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9850_194 | See also |
9850_195 | Aircraft cabin
Airline seat
Economy class
Hypermobility (travel)
First class |
9850_196 | IATA class codes
Premium economy |
9850_197 | References
External links |
9850_198 | Qantas History including business class history
Business Class Community with pictures |
9850_199 | https://www.executivetraveller.com/did-qantas-invent-business-class |
9850_200 | Airline tickets
Passenger rail transport
Travel classes |
9851_0 | This article is about the history of the United States Federal Reserve System from its creation to |
9851_1 | the present. |
9851_2 | Central banking prior to the Federal Reserve |
9851_3 | The Federal Reserve System is the third central banking system in United States history. The First |
9851_4 | Bank of the United States (1791–1811) and the Second Bank of the United States (1817–1836) each had |
9851_5 | a 20-year charter. Both banks issued currency, made commercial loans, accepted deposits, purchased |
9851_6 | securities, maintained multiple branches and acted as fiscal agents for the U.S. Treasury. The |
9851_7 | U.S. Federal Government was required to purchase 20% of the bank capital stock shares and to |
9851_8 | appoint 20% of the board members (directors) of each of those first two banks "of the United |
9851_9 | States." Therefore, each bank's majority control was placed squarely in the hands of wealthy |
9851_10 | investors who purchased the remaining 80% of the stock. These banks were opposed by state-chartered |
9851_11 | banks, who saw them as very large competitors, and by many who insisted that they were in reality |
9851_12 | banking cartels compelling the common man to maintain and support them. President Andrew Jackson |
9851_13 | vetoed legislation to renew the Second Bank of the United States, starting a period of free |
9851_14 | banking. Jackson staked the legislative success of his second presidential term on the issue of |
9851_15 | central banking. "Every monopoly and all exclusive privileges are granted at the expense of the |
9851_16 | public, which ought to receive a fair equivalent. The many millions which this act proposes to |
9851_17 | bestow on the stockholders of the existing bank must come directly or indirectly out of the |
9851_18 | earnings of the American people," Jackson said in 1832. Jackson's second term in office ended in |
9851_19 | March 1837 without the Second Bank of the United States's charter being renewed. |
9851_20 | In 1863, as a means to help finance the Civil War, a system of national banks was instituted by the |
9851_21 | National Currency Act. The banks each had the power to issue standardized national bank notes based |
9851_22 | on United States bonds held by the bank. The Act was totally revised in 1864 and later named as the |
9851_23 | National-Bank Act, or National Banking Act, as it is popularly known. The administration of the new |
9851_24 | national banking system was vested in the newly created Office of the Comptroller of the Currency |
9851_25 | and its chief administrator, the Comptroller of the Currency. The Office, which still exists today, |
9851_26 | examines and supervises all banks chartered nationally and is a part of the U.S. Treasury |
9851_27 | Department. |
9851_28 | The Federal Reserve Act, 1913 |
9851_29 | National bank currency was considered inelastic because it was based on the fluctuating value of |
9851_30 | U.S. Treasury bonds. If Treasury bond prices declined, a national bank had to reduce the amount of |
9851_31 | currency it had in circulation by either refusing to make new loans or by calling in loans it had |
9851_32 | made already. The related liquidity problem was largely caused by an immobile, pyramidal reserve |
9851_33 | system, in which nationally chartered rural/agriculture-based banks were required to set aside |
9851_34 | their reserves in federal reserve city banks, which in turn were required to have reserves in |
9851_35 | central city banks. During the planting seasons, rural banks would exploit their reserves to |
9851_36 | finance full plantings, and during the harvest seasons they would use profits from loan interest |
9851_37 | payments to restore and grow their reserves. A national bank whose reserves were being drained |
9851_38 | would replace its reserves by selling stocks and bonds, by borrowing from a clearing house or by |
9851_39 | calling in loans. As there was little in the way of deposit insurance, if a bank was rumored to be |
9851_40 | having liquidity problems then this might cause many people to remove their funds from the bank. |
9851_41 | Because of the crescendo effect of banks which lent more than their assets could cover, during the |
9851_42 | last quarter of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century, the United States economy |
9851_43 | went through a series of financial panics. |
9851_44 | The National Monetary Commission, 1907-1913 |
9851_45 | Prior to a particularly severe panic in 1907, there was a motivation for renewed demands for |
9851_46 | banking and currency reform. The following year, Congress enacted the Aldrich–Vreeland Act which |
9851_47 | provided for an emergency currency and established the National Monetary Commission to study |
9851_48 | banking and currency reform. |
9851_49 | The chief of the bipartisan National Monetary Commission was financial expert and Senate Republican |
9851_50 | leader Nelson Aldrich. Aldrich set up two commissions – one to study the American monetary system |
9851_51 | in depth and the other, headed by Aldrich, to study the European central-banking systems and report |
9851_52 | on them. |
9851_53 | Aldrich went to Europe opposed to centralized banking but, after viewing Germany's banking system, |
9851_54 | he came away believing that a centralized bank was better than the government-issued bond system |
9851_55 | that he had previously supported. Centralized banking was met with much opposition from |
9851_56 | politicians, who were suspicious of a central bank and who charged that Aldrich was biased due to |
9851_57 | his close ties to wealthy bankers such as J.P. Morgan and his daughter's marriage to John D. |
9851_58 | Rockefeller, Jr. |
9851_59 | In 1910, Aldrich and executives representing the banks of J.P. Morgan, Rockefeller, and Kuhn, Loeb |
9851_60 | & Co., secluded themselves for ten days at Jekyll Island, Georgia. The executives included Frank A. |
9851_61 | Vanderlip, president of the National City Bank of New York, associated with the Rockefellers; Henry |
9851_62 | Davison, senior partner of J.P. Morgan Company; Charles D. Norton, president of the First National |
9851_63 | Bank of New York; and Col. Edward M. House, who would later become President Woodrow Wilson's |
9851_64 | closest adviser and founder of the Council on Foreign Relations. There, Paul Warburg of Kuhn, Loeb, |
9851_65 | & Co. directed the proceedings and wrote the primary features of what would be called the Aldrich |
9851_66 | Plan. Warburg would later write that "The matter of a uniform discount rate (interest rate) was |
9851_67 | discussed and settled at Jekyll Island." Vanderlip wrote in his 1935 autobiography From Farmboy to |
9851_68 | Financier: |
9851_69 | Despite my views about the value to society of greater publicity for the affairs of corporations, |
9851_70 | there was an occasion, near the close of 1910, when I was as secretive, indeed, as furtive as any |
9851_71 | conspirator. None of us who participated felt that we were conspirators; on the contrary we felt we |
9851_72 | were engaged in a patriotic work. We were trying to plan a mechanism that would correct the |
9851_73 | weaknesses of our banking system as revealed under the strains and pressures of the panic of 1907. |
9851_74 | I do not feel it is any exaggeration to speak of our secret expedition to Jekyl Island as the |
9851_75 | occasion of the actual conception of what eventually became the Federal Reserve System. ... |
9851_76 | Discovery, we knew, simply must not happen, or else all our time and effort would be wasted. If it |
9851_77 | were to be exposed publicly that our particular group had gotten together and written a banking |
9851_78 | bill, that bill would have no chance whatever of passage by Congress. Yet, who was there in |
9851_79 | Congress who might have drafted a sound piece of legislation dealing with the purely banking |
9851_80 | problem with which we were concerned? |
9851_81 | Despite meeting in secret, from both the public and the government, the importance of the Jekyll |
9851_82 | Island meeting was revealed three years after the Federal Reserve Act was passed, when journalist |
9851_83 | Bertie Charles Forbes in 1916 wrote an article about the "hunting trip". |
9851_84 | The 1911–12 Republican plan was proposed by Aldrich to solve the banking dilemma, a goal which was |
9851_85 | supported by the American Bankers' Association. The plan provided for one great central bank, the |
9851_86 | National Reserve Association, with a capital of at least $100 million and with 15 branches in |
9851_87 | various sections. The branches were to be controlled by the member banks on a basis of their |
9851_88 | capitalization. The National Reserve Association would issue currency, based on gold and commercial |
9851_89 | paper, that would be the liability of the bank and not of the government. The Association would |
9851_90 | also carry a portion of member banks' reserves, determine discount reserves, buy and sell on the |
9851_91 | open market, and hold the deposits of the federal government. The branches and businessmen of each |
9851_92 | of the 15 districts would elect thirty out of the 39 members of the board of directors of the |
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