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provision for that free circulation of money so necessary for the course
of commerce and exchange. And when a king must distribute all those
extraordinary accessions that increase treasure beyond the due pitch, it
makes him less disposed to oppress his subjects. Such a king as this
will be the terror of ill men, and will be beloved by all the good.

"If, I say, I should talk of these or such-like things to men that had
taken their bias another way, how deaf would they be to all I could say!"
"No doubt, very deaf," answered I; "and no wonder, for one is never to
offer propositions or advice that we are certain will not be entertained.
Discourses so much out of the road could not avail anything, nor have any
effect on men whose minds were prepossessed with different sentiments.
This philosophical way of speculation is not unpleasant among friends in
a free conversation; but there is no room for it in the courts of
princes, where great affairs are carried on by authority." "That is what
I was saying," replied he, "that there is no room for philosophy in the
courts of princes." "Yes, there is," said I, "but not for this
speculative philosophy, that makes everything to be alike fitting at all
times; but there is another philosophy that is more pliable, that knows
its proper scene, accommodates itself to it, and teaches a man with
propriety and decency to act that part which has fallen to his share. If
when one of Plautus' comedies is upon the stage, and a company of
servants are acting their parts, you should come out in the garb of a
philosopher, and repeat, out of _Octavia_, a discourse of Seneca's to
Nero, would it not be better for you to say nothing than by mixing things
of such different natures to make an impertinent tragi-comedy? for you
spoil and corrupt the play that is in hand when you mix with it things of
an opposite nature, even though they are much better. Therefore go
through with the play that is acting the best you can, and do not
confound it because another that is pleasanter comes into your thoughts.
It is even so in a commonwealth and in the councils of princes; if ill
opinions cannot be quite rooted out, and you cannot cure some received
vice according to your wishes, you must not, therefore, abandon the
commonwealth, for the same reasons as you should not forsake the ship in
a storm because you cannot command the winds. You are not obliged to
assault people with discourses that are out of their road, when you see
that their received notions must prevent your making an impression upon
them: you ought rather to cast about and to manage things with all the
dexterity in your power, so that, if you are not able to make them go
well, they may be as little ill as possible; for, except all men were
good, everything cannot be right, and that is a blessing that I do not at
present hope to see." "According to your argument," answered he, "all
that I could be able to do would be to preserve myself from being mad
while I endeavoured to cure the madness of others; for, if I speak with,
I must repeat what I have said to you; and as for lying, whether a
philosopher can do it or not I cannot tell: I am sure I cannot do it. But
though these discourses may be uneasy and ungrateful to them, I do not
see why they should seem foolish or extravagant; indeed, if I should
either propose such things as Plato has contrived in his 'Commonwealth,'
or as the Utopians practise in theirs, though they might seem better, as
certainly they are, yet they are so different from our establishment,
which is founded on property (there being no such thing among them), that
I could not expect that it would have any effect on them. But such
discourses as mine, which only call past evils to mind and give warning
of what may follow, leave nothing in them that is so absurd that they may
not be used at any time, for they can only be unpleasant to those who are
resolved to run headlong the contrary way; and if we must let alone
everything as absurd or extravagant--which, by reason of the wicked lives
of many, may seem uncouth--we must, even among Christians, give over
pressing the greatest part of those things that Christ hath taught us,
though He has commanded us not to conceal them, but to proclaim on the
housetops that which He taught in secret. The greatest parts of His
precepts are more opposite to the lives of the men of this age than any
part of my discourse has been, but the preachers seem to have learned
that craft to which you advise me: for they, observing that the world
would not willingly suit their lives to the rules that Christ has given,
have fitted His doctrine, as if it had been a leaden rule, to their
lives, that so, some way or other, they might agree with one another. But
I see no other effect of this compliance except it be that men become
more secure in their wickedness by it; and this is all the success that I
can have in a court, for I must always differ from the rest, and then I
shall signify nothing; or, if I agree with them, I shall then only help
forward their madness. I do not comprehend what you mean by your
'casting about,' or by 'the bending and handling things so dexterously
that, if they go not well, they may go as little ill as may be;' for in
courts they will not bear with a man's holding his peace or conniving at
what others do: a man must barefacedly approve of the worst counsels and
consent to the blackest designs, so that he would pass for a spy, or,
possibly, for a traitor, that did but coldly approve of such wicked
practices; and therefore when a man is engaged in such a society, he will
be so far from being able to mend matters by his 'casting about,' as you
call it, that he will find no occasions of doing any good--the ill
company will sooner corrupt him than be the better for him; or if,
notwithstanding all their ill company, he still remains steady and
innocent, yet their follies and knavery will be imputed to him; and, by
mixing counsels with them, he must bear his share of all the blame that
belongs wholly to others.

"It was no ill simile by which Plato set forth the unreasonableness of a
philosopher's meddling with government. 'If a man,' says he, 'were to
see a great company run out every day into the rain and take delight in
being wet--if he knew that it would be to no purpose for him to go and
persuade them to return to their houses in order to avoid the storm, and
that all that could be expected by his going to speak to them would be
that he himself should be as wet as they, it would be best for him to
keep within doors, and, since he had not influence enough to correct
other people's folly, to take care to preserve himself.'

"Though, to speak plainly my real sentiments, I must freely own that as
long as there is any property, and while money is the standard of all

provision for that free circulation of money so necessary for the course

of commerce and exchange. And when a king must distribute all those

extraordinary accessions that increase treasure beyond the due pitch, it

makes him less disposed to oppress his subjects. Such a king as this

will be the terror of ill men, and will be beloved by all the good.

"If, I say, I should talk of these or such-like things to men that had

taken their bias another way, how deaf would they be to all I could say!"

"No doubt, very deaf," answered I; "and no wonder, for one is never to

offer propositions or advice that we are certain will not be entertained.

Discourses so much out of the road could not avail anything, nor have any

effect on men whose minds were prepossessed with different sentiments.

This philosophical way of speculation is not unpleasant among friends in

a free conversation; but there is no room for it in the courts of

princes, where great affairs are carried on by authority." "That is what

I was saying," replied he, "that there is no room for philosophy in the

courts of princes." "Yes, there is," said I, "but not for this

speculative philosophy, that makes everything to be alike fitting at all

times; but there is another philosophy that is more pliable, that knows

its proper scene, accommodates itself to it, and teaches a man with

propriety and decency to act that part which has fallen to his share. If

when one of Plautus' comedies is upon the stage, and a company of

servants are acting their parts, you should come out in the garb of a

philosopher, and repeat, out of _Octavia_, a discourse of Seneca's to

Nero, would it not be better for you to say nothing than by mixing things

of such different natures to make an impertinent tragi-comedy? for you

spoil and corrupt the play that is in hand when you mix with it things of

an opposite nature, even though they are much better. Therefore go

through with the play that is acting the best you can, and do not

confound it because another that is pleasanter comes into your thoughts.

It is even so in a commonwealth and in the councils of princes; if ill

opinions cannot be quite rooted out, and you cannot cure some received

vice according to your wishes, you must not, therefore, abandon the

commonwealth, for the same reasons as you should not forsake the ship in

a storm because you cannot command the winds. You are not obliged to

assault people with discourses that are out of their road, when you see

that their received notions must prevent your making an impression upon

them: you ought rather to cast about and to manage things with all the

dexterity in your power, so that, if you are not able to make them go

well, they may be as little ill as possible; for, except all men were

good, everything cannot be right, and that is a blessing that I do not at

present hope to see." "According to your argument," answered he, "all

that I could be able to do would be to preserve myself from being mad

while I endeavoured to cure the madness of others; for, if I speak with,

I must repeat what I have said to you; and as for lying, whether a

philosopher can do it or not I cannot tell: I am sure I cannot do it. But

though these discourses may be uneasy and ungrateful to them, I do not

see why they should seem foolish or extravagant; indeed, if I should

either propose such things as Plato has contrived in his 'Commonwealth,'

or as the Utopians practise in theirs, though they might seem better, as

certainly they are, yet they are so different from our establishment,

which is founded on property (there being no such thing among them), that

I could not expect that it would have any effect on them. But such

discourses as mine, which only call past evils to mind and give warning

of what may follow, leave nothing in them that is so absurd that they may

not be used at any time, for they can only be unpleasant to those who are

resolved to run headlong the contrary way; and if we must let alone

everything as absurd or extravagant--which, by reason of the wicked lives

of many, may seem uncouth--we must, even among Christians, give over

pressing the greatest part of those things that Christ hath taught us,

though He has commanded us not to conceal them, but to proclaim on the

housetops that which He taught in secret. The greatest parts of His

precepts are more opposite to the lives of the men of this age than any

part of my discourse has been, but the preachers seem to have learned

that craft to which you advise me: for they, observing that the world

would not willingly suit their lives to the rules that Christ has given,

have fitted His doctrine, as if it had been a leaden rule, to their

lives, that so, some way or other, they might agree with one another. But

I see no other effect of this compliance except it be that men become

more secure in their wickedness by it; and this is all the success that I

can have in a court, for I must always differ from the rest, and then I

shall signify nothing; or, if I agree with them, I shall then only help

forward their madness. I do not comprehend what you mean by your

'casting about,' or by 'the bending and handling things so dexterously

that, if they go not well, they may go as little ill as may be;' for in

courts they will not bear with a man's holding his peace or conniving at

what others do: a man must barefacedly approve of the worst counsels and

consent to the blackest designs, so that he would pass for a spy, or,

possibly, for a traitor, that did but coldly approve of such wicked

practices; and therefore when a man is engaged in such a society, he will

be so far from being able to mend matters by his 'casting about,' as you

call it, that he will find no occasions of doing any good--the ill

company will sooner corrupt him than be the better for him; or if,

notwithstanding all their ill company, he still remains steady and

innocent, yet their follies and knavery will be imputed to him; and, by

mixing counsels with them, he must bear his share of all the blame that

belongs wholly to others.

"It was no ill simile by which Plato set forth the unreasonableness of a

philosopher's meddling with government. 'If a man,' says he, 'were to

see a great company run out every day into the rain and take delight in

being wet--if he knew that it would be to no purpose for him to go and

persuade them to return to their houses in order to avoid the storm, and

that all that could be expected by his going to speak to them would be

that he himself should be as wet as they, it would be best for him to

keep within doors, and, since he had not influence enough to correct

other people's folly, to take care to preserve himself.'

"Though, to speak plainly my real sentiments, I must freely own that as

long as there is any property, and while money is the standard of all