option
list | question
stringlengths 11
354
| article
stringlengths 231
6.74k
| id
stringlengths 5
8
| label
int64 0
3
|
|---|---|---|---|---|
[
"Seneca's thinking is still applicable today.",
"Better learners will become better teachers.",
"Human intelligence tends to grow with age.",
"Philosophical thinking improves instruction."
] | What are researchers rediscovering through their studies? | For thousands of years, people have known that the best way to understand a concept is to explain it to someone else. "While we teach, we learn," said Roman philosopher Seneca. Now scientists are bringing this ancient wisdom up-to-date. They're documenting why teaching is such a fruitful way to learn, and designing innovative ways for young people to engage in instruction.
Researchers have found that students who sign up to tutor others work harder to understand the material, recall it more accurately and apply it more effectively. Student teachers score higher on tests than pupils who're learning only for their own sake. But how can children, still learning themselves, teach others? One answer: They can tutor younger kids. Some studies have found that first-born children are more intelligent than their later-born siblings . This suggests their higher IQs result from the time they spend teaching their siblings. Now educators are experimenting with ways to apply this model to academic subjects. They engage college undergraduates to teach computer science to high school students, who in turn instruct middle school students on the topic.
But the most cutting-edge tool under development is the "teachable agent"-a computerized character who learns, tries, makes mistakes and asks questions just like a real-world pupil. Computer scientists have created an animated figure called Betty's Brain, who has been "taught" about environmental science by hundreds of middle school students. Student teachers are motivated to help Betty master certain materials. While preparing to teach, they organize their knowledge and improve their own understanding. And as they explain the information to it, they identify problems in their own thinking.
Feedback from the teachable agents further enhances the tutors' learning. The agents' questions compel student tutors to think and explain the materials in different ways, and watching the agent solve problems allows them to see their knowledge put into action.
Above all, it's the emotions one experiences in teaching that facilitate learning. Student tutors feel upset when their teachable agents fail, but happy when these virtual pupils succeed as they derive pride and satisfaction from someone else's accomplishment. | 333.txt | 0 |
[
"It is a character in a popular animation.",
"It is a teaching tool under development.",
"It is a cutting-edge app in digital games.",
"It is a tutor for computer science students."
] | What do we learn about Betty's Brain? | For thousands of years, people have known that the best way to understand a concept is to explain it to someone else. "While we teach, we learn," said Roman philosopher Seneca. Now scientists are bringing this ancient wisdom up-to-date. They're documenting why teaching is such a fruitful way to learn, and designing innovative ways for young people to engage in instruction.
Researchers have found that students who sign up to tutor others work harder to understand the material, recall it more accurately and apply it more effectively. Student teachers score higher on tests than pupils who're learning only for their own sake. But how can children, still learning themselves, teach others? One answer: They can tutor younger kids. Some studies have found that first-born children are more intelligent than their later-born siblings . This suggests their higher IQs result from the time they spend teaching their siblings. Now educators are experimenting with ways to apply this model to academic subjects. They engage college undergraduates to teach computer science to high school students, who in turn instruct middle school students on the topic.
But the most cutting-edge tool under development is the "teachable agent"-a computerized character who learns, tries, makes mistakes and asks questions just like a real-world pupil. Computer scientists have created an animated figure called Betty's Brain, who has been "taught" about environmental science by hundreds of middle school students. Student teachers are motivated to help Betty master certain materials. While preparing to teach, they organize their knowledge and improve their own understanding. And as they explain the information to it, they identify problems in their own thinking.
Feedback from the teachable agents further enhances the tutors' learning. The agents' questions compel student tutors to think and explain the materials in different ways, and watching the agent solve problems allows them to see their knowledge put into action.
Above all, it's the emotions one experiences in teaching that facilitate learning. Student tutors feel upset when their teachable agents fail, but happy when these virtual pupils succeed as they derive pride and satisfaction from someone else's accomplishment. | 333.txt | 1 |
[
"It makes them aware of what they are strong at.",
"It motivates them to try novel ways of teaching.",
"It helps them learn their academic subjects better.",
"It enables them to better understand their teachers."
] | How does teaching others benefit student tutors? | For thousands of years, people have known that the best way to understand a concept is to explain it to someone else. "While we teach, we learn," said Roman philosopher Seneca. Now scientists are bringing this ancient wisdom up-to-date. They're documenting why teaching is such a fruitful way to learn, and designing innovative ways for young people to engage in instruction.
Researchers have found that students who sign up to tutor others work harder to understand the material, recall it more accurately and apply it more effectively. Student teachers score higher on tests than pupils who're learning only for their own sake. But how can children, still learning themselves, teach others? One answer: They can tutor younger kids. Some studies have found that first-born children are more intelligent than their later-born siblings . This suggests their higher IQs result from the time they spend teaching their siblings. Now educators are experimenting with ways to apply this model to academic subjects. They engage college undergraduates to teach computer science to high school students, who in turn instruct middle school students on the topic.
But the most cutting-edge tool under development is the "teachable agent"-a computerized character who learns, tries, makes mistakes and asks questions just like a real-world pupil. Computer scientists have created an animated figure called Betty's Brain, who has been "taught" about environmental science by hundreds of middle school students. Student teachers are motivated to help Betty master certain materials. While preparing to teach, they organize their knowledge and improve their own understanding. And as they explain the information to it, they identify problems in their own thinking.
Feedback from the teachable agents further enhances the tutors' learning. The agents' questions compel student tutors to think and explain the materials in different ways, and watching the agent solve problems allows them to see their knowledge put into action.
Above all, it's the emotions one experiences in teaching that facilitate learning. Student tutors feel upset when their teachable agents fail, but happy when these virtual pupils succeed as they derive pride and satisfaction from someone else's accomplishment. | 333.txt | 2 |
[
"They motivate them to think independently.",
"They ask them to design their own questions.",
"They encourage them to give prompt feedback.",
"They use various ways to explain the materials."
] | What do students do to teach their teachable agents? | For thousands of years, people have known that the best way to understand a concept is to explain it to someone else. "While we teach, we learn," said Roman philosopher Seneca. Now scientists are bringing this ancient wisdom up-to-date. They're documenting why teaching is such a fruitful way to learn, and designing innovative ways for young people to engage in instruction.
Researchers have found that students who sign up to tutor others work harder to understand the material, recall it more accurately and apply it more effectively. Student teachers score higher on tests than pupils who're learning only for their own sake. But how can children, still learning themselves, teach others? One answer: They can tutor younger kids. Some studies have found that first-born children are more intelligent than their later-born siblings . This suggests their higher IQs result from the time they spend teaching their siblings. Now educators are experimenting with ways to apply this model to academic subjects. They engage college undergraduates to teach computer science to high school students, who in turn instruct middle school students on the topic.
But the most cutting-edge tool under development is the "teachable agent"-a computerized character who learns, tries, makes mistakes and asks questions just like a real-world pupil. Computer scientists have created an animated figure called Betty's Brain, who has been "taught" about environmental science by hundreds of middle school students. Student teachers are motivated to help Betty master certain materials. While preparing to teach, they organize their knowledge and improve their own understanding. And as they explain the information to it, they identify problems in their own thinking.
Feedback from the teachable agents further enhances the tutors' learning. The agents' questions compel student tutors to think and explain the materials in different ways, and watching the agent solve problems allows them to see their knowledge put into action.
Above all, it's the emotions one experiences in teaching that facilitate learning. Student tutors feel upset when their teachable agents fail, but happy when these virtual pupils succeed as they derive pride and satisfaction from someone else's accomplishment. | 333.txt | 3 |
[
"Their sense of responsibility.",
"Their emotional involvement.",
"The learning strategy acquired.",
"The teaching experience gained."
] | What is the key factor that eases student tutors' learning? | For thousands of years, people have known that the best way to understand a concept is to explain it to someone else. "While we teach, we learn," said Roman philosopher Seneca. Now scientists are bringing this ancient wisdom up-to-date. They're documenting why teaching is such a fruitful way to learn, and designing innovative ways for young people to engage in instruction.
Researchers have found that students who sign up to tutor others work harder to understand the material, recall it more accurately and apply it more effectively. Student teachers score higher on tests than pupils who're learning only for their own sake. But how can children, still learning themselves, teach others? One answer: They can tutor younger kids. Some studies have found that first-born children are more intelligent than their later-born siblings . This suggests their higher IQs result from the time they spend teaching their siblings. Now educators are experimenting with ways to apply this model to academic subjects. They engage college undergraduates to teach computer science to high school students, who in turn instruct middle school students on the topic.
But the most cutting-edge tool under development is the "teachable agent"-a computerized character who learns, tries, makes mistakes and asks questions just like a real-world pupil. Computer scientists have created an animated figure called Betty's Brain, who has been "taught" about environmental science by hundreds of middle school students. Student teachers are motivated to help Betty master certain materials. While preparing to teach, they organize their knowledge and improve their own understanding. And as they explain the information to it, they identify problems in their own thinking.
Feedback from the teachable agents further enhances the tutors' learning. The agents' questions compel student tutors to think and explain the materials in different ways, and watching the agent solve problems allows them to see their knowledge put into action.
Above all, it's the emotions one experiences in teaching that facilitate learning. Student tutors feel upset when their teachable agents fail, but happy when these virtual pupils succeed as they derive pride and satisfaction from someone else's accomplishment. | 333.txt | 1 |
[
"It was the most widely concerned office hazard.",
"It can affect people both inside and outside the building.",
"It happens only in air-conditioned office buildings.",
"It does not develop in well-designed buildings."
] | What do we know about Legionnaire's disease from the passage? | Although many of us may feel air-conditioners bring relief from hot, humid or polluted outside air, they pose many potential health hazards. Much research has looked at how the movement of air inside a closed environment---such as an office building---can spread disease or expose people in the building to harmful chemicals.
One of the more widely publicized dangers is that of Legionnaire's disease, which was first recognized inthe 1970s. This was found to have affected people in buildings with air-conditioning systems in which warmair pumped out of the system' cooling towers was somehow sucked back into the air intake ,in mostcases due to poor design. The warm air, filled with bacteria,was combined with cooled, conditioned air andwas then circulated around various parts of the building. Studies showed that even people outside such buildings were at risk if they walked past air exhaust pipes.
Large air-conditioning systems add water to the air they circulate by means of humidifiers .Inolder systems, the water used for this process is kept in special reservoirs, the bottoms of which providebreeding grounds for bacteria which can find their way into the ventilation system. The risk to human health from this situation has been highlighted by the fact that the immune systems of approximately half of workers in air-conditioned office buildings have developed the ability to fight off the organisms found at the bottom of system reservoirs. But chemicals called "biocides"are added to reservoirs to make them germ-free, and they are dangerous in their own right in sufficient quantities, as they often contain compounds strongly linked to cancers.
Finally, it should be pointed out that the artificial climatic environment created by air-conditioners canalso affect us. In a natural environment, whether indoor or outdoor, there are small variations in temperature and humidity. Indeed, the human body has long been accustomed to these normal changes. In an air-conditioned living or working environment, however, body temperatures remain well under37℃, our normal temperature. This leads to a weakened immune system and thus greater exposure to diseases such as colds and flu. | 1495.txt | 1 |
[
"in the reservoirs",
"in the ventilation system",
"in the humidifiers",
"in the air intake"
] | In the old air-conditioned systems, bacteria first develop _ . | Although many of us may feel air-conditioners bring relief from hot, humid or polluted outside air, they pose many potential health hazards. Much research has looked at how the movement of air inside a closed environment---such as an office building---can spread disease or expose people in the building to harmful chemicals.
One of the more widely publicized dangers is that of Legionnaire's disease, which was first recognized inthe 1970s. This was found to have affected people in buildings with air-conditioning systems in which warmair pumped out of the system' cooling towers was somehow sucked back into the air intake ,in mostcases due to poor design. The warm air, filled with bacteria,was combined with cooled, conditioned air andwas then circulated around various parts of the building. Studies showed that even people outside such buildings were at risk if they walked past air exhaust pipes.
Large air-conditioning systems add water to the air they circulate by means of humidifiers .Inolder systems, the water used for this process is kept in special reservoirs, the bottoms of which providebreeding grounds for bacteria which can find their way into the ventilation system. The risk to human health from this situation has been highlighted by the fact that the immune systems of approximately half of workers in air-conditioned office buildings have developed the ability to fight off the organisms found at the bottom of system reservoirs. But chemicals called "biocides"are added to reservoirs to make them germ-free, and they are dangerous in their own right in sufficient quantities, as they often contain compounds strongly linked to cancers.
Finally, it should be pointed out that the artificial climatic environment created by air-conditioners canalso affect us. In a natural environment, whether indoor or outdoor, there are small variations in temperature and humidity. Indeed, the human body has long been accustomed to these normal changes. In an air-conditioned living or working environment, however, body temperatures remain well under37℃, our normal temperature. This leads to a weakened immune system and thus greater exposure to diseases such as colds and flu. | 1495.txt | 0 |
[
"relieve people's worry about the danger caused by the bacteria",
"help people find an effective way to get rid of the bacteria",
"reflect the serious danger brought by the bacteria",
"cause serious disease such as cancers to people"
] | The fact that about half of workers developed the ability to fight off the bacteria may__. | Although many of us may feel air-conditioners bring relief from hot, humid or polluted outside air, they pose many potential health hazards. Much research has looked at how the movement of air inside a closed environment---such as an office building---can spread disease or expose people in the building to harmful chemicals.
One of the more widely publicized dangers is that of Legionnaire's disease, which was first recognized inthe 1970s. This was found to have affected people in buildings with air-conditioning systems in which warmair pumped out of the system' cooling towers was somehow sucked back into the air intake ,in mostcases due to poor design. The warm air, filled with bacteria,was combined with cooled, conditioned air andwas then circulated around various parts of the building. Studies showed that even people outside such buildings were at risk if they walked past air exhaust pipes.
Large air-conditioning systems add water to the air they circulate by means of humidifiers .Inolder systems, the water used for this process is kept in special reservoirs, the bottoms of which providebreeding grounds for bacteria which can find their way into the ventilation system. The risk to human health from this situation has been highlighted by the fact that the immune systems of approximately half of workers in air-conditioned office buildings have developed the ability to fight off the organisms found at the bottom of system reservoirs. But chemicals called "biocides"are added to reservoirs to make them germ-free, and they are dangerous in their own right in sufficient quantities, as they often contain compounds strongly linked to cancers.
Finally, it should be pointed out that the artificial climatic environment created by air-conditioners canalso affect us. In a natural environment, whether indoor or outdoor, there are small variations in temperature and humidity. Indeed, the human body has long been accustomed to these normal changes. In an air-conditioned living or working environment, however, body temperatures remain well under37℃, our normal temperature. This leads to a weakened immune system and thus greater exposure to diseases such as colds and flu. | 1495.txt | 2 |
[
"caution",
"trust",
"enthusiasm",
"criticism"
] | The author most probably wants the readers to treat biocides with an attitude of_. | Although many of us may feel air-conditioners bring relief from hot, humid or polluted outside air, they pose many potential health hazards. Much research has looked at how the movement of air inside a closed environment---such as an office building---can spread disease or expose people in the building to harmful chemicals.
One of the more widely publicized dangers is that of Legionnaire's disease, which was first recognized inthe 1970s. This was found to have affected people in buildings with air-conditioning systems in which warmair pumped out of the system' cooling towers was somehow sucked back into the air intake ,in mostcases due to poor design. The warm air, filled with bacteria,was combined with cooled, conditioned air andwas then circulated around various parts of the building. Studies showed that even people outside such buildings were at risk if they walked past air exhaust pipes.
Large air-conditioning systems add water to the air they circulate by means of humidifiers .Inolder systems, the water used for this process is kept in special reservoirs, the bottoms of which providebreeding grounds for bacteria which can find their way into the ventilation system. The risk to human health from this situation has been highlighted by the fact that the immune systems of approximately half of workers in air-conditioned office buildings have developed the ability to fight off the organisms found at the bottom of system reservoirs. But chemicals called "biocides"are added to reservoirs to make them germ-free, and they are dangerous in their own right in sufficient quantities, as they often contain compounds strongly linked to cancers.
Finally, it should be pointed out that the artificial climatic environment created by air-conditioners canalso affect us. In a natural environment, whether indoor or outdoor, there are small variations in temperature and humidity. Indeed, the human body has long been accustomed to these normal changes. In an air-conditioned living or working environment, however, body temperatures remain well under37℃, our normal temperature. This leads to a weakened immune system and thus greater exposure to diseases such as colds and flu. | 1495.txt | 0 |
[
"we live in an artificial climatic environment",
"there are variations in temperature and humidity",
"our body temperatures often remain not high enough",
"we are often exposed to diseases such as colds and flu"
] | The last paragraph implies that our immune system can be weakened when _• | Although many of us may feel air-conditioners bring relief from hot, humid or polluted outside air, they pose many potential health hazards. Much research has looked at how the movement of air inside a closed environment---such as an office building---can spread disease or expose people in the building to harmful chemicals.
One of the more widely publicized dangers is that of Legionnaire's disease, which was first recognized inthe 1970s. This was found to have affected people in buildings with air-conditioning systems in which warmair pumped out of the system' cooling towers was somehow sucked back into the air intake ,in mostcases due to poor design. The warm air, filled with bacteria,was combined with cooled, conditioned air andwas then circulated around various parts of the building. Studies showed that even people outside such buildings were at risk if they walked past air exhaust pipes.
Large air-conditioning systems add water to the air they circulate by means of humidifiers .Inolder systems, the water used for this process is kept in special reservoirs, the bottoms of which providebreeding grounds for bacteria which can find their way into the ventilation system. The risk to human health from this situation has been highlighted by the fact that the immune systems of approximately half of workers in air-conditioned office buildings have developed the ability to fight off the organisms found at the bottom of system reservoirs. But chemicals called "biocides"are added to reservoirs to make them germ-free, and they are dangerous in their own right in sufficient quantities, as they often contain compounds strongly linked to cancers.
Finally, it should be pointed out that the artificial climatic environment created by air-conditioners canalso affect us. In a natural environment, whether indoor or outdoor, there are small variations in temperature and humidity. Indeed, the human body has long been accustomed to these normal changes. In an air-conditioned living or working environment, however, body temperatures remain well under37℃, our normal temperature. This leads to a weakened immune system and thus greater exposure to diseases such as colds and flu. | 1495.txt | 2 |
[
"the s stories often end with surprising endings.",
"there are a lot of coincidences in his stories.",
"the stories are mainly about common people.",
"his own experiences are main subjects in his stories."
] | The following statements are the characteristics of O. Henry's stories except _ | O. Henry was an American short-story writer, a master of surprising endings, who wrote about the life of ordinary people in New York City. A twist of plot, which turns on an ironic or coincidental circumstance, is typical of O. Henry's stories.
William Sydney Porter (O. Henry) was born in North Carolina. His father was a physician. When William was three, his mother died, and he was raised by his grandmother and aunt. At the age of fifteen he left school, and then worked in a drug store. He moved to Houston, where he had a number of jobs, including that of bank clerk. After moving to Austin, Texas, in 1882, he married.
In 1884 he started a humorous weekly The Rolling Stone. When the weekly failed, he joined the Houston Post as a reporter and columnist. In 1897 hw was convicted of embezzling money, although there has been much debate over his actual guilt.
While in prison O. Henry started to write short stories to earn money to support his daughter Margaret. His first work, Whistling Dick's Christmas Stocking (1899), appeared in McClure's Magazine. After doing three years of the five years sentence, Porter emerged from the prison in 1901 and changed his name to O. Henry.
O. Henry moved to New York city in 1902 and from December 1903 to January 1906 he wrote a story a week for the New York World, also publishing in other magazines. Henry's first collection, Cabbages And Kings appeared in 1904. The second, The Four Million, was published two years later and included his well-know stories The Gift of the Magi and The Furnished Room. O. Henry published 10 collections and over 600 short stoires during his lifetime.
O. Henry's last years were shadowed by ill health and financial problems. He married Sara Lindsay Coleman in 1907, but the marriage was not happy, and they separated one year later. O. Henry died on June 5, 1910, in New York. | 983.txt | 3 |
[
"O. Henry's mother's death resulted in his leaving school.",
"O. Henry earned much money by starting the Weekly.",
"some people believed O. Henry was put in prison for no good reason.",
"his daughter asked O. Henry to write short stories."
] | We can infer from the text that _ . | O. Henry was an American short-story writer, a master of surprising endings, who wrote about the life of ordinary people in New York City. A twist of plot, which turns on an ironic or coincidental circumstance, is typical of O. Henry's stories.
William Sydney Porter (O. Henry) was born in North Carolina. His father was a physician. When William was three, his mother died, and he was raised by his grandmother and aunt. At the age of fifteen he left school, and then worked in a drug store. He moved to Houston, where he had a number of jobs, including that of bank clerk. After moving to Austin, Texas, in 1882, he married.
In 1884 he started a humorous weekly The Rolling Stone. When the weekly failed, he joined the Houston Post as a reporter and columnist. In 1897 hw was convicted of embezzling money, although there has been much debate over his actual guilt.
While in prison O. Henry started to write short stories to earn money to support his daughter Margaret. His first work, Whistling Dick's Christmas Stocking (1899), appeared in McClure's Magazine. After doing three years of the five years sentence, Porter emerged from the prison in 1901 and changed his name to O. Henry.
O. Henry moved to New York city in 1902 and from December 1903 to January 1906 he wrote a story a week for the New York World, also publishing in other magazines. Henry's first collection, Cabbages And Kings appeared in 1904. The second, The Four Million, was published two years later and included his well-know stories The Gift of the Magi and The Furnished Room. O. Henry published 10 collections and over 600 short stoires during his lifetime.
O. Henry's last years were shadowed by ill health and financial problems. He married Sara Lindsay Coleman in 1907, but the marriage was not happy, and they separated one year later. O. Henry died on June 5, 1910, in New York. | 983.txt | 2 |
[
"1902",
"1904",
"1906",
"1907"
] | One of O. Henry's most famous story The Gift of the Magi came out in _ . | O. Henry was an American short-story writer, a master of surprising endings, who wrote about the life of ordinary people in New York City. A twist of plot, which turns on an ironic or coincidental circumstance, is typical of O. Henry's stories.
William Sydney Porter (O. Henry) was born in North Carolina. His father was a physician. When William was three, his mother died, and he was raised by his grandmother and aunt. At the age of fifteen he left school, and then worked in a drug store. He moved to Houston, where he had a number of jobs, including that of bank clerk. After moving to Austin, Texas, in 1882, he married.
In 1884 he started a humorous weekly The Rolling Stone. When the weekly failed, he joined the Houston Post as a reporter and columnist. In 1897 hw was convicted of embezzling money, although there has been much debate over his actual guilt.
While in prison O. Henry started to write short stories to earn money to support his daughter Margaret. His first work, Whistling Dick's Christmas Stocking (1899), appeared in McClure's Magazine. After doing three years of the five years sentence, Porter emerged from the prison in 1901 and changed his name to O. Henry.
O. Henry moved to New York city in 1902 and from December 1903 to January 1906 he wrote a story a week for the New York World, also publishing in other magazines. Henry's first collection, Cabbages And Kings appeared in 1904. The second, The Four Million, was published two years later and included his well-know stories The Gift of the Magi and The Furnished Room. O. Henry published 10 collections and over 600 short stoires during his lifetime.
O. Henry's last years were shadowed by ill health and financial problems. He married Sara Lindsay Coleman in 1907, but the marriage was not happy, and they separated one year later. O. Henry died on June 5, 1910, in New York. | 983.txt | 2 |
[
"Rough.",
"Smooth.",
"Rich.",
"Happy."
] | What do you think of O. Henry's life? | O. Henry was an American short-story writer, a master of surprising endings, who wrote about the life of ordinary people in New York City. A twist of plot, which turns on an ironic or coincidental circumstance, is typical of O. Henry's stories.
William Sydney Porter (O. Henry) was born in North Carolina. His father was a physician. When William was three, his mother died, and he was raised by his grandmother and aunt. At the age of fifteen he left school, and then worked in a drug store. He moved to Houston, where he had a number of jobs, including that of bank clerk. After moving to Austin, Texas, in 1882, he married.
In 1884 he started a humorous weekly The Rolling Stone. When the weekly failed, he joined the Houston Post as a reporter and columnist. In 1897 hw was convicted of embezzling money, although there has been much debate over his actual guilt.
While in prison O. Henry started to write short stories to earn money to support his daughter Margaret. His first work, Whistling Dick's Christmas Stocking (1899), appeared in McClure's Magazine. After doing three years of the five years sentence, Porter emerged from the prison in 1901 and changed his name to O. Henry.
O. Henry moved to New York city in 1902 and from December 1903 to January 1906 he wrote a story a week for the New York World, also publishing in other magazines. Henry's first collection, Cabbages And Kings appeared in 1904. The second, The Four Million, was published two years later and included his well-know stories The Gift of the Magi and The Furnished Room. O. Henry published 10 collections and over 600 short stoires during his lifetime.
O. Henry's last years were shadowed by ill health and financial problems. He married Sara Lindsay Coleman in 1907, but the marriage was not happy, and they separated one year later. O. Henry died on June 5, 1910, in New York. | 983.txt | 0 |
[
"accepted",
"obvious",
"debatable",
"suggested"
] | The word "proposed" in the passage is closest in meaning to | Thousands of years ago, in North America's past, all of its megafauna-large mammals such as mammoths and giant bears-disappeared. One proposed explanation for this event is that when the first Americans migrated over from Asia, they hunted the megafauna to extinction. These people, known as the Clovis society after a site where their distinctive spear points were first found, would have been able to use this food source to expand their population and fill the continent rapidly. Yet many scientists argue against this "Pleistocene overkill" hypothesis. Modern humans have certainly been capable of such drastic effects on animals, but could ancient people with little more than stone spears similarly have caused the extinction of numerous species of animals? Thirty-five genera or groups of species (and many individual species) suffered extinction in North America around 11,000 B.C., soon after the appearance and expansion of Paleo-lndians throughout the Americas (27 genera disappeared completely, and another 8 became locally extinct, surviving only outside North AmericA.
Although the climate changed at the end of the Pleistocene, warming trends had happened before. A period of massive extinction of large mammals like that seen about 11,000 years ago had not occurred during the previous 400,000 years, despite these changes. The only apparently significant difference in the Americas 11,000 years ago was the presence of human hunters of these large mammals. Was this coincidence or cause-and-effect?
We do not know. Ecologist Paul S. Martin has championed the model that associates the extinction of large mammals at the end of the Pleistocene with human predation. With researcher J. E. Mosimann, he has co-authored a work in which a computer model showed that in around 300 years, given the right conditions, a small influx of hunters into eastern Beringia 12,000 years ago could have spread across North America in a wave and wiped out game animals to feed their burgeoning population.
The researchers ran the model several ways, always beginning with a population of 100 humans in Edmonton, in Alberta, Canada, at 11,500 years ago. Assuming different initial North American big-game-animal populations (75-150 million animals) and different population growth rates for the human settlers (0.65%-3.5%), and varying kill rates, Mosimann and Martin derived figures of between 279 and 1,157 years from initial contact to big-game extinction.
Many scholars continue to support this scenario. For example, geologist Larry Agenbroad has mapped the locations of dated Clovis sites alongside the distribution of dated sites where the remains of wooly mammoths have been found in both archaeological and purely paleontological contexts. These distributions show remarkable synchronicity (occurrence at the same time).
There are, however, many problems with this model. Significantly, though a few sites are quite impressive, there really is very little archaeological evidence to support it. Writing in 1982, Martin himself admitted the paucity of evidence; for example, at that point, the remains of only 38 individual mammoths had been found at Clovis sites. In the years since, few additional mammoths have been added to the list; there are still fewer than 20 Clovis sites where the remains of one or more mammoths have been recovered, a minuscule proportion of the millions that necessarily would have had to have been slaughtered within the overkill scenario.
Though Martin claims the lack of evidence actually supports his model-the evidence is sparse because the spread of humans and the extinction of animals occurred so quickly-this argument seems weak. And how could we ever disprove it? As archaeologist Donald Grayson points out, in other cases where extinction resulted from the quick spread of human hunters-for example, the extinction of the moa, the large flightless bird of New Zealand-archaeological evidence in the form of remains is abundant. Grayson has also shown that the evidence is not so clear that all or even most of the large herbivores in late Pleistocene America became extinct after the appearance of Clovis. Of the 35 extinct genera, only 8 can be confidently assigned an extinction date of between 12,000 and 10,000 years ago. Many of the older genera, Grayson argues, may have succumbed before 12,000 B.C., at least half a century before the Clovis showed up in the American West. | 2826.txt | 3 |
[
"hidden",
"characteristic",
"scattered",
"rare"
] | The word "distinctive" in the passage is closest in meaning to | Thousands of years ago, in North America's past, all of its megafauna-large mammals such as mammoths and giant bears-disappeared. One proposed explanation for this event is that when the first Americans migrated over from Asia, they hunted the megafauna to extinction. These people, known as the Clovis society after a site where their distinctive spear points were first found, would have been able to use this food source to expand their population and fill the continent rapidly. Yet many scientists argue against this "Pleistocene overkill" hypothesis. Modern humans have certainly been capable of such drastic effects on animals, but could ancient people with little more than stone spears similarly have caused the extinction of numerous species of animals? Thirty-five genera or groups of species (and many individual species) suffered extinction in North America around 11,000 B.C., soon after the appearance and expansion of Paleo-lndians throughout the Americas (27 genera disappeared completely, and another 8 became locally extinct, surviving only outside North AmericA.
Although the climate changed at the end of the Pleistocene, warming trends had happened before. A period of massive extinction of large mammals like that seen about 11,000 years ago had not occurred during the previous 400,000 years, despite these changes. The only apparently significant difference in the Americas 11,000 years ago was the presence of human hunters of these large mammals. Was this coincidence or cause-and-effect?
We do not know. Ecologist Paul S. Martin has championed the model that associates the extinction of large mammals at the end of the Pleistocene with human predation. With researcher J. E. Mosimann, he has co-authored a work in which a computer model showed that in around 300 years, given the right conditions, a small influx of hunters into eastern Beringia 12,000 years ago could have spread across North America in a wave and wiped out game animals to feed their burgeoning population.
The researchers ran the model several ways, always beginning with a population of 100 humans in Edmonton, in Alberta, Canada, at 11,500 years ago. Assuming different initial North American big-game-animal populations (75-150 million animals) and different population growth rates for the human settlers (0.65%-3.5%), and varying kill rates, Mosimann and Martin derived figures of between 279 and 1,157 years from initial contact to big-game extinction.
Many scholars continue to support this scenario. For example, geologist Larry Agenbroad has mapped the locations of dated Clovis sites alongside the distribution of dated sites where the remains of wooly mammoths have been found in both archaeological and purely paleontological contexts. These distributions show remarkable synchronicity (occurrence at the same time).
There are, however, many problems with this model. Significantly, though a few sites are quite impressive, there really is very little archaeological evidence to support it. Writing in 1982, Martin himself admitted the paucity of evidence; for example, at that point, the remains of only 38 individual mammoths had been found at Clovis sites. In the years since, few additional mammoths have been added to the list; there are still fewer than 20 Clovis sites where the remains of one or more mammoths have been recovered, a minuscule proportion of the millions that necessarily would have had to have been slaughtered within the overkill scenario.
Though Martin claims the lack of evidence actually supports his model-the evidence is sparse because the spread of humans and the extinction of animals occurred so quickly-this argument seems weak. And how could we ever disprove it? As archaeologist Donald Grayson points out, in other cases where extinction resulted from the quick spread of human hunters-for example, the extinction of the moa, the large flightless bird of New Zealand-archaeological evidence in the form of remains is abundant. Grayson has also shown that the evidence is not so clear that all or even most of the large herbivores in late Pleistocene America became extinct after the appearance of Clovis. Of the 35 extinct genera, only 8 can be confidently assigned an extinction date of between 12,000 and 10,000 years ago. Many of the older genera, Grayson argues, may have succumbed before 12,000 B.C., at least half a century before the Clovis showed up in the American West. | 2826.txt | 1 |
[
"To argue that modern people have continued to have drastic effects on animal species",
"To illustrate how people from different historical times treated animals differently",
"To question the idea that ancient people could have hunted the megafauna to extinction",
"To emphasize that modern people are more successful hunters than ancient people were"
] | Why does the author compare "Modern humans" with "ancient people"? | Thousands of years ago, in North America's past, all of its megafauna-large mammals such as mammoths and giant bears-disappeared. One proposed explanation for this event is that when the first Americans migrated over from Asia, they hunted the megafauna to extinction. These people, known as the Clovis society after a site where their distinctive spear points were first found, would have been able to use this food source to expand their population and fill the continent rapidly. Yet many scientists argue against this "Pleistocene overkill" hypothesis. Modern humans have certainly been capable of such drastic effects on animals, but could ancient people with little more than stone spears similarly have caused the extinction of numerous species of animals? Thirty-five genera or groups of species (and many individual species) suffered extinction in North America around 11,000 B.C., soon after the appearance and expansion of Paleo-lndians throughout the Americas (27 genera disappeared completely, and another 8 became locally extinct, surviving only outside North AmericA.
Although the climate changed at the end of the Pleistocene, warming trends had happened before. A period of massive extinction of large mammals like that seen about 11,000 years ago had not occurred during the previous 400,000 years, despite these changes. The only apparently significant difference in the Americas 11,000 years ago was the presence of human hunters of these large mammals. Was this coincidence or cause-and-effect?
We do not know. Ecologist Paul S. Martin has championed the model that associates the extinction of large mammals at the end of the Pleistocene with human predation. With researcher J. E. Mosimann, he has co-authored a work in which a computer model showed that in around 300 years, given the right conditions, a small influx of hunters into eastern Beringia 12,000 years ago could have spread across North America in a wave and wiped out game animals to feed their burgeoning population.
The researchers ran the model several ways, always beginning with a population of 100 humans in Edmonton, in Alberta, Canada, at 11,500 years ago. Assuming different initial North American big-game-animal populations (75-150 million animals) and different population growth rates for the human settlers (0.65%-3.5%), and varying kill rates, Mosimann and Martin derived figures of between 279 and 1,157 years from initial contact to big-game extinction.
Many scholars continue to support this scenario. For example, geologist Larry Agenbroad has mapped the locations of dated Clovis sites alongside the distribution of dated sites where the remains of wooly mammoths have been found in both archaeological and purely paleontological contexts. These distributions show remarkable synchronicity (occurrence at the same time).
There are, however, many problems with this model. Significantly, though a few sites are quite impressive, there really is very little archaeological evidence to support it. Writing in 1982, Martin himself admitted the paucity of evidence; for example, at that point, the remains of only 38 individual mammoths had been found at Clovis sites. In the years since, few additional mammoths have been added to the list; there are still fewer than 20 Clovis sites where the remains of one or more mammoths have been recovered, a minuscule proportion of the millions that necessarily would have had to have been slaughtered within the overkill scenario.
Though Martin claims the lack of evidence actually supports his model-the evidence is sparse because the spread of humans and the extinction of animals occurred so quickly-this argument seems weak. And how could we ever disprove it? As archaeologist Donald Grayson points out, in other cases where extinction resulted from the quick spread of human hunters-for example, the extinction of the moa, the large flightless bird of New Zealand-archaeological evidence in the form of remains is abundant. Grayson has also shown that the evidence is not so clear that all or even most of the large herbivores in late Pleistocene America became extinct after the appearance of Clovis. Of the 35 extinct genera, only 8 can be confidently assigned an extinction date of between 12,000 and 10,000 years ago. Many of the older genera, Grayson argues, may have succumbed before 12,000 B.C., at least half a century before the Clovis showed up in the American West. | 2826.txt | 2 |
[
"after a period of many years",
"subsequent to a prediction",
"from time to time",
"at the same time and by chance"
] | In using the word "coincidence" in the passage, the author refers to events that occurred | Thousands of years ago, in North America's past, all of its megafauna-large mammals such as mammoths and giant bears-disappeared. One proposed explanation for this event is that when the first Americans migrated over from Asia, they hunted the megafauna to extinction. These people, known as the Clovis society after a site where their distinctive spear points were first found, would have been able to use this food source to expand their population and fill the continent rapidly. Yet many scientists argue against this "Pleistocene overkill" hypothesis. Modern humans have certainly been capable of such drastic effects on animals, but could ancient people with little more than stone spears similarly have caused the extinction of numerous species of animals? Thirty-five genera or groups of species (and many individual species) suffered extinction in North America around 11,000 B.C., soon after the appearance and expansion of Paleo-lndians throughout the Americas (27 genera disappeared completely, and another 8 became locally extinct, surviving only outside North AmericA.
Although the climate changed at the end of the Pleistocene, warming trends had happened before. A period of massive extinction of large mammals like that seen about 11,000 years ago had not occurred during the previous 400,000 years, despite these changes. The only apparently significant difference in the Americas 11,000 years ago was the presence of human hunters of these large mammals. Was this coincidence or cause-and-effect?
We do not know. Ecologist Paul S. Martin has championed the model that associates the extinction of large mammals at the end of the Pleistocene with human predation. With researcher J. E. Mosimann, he has co-authored a work in which a computer model showed that in around 300 years, given the right conditions, a small influx of hunters into eastern Beringia 12,000 years ago could have spread across North America in a wave and wiped out game animals to feed their burgeoning population.
The researchers ran the model several ways, always beginning with a population of 100 humans in Edmonton, in Alberta, Canada, at 11,500 years ago. Assuming different initial North American big-game-animal populations (75-150 million animals) and different population growth rates for the human settlers (0.65%-3.5%), and varying kill rates, Mosimann and Martin derived figures of between 279 and 1,157 years from initial contact to big-game extinction.
Many scholars continue to support this scenario. For example, geologist Larry Agenbroad has mapped the locations of dated Clovis sites alongside the distribution of dated sites where the remains of wooly mammoths have been found in both archaeological and purely paleontological contexts. These distributions show remarkable synchronicity (occurrence at the same time).
There are, however, many problems with this model. Significantly, though a few sites are quite impressive, there really is very little archaeological evidence to support it. Writing in 1982, Martin himself admitted the paucity of evidence; for example, at that point, the remains of only 38 individual mammoths had been found at Clovis sites. In the years since, few additional mammoths have been added to the list; there are still fewer than 20 Clovis sites where the remains of one or more mammoths have been recovered, a minuscule proportion of the millions that necessarily would have had to have been slaughtered within the overkill scenario.
Though Martin claims the lack of evidence actually supports his model-the evidence is sparse because the spread of humans and the extinction of animals occurred so quickly-this argument seems weak. And how could we ever disprove it? As archaeologist Donald Grayson points out, in other cases where extinction resulted from the quick spread of human hunters-for example, the extinction of the moa, the large flightless bird of New Zealand-archaeological evidence in the form of remains is abundant. Grayson has also shown that the evidence is not so clear that all or even most of the large herbivores in late Pleistocene America became extinct after the appearance of Clovis. Of the 35 extinct genera, only 8 can be confidently assigned an extinction date of between 12,000 and 10,000 years ago. Many of the older genera, Grayson argues, may have succumbed before 12,000 B.C., at least half a century before the Clovis showed up in the American West. | 2826.txt | 3 |
[
"Climate changes would have favored human population expansion occurred at the time of the extinctions.",
"The presence of human hunters had caused animal extinctions in other time periods.",
"There was a pattern of climate change earlier than 11,000 years ago that had not caused animal extinctions.",
"Harmful climate changes 11,000 years ago would have required humans to hunt larger numbers of animals for food."
] | According to paragraph 2, what suggests that human activity played a role in the extinction of mammals about 11,000 years ago? | Thousands of years ago, in North America's past, all of its megafauna-large mammals such as mammoths and giant bears-disappeared. One proposed explanation for this event is that when the first Americans migrated over from Asia, they hunted the megafauna to extinction. These people, known as the Clovis society after a site where their distinctive spear points were first found, would have been able to use this food source to expand their population and fill the continent rapidly. Yet many scientists argue against this "Pleistocene overkill" hypothesis. Modern humans have certainly been capable of such drastic effects on animals, but could ancient people with little more than stone spears similarly have caused the extinction of numerous species of animals? Thirty-five genera or groups of species (and many individual species) suffered extinction in North America around 11,000 B.C., soon after the appearance and expansion of Paleo-lndians throughout the Americas (27 genera disappeared completely, and another 8 became locally extinct, surviving only outside North AmericA.
Although the climate changed at the end of the Pleistocene, warming trends had happened before. A period of massive extinction of large mammals like that seen about 11,000 years ago had not occurred during the previous 400,000 years, despite these changes. The only apparently significant difference in the Americas 11,000 years ago was the presence of human hunters of these large mammals. Was this coincidence or cause-and-effect?
We do not know. Ecologist Paul S. Martin has championed the model that associates the extinction of large mammals at the end of the Pleistocene with human predation. With researcher J. E. Mosimann, he has co-authored a work in which a computer model showed that in around 300 years, given the right conditions, a small influx of hunters into eastern Beringia 12,000 years ago could have spread across North America in a wave and wiped out game animals to feed their burgeoning population.
The researchers ran the model several ways, always beginning with a population of 100 humans in Edmonton, in Alberta, Canada, at 11,500 years ago. Assuming different initial North American big-game-animal populations (75-150 million animals) and different population growth rates for the human settlers (0.65%-3.5%), and varying kill rates, Mosimann and Martin derived figures of between 279 and 1,157 years from initial contact to big-game extinction.
Many scholars continue to support this scenario. For example, geologist Larry Agenbroad has mapped the locations of dated Clovis sites alongside the distribution of dated sites where the remains of wooly mammoths have been found in both archaeological and purely paleontological contexts. These distributions show remarkable synchronicity (occurrence at the same time).
There are, however, many problems with this model. Significantly, though a few sites are quite impressive, there really is very little archaeological evidence to support it. Writing in 1982, Martin himself admitted the paucity of evidence; for example, at that point, the remains of only 38 individual mammoths had been found at Clovis sites. In the years since, few additional mammoths have been added to the list; there are still fewer than 20 Clovis sites where the remains of one or more mammoths have been recovered, a minuscule proportion of the millions that necessarily would have had to have been slaughtered within the overkill scenario.
Though Martin claims the lack of evidence actually supports his model-the evidence is sparse because the spread of humans and the extinction of animals occurred so quickly-this argument seems weak. And how could we ever disprove it? As archaeologist Donald Grayson points out, in other cases where extinction resulted from the quick spread of human hunters-for example, the extinction of the moa, the large flightless bird of New Zealand-archaeological evidence in the form of remains is abundant. Grayson has also shown that the evidence is not so clear that all or even most of the large herbivores in late Pleistocene America became extinct after the appearance of Clovis. Of the 35 extinct genera, only 8 can be confidently assigned an extinction date of between 12,000 and 10,000 years ago. Many of the older genera, Grayson argues, may have succumbed before 12,000 B.C., at least half a century before the Clovis showed up in the American West. | 2826.txt | 2 |
[
"Scientists used mathematical models to show that most of the extinctions occurred in areas where humans had recently arrived.",
"Scientists established that the main population of North Americans who hunted lived in Canada during the time of the megafauna extinctions.",
"Scientists used numerical models to confirm that a small population of humans could have caused big-game extinctions in a relatively short period of time.",
"Scientists used statistics to prove beyond doubt the currently accepted view that human hunters were the main cause of the megafauna extinctions."
] | Which of the following best describes the results of the research discussed in paragraph 4? | Thousands of years ago, in North America's past, all of its megafauna-large mammals such as mammoths and giant bears-disappeared. One proposed explanation for this event is that when the first Americans migrated over from Asia, they hunted the megafauna to extinction. These people, known as the Clovis society after a site where their distinctive spear points were first found, would have been able to use this food source to expand their population and fill the continent rapidly. Yet many scientists argue against this "Pleistocene overkill" hypothesis. Modern humans have certainly been capable of such drastic effects on animals, but could ancient people with little more than stone spears similarly have caused the extinction of numerous species of animals? Thirty-five genera or groups of species (and many individual species) suffered extinction in North America around 11,000 B.C., soon after the appearance and expansion of Paleo-lndians throughout the Americas (27 genera disappeared completely, and another 8 became locally extinct, surviving only outside North AmericA.
Although the climate changed at the end of the Pleistocene, warming trends had happened before. A period of massive extinction of large mammals like that seen about 11,000 years ago had not occurred during the previous 400,000 years, despite these changes. The only apparently significant difference in the Americas 11,000 years ago was the presence of human hunters of these large mammals. Was this coincidence or cause-and-effect?
We do not know. Ecologist Paul S. Martin has championed the model that associates the extinction of large mammals at the end of the Pleistocene with human predation. With researcher J. E. Mosimann, he has co-authored a work in which a computer model showed that in around 300 years, given the right conditions, a small influx of hunters into eastern Beringia 12,000 years ago could have spread across North America in a wave and wiped out game animals to feed their burgeoning population.
The researchers ran the model several ways, always beginning with a population of 100 humans in Edmonton, in Alberta, Canada, at 11,500 years ago. Assuming different initial North American big-game-animal populations (75-150 million animals) and different population growth rates for the human settlers (0.65%-3.5%), and varying kill rates, Mosimann and Martin derived figures of between 279 and 1,157 years from initial contact to big-game extinction.
Many scholars continue to support this scenario. For example, geologist Larry Agenbroad has mapped the locations of dated Clovis sites alongside the distribution of dated sites where the remains of wooly mammoths have been found in both archaeological and purely paleontological contexts. These distributions show remarkable synchronicity (occurrence at the same time).
There are, however, many problems with this model. Significantly, though a few sites are quite impressive, there really is very little archaeological evidence to support it. Writing in 1982, Martin himself admitted the paucity of evidence; for example, at that point, the remains of only 38 individual mammoths had been found at Clovis sites. In the years since, few additional mammoths have been added to the list; there are still fewer than 20 Clovis sites where the remains of one or more mammoths have been recovered, a minuscule proportion of the millions that necessarily would have had to have been slaughtered within the overkill scenario.
Though Martin claims the lack of evidence actually supports his model-the evidence is sparse because the spread of humans and the extinction of animals occurred so quickly-this argument seems weak. And how could we ever disprove it? As archaeologist Donald Grayson points out, in other cases where extinction resulted from the quick spread of human hunters-for example, the extinction of the moa, the large flightless bird of New Zealand-archaeological evidence in the form of remains is abundant. Grayson has also shown that the evidence is not so clear that all or even most of the large herbivores in late Pleistocene America became extinct after the appearance of Clovis. Of the 35 extinct genera, only 8 can be confidently assigned an extinction date of between 12,000 and 10,000 years ago. Many of the older genera, Grayson argues, may have succumbed before 12,000 B.C., at least half a century before the Clovis showed up in the American West. | 2826.txt | 2 |
[
"Agenbroad showed that Mosimann and Martin's estimates of the amount of time needed to drive big-game to extinction were correct.",
"Agenbroad's maps were the first to indicate the ages of the Clovis sites",
"Agenbroad reinforced the idea that humans could have caused the extinctions.",
"Agenbroad's studies of wooly mammoths led to his discovery of Clovis sites."
] | Which of the following statements about Larry Agenbroad's work is implied in the discussion in paragraph 5? | Thousands of years ago, in North America's past, all of its megafauna-large mammals such as mammoths and giant bears-disappeared. One proposed explanation for this event is that when the first Americans migrated over from Asia, they hunted the megafauna to extinction. These people, known as the Clovis society after a site where their distinctive spear points were first found, would have been able to use this food source to expand their population and fill the continent rapidly. Yet many scientists argue against this "Pleistocene overkill" hypothesis. Modern humans have certainly been capable of such drastic effects on animals, but could ancient people with little more than stone spears similarly have caused the extinction of numerous species of animals? Thirty-five genera or groups of species (and many individual species) suffered extinction in North America around 11,000 B.C., soon after the appearance and expansion of Paleo-lndians throughout the Americas (27 genera disappeared completely, and another 8 became locally extinct, surviving only outside North AmericA.
Although the climate changed at the end of the Pleistocene, warming trends had happened before. A period of massive extinction of large mammals like that seen about 11,000 years ago had not occurred during the previous 400,000 years, despite these changes. The only apparently significant difference in the Americas 11,000 years ago was the presence of human hunters of these large mammals. Was this coincidence or cause-and-effect?
We do not know. Ecologist Paul S. Martin has championed the model that associates the extinction of large mammals at the end of the Pleistocene with human predation. With researcher J. E. Mosimann, he has co-authored a work in which a computer model showed that in around 300 years, given the right conditions, a small influx of hunters into eastern Beringia 12,000 years ago could have spread across North America in a wave and wiped out game animals to feed their burgeoning population.
The researchers ran the model several ways, always beginning with a population of 100 humans in Edmonton, in Alberta, Canada, at 11,500 years ago. Assuming different initial North American big-game-animal populations (75-150 million animals) and different population growth rates for the human settlers (0.65%-3.5%), and varying kill rates, Mosimann and Martin derived figures of between 279 and 1,157 years from initial contact to big-game extinction.
Many scholars continue to support this scenario. For example, geologist Larry Agenbroad has mapped the locations of dated Clovis sites alongside the distribution of dated sites where the remains of wooly mammoths have been found in both archaeological and purely paleontological contexts. These distributions show remarkable synchronicity (occurrence at the same time).
There are, however, many problems with this model. Significantly, though a few sites are quite impressive, there really is very little archaeological evidence to support it. Writing in 1982, Martin himself admitted the paucity of evidence; for example, at that point, the remains of only 38 individual mammoths had been found at Clovis sites. In the years since, few additional mammoths have been added to the list; there are still fewer than 20 Clovis sites where the remains of one or more mammoths have been recovered, a minuscule proportion of the millions that necessarily would have had to have been slaughtered within the overkill scenario.
Though Martin claims the lack of evidence actually supports his model-the evidence is sparse because the spread of humans and the extinction of animals occurred so quickly-this argument seems weak. And how could we ever disprove it? As archaeologist Donald Grayson points out, in other cases where extinction resulted from the quick spread of human hunters-for example, the extinction of the moa, the large flightless bird of New Zealand-archaeological evidence in the form of remains is abundant. Grayson has also shown that the evidence is not so clear that all or even most of the large herbivores in late Pleistocene America became extinct after the appearance of Clovis. Of the 35 extinct genera, only 8 can be confidently assigned an extinction date of between 12,000 and 10,000 years ago. Many of the older genera, Grayson argues, may have succumbed before 12,000 B.C., at least half a century before the Clovis showed up in the American West. | 2826.txt | 2 |
[
"accepted the truth of",
"was unaware of",
"was troubled by",
"called attention to"
] | The word "admitted" in the passage is closest in meaning to | Thousands of years ago, in North America's past, all of its megafauna-large mammals such as mammoths and giant bears-disappeared. One proposed explanation for this event is that when the first Americans migrated over from Asia, they hunted the megafauna to extinction. These people, known as the Clovis society after a site where their distinctive spear points were first found, would have been able to use this food source to expand their population and fill the continent rapidly. Yet many scientists argue against this "Pleistocene overkill" hypothesis. Modern humans have certainly been capable of such drastic effects on animals, but could ancient people with little more than stone spears similarly have caused the extinction of numerous species of animals? Thirty-five genera or groups of species (and many individual species) suffered extinction in North America around 11,000 B.C., soon after the appearance and expansion of Paleo-lndians throughout the Americas (27 genera disappeared completely, and another 8 became locally extinct, surviving only outside North AmericA.
Although the climate changed at the end of the Pleistocene, warming trends had happened before. A period of massive extinction of large mammals like that seen about 11,000 years ago had not occurred during the previous 400,000 years, despite these changes. The only apparently significant difference in the Americas 11,000 years ago was the presence of human hunters of these large mammals. Was this coincidence or cause-and-effect?
We do not know. Ecologist Paul S. Martin has championed the model that associates the extinction of large mammals at the end of the Pleistocene with human predation. With researcher J. E. Mosimann, he has co-authored a work in which a computer model showed that in around 300 years, given the right conditions, a small influx of hunters into eastern Beringia 12,000 years ago could have spread across North America in a wave and wiped out game animals to feed their burgeoning population.
The researchers ran the model several ways, always beginning with a population of 100 humans in Edmonton, in Alberta, Canada, at 11,500 years ago. Assuming different initial North American big-game-animal populations (75-150 million animals) and different population growth rates for the human settlers (0.65%-3.5%), and varying kill rates, Mosimann and Martin derived figures of between 279 and 1,157 years from initial contact to big-game extinction.
Many scholars continue to support this scenario. For example, geologist Larry Agenbroad has mapped the locations of dated Clovis sites alongside the distribution of dated sites where the remains of wooly mammoths have been found in both archaeological and purely paleontological contexts. These distributions show remarkable synchronicity (occurrence at the same time).
There are, however, many problems with this model. Significantly, though a few sites are quite impressive, there really is very little archaeological evidence to support it. Writing in 1982, Martin himself admitted the paucity of evidence; for example, at that point, the remains of only 38 individual mammoths had been found at Clovis sites. In the years since, few additional mammoths have been added to the list; there are still fewer than 20 Clovis sites where the remains of one or more mammoths have been recovered, a minuscule proportion of the millions that necessarily would have had to have been slaughtered within the overkill scenario.
Though Martin claims the lack of evidence actually supports his model-the evidence is sparse because the spread of humans and the extinction of animals occurred so quickly-this argument seems weak. And how could we ever disprove it? As archaeologist Donald Grayson points out, in other cases where extinction resulted from the quick spread of human hunters-for example, the extinction of the moa, the large flightless bird of New Zealand-archaeological evidence in the form of remains is abundant. Grayson has also shown that the evidence is not so clear that all or even most of the large herbivores in late Pleistocene America became extinct after the appearance of Clovis. Of the 35 extinct genera, only 8 can be confidently assigned an extinction date of between 12,000 and 10,000 years ago. Many of the older genera, Grayson argues, may have succumbed before 12,000 B.C., at least half a century before the Clovis showed up in the American West. | 2826.txt | 0 |
[
"The Clovis sites that contain the remains of mammoths were settled by humans long after the extinctions occurred.",
"Only a few of the Clovis sites are located near known mammoth habitats.",
"No archaeological evidence of extinctions has been found at Clovis sites since 1982.",
"The number of mammoth remains found at Clovis sites is smaller than would be expected if hunting by humans had caused the extinctions."
] | According to paragraph 6, which of the following statements challenges the view that hunting by humans caused the extinctions of North American megafauna? | Thousands of years ago, in North America's past, all of its megafauna-large mammals such as mammoths and giant bears-disappeared. One proposed explanation for this event is that when the first Americans migrated over from Asia, they hunted the megafauna to extinction. These people, known as the Clovis society after a site where their distinctive spear points were first found, would have been able to use this food source to expand their population and fill the continent rapidly. Yet many scientists argue against this "Pleistocene overkill" hypothesis. Modern humans have certainly been capable of such drastic effects on animals, but could ancient people with little more than stone spears similarly have caused the extinction of numerous species of animals? Thirty-five genera or groups of species (and many individual species) suffered extinction in North America around 11,000 B.C., soon after the appearance and expansion of Paleo-lndians throughout the Americas (27 genera disappeared completely, and another 8 became locally extinct, surviving only outside North AmericA.
Although the climate changed at the end of the Pleistocene, warming trends had happened before. A period of massive extinction of large mammals like that seen about 11,000 years ago had not occurred during the previous 400,000 years, despite these changes. The only apparently significant difference in the Americas 11,000 years ago was the presence of human hunters of these large mammals. Was this coincidence or cause-and-effect?
We do not know. Ecologist Paul S. Martin has championed the model that associates the extinction of large mammals at the end of the Pleistocene with human predation. With researcher J. E. Mosimann, he has co-authored a work in which a computer model showed that in around 300 years, given the right conditions, a small influx of hunters into eastern Beringia 12,000 years ago could have spread across North America in a wave and wiped out game animals to feed their burgeoning population.
The researchers ran the model several ways, always beginning with a population of 100 humans in Edmonton, in Alberta, Canada, at 11,500 years ago. Assuming different initial North American big-game-animal populations (75-150 million animals) and different population growth rates for the human settlers (0.65%-3.5%), and varying kill rates, Mosimann and Martin derived figures of between 279 and 1,157 years from initial contact to big-game extinction.
Many scholars continue to support this scenario. For example, geologist Larry Agenbroad has mapped the locations of dated Clovis sites alongside the distribution of dated sites where the remains of wooly mammoths have been found in both archaeological and purely paleontological contexts. These distributions show remarkable synchronicity (occurrence at the same time).
There are, however, many problems with this model. Significantly, though a few sites are quite impressive, there really is very little archaeological evidence to support it. Writing in 1982, Martin himself admitted the paucity of evidence; for example, at that point, the remains of only 38 individual mammoths had been found at Clovis sites. In the years since, few additional mammoths have been added to the list; there are still fewer than 20 Clovis sites where the remains of one or more mammoths have been recovered, a minuscule proportion of the millions that necessarily would have had to have been slaughtered within the overkill scenario.
Though Martin claims the lack of evidence actually supports his model-the evidence is sparse because the spread of humans and the extinction of animals occurred so quickly-this argument seems weak. And how could we ever disprove it? As archaeologist Donald Grayson points out, in other cases where extinction resulted from the quick spread of human hunters-for example, the extinction of the moa, the large flightless bird of New Zealand-archaeological evidence in the form of remains is abundant. Grayson has also shown that the evidence is not so clear that all or even most of the large herbivores in late Pleistocene America became extinct after the appearance of Clovis. Of the 35 extinct genera, only 8 can be confidently assigned an extinction date of between 12,000 and 10,000 years ago. Many of the older genera, Grayson argues, may have succumbed before 12,000 B.C., at least half a century before the Clovis showed up in the American West. | 2826.txt | 3 |
[
"To show that extinctions occurred in areas other than North America.",
"To challenge Martin's claim that the lack of megafauna remains supports his model of the megafauna extinctions.",
"To identify a country where humans were highly skilled as hunters.",
"To help explain why it is unclear whether all large herbivores of late Pleistocene America became extinct after the appearance of Clovis."
] | In paragraph7, why does the author mention that there is abundant archaeological evidence for the extinction of the New Zealand moa? | Thousands of years ago, in North America's past, all of its megafauna-large mammals such as mammoths and giant bears-disappeared. One proposed explanation for this event is that when the first Americans migrated over from Asia, they hunted the megafauna to extinction. These people, known as the Clovis society after a site where their distinctive spear points were first found, would have been able to use this food source to expand their population and fill the continent rapidly. Yet many scientists argue against this "Pleistocene overkill" hypothesis. Modern humans have certainly been capable of such drastic effects on animals, but could ancient people with little more than stone spears similarly have caused the extinction of numerous species of animals? Thirty-five genera or groups of species (and many individual species) suffered extinction in North America around 11,000 B.C., soon after the appearance and expansion of Paleo-lndians throughout the Americas (27 genera disappeared completely, and another 8 became locally extinct, surviving only outside North AmericA.
Although the climate changed at the end of the Pleistocene, warming trends had happened before. A period of massive extinction of large mammals like that seen about 11,000 years ago had not occurred during the previous 400,000 years, despite these changes. The only apparently significant difference in the Americas 11,000 years ago was the presence of human hunters of these large mammals. Was this coincidence or cause-and-effect?
We do not know. Ecologist Paul S. Martin has championed the model that associates the extinction of large mammals at the end of the Pleistocene with human predation. With researcher J. E. Mosimann, he has co-authored a work in which a computer model showed that in around 300 years, given the right conditions, a small influx of hunters into eastern Beringia 12,000 years ago could have spread across North America in a wave and wiped out game animals to feed their burgeoning population.
The researchers ran the model several ways, always beginning with a population of 100 humans in Edmonton, in Alberta, Canada, at 11,500 years ago. Assuming different initial North American big-game-animal populations (75-150 million animals) and different population growth rates for the human settlers (0.65%-3.5%), and varying kill rates, Mosimann and Martin derived figures of between 279 and 1,157 years from initial contact to big-game extinction.
Many scholars continue to support this scenario. For example, geologist Larry Agenbroad has mapped the locations of dated Clovis sites alongside the distribution of dated sites where the remains of wooly mammoths have been found in both archaeological and purely paleontological contexts. These distributions show remarkable synchronicity (occurrence at the same time).
There are, however, many problems with this model. Significantly, though a few sites are quite impressive, there really is very little archaeological evidence to support it. Writing in 1982, Martin himself admitted the paucity of evidence; for example, at that point, the remains of only 38 individual mammoths had been found at Clovis sites. In the years since, few additional mammoths have been added to the list; there are still fewer than 20 Clovis sites where the remains of one or more mammoths have been recovered, a minuscule proportion of the millions that necessarily would have had to have been slaughtered within the overkill scenario.
Though Martin claims the lack of evidence actually supports his model-the evidence is sparse because the spread of humans and the extinction of animals occurred so quickly-this argument seems weak. And how could we ever disprove it? As archaeologist Donald Grayson points out, in other cases where extinction resulted from the quick spread of human hunters-for example, the extinction of the moa, the large flightless bird of New Zealand-archaeological evidence in the form of remains is abundant. Grayson has also shown that the evidence is not so clear that all or even most of the large herbivores in late Pleistocene America became extinct after the appearance of Clovis. Of the 35 extinct genera, only 8 can be confidently assigned an extinction date of between 12,000 and 10,000 years ago. Many of the older genera, Grayson argues, may have succumbed before 12,000 B.C., at least half a century before the Clovis showed up in the American West. | 2826.txt | 1 |
[
"The rapid rate of the spread of humans explains why the extinctions also occurred at a rapid rate.",
"The lack of evidence of human-caused extinctions is not surprising in view of the speed with which the extinctions occurred.",
"It is likely that more evidence will be found as dating methods improve.",
"If humans did contribute to the extinctions, much more evidence of that would have been found by now."
] | Paragraph 7 suggests that Donald Grayson believes which of the following about the remains at Clovis sites and megafaunal extinctions? | Thousands of years ago, in North America's past, all of its megafauna-large mammals such as mammoths and giant bears-disappeared. One proposed explanation for this event is that when the first Americans migrated over from Asia, they hunted the megafauna to extinction. These people, known as the Clovis society after a site where their distinctive spear points were first found, would have been able to use this food source to expand their population and fill the continent rapidly. Yet many scientists argue against this "Pleistocene overkill" hypothesis. Modern humans have certainly been capable of such drastic effects on animals, but could ancient people with little more than stone spears similarly have caused the extinction of numerous species of animals? Thirty-five genera or groups of species (and many individual species) suffered extinction in North America around 11,000 B.C., soon after the appearance and expansion of Paleo-lndians throughout the Americas (27 genera disappeared completely, and another 8 became locally extinct, surviving only outside North AmericA.
Although the climate changed at the end of the Pleistocene, warming trends had happened before. A period of massive extinction of large mammals like that seen about 11,000 years ago had not occurred during the previous 400,000 years, despite these changes. The only apparently significant difference in the Americas 11,000 years ago was the presence of human hunters of these large mammals. Was this coincidence or cause-and-effect?
We do not know. Ecologist Paul S. Martin has championed the model that associates the extinction of large mammals at the end of the Pleistocene with human predation. With researcher J. E. Mosimann, he has co-authored a work in which a computer model showed that in around 300 years, given the right conditions, a small influx of hunters into eastern Beringia 12,000 years ago could have spread across North America in a wave and wiped out game animals to feed their burgeoning population.
The researchers ran the model several ways, always beginning with a population of 100 humans in Edmonton, in Alberta, Canada, at 11,500 years ago. Assuming different initial North American big-game-animal populations (75-150 million animals) and different population growth rates for the human settlers (0.65%-3.5%), and varying kill rates, Mosimann and Martin derived figures of between 279 and 1,157 years from initial contact to big-game extinction.
Many scholars continue to support this scenario. For example, geologist Larry Agenbroad has mapped the locations of dated Clovis sites alongside the distribution of dated sites where the remains of wooly mammoths have been found in both archaeological and purely paleontological contexts. These distributions show remarkable synchronicity (occurrence at the same time).
There are, however, many problems with this model. Significantly, though a few sites are quite impressive, there really is very little archaeological evidence to support it. Writing in 1982, Martin himself admitted the paucity of evidence; for example, at that point, the remains of only 38 individual mammoths had been found at Clovis sites. In the years since, few additional mammoths have been added to the list; there are still fewer than 20 Clovis sites where the remains of one or more mammoths have been recovered, a minuscule proportion of the millions that necessarily would have had to have been slaughtered within the overkill scenario.
Though Martin claims the lack of evidence actually supports his model-the evidence is sparse because the spread of humans and the extinction of animals occurred so quickly-this argument seems weak. And how could we ever disprove it? As archaeologist Donald Grayson points out, in other cases where extinction resulted from the quick spread of human hunters-for example, the extinction of the moa, the large flightless bird of New Zealand-archaeological evidence in the form of remains is abundant. Grayson has also shown that the evidence is not so clear that all or even most of the large herbivores in late Pleistocene America became extinct after the appearance of Clovis. Of the 35 extinct genera, only 8 can be confidently assigned an extinction date of between 12,000 and 10,000 years ago. Many of the older genera, Grayson argues, may have succumbed before 12,000 B.C., at least half a century before the Clovis showed up in the American West. | 2826.txt | 3 |
[
"a survey of new approaches to art",
"a review of Futurist poetry",
"about merits of the Futurist movement",
"about laws and requirements of literature"
] | This passage is mainly . | When a new movement in art attains a certain fashion, it is advisable to find out what its advocates are aiming at, for, however farfetched and unreasonable their principles may seem today, it is possible that in years to come they may be regarded as normal. With regard to Futurist poetry, however, the case is rather difficult, for whatever Futurist poetry may be -- even admitting that the theory on which it is based may be right -- it can hardly be classed as Literature.
This, in brief, is what the Futurist says; for a century, past conditions of life have been conditionally speeding up, till now we live in a world of noise and violence and speed. Consequently, our feelings, thoughts and emotions have undergone a corresponding change. This speeding up of life, says the Futurist, requires a new form of expression. We must speed up our literature too, if we want to interpret modern stress. We must pour out a large stream of essential words, unhampered by stops, or qualifying adjectives, or finite verbs. Instead of describing sounds we must make up words that imitate them; we must use many sizes of type and different colored inks on the same page, and shorten or lengthen words at will.
Certainly their descriptions of battles are confused. But it is a little upsetting to read in the explanatory notes that a certain line describes a fight between a Turkish and a Bulgarian officer on a bridge off which they both fall into the river -- and then to find that the line consists of the noise of their falling and the weights of the officers: "Pluff! Pluff! A hundred and eighty-five kilograms."
This, though it fulfills the laws and requirements of Futurist poetry, can hardly be classed as Literature. All the same, no thinking man can refuse to accept their first proposition: that a great change in our emotional life calls for a change of expression. The whole question is really this: have we essentially changed? | 934.txt | 1 |
[
"determine its purposes",
"ignore its flaws",
"follow the new fashions",
"accept the principles"
] | When a novel literary idea appears, people should try to . | When a new movement in art attains a certain fashion, it is advisable to find out what its advocates are aiming at, for, however farfetched and unreasonable their principles may seem today, it is possible that in years to come they may be regarded as normal. With regard to Futurist poetry, however, the case is rather difficult, for whatever Futurist poetry may be -- even admitting that the theory on which it is based may be right -- it can hardly be classed as Literature.
This, in brief, is what the Futurist says; for a century, past conditions of life have been conditionally speeding up, till now we live in a world of noise and violence and speed. Consequently, our feelings, thoughts and emotions have undergone a corresponding change. This speeding up of life, says the Futurist, requires a new form of expression. We must speed up our literature too, if we want to interpret modern stress. We must pour out a large stream of essential words, unhampered by stops, or qualifying adjectives, or finite verbs. Instead of describing sounds we must make up words that imitate them; we must use many sizes of type and different colored inks on the same page, and shorten or lengthen words at will.
Certainly their descriptions of battles are confused. But it is a little upsetting to read in the explanatory notes that a certain line describes a fight between a Turkish and a Bulgarian officer on a bridge off which they both fall into the river -- and then to find that the line consists of the noise of their falling and the weights of the officers: "Pluff! Pluff! A hundred and eighty-five kilograms."
This, though it fulfills the laws and requirements of Futurist poetry, can hardly be classed as Literature. All the same, no thinking man can refuse to accept their first proposition: that a great change in our emotional life calls for a change of expression. The whole question is really this: have we essentially changed? | 934.txt | 0 |
[
"increase the production of literature",
"use poetry to relieve modern stress",
"develop new modes of expression",
"avoid using adjectives and verbs"
] | Futurists claim that we must . | When a new movement in art attains a certain fashion, it is advisable to find out what its advocates are aiming at, for, however farfetched and unreasonable their principles may seem today, it is possible that in years to come they may be regarded as normal. With regard to Futurist poetry, however, the case is rather difficult, for whatever Futurist poetry may be -- even admitting that the theory on which it is based may be right -- it can hardly be classed as Literature.
This, in brief, is what the Futurist says; for a century, past conditions of life have been conditionally speeding up, till now we live in a world of noise and violence and speed. Consequently, our feelings, thoughts and emotions have undergone a corresponding change. This speeding up of life, says the Futurist, requires a new form of expression. We must speed up our literature too, if we want to interpret modern stress. We must pour out a large stream of essential words, unhampered by stops, or qualifying adjectives, or finite verbs. Instead of describing sounds we must make up words that imitate them; we must use many sizes of type and different colored inks on the same page, and shorten or lengthen words at will.
Certainly their descriptions of battles are confused. But it is a little upsetting to read in the explanatory notes that a certain line describes a fight between a Turkish and a Bulgarian officer on a bridge off which they both fall into the river -- and then to find that the line consists of the noise of their falling and the weights of the officers: "Pluff! Pluff! A hundred and eighty-five kilograms."
This, though it fulfills the laws and requirements of Futurist poetry, can hardly be classed as Literature. All the same, no thinking man can refuse to accept their first proposition: that a great change in our emotional life calls for a change of expression. The whole question is really this: have we essentially changed? | 934.txt | 2 |
[
"based on reasonable principles",
"new and acceptable to ordinary people",
"indicative of basic change in human nature",
"more of a transient phenomenon than literature"
] | The author believes that Futurist poetry is . | When a new movement in art attains a certain fashion, it is advisable to find out what its advocates are aiming at, for, however farfetched and unreasonable their principles may seem today, it is possible that in years to come they may be regarded as normal. With regard to Futurist poetry, however, the case is rather difficult, for whatever Futurist poetry may be -- even admitting that the theory on which it is based may be right -- it can hardly be classed as Literature.
This, in brief, is what the Futurist says; for a century, past conditions of life have been conditionally speeding up, till now we live in a world of noise and violence and speed. Consequently, our feelings, thoughts and emotions have undergone a corresponding change. This speeding up of life, says the Futurist, requires a new form of expression. We must speed up our literature too, if we want to interpret modern stress. We must pour out a large stream of essential words, unhampered by stops, or qualifying adjectives, or finite verbs. Instead of describing sounds we must make up words that imitate them; we must use many sizes of type and different colored inks on the same page, and shorten or lengthen words at will.
Certainly their descriptions of battles are confused. But it is a little upsetting to read in the explanatory notes that a certain line describes a fight between a Turkish and a Bulgarian officer on a bridge off which they both fall into the river -- and then to find that the line consists of the noise of their falling and the weights of the officers: "Pluff! Pluff! A hundred and eighty-five kilograms."
This, though it fulfills the laws and requirements of Futurist poetry, can hardly be classed as Literature. All the same, no thinking man can refuse to accept their first proposition: that a great change in our emotional life calls for a change of expression. The whole question is really this: have we essentially changed? | 934.txt | 3 |
[
"transformation.",
"comeback.",
"program.",
"expansion."
] | The word "resurgence"(paragraph 1)in the passage is closest in meaning to | In the late thirteenth century, northern Italian cities such as Genoa, Florence, and Venice began an economic resurgence that made them into the most important economic centers of Europe. By the seventeenth century, however, other European powers had taken over, as the Italian cities lost much of their economic might.
This decline can be seen clearly in the changes that affected Venetian shipping and trade. First, Venice's intermediary functions in the Adriatic Sea, where it had dominated the business of shipping for other parties, were lost to direct trading. In the fifteenth century there was little problem recruiting sailors to row the galleys (large ships propelled by oars): guilds (business associations) were required to provide rowers, and through a draft system free citizens served compulsorily when called for. In the early sixteenth century the shortage of rowers was not serious because the demand for galleys was limited by a move to round ships (round-hulled ships with more cargo space), with required fewer rowers. But the shortage of crews proved to be a greater and greater problem, despite continuous appeal to Venic's tradition of maritime greatness. Even though sailors' wages doubled among the northern Italian cities from 1550 to 1590, this did not elicit an increased supply.
The problem in shipping extended to the Arsenale, Venice's huge and powerful shipyard. Timber ran short, and it was necessary to procure it from farther and farther away. In ancient Roman times, the Italian peninsula had great forest of fir preferred for warships, but scarcity was apparent as early as the early fourteenth century. Arsenale officers first brought timber from the foothills of the Alps, then from north toward Trieste, and finally from across the Adriatic. Private shipbuilders were required to buy their oak abroad. As the costs of shipbuilding rose, Venice clung to its outdated standard while the Dutch were innovation in the lighter and more easily handled ships.
The step from buying foreign timber to buying foreign ships was regarded as a short one, especially when complaints were heard in the latter sixteenth century that the standards and traditions of the Arsenale were running down. Work was stretched out and done poorly. Older workers had been allowed to stop work a half hour before the regular time, and in 1601 younger works left with them. Merchants complained that the privileges reserved for Venetian-built and owned ships were first extended to those Venetians who bought ships from abroad and then to foreign-built and owned vessels. Historian Frederic Lane observes that after the loss of ships in battle in the late sixteenth century, the shipbuilding industry no longer had the capacity to recover that it had displayed at the start of the century.
The conventional explanation for the loss of Venetian dominance in trade is establishment of the Portuguese direct sea route to the East, replacing the overland Silk Road from the Black sea and the highly profitable Indian Ocean-caravan-eastern Mediterranean route to Venice. The Portuguese Vasco da Gama's Voyage around southern Africa to India took place at the end of the fifteenth century, and by 1502 the trans- Abrabian caravan route had been cut off by political unrest.
The Venetian Council finally allowed round ships to enter the trade that was previously reserved for merchant galleys, thus reducing transport cost by one third. Prices of spices delivered by ship from the eastern Mediterranean came to equal those of spices transported by Paortuguese vessels, but the increase in quantity with both routes in operation drove the price far down. Gradually, Venice's role as a storage and distribution center for spices and silk, dyes cotton, and gold decayed, and by the early seventeenth century Venice had lost its monopoly in markets such as France and southern Germany.
Venetian shipping had started to decline from about 1530-before the entry into the Mediterranean of large volumes of Dutch and British shipping-and was clearly outclassed by the end of the century. A contemporary of Shakespeare (1564-1616) observed that the productivity of Italian shipping had declined, compared with that of the British, because of conservatism and loss of expertise. Moreover, Italian sailors were deserting and emigrating, and captains, no longer recruited from the ranks of nobles, were weak on navigations. | 4135.txt | 1 |
[
"for free.",
"for a time.",
"by requirement.",
"by design."
] | The word "compulsorily"in the passage(paragraph 1)is closest in meaning to | In the late thirteenth century, northern Italian cities such as Genoa, Florence, and Venice began an economic resurgence that made them into the most important economic centers of Europe. By the seventeenth century, however, other European powers had taken over, as the Italian cities lost much of their economic might.
This decline can be seen clearly in the changes that affected Venetian shipping and trade. First, Venice's intermediary functions in the Adriatic Sea, where it had dominated the business of shipping for other parties, were lost to direct trading. In the fifteenth century there was little problem recruiting sailors to row the galleys (large ships propelled by oars): guilds (business associations) were required to provide rowers, and through a draft system free citizens served compulsorily when called for. In the early sixteenth century the shortage of rowers was not serious because the demand for galleys was limited by a move to round ships (round-hulled ships with more cargo space), with required fewer rowers. But the shortage of crews proved to be a greater and greater problem, despite continuous appeal to Venic's tradition of maritime greatness. Even though sailors' wages doubled among the northern Italian cities from 1550 to 1590, this did not elicit an increased supply.
The problem in shipping extended to the Arsenale, Venice's huge and powerful shipyard. Timber ran short, and it was necessary to procure it from farther and farther away. In ancient Roman times, the Italian peninsula had great forest of fir preferred for warships, but scarcity was apparent as early as the early fourteenth century. Arsenale officers first brought timber from the foothills of the Alps, then from north toward Trieste, and finally from across the Adriatic. Private shipbuilders were required to buy their oak abroad. As the costs of shipbuilding rose, Venice clung to its outdated standard while the Dutch were innovation in the lighter and more easily handled ships.
The step from buying foreign timber to buying foreign ships was regarded as a short one, especially when complaints were heard in the latter sixteenth century that the standards and traditions of the Arsenale were running down. Work was stretched out and done poorly. Older workers had been allowed to stop work a half hour before the regular time, and in 1601 younger works left with them. Merchants complained that the privileges reserved for Venetian-built and owned ships were first extended to those Venetians who bought ships from abroad and then to foreign-built and owned vessels. Historian Frederic Lane observes that after the loss of ships in battle in the late sixteenth century, the shipbuilding industry no longer had the capacity to recover that it had displayed at the start of the century.
The conventional explanation for the loss of Venetian dominance in trade is establishment of the Portuguese direct sea route to the East, replacing the overland Silk Road from the Black sea and the highly profitable Indian Ocean-caravan-eastern Mediterranean route to Venice. The Portuguese Vasco da Gama's Voyage around southern Africa to India took place at the end of the fifteenth century, and by 1502 the trans- Abrabian caravan route had been cut off by political unrest.
The Venetian Council finally allowed round ships to enter the trade that was previously reserved for merchant galleys, thus reducing transport cost by one third. Prices of spices delivered by ship from the eastern Mediterranean came to equal those of spices transported by Paortuguese vessels, but the increase in quantity with both routes in operation drove the price far down. Gradually, Venice's role as a storage and distribution center for spices and silk, dyes cotton, and gold decayed, and by the early seventeenth century Venice had lost its monopoly in markets such as France and southern Germany.
Venetian shipping had started to decline from about 1530-before the entry into the Mediterranean of large volumes of Dutch and British shipping-and was clearly outclassed by the end of the century. A contemporary of Shakespeare (1564-1616) observed that the productivity of Italian shipping had declined, compared with that of the British, because of conservatism and loss of expertise. Moreover, Italian sailors were deserting and emigrating, and captains, no longer recruited from the ranks of nobles, were weak on navigations. | 4135.txt | 2 |
[
"The loss of trade in Adriatic Sea.",
"The move from galleys to round ships.",
"The decreased demand for galleys.",
"The doubling of sailor's wages."
] | According to paragraph 2, which of the following contributed to the decline of Venetian shipping? | In the late thirteenth century, northern Italian cities such as Genoa, Florence, and Venice began an economic resurgence that made them into the most important economic centers of Europe. By the seventeenth century, however, other European powers had taken over, as the Italian cities lost much of their economic might.
This decline can be seen clearly in the changes that affected Venetian shipping and trade. First, Venice's intermediary functions in the Adriatic Sea, where it had dominated the business of shipping for other parties, were lost to direct trading. In the fifteenth century there was little problem recruiting sailors to row the galleys (large ships propelled by oars): guilds (business associations) were required to provide rowers, and through a draft system free citizens served compulsorily when called for. In the early sixteenth century the shortage of rowers was not serious because the demand for galleys was limited by a move to round ships (round-hulled ships with more cargo space), with required fewer rowers. But the shortage of crews proved to be a greater and greater problem, despite continuous appeal to Venic's tradition of maritime greatness. Even though sailors' wages doubled among the northern Italian cities from 1550 to 1590, this did not elicit an increased supply.
The problem in shipping extended to the Arsenale, Venice's huge and powerful shipyard. Timber ran short, and it was necessary to procure it from farther and farther away. In ancient Roman times, the Italian peninsula had great forest of fir preferred for warships, but scarcity was apparent as early as the early fourteenth century. Arsenale officers first brought timber from the foothills of the Alps, then from north toward Trieste, and finally from across the Adriatic. Private shipbuilders were required to buy their oak abroad. As the costs of shipbuilding rose, Venice clung to its outdated standard while the Dutch were innovation in the lighter and more easily handled ships.
The step from buying foreign timber to buying foreign ships was regarded as a short one, especially when complaints were heard in the latter sixteenth century that the standards and traditions of the Arsenale were running down. Work was stretched out and done poorly. Older workers had been allowed to stop work a half hour before the regular time, and in 1601 younger works left with them. Merchants complained that the privileges reserved for Venetian-built and owned ships were first extended to those Venetians who bought ships from abroad and then to foreign-built and owned vessels. Historian Frederic Lane observes that after the loss of ships in battle in the late sixteenth century, the shipbuilding industry no longer had the capacity to recover that it had displayed at the start of the century.
The conventional explanation for the loss of Venetian dominance in trade is establishment of the Portuguese direct sea route to the East, replacing the overland Silk Road from the Black sea and the highly profitable Indian Ocean-caravan-eastern Mediterranean route to Venice. The Portuguese Vasco da Gama's Voyage around southern Africa to India took place at the end of the fifteenth century, and by 1502 the trans- Abrabian caravan route had been cut off by political unrest.
The Venetian Council finally allowed round ships to enter the trade that was previously reserved for merchant galleys, thus reducing transport cost by one third. Prices of spices delivered by ship from the eastern Mediterranean came to equal those of spices transported by Paortuguese vessels, but the increase in quantity with both routes in operation drove the price far down. Gradually, Venice's role as a storage and distribution center for spices and silk, dyes cotton, and gold decayed, and by the early seventeenth century Venice had lost its monopoly in markets such as France and southern Germany.
Venetian shipping had started to decline from about 1530-before the entry into the Mediterranean of large volumes of Dutch and British shipping-and was clearly outclassed by the end of the century. A contemporary of Shakespeare (1564-1616) observed that the productivity of Italian shipping had declined, compared with that of the British, because of conservatism and loss of expertise. Moreover, Italian sailors were deserting and emigrating, and captains, no longer recruited from the ranks of nobles, were weak on navigations. | 4135.txt | 0 |
[
"Requiring business associations to provide sailors.",
"Recruiting sailors from other cities in northern Italy.",
"Drafting Venetian citizens into services as rowers.",
"Appealing to the traditions of Venice as a sea power."
] | All of the following are mentioned in paragraph 2 as ways that Veniceprovided rowers for its galley EXCEPT | In the late thirteenth century, northern Italian cities such as Genoa, Florence, and Venice began an economic resurgence that made them into the most important economic centers of Europe. By the seventeenth century, however, other European powers had taken over, as the Italian cities lost much of their economic might.
This decline can be seen clearly in the changes that affected Venetian shipping and trade. First, Venice's intermediary functions in the Adriatic Sea, where it had dominated the business of shipping for other parties, were lost to direct trading. In the fifteenth century there was little problem recruiting sailors to row the galleys (large ships propelled by oars): guilds (business associations) were required to provide rowers, and through a draft system free citizens served compulsorily when called for. In the early sixteenth century the shortage of rowers was not serious because the demand for galleys was limited by a move to round ships (round-hulled ships with more cargo space), with required fewer rowers. But the shortage of crews proved to be a greater and greater problem, despite continuous appeal to Venic's tradition of maritime greatness. Even though sailors' wages doubled among the northern Italian cities from 1550 to 1590, this did not elicit an increased supply.
The problem in shipping extended to the Arsenale, Venice's huge and powerful shipyard. Timber ran short, and it was necessary to procure it from farther and farther away. In ancient Roman times, the Italian peninsula had great forest of fir preferred for warships, but scarcity was apparent as early as the early fourteenth century. Arsenale officers first brought timber from the foothills of the Alps, then from north toward Trieste, and finally from across the Adriatic. Private shipbuilders were required to buy their oak abroad. As the costs of shipbuilding rose, Venice clung to its outdated standard while the Dutch were innovation in the lighter and more easily handled ships.
The step from buying foreign timber to buying foreign ships was regarded as a short one, especially when complaints were heard in the latter sixteenth century that the standards and traditions of the Arsenale were running down. Work was stretched out and done poorly. Older workers had been allowed to stop work a half hour before the regular time, and in 1601 younger works left with them. Merchants complained that the privileges reserved for Venetian-built and owned ships were first extended to those Venetians who bought ships from abroad and then to foreign-built and owned vessels. Historian Frederic Lane observes that after the loss of ships in battle in the late sixteenth century, the shipbuilding industry no longer had the capacity to recover that it had displayed at the start of the century.
The conventional explanation for the loss of Venetian dominance in trade is establishment of the Portuguese direct sea route to the East, replacing the overland Silk Road from the Black sea and the highly profitable Indian Ocean-caravan-eastern Mediterranean route to Venice. The Portuguese Vasco da Gama's Voyage around southern Africa to India took place at the end of the fifteenth century, and by 1502 the trans- Abrabian caravan route had been cut off by political unrest.
The Venetian Council finally allowed round ships to enter the trade that was previously reserved for merchant galleys, thus reducing transport cost by one third. Prices of spices delivered by ship from the eastern Mediterranean came to equal those of spices transported by Paortuguese vessels, but the increase in quantity with both routes in operation drove the price far down. Gradually, Venice's role as a storage and distribution center for spices and silk, dyes cotton, and gold decayed, and by the early seventeenth century Venice had lost its monopoly in markets such as France and southern Germany.
Venetian shipping had started to decline from about 1530-before the entry into the Mediterranean of large volumes of Dutch and British shipping-and was clearly outclassed by the end of the century. A contemporary of Shakespeare (1564-1616) observed that the productivity of Italian shipping had declined, compared with that of the British, because of conservatism and loss of expertise. Moreover, Italian sailors were deserting and emigrating, and captains, no longer recruited from the ranks of nobles, were weak on navigations. | 4135.txt | 1 |
[
"strict.",
"enforced.",
"improved.",
"old-fashioned."
] | The word "outdated" in the passage is closest in meaning to | In the late thirteenth century, northern Italian cities such as Genoa, Florence, and Venice began an economic resurgence that made them into the most important economic centers of Europe. By the seventeenth century, however, other European powers had taken over, as the Italian cities lost much of their economic might.
This decline can be seen clearly in the changes that affected Venetian shipping and trade. First, Venice's intermediary functions in the Adriatic Sea, where it had dominated the business of shipping for other parties, were lost to direct trading. In the fifteenth century there was little problem recruiting sailors to row the galleys (large ships propelled by oars): guilds (business associations) were required to provide rowers, and through a draft system free citizens served compulsorily when called for. In the early sixteenth century the shortage of rowers was not serious because the demand for galleys was limited by a move to round ships (round-hulled ships with more cargo space), with required fewer rowers. But the shortage of crews proved to be a greater and greater problem, despite continuous appeal to Venic's tradition of maritime greatness. Even though sailors' wages doubled among the northern Italian cities from 1550 to 1590, this did not elicit an increased supply.
The problem in shipping extended to the Arsenale, Venice's huge and powerful shipyard. Timber ran short, and it was necessary to procure it from farther and farther away. In ancient Roman times, the Italian peninsula had great forest of fir preferred for warships, but scarcity was apparent as early as the early fourteenth century. Arsenale officers first brought timber from the foothills of the Alps, then from north toward Trieste, and finally from across the Adriatic. Private shipbuilders were required to buy their oak abroad. As the costs of shipbuilding rose, Venice clung to its outdated standard while the Dutch were innovation in the lighter and more easily handled ships.
The step from buying foreign timber to buying foreign ships was regarded as a short one, especially when complaints were heard in the latter sixteenth century that the standards and traditions of the Arsenale were running down. Work was stretched out and done poorly. Older workers had been allowed to stop work a half hour before the regular time, and in 1601 younger works left with them. Merchants complained that the privileges reserved for Venetian-built and owned ships were first extended to those Venetians who bought ships from abroad and then to foreign-built and owned vessels. Historian Frederic Lane observes that after the loss of ships in battle in the late sixteenth century, the shipbuilding industry no longer had the capacity to recover that it had displayed at the start of the century.
The conventional explanation for the loss of Venetian dominance in trade is establishment of the Portuguese direct sea route to the East, replacing the overland Silk Road from the Black sea and the highly profitable Indian Ocean-caravan-eastern Mediterranean route to Venice. The Portuguese Vasco da Gama's Voyage around southern Africa to India took place at the end of the fifteenth century, and by 1502 the trans- Abrabian caravan route had been cut off by political unrest.
The Venetian Council finally allowed round ships to enter the trade that was previously reserved for merchant galleys, thus reducing transport cost by one third. Prices of spices delivered by ship from the eastern Mediterranean came to equal those of spices transported by Paortuguese vessels, but the increase in quantity with both routes in operation drove the price far down. Gradually, Venice's role as a storage and distribution center for spices and silk, dyes cotton, and gold decayed, and by the early seventeenth century Venice had lost its monopoly in markets such as France and southern Germany.
Venetian shipping had started to decline from about 1530-before the entry into the Mediterranean of large volumes of Dutch and British shipping-and was clearly outclassed by the end of the century. A contemporary of Shakespeare (1564-1616) observed that the productivity of Italian shipping had declined, compared with that of the British, because of conservatism and loss of expertise. Moreover, Italian sailors were deserting and emigrating, and captains, no longer recruited from the ranks of nobles, were weak on navigations. | 4135.txt | 3 |
[
"The wages of officers and workers in the Arsenale kept rising.",
"Roman shipyards were using all the available fir trees for the warships.",
"The timber used in the shipbuilding had to be brought from farther and farther away.",
"Venetian standards required that shipbuilders use top-quality materials."
] | According to paragraphs 3, why did the building of ships in Venetianshipyards become increasingly expensive? | In the late thirteenth century, northern Italian cities such as Genoa, Florence, and Venice began an economic resurgence that made them into the most important economic centers of Europe. By the seventeenth century, however, other European powers had taken over, as the Italian cities lost much of their economic might.
This decline can be seen clearly in the changes that affected Venetian shipping and trade. First, Venice's intermediary functions in the Adriatic Sea, where it had dominated the business of shipping for other parties, were lost to direct trading. In the fifteenth century there was little problem recruiting sailors to row the galleys (large ships propelled by oars): guilds (business associations) were required to provide rowers, and through a draft system free citizens served compulsorily when called for. In the early sixteenth century the shortage of rowers was not serious because the demand for galleys was limited by a move to round ships (round-hulled ships with more cargo space), with required fewer rowers. But the shortage of crews proved to be a greater and greater problem, despite continuous appeal to Venic's tradition of maritime greatness. Even though sailors' wages doubled among the northern Italian cities from 1550 to 1590, this did not elicit an increased supply.
The problem in shipping extended to the Arsenale, Venice's huge and powerful shipyard. Timber ran short, and it was necessary to procure it from farther and farther away. In ancient Roman times, the Italian peninsula had great forest of fir preferred for warships, but scarcity was apparent as early as the early fourteenth century. Arsenale officers first brought timber from the foothills of the Alps, then from north toward Trieste, and finally from across the Adriatic. Private shipbuilders were required to buy their oak abroad. As the costs of shipbuilding rose, Venice clung to its outdated standard while the Dutch were innovation in the lighter and more easily handled ships.
The step from buying foreign timber to buying foreign ships was regarded as a short one, especially when complaints were heard in the latter sixteenth century that the standards and traditions of the Arsenale were running down. Work was stretched out and done poorly. Older workers had been allowed to stop work a half hour before the regular time, and in 1601 younger works left with them. Merchants complained that the privileges reserved for Venetian-built and owned ships were first extended to those Venetians who bought ships from abroad and then to foreign-built and owned vessels. Historian Frederic Lane observes that after the loss of ships in battle in the late sixteenth century, the shipbuilding industry no longer had the capacity to recover that it had displayed at the start of the century.
The conventional explanation for the loss of Venetian dominance in trade is establishment of the Portuguese direct sea route to the East, replacing the overland Silk Road from the Black sea and the highly profitable Indian Ocean-caravan-eastern Mediterranean route to Venice. The Portuguese Vasco da Gama's Voyage around southern Africa to India took place at the end of the fifteenth century, and by 1502 the trans- Abrabian caravan route had been cut off by political unrest.
The Venetian Council finally allowed round ships to enter the trade that was previously reserved for merchant galleys, thus reducing transport cost by one third. Prices of spices delivered by ship from the eastern Mediterranean came to equal those of spices transported by Paortuguese vessels, but the increase in quantity with both routes in operation drove the price far down. Gradually, Venice's role as a storage and distribution center for spices and silk, dyes cotton, and gold decayed, and by the early seventeenth century Venice had lost its monopoly in markets such as France and southern Germany.
Venetian shipping had started to decline from about 1530-before the entry into the Mediterranean of large volumes of Dutch and British shipping-and was clearly outclassed by the end of the century. A contemporary of Shakespeare (1564-1616) observed that the productivity of Italian shipping had declined, compared with that of the British, because of conservatism and loss of expertise. Moreover, Italian sailors were deserting and emigrating, and captains, no longer recruited from the ranks of nobles, were weak on navigations. | 4135.txt | 2 |
[
"The quality of work performed in the Arsenale had declined.",
"Venetian-built ships were heavy and generally inefficient.",
"Arsenale shipbuilders worked more slowly.",
"Only a few merchants controlled the buying and selling of most of the Venetian-built ships."
] | All of the following are mentioned in paragraph 3 and 4 as contributing to the problems of the Venetian ship building industry at the end of the sixteenth century EXCEPT | In the late thirteenth century, northern Italian cities such as Genoa, Florence, and Venice began an economic resurgence that made them into the most important economic centers of Europe. By the seventeenth century, however, other European powers had taken over, as the Italian cities lost much of their economic might.
This decline can be seen clearly in the changes that affected Venetian shipping and trade. First, Venice's intermediary functions in the Adriatic Sea, where it had dominated the business of shipping for other parties, were lost to direct trading. In the fifteenth century there was little problem recruiting sailors to row the galleys (large ships propelled by oars): guilds (business associations) were required to provide rowers, and through a draft system free citizens served compulsorily when called for. In the early sixteenth century the shortage of rowers was not serious because the demand for galleys was limited by a move to round ships (round-hulled ships with more cargo space), with required fewer rowers. But the shortage of crews proved to be a greater and greater problem, despite continuous appeal to Venic's tradition of maritime greatness. Even though sailors' wages doubled among the northern Italian cities from 1550 to 1590, this did not elicit an increased supply.
The problem in shipping extended to the Arsenale, Venice's huge and powerful shipyard. Timber ran short, and it was necessary to procure it from farther and farther away. In ancient Roman times, the Italian peninsula had great forest of fir preferred for warships, but scarcity was apparent as early as the early fourteenth century. Arsenale officers first brought timber from the foothills of the Alps, then from north toward Trieste, and finally from across the Adriatic. Private shipbuilders were required to buy their oak abroad. As the costs of shipbuilding rose, Venice clung to its outdated standard while the Dutch were innovation in the lighter and more easily handled ships.
The step from buying foreign timber to buying foreign ships was regarded as a short one, especially when complaints were heard in the latter sixteenth century that the standards and traditions of the Arsenale were running down. Work was stretched out and done poorly. Older workers had been allowed to stop work a half hour before the regular time, and in 1601 younger works left with them. Merchants complained that the privileges reserved for Venetian-built and owned ships were first extended to those Venetians who bought ships from abroad and then to foreign-built and owned vessels. Historian Frederic Lane observes that after the loss of ships in battle in the late sixteenth century, the shipbuilding industry no longer had the capacity to recover that it had displayed at the start of the century.
The conventional explanation for the loss of Venetian dominance in trade is establishment of the Portuguese direct sea route to the East, replacing the overland Silk Road from the Black sea and the highly profitable Indian Ocean-caravan-eastern Mediterranean route to Venice. The Portuguese Vasco da Gama's Voyage around southern Africa to India took place at the end of the fifteenth century, and by 1502 the trans- Abrabian caravan route had been cut off by political unrest.
The Venetian Council finally allowed round ships to enter the trade that was previously reserved for merchant galleys, thus reducing transport cost by one third. Prices of spices delivered by ship from the eastern Mediterranean came to equal those of spices transported by Paortuguese vessels, but the increase in quantity with both routes in operation drove the price far down. Gradually, Venice's role as a storage and distribution center for spices and silk, dyes cotton, and gold decayed, and by the early seventeenth century Venice had lost its monopoly in markets such as France and southern Germany.
Venetian shipping had started to decline from about 1530-before the entry into the Mediterranean of large volumes of Dutch and British shipping-and was clearly outclassed by the end of the century. A contemporary of Shakespeare (1564-1616) observed that the productivity of Italian shipping had declined, compared with that of the British, because of conservatism and loss of expertise. Moreover, Italian sailors were deserting and emigrating, and captains, no longer recruited from the ranks of nobles, were weak on navigations. | 4135.txt | 3 |
[
"informal.",
"logical.",
"correct.",
"usual."
] | The word "conventional" in the passage is closest in meaning to | In the late thirteenth century, northern Italian cities such as Genoa, Florence, and Venice began an economic resurgence that made them into the most important economic centers of Europe. By the seventeenth century, however, other European powers had taken over, as the Italian cities lost much of their economic might.
This decline can be seen clearly in the changes that affected Venetian shipping and trade. First, Venice's intermediary functions in the Adriatic Sea, where it had dominated the business of shipping for other parties, were lost to direct trading. In the fifteenth century there was little problem recruiting sailors to row the galleys (large ships propelled by oars): guilds (business associations) were required to provide rowers, and through a draft system free citizens served compulsorily when called for. In the early sixteenth century the shortage of rowers was not serious because the demand for galleys was limited by a move to round ships (round-hulled ships with more cargo space), with required fewer rowers. But the shortage of crews proved to be a greater and greater problem, despite continuous appeal to Venic's tradition of maritime greatness. Even though sailors' wages doubled among the northern Italian cities from 1550 to 1590, this did not elicit an increased supply.
The problem in shipping extended to the Arsenale, Venice's huge and powerful shipyard. Timber ran short, and it was necessary to procure it from farther and farther away. In ancient Roman times, the Italian peninsula had great forest of fir preferred for warships, but scarcity was apparent as early as the early fourteenth century. Arsenale officers first brought timber from the foothills of the Alps, then from north toward Trieste, and finally from across the Adriatic. Private shipbuilders were required to buy their oak abroad. As the costs of shipbuilding rose, Venice clung to its outdated standard while the Dutch were innovation in the lighter and more easily handled ships.
The step from buying foreign timber to buying foreign ships was regarded as a short one, especially when complaints were heard in the latter sixteenth century that the standards and traditions of the Arsenale were running down. Work was stretched out and done poorly. Older workers had been allowed to stop work a half hour before the regular time, and in 1601 younger works left with them. Merchants complained that the privileges reserved for Venetian-built and owned ships were first extended to those Venetians who bought ships from abroad and then to foreign-built and owned vessels. Historian Frederic Lane observes that after the loss of ships in battle in the late sixteenth century, the shipbuilding industry no longer had the capacity to recover that it had displayed at the start of the century.
The conventional explanation for the loss of Venetian dominance in trade is establishment of the Portuguese direct sea route to the East, replacing the overland Silk Road from the Black sea and the highly profitable Indian Ocean-caravan-eastern Mediterranean route to Venice. The Portuguese Vasco da Gama's Voyage around southern Africa to India took place at the end of the fifteenth century, and by 1502 the trans- Abrabian caravan route had been cut off by political unrest.
The Venetian Council finally allowed round ships to enter the trade that was previously reserved for merchant galleys, thus reducing transport cost by one third. Prices of spices delivered by ship from the eastern Mediterranean came to equal those of spices transported by Paortuguese vessels, but the increase in quantity with both routes in operation drove the price far down. Gradually, Venice's role as a storage and distribution center for spices and silk, dyes cotton, and gold decayed, and by the early seventeenth century Venice had lost its monopoly in markets such as France and southern Germany.
Venetian shipping had started to decline from about 1530-before the entry into the Mediterranean of large volumes of Dutch and British shipping-and was clearly outclassed by the end of the century. A contemporary of Shakespeare (1564-1616) observed that the productivity of Italian shipping had declined, compared with that of the British, because of conservatism and loss of expertise. Moreover, Italian sailors were deserting and emigrating, and captains, no longer recruited from the ranks of nobles, were weak on navigations. | 4135.txt | 3 |
[
"to indicate how the Portuguese came to challenge Venetian dominance of trade with the East.",
"to explain why political troubles resulted in the closing of the usual routes to India.",
"to prove that Venetians could not sail round ships as efficiently as sailors from other countries did.",
"to show that Venetian reliance on round ships rather than galleys proved to be weakness."
] | Why does the author mention "Vasco da Gama' Voyage around southern Africa to India" in the passage? | In the late thirteenth century, northern Italian cities such as Genoa, Florence, and Venice began an economic resurgence that made them into the most important economic centers of Europe. By the seventeenth century, however, other European powers had taken over, as the Italian cities lost much of their economic might.
This decline can be seen clearly in the changes that affected Venetian shipping and trade. First, Venice's intermediary functions in the Adriatic Sea, where it had dominated the business of shipping for other parties, were lost to direct trading. In the fifteenth century there was little problem recruiting sailors to row the galleys (large ships propelled by oars): guilds (business associations) were required to provide rowers, and through a draft system free citizens served compulsorily when called for. In the early sixteenth century the shortage of rowers was not serious because the demand for galleys was limited by a move to round ships (round-hulled ships with more cargo space), with required fewer rowers. But the shortage of crews proved to be a greater and greater problem, despite continuous appeal to Venic's tradition of maritime greatness. Even though sailors' wages doubled among the northern Italian cities from 1550 to 1590, this did not elicit an increased supply.
The problem in shipping extended to the Arsenale, Venice's huge and powerful shipyard. Timber ran short, and it was necessary to procure it from farther and farther away. In ancient Roman times, the Italian peninsula had great forest of fir preferred for warships, but scarcity was apparent as early as the early fourteenth century. Arsenale officers first brought timber from the foothills of the Alps, then from north toward Trieste, and finally from across the Adriatic. Private shipbuilders were required to buy their oak abroad. As the costs of shipbuilding rose, Venice clung to its outdated standard while the Dutch were innovation in the lighter and more easily handled ships.
The step from buying foreign timber to buying foreign ships was regarded as a short one, especially when complaints were heard in the latter sixteenth century that the standards and traditions of the Arsenale were running down. Work was stretched out and done poorly. Older workers had been allowed to stop work a half hour before the regular time, and in 1601 younger works left with them. Merchants complained that the privileges reserved for Venetian-built and owned ships were first extended to those Venetians who bought ships from abroad and then to foreign-built and owned vessels. Historian Frederic Lane observes that after the loss of ships in battle in the late sixteenth century, the shipbuilding industry no longer had the capacity to recover that it had displayed at the start of the century.
The conventional explanation for the loss of Venetian dominance in trade is establishment of the Portuguese direct sea route to the East, replacing the overland Silk Road from the Black sea and the highly profitable Indian Ocean-caravan-eastern Mediterranean route to Venice. The Portuguese Vasco da Gama's Voyage around southern Africa to India took place at the end of the fifteenth century, and by 1502 the trans- Abrabian caravan route had been cut off by political unrest.
The Venetian Council finally allowed round ships to enter the trade that was previously reserved for merchant galleys, thus reducing transport cost by one third. Prices of spices delivered by ship from the eastern Mediterranean came to equal those of spices transported by Paortuguese vessels, but the increase in quantity with both routes in operation drove the price far down. Gradually, Venice's role as a storage and distribution center for spices and silk, dyes cotton, and gold decayed, and by the early seventeenth century Venice had lost its monopoly in markets such as France and southern Germany.
Venetian shipping had started to decline from about 1530-before the entry into the Mediterranean of large volumes of Dutch and British shipping-and was clearly outclassed by the end of the century. A contemporary of Shakespeare (1564-1616) observed that the productivity of Italian shipping had declined, compared with that of the British, because of conservatism and loss of expertise. Moreover, Italian sailors were deserting and emigrating, and captains, no longer recruited from the ranks of nobles, were weak on navigations. | 4135.txt | 0 |
[
"It resulted in a return to profitable in luxury goods for Venetian merchants.",
"Ultimately it did not restore the superiority in the spice trade that Venice had enjoyed earlier.",
"It eventually enabled Venetian merchants to increase the quantity and price of the spices they sold in Europe.",
"It means a long-awaited improvement in the fortunes of the shipbuilding industry in Venice."
] | Which of the following can be inferred from paragraph 6 about the Venetian Council's decision concerning the use of round ships? | In the late thirteenth century, northern Italian cities such as Genoa, Florence, and Venice began an economic resurgence that made them into the most important economic centers of Europe. By the seventeenth century, however, other European powers had taken over, as the Italian cities lost much of their economic might.
This decline can be seen clearly in the changes that affected Venetian shipping and trade. First, Venice's intermediary functions in the Adriatic Sea, where it had dominated the business of shipping for other parties, were lost to direct trading. In the fifteenth century there was little problem recruiting sailors to row the galleys (large ships propelled by oars): guilds (business associations) were required to provide rowers, and through a draft system free citizens served compulsorily when called for. In the early sixteenth century the shortage of rowers was not serious because the demand for galleys was limited by a move to round ships (round-hulled ships with more cargo space), with required fewer rowers. But the shortage of crews proved to be a greater and greater problem, despite continuous appeal to Venic's tradition of maritime greatness. Even though sailors' wages doubled among the northern Italian cities from 1550 to 1590, this did not elicit an increased supply.
The problem in shipping extended to the Arsenale, Venice's huge and powerful shipyard. Timber ran short, and it was necessary to procure it from farther and farther away. In ancient Roman times, the Italian peninsula had great forest of fir preferred for warships, but scarcity was apparent as early as the early fourteenth century. Arsenale officers first brought timber from the foothills of the Alps, then from north toward Trieste, and finally from across the Adriatic. Private shipbuilders were required to buy their oak abroad. As the costs of shipbuilding rose, Venice clung to its outdated standard while the Dutch were innovation in the lighter and more easily handled ships.
The step from buying foreign timber to buying foreign ships was regarded as a short one, especially when complaints were heard in the latter sixteenth century that the standards and traditions of the Arsenale were running down. Work was stretched out and done poorly. Older workers had been allowed to stop work a half hour before the regular time, and in 1601 younger works left with them. Merchants complained that the privileges reserved for Venetian-built and owned ships were first extended to those Venetians who bought ships from abroad and then to foreign-built and owned vessels. Historian Frederic Lane observes that after the loss of ships in battle in the late sixteenth century, the shipbuilding industry no longer had the capacity to recover that it had displayed at the start of the century.
The conventional explanation for the loss of Venetian dominance in trade is establishment of the Portuguese direct sea route to the East, replacing the overland Silk Road from the Black sea and the highly profitable Indian Ocean-caravan-eastern Mediterranean route to Venice. The Portuguese Vasco da Gama's Voyage around southern Africa to India took place at the end of the fifteenth century, and by 1502 the trans- Abrabian caravan route had been cut off by political unrest.
The Venetian Council finally allowed round ships to enter the trade that was previously reserved for merchant galleys, thus reducing transport cost by one third. Prices of spices delivered by ship from the eastern Mediterranean came to equal those of spices transported by Paortuguese vessels, but the increase in quantity with both routes in operation drove the price far down. Gradually, Venice's role as a storage and distribution center for spices and silk, dyes cotton, and gold decayed, and by the early seventeenth century Venice had lost its monopoly in markets such as France and southern Germany.
Venetian shipping had started to decline from about 1530-before the entry into the Mediterranean of large volumes of Dutch and British shipping-and was clearly outclassed by the end of the century. A contemporary of Shakespeare (1564-1616) observed that the productivity of Italian shipping had declined, compared with that of the British, because of conservatism and loss of expertise. Moreover, Italian sailors were deserting and emigrating, and captains, no longer recruited from the ranks of nobles, were weak on navigations. | 4135.txt | 1 |
[
"France and Germany established monopolies and dictated prices.",
"Venetian merchant galleys competed with Venetian round ships for the spice trade.",
"More spices were available because both the Venetians and the Portuguese were importing them.",
"Increased demand for silk, dyes, cotton and gold meant that people had less money to spend on spices."
] | According to paragraphs 6, in the sixteenth century the price of spices declined because | In the late thirteenth century, northern Italian cities such as Genoa, Florence, and Venice began an economic resurgence that made them into the most important economic centers of Europe. By the seventeenth century, however, other European powers had taken over, as the Italian cities lost much of their economic might.
This decline can be seen clearly in the changes that affected Venetian shipping and trade. First, Venice's intermediary functions in the Adriatic Sea, where it had dominated the business of shipping for other parties, were lost to direct trading. In the fifteenth century there was little problem recruiting sailors to row the galleys (large ships propelled by oars): guilds (business associations) were required to provide rowers, and through a draft system free citizens served compulsorily when called for. In the early sixteenth century the shortage of rowers was not serious because the demand for galleys was limited by a move to round ships (round-hulled ships with more cargo space), with required fewer rowers. But the shortage of crews proved to be a greater and greater problem, despite continuous appeal to Venic's tradition of maritime greatness. Even though sailors' wages doubled among the northern Italian cities from 1550 to 1590, this did not elicit an increased supply.
The problem in shipping extended to the Arsenale, Venice's huge and powerful shipyard. Timber ran short, and it was necessary to procure it from farther and farther away. In ancient Roman times, the Italian peninsula had great forest of fir preferred for warships, but scarcity was apparent as early as the early fourteenth century. Arsenale officers first brought timber from the foothills of the Alps, then from north toward Trieste, and finally from across the Adriatic. Private shipbuilders were required to buy their oak abroad. As the costs of shipbuilding rose, Venice clung to its outdated standard while the Dutch were innovation in the lighter and more easily handled ships.
The step from buying foreign timber to buying foreign ships was regarded as a short one, especially when complaints were heard in the latter sixteenth century that the standards and traditions of the Arsenale were running down. Work was stretched out and done poorly. Older workers had been allowed to stop work a half hour before the regular time, and in 1601 younger works left with them. Merchants complained that the privileges reserved for Venetian-built and owned ships were first extended to those Venetians who bought ships from abroad and then to foreign-built and owned vessels. Historian Frederic Lane observes that after the loss of ships in battle in the late sixteenth century, the shipbuilding industry no longer had the capacity to recover that it had displayed at the start of the century.
The conventional explanation for the loss of Venetian dominance in trade is establishment of the Portuguese direct sea route to the East, replacing the overland Silk Road from the Black sea and the highly profitable Indian Ocean-caravan-eastern Mediterranean route to Venice. The Portuguese Vasco da Gama's Voyage around southern Africa to India took place at the end of the fifteenth century, and by 1502 the trans- Abrabian caravan route had been cut off by political unrest.
The Venetian Council finally allowed round ships to enter the trade that was previously reserved for merchant galleys, thus reducing transport cost by one third. Prices of spices delivered by ship from the eastern Mediterranean came to equal those of spices transported by Paortuguese vessels, but the increase in quantity with both routes in operation drove the price far down. Gradually, Venice's role as a storage and distribution center for spices and silk, dyes cotton, and gold decayed, and by the early seventeenth century Venice had lost its monopoly in markets such as France and southern Germany.
Venetian shipping had started to decline from about 1530-before the entry into the Mediterranean of large volumes of Dutch and British shipping-and was clearly outclassed by the end of the century. A contemporary of Shakespeare (1564-1616) observed that the productivity of Italian shipping had declined, compared with that of the British, because of conservatism and loss of expertise. Moreover, Italian sailors were deserting and emigrating, and captains, no longer recruited from the ranks of nobles, were weak on navigations. | 4135.txt | 2 |
[
"known.",
"depended on.",
"recognized.",
"utilized."
] | The word "harnessed" in the passage(paragraph 1)is closest in meaning to | Moving water was one of the earliest energy sources to be harnessed to reduce the workload of people and animals. No one knows exactly when the waterwheel was invented, but irrigation systems existed at least 5,000 years ago, and it seems probable that the earliest waterpower device was the noria, a waterwheel that raised water for irrigation in attached jars. The device appears to have evolved no later than the fifth century B.C., perhaps independently in different regions of the Middle and Far East.
The earliest waterpower mills were probably vertical-axis mills for grinding corn, known as Norse or Greek mills, which seem to have appeared during the first or second century B.C. in the Middle East and a few centuries later in Scandinavia. In the following centuries, increasingly sophisticated waterpower mills were built throughout the Roman Empire and beyond its boundaries in the Middle East and northern Europe. In England, the Saxons are thought to have used both horizontal0 and vertical-axis wheels. The first documented English mill was in the eighth century, but three centuries later about 5,000 were recorded, suggesting that every settlement of any size had its mill.
Raising water and grinding corn were by no means the only uses of the waterpower mill, and during the following centuries, the applications of waterpower kept pace with the developing technologies of mining, iron working, paper making, and the wool and cotton industries. Water was the main source of mechanical power, and by the end of the seventeenth century, England alone is thought to have had some 20,000 working mill.
There was much debate on the relative efficiencies of different types of waterwheels. The period from about 1650 until 1800 saw some excellent scientific and technical investigations of different designs. They revealed output powers ranging from about 1 horsepower to perhaps 60 for the largest wheels and confirmed that for maximum efficiency, the water should pass across the blades as smoothly as possible and fall away with minimum speed, having given up almost all of its kinetic energy. (They also proved that, in principle, the overshot wheel, a type of wheel in which an overhead stream of water powers the wheel, should win the efficiency competition.)
But then steam power entered the scene, putting the whole future of waterpower in doubt. An energy analyst writing in the year 1800 would have painted a very pessimistic picture of the future for waterpower. The coal-fired steam engine was taking over, and the waterwheel was fast becoming obsolete. However, like many later experts, this one would have suffered from an inability to see into the future. A century later the picture was completely different: by then, the world had an electric industry, and a quarter of its generating capacity was water powered.
The growth of the electric-power industry was the result of a remarkable series of scientific discoveries and development in electrotechnology during the nineteenth century, but significant changes in what we might now call hydro (water) technology also played their part. In 1832, the year of Michael Faraday's discovery that a changing magnetic field produces an electric field, a young French engineer patented a new and more efficient waterwheel. His name was Benoit Fourneyron, and his device was the first successful water turbine. (The word turbine comes form the Latin turbo: something that spins). The waterwheel, unaltered for nearly 2,000 years, had finally been superseded.
Half a century of development was needed before Faraday's discoveries in electricity were translated into full-scale power stations. In 1881 the Godalming power station in Surrey, England, on the banks of the Wey River, created the world's first public electricity supply. The power source of this most modern technology was a traditional waterwheel. Unfortunately this early plant experienced the problem common to many forms of renewable energy: the flow in the Wey River was unreliable, and the waterwheel was soon replaced by a steam engine.
From this primitive start, the electric industry grew during the final 20 years of the nineteenth century at a rate seldom if ever exceeded by any technology. The capacity of individual power stations, many of them hydro plants, rose from a few kilowatts to over a megawatt in less than a decade. | 3949.txt | 3 |
[
"when exactly the very first waterpower devices were invented.",
"when exactly the very first waterpower devices were developed.",
"whether water was one of the earliest sources of power to be used by humans.",
"whether the very earliest waterpower devices arose independently."
] | In paragraph 1, uncertainty is expressed about all of the following aspects of the early development of waterpower EXCEPT | Moving water was one of the earliest energy sources to be harnessed to reduce the workload of people and animals. No one knows exactly when the waterwheel was invented, but irrigation systems existed at least 5,000 years ago, and it seems probable that the earliest waterpower device was the noria, a waterwheel that raised water for irrigation in attached jars. The device appears to have evolved no later than the fifth century B.C., perhaps independently in different regions of the Middle and Far East.
The earliest waterpower mills were probably vertical-axis mills for grinding corn, known as Norse or Greek mills, which seem to have appeared during the first or second century B.C. in the Middle East and a few centuries later in Scandinavia. In the following centuries, increasingly sophisticated waterpower mills were built throughout the Roman Empire and beyond its boundaries in the Middle East and northern Europe. In England, the Saxons are thought to have used both horizontal0 and vertical-axis wheels. The first documented English mill was in the eighth century, but three centuries later about 5,000 were recorded, suggesting that every settlement of any size had its mill.
Raising water and grinding corn were by no means the only uses of the waterpower mill, and during the following centuries, the applications of waterpower kept pace with the developing technologies of mining, iron working, paper making, and the wool and cotton industries. Water was the main source of mechanical power, and by the end of the seventeenth century, England alone is thought to have had some 20,000 working mill.
There was much debate on the relative efficiencies of different types of waterwheels. The period from about 1650 until 1800 saw some excellent scientific and technical investigations of different designs. They revealed output powers ranging from about 1 horsepower to perhaps 60 for the largest wheels and confirmed that for maximum efficiency, the water should pass across the blades as smoothly as possible and fall away with minimum speed, having given up almost all of its kinetic energy. (They also proved that, in principle, the overshot wheel, a type of wheel in which an overhead stream of water powers the wheel, should win the efficiency competition.)
But then steam power entered the scene, putting the whole future of waterpower in doubt. An energy analyst writing in the year 1800 would have painted a very pessimistic picture of the future for waterpower. The coal-fired steam engine was taking over, and the waterwheel was fast becoming obsolete. However, like many later experts, this one would have suffered from an inability to see into the future. A century later the picture was completely different: by then, the world had an electric industry, and a quarter of its generating capacity was water powered.
The growth of the electric-power industry was the result of a remarkable series of scientific discoveries and development in electrotechnology during the nineteenth century, but significant changes in what we might now call hydro (water) technology also played their part. In 1832, the year of Michael Faraday's discovery that a changing magnetic field produces an electric field, a young French engineer patented a new and more efficient waterwheel. His name was Benoit Fourneyron, and his device was the first successful water turbine. (The word turbine comes form the Latin turbo: something that spins). The waterwheel, unaltered for nearly 2,000 years, had finally been superseded.
Half a century of development was needed before Faraday's discoveries in electricity were translated into full-scale power stations. In 1881 the Godalming power station in Surrey, England, on the banks of the Wey River, created the world's first public electricity supply. The power source of this most modern technology was a traditional waterwheel. Unfortunately this early plant experienced the problem common to many forms of renewable energy: the flow in the Wey River was unreliable, and the waterwheel was soon replaced by a steam engine.
From this primitive start, the electric industry grew during the final 20 years of the nineteenth century at a rate seldom if ever exceeded by any technology. The capacity of individual power stations, many of them hydro plants, rose from a few kilowatts to over a megawatt in less than a decade. | 3949.txt | 2 |
[
"Most had horizontal-axis wheels.",
"Their design was based on mills that had long been used in Scandinavia.",
"Their design was more popular beyond the Empire's boundaries than it was within the Empire.",
"They are more advanced than the mills used in the Middle East at an earlier time."
] | According to paragraph 2, what was true of the waterpower mills built throughout the Roman Empire? | Moving water was one of the earliest energy sources to be harnessed to reduce the workload of people and animals. No one knows exactly when the waterwheel was invented, but irrigation systems existed at least 5,000 years ago, and it seems probable that the earliest waterpower device was the noria, a waterwheel that raised water for irrigation in attached jars. The device appears to have evolved no later than the fifth century B.C., perhaps independently in different regions of the Middle and Far East.
The earliest waterpower mills were probably vertical-axis mills for grinding corn, known as Norse or Greek mills, which seem to have appeared during the first or second century B.C. in the Middle East and a few centuries later in Scandinavia. In the following centuries, increasingly sophisticated waterpower mills were built throughout the Roman Empire and beyond its boundaries in the Middle East and northern Europe. In England, the Saxons are thought to have used both horizontal0 and vertical-axis wheels. The first documented English mill was in the eighth century, but three centuries later about 5,000 were recorded, suggesting that every settlement of any size had its mill.
Raising water and grinding corn were by no means the only uses of the waterpower mill, and during the following centuries, the applications of waterpower kept pace with the developing technologies of mining, iron working, paper making, and the wool and cotton industries. Water was the main source of mechanical power, and by the end of the seventeenth century, England alone is thought to have had some 20,000 working mill.
There was much debate on the relative efficiencies of different types of waterwheels. The period from about 1650 until 1800 saw some excellent scientific and technical investigations of different designs. They revealed output powers ranging from about 1 horsepower to perhaps 60 for the largest wheels and confirmed that for maximum efficiency, the water should pass across the blades as smoothly as possible and fall away with minimum speed, having given up almost all of its kinetic energy. (They also proved that, in principle, the overshot wheel, a type of wheel in which an overhead stream of water powers the wheel, should win the efficiency competition.)
But then steam power entered the scene, putting the whole future of waterpower in doubt. An energy analyst writing in the year 1800 would have painted a very pessimistic picture of the future for waterpower. The coal-fired steam engine was taking over, and the waterwheel was fast becoming obsolete. However, like many later experts, this one would have suffered from an inability to see into the future. A century later the picture was completely different: by then, the world had an electric industry, and a quarter of its generating capacity was water powered.
The growth of the electric-power industry was the result of a remarkable series of scientific discoveries and development in electrotechnology during the nineteenth century, but significant changes in what we might now call hydro (water) technology also played their part. In 1832, the year of Michael Faraday's discovery that a changing magnetic field produces an electric field, a young French engineer patented a new and more efficient waterwheel. His name was Benoit Fourneyron, and his device was the first successful water turbine. (The word turbine comes form the Latin turbo: something that spins). The waterwheel, unaltered for nearly 2,000 years, had finally been superseded.
Half a century of development was needed before Faraday's discoveries in electricity were translated into full-scale power stations. In 1881 the Godalming power station in Surrey, England, on the banks of the Wey River, created the world's first public electricity supply. The power source of this most modern technology was a traditional waterwheel. Unfortunately this early plant experienced the problem common to many forms of renewable energy: the flow in the Wey River was unreliable, and the waterwheel was soon replaced by a steam engine.
From this primitive start, the electric industry grew during the final 20 years of the nineteenth century at a rate seldom if ever exceeded by any technology. The capacity of individual power stations, many of them hydro plants, rose from a few kilowatts to over a megawatt in less than a decade. | 3949.txt | 3 |
[
"the uses to which waterpower was put.",
"the improvement made to waterpower.",
"the method by which waterpower was supplied.",
"the source of waterpower available."
] | The phrase "the application of waterpower" in the passage (paragraph 3)is closest in meaning to | Moving water was one of the earliest energy sources to be harnessed to reduce the workload of people and animals. No one knows exactly when the waterwheel was invented, but irrigation systems existed at least 5,000 years ago, and it seems probable that the earliest waterpower device was the noria, a waterwheel that raised water for irrigation in attached jars. The device appears to have evolved no later than the fifth century B.C., perhaps independently in different regions of the Middle and Far East.
The earliest waterpower mills were probably vertical-axis mills for grinding corn, known as Norse or Greek mills, which seem to have appeared during the first or second century B.C. in the Middle East and a few centuries later in Scandinavia. In the following centuries, increasingly sophisticated waterpower mills were built throughout the Roman Empire and beyond its boundaries in the Middle East and northern Europe. In England, the Saxons are thought to have used both horizontal0 and vertical-axis wheels. The first documented English mill was in the eighth century, but three centuries later about 5,000 were recorded, suggesting that every settlement of any size had its mill.
Raising water and grinding corn were by no means the only uses of the waterpower mill, and during the following centuries, the applications of waterpower kept pace with the developing technologies of mining, iron working, paper making, and the wool and cotton industries. Water was the main source of mechanical power, and by the end of the seventeenth century, England alone is thought to have had some 20,000 working mill.
There was much debate on the relative efficiencies of different types of waterwheels. The period from about 1650 until 1800 saw some excellent scientific and technical investigations of different designs. They revealed output powers ranging from about 1 horsepower to perhaps 60 for the largest wheels and confirmed that for maximum efficiency, the water should pass across the blades as smoothly as possible and fall away with minimum speed, having given up almost all of its kinetic energy. (They also proved that, in principle, the overshot wheel, a type of wheel in which an overhead stream of water powers the wheel, should win the efficiency competition.)
But then steam power entered the scene, putting the whole future of waterpower in doubt. An energy analyst writing in the year 1800 would have painted a very pessimistic picture of the future for waterpower. The coal-fired steam engine was taking over, and the waterwheel was fast becoming obsolete. However, like many later experts, this one would have suffered from an inability to see into the future. A century later the picture was completely different: by then, the world had an electric industry, and a quarter of its generating capacity was water powered.
The growth of the electric-power industry was the result of a remarkable series of scientific discoveries and development in electrotechnology during the nineteenth century, but significant changes in what we might now call hydro (water) technology also played their part. In 1832, the year of Michael Faraday's discovery that a changing magnetic field produces an electric field, a young French engineer patented a new and more efficient waterwheel. His name was Benoit Fourneyron, and his device was the first successful water turbine. (The word turbine comes form the Latin turbo: something that spins). The waterwheel, unaltered for nearly 2,000 years, had finally been superseded.
Half a century of development was needed before Faraday's discoveries in electricity were translated into full-scale power stations. In 1881 the Godalming power station in Surrey, England, on the banks of the Wey River, created the world's first public electricity supply. The power source of this most modern technology was a traditional waterwheel. Unfortunately this early plant experienced the problem common to many forms of renewable energy: the flow in the Wey River was unreliable, and the waterwheel was soon replaced by a steam engine.
From this primitive start, the electric industry grew during the final 20 years of the nineteenth century at a rate seldom if ever exceeded by any technology. The capacity of individual power stations, many of them hydro plants, rose from a few kilowatts to over a megawatt in less than a decade. | 3949.txt | 0 |
[
"Some types of small waterwheel can produce as much horsepower as the very largest wheels.",
"Waterwheels operate more efficiently when water falls away from their blades slowly than when water falls away quickly.",
"Waterwheel efficiency can be improved by increasing the amount of kinetic energy water contains as it passes over a waterwheel's blades.",
"Unlike other types of waterwheels, the overshot wheel is capable of producing more than 60 horsepower units of energy."
] | According to paragraph 4, which of the following was discovered as a result of scientific and technical investigations of waterpower conducted between 1650 and 1800? | Moving water was one of the earliest energy sources to be harnessed to reduce the workload of people and animals. No one knows exactly when the waterwheel was invented, but irrigation systems existed at least 5,000 years ago, and it seems probable that the earliest waterpower device was the noria, a waterwheel that raised water for irrigation in attached jars. The device appears to have evolved no later than the fifth century B.C., perhaps independently in different regions of the Middle and Far East.
The earliest waterpower mills were probably vertical-axis mills for grinding corn, known as Norse or Greek mills, which seem to have appeared during the first or second century B.C. in the Middle East and a few centuries later in Scandinavia. In the following centuries, increasingly sophisticated waterpower mills were built throughout the Roman Empire and beyond its boundaries in the Middle East and northern Europe. In England, the Saxons are thought to have used both horizontal0 and vertical-axis wheels. The first documented English mill was in the eighth century, but three centuries later about 5,000 were recorded, suggesting that every settlement of any size had its mill.
Raising water and grinding corn were by no means the only uses of the waterpower mill, and during the following centuries, the applications of waterpower kept pace with the developing technologies of mining, iron working, paper making, and the wool and cotton industries. Water was the main source of mechanical power, and by the end of the seventeenth century, England alone is thought to have had some 20,000 working mill.
There was much debate on the relative efficiencies of different types of waterwheels. The period from about 1650 until 1800 saw some excellent scientific and technical investigations of different designs. They revealed output powers ranging from about 1 horsepower to perhaps 60 for the largest wheels and confirmed that for maximum efficiency, the water should pass across the blades as smoothly as possible and fall away with minimum speed, having given up almost all of its kinetic energy. (They also proved that, in principle, the overshot wheel, a type of wheel in which an overhead stream of water powers the wheel, should win the efficiency competition.)
But then steam power entered the scene, putting the whole future of waterpower in doubt. An energy analyst writing in the year 1800 would have painted a very pessimistic picture of the future for waterpower. The coal-fired steam engine was taking over, and the waterwheel was fast becoming obsolete. However, like many later experts, this one would have suffered from an inability to see into the future. A century later the picture was completely different: by then, the world had an electric industry, and a quarter of its generating capacity was water powered.
The growth of the electric-power industry was the result of a remarkable series of scientific discoveries and development in electrotechnology during the nineteenth century, but significant changes in what we might now call hydro (water) technology also played their part. In 1832, the year of Michael Faraday's discovery that a changing magnetic field produces an electric field, a young French engineer patented a new and more efficient waterwheel. His name was Benoit Fourneyron, and his device was the first successful water turbine. (The word turbine comes form the Latin turbo: something that spins). The waterwheel, unaltered for nearly 2,000 years, had finally been superseded.
Half a century of development was needed before Faraday's discoveries in electricity were translated into full-scale power stations. In 1881 the Godalming power station in Surrey, England, on the banks of the Wey River, created the world's first public electricity supply. The power source of this most modern technology was a traditional waterwheel. Unfortunately this early plant experienced the problem common to many forms of renewable energy: the flow in the Wey River was unreliable, and the waterwheel was soon replaced by a steam engine.
From this primitive start, the electric industry grew during the final 20 years of the nineteenth century at a rate seldom if ever exceeded by any technology. The capacity of individual power stations, many of them hydro plants, rose from a few kilowatts to over a megawatt in less than a decade. | 3949.txt | 1 |
[
"negative.",
"unlikely.",
"surprising.",
"incomplete."
] | The word "pessimistic" in the passage is closest in meaning to | Moving water was one of the earliest energy sources to be harnessed to reduce the workload of people and animals. No one knows exactly when the waterwheel was invented, but irrigation systems existed at least 5,000 years ago, and it seems probable that the earliest waterpower device was the noria, a waterwheel that raised water for irrigation in attached jars. The device appears to have evolved no later than the fifth century B.C., perhaps independently in different regions of the Middle and Far East.
The earliest waterpower mills were probably vertical-axis mills for grinding corn, known as Norse or Greek mills, which seem to have appeared during the first or second century B.C. in the Middle East and a few centuries later in Scandinavia. In the following centuries, increasingly sophisticated waterpower mills were built throughout the Roman Empire and beyond its boundaries in the Middle East and northern Europe. In England, the Saxons are thought to have used both horizontal0 and vertical-axis wheels. The first documented English mill was in the eighth century, but three centuries later about 5,000 were recorded, suggesting that every settlement of any size had its mill.
Raising water and grinding corn were by no means the only uses of the waterpower mill, and during the following centuries, the applications of waterpower kept pace with the developing technologies of mining, iron working, paper making, and the wool and cotton industries. Water was the main source of mechanical power, and by the end of the seventeenth century, England alone is thought to have had some 20,000 working mill.
There was much debate on the relative efficiencies of different types of waterwheels. The period from about 1650 until 1800 saw some excellent scientific and technical investigations of different designs. They revealed output powers ranging from about 1 horsepower to perhaps 60 for the largest wheels and confirmed that for maximum efficiency, the water should pass across the blades as smoothly as possible and fall away with minimum speed, having given up almost all of its kinetic energy. (They also proved that, in principle, the overshot wheel, a type of wheel in which an overhead stream of water powers the wheel, should win the efficiency competition.)
But then steam power entered the scene, putting the whole future of waterpower in doubt. An energy analyst writing in the year 1800 would have painted a very pessimistic picture of the future for waterpower. The coal-fired steam engine was taking over, and the waterwheel was fast becoming obsolete. However, like many later experts, this one would have suffered from an inability to see into the future. A century later the picture was completely different: by then, the world had an electric industry, and a quarter of its generating capacity was water powered.
The growth of the electric-power industry was the result of a remarkable series of scientific discoveries and development in electrotechnology during the nineteenth century, but significant changes in what we might now call hydro (water) technology also played their part. In 1832, the year of Michael Faraday's discovery that a changing magnetic field produces an electric field, a young French engineer patented a new and more efficient waterwheel. His name was Benoit Fourneyron, and his device was the first successful water turbine. (The word turbine comes form the Latin turbo: something that spins). The waterwheel, unaltered for nearly 2,000 years, had finally been superseded.
Half a century of development was needed before Faraday's discoveries in electricity were translated into full-scale power stations. In 1881 the Godalming power station in Surrey, England, on the banks of the Wey River, created the world's first public electricity supply. The power source of this most modern technology was a traditional waterwheel. Unfortunately this early plant experienced the problem common to many forms of renewable energy: the flow in the Wey River was unreliable, and the waterwheel was soon replaced by a steam engine.
From this primitive start, the electric industry grew during the final 20 years of the nineteenth century at a rate seldom if ever exceeded by any technology. The capacity of individual power stations, many of them hydro plants, rose from a few kilowatts to over a megawatt in less than a decade. | 3949.txt | 0 |
[
"by the time steam power entered the scene.",
"by the year 1800.",
"by the year 1900.",
"by the time waterwheel was becoming obsolete."
] | The term "by then" in the passage refers to | Moving water was one of the earliest energy sources to be harnessed to reduce the workload of people and animals. No one knows exactly when the waterwheel was invented, but irrigation systems existed at least 5,000 years ago, and it seems probable that the earliest waterpower device was the noria, a waterwheel that raised water for irrigation in attached jars. The device appears to have evolved no later than the fifth century B.C., perhaps independently in different regions of the Middle and Far East.
The earliest waterpower mills were probably vertical-axis mills for grinding corn, known as Norse or Greek mills, which seem to have appeared during the first or second century B.C. in the Middle East and a few centuries later in Scandinavia. In the following centuries, increasingly sophisticated waterpower mills were built throughout the Roman Empire and beyond its boundaries in the Middle East and northern Europe. In England, the Saxons are thought to have used both horizontal0 and vertical-axis wheels. The first documented English mill was in the eighth century, but three centuries later about 5,000 were recorded, suggesting that every settlement of any size had its mill.
Raising water and grinding corn were by no means the only uses of the waterpower mill, and during the following centuries, the applications of waterpower kept pace with the developing technologies of mining, iron working, paper making, and the wool and cotton industries. Water was the main source of mechanical power, and by the end of the seventeenth century, England alone is thought to have had some 20,000 working mill.
There was much debate on the relative efficiencies of different types of waterwheels. The period from about 1650 until 1800 saw some excellent scientific and technical investigations of different designs. They revealed output powers ranging from about 1 horsepower to perhaps 60 for the largest wheels and confirmed that for maximum efficiency, the water should pass across the blades as smoothly as possible and fall away with minimum speed, having given up almost all of its kinetic energy. (They also proved that, in principle, the overshot wheel, a type of wheel in which an overhead stream of water powers the wheel, should win the efficiency competition.)
But then steam power entered the scene, putting the whole future of waterpower in doubt. An energy analyst writing in the year 1800 would have painted a very pessimistic picture of the future for waterpower. The coal-fired steam engine was taking over, and the waterwheel was fast becoming obsolete. However, like many later experts, this one would have suffered from an inability to see into the future. A century later the picture was completely different: by then, the world had an electric industry, and a quarter of its generating capacity was water powered.
The growth of the electric-power industry was the result of a remarkable series of scientific discoveries and development in electrotechnology during the nineteenth century, but significant changes in what we might now call hydro (water) technology also played their part. In 1832, the year of Michael Faraday's discovery that a changing magnetic field produces an electric field, a young French engineer patented a new and more efficient waterwheel. His name was Benoit Fourneyron, and his device was the first successful water turbine. (The word turbine comes form the Latin turbo: something that spins). The waterwheel, unaltered for nearly 2,000 years, had finally been superseded.
Half a century of development was needed before Faraday's discoveries in electricity were translated into full-scale power stations. In 1881 the Godalming power station in Surrey, England, on the banks of the Wey River, created the world's first public electricity supply. The power source of this most modern technology was a traditional waterwheel. Unfortunately this early plant experienced the problem common to many forms of renewable energy: the flow in the Wey River was unreliable, and the waterwheel was soon replaced by a steam engine.
From this primitive start, the electric industry grew during the final 20 years of the nineteenth century at a rate seldom if ever exceeded by any technology. The capacity of individual power stations, many of them hydro plants, rose from a few kilowatts to over a megawatt in less than a decade. | 3949.txt | 2 |
[
"Better waterwheel designs improved the efficiency of waterpower.",
"Waterpower was needed to operate steam engines.",
"Waterpower was used to generate electricity.",
"Waterwheels became more efficient than coal-powered engines."
] | According to paragraph 5, why did waterpower become more importantly by 1900? | Moving water was one of the earliest energy sources to be harnessed to reduce the workload of people and animals. No one knows exactly when the waterwheel was invented, but irrigation systems existed at least 5,000 years ago, and it seems probable that the earliest waterpower device was the noria, a waterwheel that raised water for irrigation in attached jars. The device appears to have evolved no later than the fifth century B.C., perhaps independently in different regions of the Middle and Far East.
The earliest waterpower mills were probably vertical-axis mills for grinding corn, known as Norse or Greek mills, which seem to have appeared during the first or second century B.C. in the Middle East and a few centuries later in Scandinavia. In the following centuries, increasingly sophisticated waterpower mills were built throughout the Roman Empire and beyond its boundaries in the Middle East and northern Europe. In England, the Saxons are thought to have used both horizontal0 and vertical-axis wheels. The first documented English mill was in the eighth century, but three centuries later about 5,000 were recorded, suggesting that every settlement of any size had its mill.
Raising water and grinding corn were by no means the only uses of the waterpower mill, and during the following centuries, the applications of waterpower kept pace with the developing technologies of mining, iron working, paper making, and the wool and cotton industries. Water was the main source of mechanical power, and by the end of the seventeenth century, England alone is thought to have had some 20,000 working mill.
There was much debate on the relative efficiencies of different types of waterwheels. The period from about 1650 until 1800 saw some excellent scientific and technical investigations of different designs. They revealed output powers ranging from about 1 horsepower to perhaps 60 for the largest wheels and confirmed that for maximum efficiency, the water should pass across the blades as smoothly as possible and fall away with minimum speed, having given up almost all of its kinetic energy. (They also proved that, in principle, the overshot wheel, a type of wheel in which an overhead stream of water powers the wheel, should win the efficiency competition.)
But then steam power entered the scene, putting the whole future of waterpower in doubt. An energy analyst writing in the year 1800 would have painted a very pessimistic picture of the future for waterpower. The coal-fired steam engine was taking over, and the waterwheel was fast becoming obsolete. However, like many later experts, this one would have suffered from an inability to see into the future. A century later the picture was completely different: by then, the world had an electric industry, and a quarter of its generating capacity was water powered.
The growth of the electric-power industry was the result of a remarkable series of scientific discoveries and development in electrotechnology during the nineteenth century, but significant changes in what we might now call hydro (water) technology also played their part. In 1832, the year of Michael Faraday's discovery that a changing magnetic field produces an electric field, a young French engineer patented a new and more efficient waterwheel. His name was Benoit Fourneyron, and his device was the first successful water turbine. (The word turbine comes form the Latin turbo: something that spins). The waterwheel, unaltered for nearly 2,000 years, had finally been superseded.
Half a century of development was needed before Faraday's discoveries in electricity were translated into full-scale power stations. In 1881 the Godalming power station in Surrey, England, on the banks of the Wey River, created the world's first public electricity supply. The power source of this most modern technology was a traditional waterwheel. Unfortunately this early plant experienced the problem common to many forms of renewable energy: the flow in the Wey River was unreliable, and the waterwheel was soon replaced by a steam engine.
From this primitive start, the electric industry grew during the final 20 years of the nineteenth century at a rate seldom if ever exceeded by any technology. The capacity of individual power stations, many of them hydro plants, rose from a few kilowatts to over a megawatt in less than a decade. | 3949.txt | 2 |
[
"unimproved.",
"unequaled.",
"unchanged.",
"unsatisfactory."
] | The word "unaltered" in the passage is closest in meaning to | Moving water was one of the earliest energy sources to be harnessed to reduce the workload of people and animals. No one knows exactly when the waterwheel was invented, but irrigation systems existed at least 5,000 years ago, and it seems probable that the earliest waterpower device was the noria, a waterwheel that raised water for irrigation in attached jars. The device appears to have evolved no later than the fifth century B.C., perhaps independently in different regions of the Middle and Far East.
The earliest waterpower mills were probably vertical-axis mills for grinding corn, known as Norse or Greek mills, which seem to have appeared during the first or second century B.C. in the Middle East and a few centuries later in Scandinavia. In the following centuries, increasingly sophisticated waterpower mills were built throughout the Roman Empire and beyond its boundaries in the Middle East and northern Europe. In England, the Saxons are thought to have used both horizontal0 and vertical-axis wheels. The first documented English mill was in the eighth century, but three centuries later about 5,000 were recorded, suggesting that every settlement of any size had its mill.
Raising water and grinding corn were by no means the only uses of the waterpower mill, and during the following centuries, the applications of waterpower kept pace with the developing technologies of mining, iron working, paper making, and the wool and cotton industries. Water was the main source of mechanical power, and by the end of the seventeenth century, England alone is thought to have had some 20,000 working mill.
There was much debate on the relative efficiencies of different types of waterwheels. The period from about 1650 until 1800 saw some excellent scientific and technical investigations of different designs. They revealed output powers ranging from about 1 horsepower to perhaps 60 for the largest wheels and confirmed that for maximum efficiency, the water should pass across the blades as smoothly as possible and fall away with minimum speed, having given up almost all of its kinetic energy. (They also proved that, in principle, the overshot wheel, a type of wheel in which an overhead stream of water powers the wheel, should win the efficiency competition.)
But then steam power entered the scene, putting the whole future of waterpower in doubt. An energy analyst writing in the year 1800 would have painted a very pessimistic picture of the future for waterpower. The coal-fired steam engine was taking over, and the waterwheel was fast becoming obsolete. However, like many later experts, this one would have suffered from an inability to see into the future. A century later the picture was completely different: by then, the world had an electric industry, and a quarter of its generating capacity was water powered.
The growth of the electric-power industry was the result of a remarkable series of scientific discoveries and development in electrotechnology during the nineteenth century, but significant changes in what we might now call hydro (water) technology also played their part. In 1832, the year of Michael Faraday's discovery that a changing magnetic field produces an electric field, a young French engineer patented a new and more efficient waterwheel. His name was Benoit Fourneyron, and his device was the first successful water turbine. (The word turbine comes form the Latin turbo: something that spins). The waterwheel, unaltered for nearly 2,000 years, had finally been superseded.
Half a century of development was needed before Faraday's discoveries in electricity were translated into full-scale power stations. In 1881 the Godalming power station in Surrey, England, on the banks of the Wey River, created the world's first public electricity supply. The power source of this most modern technology was a traditional waterwheel. Unfortunately this early plant experienced the problem common to many forms of renewable energy: the flow in the Wey River was unreliable, and the waterwheel was soon replaced by a steam engine.
From this primitive start, the electric industry grew during the final 20 years of the nineteenth century at a rate seldom if ever exceeded by any technology. The capacity of individual power stations, many of them hydro plants, rose from a few kilowatts to over a megawatt in less than a decade. | 3949.txt | 2 |
[
"1832 marked the beginning of the industrial production of electric power.",
"Turbines using Benoit Fourneyron's design were eventually used to generate electric power.",
"Benoit Fourneyron quickly applied Michael Faraday's discovery about electric fields to acquire a pattern for a new and more efficient waterwheel.",
"Practical advances in hydro technology were more important to the development of electric power than were advances in the theoretical understanding of electricity."
] | The discussion of the history of electric power production in paragraph 6 supports which of the following? | Moving water was one of the earliest energy sources to be harnessed to reduce the workload of people and animals. No one knows exactly when the waterwheel was invented, but irrigation systems existed at least 5,000 years ago, and it seems probable that the earliest waterpower device was the noria, a waterwheel that raised water for irrigation in attached jars. The device appears to have evolved no later than the fifth century B.C., perhaps independently in different regions of the Middle and Far East.
The earliest waterpower mills were probably vertical-axis mills for grinding corn, known as Norse or Greek mills, which seem to have appeared during the first or second century B.C. in the Middle East and a few centuries later in Scandinavia. In the following centuries, increasingly sophisticated waterpower mills were built throughout the Roman Empire and beyond its boundaries in the Middle East and northern Europe. In England, the Saxons are thought to have used both horizontal0 and vertical-axis wheels. The first documented English mill was in the eighth century, but three centuries later about 5,000 were recorded, suggesting that every settlement of any size had its mill.
Raising water and grinding corn were by no means the only uses of the waterpower mill, and during the following centuries, the applications of waterpower kept pace with the developing technologies of mining, iron working, paper making, and the wool and cotton industries. Water was the main source of mechanical power, and by the end of the seventeenth century, England alone is thought to have had some 20,000 working mill.
There was much debate on the relative efficiencies of different types of waterwheels. The period from about 1650 until 1800 saw some excellent scientific and technical investigations of different designs. They revealed output powers ranging from about 1 horsepower to perhaps 60 for the largest wheels and confirmed that for maximum efficiency, the water should pass across the blades as smoothly as possible and fall away with minimum speed, having given up almost all of its kinetic energy. (They also proved that, in principle, the overshot wheel, a type of wheel in which an overhead stream of water powers the wheel, should win the efficiency competition.)
But then steam power entered the scene, putting the whole future of waterpower in doubt. An energy analyst writing in the year 1800 would have painted a very pessimistic picture of the future for waterpower. The coal-fired steam engine was taking over, and the waterwheel was fast becoming obsolete. However, like many later experts, this one would have suffered from an inability to see into the future. A century later the picture was completely different: by then, the world had an electric industry, and a quarter of its generating capacity was water powered.
The growth of the electric-power industry was the result of a remarkable series of scientific discoveries and development in electrotechnology during the nineteenth century, but significant changes in what we might now call hydro (water) technology also played their part. In 1832, the year of Michael Faraday's discovery that a changing magnetic field produces an electric field, a young French engineer patented a new and more efficient waterwheel. His name was Benoit Fourneyron, and his device was the first successful water turbine. (The word turbine comes form the Latin turbo: something that spins). The waterwheel, unaltered for nearly 2,000 years, had finally been superseded.
Half a century of development was needed before Faraday's discoveries in electricity were translated into full-scale power stations. In 1881 the Godalming power station in Surrey, England, on the banks of the Wey River, created the world's first public electricity supply. The power source of this most modern technology was a traditional waterwheel. Unfortunately this early plant experienced the problem common to many forms of renewable energy: the flow in the Wey River was unreliable, and the waterwheel was soon replaced by a steam engine.
From this primitive start, the electric industry grew during the final 20 years of the nineteenth century at a rate seldom if ever exceeded by any technology. The capacity of individual power stations, many of them hydro plants, rose from a few kilowatts to over a megawatt in less than a decade. | 3949.txt | 1 |
[
"The traditional waterwheel is used was not large enough to meet the demand for energy.",
"The flow of the River Wey, on which the power station depended, was unreliable.",
"The operators of the Godalming power station had little experience with hydro technology.",
"The steam engine that turned the waterwheel was faulty and needed to be replaced."
] | According to paragraph 7, what problem did the early power station in the town of Godalming in Surrey, United Kingdom, face in providing electricity? | Moving water was one of the earliest energy sources to be harnessed to reduce the workload of people and animals. No one knows exactly when the waterwheel was invented, but irrigation systems existed at least 5,000 years ago, and it seems probable that the earliest waterpower device was the noria, a waterwheel that raised water for irrigation in attached jars. The device appears to have evolved no later than the fifth century B.C., perhaps independently in different regions of the Middle and Far East.
The earliest waterpower mills were probably vertical-axis mills for grinding corn, known as Norse or Greek mills, which seem to have appeared during the first or second century B.C. in the Middle East and a few centuries later in Scandinavia. In the following centuries, increasingly sophisticated waterpower mills were built throughout the Roman Empire and beyond its boundaries in the Middle East and northern Europe. In England, the Saxons are thought to have used both horizontal0 and vertical-axis wheels. The first documented English mill was in the eighth century, but three centuries later about 5,000 were recorded, suggesting that every settlement of any size had its mill.
Raising water and grinding corn were by no means the only uses of the waterpower mill, and during the following centuries, the applications of waterpower kept pace with the developing technologies of mining, iron working, paper making, and the wool and cotton industries. Water was the main source of mechanical power, and by the end of the seventeenth century, England alone is thought to have had some 20,000 working mill.
There was much debate on the relative efficiencies of different types of waterwheels. The period from about 1650 until 1800 saw some excellent scientific and technical investigations of different designs. They revealed output powers ranging from about 1 horsepower to perhaps 60 for the largest wheels and confirmed that for maximum efficiency, the water should pass across the blades as smoothly as possible and fall away with minimum speed, having given up almost all of its kinetic energy. (They also proved that, in principle, the overshot wheel, a type of wheel in which an overhead stream of water powers the wheel, should win the efficiency competition.)
But then steam power entered the scene, putting the whole future of waterpower in doubt. An energy analyst writing in the year 1800 would have painted a very pessimistic picture of the future for waterpower. The coal-fired steam engine was taking over, and the waterwheel was fast becoming obsolete. However, like many later experts, this one would have suffered from an inability to see into the future. A century later the picture was completely different: by then, the world had an electric industry, and a quarter of its generating capacity was water powered.
The growth of the electric-power industry was the result of a remarkable series of scientific discoveries and development in electrotechnology during the nineteenth century, but significant changes in what we might now call hydro (water) technology also played their part. In 1832, the year of Michael Faraday's discovery that a changing magnetic field produces an electric field, a young French engineer patented a new and more efficient waterwheel. His name was Benoit Fourneyron, and his device was the first successful water turbine. (The word turbine comes form the Latin turbo: something that spins). The waterwheel, unaltered for nearly 2,000 years, had finally been superseded.
Half a century of development was needed before Faraday's discoveries in electricity were translated into full-scale power stations. In 1881 the Godalming power station in Surrey, England, on the banks of the Wey River, created the world's first public electricity supply. The power source of this most modern technology was a traditional waterwheel. Unfortunately this early plant experienced the problem common to many forms of renewable energy: the flow in the Wey River was unreliable, and the waterwheel was soon replaced by a steam engine.
From this primitive start, the electric industry grew during the final 20 years of the nineteenth century at a rate seldom if ever exceeded by any technology. The capacity of individual power stations, many of them hydro plants, rose from a few kilowatts to over a megawatt in less than a decade. | 3949.txt | 1 |
[
"identifying the kinds of thinking that are used by technologists",
"stressing the importance of nonverbal thinking in engineering design",
"proposing a new role for nonscientific thinking in the development of technology",
"contrasting the goals of engineers with those of technologists"
] | In the passage, the author is primarily concerned with | Many objects in daily use have clearly been influenced by science, but their form and function, their dimensions and appearance, were determined by technologists artisans, designers, inventors, and engineers---using non-scientific modes of thought. Many features and qualities of the objects that a technologist thinks about cannot be reduced to unambiguous verbal descriptions; they are dealt with in the mind by a visual, nonverbal process. In the development of Western technology, it has been non- verbal thinking, by and large, that has fixed the outlines and filled in the details of our material surroundings. Pyramids, cathedrals, and rockets exist not because of geometry or thermodynamics, but because they were first a picture in the minds of those who built them. The creative shaping process of a technologist's mind can be seen in nearly every artifact that exists. For exam- ple, in designing a diesel engine, a technologist might impress individual ways of nonverbal thinking on the machine by continually using an intuitive sense of rightness and fitness. What would be the shape of the com- bustion chamber? Where should the valves be placed? Should it have a long or short piston? Such questions have a range of answers that are supplied by experience, by physical requirements, by limitations of available space, and not least by a sense of form. Some decisions, such as wall thickness and pin diameter, may depend on scientific calculations, but the nonscientific component of design remains primary.
Design courses, then, should be an essential element in engineering curricula. Nonverbal thinking, a central mechanism in engineering design, involves perceptions, the stock-in-trade of the artist, not the scientist. Because perceptive processes are not assumed to entail "hard thinking," nonverbal thought is sometimes seen as a primitive stage in the development of cognitive processes and inferior to verbal or mathematical thought. But it is paradoxical that when the staff of the Historic American Engineering Record wished to have drawings made of machines and isometric views of industrial processes for its historical record of American engineering, the only college students with the requisite abilities were not engi- neering students, but rather students attending architectural schools.
It courses in design, which in a strongly analytical engineering curriculum provide the background required for practical problem- solving, are not provided, we can expect to encounter silly but costly errors occurring in advanced engineering systems. For example, early models of high-speed railroad cars loaded with sophisticated controls were unable to operate in a snowstorm because a fan sucked snow into the electrical system. Absurd random failures that plague automatic control systems are not merely trivial aberrations; they are a reflection of the chaos that results when design is assumed to be primarily a problem in mathematics. | 1917.txt | 1 |
[
"strengthened when they include courses in design",
"weakened by the substitution of physical science courses for courses designed to develop mathematical skills",
"strong because nonverbal thinking is still emphasized by most of the courses",
"strong despite the errors that graduates of such curricula have made in the development of automatic control systems"
] | It can be inferred that the author thinks engineering curricula are | Many objects in daily use have clearly been influenced by science, but their form and function, their dimensions and appearance, were determined by technologists artisans, designers, inventors, and engineers---using non-scientific modes of thought. Many features and qualities of the objects that a technologist thinks about cannot be reduced to unambiguous verbal descriptions; they are dealt with in the mind by a visual, nonverbal process. In the development of Western technology, it has been non- verbal thinking, by and large, that has fixed the outlines and filled in the details of our material surroundings. Pyramids, cathedrals, and rockets exist not because of geometry or thermodynamics, but because they were first a picture in the minds of those who built them. The creative shaping process of a technologist's mind can be seen in nearly every artifact that exists. For exam- ple, in designing a diesel engine, a technologist might impress individual ways of nonverbal thinking on the machine by continually using an intuitive sense of rightness and fitness. What would be the shape of the com- bustion chamber? Where should the valves be placed? Should it have a long or short piston? Such questions have a range of answers that are supplied by experience, by physical requirements, by limitations of available space, and not least by a sense of form. Some decisions, such as wall thickness and pin diameter, may depend on scientific calculations, but the nonscientific component of design remains primary.
Design courses, then, should be an essential element in engineering curricula. Nonverbal thinking, a central mechanism in engineering design, involves perceptions, the stock-in-trade of the artist, not the scientist. Because perceptive processes are not assumed to entail "hard thinking," nonverbal thought is sometimes seen as a primitive stage in the development of cognitive processes and inferior to verbal or mathematical thought. But it is paradoxical that when the staff of the Historic American Engineering Record wished to have drawings made of machines and isometric views of industrial processes for its historical record of American engineering, the only college students with the requisite abilities were not engi- neering students, but rather students attending architectural schools.
It courses in design, which in a strongly analytical engineering curriculum provide the background required for practical problem- solving, are not provided, we can expect to encounter silly but costly errors occurring in advanced engineering systems. For example, early models of high-speed railroad cars loaded with sophisticated controls were unable to operate in a snowstorm because a fan sucked snow into the electrical system. Absurd random failures that plague automatic control systems are not merely trivial aberrations; they are a reflection of the chaos that results when design is assumed to be primarily a problem in mathematics. | 1917.txt | 0 |
[
"When a machine like a rotary engine malfunctions, it is the technologist who is best equipped to repair it.",
"Each component of an automobile-for example, the engine or the fuel tank-has a ahape that has been scientifically determined to be best suited to that component's function",
"A telephone is a complex instrument designed by technologists using only nonverbal thought",
"The distinctive features of a suspension bridge reflect its designer's conceptualization as well as the physical requirements of its site."
] | Which of the following statements best illustrates the main point of lines 1-28 of the passage? | Many objects in daily use have clearly been influenced by science, but their form and function, their dimensions and appearance, were determined by technologists artisans, designers, inventors, and engineers---using non-scientific modes of thought. Many features and qualities of the objects that a technologist thinks about cannot be reduced to unambiguous verbal descriptions; they are dealt with in the mind by a visual, nonverbal process. In the development of Western technology, it has been non- verbal thinking, by and large, that has fixed the outlines and filled in the details of our material surroundings. Pyramids, cathedrals, and rockets exist not because of geometry or thermodynamics, but because they were first a picture in the minds of those who built them. The creative shaping process of a technologist's mind can be seen in nearly every artifact that exists. For exam- ple, in designing a diesel engine, a technologist might impress individual ways of nonverbal thinking on the machine by continually using an intuitive sense of rightness and fitness. What would be the shape of the com- bustion chamber? Where should the valves be placed? Should it have a long or short piston? Such questions have a range of answers that are supplied by experience, by physical requirements, by limitations of available space, and not least by a sense of form. Some decisions, such as wall thickness and pin diameter, may depend on scientific calculations, but the nonscientific component of design remains primary.
Design courses, then, should be an essential element in engineering curricula. Nonverbal thinking, a central mechanism in engineering design, involves perceptions, the stock-in-trade of the artist, not the scientist. Because perceptive processes are not assumed to entail "hard thinking," nonverbal thought is sometimes seen as a primitive stage in the development of cognitive processes and inferior to verbal or mathematical thought. But it is paradoxical that when the staff of the Historic American Engineering Record wished to have drawings made of machines and isometric views of industrial processes for its historical record of American engineering, the only college students with the requisite abilities were not engi- neering students, but rather students attending architectural schools.
It courses in design, which in a strongly analytical engineering curriculum provide the background required for practical problem- solving, are not provided, we can expect to encounter silly but costly errors occurring in advanced engineering systems. For example, early models of high-speed railroad cars loaded with sophisticated controls were unable to operate in a snowstorm because a fan sucked snow into the electrical system. Absurd random failures that plague automatic control systems are not merely trivial aberrations; they are a reflection of the chaos that results when design is assumed to be primarily a problem in mathematics. | 1917.txt | 3 |
[
"The assumption that the knowledge incorporated in technological developments must be derived from science ignores the many non-scientific decisions made by technologists.",
"Analytical thought is no longer a vital component in the success of technological development.",
"As knowledge of technology has increased, the tendency has been to lose sight of the important role played by scientific thought in making decisions about form, arrangement, and texture.",
"A movement in engineering colleges toward a technician's degree reflects a demand for graduates who have the nonverbal reasoning ability that was once common among engineers."
] | Which of the following statements would best serve as an introduction to the passage? | Many objects in daily use have clearly been influenced by science, but their form and function, their dimensions and appearance, were determined by technologists artisans, designers, inventors, and engineers---using non-scientific modes of thought. Many features and qualities of the objects that a technologist thinks about cannot be reduced to unambiguous verbal descriptions; they are dealt with in the mind by a visual, nonverbal process. In the development of Western technology, it has been non- verbal thinking, by and large, that has fixed the outlines and filled in the details of our material surroundings. Pyramids, cathedrals, and rockets exist not because of geometry or thermodynamics, but because they were first a picture in the minds of those who built them. The creative shaping process of a technologist's mind can be seen in nearly every artifact that exists. For exam- ple, in designing a diesel engine, a technologist might impress individual ways of nonverbal thinking on the machine by continually using an intuitive sense of rightness and fitness. What would be the shape of the com- bustion chamber? Where should the valves be placed? Should it have a long or short piston? Such questions have a range of answers that are supplied by experience, by physical requirements, by limitations of available space, and not least by a sense of form. Some decisions, such as wall thickness and pin diameter, may depend on scientific calculations, but the nonscientific component of design remains primary.
Design courses, then, should be an essential element in engineering curricula. Nonverbal thinking, a central mechanism in engineering design, involves perceptions, the stock-in-trade of the artist, not the scientist. Because perceptive processes are not assumed to entail "hard thinking," nonverbal thought is sometimes seen as a primitive stage in the development of cognitive processes and inferior to verbal or mathematical thought. But it is paradoxical that when the staff of the Historic American Engineering Record wished to have drawings made of machines and isometric views of industrial processes for its historical record of American engineering, the only college students with the requisite abilities were not engi- neering students, but rather students attending architectural schools.
It courses in design, which in a strongly analytical engineering curriculum provide the background required for practical problem- solving, are not provided, we can expect to encounter silly but costly errors occurring in advanced engineering systems. For example, early models of high-speed railroad cars loaded with sophisticated controls were unable to operate in a snowstorm because a fan sucked snow into the electrical system. Absurd random failures that plague automatic control systems are not merely trivial aberrations; they are a reflection of the chaos that results when design is assumed to be primarily a problem in mathematics. | 1917.txt | 0 |
[
"he publication needed drawings that its own staff could not make",
"architectural schools offered but did not require engineering design courses for their students",
"college students were qualified to make the drawings while practicing engineers were not",
"engineering students were not trained to make the type of drawings needed to record the development of their own discipline"
] | The author calls the predicament faced by the Historic American Engineering Record "para-doxical" (lines 36-37) most probably because | Many objects in daily use have clearly been influenced by science, but their form and function, their dimensions and appearance, were determined by technologists artisans, designers, inventors, and engineers---using non-scientific modes of thought. Many features and qualities of the objects that a technologist thinks about cannot be reduced to unambiguous verbal descriptions; they are dealt with in the mind by a visual, nonverbal process. In the development of Western technology, it has been non- verbal thinking, by and large, that has fixed the outlines and filled in the details of our material surroundings. Pyramids, cathedrals, and rockets exist not because of geometry or thermodynamics, but because they were first a picture in the minds of those who built them. The creative shaping process of a technologist's mind can be seen in nearly every artifact that exists. For exam- ple, in designing a diesel engine, a technologist might impress individual ways of nonverbal thinking on the machine by continually using an intuitive sense of rightness and fitness. What would be the shape of the com- bustion chamber? Where should the valves be placed? Should it have a long or short piston? Such questions have a range of answers that are supplied by experience, by physical requirements, by limitations of available space, and not least by a sense of form. Some decisions, such as wall thickness and pin diameter, may depend on scientific calculations, but the nonscientific component of design remains primary.
Design courses, then, should be an essential element in engineering curricula. Nonverbal thinking, a central mechanism in engineering design, involves perceptions, the stock-in-trade of the artist, not the scientist. Because perceptive processes are not assumed to entail "hard thinking," nonverbal thought is sometimes seen as a primitive stage in the development of cognitive processes and inferior to verbal or mathematical thought. But it is paradoxical that when the staff of the Historic American Engineering Record wished to have drawings made of machines and isometric views of industrial processes for its historical record of American engineering, the only college students with the requisite abilities were not engi- neering students, but rather students attending architectural schools.
It courses in design, which in a strongly analytical engineering curriculum provide the background required for practical problem- solving, are not provided, we can expect to encounter silly but costly errors occurring in advanced engineering systems. For example, early models of high-speed railroad cars loaded with sophisticated controls were unable to operate in a snowstorm because a fan sucked snow into the electrical system. Absurd random failures that plague automatic control systems are not merely trivial aberrations; they are a reflection of the chaos that results when design is assumed to be primarily a problem in mathematics. | 1917.txt | 3 |
[
"automatic control systems are designed by engineers who have little practical experience in the field",
"the failures are characteristic of systems designed by engineers relying too heavily on concepts in mathematics",
"the failures occur too often to be taken lightly",
"designers of automatic control systems have too little training in the analysis of mechanical difficulties"
] | According to the passage, random failures in automatic control systems are "not merely trivial aberrations" (lines53) because | Many objects in daily use have clearly been influenced by science, but their form and function, their dimensions and appearance, were determined by technologists artisans, designers, inventors, and engineers---using non-scientific modes of thought. Many features and qualities of the objects that a technologist thinks about cannot be reduced to unambiguous verbal descriptions; they are dealt with in the mind by a visual, nonverbal process. In the development of Western technology, it has been non- verbal thinking, by and large, that has fixed the outlines and filled in the details of our material surroundings. Pyramids, cathedrals, and rockets exist not because of geometry or thermodynamics, but because they were first a picture in the minds of those who built them. The creative shaping process of a technologist's mind can be seen in nearly every artifact that exists. For exam- ple, in designing a diesel engine, a technologist might impress individual ways of nonverbal thinking on the machine by continually using an intuitive sense of rightness and fitness. What would be the shape of the com- bustion chamber? Where should the valves be placed? Should it have a long or short piston? Such questions have a range of answers that are supplied by experience, by physical requirements, by limitations of available space, and not least by a sense of form. Some decisions, such as wall thickness and pin diameter, may depend on scientific calculations, but the nonscientific component of design remains primary.
Design courses, then, should be an essential element in engineering curricula. Nonverbal thinking, a central mechanism in engineering design, involves perceptions, the stock-in-trade of the artist, not the scientist. Because perceptive processes are not assumed to entail "hard thinking," nonverbal thought is sometimes seen as a primitive stage in the development of cognitive processes and inferior to verbal or mathematical thought. But it is paradoxical that when the staff of the Historic American Engineering Record wished to have drawings made of machines and isometric views of industrial processes for its historical record of American engineering, the only college students with the requisite abilities were not engi- neering students, but rather students attending architectural schools.
It courses in design, which in a strongly analytical engineering curriculum provide the background required for practical problem- solving, are not provided, we can expect to encounter silly but costly errors occurring in advanced engineering systems. For example, early models of high-speed railroad cars loaded with sophisticated controls were unable to operate in a snowstorm because a fan sucked snow into the electrical system. Absurd random failures that plague automatic control systems are not merely trivial aberrations; they are a reflection of the chaos that results when design is assumed to be primarily a problem in mathematics. | 1917.txt | 1 |
[
"weaken the argument that modern engineering systems have major defects because of an absence of design courses in engineering curricula",
"support the thesis that the number of errors in modern engineering systems is likely to increase",
"illustrate the idea that courses in design are the most effective means for reducing the cost of designing engineering systems",
"support the contention that a lack of attention to the nonscientific aspects of design results in poor conceptualization by engineers"
] | The author uses the example of the early models of high-speed railroad cars primarily to | Many objects in daily use have clearly been influenced by science, but their form and function, their dimensions and appearance, were determined by technologists artisans, designers, inventors, and engineers---using non-scientific modes of thought. Many features and qualities of the objects that a technologist thinks about cannot be reduced to unambiguous verbal descriptions; they are dealt with in the mind by a visual, nonverbal process. In the development of Western technology, it has been non- verbal thinking, by and large, that has fixed the outlines and filled in the details of our material surroundings. Pyramids, cathedrals, and rockets exist not because of geometry or thermodynamics, but because they were first a picture in the minds of those who built them. The creative shaping process of a technologist's mind can be seen in nearly every artifact that exists. For exam- ple, in designing a diesel engine, a technologist might impress individual ways of nonverbal thinking on the machine by continually using an intuitive sense of rightness and fitness. What would be the shape of the com- bustion chamber? Where should the valves be placed? Should it have a long or short piston? Such questions have a range of answers that are supplied by experience, by physical requirements, by limitations of available space, and not least by a sense of form. Some decisions, such as wall thickness and pin diameter, may depend on scientific calculations, but the nonscientific component of design remains primary.
Design courses, then, should be an essential element in engineering curricula. Nonverbal thinking, a central mechanism in engineering design, involves perceptions, the stock-in-trade of the artist, not the scientist. Because perceptive processes are not assumed to entail "hard thinking," nonverbal thought is sometimes seen as a primitive stage in the development of cognitive processes and inferior to verbal or mathematical thought. But it is paradoxical that when the staff of the Historic American Engineering Record wished to have drawings made of machines and isometric views of industrial processes for its historical record of American engineering, the only college students with the requisite abilities were not engi- neering students, but rather students attending architectural schools.
It courses in design, which in a strongly analytical engineering curriculum provide the background required for practical problem- solving, are not provided, we can expect to encounter silly but costly errors occurring in advanced engineering systems. For example, early models of high-speed railroad cars loaded with sophisticated controls were unable to operate in a snowstorm because a fan sucked snow into the electrical system. Absurd random failures that plague automatic control systems are not merely trivial aberrations; they are a reflection of the chaos that results when design is assumed to be primarily a problem in mathematics. | 1917.txt | 3 |
[
"The ape looks like human beings most.",
"People and the ape think alike.",
"People and the ape behave alike.",
"The ape is the most intellectual animal in the world."
] | What does the first paragraph tell us? | Among all the animals, the ape is most like human beings. Both people and apes have the similar brain structure, the similar nerve system, and the similar kind of blood.
There are four kinds of apes: the chimpanzee, the orangutan, the gorilla, and the gibbon. They live in the deep forests and warm tropical regions of Africa and of Southeast Asia, including Indonesia.
All apes are covered with brown, reddish-brown, or black hair everywhere on their bodies except their faces, feet, and hands. Their hands each have four fingers and a thumb that helps them grip things the way our thumbs help us. But they also have a thumb on each foot instead of a big toe. Thus they can hold things with their feet also. Having short, weak legs, apes do not walk on the ground very much. However, their arms are very strong. This enables them to swing from branches and travel very quickly from tree to tree.
These animals live in small family groups that move from place to place in search of vegetables and fruits. They also eat eggs, small animals, nuts, and insects. When they are tired, they build nests in the trees. But they rarely sleep there for more than a night or two. Then they move on to look for more food.
There are some differences among the following three kids of apes. The gibbon is never more than three feet high and weight only about fourteen pounds. The gorilla grows to be six feet tall and weight up to 600 pounds. The orangutan is smaller than the gorilla. It stands three to five feet tall and weight up to 200 pounds.
Chimpanzees are the smartest of all apes. They can be taught to sit at a table and eat, to dress themselves, and to do things that human children can do. | 932.txt | 0 |
[
"All apes are brown or black.",
"All parts of apes' bodies are covered with hair.",
"Apes have weak legs but very strong arms.",
"Apes' arms are strong enough to swim."
] | Which of the following sentences is TRUE? | Among all the animals, the ape is most like human beings. Both people and apes have the similar brain structure, the similar nerve system, and the similar kind of blood.
There are four kinds of apes: the chimpanzee, the orangutan, the gorilla, and the gibbon. They live in the deep forests and warm tropical regions of Africa and of Southeast Asia, including Indonesia.
All apes are covered with brown, reddish-brown, or black hair everywhere on their bodies except their faces, feet, and hands. Their hands each have four fingers and a thumb that helps them grip things the way our thumbs help us. But they also have a thumb on each foot instead of a big toe. Thus they can hold things with their feet also. Having short, weak legs, apes do not walk on the ground very much. However, their arms are very strong. This enables them to swing from branches and travel very quickly from tree to tree.
These animals live in small family groups that move from place to place in search of vegetables and fruits. They also eat eggs, small animals, nuts, and insects. When they are tired, they build nests in the trees. But they rarely sleep there for more than a night or two. Then they move on to look for more food.
There are some differences among the following three kids of apes. The gibbon is never more than three feet high and weight only about fourteen pounds. The gorilla grows to be six feet tall and weight up to 600 pounds. The orangutan is smaller than the gorilla. It stands three to five feet tall and weight up to 200 pounds.
Chimpanzees are the smartest of all apes. They can be taught to sit at a table and eat, to dress themselves, and to do things that human children can do. | 932.txt | 2 |
[
"They like to live in small family groups",
"They like to move from place to place in search of more food",
"They like to eat eggs, small animals, nuts and insects",
"it rains too often in the deep forests"
] | Apes build nests in the trees but seldom sleep there for more than a night or two because _ . | Among all the animals, the ape is most like human beings. Both people and apes have the similar brain structure, the similar nerve system, and the similar kind of blood.
There are four kinds of apes: the chimpanzee, the orangutan, the gorilla, and the gibbon. They live in the deep forests and warm tropical regions of Africa and of Southeast Asia, including Indonesia.
All apes are covered with brown, reddish-brown, or black hair everywhere on their bodies except their faces, feet, and hands. Their hands each have four fingers and a thumb that helps them grip things the way our thumbs help us. But they also have a thumb on each foot instead of a big toe. Thus they can hold things with their feet also. Having short, weak legs, apes do not walk on the ground very much. However, their arms are very strong. This enables them to swing from branches and travel very quickly from tree to tree.
These animals live in small family groups that move from place to place in search of vegetables and fruits. They also eat eggs, small animals, nuts, and insects. When they are tired, they build nests in the trees. But they rarely sleep there for more than a night or two. Then they move on to look for more food.
There are some differences among the following three kids of apes. The gibbon is never more than three feet high and weight only about fourteen pounds. The gorilla grows to be six feet tall and weight up to 600 pounds. The orangutan is smaller than the gorilla. It stands three to five feet tall and weight up to 200 pounds.
Chimpanzees are the smartest of all apes. They can be taught to sit at a table and eat, to dress themselves, and to do things that human children can do. | 932.txt | 1 |
[
"the gorilla is the biggest",
"the gibbon is only three feet high but it is heavier than the orangutan",
"the orangutan is smaller than the gorilla and cleverer than the gibbon",
"the orangutan can stand up to a great height, but others cannot"
] | Among the three kinds of apes, _ . | Among all the animals, the ape is most like human beings. Both people and apes have the similar brain structure, the similar nerve system, and the similar kind of blood.
There are four kinds of apes: the chimpanzee, the orangutan, the gorilla, and the gibbon. They live in the deep forests and warm tropical regions of Africa and of Southeast Asia, including Indonesia.
All apes are covered with brown, reddish-brown, or black hair everywhere on their bodies except their faces, feet, and hands. Their hands each have four fingers and a thumb that helps them grip things the way our thumbs help us. But they also have a thumb on each foot instead of a big toe. Thus they can hold things with their feet also. Having short, weak legs, apes do not walk on the ground very much. However, their arms are very strong. This enables them to swing from branches and travel very quickly from tree to tree.
These animals live in small family groups that move from place to place in search of vegetables and fruits. They also eat eggs, small animals, nuts, and insects. When they are tired, they build nests in the trees. But they rarely sleep there for more than a night or two. Then they move on to look for more food.
There are some differences among the following three kids of apes. The gibbon is never more than three feet high and weight only about fourteen pounds. The gorilla grows to be six feet tall and weight up to 600 pounds. The orangutan is smaller than the gorilla. It stands three to five feet tall and weight up to 200 pounds.
Chimpanzees are the smartest of all apes. They can be taught to sit at a table and eat, to dress themselves, and to do things that human children can do. | 932.txt | 0 |
[
"chimpanzees can do better than human children",
"chimpanzees can do many things that human children cannot do",
"human children can do many things that chimpanzees cannot do",
"the intelligence of chimpanzees is similar to that of human children"
] | The last paragraph tells us that _ . | Among all the animals, the ape is most like human beings. Both people and apes have the similar brain structure, the similar nerve system, and the similar kind of blood.
There are four kinds of apes: the chimpanzee, the orangutan, the gorilla, and the gibbon. They live in the deep forests and warm tropical regions of Africa and of Southeast Asia, including Indonesia.
All apes are covered with brown, reddish-brown, or black hair everywhere on their bodies except their faces, feet, and hands. Their hands each have four fingers and a thumb that helps them grip things the way our thumbs help us. But they also have a thumb on each foot instead of a big toe. Thus they can hold things with their feet also. Having short, weak legs, apes do not walk on the ground very much. However, their arms are very strong. This enables them to swing from branches and travel very quickly from tree to tree.
These animals live in small family groups that move from place to place in search of vegetables and fruits. They also eat eggs, small animals, nuts, and insects. When they are tired, they build nests in the trees. But they rarely sleep there for more than a night or two. Then they move on to look for more food.
There are some differences among the following three kids of apes. The gibbon is never more than three feet high and weight only about fourteen pounds. The gorilla grows to be six feet tall and weight up to 600 pounds. The orangutan is smaller than the gorilla. It stands three to five feet tall and weight up to 200 pounds.
Chimpanzees are the smartest of all apes. They can be taught to sit at a table and eat, to dress themselves, and to do things that human children can do. | 932.txt | 3 |
[
"the different tastes of people for sports",
"the different characteristics of sports",
"the attraction of football",
"the attraction of baseball"
] | The passage is mainly concerned with ______. | There are people in Italy who can't stand soccer. Not all Canadians love hockey. A similar situation exists in America, where there are those individuals you may be one of them who yawn or even frown when somebody mentions baseball. 『Baseball to them means boring hours watching grown men in funny tight outfits standing around in a field staring away while very little of anything happens.』① They tell you it's a game better suited to the 19th century, slow, quiet, gentlemanly. These are the same people you may be one of them who love football because there's the sport that glorifies "the hit".By contrast, baseball seems abstract, cool, silent, still.
On TV the game is fractured into a dozen perspectives, replays, closeups. The geometry of the game, however, is essential to understanding it. You will contemplate the game from one point as a painter does his subject; you may, of course, project yourself into the game. It is in this projection that the game affords so much space and time for involvement. The TV won't do it for you.
Take, for example, the third baseman. You sit behind the third base dugout and you watch him watching home plate. His legs are apart, knees flexed. His arms hang loose. He does a lot of this. The skeptic still cannot think of any other sports so still, so passive. 『But watch what happens every time the pitcher throws: the third baseman goes up on his toes, flexes his arms or bring the glove to a point in front of him, takes a step right or left, backward or forward, perhaps he glances across the field to check his first baseman's position.』② Suppose the pitch is a ball. "Nothing happened," you say. "I could have had my eyes closed."
The skeptic and the innocent must play the game. And this involvement in the stands is no more intellectual than listening to music is. Watch the third baseman. Smooth the dirt in front of you with one foot; smooth the pocket in your glove; watch the eyes of the batter, the speed of the bat, the sound of horsehide on wood. If football is a symphony of movement and theatre, baseball is chamber music, a spacious interlocking of notes, chores and responses. | 342.txt | 3 |
[
"it is only to the taste of the old",
"it involves fewer players than football",
"it is not exciting enough",
"it is pretentious and looks funny"
] | Those who don't like baseball may complain that ______. | There are people in Italy who can't stand soccer. Not all Canadians love hockey. A similar situation exists in America, where there are those individuals you may be one of them who yawn or even frown when somebody mentions baseball. 『Baseball to them means boring hours watching grown men in funny tight outfits standing around in a field staring away while very little of anything happens.』① They tell you it's a game better suited to the 19th century, slow, quiet, gentlemanly. These are the same people you may be one of them who love football because there's the sport that glorifies "the hit".By contrast, baseball seems abstract, cool, silent, still.
On TV the game is fractured into a dozen perspectives, replays, closeups. The geometry of the game, however, is essential to understanding it. You will contemplate the game from one point as a painter does his subject; you may, of course, project yourself into the game. It is in this projection that the game affords so much space and time for involvement. The TV won't do it for you.
Take, for example, the third baseman. You sit behind the third base dugout and you watch him watching home plate. His legs are apart, knees flexed. His arms hang loose. He does a lot of this. The skeptic still cannot think of any other sports so still, so passive. 『But watch what happens every time the pitcher throws: the third baseman goes up on his toes, flexes his arms or bring the glove to a point in front of him, takes a step right or left, backward or forward, perhaps he glances across the field to check his first baseman's position.』② Suppose the pitch is a ball. "Nothing happened," you say. "I could have had my eyes closed."
The skeptic and the innocent must play the game. And this involvement in the stands is no more intellectual than listening to music is. Watch the third baseman. Smooth the dirt in front of you with one foot; smooth the pocket in your glove; watch the eyes of the batter, the speed of the bat, the sound of horsehide on wood. If football is a symphony of movement and theatre, baseball is chamber music, a spacious interlocking of notes, chores and responses. | 342.txt | 2 |
[
"baseball is too peaceful for the young",
"baseball may seem boring when watched on TV",
"football is more attracting than baseball",
"baseball is more interesting than football"
] | The author admits that ______. | There are people in Italy who can't stand soccer. Not all Canadians love hockey. A similar situation exists in America, where there are those individuals you may be one of them who yawn or even frown when somebody mentions baseball. 『Baseball to them means boring hours watching grown men in funny tight outfits standing around in a field staring away while very little of anything happens.』① They tell you it's a game better suited to the 19th century, slow, quiet, gentlemanly. These are the same people you may be one of them who love football because there's the sport that glorifies "the hit".By contrast, baseball seems abstract, cool, silent, still.
On TV the game is fractured into a dozen perspectives, replays, closeups. The geometry of the game, however, is essential to understanding it. You will contemplate the game from one point as a painter does his subject; you may, of course, project yourself into the game. It is in this projection that the game affords so much space and time for involvement. The TV won't do it for you.
Take, for example, the third baseman. You sit behind the third base dugout and you watch him watching home plate. His legs are apart, knees flexed. His arms hang loose. He does a lot of this. The skeptic still cannot think of any other sports so still, so passive. 『But watch what happens every time the pitcher throws: the third baseman goes up on his toes, flexes his arms or bring the glove to a point in front of him, takes a step right or left, backward or forward, perhaps he glances across the field to check his first baseman's position.』② Suppose the pitch is a ball. "Nothing happened," you say. "I could have had my eyes closed."
The skeptic and the innocent must play the game. And this involvement in the stands is no more intellectual than listening to music is. Watch the third baseman. Smooth the dirt in front of you with one foot; smooth the pocket in your glove; watch the eyes of the batter, the speed of the bat, the sound of horsehide on wood. If football is a symphony of movement and theatre, baseball is chamber music, a spacious interlocking of notes, chores and responses. | 342.txt | 1 |
[
"The third baseman would rather sleep than play the game.",
"Even if the third baseman closed his eyes a moment ago, it could make no different to the result.",
"The third baseman is so good at baseball that he could finish the game with eyes closed all the time and do his work well.",
"The consequent was too bad he could not bear to see it."
] | By stating "I could have had my eyes closed. " the author means (4th paragraph last sentence): | There are people in Italy who can't stand soccer. Not all Canadians love hockey. A similar situation exists in America, where there are those individuals you may be one of them who yawn or even frown when somebody mentions baseball. 『Baseball to them means boring hours watching grown men in funny tight outfits standing around in a field staring away while very little of anything happens.』① They tell you it's a game better suited to the 19th century, slow, quiet, gentlemanly. These are the same people you may be one of them who love football because there's the sport that glorifies "the hit".By contrast, baseball seems abstract, cool, silent, still.
On TV the game is fractured into a dozen perspectives, replays, closeups. The geometry of the game, however, is essential to understanding it. You will contemplate the game from one point as a painter does his subject; you may, of course, project yourself into the game. It is in this projection that the game affords so much space and time for involvement. The TV won't do it for you.
Take, for example, the third baseman. You sit behind the third base dugout and you watch him watching home plate. His legs are apart, knees flexed. His arms hang loose. He does a lot of this. The skeptic still cannot think of any other sports so still, so passive. 『But watch what happens every time the pitcher throws: the third baseman goes up on his toes, flexes his arms or bring the glove to a point in front of him, takes a step right or left, backward or forward, perhaps he glances across the field to check his first baseman's position.』② Suppose the pitch is a ball. "Nothing happened," you say. "I could have had my eyes closed."
The skeptic and the innocent must play the game. And this involvement in the stands is no more intellectual than listening to music is. Watch the third baseman. Smooth the dirt in front of you with one foot; smooth the pocket in your glove; watch the eyes of the batter, the speed of the bat, the sound of horsehide on wood. If football is a symphony of movement and theatre, baseball is chamber music, a spacious interlocking of notes, chores and responses. | 342.txt | 1 |
[
"likes football",
"hates football",
"hates baseball",
"likes baseball"
] | We can safely conclude that the author ______. | There are people in Italy who can't stand soccer. Not all Canadians love hockey. A similar situation exists in America, where there are those individuals you may be one of them who yawn or even frown when somebody mentions baseball. 『Baseball to them means boring hours watching grown men in funny tight outfits standing around in a field staring away while very little of anything happens.』① They tell you it's a game better suited to the 19th century, slow, quiet, gentlemanly. These are the same people you may be one of them who love football because there's the sport that glorifies "the hit".By contrast, baseball seems abstract, cool, silent, still.
On TV the game is fractured into a dozen perspectives, replays, closeups. The geometry of the game, however, is essential to understanding it. You will contemplate the game from one point as a painter does his subject; you may, of course, project yourself into the game. It is in this projection that the game affords so much space and time for involvement. The TV won't do it for you.
Take, for example, the third baseman. You sit behind the third base dugout and you watch him watching home plate. His legs are apart, knees flexed. His arms hang loose. He does a lot of this. The skeptic still cannot think of any other sports so still, so passive. 『But watch what happens every time the pitcher throws: the third baseman goes up on his toes, flexes his arms or bring the glove to a point in front of him, takes a step right or left, backward or forward, perhaps he glances across the field to check his first baseman's position.』② Suppose the pitch is a ball. "Nothing happened," you say. "I could have had my eyes closed."
The skeptic and the innocent must play the game. And this involvement in the stands is no more intellectual than listening to music is. Watch the third baseman. Smooth the dirt in front of you with one foot; smooth the pocket in your glove; watch the eyes of the batter, the speed of the bat, the sound of horsehide on wood. If football is a symphony of movement and theatre, baseball is chamber music, a spacious interlocking of notes, chores and responses. | 342.txt | 3 |
[
"a supplement to the social cure.",
"a stimulus to group dynamics.",
"an obstacle to school progress.",
"a cause of undesirable behaviors."
] | According to the first paragraph, peer pressure often emerges as | Come on- Everybody's doing it. That whispered message, half invitation and half forcing, is what most of us think of when we hear the words peer pressure. It usually leads to no good-drinking, drugs and casual sex. But in her new book Join the Club, Tina Rosenberg contends that peer pressure can also be a positive force through what she calls the social cure, in which organizations and officials use the power of group dynamics to help individuals improve their lives and possibly the world.
Rosenberg, the recipient of a Pulitzer Prize, offers a host of examples of the social cure in action: In South Carolina, a state-sponsored antismoking program called Rage Against the Haze sets out to make cigarettes uncool. In South Africa, an HIV-prevention initiative known as LoveLife recruits young people to promote safe sex among their peers.
The idea seems promising, and Rosenberg is a perceptive observer. Her critique of the lameness of many pubic-health campaigns is spot-on: they fail to mobilize peer pressure for healthy habits, and they demonstrate a seriously flawed understanding of psychology. "Dare to be different, please don't smoke!" pleads one billboard campaign aimed at reducing smoking among teenagers - teenagers, who desire nothing more than fitting in.Rosenberg argues convincingly that public-health advocates ought to take a page from advertisers, so skilled at applying peer pressure.
But on the general effectiveness of the social cure, Rosenberg is less persuasive. Join the Club is filled with too much irrelevant detail and not enough exploration of the social and biological factors that make peer pressure so powerful. The most glaring flaw of the social cure as it's presented here is that it doesn't work very well for very long. Rage Against the Haze failed once state funding was cut. Evidence that the LoveLife program produces lasting changes is limited and mixed.
There's no doubt that our peer groups exert enormous influence on our behavior. An emerging body of research shows that positive health habits-as well as negative ones-spread through networks of friends via social communication. This is a subtle form of peer pressure: we unconsciously imitate the behavior we see every day.
Far less certain, however, is how successfully experts and bureaucrats can select our peer groups and steer their activities in virtuous directions. It's like the teacher who breaks up the troublemakers in the back row by pairing them with better-behaved classmates. The tactic never really works. And that's the problem with a social cure engineered from the outside: in the real world, as in school, we insist on choosing our own friends. | 3741.txt | 3 |
[
"recruit professional advertisers.",
"learn from advertisers' experience.",
"stay away from commercial advertisers.",
"recognize the limitations of advertisements."
] | Rosenberg holds that public-health advocates should | Come on- Everybody's doing it. That whispered message, half invitation and half forcing, is what most of us think of when we hear the words peer pressure. It usually leads to no good-drinking, drugs and casual sex. But in her new book Join the Club, Tina Rosenberg contends that peer pressure can also be a positive force through what she calls the social cure, in which organizations and officials use the power of group dynamics to help individuals improve their lives and possibly the world.
Rosenberg, the recipient of a Pulitzer Prize, offers a host of examples of the social cure in action: In South Carolina, a state-sponsored antismoking program called Rage Against the Haze sets out to make cigarettes uncool. In South Africa, an HIV-prevention initiative known as LoveLife recruits young people to promote safe sex among their peers.
The idea seems promising, and Rosenberg is a perceptive observer. Her critique of the lameness of many pubic-health campaigns is spot-on: they fail to mobilize peer pressure for healthy habits, and they demonstrate a seriously flawed understanding of psychology. "Dare to be different, please don't smoke!" pleads one billboard campaign aimed at reducing smoking among teenagers - teenagers, who desire nothing more than fitting in.Rosenberg argues convincingly that public-health advocates ought to take a page from advertisers, so skilled at applying peer pressure.
But on the general effectiveness of the social cure, Rosenberg is less persuasive. Join the Club is filled with too much irrelevant detail and not enough exploration of the social and biological factors that make peer pressure so powerful. The most glaring flaw of the social cure as it's presented here is that it doesn't work very well for very long. Rage Against the Haze failed once state funding was cut. Evidence that the LoveLife program produces lasting changes is limited and mixed.
There's no doubt that our peer groups exert enormous influence on our behavior. An emerging body of research shows that positive health habits-as well as negative ones-spread through networks of friends via social communication. This is a subtle form of peer pressure: we unconsciously imitate the behavior we see every day.
Far less certain, however, is how successfully experts and bureaucrats can select our peer groups and steer their activities in virtuous directions. It's like the teacher who breaks up the troublemakers in the back row by pairing them with better-behaved classmates. The tactic never really works. And that's the problem with a social cure engineered from the outside: in the real world, as in school, we insist on choosing our own friends. | 3741.txt | 1 |
[
"adequately probe social and biological factors.",
"effectively evade the flaws of the social cure.",
"illustrate the functions of state funding.",
"produce a long-lasting social effect."
] | In the author's view, Rosenberg's book fails to | Come on- Everybody's doing it. That whispered message, half invitation and half forcing, is what most of us think of when we hear the words peer pressure. It usually leads to no good-drinking, drugs and casual sex. But in her new book Join the Club, Tina Rosenberg contends that peer pressure can also be a positive force through what she calls the social cure, in which organizations and officials use the power of group dynamics to help individuals improve their lives and possibly the world.
Rosenberg, the recipient of a Pulitzer Prize, offers a host of examples of the social cure in action: In South Carolina, a state-sponsored antismoking program called Rage Against the Haze sets out to make cigarettes uncool. In South Africa, an HIV-prevention initiative known as LoveLife recruits young people to promote safe sex among their peers.
The idea seems promising, and Rosenberg is a perceptive observer. Her critique of the lameness of many pubic-health campaigns is spot-on: they fail to mobilize peer pressure for healthy habits, and they demonstrate a seriously flawed understanding of psychology. "Dare to be different, please don't smoke!" pleads one billboard campaign aimed at reducing smoking among teenagers - teenagers, who desire nothing more than fitting in.Rosenberg argues convincingly that public-health advocates ought to take a page from advertisers, so skilled at applying peer pressure.
But on the general effectiveness of the social cure, Rosenberg is less persuasive. Join the Club is filled with too much irrelevant detail and not enough exploration of the social and biological factors that make peer pressure so powerful. The most glaring flaw of the social cure as it's presented here is that it doesn't work very well for very long. Rage Against the Haze failed once state funding was cut. Evidence that the LoveLife program produces lasting changes is limited and mixed.
There's no doubt that our peer groups exert enormous influence on our behavior. An emerging body of research shows that positive health habits-as well as negative ones-spread through networks of friends via social communication. This is a subtle form of peer pressure: we unconsciously imitate the behavior we see every day.
Far less certain, however, is how successfully experts and bureaucrats can select our peer groups and steer their activities in virtuous directions. It's like the teacher who breaks up the troublemakers in the back row by pairing them with better-behaved classmates. The tactic never really works. And that's the problem with a social cure engineered from the outside: in the real world, as in school, we insist on choosing our own friends. | 3741.txt | 0 |
[
"is harmful to our networks of friends.",
"will mislead behavioral studies.",
"occurs without our realizing it.",
"can produce negative health habits."
] | Paragraph 5 shows that our imitation of behaviors | Come on- Everybody's doing it. That whispered message, half invitation and half forcing, is what most of us think of when we hear the words peer pressure. It usually leads to no good-drinking, drugs and casual sex. But in her new book Join the Club, Tina Rosenberg contends that peer pressure can also be a positive force through what she calls the social cure, in which organizations and officials use the power of group dynamics to help individuals improve their lives and possibly the world.
Rosenberg, the recipient of a Pulitzer Prize, offers a host of examples of the social cure in action: In South Carolina, a state-sponsored antismoking program called Rage Against the Haze sets out to make cigarettes uncool. In South Africa, an HIV-prevention initiative known as LoveLife recruits young people to promote safe sex among their peers.
The idea seems promising, and Rosenberg is a perceptive observer. Her critique of the lameness of many pubic-health campaigns is spot-on: they fail to mobilize peer pressure for healthy habits, and they demonstrate a seriously flawed understanding of psychology. "Dare to be different, please don't smoke!" pleads one billboard campaign aimed at reducing smoking among teenagers - teenagers, who desire nothing more than fitting in.Rosenberg argues convincingly that public-health advocates ought to take a page from advertisers, so skilled at applying peer pressure.
But on the general effectiveness of the social cure, Rosenberg is less persuasive. Join the Club is filled with too much irrelevant detail and not enough exploration of the social and biological factors that make peer pressure so powerful. The most glaring flaw of the social cure as it's presented here is that it doesn't work very well for very long. Rage Against the Haze failed once state funding was cut. Evidence that the LoveLife program produces lasting changes is limited and mixed.
There's no doubt that our peer groups exert enormous influence on our behavior. An emerging body of research shows that positive health habits-as well as negative ones-spread through networks of friends via social communication. This is a subtle form of peer pressure: we unconsciously imitate the behavior we see every day.
Far less certain, however, is how successfully experts and bureaucrats can select our peer groups and steer their activities in virtuous directions. It's like the teacher who breaks up the troublemakers in the back row by pairing them with better-behaved classmates. The tactic never really works. And that's the problem with a social cure engineered from the outside: in the real world, as in school, we insist on choosing our own friends. | 3741.txt | 2 |
[
"harmful.",
"desirable.",
"profound.",
"questionable."
] | The author suggests in the last paragraph that the effect of peer pressure is | Come on- Everybody's doing it. That whispered message, half invitation and half forcing, is what most of us think of when we hear the words peer pressure. It usually leads to no good-drinking, drugs and casual sex. But in her new book Join the Club, Tina Rosenberg contends that peer pressure can also be a positive force through what she calls the social cure, in which organizations and officials use the power of group dynamics to help individuals improve their lives and possibly the world.
Rosenberg, the recipient of a Pulitzer Prize, offers a host of examples of the social cure in action: In South Carolina, a state-sponsored antismoking program called Rage Against the Haze sets out to make cigarettes uncool. In South Africa, an HIV-prevention initiative known as LoveLife recruits young people to promote safe sex among their peers.
The idea seems promising, and Rosenberg is a perceptive observer. Her critique of the lameness of many pubic-health campaigns is spot-on: they fail to mobilize peer pressure for healthy habits, and they demonstrate a seriously flawed understanding of psychology. "Dare to be different, please don't smoke!" pleads one billboard campaign aimed at reducing smoking among teenagers - teenagers, who desire nothing more than fitting in.Rosenberg argues convincingly that public-health advocates ought to take a page from advertisers, so skilled at applying peer pressure.
But on the general effectiveness of the social cure, Rosenberg is less persuasive. Join the Club is filled with too much irrelevant detail and not enough exploration of the social and biological factors that make peer pressure so powerful. The most glaring flaw of the social cure as it's presented here is that it doesn't work very well for very long. Rage Against the Haze failed once state funding was cut. Evidence that the LoveLife program produces lasting changes is limited and mixed.
There's no doubt that our peer groups exert enormous influence on our behavior. An emerging body of research shows that positive health habits-as well as negative ones-spread through networks of friends via social communication. This is a subtle form of peer pressure: we unconsciously imitate the behavior we see every day.
Far less certain, however, is how successfully experts and bureaucrats can select our peer groups and steer their activities in virtuous directions. It's like the teacher who breaks up the troublemakers in the back row by pairing them with better-behaved classmates. The tactic never really works. And that's the problem with a social cure engineered from the outside: in the real world, as in school, we insist on choosing our own friends. | 3741.txt | 3 |
[
"has suddenly become a nation of old people",
"gerontology has suddenly become popular",
"more elderly professors are found on American campuses",
"American colleges have realized the need of enrolling older students"
] | "…old is suddenly in" (Line 1, Para. 1) most probably means"_ ". | For an increasing number of students at American universities, Old is suddenly in. The reason is obvious: the graying of means jobs. Coupled with the aging of the baby-boom generation, a longer life span means that the nation's elderly population is bound to expand significantly over the next 50 years. By 2050, 25 percent of all Americans will be older than 65, up from 14 percent in 1995. The change poses profound questions for government and society, of course. But it also creates career opportunities in medicine and health professions, and in law and business as well. "In addition to the doctors, we're going to need more sociologists, biologists, urban planners and specialized lawyers," says Professor Edward Schneider of the University of Southern California's (USC) School of Gerontology .
Lawyers can specialize in "elder law," which covers everything from trusts and estates to nursing-home abuse and age discrimination . Businessmen see huge opportunities in the elder market because the baby boomers, 74 million strong, are likely to be the wealthiest group of retirees in human history. "Any student who combines an expert knowledge in gerontology with, say, an MBA or law degree will have a license to print money," one professor says.
Margarite is a 21-year-old senior at USC. She began college as a biology major but found she was "really bored with bacteria." So she took a class in gerontology and discovered that she liked it. She says, "I did volunteer work in retirement homes and it was very satisfying." | 1027.txt | 1 |
[
"from the adoption of the \"elder law\"",
"from rendering special services to the elderly",
"by enriching their professional knowledge",
"by winning the trust of the elderly to promote their own interests"
] | With the aging of , lawyers can benefit _ . | For an increasing number of students at American universities, Old is suddenly in. The reason is obvious: the graying of means jobs. Coupled with the aging of the baby-boom generation, a longer life span means that the nation's elderly population is bound to expand significantly over the next 50 years. By 2050, 25 percent of all Americans will be older than 65, up from 14 percent in 1995. The change poses profound questions for government and society, of course. But it also creates career opportunities in medicine and health professions, and in law and business as well. "In addition to the doctors, we're going to need more sociologists, biologists, urban planners and specialized lawyers," says Professor Edward Schneider of the University of Southern California's (USC) School of Gerontology .
Lawyers can specialize in "elder law," which covers everything from trusts and estates to nursing-home abuse and age discrimination . Businessmen see huge opportunities in the elder market because the baby boomers, 74 million strong, are likely to be the wealthiest group of retirees in human history. "Any student who combines an expert knowledge in gerontology with, say, an MBA or law degree will have a license to print money," one professor says.
Margarite is a 21-year-old senior at USC. She began college as a biology major but found she was "really bored with bacteria." So she took a class in gerontology and discovered that she liked it. She says, "I did volunteer work in retirement homes and it was very satisfying." | 1027.txt | 0 |
[
"Retirees are more generous in spending money.",
"They can employ more gerontologists.",
"The elderly possess an enormous purchasing power.",
"There are more elderly people working than before."
] | Why can businessmen make money in the emerging elder market? | For an increasing number of students at American universities, Old is suddenly in. The reason is obvious: the graying of means jobs. Coupled with the aging of the baby-boom generation, a longer life span means that the nation's elderly population is bound to expand significantly over the next 50 years. By 2050, 25 percent of all Americans will be older than 65, up from 14 percent in 1995. The change poses profound questions for government and society, of course. But it also creates career opportunities in medicine and health professions, and in law and business as well. "In addition to the doctors, we're going to need more sociologists, biologists, urban planners and specialized lawyers," says Professor Edward Schneider of the University of Southern California's (USC) School of Gerontology .
Lawyers can specialize in "elder law," which covers everything from trusts and estates to nursing-home abuse and age discrimination . Businessmen see huge opportunities in the elder market because the baby boomers, 74 million strong, are likely to be the wealthiest group of retirees in human history. "Any student who combines an expert knowledge in gerontology with, say, an MBA or law degree will have a license to print money," one professor says.
Margarite is a 21-year-old senior at USC. She began college as a biology major but found she was "really bored with bacteria." So she took a class in gerontology and discovered that she liked it. She says, "I did volunteer work in retirement homes and it was very satisfying." | 1027.txt | 0 |
[
"Retirees who are business-minded.",
"The volunteer workers in retirement homes.",
"College graduates with an MBA or law degree.",
"Professionals with a good knowledge of gerontology."
] | Who can make big money in the new century according to the passage? | For an increasing number of students at American universities, Old is suddenly in. The reason is obvious: the graying of means jobs. Coupled with the aging of the baby-boom generation, a longer life span means that the nation's elderly population is bound to expand significantly over the next 50 years. By 2050, 25 percent of all Americans will be older than 65, up from 14 percent in 1995. The change poses profound questions for government and society, of course. But it also creates career opportunities in medicine and health professions, and in law and business as well. "In addition to the doctors, we're going to need more sociologists, biologists, urban planners and specialized lawyers," says Professor Edward Schneider of the University of Southern California's (USC) School of Gerontology .
Lawyers can specialize in "elder law," which covers everything from trusts and estates to nursing-home abuse and age discrimination . Businessmen see huge opportunities in the elder market because the baby boomers, 74 million strong, are likely to be the wealthiest group of retirees in human history. "Any student who combines an expert knowledge in gerontology with, say, an MBA or law degree will have a license to print money," one professor says.
Margarite is a 21-year-old senior at USC. She began college as a biology major but found she was "really bored with bacteria." So she took a class in gerontology and discovered that she liked it. She says, "I did volunteer work in retirement homes and it was very satisfying." | 1027.txt | 3 |
[
"will provide good job opportunities in many areas",
"will impose an unbearable burden on society",
"may lead to nursing home abuse and age discrimination",
"will create new fields of study in universities"
] | It can be seen from the passage that the expansion of 's elderly population _ . | For an increasing number of students at American universities, Old is suddenly in. The reason is obvious: the graying of means jobs. Coupled with the aging of the baby-boom generation, a longer life span means that the nation's elderly population is bound to expand significantly over the next 50 years. By 2050, 25 percent of all Americans will be older than 65, up from 14 percent in 1995. The change poses profound questions for government and society, of course. But it also creates career opportunities in medicine and health professions, and in law and business as well. "In addition to the doctors, we're going to need more sociologists, biologists, urban planners and specialized lawyers," says Professor Edward Schneider of the University of Southern California's (USC) School of Gerontology .
Lawyers can specialize in "elder law," which covers everything from trusts and estates to nursing-home abuse and age discrimination . Businessmen see huge opportunities in the elder market because the baby boomers, 74 million strong, are likely to be the wealthiest group of retirees in human history. "Any student who combines an expert knowledge in gerontology with, say, an MBA or law degree will have a license to print money," one professor says.
Margarite is a 21-year-old senior at USC. She began college as a biology major but found she was "really bored with bacteria." So she took a class in gerontology and discovered that she liked it. She says, "I did volunteer work in retirement homes and it was very satisfying." | 1027.txt | 0 |
[
"we always try to find some time to write a book",
"we always make plans but seldom fulfil them",
"we always enjoy many of life's best moments",
"we always do what we really want to do"
] | The first paragraph of the passage tells us that. | How many people have I met who have told me about the book they have been planning to write but have never yet found the time7 Far too many.
This is Life, all right, but we do treat it like a rehearsal and, unhappily, we do miss so many of its best moments.
We take jobs to stay alive and provide homes for our families always making ourselves believe that this style of life is merely a temporary state of affairs along the road to what we really want to do. Then, at 60 or 65, we are suddenly presented with a clock and several grandchildren and we look back and realize that all those years waiting for Real Life to come along were in fact real life.
In America they have a saying much laughed at by the English："Have a nice day" they speak slowly and seriously in their shops, hotels and sandwich bars. I think it is a wonderful phrase, reminding us, in effect, to enjoy the moment: to value this very day.
How often do we say to ourselves, "I'll take up horse-riding (or golf, or sailing) as soon as I get a higher position," only to do none of those things when I do get the higher position.
When I first became a reporter I knew a man who gave up a very well paid respectable job at the Daily Telegraph to go and edit a small weekly newspaper. At the time I was astonished by what appeared to me to be his completely abnormal mental state. How could anyone turn his back on Fleet Street in central London for a small local area?I wanted to know.
Now I am a little older and possibly wiser, I see the sense in it. In Fleet Street the man was under continual pressure. He lived in an unattractive London suburb and he spent much of his life sitting on Southern Region trains. | 3330.txt | 1 |
[
"in an abnormal mental state",
"under too much pressure",
"not well paid",
"not respected"
] | The man ( paragraph 6) left his first job partly because he was. | How many people have I met who have told me about the book they have been planning to write but have never yet found the time7 Far too many.
This is Life, all right, but we do treat it like a rehearsal and, unhappily, we do miss so many of its best moments.
We take jobs to stay alive and provide homes for our families always making ourselves believe that this style of life is merely a temporary state of affairs along the road to what we really want to do. Then, at 60 or 65, we are suddenly presented with a clock and several grandchildren and we look back and realize that all those years waiting for Real Life to come along were in fact real life.
In America they have a saying much laughed at by the English："Have a nice day" they speak slowly and seriously in their shops, hotels and sandwich bars. I think it is a wonderful phrase, reminding us, in effect, to enjoy the moment: to value this very day.
How often do we say to ourselves, "I'll take up horse-riding (or golf, or sailing) as soon as I get a higher position," only to do none of those things when I do get the higher position.
When I first became a reporter I knew a man who gave up a very well paid respectable job at the Daily Telegraph to go and edit a small weekly newspaper. At the time I was astonished by what appeared to me to be his completely abnormal mental state. How could anyone turn his back on Fleet Street in central London for a small local area?I wanted to know.
Now I am a little older and possibly wiser, I see the sense in it. In Fleet Street the man was under continual pressure. He lived in an unattractive London suburb and he spent much of his life sitting on Southern Region trains. | 3330.txt | 1 |
[
"Provide Homes For Our Family",
"Take Up Horse-riding",
"Value This Very Day",
"Stay Alive"
] | What is probably the best title for the passage? | How many people have I met who have told me about the book they have been planning to write but have never yet found the time7 Far too many.
This is Life, all right, but we do treat it like a rehearsal and, unhappily, we do miss so many of its best moments.
We take jobs to stay alive and provide homes for our families always making ourselves believe that this style of life is merely a temporary state of affairs along the road to what we really want to do. Then, at 60 or 65, we are suddenly presented with a clock and several grandchildren and we look back and realize that all those years waiting for Real Life to come along were in fact real life.
In America they have a saying much laughed at by the English："Have a nice day" they speak slowly and seriously in their shops, hotels and sandwich bars. I think it is a wonderful phrase, reminding us, in effect, to enjoy the moment: to value this very day.
How often do we say to ourselves, "I'll take up horse-riding (or golf, or sailing) as soon as I get a higher position," only to do none of those things when I do get the higher position.
When I first became a reporter I knew a man who gave up a very well paid respectable job at the Daily Telegraph to go and edit a small weekly newspaper. At the time I was astonished by what appeared to me to be his completely abnormal mental state. How could anyone turn his back on Fleet Street in central London for a small local area?I wanted to know.
Now I am a little older and possibly wiser, I see the sense in it. In Fleet Street the man was under continual pressure. He lived in an unattractive London suburb and he spent much of his life sitting on Southern Region trains. | 3330.txt | 2 |
[
"poor quality rails and unreliable stopping systems",
"lack of financial support for development",
"limited railroad lines",
"lack of a transcontinental railroad"
] | The major problems with America's railroad system in the mid 19th century lay in ________. | A raped means of long-distance transportation became a necessity for the United States as settlement spread ever farther westward. The early trains were impractical curiosities, and for a long time the railroad companies met with troublesome mechanical problems. The most serious ones were the construction of rails able to bear the load, and the development of a safe, effective stopping system. Once these were solved, the railroad was established as the best means of land transportation. By 1860 there were thousands of miles of railroads crossing the eastern mountain ranges and reaching westward to the Mississippi. There were also regional southern and western lines.
The high point in railroad building came with the construction of the first transcontinental system. In 1862 Congress authorized two western railroad companies to build lines from Nebraska westward and from California eastward to a meeting point, so as to complete a transcontinental crossing linking the Atlantic seaboard with the Pacific. The Government helped the railroads generously with money and land. Actual work on this project began four years later. The Central Pacific Company, starting from California, used Chinese labor, while the Union Pacific employed crews of Irish laborers. The two groups worked at remarkable speed, each trying to cover a greater distance than the other. In 1869 they met at a place called Promontory in what is now the state of Utah. Many visitors came there for the great occasion. There were joyous celebrations all over the country, with parades and the ringing of church bells to honor the great achievement.
The railroad was very important in encouraging westward movement. It also helped build up industry and farming by moving raw materials and by distributing products rapidly to distant markets. In linking towns and people to one another it helped unify the United States. | 2902.txt | 0 |
[
"brought about a rapid growth of industry and farming in the west",
"attracted many visitors to the construction sites",
"attracted laborers from Europe",
"encouraged people to travel all over the county"
] | The building of the first transcontinental system ________. | A raped means of long-distance transportation became a necessity for the United States as settlement spread ever farther westward. The early trains were impractical curiosities, and for a long time the railroad companies met with troublesome mechanical problems. The most serious ones were the construction of rails able to bear the load, and the development of a safe, effective stopping system. Once these were solved, the railroad was established as the best means of land transportation. By 1860 there were thousands of miles of railroads crossing the eastern mountain ranges and reaching westward to the Mississippi. There were also regional southern and western lines.
The high point in railroad building came with the construction of the first transcontinental system. In 1862 Congress authorized two western railroad companies to build lines from Nebraska westward and from California eastward to a meeting point, so as to complete a transcontinental crossing linking the Atlantic seaboard with the Pacific. The Government helped the railroads generously with money and land. Actual work on this project began four years later. The Central Pacific Company, starting from California, used Chinese labor, while the Union Pacific employed crews of Irish laborers. The two groups worked at remarkable speed, each trying to cover a greater distance than the other. In 1869 they met at a place called Promontory in what is now the state of Utah. Many visitors came there for the great occasion. There were joyous celebrations all over the country, with parades and the ringing of church bells to honor the great achievement.
The railroad was very important in encouraging westward movement. It also helped build up industry and farming by moving raw materials and by distributing products rapidly to distant markets. In linking towns and people to one another it helped unify the United States. | 2902.txt | 0 |
[
"Settlements Spread Westward",
"The Coast-to-Coast Railroad: A Vital Link",
"American Railroad History",
"The Importance of Trains in the American Economy"
] | The best title for this passage would be ________. | A raped means of long-distance transportation became a necessity for the United States as settlement spread ever farther westward. The early trains were impractical curiosities, and for a long time the railroad companies met with troublesome mechanical problems. The most serious ones were the construction of rails able to bear the load, and the development of a safe, effective stopping system. Once these were solved, the railroad was established as the best means of land transportation. By 1860 there were thousands of miles of railroads crossing the eastern mountain ranges and reaching westward to the Mississippi. There were also regional southern and western lines.
The high point in railroad building came with the construction of the first transcontinental system. In 1862 Congress authorized two western railroad companies to build lines from Nebraska westward and from California eastward to a meeting point, so as to complete a transcontinental crossing linking the Atlantic seaboard with the Pacific. The Government helped the railroads generously with money and land. Actual work on this project began four years later. The Central Pacific Company, starting from California, used Chinese labor, while the Union Pacific employed crews of Irish laborers. The two groups worked at remarkable speed, each trying to cover a greater distance than the other. In 1869 they met at a place called Promontory in what is now the state of Utah. Many visitors came there for the great occasion. There were joyous celebrations all over the country, with parades and the ringing of church bells to honor the great achievement.
The railroad was very important in encouraging westward movement. It also helped build up industry and farming by moving raw materials and by distributing products rapidly to distant markets. In linking towns and people to one another it helped unify the United States. | 2902.txt | 1 |
[
"9 years",
"7 years",
"4 years",
"3 years"
] | The construction of the transcontinental railroad took ________. | A raped means of long-distance transportation became a necessity for the United States as settlement spread ever farther westward. The early trains were impractical curiosities, and for a long time the railroad companies met with troublesome mechanical problems. The most serious ones were the construction of rails able to bear the load, and the development of a safe, effective stopping system. Once these were solved, the railroad was established as the best means of land transportation. By 1860 there were thousands of miles of railroads crossing the eastern mountain ranges and reaching westward to the Mississippi. There were also regional southern and western lines.
The high point in railroad building came with the construction of the first transcontinental system. In 1862 Congress authorized two western railroad companies to build lines from Nebraska westward and from California eastward to a meeting point, so as to complete a transcontinental crossing linking the Atlantic seaboard with the Pacific. The Government helped the railroads generously with money and land. Actual work on this project began four years later. The Central Pacific Company, starting from California, used Chinese labor, while the Union Pacific employed crews of Irish laborers. The two groups worked at remarkable speed, each trying to cover a greater distance than the other. In 1869 they met at a place called Promontory in what is now the state of Utah. Many visitors came there for the great occasion. There were joyous celebrations all over the country, with parades and the ringing of church bells to honor the great achievement.
The railroad was very important in encouraging westward movement. It also helped build up industry and farming by moving raw materials and by distributing products rapidly to distant markets. In linking towns and people to one another it helped unify the United States. | 2902.txt | 3 |
[
"The possibility of government support for such a task.",
"The need to explore Utah.",
"The need to connect the east coast with the west.",
"The need to del, clop the railroad industry in the west."
] | What most likely made people think' about a transcontinental railroad? | A raped means of long-distance transportation became a necessity for the United States as settlement spread ever farther westward. The early trains were impractical curiosities, and for a long time the railroad companies met with troublesome mechanical problems. The most serious ones were the construction of rails able to bear the load, and the development of a safe, effective stopping system. Once these were solved, the railroad was established as the best means of land transportation. By 1860 there were thousands of miles of railroads crossing the eastern mountain ranges and reaching westward to the Mississippi. There were also regional southern and western lines.
The high point in railroad building came with the construction of the first transcontinental system. In 1862 Congress authorized two western railroad companies to build lines from Nebraska westward and from California eastward to a meeting point, so as to complete a transcontinental crossing linking the Atlantic seaboard with the Pacific. The Government helped the railroads generously with money and land. Actual work on this project began four years later. The Central Pacific Company, starting from California, used Chinese labor, while the Union Pacific employed crews of Irish laborers. The two groups worked at remarkable speed, each trying to cover a greater distance than the other. In 1869 they met at a place called Promontory in what is now the state of Utah. Many visitors came there for the great occasion. There were joyous celebrations all over the country, with parades and the ringing of church bells to honor the great achievement.
The railroad was very important in encouraging westward movement. It also helped build up industry and farming by moving raw materials and by distributing products rapidly to distant markets. In linking towns and people to one another it helped unify the United States. | 2902.txt | 2 |
[
"he thought the day was different from before.",
"it was one of his self-proclaimed day of Gratitude.",
"his son became more cute and his wife more adventurous.",
"he could manage these little unhappy things in life."
] | The author didn't start complaining when he met with unpleasant experiences because | On day one of my self-proclaimed Month of Gratitude, my five-year-old son woke up "bored" at 5:15 a.m., I spied a speeding ticket in my wife's purse, and our water heater spluttered to its death as I was getting into the shower. Ordinarily, I would have started complaining and the day would've been off to an ugly start. But this day was different. How cute my child's dimples are. How fetching my wife's taste for adventure. Only 29 days to go.
Just a week earlier, as I struggled with the feeling that I'd been put on this earth to load and unload the dishwasher, I'd decided it was time to end my reflexive complaining. But it wasn't simply the little things that were annoying me. All of a sudden, my friends were dealing with bad news--cancer diagnoses, divorce, job loss. Shouldn't I be celebrating my relative good fortune?
I'd heard about the feel-good benefits of a gratitude attitude. Hoping for tips,I called professor Emmons, who pioneered research on the benefits of positive thinking. Emmons quoted new studies that indicated that even pretending to be thankful raises levels of the chemicals associated with pleasure and contentment. He recommended keeping a log of everything I'm grateful for in a given week or month.
I followed his suggestions, but my first attempts at keeping a gratitude list were pretty weak: coffee, naps, caffeine in general. As my list grew, I found more uplift: freshly picked blueberries; the Beatles' White Album; that I'm not bald.
By day three, I was on a tear, thanking every grocery bagger and parent on the playground like I'd just won an Oscar and hanging Post-it notes to remind myself of the next day's thank-you targets: the mailman, my son's math teacher. But soon, the full-on approach started to bum me out. Researchers call it the Pledge of Allegiance effect. "If you overdo gratitude, it loses its meaning or, worse, becomes a chore," professor Emmons told me when I mentioned my slump. Be selective, he advised, and focus on thanking the unsung heroes in your life.
Then professor Emmons suggested a "gratitude visit." Think of a person who has made a major difference in your life and whom you've never properly thanked. Compose a detailed letter to him or her that expresses your appreciation in concrete terms, then read it aloud, face-to-face.
I immediately flashed on Miss Riggi, my eighth-grade English teacher. She was the first one to open my eyes to Hemingway, Faulkner, and other literary giants. To this day, I am guided by her advice ("Never be boring"). I booked plane tickets to my hometown, Scranton, Pennsylvania.
Miss Riggi was shorter than I remember, though unmistakable with her still long, black hair and bright, intelligent eyes. After a slightly awkward hug and small talk, we settled in. I took a deep breath and read.
"I want to thank you in person for the impact you've had on my life," I began. "Nearly 30 years ago, you introduced my eighth-grade class to the wonders of the written word. Your passion for stories and characters and your enthusiasm for words made me realize there was a world out there that made sense to me." And whether it was Miss Riggi's enormous smile when I finished the letter, or the way she held it close as we said goodbye, my feeling of peace and joy remained long after I returned home.
Since then, I have written several more gratitude letters, and my wife and I both summon our "training" when we feel saddled by life. The unpleasant matters are still there, but appreciation, I've learned, has an echo--and it's loud enough to drown out the grumbling of one man emptying the dishwasher. | 56.txt | 1 |
[
"Making oneself appear to be grateful.",
"Keeping an elaborate dairy.",
"Thinking positively in a given time.",
"Recording everything appreciated for a certain time."
] | According to the passage, what did professor Emmons propose to have a gratitude attitude? | On day one of my self-proclaimed Month of Gratitude, my five-year-old son woke up "bored" at 5:15 a.m., I spied a speeding ticket in my wife's purse, and our water heater spluttered to its death as I was getting into the shower. Ordinarily, I would have started complaining and the day would've been off to an ugly start. But this day was different. How cute my child's dimples are. How fetching my wife's taste for adventure. Only 29 days to go.
Just a week earlier, as I struggled with the feeling that I'd been put on this earth to load and unload the dishwasher, I'd decided it was time to end my reflexive complaining. But it wasn't simply the little things that were annoying me. All of a sudden, my friends were dealing with bad news--cancer diagnoses, divorce, job loss. Shouldn't I be celebrating my relative good fortune?
I'd heard about the feel-good benefits of a gratitude attitude. Hoping for tips,I called professor Emmons, who pioneered research on the benefits of positive thinking. Emmons quoted new studies that indicated that even pretending to be thankful raises levels of the chemicals associated with pleasure and contentment. He recommended keeping a log of everything I'm grateful for in a given week or month.
I followed his suggestions, but my first attempts at keeping a gratitude list were pretty weak: coffee, naps, caffeine in general. As my list grew, I found more uplift: freshly picked blueberries; the Beatles' White Album; that I'm not bald.
By day three, I was on a tear, thanking every grocery bagger and parent on the playground like I'd just won an Oscar and hanging Post-it notes to remind myself of the next day's thank-you targets: the mailman, my son's math teacher. But soon, the full-on approach started to bum me out. Researchers call it the Pledge of Allegiance effect. "If you overdo gratitude, it loses its meaning or, worse, becomes a chore," professor Emmons told me when I mentioned my slump. Be selective, he advised, and focus on thanking the unsung heroes in your life.
Then professor Emmons suggested a "gratitude visit." Think of a person who has made a major difference in your life and whom you've never properly thanked. Compose a detailed letter to him or her that expresses your appreciation in concrete terms, then read it aloud, face-to-face.
I immediately flashed on Miss Riggi, my eighth-grade English teacher. She was the first one to open my eyes to Hemingway, Faulkner, and other literary giants. To this day, I am guided by her advice ("Never be boring"). I booked plane tickets to my hometown, Scranton, Pennsylvania.
Miss Riggi was shorter than I remember, though unmistakable with her still long, black hair and bright, intelligent eyes. After a slightly awkward hug and small talk, we settled in. I took a deep breath and read.
"I want to thank you in person for the impact you've had on my life," I began. "Nearly 30 years ago, you introduced my eighth-grade class to the wonders of the written word. Your passion for stories and characters and your enthusiasm for words made me realize there was a world out there that made sense to me." And whether it was Miss Riggi's enormous smile when I finished the letter, or the way she held it close as we said goodbye, my feeling of peace and joy remained long after I returned home.
Since then, I have written several more gratitude letters, and my wife and I both summon our "training" when we feel saddled by life. The unpleasant matters are still there, but appreciation, I've learned, has an echo--and it's loud enough to drown out the grumbling of one man emptying the dishwasher. | 56.txt | 1 |
[
"visit someone with a detailed letter.",
"call on someone with an appreciated letter.",
"see someone you are indebted to.",
"see someone personally."
] | According to the context, "gratitude visit" in Paragraph Six refers to | On day one of my self-proclaimed Month of Gratitude, my five-year-old son woke up "bored" at 5:15 a.m., I spied a speeding ticket in my wife's purse, and our water heater spluttered to its death as I was getting into the shower. Ordinarily, I would have started complaining and the day would've been off to an ugly start. But this day was different. How cute my child's dimples are. How fetching my wife's taste for adventure. Only 29 days to go.
Just a week earlier, as I struggled with the feeling that I'd been put on this earth to load and unload the dishwasher, I'd decided it was time to end my reflexive complaining. But it wasn't simply the little things that were annoying me. All of a sudden, my friends were dealing with bad news--cancer diagnoses, divorce, job loss. Shouldn't I be celebrating my relative good fortune?
I'd heard about the feel-good benefits of a gratitude attitude. Hoping for tips,I called professor Emmons, who pioneered research on the benefits of positive thinking. Emmons quoted new studies that indicated that even pretending to be thankful raises levels of the chemicals associated with pleasure and contentment. He recommended keeping a log of everything I'm grateful for in a given week or month.
I followed his suggestions, but my first attempts at keeping a gratitude list were pretty weak: coffee, naps, caffeine in general. As my list grew, I found more uplift: freshly picked blueberries; the Beatles' White Album; that I'm not bald.
By day three, I was on a tear, thanking every grocery bagger and parent on the playground like I'd just won an Oscar and hanging Post-it notes to remind myself of the next day's thank-you targets: the mailman, my son's math teacher. But soon, the full-on approach started to bum me out. Researchers call it the Pledge of Allegiance effect. "If you overdo gratitude, it loses its meaning or, worse, becomes a chore," professor Emmons told me when I mentioned my slump. Be selective, he advised, and focus on thanking the unsung heroes in your life.
Then professor Emmons suggested a "gratitude visit." Think of a person who has made a major difference in your life and whom you've never properly thanked. Compose a detailed letter to him or her that expresses your appreciation in concrete terms, then read it aloud, face-to-face.
I immediately flashed on Miss Riggi, my eighth-grade English teacher. She was the first one to open my eyes to Hemingway, Faulkner, and other literary giants. To this day, I am guided by her advice ("Never be boring"). I booked plane tickets to my hometown, Scranton, Pennsylvania.
Miss Riggi was shorter than I remember, though unmistakable with her still long, black hair and bright, intelligent eyes. After a slightly awkward hug and small talk, we settled in. I took a deep breath and read.
"I want to thank you in person for the impact you've had on my life," I began. "Nearly 30 years ago, you introduced my eighth-grade class to the wonders of the written word. Your passion for stories and characters and your enthusiasm for words made me realize there was a world out there that made sense to me." And whether it was Miss Riggi's enormous smile when I finished the letter, or the way she held it close as we said goodbye, my feeling of peace and joy remained long after I returned home.
Since then, I have written several more gratitude letters, and my wife and I both summon our "training" when we feel saddled by life. The unpleasant matters are still there, but appreciation, I've learned, has an echo--and it's loud enough to drown out the grumbling of one man emptying the dishwasher. | 56.txt | 2 |
[
"the author was desperate to see his teacher.",
"his teacher had great impact on him.",
"his teacher still had a deep impression of the author.",
"the author wanted to testify the professor's proposal."
] | The author's reunion with his English teacher, Miss Riggi, shows that | On day one of my self-proclaimed Month of Gratitude, my five-year-old son woke up "bored" at 5:15 a.m., I spied a speeding ticket in my wife's purse, and our water heater spluttered to its death as I was getting into the shower. Ordinarily, I would have started complaining and the day would've been off to an ugly start. But this day was different. How cute my child's dimples are. How fetching my wife's taste for adventure. Only 29 days to go.
Just a week earlier, as I struggled with the feeling that I'd been put on this earth to load and unload the dishwasher, I'd decided it was time to end my reflexive complaining. But it wasn't simply the little things that were annoying me. All of a sudden, my friends were dealing with bad news--cancer diagnoses, divorce, job loss. Shouldn't I be celebrating my relative good fortune?
I'd heard about the feel-good benefits of a gratitude attitude. Hoping for tips,I called professor Emmons, who pioneered research on the benefits of positive thinking. Emmons quoted new studies that indicated that even pretending to be thankful raises levels of the chemicals associated with pleasure and contentment. He recommended keeping a log of everything I'm grateful for in a given week or month.
I followed his suggestions, but my first attempts at keeping a gratitude list were pretty weak: coffee, naps, caffeine in general. As my list grew, I found more uplift: freshly picked blueberries; the Beatles' White Album; that I'm not bald.
By day three, I was on a tear, thanking every grocery bagger and parent on the playground like I'd just won an Oscar and hanging Post-it notes to remind myself of the next day's thank-you targets: the mailman, my son's math teacher. But soon, the full-on approach started to bum me out. Researchers call it the Pledge of Allegiance effect. "If you overdo gratitude, it loses its meaning or, worse, becomes a chore," professor Emmons told me when I mentioned my slump. Be selective, he advised, and focus on thanking the unsung heroes in your life.
Then professor Emmons suggested a "gratitude visit." Think of a person who has made a major difference in your life and whom you've never properly thanked. Compose a detailed letter to him or her that expresses your appreciation in concrete terms, then read it aloud, face-to-face.
I immediately flashed on Miss Riggi, my eighth-grade English teacher. She was the first one to open my eyes to Hemingway, Faulkner, and other literary giants. To this day, I am guided by her advice ("Never be boring"). I booked plane tickets to my hometown, Scranton, Pennsylvania.
Miss Riggi was shorter than I remember, though unmistakable with her still long, black hair and bright, intelligent eyes. After a slightly awkward hug and small talk, we settled in. I took a deep breath and read.
"I want to thank you in person for the impact you've had on my life," I began. "Nearly 30 years ago, you introduced my eighth-grade class to the wonders of the written word. Your passion for stories and characters and your enthusiasm for words made me realize there was a world out there that made sense to me." And whether it was Miss Riggi's enormous smile when I finished the letter, or the way she held it close as we said goodbye, my feeling of peace and joy remained long after I returned home.
Since then, I have written several more gratitude letters, and my wife and I both summon our "training" when we feel saddled by life. The unpleasant matters are still there, but appreciation, I've learned, has an echo--and it's loud enough to drown out the grumbling of one man emptying the dishwasher. | 56.txt | 1 |
[
"professor Emmons' suggestions were effective to the author.",
"professor Emmons' suggestions were unpractical to the author.",
"the author and his wife learn how to show gratitude to others.",
"professor Emmons' suggestions were considered as unacceptable."
] | The last paragraph shows that | On day one of my self-proclaimed Month of Gratitude, my five-year-old son woke up "bored" at 5:15 a.m., I spied a speeding ticket in my wife's purse, and our water heater spluttered to its death as I was getting into the shower. Ordinarily, I would have started complaining and the day would've been off to an ugly start. But this day was different. How cute my child's dimples are. How fetching my wife's taste for adventure. Only 29 days to go.
Just a week earlier, as I struggled with the feeling that I'd been put on this earth to load and unload the dishwasher, I'd decided it was time to end my reflexive complaining. But it wasn't simply the little things that were annoying me. All of a sudden, my friends were dealing with bad news--cancer diagnoses, divorce, job loss. Shouldn't I be celebrating my relative good fortune?
I'd heard about the feel-good benefits of a gratitude attitude. Hoping for tips,I called professor Emmons, who pioneered research on the benefits of positive thinking. Emmons quoted new studies that indicated that even pretending to be thankful raises levels of the chemicals associated with pleasure and contentment. He recommended keeping a log of everything I'm grateful for in a given week or month.
I followed his suggestions, but my first attempts at keeping a gratitude list were pretty weak: coffee, naps, caffeine in general. As my list grew, I found more uplift: freshly picked blueberries; the Beatles' White Album; that I'm not bald.
By day three, I was on a tear, thanking every grocery bagger and parent on the playground like I'd just won an Oscar and hanging Post-it notes to remind myself of the next day's thank-you targets: the mailman, my son's math teacher. But soon, the full-on approach started to bum me out. Researchers call it the Pledge of Allegiance effect. "If you overdo gratitude, it loses its meaning or, worse, becomes a chore," professor Emmons told me when I mentioned my slump. Be selective, he advised, and focus on thanking the unsung heroes in your life.
Then professor Emmons suggested a "gratitude visit." Think of a person who has made a major difference in your life and whom you've never properly thanked. Compose a detailed letter to him or her that expresses your appreciation in concrete terms, then read it aloud, face-to-face.
I immediately flashed on Miss Riggi, my eighth-grade English teacher. She was the first one to open my eyes to Hemingway, Faulkner, and other literary giants. To this day, I am guided by her advice ("Never be boring"). I booked plane tickets to my hometown, Scranton, Pennsylvania.
Miss Riggi was shorter than I remember, though unmistakable with her still long, black hair and bright, intelligent eyes. After a slightly awkward hug and small talk, we settled in. I took a deep breath and read.
"I want to thank you in person for the impact you've had on my life," I began. "Nearly 30 years ago, you introduced my eighth-grade class to the wonders of the written word. Your passion for stories and characters and your enthusiasm for words made me realize there was a world out there that made sense to me." And whether it was Miss Riggi's enormous smile when I finished the letter, or the way she held it close as we said goodbye, my feeling of peace and joy remained long after I returned home.
Since then, I have written several more gratitude letters, and my wife and I both summon our "training" when we feel saddled by life. The unpleasant matters are still there, but appreciation, I've learned, has an echo--and it's loud enough to drown out the grumbling of one man emptying the dishwasher. | 56.txt | 0 |
[
"How to pay a gratitude visit.",
"How to make matters differently.",
"How to be thankful and improve your life.",
"How to become an appreciated man."
] | Which of the following can best serve as the title of the passage? | On day one of my self-proclaimed Month of Gratitude, my five-year-old son woke up "bored" at 5:15 a.m., I spied a speeding ticket in my wife's purse, and our water heater spluttered to its death as I was getting into the shower. Ordinarily, I would have started complaining and the day would've been off to an ugly start. But this day was different. How cute my child's dimples are. How fetching my wife's taste for adventure. Only 29 days to go.
Just a week earlier, as I struggled with the feeling that I'd been put on this earth to load and unload the dishwasher, I'd decided it was time to end my reflexive complaining. But it wasn't simply the little things that were annoying me. All of a sudden, my friends were dealing with bad news--cancer diagnoses, divorce, job loss. Shouldn't I be celebrating my relative good fortune?
I'd heard about the feel-good benefits of a gratitude attitude. Hoping for tips,I called professor Emmons, who pioneered research on the benefits of positive thinking. Emmons quoted new studies that indicated that even pretending to be thankful raises levels of the chemicals associated with pleasure and contentment. He recommended keeping a log of everything I'm grateful for in a given week or month.
I followed his suggestions, but my first attempts at keeping a gratitude list were pretty weak: coffee, naps, caffeine in general. As my list grew, I found more uplift: freshly picked blueberries; the Beatles' White Album; that I'm not bald.
By day three, I was on a tear, thanking every grocery bagger and parent on the playground like I'd just won an Oscar and hanging Post-it notes to remind myself of the next day's thank-you targets: the mailman, my son's math teacher. But soon, the full-on approach started to bum me out. Researchers call it the Pledge of Allegiance effect. "If you overdo gratitude, it loses its meaning or, worse, becomes a chore," professor Emmons told me when I mentioned my slump. Be selective, he advised, and focus on thanking the unsung heroes in your life.
Then professor Emmons suggested a "gratitude visit." Think of a person who has made a major difference in your life and whom you've never properly thanked. Compose a detailed letter to him or her that expresses your appreciation in concrete terms, then read it aloud, face-to-face.
I immediately flashed on Miss Riggi, my eighth-grade English teacher. She was the first one to open my eyes to Hemingway, Faulkner, and other literary giants. To this day, I am guided by her advice ("Never be boring"). I booked plane tickets to my hometown, Scranton, Pennsylvania.
Miss Riggi was shorter than I remember, though unmistakable with her still long, black hair and bright, intelligent eyes. After a slightly awkward hug and small talk, we settled in. I took a deep breath and read.
"I want to thank you in person for the impact you've had on my life," I began. "Nearly 30 years ago, you introduced my eighth-grade class to the wonders of the written word. Your passion for stories and characters and your enthusiasm for words made me realize there was a world out there that made sense to me." And whether it was Miss Riggi's enormous smile when I finished the letter, or the way she held it close as we said goodbye, my feeling of peace and joy remained long after I returned home.
Since then, I have written several more gratitude letters, and my wife and I both summon our "training" when we feel saddled by life. The unpleasant matters are still there, but appreciation, I've learned, has an echo--and it's loud enough to drown out the grumbling of one man emptying the dishwasher. | 56.txt | 2 |
[
"The impression of the falling U.S. dollar.",
"The result of the U.S. falling dollar.",
"The side effect of U.S. falling dollar.",
"Japan and West Germany are worried about U.S. falling dollar."
] | What is the main idea of this passage? | The Result of the Falling US Dollar
Like a ticking time bomb, the falling dollar has grabbed the attention of Japan and West Germany, forcing them to consider adopting economic polices the United States advocates. The U.S. government wants the dollar to fall because as the dollar declines in value against the yen and Deutsche mark, U.S. good becomes cheaper. U.S. companies then sell more at home and abroad, and U.S. trade deficit declines. Cries for trade protection abate, and the global free-trade system is preserved.
Then, the cheaper dollar makes it cheaper for many foreign investors to snap up U.S. stocks. That prompts heavy buying from abroad-especially from Japan. Also, if the trade picture is improving, that means U.S. companies eventually will be more competitive. Consequently, many investors are buying shares of export-oriented U.S. companies in anticipation of better profits in the next year or so. But that is a rather faddish notion right now; if corporate earnings are disappointing in interest rates, the stock market rally could stall.
Improving U.S. competitiveness means a decline in another's competitiveness.
Japan and West Germany are verging on recession. Their export-oriented economies are facing major problems. Japan is worried about the damage the strong yen will do to Japanese trade. West Germany is also worried. Share prices in Frankfurt plummeted this past week. Bonn is thought to be considering a cut in interest rates to boost its economy.
Could the falling dollar get out of hand? If the dollar falls too far, investors might lose confidence in U.S. investments-especially the government bond market. The money to finance the federal budget and trade deficits could migrate elsewhere. Inflation could flare up, too, since Japanese and German manufacturers will eventually pass along price hikes-and U.S. companies might follow suit to increase their profit margins. The U.S. federal Reserve then might need to step in and stabilize the dollar by raising interest rates. And higher interest rates could cause the U.S. economy to slow down and end the Wall Street Rally.
Worried about these side effects, Federal Reserve chairman Paul Volcher has said the dollar has fallen far enough. What is the equilibrium level? Probably near where it is or slightly lower. It all depends on when the U.S. trade deficit turns around or if investors defect from U.S. Treasury Bonds. "It requires a good deal of political patience on the part of the U.S. Congress," says Dr. Cline, "And there must be an expectation of patience on the part of private investors. The chance are relatively good that we will avoid an investor break or panic." | 221.txt | 1 |
[
"prosperity.",
"decline.",
"richness.",
"import."
] | What does the word "rally" mean. | The Result of the Falling US Dollar
Like a ticking time bomb, the falling dollar has grabbed the attention of Japan and West Germany, forcing them to consider adopting economic polices the United States advocates. The U.S. government wants the dollar to fall because as the dollar declines in value against the yen and Deutsche mark, U.S. good becomes cheaper. U.S. companies then sell more at home and abroad, and U.S. trade deficit declines. Cries for trade protection abate, and the global free-trade system is preserved.
Then, the cheaper dollar makes it cheaper for many foreign investors to snap up U.S. stocks. That prompts heavy buying from abroad-especially from Japan. Also, if the trade picture is improving, that means U.S. companies eventually will be more competitive. Consequently, many investors are buying shares of export-oriented U.S. companies in anticipation of better profits in the next year or so. But that is a rather faddish notion right now; if corporate earnings are disappointing in interest rates, the stock market rally could stall.
Improving U.S. competitiveness means a decline in another's competitiveness.
Japan and West Germany are verging on recession. Their export-oriented economies are facing major problems. Japan is worried about the damage the strong yen will do to Japanese trade. West Germany is also worried. Share prices in Frankfurt plummeted this past week. Bonn is thought to be considering a cut in interest rates to boost its economy.
Could the falling dollar get out of hand? If the dollar falls too far, investors might lose confidence in U.S. investments-especially the government bond market. The money to finance the federal budget and trade deficits could migrate elsewhere. Inflation could flare up, too, since Japanese and German manufacturers will eventually pass along price hikes-and U.S. companies might follow suit to increase their profit margins. The U.S. federal Reserve then might need to step in and stabilize the dollar by raising interest rates. And higher interest rates could cause the U.S. economy to slow down and end the Wall Street Rally.
Worried about these side effects, Federal Reserve chairman Paul Volcher has said the dollar has fallen far enough. What is the equilibrium level? Probably near where it is or slightly lower. It all depends on when the U.S. trade deficit turns around or if investors defect from U.S. Treasury Bonds. "It requires a good deal of political patience on the part of the U.S. Congress," says Dr. Cline, "And there must be an expectation of patience on the part of private investors. The chance are relatively good that we will avoid an investor break or panic." | 221.txt | 0 |
[
"Because the falling dollar may cause inflation in their countries.",
"Because it may force them to sell a lot of U.S, stocks.",
"Because it may do damage to their trade.",
"Because it may make Japanese company less competitive."
] | Why are Japan and West Germany worried about the falling dollar? | The Result of the Falling US Dollar
Like a ticking time bomb, the falling dollar has grabbed the attention of Japan and West Germany, forcing them to consider adopting economic polices the United States advocates. The U.S. government wants the dollar to fall because as the dollar declines in value against the yen and Deutsche mark, U.S. good becomes cheaper. U.S. companies then sell more at home and abroad, and U.S. trade deficit declines. Cries for trade protection abate, and the global free-trade system is preserved.
Then, the cheaper dollar makes it cheaper for many foreign investors to snap up U.S. stocks. That prompts heavy buying from abroad-especially from Japan. Also, if the trade picture is improving, that means U.S. companies eventually will be more competitive. Consequently, many investors are buying shares of export-oriented U.S. companies in anticipation of better profits in the next year or so. But that is a rather faddish notion right now; if corporate earnings are disappointing in interest rates, the stock market rally could stall.
Improving U.S. competitiveness means a decline in another's competitiveness.
Japan and West Germany are verging on recession. Their export-oriented economies are facing major problems. Japan is worried about the damage the strong yen will do to Japanese trade. West Germany is also worried. Share prices in Frankfurt plummeted this past week. Bonn is thought to be considering a cut in interest rates to boost its economy.
Could the falling dollar get out of hand? If the dollar falls too far, investors might lose confidence in U.S. investments-especially the government bond market. The money to finance the federal budget and trade deficits could migrate elsewhere. Inflation could flare up, too, since Japanese and German manufacturers will eventually pass along price hikes-and U.S. companies might follow suit to increase their profit margins. The U.S. federal Reserve then might need to step in and stabilize the dollar by raising interest rates. And higher interest rates could cause the U.S. economy to slow down and end the Wall Street Rally.
Worried about these side effects, Federal Reserve chairman Paul Volcher has said the dollar has fallen far enough. What is the equilibrium level? Probably near where it is or slightly lower. It all depends on when the U.S. trade deficit turns around or if investors defect from U.S. Treasury Bonds. "It requires a good deal of political patience on the part of the U.S. Congress," says Dr. Cline, "And there must be an expectation of patience on the part of private investors. The chance are relatively good that we will avoid an investor break or panic." | 221.txt | 2 |
[
"The prosperity of the U.S. economy would disappear.",
"The U.S. economy might face serious problems.",
"Investors might lose confidence in U.S. investments.",
"Inflation could flare up."
] | If dollar-falling got out of hand, and the U.S. Federal Reserve might step in , what would happen? | The Result of the Falling US Dollar
Like a ticking time bomb, the falling dollar has grabbed the attention of Japan and West Germany, forcing them to consider adopting economic polices the United States advocates. The U.S. government wants the dollar to fall because as the dollar declines in value against the yen and Deutsche mark, U.S. good becomes cheaper. U.S. companies then sell more at home and abroad, and U.S. trade deficit declines. Cries for trade protection abate, and the global free-trade system is preserved.
Then, the cheaper dollar makes it cheaper for many foreign investors to snap up U.S. stocks. That prompts heavy buying from abroad-especially from Japan. Also, if the trade picture is improving, that means U.S. companies eventually will be more competitive. Consequently, many investors are buying shares of export-oriented U.S. companies in anticipation of better profits in the next year or so. But that is a rather faddish notion right now; if corporate earnings are disappointing in interest rates, the stock market rally could stall.
Improving U.S. competitiveness means a decline in another's competitiveness.
Japan and West Germany are verging on recession. Their export-oriented economies are facing major problems. Japan is worried about the damage the strong yen will do to Japanese trade. West Germany is also worried. Share prices in Frankfurt plummeted this past week. Bonn is thought to be considering a cut in interest rates to boost its economy.
Could the falling dollar get out of hand? If the dollar falls too far, investors might lose confidence in U.S. investments-especially the government bond market. The money to finance the federal budget and trade deficits could migrate elsewhere. Inflation could flare up, too, since Japanese and German manufacturers will eventually pass along price hikes-and U.S. companies might follow suit to increase their profit margins. The U.S. federal Reserve then might need to step in and stabilize the dollar by raising interest rates. And higher interest rates could cause the U.S. economy to slow down and end the Wall Street Rally.
Worried about these side effects, Federal Reserve chairman Paul Volcher has said the dollar has fallen far enough. What is the equilibrium level? Probably near where it is or slightly lower. It all depends on when the U.S. trade deficit turns around or if investors defect from U.S. Treasury Bonds. "It requires a good deal of political patience on the part of the U.S. Congress," says Dr. Cline, "And there must be an expectation of patience on the part of private investors. The chance are relatively good that we will avoid an investor break or panic." | 221.txt | 0 |
[
"tourism contributes nothing to increasing understanding between nations.",
"Tourism is tiresome.",
"Conducted tour is dull.",
"tourism really does something to one's country."
] | The best title for this passage is | The Tourist Trade Contributes Absolutely Nothing to Increasing Understanding between Nations
The tourist trade is booming. With all this coming andgoing, you'd expect greater understanding to develop betweenthe nations of the world. Not a bit of it! Superb systems ofcommunication by air, sea and land make it possible for us tovisit each other's countries at a moderate cost. What was oncethe ‘grand tour', reserved for only the very rich, is now withineverybody's grasp? The package tour and chartered flights are not to be sneered at. Moderntravelers enjoy a level of comfort which the lords and ladies on grand tours in the old days couldn'thave dreamed of. But what's the sense of this mass exchange of populations if the nations of theworld remain basically ignorant of each other?
Many tourist organizations are directly responsible for this state of affairs. They deliberately set outto protect their clients from too much contact with the local population. The modern tourist leadsa cosseted, sheltered life. He lives at international hotels, where he eats his international food andsips his international drink while he gazes at the natives from a distance. Conducted tours to placesof interest are carefully censored. The tourist is allowed to see only what the organizers want himto see and no more. A strict schedule makes it impossible for the tourist to wander off on his own;and anyway, language is always a barrier, so he is only too happy to be protected in this way. Atits very worst, this leads to a new and hideous kind of colonization. The summer quarters of theinhabitants of the cite universitaire: are temporarily reestablished on the island of Corfu. Blackpool isrecreated at Torremolinos where the traveler goes not to eat paella, but fish and chips.
The sad thing about this situation is that it leads to the persistence of national stereotypes. Wedon't see the people of other nations as they really are, but as we have been brought up to believethey are. You can test this for yourself. Take five nationalities, say, French, German, English,American and Italian. Now in your mind, match them with these five adjectives: musical, amorous,cold, pedantic, native. Far from providing us with any insight into the national characteristics of thepeoples just mentioned, these adjectives actually act as barriers. So when you set out on yourtravels, the only characteristics you notice are those which confirm your preconceptions. Youcome away with the highly unoriginal and inaccurate impression that, say, ‘Anglo-Saxons arehypocrites' of that ‘Latin peoples shout a lot'. You only have to make a few foreign friends tounderstand how absurd and harmful national stereotypes are. But how can you make foreignfriends when the tourist trade does its best to prevent you?
Carried to an extreme, stereotypes can be positively dangerous. Wild generalizations stir up racialhatred and blind us to the basic fact-how trite it sounds! - That all people are human. We are allsimilar to each other and at the same time all unique. | 231.txt | 0 |
[
"apprehensive.",
"negative.",
"critical.",
"appreciative."
] | What is the author's attitude toward tourism? | The Tourist Trade Contributes Absolutely Nothing to Increasing Understanding between Nations
The tourist trade is booming. With all this coming andgoing, you'd expect greater understanding to develop betweenthe nations of the world. Not a bit of it! Superb systems ofcommunication by air, sea and land make it possible for us tovisit each other's countries at a moderate cost. What was oncethe ‘grand tour', reserved for only the very rich, is now withineverybody's grasp? The package tour and chartered flights are not to be sneered at. Moderntravelers enjoy a level of comfort which the lords and ladies on grand tours in the old days couldn'thave dreamed of. But what's the sense of this mass exchange of populations if the nations of theworld remain basically ignorant of each other?
Many tourist organizations are directly responsible for this state of affairs. They deliberately set outto protect their clients from too much contact with the local population. The modern tourist leadsa cosseted, sheltered life. He lives at international hotels, where he eats his international food andsips his international drink while he gazes at the natives from a distance. Conducted tours to placesof interest are carefully censored. The tourist is allowed to see only what the organizers want himto see and no more. A strict schedule makes it impossible for the tourist to wander off on his own;and anyway, language is always a barrier, so he is only too happy to be protected in this way. Atits very worst, this leads to a new and hideous kind of colonization. The summer quarters of theinhabitants of the cite universitaire: are temporarily reestablished on the island of Corfu. Blackpool isrecreated at Torremolinos where the traveler goes not to eat paella, but fish and chips.
The sad thing about this situation is that it leads to the persistence of national stereotypes. Wedon't see the people of other nations as they really are, but as we have been brought up to believethey are. You can test this for yourself. Take five nationalities, say, French, German, English,American and Italian. Now in your mind, match them with these five adjectives: musical, amorous,cold, pedantic, native. Far from providing us with any insight into the national characteristics of thepeoples just mentioned, these adjectives actually act as barriers. So when you set out on yourtravels, the only characteristics you notice are those which confirm your preconceptions. Youcome away with the highly unoriginal and inaccurate impression that, say, ‘Anglo-Saxons arehypocrites' of that ‘Latin peoples shout a lot'. You only have to make a few foreign friends tounderstand how absurd and harmful national stereotypes are. But how can you make foreignfriends when the tourist trade does its best to prevent you?
Carried to an extreme, stereotypes can be positively dangerous. Wild generalizations stir up racialhatred and blind us to the basic fact-how trite it sounds! - That all people are human. We are allsimilar to each other and at the same time all unique. | 231.txt | 2 |
[
"silent.",
"noisy.",
"lively.",
"active."
] | Which word in the following is the best to summarize Latin people shout a lot? | The Tourist Trade Contributes Absolutely Nothing to Increasing Understanding between Nations
The tourist trade is booming. With all this coming andgoing, you'd expect greater understanding to develop betweenthe nations of the world. Not a bit of it! Superb systems ofcommunication by air, sea and land make it possible for us tovisit each other's countries at a moderate cost. What was oncethe ‘grand tour', reserved for only the very rich, is now withineverybody's grasp? The package tour and chartered flights are not to be sneered at. Moderntravelers enjoy a level of comfort which the lords and ladies on grand tours in the old days couldn'thave dreamed of. But what's the sense of this mass exchange of populations if the nations of theworld remain basically ignorant of each other?
Many tourist organizations are directly responsible for this state of affairs. They deliberately set outto protect their clients from too much contact with the local population. The modern tourist leadsa cosseted, sheltered life. He lives at international hotels, where he eats his international food andsips his international drink while he gazes at the natives from a distance. Conducted tours to placesof interest are carefully censored. The tourist is allowed to see only what the organizers want himto see and no more. A strict schedule makes it impossible for the tourist to wander off on his own;and anyway, language is always a barrier, so he is only too happy to be protected in this way. Atits very worst, this leads to a new and hideous kind of colonization. The summer quarters of theinhabitants of the cite universitaire: are temporarily reestablished on the island of Corfu. Blackpool isrecreated at Torremolinos where the traveler goes not to eat paella, but fish and chips.
The sad thing about this situation is that it leads to the persistence of national stereotypes. Wedon't see the people of other nations as they really are, but as we have been brought up to believethey are. You can test this for yourself. Take five nationalities, say, French, German, English,American and Italian. Now in your mind, match them with these five adjectives: musical, amorous,cold, pedantic, native. Far from providing us with any insight into the national characteristics of thepeoples just mentioned, these adjectives actually act as barriers. So when you set out on yourtravels, the only characteristics you notice are those which confirm your preconceptions. Youcome away with the highly unoriginal and inaccurate impression that, say, ‘Anglo-Saxons arehypocrites' of that ‘Latin peoples shout a lot'. You only have to make a few foreign friends tounderstand how absurd and harmful national stereotypes are. But how can you make foreignfriends when the tourist trade does its best to prevent you?
Carried to an extreme, stereotypes can be positively dangerous. Wild generalizations stir up racialhatred and blind us to the basic fact-how trite it sounds! - That all people are human. We are allsimilar to each other and at the same time all unique. | 231.txt | 1 |
[
"conducted tour is disappointing.",
"the way of touring should be changed.",
"when traveling, you notice characteristics which confirm preconception.",
"national stereotypes should be changed."
] | The purpose of the author's criticism is to point out | The Tourist Trade Contributes Absolutely Nothing to Increasing Understanding between Nations
The tourist trade is booming. With all this coming andgoing, you'd expect greater understanding to develop betweenthe nations of the world. Not a bit of it! Superb systems ofcommunication by air, sea and land make it possible for us tovisit each other's countries at a moderate cost. What was oncethe ‘grand tour', reserved for only the very rich, is now withineverybody's grasp? The package tour and chartered flights are not to be sneered at. Moderntravelers enjoy a level of comfort which the lords and ladies on grand tours in the old days couldn'thave dreamed of. But what's the sense of this mass exchange of populations if the nations of theworld remain basically ignorant of each other?
Many tourist organizations are directly responsible for this state of affairs. They deliberately set outto protect their clients from too much contact with the local population. The modern tourist leadsa cosseted, sheltered life. He lives at international hotels, where he eats his international food andsips his international drink while he gazes at the natives from a distance. Conducted tours to placesof interest are carefully censored. The tourist is allowed to see only what the organizers want himto see and no more. A strict schedule makes it impossible for the tourist to wander off on his own;and anyway, language is always a barrier, so he is only too happy to be protected in this way. Atits very worst, this leads to a new and hideous kind of colonization. The summer quarters of theinhabitants of the cite universitaire: are temporarily reestablished on the island of Corfu. Blackpool isrecreated at Torremolinos where the traveler goes not to eat paella, but fish and chips.
The sad thing about this situation is that it leads to the persistence of national stereotypes. Wedon't see the people of other nations as they really are, but as we have been brought up to believethey are. You can test this for yourself. Take five nationalities, say, French, German, English,American and Italian. Now in your mind, match them with these five adjectives: musical, amorous,cold, pedantic, native. Far from providing us with any insight into the national characteristics of thepeoples just mentioned, these adjectives actually act as barriers. So when you set out on yourtravels, the only characteristics you notice are those which confirm your preconceptions. Youcome away with the highly unoriginal and inaccurate impression that, say, ‘Anglo-Saxons arehypocrites' of that ‘Latin peoples shout a lot'. You only have to make a few foreign friends tounderstand how absurd and harmful national stereotypes are. But how can you make foreignfriends when the tourist trade does its best to prevent you?
Carried to an extreme, stereotypes can be positively dangerous. Wild generalizations stir up racialhatred and blind us to the basic fact-how trite it sounds! - That all people are human. We are allsimilar to each other and at the same time all unique. | 231.txt | 1 |
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.