ariondas/full_text_dataset · Datasets at Hugging Face

text stringlengths 0 1.91k
were to come in, that so he might both pay much with a little, and in a
little receive a great deal. Another proposes a pretence of a war, that
money might be raised in order to carry it on, and that a peace be
concluded as soon as that was done; and this with such appearances of
religion as might work on the people, and make them impute it to the
piety of their prince, and to his tenderness for the lives of his
subjects. A third offers some old musty laws that have been antiquated
by a long disuse (and which, as they had been forgotten by all the
subjects, so they had also been broken by them), and proposes the levying
the penalties of these laws, that, as it would bring in a vast treasure,
so there might be a very good pretence for it, since it would look like
the executing a law and the doing of justice. A fourth proposes the
prohibiting of many things under severe penalties, especially such as
were against the interest of the people, and then the dispensing with
these prohibitions, upon great compositions, to those who might find
their advantage in breaking them. This would serve two ends, both of
them acceptable to many; for as those whose avarice led them to
transgress would be severely fined, so the selling licences dear would
look as if a prince were tender of his people, and would not easily, or
at low rates, dispense with anything that might be against the public
good. Another proposes that the judges must be made sure, that they may
declare always in favour of the prerogative; that they must be often sent
for to court, that the king may hear them argue those points in which he
is concerned; since, how unjust soever any of his pretensions may be, yet
still some one or other of them, either out of contradiction to others,
or the pride of singularity, or to make their court, would find out some
pretence or other to give the king a fair colour to carry the point. For
if the judges but differ in opinion, the clearest thing in the world is
made by that means disputable, and truth being once brought in question,
the king may then take advantage to expound the law for his own profit;
while the judges that stand out will be brought over, either through fear
or modesty; and they being thus gained, all of them may be sent to the
Bench to give sentence boldly as the king would have it; for fair
pretences will never be wanting when sentence is to be given in the
prince's favour. It will either be said that equity lies of his side, or
some words in the law will be found sounding that way, or some forced
sense will be put on them; and, when all other things fail, the king's
undoubted prerogative will be pretended, as that which is above all law,
and to which a religious judge ought to have a special regard. Thus all
consent to that maxim of Crassus, that a prince cannot have treasure
enough, since he must maintain his armies out of it; that a king, even
though he would, can do nothing unjustly; that all property is in him,
not excepting the very persons of his subjects; and that no man has any
other property but that which the king, out of his goodness, thinks fit
to leave him. And they think it is the prince's interest that there be
as little of this left as may be, as if it were his advantage that his
people should have neither riches nor liberty, since these things make
them less easy and willing to submit to a cruel and unjust government.
Whereas necessity and poverty blunts them, makes them patient, beats them
down, and breaks that height of spirit that might otherwise dispose them
to rebel. Now what if, after all these propositions were made, I should
rise up and assert that such counsels were both unbecoming a king and
mischievous to him; and that not only his honour, but his safety,
consisted more in his people's wealth than in his own; if I should show
that they choose a king for their own sake, and not for his; that, by his
care and endeavours, they may be both easy and safe; and that, therefore,
a prince ought to take more care of his people's happiness than of his
own, as a shepherd is to take more care of his flock than of himself? It
is also certain that they are much mistaken that think the poverty of a
nation is a mean of the public safety. Who quarrel more than beggars?
who does more earnestly long for a change than he that is uneasy in his
present circumstances? and who run to create confusions with so desperate
a boldness as those who, having nothing to lose, hope to gain by them? If
a king should fall under such contempt or envy that he could not keep his
subjects in their duty but by oppression and ill usage, and by rendering
them poor and miserable, it were certainly better for him to quit his
kingdom than to retain it by such methods as make him, while he keeps the
name of authority, lose the majesty due to it. Nor is it so becoming the
dignity of a king to reign over beggars as over rich and happy subjects.
And therefore Fabricius, a man of a noble and exalted temper, said 'he
would rather govern rich men than be rich himself; since for one man to
abound in wealth and pleasure when all about him are mourning and
groaning, is to be a gaoler and not a king.' He is an unskilful
physician that cannot cure one disease without casting his patient into
another. So he that can find no other way for correcting the errors of
his people but by taking from them the conveniences of life, shows that
he knows not what it is to govern a free nation. He himself ought rather
to shake off his sloth, or to lay down his pride, for the contempt or
hatred that his people have for him takes its rise from the vices in
himself. Let him live upon what belongs to him without wronging others,
and accommodate his expense to his revenue. Let him punish crimes, and,
by his wise conduct, let him endeavour to prevent them, rather than be
severe when he has suffered them to be too common. Let him not rashly
revive laws that are abrogated by disuse, especially if they have been
long forgotten and never wanted. And let him never take any penalty for
the breach of them to which a judge would not give way in a private man,
but would look on him as a crafty and unjust person for pretending to it.
To these things I would add that law among the Macarians--a people that
live not far from Utopia--by which their king, on the day on which he
began to reign, is tied by an oath, confirmed by solemn sacrifices, never
to have at once above a thousand pounds of gold in his treasures, or so
much silver as is equal to that in value. This law, they tell us, was
made by an excellent king who had more regard to the riches of his
country than to his own wealth, and therefore provided against the
heaping up of so much treasure as might impoverish the people. He
thought that moderate sum might be sufficient for any accident, if either
the king had occasion for it against the rebels, or the kingdom against
the invasion of an enemy; but that it was not enough to encourage a
prince to invade other men's rights--a circumstance that was the chief
cause of his making that law. He also thought that it was a good

were to come in, that so he might both pay much with a little, and in a

little receive a great deal. Another proposes a pretence of a war, that

money might be raised in order to carry it on, and that a peace be

concluded as soon as that was done; and this with such appearances of

religion as might work on the people, and make them impute it to the

piety of their prince, and to his tenderness for the lives of his

subjects. A third offers some old musty laws that have been antiquated

by a long disuse (and which, as they had been forgotten by all the

subjects, so they had also been broken by them), and proposes the levying

the penalties of these laws, that, as it would bring in a vast treasure,

so there might be a very good pretence for it, since it would look like

the executing a law and the doing of justice. A fourth proposes the

prohibiting of many things under severe penalties, especially such as

were against the interest of the people, and then the dispensing with

these prohibitions, upon great compositions, to those who might find

their advantage in breaking them. This would serve two ends, both of

them acceptable to many; for as those whose avarice led them to

transgress would be severely fined, so the selling licences dear would

look as if a prince were tender of his people, and would not easily, or

at low rates, dispense with anything that might be against the public

good. Another proposes that the judges must be made sure, that they may

declare always in favour of the prerogative; that they must be often sent

for to court, that the king may hear them argue those points in which he

is concerned; since, how unjust soever any of his pretensions may be, yet

still some one or other of them, either out of contradiction to others,

or the pride of singularity, or to make their court, would find out some

pretence or other to give the king a fair colour to carry the point. For

if the judges but differ in opinion, the clearest thing in the world is

made by that means disputable, and truth being once brought in question,

the king may then take advantage to expound the law for his own profit;

while the judges that stand out will be brought over, either through fear

or modesty; and they being thus gained, all of them may be sent to the

Bench to give sentence boldly as the king would have it; for fair

pretences will never be wanting when sentence is to be given in the

prince's favour. It will either be said that equity lies of his side, or

some words in the law will be found sounding that way, or some forced

sense will be put on them; and, when all other things fail, the king's

undoubted prerogative will be pretended, as that which is above all law,

and to which a religious judge ought to have a special regard. Thus all

consent to that maxim of Crassus, that a prince cannot have treasure

enough, since he must maintain his armies out of it; that a king, even

though he would, can do nothing unjustly; that all property is in him,

not excepting the very persons of his subjects; and that no man has any

other property but that which the king, out of his goodness, thinks fit

to leave him. And they think it is the prince's interest that there be

as little of this left as may be, as if it were his advantage that his

people should have neither riches nor liberty, since these things make

them less easy and willing to submit to a cruel and unjust government.

Whereas necessity and poverty blunts them, makes them patient, beats them

down, and breaks that height of spirit that might otherwise dispose them

to rebel. Now what if, after all these propositions were made, I should

rise up and assert that such counsels were both unbecoming a king and

mischievous to him; and that not only his honour, but his safety,

consisted more in his people's wealth than in his own; if I should show

that they choose a king for their own sake, and not for his; that, by his

care and endeavours, they may be both easy and safe; and that, therefore,

a prince ought to take more care of his people's happiness than of his

own, as a shepherd is to take more care of his flock than of himself? It

is also certain that they are much mistaken that think the poverty of a

nation is a mean of the public safety. Who quarrel more than beggars?

who does more earnestly long for a change than he that is uneasy in his

present circumstances? and who run to create confusions with so desperate

a boldness as those who, having nothing to lose, hope to gain by them? If

a king should fall under such contempt or envy that he could not keep his

subjects in their duty but by oppression and ill usage, and by rendering

them poor and miserable, it were certainly better for him to quit his

kingdom than to retain it by such methods as make him, while he keeps the

name of authority, lose the majesty due to it. Nor is it so becoming the

dignity of a king to reign over beggars as over rich and happy subjects.

And therefore Fabricius, a man of a noble and exalted temper, said 'he

would rather govern rich men than be rich himself; since for one man to

abound in wealth and pleasure when all about him are mourning and

groaning, is to be a gaoler and not a king.' He is an unskilful

physician that cannot cure one disease without casting his patient into

another. So he that can find no other way for correcting the errors of

his people but by taking from them the conveniences of life, shows that

he knows not what it is to govern a free nation. He himself ought rather

to shake off his sloth, or to lay down his pride, for the contempt or

hatred that his people have for him takes its rise from the vices in

himself. Let him live upon what belongs to him without wronging others,

and accommodate his expense to his revenue. Let him punish crimes, and,

by his wise conduct, let him endeavour to prevent them, rather than be

severe when he has suffered them to be too common. Let him not rashly

revive laws that are abrogated by disuse, especially if they have been

long forgotten and never wanted. And let him never take any penalty for

the breach of them to which a judge would not give way in a private man,

but would look on him as a crafty and unjust person for pretending to it.

To these things I would add that law among the Macarians--a people that

live not far from Utopia--by which their king, on the day on which he

began to reign, is tied by an oath, confirmed by solemn sacrifices, never

to have at once above a thousand pounds of gold in his treasures, or so

much silver as is equal to that in value. This law, they tell us, was

made by an excellent king who had more regard to the riches of his

country than to his own wealth, and therefore provided against the

heaping up of so much treasure as might impoverish the people. He

thought that moderate sum might be sufficient for any accident, if either

the king had occasion for it against the rebels, or the kingdom against

the invasion of an enemy; but that it was not enough to encourage a

prince to invade other men's rights--a circumstance that was the chief

cause of his making that law. He also thought that it was a good