Unnamed: 0
int64 0
3.3k
| ID
int64 50.6k
63.3k
| name
stringlengths 10
148
| href
stringlengths 33
45
| docket
stringlengths 1
9
⌀ | term
stringclasses 70
values | first_party
stringlengths 1
223
⌀ | second_party
stringlengths 1
193
⌀ | facts
stringlengths 26
6.2k
| facts_len
int64 26
6.2k
| majority_vote
int64 0
9
| minority_vote
int64 0
4
| first_party_winner
bool 2
classes | decision_type
stringclasses 10
values | disposition
stringclasses 9
values | issue_area
stringclasses 14
values |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1,400 | 54,989 |
Festo Corporation v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Company
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/00-1543
|
00-1543
|
2001
|
Festo Corporation
|
Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Company
|
<p>Festo Corporation owns two patents for an improved magnetic rodless cylinder, a piston-driven device that relies on magnets to move objects in a conveying system. When the patent examiner rejected the initial application for the first patent because of defects in description, the application was amended to add the new limitations that the device would contain a pair of one-way sealing rings and that its outer sleeve would be made of a magnetizable material. The second patent was also amended during a reexamination proceeding to add the sealing rings limitation. After Festo began selling its device, SMC entered the market with a similar device that uses one two-way sealing ring and a nonmagnetizable sleeve. Festo filed suit, claiming that SMC's device is so similar that it infringes Festo's patents under the doctrine of equivalents. Rejecting SMC's argument that the prosecution history, or the public record of the patent proceedings, estopped Festo from saying that SMC's device was similar, the District Court ruled in Festo's favor. Ultimately, the en banc Court of Appeals held that the prosecution history estoppel applied, ruling that estoppel arises from any amendment that narrows a claim to comply with the Patent Act. The Court of Appeals also held that, when estoppel applies, it bars any claim of equivalence for the element that was amended.</p>
| 1,374 | 9 | 0 | false |
majority opinion
|
affirmed
|
Economic Activity
|
1,401 | 54,991 |
JPMorgan Chase Bank v. Traffic Stream (BVI) Infrastructure Ltd.
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/01-651
|
01-651
|
2001
|
JPMorgan Chase Bank
|
Traffic Stream (BVI) Infrastructure Ltd.
|
<p>Traffic Stream (BVI) Infrastructure Ltd. is a corporation organized under the laws of the British Virgin Islands (BVI), an Overseas Territory of the United Kingdom. In 1998, Chase Manhattan Bank, now JPMorgan Chase Bank, agreed to finance certain Traffic Stream ventures, with the contract to be governed by New York law and with Traffic Stream agreeing to submit to the jurisdiction of federal courts in Manhattan. Subsequently, Chase sued Traffic Stream for defaulting on its obligations. The District Court found subject-matter jurisdiction under the alienage diversity statute, 28 USC section 1332(a)(2), which gives district courts jurisdiction over civil actions where the controversy is "between citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state," and granted Chase summary judgment. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found that, because Traffic Stream was a citizen of an Overseas Territory and not an independent foreign state, jurisdiction was lacking.</p>
| 985 | 9 | 0 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed
|
Judicial Power
|
1,402 | 54,994 |
Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/00-1293
|
00-1293
|
2001
|
Ashcroft
|
American Civil Liberties Union
|
<p>Unlike the Communications Decency Act of 1996, the Child Online Protection Act (COPA) applies only to material displayed on the World Wide Web, covers only communications made for commercial purposes, and restricts only "material that is harmful to minors." Moreover, COPA requires jurors to apply "contemporary community standards" in assessing material. Before it was scheduled to go into effect, a number of organizations affected by COPA filed suit, alleging that the statute violated adults' First Amendment rights because it effectively banned constitutionally protected speech, was not the least restrictive means of accomplishing a compelling governmental purpose, and was substantially overbroad. The District Court issued a preliminary injunction. In affirming, the Court of Appeals, reasoning that COPA's use of contemporary community standards to identify material that is harmful to minors rendered the statute substantially overbroad.</p>
| 956 | 8 | 1 | true |
majority opinion
|
vacated/remanded
|
First Amendment
|
1,403 | 54,993 |
Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/00-1167
|
00-1167
|
2001
|
Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc.
|
Tahoe Regional Planning Agency
|
<p>The Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (TRPA) imposed two moratoria from August 24, 1981, until August 26, 1983 and from August 27, 1983, until April 25, 1984, totaling 32 months, on development in the Lake Tahoe Basin while formulating a comprehensive land-use plan for the area. Real estate owners affected by the moratoria and an association representing such owners, including the Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc., filed suits, claiming that TRPA's actions constituted a taking of their property without just compensation. The District Court found that TRPA had not effected a partial taking; however, it concluded that the moratoria did constitute a categorical taking because TRPA temporarily deprived real estate owners of all economically viable use of their land. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that because the regulations had only a temporary impact, no categorical taking had occurred.</p>
| 917 | 6 | 3 | false |
majority opinion
|
affirmed
|
Due Process
|
1,404 | 54,996 |
National Railroad Passenger Corporation v. Morgan
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/00-1614
|
00-1614
|
2001
|
National Railroad Passenger Corporation
|
Morgan
|
<p>Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, a plaintiff shall file an employment discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) either 180 or 300 days after an alleged unlawful employment practice occurred. Abner Morgan filed a charge of discrimination and retaliation with the EEOC against National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak), alleging that he had been subjected to discrete discriminatory and retaliatory acts and had experienced a racially hostile work environment throughout his employment. The EEOC issued a "Notice of Right to Sue." While some of the allegedly discriminatory acts occurred within 300 days of the time that Morgan filed his EEOC charge, many took place prior to that period. The District Court granted Amtrak summary judgment in part, holding that the company could not be liable for conduct occurring outside of the 300-day filing period. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that a plaintiff may sue on claims that would ordinarily be time-barred so long as they either are sufficiently related to incidents that fall within the statutory period or are part of a systematic policy or practice of discrimination that took place, at least in part, within the period.</p>
| 1,248 | 5 | 4 | false |
majority opinion
|
reversed in-part/remanded
|
Civil Rights
|
1,405 | 54,999 |
Correctional Services Corporation v. Malesko
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/00-860
|
00-860
|
2001
|
Correctional Services Corporation
|
Malesko
|
<p>In 1993, John E. Malesko was assigned to a bedroom on the fifth floor of the Le Marquis Community Correctional Center, a facility that houses federal inmates run by the Correctional Services Corporation (CSC) under contract with the Bureau of Prisons. After CSC instituted a policy requiring inmates residing below the sixth floor to use the stairs rather than the elevator, Malesko, who was afflicted with a heart condition limiting his ability to climb stairs, was exempted form the policy. When a CSC employee did not let Malesko use the elevator, he climbed the stairs, suffered a heart attack, and fell. Subsequently, Malesko filed a suit, alleging that CSC was negligence in refusing him the use of the elevator. Under Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, in which the U.S. Supreme Court recognized for the first time an implied private action for damages against federal officers alleged to have violated a citizen's constitutional rights, the District Court dismissed the suit, finding that such an action may only be maintained against individuals. In reversing, the Court of Appeals reasoned that such private entities should be held liable under Bivens to accomplish Bivens' goal of providing a remedy for constitutional violations.</p>
| 1,273 | 5 | 4 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed
|
Civil Rights
|
1,406 | 54,998 |
Atkins v. Virginia
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/00-8452
|
00-8452
|
2001
|
Atkins
|
Virginia
|
<p>Daryl Renard Atkins was convicted of abduction, armed robbery, and capital murder. In the penalty phase of Atkins' trial, the defense relied on one witness, a forensic psychologist, who testified that Atkins was mildly mentally disabled (or "mentally retarded" in the vernacular of the day). The jury sentenced Atkins to death, but the Virginia Supreme Court ordered a second sentencing hearing because the trial court had used a misleading verdict form. During resentencing the same forensic psychologist testified, but this time the State rebutted Atkins' intelligence. The jury again sentenced Atkins to death. In affirming, the Virginia Supreme Court relied on Penry v. Lynaugh, in rejecting Atkins' contention that he could not be sentenced to death because he is mentally retarded.</p>
| 795 | 6 | 3 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed/remanded
|
Criminal Procedure
|
1,407 | 55,001 |
United States v. Knights
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/00-1260
|
00-1260
|
2001
|
United States
|
Knights
|
<p>A California court sentenced Mark James Knights to probation for a drug offense. The probation order included the following condition: that Knights would "submit his...person, property, place of residence, vehicle, personal effects, to search at anytime, with or without a search warrant, warrant of arrest or reasonable cause by any probation officer or law enforcement officer." In the aftermath of arson at the site of a Pacific Gas and Electric (PGE) power transformer, a sheriff's detective, with reasonable suspicion, searched Knights's apartment. Based in part on items recovered, including a PGE padlock, a federal grand jury indicted Knights for conspiracy to commit arson, for possession of an unregistered destructive device, and for being a felon in possession of ammunition. In granting Knights's motion to suppress, the District Court held that, although the detective had reasonable suspicion to believe that Knights was involved with incendiary materials, the search was for "investigatory" rather than "probationary" purposes. The Court of Appeals affirmed.</p>
| 1,082 | 9 | 0 | true |
majority opinion
|
affirmed
|
Criminal Procedure
|
1,408 | 55,000 |
Owasso Independent School District No. I-011 v. Falvo
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/00-1073
|
00-1073
|
2001
|
Owasso Independent School District No. I-011
|
Falvo
|
<p>Kristja J. Falvo asked the Owasso Independent School District to ban peer grading, or the practice of allowing students to score each other's tests, papers, and assignments as the teachers explain the correct answers to the entire class, because it embarrassed her children. When the school district declined, Falvo filed an action against the school district, claming that such peer grading violates the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 (FERPA). FERPA authorizes federal funds to be withheld from school districts that permit students' "education records (or personally identifiable information contained therein)" to be released without their parents' written consent and defines education records as "records, files, documents, and other materials" containing information directly related to a student, which "are maintained by an educational agency or institution or by a person acting for such agency or institution." Disagreeing with Falvo, the District Court held that grades put on papers by another student are not "education records." In reversing, the Court of Appeals found that grades marked by students on each other's work are "education records," such that the very act of grading is an impermissible release of information to the student grader.</p>
| 1,287 | 9 | 0 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed/remanded
|
Privacy
|
1,409 | 55,003 |
New York v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/00-568
|
00-568
|
2001
|
New York
|
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
|
<p>In 1935, when the Federal Power Act (FPA) became law, most electric utilities operated as separate, local monopolies subject to state or local regulation and their sales were bundled, meaning that consumers paid a single charge for both the cost of the electricity and the cost of its delivery. Section 201(b) of the FPA provides the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) with jurisdiction over "the transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce and the sale of such energy at wholesale in interstate commerce" and section 205 prohibits unreasonable rates and undue discrimination "with respect to any transmission or sale subject to the [Commission's] jurisdiction." Currently, public utilities still retain ownership of the transmission lines that their competitors must use to deliver electricity to wholesale and retail customers and thus can refuse to deliver their competitors' energy or deliver that power on terms and conditions less favorable than those they apply to their own transmissions. In Order No. 888, FERC found such practices discriminatory under section 205. FERC then ordered the unbundling of wholesale generation and transmission services, which means that each utility must state separate rates for its wholesale generation, transmission, and ancillary services; imposed a similar open access requirement on unbundled retail transmissions in interstate commerce; and declined to extend the open access requirement to the transmission component of bundled retail sales. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals upheld the order.</p>
| 1,567 | 6 | 3 | false |
majority opinion
|
affirmed
|
Judicial Power
|
1,410 | 55,002 |
Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc.
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/00-6029
|
00-6029
|
2001
|
Ragsdale
|
Wolverine World Wide, Inc.
|
<p>The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA) guarantees qualifying employees 12 weeks of unpaid leave each year and encourages businesses to adopt more generous policies. In 1996, Wolverine World Wide, Inc. granted Tracy Ragsdale 30 weeks of medical leave after she was diagnosed with Hodgkin's disease. Wolverine did not notify Ragsdale that 12 weeks of the absence would count as her FMLA leave. After Ragsdale sought another 30-day extension, Wolverine refused her request and terminated her when she did not return to work. Ragsdale filed suit, alleging under Labor Department regulation 29 CFR section 825.700(a), which provides that if an employee takes medical leave "and the employer does not designate the leave as FMLA leave, the leave taken does not count against an employee's FMLA entitlement," that Wolverine was required to grant her 12 additional weeks of leave. The District Court granted Wolverine summary judgment, finding that the regulation was in conflict with the statute and invalid because it required Wolverine to grant Ragsdale more than 12 weeks of FMLA-compliant leave in one year. The Court of Appeals affirmed.</p>
| 1,152 | 5 | 4 | false |
majority opinion
|
affirmed
|
Judicial Power
|
1,411 | 55,006 |
United States v. Drayton
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/01-631
|
01-631
|
2001
|
United States
|
Drayton
|
<p>Christopher Drayton and Clifton Brown were traveling on a Greyhound bus. In Tallahassee, Florida, police officers boarded the bus as part of a routine interdiction effort. One of the officers worked his way from back to front, speaking with individual passengers as he went. The officer did not inform the passengers of their right to refuse to cooperate. As the officer approached Drayton and Brown, he identified himself, declared that the police were looking for drugs and weapons, and asked if the two had any bags. Subsequently, the officer asked Brown whether he minded if he checked his person. Brown agreed and a pat-down revealed hard objects similar to drug packages in both thigh areas. When Drayton agreed, a pat-down revealed similar objects. Both were arrested. A further search revealed that Drayton and Brown had taped cocaine to their legs. Charged with federal drug crimes, Drayton and Brown moved to suppress the cocaine on the ground that their consent to the pat-down searches was invalid. In denying the motions, the District Court determined that the police conduct was not coercive and Drayton and Brown's consent to the search was voluntary. In reversing, the Court of Appeals noted that bus passengers do not feel free to disregard officers' requests to search absent some positive indication that consent may be refused.</p>
| 1,355 | 6 | 3 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed/remanded
|
Criminal Procedure
|
1,412 | 55,004 |
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/00-795
|
00-795
|
2001
|
Ashcroft
|
Free Speech Coalition
|
<p>The Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 (CPPA) prohibits "any visual depiction, including any photograph, film, video, picture, or computer or computer-generated image or picture" that "is, or appears to be, of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct," and any sexually explicit image that is "advertised, promoted, presented, described, or distributed in such a manner that conveys the impression" it depicts "a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct." The Free Speech Coalition, an adult-entertainment trade association, and others filed suit, alleging that the "appears to be" and "conveys the impression" provisions are overbroad and vague and, thus, restrain works otherwise protected by the First Amendment. Reversing the District Court, the Court of Appeals held the CPPA invalid on its face, finding it to be substantially overbroad because it bans materials that are neither obscene under Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, nor produced by the exploitation of real children as in New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747.</p>
| 1,046 | 6 | 3 | false |
majority opinion
|
affirmed
|
First Amendment
|
1,413 | 55,005 |
National Cable and Telecommunications Association v. Gulf Power Company
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/00-832
|
00-832
|
2001
|
National Cable and Telecommunications Association
|
Gulf Power Company
|
<p>The Pole Attachments Act requires the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to set reasonable rates, terms, and conditions for certain attachments to telephone and electric poles. A pole attachment includes "any attachment by a cable television system or provider of telecommunications service to a [utility's] pole, conduit, or right-of-way." After the FCC issued an order that interpreted the Act to cover pole attachments for commingled high-speed Internet and traditional cable television services and attachments by wireless telecommunications providers, pole-owning utilities challenged the order. Reversing both of the FCC's positions, the Court of Appeals held that commingled services are not covered by either of the Act's two specific rate formulas and, thus, were not covered by the Act. Additionally, the appellate court held that the Act does not give the FCC authority to regulate wireless communications.</p>
| 930 | 6 | 2 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed/remanded
|
Judicial Power
|
1,414 | 55,007 |
Verizon Communications, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/00-511
|
00-511
|
2001
|
Verizon Communications, Inc.
|
Federal Communications Commission
|
<p>The Telecommunications Act of 1996 entitles new companies seeking to enter local telephone service markets to lease elements of the incumbent carriers' local exchange networks and directs the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to prescribe methods for state utility commissions to use in setting rates for the sharing of those elements. The FCC provided for the rates to be set based upon the forward-looking economic cost of an element as the sum of the total element long-run incremental cost of the element (TELRIC) and a reasonable allocation of forward-looking common costs incurred in providing a group of elements that cannot be attributed directly to individual elements and specified that the TELRIC should be measured based on the use of the most efficient telecommunications technology currently available and the lowest cost network configuration. FCC regulations also contain combination rules, requiring an incumbent to perform the functions necessary to combine network elements for an entrant, unless the combination is not technically feasible. In five separate cases, a range of parties challenged the FCC regulations. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals held that the use of the TELRIC methodology was foreclosed because the Act plainly required rates based on the actual cost of providing the network element and invalidated certain combination rules.</p>
| 1,381 | 6 | 2 | false |
majority opinion
|
reversed in-part/remanded
|
Economic Activity
|
1,415 | 55,008 |
City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc.
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/00-799
|
00-799
|
2001
|
City of Los Angeles
|
Alameda Books, Inc.
|
<p>Based on its 1977 study concluding that concentrations of adult entertainment establishments are associated with higher crime rates in surrounding communities, the city of Los Angeles enacted Municipal Code section 12.70(C), which prohibited such enterprises within 1,000 feet of each other. The city later amended the ordinance to prohibit more than one adult entertainment business in the same building. Alameda Books, Inc. and Highland Books, Inc., two adult establishments that openly operate combined bookstores/video arcades, sued, alleging that the ordinance violates the First Amendment. Finding that the ordinance was not a content-neutral regulation of speech, the District Court reasoned that the 1977 study did not support a reasonable belief that multiple-use adult establishments produce the secondary effects the city asserted as content-neutral justifications for its prohibition. In affirming, the Court of Appeals found that, even if the ordinance were content neutral, the city failed to present evidence upon which it could reasonably rely to demonstrate that its regulation of multiple-use establishments was designed to serve its substantial interest in reducing crime.</p>
| 1,199 | 5 | 4 | true |
plurality opinion
|
reversed/remanded
|
First Amendment
|
1,416 | 55,010 |
J. E. M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc.
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/99-1996
|
99-1996
|
2001
|
J. E. M. Ag Supply, Inc.
|
Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc.
|
<p>Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc. holds 17 utility patents issued under 35 USC section 101 that cover the manufacture, use, sale, and offer for sale of its hybrid corn seed products. Pioneer sells its patented hybrid seeds under a limited label license that allows only the production of grain and/or forage. J. E. M. Ag Supply, Inc., doing business as Farm Advantage, Inc., bought patented seeds from Pioneer in bags bearing the license agreement and then resold the bags. Subsequently, Pioneer filed a patent infringement suit. In response, Farm Advantage filed a patent invalidity counterclaim, arguing that sexually reproducing plants, such as Pioneer's corn plants, are not patentable subject matter within section 101. Farm Advantage maintained that the Plant Patent Act of 1930 (PPA) and the Plant Variety Protection Act (PVPA) set forth the exclusive statutory means for protecting plant life. The District Court granted Pioneer summary judgment. The court held that section 101 clearly covers plant life and that in enacting the PPA and the PVPA, Congress neither expressly nor implicitly removed plants from section 101's subject matter. The Court of Appeals affirmed.</p>
| 1,188 | 6 | 2 | false |
majority opinion
|
affirmed
|
Economic Activity
|
1,417 | 55,009 |
City of Columbus v. Ours Garage and Wrecker Service, Inc.
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/01-419
|
01-419
|
2001
|
City of Columbus
|
Ours Garage and Wrecker Service, Inc.
|
<p>Pursuant to 49 USC section 14501(c)(2)(A), federal preemption prescriptions relating to motor carriers "shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles." Columbus, Ohio, extensively regulates the operation of tow trucks seeking to pick up vehicles within city limits. Ours Garage and Wrecker Service, Inc., a tow-truck operator and a trade association of such operators, sought to enjoin enforcement of the City's tow-truck regulations on the ground that they were preempted. The District Court granted Ours Garage summary judgment. In affirming, the Court of Appeals relied on precedent that section 14501(c)(1)'s preemption rule explicitly applies to "a State [or] political subdivision of a State," while the exception for safety regulations, section 14501(c)(2)(A), refers only to the "authority of a State." The appellate court also noted that precedent determined that the contrast in statutory language indicated that Congress meant to limit the safety exception to States alone.</p>
| 1,039 | 7 | 2 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed/remanded
|
Federalism
|
1,418 | 55,014 |
Utah v. Evans
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/01-714
|
01-714
|
2001
|
Utah
|
Evans
|
<p>In conducting the 2000 census, the Census Bureau used "hot-deck imputation" to fill in certain gaps in its information and resolved certain conflicts in the data. Under this methodology, the Bureau imputes the relevant information by inferring that the address or unit about which it is uncertain has the same population characteristics as those of its geographically closest neighbor of the same type. Hot-deck Imputation increased North Carolina's population by 0.4% while increasing Utah's population by only 0.2% such that North Carolina will receive one more Representative and Utah one less than if the Bureau had simply filled relevant informational gaps by counting the related number of individuals as zero. Utah brought suit against the officials charged with conducting the census, claiming that the Bureau's use of hot-deck imputation violates 13 USC section 195, which prohibits use of "the statistical method known as 'sampling,'" and is inconsistent with Article 1, section 2, clause 3 of the Constitution, which states that an "actual Enumeration be made." Utah sought an injunction compelling a change of the official census results. The District Court found for the Bureau.</p>
| 1,199 | 5 | 4 | false |
majority opinion
|
affirmed
|
Civil Rights
|
1,419 | 55,013 |
Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y of New York, Inc. v. Village of Stratton
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/00-1737
|
00-1737
|
2001
|
Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y of New York, Inc.
|
Village of Stratton
|
<p>The Village of Stratton promulgated an ordinance that prohibits canvassers from entering private residential property to promote any cause without first obtaining a permit from the mayor's office. The Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York, Inc., a congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses that publish and distribute religious materials, brought an action for injunctive relief, alleging that the ordinance violates their First Amendment rights to the free exercise of religion, free speech, and freedom of the press. The District Court upheld most provisions of the ordinance as valid, content-neutral regulations. The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that the Village's interests in protecting its residents from fraud and its desire to prevent criminals from posing as canvassers in order to defraud its residents were sufficient bases on which to justify the regulation.</p>
| 891 | 8 | 1 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed/remanded
|
First Amendment
|
1,420 | 55,015 |
Lapides v. Board of Regents of University System of Georgia
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/01-298
|
01-298
|
2001
|
Lapides
|
Board of Regents of University System of Georgia
|
<p>Paul Lapides, a professor employed by the Georgia state university system, filed a state-court lawsuit against the system?s board of regents and other university officials, alleging that the officials had violated state tort law and 42 USC section 1983 when they placed sexual harassment allegations in his personnel files. The defendants removed the case to Federal District Court and then sought a dismissal. Conceding that a state statute had waived Georgia's sovereign immunity from state-law suits in state court, the State claimed Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in the federal court. The District Court held that Georgia had waived such immunity when it removed the case to federal court. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found that, because state law was unclear as to whether the state attorney general had the legal authority to waive Georgia's Eleventh Amendment immunity, the State retained the legal right to assert immunity, even after the removal.</p>
| 978 | 9 | 0 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed
|
Federalism
|
1,421 | 55,016 |
Gonzaga University v. Doe
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/01-679
|
01-679
|
2001
|
Gonzaga University
|
Doe
|
<p>A student at Gonzaga University planned to become a public elementary school teacher in Washington, which required all new teachers to obtain an affidavit of good moral character from their graduating colleges. Gonzaga's teacher certification specialist overheard one student tell another that the student had engaged in sexual misconduct, contacted the state agency responsible for teacher certification, and discussed the allegations, identifying the student by name. Ultimately, the student was told that he would not receive his certification affidavit. The student sued Gonzaga in state court, alleging a violation of the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 (FERPA), which prohibits the federal funding of schools that have a policy or practice of permitting the release of students' education records without their parents' written consent. A jury awarded the student compensatory and punitive damages. Ultimately, the State Supreme Court acknowledged that FERPA does not give rise to a private cause of action, but reasoned that the nondisclosure provision creates a federal right that is enforceable.</p>
| 1,130 | 7 | 2 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed/remanded
|
Privacy
|
1,422 | 55,017 |
United States v. Craft
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/00-1831
|
00-1831
|
2001
|
United States
|
Craft
|
<p>When Don Craft failed to pay federal income tax liabilities for the failure to file federal income tax returns for the years 1979 through 1986, a federal tax lien attached to "all [of his] property and rights to property," pursuant to 26 USC section 6321. After the notice of the lien was filed, Dan and his wife Sandra L. Craft jointly executed a quitclaim deed purporting to transfer to her his interest in a piece of real property in Michigan that they owned as tenants by the entirety. Subsequently, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) agreed to release the lien and allow the Crafts to sell the property with half the net proceeds to be held in escrow pending determination of the Government's interest in the property. After Sandra brought an action to quiet title to the escrowed proceeds, the Government claimed that its lien had attached to the husband's interest in the tenancy by the entirety. The District Court granted the Government summary judgment. The Court of Appeals, however, held that no lien attached because the husband had no separate interest in the entireties property under Michigan law.</p>
| 1,121 | 6 | 3 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed/remanded
|
Federal Taxation
|
1,423 | 55,018 |
United States v. Ruiz
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/01-595
|
01-595
|
2001
|
United States
|
Ruiz
|
<p>After immigration agents found 30 kilograms of marijuana in Angela Ruiz's luggage, federal prosecutors offered her a "fast track" plea bargain in which she would waive indictment, trial, and an appeal in exchange for a reduced sentence recommendation. The prosecutors' offer requires that the defendant waive the right to receive impeachment information relating to any informants or other witnesses, as well as information supporting any affirmative defense she raises if the case goes to trial. When Ruiz rejected the waiver, the prosecutors withdrew their offer, indicted her for unlawful drug possession, and she pleaded guilty. At sentencing, Ruiz asked the judge to grant her the same reduced sentence that the Government would have recommended had she accepted the plea bargain. The Government opposed her request, and the District Court denied it. In vacating the sentence, the Court of Appeals ruled that the Constitution prohibits defendants from waiving their right to certain impeachment information.</p>
| 1,020 | 9 | 0 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed
|
Criminal Procedure
|
1,424 | 55,020 |
Young v. United States
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/00-1567
|
00-1567
|
2001
|
Young
|
United States
|
<p>Cornelius and Suzanne Young failed to include payment with their 1992 income tax return, which was due and filed on October 15, 1993. Subsequently, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) assessed a tax liability against them. After filing a Chapter 13 petition, the Youngs ultimately filed a Chapter 7 petition and were granted a discharge, meaning that Youngs had no assets available to satisfy unsecured creditors, including the IRS. If the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has a claim for certain taxes for which the return was due within three years before the individual taxpayer files a bankruptcy petition, its claim enjoys eighth priority under 11 USC section 507(a)(8)(A)(i), and is nondischargeable in bankruptcy under section 523(a)(1)(A). When the IRS subsequently demanded that they pay the tax debt, the Youngs asked the Bankruptcy Court to reopen the Chapter 7 case and declare the debt discharged under section 523(a)(1)(A), claiming that it fell outside section 507(a)(8)(A)(i)'s "three-year lookback period" because it pertained to a tax return due more than three years before their Chapter 7 filing. The District Court held that the "lookback period" is tolled during the pendency of a prior bankruptcy petition and concluded that the 1992 debt had not been discharged when the Youngs were granted a discharge under Chapter 7. The Court of Appeals affirmed.</p>
| 1,379 | 9 | 0 | false |
majority opinion
|
affirmed
|
Economic Activity
|
1,425 | 55,019 |
Verizon Maryland, Inc. v. Public Service Commission of Maryland
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/00-1531
|
00-1531
|
2001
|
Verizon Maryland, Inc.
|
Public Service Commission of Maryland
|
<p>The Telecommunications Act of 1996 requires that incumbent local-exchange carriers (LECs) provide interconnection with their existing networks; that the carriers then establish reciprocal compensation arrangements for transporting and terminating the calls of each others' customers; and that their interconnection agreements be approved by a state utility commission. Verizon Maryland Inc., the incumbent LEC in Maryland, negotiated an interconnection agreement with MCI WorldCom, Inc. After the Maryland Public Service Commission approved the agreement, Verizon informed WorldCom that it would no longer pay reciprocal compensation for calls made by Verizon's customers to the local access numbers of Internet Service Providers (ISPs) because ISP traffic was not local traffic subject to the reciprocal compensation agreement. WorldCom filed a complaint with the Commission, which ordered Verizon to make the payments for past and future ISP-bound calls. Verizon then filed an action in federal district court, seeking an injunction prohibiting its enforcement, alleging that the determination that Verizon must pay reciprocal compensation for ISP traffic violated the Act. The District Court dismissed the action. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that the Commission had not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity and that the Act did not provide a basis for jurisdiction over Verizon's claims.</p>
| 1,412 | 8 | 0 | true |
majority opinion
|
vacated/remanded
|
Federalism
|
1,426 | 55,022 |
Barnes v. Gorman
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/01-682
|
01-682
|
2001
|
Barnes
|
Gorman
|
<p>Jeffrey Gorman is a paraplegic. After being arrested, he was transported to a Kansas City police station in a van that was not equipped to accommodate the disabled. Gorman was removed from his wheelchair and seatbelted to a bench in the van. During the ride, Gorman fell to the floor, suffering serious injuries that left him unable to work full time. Gorman sued certain Kansas police officials for discriminating against him on the basis of his disability, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, by failing to maintain appropriate policies for the arrest and transportation of persons with spinal cord injuries. A jury awarded him compensatory and punitive damages. The District Court vacated as to punitive damages, holding that they are unavailable in private suits brought under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found punitive damages available under a general rule that absent clear direction to the contrary by Congress federal courts have the power to award any appropriate relief for violation of a federal right.</p>
| 1,131 | 9 | 0 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed
|
Economic Activity
|
1,427 | 55,024 |
United States v. Vonn
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/00-973
|
00-973
|
2001
|
United States
|
Vonn
|
<p>Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 lays out steps that a judge must take to ensure that a guilty plea is knowing and voluntary. Rule 11(h)'s requirement that any variance from those procedures "which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded" is similar to the general harmless-error rule in Rule 52(a). On February 28, 1997, Alphonso Vonn was charged with federal bank robbery and firearm crimes. That day a Magistrate Judge twice advised him of his constitutional rights. Vonn also signed a statement saying that he had read and understood his rights and he answered yes to the court's questions whether he had understood the court's explanation of his rights and whether he had read and signed the statement. When Vonn later pleaded guilty to robbery, the court advised him of the constitutional rights he was relinquishing, but skipped the advice required by Rule (11)(c)(3) that he would have the right to assistance of counsel at trial. Subsequently, Vonn pleaded guilty to the firearm charge and to a later-charged conspiracy count. Again, the court advised him of the rights he was waiving, but did not mention the right to counsel. Appealing his convictions, Vonn raised Rule 11 for the first time. The Court of Appeals agreed that there had been error and vacated the convictions.</p>
| 1,315 | 8 | 1 | true |
majority opinion
|
vacated/remanded
|
Criminal Procedure
|
1,428 | 55,023 |
Devlin v. Scardelletti
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/01-417
|
01-417
|
2001
|
Devlin
|
Scardelletti
|
<p>Robert Devlin, a retired worker represented by the Transportation Communications International Union, participates in a defined benefits pension plan (Plan) administered by the Union. In 1991, the Plan was amended to add a cost of living increase (COLA). In 1997, the Plan's trustees eliminated the COLA because the Plan could not support such a large benefits increase. The trustees also filed a class action in federal court, seeking a declaratory judgment that the 1997 elimination was binding on all Plan members or that the 1991 COLA was void. After the District Court conditionally certified a class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(1) and the trustees asked the court to approve their settlement with the class representatives, Devlin moved to intervene. The court denied his motion as untimely. The court then heard objections to the settlement, including those advanced by Devlin, and approved the settlement. In affirming the District Court's denial of Devlins's intervention, the Court of Appeals held that, because Devlin was not a named class representative and because he had been properly denied the right to intervene, he lacked standing to challenge the settlement.</p>
| 1,201 | 6 | 3 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed/remanded
|
Judicial Power
|
1,429 | 55,025 |
United States Postal Service v. Gregory
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/00-758
|
00-758
|
2001
|
United States Postal Service
|
Gregory
|
<p>Maria Gregory worked for the United States Postal Service as a letter technician with responsibility for overseeing letter carriers on five mail routes and serving as a replacement carrier on those routes. In 1997, while three disciplinary actions that the Postal Service took against Gregory were pending in grievance proceedings pursuant to the Postal Service's collective bargaining agreement with her union, the Postal Service terminated Gregory's employment after a fourth violation. Gregory then appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board, where an agency must prove its charge by a preponderance of the evidence, proving not only that the misconduct occurred, but also that the penalty assessed is reasonable in relation to it. Analyzing her three prior disciplinary actions independently, an Administrative Law Judge concluded that Gregory's termination was reasonable in light of her four violations. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that prior disciplinary actions subject to ongoing proceedings may not be used to support a penalty's reasonableness.</p>
| 1,101 | 9 | 0 | true |
majority opinion
|
vacated/remanded
|
Judicial Power
|
1,430 | 55,027 |
Edelman v. Lynchburg College
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/00-1072
|
00-1072
|
2001
|
Edelman
|
Lynchburg College
|
<p>Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 requires that a charge of employment discrimination be filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) "within [a specified number of] days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred." An EEOC regulation permits an otherwise timely filer to verify a charge after the time for filing has expired. In November 1997, Leonard Edelman faxed a letter to the EEOC, claiming that Lynchburg College had subjected him to gender-based, national origin, and religious discrimination after it denied him tenure. The EEOC informed Edelman of the 300-day time limit and sent him a Form 5 Charge of Discrimination, which he returned 313 days after he was denied tenure. The District Court dismissed the Title VII complaint, finding that the letter was not a charge under Title VII because neither Edelman nor the EEOC treated it as one. In affirming, the Court of Appeals concluded that because a charge requires verification and must be filed within the limitations period, it follows that a charge must be verified within that period.</p>
| 1,097 | 9 | 0 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed/remanded
|
Civil Rights
|
1,431 | 55,026 |
Bell v. Cone
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/01-400
|
01-400
|
2001
|
Ricky Bell, Warden
|
Gary Bradford Cone
|
<p>Gary Cone was tried in a Tennessee court for a 2-day crime spree that ended with the killing of an elderly couple. In response to the overwhelming evidence that he perpetrated the crimes, Cone's defense asserted that he was not guilty by reason of insanity. The jury found him guilty. During the sentencing hearing, Cone's counsel cross-examined prosecution witnesses, but called no witnesses. After the prosecutor closed, the defense counsel waived final argument. Ultimately, Cone was sentenced to death. The State Criminal Court denied Cone's petition for post-conviction relief, rejecting his contention that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance during the sentencing phase by failing to present mitigating evidence and waiving final argument. Subsequently, the Federal District Court denied Cone's federal habeas petition, ruling that he did not meet 28 USC section 2254(d)(1)'s requirement that a state decision be "contrary to" or involve "an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law." In reversing, the Court of Appeals found that Cone suffered a Sixth Amendment violation for which prejudice should be presumed because his counsel, by not asking for mercy after the prosecutor's final argument, did not subject the State's death penalty call to meaningful adversarial testing.</p>
| 1,319 | 8 | 1 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed/remanded
|
Criminal Procedure
|
1,432 | 55,028 |
Raygor v. Regents of University of Minnesota
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/00-1514
|
00-1514
|
2001
|
Raygor
|
Regents of University of Minnesota
|
<p>In 1996, Lance Raygor and James Goodchild filed complaints in Federal District Court against the Board of Regents of the University of Minnesota, stemming from an alleged incident in which the university attempted to compel them to accept early retirement. They refused. Subsequently, their jobs were reclassified to reduce their salaries. The complaints alleged a federal cause of action under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) and a state law discrimination action under the federal supplemental jurisdiction statute, which purports to toll the limitations period for supplemental claims while they are pending in federal court and for 30 days after they are dismissed. The District Court ultimately dismissed their cases on Eleventh Amendment grounds. Before the dismissal, Raygor and Goodrich refilled their state law claims in state court. The university contended that the federal supplemental jurisdiction statute did not toll the limitations period on those claims because the Federal District Court never had subject matter jurisdiction over the ADEA claims. Ultimately, the State Supreme Court held the federal supplemental jurisdiction statute unconstitutional when applied to claims against nonconsenting state defendants, such as the university.</p>
| 1,280 | 6 | 3 | false |
majority opinion
|
affirmed
|
Judicial Power
|
1,433 | 55,029 |
Lee v. Kemna
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/00-6933
|
00-6933
|
2001
|
Lee
|
Kemna
|
<p>While on trial for first-degree murder, Remon Lee planned an alibi defense. His mother, stepfather, and sister were to voluntarily testify that he was in California at the time of the murder. The day the defense was to begin its case, the three could not be found. Lee's counsel moved for an overnight continuance to gain time to find the witnesses. The trial judge denied the motion. Subsequently, no alibi witnesses testified, the jury found Lee guilty, and he was sentenced to prison for life without possibility of parole. The Missouri Court of Appeals eventually disposed of the case on state procedural grounds. The appeals court held that the denial of the continuance motion was proper because Lee's counsel had failed to comply with Missouri Supreme Court Rule 24.09, which requires that such motions be in writing and accompanied by an affidavit, and with Rule 24.10, which sets out the showings a movant must make to gain a continuance grounded on witnesses' absence. Ultimately, the Federal Court of Appeals ruled that federal review of Lee's claim, that the refusal to grant his continuance motion deprived him of his federal due process right to a defense, was unavailable because the state court's rejection of that claim rested on state-law grounds, independent of the federal question and adequate to support the judgment.</p>
| 1,347 | 6 | 3 | true |
majority opinion
|
vacated/remanded
|
Judicial Power
|
1,434 | 55,030 |
Ewing v. California
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/01-6978
|
01-6978
|
2002
|
Gary Ewing
|
California
|
<p>On March 12, 2000, Gary Ewing, a serial offender with a long history of criminal convictions, was arrested for stealing three golf clubs, each worth $399, from a Los Angeles-area golf course. At the time of his arrest, Ewing was on parole from a 9-year prison term for convictions in three burglaries and one robbery. Under California's three strikes law, another felony conviction would require a sentence of 25 years to life. Ewing was charged with and convicted of one count of felony grand theft for the incident at the golf course. During sentencing, Ewing requested the judge in the case exercise discretion permitted under California law and reduce the conviction to a misdemeanor. The judge declined and sentenced Ewing in accordance with the three strikes law. On appeal, Ewing argued the sentence of 25 years to life was grossly disproportionate to the crime and therefore a violation of the Eighth Amendment protection against cruel and unusual punishments. The court, reasoning that the three strikes law served the state's legitimate interests, rejected this claim. The California Supreme Court declined to hear the case.</p>
| 1,142 | 5 | 4 | false |
plurality opinion
|
affirmed
|
Criminal Procedure
|
1,435 | 55,031 |
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Campbell
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/01-1289
|
01-1289
|
2002
|
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company
|
Campbell
|
<p>Although investigators concluded that Curtis Campbell caused an accident in which one person was killed and another permanently disabled, his insurer, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, contested liability and took the case to trial. State Farm assured the Campbells that they would represent their interests. After losing in court, the Campbells sued State Farm for bad faith, fraud, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. In the first part of the trial, the jury found State Farm's decision not to settle unreasonable. In the second part, the trial court denied State Farm's renewed motion to exclude dissimilar out-of-state conduct evidence, ruling such evidence was admissible to determine whether State Farm's conduct in the Campbell case was indeed intentional and sufficiently egregious to warrant punitive damages. The jury awarded the Campbells $2.6 million in compensatory damages and $145 million in punitive damages, which the trial court reduced to $1 million and $25 million respectively. The Utah Supreme Court reinstated the $145 million punitive damages award.</p>
| 1,109 | 6 | 3 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed/remanded
|
Economic Activity
|
1,436 | 55,032 |
Entergy Louisiana, Inc. v. Louisiana Public Service Commission
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/02-299
|
02-299
|
2002
|
Entergy Louisiana, Inc.
|
Louisiana Public Service Commission
|
<p> </p>
<p>Several Louisiana cotton gins sued Entergy, an electric utility company, because it had over-billed them for electricity between 1988 and 1994. The gins claimed that Entergy had failed to notify them of a lower rate that would have saved them more than $2 million over the six-year period. Louisiana law requires that utility companies notify customers when they are eligible for a lower rate. Furthermore, the gins claimed that Entergy had discriminated against them by notifying several other gins in the state of the lower rate. Deferring to the decision of the Louisiana Public Service Commission, the state's utility regulatory agency, a state district court ruled against Entergy. The Supreme Court of Louisiana affirmed the decision on appeal.</p>
<p> </p>
| 776 | 9 | 0 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed
|
Federalism
|
1,437 | 55,033 |
Kaupp v. Texas
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/02-5636
|
02-5636
|
2002
|
Robert Kaupp
|
Texas
|
<p>In January 1999, a 14-year-old girl disappeared. The police discovered that she had been having a sexual relationship with her 19-year-old half-brother, who had been with Robert Kaupp on the day of the girl’s disappearance. The police questioned the girl’s half-brother and Kaupp at police headquarters and allowed Kaupp to leave. The half-brother later confessed to stabbing the missing girl and implicated Kaupp in the crime. The police failed to obtain a warrant to question Kaupp, but they went to his home in the middle of the night and were given permission to enter by Kaupp’s father. Police officers awakened Kaupp and said, “We need to go and talk,” and Kaupp responded, “Okay.” Wearing only his pajamas and no shoes, Kaupp was handcuffed and taken for questioning. There is no evidence that Kaupp was told he could decline to go with the officers for questioning. Kaupp was read his Miranda rights at the police station and, after being informed of the half-brother’s confession, admitted to some involvement in the crime. At trial, Kaupp moved to suppress his confession as the fruit of an illegal arrest. The motion was denied, and Kaupp was convicted of murder and sentenced to 55 years in prison. The Texas Court of Appeals confirmed the district court’s conviction and held that no arrest had occurred until after Kaupp’s confession because Kaupp’s statement indicated that he consented to going with the officers. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied discretionary review.</p>
| 1,502 | 9 | 0 | true |
per curiam
|
vacated/remanded
|
Criminal Procedure
|
1,438 | 55,035 |
Nike, Inc. v. Kasky
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/02-575
|
02-575
|
2002
|
Nike, Inc.
|
Marc Kasky
|
<p>Beginning in 1996, a number of allegations arose that Nike was mistreating and underpaying workers at foreign facilities. Nike responded to the charges in numerous ways, such as by issuing press releases. In 1998, Marc Kasky, a California resident, sued Nike for unfair and deceptive practices under California's Unfair Competition Law. Kasky alleged that Nike made "false statements and/or material omissions of fact" concerning the working conditions under which its products are manufactured. Nike filed a demurrer, contending that Kasky's suit was absolutely barred by the First Amendment. The trial court dismissed the case and the California Court of Appeal affirmed. In reversing, the California Supreme Court found that Nike's messages were commercial speech, but that the suit was at such a preliminary stage that the issue whether any false representations had been made had yet to be resolved.</p>
| 912 | 6 | 3 | false |
per curiam
| null |
Judicial Power
|
1,439 | 55,034 |
Demore v. Kim
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/01-1491
|
01-1491
|
2002
|
Demore
|
Kim
|
<p>Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 USC section 1226(c), the Attorney General shall take into custody any alien who is removable from this country because he has been convicted of one of a specified set of crimes, including an aggravated felony. After Hyung Joon Kim, a lawful permanent resident alien, was convicted in state court of first-degree burglary and petty theft with priors, the Immigration and Naturalization Service charged him with being deportable and detained him pending his removal hearing. Kim filed a habeas corpus action challenging section 1226(c) on the ground that his detention violated due process because the INS had made no determination that he posed either a danger to society or a flight risk. The District Court granted Kim's petition. In affirming, the Court of Appeals concluded that the INS had not provided a justification for no-bail civil detention sufficient to overcome a permanent resident alien's liberty interest.</p>
| 973 | 5 | 4 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed
|
Civil Rights
|
1,440 | 55,037 |
Breuer v. Jim's Concrete of Brevard, Inc.
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/02-337
|
02-337
|
2002
|
Breuer
|
Jim's Concrete of Brevard, Inc.
|
<p>Philip Breuer sued in state court to resolve an overtime dispute under the Federal Labor Standards Act (FLSA). Attorneys for Breuer's employer, Jim's Concrete of Brevard, had the case moved to federal court by citing the federal removal statute. According to the statute, defendants in state court cases dealing with federal laws may have the case moved to federal court "unless otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress." Breuer's attorney argued that Congress had provided for suits under the FLSA to be heard in state court and that the case should therefore be returned to state court; attorneys for Jim's Concrete disagreed. The district court refused to send the case back to state court. The 11th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.</p>
| 752 | 9 | 0 | false |
majority opinion
|
affirmed
|
Judicial Power
|
1,441 | 55,036 |
Pierce County v. Guillen
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/01-1229
|
01-1229
|
2002
|
Pierce County
|
Guillen
|
<p>The Hazard Elimination Program provides state governments with funding to improve the most dangerous sections of their roads. To be eligible for funding, a state must undertake a thorough evaluation of its public roads. This led to concerns that the absence of confidentiality would increase the liability risk for accidents that took place at hazardous locations before improvements could be made. Ultimately, Congress provided that materials "compiled or collected" for purposes of the program "shall not be subject to discovery or admitted into evidence in a Federal or State court proceeding." In 1996, Ignacio Guillen's wife died in an automobile accident in a Pierce County, Washington intersection. While Washington had previously been denied funding for the intersection where the accident occurred, its second request was granted after the accident. Guillen first sought information on the intersection and then asserted that the state had been negligent in failing to install proper traffic controls. Washington sought to protect itself under the Program. The Washington Supreme Court held that the Program exceeded Congress's power under the Constitution.</p>
| 1,174 | 9 | 0 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed/remanded
|
Economic Activity
|
1,442 | 55,038 |
Clay v. United States
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/01-1500
|
01-1500
|
2002
|
Clay
|
United States
|
<p>Erick Clay was convicted of arson and distribution of cocaine base in federal District Court. The Court of Appeals affirmed his convictions on November 23, 1998, the court's mandate issued on December 15, 1998, and Clay did not file a petition for a writ of certiorari. One year and 69 days after the Court of Appeals issued its mandate, and exactly one year after the time for seeking certiorari expired, Clay filed a motion for postconviction relief under 28 USC section 2255. Section 2255 provides that such motions are subject to a one-year time limitation that runs from "the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final." The District Court stated that when a federal prisoner does not seek certiorari, his judgment of conviction becomes final for section 2255 purposes upon issuance of the court of appeals's mandate. Because Clay filed his motion more than one year after that date, the court denied it as time barred. The Court of Appeals affirmed.</p>
| 975 | 9 | 0 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed/remanded
|
Criminal Procedure
|
1,443 | 55,039 |
Yellow Transportation, Inc. v. Michigan
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/01-270
|
01-270
|
2002
|
Yellow Transportation, Inc.
|
Michigan
|
<p>Before 1994, the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) allowed States to charge interstate motor carriers annual registration fees of up to $10 per vehicle. Under this system, some States discounted or waived registration fees for carriers from other States in exchange for reciprocal treatment. Under the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 (ISTEA), the ICC implemented a new registration system. ISTEA also capped state registration fees by establishing a fee system that "will result in a fee for each participating State that is equal to the fee?that such State collected or charged as of?1991." In 1991, the Michigan Public Service Commission did not levy a fee for Yellow Transportation, Inc.'s trucks pursuant to a reciprocal agreement. However, in 1992, the commission changed how it computed fees and, ultimately, levied a fee of $10 per vehicle on Yellow Transportation's entire fleet. Yellow Transportation sued, alleging that, because Michigan had not collected or charged a 1991 registration fee for those trucks, ISTEA's fee-cap provision prohibits Michigan from levying a fee for them. The Michigan Supreme Court concluded that reciprocity agreements are not relevant in determining what fee a State charged or collected as of 1991. The court reasoned that the new fee system is not based on the fees collected from one company, but at the generic fee Michigan charged or collected from carriers as of 1991.</p>
| 1,450 | 9 | 0 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed/remanded
|
Economic Activity
|
1,444 | 55,041 |
Virginia v. Black
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/01-1107
|
01-1107
|
2002
|
Virginia
|
Black
|
<p>Barry Black, Richard Elliott, and Jonathan O'Mara were convicted separately of violating a Virginia statute that makes it a felony "for any person..., with the intent of intimidating any person or group..., to burn...a cross on the property of another, a highway or other public place," and specifies that "any such burning...shall be prima facie evidence of an intent to intimidate a person or group." At trial, Black objected on First Amendment grounds to a jury instruction that cross burning by itself is sufficient evidence from which the required "intent to intimidate" could be inferred. He was found guilty. O'Mara pleaded guilty to charges of violating the statute, but reserved the right to challenge its constitutionality. In Elliott's trial, the judge did not give an instruction on the statute's prima facie evidence provision. Ultimately, the Virginia Supreme Court held, among other things, that the cross-burning statute is unconstitutional on its face and that the prima facie evidence provision renders the statute overbroad because the probability of prosecution under the statute chills the expression of protected speech.</p>
| 1,150 | 7 | 2 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed/remanded
|
First Amendment
|
1,445 | 55,042 |
Archer v. Warner
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/01-1418
|
01-1418
|
2002
|
Archer
|
Warner
|
<p>In 1991, Leonard and Arlene Warner sold the Warner Manufacturing Company to Elliott and Carol Archer. Subsequently, the Archers sued the Warners for fraud connected with the sale. In settling the lawsuit, the Archers executed releases except for obligations under a $100,000 promissory note and then voluntarily dismissed the lawsuit. After the Warners failed to make the first payment on the promissory note, the Archers sued in state court. The Warners filed for bankruptcy, and the Bankruptcy Court ordered liquidation under Chapter 7. The Archers then brought a claim asking the Bankruptcy Court to find the $100,000 debt nondischargeable and to order the Warners to pay the sum. The Bankruptcy Code provides that a debt shall not be dischargeable in bankruptcy "to the extent" it is "for money...obtained by...false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud." The Bankruptcy Court denied the Archers' claim. The District Court and the Court of Appeals affirmed.</p>
| 983 | 7 | 2 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed/remanded
|
Economic Activity
|
1,446 | 55,040 |
Gratz v. Bollinger
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/02-516
|
02-516
|
2002
|
Jennifer Gratz
|
Lee Bollinger et al.
|
<p>The University of Michigan’s Office of Undergraduate Admissions (OUA) considers a number of factors in its evaluative process, such as high school grades, standardized test scores, curriculum strength, alumni relationships, geography, and leadership. The OUA also considers race and admits virtually every qualified applicant from certain groups determined to be “underrepresented minorities.” Beginning in 1998, the OUA used a point system in which students were awarded an additional 20 points for being a member of an underrepresented minority, and beginning in 1999, the University established an Admissions Review Committee to provide an additional level of consideration.</p>
<p>In 1995, Jennifer Gratz and Patrick Hamacher both applied for admission to the University of Michigan’ College of Literature, Science, and the Arts (LSA) as residents of the state of Michigan. Both are of Caucasian descent. Both were denied admission and told that, although they were qualified, they were not competitive enough applicants to be admitted on first review. In October 1997, Gratz and Hamacher filed a class action suit against the University, the LSA, Lee Bollinger, and James Duderstadt. They argued that the admission procedure discriminated against certain racial and ethnic groups in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The district court held that the respondents had shown that a racially and ethnically diverse student body produced significant academic benefits but that the admission policies of 1995-1998 were problematic because they amounted to “holding seats” for certain minority groups. Therefore, the court granted summary judgment for the petitioners with respect to the admissions policies for 1995-1998 and for the respondents with respect to the policy that began in 1999. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit heard this case the same day as <em>Grutter v. Bollinger</em>, a similar case, and upheld the University’s admission policies in that case. The petitioners in this case then asked the Court to grant certiorari, despite the lack of opinion from the lower court, to resolve the issue.</p>
| 2,210 | 6 | 3 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed/remanded
|
Civil Rights
|
1,447 | 55,044 |
United States v. Bean
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/01-704
|
01-704
|
2002
|
United States
|
Bean
|
<p>After attending a gun show in Texas, Thomas Bean drove to Mexico. When Mexican officials stopped his vehicle at the border, they found ammunition, and Bean was subsequently convicted in a Mexican court of importing ammunition. Because of his felony conviction, 18 USC section 922(g)(1) prohibited Bean from possessing, distributing, or receiving firearms or ammunition. Bean applied to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) for relief from his firearms disabilities, but the ATF returned the application unprocessed, explaining that its annual appropriations law forbade it from expending any funds to investigate or act upon applications such as Bean's. Bean then filed suit, asking the District Court to conduct its own inquiry into his fitness to possess a gun and grant relief from his inability to possess, distribute, or receive firearms or ammunition. The court granted the requested relief, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.</p>
| 954 | 9 | 0 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed
|
Judicial Power
|
1,448 | 55,043 |
Federal Communications Commission v. Nextwave Personal Communications, Inc.
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/01-653
|
01-653
|
2002
|
Federal Communications Commission
|
Nextwave Personal Communications, Inc.
|
<p>After the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) auctioned off certain broadband personal communications services licenses to NextWave Personal Communications, Inc., Nextwave filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection and suspended payments to all creditors, including the FCC. The FCC asserted that NextWave's licenses had been canceled automatically when the company missed its first payment-deadline and announced that NextWave's licenses were available for auction. Ultimately, when the FCC denied NextWave's petition for reconsideration of the license cancellation, the Court of Appeals for the D. C. Circuit held that the cancellation violated 11 USC section 525(a), which provides that a "governmental unit may not...revoke...a license...to...a debtor...solely because such...debtor...has not paid a debt that is dischargeable in the case." (Together with No. 01-657, Arctic Slope Regional Corp. et al. v. NextWave Personal Communications Inc. et al.)</p>
| 967 | 8 | 1 | false |
majority opinion
|
affirmed
|
Economic Activity
|
1,449 | 55,045 |
Beneficial National Bank v. Anderson
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/02-306
|
02-306
|
2002
|
Beneficial National Bank
|
Marie Anderson et al.
|
<p>Several H&R Block customers, who took out loans from Beneficial National Bank in anticipation of their tax refunds, sued the bank in state court. The customers alleged that the bank charged excessive interest in violation of Alabama law. The bank asked that the case be heard in federal, rather than state, court, because the issues were covered under the National Bank Act (NBA), a federal law. The district court ruled in favor of the bank; the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the NBA did not completely preempt state laws governing lending rates and that the case could therefore be heard in state court.</p>
| 640 | 7 | 2 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed
|
Judicial Power
|
1,450 | 55,046 |
Virginia v. Hicks
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/02-371
|
02-371
|
2002
|
Virginia
|
Kevin Lamont Hicks
|
<p>The Richmond Redevelopment and Housing Authority (RRHA), a political subdivision of Virginia, owns and operates Whitcomb Court, a low-income housing development. In 1997, the Richmond City Council conveyed Whitcomb Court's streets to the RRHA. Subsequently, the RRHA enacted a policy authorizing the Richmond police to serve notice on any person lacking "a legitimate business or social purpose" for being on the premises and to arrest for trespassing any person who remains or returns after having been notified. After the RRHA gave Kevin Hicks, a nonresident, written notice barring him from Whitcomb Court, he trespassed there and was arrested and convicted. At trial, Hicks claimed that RRHA's policy was unconstitutionally overbroad and void for vagueness. The Virginia en banc Court of Appeals vacated his conviction. In affirming, the Virginia Supreme Court found the policy unconstitutionally overbroad in violation of the First Amendment.</p>
| 955 | 9 | 0 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed/remanded
|
First Amendment
|
1,451 | 55,050 |
Kentucky Association of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/00-1471
|
00-1471
|
2002
|
Kentucky Association of Health Plans, Inc.
|
Miller
|
<p>Kentucky's two "Any Willing Provider" (AWP) statutes prohibit "[a] health insurer [from] discriminating against any provider who is...willing to meet the terms and conditions for participation established by the?insurer," and require a "health benefit plan that includes chiropractic benefits [to]...permit any licensed chiropractor who agrees to abide by the terms [and] conditions?of the?plan to serve as a participating primary chiropractic provider." Certain health maintenance organizations (HMOs) filed suit asserting that Kentucky's AWP laws are preempted by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), which preempts all state laws "insofar as they?relate to any employee benefit plan," but saves from preemption state "laws...which regulate insurance." The District Court concluded that although both AWP statutes "relate to" employee benefit plans each law "regulates insurance" and is therefore saved from preemption. The Court of Appeals affirmed.</p>
| 984 | 9 | 0 | false |
majority opinion
|
affirmed
|
Federalism
|
1,452 | 55,048 |
Meyer v. Holley
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/01-1120
|
01-1120
|
2002
|
Meyer
|
Holley
|
<p>The Fair Housing Act (FHA) forbids racial discrimination in respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling. The Holleys, an interracial couple, alleged that a Triad real-estate corporation sales representative prevented them from buying a Triad-listed house for racially discriminatory reasons. The Holleys filed suit against the sales representative and David Meyer, Triad's president, sole shareholder, and licensed "officer/broker," claiming that he was vicariously liable for the sales representative's unlawful actions. The District Court dismissed the claims, stating that the FHA did not impose personal vicarious liability upon a corporate officer or a "designated officer/broker." In reversing, the Court of Appeals ruled that the FHA imposes strict liability principles beyond those traditionally associated with agent/principal or employee/employer relationships.</p>
| 879 | 9 | 0 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed/remanded
|
Civil Rights
|
1,453 | 55,047 |
Sell v. United States
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/02-5664
|
02-5664
|
2002
|
Sell
|
United States
|
<p>In 1997, the Federal Government charged Charles Sell with submitting fictitious insurance claims for payment. Although Sell has a long history of mental illness and was initially found competent to stand trial for fraud and attempted murder, a Federal Magistrate Judge ordered his hospitalization to determine whether he would attain the capacity to allow his trial to proceed. Subsequently, the Magistrate authorized forced administration of antipsychotic drugs. In affirming, the District Court concluded that medication was the only viable hope of rendering Sell competent to stand trial and was necessary to serve the Federal Government's interest in obtaining an adjudication of his guilt or innocence. The Court of Appeals affirmed. On the fraud charges, the appellate court found that the Federal Government had an essential interest in bringing Sell to trial, that the treatment was medically appropriate, and that the medical evidence indicated that Sell would fairly be able to participate in his trial.</p>
| 1,021 | 6 | 3 | true |
majority opinion
|
vacated/remanded
|
Due Process
|
1,454 | 55,049 |
Clackamas Gastroenterology Associates, P. C. v. Wells
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/01-1435
|
01-1435
|
2002
|
Clackamas Gastroenterology Associates, P. C.
|
Wells
|
<p>Deborah Wells worked for Clackamas Gastroenterology Associates, P.C. from 1986 until 1997. Wells filed suit, alleging that Clackamas Gastroenterology violated the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) when it terminated her employment. Clackamas moved for summary judgment, arguing that it was not covered by the Act because it did not have 15 or more employees for the 20 weeks required by the ADA. This argument depended on the four physician-shareholders, who own the professional corporation and constitute its board of directors, not being counted as employees. In granting the motion, the District Court concluded that the physicians were more analogous to partners in a partnership than to shareholders in a corporation and therefore were not employees under the ADA. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found no reasoned to permit the professional corporation to argue it was a partnership so as to avoid employment discrimination liability.</p>
| 964 | 7 | 2 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed/remanded
|
Civil Rights
|
1,455 | 55,052 |
Early v. Packer
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/01-1765
|
01-1765
|
2002
|
Richard E. Early, Warden, et al.
|
William Packer
|
<p>William Packer was convicted in a California state court for second-degree murder and attempted murder. During jury deliberations, a juror requested dismissal on two separate occasions. In order to avoid having to restart deliberations with a replacement juror, the judge asked the juror to continue. After further conversations between the judge and the juror in question as well as the foreperson of the jury, the jury returned a guilty verdict. On appeal to the Court of Appeals of California, Packer argued that the state trial judge had coerced the jury’s verdict in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. The appellate court affirmed his conviction and held that, as long as the judge only encouraged further deliberations and did not coerce a certain verdict, there was no violation of due process.</p>
<p>Packer petitioned for habeas relief from the federal district court, which denied his petition. The US. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s ruling and held that the state appellate court failed to properly apply federal law and that the judge was impermissibly coercive, which affected the jury’s guilty verdict.</p>
| 1,187 | 9 | 0 | true |
per curiam
|
reversed
|
Criminal Procedure
|
1,456 | 55,051 |
Chavez v. Martinez
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/01-1444
|
01-1444
|
2002
|
Chavez
|
Martinez
|
<p>Oliverio Martinez was stopped while riding his bicycle home from work by police investigating narcotics violations. When police attempted to handcuff him, a struggle ensued, but it is unclear who started it. During the struggle, Martinez was shot, resulting in permanent paralysis and loss of vision. A year later he sued the officers, saying the search and use of deadly force were unconstitutional. The officers introduced as evidence in their defense a taped confession obtained while Martinez was receiving medical treatment in the hospital, in which he admitted to grabbing the gun of one of the officers during the struggle. Martinez claimed that the tape could not be used as evidence because he had not been read his Miranda rights. The district court ruled with Martinez that the tape was inadmissible. The 9th Circuit Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed.</p>
| 874 | 6 | 3 | true |
plurality opinion
|
reversed
|
Criminal Procedure
|
1,457 | 55,054 |
Miller-El v. Cockrell
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/01-7662
|
01-7662
|
2002
|
Miller-El
|
Cockrell
|
<p>When Dallas County prosecutors used peremptory strikes to exclude 10 of the 11 African-Americans eligible to serve on the jury at Thomas Miller-El's capital murder trial, he moved to strike the jury on the ground that the exclusions violated equal protection. The trial judge denied relief, finding no evidence indicating a systematic exclusion of African-Americans. Subsequently, the jury found Miller-El guilty, and he was sentenced to death. After Miller-El's direct appeal and state habeas corpus petitions were denied, he filed a federal habeas corpus petition. The Federal District Court denied Miller-El's application for a certificate of appealability (COA) in deference to the state courts' acceptance of the prosecutors' race-neutral justifications for striking the potential jurors. The Court of Appeals also denied the COA, finding that Miller-El failed to present clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.</p>
| 931 | 8 | 1 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed/remanded
|
Criminal Procedure
|
1,458 | 55,053 |
National Park Hospitality Assn. v. Dept. of the Interior
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/02-196
|
02-196
|
2002
|
National Park Hospitality Assn.
|
Dept. of the Interior
|
<p>The Contract Disputes Act of 1978 (CDA) established rules governing disputes arising out of certain federal government contracts. After Congress enacted the National Parks Omnibus Management Act of 1998, which established a comprehensive concession management program for national parks, the National Park Service (NPS) issued 36 CFR section 51.3, which purported to render the CDA inapplicable to concession contracts. The National Park Hospitality Association challenged 51.3's validity. Upholding the regulation, the District Court concluded that the CDA is ambiguous as to whether it applies to concession contracts and found the NPS's interpretation reasonable. In affirming, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit found the NPS's reading of the CDA consistent with both the CDA and the National Parks Omnibus Management Act of 1998.</p>
| 865 | 7 | 2 | false |
majority opinion
|
vacated/remanded
|
Judicial Power
|
1,459 | 55,056 |
Abdur'Rahman v. Bell
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/01-9094
|
01-9094
|
2002
|
Abu-Ali Abdur'Rahman
|
Ricky Bell, Warden
|
<p>In 1987, Abu-Ali Abdur'Rahman was convicted of first-degree murder and related charges. In state post-conviction proceedings, Abdur'Rahman presented claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel and prosecutorial misconduct. Presenting all of his claims to the Tennessee Supreme Court, Abdur'Rahman was denied leave to appeal, and then he only presented some of his claims, on which he ultimately lost, to the federal District Court. While Abdur'Rahman's certiorari petition was pending, the Tennessee Supreme Court adopted Rule 39, which expressly states that Tennessee litigants do not need to seek discretionary review from the court in order to exhaust their claims. Abdur'Rahman then filed a federal motion for relief of judgment, pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, re-presenting claims that the district court had previously determined to be unexhausted and procedurally barred. The District Court construed the Rule 60(b) motion as a second, or successive, habeas corpus petition and denied relief. Subsequently, the Court of Appeals denied all of Abdur'Rahman's motions.</p>
| 1,119 | 8 | 1 | false |
per curiam
| null |
Criminal Procedure
|
1,460 | 55,059 |
Dow Chemical Company v. Stephenson
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/02-271
|
02-271
|
2002
|
Dow Chemical Company
|
Stephenson
|
<p>In 1984 Dow Chemical Co. negotiated a settlement in a class action lawsuit filed by Vietnam War veterans who had been exposed to Agent Orange and subsequently developed various injuries and illnesses. The settlement created a fund that would pay those who developed illnesses up until 1994. Daniel Stephenson, a Vietnam veteran, developed cancer in 1998 and could therefore not collect money from the fund. He sued, saying that he was not adequately represented in the original settlement, which made no provision for injuries that developed after 1994. Therefore, he claimed, he had the right to file a suit of his own. The district court ruled for Dow Chemical; the 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals unanimously reversed, ruling for Stephenson.</p>
| 749 | 8 | 0 | true |
per curiam
|
vacated in-part/remanded
|
Judicial Power
|
1,461 | 55,055 |
Grutter v. Bollinger
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/02-241
|
02-241
|
2002
|
Grutter
|
Bollinger
|
<p>In 1997, Barbara Grutter, a white resident of Michigan, applied for admission to the University of Michigan Law School. Grutter applied with a 3.8 undergraduate GPA and an LSAT score of 161. She was denied admission. The Law School admits that it uses race as a factor in making admissions decisions because it serves a "compelling interest in achieving diversity among its student body." The District Court concluded that the Law School's stated interest in achieving diversity in the student body was not a compelling one and enjoined its use of race in the admissions process. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that Justice Powell's opinion in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), constituted a binding precedent establishing diversity as a compelling governmental interest sufficient under strict scrutiny review to justify the use of racial preferences in admissions. The appellate court also rejected the district court's finding that the Law School's "critical mass" was the functional equivalent of a quota.</p>
| 1,063 | 5 | 4 | false |
majority opinion
|
affirmed
|
Civil Rights
|
1,462 | 55,061 |
Borden Ranch Partnership v. Army Corps of Engineers
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/01-1243
|
01-1243
|
2002
|
Borden Ranch Partnership
|
Army Corps of Engineers
|
<p>In 1993, Angelo Tsakopoulos purchased the Borden Ranch, an 8348-acre ranch in California. Tsakopoulos planned to subdivide the land into parcels for cultivation as vineyards and orchards. Because a dense layer of material prevented water from reaching the depths necessary to cultivate vineyards or orchards, Tsakopoulos intended to "deep rip" the soil. Deep ripping has a dramatic effect on the character of a wetland area. The Corps of Engineers and the Environmental Protection Agency informed Tsakopoulos that he was not to deep rip protected waters without a permit. Ultimately, the District Court found that Tsakopoulos had violated the Clean Water Act multiple times and imposed a substantial fine. The Court of Appeals affirmed in relevant part.</p>
| 761 | 4 | 4 | false |
equally divided
|
affirmed
|
Economic Activity
|
1,463 | 55,062 |
Brown v. Legal Foundation of Washington
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/01-1325
|
01-1325
|
2002
|
Brown
|
Legal Foundation of Washington
|
<p>Every state uses interest on lawyers' trust accounts (IOLTA) to pay for legal services for the needy. Among it rules, Washington's program requires that funds that cannot earn net interest for the client be deposited in an IOLTA account. The Supreme Court of Washington extended its IOLTA rules to cover Limited Practice Officers (LPOs), nonlawyers who are licensed to act as escrowees in real estate closings. Allen Brown and Greg Hayes alleged that they regularly purchase and sell real estate, in the course of such transactions they deliver funds to LPOs who are required to deposit them in IOLTA accounts, and the taking of the interest earned on their funds in IOLTA accounts violates the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The District Court found, among other things, that Brown and Hayes had lost nothing. Sitting en banc, the Court of Appeals reasoned that there was no taking because Brown and Hayes had suffered neither an actual loss nor an interference with any investment-backed expectations.</p>
| 1,029 | 5 | 4 | false |
majority opinion
|
affirmed
|
Due Process
|
1,464 | 55,058 |
United States v. American Library Assn., Inc.
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/02-361
|
02-361
|
2002
|
United States
|
American Library Assn., Inc.
|
<p>Congress passed the Children's Internet Protection Act (CIPA) in 2000, requiring public libraries to install internet filtering software on their computers in order to qualify for federal funding. The American Library Association and others challenged the law, claiming that it improperly required them to restrict the First Amendment rights of their patrons. As stipulated by the law, a three judge panel heard the case, and ruled unanimously that the CIPA violated the First Amendment.</p>
| 495 | 6 | 3 | true |
plurality opinion
|
reversed
|
First Amendment
|
1,465 | 55,060 |
Nguyen v. United States
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/01-10873
|
01-10873
|
2002
|
Khanh Phuong Nguyen
|
United States
|
<p>Khanh Phuong Nguyen and Tuyet Mai Thi Phan were tried, convicted, and sentenced on federal narcotics charges in the District Court of Guam, a territorial court with subject-matter jurisdiction over both federal-law and local-law causes. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit panel that convened to hear their appeals included two judges from that court, both of whom are life-tenured Article III judges, and the Chief Judge of the District Court for the Northern Mariana Islands, an Article IV territorial-court judge appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate for a 10-year term. Neither Nguyen nor Phan objected to the panel's composition before the cases were submitted for decision and neither sought rehearing to challenge the panel's authority to decide their appeals immediately after it affirmed their convictions.</p>
| 847 | 5 | 4 | true |
majority opinion
|
vacated/remanded
|
Judicial Power
|
1,466 | 55,063 |
Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc.
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/01-1015
|
01-1015
|
2002
|
Moseley
|
V Secret Catalogue, Inc.
|
<p>V Secret Catalogue, Inc., the affiliated corporations that own the Victoria's Secret trademarks, filed suit, alleging that the name Victor's Little Secret contributed to "the dilution of famous marks" under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act (FTDA). The law defines "dilution" as "the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or services." The District Court granted V Secret summary judgment on the FTDA claim. The Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that V Secret's mark was distinctive and that the evidence established dilution even though no actual harm had been proved.</p>
| 618 | 9 | 0 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed/remanded
|
Economic Activity
|
1,467 | 55,064 |
Dastar Corporation v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/02-428
|
02-428
|
2002
|
Dastar Corporation
|
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation
|
<p>Doubleday published the WWII book, Crusade in Europe, registered the work's copyright, and granted exclusive television rights to Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation. In 1975, Doubleday renewed the book's copyright, but Fox never renewed the copyright on the television series, leaving the series in the public domain. In 1988, Fox reacquired the television rights. In 1995, Dastar Corporation released a video set, World War II Campaigns in Europe, which it made from tapes of the original version of the Crusade television series. Fox filed suit, alleged that Dastar's sale of Campaigns without proper credit to the Crusade television series constituted "reverse passing off" in violation of the Lanham Act. The District Court granted Fox summary judgment. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that, because Dastar copied substantially the Crusade series, labeled it with a different name, and marketed it without attribution to Fox, Dastar had committed a "bodily appropriation" of Fox's series, which was sufficient to establish reverse passing off.</p>
| 1,067 | 8 | 0 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed/remanded
|
Economic Activity
|
1,468 | 55,067 |
Roell v. Withrow
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/02-69
|
02-69
|
2002
|
Roell
|
Withrow
|
<p>The Federal Magistrate Act of 1979 authorizes magistrate judges to conduct "any or all proceedings in a jury or nonjury civil matter and order the entry of judgment in the case" with "the consent of the parties." When Jon Withrow, a state prisoner, brought suit against members of the prison's medical staff, he gave written consent for the magistrate judge to preside over the entire case. Only one of the three staff members gave written consent. The other two members voluntarily participated. When the medical staff won, Withrow appealed and the Court of Appeals sua sponte remanded the case to determine whether the parties had consented to proceed before the magistrate judge. Ultimately, the magistrate judge reported that she had lacked jurisdiction because such consent had to be expressly given. The District Court adopted the report and recommendation. In affirming, the Court of Appeals found that consent must be express and that the staffs' postjudgment consent was inadequate.</p>
| 999 | 5 | 4 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed/remanded
|
Judicial Power
|
1,469 | 55,066 |
Cook County v. United States ex rel. Chandler
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/01-1572
|
01-1572
|
2002
|
Cook County
|
United States ex rel. Chandler
|
<p>Under the False Claims Act (FCA), "any person" who "knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, to an officer or employee of the United States Government...a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval" is liable to the federal government. A private person may bring a qui tam action "in the name of the Government" under the FCA. After the National Institute of Drug Abuse gave Cook County Hospital a $5 million research grant, Janet Chandler, who ran the study for a nonprofit research institute affiliated with the hospital, filed a qui tam action, claiming that Cook County and the institute had submitted false statements to obtain grant funds. Based on precedent, which held that States are not "persons" subject to FCA qui tam actions, the District Court granted the County's motion to dismiss. The Court of Appeals reversed.</p>
| 849 | 9 | 0 | false |
majority opinion
|
affirmed
|
Economic Activity
|
1,470 | 55,065 |
Hillside Dairy, Inc. v. Lyons
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/01-950
|
01-950
|
2002
|
Hillside Dairy, Inc.
|
Lyons
|
<p>California regulates the minimum price paid to dairy farmers producing raw milk by establishing price minimums and requiring contributions to a price equalization pool. After it became profitable for some California processors to buy raw milk from out-of-state producers, the California Department of Food and Agriculture amended its regulations to require contributions to the price equalization pool on some out-of-state purchases. Four dairy farms in Nevada filed suit, alleging that the amendment unconstitutionally discriminated against them. Without reaching the merits, the District Court dismissed both cases. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that the Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996 immunized California's milk pricing and pooling laws from Commerce Clause challenge. The appellate court also held that the individual petitioners' Privileges and Immunities Clause claims failed because the amendment did not create classifications based on any individual's residency or citizenship.</p>
| 1,029 | 8 | 1 | true |
majority opinion
|
vacated/remanded
|
Economic Activity
|
1,471 | 55,071 |
Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Ventura
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/02-29
|
02-29
|
2002
|
Immigration and Naturalization Service
|
Fredy Orlando Ventura
|
<p>Fredy Orlando Ventura illegally entered the United States in 1993. In 1998, an immigration judge heard Orlando Ventura’s request for asylum in the United States; he claimed that his political views made him a target for guerilla armies in Guatemala. The judge denied Orlando Ventura’s request, despite recognizing that Orlando Ventura’s fears of prosecution may be legitimate, because the political climate in Guatemala had drastically changed since Orlando Ventura had arrived in the United States and therefore he was no longer in danger. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the judgment of the immigration judge, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was “compelled” by Orlando Ventura’s testimony to reverse the lower court’s decision and subsequently denied remand to the BIA.</p>
| 815 | 9 | 0 | true |
per curiam
|
reversed/remanded
|
Civil Rights
|
1,472 | 55,070 |
Bunkley v. Florida
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/02-8636
|
02-8636
|
2002
|
Clyde Timothy Bunkley
|
Florida
|
<p>In 1989, Clyde Timothy Bunkley was convicted of burglary in the first degree because he was armed with a “dangerous weapon” at the time of the burglary. The “dangerous weapon” was a pocketknife with a 2.5-3 inch blade. In 1997, the state court interpreted the “common pocketknife” exception to the definition of “weapon” as a blade of 3.75 inches or shorter. Bunkley filed a motion for state post-conviction relief based on the state court’s 1997 decision and argued that his pocketknife could not have been considered a “weapon.” The trial court rejected the defendant’s motion for relief, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Florida Supreme Court also affirmed and found the “common pocketknife” exception did not apply retroactively because the 1997 decision was merely an “evolutionary refinement,” not a “major constitutional change,” and therefore did not apply retroactively.</p>
| 893 | 6 | 3 | true |
per curiam
|
vacated/remanded
|
Due Process
|
1,473 | 55,069 |
Boeing Company v. United States
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/01-1209
|
01-1209
|
2002
|
Boeing Company
|
United States
|
<p>In 1971, Congress enacted tax provisions providing special tax treatment for export sales made by an American manufacturer through a subsidiary that qualified as a "domestic international sales corporation" (DISC). Regarding research and development (R&D) expenses, Treasury Regulation 26 CFR section 1.861-8(e)(3) provides what must be treated as a cost when calculating combined taxable income (CTI), and how those costs should be allocated among different products and apportioned between the DISC and its parent. Under this regulation, the Internal Revenue Service reallocated Boeing's company sponsored R&D costs for 1979 to 1987, thereby decreasing the untaxed profits of its export subsidiaries and increasing its taxable profits on export sales. Subsequently, Boeing filed suit, arguing that it had an unqualified right to allocate its company sponsored R&D expenses to specific products and to exclude any allocated R&D from being treated as a cost of another product. In granting Boeing summary judgment, the District Court found section 1.861-8(e)(3) invalid due to a specific DISC regulation giving the taxpayer the right to group and allocate income and costs by product or product line. The Court of Appeals reversed.</p>
| 1,255 | 7 | 2 | false |
majority opinion
|
affirmed
|
Federal Taxation
|
1,474 | 55,068 |
Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Company
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/01-705
|
01-705
|
2002
|
Barnhart
|
Peabody Coal Company
|
<p>Under the Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefit Act of 1992, the Commissioner of Social Security "shall, before October 1, 1993," assign each coal industry retiree eligible for benefits under the Act to a company, which shall then be responsible for funding the beneficiary's benefits. After October 1, 1993, the Commissioner assigned 600 hundred beneficiaries to various coal companies. The companies challenged the assignments, claiming that the statutory date sets a time limit on the Commissioner's power to assign such that a beneficiary not assigned on October 1, 1993 must be left unassigned for life. Under the companies' argument, the challenged assignments are void and the corresponding benefits must be financed by other pension plans and funds. The companies obtained summary judgments, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.</p>
| 841 | 6 | 3 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed
|
Civil Rights
|
1,475 | 55,072 |
Federal Election Commission v. Beaumont
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/02-403
|
02-403
|
2002
|
Federal Election Commission
|
Beaumont
|
<p>In 1971 Congress passed the Federal Election Campaign Act, banning direct corporate donations to federal election campaigns. In 2000, Christine Beaumont and the North Carolina Right to Life (NCRL), an anti-abortion advocacy group, challenged the act, saying it violated their right to free speech. The group is an incorporated non-profit that lobbies and backs political candidates friendly to its cause, but under the act it cannot make political donations. The district court ruled in favor of NCRL. The 4th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.</p>
| 552 | 7 | 2 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed
|
First Amendment
|
1,476 | 55,073 |
Stogner v. California
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/01-1757
|
01-1757
|
2002
|
Stogner
|
California
|
<p>In 1993, California enacted a new criminal statute of limitations permitting prosecution for sex-related child abuse where the prior limitations period has expired if the prosecution is begun within one year of a victim's report to police. In 1998, Marion Stogner was indicted for sex-related child abuse committed between 1955 and 1973. Without the new statute allowing revival of the State's cause of action, California could not have prosecuted Stogner. Stogner moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the Ex Post Facto Clause forbids revival of a previously time-barred prosecution. The trial court agreed, but the California Court of Appeal reversed. The trial court denied Stogner's subsequent dismissal motion, in which he argued that his prosecution violated the Ex Post Facto and Due Process Clauses. The Court of Appeal affirmed.</p>
| 857 | 5 | 4 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed
|
Criminal Procedure
|
1,477 | 55,076 |
Scheidler v. National Organization for Women, Inc.
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/01-1118
|
01-1118
|
2002
|
Scheidler
|
National Organization for Women, Inc.
|
<p>The National Organization for Women, Inc. (NOW) filed a class action alleging that certain individuals and organizations that oppose legal abortion violated the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) by engaging in a nationwide conspiracy to shut down abortion clinics through "a pattern of racketeering activity" that included acts of extortion in violation of the Hobbs Act. Ultimately, the District Court entered a permanent nationwide injunction against the abortion opponents. Upholding the injunction, the Court of Appeals held, in part, that the things abortion supporters claimed were extorted from them, such as women's right to seek medical services from the clinics and the clinic doctors' rights to perform their jobs, constituted "property" that was "obtained" for purposes of the Hobbs Act. (Together with No. 01-1119, Operation Rescue v. National Organization for Women.)</p>
| 913 | 8 | 1 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed
|
Privacy
|
1,478 | 55,074 |
Fitzgerald v. Racing Association of Central Iowa
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/02-695
|
02-695
|
2002
|
Michael Fitzgerald, Treasurer of Iowa
|
Racing Association of Central Iowa
|
<p>A group of racetracks that earn revenue from gambling sued the state of Iowa, claiming that the state's practice of taxing racetrack gambling at a higher rate than riverboat gambling violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. The group asserted that gambling at racetracks and riverboat casinos is is not substantially different, and that the state should therefore charge the same tax rate for both activities. A state district court sided with the state, ruling that important differences did exist between riverboat and racetrack gambling; the Iowa Supreme Court reversed in a 4-3 decision.</p>
| 619 | 9 | 0 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed/remanded
|
Economic Activity
|
1,479 | 55,075 |
Price v. Vincent
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/02-524
|
02-524
|
2002
|
Price
|
Vincent
|
<p>During Duyonn Vincent's trial, defense counsel moved for a directed verdict of acquittal as to first-degree murder. Subsequently, when the prosecution made a statement on first-degree murder, defense counsel objected, arguing that the court had granted its directed verdict motion and that further prosecution on first-degree murder would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. The judge responded that he had granted the motion but had not directed a verdict. The judge then submitted the first-degree murder charge to the jury, which convicted Vincent on that charge. The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed the conviction based on the Double Jeopardy Clause. In reversing, the State Supreme Court determined that the trial judge's comments were not sufficiently final to terminate jeopardy. Subsequently, the Federal District Court granted Vincent's federal habeas corpus petition after concluding that continued prosecution for first-degree murder had violated the Double Jeopardy Clause and the Court of Appeals affirmed.</p>
| 1,030 | 9 | 0 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed
|
Criminal Procedure
|
1,480 | 55,080 |
Los Angeles v. David
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/02-1212
|
02-1212
|
2002
|
City of Los Angeles
|
Edwin David
|
<p>On August 13, 1998, Edwin David’s car was towed because he was improperly parked in a spot where parking was prohibited. He claimed he could not see the “no parking” sign because there were trees blocking it from view. David paid the fees to recover his car, but he also submitted a request for a hearing to challenge the ticket and recover his money. The hearing was held 27 days after the car was towed, and David’s claim was dismissed. David then sued the City of Los Angeles under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and claimed that the 27-day wait for the hearing denied him due process under the law as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment for the City, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and held that the Due Process Clause required that the city hold a hearing at least within five days.</p>
| 857 | 9 | 0 | true |
per curiam
|
reversed
|
Due Process
|
1,481 | 55,077 |
United States v. White Mt. Apache Tribe
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/01-1067
|
01-1067
|
2002
|
United States
|
White Mt. Apache Tribe
|
<p>Under Public Law 86-392, the former Fort Apache Military Reservation is held in trust for the White Mountain Apache Tribe. The Tribe sued the federal government to rehabilitate the property, alleging that the United States had breached a fiduciary duty to maintain, protect, repair, and preserve it. In its motion to dismiss, the federal government argued that jurisdiction was lacking here because no statute or regulation could be read to impose a legal obligation on it to maintain or restore the trust property, let alone authorize compensation for breach. The Court of Federal Claims agreed and dismissed the complaint. In reversing, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit concluded that the federal government's property use triggered a common-law trustee's duty to act reasonably to preserve any property the Secretary of the Interior chose to utilize, which also supported a money damages claim.</p>
| 917 | 5 | 4 | false |
majority opinion
|
affirmed
|
Civil Rights
|
1,482 | 55,078 |
Jinks v. Richland County, South Carolina
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/02-258
|
02-258
|
2002
|
Susan Jinks
|
Richland County, South Carolnia
|
<p>If a federal court with jurisdiction over a civil action declines to exercise supplement jurisdiction over other related claims, the claims will be dismissed and must be refiled in state court. To prevent the limitations period on those claims from expiring, 28 USC section 1367(d) requires state courts to toll the period while a supplemental claim is pending in federal court. In 1994, Susan Jinks filed a federal-court action against Richland County, South Carolina. The District Court granted the county summary judgment and declined to exercise jurisdiction over Jinks's state-law claims. Jinks then filed the supplemental claims in state court and won. In reversing, the Supreme Court of South Carolina found the state-law claims time-barred. Although they would not have been barred under section 1367(d)'s tolling rule, the court held section 1367(d) unconstitutional as applied to claims brought in state court against a State's political subdivisions.</p>
| 969 | 9 | 0 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed/remanded
|
Judicial Power
|
1,483 | 55,081 |
Eldred v. Ashcroft
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/01-618
|
01-618
|
2002
|
Eldred
|
Ashcroft
|
<p>Under the Copyright and Patent Clause of the Constitution, Article 1, section 8, "Congress shall have Power...to promote the Progress of Science...by securing [to Authors] for limited Times...the exclusive Right to their...Writings." In the 1998 Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA), Congress enlarged the duration of copyrights by 20 years, making copyrights now run from creation until 70 years after the author's death. Petitioners, whose products or services build on copyrighted works that have entered the public domain, argued that the CTEA violates both the Copyright Clause's "limited Times" prescription and the First Amendment's free speech guarantee. They claimed Congress cannot extend the copyright term for published works with existing copyrights. The District Court and the District of Columbia Circuit disagreed.</p>
| 837 | 7 | 2 | false |
majority opinion
|
affirmed
|
Economic Activity
|
1,484 | 55,085 |
American Insurance Ass'n v. Garamendi
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/02-722
|
02-722
|
2002
|
American Insurance Ass'n
|
Garamendi
|
<p>In 1999 the California legislature enacted the Holocaust Victim Insurance Relief Act (HVIRA) in an attempt to facilitate Holocaust-era insurance claims by California residents. The Act required all insurance companies doing business in California that sold policies to people in Europe between 1920 and 1945 to make public all of those policies, including the names of policy owners and the status of the policies. A group of insurance companies and a trade organization sued, saying that only the federal government, with its jurisdiction over commerce and foreign affairs, had the right to enact such legislation. They also said the law violated the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses of the U.S. Constitution because the companies, if they failed to comply, could lose their insurance licenses. The District Court ruled for the insurance companies; the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.</p>
| 908 | 5 | 4 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed
|
Federalism
|
1,485 | 55,082 |
Ford Motor Company v. Romo
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/02-1097
|
02-1097
|
2002
|
Ford Motor Company
|
Ramon Romo
|
<p>When Romo's Ford Bronco swerved to avoid another vehicle, it rolled over, killing three of the Romo family and injuring three more. A California jury found that the rollover was caused by a dangerous flaw in the design of the Bronco, which Ford had willfully ignored. The jury awarded Romo $5 million in compensatory damages (which are intended to compensate the plaintiff for a loss) and $290 million in punitive damages (which are intended to punish the defendant for wrongdoing.) Ford argued that the very large award of punitive damages was excessive. Nevertheless, the California Fifth Appellate District Court of Appeal upheld the verdict, comparing the level of Ford's negligence to involuntary manslaughter. After the California Supreme Court declined to hear the case, Ford appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, arguing that the punitive damages awarded by the jury were so excessive as to be prohibited by the Constitution's Due Process Clause.</p>
| 960 | 0 | 0 | true |
per curiam
|
vacated/remanded
| null |
1,486 | 55,083 |
Medical Board of California v. Hason
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/02-479
|
02-479
|
2002
|
Medical Board of California
|
Hason
|
<p>The California Medical Board denied Hason a license to practice medicine because of his mental illness. Hason sued in federal district court, alleging that his rights were violated under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The district court dismissed the suit, holding that his claims were barred by the 11th Amendment's guarantee of sovereign immunity, which prohibits a private party from suing a non-consenting state or its agencies in federal court. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, ruling that Congress abrogated 11th Amendment sovereign immunity by enacting Title II of the ADA "and thus states and their agencies may be sued pursuant to Title II."</p>
| 682 | 0 | 0 | false |
dismissal - moot
|
none
| null |
1,487 | 55,086 |
Woodford v. Visciotti
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/02-137
|
02-137
|
2002
|
Jeanne Woodford, Warden
|
John Louis Visciotti
|
<p>On November 8, 1982, John Louis Visciotti and his co-worker attempted to rob two fellow employees while driving together to a party. Visciotti asked the driver to stop the car in a remote area, pulled out a gun, and demanded the victims’ wallets. Because the victims had little money in their wallets, Visciotti located the money in the car and then shot the victims. Visciotti was convicted of first-degree murder, attempted murder, and robbery. The jury recommended the death penalty since the homicide took place during a robbery with a deadly weapon.</p>
<p>Visciotti petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus from the California Supreme Court and claimed that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. The California Supreme Court denied the petition and held that, although Visciotti received ineffective assistance of counsel at the penalty phase of his trial, the jury was not prejudiced. The state court interpreted the Supreme Court’s ineffective assistance of counsel precedent as requiring the defendant to show that, more likely than not, the outcome of the trial would have been different had it not been for the ineffective assistance of counsel. Visciotti then petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus from the federal district court, which granted the petition and determined that Visciotti had received ineffective assistance of counsel. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.</p>
| 1,421 | 9 | 0 | true |
per curiam
|
reversed
|
Criminal Procedure
|
1,488 | 55,087 |
Lockyer v. Andrade
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/01-1127
|
01-1127
|
2002
|
Lockyer
|
Andrade
|
<p>Leandro Andrade was found guilty of two felony counts of petty theft with a prior conviction after he stole approximately $150 worth of videotapes. Under California's three strikes regime, a judge sentenced him to two consecutive terms of 25 years to life. In affirming, the California Court of Appeal rejected his claim that his sentence violated the Eighth Amendment. After the Supreme Court of California denied discretionary review, Andrade filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in Federal District Court. The District Court denied his petition. In reversing, the Court of Appeals granted Andrade a certificate of appealability as to his claim that his sentence violated the Eighth Amendment.</p>
| 711 | 5 | 4 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed
|
Criminal Procedure
|
1,489 | 55,088 |
PacifiCare Health Systems, Inc. v. Book
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/02-215
|
02-215
|
2002
|
PacifiCare Health Systems, Inc.
|
Book
|
<p>A group of physicians filed suit against a number of managed-health-care organizations, alleging they violated the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) by failing to reimburse them for health-care services that they had provided to patients covered by the organizations' plans. The District Court refused to compel arbitration of the RICO claims on the ground that the arbitration clauses in the parties' agreements prohibited awards of punitive damages. Subsequently, the court found the arbitration agreements unenforceable. The Court of Appeals affirmed.</p>
| 586 | 8 | 0 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed/remanded
|
Economic Activity
|
1,490 | 55,089 |
Franchise Tax Board of California v. Hyatt
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/02-42
|
02-42
|
2002
|
Franchise Tax Board of California
|
Gilbert P. Hyatt et al.
|
<p>Gilbert Hyatt filed a part-year resident income-tax return in California for 1991, which represented that he had become a Nevada resident in October 1991, shortly before he received substantial licensing fees. The California Franchise Tax Board (CFTB) determined that Hyatt was a California resident until April 1992 and issued notices of proposed assessments and imposed substantial civil fraud penalties. Hyatt filed suit against CFTB in a Nevada state court, alleging that CFTB had committed negligence and intentional torts during the course of its audit. CFTB argued that the state court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because full faith and credit required that the court apply California law immunizing CFTB from suit. Ultimately, the Nevada Supreme Court allowed the intentional tort claims to proceed to trial. The court held that affording CFTB statutory immunity with respect to intentional torts would contravene Nevada's interest in protecting its citizens from injurious intentional torts and bad faith acts committed by sister States' government employees.</p>
| 1,083 | 9 | 0 | false |
majority opinion
|
affirmed
|
Interstate Relations
|
1,491 | 55,090 |
Wiggins v. Smith
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/02-311
|
02-311
|
2002
|
Wiggins
|
Smith
|
<p>Kevin Wiggins was convicted and sentenced to death for a 1988 murder. He appealed, claiming that his attorney's decision not to tell jurors about Wiggins' troubled childhood amounted to ineffective counsel because it resulted in a harsher sentence. Prosecutors countered that the attorney's decision had been carefully considered, and that a different decision would not necessarily have resulted in a different outcome. Therefore, they said, it was not ineffective counsel. A Maryland district court sided with Wiggins; the Maryland Supreme Court reversed, siding with the state. On appeal to federal court, the 4th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, ruling for Maryland.</p>
| 680 | 7 | 2 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed/remanded
|
Criminal Procedure
|
1,492 | 55,094 |
Black & Decker Disability Plan v. Nord
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/02-469
|
02-469
|
2002
|
Black & Decker Disability Plan
|
Nord
|
<p>With the recommendation of his doctor, Kenneth Nord filed for disability benefits with his employer of 25 years, Kwikset Corp., a company owned by Black & Decker Corp. After the company denied his claim, Nord asked for a review of the denial. A doctor hired by the company determined that Nord could in fact perform the duties required by his job and was therefore ineligible for benefits, despite determinations to the contrary by Nord's physician, his orthopedic surgeon and a Black & Decker human resource representative. Nord sued to have the decision reversed, claiming that the company's preference of its doctor's opinion over the opinions of the other physicians violated the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974. The district court ruled in favor of Black & Decker Corp. The 9th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.</p>
| 853 | 9 | 0 | true |
majority opinion
|
vacated/remanded
|
Economic Activity
|
1,493 | 55,095 |
Massaro v. United States
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/01-1559
|
01-1559
|
2002
|
Massaro
|
United States
|
<p>Joseph Massaro was indicted on federal racketeering charges, including murder in aid of racketeering. Though prosecutors found a bullet before the trial began and did not inform the defense until the trial was underway, defense counsel declined more than once the trial court's offer of a continuance so the bullet could be examined. Subsequently, Massaro was convicted. On direct appeal, Massaro but did not raise an ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Massaro later moved to vacate his conviction, under 28 USC section 2255, based on an ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim. The District Court found his claim procedurally defaulted because he could have raised it on direct appeal. In affirming, the Court of Appeals concluded that, when the defendant is represented by new counsel on appeal and the ineffective-assistance claim is based solely on the trial record, the claim must be raised on direct appeal.</p>
| 973 | 9 | 0 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed/remanded
|
Criminal Procedure
|
1,494 | 55,096 |
Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/01-706
|
01-706
|
2002
|
Sprietsma
|
Mercury Marine
|
<p>Rex Sprietsma's wife was killed in a boating accident when she was struck by the propeller of a motor made by Mercury Marine. Sprietsma sued Mercury Marine under Illinois common law, alleging that his wife's injuries were caused by an unreasonably dangerous motor. The trial court, the intermediate court, and the Illinois Supreme Court all dismissed the complaint, finding the Federal Boat Safety Act of 1971 (FBSA) preempted such state common-law claims.</p>
| 464 | 9 | 0 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed/remanded
|
Federalism
|
1,495 | 55,092 |
United States v. Navajo Nation
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/01-1375
|
01-1375
|
2002
|
United States
|
Navajo Nation
|
<p>The Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938 (IMLA) allows Indian tribes, with the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, to lease the mining rights on their tribal lands to private companies. In 1964, Navajo Nation (tribe) entered into a lease with the predecessor of Peabody Coal Company, allowing Peabody to mine on the tribe's land in return for a royalty of 37.5 cents for every ton of coal mined. The agreement was subject to renegotiation after 20 years. By 1984, the tribe's royalty was only worth 2% of Peabody's gross proceeds. In 1977 Congress had required a minimum of 12.5%. The tribe requested that the Secretary set a new rate, and the Director of Bureau of Indian Affairs for the Navajo Area, as the Secretary's representative, made a preliminary decision to set the rate at 20%. Peabody's representatives urged the Secretary to reverse or delay the decision. The Secretary agreed, and urged the parties to resume negotiations. The tribe and Peabody agreed on a rate of 12.5%. In 1993, however, the tribe sued the government in the Court of Federal Claims, alleging a breach of trust and claiming $600 million in damages. The court ruled for the government, explaining that though the government may have betrayed the tribe's trust by acting in Peabody's interest rather than the tribe's, it had not violated any specific statutory or regulatory obligation. The tribe was therefore not entitled to monetary relief. On appeal, the tribe argued that the entirety of the IMLA imposes on the government a broad obligation to look after the wellbeing of the tribe. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit agreed and reversed the lower court, finding that "the Secretary must act in the best interests of the Indian tribes."</p>
| 1,745 | 6 | 3 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed/remanded
|
Civil Rights
|
1,496 | 55,097 |
Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Associates, Inc.
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/01-1806
|
01-1806
|
2002
|
Illinois ex rel. Madigan
|
Telemarketing Associates, Inc.
|
<p>VietNow National Headquarters, a charitable nonprofit corporation, retained for-profit fundraising telemarketing corporations to solicit donations to aid Vietnam veterans. The contracts provided that the telemarketers would retain 85 percent of the gross receipts from Illinois donors. The Illinois Attorney General filed a complaint in state court, alleging that the telemarketers represented to donors that a significant amount of each dollar donated would be paid over to VietNow for charitable endeavors and that such representations were knowingly deceptive and materially false and constituted a fraud. The trial court granted the telemarketers' motion to dismiss on First Amendment grounds. In affirming, the Illinois Supreme Courts relied on U.S. Supreme Court precedent that held that certain regulations of charitable solicitation barring fees in excess of a prescribed level effectively imposed prior restraints on fundraising and were therefore incompatible with the First Amendment.</p>
| 1,003 | 9 | 0 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed/remanded
|
First Amendment
|
1,497 | 55,098 |
Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/01-7574
|
01-7574
|
2002
|
Sattazahn
|
Pennsylvania
|
<p>When David Sattazahn's penalty-phase jury reported to the trial judge that it was hopelessly deadlocked 9-to-3 for life imprisonment, the court discharged the jury and entered a life sentence, as required under Pennsylvania law. On appeal, the Pennsylvania Superior Court reversed Sattazahn's first-degree murder conviction and remanded for a new trial. At the second trial, Pennsylvania again sought the death penalty and the jury again convicted Sattazahn, but this time the jury imposed a death sentence. In affirming, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that neither the Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause nor the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause barred Pennsylvania from seeking the death penalty at the retrial.</p>
| 741 | 5 | 4 | false |
majority opinion
|
affirmed
|
Criminal Procedure
|
1,498 | 55,099 |
Norfolk & Western Railway Company v. Ayers
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/01-963
|
01-963
|
2002
|
Norfolk & Western Railway Company
|
Ayers
|
<p>Six employees of the Norfolk and Western Railroad Company contracted asbestosis, a disease caused by exposure to asbestos. The employees brought suit under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA), including a damages request for pain and suffering caused by a fear of cancer (which they had not yet contracted). The district court ruled for the plaintiffs. The court of appeals denied discretionary review.</p>
| 418 | 5 | 4 | false |
majority opinion
|
affirmed
|
Economic Activity
|
1,499 | 55,093 |
United States v. Jimenez Recio
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/01-1184
|
01-1184
|
2002
|
United States
|
Jimenez Recio
|
<p>In 1997, police stopped a truck in Nevada and seized the illegal drugs that it was carrying. With the help of the truck drivers, the police set up a sting. Francisco Jimenez Recio and Adrian Lopez-Meza came for the truck and were subsequently arrested. A jury convicted Jimenez Recio and Lopez-Meza of conspiracy, but the trial judge ordered a new trial under Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals precedent that held a conspiracy terminates when "'there is affirmative evidence of...defeat of the object of the conspiracy.'" In other words, the federal government could not prosecute the drug conspiracy defendants unless they had joined the conspiracy before the government seized the drugs. The new jury convicted the two men once again. In reversing, the Ninth Circuit held that the evidence presented at the second trial was insufficient to show that Jimenez Recio and Lopez-Meza had joined the conspiracy before the drug seizure.</p>
| 936 | 8 | 1 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed/remanded
|
Criminal Procedure
|
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.