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1,600 | 55,207 |
Leocal v. Ashcroft
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/03-583
|
03-583
|
2004
|
Josue Leocal
|
John D. Ashcroft, Attorney General, et al.
|
<p>A Florida court convicted Vietnam citizen Duan Le for driving under the influence and causing serious bodily injury. The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) charged in federal immigration court that Le should be deported. The INS argued Le committed a crime of violence that was an aggravated felony under federal immigration laws - a deportable crime. The immigration court and an appellate immigration court ruled Le could be deported. The 11th Circuit Court of Appeals agreed.</p>
| 496 | 9 | 0 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed/remanded
|
Civil Rights
|
1,601 | 55,206 |
Johnson v. United States
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/03-9685
|
03-9685
|
2004
|
Robert Johnson, Jr.
|
United States
|
<p>In 1998 a Georgia court reversed all of Johnson's seven prior convictions. One of these had been the basis for the enhanced federal sentence Johnson had received in 1994. In light of the reversals, Johnson filed a motion to vacate his enhanced federal sentence. Federal law, however, set out a one-year statute of limitations on motions by prisoners seeking to modify their sentences. That one-year period ran from the latest of four dates, the last of which was "the date on which the facts supporting the claim...could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence." Johnson argued his motion was timely because the reversals constituted previously undiscoverable "facts supporting the claim" and thus triggered a renewed limitation period. The district court and the 11th Circuit denied Johnson's motion as untimely.</p>
| 840 | 5 | 4 | false |
majority opinion
|
affirmed
|
Judicial Power
|
1,602 | 55,208 |
Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc.
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/02-1192
|
02-1192
|
2004
|
Cooper Industries, Inc.
|
Aviall Services, Inc.
|
<p>Texas prodded Aviall Services to clean up contaminated property bought from Cooper Industries. Aviall sued in federal district court to force Cooper to pay some of the clean up costs. Aviall claimed it could sue Cooper under the federal Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA). Cooper admitted to being a potentially responsible party (PRP), but claimed it was not liable because Aviall was never sued to clean up the land and had no federal requirement to do so. The district court and a panel for the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled against Aviall. The entire appellate court reversed and ruled CERCLA does not require a PRP to first be sued before seeking clean up funds from other PRPs.</p>
| 741 | 7 | 2 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed/remanded
|
Economic Activity
|
1,603 | 55,210 |
Pace v. DiGuglielmo
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/03-9627
|
03-9627
|
2004
|
John A. Pace
|
David DiGuglielmo, Superintendent, State Correctional Institution at Graterford, et al.
|
<p>In 1986 John Pace was convicted for murder in a Pennsylvania court. His post-conviction appeal was rejected by the state courts as untimely. In 1999 he filed a federal habeas corpus petition. While federal law provides a one-year statute of limitations on filing habeas petitions, that period is tolled while "a properly filed" state appeal is pending. The district court found Pace entitled to both statutory and equitable tolling, effectively discounting the period of time when Pace pursued appeals in state courts. Pennsylvania appealed and argued the court had no basis for the extension. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals agreed and ruled Pace could not file a federal habeas petition.</p>
| 700 | 5 | 4 | false |
majority opinion
|
affirmed
|
Judicial Power
|
1,604 | 55,211 |
Smith v. Massachusetts
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/03-8661
|
03-8661
|
2004
|
Melvin T. Smith
|
Massachusetts
|
<p>Melvin T. Smith was tried in for illegal possession of a firearm, among other offenses. During the trial the judge ruled Smith was not guilty because the state failed to introduce direct evidence of the gun's length - therefore not proving the gun Smith possessed met the statutory definition of a firearm. The state later pointed to the state supreme court's ruling that testimony that a gun was a pistol or revolver was sufficient evidence to allow a firearm charge to go to the jury. Because a witness had testified that Smith's gun was a pistol, the judge reversed and sent the possession charge to the jury.</p>
<p>Smith appealed and argued the judge's reversal of the not guilty ruling on the possession charge violated the Fifth Amendment's doubly jeopardy clause, which prohibited successive prosecutions. The state court of appeals rejected Smith's argument and ruled no Fifth Amendment violation occurred because the judge's reversal did not require a second proceeding.</p>
| 988 | 5 | 4 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed/remanded
|
Criminal Procedure
|
1,605 | 55,209 |
Stewart v. Dutra Construction Company
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/03-814
|
03-814
|
2004
|
Willard Stewart
|
Dutra Construction Company
|
<p>Willard Stewart was injured while working on a dredge (a machine for underwater digging) for Dutra, a dredging company. Stewart alleged Dutra was negligent and sued the company in federal district court under the Jones Act. The district court ruled a dredge is not a "vessel in navigation" as defined by the Jones Act and therefore Stewart could not sue under the act. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.</p>
| 421 | 8 | 0 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed/remanded
|
Economic Activity
|
1,606 | 55,213 |
Mayle v. Felix
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/04-563
|
04-563
|
2004
|
Deneice A. Mayle, Warden
|
Jacoby Lee Felix
|
<p>A California state court sentenced Felix to life in prison for murder. Felix's conviction became final on August 12, 1997. Federal habeas law gave Felix one year to file a habeas petition in federal court. On May 8, 1998, Felix filed a habeas petition and asserted a Sixth Amendment challenge to the admission into his trial of videotaped prosecution witness testimony. On January 28, 1999, more than five months after the one-year habeas time limit, Felix filed an amended petition arguing that the admission into his trial of pretrial statements had violated the Fifth Amendment. Felix argued that the one-year limit did not bar this amended petition, citing the rule under federal habeas law that amended petitions relate back to the filing date of the original petition if both arise out of the original's "conduct, transaction or occurrence." Because his Fifth and Sixth Amendment claims challenged the same criminal conviction, Felix argued, they arose out of the same "conduct, transaction, or occurrence." The district court disagreed and ruled the amended petition time barred; the court rejected the Sixth Amendment claim on its merits. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the Sixth Amendment ruling, but agreed with Felix that his amended petition was not time barred because they both arose out of the same trial and conviction.</p>
| 1,339 | 7 | 2 | true |
majority opinion
|
vacated/remanded
|
Criminal Procedure
|
1,607 | 55,212 |
Smith v. City of Jackson, Mississippi
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/03-1160
|
03-1160
|
2004
|
Azel P. Smith, et al.
|
City of Jackson, Mississippi, et al.
|
<p>Azel Smith and group of other police department employees over the age of 40 sued Jackson, Mississippi, and the city police department in federal district court. The group alleged the department salary plan violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), which banned employers from engaging in age discrimination. The department plan gave officers with five or fewer years of tenure with the department larger raises than those with more than five years of tenure. The group made a "disparate impact" claim under the ADEA, arguing the department and city unintentionally engaged in age discrimination. The federal district court and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled disparate impact claims could not be made under the ADEA. Other federal appeals courts ruled to the contrary.</p>
| 802 | 8 | 0 | false |
majority opinion
|
affirmed
|
Civil Rights
|
1,608 | 55,214 |
Medellín v. Dretke
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/04-5928
|
04-5928
|
2004
|
Jose Ernesto Medellin
|
Doug Dretke, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division
|
<p>A Texas trial court sentenced Medellin, a Mexican citizen, to death for participating in the gang rape and murder of two girls in 1993. A state appeals court affirmed the conviction. Medellin then filed a state habeas corpus action, claiming that Texas failed to notify him of his right to counsel under the Vienna Convention. The state trial court and the appellate court rejected this claim. Medellin then filed a federal habeas petition, raising the Vienna Convention claim. The district court denied the petition. Medellin next appealed to the Fifth Circuit. Before the Fifth Circuit could rule, the International Court of Justice issued its decision in a case where Mexico had alleged the United States violated the Vienna Convention with respect to Medellin and other Mexican citizens facing the death penalty in the United States. The ICJ held that the United States had violated the individually enforceable rights guaranteed by Vienna and must reconsider the convictions. The Fifth Circuit rejected Medellin's appeal, citing its previous holdings that the Vienna Convention did not create an individually enforceable right. More than two months after the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear the case, President George W. Bush issued a memo requiring the United States to follow the ICJ's ruling by having state courts review the Mexicans' cases. Citing the memo and the ICJ ruling, Medellin filed a new appeal in a Texas state court.</p>
| 1,448 | 5 | 4 | false |
per curiam
| null |
Judicial Power
|
1,609 | 55,215 |
Halbert v. Michigan
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/03-10198
|
03-10198
|
2004
|
Antonio Dwayne Halbert
|
Michigan
|
<p>Halbert pleaded no contest in a Michigan court to two counts of criminal sexual conduct. The day after Halbert's sentence was imposed, Halbert moved to withdraw his plea. The trial court denied the motion and told Halbert the property remedy for his complaint was the state appellate court. Michigan required a defendant convicted on a guilty or no contest plea to apply for leave of appeal to the state appellate court. Halbert asked the trial court twice to appoint counsel to help him with his application. The trial court refused. Without counsel, Halbert still applied for leave to appeal, which the court of appeals denied. The state supreme court also denied Halbert's application for leave to appeal to that court.</p>
| 730 | 7 | 2 | true |
majority opinion
|
vacated/remanded
|
Civil Rights
|
1,610 | 55,220 |
Pasquantino v. United States
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/03-725
|
03-725
|
2004
|
David B. Pasquantino, Carl J. Pasquantino, and Arthur Hilts
|
United States
|
<p>Carl J. Pasquantino, David B. Pasquantino and Arthur Hilts smuggled large quantities of liquor from the United States into Canada to evade that country's heavy alcohol import taxes. A federal district court convicted them for violating the federal wire fraud statute, which prohibited the use of interstate wires for "any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses." The Fourth Circuit affirmed their convictions, rejecting the petitioners' argument that they could not be prosecuted because of the common-law revenue, which rule barred courts from enforcing foreign tax laws.</p>
| 649 | 5 | 4 | false |
majority opinion
|
affirmed
|
Criminal Procedure
|
1,611 | 55,216 |
Exxon Mobil Corporation v. Saudi Basic Industries Corporation
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/03-1696
|
03-1696
|
2004
|
Exxon Mobil Corporation, Exxon Chemical Arabia, Inc., and Mobil Yanbu Petrochemical Company, Inc.
|
Saudi Basic Industries Corporation
|
<p>Two subsidiaries of ExxonMobil formed joint ventures with Saudi Basic Industries Corp. (SABIC) to produce polyethylene in Saudi Arabia. When a dispute arose over the royalties SABIC had charged, SABIC sued the two subsidiaries in a Delaware state court, seeking a ruling that the royalties were proper. ExxonMobil countersued in federal district court, alleging SABIC had overcharged. Before the state-court trial, the district court denied SABIC's motion to dismiss the federal suit. As SABIC appealed, the Delaware court ruled for ExxonMobil. The Third Circuit held that as a result of of the state court judgment, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred the suit. That doctrine was an offshoot of the federal law giving the U.S. Supreme Court sole authority to modify and prohibiting a federal district court from exercising appellate jurisdiction.</p>
| 854 | 9 | 0 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed/remanded
|
Judicial Power
|
1,612 | 55,218 |
Johnson v. California
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/03-636
|
03-636
|
2004
|
Garrison S. Johnson
|
California, et al.
|
<p>California prisoner Garrison Johnson alleged in federal district court that the California Department of Corrections used race to assign temporary cell mates for new prisoners. Johnson alleged this violated the U.S. Constitution's equal protection clause. The district court and a federal appellate court ruled against Johnson. The appellate court pointed to the U.S. Supreme Court's 1987 decision in Turner v. Safley, which said a relaxed standard - as opposed to a "strict scrutiny" standard - should be used to determine whether prison regulations are constitutional. The prison's policies were "reasonably related to the administrators' concern for racial violence and thus must be upheld," the appellate court wrote.</p>
| 729 | 6 | 2 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed/remanded
|
Civil Rights
|
1,613 | 55,219 |
Illinois v. Caballes
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/03-923
|
03-923
|
2004
|
Illinois
|
Roy I. Caballes
|
<p>During a routine traffic stop, a drug-detection dog alerted police to marijuana in Roy Caballes' car trunk. An Illinois court convicted Caballes of cannabis trafficking. Caballes appealed and argued the search violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. The state appellate court affirmed the conviction. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed and ruled police performed the canine sniff without specific and articulable facts to support its use, "unjustifiably enlarging the scope of a routine traffic stop into a drug investigation."</p>
| 584 | 6 | 2 | true |
majority opinion
|
vacated/remanded
|
Criminal Procedure
|
1,614 | 55,221 |
Bell v. Cone
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/04-394
|
04-394
|
2004
|
Bell
|
Cone
|
<p>In 1984 a Tennessee court sentenced Cone to death for murder. The jury had found four aggravating circumstances, one of which was that the murder was "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel." Cone's state appeals were unsuccessful. A federal district court then rejected Cone's habeas petition. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit's ruling in Bell v. Cone (2002). On remand, the Sixth Circuit again reversed Cone's sentence on the ground that the "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel" aggravator was unconstitutionally vague under the Eighth Amendment.</p>
| 607 | 9 | 0 | true |
per curiam
|
reversed/remanded
|
Judicial Power
|
1,615 | 55,224 |
Brosseau v. Haugen
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/03-1261
|
03-1261
|
2004
|
Brosseau
|
Haugen
|
<p>Brosseau, a police officer in Washington state, shot Haugen in the back as he tried to flee in his vehicle from the police. Haugen sued Brosseau in federal district court, alleging Brosseau used excessive force in shooting him and violated his constitutional rights. The district court ruled for Brosseau, finding she was entitled to qualified immunity. The Ninth Circuit reversed.</p>
| 389 | 8 | 1 | true |
per curiam
|
reversed/remanded
|
Economic Activity
|
1,616 | 55,223 |
San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City and County of San Francisco, California
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/04-340
|
04-340
|
2004
|
San Remo Hotel, L.P., et al.
|
City and County of San Francisco, California, et al.
|
<p>The owners and operators of a hotel in San Francisco sued the city in state court, arguing a $567,000 conversion fee they had to pay in 1996 was an unconstitutional taking of private property. After California courts rejected this argument, the hoteliers argued in federal district court that the fee violated the Fifth Amendment's takings clause. This claim depended on issues identical to those that had been resolved in their state-court suit. The federal full faith and credit statute, however, barred litigants from suing in federal court when that suit was based on issues that had been resolved in state court (the rule of "issue preclusion"). The hoteliers asked the district court to exempt from the statute claims brought under the takings clause.</p>
| 765 | 9 | 0 | false |
majority opinion
|
affirmed
|
Due Process
|
1,617 | 55,225 |
KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc.
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/03-409
|
03-409
|
2004
|
KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc.
|
Lasting Impression I, Inc., et al.
|
<p>Cosmetics company Lasting Impression trademarked the term "micro colors." Lasting Impression sued K.P. Permanent Make-Up in federal district court for using the term. K.P. used the "classic fair use defense" and argued it used the term only to describe K.P. products. The district court sided with K.P. Lasting appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Unlike other federal appellate courts, the Ninth Circuit required companies that used the fair use defense to prove there was no likelihood of confusion in use of the term. The Ninth Circuit ruled there was likelihood of confusion and reversed the district court's ruling.</p>
| 639 | 9 | 0 | true |
majority opinion
|
vacated/remanded
|
Economic Activity
|
1,618 | 55,229 |
United States v. Booker
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/04-104
|
04-104
|
2004
|
United States
|
Freddie J. Booker
|
<p>In <em>Blakely v. Washington</em> (2004) the U.S. Supreme Court ruled the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury required judges to use only facts proved to a jury to increase a sentence beyond the standard range.</p>
<p>Following U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, a federal district court judge enhanced Freddie Booker's sentence based on facts the judge determined. Booker appealed and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals ruled the guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment where they required sentences to be based on facts found by a judge.</p>
<p>In another case, U.S. Sentencing Guidelines allowed a judge to sentence Ducan Fanfan to 188-235 months in prison based on facts the judge determined. The judge decided Blakely v. Washington prevented him from enhancing the sentence and sentenced Fanfan to 78 months. The federal government appealed directly to the U.S. Supreme Court. The Court consolidated the Booker and Fanfan cases.</p>
| 939 | 5 | 4 | false |
majority opinion
|
affirmed
|
Criminal Procedure
|
1,619 | 55,227 |
Grable & Sons Metal Products v. Darue Engineering & Manufacturing
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/04-603
|
04-603
|
2004
|
Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc.
|
Darue Engineering & Manufacturing
|
<p>The IRS seized property owned by Grable and gave Grable notice by certified mail before selling the property to Darue. Grable sued in state court, claiming Darue's title was invalid because federal law required the IRS to give Grable notice of the sale by personal service, not certified mail. Darue removed the case to federal disctrict court, arguing that the case presented a federal question because Grable's claim depended on an interpretation of federal tax law. The district court agreed and ruled for Darue. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the decision.</p>
| 564 | 9 | 0 | false |
majority opinion
|
affirmed
|
Judicial Power
|
1,620 | 55,228 |
Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Nigh
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/03-377
|
03-377
|
2004
|
Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc.
|
Nigh
|
<p>Bradley Nigh bought a car from Koons Buick Pontiac GMC. Nigh later sued the dealership for intentionally charging him for a car feature for which he did not agree to pay. Nigh sued under the federal Truth in Lending Act (TILA). A federal district court awarded Nigh about $24,000. Koons Buick appealed and argued the district court ignored TILA's cap on damages to $1,000. A Fourth Circuit held that a 1995 amendment to the act removed the $1,000 cap on recoveries involving loans secured by personal property.</p>
| 518 | 8 | 1 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed/remanded
|
Economic Activity
|
1,621 | 55,230 |
Orff v. United States
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/03-1566
|
03-1566
|
2004
|
Francis A. Orff, et al.
|
United States, et al.
|
<p>The Westlands Water District received water from the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation under a 1963 contract. In 1993 Westlands sued the district for reducing their water supply. California farmers who had bought water from Westlands also sued the bureau, intervening as plaintiffs. After negotiations Westlands agreed to dismiss their suit. But the farmers refused to drop theirs, accusing the bureau of breach of contract. The farmers claimed that as third-party beneficiaries they could enforce the contract and that the United States had waived its sovereing immunity from such suits in the Reclamation Reform Act of 1982. That act allowed parties "to join the United States as a necessary party defendant in any suit" over rights under a federal reclamation contract. The district court held that the farmers were not contracting parties or third-party beneficiaries and thus could not invoke the waiver. The Ninth Circuit affirmed that decision.</p>
| 952 | 9 | 0 | false |
majority opinion
|
affirmed
|
Economic Activity
|
1,622 | 55,233 |
Wilkinson v. Austin
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/04-495
|
04-495
|
2004
|
Reginald A. Wilkinson, Director, Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction, et al.
|
Charles E. Austin, et al.
|
<p>When Ohio's highest security prison first opened, no official policy governed placement there, resulting in haphazard and erroneous placements. Ohio ultimately issued the "New Policy," which required formal procedures for evaluating whether prisoners classified for placement into the facility. The New Policy also required a three-tier review process after a recommendation for Supermax placement was made. For instance, the state had to explain a placement recommendation to an inmate and that inmate had to have an opportunity for rebuttal at a hearing. Prisoners in the facility sued in federal district court, alleging the prison placement policy violated the 14th Amendment's due process clause. The court agreed that the New Policy violated due process and ordered elaborate and far-reaching modifications to the policy. The Sixth Circuit affirmed but set aside the substantive modifications on the ground they exceeded the court's authority.</p>
| 957 | 9 | 0 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed in-part/remanded
|
Due Process
|
1,623 | 55,231 |
Tenet v. Doe
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/03-1395
|
03-1395
|
2004
|
George J. Tenet, Individually, Porter J. Goss, Director of Central Intelligence and Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and United States
|
John Doe, et ux.
|
<p>Jane and John Doe said they performed espionage activities abroad for the United States. The Does sued the CIA in federal district court for not paying financial support allegedly promised to the Does and for allegedly violating the Does' due process rights. The CIA argued the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in <em>Totten v. U.S.</em> (1875) prohibited the district court from hearing the case. In Totten the Court dismissed a spy's claim against the government for damages for breach of contract. Both the district court and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled Totten did not prevent the district court from hearing the Does' case. The courts reasoned that the Does' case, unlike Totten's, was mainly about the denial of due process rights. The Ninth Circuit said the CIA could prohibit the district court from hearing the Does' case only if the CIA could show that state secrets would be in jeopardy were the case to proceed. The Ninth Circuit sent the case back to the district court for that court to determine the CIA's potential state secrets claim.</p>
| 1,068 | 9 | 0 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed
|
Economic Activity
|
1,624 | 55,234 |
Bell v. Thompson
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/04-514
|
04-514
|
2004
|
Ricky Bell, Warden
|
Gregory Thompson
|
<p>A Tennessee trial court sentenced Thompson to death for murder. Thompson made unsuccesful appeals in state court based on the claim that his counsel had failed to adequately investigate his mental health. A federal district court also rejected Thompson's petition based on that claim. However, Thompson's habeas counsel had failed to include in the record the deposition and report of a psychologist who argued Thompson had suffered from serious mental illness. The counsel included the documents when Thompson appealed to the Sixth Circuit, which nevertheless dismissed Thompson's claim. Thompson then petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court, and the Sixth Circuit stayed its mandate until the Court decided whether to hear the case. The Court denied the petition, but the Sixth Circuit stayed its mandate again, pending the Supreme Court's decision on Thompson's petition for rehearing, which the Court denied. The Sixth Circuit still did not issue its mandate. Five months later, Tennessee had set Thompson's execution date. The Sixth Circuit suddenly issued an amended opinion on Thompson's habeas petition, overturning the district court's dismissal of his ineffective counsel claim and ordering hearings based on that claim. The Sixth Circuit included in the appeal record the initially ommitted psychologist deposition. The circuit court argued its authority to issue an amended opinion five months after the Supreme Court denied Thompson's petition was based on its inherent power to reconsider an opinion before issuance of the the mandate.</p>
| 1,551 | 5 | 4 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed
|
Judicial Power
|
1,625 | 55,232 |
Gonzales v. Raich
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/03-1454
|
03-1454
|
2004
|
Alberto R. Gonzales, Attorney General, et al.
|
Angel McClary Raich, et al.
|
<p>In 1996 California voters passed the Compassionate Use Act, legalizing marijuana for medical use. California's law conflicted with the federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA), which banned possession of marijuana. After the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) seized doctor-prescribed marijuana from a patient's home, a group of medical marijuana users sued the DEA and U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft in federal district court.</p>
<p>The medical marijuana users argued the Controlled Substances Act - which Congress passed using its constitutional power to regulate interstate commerce - exceeded Congress' commerce clause power. The district court ruled against the group. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and ruled the CSA unconstitutional as it applied to intrastate (within a state) medical marijuana use. Relying on two U.S. Supreme Court decisions that narrowed Congress' commerce clause power - U.S. v. Lopez (1995) and U.S. v. Morrison (2000) - the Ninth Circuit ruled using medical marijuana did not "substantially affect" interstate commerce and therefore could not be regulated by Congress.</p>
| 1,128 | 6 | 3 | true |
majority opinion
|
vacated/remanded
|
Federalism
|
1,626 | 55,235 |
City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/03-1601
|
03-1601
|
2004
|
City of Rancho Palos Verdes, California, et al.
|
Mark J. Abrams
|
<p>Rancho Palos Verdes, a city in California, gave Mark Abrams a permit to construct an antenna on his property for amateur use. But when the city learned Abrams used the antenna for commercial purposes, the city forced Abrams to stop until he got a commercial use permit. Abrams applied and the city refused to give him the permit. Abrams then sued in federal district court, alleging the city violated his rights under the Telecommunications Act of 1996. Abrams sought damages under a federal liability law that allowed people to sue for damages for federal rights violations.</p>
<p>The district court agreed with Abrams and ordered the city to give Abrams the permit. But the court refused Abrams' request for damages under the separate federal liability law. The court said Congress intended for violations of rights under the Telecommunications Act to include only remedies specifically found in that act. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and ruled that because the act did not contain a "comprehensive remedial scheme," Abrams could seek damages under other federal laws.</p>
| 1,094 | 9 | 0 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed/remanded
|
Civil Rights
|
1,627 | 55,236 |
City of San Diego v. Roe
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/03-1669
|
03-1669
|
2004
|
City of San Diego, California
|
John Roe
|
<p>John Roe, a San Diego police officer, was fired for selling a video on eBay that showed him stripping off a police uniform and masturbating. He then sued the city in federal district court and alleged his firing violated his First Amendment right to freedom of speech. The district court ruled against the officer; the Ninth Circuit reversed.</p>
| 350 | 9 | 0 | true |
per curiam
|
reversed
|
First Amendment
|
1,628 | 55,237 |
Clingman v. Beaver
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/04-37
|
04-37
|
2004
|
Michael Clingman, Secretary, Oklahoma State Election Board, et al.
|
Andrea L. Beaver, et al.
|
<p>Oklahoma's election laws created a primary system in which a party could invite only its own members and Independents to vote in its primary. The Libertarian Party and voters registered in other parties argued the laws violated the First Amendment freedoms of expression and association by preventing the Libertarian Party from inviting members of other parties to vote in its primary elections. The district court ruled for Oklahoma. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and ruled Oklahoma's election laws violated the First Amendment.</p>
| 551 | 6 | 3 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed/remanded
|
First Amendment
|
1,629 | 55,238 |
Deck v. Missouri
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/04-5293
|
04-5293
|
2004
|
Carman L. Deck
|
Missouri
|
<p>After the Missouri Supreme Court set aside Carman Deck's death sentence, Deck was presented at his new sentence hearing shackled with leg irons, handcuffs and a belly chain. Deck was again sentenced to death. The state supreme court rejected Deck's claim that his shackling violated the U.S. Constitution.</p>
| 313 | 7 | 2 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed/remanded
|
Due Process
|
1,630 | 55,242 |
Smith v. Texas
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/04-5323
|
04-5323
|
2004
|
Smith
|
Texas
|
<p>Before the Texas jury in Smith's murder trial reached its sentence, the judge issued a "nullification instruction." The judge told the jury to consider mitigating evidence when filling out the verdict form. That form consisted of two "yes" or "no" questions: whether Smith acted deliberately and whether he posed a future danger. The judge told jurors that even if they believed the state had proved that the answer to both questions was "yes," jurors should answer "no" to at least one of them if they believed the death sentence should not be imposed because of the mitigating evidence. The jury answered "yes" to both questions and sentenced Smith to death. Smith lost his appeal in state court.</p>
| 706 | 7 | 2 | true |
per curiam
|
reversed/remanded
|
Criminal Procedure
|
1,631 | 55,239 |
MGM Studios v. Grokster
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/04-480
|
04-480
|
2004
|
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc., et al.
|
Grokster, Ltd., et al.
|
<p>Grokster and other companies distributed free software that allowed computer users to share electronic files through peer-to-peer networks. In such networks, users can share digital files directly between their computers, without the use of a central server. Users employed the software primarily to download copyrighted files, file-sharing which the software companies knew about and encouraged. The companies profited from advertising revenue, since they streamed ads to the software users. A group of movie studios and other copyright holders sued and alleged that Grokster and the other companies violated the Copyright Act by intentionally distributing software to enable users to infringe copyrighted works. The district court ruled for Grokster, reasoning that the software distribution companies were not liable for copyright violations stemming from their software, which could have been used lawfully. The Ninth Circuit affirmed.</p>
| 947 | 9 | 0 | true |
majority opinion
|
vacated/remanded
|
Economic Activity
|
1,632 | 55,240 |
Lingle v. Chevron U. S. A. Inc.
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/04-163
|
04-163
|
2004
|
Linda Lingle, Governor of Hawaii, et al.
|
Chevron U.S.A. Inc.
|
<p>Hawaii enacted a limit on the rent oil companies could charge dealers leasing company-owned service stations. The rent cap was a response to concerns about the effects of market concentration on gasoline prices. Chevron, one of the state's largest oil companies, argued in federal district court that the the cap was an unconstitutional taking of its property. The district court held that the cap amounted to an uncompensated taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment, because it did not substantially advance Hawaii's asserted interest in controlling gas prices. The court cited the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Agins v. City of Tiburon (1980), where the Court declared that government regulation of private property is "a taking if it does not substantially advance legitimate state interests." The Ninth Circuit affirmed.</p>
| 838 | 9 | 0 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed/remanded
|
Due Process
|
1,633 | 55,241 |
Graham County Soil & Water Conservation District v. United States ex Rel. Wilson
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/04-169
|
04-169
|
2004
|
Graham County Soil & Water Conservation District, et al.
|
United States, ex rel. Karen T. Wilson
|
<p>The False Claims Act (FCA) allows the government or an individual on the government's behalf to sue any person for "making false or fraudulent claims for payment to the United States." A 1986 amendment to the FCA allows individuas to sue their employer if the employer retaliates against them in any way for assisting in an investigation of such false claims. In 2001, Karen Wilson, a secretary for Graham County Water District, sued her employer for various false claims it allegedly made concerning a federal disaster relief program. She also brought a retaliation suit against her employer, alleging that after she had provided information on the false claims to federal officials in December 1995, she had been repeatedly harassed by Graham County District officials until she resigned in March 1997. The District Court dismissed Wilson's suit as untimely. The court accepted Graham County District's argument that the six-year statute of limitations in the 1986 amendment to the FCA was not intended to apply to retaliation suits. Therefore, the court held, the most closely analogous state limitation applies instead. The north Carolina limit for retaliation suits was three years, so Wilson's suit was brought too late. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the District Court and applied the six-year limitation to all retaliation suits under the FCA.</p>
| 1,393 | 7 | 2 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed/remanded
|
Judicial Power
|
1,634 | 55,243 |
Gonzalez v. Crosby
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/04-6432
|
04-6432
|
2004
|
Aurelio O. Gonzalez
|
James V. Crosby, Jr., Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections
|
<p>In Artuz v. Bennett (2000) the U.S. Supreme Court held that state petitions for postconviction relief could toll the federal statute of limitations even if those petitions were ultimately dismissed as procedurally barred. Gonzalez, whose federal habeas petition had been dismissed as time barred, filed a new petition (a Rule 60[b] petition) in light of the Artuz ruling. The district court denied Gonzalez's new motion. The 11th Circuit affirmed the denial, holding that Gonzalez's latest motion amounted to a second or succcessive habeas petition which could not be filed without precertification by the court of appeals.</p>
| 631 | 7 | 2 | false |
majority opinion
|
affirmed
|
Judicial Power
|
1,635 | 55,244 |
Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/03-388
|
03-388
|
2004
|
Dennis Bates, et al.
|
Dow Agrosciences LLC
|
<p>A group of peanut farmers in Texas threatened to sue Dow Agrosciences in state court for damages caused by one of Dow's herbicides. The farmers alleged Dow violated Texas labeling requirements. Dow asked a federal district court to rule the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) preempted and therefore prohibited the farmers' state law claims. The district court and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled FIFRA expressly prohibited additional state labeling requirements such as Texas'.</p>
| 519 | 7 | 2 | true |
majority opinion
|
vacated/remanded
|
Federalism
|
1,636 | 55,246 |
Dodd v. United States
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/04-5286
|
04-5286
|
2004
|
Michael Donald Dodd
|
United States
|
<p>In 1997, Dodd was convicted under federal law for knowingly and intentionally engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise. On April 4, 2001 he filed a motion that the conviction should be set aside because it was contrary to the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in 1999 in Richardson v. U.S. In that case, the Court held that a jury must agree unanimously that a defendant is guilty of each of the specific violations that constitute the continuing criminal enterprise. The district court rejected Dodd's motion, because it was filed more than a year after the Court decided Richardson. Under federal law, the one-year limitation period in which a prisoner may file a motion to change his sentence, begins "on the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review." The 11th Circuit affirmed.</p>
| 953 | 5 | 4 | false |
majority opinion
|
affirmed
|
Criminal Procedure
|
1,637 | 55,245 |
Ballard v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/03-184
|
03-184
|
2004
|
Estate of Burton W. Kanter, Deceased, et al.
|
Commissioner of Internal Revenue
|
<p>Under federal law, the Tax Court could appoint special trial judges to hear certain cases and to make recommendations to the Tax Court. The Tax Court judge, under Tax Rule 183(b), had to presume the special judge's fact findings to be correct, but could make the ultimate decision in the case. The special trail judge reports were made public and included in the record on appeal. Only after a rule revision in 1983 did the Tax Court stop making such reports public and exclude them from the appellate record. Whether the final Tax Court's decision deviated from the special judge's recommendations was kept secret. Tax Court Judge Howard Dawson ruled that Kanter was guilty of tax fraud and of illegally diverting money to Claude Ballard, a business associate. In his opinion, Dawson claimed to have adopted the opinion of the special trial judge. Ballard and Kanter separately appealed, objecting to the absence of the special trial judge's report from the appellate record. Two federal appellate courts ruled against Kanter and Ballard.</p>
| 1,047 | 7 | 2 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed/remanded
|
Judicial Power
|
1,638 | 55,247 |
Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/04-368
|
04-368
|
2004
|
Arthur Andersen LLP
|
United States
|
<p>As Enron's financial difficulties became public in 2001, Arthur Andersen instructed its employees to destroy Enron-related documents. This was consistent with Andersen's document retention policy. The government later charged Andersen for violating federal law, which made it a crime to "knowingly...corruptly persuade another person" to "withold" or "alter" documents in an "offical proceeding." The federal jury found Andersen guilty. The company appealed, arguing the jury instructions failed to convey the elements of a "corrupt persuasion" conviction - specifically, that a "consciousness of wrongdoing" was required. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the conviction.</p>
| 673 | 9 | 0 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed/remanded
|
Criminal Procedure
|
1,639 | 55,248 |
City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/03-855
|
03-855
|
2004
|
City of Sherrill, New York
|
Oneida Indian Nation of New York, et al.
|
<p>In the late 18th century, Congress set aside most of the tribal land of the Oneida Indian Nation of New York as a reservation. The tribe later sold off much of the reservation. In the 1990s members of the tribe began to buy back pieces of the land. The tribe said the reacquired land was part of a reservation and therefore exempt from state and municipal taxes. The City of Sherrill - which encompassed some of the tribe's property - argued the land was not tax-exempt. The Oneidas sued Sherrill in federal district court and alleged the land was recognized by the 1794 Treaty of Canandaigua as part of their historic reservation. The Oneidas also pointed to the 1790 Non- Intercourse Act that required federal consent for Indian land to lose its reservation status. Sherrill argued the land lost its reservation status after leaving the Oneidas' ownership originally. The district court and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals ruled for the Oneidas.</p>
| 959 | 8 | 1 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed/remanded
|
Civil Rights
|
1,640 | 55,249 |
Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/02-1672
|
02-1672
|
2004
|
Roderick Jackson
|
Birmingham Board of Education
|
<p>Roderick Jackson, a high school basketball coach, claimed he was fired for complaining that the girls' basketball team he coached was denied equal treatment by the school. Jackson sued the Birmingham Board of Education in federal court, claiming his firing violated Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972. Title IX bans sex discrimination in federally-funded schools. Jackson claimed Title IX gave him the right to sue - a "private right of action" - because he suffered for reporting sex discrimination against others, despite the fact the he did not suffer from sex discrimination. The federal district court and appellate court ruled against Jackson.</p>
| 667 | 5 | 4 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed/remanded
|
Civil Rights
|
1,641 | 55,250 |
Kelo v. New London
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/04-108
|
04-108
|
2004
|
Susette Kelo, et al.
|
City of New London, Connecticut, et al.
|
<p>New London, a city in Connecticut, used its eminent domain authority to seize private property to sell to private developers. The city said developing the land would create jobs and increase tax revenues. Susette Kelo and others whose property was seized sued New London in state court. The property owners argued the city violated the Fifth Amendment's takings clause, which guaranteed the government will not take private property for public use without just compensation. Specifically, the property owners argued taking private property to sell to private developers was not public use. The Connecticut Supreme Court ruled for New London.</p>
| 649 | 5 | 4 | false |
majority opinion
|
affirmed
|
Due Process
|
1,642 | 55,251 |
Norfolk Southern Railway Company v. James N. Kirby, Proprietary Limited
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/02-1028
|
02-1028
|
2004
|
Norfolk Southern Railway Company
|
James N. Kirby, Pty Ltd., dba Kirby Engineering, and Allianz Australia Insurance Limited
|
<p>James Kirby hired International Cargo Control (ICC) as a shipping intermediary to arrange a shipment of goods from Australia to Alabama. ICC issued Kirby a bill of lading (a contract that set shipping terms). The bill invoked liability limitations provided by the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA). The bill also included a Himalaya Clause, which extended ICC's limitations of liability to companies ICC hired. ICC hired Hamburg Sud to transport the goods. Hamburg Sud issued ICC a bill of lading that also invoked COGSA protections and included a Himalaya Clause. Hamburg Sud carried the goods on a ship to Georgia and subcontracted Norfolk Southern Railroad to transport the goods inland to Alabama.</p>
<p>The train derailed and Kirby sued Norfolk Southern to recover the $1.5 million in damages he claimed the derailment caused his goods. The district court ruled Norfolk Southern could limit its liability to Kirby on the basis of the Himalaya clause in the Hamburg Sud contract. The 11th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and ruled the Hamburg Sud bill did not limit Norfolk Southern's liability to Kirby because Kirby was not bound by its terms.</p>
| 1,163 | 9 | 0 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed/remanded
|
Economic Activity
|
1,643 | 55,252 |
Castle Rock v. Gonzales
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/04-278
|
04-278
|
2004
|
Town of Castle Rock, Colorado
|
Jessica Gonzales, Individually and as Next Best Friend of Her Deceased Minor Children, Rebecca Gonzales, Katheryn Gonzales, and Leslie Gonzales
|
<p>Jessica Gonzales requested a restraining order against her estranged husband. A state trial court issued the order, which prohibited the husband from seeing Gonzales or their three daughters except during pre-arranged visits. A month later, Gonzales's husband abducted the three children. Gonzales repeatedly urged the police to search for and arrest her husband, but the police told her to wait until later that evening and see if her husband brought the children back. During the night Gonzales's husband murdered all three children and then opened fire inside a police station, where police returned fire and killed him. Gonzales brought a complaint in federal District Court, alleging that the Castle Rock police had violated her rights under the Due Process Clause of the Constitution by willfully or negligently refusing to enforce her restraining order. The Due Process Clause states: "No state shall...deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law..." The District Court dismissed the complaint, ruling that no principle of substantive or procedural due process allowed Gonzales to sue a local government for its failure to enforce a restraining order. On appeal, however, a panel of the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit found that Gonzales had a legitimate procedural due process claim. A rehearing by the full appeals court agreed, ruling that Gonzales had a "protected property interest in the enforcement of the terms of her restraining order," which the police had violated.</p>
| 1,532 | 7 | 2 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed
|
Due Process
|
1,644 | 55,253 |
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Banks
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/03-892
|
03-892
|
2004
|
Commissioner of Internal Revenue
|
Sigitas J. Banaitis
|
<p>Sigitas Banaitis and John Banks separately argued to the U.S. Tax Court that contingency fees paid to lawyers could be deducted from taxable gross income. The court disagreed and ruled for the Internal Revenue Service. The IRS said Banaitis and Banks owed taxes on contingency fees. Banaitis appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which ruled that under Oregon law contingency fees could not be taxed as income. Banks appealed to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, which ruled contingency fees were never taxable income. Other federal appeals courts ruled to the contrary. The U.S. Supreme Court consolidated Banaitis' and Banks' cases.</p>
| 654 | 8 | 0 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed/remanded
|
Federal Taxation
|
1,645 | 55,257 |
Muehler v. Mena
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/03-1423
|
03-1423
|
2004
|
Darin L. Muehler, et al.
|
Iris Mena
|
<p>Police detained Mena and others in handcuffs while they searched the house they occupied. During the detention they asked Mena about her immigration status. The police had a search warrant to search the premises for deadly weapons and evidence of gang membership. Mena sued the officers in federal district court for violating her Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure. The district court ruled for Mena. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that using handcuffs to detain Mena during the search violated the Fourth Amendment and that the officers' questioning of Mena about her immigration status also violated the Fourth Amendment.</p>
| 662 | 9 | 0 | true |
majority opinion
|
vacated/remanded
|
Criminal Procedure
|
1,646 | 55,255 |
Johnson v. California
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/04-6964
|
04-6964
|
2004
|
Jay Shawn Johnson
|
California
|
<p>NonJay Shawn Johnson, on trial in California for murder, objected to the district attorney's use of peremptory challenges to eliminate all three black prospective jurors. Johnson argued the eliminations were based on race. The judge denied Johnson's motions and held that Johnson had failed to show a "strong likelihood" that the dismissals were race-based. The judge relied on People v. Wheeler, the 1978 case in which the California Supreme Court ruled that to establish a prima facie case of racial bias in peremptory challenges, the objector had to show "strong likelihood" that the challenges were race-based. The jury found Johnson guilty of second-degree murder.</p>
<p>Johnson appealed and argued that the "strong likelihood" standard in Wheeler was at odds with the 'reasonable inference" standard the U.S. Supreme Court set in Batson v. Kentucky (1986). The appeals court agreed and reversed Johnson's conviction. The California Supreme Court reversed and ruled that the two standards were the same. The U.S. Supreme Court at first dismissed Johnson's appeal because the case was not finalized (see <em>Johnson v. California</em> 2004, No. 03-6539). After another round of appeals, however, the Court agreed to decide the case.</p>
| 1,245 | 8 | 1 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed/remanded
|
Civil Rights
|
1,647 | 55,256 |
Rhines v. Weber
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/03-9046
|
03-9046
|
2004
|
Charles Russell Rhines
|
Douglas Weber, Warden
|
<p>A South Dakota court convicted Charles Rhines of murder. Rhines filed a habeas corpus petition with a federal district court, alleging various violations of his constitutional rights in the trial and conviction. The district court ruled Rhines failed to exhaust all of his claims in state court. The court stayed Rhines' habeas petition so that Rhines could finish his claims in state court. The stay prevented the one-year statute of limitations in the federal Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act from barring Rhines from appealing to a federal court once he exhausted state remedies. The state penitentiary warden appealed. The Eight Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and ruled the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in <em>Rose v. Lundy</em> (1982) required the dismissal of a habeas petition that included unexhausted claims.</p>
| 842 | 9 | 0 | true |
majority opinion
|
vacated/remanded
|
Criminal Procedure
|
1,648 | 55,254 |
Granholm v. Heald
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/03-1116
|
03-1116
|
2004
|
Jennifer M. Granholm, Governor of Michigan et al.
|
Eleanor Heald et al.
|
<p>Michigan and New York laws allowed in-state wineries to directly ship alcohol to consumers but restricted the ability of out-of-state wineries to do so. In separate cases groups sued the states and argued the laws violated the U.S. Constitution's "dormant" commerce clause. The dormant commerce clause prohibited states from passing laws affecting interstate commerce, particularly laws favoring in-state business over out-of-state business. The states argued the laws were valid exercises of state power under the 21st Amendment, which ended federal Prohibition and allowed states to regulate alcohol importation. A federal district court ruled for Michigan. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and ruled the Michigan law violated the dormant commerce clause and did not advance the core concerns of the 21st Amendment (such as temperance). A separate federal district court ruled against New York. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and ruled the 21st Amendment allowed New York's law.</p>
| 1,013 | 5 | 4 | false |
majority opinion
|
affirmed
|
Economic Activity
|
1,649 | 55,258 |
American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. Michigan Public Service Commission
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/03-1230
|
03-1230
|
2004
|
American Trucking Associations, Inc. and USF Holland, Inc.
|
Michigan Public Service Commission, et al.
|
<p>Michigan law required every truck engaged in intrastate commercial hauling to pay a flat $100 annual fee. Interstate trucking companies asked Michigan courts to invalidate the fee, claiming the flat fee discriminated against interstate carriers and imposed an unconstitutional burden on interstate trade (in violation of the "dormant" commerce clause). They pointed to the fact that trucks carrying both interstate and intrastate loads engaged in intrastate business less than trucks that only haul within Michigan. State courts refused to invalidate the fee.</p>
| 567 | 9 | 0 | false |
majority opinion
|
affirmed
|
Economic Activity
|
1,650 | 55,260 |
Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd.
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/03-1388
|
03-1388
|
2004
|
Douglas Spector, et al.
|
Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd.
|
<p>A group of disabled people who travelled on Norwegian Cruise Line ships sued the company in federal district court and alleged two of its ships did not conform with Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act. The company argued the ADA did not apply to the two ships because, though the ships sailed out of Texas, they sailed under the Bahamian flag. The district court dismissed the group's claims and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled foreign-flagged cruise ships are not subject to Title III of the ADA.</p>
| 527 | 6 | 3 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed/remanded
|
Civil Rights
|
1,651 | 55,259 |
Rousey v. Jacoway
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/03-1407
|
03-1407
|
2004
|
Richard Gerald Rousey, et ux.
|
Jill R. Jacoway
|
<p>Richard and Betty Rousey filed bankruptcy and claimed their two Individual Retirement Accounts were exempt from the bankruptcy. Federal law exempted the following from bankruptcy: "a payment under a stock bonus, pension, profitsharing, annuity, or similar plan or contract." The exemption had to be "on account of illness, disability, death, age, or length of service, to the extent reasonable necessary for the support of the debtor...." The Rouseys said an IRA was a "similar plan or contract." The bankruptcy court and a bankruptcy appellate panel ruled an IRA not a "similar plan or contract." The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that even if IRAs are "similar plans or contracts," the Rouseys' account withdrawals would not be "on account of illness, disability, death, age, or length of service." The Eighth Circuit's ruling conflicted with those of other circuits.</p>
| 885 | 9 | 0 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed/remanded
|
Economic Activity
|
1,652 | 55,261 |
Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/03-932
|
03-932
|
2004
|
Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc., et al.
|
Michael Broudo, et al.
|
<p>Michael Broudo and a group of shareholders sued Dura Pharmaceuticals under the Securities and Exchange Act after the price of the company's stock dropped sharply. The shareholders alleged the company's misleading statements about its antibiotic sales and about the possibility of FDA approval of an asthma device caused the price drop. The district court ruled the investors failed to prove "loss causation" because they could not prove a causal connection between the alleged fraud and the drop in price. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and ruled the investors proved loss causation because they proved the stock price on the date of purchase was inflated because of misrepresentation.</p>
| 706 | 9 | 0 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed/remanded
|
Economic Activity
|
1,653 | 55,264 |
Bradshaw v. Stumpf
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/04-637
|
04-637
|
2004
|
Margaret Bradshaw, Warden
|
John David Stumpf
|
<p>In Ohio state court proceedings, Stumpf pled guilty in to aggravated murder committed in an armed robbery. That robbery had left Mr. Stout wounded and Mrs. Stout dead. While Stumpf admitted to shooting Mr. Stout, he insisted his accomplice Wesley had shot Mrs. Stout. A three-judge panel ruled Stumpf the principal offender in Mrs. Stout's murder and sentenced him to death. Following this, in Wesley's trial, the state presented evidence that Wesley had admitted to shooting Mrs. Stout. After Wesley's trial, Stumpf moved to withdraw his plea or reverse his death sentence, arguing that the evidence presented by the prosecution in Wesley's trial was inconsistent with what it had presented in his own. This, Stumpf argued, cast doubt on his conviction and sentence. Stumpf's motion was unscucessful in Ohio courts. A federal district court denied Stumpf habeas relief, but the Sixth Circuit reversed.</p>
| 910 | 9 | 0 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed in-part/remanded
|
Criminal Procedure
|
1,654 | 55,262 |
Exxon Corp v. Allapattah Services
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/04-70
|
04-70
|
2004
|
Exxon Mobil Corporation
|
Allapattah Services, Inc., et al.
|
<p>In 1991 about 10,000 Exxon dealers sued Exxon Corporation in federal court, alleging that the corporation had engaged in an extensive scheme to overcharge them for fuel. A jury found in favor of the plaintiffs, but the District Court judge certified the case for review on the question of supplemental jurisdiction. Some of the multiple plaintiffs in the case had claims that did not meet the $75,000 minimum amount in controversy necessary to qualify for federal diversity jurisdiction. In 1990 Congress had enacted 28 U.S.C. Section 1367, overturning <em>Finley v. United States</em>, which had narrowly interpreted federal courts' power to confer supplementary jurisdiction on related claims. The question for the District Court was whether Section 1367 also overturned <em>Zahn v. International Paper Co.</em>, which ruled that each plaintiff had to separately meet the minimum amount-in-controversy requirement. The District Court accepted the plaintiffs' argument that Section 1367 gave federal courts power to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs with related claims, even if some plaintiffs' claims did not meet the required amount. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the District Court's ruling on supplemental jurisdiction. However, this ruling conflicted with the ruling of another Circuit, which had taken the opposite view of Section 1367's scope (see Ortega v. Star-Kist Foods, No. 04-79). The Supreme Court granted certiorari and consolidated the cases for argument.</p>
| 1,524 | 5 | 4 | false |
majority opinion
|
affirmed
|
Judicial Power
|
1,655 | 55,265 |
Whitfield v. United States
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/03-1293
|
03-1293
|
2004
|
David Whitfield
|
United States
|
<p>Federal district courts convicted David Whitfield and Haywood Hall of conspiracy to commit money laundering. They appealed and argued the federal money laundering law required the jury to have found proof of an "overt act" furthering the conspiracy. The 11th Circuit Court of Appeals rejected this argument, reasoning that the law lacked any language requiring proof of an overt act. Other federal appeals courts had ruled the law did require an overt act.</p>
| 464 | 9 | 0 | false |
majority opinion
|
affirmed
|
Criminal Procedure
|
1,656 | 55,263 |
Shepard v. United States
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/03-9168
|
03-9168
|
2004
|
Reginald Shepard
|
United States
|
<p>Reginald Shepard pled guilty to violating the federal statute prohibiting a felon from possessing a gun. The government argued Shepard's sentence should be enhanced under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). The act added at least a 15-year sentence for any felon with three or more "violent felony" convictions who then possessed a gun. The government argued at least five of the 11 breaking and entering convictions on Shepard's record were violent felonies. The ACCA listed "burglary" as a violent felony and in Taylor v. U.S.(1990) the U.S. Supreme Court said the act meant "generic burglary" of a "building or other structure." However the Massachusetts burglary law Shepard pled guilty to breaking gave burglary a nongeneric definition - including entry into non-structures like cars. Shepard argued he had not pled guilty to generic robbery. The federal district court refused to sentence Shepard under the ACCA. The First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and said the district court must consider evidence that showed it was obvious to Shepard that he pled guilty to generic robbery. The district court refused. The First Circuit reversed and sentenced Shepard under the ACCA.</p>
| 1,194 | 5 | 3 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed/remanded
|
Criminal Procedure
|
1,657 | 55,267 |
Small v. United States
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/03-750
|
03-750
|
2004
|
Gary Sherwood Small
|
United States
|
<p>Federal law made gun possession illegal for any person "convicted in any court" for crimes punishable by more than a year in prison. A Japanese court convicted Gary Sherwood Small for crimes punishable by a prison term longer than one year. Years later a U.S. District Court convicted Small, because of his prior conviction, of illegally possessing a gun. Small appealed and argued the term "convicted in any court" did not include convictions in foreign courts. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals ruled against Small.</p>
| 526 | 5 | 3 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed/remanded
|
Criminal Procedure
|
1,658 | 55,266 |
Roper v. Simmons
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/03-633
|
03-633
|
2004
|
Donald P. Roper, Superintendent, Potosi Correctional Center
|
Christopher Simmons
|
<p>Christopher Simmons was sentenced to death in 1993, when he was only 17. A series of appeals to state and federal courts lasted until 2002, but each appeal was rejected. Then, in 2002, the Missouri Supreme Court stayed Simmon's execution while the U.S. Supreme Court decided Atkins v. Virginia, a case that dealt with the execution of the mentally disabled. After the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that executing the mentally disabled (or "mentally retarded" in the vernacular of the day) violated the Eighth and 14th Amendment prohibitions on cruel and unusual punishment because a majority of Americans found it cruel and unusual, the Missouri Supreme Court decided to reconsider Simmons' case.</p>
<p>Using the reasoning from the Atkins case, the Missouri court decided, 6-to-3, that the U.S. Supreme Court's 1989 decision in Stanford v. Kentucky, which held that executing minors was not unconstitutional, was no longer valid. The opinion in Stanford v. Kentucky had relied on a finding that a majority of Americans did not consider the execution of minors to be cruel and unusual. The Missouri court, citing numerous laws passed since 1989 that limited the scope of the death penalty, held that national opinion had changed. Finding that a majority of Americans were now opposed to the execution of minors, the court held that such executions were now unconstitutional.</p>
<p>On appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, the government argued that allowing a state court to overturn a Supreme Court decision by looking at "evolving standards" would be dangerous, because state courts could just as easily decide that executions prohibited by the Supreme Court (such as the execution of the mentally ill in Atkins v. Virginia) were now permissible due to a change in the beliefs of the American people.</p>
| 1,802 | 5 | 4 | false |
majority opinion
|
affirmed
|
Criminal Procedure
|
1,659 | 55,269 |
Florida v. Nixon
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/03-931
|
03-931
|
2004
|
Florida
|
Joe Elton Nixon
|
<p>A Florida court convicted Joe Elton Nixon of murder and sentenced him to death. During the trial Nixon's lawyer told the jury Nixon was guilty. Nixon appealed and argued he received ineffective counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment. Nixon said he did not agree to the lawyer's strategy. After several appeals the Florida Supreme Court granted Nixon a new trial. The court said Nixon's lawyer's comments were essentially a guilty plea and that because Nixon did not explicitly agree to the strategy, the lawyer was "per se ineffective."</p>
| 549 | 8 | 0 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed/remanded
|
Criminal Procedure
|
1,660 | 55,268 |
Devenpeck v. Alford
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/03-710
|
03-710
|
2004
|
Gerald Devenpeck, et al.
|
Jerome Anthony Alford
|
<p>Tony Alford was driving when Washington state police, concerned Alford was impersonating a police officer, pulled him over. During a search of Alford's car, police found a tape recorder recording the traffic stop. The police arrested Alford and said he had made an illegal recording of a private conversation - a violation, they said, of the state's Privacy Act. A state court judge dismissed charges against Alford, ruling - as another state court already had - that the Privacy Act did not apply to public police work.</p>
<p>Alford then sued the officers in federal district court, alleging his arrest violated the Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure. The district court ruled for the officers.</p>
<p>The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and ruled the officers violated Alford's Fourth Amendment rights. The facts and law were so clearly established that no reasonable officer could believe Alford violated the Privacy Act. Therefore the officers lacked probable cause for the arrest and were not protected by qualified immunity. The court rejected the officers' argument that the arrest was constitutional because there was probable cause Alford committed the crime of impersonating a police officer. That was not the reason police gave during the arrest. The Ninth Circuit said there was only one instance when an arrest for a reason the police did not articulate was constitutional: if that reason was closely related to the stated reason for the arrest. Impersonating a police officer was not closely related to violating the state Privacy Act. Other circuit courts disagreed with the Ninth Circuit's "closely related offense doctrine."</p>
| 1,683 | 8 | 0 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed/remanded
|
Criminal Procedure
|
1,661 | 55,271 |
Cutter v. Wilkinson
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/03-9877
|
03-9877
|
2004
|
Jon B. Cutter, et al.
|
Reginald Wilkinson, Director, Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction, et al.
|
<p>The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (2000, RLUIPA) prohibited government from imposing a substantial burden on prisoners' religious exercise, unless the burden furthered a "compelling government interest." Prisoners in Ohio alleged in federal district court that prison officials violated RLUIPA by failing to accomodate the inmates' exercise of their "nonmainstream" religions. The prison officials argued that the act improperly advanced religion and thus violated the First Amendment's establishment clause (which prohibited government from making laws "respecting an establishment of religion"). The district court rejected that argument and ruled for the inmates. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.</p>
| 742 | 9 | 0 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed/remanded
|
First Amendment
|
1,662 | 55,270 |
McCreary County v. American Civil Liberties Union of Ky.
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/03-1693
|
03-1693
|
2004
|
McCreary County, Kentucky, et al.
|
American Civil Liberties Union of Kentucky, et al.
|
<p>The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) sued three Kentucky counties in federal district court for displaying framed copies of the Ten Commandments in courthouses and public schools. The ACLU argued the displays violated the First Amendment's establishment clause, which prohibits the government from passing laws "respecting an establishment of religion." The district court and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled the displays violated the establishment clause.</p>
| 478 | 5 | 4 | false |
majority opinion
|
affirmed
|
First Amendment
|
1,663 | 55,272 |
Brown v. Payton
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/03-1039
|
03-1039
|
2004
|
Jill L. Brown, Warden
|
William Charles Payton
|
<p>A California court sentenced William Payton to death for murder and attempted murder. Payton appealed and alleged the jury, when imposing the death penalty, did not consider the potentially mitigating evidence of his post-crime religious conversion. California's death penalty statute required jurors to weigh 11 factors when imposing a death penalty. The first 10 factors were specific to the crime and the eleventh factor was a "catch-all factor" that allowed the judge or jury to consider any other circumstance the defendant presented in mitigation of a death sentence. Payton alleged the judge's jury instructions effectively prevented the jury from considering his post-crime religious conversion. The California Supreme Court ruled there was nothing wrong with the judge's jury instructions. A federal district court and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with Payton and reversed the death sentence. The Ninth Circuit said the California Supreme Court's application of U.S. Supreme Court precedent was objectively unreasonable. According to the Ninth Circuit, the clearly established precedent required juries to consider mitigating post-crime evidence when considering a death sentence.</p>
| 1,210 | 5 | 3 | true |
majority opinion
|
vacated/remanded
|
Criminal Procedure
|
1,664 | 55,273 |
Rompilla v. Beard
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/04-5462
|
04-5462
|
2004
|
Ronald Rompilla
|
Jeffrey A. Beard, Secretary, Pennsylvania Department of Corrections
|
<p>A Pennsylvania court convicted Ronald Rompilla of murder. During the sentencing phase, the prosecution presented to the jury Rompilla's previous rape and assault conviction, as an aggravating factor to justify the death sentence. The jury sentenced Rompilla to death and the state supreme court affirmed. Rompilla's new lawyers filed an additional appeal, arguing that Rompilla's trial counsel had been ineffective for failing to present mitigating evidence about his various personal problems. The state courts found that Rompilla's counsel had sufficiently investigated mitigation possibilities. After Rompilla filed a federal habeas petition, a district court reversed the sentence and ruled the state supreme court had unreasonably applied the U.S. Supreme Court's 1984 decision in Strickland v. Washington. Had the state court followed that case, the district court ruled, the court would have found Rompilla's trial counsel ineffective for failing to investigate obvious signs of Rompilla's troubled childhood, mental illness and alcoholism. The Third Circuit reversed.</p>
| 1,083 | 5 | 4 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed
|
Criminal Procedure
|
1,665 | 55,274 |
National Cable & Telecommunications Assocation v. Brand X Internet Services
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/04-277
|
04-277
|
2004
|
National Cable & Telecommunications Association, et al.
|
Brand X Internet Services, et al.
|
<p>Title II of the Communications Act of 1934, which was amended in 1996, subjected providers of "telecommunications service" to mandatory common- carrier regulation. The FCC concluded that this did not include broadband cable companies. The Ninth Circuit reversed and cited its own previous opinion that had held that cable modem service was a "telecommunications service."</p>
| 379 | 6 | 3 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed/remanded
|
Judicial Power
|
1,666 | 55,276 |
Mid-Con Freight Systems, Inc. v. Michigan Public Service Commission
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/03-1234
|
03-1234
|
2004
|
Mid-Con Freight Systems, Inc., et al.
|
Michigan Public Service Commission, et al.
|
<p>A Michigan law imposed an annual $100 fee on each Michigan license-plated truck that operated entirely in interstate commerce. A group of interstate trucking companies sought unsuccesfully to have Michigan courts invalidate the law. The companies claimed that the federal law that had created the Single State Registration System (SSRS) preempted and prohibited such state fees. Under the federal law a trucking company could obtain a permit applicable in every state by registering once in a single state. While the initial state could demand a fee equal to the sum of its individual state fee, the law prohibited a state from imposing an additional "state registration requirement."</p>
| 692 | 6 | 3 | false |
majority opinion
|
affirmed
|
Federalism
|
1,667 | 55,275 |
Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma v. Leavitt
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/02-1472
|
02-1472
|
2004
|
Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma and Shoshone-Paiute Tribes of the Duck Valley Reservation
|
Michael O. Leavitt, Secretary of Health and Human Services, et al.
|
<p>The Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act (ISDA) allows tribes to administer health care programs previously run by the federal government. Tribes can opt to do this by entering into contracts with the Secretary of Health and Human Services, who is obligated to fund tribe-run health services as if they were still federally run. The Secretary must also fund "contract support costs" associated with carrying out the contract. However, ISDA requires the federal government to fund contract support costs only to the extent money is available. ISDA also does not require the federal government to reduce funding for some tribe programs to make funds available for other tribes. In two separate cases tribes claimed the federal government under-funded contract support costs. The Secretary argued the Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Appropriations Act made it clear the government lacked the funds to pay the full contract support costs. In one case a federal appellate court ruled that the federal government did not adequately fund contract support costs and that funds were available. In another case a federal appellate court ruled for the federal government.</p>
| 1,189 | 8 | 0 | true |
majority opinion
|
affirmed
|
Civil Rights
|
1,668 | 55,280 |
Howell, aka Cox v. Mississippi
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/03-9560
|
03-9560
|
2004
|
Marlon Howell, aka Marlon Cox
|
Mississippi
|
<p>A Mississippi court convicted Marlon Howell of capital murder - murder committed during a felony - and sentenced him to death. Howell appealed and argued the trial court was wrong to deny the jury the option of finding Howell guilty of the lesser offenses of non-capital murder or manslaughter, for which the death penalty would not have been an option. The Mississippi Supreme Court ruled against Howell and said there was no evidence to support lesser charges.</p>
| 470 | 9 | 0 | false |
per curiam
| null |
Judicial Power
|
1,669 | 55,278 |
Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd.
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/03-1237
|
03-1237
|
2004
|
Merck KGaA
|
Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., et al.
|
<p>Integra Lifesciences sued Merck for supplying an Integra patented compound to other drug companies for use in preclinical research. In response, Merck claimed its actions were allowed under the federal law that said it was not an act of patent infringement to use or import a patented invention into the United States, if the invention was used only in ways related to the development and submission of information under a federal drug law (such as the law governing submission of data to the FDA). The district court ruled against Merck and awarded Integra damages. The Federal Circuit affirmed the judgment but ordered a modification of damages.</p>
| 655 | 9 | 0 | true |
majority opinion
|
vacated/remanded
|
Economic Activity
|
1,670 | 55,277 |
Jama v. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/03-674
|
03-674
|
2004
|
Keyse G. Jama
|
Immigration and Customs Enforcement
|
<p>A Minnesota state court convicted Somalian refugee Keyse Jama of assault. As a result the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) argued in immigration court that Jama should be deported to Somalia. The court agreed and an immigration appeals court also agreed. Jama then appealed to a federal district court and argued the part of the U.S. Code dealing with deporting an alien to his country of birth required that country to first accept the alien. Because Somalia lacked a functioning central government, this was impossible. The district court ruled for Jama. A federal appellate court reversed and said Jama and the district court misinterpreted the law.</p>
| 672 | 5 | 4 | false |
majority opinion
|
affirmed
|
Civil Rights
|
1,671 | 55,279 |
Kowalski v. Tesmer
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/03-407
|
03-407
|
2004
|
John F. Kowalski, Judge, 26th Judicial Circuit Court of Michigan, et al.
|
John C. Tesmer, et al.
|
<p>A 1994 amendment to the Michigan constitution said criminal defendants who pled guilty had no right to appeal and could appeal only with the permission of a state appellate court. Michigan then enacted a law that said in most cases judges could not appoint appellate lawyers for indigent defendants who pled guilty. Two criminal attorneys and three indigent defendants who were denied appointed appellate lawyers filed a single suit alleging the state law violated the 14th Amendment's due process and equal protection clauses. The district court ruled that the indigents had standing to sue and that the lawyers who sued with them had the right to sue as third-party representatives of the rights of indigents. A federal appellate court agreed the statute was unconstitutional, but based this only on the lawyers' claims. The court said the U.S. Supreme Court's 1971 decision in Younger v. Harris required it to abstain from hearing the indigents' claims because the indigents were involved in related proceedings in state court.</p>
| 1,038 | 6 | 3 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed/remanded
|
Judicial Power
|
1,672 | 55,281 |
Clark v. Martinez
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/03-878
|
03-878
|
2004
|
A. Neil Clark, Field Office Director, Seattle, Washington, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, et al.
|
Sergio Martinez
|
<p>The federal government deemed Daniel Benitez and Sergio Martinez inadmissible immigrants and detained them until they could be returned to Cuba.</p>
<p>Benitez and Martinez argued that because deportation to Cuba was unforeseeable, they could not be detained longer than the 90 days allowed by federal law. They pointed to the U.S. Supreme Court's 2001 decision in Zadvydas v. Davis that said the government can detain beyond 90 days immigrants who were admitted to the United States, but only so long as necessary to deport them. Immigrants must be released if deportation is unforeseeable, the Court said.</p>
<p>While separate district courts agreed deportation to Cuba was unforeseeable, the Ninth Circuit and 11th Circuits disagreed over whether Zadvydas applied to inadmissible immigrants.</p>
<p>The U.S. Supreme Court consolidated the two cases.</p>
| 861 | 7 | 2 | false |
majority opinion
|
affirmed
|
Civil Rights
|
1,673 | 55,285 |
Salinas v. United States
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2005/05-8400
|
05-8400
|
2005
|
Jeffrey Jerome Salinas
|
United States
|
<p>Jeffrey Jerome Salinas was charged with bank robbery in federal district court. The district court treated Salinas’ two prior robbery convictions as unrelated. But because he had a prior conviction for possession of a controlled substance, he was treated as a career offender for sentencing purposes, which meant that his sentence was increased in accordance with the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling and held that the district court properly treated Salinas’ prior robbery convictions as unrelated and that his conviction for simple possession of a controlled substance was a “controlled substance offense” within the meaning of "career offender" for sentencing purposes.</p>
| 760 | 9 | 0 | true |
per curiam
|
vacated/remanded
|
Criminal Procedure
|
1,674 | 55,282 |
Alaska v. United States
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/128-orig
|
128-orig
|
2004
|
Alaska
|
United States
|
<p>Alaska and the United States disputed ownership of two areas of submerged lands - enclaves under the Alexander Archipelago, which are more than three miles from the coast of Alaska or any island, and lands beneath the inland waters of Glacier Bay. Alaska claimed the archipelago waters under the Submerged Lands Act, which entitled states to submerged lands three miles seaward of their coastline and to land beneath inland navigable waters. The dispute over the submerged lands under Glacier Bay centered on the United States' claim that, at the time Alaska gained statehood, those lands were intended for a national monument. A Special Master appointed to deal with the conflict, recommended to the U.S. Supreme Court that the Court side with the United States with respect to both areas. Alaska appealed that decision.</p>
| 829 | 6 | 3 | null |
majority opinion
| null | null |
1,675 | 55,284 |
Wilkinson v. Dotson
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/03-287
|
03-287
|
2004
|
Reginald A. Wilkinson, Director, Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction, et al.
|
William Dwight Dotson, et al.
|
<p>Ohio state prisoners Rogerico Johnson and William Dwight Dotson separately alleged their parole proceedings violated due process. Each sued the Ohio prison system under a section of the U.S. Code - section 1983 - which allows prisoners to challenge conditions of confinement. The district courts dismissed the prisoners' claims. The courts ruled their claims challenging parole decisions actually challenged their sentences and that the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in <em>Heck v. Humphrey</em> (1994) barred prisoners from using section 1983 to do this. The prisoners could make their claims only under the section of the U.S. Code that allows prisoners to petition for habeas corpus. A federal appellate court reversed the district courts' decisions.</p>
| 761 | 8 | 1 | false |
majority opinion
|
affirmed
|
Criminal Procedure
|
1,676 | 55,283 |
Miller-El v. Dretke
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/03-9659
|
03-9659
|
2004
|
Thomas Joe Miller-El
|
Doug Dretke, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division
|
<p>Miller-El alleged the prosecution in his capital murder trial violated the 14th Amendment's equal protection clause by excluding 10 of 11 blacks from the jury. The jury convicted Miller-El and he was sentenced to death. State courts rejected Miller-El's appeals and ruled Miller-El failed to meet the requirements for proving jury-selection discrimination outlined by the U.S. Supreme Court in <em>Batson v. Kentucky</em> (1986). Miller-El then appealed to a federal district court. The district court rejected Miller-El's appeal and ruled the court must defer to the state courts' acceptance of prosecutors' race-neutral justifications for striking potential jurors. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed and ruled a federal court could only grant an appeal if the applicant made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.</p>
<p>Miller-El appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court and in <em>Miller-El v. Cockrell</em> (2003) the Court ruled the Fifth Circuit should have accepted Miller- El's appeal to review the district court's ruling. The Supreme Court said an appeal should have been granted if the petitioner could demonstrate reasonable jurists could disagree with the district court's decision. The Court said the district court did not give full consideration to the substantial evidence Miller-El presented. The Fifth Circuit reconsidered Miller-El's appeal and ruled Miller-El failed to show clear and convincing evidence that the state court was wrong to find no purposeful discrimination.</p>
| 1,531 | 6 | 3 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed/remanded
|
Criminal Procedure
|
1,677 | 55,286 |
Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2005/05-259
|
05-259
|
2005
|
Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway Company
|
Sheila White
|
<p>Sheila White was the only woman working in the Maintenance of Way Department of the Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railroad's Tennessee Yard. After she complained of harassment by her supervisor, White was moved from duties as a forklift operator to less desirable duties as a track laborer, though her job classification remained the same. She was also suspended for 37 days without pay, but was eventually reinstated and given full back pay.</p>
<p>White filed suit in federal court, where a jury rejected her claims of sex discrimination but awarded her damages of $43,000 after finding that she had been retaliated against for her complaints, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. On appeal, Burlington Northern argued that White had not suffered "adverse employment action," and therefore could not bring the suit, because she had not been fired, demoted, denied a promotion, or denied wages. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed, finding that the suspension without pay - even if back pay was eventually awarded - was an "adverse employment action," as was the change of responsibilities within the same job category.</p>
| 1,158 | 9 | 0 | false |
majority opinion
|
affirmed
|
Civil Rights
|
1,678 | 55,287 |
Eberhart v. United States
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2005/04-9949
|
04-9949
|
2005
|
Ivan Eberhart
|
United States
|
<p>Ivan Eberhart was convicted of conspiring to distribute cocaine. He filed a motion for judgment of acquittal or for a new trial on the last day available for post-trial motions. Eberhart claimed that a flaw in the transcript published to the jury provided the basis for his motion. Six months later, he filed a “supplemental memorandum” alleging two additional grounds for his motion: the admission of potential hearsay testimony into evidence, and the district court’s failure to give a “buyer-seller instruction” to the jury. The district court granted Eberhart’s motion for a new trial. However, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed and held that the district court did not have jurisdiction to grant a new trial under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33, which states that a motion for a new trial that is not based on new evidence must be filed within seven days of the verdict. Because Eberhart filed after the seven-day deadline, a new trial could not be granted.</p>
| 1,002 | 9 | 0 | true |
per curiam
|
reversed/remanded
|
Criminal Procedure
|
1,679 | 55,288 |
S.D. Warren Co. v. Maine Board of Environmental Protection
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2005/04-1527
|
04-1527
|
2005
|
S.D. Warren Company
|
Maine Board of Environmental Protection et al.
|
<p>S.D. Warren Company (Warren) operates several hydroelectric dams in Maine. Under Section 401 of the federal Clean Water Act, companies must obtain state approval of "any activity" "which may result in any discharge into the [Nation's] navigable waters." When Warren sought to renew the federal licenses for its dams, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) required that it first get approval from the Maine Board of Environmental Protection because, FERC ruled, the dams resulted in a "discharge." Warren disagreed, arguing that the water which moved through the hydroelectric dams was not actually a "discharge" because it was water from the same river which had just been temporarily re-routed. After Warren's administrative appeals and state court suit (which went to the Maine Supreme Judicial Court) failed, it appealed the case to the U.S. Supreme Court.</p>
| 877 | 9 | 0 | false |
majority opinion
|
affirmed
|
Economic Activity
|
1,680 | 55,289 |
DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2005/04-1704
|
04-1704
|
2005
|
DaimlerChrysler Corp.
|
Charlotte Cuno, et al.
|
<p>As part of Ohio's economic development plan, DaimlerChrysler agreed to expand its operations in Toledo in exchange for tax exemptions and tax credits worth roughly $280 million. Charlotte Cuno and others challenged the deal, however, arguing that Ohio had violated the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution by offering the tax incentives. A federal district court disagreed, ruling for DaimlerChrysler, but on appeal a panel of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. The panel found that the tax incentives coerced businesses to expand in Ohio at the expense of other states, and were therefore unconstitutional manipulations of interstate commerce.</p>
| 666 | 9 | 0 | true |
majority opinion
|
vacated/remanded
|
Judicial Power
|
1,681 | 55,290 |
Schriro v. Smith
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2005/04-1475
|
04-1475
|
2005
|
Dora B. Schriro, Director, Arizona Department of Corrections
|
Robert Douglas Smith
|
<p>In 1982, Robert Douglas Smith was sentenced to death for murder, kidnapping, and sexual assault in an Arizona state court. Smith filed a petition for a writ of federal habeas corpus in district court that was denied. After the Supreme Court decided <em>Atkins v. Virginia</em>, which stated that a mentally retarded person cannot be executed, Smith appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and argued that he was mentally retarded and therefore could not be executed. The appellate court held that the issue of whether or not Smith was mentally retarded had to be decided by a jury.</p>
| 609 | 9 | 0 | true |
per curiam
|
vacated/remanded
|
Criminal Procedure
|
1,682 | 55,293 |
IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2005/03-1238
|
03-1238
|
2005
|
IBP, Inc.
|
Gabriel Alvarez, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, et al.
|
<p>In two separate cases, employees sued Barber Foods and IBP in federal district court. The employees alleged the companies violated the Fair Labor Standards Act by not paying them for time spent walking to the worksite after putting on required equipment. The district court and later the First Circuit ruled against the Barber employees. A separate district court ruled IBP must compensate its employees for the disputed time. The Ninth Circuit agreed. The U.S. Supreme Court consolidated the cases.</p>
| 507 | 9 | 0 | false |
majority opinion
|
affirmed
|
Unions
|
1,683 | 55,292 |
Hill v. McDonough
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2005/05-8794
|
05-8794
|
2005
|
Clarence E. Hill
|
James R. McDonough, Interim Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, et al.
|
<p>Clarence Hill was sentenced to death in Florida, which ordinarily uses a three-drug combination for executions. Hill claimed that this particular form of lethal injection was unnecessarily and gratuitously painful, and that it therefore violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. However, Hill had previously filed for a federal writ of habeas corpus challenging his conviction, and the federal district court ruled that his new challenge was the practical equivalent of a second habeas corpus appeal. Successive habeas corpus appeals are not allowed under 28 U.S.C. 2244, and so the district court rejected Hill's petition. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.</p>
| 727 | 9 | 0 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed/remanded
|
Civil Rights
|
1,684 | 55,296 |
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2005/04-1371
|
04-1371
|
2005
|
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.
|
Shadi Dabit
|
<p>Shadi Dabit, formerly a stockbroker at Merrill Lynch, brought a class action suit against his former employer alleging that the company had defrauded brokers by deceptively inflating stock prices, causing the brokers to hold onto stocks they would otherwise have sold. Dabit's class action was filed in the U.S. District Court based on federal diversity jurisdiction, but was based on Oklahoma state law.</p>
<p>In response to perceived abuses of the class-action vehicle in securities litigation, Congress had passed the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, which placed restrictions on federal securities fraud class actions. When plaintiffs began avoiding the law by bringing the suits in state courts instead of federal courts, Congress passed the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (SLUSA), which pre-empts federal class action securities fraud claims brought under state law that allege misrepresentation "in connection with the purchase or sale of a covered security."</p>
<p>Merrill Lynch argued that Dabit's suit was pre-empted by SLUSA and therefore could not be brought under state law. Dabit countered that the suit alleged misrepresentation concerning only the holding of stocks, and therefore was beyond the scope of SLUSA. The District Court for the Southern District of New York ruled for Merrill Lynch, finding the language of SLUSA broad enough to include suits such as Dabit's. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that suits by holders of stocks are distinct from suits by sellers and purchasers and that SLUSA was meant to pre-empt only the latter.</p>
| 1,624 | 8 | 0 | true |
majority opinion
|
vacated/remanded
|
Federalism
|
1,685 | 55,294 |
Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2005/04-1264
|
04-1264
|
2005
|
Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc.
|
John Cardegna et al.
|
<p>John Cardegna signed a contract for a loan from Buckeye Check Cashing. The contract contained a clause in which Cardegna agreed to resolve any controversies over the loan through arbitration. Cardegna later sued Buckeye, claiming that the conditions for the loan stipulated by the contract were illegal. Buckeye filed a motion in Florida district court to have the case resolved by arbitration, as required by the contract. Cardegna countered that the contract as a whole was illegal and that the arbitration clause was therefore not enforceable. The court agreed and ruled for Cardegna.</p>
<p>On appeal, the state appeals court reversed, holding that the Federal Arbirtration Act, as interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court, allows arbitration clauses to be enforced even if they are part of otherwise invalid contracts. The appeals court relied on the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Prima Paint Corporation v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Company. The Florida Supreme Court disagreed with the appeals court's use of Prima Paint, however, because the contract in that case had been merely voidable, while the contract in Cardegna's case was actually illegal. The Florida Supreme Court therefore reversed, ruling in favor of Cardegna.</p>
| 1,248 | 7 | 1 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed/remanded
|
Economic Activity
|
1,686 | 55,295 |
Texaco Inc. v. Dagher
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2005/04-805
|
04-805
|
2005
|
Texaco Inc.
|
Fouad N. Dagher et al.
|
<p>In 1998, Texaco and Shell Oil agreed to stop competing for the U.S. oil market. The two companies formed a joint venture, Equilon Enterprises, which would manage the refining and marketing of gasoline in the western United States. The joint venture was charged with setting prices for Texaco and Shell gasoline, which would be sold under the original brand names. When Equilon set the same price for both brands, Dagher and other service station owners sued under Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, alleging that Equilon was engaging in illegal price-fixing. The dispute turned on whether Equilon's actions fell under the Sherman Act's per se rule against price-fixing, under which all such instances of price-fixing by joint ventures would be illegal without regard to the specific harm caused in any particular case. The District Court granted summary judgment for Texaco, holding that the per se rule did not apply to the price-setting engaged in by Equilon. The District Judge reasoned that all enterprises, including joint ventures, must eventually set prices for their products. Therefore Equilon was merely engaged in a normal business practice, not the type of unreasonable, anticompetitive price-fixing that would run afoul of the Supreme Court's non-literal interpretation of the Sherman Act. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, ruling that Equilon's actions constituted price-fixing under the Sherman Act's per se rule and therefore could not be legal.</p>
| 1,485 | 8 | 0 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed
|
Economic Activity
|
1,687 | 55,297 |
Will v. Hallock
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2005/04-1332
|
04-1332
|
2005
|
Richard Will et al.
|
Susan Hallock et al.
|
<p>U.S. Customs Service agents investigating a child pornography website raided Susan and Richard Hallock's residence and seized several computers. The Hallocks were cleared of any guilt, but the computers were damaged beyond repair. Susan Hallock originally sued the government under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), which waives the government's sovereign immunity in certain cases. The District Court dismissed that case for lack of jurisdiction, because the FTCA's waiver has an exception for claims arising from the detention of goods by customs. Hallock then sued Will and the other customs agents as individuals. The agents made a motion for dismissal under a provision of the FTCA that bars suits where a judgment on the claim has already been entered. The District Court denied the motion, accepting Hallock's argument that the dismissal for lack of jurisdiction did not constitute a final judgment. Although the trial had not yet concluded, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals granted the agents' appeal of the District Court's ruling on the motion and affirmed the District Court, ruling that since Hallock had not properly brought a claim in the original suit, no judgment had been entered. The Circuit Court ruled that it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal under the collateral order doctrine, under which some decisions of lower courts other than final judgments can be appealed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the question of the motion to dismiss, but instructed the parties to argue the question of the Circuit Court's authority to hear the appeal.</p>
| 1,583 | 9 | 0 | false |
majority opinion
|
vacated/remanded
|
Judicial Power
|
1,688 | 55,299 |
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2005/05-130
|
05-130
|
2005
|
eBay Inc. et al.
|
MercExchange, L.L.C.
|
<p>MercExchange patented a design for an online marketplace in which a single company provides the trustworthy framework within which buyers and sellers can negotiate for goods. After negotiations with eBay and Half.com to license the patent failed, MercExchange brought suit in federal district court alleging patent violation under the Patent Act. The jury sided with MercExchange, ruling that its patent had been violated, but the district court judge refused to issue a permanent injunction. The injunction would have forced eBay and Half.com to stop using the contested framework, but the judge applied the traditional four-part test to determine whether an injunction was necessary and found that it was not. That decision was reversed, however, by the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which applied a "general rule that courts will issue permanent injunctions against patent infringements absent exceptional circumstances."</p>
| 957 | 9 | 0 | true |
majority opinion
|
vacated/remanded
|
Economic Activity
|
1,689 | 55,302 |
Scheidler v. National Organization for Women, Inc.
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2005/04-1244
|
04-1244
|
2005
|
Joseph Scheidler et al.
|
National Organization for Women, Inc., et al.
|
<p>In 2003, the Supreme Court ruled that abortion protesters do not commit extortion in violation the Hobbs Act and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) when they blockade abortion clinics, because they do not "obtain" property, as required by the Act. The Court concluded that "Without an underlying RICO violation, the injunction [on the protesters] issued by the District Court must necessarily be vacated." The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals declined to vacate the injunction, however, finding that the Court had only ruled on the 117 counts of extortion, and not on four additional counts of violence unrelated to extortion. The National Organization for Women (NOW) argued that acts of physical violence are sufficient to establish a violation of the Hobbs Act. Scheidler countered that the four counts of "violence-only" were irrelevant to the Hobbs Act, which he said requires that violence be used for robbery or extortion. Scheidler petitioned the Supreme Court to decide whether the Circuit Court had acted properly, and the Court granted certiorari. (Consolidated with No. 04-1352, Operation Rescue v. NOW.)</p>
| 1,151 | 8 | 0 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed/remanded
|
Privacy
|
1,690 | 55,301 |
Youngblood v. West Virginia
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2005/05-6997
|
05-6997
|
2005
|
Denver A. Youngblood, Jr.
|
West Virginia
|
<p>Denver A. Youngblood, Jr. was indicted on charges relating to the alleged abduction and sexual assault of three young women. The prosecution’s case rested largely on the testimony of the young women and evidence consistent with their claims. The jury convicted Youngblood of sexual assault, brandishing a firearm, wanton endangerment involving a firearm, and indecent exposure. After being sentenced, Youngblood moved to set aside the verdict and argued that there was new and exculpatory evidence in the form of a note from two of the young women that supported Youngblood’s consensual-sex defense to the sexual assault charge. The note had allegedly been shown to a state trooper who was investigating the incident, but he had refused to accept possession of it and requested that it be destroyed. Youngblood claimed that the suppression of this evidence constituted a violation of his rights under <em>Brady v. Maryland</em>, which held that a constitutional violation occurs when the government fails to disclose evidence favorable to the accused. The trial court denied Youngblood a new trial by holding that the note was only impeachment, not exculpatory, evidence. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed by holding that the trial court had not abused its discretion in denying a new trial. The Supreme Court of Appeals did not reach a decision on the merits of the alleged <em>Brady</em> violation.</p>
| 1,429 | 6 | 3 | true |
per curiam
|
vacated/remanded
|
Criminal Procedure
|
1,691 | 55,298 |
Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Schmidt
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2005/04-1186
|
04-1186
|
2005
|
Wachovia Bank, National Association
|
Daniel G. Schmidt, III, et al.
|
<p>Schmidt, a South Carolina citizen, sued Wachovia Bank in a South Carolina state court for fraudulently inducing him to participate in an illegal tax shelter. Wachovia is a national bank with its main office in North Carolina and branch offices in several other states, including South Carolina. Under federal diversity jurisdiction, federal courts can hear cases in which the parties are citizens of different states. Wachovia filed a petition in Federal District Court, seeking to compel arbitration of the dispute. After the petition was denied on the merits, Wachovia appealed to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, which dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. Under 28 U.S.C. Section 1348, national banks are "deemed citizens of the States in which they are respectively located." The Circuit Court interpreted "located" to mean any state where the bank has a branch location. Noting that the statute uses both "located" and "established" to refer to the presence of a bank, the Circuit Court determined that a national bank is "established" in the state where its main office is located, and "located" in every state where it has a branch office. Therefore, under the Fourth Circuit's reasoning, Wachovia was "located" in, and a citizen of, South Carolina (as well as several other states with branch offices). Since both parties, Schmidt and Wachovia, had South Carolina citizenship, the Circuit Court dismissed the case for lack of diversity jurisdiction.</p>
| 1,477 | 8 | 0 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed/remanded
|
Judicial Power
|
1,692 | 55,300 |
Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp.
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2005/04-944
|
04-944
|
2005
|
Jenifer Arbaugh
|
Y & H Corporation, dba The Moonlight Cafe
|
<p>Jennifer Arbaugh, a waitress at the Moonlight Cafe in Louisiana, sued her employer, the Y&H Corporation, for sexual harassment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. The federal district court jury ruled for Arbaugh. Filing a motion to dismiss, Y&H claimed it did not qualify as an employer under Title VII, because it did not employ 15 or more employees for 20 or more calendar weeks during the relevant time period. The district court then reversed the jury judgment, holding that the number of employees determines a court's subject matter jurisdiction in a Title VII suit. The Fifth Circuit affirmed.</p>
| 622 | 8 | 0 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed/remanded
|
Civil Rights
|
1,693 | 55,303 |
Dolan v. Postal Service
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2005/04-848
|
04-848
|
2005
|
Barbara Dolan
|
United States Postal Service et al.
|
<p>Barbara Dolan tripped over mail left on her porch by a mailman, injuring herself. She sued the Postal Service under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), arguing that her injuries were due to the mailman's negligence. The government, claiming that its sovereign immunity had not been waived in this particular case, moved to have the case dismissed. The FTCA, while waiving federal sovereign immunity for most incidents that could arise under it, has an exception for the "negligent transmission of letters or postal matter." Dolan argued that this exception referred only to mail that was lost or damaged by the Postal Service, not to people injured by the placement of the mail, but the district court disagreed. The case was dismissed, and the dismissal was affirmed by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.</p>
| 814 | 7 | 1 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed/remanded
|
Economic Activity
|
1,694 | 55,305 |
United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2005/05-352
|
05-352
|
2005
|
United States
|
Cuauhtemoc Gonzalez-Lopez
|
<p>Cuauhtemoc Gonzalez-Lopez hired Joseph Low, an attorney, to represent him in a federal criminal trial. The district court judge refused to allow Low to represent Gonzalez-Lopez, however, because the judge ruled that Low had violated a court rule in a previous case. Gonzalez-Lopez was subsequently convicted. On appeal, he argued that his Sixth Amendment right to paid counsel of his own choosing had been violated and that the conviction should therefore be overturned. The Eighth Circuit agreed, holding that the trial judge had misinterpreted the court rule and that Low's conduct had been acceptable under a proper understanding of the rule. The decision to not allow him to represent Gonzalez-Lopez was therefore wrong, and resulted in a violation of Gonzalez- Lopez's Sixth Amendment rights significant enough to warrant overturning the conviction.</p>
| 862 | 5 | 4 | false |
majority opinion
|
affirmed
|
Criminal Procedure
|
1,695 | 55,304 |
Central Va. Community College v. Katz
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2005/04-885
|
04-885
|
2005
|
Central Virginia Community College et al.
|
Bernard Katz, Liquidating Supervisor for Wallace's Bookstores, Inc.
|
<p>Katz, the court-appointed liquidating supervisor of the bankrupt estate of a bookstore, filed a suit to collect debts owed to the bookstore by Central Virginia Community College and several other schools operated by the state of Virginia. Katz also petitioned to prevent the schools from filing claims to collect money from the bookstore because of its bankruptcy status. The colleges argued that they could not be sued by Katz because of state sovereign immunity (which holds that a state must consent in order to be sued). The bankruptcy court disagreed, however, finding that Congress's authority under the Bankruptcy Clause of the Constitution (Article I Section 8) was sufficient to allow them to waive states' sovereign immunity in bankruptcy cases.</p>
| 763 | 5 | 4 | false |
majority opinion
|
affirmed
|
Federalism
|
1,696 | 55,306 |
Samson v. California
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2005/04-9728
|
04-9728
|
2005
|
Donald Curtis Samson
|
California
|
<p>A police officer stopped and searched Samson on the street in San Bruno, California. The officer had no warrant and later admitted he had stopped Samson only because he knew him to be on parole. The officer found that Samson was in possession of methamphetamines. Samson was arrested and charged with drug possession in state court. At trial Samson argued the drugs were inadmissible as evidence, because the search had violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The trial court denied the motion and the state supreme court declined to hear the case.</p>
| 554 | 6 | 3 | false |
majority opinion
|
affirmed
|
Criminal Procedure
|
1,697 | 55,309 |
Kane v. Garcia Espitia
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2005/04-1538
|
04-1538
|
2005
|
Anthony Kane, Warden
|
Joe Garcia Espitia
|
<p>Joe Garcia Espitia chose to represent himself in his trial on charges of carjacking and was convicted. Garcia Espitia was repeatedly denied law library access to prepare for trial, but he received four hours of access during trial just before closing arguments. He sought federal habeas relief, but the district court denied his petition. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and held that the lack of pretrial access to law books violated Garcia Espitia’s Sixth Amendment right to represent himself as established in <em>Faretta v. California</em>.</p>
| 577 | 9 | 0 | true |
per curiam
|
reversed/remanded
|
Civil Rights
|
1,698 | 55,308 |
Unitherm Food Systems, Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc.
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2005/04-597
|
04-597
|
2005
|
Unitherm Food Systems, Inc.
|
Swift-Eckrich, Inc., dba ConAgra Refrigerated Foods
|
<p>When ConAgra, Swift-Eckrich's parent company, attempted to enforce its patent for a process for browning precooked meats, Unitherm claimed that the patent was invalid because Unitherm's president had invented the process six years before. Unitherm sued, alleging that ConAgra had violated the Sherman Antitrust Act by attempting to enforce a patent obtained by fraud. Pursuant to Rule 50(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, ConAgra moved for judgment as a matter of law, asking the Disrict Court to dismiss the case based on insufficiency of evidence. The court denied the motion and sent the case to the jury, which returned a verdict for Unitherm. ConAgra appealed to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, again arguing that the evidence was insufficent to prove an antitrust violation. However, ConAgra did not renew the motion for judgment as a matter of law after the verdict, pursuant to Rule 50(b), or move for a new trial, pursuant to Rule 59. Normally, parties must file the Rule 50(b) motion after an unfavorable verdict in order to obtain judgment as a matter of law on appeal. Unitherm argued that since ConAgra had failed to renew its motion under Rule 50(b), the Court of Appeals could not consider the insufficiency-of-evidence claim. ConAgra took the position that renewal of the motion is optional. The Federal Circuit considered itself bound to apply the precedent of the relevant regional Circuit Court (the Tenth), under which Rule 50(b) is indeed optional, in contrast to the precedents of the other Circuit Courts. The Federal Circuit found the evidence insufficient to support the jury's verdict, so it reversed the District Court and ordered a new trial. Unitherm appealed to the Supreme Court, which agreed to consider the procedural dispute.</p>
| 1,799 | 7 | 2 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed
|
Judicial Power
|
1,699 | 55,307 |
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld
|
https://api.oyez.org/cases/2005/05-184
|
05-184
|
2005
|
Salim Ahmed Hamdan
|
Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, et al.
|
<p>Salim Ahmed Hamdan, Osama bin Laden's former chauffeur, was captured by Afghan forces and imprisoned by the U.S. military in Guantanamo Bay. He filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court to challenge his detention. Before the district court ruled on the petition, he received a hearing from a military tribunal, which designated him an enemy combatant.</p>
<p>A few months later, the district court granted Hamdan's habeas petition, ruling that he must first be given a hearing to determine whether he was a prisoner of war under the Geneva Convention before he could be tried by a military commission. The Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed the decision, however, finding that the Geneva Convention could not be enforced in federal court and that the establishment of military tribunals had been authorized by Congress and was therefore not unconstitutional.</p>
| 923 | 5 | 3 | true |
majority opinion
|
reversed/remanded
|
Criminal Procedure
|
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