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| He was satisfied with the salary that was _ with his abilities. | Is Education A Robbery?
One of our expectations about education is that it will pay off in terms of upward mobility. Historically, the correlation between education and income has been strong. But in the early 1970 s a contradiction developed between education and the economy. Our value of education and our average educational attainment outstripped the capacity of the economy to absorb the graduates. Since the 1970s, high-school graduates have experienced a striking decrease in earnings, making them the first generation since World WarⅡ to face a lower standard of living than their parents had.
Experts have argued that this contradiction is at the heart of the problem of public education today. It is not, as business leaders claim, that the schools are failing to properly educate students, that they are turning out young people who are inadequately prepared to function in the workplace. The real problem is a dearth of economic opportunities for students who are not continuing on to college.
College graduates also are having difficulty finding jobs. Even when they do, the jobs may not be commensurate with their training and expectations. Part of the problem is that too many young Americans aspire to have professional jobs, making disappointment and frustration inevitable for some. Many students assumed that what was true of an individu-al - that the higher the education, the better the job opportunities -would also be true for an entire society. But when the numbers of better-educated young people became too great, the economy could no longer absorb them
Another part of the problem is the assumption that greater educational attainment guarantees career advancement. In fact, employers do not routinely reward educational attainment; rather, they reward it only when they believe it will contribute to the employee's productivity.
We should not overlook the fact that there is still a strong correlation between education, occupation, and income. College graduates have a strong advantage over those with less education. But the payoff is neither as large nor as certain as it once was.
Unfortunately, Americans have focused so strongly on the economic payoff that many consider their college education useless if it does not yield a desirable, well-paying job. Only in this sense can we speak of an "oversupply" of college graduates. We could argue that all or at least the majority of Americans would profit by some degree because higher education can enable the individual to think more deeply, explore more widely, and enjoy a greater range of experiences. | 202.txt | 3 |
[
"How to cure a drug addict.",
"Heroin and narcotic.",
"The harm of the drugs and the antidrug measures taken by the government.",
"The American laws. "
]
| What is the topic of this passage? | Heroin addictions today is found chiefly among young men of minority groups in ghettoareas.Of the more than 60,000 known addicts,more than half live in New York State.Most of them live in New York City.Recent figures show that more than half of the addicts are under 30 years of age.
Narcotic addiction in the United States is not limted to heroin users.Some middle-aged and older people who take narcotic drugs regularly to relieve pain can also become addicted.So do some people who can get drugs easily,such as doctors,nurses,and pharmacists.Studies show that this type of addict has personality and emotional problems very similar to those of other regular narcotic users.
Many addicts admit that getting a continued supply is the main object of their lives.An addict's concentration on getting drugs often prevents continuing an education or working at a job.His health is often poor.He may be sick one day from the effects of withdrawal and sick the next day from an overdose.Statistics show that an addict's life span may be shortened by 15 to 20 years.The addict is usually in trouble with the family and almost always in trouble with the law.
Some studies suggest that many of the known narcotic addicts had some trouble with the law before they became addicted.Once addicted,they may become even more involved with crime because it costs so much to support the heroin habit.
Most authorities agree that the addict's involvement with crime is not a direct effect of the drug itself.Turning to crime is usually the only way to get that much money.The addicts' crimes are nearly always thefts or other crimes againstproperty.
Federal penalties for illegal narcotics usage were established under the Harris on Act of 1914.The Act provides that illegal possession of narcotics is punishable by fines and/or imprisonment.Sentences can range from 2 to 10 years for the first offense,5 to 20 years for the second,and 10 to 20 years for further offenses.
Illegal sale of narcotics can mean a fine of $20,000 and a sentence from 20 to 40 years for later offenses.A person who sells narcotics to someone under 18 is refused parole and probation,even for the first offense.If the drug is heroin,he can be sentenced to life imprisonment or to death. | 2009.txt | 2 |
[
"his concentration on getting drugs",
"his personality",
"his emotional problems",
"his stortage of money "
]
| An addict cannot continue his eduction or work at a job,because of _ | Heroin addictions today is found chiefly among young men of minority groups in ghettoareas.Of the more than 60,000 known addicts,more than half live in New York State.Most of them live in New York City.Recent figures show that more than half of the addicts are under 30 years of age.
Narcotic addiction in the United States is not limted to heroin users.Some middle-aged and older people who take narcotic drugs regularly to relieve pain can also become addicted.So do some people who can get drugs easily,such as doctors,nurses,and pharmacists.Studies show that this type of addict has personality and emotional problems very similar to those of other regular narcotic users.
Many addicts admit that getting a continued supply is the main object of their lives.An addict's concentration on getting drugs often prevents continuing an education or working at a job.His health is often poor.He may be sick one day from the effects of withdrawal and sick the next day from an overdose.Statistics show that an addict's life span may be shortened by 15 to 20 years.The addict is usually in trouble with the family and almost always in trouble with the law.
Some studies suggest that many of the known narcotic addicts had some trouble with the law before they became addicted.Once addicted,they may become even more involved with crime because it costs so much to support the heroin habit.
Most authorities agree that the addict's involvement with crime is not a direct effect of the drug itself.Turning to crime is usually the only way to get that much money.The addicts' crimes are nearly always thefts or other crimes againstproperty.
Federal penalties for illegal narcotics usage were established under the Harris on Act of 1914.The Act provides that illegal possession of narcotics is punishable by fines and/or imprisonment.Sentences can range from 2 to 10 years for the first offense,5 to 20 years for the second,and 10 to 20 years for further offenses.
Illegal sale of narcotics can mean a fine of $20,000 and a sentence from 20 to 40 years for later offenses.A person who sells narcotics to someone under 18 is refused parole and probation,even for the first offense.If the drug is heroin,he can be sentenced to life imprisonment or to death. | 2009.txt | 0 |
[
"Borrow from their families.",
"By hard working.",
"In an illegal way.",
"The author doesn't mention it. "
]
| According to the author,how can the addicts get the money for drugs? | Heroin addictions today is found chiefly among young men of minority groups in ghettoareas.Of the more than 60,000 known addicts,more than half live in New York State.Most of them live in New York City.Recent figures show that more than half of the addicts are under 30 years of age.
Narcotic addiction in the United States is not limted to heroin users.Some middle-aged and older people who take narcotic drugs regularly to relieve pain can also become addicted.So do some people who can get drugs easily,such as doctors,nurses,and pharmacists.Studies show that this type of addict has personality and emotional problems very similar to those of other regular narcotic users.
Many addicts admit that getting a continued supply is the main object of their lives.An addict's concentration on getting drugs often prevents continuing an education or working at a job.His health is often poor.He may be sick one day from the effects of withdrawal and sick the next day from an overdose.Statistics show that an addict's life span may be shortened by 15 to 20 years.The addict is usually in trouble with the family and almost always in trouble with the law.
Some studies suggest that many of the known narcotic addicts had some trouble with the law before they became addicted.Once addicted,they may become even more involved with crime because it costs so much to support the heroin habit.
Most authorities agree that the addict's involvement with crime is not a direct effect of the drug itself.Turning to crime is usually the only way to get that much money.The addicts' crimes are nearly always thefts or other crimes againstproperty.
Federal penalties for illegal narcotics usage were established under the Harris on Act of 1914.The Act provides that illegal possession of narcotics is punishable by fines and/or imprisonment.Sentences can range from 2 to 10 years for the first offense,5 to 20 years for the second,and 10 to 20 years for further offenses.
Illegal sale of narcotics can mean a fine of $20,000 and a sentence from 20 to 40 years for later offenses.A person who sells narcotics to someone under 18 is refused parole and probation,even for the first offense.If the drug is heroin,he can be sentenced to life imprisonment or to death. | 2009.txt | 2 |
[
"Government men.",
"Medical workers.",
"The minorities.",
"The Jews. "
]
| According to the author,who can get narcotic easily? | Heroin addictions today is found chiefly among young men of minority groups in ghettoareas.Of the more than 60,000 known addicts,more than half live in New York State.Most of them live in New York City.Recent figures show that more than half of the addicts are under 30 years of age.
Narcotic addiction in the United States is not limted to heroin users.Some middle-aged and older people who take narcotic drugs regularly to relieve pain can also become addicted.So do some people who can get drugs easily,such as doctors,nurses,and pharmacists.Studies show that this type of addict has personality and emotional problems very similar to those of other regular narcotic users.
Many addicts admit that getting a continued supply is the main object of their lives.An addict's concentration on getting drugs often prevents continuing an education or working at a job.His health is often poor.He may be sick one day from the effects of withdrawal and sick the next day from an overdose.Statistics show that an addict's life span may be shortened by 15 to 20 years.The addict is usually in trouble with the family and almost always in trouble with the law.
Some studies suggest that many of the known narcotic addicts had some trouble with the law before they became addicted.Once addicted,they may become even more involved with crime because it costs so much to support the heroin habit.
Most authorities agree that the addict's involvement with crime is not a direct effect of the drug itself.Turning to crime is usually the only way to get that much money.The addicts' crimes are nearly always thefts or other crimes againstproperty.
Federal penalties for illegal narcotics usage were established under the Harris on Act of 1914.The Act provides that illegal possession of narcotics is punishable by fines and/or imprisonment.Sentences can range from 2 to 10 years for the first offense,5 to 20 years for the second,and 10 to 20 years for further offenses.
Illegal sale of narcotics can mean a fine of $20,000 and a sentence from 20 to 40 years for later offenses.A person who sells narcotics to someone under 18 is refused parole and probation,even for the first offense.If the drug is heroin,he can be sentenced to life imprisonment or to death. | 2009.txt | 1 |
[
"fined $20,000.",
"sentenced to 5 to 20 years in prison.",
"sentenced to 20 to 40 years in prison.",
"sentenced to death."
]
| A person who sell heroin to a kid can be? | Heroin addictions today is found chiefly among young men of minority groups in ghettoareas.Of the more than 60,000 known addicts,more than half live in New York State.Most of them live in New York City.Recent figures show that more than half of the addicts are under 30 years of age.
Narcotic addiction in the United States is not limted to heroin users.Some middle-aged and older people who take narcotic drugs regularly to relieve pain can also become addicted.So do some people who can get drugs easily,such as doctors,nurses,and pharmacists.Studies show that this type of addict has personality and emotional problems very similar to those of other regular narcotic users.
Many addicts admit that getting a continued supply is the main object of their lives.An addict's concentration on getting drugs often prevents continuing an education or working at a job.His health is often poor.He may be sick one day from the effects of withdrawal and sick the next day from an overdose.Statistics show that an addict's life span may be shortened by 15 to 20 years.The addict is usually in trouble with the family and almost always in trouble with the law.
Some studies suggest that many of the known narcotic addicts had some trouble with the law before they became addicted.Once addicted,they may become even more involved with crime because it costs so much to support the heroin habit.
Most authorities agree that the addict's involvement with crime is not a direct effect of the drug itself.Turning to crime is usually the only way to get that much money.The addicts' crimes are nearly always thefts or other crimes againstproperty.
Federal penalties for illegal narcotics usage were established under the Harris on Act of 1914.The Act provides that illegal possession of narcotics is punishable by fines and/or imprisonment.Sentences can range from 2 to 10 years for the first offense,5 to 20 years for the second,and 10 to 20 years for further offenses.
Illegal sale of narcotics can mean a fine of $20,000 and a sentence from 20 to 40 years for later offenses.A person who sells narcotics to someone under 18 is refused parole and probation,even for the first offense.If the drug is heroin,he can be sentenced to life imprisonment or to death. | 2009.txt | 3 |
[
"It was fashionable among young people of the time.",
"It was unaffordable for ordinary people.",
"It produced some famous European artists.",
"It made a compulsory part of college education."
]
| What is said about the Grand Tour? | Beginning in the late sixteenth century, it became fashionable for young aristocrats to visit Paris, Venice, Florence, and above all, Rome, as the culmination of their classical education. Thus was born the idea of the Grand Tour, a practice which introduced Englishmen, Germans, Scandinavians, and also Americans to the art and culture of France and Italy for the next 300 years. Travel was arduous and costly throughout the period, possible only for a privileged class-the same that produced gentlemen scientists, authors, antique experts, and patrons of the arts.
The Grand Tourist was typically a young man with a thorough grounding in Greek and Latin literature as well as some leisure time, some means, and some interest in art. The German traveler Johann Winckelmann pioneered the field of art history with his comprehensive study of Greek and Roman sculpture; he was portrayed by his friend Anton Raphael Mengs at the beginning of his long residence in Rome. Most Grand Tourists, however, stayed for briefer periods and set out with less scholarly intentions, accompanied by a teacher or guardian, and expected to return home with souvenirs of their travels as well as an understanding of art and architecture formed by exposure to great masterpieces.
London was a frequent starting point for Grand Tourists, and Paris a compulsory destination; many traveled to the Netherlands, some to Switzerland and Germany, and a very few adventurers to Spain, Greece, or Turkey. The essential place to visit, however, was Italy. The British traveler Charles Thompson spoke for many Grand Tourists when in 1744 he described himself as "being impatiently desirous of viewing a country so famous in history, a country which once gave laws to the world, and which is at present the greatest school of music and painting, contains the noblest productions of sculpture and architecture, and is filled with cabinets of rarities, and collections of all kinds of historical relics". Within Italy, the great focus was Rome, whose ancient ruins and more recent achievements were shown to every Grand Tourist. Panini's Ancient Rome and Modem Rome represent the sights most prized, including celebrated Greco-Roman statues and views of famous ruins, fountains, and churches. Since there were few museums anywhere in Europe before the close of the eighteenth century, Grand Tourists often saw paintings and sculptures by gaining admission to private collections, and many were eager to acquire examples of Greco-Roman and Italian art for their own collections. In England, where architecture was increasingly seen as an aristocratic pursuit, noblemen often applied what they learned from the villas of Palladio in the Veneto and the evocative ruins of Rome to their own country houses and gardens. | 1948.txt | 1 |
[
"They had much geographic knowledge.",
"They were courageous and venturesome.",
"They were versed in literature and interested in art.",
"They had enough travel and outdoor-life experience."
]
| What did Grand Tourists have in common? | Beginning in the late sixteenth century, it became fashionable for young aristocrats to visit Paris, Venice, Florence, and above all, Rome, as the culmination of their classical education. Thus was born the idea of the Grand Tour, a practice which introduced Englishmen, Germans, Scandinavians, and also Americans to the art and culture of France and Italy for the next 300 years. Travel was arduous and costly throughout the period, possible only for a privileged class-the same that produced gentlemen scientists, authors, antique experts, and patrons of the arts.
The Grand Tourist was typically a young man with a thorough grounding in Greek and Latin literature as well as some leisure time, some means, and some interest in art. The German traveler Johann Winckelmann pioneered the field of art history with his comprehensive study of Greek and Roman sculpture; he was portrayed by his friend Anton Raphael Mengs at the beginning of his long residence in Rome. Most Grand Tourists, however, stayed for briefer periods and set out with less scholarly intentions, accompanied by a teacher or guardian, and expected to return home with souvenirs of their travels as well as an understanding of art and architecture formed by exposure to great masterpieces.
London was a frequent starting point for Grand Tourists, and Paris a compulsory destination; many traveled to the Netherlands, some to Switzerland and Germany, and a very few adventurers to Spain, Greece, or Turkey. The essential place to visit, however, was Italy. The British traveler Charles Thompson spoke for many Grand Tourists when in 1744 he described himself as "being impatiently desirous of viewing a country so famous in history, a country which once gave laws to the world, and which is at present the greatest school of music and painting, contains the noblest productions of sculpture and architecture, and is filled with cabinets of rarities, and collections of all kinds of historical relics". Within Italy, the great focus was Rome, whose ancient ruins and more recent achievements were shown to every Grand Tourist. Panini's Ancient Rome and Modem Rome represent the sights most prized, including celebrated Greco-Roman statues and views of famous ruins, fountains, and churches. Since there were few museums anywhere in Europe before the close of the eighteenth century, Grand Tourists often saw paintings and sculptures by gaining admission to private collections, and many were eager to acquire examples of Greco-Roman and Italian art for their own collections. In England, where architecture was increasingly seen as an aristocratic pursuit, noblemen often applied what they learned from the villas of Palladio in the Veneto and the evocative ruins of Rome to their own country houses and gardens. | 1948.txt | 2 |
[
"They found inspiration in the world's greatest masterpieces.",
"They got a better understanding of early human civilization.",
"They developed an interest in the origin of modem art forms.",
"They gained some knowledge of classical art and architecture."
]
| How did Grand Tourists benefit from their travel? | Beginning in the late sixteenth century, it became fashionable for young aristocrats to visit Paris, Venice, Florence, and above all, Rome, as the culmination of their classical education. Thus was born the idea of the Grand Tour, a practice which introduced Englishmen, Germans, Scandinavians, and also Americans to the art and culture of France and Italy for the next 300 years. Travel was arduous and costly throughout the period, possible only for a privileged class-the same that produced gentlemen scientists, authors, antique experts, and patrons of the arts.
The Grand Tourist was typically a young man with a thorough grounding in Greek and Latin literature as well as some leisure time, some means, and some interest in art. The German traveler Johann Winckelmann pioneered the field of art history with his comprehensive study of Greek and Roman sculpture; he was portrayed by his friend Anton Raphael Mengs at the beginning of his long residence in Rome. Most Grand Tourists, however, stayed for briefer periods and set out with less scholarly intentions, accompanied by a teacher or guardian, and expected to return home with souvenirs of their travels as well as an understanding of art and architecture formed by exposure to great masterpieces.
London was a frequent starting point for Grand Tourists, and Paris a compulsory destination; many traveled to the Netherlands, some to Switzerland and Germany, and a very few adventurers to Spain, Greece, or Turkey. The essential place to visit, however, was Italy. The British traveler Charles Thompson spoke for many Grand Tourists when in 1744 he described himself as "being impatiently desirous of viewing a country so famous in history, a country which once gave laws to the world, and which is at present the greatest school of music and painting, contains the noblest productions of sculpture and architecture, and is filled with cabinets of rarities, and collections of all kinds of historical relics". Within Italy, the great focus was Rome, whose ancient ruins and more recent achievements were shown to every Grand Tourist. Panini's Ancient Rome and Modem Rome represent the sights most prized, including celebrated Greco-Roman statues and views of famous ruins, fountains, and churches. Since there were few museums anywhere in Europe before the close of the eighteenth century, Grand Tourists often saw paintings and sculptures by gaining admission to private collections, and many were eager to acquire examples of Greco-Roman and Italian art for their own collections. In England, where architecture was increasingly seen as an aristocratic pursuit, noblemen often applied what they learned from the villas of Palladio in the Veneto and the evocative ruins of Rome to their own country houses and gardens. | 1948.txt | 3 |
[
"They could buy unique souvenirs there to take back home.",
"Europe hardly had any museums before the 19th century.",
"They found the antiques there more valuable.",
"Private collections were of greater variety."
]
| Why did many Grand Tourists visit the private collections? | Beginning in the late sixteenth century, it became fashionable for young aristocrats to visit Paris, Venice, Florence, and above all, Rome, as the culmination of their classical education. Thus was born the idea of the Grand Tour, a practice which introduced Englishmen, Germans, Scandinavians, and also Americans to the art and culture of France and Italy for the next 300 years. Travel was arduous and costly throughout the period, possible only for a privileged class-the same that produced gentlemen scientists, authors, antique experts, and patrons of the arts.
The Grand Tourist was typically a young man with a thorough grounding in Greek and Latin literature as well as some leisure time, some means, and some interest in art. The German traveler Johann Winckelmann pioneered the field of art history with his comprehensive study of Greek and Roman sculpture; he was portrayed by his friend Anton Raphael Mengs at the beginning of his long residence in Rome. Most Grand Tourists, however, stayed for briefer periods and set out with less scholarly intentions, accompanied by a teacher or guardian, and expected to return home with souvenirs of their travels as well as an understanding of art and architecture formed by exposure to great masterpieces.
London was a frequent starting point for Grand Tourists, and Paris a compulsory destination; many traveled to the Netherlands, some to Switzerland and Germany, and a very few adventurers to Spain, Greece, or Turkey. The essential place to visit, however, was Italy. The British traveler Charles Thompson spoke for many Grand Tourists when in 1744 he described himself as "being impatiently desirous of viewing a country so famous in history, a country which once gave laws to the world, and which is at present the greatest school of music and painting, contains the noblest productions of sculpture and architecture, and is filled with cabinets of rarities, and collections of all kinds of historical relics". Within Italy, the great focus was Rome, whose ancient ruins and more recent achievements were shown to every Grand Tourist. Panini's Ancient Rome and Modem Rome represent the sights most prized, including celebrated Greco-Roman statues and views of famous ruins, fountains, and churches. Since there were few museums anywhere in Europe before the close of the eighteenth century, Grand Tourists often saw paintings and sculptures by gaining admission to private collections, and many were eager to acquire examples of Greco-Roman and Italian art for their own collections. In England, where architecture was increasingly seen as an aristocratic pursuit, noblemen often applied what they learned from the villas of Palladio in the Veneto and the evocative ruins of Rome to their own country houses and gardens. | 1948.txt | 1 |
[
"There appeared more and more Roman-style buildings.",
"Many aristocrats began to move into Roman-style villas.",
"Aristocrats' country houses all had Roman-style gardens.",
"Italian architects were hired to design houses and gardens."
]
| How did the Grand Tour influence the architecture in England? | Beginning in the late sixteenth century, it became fashionable for young aristocrats to visit Paris, Venice, Florence, and above all, Rome, as the culmination of their classical education. Thus was born the idea of the Grand Tour, a practice which introduced Englishmen, Germans, Scandinavians, and also Americans to the art and culture of France and Italy for the next 300 years. Travel was arduous and costly throughout the period, possible only for a privileged class-the same that produced gentlemen scientists, authors, antique experts, and patrons of the arts.
The Grand Tourist was typically a young man with a thorough grounding in Greek and Latin literature as well as some leisure time, some means, and some interest in art. The German traveler Johann Winckelmann pioneered the field of art history with his comprehensive study of Greek and Roman sculpture; he was portrayed by his friend Anton Raphael Mengs at the beginning of his long residence in Rome. Most Grand Tourists, however, stayed for briefer periods and set out with less scholarly intentions, accompanied by a teacher or guardian, and expected to return home with souvenirs of their travels as well as an understanding of art and architecture formed by exposure to great masterpieces.
London was a frequent starting point for Grand Tourists, and Paris a compulsory destination; many traveled to the Netherlands, some to Switzerland and Germany, and a very few adventurers to Spain, Greece, or Turkey. The essential place to visit, however, was Italy. The British traveler Charles Thompson spoke for many Grand Tourists when in 1744 he described himself as "being impatiently desirous of viewing a country so famous in history, a country which once gave laws to the world, and which is at present the greatest school of music and painting, contains the noblest productions of sculpture and architecture, and is filled with cabinets of rarities, and collections of all kinds of historical relics". Within Italy, the great focus was Rome, whose ancient ruins and more recent achievements were shown to every Grand Tourist. Panini's Ancient Rome and Modem Rome represent the sights most prized, including celebrated Greco-Roman statues and views of famous ruins, fountains, and churches. Since there were few museums anywhere in Europe before the close of the eighteenth century, Grand Tourists often saw paintings and sculptures by gaining admission to private collections, and many were eager to acquire examples of Greco-Roman and Italian art for their own collections. In England, where architecture was increasingly seen as an aristocratic pursuit, noblemen often applied what they learned from the villas of Palladio in the Veneto and the evocative ruins of Rome to their own country houses and gardens. | 1948.txt | 0 |
[
"Transform people's cultural identity.",
"Change the way future events unfold.",
"Get a firm grip on the most important issues.",
"Eliminate emotional and ideological bias."
]
| What do data-ists assume they can do? | If you asked me to describe the rising philosophy of the day, I'd say it is data-ism. We now have theability to gather huge amounts of data. This ability seems to carry with it certain cultural assumptions--that everything that can be measured should be measured; that data is a transparent and reliable lens thatallows us to filter out emotionalism and ideology; that data will help us do remarkable things--like foretellthe future.
Over the next years, I'm hoping to get a better grip on some of the questions raised by the datarevolution: In what situations should we rely on intuitive pattern recognition and in which situations shouldwe ignore intuition and follow the data? What kinds of events are predictable using statistical analysis andwhat sorts of events are not?
I confess I enter this in a skeptical frame of mind, believing that we tend to get carried away in ourdesire to reduce everything to the quantifiable. But at the outset let me celebrate two things data doesreally well.
First, it's really good at exposing when our intuitive view of reality is wrong. For example, nearlyevery person who runs for political office has an intuitive sense that they can powerfully influence theirodds of winning the election if they can just raise and spend more money. But this is largely wrong.
After the 2006 election, Sean Trende constructed a graph comparing the incumbent campaign spending advantages with their eventual margins of victory. There was barely any relationshipbetween more spending and a bigger victory.
Likewise, many teachers have an intuitive sense that different students have different learningstyles: some are verbal and some are visual; some are linear, some are holistic . Teachersimagine they will improve outcomes if they tailor their presentations to each student. But there's noevidence to support this either.
Second, data can illuminate patterns of behavior we haven't yet noticed. For example, I've alwaysassumed people who frequently use words like "I," "me," and "mine" are probably more self-centeredthan people who don't. But as James Pennebaker of the University of Texas notes in his book, The SecretLife of Pronouns, when people are feeling confident, they are focused on the task at hand, not onthemselves. High-status, confident people use fewer "I" words, not more.
Our brains often don't notice subtle verbal patterns, but Pennebaker's computers can. Youngerwriters use more negative and past-tense words than older writers who use more positive and future-tensewords.
In sum, the data revolution is giving us wonderful ways to understand the present and the past. Will it transform our ability to predict and make decisions about the future? We'll see. | 1503.txt | 3 |
[
"Use data analysis to predict the election result.",
"Win the election if they can raise enough funds.",
"Manipulate public opinion with favorable data.",
"Increase the chances of winning by foul means."
]
| What do people running for political office think they can do? | If you asked me to describe the rising philosophy of the day, I'd say it is data-ism. We now have theability to gather huge amounts of data. This ability seems to carry with it certain cultural assumptions--that everything that can be measured should be measured; that data is a transparent and reliable lens thatallows us to filter out emotionalism and ideology; that data will help us do remarkable things--like foretellthe future.
Over the next years, I'm hoping to get a better grip on some of the questions raised by the datarevolution: In what situations should we rely on intuitive pattern recognition and in which situations shouldwe ignore intuition and follow the data? What kinds of events are predictable using statistical analysis andwhat sorts of events are not?
I confess I enter this in a skeptical frame of mind, believing that we tend to get carried away in ourdesire to reduce everything to the quantifiable. But at the outset let me celebrate two things data doesreally well.
First, it's really good at exposing when our intuitive view of reality is wrong. For example, nearlyevery person who runs for political office has an intuitive sense that they can powerfully influence theirodds of winning the election if they can just raise and spend more money. But this is largely wrong.
After the 2006 election, Sean Trende constructed a graph comparing the incumbent campaign spending advantages with their eventual margins of victory. There was barely any relationshipbetween more spending and a bigger victory.
Likewise, many teachers have an intuitive sense that different students have different learningstyles: some are verbal and some are visual; some are linear, some are holistic . Teachersimagine they will improve outcomes if they tailor their presentations to each student. But there's noevidence to support this either.
Second, data can illuminate patterns of behavior we haven't yet noticed. For example, I've alwaysassumed people who frequently use words like "I," "me," and "mine" are probably more self-centeredthan people who don't. But as James Pennebaker of the University of Texas notes in his book, The SecretLife of Pronouns, when people are feeling confident, they are focused on the task at hand, not onthemselves. High-status, confident people use fewer "I" words, not more.
Our brains often don't notice subtle verbal patterns, but Pennebaker's computers can. Youngerwriters use more negative and past-tense words than older writers who use more positive and future-tensewords.
In sum, the data revolution is giving us wonderful ways to understand the present and the past. Will it transform our ability to predict and make decisions about the future? We'll see. | 1503.txt | 1 |
[
"They think students prefer flexible teaching methods.",
"They will be able to try different approaches.",
"They believe students' learning styles vary.",
"They can accommodate students with special needs."
]
| Why do many teachers favor the idea of tailoring their presentations to different students? | If you asked me to describe the rising philosophy of the day, I'd say it is data-ism. We now have theability to gather huge amounts of data. This ability seems to carry with it certain cultural assumptions--that everything that can be measured should be measured; that data is a transparent and reliable lens thatallows us to filter out emotionalism and ideology; that data will help us do remarkable things--like foretellthe future.
Over the next years, I'm hoping to get a better grip on some of the questions raised by the datarevolution: In what situations should we rely on intuitive pattern recognition and in which situations shouldwe ignore intuition and follow the data? What kinds of events are predictable using statistical analysis andwhat sorts of events are not?
I confess I enter this in a skeptical frame of mind, believing that we tend to get carried away in ourdesire to reduce everything to the quantifiable. But at the outset let me celebrate two things data doesreally well.
First, it's really good at exposing when our intuitive view of reality is wrong. For example, nearlyevery person who runs for political office has an intuitive sense that they can powerfully influence theirodds of winning the election if they can just raise and spend more money. But this is largely wrong.
After the 2006 election, Sean Trende constructed a graph comparing the incumbent campaign spending advantages with their eventual margins of victory. There was barely any relationshipbetween more spending and a bigger victory.
Likewise, many teachers have an intuitive sense that different students have different learningstyles: some are verbal and some are visual; some are linear, some are holistic . Teachersimagine they will improve outcomes if they tailor their presentations to each student. But there's noevidence to support this either.
Second, data can illuminate patterns of behavior we haven't yet noticed. For example, I've alwaysassumed people who frequently use words like "I," "me," and "mine" are probably more self-centeredthan people who don't. But as James Pennebaker of the University of Texas notes in his book, The SecretLife of Pronouns, when people are feeling confident, they are focused on the task at hand, not onthemselves. High-status, confident people use fewer "I" words, not more.
Our brains often don't notice subtle verbal patterns, but Pennebaker's computers can. Youngerwriters use more negative and past-tense words than older writers who use more positive and future-tensewords.
In sum, the data revolution is giving us wonderful ways to understand the present and the past. Will it transform our ability to predict and make decisions about the future? We'll see. | 1503.txt | 2 |
[
"The importance of using pronouns properly.",
"Repeated use of first-person pronouns by self-centered people.",
"Frequent use of pronouns and future tense by young people.",
"A pattern in confident people's use of pronouns."
]
| What does James Pennebaker reveal in The Secret Life of Pronouns? | If you asked me to describe the rising philosophy of the day, I'd say it is data-ism. We now have theability to gather huge amounts of data. This ability seems to carry with it certain cultural assumptions--that everything that can be measured should be measured; that data is a transparent and reliable lens thatallows us to filter out emotionalism and ideology; that data will help us do remarkable things--like foretellthe future.
Over the next years, I'm hoping to get a better grip on some of the questions raised by the datarevolution: In what situations should we rely on intuitive pattern recognition and in which situations shouldwe ignore intuition and follow the data? What kinds of events are predictable using statistical analysis andwhat sorts of events are not?
I confess I enter this in a skeptical frame of mind, believing that we tend to get carried away in ourdesire to reduce everything to the quantifiable. But at the outset let me celebrate two things data doesreally well.
First, it's really good at exposing when our intuitive view of reality is wrong. For example, nearlyevery person who runs for political office has an intuitive sense that they can powerfully influence theirodds of winning the election if they can just raise and spend more money. But this is largely wrong.
After the 2006 election, Sean Trende constructed a graph comparing the incumbent campaign spending advantages with their eventual margins of victory. There was barely any relationshipbetween more spending and a bigger victory.
Likewise, many teachers have an intuitive sense that different students have different learningstyles: some are verbal and some are visual; some are linear, some are holistic . Teachersimagine they will improve outcomes if they tailor their presentations to each student. But there's noevidence to support this either.
Second, data can illuminate patterns of behavior we haven't yet noticed. For example, I've alwaysassumed people who frequently use words like "I," "me," and "mine" are probably more self-centeredthan people who don't. But as James Pennebaker of the University of Texas notes in his book, The SecretLife of Pronouns, when people are feeling confident, they are focused on the task at hand, not onthemselves. High-status, confident people use fewer "I" words, not more.
Our brains often don't notice subtle verbal patterns, but Pennebaker's computers can. Youngerwriters use more negative and past-tense words than older writers who use more positive and future-tensewords.
In sum, the data revolution is giving us wonderful ways to understand the present and the past. Will it transform our ability to predict and make decisions about the future? We'll see. | 1503.txt | 3 |
[
"Data may not be easily accessible.",
"Errors may occur with large data samples.",
"Data cannot always do what we imagine it can.",
"Some data may turn out to be outdated."
]
| Why is the author skeptical of the data revolution? | If you asked me to describe the rising philosophy of the day, I'd say it is data-ism. We now have theability to gather huge amounts of data. This ability seems to carry with it certain cultural assumptions--that everything that can be measured should be measured; that data is a transparent and reliable lens thatallows us to filter out emotionalism and ideology; that data will help us do remarkable things--like foretellthe future.
Over the next years, I'm hoping to get a better grip on some of the questions raised by the datarevolution: In what situations should we rely on intuitive pattern recognition and in which situations shouldwe ignore intuition and follow the data? What kinds of events are predictable using statistical analysis andwhat sorts of events are not?
I confess I enter this in a skeptical frame of mind, believing that we tend to get carried away in ourdesire to reduce everything to the quantifiable. But at the outset let me celebrate two things data doesreally well.
First, it's really good at exposing when our intuitive view of reality is wrong. For example, nearlyevery person who runs for political office has an intuitive sense that they can powerfully influence theirodds of winning the election if they can just raise and spend more money. But this is largely wrong.
After the 2006 election, Sean Trende constructed a graph comparing the incumbent campaign spending advantages with their eventual margins of victory. There was barely any relationshipbetween more spending and a bigger victory.
Likewise, many teachers have an intuitive sense that different students have different learningstyles: some are verbal and some are visual; some are linear, some are holistic . Teachersimagine they will improve outcomes if they tailor their presentations to each student. But there's noevidence to support this either.
Second, data can illuminate patterns of behavior we haven't yet noticed. For example, I've alwaysassumed people who frequently use words like "I," "me," and "mine" are probably more self-centeredthan people who don't. But as James Pennebaker of the University of Texas notes in his book, The SecretLife of Pronouns, when people are feeling confident, they are focused on the task at hand, not onthemselves. High-status, confident people use fewer "I" words, not more.
Our brains often don't notice subtle verbal patterns, but Pennebaker's computers can. Youngerwriters use more negative and past-tense words than older writers who use more positive and future-tensewords.
In sum, the data revolution is giving us wonderful ways to understand the present and the past. Will it transform our ability to predict and make decisions about the future? We'll see. | 1503.txt | 2 |
[
"are forms of biological development",
"are essentially forms of taming the prey",
"have actually developed from hunting",
"have changed the ways of hunting"
]
| The author believes that sporting activities ________. | Sporting activities are essentially modified forms of hunting behaviour. Viewed biologically, the modern footballer is in reality a member of a hunting group. His killing weapon has turned into a harmless football and his prey into a goalmouth. If his aim is accurate and he scores a goal, he enjoys the hunter's triumph of killing his prey.
To understand how this transformation has taken place we must briefly look back at our forefathers. They spent over a million years evolving as cooperative hunters. Their very survival depended on success in the hunting-field. Under this pressure their whole way of life, even their bodies, became greatly changed. They became chasers, runners, jumpers, aimers, throwers and prey-killers. They cooperated as skillful male-group attackers.
Then about ten thousand years ago, after this immensely long period of hunting their food, they became farmers. Their improved intelligence, so vital to their old hunting life, was put to a new use-that of controlling and domesticating their prey. The hunt became suddenly out of date. The food was there on the farms, awaiting their needs. The risks and uncertainties of the hunt were no longer essential for survival.
The skills and thirst for hunting remained, however, and demanded new outlets. Hunting for sport replaced hunting for necessity. This new activity involved all the original hunting sequencer but the aim of the operation was no longer to avoid starvation. Instead the sportsmen set off to test their skill against prey that were no longer essential to their survival, to be sure, the kill may have been eaten, but there were other, much simpler ways of obtaining a meaty meal. | 3125.txt | 1 |
[
"any member of the opposing team",
"the goal-mouth",
"the goal keeper",
"the football"
]
| For over a million years, our forefathers were basically ________. | Sporting activities are essentially modified forms of hunting behaviour. Viewed biologically, the modern footballer is in reality a member of a hunting group. His killing weapon has turned into a harmless football and his prey into a goalmouth. If his aim is accurate and he scores a goal, he enjoys the hunter's triumph of killing his prey.
To understand how this transformation has taken place we must briefly look back at our forefathers. They spent over a million years evolving as cooperative hunters. Their very survival depended on success in the hunting-field. Under this pressure their whole way of life, even their bodies, became greatly changed. They became chasers, runners, jumpers, aimers, throwers and prey-killers. They cooperated as skillful male-group attackers.
Then about ten thousand years ago, after this immensely long period of hunting their food, they became farmers. Their improved intelligence, so vital to their old hunting life, was put to a new use-that of controlling and domesticating their prey. The hunt became suddenly out of date. The food was there on the farms, awaiting their needs. The risks and uncertainties of the hunt were no longer essential for survival.
The skills and thirst for hunting remained, however, and demanded new outlets. Hunting for sport replaced hunting for necessity. This new activity involved all the original hunting sequencer but the aim of the operation was no longer to avoid starvation. Instead the sportsmen set off to test their skill against prey that were no longer essential to their survival, to be sure, the kill may have been eaten, but there were other, much simpler ways of obtaining a meaty meal. | 3125.txt | 2 |
[
"co-operating hunters,",
"successful farmers",
"runners and jumpers",
"skillful sportsmen"
]
| For over a million years, our foregathers were basically ________. | Sporting activities are essentially modified forms of hunting behaviour. Viewed biologically, the modern footballer is in reality a member of a hunting group. His killing weapon has turned into a harmless football and his prey into a goalmouth. If his aim is accurate and he scores a goal, he enjoys the hunter's triumph of killing his prey.
To understand how this transformation has taken place we must briefly look back at our forefathers. They spent over a million years evolving as cooperative hunters. Their very survival depended on success in the hunting-field. Under this pressure their whole way of life, even their bodies, became greatly changed. They became chasers, runners, jumpers, aimers, throwers and prey-killers. They cooperated as skillful male-group attackers.
Then about ten thousand years ago, after this immensely long period of hunting their food, they became farmers. Their improved intelligence, so vital to their old hunting life, was put to a new use-that of controlling and domesticating their prey. The hunt became suddenly out of date. The food was there on the farms, awaiting their needs. The risks and uncertainties of the hunt were no longer essential for survival.
The skills and thirst for hunting remained, however, and demanded new outlets. Hunting for sport replaced hunting for necessity. This new activity involved all the original hunting sequencer but the aim of the operation was no longer to avoid starvation. Instead the sportsmen set off to test their skill against prey that were no longer essential to their survival, to be sure, the kill may have been eaten, but there were other, much simpler ways of obtaining a meaty meal. | 3125.txt | 1 |
[
"domesticating animals",
"hunting",
"prey killing",
"sports activities"
]
| The word "operation" (Para. 4, Line 4) refers to ________. | Sporting activities are essentially modified forms of hunting behaviour. Viewed biologically, the modern footballer is in reality a member of a hunting group. His killing weapon has turned into a harmless football and his prey into a goalmouth. If his aim is accurate and he scores a goal, he enjoys the hunter's triumph of killing his prey.
To understand how this transformation has taken place we must briefly look back at our forefathers. They spent over a million years evolving as cooperative hunters. Their very survival depended on success in the hunting-field. Under this pressure their whole way of life, even their bodies, became greatly changed. They became chasers, runners, jumpers, aimers, throwers and prey-killers. They cooperated as skillful male-group attackers.
Then about ten thousand years ago, after this immensely long period of hunting their food, they became farmers. Their improved intelligence, so vital to their old hunting life, was put to a new use-that of controlling and domesticating their prey. The hunt became suddenly out of date. The food was there on the farms, awaiting their needs. The risks and uncertainties of the hunt were no longer essential for survival.
The skills and thirst for hunting remained, however, and demanded new outlets. Hunting for sport replaced hunting for necessity. This new activity involved all the original hunting sequencer but the aim of the operation was no longer to avoid starvation. Instead the sportsmen set off to test their skill against prey that were no longer essential to their survival, to be sure, the kill may have been eaten, but there were other, much simpler ways of obtaining a meaty meal. | 3125.txt | 1 |
[
"It is farming that gives human beings enough leisure time for sporting activities.",
"Farming is very important in human civilization because it saves human beings from risks and uncertainties of hunting for survival.",
"It is hunting that provides human beings with much simpler ways of obtaining meaty meals.",
"Sporting activities satisfy the desire of modern man to exercise hunting skills which his forefathers developed for survival."
]
| Which of the following best summarizes the main idea of the passage? | Sporting activities are essentially modified forms of hunting behaviour. Viewed biologically, the modern footballer is in reality a member of a hunting group. His killing weapon has turned into a harmless football and his prey into a goalmouth. If his aim is accurate and he scores a goal, he enjoys the hunter's triumph of killing his prey.
To understand how this transformation has taken place we must briefly look back at our forefathers. They spent over a million years evolving as cooperative hunters. Their very survival depended on success in the hunting-field. Under this pressure their whole way of life, even their bodies, became greatly changed. They became chasers, runners, jumpers, aimers, throwers and prey-killers. They cooperated as skillful male-group attackers.
Then about ten thousand years ago, after this immensely long period of hunting their food, they became farmers. Their improved intelligence, so vital to their old hunting life, was put to a new use-that of controlling and domesticating their prey. The hunt became suddenly out of date. The food was there on the farms, awaiting their needs. The risks and uncertainties of the hunt were no longer essential for survival.
The skills and thirst for hunting remained, however, and demanded new outlets. Hunting for sport replaced hunting for necessity. This new activity involved all the original hunting sequencer but the aim of the operation was no longer to avoid starvation. Instead the sportsmen set off to test their skill against prey that were no longer essential to their survival, to be sure, the kill may have been eaten, but there were other, much simpler ways of obtaining a meaty meal. | 3125.txt | 3 |
[
"borrowing from banks to invest in the stock market",
"who invest in Treasury bonds",
"advocating the government to borrow money from citizens",
"who earn large sums of money in personal accounts"
]
| According to the author, "privatizers"are those _ . | The National Association of Securities Dealers is investigating whether some brokerage houses are inappropriately pushing individuals to borrow large sums on their houses to invest in the stock market. Can we persuade the association to investigate would-be privatizers of Social Security? For it is now apparent that the Bush administration's privatization proposal will amount to the same thing: borrow trillions, put the money in the stock market and hope.
Privatization would begin by diverting payroll taxes, which pay for current Social Security benefits, into personal investment accounts. The government would have to borrow to make up the shortfall. This would sharply increase the government's debt. "Never mind", privatization advocates say, "in the long run, people would make so much on personal accounts that the government could save money by cutting retirees' benefits."
Even so, if personal investment accounts were invested in Treasury bonds, this whole process would accomplish precisely nothing. The interest workers would receive on their accounts would exactly match the interest the government would have to pay on its additional debt. To compensate for the initial borrowing, the government would have to cut future benefits so much that workers would gain nothing at all. However, privatizersclaim that these investments would make a lot of money and that, in effect, the government, not the workers, would reap most of those gains, because as personal accounts grew, the government could cut benefits.
We can argue at length about whether the high stock returns such schemes assume are realistic (they aren't), but let's cut to the chase: in essence, such schemes involve having the government borrow heavily and put the money in the stock market. That's because the government would, in effect, confiscate workers'gains in their personal accounts by cutting those workers' benefits.
Once you realize whatprivatization really means, it doesn't sound too responsible, does it? But the details make it considerably worse. First, financial markets would, correctly, treat the reality of huge deficits today as a much more important indicator of the government's fiscal health than the mere promise that government could save money by cutting benefits in the distant future. After all, a government bond is a legally binding promise to pay, while a benefits formula that supposedly cuts costs 40 years from now is nothing more than a suggestion to future Congresses. If a privatization plan passed in 2005 called for steep benefit cuts in 2045, what are the odds that those cuts would really happen? Second, a system of personal accounts would pay huge brokerage fees. Of course, from Wall Street's point of view that's a benefit, not a cost. | 1069.txt | 2 |
[
"it shares similarities with the government's Social Security policies",
"there is no guarantee that it will be profitable in the stock market",
"it is not proper for the brokerage houses to persuade people to borrow money",
"it is an indication of the Bush administration's serious concern over the stock market"
]
| In the first paragraph, individual borrowing is cited because _ . | The National Association of Securities Dealers is investigating whether some brokerage houses are inappropriately pushing individuals to borrow large sums on their houses to invest in the stock market. Can we persuade the association to investigate would-be privatizers of Social Security? For it is now apparent that the Bush administration's privatization proposal will amount to the same thing: borrow trillions, put the money in the stock market and hope.
Privatization would begin by diverting payroll taxes, which pay for current Social Security benefits, into personal investment accounts. The government would have to borrow to make up the shortfall. This would sharply increase the government's debt. "Never mind", privatization advocates say, "in the long run, people would make so much on personal accounts that the government could save money by cutting retirees' benefits."
Even so, if personal investment accounts were invested in Treasury bonds, this whole process would accomplish precisely nothing. The interest workers would receive on their accounts would exactly match the interest the government would have to pay on its additional debt. To compensate for the initial borrowing, the government would have to cut future benefits so much that workers would gain nothing at all. However, privatizersclaim that these investments would make a lot of money and that, in effect, the government, not the workers, would reap most of those gains, because as personal accounts grew, the government could cut benefits.
We can argue at length about whether the high stock returns such schemes assume are realistic (they aren't), but let's cut to the chase: in essence, such schemes involve having the government borrow heavily and put the money in the stock market. That's because the government would, in effect, confiscate workers'gains in their personal accounts by cutting those workers' benefits.
Once you realize whatprivatization really means, it doesn't sound too responsible, does it? But the details make it considerably worse. First, financial markets would, correctly, treat the reality of huge deficits today as a much more important indicator of the government's fiscal health than the mere promise that government could save money by cutting benefits in the distant future. After all, a government bond is a legally binding promise to pay, while a benefits formula that supposedly cuts costs 40 years from now is nothing more than a suggestion to future Congresses. If a privatization plan passed in 2005 called for steep benefit cuts in 2045, what are the odds that those cuts would really happen? Second, a system of personal accounts would pay huge brokerage fees. Of course, from Wall Street's point of view that's a benefit, not a cost. | 1069.txt | 0 |
[
"Investors in stock markets.",
"Retired workers in the future.",
"The future Congresses.",
"Account information brokers."
]
| According to its advocates, who will gain from the privatization of Social Security? | The National Association of Securities Dealers is investigating whether some brokerage houses are inappropriately pushing individuals to borrow large sums on their houses to invest in the stock market. Can we persuade the association to investigate would-be privatizers of Social Security? For it is now apparent that the Bush administration's privatization proposal will amount to the same thing: borrow trillions, put the money in the stock market and hope.
Privatization would begin by diverting payroll taxes, which pay for current Social Security benefits, into personal investment accounts. The government would have to borrow to make up the shortfall. This would sharply increase the government's debt. "Never mind", privatization advocates say, "in the long run, people would make so much on personal accounts that the government could save money by cutting retirees' benefits."
Even so, if personal investment accounts were invested in Treasury bonds, this whole process would accomplish precisely nothing. The interest workers would receive on their accounts would exactly match the interest the government would have to pay on its additional debt. To compensate for the initial borrowing, the government would have to cut future benefits so much that workers would gain nothing at all. However, privatizersclaim that these investments would make a lot of money and that, in effect, the government, not the workers, would reap most of those gains, because as personal accounts grew, the government could cut benefits.
We can argue at length about whether the high stock returns such schemes assume are realistic (they aren't), but let's cut to the chase: in essence, such schemes involve having the government borrow heavily and put the money in the stock market. That's because the government would, in effect, confiscate workers'gains in their personal accounts by cutting those workers' benefits.
Once you realize whatprivatization really means, it doesn't sound too responsible, does it? But the details make it considerably worse. First, financial markets would, correctly, treat the reality of huge deficits today as a much more important indicator of the government's fiscal health than the mere promise that government could save money by cutting benefits in the distant future. After all, a government bond is a legally binding promise to pay, while a benefits formula that supposedly cuts costs 40 years from now is nothing more than a suggestion to future Congresses. If a privatization plan passed in 2005 called for steep benefit cuts in 2045, what are the odds that those cuts would really happen? Second, a system of personal accounts would pay huge brokerage fees. Of course, from Wall Street's point of view that's a benefit, not a cost. | 1069.txt | 2 |
[
"provide high returns for the new governments",
"be strongly opposed by Wall Street",
"bring the future retirees more benefits",
"allow individuals to invest in personal accounts"
]
| It can be inferred from the passage that Social Security privatization will _ . | The National Association of Securities Dealers is investigating whether some brokerage houses are inappropriately pushing individuals to borrow large sums on their houses to invest in the stock market. Can we persuade the association to investigate would-be privatizers of Social Security? For it is now apparent that the Bush administration's privatization proposal will amount to the same thing: borrow trillions, put the money in the stock market and hope.
Privatization would begin by diverting payroll taxes, which pay for current Social Security benefits, into personal investment accounts. The government would have to borrow to make up the shortfall. This would sharply increase the government's debt. "Never mind", privatization advocates say, "in the long run, people would make so much on personal accounts that the government could save money by cutting retirees' benefits."
Even so, if personal investment accounts were invested in Treasury bonds, this whole process would accomplish precisely nothing. The interest workers would receive on their accounts would exactly match the interest the government would have to pay on its additional debt. To compensate for the initial borrowing, the government would have to cut future benefits so much that workers would gain nothing at all. However, privatizersclaim that these investments would make a lot of money and that, in effect, the government, not the workers, would reap most of those gains, because as personal accounts grew, the government could cut benefits.
We can argue at length about whether the high stock returns such schemes assume are realistic (they aren't), but let's cut to the chase: in essence, such schemes involve having the government borrow heavily and put the money in the stock market. That's because the government would, in effect, confiscate workers'gains in their personal accounts by cutting those workers' benefits.
Once you realize whatprivatization really means, it doesn't sound too responsible, does it? But the details make it considerably worse. First, financial markets would, correctly, treat the reality of huge deficits today as a much more important indicator of the government's fiscal health than the mere promise that government could save money by cutting benefits in the distant future. After all, a government bond is a legally binding promise to pay, while a benefits formula that supposedly cuts costs 40 years from now is nothing more than a suggestion to future Congresses. If a privatization plan passed in 2005 called for steep benefit cuts in 2045, what are the odds that those cuts would really happen? Second, a system of personal accounts would pay huge brokerage fees. Of course, from Wall Street's point of view that's a benefit, not a cost. | 1069.txt | 3 |
[
"impartial",
"suspicious",
"neutral",
"approval"
]
| The author's attitude towards the privatization proposal is _ . | The National Association of Securities Dealers is investigating whether some brokerage houses are inappropriately pushing individuals to borrow large sums on their houses to invest in the stock market. Can we persuade the association to investigate would-be privatizers of Social Security? For it is now apparent that the Bush administration's privatization proposal will amount to the same thing: borrow trillions, put the money in the stock market and hope.
Privatization would begin by diverting payroll taxes, which pay for current Social Security benefits, into personal investment accounts. The government would have to borrow to make up the shortfall. This would sharply increase the government's debt. "Never mind", privatization advocates say, "in the long run, people would make so much on personal accounts that the government could save money by cutting retirees' benefits."
Even so, if personal investment accounts were invested in Treasury bonds, this whole process would accomplish precisely nothing. The interest workers would receive on their accounts would exactly match the interest the government would have to pay on its additional debt. To compensate for the initial borrowing, the government would have to cut future benefits so much that workers would gain nothing at all. However, privatizersclaim that these investments would make a lot of money and that, in effect, the government, not the workers, would reap most of those gains, because as personal accounts grew, the government could cut benefits.
We can argue at length about whether the high stock returns such schemes assume are realistic (they aren't), but let's cut to the chase: in essence, such schemes involve having the government borrow heavily and put the money in the stock market. That's because the government would, in effect, confiscate workers'gains in their personal accounts by cutting those workers' benefits.
Once you realize whatprivatization really means, it doesn't sound too responsible, does it? But the details make it considerably worse. First, financial markets would, correctly, treat the reality of huge deficits today as a much more important indicator of the government's fiscal health than the mere promise that government could save money by cutting benefits in the distant future. After all, a government bond is a legally binding promise to pay, while a benefits formula that supposedly cuts costs 40 years from now is nothing more than a suggestion to future Congresses. If a privatization plan passed in 2005 called for steep benefit cuts in 2045, what are the odds that those cuts would really happen? Second, a system of personal accounts would pay huge brokerage fees. Of course, from Wall Street's point of view that's a benefit, not a cost. | 1069.txt | 1 |
[
"Philosophy of mathematics.",
"The Recent Growth in Science.",
"The Verification of Facts.",
"Methods of Scientific Inquiry."
]
| The title that best expresses the ideas of this passage is | Method of Scientific Inquiry
Why the inductive and mathematical sciences, after their first rapid development at the culmination of Greek civilization, advanced so slowly for two thousand years-and why in the following two hundred years a knowledge of natural and mathematical science has accumulated, which so vastly exceeds all that was previously known that these sciences may be justly regarded as the products of our own times-are questions which have interested the modern philosopher not less than the objects with which these sciences are more immediately conversant. Was it the
employment of a new method of research, or in the exercise of greater virtue in the use of the old methods, that this singular modern phenomenon had its origin? Was the long period one of arrested development, and is the modern era one of normal growth? Or should we ascribe the characteristics of both periods to so-called historical accidents-to the influence of conjunctions in circumstances of which no explanation is possible, save in the omnipotence and wisdom of a guiding Providence?
The explanation which has become commonplace, that the ancients employed deduction chiefly in their scientific inquiries, while the moderns employ induction, proves to be too narrow, and fails upon close examination to point with sufficient distinctness the contrast that is evident between ancient and modern scientific doctrines and inquiries. For all knowledge is founded on observation, and proceeds from this by analysis, by synthesis and analysis, by induction and deduction, and if possible by verification, or by new appeals to observation under the guidance of
deduction-by steps which are indeed correlative parts of one method; and the ancient sciences afford examples of every one of these methods, or parts of one method, which have been generalized from the examples of science.
A failure to employ or to employ adequately any one of these partial methods, an imperfection in the arts and resources of observation and experiment, carelessness in observation, neglect of relevant facts, by appeal to experiment and observation-these are the faults which cause all failures to ascertain truth, whether among the ancients or the moderns; but this statement does not explain why the modern is possessed of a greater virtue, and by what means he attained his superiority. Much less does it explain the sudden growth of science in recent times.
The attempt to discover the explanation of this phenomenon in the antithesis of "facts" and "theories" or "facts" and "ideas"-in the neglect among the ancients of the former, and their too exclusive attention to the latter-proves also to be too narrow, as well as open to the charge of vagueness. For in the first place, the antithesis is not complete. Facts and theories are not coordinate species. Theories, if true, are facts-a particular class of facts indeed, generally
complex, and if a logical connection subsists between their constituents, have all the positive attributes of theories.
Nevertheless, this distinction, however inadequate it may be to explain the source of true method in science, is well founded, and connotes an important character in true method. A fact is a proposition of simple. A theory, on the other hand, if true has all the characteristics of a fact, except that its verification is possible only by indirect, remote, and difficult means. To convert theories into facts is to add simple verification, and the theory thus acquires the full characteristics of a fact. | 278.txt | 3 |
[
"the similarity between the two periods.",
"that it was an act of God.",
"that both tried to develop the inductive method.",
"due to the decline of the deductive method."
]
| According to the author, one possible reason for the growth of science during the days of the ancient Greeks and in modern times is | Method of Scientific Inquiry
Why the inductive and mathematical sciences, after their first rapid development at the culmination of Greek civilization, advanced so slowly for two thousand years-and why in the following two hundred years a knowledge of natural and mathematical science has accumulated, which so vastly exceeds all that was previously known that these sciences may be justly regarded as the products of our own times-are questions which have interested the modern philosopher not less than the objects with which these sciences are more immediately conversant. Was it the
employment of a new method of research, or in the exercise of greater virtue in the use of the old methods, that this singular modern phenomenon had its origin? Was the long period one of arrested development, and is the modern era one of normal growth? Or should we ascribe the characteristics of both periods to so-called historical accidents-to the influence of conjunctions in circumstances of which no explanation is possible, save in the omnipotence and wisdom of a guiding Providence?
The explanation which has become commonplace, that the ancients employed deduction chiefly in their scientific inquiries, while the moderns employ induction, proves to be too narrow, and fails upon close examination to point with sufficient distinctness the contrast that is evident between ancient and modern scientific doctrines and inquiries. For all knowledge is founded on observation, and proceeds from this by analysis, by synthesis and analysis, by induction and deduction, and if possible by verification, or by new appeals to observation under the guidance of
deduction-by steps which are indeed correlative parts of one method; and the ancient sciences afford examples of every one of these methods, or parts of one method, which have been generalized from the examples of science.
A failure to employ or to employ adequately any one of these partial methods, an imperfection in the arts and resources of observation and experiment, carelessness in observation, neglect of relevant facts, by appeal to experiment and observation-these are the faults which cause all failures to ascertain truth, whether among the ancients or the moderns; but this statement does not explain why the modern is possessed of a greater virtue, and by what means he attained his superiority. Much less does it explain the sudden growth of science in recent times.
The attempt to discover the explanation of this phenomenon in the antithesis of "facts" and "theories" or "facts" and "ideas"-in the neglect among the ancients of the former, and their too exclusive attention to the latter-proves also to be too narrow, as well as open to the charge of vagueness. For in the first place, the antithesis is not complete. Facts and theories are not coordinate species. Theories, if true, are facts-a particular class of facts indeed, generally
complex, and if a logical connection subsists between their constituents, have all the positive attributes of theories.
Nevertheless, this distinction, however inadequate it may be to explain the source of true method in science, is well founded, and connotes an important character in true method. A fact is a proposition of simple. A theory, on the other hand, if true has all the characteristics of a fact, except that its verification is possible only by indirect, remote, and difficult means. To convert theories into facts is to add simple verification, and the theory thus acquires the full characteristics of a fact. | 278.txt | 1 |
[
"is that the latter needs confirmation.",
"rests on the simplicity of the former.",
"is the difference between the modern scientists and the ancient Greeks.",
"helps us to understand the deductive method."
]
| The difference between "fact" and "theory" | Method of Scientific Inquiry
Why the inductive and mathematical sciences, after their first rapid development at the culmination of Greek civilization, advanced so slowly for two thousand years-and why in the following two hundred years a knowledge of natural and mathematical science has accumulated, which so vastly exceeds all that was previously known that these sciences may be justly regarded as the products of our own times-are questions which have interested the modern philosopher not less than the objects with which these sciences are more immediately conversant. Was it the
employment of a new method of research, or in the exercise of greater virtue in the use of the old methods, that this singular modern phenomenon had its origin? Was the long period one of arrested development, and is the modern era one of normal growth? Or should we ascribe the characteristics of both periods to so-called historical accidents-to the influence of conjunctions in circumstances of which no explanation is possible, save in the omnipotence and wisdom of a guiding Providence?
The explanation which has become commonplace, that the ancients employed deduction chiefly in their scientific inquiries, while the moderns employ induction, proves to be too narrow, and fails upon close examination to point with sufficient distinctness the contrast that is evident between ancient and modern scientific doctrines and inquiries. For all knowledge is founded on observation, and proceeds from this by analysis, by synthesis and analysis, by induction and deduction, and if possible by verification, or by new appeals to observation under the guidance of
deduction-by steps which are indeed correlative parts of one method; and the ancient sciences afford examples of every one of these methods, or parts of one method, which have been generalized from the examples of science.
A failure to employ or to employ adequately any one of these partial methods, an imperfection in the arts and resources of observation and experiment, carelessness in observation, neglect of relevant facts, by appeal to experiment and observation-these are the faults which cause all failures to ascertain truth, whether among the ancients or the moderns; but this statement does not explain why the modern is possessed of a greater virtue, and by what means he attained his superiority. Much less does it explain the sudden growth of science in recent times.
The attempt to discover the explanation of this phenomenon in the antithesis of "facts" and "theories" or "facts" and "ideas"-in the neglect among the ancients of the former, and their too exclusive attention to the latter-proves also to be too narrow, as well as open to the charge of vagueness. For in the first place, the antithesis is not complete. Facts and theories are not coordinate species. Theories, if true, are facts-a particular class of facts indeed, generally
complex, and if a logical connection subsists between their constituents, have all the positive attributes of theories.
Nevertheless, this distinction, however inadequate it may be to explain the source of true method in science, is well founded, and connotes an important character in true method. A fact is a proposition of simple. A theory, on the other hand, if true has all the characteristics of a fact, except that its verification is possible only by indirect, remote, and difficult means. To convert theories into facts is to add simple verification, and the theory thus acquires the full characteristics of a fact. | 278.txt | 0 |
[
"an inductive science.",
"in need of simple verification.",
"a deductive science.",
"based on fact and theory."
]
| According to the author, mathematics is | Method of Scientific Inquiry
Why the inductive and mathematical sciences, after their first rapid development at the culmination of Greek civilization, advanced so slowly for two thousand years-and why in the following two hundred years a knowledge of natural and mathematical science has accumulated, which so vastly exceeds all that was previously known that these sciences may be justly regarded as the products of our own times-are questions which have interested the modern philosopher not less than the objects with which these sciences are more immediately conversant. Was it the
employment of a new method of research, or in the exercise of greater virtue in the use of the old methods, that this singular modern phenomenon had its origin? Was the long period one of arrested development, and is the modern era one of normal growth? Or should we ascribe the characteristics of both periods to so-called historical accidents-to the influence of conjunctions in circumstances of which no explanation is possible, save in the omnipotence and wisdom of a guiding Providence?
The explanation which has become commonplace, that the ancients employed deduction chiefly in their scientific inquiries, while the moderns employ induction, proves to be too narrow, and fails upon close examination to point with sufficient distinctness the contrast that is evident between ancient and modern scientific doctrines and inquiries. For all knowledge is founded on observation, and proceeds from this by analysis, by synthesis and analysis, by induction and deduction, and if possible by verification, or by new appeals to observation under the guidance of
deduction-by steps which are indeed correlative parts of one method; and the ancient sciences afford examples of every one of these methods, or parts of one method, which have been generalized from the examples of science.
A failure to employ or to employ adequately any one of these partial methods, an imperfection in the arts and resources of observation and experiment, carelessness in observation, neglect of relevant facts, by appeal to experiment and observation-these are the faults which cause all failures to ascertain truth, whether among the ancients or the moderns; but this statement does not explain why the modern is possessed of a greater virtue, and by what means he attained his superiority. Much less does it explain the sudden growth of science in recent times.
The attempt to discover the explanation of this phenomenon in the antithesis of "facts" and "theories" or "facts" and "ideas"-in the neglect among the ancients of the former, and their too exclusive attention to the latter-proves also to be too narrow, as well as open to the charge of vagueness. For in the first place, the antithesis is not complete. Facts and theories are not coordinate species. Theories, if true, are facts-a particular class of facts indeed, generally
complex, and if a logical connection subsists between their constituents, have all the positive attributes of theories.
Nevertheless, this distinction, however inadequate it may be to explain the source of true method in science, is well founded, and connotes an important character in true method. A fact is a proposition of simple. A theory, on the other hand, if true has all the characteristics of a fact, except that its verification is possible only by indirect, remote, and difficult means. To convert theories into facts is to add simple verification, and the theory thus acquires the full characteristics of a fact. | 278.txt | 2 |
[
"a metaphor.",
"a paradox.",
"an appraisal of the inductive and deductive methods.",
"a pun."
]
| The statement "Theories are facts" may be called. | Method of Scientific Inquiry
Why the inductive and mathematical sciences, after their first rapid development at the culmination of Greek civilization, advanced so slowly for two thousand years-and why in the following two hundred years a knowledge of natural and mathematical science has accumulated, which so vastly exceeds all that was previously known that these sciences may be justly regarded as the products of our own times-are questions which have interested the modern philosopher not less than the objects with which these sciences are more immediately conversant. Was it the
employment of a new method of research, or in the exercise of greater virtue in the use of the old methods, that this singular modern phenomenon had its origin? Was the long period one of arrested development, and is the modern era one of normal growth? Or should we ascribe the characteristics of both periods to so-called historical accidents-to the influence of conjunctions in circumstances of which no explanation is possible, save in the omnipotence and wisdom of a guiding Providence?
The explanation which has become commonplace, that the ancients employed deduction chiefly in their scientific inquiries, while the moderns employ induction, proves to be too narrow, and fails upon close examination to point with sufficient distinctness the contrast that is evident between ancient and modern scientific doctrines and inquiries. For all knowledge is founded on observation, and proceeds from this by analysis, by synthesis and analysis, by induction and deduction, and if possible by verification, or by new appeals to observation under the guidance of
deduction-by steps which are indeed correlative parts of one method; and the ancient sciences afford examples of every one of these methods, or parts of one method, which have been generalized from the examples of science.
A failure to employ or to employ adequately any one of these partial methods, an imperfection in the arts and resources of observation and experiment, carelessness in observation, neglect of relevant facts, by appeal to experiment and observation-these are the faults which cause all failures to ascertain truth, whether among the ancients or the moderns; but this statement does not explain why the modern is possessed of a greater virtue, and by what means he attained his superiority. Much less does it explain the sudden growth of science in recent times.
The attempt to discover the explanation of this phenomenon in the antithesis of "facts" and "theories" or "facts" and "ideas"-in the neglect among the ancients of the former, and their too exclusive attention to the latter-proves also to be too narrow, as well as open to the charge of vagueness. For in the first place, the antithesis is not complete. Facts and theories are not coordinate species. Theories, if true, are facts-a particular class of facts indeed, generally
complex, and if a logical connection subsists between their constituents, have all the positive attributes of theories.
Nevertheless, this distinction, however inadequate it may be to explain the source of true method in science, is well founded, and connotes an important character in true method. A fact is a proposition of simple. A theory, on the other hand, if true has all the characteristics of a fact, except that its verification is possible only by indirect, remote, and difficult means. To convert theories into facts is to add simple verification, and the theory thus acquires the full characteristics of a fact. | 278.txt | 1 |
[
"the real-estate market is cooling down",
"they cannot afford children's tuition fee at international schools",
"the city is over-populated",
"the hiking rents are making life tougher"
]
| Foreigners in Hong Kong begin to sweat because _ . | Rich immigrants in Asia's financial capitals generally have life pretty easy. But this summer, those in Hong Kong and Singapore are starting to sweat. The problem? Sizzling real-estate markets that make even bankers blink, and international schools packed like the Tokyo subway at rush hour. One-bedroom flats in Hong Kong's most fashionable buildings now go for $5,000 per month. Office rents in Singapore have shot up 105 percent in the past year-the fastest appreciation rate in the world. For workers with kids, the picture is particularly bleak. Incoming students at international schools now land not in classes but on long waiting lists-unless their parents jump the queue by purchasing debentures that have sold for as much as $120,000 in Hong Kong.
Asia's duelingfinancial hubs invest a lot of capital-real and emotional-in what's often cast as a zero-sum contest for the affection of foreign companies. Yet both cities have done so well wooing them of late that the major threat facing each isn't the other, but bottlenecks in the foreign infrastructure common to both. High-end housing costs are pushing past records set before the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis, prompting Singapore's founding father, Lee Kuan Yew, to lament, " We must check this hike in rents or we will lose our competitiveness."
Talent is getting tougher to find as both economies near full employment. Office rents are driving even the richest investment banks to seek cheaper alternatives to prime downtown addresses. And as both cities increase their populations by luring hundreds of thousands of additional outsiders over the coming decade, locals are getting squeezed. " There may be a political cost if Singaporeans feel priced out by foreigners," warns Charles Chong, head of a parliamentary committee on national development in Singapore.
Both cities are, in a sense, victims of their success. Each ranks among the most efficient spots on the planet to register new businesses. They boast world-class banking, accounting and legal services, undergirded by respect for contracts and commercial codes not found in the rest of Asia. In a region awash in cash from record trade surpluses, Chinese expansion and a flood of new stock listings, the cities have posted incredible GDP growth numbers of late-6.8 percent and 7.9 percent for Hong Kong and Singapore, respectively, last year.
Given that local fertility rates are falling, both hubs hope to continue to fuel that boom via immigration. Singapore's Minister for National Development Mah Bow Tan expects the city-state's population to hit 6.5 million by 2027, up 2 million from today-which implies a yearly influx of 100, 000 foreigners over the next two decades. Hong Kong Chief Executive Donald Tsang has said he envisions his city's population eventually surpassing 10 million-a 30 percent increase from today's total-thanks to" an injection of new blood from all nationalities." As the hubs grow more receptive to outsiders, new factors are ensuring that immigrants arrive in large numbers. Whereas globalization was once confined to big multinationals, today's expatriates work disproportionately for smaller-and medium-size companies. Nor are they predominantly European or North America anymore; China, India and South Korea are just three of the many countries now sending professionals abroad. | 440.txt | 3 |
[
"Hong Kong and Singapore consider each other as competitors",
"both two cities should not attract any more foreigners because there will not be enough land to hold them",
"the\" bottlenecks\" refer to the fact that the infrastructures of the two cities are not pleasant enough to woo foreign companies",
"Lee Kuan Yew's comment shows that he's pessimistic about Singapore's future development"
]
| We can learn from the second paragraph that _ . | Rich immigrants in Asia's financial capitals generally have life pretty easy. But this summer, those in Hong Kong and Singapore are starting to sweat. The problem? Sizzling real-estate markets that make even bankers blink, and international schools packed like the Tokyo subway at rush hour. One-bedroom flats in Hong Kong's most fashionable buildings now go for $5,000 per month. Office rents in Singapore have shot up 105 percent in the past year-the fastest appreciation rate in the world. For workers with kids, the picture is particularly bleak. Incoming students at international schools now land not in classes but on long waiting lists-unless their parents jump the queue by purchasing debentures that have sold for as much as $120,000 in Hong Kong.
Asia's duelingfinancial hubs invest a lot of capital-real and emotional-in what's often cast as a zero-sum contest for the affection of foreign companies. Yet both cities have done so well wooing them of late that the major threat facing each isn't the other, but bottlenecks in the foreign infrastructure common to both. High-end housing costs are pushing past records set before the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis, prompting Singapore's founding father, Lee Kuan Yew, to lament, " We must check this hike in rents or we will lose our competitiveness."
Talent is getting tougher to find as both economies near full employment. Office rents are driving even the richest investment banks to seek cheaper alternatives to prime downtown addresses. And as both cities increase their populations by luring hundreds of thousands of additional outsiders over the coming decade, locals are getting squeezed. " There may be a political cost if Singaporeans feel priced out by foreigners," warns Charles Chong, head of a parliamentary committee on national development in Singapore.
Both cities are, in a sense, victims of their success. Each ranks among the most efficient spots on the planet to register new businesses. They boast world-class banking, accounting and legal services, undergirded by respect for contracts and commercial codes not found in the rest of Asia. In a region awash in cash from record trade surpluses, Chinese expansion and a flood of new stock listings, the cities have posted incredible GDP growth numbers of late-6.8 percent and 7.9 percent for Hong Kong and Singapore, respectively, last year.
Given that local fertility rates are falling, both hubs hope to continue to fuel that boom via immigration. Singapore's Minister for National Development Mah Bow Tan expects the city-state's population to hit 6.5 million by 2027, up 2 million from today-which implies a yearly influx of 100, 000 foreigners over the next two decades. Hong Kong Chief Executive Donald Tsang has said he envisions his city's population eventually surpassing 10 million-a 30 percent increase from today's total-thanks to" an injection of new blood from all nationalities." As the hubs grow more receptive to outsiders, new factors are ensuring that immigrants arrive in large numbers. Whereas globalization was once confined to big multinationals, today's expatriates work disproportionately for smaller-and medium-size companies. Nor are they predominantly European or North America anymore; China, India and South Korea are just three of the many countries now sending professionals abroad. | 440.txt | 0 |
[
"do not welcome overseas talents",
"are facing worse living conditions",
"are unsatisfied with the government",
"are in full employment"
]
| According to the text, local people in the two cities _ . | Rich immigrants in Asia's financial capitals generally have life pretty easy. But this summer, those in Hong Kong and Singapore are starting to sweat. The problem? Sizzling real-estate markets that make even bankers blink, and international schools packed like the Tokyo subway at rush hour. One-bedroom flats in Hong Kong's most fashionable buildings now go for $5,000 per month. Office rents in Singapore have shot up 105 percent in the past year-the fastest appreciation rate in the world. For workers with kids, the picture is particularly bleak. Incoming students at international schools now land not in classes but on long waiting lists-unless their parents jump the queue by purchasing debentures that have sold for as much as $120,000 in Hong Kong.
Asia's duelingfinancial hubs invest a lot of capital-real and emotional-in what's often cast as a zero-sum contest for the affection of foreign companies. Yet both cities have done so well wooing them of late that the major threat facing each isn't the other, but bottlenecks in the foreign infrastructure common to both. High-end housing costs are pushing past records set before the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis, prompting Singapore's founding father, Lee Kuan Yew, to lament, " We must check this hike in rents or we will lose our competitiveness."
Talent is getting tougher to find as both economies near full employment. Office rents are driving even the richest investment banks to seek cheaper alternatives to prime downtown addresses. And as both cities increase their populations by luring hundreds of thousands of additional outsiders over the coming decade, locals are getting squeezed. " There may be a political cost if Singaporeans feel priced out by foreigners," warns Charles Chong, head of a parliamentary committee on national development in Singapore.
Both cities are, in a sense, victims of their success. Each ranks among the most efficient spots on the planet to register new businesses. They boast world-class banking, accounting and legal services, undergirded by respect for contracts and commercial codes not found in the rest of Asia. In a region awash in cash from record trade surpluses, Chinese expansion and a flood of new stock listings, the cities have posted incredible GDP growth numbers of late-6.8 percent and 7.9 percent for Hong Kong and Singapore, respectively, last year.
Given that local fertility rates are falling, both hubs hope to continue to fuel that boom via immigration. Singapore's Minister for National Development Mah Bow Tan expects the city-state's population to hit 6.5 million by 2027, up 2 million from today-which implies a yearly influx of 100, 000 foreigners over the next two decades. Hong Kong Chief Executive Donald Tsang has said he envisions his city's population eventually surpassing 10 million-a 30 percent increase from today's total-thanks to" an injection of new blood from all nationalities." As the hubs grow more receptive to outsiders, new factors are ensuring that immigrants arrive in large numbers. Whereas globalization was once confined to big multinationals, today's expatriates work disproportionately for smaller-and medium-size companies. Nor are they predominantly European or North America anymore; China, India and South Korea are just three of the many countries now sending professionals abroad. | 440.txt | 1 |
[
"Efficiency of business registration.",
"China's development.",
"Booming stock market.",
"Benefit from trade."
]
| Which of the following is NOT the reason of the region's abundance of capital? | Rich immigrants in Asia's financial capitals generally have life pretty easy. But this summer, those in Hong Kong and Singapore are starting to sweat. The problem? Sizzling real-estate markets that make even bankers blink, and international schools packed like the Tokyo subway at rush hour. One-bedroom flats in Hong Kong's most fashionable buildings now go for $5,000 per month. Office rents in Singapore have shot up 105 percent in the past year-the fastest appreciation rate in the world. For workers with kids, the picture is particularly bleak. Incoming students at international schools now land not in classes but on long waiting lists-unless their parents jump the queue by purchasing debentures that have sold for as much as $120,000 in Hong Kong.
Asia's duelingfinancial hubs invest a lot of capital-real and emotional-in what's often cast as a zero-sum contest for the affection of foreign companies. Yet both cities have done so well wooing them of late that the major threat facing each isn't the other, but bottlenecks in the foreign infrastructure common to both. High-end housing costs are pushing past records set before the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis, prompting Singapore's founding father, Lee Kuan Yew, to lament, " We must check this hike in rents or we will lose our competitiveness."
Talent is getting tougher to find as both economies near full employment. Office rents are driving even the richest investment banks to seek cheaper alternatives to prime downtown addresses. And as both cities increase their populations by luring hundreds of thousands of additional outsiders over the coming decade, locals are getting squeezed. " There may be a political cost if Singaporeans feel priced out by foreigners," warns Charles Chong, head of a parliamentary committee on national development in Singapore.
Both cities are, in a sense, victims of their success. Each ranks among the most efficient spots on the planet to register new businesses. They boast world-class banking, accounting and legal services, undergirded by respect for contracts and commercial codes not found in the rest of Asia. In a region awash in cash from record trade surpluses, Chinese expansion and a flood of new stock listings, the cities have posted incredible GDP growth numbers of late-6.8 percent and 7.9 percent for Hong Kong and Singapore, respectively, last year.
Given that local fertility rates are falling, both hubs hope to continue to fuel that boom via immigration. Singapore's Minister for National Development Mah Bow Tan expects the city-state's population to hit 6.5 million by 2027, up 2 million from today-which implies a yearly influx of 100, 000 foreigners over the next two decades. Hong Kong Chief Executive Donald Tsang has said he envisions his city's population eventually surpassing 10 million-a 30 percent increase from today's total-thanks to" an injection of new blood from all nationalities." As the hubs grow more receptive to outsiders, new factors are ensuring that immigrants arrive in large numbers. Whereas globalization was once confined to big multinationals, today's expatriates work disproportionately for smaller-and medium-size companies. Nor are they predominantly European or North America anymore; China, India and South Korea are just three of the many countries now sending professionals abroad. | 440.txt | 0 |
[
"the conflict between population and rent in the two cities might be more serious since both cities plan to enlarge their citizen number",
"the population increase plan of the two cities can hardly be fulfilled as the higher living expense damages their attractiveness",
"the definition of globalization has been changed mainly because most local people refuse to work in multinational companies",
"the influx of foreigners can damage local economy because they will compete for the limited resources with locals"
]
| We can draw a conclusion from the last paragraph that _ . | Rich immigrants in Asia's financial capitals generally have life pretty easy. But this summer, those in Hong Kong and Singapore are starting to sweat. The problem? Sizzling real-estate markets that make even bankers blink, and international schools packed like the Tokyo subway at rush hour. One-bedroom flats in Hong Kong's most fashionable buildings now go for $5,000 per month. Office rents in Singapore have shot up 105 percent in the past year-the fastest appreciation rate in the world. For workers with kids, the picture is particularly bleak. Incoming students at international schools now land not in classes but on long waiting lists-unless their parents jump the queue by purchasing debentures that have sold for as much as $120,000 in Hong Kong.
Asia's duelingfinancial hubs invest a lot of capital-real and emotional-in what's often cast as a zero-sum contest for the affection of foreign companies. Yet both cities have done so well wooing them of late that the major threat facing each isn't the other, but bottlenecks in the foreign infrastructure common to both. High-end housing costs are pushing past records set before the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis, prompting Singapore's founding father, Lee Kuan Yew, to lament, " We must check this hike in rents or we will lose our competitiveness."
Talent is getting tougher to find as both economies near full employment. Office rents are driving even the richest investment banks to seek cheaper alternatives to prime downtown addresses. And as both cities increase their populations by luring hundreds of thousands of additional outsiders over the coming decade, locals are getting squeezed. " There may be a political cost if Singaporeans feel priced out by foreigners," warns Charles Chong, head of a parliamentary committee on national development in Singapore.
Both cities are, in a sense, victims of their success. Each ranks among the most efficient spots on the planet to register new businesses. They boast world-class banking, accounting and legal services, undergirded by respect for contracts and commercial codes not found in the rest of Asia. In a region awash in cash from record trade surpluses, Chinese expansion and a flood of new stock listings, the cities have posted incredible GDP growth numbers of late-6.8 percent and 7.9 percent for Hong Kong and Singapore, respectively, last year.
Given that local fertility rates are falling, both hubs hope to continue to fuel that boom via immigration. Singapore's Minister for National Development Mah Bow Tan expects the city-state's population to hit 6.5 million by 2027, up 2 million from today-which implies a yearly influx of 100, 000 foreigners over the next two decades. Hong Kong Chief Executive Donald Tsang has said he envisions his city's population eventually surpassing 10 million-a 30 percent increase from today's total-thanks to" an injection of new blood from all nationalities." As the hubs grow more receptive to outsiders, new factors are ensuring that immigrants arrive in large numbers. Whereas globalization was once confined to big multinationals, today's expatriates work disproportionately for smaller-and medium-size companies. Nor are they predominantly European or North America anymore; China, India and South Korea are just three of the many countries now sending professionals abroad. | 440.txt | 0 |
[
"criticisms that shape everyone's experience",
"the opinions which contradict the established beliefs",
"the tendencies that help the newcomers to see office matters with a fresh eye",
"the ideas which usually come up with usually come up with new ways of management in the organization"
]
| According to the passage, "things formerly judged to be best left unsaid" (Line 2, Para. 1) probably refers to "________". | The more women and minorities make their way into the ranks of management, the more they seem to want to talk about things formerly judged to be best left unsaid. The newcomers also tend to see office matters with a fresh eye, in the process sometimes coming up with critical analyses of the forces that shape everyone's experience in the organization.
Consider the novel views of Harvey Coleman of Atlanta on the subject of getting ahead. Coleman is black. He spent 11 years with IBM, half of them working in management development, and now serves as a consultant to the likes of AT&T, Coca Cola, Prudential, and Merch. Coleman says that based on what he's seen at big companies, he weighs the different elements that make for long term career success as follows: performance counts a mere 10%, image, 30%; and exposure, a full 60%. Coleman concludes that excellent job performance is so common these days that while doing your work well may win you pay increases, it won't secure you the big promotion. He finds that advancement more often depends on how many people know you and your work, and how high up they are.
Ridiculous beliefs? Not to many people, especially many women and members of minority races who, like Coleman, feel that the scales have dropped from their eyes. "Women and blacks in organizations work under false beliefs," says Kaleel Jamison, a New York based management consultant who helps corporations deal with these issues. "They think that if you work hard, you'll get ahead-that someone in authority will reach down and give you a promotion." She adds, "Most women and blacks are so frightened that people will think they've gotten ahead because of their sex or color that they play down their visibility." Her advice to those folks: learn the ways that white males have traditionally used to find their way into the spotlight. | 2905.txt | 1 |
[
"let your superiors know how good you are",
"project a favorable image to the people around you",
"work as a consultant to your superiors",
"perform well your tasks given by your superiors"
]
| To achieve success in your career, the most important factor, according to the passage, is to ________. | The more women and minorities make their way into the ranks of management, the more they seem to want to talk about things formerly judged to be best left unsaid. The newcomers also tend to see office matters with a fresh eye, in the process sometimes coming up with critical analyses of the forces that shape everyone's experience in the organization.
Consider the novel views of Harvey Coleman of Atlanta on the subject of getting ahead. Coleman is black. He spent 11 years with IBM, half of them working in management development, and now serves as a consultant to the likes of AT&T, Coca Cola, Prudential, and Merch. Coleman says that based on what he's seen at big companies, he weighs the different elements that make for long term career success as follows: performance counts a mere 10%, image, 30%; and exposure, a full 60%. Coleman concludes that excellent job performance is so common these days that while doing your work well may win you pay increases, it won't secure you the big promotion. He finds that advancement more often depends on how many people know you and your work, and how high up they are.
Ridiculous beliefs? Not to many people, especially many women and members of minority races who, like Coleman, feel that the scales have dropped from their eyes. "Women and blacks in organizations work under false beliefs," says Kaleel Jamison, a New York based management consultant who helps corporations deal with these issues. "They think that if you work hard, you'll get ahead-that someone in authority will reach down and give you a promotion." She adds, "Most women and blacks are so frightened that people will think they've gotten ahead because of their sex or color that they play down their visibility." Her advice to those folks: learn the ways that white males have traditionally used to find their way into the spotlight. | 2905.txt | 0 |
[
"know that someone in authority will reach down and give them a promotion",
"want to give people the impression that they work under false beliefs",
"don't want people to think that their promotions were due to sex or color",
"believe they can get promoted by reason of their sex or color"
]
| The reason why women and blacks play down their visibility is that they ________. | The more women and minorities make their way into the ranks of management, the more they seem to want to talk about things formerly judged to be best left unsaid. The newcomers also tend to see office matters with a fresh eye, in the process sometimes coming up with critical analyses of the forces that shape everyone's experience in the organization.
Consider the novel views of Harvey Coleman of Atlanta on the subject of getting ahead. Coleman is black. He spent 11 years with IBM, half of them working in management development, and now serves as a consultant to the likes of AT&T, Coca Cola, Prudential, and Merch. Coleman says that based on what he's seen at big companies, he weighs the different elements that make for long term career success as follows: performance counts a mere 10%, image, 30%; and exposure, a full 60%. Coleman concludes that excellent job performance is so common these days that while doing your work well may win you pay increases, it won't secure you the big promotion. He finds that advancement more often depends on how many people know you and your work, and how high up they are.
Ridiculous beliefs? Not to many people, especially many women and members of minority races who, like Coleman, feel that the scales have dropped from their eyes. "Women and blacks in organizations work under false beliefs," says Kaleel Jamison, a New York based management consultant who helps corporations deal with these issues. "They think that if you work hard, you'll get ahead-that someone in authority will reach down and give you a promotion." She adds, "Most women and blacks are so frightened that people will think they've gotten ahead because of their sex or color that they play down their visibility." Her advice to those folks: learn the ways that white males have traditionally used to find their way into the spotlight. | 2905.txt | 2 |
[
"biased",
"popular",
"insightful",
"superficial"
]
| The author is of the opinion that Coleman's beliefs are ________. | The more women and minorities make their way into the ranks of management, the more they seem to want to talk about things formerly judged to be best left unsaid. The newcomers also tend to see office matters with a fresh eye, in the process sometimes coming up with critical analyses of the forces that shape everyone's experience in the organization.
Consider the novel views of Harvey Coleman of Atlanta on the subject of getting ahead. Coleman is black. He spent 11 years with IBM, half of them working in management development, and now serves as a consultant to the likes of AT&T, Coca Cola, Prudential, and Merch. Coleman says that based on what he's seen at big companies, he weighs the different elements that make for long term career success as follows: performance counts a mere 10%, image, 30%; and exposure, a full 60%. Coleman concludes that excellent job performance is so common these days that while doing your work well may win you pay increases, it won't secure you the big promotion. He finds that advancement more often depends on how many people know you and your work, and how high up they are.
Ridiculous beliefs? Not to many people, especially many women and members of minority races who, like Coleman, feel that the scales have dropped from their eyes. "Women and blacks in organizations work under false beliefs," says Kaleel Jamison, a New York based management consultant who helps corporations deal with these issues. "They think that if you work hard, you'll get ahead-that someone in authority will reach down and give you a promotion." She adds, "Most women and blacks are so frightened that people will think they've gotten ahead because of their sex or color that they play down their visibility." Her advice to those folks: learn the ways that white males have traditionally used to find their way into the spotlight. | 2905.txt | 1 |
[
"Role of Women and Minorities in Management",
"The Importance of Being Visible",
"Job Performance and Advancement",
"Sex and Career Success"
]
| The best title for this passage would be ________. | The more women and minorities make their way into the ranks of management, the more they seem to want to talk about things formerly judged to be best left unsaid. The newcomers also tend to see office matters with a fresh eye, in the process sometimes coming up with critical analyses of the forces that shape everyone's experience in the organization.
Consider the novel views of Harvey Coleman of Atlanta on the subject of getting ahead. Coleman is black. He spent 11 years with IBM, half of them working in management development, and now serves as a consultant to the likes of AT&T, Coca Cola, Prudential, and Merch. Coleman says that based on what he's seen at big companies, he weighs the different elements that make for long term career success as follows: performance counts a mere 10%, image, 30%; and exposure, a full 60%. Coleman concludes that excellent job performance is so common these days that while doing your work well may win you pay increases, it won't secure you the big promotion. He finds that advancement more often depends on how many people know you and your work, and how high up they are.
Ridiculous beliefs? Not to many people, especially many women and members of minority races who, like Coleman, feel that the scales have dropped from their eyes. "Women and blacks in organizations work under false beliefs," says Kaleel Jamison, a New York based management consultant who helps corporations deal with these issues. "They think that if you work hard, you'll get ahead-that someone in authority will reach down and give you a promotion." She adds, "Most women and blacks are so frightened that people will think they've gotten ahead because of their sex or color that they play down their visibility." Her advice to those folks: learn the ways that white males have traditionally used to find their way into the spotlight. | 2905.txt | 1 |
[
"migration over land requires a simpler explanation than migration over water does",
"the means by which animals migrate over water are complex and only partly understood",
"the ability of migrant animals to keep track of time is related to their magnetic sense",
"knowledge of geographic location is essential to migrants with little or no compass sense"
]
| The main idea of the passage is that | A mysterious phenomenon is the ability of over-water migrants to travel on course. Birds, bees, and other species can keep track of time without any sensory cues from the outside world, and such "biological clocks" clearly contribute to their "compass sense." For example, they can use the position of the Sun or stars, along with the time of day, to find north. But compass sense alone cannot explain how birds navigate the ocean: after a flock traveling east is blown far south by a storm, it will assume the proper northeasterly course to compensate. Perhaps, some scientists thought, migrants determine their geographic position on Earth by celestial navigation, almost as human navigators use stars and planets, but this would demand of the animals a fantastic map sense. Researchers now know that some species have a magnetic sense, which might allow migrants to determine their geographic location by detecting variations in the strength of the Earth's magnetic field. | 2033.txt | 1 |
[
"east",
"north",
"northwest",
"south"
]
| It can be inferred from the passage that if the flock of birds described in lines 10-15 were navigating by compass sense alone, they would, after the storm, fly | A mysterious phenomenon is the ability of over-water migrants to travel on course. Birds, bees, and other species can keep track of time without any sensory cues from the outside world, and such "biological clocks" clearly contribute to their "compass sense." For example, they can use the position of the Sun or stars, along with the time of day, to find north. But compass sense alone cannot explain how birds navigate the ocean: after a flock traveling east is blown far south by a storm, it will assume the proper northeasterly course to compensate. Perhaps, some scientists thought, migrants determine their geographic position on Earth by celestial navigation, almost as human navigators use stars and planets, but this would demand of the animals a fantastic map sense. Researchers now know that some species have a magnetic sense, which might allow migrants to determine their geographic location by detecting variations in the strength of the Earth's magnetic field. | 2033.txt | 0 |
[
"admiration for the ability of the migrants",
"skepticism about celestial navigation as an explanation",
"certainly that the phenomenon of migration will remain mysterious",
"interest in a new method of accounting for over-water migration"
]
| In maintaining that migrating animals would need "a fantastic map sense" (lines 20-21) to determine their geographic position by celestial navigation, the author intends to express | A mysterious phenomenon is the ability of over-water migrants to travel on course. Birds, bees, and other species can keep track of time without any sensory cues from the outside world, and such "biological clocks" clearly contribute to their "compass sense." For example, they can use the position of the Sun or stars, along with the time of day, to find north. But compass sense alone cannot explain how birds navigate the ocean: after a flock traveling east is blown far south by a storm, it will assume the proper northeasterly course to compensate. Perhaps, some scientists thought, migrants determine their geographic position on Earth by celestial navigation, almost as human navigators use stars and planets, but this would demand of the animals a fantastic map sense. Researchers now know that some species have a magnetic sense, which might allow migrants to determine their geographic location by detecting variations in the strength of the Earth's magnetic field. | 2033.txt | 1 |
[
"Pigeons can properly readjust their course even when flying long distances through exceedingly dense fogs.",
"Bison are able to reach their destination by passing through a landscape that has been partially altered by a recent fire.",
"Elephants are able to find grounds that some members of the herd have never seen before.",
"Swallows are able to return to a given spot at the same time every year."
]
| Of the following descriptions of migrating animals, which most strongly suggests that the animals are depending on magnetic cues to orient themselves? | A mysterious phenomenon is the ability of over-water migrants to travel on course. Birds, bees, and other species can keep track of time without any sensory cues from the outside world, and such "biological clocks" clearly contribute to their "compass sense." For example, they can use the position of the Sun or stars, along with the time of day, to find north. But compass sense alone cannot explain how birds navigate the ocean: after a flock traveling east is blown far south by a storm, it will assume the proper northeasterly course to compensate. Perhaps, some scientists thought, migrants determine their geographic position on Earth by celestial navigation, almost as human navigators use stars and planets, but this would demand of the animals a fantastic map sense. Researchers now know that some species have a magnetic sense, which might allow migrants to determine their geographic location by detecting variations in the strength of the Earth's magnetic field. | 2033.txt | 0 |
[
"He should find an excuse",
"He should adk for excuse.",
"He should say sorry",
"He should telephone to explain his being late."
]
| If one has accepted a dinner invitation ,what should he do if he is tobe late for the dinner? | Social customs and ways of behaving change. Things which were considered impolite many years ago are now acceptable. Just a few years ago, it was considered impolite behaviour for a man to smoke on street. No man who thought of himself by smoking when a lady was in a room.
Customs also differ from country to country. Does a man walk on the left or the right of a woman in your country? Or doesn't it matter? Should you use both hands when you are eating? Should leave one in your lap,or on the table?
The Americans and the British not only speak the same language but also share a large number of social customs. For example, in both America and England people shake hands when they meet each other for the first time. Also, most Englishmen will open a door for a wonman or offer their seat to a woman , and so will most Americans. Promptness is important both in England and in America. That is , if a dinner invitation is for 7 o'clock , the dinner guest either arrives close to that time or calls up to explain his delay.
The important thing to remember about social customs is not to do anything that might make other people feel uncomfortable-----especially if they are your guests. When the food was served , one of the guests strated to eat his peas with a knife . The other guests were amused or shocked , but the host calmly picked up his knife and began eating in the same way. It would have been bad manners to make his guest feel foolish or uncomfortable. | 1402.txt | 3 |
[
"ugly",
"dishonest",
"impolite",
"shameful"
]
| "It would have been bad manners to make his guests feel foolish or uncomfortable." "Bad manners " means _ . | Social customs and ways of behaving change. Things which were considered impolite many years ago are now acceptable. Just a few years ago, it was considered impolite behaviour for a man to smoke on street. No man who thought of himself by smoking when a lady was in a room.
Customs also differ from country to country. Does a man walk on the left or the right of a woman in your country? Or doesn't it matter? Should you use both hands when you are eating? Should leave one in your lap,or on the table?
The Americans and the British not only speak the same language but also share a large number of social customs. For example, in both America and England people shake hands when they meet each other for the first time. Also, most Englishmen will open a door for a wonman or offer their seat to a woman , and so will most Americans. Promptness is important both in England and in America. That is , if a dinner invitation is for 7 o'clock , the dinner guest either arrives close to that time or calls up to explain his delay.
The important thing to remember about social customs is not to do anything that might make other people feel uncomfortable-----especially if they are your guests. When the food was served , one of the guests strated to eat his peas with a knife . The other guests were amused or shocked , but the host calmly picked up his knife and began eating in the same way. It would have been bad manners to make his guest feel foolish or uncomfortable. | 1402.txt | 2 |
[
"Social Customs and Customs",
"Social Life",
"American and British Customs",
"Promptness Is Important"
]
| which of the following do you think is the best tiltle for this passage? | Social customs and ways of behaving change. Things which were considered impolite many years ago are now acceptable. Just a few years ago, it was considered impolite behaviour for a man to smoke on street. No man who thought of himself by smoking when a lady was in a room.
Customs also differ from country to country. Does a man walk on the left or the right of a woman in your country? Or doesn't it matter? Should you use both hands when you are eating? Should leave one in your lap,or on the table?
The Americans and the British not only speak the same language but also share a large number of social customs. For example, in both America and England people shake hands when they meet each other for the first time. Also, most Englishmen will open a door for a wonman or offer their seat to a woman , and so will most Americans. Promptness is important both in England and in America. That is , if a dinner invitation is for 7 o'clock , the dinner guest either arrives close to that time or calls up to explain his delay.
The important thing to remember about social customs is not to do anything that might make other people feel uncomfortable-----especially if they are your guests. When the food was served , one of the guests strated to eat his peas with a knife . The other guests were amused or shocked , but the host calmly picked up his knife and began eating in the same way. It would have been bad manners to make his guest feel foolish or uncomfortable. | 1402.txt | 0 |
[
"tries his best to make his guests feel comfortable",
"makes his guests feel excited",
"tries to avoid being naughty to his guests",
"tries to avoid being foolish"
]
| According to the text, the best host_ . | Social customs and ways of behaving change. Things which were considered impolite many years ago are now acceptable. Just a few years ago, it was considered impolite behaviour for a man to smoke on street. No man who thought of himself by smoking when a lady was in a room.
Customs also differ from country to country. Does a man walk on the left or the right of a woman in your country? Or doesn't it matter? Should you use both hands when you are eating? Should leave one in your lap,or on the table?
The Americans and the British not only speak the same language but also share a large number of social customs. For example, in both America and England people shake hands when they meet each other for the first time. Also, most Englishmen will open a door for a wonman or offer their seat to a woman , and so will most Americans. Promptness is important both in England and in America. That is , if a dinner invitation is for 7 o'clock , the dinner guest either arrives close to that time or calls up to explain his delay.
The important thing to remember about social customs is not to do anything that might make other people feel uncomfortable-----especially if they are your guests. When the food was served , one of the guests strated to eat his peas with a knife . The other guests were amused or shocked , but the host calmly picked up his knife and began eating in the same way. It would have been bad manners to make his guest feel foolish or uncomfortable. | 1402.txt | 0 |
[
"The guest who ate his peas with a knife",
"The other guests who were amused or shocked",
"The host who picked up his knife and began eating in the same way",
"None of the above"
]
| The author of this article may agree with which of the following? | Social customs and ways of behaving change. Things which were considered impolite many years ago are now acceptable. Just a few years ago, it was considered impolite behaviour for a man to smoke on street. No man who thought of himself by smoking when a lady was in a room.
Customs also differ from country to country. Does a man walk on the left or the right of a woman in your country? Or doesn't it matter? Should you use both hands when you are eating? Should leave one in your lap,or on the table?
The Americans and the British not only speak the same language but also share a large number of social customs. For example, in both America and England people shake hands when they meet each other for the first time. Also, most Englishmen will open a door for a wonman or offer their seat to a woman , and so will most Americans. Promptness is important both in England and in America. That is , if a dinner invitation is for 7 o'clock , the dinner guest either arrives close to that time or calls up to explain his delay.
The important thing to remember about social customs is not to do anything that might make other people feel uncomfortable-----especially if they are your guests. When the food was served , one of the guests strated to eat his peas with a knife . The other guests were amused or shocked , but the host calmly picked up his knife and began eating in the same way. It would have been bad manners to make his guest feel foolish or uncomfortable. | 1402.txt | 2 |
[
"to tell an interesting experience",
"to show the easiest way out of a difficulty",
"to describe the trouble facing a newly married woman",
"to explain the difficulty of learning to cook from books"
]
| The writer's purpose in writing this story is _ . | The easy way out isn't always easiest. I learned thatlesson when I decided to treat Doug, my husband ofone month, to a special meal. I glanced through mycook book and chose a menu which includedhomemade bread. Knowing the bread would taketime. I started on it as soon as Doug left for work. AsI was not experienced in cooking, I thought if adozen was good, two dozen would be better, so Idoubled everything. As Doug loved oranges, I also opened a can of orange and poured it all intothe bowl. Soon there was a sticky dough covered with ugly yellowish marks. Realizing I hadbeen defeated, I put the dough in the rubbish bin outside so I wouldn't have to face Douglaughing at my work. I went on preparing the rest of the meal, and, when Doug got home, wesat down to Cornish chicken with rice. He tried to enjoy the meal but seemed disturbed. Twicehe got up and went outside, saying he thought he heard a noise. The third time he left, I wentto the windows to see what he was doing. Looking out, I saw Doug standing about three feetfrom the rubbish bin, holding the lid up with a stick and looking into the container. When Icame out of the house, he dropped the stick and explained that there was something alive inout rubbish bin. Picking up the stick again, he held the lid up enough for me to see. I feltcold. But I stepped closer and looked harder. Without doubt it was my work. The hot sun hadcaused the dough to double in size and the fermenting yeast made the surface shake andsigh as though it were breathing. I had to admit what the living thing?was and why it wasthere. I don't know who was more embarrassed by the whole thing-Doug or me. | 2349.txt | 0 |
[
"The canned orange had gone bad.",
"She didn't use the right kind of flour.",
"The cookbook was hard to understand.",
"She did not follow the directions closely."
]
| Why did the woman's attempt at making the bread turn out to be unsuccessful? | The easy way out isn't always easiest. I learned thatlesson when I decided to treat Doug, my husband ofone month, to a special meal. I glanced through mycook book and chose a menu which includedhomemade bread. Knowing the bread would taketime. I started on it as soon as Doug left for work. AsI was not experienced in cooking, I thought if adozen was good, two dozen would be better, so Idoubled everything. As Doug loved oranges, I also opened a can of orange and poured it all intothe bowl. Soon there was a sticky dough covered with ugly yellowish marks. Realizing I hadbeen defeated, I put the dough in the rubbish bin outside so I wouldn't have to face Douglaughing at my work. I went on preparing the rest of the meal, and, when Doug got home, wesat down to Cornish chicken with rice. He tried to enjoy the meal but seemed disturbed. Twicehe got up and went outside, saying he thought he heard a noise. The third time he left, I wentto the windows to see what he was doing. Looking out, I saw Doug standing about three feetfrom the rubbish bin, holding the lid up with a stick and looking into the container. When Icame out of the house, he dropped the stick and explained that there was something alive inout rubbish bin. Picking up the stick again, he held the lid up enough for me to see. I feltcold. But I stepped closer and looked harder. Without doubt it was my work. The hot sun hadcaused the dough to double in size and the fermenting yeast made the surface shake andsigh as though it were breathing. I had to admit what the living thing?was and why it wasthere. I don't know who was more embarrassed by the whole thing-Doug or me. | 2349.txt | 3 |
[
"She didn't see the use of keeping it.",
"She meant to joke with her husband.",
"She didn't want her husband to see it.",
"She hoped it would soon dry in the sun."
]
| Why did the woman put the dough in the rubbish bin? | The easy way out isn't always easiest. I learned thatlesson when I decided to treat Doug, my husband ofone month, to a special meal. I glanced through mycook book and chose a menu which includedhomemade bread. Knowing the bread would taketime. I started on it as soon as Doug left for work. AsI was not experienced in cooking, I thought if adozen was good, two dozen would be better, so Idoubled everything. As Doug loved oranges, I also opened a can of orange and poured it all intothe bowl. Soon there was a sticky dough covered with ugly yellowish marks. Realizing I hadbeen defeated, I put the dough in the rubbish bin outside so I wouldn't have to face Douglaughing at my work. I went on preparing the rest of the meal, and, when Doug got home, wesat down to Cornish chicken with rice. He tried to enjoy the meal but seemed disturbed. Twicehe got up and went outside, saying he thought he heard a noise. The third time he left, I wentto the windows to see what he was doing. Looking out, I saw Doug standing about three feetfrom the rubbish bin, holding the lid up with a stick and looking into the container. When Icame out of the house, he dropped the stick and explained that there was something alive inout rubbish bin. Picking up the stick again, he held the lid up enough for me to see. I feltcold. But I stepped closer and looked harder. Without doubt it was my work. The hot sun hadcaused the dough to double in size and the fermenting yeast made the surface shake andsigh as though it were breathing. I had to admit what the living thing?was and why it wasthere. I don't know who was more embarrassed by the whole thing-Doug or me. | 2349.txt | 2 |
[
"The rising and falling movement.",
"The strange-looking marks.",
"Its shape.",
"Its size."
]
| What made the dough in the bin looks frighting? | The easy way out isn't always easiest. I learned thatlesson when I decided to treat Doug, my husband ofone month, to a special meal. I glanced through mycook book and chose a menu which includedhomemade bread. Knowing the bread would taketime. I started on it as soon as Doug left for work. AsI was not experienced in cooking, I thought if adozen was good, two dozen would be better, so Idoubled everything. As Doug loved oranges, I also opened a can of orange and poured it all intothe bowl. Soon there was a sticky dough covered with ugly yellowish marks. Realizing I hadbeen defeated, I put the dough in the rubbish bin outside so I wouldn't have to face Douglaughing at my work. I went on preparing the rest of the meal, and, when Doug got home, wesat down to Cornish chicken with rice. He tried to enjoy the meal but seemed disturbed. Twicehe got up and went outside, saying he thought he heard a noise. The third time he left, I wentto the windows to see what he was doing. Looking out, I saw Doug standing about three feetfrom the rubbish bin, holding the lid up with a stick and looking into the container. When Icame out of the house, he dropped the stick and explained that there was something alive inout rubbish bin. Picking up the stick again, he held the lid up enough for me to see. I feltcold. But I stepped closer and looked harder. Without doubt it was my work. The hot sun hadcaused the dough to double in size and the fermenting yeast made the surface shake andsigh as though it were breathing. I had to admit what the living thing?was and why it wasthere. I don't know who was more embarrassed by the whole thing-Doug or me. | 2349.txt | 0 |
[
"surprised at his being interested in the bin",
"afraid that he would discover her secret",
"unhappy that he didn't enjoy the meal",
"curious to know what disturbed him"
]
| When Doug went out the third time, the woman looked out of the window becauseshe was _ . | The easy way out isn't always easiest. I learned thatlesson when I decided to treat Doug, my husband ofone month, to a special meal. I glanced through mycook book and chose a menu which includedhomemade bread. Knowing the bread would taketime. I started on it as soon as Doug left for work. AsI was not experienced in cooking, I thought if adozen was good, two dozen would be better, so Idoubled everything. As Doug loved oranges, I also opened a can of orange and poured it all intothe bowl. Soon there was a sticky dough covered with ugly yellowish marks. Realizing I hadbeen defeated, I put the dough in the rubbish bin outside so I wouldn't have to face Douglaughing at my work. I went on preparing the rest of the meal, and, when Doug got home, wesat down to Cornish chicken with rice. He tried to enjoy the meal but seemed disturbed. Twicehe got up and went outside, saying he thought he heard a noise. The third time he left, I wentto the windows to see what he was doing. Looking out, I saw Doug standing about three feetfrom the rubbish bin, holding the lid up with a stick and looking into the container. When Icame out of the house, he dropped the stick and explained that there was something alive inout rubbish bin. Picking up the stick again, he held the lid up enough for me to see. I feltcold. But I stepped closer and looked harder. Without doubt it was my work. The hot sun hadcaused the dough to double in size and the fermenting yeast made the surface shake andsigh as though it were breathing. I had to admit what the living thing?was and why it wasthere. I don't know who was more embarrassed by the whole thing-Doug or me. | 2349.txt | 3 |
[
"SeaFalcon looks like an aircraft and is a kind of aircraft as a matter of fact.",
"SeaFalcon is not defined as a ship by the IMO because it is lighter than an aircraft.",
"SeaFalcon is both regarded as an aircraft because of its external form and a ship because of its function.",
"SeaFalcon is made with the appearance of a ship in order to avoid the regulation of IMO."
]
| According to the first paragraph, which one of the following statements is TURE of the SeaFalcon? | Walk along the River Warnow, in northern Germany, and you may be lucky enough to spot a SeaFalcon, a sleek, white machine with two propellers, two wings and a distinctly un-birdlike tail. It looks like an aircraft. Which is what it is. Except, it isn't. It is a ship-at least in the eyes of the International Marine Organisation, which regulates such things. That matters, because ships are much more lightly regulated than aircraft.
The SeaFalcon is really a ground-effect vehicle. It flies only over water and only two metres above that water. This means the air beneath its wings is compressed, giving it additional lift. In effect, it is floating on a cushion of air. That makes it far cheaper to run than a plane of equivalent size, while the fact that it is flying means it is far faster-at 80-100 knots-than a ship of any size. Its designer, Dieter Puls, thus hopes it will fill a niche for the rapid transport of people and light goods in parts of the world where land and sea exist in similar proportions.
The theory of ground-effect vehicles goes back to the 1920s, when Carl Wieselsberger, a German physicist, described how the ground effect works. There was then a period of silence, followed by a false start. In the 1960s the Soviet armed forces thought that ground-effect vehicles would be ideal for shifting heavy kit around places like the Black Sea. Their prototypes did fly, but were never deployed in earnest-and their jet engines consumed huge amounts of fuel.
This did, however, prove that the idea worked. And two German engineers, Mr Puls and Hanno Fischer, have taken it up and made it work by using modern, composite materials for the airframes, and propellers rather than jets for propulsion. One reason the Soviet design was so thirsty is that the power needed to lift a ground-effect vehicle is far greater than that needed to sustain it in level flight. The Soviet design used heavy jet engines to deliver the power needed for take-off. But the SeaFalcon uses a hydrofoil to lift itself out of the water, and Airfish 8 uses what Mr Fischer calls a hoverwing-a system of pipes that takes air which has passed through the propeller and blasts it out under the craft during take-off.
The next stage is to begin production in earnest-and that seems to be about to happen. Mr Puls says he has signed a deal with an Indonesian firm for an initial order of ten, while both he and Mr Fischer are in discussions with Wigetworks, a Singaporean company, with a view to starting production next year. South-East Asia, with its plethora of islands and high rate of economic growth is just the sort of place where ground-effect vehicles should do well.
But a note of caution is needed. For another sort of ground-effect vehicle was also expected to do well and ended up going nowhere. The hovercraft differed from the vehicles designed by Messrs Puls and Fischer in that it relied on creating its own cushion of air, rather than having one provided naturally. That meant it could go on land as well as sea-which was thought at the time to be a winning combination. Sadly, it was not. Hovercraft have almost disappeared. But then, in the eyes of the regulators, they counted as aircraft. | 3575.txt | 0 |
[
"the device of air cushion is deployed in the SeaFalcon to provide the power for lift.",
"the SeaFalcon is far cheaper and smaller than an aircraft.",
"the SeaFalcon could only fly a few meters above the water.",
"the SeaFalcon adopt a kind of engine that is essentially different from an aircraft."
]
| The SeaFalcon is different from the real aircraft in that _ | Walk along the River Warnow, in northern Germany, and you may be lucky enough to spot a SeaFalcon, a sleek, white machine with two propellers, two wings and a distinctly un-birdlike tail. It looks like an aircraft. Which is what it is. Except, it isn't. It is a ship-at least in the eyes of the International Marine Organisation, which regulates such things. That matters, because ships are much more lightly regulated than aircraft.
The SeaFalcon is really a ground-effect vehicle. It flies only over water and only two metres above that water. This means the air beneath its wings is compressed, giving it additional lift. In effect, it is floating on a cushion of air. That makes it far cheaper to run than a plane of equivalent size, while the fact that it is flying means it is far faster-at 80-100 knots-than a ship of any size. Its designer, Dieter Puls, thus hopes it will fill a niche for the rapid transport of people and light goods in parts of the world where land and sea exist in similar proportions.
The theory of ground-effect vehicles goes back to the 1920s, when Carl Wieselsberger, a German physicist, described how the ground effect works. There was then a period of silence, followed by a false start. In the 1960s the Soviet armed forces thought that ground-effect vehicles would be ideal for shifting heavy kit around places like the Black Sea. Their prototypes did fly, but were never deployed in earnest-and their jet engines consumed huge amounts of fuel.
This did, however, prove that the idea worked. And two German engineers, Mr Puls and Hanno Fischer, have taken it up and made it work by using modern, composite materials for the airframes, and propellers rather than jets for propulsion. One reason the Soviet design was so thirsty is that the power needed to lift a ground-effect vehicle is far greater than that needed to sustain it in level flight. The Soviet design used heavy jet engines to deliver the power needed for take-off. But the SeaFalcon uses a hydrofoil to lift itself out of the water, and Airfish 8 uses what Mr Fischer calls a hoverwing-a system of pipes that takes air which has passed through the propeller and blasts it out under the craft during take-off.
The next stage is to begin production in earnest-and that seems to be about to happen. Mr Puls says he has signed a deal with an Indonesian firm for an initial order of ten, while both he and Mr Fischer are in discussions with Wigetworks, a Singaporean company, with a view to starting production next year. South-East Asia, with its plethora of islands and high rate of economic growth is just the sort of place where ground-effect vehicles should do well.
But a note of caution is needed. For another sort of ground-effect vehicle was also expected to do well and ended up going nowhere. The hovercraft differed from the vehicles designed by Messrs Puls and Fischer in that it relied on creating its own cushion of air, rather than having one provided naturally. That meant it could go on land as well as sea-which was thought at the time to be a winning combination. Sadly, it was not. Hovercraft have almost disappeared. But then, in the eyes of the regulators, they counted as aircraft. | 3575.txt | 0 |
[
"the principle of the effect-ground vehicles was not deployed in earnest.",
"the prototypes led to scientists believing that such vehicle would never work.",
"the prototype was not an ideal vehicle to shift heavy kit in the Black Sea.",
"the prototype was made more like a jet rather than a ship."
]
| The prototypes made by the Soviet armed forces in 1960s was a false start probably because _ | Walk along the River Warnow, in northern Germany, and you may be lucky enough to spot a SeaFalcon, a sleek, white machine with two propellers, two wings and a distinctly un-birdlike tail. It looks like an aircraft. Which is what it is. Except, it isn't. It is a ship-at least in the eyes of the International Marine Organisation, which regulates such things. That matters, because ships are much more lightly regulated than aircraft.
The SeaFalcon is really a ground-effect vehicle. It flies only over water and only two metres above that water. This means the air beneath its wings is compressed, giving it additional lift. In effect, it is floating on a cushion of air. That makes it far cheaper to run than a plane of equivalent size, while the fact that it is flying means it is far faster-at 80-100 knots-than a ship of any size. Its designer, Dieter Puls, thus hopes it will fill a niche for the rapid transport of people and light goods in parts of the world where land and sea exist in similar proportions.
The theory of ground-effect vehicles goes back to the 1920s, when Carl Wieselsberger, a German physicist, described how the ground effect works. There was then a period of silence, followed by a false start. In the 1960s the Soviet armed forces thought that ground-effect vehicles would be ideal for shifting heavy kit around places like the Black Sea. Their prototypes did fly, but were never deployed in earnest-and their jet engines consumed huge amounts of fuel.
This did, however, prove that the idea worked. And two German engineers, Mr Puls and Hanno Fischer, have taken it up and made it work by using modern, composite materials for the airframes, and propellers rather than jets for propulsion. One reason the Soviet design was so thirsty is that the power needed to lift a ground-effect vehicle is far greater than that needed to sustain it in level flight. The Soviet design used heavy jet engines to deliver the power needed for take-off. But the SeaFalcon uses a hydrofoil to lift itself out of the water, and Airfish 8 uses what Mr Fischer calls a hoverwing-a system of pipes that takes air which has passed through the propeller and blasts it out under the craft during take-off.
The next stage is to begin production in earnest-and that seems to be about to happen. Mr Puls says he has signed a deal with an Indonesian firm for an initial order of ten, while both he and Mr Fischer are in discussions with Wigetworks, a Singaporean company, with a view to starting production next year. South-East Asia, with its plethora of islands and high rate of economic growth is just the sort of place where ground-effect vehicles should do well.
But a note of caution is needed. For another sort of ground-effect vehicle was also expected to do well and ended up going nowhere. The hovercraft differed from the vehicles designed by Messrs Puls and Fischer in that it relied on creating its own cushion of air, rather than having one provided naturally. That meant it could go on land as well as sea-which was thought at the time to be a winning combination. Sadly, it was not. Hovercraft have almost disappeared. But then, in the eyes of the regulators, they counted as aircraft. | 3575.txt | 0 |
[
"the power needed for level flight was much smaller than a ground-effect vehicle.",
"the vehicles designed by them were already well accepted by the commercial circle.",
"learn from the Soviet lesson and did not adopt the jet engine in the design, but used hydrofoil instead.",
"it has already won immense support from South-eastern Asian countries which were eager for such vehicles."
]
| The design made by Mr Puls and Hanno Fischer proved to be a successful case because of the following reasons that _ | Walk along the River Warnow, in northern Germany, and you may be lucky enough to spot a SeaFalcon, a sleek, white machine with two propellers, two wings and a distinctly un-birdlike tail. It looks like an aircraft. Which is what it is. Except, it isn't. It is a ship-at least in the eyes of the International Marine Organisation, which regulates such things. That matters, because ships are much more lightly regulated than aircraft.
The SeaFalcon is really a ground-effect vehicle. It flies only over water and only two metres above that water. This means the air beneath its wings is compressed, giving it additional lift. In effect, it is floating on a cushion of air. That makes it far cheaper to run than a plane of equivalent size, while the fact that it is flying means it is far faster-at 80-100 knots-than a ship of any size. Its designer, Dieter Puls, thus hopes it will fill a niche for the rapid transport of people and light goods in parts of the world where land and sea exist in similar proportions.
The theory of ground-effect vehicles goes back to the 1920s, when Carl Wieselsberger, a German physicist, described how the ground effect works. There was then a period of silence, followed by a false start. In the 1960s the Soviet armed forces thought that ground-effect vehicles would be ideal for shifting heavy kit around places like the Black Sea. Their prototypes did fly, but were never deployed in earnest-and their jet engines consumed huge amounts of fuel.
This did, however, prove that the idea worked. And two German engineers, Mr Puls and Hanno Fischer, have taken it up and made it work by using modern, composite materials for the airframes, and propellers rather than jets for propulsion. One reason the Soviet design was so thirsty is that the power needed to lift a ground-effect vehicle is far greater than that needed to sustain it in level flight. The Soviet design used heavy jet engines to deliver the power needed for take-off. But the SeaFalcon uses a hydrofoil to lift itself out of the water, and Airfish 8 uses what Mr Fischer calls a hoverwing-a system of pipes that takes air which has passed through the propeller and blasts it out under the craft during take-off.
The next stage is to begin production in earnest-and that seems to be about to happen. Mr Puls says he has signed a deal with an Indonesian firm for an initial order of ten, while both he and Mr Fischer are in discussions with Wigetworks, a Singaporean company, with a view to starting production next year. South-East Asia, with its plethora of islands and high rate of economic growth is just the sort of place where ground-effect vehicles should do well.
But a note of caution is needed. For another sort of ground-effect vehicle was also expected to do well and ended up going nowhere. The hovercraft differed from the vehicles designed by Messrs Puls and Fischer in that it relied on creating its own cushion of air, rather than having one provided naturally. That meant it could go on land as well as sea-which was thought at the time to be a winning combination. Sadly, it was not. Hovercraft have almost disappeared. But then, in the eyes of the regulators, they counted as aircraft. | 3575.txt | 2 |
[
"It was generally believed that to be able to go on land as well as sea was a great advantage of a hovercraft.",
"The hovercraft was in fact a ground-effect vehicle rather than an aircraft.",
"The special characteristics of the hovercraft were the actual reason attributing to its disappearance.",
"The hovercraft proved to be a failure mainly because of its power system."
]
| Which one of the following statements is TRUE of the hovercraft? | Walk along the River Warnow, in northern Germany, and you may be lucky enough to spot a SeaFalcon, a sleek, white machine with two propellers, two wings and a distinctly un-birdlike tail. It looks like an aircraft. Which is what it is. Except, it isn't. It is a ship-at least in the eyes of the International Marine Organisation, which regulates such things. That matters, because ships are much more lightly regulated than aircraft.
The SeaFalcon is really a ground-effect vehicle. It flies only over water and only two metres above that water. This means the air beneath its wings is compressed, giving it additional lift. In effect, it is floating on a cushion of air. That makes it far cheaper to run than a plane of equivalent size, while the fact that it is flying means it is far faster-at 80-100 knots-than a ship of any size. Its designer, Dieter Puls, thus hopes it will fill a niche for the rapid transport of people and light goods in parts of the world where land and sea exist in similar proportions.
The theory of ground-effect vehicles goes back to the 1920s, when Carl Wieselsberger, a German physicist, described how the ground effect works. There was then a period of silence, followed by a false start. In the 1960s the Soviet armed forces thought that ground-effect vehicles would be ideal for shifting heavy kit around places like the Black Sea. Their prototypes did fly, but were never deployed in earnest-and their jet engines consumed huge amounts of fuel.
This did, however, prove that the idea worked. And two German engineers, Mr Puls and Hanno Fischer, have taken it up and made it work by using modern, composite materials for the airframes, and propellers rather than jets for propulsion. One reason the Soviet design was so thirsty is that the power needed to lift a ground-effect vehicle is far greater than that needed to sustain it in level flight. The Soviet design used heavy jet engines to deliver the power needed for take-off. But the SeaFalcon uses a hydrofoil to lift itself out of the water, and Airfish 8 uses what Mr Fischer calls a hoverwing-a system of pipes that takes air which has passed through the propeller and blasts it out under the craft during take-off.
The next stage is to begin production in earnest-and that seems to be about to happen. Mr Puls says he has signed a deal with an Indonesian firm for an initial order of ten, while both he and Mr Fischer are in discussions with Wigetworks, a Singaporean company, with a view to starting production next year. South-East Asia, with its plethora of islands and high rate of economic growth is just the sort of place where ground-effect vehicles should do well.
But a note of caution is needed. For another sort of ground-effect vehicle was also expected to do well and ended up going nowhere. The hovercraft differed from the vehicles designed by Messrs Puls and Fischer in that it relied on creating its own cushion of air, rather than having one provided naturally. That meant it could go on land as well as sea-which was thought at the time to be a winning combination. Sadly, it was not. Hovercraft have almost disappeared. But then, in the eyes of the regulators, they counted as aircraft. | 3575.txt | 0 |
[
"Americans are more traditional than Europeans",
"More Americans prefer marriage and at a younger age than European",
"most divorced individuals remarry",
"marriage is the most important part of American life"
]
| By calling Americans a marrying people the writer means that _ . | More surprising, perhaps, than the current difficulties of traditional marriage is the fact that marriage itself is alive and thriving. As Skolnick notes, Americans are a marrying people: relative to Europeans, more of us marry and we marry at a younger age. Moreover, after a decline in the early 1970s, the rate of marriage in the United States is now increasing. Even the divorce rate needs to be taken in this pro- marriage context: some 80 percent of divorced individuals remarry. Thus, marriage remains by far the preferred way of life for the vast majority of the people in our society.
What has changed more than marriage is the nuclear family. Twenty- five years ago, the typical American family consisted of the husband, the wife, and two or three children. Now, there are many marriages in whichcouples have decided not to have any children, and there are many marriages where at least some of the children are from the wife's previous marriage, or the husband's, or both. Sometimes these children spend all of their time with one parent from the former marriage; sometimes they are shared between the two former spouses .
Thus, one can find every type of tamely arrangement. There are marriages without children; marriages with children from only the present marriages; marriages with" full - time" children from both the present and former marriages; marriages with" full- time" children from the present marriage and" part- time" childrenfrom former marriages. There are stepfathers, stepmothers, half- brothers and half-sisters. It is not all that unusual for a child to have four parents and eight grandparents! These are enormous changes from the traditional nuclear family. But even so, even in the midst of all this, there remains one constant: most Americans spend most of their adult lives married. | 822.txt | 1 |
[
"traditional marriage now runs into difficulty",
"marriage rate has been rising since the 1970",
"marriage rate in Europe is rather low",
"European marry when they are quite old"
]
| From the first paragraph we can know that _ | More surprising, perhaps, than the current difficulties of traditional marriage is the fact that marriage itself is alive and thriving. As Skolnick notes, Americans are a marrying people: relative to Europeans, more of us marry and we marry at a younger age. Moreover, after a decline in the early 1970s, the rate of marriage in the United States is now increasing. Even the divorce rate needs to be taken in this pro- marriage context: some 80 percent of divorced individuals remarry. Thus, marriage remains by far the preferred way of life for the vast majority of the people in our society.
What has changed more than marriage is the nuclear family. Twenty- five years ago, the typical American family consisted of the husband, the wife, and two or three children. Now, there are many marriages in whichcouples have decided not to have any children, and there are many marriages where at least some of the children are from the wife's previous marriage, or the husband's, or both. Sometimes these children spend all of their time with one parent from the former marriage; sometimes they are shared between the two former spouses .
Thus, one can find every type of tamely arrangement. There are marriages without children; marriages with children from only the present marriages; marriages with" full - time" children from both the present and former marriages; marriages with" full- time" children from the present marriage and" part- time" childrenfrom former marriages. There are stepfathers, stepmothers, half- brothers and half-sisters. It is not all that unusual for a child to have four parents and eight grandparents! These are enormous changes from the traditional nuclear family. But even so, even in the midst of all this, there remains one constant: most Americans spend most of their adult lives married. | 822.txt | 0 |
[
"There are no nuclear families any more.",
"A family usually consists of only a husband ,a wife and two or three children",
"a child usually has four grandparents",
"Many types of family rearrangements have become socially acceptable."
]
| Which of the following can be presented as the picture of today's American families？ | More surprising, perhaps, than the current difficulties of traditional marriage is the fact that marriage itself is alive and thriving. As Skolnick notes, Americans are a marrying people: relative to Europeans, more of us marry and we marry at a younger age. Moreover, after a decline in the early 1970s, the rate of marriage in the United States is now increasing. Even the divorce rate needs to be taken in this pro- marriage context: some 80 percent of divorced individuals remarry. Thus, marriage remains by far the preferred way of life for the vast majority of the people in our society.
What has changed more than marriage is the nuclear family. Twenty- five years ago, the typical American family consisted of the husband, the wife, and two or three children. Now, there are many marriages in whichcouples have decided not to have any children, and there are many marriages where at least some of the children are from the wife's previous marriage, or the husband's, or both. Sometimes these children spend all of their time with one parent from the former marriage; sometimes they are shared between the two former spouses .
Thus, one can find every type of tamely arrangement. There are marriages without children; marriages with children from only the present marriages; marriages with" full - time" children from both the present and former marriages; marriages with" full- time" children from the present marriage and" part- time" childrenfrom former marriages. There are stepfathers, stepmothers, half- brothers and half-sisters. It is not all that unusual for a child to have four parents and eight grandparents! These are enormous changes from the traditional nuclear family. But even so, even in the midst of all this, there remains one constant: most Americans spend most of their adult lives married. | 822.txt | 3 |
[
"do part-time job to earn their living",
"spend all of their time with one parent from the previous marriage",
"are shared between the two former spouses",
"are quite unusual even in the U.S.A"
]
| " Part-time " children _ | More surprising, perhaps, than the current difficulties of traditional marriage is the fact that marriage itself is alive and thriving. As Skolnick notes, Americans are a marrying people: relative to Europeans, more of us marry and we marry at a younger age. Moreover, after a decline in the early 1970s, the rate of marriage in the United States is now increasing. Even the divorce rate needs to be taken in this pro- marriage context: some 80 percent of divorced individuals remarry. Thus, marriage remains by far the preferred way of life for the vast majority of the people in our society.
What has changed more than marriage is the nuclear family. Twenty- five years ago, the typical American family consisted of the husband, the wife, and two or three children. Now, there are many marriages in whichcouples have decided not to have any children, and there are many marriages where at least some of the children are from the wife's previous marriage, or the husband's, or both. Sometimes these children spend all of their time with one parent from the former marriage; sometimes they are shared between the two former spouses .
Thus, one can find every type of tamely arrangement. There are marriages without children; marriages with children from only the present marriages; marriages with" full - time" children from both the present and former marriages; marriages with" full- time" children from the present marriage and" part- time" childrenfrom former marriages. There are stepfathers, stepmothers, half- brothers and half-sisters. It is not all that unusual for a child to have four parents and eight grandparents! These are enormous changes from the traditional nuclear family. But even so, even in the midst of all this, there remains one constant: most Americans spend most of their adult lives married. | 822.txt | 2 |
[
"the functions of marriage remain unchanged",
"most Americans prefer a second marriage",
"the vast majority of Americans still have faith in marriage",
"nuclear family is alive and thriving"
]
| Even though great changes have taken place in the structure of American families, _ . | More surprising, perhaps, than the current difficulties of traditional marriage is the fact that marriage itself is alive and thriving. As Skolnick notes, Americans are a marrying people: relative to Europeans, more of us marry and we marry at a younger age. Moreover, after a decline in the early 1970s, the rate of marriage in the United States is now increasing. Even the divorce rate needs to be taken in this pro- marriage context: some 80 percent of divorced individuals remarry. Thus, marriage remains by far the preferred way of life for the vast majority of the people in our society.
What has changed more than marriage is the nuclear family. Twenty- five years ago, the typical American family consisted of the husband, the wife, and two or three children. Now, there are many marriages in whichcouples have decided not to have any children, and there are many marriages where at least some of the children are from the wife's previous marriage, or the husband's, or both. Sometimes these children spend all of their time with one parent from the former marriage; sometimes they are shared between the two former spouses .
Thus, one can find every type of tamely arrangement. There are marriages without children; marriages with children from only the present marriages; marriages with" full - time" children from both the present and former marriages; marriages with" full- time" children from the present marriage and" part- time" childrenfrom former marriages. There are stepfathers, stepmothers, half- brothers and half-sisters. It is not all that unusual for a child to have four parents and eight grandparents! These are enormous changes from the traditional nuclear family. But even so, even in the midst of all this, there remains one constant: most Americans spend most of their adult lives married. | 822.txt | 2 |
[
"the growth of world population.",
"one type of the exponential rate.",
"the population problem of more rapidly growing countries.",
"the possible ways of dealing with the rapid population growth."
]
| This passage chiefly discusses | Population tends to grow at an exponentialrate. This means that they progressively double. As an example of this type of growth rate take one penny and double every day for one month. After the first week, you would have only 64 cent, but after the fourth week you would have over a million dollars.
This helps explain why the population has come on"all of a sudden"took from he beginning of human 1ife to the year 1830 for the population of the earth to reach one billion. That repents a time span of at least two million years. Then it took from 1830 to 1930 for world population to reach 2 billion. The next billion was added by 1960 only thirty years and in 1975 world population reached 4 billion which is another billion people in only fifteen years.
World population is increasing at a rate of 9, 000per hour, 220,000 per day and 80 million per year.
This is not only due to higher birth rate, but to lower death rate as well. The number of births has not declined at the same rate as the number of deaths.
Some countries such as Columbia, Thailand, Morocco, Costa Rica and the Philippines are doubling their population about every twenty-one years with a growth rate of 3.3 percent a year or more. The United States is doubling its population about very eighty-seven years, with a rate of 0.8 percent per year. (81)Every time a population doubles, the country involved needs twice as much of everything, including hospitals, schools, resources, food and medicines to care for its people. It is easy to see that this is very difficult to achieve for the more rapidly growing countries. | 418.txt | 0 |
[
"The penny that doubles itself every day for one month.",
"The time span of at 1east two million years in human history.",
"An illustration of the exponent growth rate given by the author.",
"The large amount of money you would luckily make after the fourth week."
]
| According to the passage what helps to explain why the population problem has come on ―all of a sudden‖? | Population tends to grow at an exponentialrate. This means that they progressively double. As an example of this type of growth rate take one penny and double every day for one month. After the first week, you would have only 64 cent, but after the fourth week you would have over a million dollars.
This helps explain why the population has come on"all of a sudden"took from he beginning of human 1ife to the year 1830 for the population of the earth to reach one billion. That repents a time span of at least two million years. Then it took from 1830 to 1930 for world population to reach 2 billion. The next billion was added by 1960 only thirty years and in 1975 world population reached 4 billion which is another billion people in only fifteen years.
World population is increasing at a rate of 9, 000per hour, 220,000 per day and 80 million per year.
This is not only due to higher birth rate, but to lower death rate as well. The number of births has not declined at the same rate as the number of deaths.
Some countries such as Columbia, Thailand, Morocco, Costa Rica and the Philippines are doubling their population about every twenty-one years with a growth rate of 3.3 percent a year or more. The United States is doubling its population about very eighty-seven years, with a rate of 0.8 percent per year. (81)Every time a population doubles, the country involved needs twice as much of everything, including hospitals, schools, resources, food and medicines to care for its people. It is easy to see that this is very difficult to achieve for the more rapidly growing countries. | 418.txt | 2 |
[
"100 years",
"175 years",
"1975 years",
"over two million years"
]
| It took for the world to increase its population from 1 billion to 4 billion. | Population tends to grow at an exponentialrate. This means that they progressively double. As an example of this type of growth rate take one penny and double every day for one month. After the first week, you would have only 64 cent, but after the fourth week you would have over a million dollars.
This helps explain why the population has come on"all of a sudden"took from he beginning of human 1ife to the year 1830 for the population of the earth to reach one billion. That repents a time span of at least two million years. Then it took from 1830 to 1930 for world population to reach 2 billion. The next billion was added by 1960 only thirty years and in 1975 world population reached 4 billion which is another billion people in only fifteen years.
World population is increasing at a rate of 9, 000per hour, 220,000 per day and 80 million per year.
This is not only due to higher birth rate, but to lower death rate as well. The number of births has not declined at the same rate as the number of deaths.
Some countries such as Columbia, Thailand, Morocco, Costa Rica and the Philippines are doubling their population about every twenty-one years with a growth rate of 3.3 percent a year or more. The United States is doubling its population about very eighty-seven years, with a rate of 0.8 percent per year. (81)Every time a population doubles, the country involved needs twice as much of everything, including hospitals, schools, resources, food and medicines to care for its people. It is easy to see that this is very difficult to achieve for the more rapidly growing countries. | 418.txt | 1 |
[
"World population is increasing at a rate of 150 per minute.",
"Lower death rate also contributes to world population growth.",
"The population of Columbia has been doubling every year for 21 years.",
"The United States is usually doubling its population on about every 87 years."
]
| Which of the following statements is NOT true? | Population tends to grow at an exponentialrate. This means that they progressively double. As an example of this type of growth rate take one penny and double every day for one month. After the first week, you would have only 64 cent, but after the fourth week you would have over a million dollars.
This helps explain why the population has come on"all of a sudden"took from he beginning of human 1ife to the year 1830 for the population of the earth to reach one billion. That repents a time span of at least two million years. Then it took from 1830 to 1930 for world population to reach 2 billion. The next billion was added by 1960 only thirty years and in 1975 world population reached 4 billion which is another billion people in only fifteen years.
World population is increasing at a rate of 9, 000per hour, 220,000 per day and 80 million per year.
This is not only due to higher birth rate, but to lower death rate as well. The number of births has not declined at the same rate as the number of deaths.
Some countries such as Columbia, Thailand, Morocco, Costa Rica and the Philippines are doubling their population about every twenty-one years with a growth rate of 3.3 percent a year or more. The United States is doubling its population about very eighty-seven years, with a rate of 0.8 percent per year. (81)Every time a population doubles, the country involved needs twice as much of everything, including hospitals, schools, resources, food and medicines to care for its people. It is easy to see that this is very difficult to achieve for the more rapidly growing countries. | 418.txt | 2 |
[
"hospitals and medicines",
"schools and students",
"food and manpower resources",
"all of the above"
]
| When a population doubles, the country involved needs twice as much of everything including _ . | Population tends to grow at an exponentialrate. This means that they progressively double. As an example of this type of growth rate take one penny and double every day for one month. After the first week, you would have only 64 cent, but after the fourth week you would have over a million dollars.
This helps explain why the population has come on"all of a sudden"took from he beginning of human 1ife to the year 1830 for the population of the earth to reach one billion. That repents a time span of at least two million years. Then it took from 1830 to 1930 for world population to reach 2 billion. The next billion was added by 1960 only thirty years and in 1975 world population reached 4 billion which is another billion people in only fifteen years.
World population is increasing at a rate of 9, 000per hour, 220,000 per day and 80 million per year.
This is not only due to higher birth rate, but to lower death rate as well. The number of births has not declined at the same rate as the number of deaths.
Some countries such as Columbia, Thailand, Morocco, Costa Rica and the Philippines are doubling their population about every twenty-one years with a growth rate of 3.3 percent a year or more. The United States is doubling its population about very eighty-seven years, with a rate of 0.8 percent per year. (81)Every time a population doubles, the country involved needs twice as much of everything, including hospitals, schools, resources, food and medicines to care for its people. It is easy to see that this is very difficult to achieve for the more rapidly growing countries. | 418.txt | 0 |
[
"rather bleak",
"fairly bright",
"very impressive",
"quite encouraging"
]
| The picture of the reading ability of the American people, drawn by the author, is _ . | It is hardly necessary for me to cite all the evidence of the depressing state of literacy. These figures from the Department of Education are sufficient: 27 million Americans cannot read at all. and a further 35million read al a level that is less than sufficient to survive in our society.
But my own worry today is fess that of the overwhelming problem of elemental literacy than it is of the slightly more luxurious problem of the decline in the skill even of the middle-class reader, of his unwillingness to afford those spaces of silence. those luxuries of domesticity and time and concentration, that surround the image of the classic act of reading. n has been suggested that almost 80 percent of America's literate, educated teenagers can no longer read without an accompanying noise (music) in the background or a television screen flickering at the corner of their field of perception. We know very little about the brain and how it deals with simultaneous conflicting input, but every common-sense intuition suggests we should be profoundly alarmed. This violation of concentration} silence, solitude goes tothe very heart of our notion of literacy; this new form of part-reading, of part-perception against background distraction renders impossible certain essential acts of apprehension and concentration, let alone that most important tribute any human being can pay to a poem or a piece of prose he or she really loves, which is to learn it by heart. Not by brain. by heart; the expression is vital.
Under these circumstances. the question of what future there is for the arts of reading is a real one. Ahead of us lie technical. psychic. and social transformations probably much more dramatic than thosebrought about by Gutenberg, the German inventor in printing. The Gutenberg revolution. as we now know it, took a long time; its effects are still being debated. The information revolution will touch every fact ofcomposition. publication. distribution. and reading. No one in the book industry can say with any confidence what will
happen to the book as we've known it. | 181.txt | 0 |
[
"elementary school children's disinterest in reading classics",
"the surprisingly low rate of literacy in the U.S.",
"the musical setting American readers require for reading",
"the reading ability and reading behavior of the middle class"
]
| The author's biggest concern is _ . | It is hardly necessary for me to cite all the evidence of the depressing state of literacy. These figures from the Department of Education are sufficient: 27 million Americans cannot read at all. and a further 35million read al a level that is less than sufficient to survive in our society.
But my own worry today is fess that of the overwhelming problem of elemental literacy than it is of the slightly more luxurious problem of the decline in the skill even of the middle-class reader, of his unwillingness to afford those spaces of silence. those luxuries of domesticity and time and concentration, that surround the image of the classic act of reading. n has been suggested that almost 80 percent of America's literate, educated teenagers can no longer read without an accompanying noise (music) in the background or a television screen flickering at the corner of their field of perception. We know very little about the brain and how it deals with simultaneous conflicting input, but every common-sense intuition suggests we should be profoundly alarmed. This violation of concentration} silence, solitude goes tothe very heart of our notion of literacy; this new form of part-reading, of part-perception against background distraction renders impossible certain essential acts of apprehension and concentration, let alone that most important tribute any human being can pay to a poem or a piece of prose he or she really loves, which is to learn it by heart. Not by brain. by heart; the expression is vital.
Under these circumstances. the question of what future there is for the arts of reading is a real one. Ahead of us lie technical. psychic. and social transformations probably much more dramatic than thosebrought about by Gutenberg, the German inventor in printing. The Gutenberg revolution. as we now know it, took a long time; its effects are still being debated. The information revolution will touch every fact ofcomposition. publication. distribution. and reading. No one in the book industry can say with any confidence what will
happen to the book as we've known it. | 181.txt | 3 |
[
"their fondness of music and TV programs",
"their ignorance of various forms of art and literature",
"their lack of attentiveness and basic understanding",
"their inability to focus on conflicting input"
]
| A major problem with most adolescents who can read is _ . | It is hardly necessary for me to cite all the evidence of the depressing state of literacy. These figures from the Department of Education are sufficient: 27 million Americans cannot read at all. and a further 35million read al a level that is less than sufficient to survive in our society.
But my own worry today is fess that of the overwhelming problem of elemental literacy than it is of the slightly more luxurious problem of the decline in the skill even of the middle-class reader, of his unwillingness to afford those spaces of silence. those luxuries of domesticity and time and concentration, that surround the image of the classic act of reading. n has been suggested that almost 80 percent of America's literate, educated teenagers can no longer read without an accompanying noise (music) in the background or a television screen flickering at the corner of their field of perception. We know very little about the brain and how it deals with simultaneous conflicting input, but every common-sense intuition suggests we should be profoundly alarmed. This violation of concentration} silence, solitude goes tothe very heart of our notion of literacy; this new form of part-reading, of part-perception against background distraction renders impossible certain essential acts of apprehension and concentration, let alone that most important tribute any human being can pay to a poem or a piece of prose he or she really loves, which is to learn it by heart. Not by brain. by heart; the expression is vital.
Under these circumstances. the question of what future there is for the arts of reading is a real one. Ahead of us lie technical. psychic. and social transformations probably much more dramatic than thosebrought about by Gutenberg, the German inventor in printing. The Gutenberg revolution. as we now know it, took a long time; its effects are still being debated. The information revolution will touch every fact ofcomposition. publication. distribution. and reading. No one in the book industry can say with any confidence what will
happen to the book as we've known it. | 181.txt | 2 |
[
"to be able to appreciate it and memorize it",
"to analyze its essential features",
"to think it over conscientiously",
"to make a fair appraisal of its artistic value"
]
| The author claims that the best way a reader can show admiration for a piece of poetry or prose is _ . | It is hardly necessary for me to cite all the evidence of the depressing state of literacy. These figures from the Department of Education are sufficient: 27 million Americans cannot read at all. and a further 35million read al a level that is less than sufficient to survive in our society.
But my own worry today is fess that of the overwhelming problem of elemental literacy than it is of the slightly more luxurious problem of the decline in the skill even of the middle-class reader, of his unwillingness to afford those spaces of silence. those luxuries of domesticity and time and concentration, that surround the image of the classic act of reading. n has been suggested that almost 80 percent of America's literate, educated teenagers can no longer read without an accompanying noise (music) in the background or a television screen flickering at the corner of their field of perception. We know very little about the brain and how it deals with simultaneous conflicting input, but every common-sense intuition suggests we should be profoundly alarmed. This violation of concentration} silence, solitude goes tothe very heart of our notion of literacy; this new form of part-reading, of part-perception against background distraction renders impossible certain essential acts of apprehension and concentration, let alone that most important tribute any human being can pay to a poem or a piece of prose he or she really loves, which is to learn it by heart. Not by brain. by heart; the expression is vital.
Under these circumstances. the question of what future there is for the arts of reading is a real one. Ahead of us lie technical. psychic. and social transformations probably much more dramatic than thosebrought about by Gutenberg, the German inventor in printing. The Gutenberg revolution. as we now know it, took a long time; its effects are still being debated. The information revolution will touch every fact ofcomposition. publication. distribution. and reading. No one in the book industry can say with any confidence what will
happen to the book as we've known it. | 181.txt | 0 |
[
"upset",
"uncertain",
"alarmed",
"pessimistic"
]
| About the future of the arts of reading the author feels _ . | It is hardly necessary for me to cite all the evidence of the depressing state of literacy. These figures from the Department of Education are sufficient: 27 million Americans cannot read at all. and a further 35million read al a level that is less than sufficient to survive in our society.
But my own worry today is fess that of the overwhelming problem of elemental literacy than it is of the slightly more luxurious problem of the decline in the skill even of the middle-class reader, of his unwillingness to afford those spaces of silence. those luxuries of domesticity and time and concentration, that surround the image of the classic act of reading. n has been suggested that almost 80 percent of America's literate, educated teenagers can no longer read without an accompanying noise (music) in the background or a television screen flickering at the corner of their field of perception. We know very little about the brain and how it deals with simultaneous conflicting input, but every common-sense intuition suggests we should be profoundly alarmed. This violation of concentration} silence, solitude goes tothe very heart of our notion of literacy; this new form of part-reading, of part-perception against background distraction renders impossible certain essential acts of apprehension and concentration, let alone that most important tribute any human being can pay to a poem or a piece of prose he or she really loves, which is to learn it by heart. Not by brain. by heart; the expression is vital.
Under these circumstances. the question of what future there is for the arts of reading is a real one. Ahead of us lie technical. psychic. and social transformations probably much more dramatic than thosebrought about by Gutenberg, the German inventor in printing. The Gutenberg revolution. as we now know it, took a long time; its effects are still being debated. The information revolution will touch every fact ofcomposition. publication. distribution. and reading. No one in the book industry can say with any confidence what will
happen to the book as we've known it. | 181.txt | 1 |
[
"provide more jobs for foreign workers.",
"slow down the rate of its development.",
"sell the off it is producing abroad.",
"develop more quickly than at present."
]
| The Norwegian Government would prefer the oil industry to _ . | The Law to Keep the Oil Industry under Control
The Norwegian Government is doing its best to keep the oil industry under control. A new law limits exploration to an area south of the southern end of the long coastline; production limits have been laid down (though these have already been raised); and oil companies have not been allowed to employ more than a limited number of foreign workers.
But the oil industry has a way of getting over such problems, and few people believe that the Government will be able to hold things back for long.
As on Norwegian politician said last week: "We will soon be changed beyond all recognition."
Ever since the war, the Government has been carrying out a programme of development in the area north of the Arctic Circle. During the past few years this programme has had a great deal of success: Tromso has been built up into a local capital with a university, a large hospital and a healthy industry.
But the oil industry has already started to draw people south, and within a few years the whole northern policy could be in ruins.
The effects of the oil industry would not be limited to the north, however. With nearly 100 percent employment, everyone can see a situation developing in which the service industries and the tourist industry will lose more of their workers to the oil industry. Some smaller industries might even disappear altogether when it becomes cheaper to buy goods from abroad.
The real argument over oil is its threat to the Norwegian way of life. Farmers and fishermen do not make up most of the population, but they are an important part of it, because Norwegians see in them many of the qualities that they regard with pride as essentially Norwegian.
And it is the farmers and the fishermen who are most critical of the oil industry because of the damage that it might cause to the countryside and to the sea. | 174.txt | 1 |
[
"encourage the off companies to discover new off sources.",
"prevent oil companies employing people from northern Norway.",
"help the oil companies solve many of their problems.",
"keep the off industry to something near its present size."
]
| The Norwegian Government has tried to | The Law to Keep the Oil Industry under Control
The Norwegian Government is doing its best to keep the oil industry under control. A new law limits exploration to an area south of the southern end of the long coastline; production limits have been laid down (though these have already been raised); and oil companies have not been allowed to employ more than a limited number of foreign workers.
But the oil industry has a way of getting over such problems, and few people believe that the Government will be able to hold things back for long.
As on Norwegian politician said last week: "We will soon be changed beyond all recognition."
Ever since the war, the Government has been carrying out a programme of development in the area north of the Arctic Circle. During the past few years this programme has had a great deal of success: Tromso has been built up into a local capital with a university, a large hospital and a healthy industry.
But the oil industry has already started to draw people south, and within a few years the whole northern policy could be in ruins.
The effects of the oil industry would not be limited to the north, however. With nearly 100 percent employment, everyone can see a situation developing in which the service industries and the tourist industry will lose more of their workers to the oil industry. Some smaller industries might even disappear altogether when it becomes cheaper to buy goods from abroad.
The real argument over oil is its threat to the Norwegian way of life. Farmers and fishermen do not make up most of the population, but they are an important part of it, because Norwegians see in them many of the qualities that they regard with pride as essentially Norwegian.
And it is the farmers and the fishermen who are most critical of the oil industry because of the damage that it might cause to the countryside and to the sea. | 174.txt | 3 |
[
"the development of industry.",
"a growth in population.",
"the failure of the development programme.",
"the development of new towns."
]
| According to the passage, the off industry might lead northern Norway to _ . | The Law to Keep the Oil Industry under Control
The Norwegian Government is doing its best to keep the oil industry under control. A new law limits exploration to an area south of the southern end of the long coastline; production limits have been laid down (though these have already been raised); and oil companies have not been allowed to employ more than a limited number of foreign workers.
But the oil industry has a way of getting over such problems, and few people believe that the Government will be able to hold things back for long.
As on Norwegian politician said last week: "We will soon be changed beyond all recognition."
Ever since the war, the Government has been carrying out a programme of development in the area north of the Arctic Circle. During the past few years this programme has had a great deal of success: Tromso has been built up into a local capital with a university, a large hospital and a healthy industry.
But the oil industry has already started to draw people south, and within a few years the whole northern policy could be in ruins.
The effects of the oil industry would not be limited to the north, however. With nearly 100 percent employment, everyone can see a situation developing in which the service industries and the tourist industry will lose more of their workers to the oil industry. Some smaller industries might even disappear altogether when it becomes cheaper to buy goods from abroad.
The real argument over oil is its threat to the Norwegian way of life. Farmers and fishermen do not make up most of the population, but they are an important part of it, because Norwegians see in them many of the qualities that they regard with pride as essentially Norwegian.
And it is the farmers and the fishermen who are most critical of the oil industry because of the damage that it might cause to the countryside and to the sea. | 174.txt | 2 |
[
"a large reduction on unemployment.",
"a growth in the tourist industry.",
"a reduction in the number of existing industries.",
"the development of a number of service industries."
]
| In the south, one effect to the development of the oil industry might be _ . | The Law to Keep the Oil Industry under Control
The Norwegian Government is doing its best to keep the oil industry under control. A new law limits exploration to an area south of the southern end of the long coastline; production limits have been laid down (though these have already been raised); and oil companies have not been allowed to employ more than a limited number of foreign workers.
But the oil industry has a way of getting over such problems, and few people believe that the Government will be able to hold things back for long.
As on Norwegian politician said last week: "We will soon be changed beyond all recognition."
Ever since the war, the Government has been carrying out a programme of development in the area north of the Arctic Circle. During the past few years this programme has had a great deal of success: Tromso has been built up into a local capital with a university, a large hospital and a healthy industry.
But the oil industry has already started to draw people south, and within a few years the whole northern policy could be in ruins.
The effects of the oil industry would not be limited to the north, however. With nearly 100 percent employment, everyone can see a situation developing in which the service industries and the tourist industry will lose more of their workers to the oil industry. Some smaller industries might even disappear altogether when it becomes cheaper to buy goods from abroad.
The real argument over oil is its threat to the Norwegian way of life. Farmers and fishermen do not make up most of the population, but they are an important part of it, because Norwegians see in them many of the qualities that they regard with pride as essentially Norwegian.
And it is the farmers and the fishermen who are most critical of the oil industry because of the damage that it might cause to the countryside and to the sea. | 174.txt | 2 |
[
"they form such a large part of Norwegian ideal.",
"their lives and values represent the Norwegian ideal.",
"their work is so useful to the rest of Norwegian society.",
"they regard off as a threat to the Norwegian way of life."
]
| Norwegian farmers and fishermen have an important influence because _ . | The Law to Keep the Oil Industry under Control
The Norwegian Government is doing its best to keep the oil industry under control. A new law limits exploration to an area south of the southern end of the long coastline; production limits have been laid down (though these have already been raised); and oil companies have not been allowed to employ more than a limited number of foreign workers.
But the oil industry has a way of getting over such problems, and few people believe that the Government will be able to hold things back for long.
As on Norwegian politician said last week: "We will soon be changed beyond all recognition."
Ever since the war, the Government has been carrying out a programme of development in the area north of the Arctic Circle. During the past few years this programme has had a great deal of success: Tromso has been built up into a local capital with a university, a large hospital and a healthy industry.
But the oil industry has already started to draw people south, and within a few years the whole northern policy could be in ruins.
The effects of the oil industry would not be limited to the north, however. With nearly 100 percent employment, everyone can see a situation developing in which the service industries and the tourist industry will lose more of their workers to the oil industry. Some smaller industries might even disappear altogether when it becomes cheaper to buy goods from abroad.
The real argument over oil is its threat to the Norwegian way of life. Farmers and fishermen do not make up most of the population, but they are an important part of it, because Norwegians see in them many of the qualities that they regard with pride as essentially Norwegian.
And it is the farmers and the fishermen who are most critical of the oil industry because of the damage that it might cause to the countryside and to the sea. | 174.txt | 1 |
[
"positive",
"neutral",
"suspicious",
"critical"
]
| The author's attitude towards the current situation in the exploitation of natural resources is ________. | The word conservation has a thrifty meaning. To conserve is to save and protect, to leave what we ourselves enjoy in such good condition that others may also share the enjoyment. Our forefathers had no idea that human population would increase faster than the supplies of raw materials; most of them, even until very recently, had the foolish idea that the treasures were "limitless" and "inexhaustible". Most of the citizens of earlier generations knew little or nothing about the complicated and delicate system that runs all through nature, and which means that, as in a living body, an unhealthy condition of one part will sooner or later be harmful to all the others.
Fifty years ago nature study was not part of the school work; scientific forestry was a new idea; timber was still cheap because it could be brought in any quantity from distant woodlands; soil destruction and river floods were not national problems; nobody had yet studied long-terms climatic cycles in relation to proper land use; even the word "conservation" had nothing of the meaning that it has for us today.
For the sake of ourselves and those who will come after us, we must now set about repairing the mistakes of our forefathers. Conservation should, therefore, be made a part of everyone's daily life. To know about the water table in the ground is just as important to us as a knowledge of the basic arithmetic formulas. We need to know why all watersheds need the protection of plant life and why the running current of streams and rivers must be made to yield their full benefit to the soil before they finally escape to the sea. We need to be taught the duty of planting trees as well as of cutting them. We need to know the importance of big, mature trees, because living space for most of man's fellow creatures on this planet is figured not only in square measure of surface but also in cubic volume above the earth. In brief, it should be our goal to restore as much of the original beauty of nature as we can. | 1335.txt | 3 |
[
"they had no idea about scientific forestry",
"they had little or no sense of environmental protection",
"they were not aware of the significance of nature study",
"they had no idea of how to make good use of raw materials"
]
| According to the author, the greatest mistake of our forefathers was that ________. | The word conservation has a thrifty meaning. To conserve is to save and protect, to leave what we ourselves enjoy in such good condition that others may also share the enjoyment. Our forefathers had no idea that human population would increase faster than the supplies of raw materials; most of them, even until very recently, had the foolish idea that the treasures were "limitless" and "inexhaustible". Most of the citizens of earlier generations knew little or nothing about the complicated and delicate system that runs all through nature, and which means that, as in a living body, an unhealthy condition of one part will sooner or later be harmful to all the others.
Fifty years ago nature study was not part of the school work; scientific forestry was a new idea; timber was still cheap because it could be brought in any quantity from distant woodlands; soil destruction and river floods were not national problems; nobody had yet studied long-terms climatic cycles in relation to proper land use; even the word "conservation" had nothing of the meaning that it has for us today.
For the sake of ourselves and those who will come after us, we must now set about repairing the mistakes of our forefathers. Conservation should, therefore, be made a part of everyone's daily life. To know about the water table in the ground is just as important to us as a knowledge of the basic arithmetic formulas. We need to know why all watersheds need the protection of plant life and why the running current of streams and rivers must be made to yield their full benefit to the soil before they finally escape to the sea. We need to be taught the duty of planting trees as well as of cutting them. We need to know the importance of big, mature trees, because living space for most of man's fellow creatures on this planet is figured not only in square measure of surface but also in cubic volume above the earth. In brief, it should be our goal to restore as much of the original beauty of nature as we can. | 1335.txt | 1 |
[
"the interdependence of water, soil, and living things",
"the importance of the proper use of land",
"the harmfulness of soil destruction and river floods",
"the value of the beauty of nature"
]
| It can be inferred from the third paragraph that earlier generations didn't realize ________. | The word conservation has a thrifty meaning. To conserve is to save and protect, to leave what we ourselves enjoy in such good condition that others may also share the enjoyment. Our forefathers had no idea that human population would increase faster than the supplies of raw materials; most of them, even until very recently, had the foolish idea that the treasures were "limitless" and "inexhaustible". Most of the citizens of earlier generations knew little or nothing about the complicated and delicate system that runs all through nature, and which means that, as in a living body, an unhealthy condition of one part will sooner or later be harmful to all the others.
Fifty years ago nature study was not part of the school work; scientific forestry was a new idea; timber was still cheap because it could be brought in any quantity from distant woodlands; soil destruction and river floods were not national problems; nobody had yet studied long-terms climatic cycles in relation to proper land use; even the word "conservation" had nothing of the meaning that it has for us today.
For the sake of ourselves and those who will come after us, we must now set about repairing the mistakes of our forefathers. Conservation should, therefore, be made a part of everyone's daily life. To know about the water table in the ground is just as important to us as a knowledge of the basic arithmetic formulas. We need to know why all watersheds need the protection of plant life and why the running current of streams and rivers must be made to yield their full benefit to the soil before they finally escape to the sea. We need to be taught the duty of planting trees as well as of cutting them. We need to know the importance of big, mature trees, because living space for most of man's fellow creatures on this planet is figured not only in square measure of surface but also in cubic volume above the earth. In brief, it should be our goal to restore as much of the original beauty of nature as we can. | 1335.txt | 0 |
[
"we plant more trees",
"natural science be taught to everybody",
"environmental education be directed toward everyone",
"we return to nature"
]
| To avoid correcting the mistake of our forefathers, the author suggests that ________. | The word conservation has a thrifty meaning. To conserve is to save and protect, to leave what we ourselves enjoy in such good condition that others may also share the enjoyment. Our forefathers had no idea that human population would increase faster than the supplies of raw materials; most of them, even until very recently, had the foolish idea that the treasures were "limitless" and "inexhaustible". Most of the citizens of earlier generations knew little or nothing about the complicated and delicate system that runs all through nature, and which means that, as in a living body, an unhealthy condition of one part will sooner or later be harmful to all the others.
Fifty years ago nature study was not part of the school work; scientific forestry was a new idea; timber was still cheap because it could be brought in any quantity from distant woodlands; soil destruction and river floods were not national problems; nobody had yet studied long-terms climatic cycles in relation to proper land use; even the word "conservation" had nothing of the meaning that it has for us today.
For the sake of ourselves and those who will come after us, we must now set about repairing the mistakes of our forefathers. Conservation should, therefore, be made a part of everyone's daily life. To know about the water table in the ground is just as important to us as a knowledge of the basic arithmetic formulas. We need to know why all watersheds need the protection of plant life and why the running current of streams and rivers must be made to yield their full benefit to the soil before they finally escape to the sea. We need to be taught the duty of planting trees as well as of cutting them. We need to know the importance of big, mature trees, because living space for most of man's fellow creatures on this planet is figured not only in square measure of surface but also in cubic volume above the earth. In brief, it should be our goal to restore as much of the original beauty of nature as we can. | 1335.txt | 2 |
[
"Our living space on the earth is getting smaller and smaller.",
"Our living space should be measured in cubic volume.",
"We need to take some measure to protect space.",
"We must preserve good living conditions for both birds and animals."
]
| What does the author imply by saying "living space... is figured... also in cubic volume above the earth" (Lines 7-8, Para. 3)? | The word conservation has a thrifty meaning. To conserve is to save and protect, to leave what we ourselves enjoy in such good condition that others may also share the enjoyment. Our forefathers had no idea that human population would increase faster than the supplies of raw materials; most of them, even until very recently, had the foolish idea that the treasures were "limitless" and "inexhaustible". Most of the citizens of earlier generations knew little or nothing about the complicated and delicate system that runs all through nature, and which means that, as in a living body, an unhealthy condition of one part will sooner or later be harmful to all the others.
Fifty years ago nature study was not part of the school work; scientific forestry was a new idea; timber was still cheap because it could be brought in any quantity from distant woodlands; soil destruction and river floods were not national problems; nobody had yet studied long-terms climatic cycles in relation to proper land use; even the word "conservation" had nothing of the meaning that it has for us today.
For the sake of ourselves and those who will come after us, we must now set about repairing the mistakes of our forefathers. Conservation should, therefore, be made a part of everyone's daily life. To know about the water table in the ground is just as important to us as a knowledge of the basic arithmetic formulas. We need to know why all watersheds need the protection of plant life and why the running current of streams and rivers must be made to yield their full benefit to the soil before they finally escape to the sea. We need to be taught the duty of planting trees as well as of cutting them. We need to know the importance of big, mature trees, because living space for most of man's fellow creatures on this planet is figured not only in square measure of surface but also in cubic volume above the earth. In brief, it should be our goal to restore as much of the original beauty of nature as we can. | 1335.txt | 3 |
[
"They were completely industrialized by the start of the nineteenth century.",
"They possessed plentiful supplies of coal.",
"They were overtaken economically by the Netherlands and Scandinavia during the early nineteenth century.",
"They succeeded for the same reasons that the Netherlands and Scandinavia did."
]
| Paragraph 1 supports which of the following ideas about England and Germany? | While some European countries, such as England and Germany, began to industrialize in the eighteenth century, the Netherlands and the Scandinavian countries of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden developed later. All four of these countries lagged considerably behind in the early nineteenth century. However, they industrialized rapidly in the second half of the century, especially in the last two or three decades. In view of their later start and their lack of coal-undoubtedly the main reason they were not among the early industrializers-it is important to understand the sources of their success.
All had small populations. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, Denmark and Norway had fewer than 1 million people, while Sweden and the Netherlands had fewer than 2.5 million inhabitants. All exhibited moderate growth rates in the course of the century (Denmark the highest and Sweden the lowest), but all more than doubled in population by 1900. Density varied greatly. The Netherlands had one of the highest population densities in Europe, whereas Norway and Sweden had the lowest Denmark was in between but closer to the Netherlands.
Considering human capital as a characteristic of the population, however, all four countries were advantaged by the large percentages of their populations who could read and write. In both 1850 and 1914, the Scandinavian countries had the highest literacy rates in Europe, or in the world, and the Netherlands was well above the European average. This fact was of enormous value in helping the national economies find their niches in the evolving currents of the international economy.
Location was an important factor for all four countries. All had immediate access to the sea, and this had important implications for a significant international resource, fish, as well as for cheap transport, merchant marines, and the shipbuilding industry. Each took advantage of these opportunities in its own way. The people of the Netherlands, with a long tradition of fisheries and mercantile shipping, had difficulty in developing good harbors suitable for steamships: eventually they did so at Rotterdam and Amsterdam, with exceptional results for transit trade with Germany and central Europe and for the processing of overseas foodstuffs and raw materials (sugar, tobacco, chocolate, grain, and eventually oil). Denmark also had an admirable commercial history, particularly with respect to traffic through the Sound (the strait separating Denmark and Sweden). In 1857, in return for a payment of 63 million kronor from other commercial nations, Denmark abolished the Sound toll dues the fees it had collected since 1497 for the use of the Sound. This, along with other policy shifts toward free trade, resulted in a significant increase in traffic through the Sound and in the port of Copenhagen.
The political institutions of the four countries posed no significant barriers to industrialization or economic growth. The nineteenth century passed relatively peacefully for these countries, with progressive democratization taking place in all of them. They were reasonably well governed, without notable corruption or grandiose state projects, although in all of them the government gave some aid to railways, and in Sweden the state built the main lines. As small countries dependent on foreign markets, they followed a liberal trade policy in the main, though a protectionist movement developed in Sweden. In Denmark and Sweden agricultural reforms took place gradually from the late eighteenth century through the first half of the nineteenth, resulting in a new class of peasant landowners with a definite market orientation.
The key factor in the success of these countries (along with high literacy, which contributed to it) was their ability to adapt to the international division of labor determined by the early industrializers and to stake out areas of specialization in international markets for which they were especially well suited. This meant a great dependence on international commerce, which had notorious fluctuations; but it also meant high returns to those factors of production that were fortunate enough to be well placed in times of prosperity. In Sweden exports accounted for 18 percent of the national income in 1870, and in 1913, 22 percent of a much larger national income. In the early twentieth century, Denmark exported 63 percent of its agricultural production: butter, pork products, and eggs. It exported 80 percent of its butter, almost all to Great Britain, where it accounted for 40 percent of British butter imports. | 542.txt | 1 |
[
"It was a more important factor than population size.",
"It was more influential than the rate of population growth.",
"It was more important in the early stages than it was later.",
"It was not a significant factor."
]
| Paragraph 2 suggests which of the following about the importance of population density in the industrialization of the Netherlands and Scandinavia? | While some European countries, such as England and Germany, began to industrialize in the eighteenth century, the Netherlands and the Scandinavian countries of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden developed later. All four of these countries lagged considerably behind in the early nineteenth century. However, they industrialized rapidly in the second half of the century, especially in the last two or three decades. In view of their later start and their lack of coal-undoubtedly the main reason they were not among the early industrializers-it is important to understand the sources of their success.
All had small populations. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, Denmark and Norway had fewer than 1 million people, while Sweden and the Netherlands had fewer than 2.5 million inhabitants. All exhibited moderate growth rates in the course of the century (Denmark the highest and Sweden the lowest), but all more than doubled in population by 1900. Density varied greatly. The Netherlands had one of the highest population densities in Europe, whereas Norway and Sweden had the lowest Denmark was in between but closer to the Netherlands.
Considering human capital as a characteristic of the population, however, all four countries were advantaged by the large percentages of their populations who could read and write. In both 1850 and 1914, the Scandinavian countries had the highest literacy rates in Europe, or in the world, and the Netherlands was well above the European average. This fact was of enormous value in helping the national economies find their niches in the evolving currents of the international economy.
Location was an important factor for all four countries. All had immediate access to the sea, and this had important implications for a significant international resource, fish, as well as for cheap transport, merchant marines, and the shipbuilding industry. Each took advantage of these opportunities in its own way. The people of the Netherlands, with a long tradition of fisheries and mercantile shipping, had difficulty in developing good harbors suitable for steamships: eventually they did so at Rotterdam and Amsterdam, with exceptional results for transit trade with Germany and central Europe and for the processing of overseas foodstuffs and raw materials (sugar, tobacco, chocolate, grain, and eventually oil). Denmark also had an admirable commercial history, particularly with respect to traffic through the Sound (the strait separating Denmark and Sweden). In 1857, in return for a payment of 63 million kronor from other commercial nations, Denmark abolished the Sound toll dues the fees it had collected since 1497 for the use of the Sound. This, along with other policy shifts toward free trade, resulted in a significant increase in traffic through the Sound and in the port of Copenhagen.
The political institutions of the four countries posed no significant barriers to industrialization or economic growth. The nineteenth century passed relatively peacefully for these countries, with progressive democratization taking place in all of them. They were reasonably well governed, without notable corruption or grandiose state projects, although in all of them the government gave some aid to railways, and in Sweden the state built the main lines. As small countries dependent on foreign markets, they followed a liberal trade policy in the main, though a protectionist movement developed in Sweden. In Denmark and Sweden agricultural reforms took place gradually from the late eighteenth century through the first half of the nineteenth, resulting in a new class of peasant landowners with a definite market orientation.
The key factor in the success of these countries (along with high literacy, which contributed to it) was their ability to adapt to the international division of labor determined by the early industrializers and to stake out areas of specialization in international markets for which they were especially well suited. This meant a great dependence on international commerce, which had notorious fluctuations; but it also meant high returns to those factors of production that were fortunate enough to be well placed in times of prosperity. In Sweden exports accounted for 18 percent of the national income in 1870, and in 1913, 22 percent of a much larger national income. In the early twentieth century, Denmark exported 63 percent of its agricultural production: butter, pork products, and eggs. It exported 80 percent of its butter, almost all to Great Britain, where it accounted for 40 percent of British butter imports. | 542.txt | 3 |
[
"The relatively small size of their populations",
"The rapid rate at which their populations were growing",
"The large amount of capital they had available for investment",
"The high proportion of their citizens who were educated"
]
| According to paragraphs 2 and 3, which of the following contributed significantly to the successful economic development of the Netherlands and of Scandinavia? | While some European countries, such as England and Germany, began to industrialize in the eighteenth century, the Netherlands and the Scandinavian countries of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden developed later. All four of these countries lagged considerably behind in the early nineteenth century. However, they industrialized rapidly in the second half of the century, especially in the last two or three decades. In view of their later start and their lack of coal-undoubtedly the main reason they were not among the early industrializers-it is important to understand the sources of their success.
All had small populations. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, Denmark and Norway had fewer than 1 million people, while Sweden and the Netherlands had fewer than 2.5 million inhabitants. All exhibited moderate growth rates in the course of the century (Denmark the highest and Sweden the lowest), but all more than doubled in population by 1900. Density varied greatly. The Netherlands had one of the highest population densities in Europe, whereas Norway and Sweden had the lowest Denmark was in between but closer to the Netherlands.
Considering human capital as a characteristic of the population, however, all four countries were advantaged by the large percentages of their populations who could read and write. In both 1850 and 1914, the Scandinavian countries had the highest literacy rates in Europe, or in the world, and the Netherlands was well above the European average. This fact was of enormous value in helping the national economies find their niches in the evolving currents of the international economy.
Location was an important factor for all four countries. All had immediate access to the sea, and this had important implications for a significant international resource, fish, as well as for cheap transport, merchant marines, and the shipbuilding industry. Each took advantage of these opportunities in its own way. The people of the Netherlands, with a long tradition of fisheries and mercantile shipping, had difficulty in developing good harbors suitable for steamships: eventually they did so at Rotterdam and Amsterdam, with exceptional results for transit trade with Germany and central Europe and for the processing of overseas foodstuffs and raw materials (sugar, tobacco, chocolate, grain, and eventually oil). Denmark also had an admirable commercial history, particularly with respect to traffic through the Sound (the strait separating Denmark and Sweden). In 1857, in return for a payment of 63 million kronor from other commercial nations, Denmark abolished the Sound toll dues the fees it had collected since 1497 for the use of the Sound. This, along with other policy shifts toward free trade, resulted in a significant increase in traffic through the Sound and in the port of Copenhagen.
The political institutions of the four countries posed no significant barriers to industrialization or economic growth. The nineteenth century passed relatively peacefully for these countries, with progressive democratization taking place in all of them. They were reasonably well governed, without notable corruption or grandiose state projects, although in all of them the government gave some aid to railways, and in Sweden the state built the main lines. As small countries dependent on foreign markets, they followed a liberal trade policy in the main, though a protectionist movement developed in Sweden. In Denmark and Sweden agricultural reforms took place gradually from the late eighteenth century through the first half of the nineteenth, resulting in a new class of peasant landowners with a definite market orientation.
The key factor in the success of these countries (along with high literacy, which contributed to it) was their ability to adapt to the international division of labor determined by the early industrializers and to stake out areas of specialization in international markets for which they were especially well suited. This meant a great dependence on international commerce, which had notorious fluctuations; but it also meant high returns to those factors of production that were fortunate enough to be well placed in times of prosperity. In Sweden exports accounted for 18 percent of the national income in 1870, and in 1913, 22 percent of a much larger national income. In the early twentieth century, Denmark exported 63 percent of its agricultural production: butter, pork products, and eggs. It exported 80 percent of its butter, almost all to Great Britain, where it accounted for 40 percent of British butter imports. | 542.txt | 3 |
[
"low-cost transportation of goods",
"access to fish",
"shipbuilding industries",
"military control of the sea"
]
| According to paragraph 4, because of their location, the Netherlands and the Scandinavian countries had all of the following advantages when they began to industrialize EXCEPT | While some European countries, such as England and Germany, began to industrialize in the eighteenth century, the Netherlands and the Scandinavian countries of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden developed later. All four of these countries lagged considerably behind in the early nineteenth century. However, they industrialized rapidly in the second half of the century, especially in the last two or three decades. In view of their later start and their lack of coal-undoubtedly the main reason they were not among the early industrializers-it is important to understand the sources of their success.
All had small populations. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, Denmark and Norway had fewer than 1 million people, while Sweden and the Netherlands had fewer than 2.5 million inhabitants. All exhibited moderate growth rates in the course of the century (Denmark the highest and Sweden the lowest), but all more than doubled in population by 1900. Density varied greatly. The Netherlands had one of the highest population densities in Europe, whereas Norway and Sweden had the lowest Denmark was in between but closer to the Netherlands.
Considering human capital as a characteristic of the population, however, all four countries were advantaged by the large percentages of their populations who could read and write. In both 1850 and 1914, the Scandinavian countries had the highest literacy rates in Europe, or in the world, and the Netherlands was well above the European average. This fact was of enormous value in helping the national economies find their niches in the evolving currents of the international economy.
Location was an important factor for all four countries. All had immediate access to the sea, and this had important implications for a significant international resource, fish, as well as for cheap transport, merchant marines, and the shipbuilding industry. Each took advantage of these opportunities in its own way. The people of the Netherlands, with a long tradition of fisheries and mercantile shipping, had difficulty in developing good harbors suitable for steamships: eventually they did so at Rotterdam and Amsterdam, with exceptional results for transit trade with Germany and central Europe and for the processing of overseas foodstuffs and raw materials (sugar, tobacco, chocolate, grain, and eventually oil). Denmark also had an admirable commercial history, particularly with respect to traffic through the Sound (the strait separating Denmark and Sweden). In 1857, in return for a payment of 63 million kronor from other commercial nations, Denmark abolished the Sound toll dues the fees it had collected since 1497 for the use of the Sound. This, along with other policy shifts toward free trade, resulted in a significant increase in traffic through the Sound and in the port of Copenhagen.
The political institutions of the four countries posed no significant barriers to industrialization or economic growth. The nineteenth century passed relatively peacefully for these countries, with progressive democratization taking place in all of them. They were reasonably well governed, without notable corruption or grandiose state projects, although in all of them the government gave some aid to railways, and in Sweden the state built the main lines. As small countries dependent on foreign markets, they followed a liberal trade policy in the main, though a protectionist movement developed in Sweden. In Denmark and Sweden agricultural reforms took place gradually from the late eighteenth century through the first half of the nineteenth, resulting in a new class of peasant landowners with a definite market orientation.
The key factor in the success of these countries (along with high literacy, which contributed to it) was their ability to adapt to the international division of labor determined by the early industrializers and to stake out areas of specialization in international markets for which they were especially well suited. This meant a great dependence on international commerce, which had notorious fluctuations; but it also meant high returns to those factors of production that were fortunate enough to be well placed in times of prosperity. In Sweden exports accounted for 18 percent of the national income in 1870, and in 1913, 22 percent of a much larger national income. In the early twentieth century, Denmark exported 63 percent of its agricultural production: butter, pork products, and eggs. It exported 80 percent of its butter, almost all to Great Britain, where it accounted for 40 percent of British butter imports. | 542.txt | 3 |
[
"extraordinary",
"surprising",
"immediate",
"predictable"
]
| The word "exceptional" in passage 4 is closest in meaning to | While some European countries, such as England and Germany, began to industrialize in the eighteenth century, the Netherlands and the Scandinavian countries of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden developed later. All four of these countries lagged considerably behind in the early nineteenth century. However, they industrialized rapidly in the second half of the century, especially in the last two or three decades. In view of their later start and their lack of coal-undoubtedly the main reason they were not among the early industrializers-it is important to understand the sources of their success.
All had small populations. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, Denmark and Norway had fewer than 1 million people, while Sweden and the Netherlands had fewer than 2.5 million inhabitants. All exhibited moderate growth rates in the course of the century (Denmark the highest and Sweden the lowest), but all more than doubled in population by 1900. Density varied greatly. The Netherlands had one of the highest population densities in Europe, whereas Norway and Sweden had the lowest Denmark was in between but closer to the Netherlands.
Considering human capital as a characteristic of the population, however, all four countries were advantaged by the large percentages of their populations who could read and write. In both 1850 and 1914, the Scandinavian countries had the highest literacy rates in Europe, or in the world, and the Netherlands was well above the European average. This fact was of enormous value in helping the national economies find their niches in the evolving currents of the international economy.
Location was an important factor for all four countries. All had immediate access to the sea, and this had important implications for a significant international resource, fish, as well as for cheap transport, merchant marines, and the shipbuilding industry. Each took advantage of these opportunities in its own way. The people of the Netherlands, with a long tradition of fisheries and mercantile shipping, had difficulty in developing good harbors suitable for steamships: eventually they did so at Rotterdam and Amsterdam, with exceptional results for transit trade with Germany and central Europe and for the processing of overseas foodstuffs and raw materials (sugar, tobacco, chocolate, grain, and eventually oil). Denmark also had an admirable commercial history, particularly with respect to traffic through the Sound (the strait separating Denmark and Sweden). In 1857, in return for a payment of 63 million kronor from other commercial nations, Denmark abolished the Sound toll dues the fees it had collected since 1497 for the use of the Sound. This, along with other policy shifts toward free trade, resulted in a significant increase in traffic through the Sound and in the port of Copenhagen.
The political institutions of the four countries posed no significant barriers to industrialization or economic growth. The nineteenth century passed relatively peacefully for these countries, with progressive democratization taking place in all of them. They were reasonably well governed, without notable corruption or grandiose state projects, although in all of them the government gave some aid to railways, and in Sweden the state built the main lines. As small countries dependent on foreign markets, they followed a liberal trade policy in the main, though a protectionist movement developed in Sweden. In Denmark and Sweden agricultural reforms took place gradually from the late eighteenth century through the first half of the nineteenth, resulting in a new class of peasant landowners with a definite market orientation.
The key factor in the success of these countries (along with high literacy, which contributed to it) was their ability to adapt to the international division of labor determined by the early industrializers and to stake out areas of specialization in international markets for which they were especially well suited. This meant a great dependence on international commerce, which had notorious fluctuations; but it also meant high returns to those factors of production that were fortunate enough to be well placed in times of prosperity. In Sweden exports accounted for 18 percent of the national income in 1870, and in 1913, 22 percent of a much larger national income. In the early twentieth century, Denmark exported 63 percent of its agricultural production: butter, pork products, and eggs. It exported 80 percent of its butter, almost all to Great Britain, where it accounted for 40 percent of British butter imports. | 542.txt | 0 |
[
"ended",
"raised",
"returned",
"lowered"
]
| The word "abolished" in passage 4 is closest in meaning to | While some European countries, such as England and Germany, began to industrialize in the eighteenth century, the Netherlands and the Scandinavian countries of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden developed later. All four of these countries lagged considerably behind in the early nineteenth century. However, they industrialized rapidly in the second half of the century, especially in the last two or three decades. In view of their later start and their lack of coal-undoubtedly the main reason they were not among the early industrializers-it is important to understand the sources of their success.
All had small populations. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, Denmark and Norway had fewer than 1 million people, while Sweden and the Netherlands had fewer than 2.5 million inhabitants. All exhibited moderate growth rates in the course of the century (Denmark the highest and Sweden the lowest), but all more than doubled in population by 1900. Density varied greatly. The Netherlands had one of the highest population densities in Europe, whereas Norway and Sweden had the lowest Denmark was in between but closer to the Netherlands.
Considering human capital as a characteristic of the population, however, all four countries were advantaged by the large percentages of their populations who could read and write. In both 1850 and 1914, the Scandinavian countries had the highest literacy rates in Europe, or in the world, and the Netherlands was well above the European average. This fact was of enormous value in helping the national economies find their niches in the evolving currents of the international economy.
Location was an important factor for all four countries. All had immediate access to the sea, and this had important implications for a significant international resource, fish, as well as for cheap transport, merchant marines, and the shipbuilding industry. Each took advantage of these opportunities in its own way. The people of the Netherlands, with a long tradition of fisheries and mercantile shipping, had difficulty in developing good harbors suitable for steamships: eventually they did so at Rotterdam and Amsterdam, with exceptional results for transit trade with Germany and central Europe and for the processing of overseas foodstuffs and raw materials (sugar, tobacco, chocolate, grain, and eventually oil). Denmark also had an admirable commercial history, particularly with respect to traffic through the Sound (the strait separating Denmark and Sweden). In 1857, in return for a payment of 63 million kronor from other commercial nations, Denmark abolished the Sound toll dues the fees it had collected since 1497 for the use of the Sound. This, along with other policy shifts toward free trade, resulted in a significant increase in traffic through the Sound and in the port of Copenhagen.
The political institutions of the four countries posed no significant barriers to industrialization or economic growth. The nineteenth century passed relatively peacefully for these countries, with progressive democratization taking place in all of them. They were reasonably well governed, without notable corruption or grandiose state projects, although in all of them the government gave some aid to railways, and in Sweden the state built the main lines. As small countries dependent on foreign markets, they followed a liberal trade policy in the main, though a protectionist movement developed in Sweden. In Denmark and Sweden agricultural reforms took place gradually from the late eighteenth century through the first half of the nineteenth, resulting in a new class of peasant landowners with a definite market orientation.
The key factor in the success of these countries (along with high literacy, which contributed to it) was their ability to adapt to the international division of labor determined by the early industrializers and to stake out areas of specialization in international markets for which they were especially well suited. This meant a great dependence on international commerce, which had notorious fluctuations; but it also meant high returns to those factors of production that were fortunate enough to be well placed in times of prosperity. In Sweden exports accounted for 18 percent of the national income in 1870, and in 1913, 22 percent of a much larger national income. In the early twentieth century, Denmark exported 63 percent of its agricultural production: butter, pork products, and eggs. It exported 80 percent of its butter, almost all to Great Britain, where it accounted for 40 percent of British butter imports. | 542.txt | 0 |
[
"generally liberal trade policies",
"huge projects undertaken by the state",
"relatively uncorrupt governments",
"relatively little social or political disruption"
]
| According to paragraph 5, each of the following contributed positively to the industrialization of the Netherlands and Scandinavia EXCEPT | While some European countries, such as England and Germany, began to industrialize in the eighteenth century, the Netherlands and the Scandinavian countries of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden developed later. All four of these countries lagged considerably behind in the early nineteenth century. However, they industrialized rapidly in the second half of the century, especially in the last two or three decades. In view of their later start and their lack of coal-undoubtedly the main reason they were not among the early industrializers-it is important to understand the sources of their success.
All had small populations. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, Denmark and Norway had fewer than 1 million people, while Sweden and the Netherlands had fewer than 2.5 million inhabitants. All exhibited moderate growth rates in the course of the century (Denmark the highest and Sweden the lowest), but all more than doubled in population by 1900. Density varied greatly. The Netherlands had one of the highest population densities in Europe, whereas Norway and Sweden had the lowest Denmark was in between but closer to the Netherlands.
Considering human capital as a characteristic of the population, however, all four countries were advantaged by the large percentages of their populations who could read and write. In both 1850 and 1914, the Scandinavian countries had the highest literacy rates in Europe, or in the world, and the Netherlands was well above the European average. This fact was of enormous value in helping the national economies find their niches in the evolving currents of the international economy.
Location was an important factor for all four countries. All had immediate access to the sea, and this had important implications for a significant international resource, fish, as well as for cheap transport, merchant marines, and the shipbuilding industry. Each took advantage of these opportunities in its own way. The people of the Netherlands, with a long tradition of fisheries and mercantile shipping, had difficulty in developing good harbors suitable for steamships: eventually they did so at Rotterdam and Amsterdam, with exceptional results for transit trade with Germany and central Europe and for the processing of overseas foodstuffs and raw materials (sugar, tobacco, chocolate, grain, and eventually oil). Denmark also had an admirable commercial history, particularly with respect to traffic through the Sound (the strait separating Denmark and Sweden). In 1857, in return for a payment of 63 million kronor from other commercial nations, Denmark abolished the Sound toll dues the fees it had collected since 1497 for the use of the Sound. This, along with other policy shifts toward free trade, resulted in a significant increase in traffic through the Sound and in the port of Copenhagen.
The political institutions of the four countries posed no significant barriers to industrialization or economic growth. The nineteenth century passed relatively peacefully for these countries, with progressive democratization taking place in all of them. They were reasonably well governed, without notable corruption or grandiose state projects, although in all of them the government gave some aid to railways, and in Sweden the state built the main lines. As small countries dependent on foreign markets, they followed a liberal trade policy in the main, though a protectionist movement developed in Sweden. In Denmark and Sweden agricultural reforms took place gradually from the late eighteenth century through the first half of the nineteenth, resulting in a new class of peasant landowners with a definite market orientation.
The key factor in the success of these countries (along with high literacy, which contributed to it) was their ability to adapt to the international division of labor determined by the early industrializers and to stake out areas of specialization in international markets for which they were especially well suited. This meant a great dependence on international commerce, which had notorious fluctuations; but it also meant high returns to those factors of production that were fortunate enough to be well placed in times of prosperity. In Sweden exports accounted for 18 percent of the national income in 1870, and in 1913, 22 percent of a much larger national income. In the early twentieth century, Denmark exported 63 percent of its agricultural production: butter, pork products, and eggs. It exported 80 percent of its butter, almost all to Great Britain, where it accounted for 40 percent of British butter imports. | 542.txt | 1 |
[
"rapid",
"partial",
"increasing",
"individual"
]
| The word "progressive" in passage 5 is closest in meaning to | While some European countries, such as England and Germany, began to industrialize in the eighteenth century, the Netherlands and the Scandinavian countries of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden developed later. All four of these countries lagged considerably behind in the early nineteenth century. However, they industrialized rapidly in the second half of the century, especially in the last two or three decades. In view of their later start and their lack of coal-undoubtedly the main reason they were not among the early industrializers-it is important to understand the sources of their success.
All had small populations. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, Denmark and Norway had fewer than 1 million people, while Sweden and the Netherlands had fewer than 2.5 million inhabitants. All exhibited moderate growth rates in the course of the century (Denmark the highest and Sweden the lowest), but all more than doubled in population by 1900. Density varied greatly. The Netherlands had one of the highest population densities in Europe, whereas Norway and Sweden had the lowest Denmark was in between but closer to the Netherlands.
Considering human capital as a characteristic of the population, however, all four countries were advantaged by the large percentages of their populations who could read and write. In both 1850 and 1914, the Scandinavian countries had the highest literacy rates in Europe, or in the world, and the Netherlands was well above the European average. This fact was of enormous value in helping the national economies find their niches in the evolving currents of the international economy.
Location was an important factor for all four countries. All had immediate access to the sea, and this had important implications for a significant international resource, fish, as well as for cheap transport, merchant marines, and the shipbuilding industry. Each took advantage of these opportunities in its own way. The people of the Netherlands, with a long tradition of fisheries and mercantile shipping, had difficulty in developing good harbors suitable for steamships: eventually they did so at Rotterdam and Amsterdam, with exceptional results for transit trade with Germany and central Europe and for the processing of overseas foodstuffs and raw materials (sugar, tobacco, chocolate, grain, and eventually oil). Denmark also had an admirable commercial history, particularly with respect to traffic through the Sound (the strait separating Denmark and Sweden). In 1857, in return for a payment of 63 million kronor from other commercial nations, Denmark abolished the Sound toll dues the fees it had collected since 1497 for the use of the Sound. This, along with other policy shifts toward free trade, resulted in a significant increase in traffic through the Sound and in the port of Copenhagen.
The political institutions of the four countries posed no significant barriers to industrialization or economic growth. The nineteenth century passed relatively peacefully for these countries, with progressive democratization taking place in all of them. They were reasonably well governed, without notable corruption or grandiose state projects, although in all of them the government gave some aid to railways, and in Sweden the state built the main lines. As small countries dependent on foreign markets, they followed a liberal trade policy in the main, though a protectionist movement developed in Sweden. In Denmark and Sweden agricultural reforms took place gradually from the late eighteenth century through the first half of the nineteenth, resulting in a new class of peasant landowners with a definite market orientation.
The key factor in the success of these countries (along with high literacy, which contributed to it) was their ability to adapt to the international division of labor determined by the early industrializers and to stake out areas of specialization in international markets for which they were especially well suited. This meant a great dependence on international commerce, which had notorious fluctuations; but it also meant high returns to those factors of production that were fortunate enough to be well placed in times of prosperity. In Sweden exports accounted for 18 percent of the national income in 1870, and in 1913, 22 percent of a much larger national income. In the early twentieth century, Denmark exported 63 percent of its agricultural production: butter, pork products, and eggs. It exported 80 percent of its butter, almost all to Great Britain, where it accounted for 40 percent of British butter imports. | 542.txt | 2 |
[
"support the claim that the political institutions of the four countries posed no significant barriers to industrialization or economic growth",
"identify an exception to the general trend favoring liberal trade policy",
"explain why Sweden industrialized less quickly than the other Scandinavian countries and Netherlands",
"provide evidence that agricultural reforms take place more quickly in countries that have a liberal trade policy than in those that do not"
]
| The author includes the information that "a protectionist movement developed in Sweden"(in paragraph 5) in order to | While some European countries, such as England and Germany, began to industrialize in the eighteenth century, the Netherlands and the Scandinavian countries of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden developed later. All four of these countries lagged considerably behind in the early nineteenth century. However, they industrialized rapidly in the second half of the century, especially in the last two or three decades. In view of their later start and their lack of coal-undoubtedly the main reason they were not among the early industrializers-it is important to understand the sources of their success.
All had small populations. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, Denmark and Norway had fewer than 1 million people, while Sweden and the Netherlands had fewer than 2.5 million inhabitants. All exhibited moderate growth rates in the course of the century (Denmark the highest and Sweden the lowest), but all more than doubled in population by 1900. Density varied greatly. The Netherlands had one of the highest population densities in Europe, whereas Norway and Sweden had the lowest Denmark was in between but closer to the Netherlands.
Considering human capital as a characteristic of the population, however, all four countries were advantaged by the large percentages of their populations who could read and write. In both 1850 and 1914, the Scandinavian countries had the highest literacy rates in Europe, or in the world, and the Netherlands was well above the European average. This fact was of enormous value in helping the national economies find their niches in the evolving currents of the international economy.
Location was an important factor for all four countries. All had immediate access to the sea, and this had important implications for a significant international resource, fish, as well as for cheap transport, merchant marines, and the shipbuilding industry. Each took advantage of these opportunities in its own way. The people of the Netherlands, with a long tradition of fisheries and mercantile shipping, had difficulty in developing good harbors suitable for steamships: eventually they did so at Rotterdam and Amsterdam, with exceptional results for transit trade with Germany and central Europe and for the processing of overseas foodstuffs and raw materials (sugar, tobacco, chocolate, grain, and eventually oil). Denmark also had an admirable commercial history, particularly with respect to traffic through the Sound (the strait separating Denmark and Sweden). In 1857, in return for a payment of 63 million kronor from other commercial nations, Denmark abolished the Sound toll dues the fees it had collected since 1497 for the use of the Sound. This, along with other policy shifts toward free trade, resulted in a significant increase in traffic through the Sound and in the port of Copenhagen.
The political institutions of the four countries posed no significant barriers to industrialization or economic growth. The nineteenth century passed relatively peacefully for these countries, with progressive democratization taking place in all of them. They were reasonably well governed, without notable corruption or grandiose state projects, although in all of them the government gave some aid to railways, and in Sweden the state built the main lines. As small countries dependent on foreign markets, they followed a liberal trade policy in the main, though a protectionist movement developed in Sweden. In Denmark and Sweden agricultural reforms took place gradually from the late eighteenth century through the first half of the nineteenth, resulting in a new class of peasant landowners with a definite market orientation.
The key factor in the success of these countries (along with high literacy, which contributed to it) was their ability to adapt to the international division of labor determined by the early industrializers and to stake out areas of specialization in international markets for which they were especially well suited. This meant a great dependence on international commerce, which had notorious fluctuations; but it also meant high returns to those factors of production that were fortunate enough to be well placed in times of prosperity. In Sweden exports accounted for 18 percent of the national income in 1870, and in 1913, 22 percent of a much larger national income. In the early twentieth century, Denmark exported 63 percent of its agricultural production: butter, pork products, and eggs. It exported 80 percent of its butter, almost all to Great Britain, where it accounted for 40 percent of British butter imports. | 542.txt | 1 |
[
"lacked stability",
"were not well suited to agricultural products",
"were largely controlled by the early industrializers",
"led to slower growth of local industries"
]
| According to paragraph 6, a major problem with depending heavily on international markets was that they | While some European countries, such as England and Germany, began to industrialize in the eighteenth century, the Netherlands and the Scandinavian countries of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden developed later. All four of these countries lagged considerably behind in the early nineteenth century. However, they industrialized rapidly in the second half of the century, especially in the last two or three decades. In view of their later start and their lack of coal-undoubtedly the main reason they were not among the early industrializers-it is important to understand the sources of their success.
All had small populations. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, Denmark and Norway had fewer than 1 million people, while Sweden and the Netherlands had fewer than 2.5 million inhabitants. All exhibited moderate growth rates in the course of the century (Denmark the highest and Sweden the lowest), but all more than doubled in population by 1900. Density varied greatly. The Netherlands had one of the highest population densities in Europe, whereas Norway and Sweden had the lowest Denmark was in between but closer to the Netherlands.
Considering human capital as a characteristic of the population, however, all four countries were advantaged by the large percentages of their populations who could read and write. In both 1850 and 1914, the Scandinavian countries had the highest literacy rates in Europe, or in the world, and the Netherlands was well above the European average. This fact was of enormous value in helping the national economies find their niches in the evolving currents of the international economy.
Location was an important factor for all four countries. All had immediate access to the sea, and this had important implications for a significant international resource, fish, as well as for cheap transport, merchant marines, and the shipbuilding industry. Each took advantage of these opportunities in its own way. The people of the Netherlands, with a long tradition of fisheries and mercantile shipping, had difficulty in developing good harbors suitable for steamships: eventually they did so at Rotterdam and Amsterdam, with exceptional results for transit trade with Germany and central Europe and for the processing of overseas foodstuffs and raw materials (sugar, tobacco, chocolate, grain, and eventually oil). Denmark also had an admirable commercial history, particularly with respect to traffic through the Sound (the strait separating Denmark and Sweden). In 1857, in return for a payment of 63 million kronor from other commercial nations, Denmark abolished the Sound toll dues the fees it had collected since 1497 for the use of the Sound. This, along with other policy shifts toward free trade, resulted in a significant increase in traffic through the Sound and in the port of Copenhagen.
The political institutions of the four countries posed no significant barriers to industrialization or economic growth. The nineteenth century passed relatively peacefully for these countries, with progressive democratization taking place in all of them. They were reasonably well governed, without notable corruption or grandiose state projects, although in all of them the government gave some aid to railways, and in Sweden the state built the main lines. As small countries dependent on foreign markets, they followed a liberal trade policy in the main, though a protectionist movement developed in Sweden. In Denmark and Sweden agricultural reforms took place gradually from the late eighteenth century through the first half of the nineteenth, resulting in a new class of peasant landowners with a definite market orientation.
The key factor in the success of these countries (along with high literacy, which contributed to it) was their ability to adapt to the international division of labor determined by the early industrializers and to stake out areas of specialization in international markets for which they were especially well suited. This meant a great dependence on international commerce, which had notorious fluctuations; but it also meant high returns to those factors of production that were fortunate enough to be well placed in times of prosperity. In Sweden exports accounted for 18 percent of the national income in 1870, and in 1913, 22 percent of a much larger national income. In the early twentieth century, Denmark exported 63 percent of its agricultural production: butter, pork products, and eggs. It exported 80 percent of its butter, almost all to Great Britain, where it accounted for 40 percent of British butter imports. | 542.txt | 0 |
[
"A steadily rising national income",
"Greater control over market fluctuations",
"High returns when things went well",
"A reduced need for imports"
]
| According to paragraph 6, what advantage could a country gain from being heavily involved in international commerce? | While some European countries, such as England and Germany, began to industrialize in the eighteenth century, the Netherlands and the Scandinavian countries of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden developed later. All four of these countries lagged considerably behind in the early nineteenth century. However, they industrialized rapidly in the second half of the century, especially in the last two or three decades. In view of their later start and their lack of coal-undoubtedly the main reason they were not among the early industrializers-it is important to understand the sources of their success.
All had small populations. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, Denmark and Norway had fewer than 1 million people, while Sweden and the Netherlands had fewer than 2.5 million inhabitants. All exhibited moderate growth rates in the course of the century (Denmark the highest and Sweden the lowest), but all more than doubled in population by 1900. Density varied greatly. The Netherlands had one of the highest population densities in Europe, whereas Norway and Sweden had the lowest Denmark was in between but closer to the Netherlands.
Considering human capital as a characteristic of the population, however, all four countries were advantaged by the large percentages of their populations who could read and write. In both 1850 and 1914, the Scandinavian countries had the highest literacy rates in Europe, or in the world, and the Netherlands was well above the European average. This fact was of enormous value in helping the national economies find their niches in the evolving currents of the international economy.
Location was an important factor for all four countries. All had immediate access to the sea, and this had important implications for a significant international resource, fish, as well as for cheap transport, merchant marines, and the shipbuilding industry. Each took advantage of these opportunities in its own way. The people of the Netherlands, with a long tradition of fisheries and mercantile shipping, had difficulty in developing good harbors suitable for steamships: eventually they did so at Rotterdam and Amsterdam, with exceptional results for transit trade with Germany and central Europe and for the processing of overseas foodstuffs and raw materials (sugar, tobacco, chocolate, grain, and eventually oil). Denmark also had an admirable commercial history, particularly with respect to traffic through the Sound (the strait separating Denmark and Sweden). In 1857, in return for a payment of 63 million kronor from other commercial nations, Denmark abolished the Sound toll dues the fees it had collected since 1497 for the use of the Sound. This, along with other policy shifts toward free trade, resulted in a significant increase in traffic through the Sound and in the port of Copenhagen.
The political institutions of the four countries posed no significant barriers to industrialization or economic growth. The nineteenth century passed relatively peacefully for these countries, with progressive democratization taking place in all of them. They were reasonably well governed, without notable corruption or grandiose state projects, although in all of them the government gave some aid to railways, and in Sweden the state built the main lines. As small countries dependent on foreign markets, they followed a liberal trade policy in the main, though a protectionist movement developed in Sweden. In Denmark and Sweden agricultural reforms took place gradually from the late eighteenth century through the first half of the nineteenth, resulting in a new class of peasant landowners with a definite market orientation.
The key factor in the success of these countries (along with high literacy, which contributed to it) was their ability to adapt to the international division of labor determined by the early industrializers and to stake out areas of specialization in international markets for which they were especially well suited. This meant a great dependence on international commerce, which had notorious fluctuations; but it also meant high returns to those factors of production that were fortunate enough to be well placed in times of prosperity. In Sweden exports accounted for 18 percent of the national income in 1870, and in 1913, 22 percent of a much larger national income. In the early twentieth century, Denmark exported 63 percent of its agricultural production: butter, pork products, and eggs. It exported 80 percent of its butter, almost all to Great Britain, where it accounted for 40 percent of British butter imports. | 542.txt | 2 |
[
"family members do not eat at the family table",
"family members do not greet each other",
"young people live happily in their families",
"young people seldom talk with their family members"
]
| In Paragraph 3,the author points out that. | Being able to multitask-doing several things at the same time-is considered a welcome skill by most people.But if we consider the situation of the young people aged from eight to eighteen,we should think again.
What we often see nowadays is that young people juggle an ever larger number of electronic devices as they study.While working,they also surf on the Internet,send out emails,answer the telephone and listen to music on their iPods.In a sense,they are spending a significant amount of time in fruitless efforts as they multitask.
Multitasking is even changing the relationship between family members.As young people give so much attention to their own worlds,they seem to have no time to spend with the other people around them.They can no longer greet family members when they enter the house,nor can they eat at the family table.
Multitasking also affects young people's performance at university and in the workplace.When asked about their opinion of the effect of modern gadgets on their performance of tasks,many young people gave a positive response.
However,the response from the worlds of education and business was not quite as positive.Educators feel that multitasking by children has a serious effect on later development of study skills.They believe that many college students now need help to improve their study skills.Similarly,employers feel that young people entering the job market need to be taught all over again,as modern gadgets have made it unnecessary for them to learn special skills to do their work. | 3421.txt | 3 |
[
"Multitasking is harmful to young people's development.",
"Young people benefit a lot from modern gadgets.",
"Multitasking is an important skill to young people.",
"Young people must learn skills for future jobs."
]
| What is the main idea of the last paragraph? | Being able to multitask-doing several things at the same time-is considered a welcome skill by most people.But if we consider the situation of the young people aged from eight to eighteen,we should think again.
What we often see nowadays is that young people juggle an ever larger number of electronic devices as they study.While working,they also surf on the Internet,send out emails,answer the telephone and listen to music on their iPods.In a sense,they are spending a significant amount of time in fruitless efforts as they multitask.
Multitasking is even changing the relationship between family members.As young people give so much attention to their own worlds,they seem to have no time to spend with the other people around them.They can no longer greet family members when they enter the house,nor can they eat at the family table.
Multitasking also affects young people's performance at university and in the workplace.When asked about their opinion of the effect of modern gadgets on their performance of tasks,many young people gave a positive response.
However,the response from the worlds of education and business was not quite as positive.Educators feel that multitasking by children has a serious effect on later development of study skills.They believe that many college students now need help to improve their study skills.Similarly,employers feel that young people entering the job market need to be taught all over again,as modern gadgets have made it unnecessary for them to learn special skills to do their work. | 3421.txt | 0 |
[
"providing typical examples",
"following the natural time order",
"comparing opinions from different fields",
"presenting a cause and analyzing its effects"
]
| The author develops the passage mainly by. | Being able to multitask-doing several things at the same time-is considered a welcome skill by most people.But if we consider the situation of the young people aged from eight to eighteen,we should think again.
What we often see nowadays is that young people juggle an ever larger number of electronic devices as they study.While working,they also surf on the Internet,send out emails,answer the telephone and listen to music on their iPods.In a sense,they are spending a significant amount of time in fruitless efforts as they multitask.
Multitasking is even changing the relationship between family members.As young people give so much attention to their own worlds,they seem to have no time to spend with the other people around them.They can no longer greet family members when they enter the house,nor can they eat at the family table.
Multitasking also affects young people's performance at university and in the workplace.When asked about their opinion of the effect of modern gadgets on their performance of tasks,many young people gave a positive response.
However,the response from the worlds of education and business was not quite as positive.Educators feel that multitasking by children has a serious effect on later development of study skills.They believe that many college students now need help to improve their study skills.Similarly,employers feel that young people entering the job market need to be taught all over again,as modern gadgets have made it unnecessary for them to learn special skills to do their work. | 3421.txt | 3 |
[
"stress the importance of professional training.",
"spotlight the soccer superstars in the World Cup.",
"introduce the topic of what makes expert performance.",
"explain why some soccer teams play better than others."
]
| The birthday phenomenon found among soccer players is mentioned to | If you were to examine the birth certificates of every soccer player in 2006's World Cup tournament, you would most likely find a noteworthy quirk: elite soccer players are more likely to have been born in the earlier months of the year than in the later months. If you then examined the European national youth teams that feed the World Cup and professional ranks, you would find this strange phenomenon to be even more pronounced.
What might account for this strange phenomenon? Here are a few guesses: a) certain astrological signs confer superior soccer skills; b) winter-born babies tend to have higher oxygen capacity, which increases soccer stamina; c) soccer-mad parents are more likely to conceive children in springtime, at the annual peak of soccer mania; d) none of the above.
Anders Ericsson, a 58-year-old psychology professor at Florida State University, says he believes strongly in "none of the above." Ericsson grew up in Sweden, and studied nuclear engineering until he realized he would have more opportunity to conduct his own research if he switched to psychology. His first experiment, nearly 30 years ago, involved memory: training a person to hear and then repeat a random series of numbers. "With the first subject, after about 20 hours of training, his digit span had risen from 7 to 20," Ericsson recalls. "He kept improving, and after about 200 hours of training he had risen to over 80 numbers."
This success, coupled with later research showing that memory itself is not genetically determined, led Ericsson to conclude that the act of memorizing is more of a cognitive exercise than an intuitive one. In other words, whatever inborn differences two people may exhibit in their abilities to memorize, those differences are swamped by how well each person "encodes" the information. And the best way to learn how to encode information meaningfully, Ericsson determined, was a process known as deliberate practice. Deliberate practice entails more than simply repeating a task. Rather, it involves setting specific goals, obtaining immediate feedback and concentrating as much on technique as on outcome.
Ericsson and his colleagues have thus taken to studying expert performers in a wide range of pursuits, including soccer. They gather all the data they can, not just performance statistics and biographical details but also the results of their own laboratory experiments with high achievers. Their work makes a rather startling assertion: the trait we commonly call talent is highly overrated. Or, put another way, expert performers - whether in memory or surgery, ballet or computer programming - are nearly always made, not born. | 2715.txt | 2 |
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