counter
state. The urban strategy requires significantly less support. |
3-24.2 | 52 | Chapter 2
Supplies
2-72. Once the insurgent’s on-hand supplies are exhausted, supplies must come from the populace or an
external source. In most insurgencies, initial support comes from the populace (either voluntarily
or coerced). Identifying types of supplies the insurgency needs and then discovering how the insurgent
is obtaining these supplies are significant steps in the process of identifying insurgent supporters
and insurgent bases. Medical supplies are often the most critical supply that the insurgency requires.
Weapons and Ammunition
2-73. External sources are often required to sustain specialized arms and equipment. Insurgents can
obtain these weapons through legal or illegal purchases, or from foreign sources. Another common tactic
is to capture weapons from government forces.
Money
2-74. Money is essential to an insurgency for the purchase of critical supplies, especially high-tech
weapons and ammunition or bomb making materials. Money is also essential for the payment of guerrillas
and the bribery of corrupt officials. Money can be obtained through many sources and in today’s electronic
world, it crosses all boundaries. While money is often shipped to insurgents just like other supplies, it may
also be moved and held by local financial institutions. In some cases, insurgencies develop an
“underground banking” system, sometimes known as hawala, which can be used to launder money. Just
like supply lines, the money path must be discovered, tracked, and disrupted. Funding greatly influences an
insurgency’s character and vulnerabilities. Local supporters or international front organizations may
provide donations. Sometimes legitimate businesses are established to furnish funding. In areas controlled
by insurgents, confiscation or taxation might be used, especially in cases when insurgencies provide their
own essential services to the population. Another common source of funding is criminal activity, especially
the illegal trade of drugs.
Supply Lines
2-75. In all cases, either the insurgents must go to their suppliers, or the suppliers must come to the
insurgents. Discovering and tracking these supply lines can provide key information on insurgent forces
and support. Although rarely overt, all insurgent organizations will have some system of supply lines,
means of transportation, and storage facilities. Skillful counterinsurgents attempt to cut off the flow
of supplies, especially weapons and ammunition. Often, a nation neighboring an insurgent AO is used as a
depot.
INSURGENT BASES
2-76. In counterinsurgencies, there are two general types of insurgent bases: safe houses and guerrilla
base camps. Insurgents will normally establish multiple safe houses of guerrilla camps based upon
functioning groups or cells. Urban insurgents tend to use safe houses, while rural insurgents tend use
guerrilla base camps. Additionally, training camps may be established. These training camps may be
established within a safe house; however, they normally will be established either in a rural guerrilla base
camp or outside the territory controlled by the existing government, often in a foreign country.
Safe Houses
2-77. Many legitimate and illegitimate organizations use safe houses. A safe house is typically occupied
by a member of the auxiliary and temporarily used to hide insurgents. Normally a system of “safe houses”
have been carefully selected. The occupant of the safe house has procedures to move insurgents along
selected routes at the best times to avoid detection.
Guerrilla Base Camps
2-78. Like any other armed force, guerrillas have requirements for command and control, rest, resupply,
refit, and training. The larger the guerrilla force and more active they are, the more they will need |
3-24.2 | 53 | Foundations of Insurgency
established bases, both semipermanent and temporary. Base camps must be relatively safe and secure
in areas where insurgents can rest, eat, and plan. More sophisticated guerrilla base camps have command
posts, training areas, communications facilities, medical stations, and sustainment centers. These base
camps, however, are not the same as conventional bases. They are usually small in overall scope, spread
out, and sometimes underground. Insurgents try to locate base camps within insurgent-controlled areas
where cover and concealment provide security against detection. In rural areas, base camps tend to be
in remote areas characterized by rough, inaccessible terrain. In urban areas, base camps tend to be located
in areas where the insurgent has popular support. Urban insurgents may rent houses for use as temporary
base camps. Insurgents will normally avoid battling over their base camp. Once detected, they will move
to an alternate location. Routes into a base camp will be constantly observed for security. Mines, booby
traps, special-purpose munitions, expedient devices, and ambushes are used as standard security
enhancements. If surprised and cornered, they will vigorously defend themselves with a delaying action
while evacuating key personnel and equipment.
Insurgent Training Camps
2-79. Insurgent training camps are established both in urban and rural environments. While some
training is accomplished at urban safe houses or rural guerrilla base camps, most training is accomplished
at locations focused on training. This may be a special urban safe house, a remote guerrilla base camp or an
insurgent training center in another country.
PHASING AND TIMING
2-80. Insurgencies often progress through three phases in their efforts. While the use of these three
phases is common in most writings concerning insurgencies, the titles used for these three phases vary
considerably. However, what makes up each phase remains nearly identical.
Phase I—Latent and Incipient
2-81. The first phase of an insurgency tends to begin with the government having stronger forces than
the insurgents do. As a result, insurgents often must concentrate on survival and building support.
Insurgent efforts may include—
• Establishing and expanding the organization
• Spreading its ideology through information operations
• Starting or supporting antigovernment activity such as demonstrations and strikes
• Raising funds through illegal taxation and crime
• Organizing small, local guerrilla forces that conduct small-scale intermittent operations
• Using terrorism and sabotage to intimidate uncooperative government officials and members
of the population
Phase II—Guerrilla Warfare
2-82. The second phase of an insurgency starts when force correlations approach equilibrium
and guerrilla warfare becomes the most important, pervasive activity. Insurgent efforts may include—
• Increased scale of guerrilla attacks; attempt to force government forces into the defense.
• Increased use of sabotage and terrorism.
• Intensified propaganda.
• Attempts to gain control of isolated geographic areas and develop bases for further operations.
• Government officials are being driven out of areas with strong insurgent support.
• Establishment of local shadow governments.
• Increased efforts to gain international recognition and support. |
3-24.2 | 54 | Chapter 2
Phase III—War of Movement
2-83. The third phase of an insurgency normally begins when insurgents believe they have superior
strength and their military forces attempt conventional operations to destroy the government’s military
capability. Insurgent efforts may include—
• Combining guerrilla forces and training them to fight as conventional forces. Over time, these
conventional forces form multiple echelons. These forces confront the counterinsurgents
in conventional battle.
• Acquiring more powerful and sophisticated weapons through foreign assistance or capture.
• Obtaining support from external combat forces, such as special or conventional forces.
• Expanding areas of insurgent control and increasing political activity.
2-84. Not all insurgencies progress through all three phases, and linear progression through all three
phases is certainly not a requirement for success. Insurgent success can occur in any phase. Also,
insurgencies can revert to an earlier phase and resume development when favorable conditions return.
Insurgent success can occur in any phase.
2-85. Movement from one phase to another phase does not end the operational and tactical activities
of earlier phases; it incorporates them. Therefore, it is difficult to determine when an insurgency moves
from one phase to another. In addition, a single insurgency may be in different phases in different parts of
the country. Advanced insurgencies can rapidly shift, split, combine, or reorganize—they are dynamic
and adaptive.
ORGANIZATIONAL AND OPERATIONAL PATTERNS
2-86. Insurgencies develop organizational and operational patterns from the interaction of many factors.
Although each insurgency organization is unique, there are often similarities among them and knowing the
commonly accepted general patterns or strategies of insurgency helps in predicting the tactics
and techniques they may employ against the government. Other considerations include the operational
environment, level of success of the insurgency, and the length of time an insurgency has been operating.
A counterinsurgent must learn about the insurgency and adapt to it based off its operational
organizational patterns.
2-87. Insurgent organizational and operational patterns vary widely between one province or urban area
and another. Different insurgent groups using different methods may form loose coalitions when it serves
their interests. These groups may also fight among themselves. The result is more than just a “three-block
war”—it is a shifting, “mosaic war” that is difficult for counterinsurgents to envision as a whole. In such
situations, an effective COIN strategy must be multifaceted and flexible. Insurgents gain ground by sowing
chaos and disorder anywhere. Counterinsurgents lose ground by failing to maintain stability order
everywhere. Insurgents normally begin substantially weaker than the established government. This sets the
tone for how they operate and how they fight
Section IV—STRATEGIES
Even if modern insurgencies use more than one doctrinal model or theory for their strategy, aspects of these
strategies and recognizable characteristics do exist. The six common insurgent strategies are urban,
military-focused, protracted popular war, identity-focused, conspiratorial, and composite and coalition. At the
tactical level, a counterinsurgent will deal usually only with the urban, military-focused, and protracted popular
war strategies. These insurgent strategies provide a common frame of reference for the counterinsurgent. The
savvy counterinsurgent can identify if an insurgency is using one or a combination of the strategies. Knowing
what strategy the insurgents are using facilitates the anticipation of insurgent courses of action (COAs). |
3-24.2 | 55 | Foundations of Insurgency
URBAN STRATEGY
2-88. In the urban strategy, the insurgents attack government targets with the intention of causing
government forces to overreact against the population. The insurgents want the government’s repressive
measures to enrage the people so they will rise up, support the insurgency and overthrow the government.
This strategy can be initiated without popular support. Its success relies almost exclusively on a
spontaneous uprising sparked by rage at government oppression. However, an insurgency occurring in an
urban area does not necessarily mean that it uses the urban strategy. On November 1, 1954, the National
Liberation Front in Algeria used a form of the urban strategy when they launched a series of bombings
and attacks, causing significant civilian casualties, in order to shock the French into negotiations. The
urban strategy actions are often predictable and possess these characteristics—
• Insurgents often use terrorist attacks, which they hope are highly visible and produce high
casualties. Their true intention may not necessarily be to cause fear or terror, but to provoke the
government into overreaction.
• Insurgent propaganda tends to focus on government brutality, calling attention to specific harsh
government actions such as massacres, torture of political prisoners, disappearances
of individuals, and brutal responses to peaceful demonstrations.
• Insurgent political organization is minimal with no sustained effort to indoctrinate political
cadre or the masses.
• Insurgents make little or no effort to subvert the government from within (however, infiltration
of HN government and security forces still possible.
• Insurgents require only a small amount of popular support.
MILITARY-FOCUSED STRATEGY
2-89. The military-focused strategy believes that military action can create the conditions needed
for success. Military-focused insurgents often believe that a small group of guerrillas operating in an area
where grievances exist can eventually gather enough support to achieve their aims. The success of this
small group depends upon successful military action and popular uprising. The most iconic examples
of military-focused strategy are Che Guevara and Fidel Castro; both proposed attacks on military
and government targets until they gathered the support necessary to seize power. Military-focused strategy
actions include—
• Attacks on Host Nation targets to gain popular support.
• Propaganda that incites people to join the insurgency and rise up against the government
and that focuses on demonstrating the Host Nation Government’s weakness and illegitimacy.
• Little evidence of long-term efforts at building a political base.
• Little effort to building the political wing or infiltrating legitimate organizations.
PROTRACTED POPULAR WAR STRATEGY
2-90. The protracted popular war strategy is based on Mao Zedong’s theory of protracted popular war.
This strategy is broken down into three distinct phases—latent or incipient, guerrilla warfare, and war
of movement. Each phase builds upon the previous phase, and continues activities from the previous
phases. The protracted popular war strategy has both a political wing and a military wing. This strategy
requires a high level of organization and indoctrination, actions along multiple lines of effort,
and leadership to direct the shifting of phases according to circumstances. In all the variations of this
strategy, certain characteristics tend to stand out, such as—
• Continuous, long-term efforts to build popular support, infiltrate legitimate government
organizations, and establish and maintain a clandestine organization.
• Highly-indoctrinated leadership, political cadre, and guerrilla fighters.
• Extensive, well-organized, unarmed auxiliary.
• Leadership that is able to exert control over the insurgency. |
3-24.2 | 56 | Chapter 2
• Ability to shift phases at the direction of its leadership; including return to previous phase
if necessary.
• Attacks on infrastructure and attacks designed to wear down the government
and counterinsurgents.
• Continuous operations along multiple lines of effort, although some phases will emphasize
different lines of effort.
IDENTITY-FOCUSED STRATEGY
2-91. The identity-focused strategy mobilizes support based on the common identity of religious
affiliation, clan, tribe, or ethnic group. In this strategy, legitimacy and popular support are tied to their
identity and, often, no effort is made to garner popular support outside their identity. Rather, communities
often join the insurgent movement as a whole, bringing with them their existing social or military
hierarchy. External support is garnered from international elements of the same identity. In Sri Lanka, the
Tamil Tigers have fought an insurgency against the government for decades in order to establish an ethnic
Tamil state and, at times, have received support from India. Contemporary characteristics of the
identity-focused strategy include—
• Attacks on those who threaten the traditions and social structure of the identity.
• Little or no need to establish a shadow government; already established.
• Protects what it considers the interest of the identity.
• Willingness to use tactics of other strategies.
• Mass base easily aligns with insurgency objectives.
CONSPIRATORIAL STRATEGY
2-92. The conspiratorial strategy attempts to subvert the government from within and often involves a
few leaders and a militant cadre. Although subversive activities may take place in other strategies,
particularly in the protracted popular war or urban strategies, conspiratorial strategies often attempt to have
its illegal political party become a legitimate political party, enter the government legitimately and then
take control of the government. Insurgents using the conspiratorial strategy do not intend to integrate into
the national government, but to overthrow the government. Once the insurgency succeeds in gaining
legitimate political representation, the newly legitimized politicians, who may have been previously
targeted by counterinsurgents, must be re-evaluated to see if they are still legitimate targets. In the Russian
Revolution in 1917, the Bolshevik Party actively worked to break existing government, while being elected
to serve in the administration. Distinguishing characteristics of this strategy include—
• Insurgents seeking meetings with HN government to discuss ceasefires.
• Attacks on infrastructure designed to wear down and reduce the credibility of government.
• Political cadre distancing itself from the insurgency by making public statements denouncing
violence, yet the insurgent leadership still controls the cadre.
• A public breach between militant and political elements of the insurgency, although this
is often a deception.
• Formation of new alliances, often with groups that seem to have little in common with the
insurgency or its ideology apart from the desire for governmental change.
• An end or reduction in guerrilla activity with an increase in political activity.
• Intensive efforts to gain international moral and political support.
• Using sophisticated propaganda, aimed at specific target audiences.
• Insurgent political wing seeks recognition and entry into politics, including election to local,
district, departmental, regional, or national offices. |
3-24.2 | 57 | Foundations of Insurgency
COMPOSITE AND COALITION STRATEGY
2-93. The composite and coalition strategy applies when different insurgent groups using different
strategies combine to form loose coalitions that serve the purposes of the different groups. However, the
composite and coalition strategy is usually united in opposition to something, for example an occupier or
specific grievance, rather than for a positive objective. Within a single AO, there may be multiple
competing entities, each seeking to maximize its survivability and influence. Recently, Al—Qaeda in Iraq
provides the best example of a composite and coalition strategy; they founded the Islamic State of Iraq
and became an umbrella group for many other established insurgent groups. Contemporary actions of the
composite and coalition strategy include—
• Unclear or vague objective.
• Multiple or disjointed strategies within a single area of operations.
• More likely to ally with criminal actors.
• Attacks on other members of the coalition.
SHIFTS BETWEEN STRATEGIES AND PHASES
2-94. Insurgencies often operate using different strategies, in different phases, in different geographical
areas. These decisions are based on the operational environment and insurgent objectives. Most
insurgencies eventually move to the protracted popular war or subversive strategy after another strategy
proves unsuccessful.
2-95. Insurgencies can also shift both phases and strategy. Pressure from the counterinsurgent can force
an insurgent to move laterally to a new strategy or return to an earlier phase (Figure 2-6). For example, an
insurgency in Phase I, Latent and Incipient, using an urban strategy, builds sufficient strength to progress
to Phase II, Guerrilla Warfare. Once in Phase II, the insurgents may believe they are strong enough
to initiate a series of attacks. Then, if counterinsurgents successfully drive out the insurgents, the insurgents
will normally consolidate and reorganize elsewhere. However, this failure may force the insurgency back
to Phase I in that area. Additionally, the insurgent leadership may transition from the urban strategy to a
protracted popular war strategy. When the insurgent leaders believe they are ready, the insurgency will
return to Phase II, Guerrilla Warfare.
2-96. Insurgencies are often vulnerable when they shift between strategy or phases. These shifts may be
due to fractures within the insurgent leadership or setbacks. Shifts may also occur due to time, changes
in external support, changes in leadership, or counterinsurgent action. These shifts are often rapid so
counterinsurgents must be able to recognize and exploit them. Indicators of a shift in strategies may be:
• Changes in propaganda message content
• Uncharacteristic increase in communications
• Unexplained pauses or sudden increases in guerrilla attacks
• Shift of effort between urban and rural efforts
• Displacement of insurgents from one location to another
• Unanticipated statements of support from external actors for an insurgency
• Increased organization, indoctrination, and secure means of communications
• Increased efforts to infiltrate legitimate organizations such as trade unions, professional
or business organizations, universities, and so on.
• New advocacy for rights of peasants, farmers, or other groups
• Change of in focus of attacks, such as the targeting of a specific sector |
3-24.2 | 58 | Chapter 2
Figure 2-6. Shifts between strategies and phases.
Section V—TACTICS
Insurgencies employ both violent and nonviolent tactics to achieve their objectives. Nonviolent tactics attempt
to achieve political goals without the use of force. Insurgent violent tactics are often accompanied by a variety
of nonviolent tactics. Used together, these tactics, along with supporting propaganda, can assist in recruiting
and gathering popular support. Historically insurgencies have fielded dedicated personnel to foment nonviolent
action such as strikes and protests to supplement violent action. Insurgents are by nature an asymmetric threat.
Asymmetric Warfare is a conflict in which a weaker opponent uses unorthodox or surprise tactics to attack
weak points of a stronger opponent, especially if the tactics include terrorism, guerrilla warfare, criminal
activity, subversion, or propaganda. Violent tactics by insurgents can include terrorism, guerrilla warfare,
sabotage, or conventional operations. Insurgents often use terrorism and guerrilla tactics to achieve their goals,
because they do not have the capability to contest the government or counterinsurgency forces in conventional
operations.
VIOLENT TACTICS
2-97. Violent insurgent tactics are normally characterized by elusiveness, surprise, and brief, violent
action. These tactics are often divided between terrorism and guerrilla warfare early in the insurgency.
In Phase III of the insurgency, it is common to see more conventional operations. There are three general
tactics available to insurgents that use violence—terrorism, guerrilla tactics, conventional tactics
and criminal activity. The challenge is that at any given time the insurgent could use any of them. For
clarity, the term ‘guerrilla’ applies to any insurgent forces performing any of these four types of violence. |
3-24.2 | 59 | Foundations of Insurgency
2-98. Although violence can alienate the population when not linked to a vision of a better life or the
violence is indiscriminant, the commitment to use violence is a potent insurgent weapon. Targets
of violence can be anything insurgents deem to be obstructions to their cause. Host nation security forces,
foreign forces, aid workers, members of the population who do not accept insurgent claims,
and infrastructure are typical insurgent targets.
2-99. Normally, organized groups of insurgents using terrorism or guerrilla warfare use violent tactics.
The differences between these two can become blurred, especially within an urban environment or where
the government exerts strong control. Although potentially nonviolent, criminal activity provides a ready
source of income for an insurgency and, for the purposes of this FM, has a violent nature. Violent tactics
include, but are not limited to (for more see FM 3-24):
• Ambushes.
• Assassination.
• Arson.
• Bombing and high explosives.
• Chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons.
• Hijacking and skyjacking.
• Hostage taking.
• Indirect fire.
• Kidnapping.
• Raids or attacks on facilities.
• Sabotage.
• Seizure.
TERRORISM
2-100. A terrorist is an individual who uses violence, terror, and intimidation to achieve a result (DOD).
Insurgents may use terrorism. Terrorist attacks employ violence primarily against noncombatants as a way
to increase the population's vulnerability and decrease their perception of security. Insurgent terrorism
techniques include assassination, arson, blackmail, bombings, hijacking, kidnapping, threats, murder,
mutilation, and torture. The insurgent using terrorism often targets economic and political symbols
to undermine the legitimacy of the government. Any overreaction by government forces or other
authorities adds to the population's resentment toward the government and turns its support to the
insurgency.
2-101. Insurgents using terrorism generally require fewer personnel than guerrilla warfare
or conventional operations. Inherently, these activities have greater security and lower support
requirements. Insurgents using terrorism often select targets for their political and psychological impact.
Their attacks can be effective in generating popular support within one faction when used against a
competing faction. They can also be effective in forcing government reaction that alters government
policies to benefit insurgent objectives.
GUERRILLA TACTICS
2-102. Guerrilla tactics are typified by hit-and-run attacks by lightly armed, small groups. The guerrilla is
the combat element of the insurgency. Guerrilla tactics emphasize ambushes, raids, snipers, rocket
and mortar attacks, and the use of explosive devices. Guerrilla tactics may also include assassination,
coercion, and kidnapping to achieve support or eliminate opposition.
Principles
2-103. The principles of guerrilla tactics as stated by Mao Zedong are still valid: “Enemy advances, we
retreat. Enemy halts, we harass. Enemy tires, we attack. Enemy retreats, we pursue.” |
3-24.2 | 60 | Chapter 2
2-104. Guerrilla operations are generally offensive, not defensive, and are often harassing in nature.
Guerrillas seldom attempt to seize and defend physical objectives and, in general, avoid decisive
engagement. Their overall aim is often to cause confusion, to destroy infrastructure or security forces,
and to lower public morale. Guerrilla harassment attempts to keep government forces on the defensive
and weaken the Host Nation, which can include destroying resources and disrupting lines
of communication. One advantage of harassment is that it may create the perception that the guerrilla can
strike anywhere and that the Host Nation cannot prevent it. Because of this, counterinsurgents the must not
only win small battles, but also win the battle of public perception. In rural areas, guerrillas may seize a
remote area or conduct raids and small-scale attacks on remote targets and lines of communications.
Numerical Superiority
2-105. While government forces outnumber the guerrilla, the guerrilla seeks to attain local numerical
superiority. If guerrillas can successfully concentrate against counterinsurgents, they can attain victory over
small elements of government forces. Guerrillas often use simple techniques of speed, surprise, maneuver,
and especially infiltration. Near the target area, small guerrilla elements will often mass in order to conduct
a specific, larger-scale operation. The baited ambush is a favorite guerrilla technique. Guerrillas often
create incidents, such as arsons, bombings, and hoaxes, as the bait. These baited ambushes can attempt
to lure small government forces of all types into a mechanical or manned ambush.
CONVENTIONAL TACTICS
2-106. Conventional operations are not always necessary for success; however, guerrillas may engage
in conventional operations after an insurgency develops extensive popular and logistical support. When
they feel the conditions are set, insurgents may generate a conventional military force that can directly
confront HN security forces. These conventional operations may vary from a small regional operation
to general conventional warfare. Large conventional operations are usually an attempt to obtain the
strategic or operational objectives.
CRIMINAL ACTIVITY
2-107. Sustainment requirements, especially funding, often bring insurgents into relationships with
organized crime or insurgents may turn to criminal activity themselves. Reaping windfall profits
and avoiding the costs and difficulties involved in securing external support makes illegal activity
attractive to insurgents. Taxing a mass base usually yields low returns and alienates the population,
especially in cases where the insurgency provides essential services to the population. In contrast,
kidnapping or hostage taking, extortion, armed robbery, and trafficking (drug, human, black market goods,
and so on)—four possible insurgent criminal activities—are very lucrative, although they also alienate the
population. The activities of the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) are a perfect
example. The FARC often receives millions of US dollars from a single high-profile kidnapping. Similarly,
failed and failing states with rich natural resources like oil or poppies are particularly lucrative areas
for criminal activity.
2-108. Devoting exceptional amounts of time and effort to fund-raising requires insurgents
to shortchange ideological or armed action. Indeed, the method of raising funds is often at the heart
of internal debates within the insurgency. For example, the FARCs involvement in the drug trade has made
it the richest self-sustaining insurgent group in history; yet it continues to claim to pursue “Bolivarian”
and “socialist” or “Marxist-Leninist” ends. FARC activities have increasingly been labeled
“narco-terrorist” or, simply "criminal," by a variety of critics.
2-109. Many insurgencies have degenerated into criminality. This occurred as the primary movements
disintegrated and the remaining elements were cast adrift. Such disintegration is desirable for the
counterinsurgent. It replaces a dangerous, ideologically inspired body of disaffiliated individuals with a
less dangerous but more diverse body. This transition would mean the counterinsurgency would also
transition to more of a law-and-order approach. Successful counterinsurgents must recognize that the ideal
approach eliminates both the insurgency and any criminal threats. |
3-24.2 | 61 | Foundations of Insurgency
NONVIOLENT TACTICS
2-110. Successful insurgents use nonviolent tactics in conjunction with violent tactics. Subversion
and propaganda are the two most prevalent forms of nonviolent warfare. Although some subversive
activities can bleed over to violent activities, for the purposes of this FM, subversion will emphasize the
nonviolent activities that define the nonviolent nature of subversion. Nonviolent tactics include, but are not
limited to (for more see FM 3-24):
• Demonstrations
• Denial and Deception
• Hoaxes
• Infiltration
• Strikes
SUBVERSION
2-111. Subversion is action designed to undermine the military, economic, psychological, or political
strength or morale of a regime (DOD). In addition, Subversive activity is anyone lending aid, comfort,
and moral support to individuals, groups, or organizations that advocate the overthrow of incumbent
governments by force and violence (DOD). All willful acts that are intended to be detrimental to the best
interests of the government that do not fall into the categories of treason, sedition, sabotage, or espionage
are subversive activity.
2-112. Insurgents use various subversive techniques in their attempt to convince the populace to resist the
government and COIN forces and support their insurgency. These techniques include demonstrations,
boycotts, clandestine radio broadcasts, newspapers, and pamphlets. In addition, movement leaders organize
or develop cooperative relationships with legitimate political action groups, youth groups, and trade
unions. This approach develops popular support for later political and military activities. Subversive
activities often openly challenge, in an organized pattern and just short of violence, the control
and legitimacy of the established government and COIN forces.
2-113. One of the most visual forms of subversion is civil unrest. The fomenting of riots, organizing
of strikes, and staging of demonstrations can drain the power, presence, and capabilities of the government
and conversely increase the power and prestige of the insurgency. Another means of subversion
is infiltration of government organizations, political parties, labor unions, community groups, universities,
and charitable organizations.
2-114. To increase public credibility, attract new supporters, generate revenue, and acquire other
resources, insurgent groups may establish their own front groups. Front groups are organizations that
purport to be independent, but are in fact created and controlled by the leaders of the insurgency. A historic
example of a front group is the Sinn Fein. The Irish Republican Army (IRA) used Sinn Fein, their
“political wing” made up of political cadre, to serve as the IRA’s respectable public face.
PROPAGANDA
2-115. Insurgent groups commonly use propaganda to increase their base of support or reduce support
for COIN forces. The joint definition of propaganda is any form of communication in support of national
objectives designed to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, or behavior of any group in order
to benefit the sponsor, either directly or indirectly (JP 1-02). In this case, the insurgents use propaganda
to further their own ends.
2-116. The insurgent’s propaganda efforts use activities such as clandestine radio broadcasts, the
Internet, newspapers, graffiti and pamphlets that openly challenge the control and legitimacy of the
established government. Insurgents will search for any leverage they can use in their propaganda. This
includes seeking support based on the common identity of religious affiliation, clan, tribe, or ethnic group.
Additionally, insurgents often create new problems and reinforce existing problems they then can exploit.
Insurgents will arrange for the “coincidental” presence of photographers or cameras where planned events |
3-24.2 | 62 | Chapter 2
occur. If the government is unwilling or unable to address these problems successfully, the insurgency can
claim they will solve them. Common insurgent propaganda efforts include the following:
• Encouraging the HN populace or specific neutral parties to avoid supporting HN or other
friendly government’s forces.
• Increasing insurgent will to resist by fanning hatreds, biases, and predispositions.
• Inciting riots or organizing rallies, which may include honoring “martyred” insurgents.
• Causing or exacerbating a dislocated civilian crises.
• Creating or fostering public distrust of the HN security forces.
• Undermining the support of specific HN local leaders or businessmen.
• Creating or intensifying general ethnic or religious unrest or friction.
• Supporting or revitalizing dissident or opposition organizations.
• Linking local groups with similar groups in neighboring countries or regions.
• Discrediting or ridiculing specific HN or counterinsurgent officials.
• Characterizing government leaders as puppets and tools of foreign COIN forces.
• Spreading hostile coverage of COIN personnel, especially counterinsurgent mistakes.
2-117. Effective counterinsurgents must counter insurgent propaganda. This can be accomplished by
conducting information engagement (IE) to exploit inconsistencies in the insurgents’ propaganda and their
excessive use of force or intimidation. Additionally, counterinsurgents must have a coherent and unified
information engagement plan. This IE plan must be planned, prepared, and executed with input from all
appropriate civil and military agencies, especially the HN.
Section VI—STRENGTHS AND VULNERABILITIES
Understanding insurgents’ typical strengths and vulnerabilities allows counterinsurgents at the tactical level
to work toward neutralizing or avoiding their capabilities and exploiting their weaknesses. The typical strengths
and vulnerabilities of insurgents are explained below.
STRENGTHS
2-118. The recognized strengths of insurgent warfare provide a base to analyze the specific insurgent
threat. No two insurgent forces are identical. Known strengths are applied against a specific situation the
COIN force encounters, and are refined because of local analysis. Regardless, identified insurgent strengths
must be reduced or circumvented. Table 2-1 presents insurgent strengths and countermeasures for analysis
during COIN operations.
Table 2-1. Insurgent strengths and countermeasures.
Insurgent Strengths Countermeasures
2-24 FM 3-24.2 21 April 2009
SUONEGIDNI
Insurgents are usually indigenous to the local area The counterinsurgent force must separate the
and have the support of at least some of the populace. insurgent from the rest of the populace. This is best
Therefore, they have the ability to blend with the local accomplished through the effective use of populace
populace. In many cases they have two roles—a local and resources control. Care must be taken
resident one moment, an insurgent the next moment. This to ensure that civilians are not injured or mistreated
enhances their capability to operate without discovery in a as a result of counterinsurgent operations |
3-24.2 | 63 | Foundations of Insurgency
Table 2-1. Insurgent strengths and countermeasures (continued).
21 April 2009 FM 3-24.2 2-25
EGDELWONK
Since most insurgents are indigenous, their knowledge The counterinsurgent force must overcome the
of the local populace, customs, issues, language insurgent’s advantage of local knowledge by
and terrain are first hand. The insurgents use this fostering a strong relationship with government
understanding to develop working relationships with the security forces, other counterinsurgent forces,
populace. The insurgent can apply this knowledge to the and the populace. If possible, counterinsurgent
effective use of propaganda. If insurgents can get some forces should include members of the local
of the local populace to identify to some degree with their populace and reside within the local area.
cause, they can win their support and gain new recruits. If Maintaining continuous counterinsurgent operations
insurgents cannot persuade locals to help or refrain from in a given area through a permanently stationed
hindering, they may resort to coercion. counterinsurgent force is important. The skillful use
of local assets or creating a local civilian defense
force that has the support and backing of the
government are some ways to accomplish this.
ECNEGILLETNI SNOITAREPO
The insurgent’s inherent advantage with the population The counterinsurgent force must place
normally allows them to develop intelligence networks counterintelligence operations, intelligence
and infrastructure within the government and population. collecting, and intelligence analyses as a high
These networks can provide insurgents with continuous priority. The use of compartmentalization, deception,
and current information on government or counterinsurgent operations security, and communications security
force dispositions, strengths, weaknesses, and capabilities must be constantly emphasized. Since insurgents
are indigenous, their intelligence networks
and infrastructures can be infiltrated to gather
intelligence and turn insurgent operatives into
double agents.
NOITAVITOM
Some insurgents may be devoted to their cause to the The counterinsurgent force must therefore promote
point of fanaticism. On the other hand, insurgents who wish the belief that remaining an insurgent leads only
to abandon the movement face major challenges. their to death and defeat while at the same time creating
ability to cease being an insurgent is difficult. The a viable method for “former” insurgents to return
government and the local populace may not welcome them to normal life. Host government reintegration,
back, and the remaining insurgents will view them as a reconciliation, and amnesty programs remain the
turncoat and threat. Motivation within the insurgency important elements of this success.
is usually kept high through intimidation and threats
of violence on them and their families.
DESUCOF
YTILIBISNOPSER
Insurgents do not have the responsibility to maintain Counterinsurgent forces can use the insurgent’s
normal governmental obligations toward society. This frees lack of provisions for the society, as a tool
their efforts to conduct focused operations in support to increase government support
of their goals. However, they often provide some aid of counterinsurgent operations and to decrease
and services to the local community, especially where populace’s insurgent support. In addition, they
government services fall short and they highly advertise can show that the insurgents have acted
this fact. irresponsibly. Increasing the HN governments
ability to provide services to the population may
marginalize insurgent efforts.
TNEGRUSNI
SCITCAT
The insurgent can use a broad range of tactics, from The counterinsurgents must remain flexible
conventional warfare to terrorism. They can escalate and adaptive to engage and, if possible, disband,
or deescalate their activity in reaction to government defeat or destroy the insurgent force while at the
or counterinsurgent activity almost at will. same time preventing the insurgent force from
having tactical successes. They must also learn
and adapt quickly.
GNIRUDNE PIHSDRAH
Insurgent Strengths Countermeasures
Insurgents often come from impoverished backgrounds, The counterinsurgent force must therefore
are young, and are in good shape. They can make do with establish controls and eliminate resource support.
less by both design and background. Successful Tight security and control on arms
insurgents are innovative in their tactics, techniques and ammunition must be maintained, to include
and procedures. They learn and adapt to changes in the thorough destruction of unused, abandoned,
operational environment. discarded equipment. Hardships are still
hardships, and the harder life is for the insurgent,
the more likely they are to quit.
VULNERABILITIES
2-119. The vulnerabilities of insurgents also provide a base for analysis. To gain the advantage over the
insurgent and enhance effectiveness, these weaknesses must be targeted and exploited. Table 2-2 displays |
3-24.2 | 64 | Chapter 2
Table 2-2. Insurgent vulnerabilities and considerations.
Insurgent Vulnerabilities Considerations
2-26 FM 3-24.2 21 April 2009
DETIMIL
LENNOSREP
Insurgents operate in small bands to avoid detection by Insurgent methods to recruit replacements
government and counterinsurgent forces. Due to the can be identified and exploited.
challenges of recruiting new insurgents, insurgent personnel
losses are not easily replaced.
DETIMIL
SECRUOSER Because of their covert nature, insurgents must rely on Insurgent equipment losses are not easily
resources that are stolen or clandestinely delivered from replaced, and methods of re-supply can be
friendly entities such as internal or external supporters. This discovered, severed, or tracked to sources
is especially true for sophisticated equipment, cash, and destinations.
replacement parts and expendable supplies.
REWOP
TABMOC
The insurgents normally lack the combat power for a Insurgents will usually break off
sustained fight. As a result, insurgents typically avoid decisive engagements when they become too
engagements with government forces. By their own design, intense, as the potential for higher losses
insurgent operations are usually limited in scope and are is not usually worth the risk. However, they
driven by both engagement and disengagement plans. may conduct a stand up fight if they have a
large base of expendable guerrillas; they
think they can manipulate a large political
gain; or in some cases a rites of passage
event.
SROTCAF
LAUDIVIDNI
The insurgent endures a life of physical danger, privation Counterinsurgent forces can exploit these
and many types of stress. Stresses include combat and the stresses. Offering insurgents, a pardon,
fear of combat, the need to live covertly (constantly fearing to include food, shelter and protections from
discovery by the government) recognizing the numeric both the government and insurgent,
superiority of the government forces they face; fear of criminal is sometimes enough incentive to induce
treatment if captured by the government; and fear of violence insurgent desertions.
to self and family (often imposed by the insurgent organization
to ensure cooperation). Besides a belief in the cause, the
insurgent may remain an insurgent due to fear of government
reprisal or reprisals from the insurgent organization.
RALUPOP TROPPUS
The dependence of the insurgent on popular support is a If the popular support is withdrawn, the
major weakness. This popular support includes direct aid insurgent will not be able to operate
and active intelligence reporting. effectively. If the populace turns against the
insurgent, the government can reap
significant benefits. Willing locals can help
locate, capture, or kill once “popular”
insurgents.
LANOITAREPO
SROTCAF
Insurgent operational weaknesses can include security The counterinsurgent force can exploit these
(requiring extensive resources that may slow down insurgent weaknesses by interdicting supply
responsiveness); bases and safe houses (that are difficult routes and facilities, following the supply
to acquire and operate); a lack of sophisticated trail, forcing desertion because of hardships,
communications (requiring insurgents to spend excessive and inflicting combat losses that are hard
amounts of time preparing to launch operations); and a lack to replace.
of technology (including the ability to maintain captured |
3-24.2 | 65 | Foundations of Insurgency
SUMMARY
The central struggle of the majority of insurgencies is to gain and maintain the support of the population.
However, the five elements of each insurgency, the eight dynamics, the strategy, the tactics, and the
specific strengths and vulnerabilities are each unique to an individual insurgent group. For the tactical
leader, from the platoon to the brigade, it is imperative that they first identify and understand the insurgent
group or groups that they are fighting, before determining potential insurgent COAs and friendly COAs. |
3-24.2 | 67 | Chapter 3
Foundations of Counterinsurgency
“The best way to attain peace is to combine force with politics, We must remember
that destruction must be used as a last recourse, and even then only in order to build
something better in the end…Each time an officer is required to act against a village
in a war, he needs to remember that his first duty, after securing submission of the
local population, is to rebuild the village, reorganize the local market and establish
a school.”
General Joseph Gallieni, Fundamental Instructions, 1898
US and Host Nation participation in combating an insurgency includes simultaneous
military and nonmilitary efforts that normally build upon the Host Nation
government’s efforts, its institutions and plans. This chapter discusses the foundations
of a successful counterinsurgency through sections on the seven of counterinsurgency
lines of effort, tactical force consideration, clear-hold-build operations, other major
COIN operations, and the phases of COIN operations.
Section I—OVERVIEW
A counterinsurgency is a complex subset of warfare. This section defines counterinsurgency, explains the
concepts of foreign internal defense (FID) and internal defense and development (IDAD), and describes the
scores of units, agencies, organizations that units could work with in their area of operations. This discussion
also covers full-spectrum operations and their applications in counterinsurgency. Finally, it introduces the
seven counterinsurgency lines of effort (LOEs) to help units achieve unity of effort.
DEFINITION OF COUNTERINSURGENCY
3-1. Counterinsurgency is those military, paramilitary, economic, psychological and civil actions taken
by a government to defeat an insurgency (JP 1-02). In a counterinsurgency, Host Nation forces
and partners operate to defeat armed resistance, reduce passive opposition, and establish or reestablish the
legitimacy of the Host Nation's government (FM 3-0). Counterinsurgency is a proactive approach
involving all elements of national power; even down to the tactical level. COIN operations strive to achieve
unity of effort amongst many joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational organizations. COIN
includes tactical planning; intelligence development and analysis; training; materiel, technical,
organizational assistance; advice; infrastructure development; tactical-level operations; and information
engagement. US forces often lead the US government’s counterinsurgency efforts because the US military
can quickly project a counterinsurgent force and sustain not only its force but also other agencies.
GOAL OF COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS
3-2. The end state of counterinsurgency operations is a legitimate Host Nation government that can
provide effective governance. This includes providing for their populace, eliminating the root causes of the
insurgency and preventing those root causes from returning. Counterinsurgent operations can successfully
defeat an insurgency; achieve unity of effort along multiple lines of effort; isolate the insurgent from the
people; and increase the legitimacy of the Host Nation government. The five requirements for successful
COIN operations at the tactical level include:
• Together, US and HN military commanders devise the plan for attacking the insurgent strategy,
and focus on bolstering governmental legitimacy.
• HN and US forces establish control of area and secure the population continuously. |
3-24.2 | 68 | Chapter 3
• Operations should be initiated from the HN government’s area of strength against areas under
insurgent control.
• Regaining control of the insurgent’s areas requires the HN government to expand operations
to secure and support the population.
• Information engagements favorably influence perceptions of HN legitimacy, obtain local
support for COIN operations, publicize insurgent violence, and discredit insurgent propaganda.
FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE
3-3. Foreign internal defense (FID) is the participation by civilian and military agencies of a
government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization
to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency (JP 3-07.1). The FID programs
are used to support friendly nations operating in or threatened with potential hostilities. As a tool of US
foreign policy, FID is a national-level effort that involves numerous US Government agencies all working
together to eliminate the root causes of an insurgency.
3-4. US military involvement in FID has traditionally been focused toward counterinsurgency.
Although much of the FID effort remains focused on this important area, US FID programs may aim at
other threats to an HN’s internal stability, such as civil disorder, illicit drug trafficking, or terrorism. These
threats may, in fact, predominate in the future as traditional power centers shift, suppressed cultural
and ethnic rivalries surface, and the economic incentives of illegal drug trafficking continue. Typical
tactical involvement in FID entails conducting combat operations against guerrillas, conducting actions
across all seven lines of effort to defeat insurgency, and training Host Nation security forces.
INTERNAL DEFENSE AND DEVELOPMENT
3-5. Internal defense and development (IDAD) is the full range of measures taken by a nation
to promote its growth and protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. It focuses on
building viable institutions (political, economic, social, and military) that respond to the need of the society
(FM 1-02). IDAD is not only a single master plan, it is a compilation of all internal defense
and development plans at the strategic, operational, and tactical level that a nation possesses. The
fundamental goal of IDAD is to prevent subversion, lawlessness and insurgency by forestalling
or defeating the threat and by working to correct the conditions that prompted the violence. Tactical units
may only see the local government strategy, economic development plan, or the long-range military plan
of their partner HN security force unit, which are part of the IDAD plan.
JOINT, INTERAGENCY, INTERGOVERNMENTAL,
MULTINATIONAL
3-6. Successfully conducting a counterinsurgency requires a host of organizations. Brigade, battalion,
and company commanders must integrate and synchronize their operations directly with the activities
and operations of other military forces and nonmilitary organizations in their area of operations.
TERMS
3-7. Leaders must understand the terminology between joint, interagency, intergovernmental,
and multinational operations.
Joint
3-8. Between military services (Army, Navy, USAF, and USMC).
Interagency
3-9. Between other government agencies, for example, Department of State, Central Intelligence
Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, National Security Agency, USAID. |
3-24.2 | 69 | Foundations of Counterinsurgency
Intergovernmental
3-10. Between international government organizations, for example, United Nations, European Union,
NATO, African Union.
Multinational
3-11. Between foreign government organizations, for example, Great Britain, Saudi Arabia, Poland.
COMMAND RESPONSIBILITIES
3-12. When working with interagency, intergovernmental, nongovernmental and multinational groups,
Army commanders have inherent responsibilities that include clarifying the military’s mission; determining
controlling legal and policy authorities; and sustaining and caring for these organizations and individuals.
Information sharing between the elements is essential to establish ground truth. Not all agencies may agree
on the nature or scope of support required or on the operation’s progress.
3-13. Gaining and maintaining popular support presents a formidable challenge that the military cannot
accomplish alone. Achieving these aims requires synchronizing the efforts of many nonmilitary and HN
agencies in a coordinated approach. Coordination at the lowest level is essential for unity of effort. Likely
participants in COIN operations include the following:
• US military forces.
• Multinational (including HN) military forces.
• US governmental organizations.
• Intergovernmental organizations (IGOs).
• Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs).
• Multinational corporations and contractors.
• Indigenous population and institutions (IPI).
US MILITARY FORCES
3-14. The military’s contribution is vital for COIN efforts. Demanding and complex, COIN draws
heavily on a broad range of the force’s capabilities and requires a different mix of offensive, defensive,
and stability operations from that expected in major combat operations. Air, land, and maritime
components all contribute to successful operations and to the vital effort to separate insurgents from the
people. The Army and Marine Corps usually furnish the principal US military contributions to COIN
forces.
3-15. The most important military assets in COIN are disciplined Soldiers and Marines with adaptive,
self-aware, and intelligent leaders. Tactical units may have specially trained or attached personnel who
bring certain capabilities such as—
• Civil affairs.
• PSYOP.
• Language specialists.
• Human intelligence.
• Logistic support.
• Contractors.
• Medical units.
• Military police.
• Engineers.
• Legal affairs. |
3-24.2 | 70 | Chapter 3
MULTINATIONAL MILITARY FORCES
3-16. Soldiers and Marines may function as part of a multinational force. In COIN operations, US
forces usually operate with the Host Nation security forces. Each multinational participant provides
capabilities and strengths that US forces may not have. Other countries’ military forces bring different
cultural backgrounds, historical experiences, languages and other capabilities that can be particularly
valuable to COIN efforts.
US GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS
3-17. Commanders’ situational awareness includes being familiar with other US governmental
organizations participating in the COIN effort and their capabilities. Commanders and leaders of other US
governmental organizations should collaboratively plan and coordinate actions to avoid duplication
or conflicting purposes. Within the US Government, key organizations that tactical units may work with
are shown in Table 3-1.
Table 3-1. US governmental organizations.
Department of State
(cid:131) Office of the Coordinator for
Stabilization and Reconstruction
US Agency for International Development
(USAID)
Central Intelligence Agency
Department of Justice
• Drug Enforcement Administration
• Federal Bureau of Investigation
Department of the Treasury
Department of Homeland Security
• US Coast Guard
• Immigration Customs Enforcement
Department of Agriculture
INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS
3-18. An intergovernmental organization is an organization created by a formal agreement, for
example, a treaty, between two or more governments. It may be established on a global, regional,
or functional basis for wide-ranging or narrowly defined purposes. IGOs are formed to protect and promote
national interests shared by member states (JP 1-02). The most notable IGO is the United Nations.
Depending on the situation and HN needs, tactical units can expect to encounter any number of UN
organizations in their AOs, such as the following:
• Department of Peacekeeping Operations.
• World Food Program.
• UN Refugee Agency (the UN High Commissioner for Refugees).
• UN High Commissioner for Human Rights.
NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS
3-19. Joint doctrine defines a nongovernmental organization as a private, self-governing, not-for-profit
organization dedicated to alleviating human suffering; or promoting education, health care, economic |
3-24.2 | 71 | Foundations of Counterinsurgency
development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict resolution; or encouraging the
establishment of democratic institutions and civil society. (JP 1-02). There are several thousand NGOs
of many different types. NGO activities are governed by their organizing charters and their members’
motivations. Typical NGOs that tactical units may encounter include—
• Médecins sans Frontières (Doctors without Borders).
• Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere (CARE).
• Oxford Committee for Famine Relief (OXFAM).
• Save the Children.
INDIGENOUS POPULATION AND INSTITUTIONS
3-20. IPI is the civilian construct of an area of operations to include its population, governmental, tribal,
commercial, and private organizations and entities. The population includes legal citizens, legal and illegal
immigrants, and all categories of dislocated civilians. As stated earlier, this is the most important group
for counterinsurgent units to protect, engage, and synchronize actions.
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND CONTRACTORS
3-21. Multinational corporations often engage in reconstruction, economic development, security
and governance activities. At a minimum, commanders should know which companies are present in their
AO and where those companies are conducting business. Such information can prevent fratricide
and destruction of private property.
INTERAGENCY COORDINATION IN COIN
3-22. A tactical unit conducting COIN operations can expect to work with a wide range of agencies and
will be expected to track, manage, support, and coordinate with all of these agencies, some of whose
agendas or desired outcomes may or may not coincide with the overall COIN effort. Commanders at all
levels will have to overcome many challenges and work to integrate all the agencies organizations present
in the AO, so that everyone works towards a common end state.
3-23. Challenges to the integration of military and civilian agencies include different organizational
cultures, capabilities and structures. Some civilian organizations may not be trained and equipped
to operate in austere, unsecured environments or they may not be able to sustain themselves in remote
areas. Some organizations may be averse to assuming risk, which may hinder the overall COIN effort.
Military and governmental organizations are heavily dependent on establishing and implementing their
internal operating procedures and they are often reluctant to adapt or change those procedures
to accommodate the addition of new actors. Different expectations amongst the organizations can also
serve to further heighten tensions and create friction among agencies.
3-24. US government and civilian agencies provide capabilities critical to the successful
accomplishment of the counterinsurgency mission. Most agencies have their own budgets, and often will
have more robust financial capabilities than military units. An effective interagency effort can use all of the
organizations’ budgets in a complementary way to facilitate stability and development efforts. Civilian
agencies can also provide links to strategic resources that may not be available to tactical units. They may
also have access to information, resources and enablers that can help military units develop a
comprehensive understanding of the operational environment.
3-25. Military forces have several complementary characteristics that can be of value to other agencies.
The most obvious is the ability to provide security and transportation assets. Military forces also have the
ability to provide an accurate assessment of whether an area is ready for or capable of supporting essential
services and economic development projects. Once these indicators become apparent, counterinsurgent
forces have the ability to provide logistical support, security, and expertise to a project.
3-26. The formation of effective civil-military teams creates complementary capabilities that mitigate
the inherent weaknesses of both the counterinsurgent force and civilian agencies. Effective interagency |
3-24.2 | 72 | Chapter 3
teams can conduct concurrent operations to capitalize on gains made through security operations.
In Afghanistan on 2002, USAID representatives embedded with units were able to render immediate aid
to returning families whose homes were damaged during combat operations.
FULL SPECTRUM OPERATIONS
3-27. FM 3-0 states that Army forces conduct full-spectrum operations outside the United States by
executing offensive, defensive, and stability operations as part of integrated joint, interagency,
and multinational teams. Full spectrum operations entail simultaneous and continuous combinations
of offensive, defensive, and stability or civil support operations. Based on the mission, one type
of operation may predominate. Commanders shift the predominant type of operation based on the current
situation and their assessment as they shape the operational environment and set the conditions to achieve
the end-state (Figure 3-1).
Joint Campaigns (Overseas)
Offense Offense
Offense Defense
Defense Stability Defense
Stability
Stability
Figure 3-1. Full-spectrum operations.
3-28. Like any Army operation, at the tactical level, counterinsurgency operations are a combination
of offensive, defensive, and stability operations. Counterinsurgent offensive operations focus on
eliminating the insurgents. Counterinsurgent defensive operations focus on protecting the populace
and infrastructure from insurgent attacks. Stability operations focus on addressing the root causes that
allowed to insurgency to come into existence. Determining the combination is not easy, since it varies
depending on the situation, the mission, and the commander’s desired end-state. All three of these
operations may be ongoing within different parts of the area of operations at the same time.
OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS
3-29. These are combat operations conducted to defeat and destroy enemy forces and seize terrain,
resources and population centers. They impose the commander’s will on the enemy. This active imposition
of land power potentially makes the offense the decisive type of military operation, whether undertaken
against irregular forces or the armed forces of a nation-state supporting the insurgency. The physical
presence of land forces also enhances stability operations through the threat of offensive action in areas
they occupy. During an insurgency, offensive operations aim at destroying the guerrilla, underground
or leader in order to establish a secure environment for the establishment or the re-establishment of the rule
of law, legitimate government, and economic development. The successful counterinsurgent unit designs
their offensive operations to complement their other defensive and stability operations. Chapter 5 further
discusses offensive operations.
DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS
3-30. These are combat operations conducted to defeat an enemy attack, gain time, economize forces,
and develop conditions favorable for offensive or stability operations. They defeat attacks, destroying
as many attackers as necessary. The defense preserves physical dominance over land, resources,
and populations. Defensive operations retain terrain, as well as protecting the HN population and key
resources. Defensive operations during an insurgency aim at securing the population, protecting |
3-24.2 | 73 | Foundations of Counterinsurgency
counterinsurgent forces, securing key sites, and securing key personnel. The successful counterinsurgent
unit designs its defensive operations to complement its other offensive and stability operations. Chapter 6
further discusses defensive operations.
STABILITY OPERATIONS
3-31. These encompass various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United
States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure
environment, provide essential government, services, emergency infrastructure, reconstruction,
and humanitarian relief. Most stability operations are both multiagency and multinational. Forces engaged
in stability operations may have to conduct offensive and defensive operations to defend themselves
or destroy forces seeking to undermine the effectiveness or credibility of the stability mission.
3-32. Stability operations consist of five primary tasks—establish civil security, establish civil control,
support to governance, restore essential services, and support to economic and infrastructure development.
At the tactical level, the primary stability tasks may serve as lines of effort or simply as guideposts
to ensure broader unity of effort. In this manual, they become the nucleus for the seven COIN lines
of effort.
3-33. The degree to which Army forces engage in stability operations is dependent on the specific
circumstances of any given operation. In some operations, the Host Nation can carry out most security
operations and Army forces are engaged in stability operations to offset any negative impact of military
presence on the populace. In other operations, Army forces within a failed state may be responsible for the
well-being of the local population, to include providing basic civil functions, while working with other
agencies to restore essential services to the area or region. An example of this was Operation Restore Hope
in Somalia in 1992 and 1993. Chapter 7 further discusses stability operations.
LINES OF EFFORT IN COUNTERINSURGENCY
3-34. Commanders use LOEs to visualize, describe, and direct operations when positional reference
to enemy forces has little relevance, such as an insurgency. FM 3-0 defines a line of effort as a line that
links multiple tasks and missions using the logic of purpose—cause and effect—to focus efforts toward
establishing operational and strategic conditions. A plan based on LOEs unifies the efforts of all actors
participating in a counterinsurgency toward a common purpose. Each LOE represents a conceptual
category along which the HN government and COIN force commander intend to attack the insurgent
strategy and tactics and establish HN government legitimacy. LOEs are closely related and are not
sequential in nature. Successful achievement of the end state requires careful coordination of actions
undertaken along all LOEs. Figure 3-2 shows example COIN LOEs. The figure also shows how the LOEs
try to gain the support of the population to reach the end state.
3-35. Success in one LOE reinforces successes in the others. Progress along each LOE contributes
to attaining a stable and secure environment for the Host Nation. Once a measure of stability is achieved,
achievements in other LOEs, like popular recognition of the HN government’s legitimacy, improved
governance, and progressive, substantive reduction of the root causes that lead to the insurgency, follow.
No single list of LOEs applies to all insurgencies. Commanders select LOEs based on their understanding
of the nature of the insurgency and what the COIN force must do to counter it. Commanders designate
LOEs that best focus counterinsurgent efforts against the insurgents’ strategy.
3-36. Commanders at all echelons can use LOEs. Lower echelon operations are nested within the higher
echelon’s LOEs; however, lower echelon operations are conducted based on each unit’s AO. Commanders
and staffs synchronize activities along all LOEs to gain unity of effort. This approach ensures the LOEs
converge on a well-defined, commonly understood end state.
3-37. Commanders at all levels should select the LOEs that relate best to achieving the desired end state.
The following list of possible LOEs is not all-inclusive. However, it gives commanders a place to start:
• Establish civil security. |
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• Establish civil control.
• Support HN security forces.
• Support to governance.
• Restore essential services.
• Support to economic and infrastructure development.
• Conduct information engagement.
Figure 3-2. Example lines of effort for a counterinsurgency.
3-38. These lines can be customized, renamed, changed altogether, or simply not used. Commanders
may combine two or more of the listed LOEs or split one LOE into several. For example, some
commanders may combine the LOEs, restore essential services, and support to economic and infrastructure
development into one LOE. Likewise, other commanders may split out rule of law from the civil
control LOE.
3-39. Tactical units, HN security forces and the HN’s government can only accomplish a limited
number of tasks at any one time. The seven COIN LOEs help prioritize and synchronize efforts along all
of the LOEs. One useful construct is the rheostat approach with LOEs—increased effort along the establish
civil security LOE usually means less effort along the other LOEs. Units may see this during operations
against a powerful insurgency or during the clear phase of a clear-hold-build operation. In most cases,
restoring security to an AO enables units and the HN government to rapidly meet objectives along the
other lines of effort. In other AOs, units may increase effort along the support to governance and support
to economic and infrastructure development LOEs, while seeing a reduction in effort along the establish
civil control LOE. This occurs during operations against a weak insurgency or during the build phase of a
clear-hold-build operation. Figure 3-3 shows the rheostat approach to the LOEs.
3-40. Operations designed using LOEs typically employ an extended, event-driven timeline with short-,
mid-, and long-term goals. These operations combine the effects of long-term operations, such
as neutralizing the insurgent infrastructure, with cyclic and short-term events, like regular trash collection
and attacks against insurgent bases. Chapter 4 discusses considerations for planning LOEs and horizons. |
3-24.2 | 75 | Foundations of Counterinsurgency
Section II—HISTORICAL THEORIES
This section compares three historic theories of counterinsurgency. Together, they provide a reference
for forces engaged in COIN operations. COIN operations are complicated. Even considering these theories will
not guarantee success. However, understanding these aspects will help illuminate the challenges inherent
in defeating an insurgency. Three counterinsurgency experts, Robert Thompson, David Galula and Charles
Callwell, had very specific theories concerning the conduct of counterinsurgency based on their experience.
Figure 3-3. Rheostat approach to the lines of effort.
ROBERT THOMPSON'S PRINCIPLES FOR SUCCESSFUL COIN
3-41. Robert Thompson’s Five Principles for Successful Counterinsurgency based on his experience in
the Malayan emergency follow:
• The need for government to have a clear political aim.
• To function within the law.
• To establish an overall plan, whereby all political, socio-economic and military responses were
coordinated.
• To give priority to the elimination of political subversion.
• To secure the government’s base area before conducting a military campaign.
DAVID GALULA’S FOUR LAWS FOR SUCCESSFUL COIN
3-42. David Galula’s Four Laws for Successful Counterinsurgency based on his experience
in Indochina and Algeria follow:
• The support of the population is necessary for the counterinsurgent as it is the insurgent.
• Support is gained through the active minority. |
3-24.2 | 76 | Chapter 3
• Support from the population is conditional.
• Intensity of efforts and vastness of means are essential.
CHARLES CALLWELL’S IDEAS FOR SUCCESSFUL COIN
3-43. Charles Callwell’s Ideas for Successful Counterinsurgency, based on his experience in the Boer
War and other British Imperial operations, follow:
• [Following up] successes…; a single blow will often achieve results, but a succession of blows
paralyzes the enemy.
• Matching the enemy in mobility and inventiveness.
• Collecting actionable intelligence.
• Seizing what the enemy prizes most.
Section III—TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS
This section contains basic tactical considerations common to counterinsurgency operations, categorized first
by terrain, and then by troops. As for any type of operation, the commander and staff must consider all relevant
operational and mission variables, and their effects on operations. These additional considerations for terrain
and troops allow the commander to better visualize the conduct of counterinsurgency operations as he
accomplishes the assigned mission.
TERRAIN
3-44. As with any type military operation, terrain plays a key role in counterinsurgency operations.
Insurgencies are fought in either urban or a rural terrain, each with its own characteristics.
URBAN AREAS
3-45. The urbanization of the world population continues to increase. The concealment and anonymity
that was once only provided by remote rural areas to the insurgent is now available in urban areas. The
transient nature and size of urban populations increasingly hinder a counterinsurgent’s ability to detect
and identify insurgents. Insurgents use urban centers for freedom of movement, easy access to their mass
base and proximity to targets. Popular support at the outset of this kind of insurgency is not necessary, but
can be gained through intimidation and attacking basic services provided by the government. With a
greater population density, urban areas need more government functions and services than rural areas. This
requires more government organizations for operations and a balanced approach using all LOEs.
3-46. Insurgencies thrive in an urban environment. Operations against urban insurgents vary from
operations designed to control the population to operations that involve seeking out and killing or capturing
the insurgent. In these urban areas, counterinsurgency forces may have to emphasize intelligence
and police operations to counter clandestine organizational, intelligence, logistic, and terrorist activities.
Counterinsurgency forces may be required to reinforce HN police forces in combating riots and disorders
provoked by the insurgents as well as conducting raids and cordon and searches. Military
counterinsurgency forces must be able to communicate with HN police forces and other agencies involved
in operations.
Considerations during Counterinsurgencies
3-47. When military forces must reinforce police or defeat insurgent forces inside the urban area,
leaders must closely control and coordinate operations. However, the local government determines the
level of intensity at which urban operations are conducted. Military forces should be withdrawn as soon
as police forces can manage the situation. Basic urban counterinsurgency considerations include—
• Maintaining a constant, forward presence with the population.
• Acquiring and disseminating accurate and timely intelligence. |
3-24.2 | 77 | Foundations of Counterinsurgency
• Avoiding overreaction to insurgent activity.
• Ensuring the population has the basic level of essential services.
• Developing relationships with competent Host Nation officials.
• Using countersniper operations, especially at roadblocks, outposts, and sentry posts.
• Reacting to the ambush of patrols and firing on helicopters.
• Emphasizing countermeasures against explosive hazards (to include improvised explosive
devices and mines) and booby traps of all types.
• Controlling access to weapons, uniforms and other supplies the insurgents may use.
• Protecting industry and public services from attack and sabotage.
• Preventing riots, protests and other large population incidents.
Lines of Effort
3-48. All urban operations require careful planning and coordination, particularly those operations
involving application of force. The most vital requirement is accurate and timely intelligence. Military
forces must be able to communicate with police and other agencies involved in the operations. During
urban operations, actions must be taken across the all LOEs. Examples of actions along each LOE are—
Establish Civil Security
3-49. Conduct targeted raids with HN security forces to attack key insurgent cells.
Establish Civil Control
3-50. Conduct investigative training for HN police forces to increase arrests and convictions; establish a
block committee to control the population.
Support HN Security Forces
3-51. Maximize the number, effectiveness, and use of HN security forces to secure and control the
population and to prevent the insurgent’s freedom of movement.
Support to Governance
3-52. Establish or convene local or tribal council meetings to identify and solve the underlying issues
of the insurgency.
Restore Essential Services
3-53. Provide projects, such as the restoration of electrical power and sewer systems to blocks that
support the government. Projects should provide positive reinforcement of desired behavior.
Support to Economic and Infrastructure Development
3-54. Provide funds to city managers to hire additional personnel and initiate economic development
projects. Hire from blocks that are neutral to increase their support for the government.
Conduct Information Engagement
3-55. Conduct information engagements to highlight government successes and expose insurgent
defeats and excesses.
RURAL AREAS
3-56. Much of the guerrilla warfare in the 20th Century occurred in a rural setting—the mountains
of Yugoslavia in WWII, the jungles of South Vietnam in the 1950s and 1960s, and the jungles of Columbia
in the 1980s and 1990s. The reduced potential for collateral damage, limited infrastructure, and the lack of |
3-24.2 | 78 | Chapter 3
urban development, and the characteristics of the rural setting itself influence both insurgent
and counterinsurgent operations.
Considerations during Counterinsurgencies
3-57. Counterinsurgency operations in a rural environment may allow for the potential application
of full military combat power, conventional fire and maneuver, and less restrictive rules of engagement due
to a lower population density. However, leaders, still plan for the application of the minimum-essential
force required to accomplish the mission.
3-58. In the rural environment, insurgents rely on friendly elements within the population to provide
supplies and intelligence. Rural insurgents prefer to operate in regions providing plenty of cover
and concealment such as heavily forested and mountainous areas that hinder the counterinsurgency force
in gaining access and intelligence. Often operating from their own home or village, rural insurgents will
often move to camps if security does not permit them to remain at home. Insurgent camps are also chosen
with a view toward easy access to the target population, access to a friendly or neutral border, prepared
escape routes, and good observation of counterinsurgency force approach routes. When counterinsurgency
operations force the insurgents out of his preferred base camps, he tends to establish camps in rugged
inhospitable areas not easily penetrated. Like COIN in urban areas, rural counterinsurgency operations
must focus on both locating and killing the guerrilla and on severing the supportive element of the
population, such as the mass base and auxiliary, from providing supplies and intelligence.
3-59. Offensive operations are usually conducted in areas that either are under insurgent control or are
contested. In these areas, ground or water modes of entry are often used, but air assault or parachute
operations can also be employed. These operations use offensive tactics such as a raid, a reconnaissance
in force, a cordon and search, a hasty or deliberate attack, a pursuit, or a combination of these.
Purpose
3-60. Their purpose is to—
• Destroy the insurgent force and its base complexes.
• Expand controlled areas.
• Isolate guerrillas from their support.
• Demonstrate support for the government and for the populace in the local area.
• Harass the insurgent to prevent the buildup of personnel and logistical resources.
Lines of Effort
3-61. All rural operations must address all LOEs. Examples along each LOE to consider include—
Establish Civil Security
3-62. Conduct raids with HN security forces to attack key guerrilla groups.
Establish Civil Control
3-63. Reinforce police operations, especially police stations and checkpoints, as a means to increase
control of the population; conduct census.
Support HN Security Forces
3-64. Use HN security forces to increase combat power, expand the AO, increase the number of villages
secured, and increase the legitimacy of the operation.
Support to Governance
3-65. Establish or convene a village, district, provincial or tribal council to identify and solve
underlying issues. |
3-24.2 | 79 | Foundations of Counterinsurgency
Restore Essential Services
3-66. Provide projects such as wells to villages that support the government.
Support to Economic and Infrastructure Development
3-67. Provide economic stimuli such as the donation of a tractor or gasoline to villages that are neutral
to increase their support for the government.
Conduct Information Engagement
3-68. Conduct information engagements to generate support for the HN government, highlight
government victories and expose insurgent defeats and excesses.
BORDER AREAS
3-69. In addition to the typical external support, usually supplies, that an insurgent group may receive
from across a border, insurgents may also establish sanctuary base camps and conduct cross-border
operations from adjacent countries.
3-70. Host nation police, customs, or paramilitary border forces should be responsible for border
security. However, the guerrilla threat may force the military to conduct border operations, particularly
in rural areas. US forces advise and assist Host Nation security forces to interdict the infiltration
of insurgent personnel and materiel across international boundaries with the intent of isolating the
insurgent forces from their external support and sanctuaries. Border operations normally require restrictive
measures for tribal and ethnic groups who do not recognize the international boundary.
3-71. Border operations require close coordination and cooperation between the armed forces,
paramilitary forces, and government agencies involved. Physically sealing the border may be impossible,
since doing so could increase the requirement for forces and materiel beyond available resources. Placing
forces or barriers at every crossing and entry site may also be impossible. Commanders should prioritize
where to place their forces or barriers.
Routes
3-72. Based on detailed terrain analysis and intelligence, commanders can determine infiltration
and exfiltration routes, support sites, frequency and volume of traffic, type of transportation, number
and type of personnel, amount and type of materiel, terrain and traffic conditions, and the probable location
of base areas and sanctuaries. Continuous and detailed surveillance is required.
Zones
3-73. Restricted zones or friendly population buffer zones can be established if needed. Either of these
operations, which could require relocating many persons, must be carefully planned. Although armed
forces may assist, civil authorities normally are responsible for planning and carrying out a relocation
program. Forced relocation is held to a minimum. The 1949 Geneva Conventions prohibit forced
population resettlement unless there is clear military necessity.
Restricted Zone
3-74. This is a carefully selected area, varied in width and contiguous to the border. Authorities
normally relocate all persons living in this zone. Authorities give public notice that they will regard all
unauthorized individuals or groups encountered in the restricted zone as infiltrators or insurgents.
Friendly Population Buffer Zone
3-75. This is an area where only civilians believed to be loyal to the government live in the AO. The
government relocates all persons whose loyalty it cannot establish. The government may use this operation |
3-24.2 | 80 | Chapter 3
to establish information nets and employ loyal citizens in paramilitary units. The operation denies
insurgents potential civilian contacts and base areas for border-crossing activities.
Lines of Effort
3-76. Border operations must use actions across all LOEs. One or two examples along each LOE are—
Establish Civil Security
3-77. Conduct ambushes with and without HN security forces at likely insurgent crossing sites.
Establish Civil Control
3-78. Conduct training of HN police and border forces to increase the speed and results of searches.
Support HN Security Forces
3-79. Integrate and maximize the number and effectiveness of HN border, police and Army forces.
Support to Governance
3-80. Establish or convene a village or tribal council from both sides of the border to identify
and solve issues.
Restore Essential Services
3-81. Provide projects, such as restoration of irrigation systems to villages that assist the government’s
efforts to close the border. Projects should provide positive reinforcement of desired behavior.
Support to Economic and Infrastructure Development
3-82. Provide economic stimuli such as hiring village personnel to build border fences or to act
as guards. Hire from villages that are neutral to increase their support for the government.
Conduct Information Engagement
3-83. Create information engagements to canalize movement through official points of entry
and establish the legitimacy of the border in the eyes of the populace.
TROOPS
3-84. Counterinsurgency operations typically involve actions that combine joint, interagency,
multinational, and nongovernmental organizations efforts. The increased number of military
and nonmilitary participants and their divergent missions and methods are a coordination and unity
of effort challenge. Achieving unity of effort requires the greatest possible common purpose and direction
among all agencies. One means of achieving this is using a long-range plan designed around the seven
COIN lines of effort.
TASK ORGANIZATION
3-85. The organization for, and conduct of, counterinsurgency operations depends on the mission
variables and the OE. However, COIN operations place a premium on boots on the ground. Task
organization is the temporary grouping of forces designed to accomplish a particular mission (FM 3-0).
Task organization for counterinsurgency operations is often substantially different from how units are task
organized in conventional operations. During counterinsurgency operations, many units do not perform
their traditional role. For example, in Iraq and Afghanistan, many artillerymen have served in infantry, civil
affairs, military police, or intelligence roles. |
3-24.2 | 81 | Foundations of Counterinsurgency
TROOPS-TO-TASK ANALYSIS
3-86. Given the extended nature of COIN, tactical units must maximize all available assets to
accomplish missions in each of the COIN LOEs and sustain Soldier proficiency, physical fitness, and
emotional and psychological well-being. A means to maximize the employment of all assets is referred to
as troops-to-task analysis. This process enables units to correctly assign tasks to units of appropriate size
and capabilities.
3-87. Often conducted during MDMP, staffs and tactical units begin troops-to-task analysis by
determining a standard size element to use as a baseline (Infantry platoon, Armor platoon, Cavalry platoon,
company, or others). The staff determines the forces available (often including HN security forces). Then,
the staff or tactical unit lists and prioritizes each task and determines the forces required to accomplish each
task using the baseline unit as a measure,. Finally, the tactical unit and staff uses the commander’s planning
guidance to array forces and assign tasks.
3-88. Figure 3-4 shows an example format for a troops-to-task analysis worksheet. It identifies specified
and implied tasks, a baseline number of unit or units, including HN security forces, required to accomplish
a task, and assigned them higher headquarters. The troops-to-task process is also useful for establishing
unit AOs.
Figure 3-4. Example format for AO platoon requirements worksheet.
BRIGADE COMBAT TEAMS
3-89. In larger COIN efforts, BCTs will usually provide the required command and control apparatus
to conduct sustained tactical operations over an AO. Typically, a BCT’s boundary is aligned with a Host
Nation governmental boundary. BCTs also allocate resources to their subordinate battalions and coordinate |
3-24.2 | 82 | Chapter 3
with higher military headquarters, Host Nation government officials, HN security forces, NGOs, or US
agencies.
3-90. Once a BCT is given an AO, they, along with the Host Nation, should be the controlling
headquarters for all other elements in their AO. This should include the temporary attachment for control,
if not command, of any element that is physically within their AO. Examples would include the United
States Agency for Internal Development (USAID), Corps of Engineers, Military Police, advisor teams,
reconstruction teams, Host Nation security forces, or private contracting security firms, since these
elements may not completely understand the intricacies in the BCT’s assigned AO.
3-91. The military force conducting counterinsurgency operations will not always consist of maneuver
forces. Counterinsurgency operations are manpower intensive and therefore infantry, armor, artillery,
reconnaissance, and military police battalions are the primary tactical building blocks for combat in a
counterinsurgency environment. The composition of the tactical force in counterinsurgency operations
depends upon these available forces and the threat that is faced. Aviation, engineers, military working dog
teams, special operations forces, and reconstruction teams are key force multipliers for the
counterinsurgency force. In deciding how to use these forces, leaders assess the factors of METT-TC.
Normally, most ground combat elements are organized to fight as maneuver forces. However, the proper
use of other forces can provide the counterinsurgency force with many advantages.
HOST NATION SECURITY FORCES
3-92. The Host Nation security forces must be included or, in some cases, drive the unity of effort of the
counterinsurgent effort. HN security forces can be integrated in planning cells, share bases with US forces
and, at a tactical level, conduct parallel planning in corresponding staff sections. Additionally, HN security
forces give many benefits to counterinsurgency efforts. For more information, see Chapter 8.
CAPABILITIES
3-93. Units conducting counterinsurgency operations have identified the need for additional capabilities
beyond their standard task organization. Human terrain teams, document and media exploitation teams,
personal security detachments, detainee holding areas, Host Nation security force advisor teams, base
commanders and base defense commanders, explosive ordnance disposal teams, company intelligence
support teams, and tactical site exploitation teams have all proved useful during recent operations.
3-94. A human terrain team is a group of civilian anthropologists attached to brigades and battalions.
This team helps the unit understand local cultures. These social scientists aid leaders in better
understanding relevant cultural history, engaging locals in a positive way, and incorporating knowledge of
tribal traditions to help resolve conflicts.
3-95. Document and media exploitation teams (DOMEX) process, translate, analyze, exploit, and share
hard copy documents and electronic media collected during operations. This capability increases
in importance as the rule of law is re-established and insurgents go to trial, rather than long term detention.
3-96. Due to the organization of brigade and battalion headquarters, commanders and sergeant majors
lack the combat power needed to move freely around the battlefield. In recent operations, units have either
built ad hoc organizations or tasked platoons to serve as escorts so that they can reconnoiter the AO, attend
meetings, engage locals, check on Soldiers, and better visualize the fight. These are often called personal
security detachments. Most theaters have implemented a three or four vehicle rule for convoys, which
make this unit’s strength at least twelve Soldiers strong.
3-97. A detainee holding area (DHA) is a temporary location used to field process and house any
person captured or otherwise detained by an armed force, and provide resources for intelligence
exploitation. Detainees are kept here for a short period of time before being released or being sent to a
theater internment facility. The DHA generally consists of a semipermanent structure designed to house
detainees. Basic infrastructure includes shelter, latrines, basic hygiene facilities, medical care, interrogation
facilities, and evidence holding areas. For more see FM 3-19.40. |
3-24.2 | 83 | Foundations of Counterinsurgency
3-98. Host nation security force advisor teams conduct operations to train HN military individuals
and units in tactical employment, sustainment and integration of land, air, and maritime skills; provide
advice and assistance to military leaders; and provide training on tactics, techniques, and procedures. These
teams can be resourced by the BCT or battalion, or provided by DA. Their size and capability varies on the
size of the HN security force being advised. (For more information, see Chapter 8.)
3-99. Base commanders and base defense commanders are typically internally resourced personnel
and units of the brigade, battalion, and company level who command and control the base and supervise
the defense of the base. (For more information, see Chapter 6.)
3-100. Explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) support provides the capability to neutralize domestic
of foreign conventional explosive hazards, which include unexploded ordnance (UXO), booby traps,
improvised explosive devices (IEDs), captured enemy ammunition, and bulk explosive. EOD units detect,
mark, identify, render safe, and dispose of explosive hazards. Also, EOD specialists work with intelligence
personnel to conduct explosive forensics to help identify the makers of the devices, as well as their ever
evolving methods of construction, placement, concealment, and detonation.
3-101. Human intelligence collection teams (HCTs) are teams with trained HUMINT collectors that
collect information for people and their associated documents and media sources to identify elements,
intentions, capability, strength, disposition, tactics, and equipment. The team uses human sources as tools
and a variety of collection methods to satisfy the commander’s intelligence requirements.
They can conduct source operations and interrogate detainees.
3-102. A PSYOP team is a team that reinforces the effects of tactical and nontactical operations, as well
as discrediting and demoralizing the insurgency. Their actions enhance the probability of accomplishing
the unit’s mission.
3-103. A civil affairs team (CAT) is a team that helps a unit establish, maintain, influence, or exploit
relations between the unit and civilian organizations, governments, authorities, and populace in an area
of operations. Civil affairs core tasks include populace and resource control (PRC), foreign humanitarian
assistance, civil information management, nation assistance, and support to civil administration.
3-104. Company operations teams sometimes referred to as company intelligence support teams are a
group of two to six individuals at the company level who enhance the company commanders’ situational
awareness of their area of operations by producing intelligence at the company level. They collect
and analyze patrol reports, human intelligence reports, and battalion intelligence reports. As a result, they
are able to conduct link analysis, conduct pattern analysis, create target folders, and enemy situation
templates.
3-105. Site exploitations teams are teams at the company or battalion level that execute systematic
actions with the appropriate equipment, to ensure that personnel, document, electronic data, and other
material at any site are identified, evaluated, collected, and protected to gather information to be developed
into intelligence and facilitate future operations. They may collect biometric, physical, digital, and spoken
data. (See also Chapter 5 of this manual or CALL product 07-26.)
Section IV—CLEAR-HOLD-BUILD OPERATIONS
A clear-hold-build operation is a full spectrum operation that combines offense (finding and eliminating the
insurgent), defense (protecting the local populace) and stability (rebuilding the infrastructure, increasing the
legitimacy of the local government and bringing the rule of law to the area) operations. Each phase—clear,
hold, and build—combines offensive, defensive, and stability operations in varying degrees. In the clear phase,
offensive operations usually dominate; in the hold phase, defensive operations are emphasized; and in the hold
phase stability operations are preeminent. It is usually a relatively long-term operation and requires the
commitment of a large number of forces. Figure 3-5 shows the typical combination of offense, defense
and stability operations. |
3-24.2 | 84 | Chapter 3
Clear Hold Build
Offense Offense
Offense Defense
Defense Stability Defense
Stability
Stability
Figure 3-5. Clear-hold-build framework.
OVERVIEW
3-106. This pattern of operation is to clear, hold, and build one village, area, or city at a time—and then
expand into another area. In previous conflicts, this was known as the "Oil Spot Strategy." This type
of operation was used successfully in Algeria and Indochina by the French, who called it tache d’huile;
in Malaysia by the British, who referred to it as "The Briggs Plan"; and in Tal Afar by the Americans, who
named it "clear-hold-build." This operation aims to develop a long-term, effective Host Nation government
framework and presence in the area, which secures the people and facilitates meeting their basic needs,
and provides legitimate governance.
3-107. The purpose of America’s ground forces is to fight and win the Nation’s wars. Throughout
history, however, the Army has been called on to perform many tasks beyond pure combat; this has been
particularly true during the conduct of COIN operations. COIN operations will continue to require Soldiers
to be ready both to fight and to build—depending on the security situation and a variety of other factors.
RESOURCES
3-108. Clear-hold-build operations require a substantial commitment of resources, time and a clear unity
of effort by civil authorities, other agencies, and security forces. Counterinsurgent commanders must first
plan and prepare for a long-term effort. Before conducting a clear-hold-build operation, units must ensure
that they have identified or coordinated for—
• Adequate troops, US and HN, to clear the insurgents from a designated area.
• Interagency cooperation and unity of effort.
• Sufficient resources, expertise, and labor to restore essential services.
• A local government that will support the operation.
• Means for US and HN security (military, police, and paramilitary) forces to share intelligence.
OBJECTIVES
3-109. Actual operations begin by controlling access to the area and then by controlling key points within
the area. Security and influence can then spread out from these areas. Often, the steps of clear-hold-build
operations will overlap, especially between hold and build, where activities are often conducted
simultaneously. Clear-hold-build operations have the following objectives:
• Create a secure physical and psychological environment.
• Provide continuous security for the local populace.
• Eliminate the insurgent presence.
• Reinforce political primacy.
• Enforce the rule of law. |
3-24.2 | 85 | Foundations of Counterinsurgency
• Rebuild local Host Nation institutions.
• Gain the populace’s support.
CLEAR
3-110. Clear is a tactical mission task that requires the commander to remove all enemy forces
and eliminate organized resistance in an assigned area (FM 3-90). The force does this by destroying,
capturing, or forcing the withdrawal of insurgent combatants and leaders. This task is most effectively
initiated by a clear-in-zone or cordon-and-search operation, as well as patrolling, ambushes,
and targeted raids.
OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS
3-111. Offensive operations predominate during the clear phase; however, defensive and stability
operations are still conducted. Eliminating guerrilla forces does not remove the entrenched insurgent
infrastructure. While leaders and the underground exist, insurgents will continue to recruit among the
population, undermine the Host Nation government, receive supplies, and coerce the populace through
intimidation and violence. After guerrilla forces have been eliminated, removing the insurgent
infrastructure such as leaders, underground, and auxiliaries begins. This should be done in a way that
minimizes the impact on the local populace.
3-112. If insurgent forces are not eliminated, but are expelled or have broken into smaller groups instead,
they must be prevented from reentering the area. Once counterinsurgent units have established their bases,
platoons and companies cannot become static. They should be mobile and should patrol throughout the
area. The local populace should be compensated for damages that occur while clearing the area of
insurgents.
DEFENSIVE AND STABILITY OPERATIONS
3-113. Defensive and stability operations are continued to maintain gains and set the conditions for future
activities. These include—
• Isolating the area to cut off external support and to kill or capture escaping insurgents.
• Conducting periodic patrols to identify, disrupt, eliminate, or expel insurgents, as well as secure
the population.
• Employing security forces and government representatives throughout the area to secure the
populace and facilitate follow-on stages of development.
LINES OF EFFORT
3-114. Although the clear phase emphasizes establishing civil security, operations across the other LOEs
must happen. Examples of complimentary actions across all LOEs include—
Establish Civil Security
3-115. Conduct targeting of insurgent leaders and guerrilla bands, cordon and searches of insurgent
controlled areas, and raids on safehouses.
Establish Civil Control
3-116. Train and support police forces or paramilitary forces to implement curfews to interdict insurgent
movement.
Support HN Security Forces
3-117. Train and use HN security forces to increase combat power during clearing operations. |
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Support to Governance
3-118. Identify key government and local leaders that can support the re-establishment of local
government that can administer the area. Identifying the underlying issues of the population.
Restore Essential Services
3-119. Identify essential services that need immediate attention.
Support to Economic and Infrastructure Development
3-120. Identify potential “quick win” projects to stimulate the local economy and create additional
support for the government.
Conduct Information Engagement
3-121. The message to the populace focuses on gaining and maintaining their overt support for the
counterinsurgency effort, as well as informing them that active support for the insurgency would prolong
combat operations, creating a risk to themselves and their neighbors. The message to the insurgent force
focuses on convincing them that they cannot win, and that the most constructive alternatives are
to surrender or cease their activities.
HOLD
3-122. After clearing the area of guerrillas, the counterinsurgent force must then assign sufficient troops
to the cleared area to prevent their return, to defeat any remnants, and to secure the population. This is the
hold task. Ideally, Host Nation security forces execute this part of the clear-hold-build operation. Success
or failure depends on effectively and continuously securing the populace and on reestablishing an HN local
government. Although offensive and stability operations continue, in this phase, uses defensive operations
to secure the population.
BASES
3-123. Cleared areas are best held by establishing counterinsurgent forces in bases among or adjacent to
the area. From these bases, the counterinsurgent forces can then concentrate on two primary purposes:
to disrupt, identify, and ultimately eliminate the insurgents, especially their leadership and infrastructure;
and to end popular support for the insurgency and to gain popular support for the government
3-124. Exactly where these bases are established and their actual force composition is a key
counterinsurgent decision. The main consideration should be towards the desired effect on the population,
especially increasing their security. If a area is supportive of the insurgency, then a base established
in known insurgent strongholds may sever the relationships between insurgents and the populace.
However, if the area is neutral or has pockets of support for the government, then the base should be
established where it can best help in developing the area.
SECURING THE POPULACE
3-125. If adequate HN security forces are not available, units should consider hiring and training local
paramilitary forces to secure the cleared village or neighborhood. Not only do the members of the
paramilitary have a stake in their area’s security, they also receive a wage. Providing jobs stimulates the
economy. Having a job improves morale and allows locals to become a potential member of the local
governmental process.
3-126. Contact with the population should be continuous, and both planned and unplanned. Being based
within the population forces information engagement and provides opportunities for contact with the
population. From the first day, Soldier’s actions in these areas, if culturally astute, can build bonds with the
local populace and in many cases change the attitudes of the people. Ultimately, the goal of this contact |
3-24.2 | 87 | Foundations of Counterinsurgency
is twofold: to gain a better picture of the actual situation and to turn the population’s support toward the
government.
3-127. Another consideration is to secure key physical infrastructure. Because resources are always
limited, parts of the infrastructure vital for stability and vulnerable to attack must receive the priority
of protection. This can be accomplished by analyzing the risk and likelihood of attack on various sites in
the AO. (Chapter 7 discusses one technique for this.)
LINES OF EFFORT
3-128. Although the hold phase emphasizes defensive actions, operations across all LOEs must be
employed. Examples of complimentary actions along multiple LOEs include—
Establish Civil Security
3-129. Continuously secure the people and separate them from the insurgents. Establish a firm
government presence and control over the area and populace by recruiting, organizing, arming,
and training local paramilitary forces and integrate them into operations against the insurgents. Continue
to conduct raids on insurgent leaders or members of the underground.
Establish Civil Control
3-130. Train and support police force to combat crime and enforce curfews to curtail insurgent
movement.
Support HN Security Forces
3-131. Conduct combined patrols, checkpoints, cordon and searches, and raids with HN security forces.
Support to Governance
3-132. Establish or reestablish a government political apparatus to replace the insurgent apparatus.
Restore Essential Services
3-133. Establish contracts, empower or finance local governments to initiate SWEAT-MSO repairs.
Support to Economic and Infrastructure Development
3-134. Conduct local improvements designed to convince the populace to support the Host Nation
government, participate in securing their area, and contribute to the reconstruction effort.
Conduct Information Engagement
3-135. Information engagements should affirm that security forces supporting the Host Nation
government are in the area for the long term and are securing the population from insurgent intimidation,
coercion, and reprisals.
BUILD
3-136. The build phase of clear-hold-build operations consists of carrying out programs designed
to remove the root causes that led to the insurgency, improve the lives of the inhabitants, and strengthen the
Host Nation’s ability to provide effective governance. Stability operations predominate in this phase, with
many important activities being conducted by nonmilitary agencies. During this phase, the Host Nation
security forces should have primary responsibility for security. Progress in building support for the Host
Nation government requires protecting the local populace. People who do not believe they are secure from
insurgent intimidation, coercion, and reprisals will not risk overtly supporting counterinsurgent efforts. |
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SECURING THE POPULACE
3-137. To secure the populace, security forces should continuously conduct patrols and use measured
force against insurgent targets of opportunity. Just like in the hold phase, if the HN security forces are
inadequate, units should consider hiring a paramilitary force to secure the village or neighborhood. Contact
with the people is critical to the local counterinsurgency effort’s success. Actions to eliminate the
remaining covert insurgent support infrastructure, such as the underground, auxiliary, and mass base, must
be continued, because any insurgent presence will continue to threaten and influence people.
END STATE
3-138. During the build phase, Host Nation government representatives reestablish government offices
and normal administrative procedures. National and international development agencies rebuild
infrastructure and key facilities. Local leaders are developed and given authority. Life for the area’s
inhabitants begins the return to normal.
LINES OF EFFORT
3-139. Although the build phase continues to secure the population and separate them from the
insurgents, the focus will shift to the other LOEs. Examples of complimentary actions along multiple LOEs
include—
Establish Civil Security
3-140. Conduct targeted raids on insurgent leaders and the underground, led by HN security forces.
Provide a US Quick Reaction Force (QRF) to HN security forces.
Establish Civil Control
3-141. Continue to patrol the area and control the population while improving HN police training
and equipment. Police forces may continue to expand their role.
Support HN Security Forces
3-142. Increase the number of patrols by HN security forces; US forces begin reducing their roles.
Support to Governance
3-143. Continue to support and enhance the local government.
Restore Essential Services
3-144. Continue projects to restore SWEAT-MSO services such as building roads, digging wells,
building schools and establishing emergency services.
Support to Economic and Infrastructure Development
3-145. Continue to stimulate the local economy through projects such as market repairs.
Conduct Information Engagement
3-146. Information engagements should affirm that security forces supporting the Host Nation
government are in the area for the long term and are eliminating insurgent leaders, organizations
and infrastructure and improving essential services. |
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The Strategic Hamlet Program
Successful clear-hold build operations (CORDS program and Tal Afar) are discussed in FM 3-24. This
vignette highlights the challenges of executing a clear-hold-build operation properly.
In 1962, the Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) launched the Strategic Hamlet Program
to compliment its advisory efforts with the Republic of Vietnam’s military. The Strategic Hamlet Program
was an extremely ambitious program designed to build fortified hamlets, relocate the population to the
hamlets, and train paramilitary forces, known as the Regional or Provincial Forces, across South Vietnam.
Together this would increase security and quality of life for the population. With the goal of fortifying half
the country’s hamlets in only 18 months, the program struggled with providing governance and solving
bureaucratic issues, ensuring security for all the villages, and limiting corruption. Additionally, the program
met resistance from locals, who felt an ancestral connection to their original hamlets.
Although the program was abandoned in 1964, after the war, the North Vietnamese Army acknowledged
that the well-run hamlets forced their guerrilla forces to relocate to other, insurgent controlled areas. The
South Vietnamese Strategic Hamlet program failed to meet all five prerequisites for a clear-hold-build
operation, especially obtaining an adequate number of troops, securing sufficient resources, and providing
a local government up to the task.
Section V—OTHER MAJOR COIN TACTICAL OPERATIONS
Major counterinsurgency tactical operations include Strike operations and Populace and Resource Control
operations. Strike operations are operations to find, fix and finish insurgent forces in areas under insurgent
control where the counterinsurgent does not want to maintain a permanent presence afterwards. Population
and resources control operations are government operations to control the populace, deny insurgents access to
the populace and resources, and reestablish law order.
STRIKE OPERATIONS
3-147. Strike operations are short duration (generally one day to several weeks) offensive, tactical
operations conducted in contested or insurgent controlled urban or rural areas to find, fix and destroy
insurgent forces. Small, highly mobile combat forces operate in dispersed formations to locate and fix the
insurgents. Upon locating the insurgents, commanders direct their forces to attack, pursue, and destroy
them. If contact is lost, the units resume aggressive patrolling to reestablish contact and destroy insurgent
forces before they can rest, reorganize, and resume operations. Strike operations seek to destroy insurgent
forces and base areas, isolate insurgent forces from their support, and interdict insurgent infiltration routes
and lines of communications (LOCs). Strike forces are organized as self-sufficient task forces capable
of operating in areas remote from logistical bases. Ground or water borne means of entry may be used,
as well as air assault or parachute deliveries. Strike operations use offensive tactics such as raids,
reconnaissance in force, cordons and attacks, hasty or deliberate attacks, and pursuits. It is often a
complementary operation to a clear-hold-build operation.
3-148. Speed and surprise are important in strike operations. The sudden and unexpected delivery
of combat forces into an insurgent-held or contested area provides significant advantages to the forces
conducting these operations. Speed and surprise can be achieved by using air assaults to insert the first
forces into the area of operations. Subsequent forces can be delivered on later airlifts or by other modes
of transportation. Fires can also be used to block escape routes or areas that are not secured by
ground forces.
3-149. A strike on an insurgent force normally requires superior combat power. COIN forces attempt
to immediately engage and destroy insurgents before they can disperse. Depending on the situation, hasty
or deliberate attacks are made on bases that contain fortifications. After a successful attack on insurgent
forces, troops thoroughly search the area for insurgent personnel, supplies, equipment, and documents. All |
3-24.2 | 90 | Chapter 3
captured enemy documents must be placed into intelligence channels as soon as possible to ensure that it
is properly exploited by DOMEX personnel. Pursuit operations are undertaken to destroy or capture forces
attempting to flee. Artillery, air support, and air assault forces support ground pursuit.
PURPOSE
3-150. Strike operations may also be used as a means to encourage reconcilable insurgents to the
negotiation table. Strike operations are conducted to—
• Harass the insurgent to prevent the buildup of personnel and logistical resources.
• Destroy the insurgent force and its base complexes.
• Demonstrate government resolve and garner support from the populace in the local area.
• Set the conditions to expand clear-hold-build operations.
•
LINES OF EFFORT
3-151. Along the LOEs in a strike operation, tactical units should examine—
Establish Civil Security
3-152. Conduct attacks, raids, and cordon and searches with HN security forces on insurgent forces
and bases.
Establish Civil Control
3-153. Conduct PRC operations, such as a census, a checkpoint or a search operation in villages
or blocks to control the populace.
Support HN Security Forces
3-154. Increase combat power by using HN security forces.
Support to Governance
3-155. Establish or convene local or tribal council meetings to identify and solve the underlying issues
of the insurgency.
Restore Essential Services
3-156. Ensure projects provide positive reinforcement of desired behavior, such as digging a well for a
tribal sheik who provides intelligence.
Support to Economic and Infrastructure Development
3-157. Hire people from villages or blocks that are neutral to increase support for the government.
Conduct Information Engagements
3-158. Use information engagements to highlight government success and expose insurgent defeats
and excesses.
POPULACE AND RESOURCE CONTROL OPERATIONS
3-159. Populace and resource control (PRC) operations are government actions to protect the populace
and its materiel resources from insurgents, to deny insurgents access to the populace and material resources
and to identify and eliminate the insurgents, their organization, their activities, and influence while doing
so. The objective of populace and resources control is to assist in preserving or reestablishing a state of law |
3-24.2 | 91 | Foundations of Counterinsurgency
order within an area or entire nation. PRC operations are normally nontactical, police-type operations and a
responsibility of HN governments. However, US forces may be required to conduct PRC operations until
HN security forces possess the will and capability. PRC operations may be conducted independently
of clear-hold-build operations or Strike operations or as an integrated part in each of these operations.
3-160. In peacetime, police forces protect the population and resources of a state from criminal activity
by both armed and unarmed criminals. During an insurgency, however, the number of armed insurgents,
the willingness of insurgents to use violence against the police and the populace, and the potential
for civilians to become displaced or refugees, often creates a situation where police forces and their
operations cannot successfully curtail the insurgents nor protect the population and resources.
OBJECTIVES
3-161. Typical objectives for populace and resources control operations include—
• Establish and maintain a secure physical and psychological environment for the population.
• Limit insurgent freedom of movement and initiative.
• Sever relationships between the population and insurgents.
• Identify and neutralize insurgent support activities.
• Establish and maintain security of resources.
CATEGORIES
3-162. Populace and resources control measures can be classified into four general categories:
• Surveillance and intelligence measures.
• Establish control measures.
• Enforce control measures.
• Protection measures.
Surveillance and Intelligence Measures
3-163. Surveillance and intelligence measures include both overt and covert surveillance of known, likely
or potential insurgents, their targets, and the creation of a QRF to exploit intelligence or conduct greater
surveillance of insurgent targets. Expanded police intelligence and surveillance operations, to include
police informants and agent networks, may link criminal acts from robberies, kidnappings, terrorism,
and extortion to insurgent activities.
3-164. Surveillance must be established and maintained over key individuals, groups, and activities
of interest. Increased surveillance must be maintained over critical locations, especially government
and civilian sources of weapons and ammunition. This includes maximum use of sensors, cameras
and other electronic surveillance equipment to provide continuous coverage of suspected areas and routes
used by insurgents. An additional means of gathering intelligence is to monitor local media (radio,
newspaper) both for rumor control and counterpropaganda purposes as well as intelligence tip-offs.
In addition, the public and private actions of influential local leaders provide additional insight. It
is important to live forward with the local people and listen to what they are saying. Still other intelligence
and surveillance measures include—
• Establish general covert surveillance measures at marketplace and stores.
• Use HUMINT collection teams (HCTs) or the HN police to recruit locals for surveillance
and intelligence.
• Establish a system of block or village wardens with reporting procedures as well as incentives.
Hold the wardens accountable for knowing what is going on in their block or village.
Establish Control Measures
3-165. Successful counterinsurgency operations typically use increased control measures to limit
insurgent activities and their ability to hide within the population. Normal security functions must be
performed efficiently and effectively, which is especially true if they are in any way part of the root causes
of the insurgency. However, due to the insurgency, additional security measures and operational techniques |
3-24.2 | 92 | Chapter 3
must be implemented. Two such considerations are increasing the size of police/border patrols due to the
threat and establishing QRFs to rapidly reinforce any patrol or site.
3-166. Combating an insurgency requires increased control measures to limit the insurgent’s freedom
of movement and their supporters. Control measures should be well planned and coordinated to ensure
rapid and efficient operations, with a minimum of delay and inconvenience to the people. All control
measures must be authorized by national laws and regulations, as well as be enforceable. Each control
measure should be tailored to fit the situation and used to establish or reinforce the credibility of the Host
Nation government.
3-167. The Host Nation government should explain and justify all control measures to the HN
population. They should be the least restrictive to accomplish the purpose. Local civilians must understand
that these measures are necessary to protect them from insurgent intimidation, coercion, and reprisals.
Ideally, the local population and their leaders should accept the needed measures before implementation
and that their support will minimize the inconvenience of the measures. These restrictions must be lifted
as soon as the situation permits.
3-168. Once control measures are in place, the Host Nation government should implement a system
of punishments for offenses related to them. These punishments should be announced and enforced
equally. All inconveniences and discomforts these measures cause should be blamed squarely upon the
insurgents. PSYOP products, widely disseminated to the population, can help ensure the measures have the
intended effect and undermine popular support for the insurgency. Control measures fall under the
populace control or resource control categories.
Populace Controls
3-169. Population control measures include—
• Curfews.
• Travel permits and passes.
• Movement restrictions.
• Restricted areas.
• Census or registration of residents.
• Block committee.
• National or regional identification system or ID cards.
• Licensing for jobs such as medical, security, construction, and drivers.
• Immigration restrictions
Resource Controls
3-170. Resource control measures include control of select resources to include foodstuffs, medical
supplies, and key equipment through:
• Rationing or purchase permits
• Registration of firearms.
• Registration of automobiles and trucks.
• Export and import restrictions.
Techniques
3-171. Enforcement operations must be conducted both day and night. Checkpoints and roadblocks are
set up to check and control the movement of personnel, vehicles, and material, and prevent actions that aid
the insurgency. During counterinsurgency operations, checkpoints and roadblocks assist the government
and counterinsurgent forces in maintaining the initiative against the insurgents by disrupting, interfering
with, and deterring insurgent operations and disrupting the insurgents’ decision-making cycle. It
is important to conduct checkpoints and roadblocks with interpreters, HN police, or other HN security
forces. Checkpoints and roadblocks used together can channel vehicles and personnel into a checkpoint
or a search. |
3-24.2 | 93 | Foundations of Counterinsurgency
Roadblock
3-172. A barrier or obstacle (usually covered by fire) used to block or limit the movement of vehicles
along a route.
Checkpoint
3-173. Checkpoints are manned locations used to control movement that may be established from 1 to 72
hours depending on the purpose of the operation.
Inspections
3-174. This includes random cordons and searches, both day and night, of homes, shops and buildings
for arms, propaganda material and insurgents. The use of military working dog teams can be very effective
in intercepting contraband. To decrease population resentment, it is important to ensure intelligence
supports the inspections. An inspection can also be used as a subterfuge for a meeting with key people.
Rewards for Cooperation and Compliance
3-175. A separate, yet related, function is the rewarding of cooperation or compliance. The ultimate
reward to the society as a whole is the removal or reduction of restrictions. However, this must be balanced
with the increased potential of the insurgent to gain benefit from these reduced or removed restrictions.
• Cooperative towns, villages or neighborhoods may be collectively rewarded by essential
service projects or economic stimulation projects.
• At the individual level, the government may provide monetary or material rewards
for information on suspicious activities.
Protection Measures
3-176. A form of protection measures is internment and resettlement, which consist of those measures
necessary to provide shelter, sustain, guard, protect, and account for people (enemy prisoners of war
[EPWs] and civilian internees [CIs]), US military prisoners, and dislocated civilians [DC]. Resettlement
of a population may vary from a geographic based resettlement to the resettlement of a specific population
group within a defined area. Resettlement operations should be under Host Nation direction and control.
For more information, see FM 3-19.40.
Section VI—PHASES
Major counterinsurgency tactical operations are long-term population security operations conducted in territory
generally under Host Nation government control to establish, regain, or maintain control of those areas
and to provide adequate security and control to the populace to allow restoration of essential services
and improvements to the economy. They typically move through three phases. They combine offensive,
defensive, and stability operations to achieve the stable and secure environment needed for effective
governance, essential services, and economic development to flourish. At the operational level, the phases
are—the initial response phase, the transformation phase, and the fostering sustainability phase. At the tactical
level, these three phases may resemble the three parts of a clear-hold-build operation. Understanding this
evolution and recognizing the relative maturity of the AO are important for the proper planning, preparation,
execution, and assessment of COIN operations. It is also important to recall that the insurgent also operates
in three stages—latent and incipient, guerrilla warfare, and war of movement. This knowledge allows
commanders to ensure that their activities are appropriate to the current situation.
INITIAL RESPONSE PHASE
3-177. The initial response phase generally reflects tasks executed to stabilize the operational
environment in a crisis. During this phase, military forces perform stability tasks during or directly after a
conflict where the security situation hinders the introduction of civilian personnel. Activities during the
initial response phase aim to provide a safe, secure environment as well as to attend to the immediate
essential service needs of the Host Nation population. At the tactical level, the initial response may appear |
3-24.2 | 94 | Chapter 3
to be similar to the clear phase of a clear-hold-build operation. Units may also incorporate strike operations
and PRC operations during this phase. Against a determined insurgency, the initial response may last
months or years.
TRANSFORMATION PHASE
3-178. The transformation phase represents a broad range of post-conflict reconstruction, stabilization,
and capacity-building. The transformation phase may be executed in either crisis or vulnerable states.
Counterinsurgent forces are most active here, working aggressively along all lines of effort (LOEs). The
desire in this stage is to develop and build enduring capability and capacity in the HN government
and security forces. As civil security is assured, focus expands to include the development of legitimate
governance, provision of essential services, and stimulation of economic development. Relationships with
HN counterparts in the government and security forces and with the local populace are developed
and strengthened. These relationships increase the flow of intelligence. This intelligence facilitates
measured offensive operations in conjunction with the HN security forces. The Host Nation increases its
legitimacy through providing security, expanding effective governance, providing essential services,
and achieving incremental success in meeting public expectations.
3-179. At the tactical level, the transformation phase may look a lot like the hold phase of a
clear-hold-build operation. Units may use Strike operations and PRC operations that complement their
holding efforts. Once again, a tenacious insurgency may cause the transformation or hold phase to last
months or even years.
FOSTERING SUSTAINABILITY PHASE
3-180. Fostering sustainability phase encompasses long-term efforts that capitalize on capacity-building
and reconstruction activities to establish conditions that enable sustainable development. This phase
is characterized by the expansion of stability operations across contested regions, ideally using HN security
forces. The main goal for this phase is to transition responsibility for COIN operations to HN leadership
and security forces. In this phase, the multinational force works with the Host Nation in an increasingly
supporting role, turning over responsibility wherever and whenever appropriate. QRF and fire support
capabilities may still be needed in some areas, but more functions along all LOEs are performed by HN
security forces with the assistance of multinational advisors. In this phase, the Host Nation has established
or reestablished the systems needed to provide effective and stable governance that sustains the rule of law.
The government secures its citizens continuously, sustains and builds legitimacy through effective
governance, has effectively isolated the insurgency, and can manage and meet the expectations of the
population.
3-181. At the tactical level, the fostering sustainability phase may resemble the build phase of a
clear-hold-build operation. Due to the stable security environment, PRC operations may be relaxed.
In ungoverned areas, there still may be a requirement for strike operations to disrupt the remnants of an
insurgency. This phase progresses at the pace of the HN’s ability to rebuild their infrastructure
and institutions, assume control of their security, and provide legitimate governance to the people.
SUMMARY
The foundations of COIN are the guiding principles for any unit conducting counterinsurgency operations.
Once understood and applied they enable commanders to craft a coherent plan that achieves unity
of effort amongst all organizations in the area of operations. |
3-24.2 | 95 | Chapter 4
Comprehensive Tactical Planning in Counterinsurgency
“The fight against the guerrilla must be organized methodically and conducted with
unremitting patience and resolution. Except for the rare exception, it will never
achieve spectacular results, so dear to laurel seeking military leaders.”
Roger Trinquier. Modern Warfare—A French View of Counterinsurgency. 1964.
The aim of counterinsurgency operations is to set the conditions that eliminate
insurgency by securing and garnering the support of the population, as well
as increasing the legitimacy of the Host Nation government. To accomplish this,
tactical COIN planning uses all capabilities, not just military capabilities. This
chapter shows the tactical planning process of counterinsurgency operations through
sections on basic tactical design, planning horizons, the military decision-making
process (MDMP), troop-leading procedures (TLP), and targeting.
Section I—OVERVIEW
The battlefield of the Twenty-First Century has proven to be complex due to increasing urbanization,
globalization, and religious fundamentalism; multiple enemy, friendly, and neutral actors; and ambiguous
guidance and direction. It is through planning that the commander is able to see the desired outcome, lay out
effective ways to achieve it, and communicate his vision, intent, and decisions to his subordinates, focusing on
the results he wants to achieve (FM 5-0). Progress in counterinsurgencies is slow and difficult to measure.
It can continue for weeks, months, even years. With the complexity of counterinsurgency operations,
commanders and staff have relied upon end states, the seven COIN lines of effort, measures of effectiveness
and performance and tight planning horizons to impose order on the chaos and craft functional plans to guide
counterinsurgent efforts to increase the legitimacy of the Host Nation government along multiple lines of effort.
END STATE
4-1. At the tactical level, this is the set of conditions that, when achieved, accomplish the mission.
4-2. A condition is a specific existing circumstance, framed in military terms. that, when achieved,
describes one aspect of the desired end state. Achievement of all of the conditions obtains the end state. For
tactical commanders, the end state is typically a set of required conditions, usually for each LOE, that
defines the achievement of the commander’s tactical objective.
4-3. Historically, successful counterinsurgencies commonly focus on the political end state, unified
in their approach, and flexible in addressing the core insurgency issues. They secure the people, enhance
the legitimacy of the Host Nation government and, above all, show patience.
4-4. A military operation must be linked to a political end state, composed of various conditions that
the populace supports.
UNITY OF ACTION
4-5. Close coordination and effective cooperation between the Host Nation (civil, police, and military),
the US counterinsurgency force and all other coalition partners, allows the full strength of each to engage
all levels of the insurgency. Unity of effort is key. |
3-24.2 | 96 | Chapter 4
ROOT CAUSES
4-6. Root causes are the grievances of the people. Ultimately, for an insurgency to be successful, it
must provide a solution to the key issues of the people. At the same time, for a counterinsurgency to be
successful, it too must address these key issues.
PROTECTION OF THE PEOPLE
4-7. Most insurgencies use coercion and terror to gain support from the people and to inhibit the
people’s support of the government. The target of this coercion and terror is frequently the people
connected to the government—police, local administrators and teachers. As such, if the counterinsurgent
wishes to receive the support of the people they must not only protect their supporters and their families,
but also their communities. Often, protecting and controlling the people enables the counterinsurgent
to achieve the other conditions.
ENHANCEMENT OF THE LEGITIMACY OF THE HN GOVERNMENT
4-8. The US and other counterinsurgency partners must always focus on strengthening the Host Nation
government’s ability to defend itself and its populace from the insurgency.
PATIENCE
4-9. There is no decisive battle in counterinsurgency operations. Often, it takes years to create an
environment where a Host Nation government can and will defend itself and its people.
MEASURES OF PERFORMANCE AND EFFECTIVENESS
4-10. Tactical units must measure progress toward mission accomplishment. Commanders continuously
assess the operational environment and the progress of operations, and compare them to their initial vision
and commander’s intent. Units evaluate the operations progress or success through intelligence assets,
patrol reports, engagement with local leaders, graffiti, or surveys. Commanders adjust operations based on
their assessment to ensure objectives are met and the desired end state is achieved.
4-11. The assessment process measures the efforts that support operational and tactical objectives
and progress toward the desired military end state of the counterinsurgency across all LOEs. The
assessment process uses measures of performance and measures of effectiveness to gauge progress.
They are defined as follows:
MEASURE OF PERFORMANCE
4-12. An MOP is criterion used to assess friendly actions that is tied to measuring task accomplishment
(JP 1-02). MOPs confirm or deny that the task has been correctly performed. An example of a MOP
is “How many people registered to vote at the school this week?”
MEASURE OF EFFECTIVENESS
4-13. An MOE is criterion used to assess changes in system behavior, capability, or operational
environment that is tied to measuring the attainment of an end state, achievement of an objective,
or creation of an effect (JP 3-0). An example of a MOE is “Did the well project provide clean drinking
water to the village?”
PURPOSES
4-14. Measures of effectiveness and of performance help commanders determine when all or part of the
mission has been accomplished. The criteria used depend on the situation. Many times the MOP and MOE
must be determined and evaluated by the HN government or security forces. They often require
readjustment as the situation changes and objectives evolve. If an effect cannot be measured directly, then |
3-24.2 | 97 | Comprehensive Tactical Planning in Counterinsurgency
indicators of achieving the effect are measured. A measure of effectiveness or a measure of performance
has four characteristics. They are—
Measurable
4-15. They require quantitative or qualitative standards that can be used to measure them.
Discrete
4-16. Each criterion measures a distinct aspect of the operation. Excessive numbers of MOEs and MOPs
become unmanageable. At that point, the cost of collection efforts outweighs the value of assessing.
Relevant
4-17. Each MOE and MOP must be relevant to the result or outcome. The key is visualizing the desired
result or outcome and identifying the most accurate and simplest indicator of it.
Responsive
4-18. MOEs and MOPs must detect changes quickly enough for commanders to respond immediately
and effectively.
4-19. Commanders and staffs also develop a standard or baseline as a comparison and identify trends.
From this information and analysis of why a trend is up or down, staffs can identify trouble spots and plan
operations to reverse negative trends. They can also capitalize on positive trends by determining what
is causing the positive increases and apply those tactics, techniques, and procedures more broadly.
4-20. Measures of effectiveness and measures of performance are included in the approved plan
or order and reevaluated continuously throughout preparation and execution. Higher echelon staffs should
ensure that the number of MOEs and MOPs do not overly burden lower echelons—especially battalion
and below. Well-devised MOEs and MOPs, supported by effective management of available information,
help commanders and staffs understand links between tasks, end state, and lines of effort.
PLANNING HORIZONS
4-21. During operations, a headquarters sends a tactical unit an operations plan or operations order.
Tactical units must then consider the scope of their mission and determine the planning horizons.
A planning horizon is a point in time commanders use to focus the organization’s planning efforts to shape
future events. Planning horizons, which in major combat operations are measured in hours and days
for tactical commanders may, in COIN operations, be measured in weeks, months, and years.
4-22. In contrast, tactical commanders, who have responsibility for terrain and a mission covering
multiple objectives that must be achieved systematically, require extended planning horizons. Managing
extended planning horizons have an impact on a tactical unit. The staff processes must be organized
to facilitate multiple outlooks, as an extended outlook does not relieve the immediacy of current operations.
However, this may be challenging for a company commander without a staff.
4-23. FM 5-0 defines three planning horizons—long-, mid-, and short-range plans. These horizons
create a useful construct for operations executed by tactical units in a counterinsurgency. Additionally, the
familiar quarterly training guidance and brief processes in FM 7-0 fit the long-term nature
of counterinsurgency operations.
LONG-RANGE PLANNING
4-24. Long-range planning encompasses the range of time where the situation is too uncertain to plan
for specific operations. Commanders must visualize what conditions they desire to exist, resulting from the
cumulative effect of all their tactical objectives. Visualizing the time required to establish these conditions
places approximate bounds on the extent of future planning. In general, when units are in a rotation
and have a planned transfer of authority, the long-range plan should consider the conditions that the
commander desires to exist at three months after the transfer. |
3-24.2 | 98 | Chapter 4
4-25. The long-range plan provides a construct for a commander to describe his vision of the
operational environment and their unit’s role over time using lines of effort. In addition to describing the
unit’s tactical objectives and the conditions they create, the plan provides a description of major events.
Providing a long lead time on major events can be critical to anticipating resources and identifying
milestones, or identifying and completing a series of interrelated tasks well in advance of the event.
Friendly forces as in a transfer of authority, the population as in elections, or the insurgency could drive the
event as it changes in phases, strategies, or organization.
4-26. Management of long-range plans allows the unit to synchronize its efforts with adjacent units
and the higher headquarters. When an objective requires the cumulative effect of hundreds of company,
platoon and squad missions to achieve the desired end state, long-range plans using lines of effort become
the tool to ensure unity of effort across the echelons. Assessment from current operations is analyzed
to determine if the desired effect is being achieved, then the long-range plan adjusts the activities of current
operations to ensure that the unit’s efforts are directed towards the defined end state. Table 4-1 shows
COIN long-range planning cycles.
Table 4-1. COIN long-range planning cycle.
Planning Action Planning Guidance Planning Horizon
Division Long-Range Plan 3 months prior to start Long-range plan horizon of 1 year
and Long-Range Calendar Calendar at least 1 year
BCT Long-Range Plan 2 months prior to start Long-range plan horizon of 1 year
and Long-Range Calendar Calendar at least 1 year
Battalion/Squadron Long-Range Plan 1 months prior to start Long-range plan horizon of 1 year
and Long-Range Calendar Calendar at least 6 months
MID-RANGE PLANNING
4-27. Mid-range plans are derived from the long-range plan. The long-range plan narrows the scope to a
frame of time where objectives or milestones that support objectives can be clearly defined and operations
planned in detail along all lines of effort. The mid-range plans therefore refine and expand upon the
appropriate portion of the long-range plan. Mid-range planning should not exceed the unit’s capability
to reasonably forecast events, assign resources and commit to a particular plan.
4-28. It is the mid-range plan that analyzes the mission in detail and produces the warning, fragmentary,
and operations orders that drive daily actions. These plans represent a commitment of resources and initiate
preparation by subordinate units. Table 4-2 shows various mid-range planning cycles.
Table 4-2. COIN mid-range planning cycle.
Planning Action Planning Guidance Planning Horizon
Division Quarterly FRAGO 6 weeks prior to start 3 months
of quarter
BCT Quarterly FRAGO 1 month prior to start 3 months
of quarter
Battalion/Squadron Quarterly FRAGO 2 weeks prior to start 3 months
of quarter
Company plan and calendar 1 week prior to start 3 months
of quarter
Quarterly assessment and backbrief Prior to start 3 months or more
of quarter |
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SHORT-RANGE PLANNING
4-29. Short-range planning represents the scope of detailed planning associated with a specific mission
or one to four weeks of normal operations. With resources assigned through mid-range planning,
short-range planning, the unit refines and expands the plan to include the tactical arrangement of forces,
execution matrices, patrol schedules, ISR plans and convoys.
4-30. A framework order is a fragmentary order (FRAGO) that identifies and tasks units for missions
for one to four weeks. It has also been called a “steady state order.” An example is a battalion FRAGO that
identifies the company that will patrol the route each day during the upcoming week. Table 4-3 shows
possible short-range planning cycles for units.
Table 4-3. COIN short-range planning cycle.
Planning Action Planning Guidance Planning Horizon
Brigade/Battalion/Squadron Meetings, 3 to 4 days prior to 1 to 4 weeks
Calendars, and Framework FRAGOs execution
Company Calendar and FRAGO 1 to 2 days prior to 1 week
execution
Section II—TACTICAL DESIGN
During counterinsurgency operations, small units address immediate objectives through tactics such as a raid
or cordon and search. These operations resemble the small unit actions of tactical units in major combat
operations, and many of the planning tools apply directly. The counterinsurgent, however, must also
accomplish objectives, which require time, assessment and continual redirection to accomplish tasks arranged
in lines of effort. Thus, COIN is an iterative process. In addition to presenting commanders and staffs with
objectives that must be accomplished both immediately and over time, counterinsurgencies typically present
more tactical objectives to a unit than they can address simultaneously. The counterinsurgent must truly plan
for full spectrum operations, transitioning from tasks that support one objective onto tasks that support a
different objective often within the same day. A systematic approach must be developed that is tailored to the
situation based on continuous assessment. While the complexities of major combat operations should not be
underestimated, counterinsurgencies bring a different set of complexities that requires staffs to apply analytical
tools to achieve mission success.
CONSIDERATIONS
4-31. The long, mid and short-range planning horizons help units establish a routine to assess the
success of their plan and revise the plan based on a changing operational environment. COIN is an iterative
process. —No unit—company, battalion, or brigade—understands its AO well enough to craft a perfect
plan across all seven LOEs. Like a rheostat, each must be balanced against the others. Success in the
Establish Civil Security and Establish Civil Control lines of effort typically allows units to focus less on
security and more on support to governance and restoration of essential services LOEs. The most effective
C2 mechanisms often give one single, permanent, senior local government official overall responsibility
for the counterinsurgency in their AO. These local officials in turn establish a local board, composed
of representatives from the civil authority, the military, the police, the intelligence services, and the civil
population, who manage all civil or military assets inside their AO. Additionally, tactical design
in counterinsurgency must consider how to—
• Secure the populations and areas that remain loyal.
• Reclaim the populations and areas that support the insurgency.
• Eliminate the insurgency, politically, militarily and philosophically.
• Develop Host Nation military and police forces that—
(cid:131) Defend their own bases and other critical sites. |
3-24.2 | 100 | Chapter 4
(cid:131) Protect and secure all elements of the populace equally.
(cid:131) Support the restoration of government presence and control.
(cid:131) Aggressively oppose insurgency in order to neutralize the insurgent leadership, cadre,
and combatants, through death, capture, co-opting individual, or forcing them to leave
the area.
(cid:131) Promote normalcy and stability.
(cid:131) Protect basic services.
(cid:131) Assist civic action projects.
• Help establish an HN legal framework and C2 mechanisms to aid implementation of the plan.
• Secure the critical infrastructure, to include governmental and societal critical sites.
• Win the information war, specifically—
(cid:131) Counter the insurgent’s propaganda.
(cid:131) Conduct friendly information engagements.
• Continually analyze and assess the success of the plan.
THE SEVEN COUNTERINSURGENCY LINES OF EFFORT
4-32. As discussed in Chapter 3, lines of effort (LOEs) are used to visualize, describe and direct
operations when positional references to an adversary have little relevance, like in a counterinsurgency.
Ideally, LOEs combine the complementary, long-term effects of stability tasks with the cyclic, short-term
events typical of combat operations. Using lines of effort, tactical commanders develop tactical tasks
and tactical missions, allocate resources, and assess the effectiveness of the operation. The commander
may specify which line of effort represents the decisive operation and which are shaping operations.
Commanders synchronize activities along multiple LOEs to achieve the conditions that compose the
desired end state and do not view them as a sequential “road map” to success.
4-33. The seven counterinsurgency lines of effort—establish civil security, establish civil control,
support Host Nation security forces, restore essential services, support to economic and infrastructure
development, support to governance, and conduct information engagement—are intended as a guide
for tactical units. LOEs can be combined, eliminated, or expanded depending on the insurgency and the
overall situation. Employing the seven COIN LOEs adeptly requires a unity of effort with the HN
and other nonmilitary agencies. Figure 4-1 shows a notional tactical unit’s LOEs during a
counterinsurgency. The subparagraphs that follow the figure summarize the seven counterinsurgency lines
of effort and their first primary subtasks.
ESTABLISH CIVIL SECURITY
4-34. Civil security involves protecting areas, resources, and the populace from both external
and internal threats (FM 3-07). Ideally, Army forces focus on the external threats while police and security
elements address internal security against terrorists, criminals and small, hostile groups. However, during
an insurgency, the Army may also address the internal security against criminals, terrorists, and guerrillas.
4-35. Most societal and government functions require a secure environment and obtaining civil security
is often a prerequisite for other stability tasks to be effective. Although US and multinational forces can
provide direct assistance to establish and maintain security, this situation is at best a provisional solution.
Ultimately, the Host Nation must secure its own people. Typical civil security tasks include—
• Enforce cessation of hostilities, peace agreements, and other arrangements.
• Conduct disarmament, demobilization, and registration.
• Conduct border control, boundary security, and freedom of movement.
• Support identification.
• Protect key personnel and facilities.
• Clear explosive and CBRN hazards. |
3-24.2 | 101 | Comprehensive Tactical Planning in Counterinsurgency
ESTABLISH CIVIL CONTROL
4-36. Civil control regulates selected behavior and activities of individuals and groups (FM 3-07). This
control reduces risk to individuals or groups and promotes security. Civil control channels the population’s
activities to allow provision of security and essential services while coexisting with a military force
conducting operations. Typical civil control tasks include—
• Establish public order and safety.
• Establish interim criminal justice system.
• Support law enforcement and police reform.
• Support judicial reform.
• Support property dispute resolution processes.
• Support corrections reform.
• Support public outreach and community rebuilding programs. |
3-24.2 | 102 | Chapter 4
Figure 4-1. Lines of effort.
SUPPORT TO HOST NATION SECURITY FORCES
4-37. The US military helps the Host Nation develop the forces required to establish and sustain
stability within its borders. This assistance can include developing, equipping, training and employing HN
security forces. It may expand to multinational operations where HN forces and US forces fight alongside
one another. HN security forces include military forces, police, corrections and border guards. Typical civil
control tasks include—
• Measure (assess) HN security forces.
• Organize HN security forces. |
3-24.2 | 103 | Comprehensive Tactical Planning in Counterinsurgency
• Rebuild/build infrastructure for HN security forces.
• Train HN security forces.
• Equip HN security forces.
• Advise HN security forces.
• Mentor HN security forces.
SUPPORT TO GOVERNANCE
4-38. Sometimes no HN government exists or the government is unable or unwilling to assume full
responsibility for governance. In those cases, this LOE may involve establishing and maintaining a military
government or a civil administration while creating an HN capability to govern. When well executed, these
actions may eliminate the root causes of the insurgency. Governance activities are among the most
important of all in establishing lasting stability for a region or nation. Stability operations establish
conditions that enable interagency and Host Nation actions to succeed. Military efforts help to build
progress toward achieving effective, legitimate governance by restoring public administration
and re-sorting public services while fostering long-term efforts to establish a functional, effective system
of political governance. Military actions help to shape the environment so interagency and HN actions can
succeed. Typical support to government tasks include—
• Support transitional administrations.
• Support development of local governance.
• Support anticorruption initiatives.
• Support elections.
RESTORE ESSENTIAL SERVICES
4-39. Army forces establish or restore the basic services that address the life support needs of the HN
population and protect them until a civil authority or the Host Nation can provide them (FM 3-0). The
counterinsurgent force works toward meeting the population’s basic needs. Ideally, the military is simply
providing the security for the humanitarian assistance by supporting other government, intergovernmental,
and Host Nation agencies. When the Host Nation or other agency cannot perform its role, Army forces
may provide the basics directly. Typical "restore essential services tasks include—
• Provide essential civil services.
• Tasks related to civilian dislocation.
• Support famine prevention and emergency food relief programs.
• Support public health programs.
• Support education programs.
SUPPORT TO ECONOMIC AND INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT
4-40. Military task executed to support the economic sector are critical to sustainable economic
development (FM 3-07). The economic development LOE includes both short—and long-term aspects.
The short-term aspect concerns immediate problems, such as large-scale unemployment and reestablishing
an economy. The long-term aspect involves stimulating indigenous, robust, and broad economic activity.
The stability a nation enjoys is often related to its people’s economic situation and its adherence to the rule
of law. However, a nation’s economic health also depends on its government’s ability to continuously
secure its population. Support to economic and infrastructure development helps a Host Nation develop
capability and capacity in these areas. It may involve direct and indirect military assistance to local,
regional, and national entities. Typical support economic and infrastructure development tasks include—
• Support economic generation and enterprise creation.
• Support public sector investment programs.
• Support private sector development.
• Support agricultural development programs.
• Restore transportation infrastructure. |
3-24.2 | 104 | Chapter 4
• Restore telecommunications infrastructure.
• Support general infrastructure reconstruction programs.
• Use money as a weapon system.
CONDUCT INFORMATION ENGAGEMENT
4-41. This is the integrated employment of public affairs to inform US and friendly audiences;
psychological operations, combat camera, US Government strategic communication and defense support
to public diplomacy, and other means necessary to influence foreign audiences; and, leader and Soldier
engagements to support both efforts (FM 3-0). Information engagements are part of all military operations
in an area. All leaders must be directly involved in conducting information engagements. These shape the
information environment in three ways: by informing audiences using factual information (with public
affairs), by influencing selected audiences in the area of operations (with psychological operations
and face-to-face meetings), and most important, by persuading audiences through the actions of Soldiers.
Considerations for Constructing an Information Engagement Plan
4-42. Effective information engagement plans can rally popular support for counterinsurgent efforts,
marginalize insurgent violent actions, and neutralize the insurgency’s political decision-making
capabilities. Everything that a tactical unit does or fails to do in COIN plays a part in its information
engagement plan. Therefore, information engagements must be synchronized and nested through common
multiechelon themes. Themes must be tailored to different target audience by the manner in which they are
presented or distributed. In COIN, perception is often more important than truth.
Successful Planning Characteristics
4-43. To effectively craft an effective information engagement plan, tactical units must ensure that it is
decentralized to the lowest level, executed in a timely manner, account for HN culture, be planned with HN
counterparts, and easily be combined into all COIN operations. The commander should take an active
interest in his information engagement plan. He does this through his information engagement intent,
emphasis to his staff and soldiers, and assignment of information engagement responsibilities. The staff
should be integrated into the information engagement plan and dedicated to information engagement
success. Higher headquarters should prevent information fratricide by subordinate units through integrating
mechanisms, which most often comes through daily or weekly synchronization meetings.
Themes
4-44. Tactical units most often implement their information engagement plans through the construct of
themes that address target audiences. Themes may include simple messages that can easily be repeated (the
“bumper sticker”) and are often referred to as “talking points.” Successful themes are those that –
• Keep objectives simple and achievable.
• Manage expectations and perceptions of the HN populace. Keep counterinsurgent goals
attainable.
• Use previous HN contacts and relationships.
• Can be distributed using formal and informal methods by Soldiers at all levels. Formal methods
include posting public notices, briefings to community leaders, and talking to local media.
Informal methods include patrols talking to local citizenry, handing out leaflets, and using
loudspeakers.
• Respond to events and insurgent propaganda rapidly, admit mistakes, and deals with the
populace honestly.
Target Audiences
4-45. In COIN, themes must be tailored to resonate with the target audience. The tailoring process
should take into account cultural understanding. In addition, audiences can be separated as far down as
neighborhoods, ethnicity, religion, class, and other factors. The audience may include the US civilian
population, international forums, US soldiers, HN population, and insurgents. |
3-24.2 | 105 | Comprehensive Tactical Planning in Counterinsurgency
HN Population
4-46. Themes that target the HN populace should focus on rallying them against insurgent activities and
highlight successes of the HN government and HN security forces. Both themes will reinforce legitimacy.
These themes generally build cohesiveness among the population and counter insurgent divisive themes.
Cohesive themes highlight—
• Commonality of ultimate goals.
• Commonality of labor, economic, and material problems.
• Ability to separate facts from perceptions and solve important problems.
• Ethnic similarities and common origins.
• Religion and social similarities.
• Traditional or historical evidence of unity.
• Failure of traditional solutions accompanied by awareness of a need for new solutions.
• Patriotism and nationalism.
• Ability to provide information to the government without fear of reprisal.
Insurgent
4-47. Insurgents manage perceptions through propaganda and disinformation. Rarely do they have to
tell the truth. In technologically advanced insurgencies, filming an attack may be as important as the attack
itself. Therefore, themes aimed at insurgents must divide insurgent groups into smaller groups and
separate the insurgents from the population. Also, themes should counter insurgent propaganda. In many
successful information engagement plans, reconciliation and amnesty for certain insurgents have been key
components.
• Divisive theme categories.
(cid:131) Political, social, economic, and ideological differences among elements of the insurgents.
(cid:131) Leadership rivalries within the insurgent movement.
(cid:131) Portrait of insurgents as criminals, inept, and counter to the goals of the HN populace.
(cid:131) Danger of betrayal from among the insurgents.
(cid:131) Harsh living conditions of insurgents.
(cid:131) Selfish motivation of opportunists supporting the insurgents.
(cid:131) Separate foreign fighters from domestic groups using patriotism and nationalism, when
appropriate.
(cid:131) Separate public from the perception that insurgents are noble.
(cid:131) Public outcry.
(cid:131) Reconciliation or amnesty.
• Countering insurgent propaganda
(cid:131) Proactive and designed to neutralize the psychological impact of future attacks.
(cid:131) Acknowledge the possibility, even likelihood, of future attacks.
(cid:131) Criminal attacks against HN population.
(cid:131) Foreign ties and leadership.
(cid:131) Highlight Insurgent ineptitude.
Public Affairs
4-48. This is a commander’s responsibility. Its purpose is to proactively inform and educate through
public information, command information, and direct community engagement. Public affairs have a
statutory responsibility to factually and accurately inform various publics without intent to propagandize
or manipulate public opinion. Public affairs facilitates a commander’s obligation to support informed US
citizenry, US Government decision makers, and as tactical requirements may dictate non-US audiences.
Public affairs and other information engagement tasks must be synchronized to ensure consistency,
command credibility, and operations security as part of the planning process. (For more information, see
JP 3-61, AR 360-1, FM 46-1 and FM 3-61.1.) |
3-24.2 | 106 | Chapter 4
Media
4-49. In a COIN environment, the most difficult portion of information engagement—when necessary—
involves dealing with the media. Media contacts normally should be handled by the appropriate public
affairs officer (PAO). However, this is not always possible, and silence is not always the best solution.
Refusal to speak with accredited members of the media may create strong negative impressions with
strategic implications.
Best Practices
• Stress the human aspects of a story, including the impact of opposing operations on people,
with which readers, viewers, or listeners can identify.
• Point out the needs of the unfortunate, and the fact that both Soldiers and HN counterparts are
working to address those needs.
• If you do not know the answer, try to get it and then either inform the reporter, or refer the
reporter to another source. This may establish your team as a helpful source and develop a
relationship that can help ensure future balanced coverage.
• Resist the temptation to attack other groups or organizations, and avoid committing information
fratricide.
• If questioned about another agency’s activities, refer to that agency for comment. Never speak
for other organizations.
• Keep trusted reporters and editors who cover the AO about significant activities there.
• Answer media inquiries promptly, accurately, and courteously.
• Learn reporters’ deadlines and use them to the friendly force’s advantage.
• Encourage media to see what HN and US Soldiers are doing.
• Avoid reacting emotionally to skepticism or hostility.
• Discuss issues calmly.
• Use facts to back up statements.
• Stay focused on the mission.
• Follow the policies of higher HQ and PAO for media interviews.
• Remain friendly, yet professional.
• Use reporters' names.
• Use clear, understandable language.
• Be prepared. Anticipate questions and think about various responses.
• Get to know the interviewers.
• Research the media’s organizations and views.
• Find out how the reporter previously conducted interviews.
• Emphasize the interests of the local nationals or other beneficiaries of the mission.
• Avoid speculation.
• State only facts that can be verified.
• Quote statistics with care, as data is easily repurposed.
• Avoid repeating questions, especially those with incorrect or inflammatory language, as this
could easily be misquoted or taken out of context.
• Refuse “off-the-record” discussions—there is no such thing!
• Avoid saying “No comment.” which can make you sound evasive.
• Stay objective. Save personal opinions and beliefs for a more appropriate time and place.
Psychological Operations
4-50. These operations convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence
their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments,
organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce
foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator’s objectives (JP 1-02). Psychological operations |
3-24.2 | 107 | Comprehensive Tactical Planning in Counterinsurgency
can be directed at the civilian populace as a whole, specific groups, or individuals outside the United States
and its territories. Psychological operations can influence and modify the behavior of foreign target
audiences in support of US objectives. In a COIN operation, PSYOP seeks to increase popular support for
the Host Nation government. Typically, PSYOP directs its messages at the populace. However,
psychological operations may focus on convincing enemy fighters to surrender rather than risk destruction.
Therefore, these capabilities may be integrated into counterinsurgency targeting. Psychological operations
units may also be task-organized with maneuver forces.
Population
4-51. The PSYOP message to the population in COIN has three key facets:
• Obtain buy-in by COIN force for actions that affect the populace, such as—
(cid:131) Control measures.
(cid:131) Census.
• Win over passive or neutral people by showing HN legitimacy and commitment.
• Encourage locals to provide information about the insurgency to US or HN security forces.
Insurgents
4-52. The PSYOP message to the insurgents has three key facets:
• Divide insurgent leaders and guerrillas by emphasizing differences
(cid:131) In ideology within the insurgency.
(cid:131) In the degree of sacrifice required by different groups.
• Divide insurgents and mass base by emphasizing
(cid:131) Failures of the insurgency.
(cid:131) Successes of the government.
• Create a means for insurgents to abandon the movement and return to the society.
Leader and Soldier Engagement
4-53. The actions of leaders and Soldiers are the most powerful components of information
engagement. Visible actions coordinated with carefully chosen, truthful words influence audiences more
than either does alone. Local and regional audiences as well as adversaries compare the friendly force’s
message with its actions. Face-to-face interaction by leaders and Soldiers strongly influences the
perceptions of the local populace. Meetings conducted by leaders with key communicators, civilian
leaders, or others whose perceptions, decisions, and actions will affect mission accomplishment can be
critical to mission success. These meetings provide the most convincing venue for conveying positive
information, assuaging fears, and refuting rumors, lies, and misinformation.
Techniques
4-54. At the tactical level, there are three primary means a unit can use to disseminate its message: word
of mouth, announcements, and town hall meetings.
Word of Mouth
4-55. This is the most basic form of sending and receiving information, and ultimately the form that
every other method will become. Word of mouth is the quickest, most common, most inaccurate and most
uncontrollable means of disseminating information; but it may be the best way to send a message. Rumors,
spins, casual conversations and dinner-table discussions—whatever form they take, word of mouth travels
like wild fire. It spreads out of control and the story grows and changes with each conversation. Everything
a unit does is observed and discussed by the locals and spun by the enemy. Units should be prepared
to counter false information. Patrols must interact with the populace. They must listen for rumors
and correct the ones they hear, but do not waste time arguing about them. Units must spread a positive
image and reinforce the good things the government is doing in the area to help the populace. |
3-24.2 | 108 | Chapter 4
Announcements
4-56. Both written and verbal announcements are quick and controlled means of sending messages.
Flyers, loud speakers and public speaking are useful ways of informing the populace of progress, incentive
programs, civil projects and operations.
Town Hall Meetings
4-57. Town Hall meetings are an effective means of discussing points and counter points to coalition
or government presence, operations and the unifying message. They tend to draw the people that are most
interested in the issues and have the most legitimate grievances. This type of meeting also exposes the
leaders of the community and the general opinion of the locals. These are planned meetings with an open
forum. Units should exercise caution and not allow themselves to get trapped in arguments that take them
off their message. Keep in mind that it is an open forum and the insurgents will ensure that people
sympathetic to their cause are present and are fighting for their interests in the political arena.
Section III—MDMP AND TLP
The Army has two tactical planning processes: the military decision-making process (MDMP)
and troop-leading procedures (TLP). The MDMP is more appropriate for headquarters with staffs; it provides a
logical sequence of decisions and interactions between the commander and staff for developing estimates
and effective plans orders. Leaders at company level and below use TLP to plan and prepare for an operation.
The preferred method of planning is reverse planning. The commander visualizes and describes the end state
and the staff plans from the operations end state, working backward in time. Counterinsurgency can create
situations where the end state serves as a distant aiming point for a tactical objective. Over time and through
continual assessment, the end state and conditions that define mission success become more clear. Forward
planning involves starting with the present conditions and laying out potential decisions and actions forward
in time, identifying the next feasible step, and the next after that. The counterinsurgent must effectively
combine the two methods of planning to achieve both the immediate objective and those, which must be
accomplished over time.
MILITARY DECISION-MAKING PROCESS
4-58. The military decision-making process is a planning model that establishes procedures
for analyzing a mission; developing, analyzing, and comparing courses of action against measures of
effectives and performance and each other; selecting the optimum course of action; and producing a plan
or order. The MDMP helps organize the thought process of commanders and staff. It is the process used by
tactical counterinsurgent forces to organize large amounts of information orchestrate the appropriate
sequence of action to defeat the insurgency. The process of developing long-range plans uses the military
decision-making process. The following are some key points in the development of the plan.
• Perform IPB (incorporate enemy and population throughout the process).
• Analyze the mission using the operational variables (PMESII-PT).
• Analyze the mission using the mission variables (METT-TC).
(cid:131) Use ASCOPE to understand `the civil considerations.
(cid:131) If not clear from higher, determine the problem. This may be an iterative process.
• Determine end state and conditions along nested LOEs.
• Determine objectives.
(cid:131) Specified (directed objectives and missions).
(cid:131) Implied (direct approach to insurgents, indirect approach to insurgents addressing
prerequisites and root causes, supporting higher HQs objectives and end state).
• Organize objectives along LOEs and adjust LOEs and further define conditions.
• Identify a potentially decisive line of effort.
• Refine each objective and develop—
(cid:131) Decisive points.
(cid:131) MOEs. |
3-24.2 | 109 | Comprehensive Tactical Planning in Counterinsurgency
(cid:131) MOPs.
(cid:131) Supporting objectives.
(cid:131) Targets.
• Frame the time and resources for near-term planning—
(cid:131) Events
(cid:131) Ability to predict or analyze
(cid:131) Combat power
(cid:131) Operating tempo
(cid:131) Phasing or timing.
• Pay attention to balanced development across all lines of effort.
• Prioritize supporting objectives and targets to resources.
• Develop order with tasks and ISR plan.
• Make current operations plans.
• Execute near-term missions.
• Assess current operations, new intelligence or new missions.
• Use this assessment to drive the process through another cycle.
4-59. Commanders modify the process as needed to fit the situation. While typical modification of the
MDMP is driven by the need to save time, the counterinsurgent unit has two key reasons to modify
the process:
• The end product of long-range planning is not an operations order that is prepared
for execution in the traditional sense. The long-range plan provides a focus for short-range
planning and ensures that the operations currently being conducted are having the desired effect
on the end state.
• Each planning session within a counterinsurgency is interrelated to the planning that preceded
it. Units will conduct a thorough MDMP initially and then build continuously on those products
and their situational understanding as they progress through successive planning cycles. Units
throughout their rotation continue to “learn and adapt." Through assessment, the commander
will focus his staff on areas that require further detailed analysis and limit effort on areas where
sufficient analysis has already been conducted.
4-60. This analysis is captured in the staff’s running estimate. A running estimate is a staff section’s
continuous assessment of current and future operations to determine if the current operation is proceeding
according to the commander’s intent and if future operations are supportable. This, along with the
commander’s assessment and those of subordinate commanders, build a growing understanding of the
unit’s operations area and allows the unit to modify the MDMP, not out of necessity of time but through
the ability to rapidly and accurately define problems and solutions.
4-61. Insurgencies are inherently complex and dynamic; they cannot be fully understood through a
single cycle of the MDMP. It is the cumulative effect of analysis and planning that builds and refines
knowledge of a unit’s area of operations, captured in the running estimate over the course of many
successive planning cycles that allows the successful defeat of the insurgency.
4-62. By developing a comprehensive and iterative plan the counterinsurgent force follows the
conventional MDMP steps. However, fighting an insurgency, or more precisely conducting
counterinsurgency operations, is not a conventional military operation. As such, the operational
environment of counterinsurgency dictates some unique considerations to the conventional MDMP steps.
These considerations apply primarily to four MDMP steps—receive the mission, mission analysis, COA
development and COA analysis. Figure 4-2 highlights considerations in a COIN MDMP. |
3-24.2 | 110 | Chapter 4
Input Steps Output Coin
Mission received from Step 1: Receipt of Commander's initial Mission developed internally
higher or developed mission guidance *
internally * WARNORD
WARNORD
Higher HQ's order/plan Step 2: Mission analysis Restated mission * Use PMESII-PT to analyze
Higher HQ's IPB Initial commander's intent the AO
Running estimates and planning guidance * Use the mission variables
Initial CCIR * and civil considerations to
develop better understanding
Updated running estimates
of the AO
Initial IPB products
Account for HN security
Initial ISR plan
forces, multinational,
Preliminary movement paramilitary, and all US
forces and agencies
Account for multiple enemy,
multinational, and
paramilitary forces
WARNORD
Restated mission * Step 3: COA Updated running estimates Use components and
Initial commander's intent, Development and products manifestations of the
planning guidance, and COA statements and insurgency in IPB
CCIR * sketches Develop COAs for HN
Updated running Refined commander's intent security forces
estimates and planning guidance *
Initial PPB products
Refined commander's Step 4: COA Analysis War-game results War-game with four groups:
intent and planning (Wargame) Decision support templates Enemy/population
guidance
Task organization Host Nation/US COIN forces
Enemy COAs
Mission to subordinate units Modeling may be an
COA statements and Recommended CCIR appropriate wargaming tool
sketches
War-game results Step 5: COA Decision matrix *
Criteria for comparison Comparison
Decision matrix Step 6: COA Approval Approved COA *
Refined commander's
intent *
Refined CCIR *
High payoff target list *
WARNORD
Approved COA Step 7: Orders OPLAN/OPORD Ensure balance between
Refined commander's Production LOEs
intent and guidance Ensure unity of effort
Refined CCIR Using two languages
increases the time required to
produce and brief the order,
and to conduct combined
rehearsals
* Commander's activity or decision
Figure 4-2. COIN MDMP. |
3-24.2 | 111 | Comprehensive Tactical Planning in Counterinsurgency
Step 1: Receipt of Mission
4-63. As with any military operation, the MDMP begins upon receipt of an order, upon anticipating a
change in mission or upon seizing an opportunity in the AO. As in conventional operations, the MDMP
steps during this phase—alert the staff, gather the tools, update running estimates, perform an initial
assessment, issue the initial guidance, and issue the initial warning order—are largely unchanged. Units
should account for additional time when working with HN security forces and continue to refine their
METT-TC analysis, especially the civil considerations using ASCOPE.
4-64. During receipt of the mission, two basic considerations apply. First, the strategic mission
of defeating the insurgency applies to all levels at all times. This means that all operational or tactical
missions, activities and tasks are nested within this mission and can have a direct, lasting impact on its
success or failure. Second, it is here that the commander begins to visualize the operation. It is critical for
the commander to create a comprehensive vision of the end state. From this desired end state, the staff
develops the lines of effort that support creating the commander’s vision. All lines of effort are focused on
their own end states and those end states are nested with the commander’s overall end state for the
operation, which is nested with the overall mission of defeating the insurgency.
Step 2: Mission Analysis
4-65. The seventeen tasks within mission analysis differ little from those for conventional operations.
For COIN, the staff considers the following factors:
Analyze Higher Headquarters' Order
4-66. In addition to analyzing the information the order, the staff must use the operational and mission
variables to analyze the AO. Staff members pay special attention to civil considerations within the AO,
using ASCOPE.
Perform Initial IPB
4-67. (See Appendix A for a detailed discussion of IPB in a COIN environment.)
Determine Specified, Implied, and Essential Tasks
4-68. The staff may find identifying the implied tasks in the ambiguous and complex COIN
environment more difficult than the task would be for a conventional operation. They may have to conduct
the MDMP many times as situations change.
Review Available Assets
4-69. The staff must remember to account for all HN security forces and for US, coalition, and Host
Nation enablers.
Determine Constraints
4-70. The staff reviews the ROE.
Identify Critical Facts and Assumptions
4-71. The staff ensures that facts and assumptions include US, HN security forces, population groups as
well as the enemy.
Perform Risk Assessment
4-72. (Same as for conventional operations; see FM 5-19.)
Determine Initial CCIR (PIR and FFIR) and EEFI
4-73. (No change from conventional.) |
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